Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No.

131429
Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 131429
Case Digest
By: G-one T. Paisones

Facts:
Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-In-Charge of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, would appear to
have had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, Quiaoit was appointed
by President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his
appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and
immediately informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service
Commission, of that assumption. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of Provincial Prosecutor
claiming that the original copy of Quiaoits appointment had not yet been released by the Secretary
of Justice.
On 17 September 1997, Bermudez and Quiaoit were summoned to Manila by Justice
Secretary Guingona. The three met at the Department of Justice and, following the conference,
Bermudez was ordered to wind up his cases until 15 October 1997 and to turn-over the contested
office to Quiaoit the next day.
On the basis of the transmittal letter of Regional State Prosecutor de Leon, Quiaoit, as
directed, again so assumed office on 16 October 1997. On even date, Bermudez was detailed at
the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region III, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment
lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987.

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the
President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit

Held:
No

Ratio:
The legislative intent is, of course, primordial. There is no hard-and-fast rule in ascertaining
whether the language in a statute should be considered mandatory or directory, and the application
of a ruling in one particular instance may not necessarily be apt in another for each must be
determined on the basis of the specific law in issue and the peculiar circumstances attendant to
it. More often than not, the problem, in the final analysis, is firmed up and addressed on a
case-to-case basis. The nature, structure and aim of the law itself is often resorted to in looking at
the legislative intent. Generally, it is said that if no consequential rights or liabilities depend on it and
no injury can result from ignoring it, and that the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a
manner other than that prescribed when substantially the same results can be obtained, then the
statute should be regarded merely as directory, rather than as mandatory, in character.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of
choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of
the appointing power

Supreme Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase upon recommendation of the
Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the RAC, should be interpreted, as it is
normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made.
Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

16

AUG

Ponente: CORONA, J.

FACTS:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in
Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio
Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises.
Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent,
as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive
at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent
ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants
as punong barangay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.

RATIO:

[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and
Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission
of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules.
Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Case Digest #2-1 | GR No. 148208 | Central Bank Employees (Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Association
vs Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary | Dec 15, 2004

FACTS:

The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND:

July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of
the Philippines and created a new BSP.

Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies and wage
surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bank
Sentrals human resource development program. Provided that the Monetary Board shall make its
own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under RA No 6758 (Salary
Standardization Act). Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose
positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under
RA No 6758.

7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of Government
Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA No 8282 (1997) – SSS, RA
No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No 8763 (2000) – HGC, and
RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD:

The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.

RULING:

With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653,
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.

The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were
substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.

The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that

considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II
of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of the
BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally
to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it
cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between
persons who are without differences.

The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests on
the policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support the
inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the
inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are similarly
situated.

The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The
challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the
irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.

In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or
indirectly.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if not identical
are analogous.
Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]

15

AUG

Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she
is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation
benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980,
or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to
the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the
NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of
Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD:

YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant, like casual and
emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits
under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683
expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including
those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable
maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.

[T] he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s
application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and
oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period
and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application
must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.
Case Digest: Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Case Digest: Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66574, February 21, 1990

Doctrine: Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda (what is generally spoken shall be

generally understood)

Facts:

It is undisputed:

1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's
mother Juliana were the only legitimate child of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;

2) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero;

3) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents;

4) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976;

5) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa.

Issue:

Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Held:

Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir
to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance
therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and
inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.
That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus.

The term relatives in “Article 992 of New Civil Code” in more restrictive sense than it is used and
intended; is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, when the law intends to use the
term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and
1009 of the New Civil Code.

Saturday, May 27, 2017

GAMBOA V. TEVES (G.R. NO.

176579; JUNE 28, 2011)

CASE DIGEST: WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. FINANCE

SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE
UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER
RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE
PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI SALIM OF
FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF
METRO PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN
MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD.,
PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT
FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE,
Respondents. PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD,
Petitioners-in-Intervention.

FACTS: In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE),

sold 26 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime
Holdings, Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC.
In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered
by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415
PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding
capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the
Republic of the Philippines.

In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered acquired the remaining 54

percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006,
the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government
through a public bidding sold the same shares to Parallax Venture who won
with a bid of P25.6 billion or US$510 million.

Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first
refusal as a PTIC stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching
the bid price of Parallax. On 14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its
subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase
Agreement of the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding
capital stock of PTIC, with the Philippine Government for the price of
P25,217,556,000 or US$510,580,189. The sale was completed on 28
February 2007.

Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government

of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million
shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT.
With the sale, First Pacific common shareholdings in PLDT increased from
30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings
of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This, according to petitioner,
violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than
40 percent.

On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition,

injunction, declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415
PTIC shares.

ISSUE: Does the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refer to the total common shares only or to the
total outstanding capital stock of PLDT, a public utility?

HELD: Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony)

of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public
utilities, to wit:

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for

the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive
in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors
in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to
their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing
officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and

restrictions on fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for
Filipino nationals to be always in control of the corporation undertaking
said activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Court ruling upholding respondent's
arguments were to be given credence, it would be possible for the
ownership structure of a public utility corporation to be divided into one
percent (1%) common stocks and ninety-nine percent (99%) preferred
stocks. Following the Trial Court ruling adopting respondent's arguments,
the common shares can be owned entirely by foreigners thus creating an
absurd situation wherein foreigners, who are supposed to be minority
shareholders, control the public utility corporation.

The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only
to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in
the control or management of the corporation. This is exercised through his
vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that
controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the
articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares,
preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However,
preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is,
deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other
matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors
in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. In fact,
under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares can be
deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of the
right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of
incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is
invalid.

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to

control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights,
the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote
in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such
preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors.

This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the

Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes,
or should result in, "controlling interest" in the corporation and thus in the
present case, only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares).
BERNARDINO MARCELINO v. FERNANDO CRUZ +

206 Phil. 47

ESCOLIN, J.:

A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando
Cruz, Jr. from promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910, entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Bernardino Marcelino," and for release from detention of petitioner, the
accused in said case, on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the
case for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety (90) days from submission
thereof.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his case
on August 4, 1975. On the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved for time
within which to submit their respective memoranda. The trial court granted the motion as
follows:

"Upon joint motion, the parties are given thirty [30] days to submit their
respective memoranda, simultaneously, and thereafter the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision of the Court."
Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was filed
by the People.

On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in
said case for promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975.[1]

A certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by Postmaster Jesse A. Santos of the
Grace Park Post Office[2] to the effect that registered letters Nos. 011980 and 011981,
addressed to Marietta Ferrer of 9-E Mango Road, Potrero, Malabon, Rizal, the complaining
witness, and Atty. Angel P. Purisima of 414 Shurdut Bldg., Intramuros, Manila, counsel for the
accused, respectively, were posted in said office on December 4, 1975. These notices were
received by the respective addressees on December 8 and 9, 1975.[3]

Similar notices were sent to the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig and to the Provincial Warden of
Pasig, Rizal, who both received them on December 2, 1975.[4]

On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for postponement,
raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the
case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision. Acceding to counsel's request that
he be given time to consider the proper remedial measure to take, the respondent judge reset
the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976 at 8:30 A.M.

On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew for the resetting of the promulgation
of decision. Granting the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the promulgation to January
26, 1976.

Meanwhile, on January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed before Us the present petition.
On January 16, 1976, this Court issued an Order temporarily restraining respondent judge
from promulgating the decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910.

Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed by Section 11[1] of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character
and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the
unresolved case.

We disagree. Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or eighty-five [85] days from
September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge
filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910. He had thus
veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period prescribed by the
Constitution.

In Comia v. Nicolas[5] Ago, v. Court of Appeals[6] and Balquidra v. Court of First

Instance[7] this Court ruled that the rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing
of the signed decision with the clerk of Court. There is no doubt that the constitutional
provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation
thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not
respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of
promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily
comes at a later dated, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the
other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge. As pointed out in
People v. Court of Appeals[8] the promulgation of a judgment in the trial court does not
necessarily coincide with the date of its delivery by the judge to the clerk of court.

Section 11[1]. Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:

"SEC. 11[1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period
within which a case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its
submission, shall be eighteen months for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts,
and three months for all other inferior courts."
To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-quoted provision has been rendered by
this Court. Thus, in approaching this novel question, We now tread upon what Mr. Cooley
characterizes as "very dangerous ground when they [referring to the courts] venture to apply
rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a
constitution."[9]

The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless
by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest."[10] "The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
by enforcing the letter of the law."[11]

In Trapp v. McCormick,[12] a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a

limitation of thirty [30] days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of
counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate
to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.

On this view, authorities are one in saying that:

"Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after

the trial or verdict have been held by some courts to be merely directory so
that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the
theory that if the statute had intended such result it would clearly have
indicated it." [American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65
Pac. 742; Heillen v. Phillips, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo.
App. 39; State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585, 5 Ann. Cas. 1000, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1023,
92 S.W. 484; Wissman v. Meagher 115 Mo. App. 82, 91 S.W. 448; Pohle v.
Dickmann, 67 Mo. App. 381; Herwick v. Koken Barber Supply Co., 61 Mo. App.
454].
Such construction applies equally to the constitutional provision under consideration. In
Mikell v. School Dis. of Philadelphia,[13] it was ruled that "the legal distinction between
directory and mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws."
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the
exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court,"
it is evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court in
accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New Constitution to
"promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. . .". And there can
be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates
merely to matters of procedure. Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris[14] declares that
constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely
procedural.

In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. This Court had at
various times, upon proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior
courts additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases submitted
to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the
general public than would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the courts
with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts,
through which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes by
reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the alloted term. Such an absurd
situation could not have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law.

As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black in his Construction and Interpretation of the
Laws,[15] the constitutional provision in question should be held merely as directory. "Thus,
where the contrary construction would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous
consequences, it should not be followed."

One last point. Notwithstanding Our conclusion that courts are not divested of their
jurisdiction for failure to decide a case within the ninety-day period, We here emphasize the
rule, for the guidance of the judges manning our courts, that cases pending before their salas
must be decided within the afore-mentioned period. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a
ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In fact, a certificate to this
effect is required before judges are allowed to draw their salaries.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed; and the Restraining Order dated January 16,
1976 issued by this Court is lifted. Since respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. is already
deceased, his successor is hereby ordered to decide Criminal Case No. C-5910 on the basis of
the record thereof within ninety [90] days from the time the case is raffled to him.
Marsaman Manning Agency vs. NLRC

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie
xie

Marsaman Manning Agency vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 127195, August 25, 1999

R.A. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act)

Facts:

Private respondent Wilfredo T. Cajeras was hired by petitioner MARSAMAN, the local manning agent
of petitioner DIAMANTIDES, as Chief Cook Steward on the MV Prigipos, owned and operated by
DIAMANTIDES, for a contract period of ten (10) months. Cajeras started work on 8 August 1995, but
less than two (2) months later, he was repatriated to the Philippines allegedly by "mutual consent."
Private respondent Cajeras filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners with the NLRC
alleging that he was dismissed illegally, denying that his repatriation was by mutual consent, and
asking for his unpaid wages, overtime pay, damages, and attorney's fees.

On 29 January 1996 Labor Arbiter resolved the dispute in favor of private respondent Cajeras ruling
that the latter's discharge from the MV Prigipos allegedly by "mutual consent" was not proved by
convincing evidence.

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. On 16 September 1996 the NLRC affirmed the appealed findings
and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC
in its Resolution dated 12 November 1996.

Hence, the petition contending that, among other things, the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering a monetary award beyond the maximum of three (3) months' salary for every
year of service set by RA 8042.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling:

On the amount of salaries due private respondent, the rule has always been that an illegally dismissed
worker whose employment is for a fixed period is entitled to payment of his salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of his employment. On 15 July 1995, RA 8042 otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" took effect, Sec. 10 of which provides:

Sec. 10. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement
fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term whichever is less.

A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally
dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months' salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1)
year or more.

To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only
simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in
the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal
hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be
given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in
the statue and to have used them advisedly.

The questioned Decision and Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
are AFFIRMED.
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice

G.R. No. 167571

November 25, 2008

Facts:

Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of
money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business
associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the
said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of
funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary
investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that
he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to
Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in
fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson
denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks
had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures,
which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only
against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the
Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a
letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the
bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during
the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act
No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after
four (4) years.

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.

On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in
his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with
the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered
"the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In
justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special
acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326
applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses
penalized thereunder.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's
failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition,
petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on
technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the
questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its
own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Issue:

Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of
the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?

Held:

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from
the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995)
up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the
active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's
flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004
and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9
August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the
information against the petitioner. No costs.

ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL
FUND

Posted on June 20, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

G.R. No. 131082 June 19, 2000

Facts: petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER),
a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995, from the Pag-IBIG Fund
coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement plan.

The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution
No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or
suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and
housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.

PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules are invalid.
In that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of
P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power,
which cannot be delegated to HMDF.
HDMF disapproved PETITIONER’s application on the ground that the requirement that there should
be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase “and/or,” and
that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but
merely implement the law. The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under
Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use “and” only instead of “or” in the rules on waiver
in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing “and,” the Board has clarified
the confusion brought about by the use of “and/or” in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.

PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.

Held: YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words “and/or.”

It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended
that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may
obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a
superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the
words “and” instead of “and/or.”

Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the
features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously
contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an
exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the
existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not
clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing rules
the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.

It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 17 of R.A.
No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations,
which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have
the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by law.

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the
1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should
have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for
exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board
subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D.
No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not
within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must
not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to
carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.