REPORT SEPTEMBER

434-04 2019

RISK ASSESSMENT DATA DIRECTORY

Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

responsible supply
Acknowledgements
Safety Committee

Photography used with permission courtesy of

©Opla/iStockphoto and ©pichitstocker/iStockphoto (Front cover)
©Photo_Concepts/iStockphoto (Back cover)

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 REPORT SEPTEMBER
434-04 2019

RISK ASSESSMENT DATA DIRECTORY

Riser & Pipeline Release

Frequencies

Revision history

VERSION DATE AMENDMENTS

1.0 September 2019 First release

Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Contents

Abbreviations 5

1. Scope and definitions 6

1.1 Application 6
1.2 Changes From Previous Version of this Document 6
1.3 Definitions 6

2. Summary of recommended data 8

3. Guidance on use of data 11

3.1 General validity 11
3.2 Uncertainties 11
3.3 Application of frequencies to specific pipelines 11
3.4 Application to pipelines conveying fluids other than hydrocarbons 15

4. Review of data sources 16

4.1 Basis of data presented 16
4.2 Other data sources 27

5. Recommended data sources for further information 30

6. References 31

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Abbreviations

AGA American Gas Association

ANSI American National Standards Institute

API American Petroleum Institute

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

bbl Barrels of oil

CONCAWE Conservation of Clean Air and Water in Europe

DNV Det Norske Veritas

EGIG European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group

ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve

PARLOC Pipeline And Riser Loss Of Containment

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration

UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf

UK HSE United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive

UKOPA United Kingdom Pipeline Operators’ Association

VIV Vortex Induced Vibration

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

1. Scope and definitions

1.1 Application
This datasheet presents frequencies of riser and pipeline releases in Section 2.
Frequencies for both offshore and onshore pipelines are included.

The frequencies given are based on analysis for pipelines conveying hydrocarbons. They
may be applied to pipelines conveying other fluids as discussed in Section 3.4.

1.2 Changes From Previous Version of this Document

Information on leak frequencies for offshore risers and pipelines given in the previous
version of this report was based on PARLOC 2001 [1] but adjusted to take account of a
reanalysis of the data carried out by DNV GL. Reports of this reanalysis are not publicly
available. The equivalent leak frequencies in this report are based on PARLOC 2012 [2].
While it is acknowledged that lack of data available on the hole size distribution meant that
guidance on such a distribution is largely absent from PARLOC 2012 it is still considered
the most relevant reference. Hole size distributions based on various approaches are also
included for reference.

Onshore pipeline frequencies are based on the latest versions of the EGIG and CONCAWE
reports.

1.3 Definitions
The terms “release”, “failure”, “leak” and “loss of containment” as used in this document
should be regarded as synonymous. All relate to situations where a through-wall pipeline
or riser defect results in a release of hazardous material. Incidents which result in damage
to a pipeline without being breached are not considered in this report. The terms used
generally reflect the terminology used in the source document.

The pipeline frequencies are given for four different segments as shown in Figure 1-1.

Risers are considered to comprise two sections:

• Above water (from sea level to the riser ESDV)
• Below water (from sea level to the point where it touches down on the seabed, after
which it is considered to be a pipeline)

Previous analyses have made a distinction for the “Splash Zone”, i.e., the lower part of
the “above water” segment which was considered more vulnerable to ship collisions
and corrosion However, the most recent data does not report the location of the leaks in
sufficient detail to apportion these.

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Figure 1-1: Definition of Riser and Pipeline Segments

For offshore sections, frequencies are given for steel and flexible risers and pipelines.
“Flexible” should be understood in the context of the source data (see Section 4.1.1),
which is from the North Sea. It therefore includes risers from FPSOs, TLPs and
semisubmersibles, but would not include deep water technologies such as steel catenary
risers. Use of steel catenary risers is a relatively new area with little or no data to support
frequencies which differ from conventional steel risers. The leak frequency from steel
catenary risers is considered to be considerably lower than for flexibles and are closer to
rigid steel; therefore, it would be appropriate to adopt these in the risk assessment. If this
aspect is critical to the risk assessment, it should be undertaken using suitable expertise.

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

2. Summary of recommended data

The recommended frequencies and associated data are presented as follows:

• Table 2-1: Recommended Riser and Pipelines Failure Frequencies From [2, 3 and 4]
• Table 2-2: Recommended Hole Size Distributions for Risers and Pipelines Based on
[2, 3 and 4]
• Table 2-3: Release Location Distribution for Risers Based on [1 and 2]

Refer to Section 4 for details of the source and rationale for the data presented.

Note that separate failure frequencies are not given for Segment III, Landfall Zone. This
segment, representing the tidal zone, is defined as the area where the pipeline may be wet
and dry at different times. This allows the anode system to function. Onshore pipelines are
often more affected by corrosion than pipelines in the tidal zone. Hence frequencies for
onshore pipelines should be used in tidal zones. A pipeline in the landfall zone may also be
subject to increased risk of external impact, e.g.,due to grounding ships. Such risks may
have to be assessed separately. 

Table 2-1: Recommended Riser and Pipelines Failure Frequencies From [2, 3 and 4]

Pipeline Category Failure frequency Unit

Diameter <=6” 4.3 x 10-3 per km-year

Steel Pipelines Diameter >6” to 10” 7.5 x 10-3

per km-year
Segment I Diameter >10” to 16” 3.6 x 10-3 per km-year

Diameter >16” 4.1 x 10-4 per km-year

Diameter <=6” 5.7 x 10-4

per km-year

Steel Pipelines Diameter >6” to 10” 9.9 x 10-4 per km-year

Segment II Diameter >10” to 16” 4.8 x 10-4
per km-year

Diameter >16” 5.3 x 10-5 per km-year

Flexible Pipelines
Overall* 5.4 x 10-3 per km-year
Segment I and II

Diameter <=16” 2.0 x 10-3 per riser year

Steel Risers
Diameter >16” 2.6 x 10-4 per riser year

Flexible Risers Overall* 4.4 x 10-3 per riser year

Diameter < 8 inch 4.7 × 10-4 per km-year

8 inch ≤ Diameter < 12 inch 3.5 × 10 -4

per km-year

12 inch ≤ Diameter < 16 inch 2.7 × 10-4 per km-year

Oil pipelines onshore
16 inch ≤ Diameter < 24 inch 3.3 × 10-4 per km-year

24 inch ≤ Diameter < 30 inch 1.9 × 10 -4

per km-year

Diameter ≥ 30 inch 2.1 × 10-4 per km-year

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Pipeline Category Failure frequency Unit

Diameter < 5’’ 4.1 × 10-4 per km-year

5” ≤ Diameter < 11” 2.6 × 10 -4

per km-year

11” ≤ Diameter < 17” 1.3 × 10-4 per km-year

17” ≤ Diameter < 23” 9.1 × 10 -5

per km-year

Gas pipelines onshore 23” ≤ Diameter < 29” 5.9 × 10-5 per km-year

29” ≤ Diameter < 35” 2.0 × 10-5 per km-year

35” ≤ Diameter < 41” 1.6 × 10 -5

per km-year

41” ≤ Diameter < 47” 3.3 × 10-6 per km-year

Diameter ≥ 47” 8.6 × 10-6 per km-year

* Section 4 indicates that there is limited data for flexible risers/pipelines. Therefore, it is considered appropriate to use the
overall values for flexible risers/pipelines rather than frequencies for each diameter class.

Table 2-2: Recommended Hole Size Distributions for Risers and Pipelines Based on
[2, 3 and 4]

Offshore Pipelines Risers Onshore pipeline

Hole size (diameter)
Steel Flexible Steel Flexible Gas Oil

Very Small (< 5mm) 70% 45% 50% 70% 55% 15%

Small (5-20 mm) 15% 10% 15% 5% 15% 16%

Medium (20 to 80 mm) 10% 15% 10% 3% 15% 34%

Large (> 80 mm) 2% 10% 15% 2% 5% 16%

Full rupture* 3% 20% 10% 20% 10% 19%

* Definitions of rupture vary between reporting bodies. Users should conservatively assume that a rupture will allow a discharge
from both ends of the fractured pipeline and is unrestricted by the dimensions of the hole.

Table 2-3: Release Location Distribution for Risers Based on [1 and 2]

Release location Distribution

Above Water 36%

Subsea 64%

Note that the distribution given in Table 2-3 is significantly different from that reported
in the previous version of this document and there is a large amount of uncertainty as
discussed in Section 4.1.1.

The PARLOC 2012 data may be interpreted in a number of different ways which will lead
to different sets of frequencies depending on hole size distribution. An interpretation of
the PARLOC 2012 data has been supplied by a member organisation of IOGP to provide an
alternative to the data in Table 2 2. This gives frequencies for combinations of hole size

9
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

range and location. These are presented in Table 2-4 and Table 2-5. Analysis based on any
of the tables presented here would be considered appropriate for use in a QRA given the
wide uncertainties in the PARLOC source data.

Table 2-4: Example of Breakdown of Failure Frequencies for Steel Risers and Steel Pipelines

Hole Size Range (Size to conservatively use in QRA)

Release Source <=1.5 mm >=30 mm Total

1.5 – 7 mm 7 -30 mm Rupture
(not considered (excl. rupture)
(5 mm) (15 mm) (Full Bore)
in QRA) (50 mm)

Riser – Above
9.63 x 10-5 4.33 x 10-4 1.44 x 10-4 9.63 x 10-5 8.00 x 10-5 8.50 x 10-4
Sea (per year)

Riser – Below
9.16 x 10-5 4.12 x 10-4 1.37 x 10-4 9.16 x 10-5 7.61 x 10-5 8.09 x 10-4
Sea (per year)

Safety Zone
– Near (up to 8.59 x 10-5 3.87 x 10-4 1.29 x 10-4 8.59 x 10-5 7.14 x 10-5 7.59 x 10-4
100m) (per year)

Safety Zone – Far

(100 m – 500 m) 5.57 x 10-5 2.51 x 10-4 8.35 x 10-5 5.57 x 10-5 4.63 x 10-5 4.92 x 10-4
(per year)

Midline
2.85 x 10-5 1.28 x 10-4 4.27 x 10-5 2.85 x 10-5 2.37 x 10-5 2.51 x 10-4
(per km year)

Table 2-5: Example of Breakdown of Failure Frequencies for Flexible Risers and Flexible
Pipelines

Hole Size Range (Size to conservatively use in QRA)

Release Source <=1.5 mm >=30 mm Total

1.5 – 7 mm 7 -30 mm Rupture
(not considered (excl. rupture)
(5 mm) (15 mm) (Full Bore)
in QRA) (50 mm)

Riser – Above
3.17 x 10-4 1.43 x 10-3 4.76 x 10-4 3.17 x 10-4 5.57 x 10-4 3.10 x 10-3
Sea (per year)

Riser – Below
3.17 x 10-4 1.43 x 10-3 4.76 x 10-4 3.17 x 10-4 5.57 x 10-4 3.10 x 10-3
Sea (per year)

Safety Zone
– Near (up to 7.48 x 10-5 3.37 x 10-4 1.12 x 10-4 7.48 x 10-5 1.31 x 10-4 7.30 x 10-4
100m) (per year)

Safety Zone – Far

(100 m – 500 m) 6.96 x 10-5 3.13 x 10-4 1.04 x 10-4 6.96 x 10-5 1.22 x 10-4 6.79 x 10-4
(per year)

Midline
2.55 x 10-4 1.15 x 10-3 3.82 x 10-4 2.55 x 10-4 4.48 x 10-4 2.49 x 10-3
(per km year)

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

3. Guidance on use of data

3.1 General validity

The frequencies given are based on analysis for pipelines conveying hydrocarbons. They
may be applied to pipelines conveying other fluids as discussed in Section 3.4.

There is an implicit assumption that the pipelines are designed, constructed and operated
to a recognised international standard. Examples include ASME B31.4/8 [5, 6] or, for subsea
pipelines, DNV-OS-F101 [7]. A listing of pipeline standards is provided by the UK HSE [8]. It
is also assumed that they are inspected under a recognised inspection standard.

3.2 Uncertainties
Given the limited number of incidents which have taken place, there are significant
uncertainties in the values quoted in the tables in Section 2. The level of uncertainty
increases when the results are categorised by pipe size, hole size, location or cause and
tends to be greatest for large hole sizes and for equipment sizes/types where few releases
have been recorded. For this reason, some of the recommended values given in Table 2-1
are overall values rather than subdivided into pipe size categories.

New or unknown factors may also be the cause of leaks. However, unknown factors cannot
be used either to identify pipelines which are especially exposed to the possibility of leakage
or to prioritise risk mitigation measures.

3.3 Application of frequencies to specific pipelines

In Table 2-1, most frequencies are given per km-year as they are dependent on the length
of the pipeline. For a typical pipeline of length ℓ (km) with release frequency fkm, the
release frequency F along the full length of the pipeline is simply given by:

F = ℓ × fkm per year:

There are several causes that can result in the release frequency for a specific pipeline, or for a
section of a pipeline, being different from that obtained simply using the Section 2 frequencies.

In general, there are two main groups of causes of pipeline failures. The first group is
related to loads exceeding pipeline critical loads, usually resulting in an isolated incident.
The second group is related to effects gradually weakening the pipeline over a period of
time. These causes and their applicability offshore or onshore are given in Table 3-1.

These are discussed further in Sections 3.3.1 (offshore pipelines) and 3.3.2 (onshore
pipelines). In situations where several of these causes pertain or critical decisions are
dependent on the analysis results, a detailed pipeline-specific analysis should be carried
out utilising appropriate expertise and data specific to the situation. Such analysis is beyond
the scope of this datasheet.

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Some modification factors are suggested in this section to deal with situations which
may be preferable or more adverse than normal. These factors are based on engineering
judgement and can be used as a limit to which the standard values may be adjusted.

Table 3-1: Causes of Pipeline Failure

Cause Offshore Onshore Cause Offshore Onshore

Loads from trawl boards 3 Construction defect 3 3

Ship anchor/sinking ship
Subsea landslide
Open spans causing fatigue
3 Material failure 3 3
3 Vibration/Fatigue 3 3
External interference,
3 3
e.g., digging/excavation

Impact from dropped or

3 3 Hot-tap made by error 3
swinging objects

Incorrect Operation 3 3 River Flooding 3

Ground movement
3 3 Sabotage/Vandalism 3
(e.g.,landslide, seismic)

Ground movement, e.g.,

Corrosion 3 3 3
mining

Buckling 3 3 Ice Scour 3

3.3.1 Offshore pipelines

Where none of the additional causes listed in Section 3.3 that could exacerbate the
likelihood of a release are present, the release frequency can be reduced by up to 50%.

On pipeline sections where loads from trawl boards pose a threat, it is suggested that
frequencies could be up to a factor of 5 higher (see Section 3.3.1.1).

On pipeline sections where the other causes pose a threat, it is suggested that frequencies
could be up to a factor of 2 higher (see Sections 3.3.1.2 to 3.3.1.6).

3.3.1.1 Loads from trawl boards

Pipelines located in areas where trawling activity takes place may be damaged. Pipelines are
normally dimensioned to withstand loads from a trawl, such as impacts, overdraw1 or hook
up2. The pipe wall is normally covered by a concrete coating giving protection against local
impact loads to the pipeline, and it gives the pipeline the necessary weight to gain stability.

Overdraw and hook ups can initiate buckling of the pipeline. Free spans will exacerbate the
effect of trawl impacts.

A trawl can also catch other equipment such as exposed flanges and bolts, and a trawl
hook up may cause pipeline fracture on smaller pipelines.

1 Overdraw is a situation where the trawl board comes in under the pipeline and is drawn over applying force sideways.
2 Hook up is a situation where the trawl board gets stuck beneath the pipeline. The pipeline may be damaged if the vessel tries to bring
in the trawl.

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Trawling with lump weights is a relatively new practice and consequently most pipelines
are not designed to tackle such loads. Even though no serious damage due to lump weights
has yet been registered, it is still uncertain what consequences boom trawl and lump
weights may cause.

3.3.1.2 Ship anchor/impact from sinking ships

Pipelines located in areas with shipping traffic may be damaged by anchors snagging on
the pipeline, or a sinking ship hitting the line. Relevant factors include shipping traffic
density, distance from shore or port, water depth, vessel traffic surveillance.

3.3.1.3 Material left behind from war years

If a pipeline is laid through coastal areas that were mined during war years, there may still
be material present that poses a threat to the pipeline even if these areas were cleared
before installation of the pipeline.

3.3.1.4 Impact from dropped objects

Offshore operations entail the transfer of equipment and supplies from supply ships to
the installation. There is a risk of the loads being dropped into the sea and impacting on
pipelines causing them to be deformed. If the impacting energy is large enough, this may
result in loss of containment. Relevant factors in assessing the risk include, the frequency
and size of lifts, the potential areas where the loads may be dropped relative to pipelines,
the strength of the pipeline and the presence of any protective measures. Guidance on the
assessment of dropped objects is available in [9] and [10].

3.3.1.5 Fatigue (mainly due to free spans)

Free spans can result in fatigue if the span is excited by current, and the pipeline can
fracture relatively quickly. Some spans develop as the soil beneath the pipeline is washed
away, and an already existing span may evolve quickly since the free spans influence local
currents near the pipeline. Vortex Induced Vibration (VIV) has also resulted in fatigue leading
to leakages in the past, but today’s pipelines are designed to resist the associated stress.

Only one incident, from China, is known to be caused by free spans. This incident was
caused by extreme climatic conditions (following cyclones) and the free span was longer
than the pipeline was designed for.

3.3.1.6 Buckling
Buckling may occur if the pipeline is prevented from extension resulting in pressure tension
in the axial direction. This can cause buckling sideways or upwards. Some pipelines are
designed to allow for a controlled buckling to relieve axial tension. It is important that the
buckling takes place over a long distance. If the buckling is very local, great strain may be
placed on the pipeline; this may result in pipeline leakage and subsequent replacement.
Buckling will normally occur during the first years of operation when temperatures are
at their highest, but may occur if operational conditions are changed, there are new
connections to the pipeline or new compressor stations.

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

3.3.1.7 Material damage/failures

If there are indications of pipelines being especially exposed to a specific type of failure,
then correction factors should be applied utilising suitable engineering expertise. These
correction factors would typically be in the range 2 to 3 and applied to the contribution from
the specific failure mechanism affected. Expert engineering judgement should be used to
determine a suitable factor.

3.3.1.8 Fluid medium

Both wet and dry gas should be properly processed to avoid corrosion or keep corrosion
under control. For example, control and monitoring techniques of the pipelines operated
by Norwegian companies is considered to be so good that wet gas pipelines do not have a
higher probability of corrosion than the dry gas pipelines. The same applies to processed
gas. Hence in general no correction need be applied for fluid medium for situations where
the risk is adequately managed. However, if it is known that the control techniques in
place or planned do not meet current best practice, then a correction should be made
in the same way as described for material damage/failures (Section 3.3.1.7). Particular
consideration should be given to hydrocarbon pipelines which due to the fluid composition,
e.g.,the presence of H2S or CO2, may be susceptible to additional threats that may increase
the leak frequency.

3.3.2 Onshore pipelines

The EGIG and CONCAWE reports [3, 4] give breakdowns of release frequencies by cause
and release size. These are partially reproduced in Sections 4.1.2 (for gas pipelines) and
4.1.3 (for oil pipelines), and further data are available in the EGIG and CONCAWE reports.
It is possible to use these sources of information to obtain location-specific estimates of
the release frequencies if required; thus taking account of the relevant pipeline-specific
threats.

The use of averaged historical data from EGIG and CONCAWE, both of which are European
databases, implies that the pipeline being assessed is designed, constructed and
operated to the same or equivalent standards, as noted in Section 3.1. Pipeline standards
recommend measures to protect the pipeline against typical threats, noted in Section
3.3. Such measures include: recommended minimum depth of cover for buried pipelines,
marker posts and surveillance (to protect against failures due to external interference);
pipeline coatings, cathodic protection and inspection (to protect against failure due to
corrosion); quality assurance, inspection and hydrotesting (to protect against failures due to
material and construction defects).

The use of this averaged data also implies that the European average is appropriate for the
pipeline being assessed. Where pipelines are exposed to local threats (for example a high
propensity to ground movement, such as erosion at river crossings or landslides due to
slope instability), where the fluid transported is not represented by the data (such as wet
gas) or where the recommended measures are not compliant with the recommendations
(such as shallow depth of cover) a more detailed pipeline-specific analysis, may be
required. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this datasheet; however, guidance on
possible approaches is discussed further in Section 4.2 and in references 11, 12 and 13.

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

3.4 Application to pipelines conveying fluids other than

hydrocarbons
Certain non-hydrocarbon fluids can increase the likelihood of failure through specific
mechanisms. For example, ammonia may cause stress corrosion cracking, increasing the
contributions from internal and external corrosion. As already discussed in Section 3.3.1,
the factor should be estimated using expert engineering judgment.

In offshore applications, loss of containment of the fluid in umbilicals will not necessarily
have safety implications but may result in business disruption.

15
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

4. Review of data sources

4.1 Basis of data presented

4.1.1 Risers and offshore pipelines

The frequencies and distributions presented in Section 2 for risers and offshore pipelines
are primarily derived from information in PARLOC 2012 [2] covering releases in the UK
Continental Shelf in the period 2001 to 2012 inclusive. However, there is insufficient data
within PARLOC 2012 to determine hole size distributions. Therefore, for this, the UK HSE’s
Hydrocarbon Release Database (HCRD) [15] was used.

Data from the period 2001 to 2012 has been used as the basis of the frequencies to reflect
recent experience. PARLOC 2012 did not attempt to combine the data with the results of the
PARLOC 2001 study which included incidents to the end of 2000 because it was not possible
to recover the incident and population data used in the PARLOC 2001 study. In addition, the
PARLOC 2001 study was based on pipelines in the North Sea (UK, Norwegian, Dutch and
Danish Sectors) whereas the PARLOC 2012 study was based on operations in the UKCS
(including eastern Irish Sea and west of Shetland).

Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 presents the data used as the basis of the analysis. Estimated
numbers of incidents are rounded to one decimal place. Frequencies quoted are calculated
from the unrounded values.

Table 4-1: Incident and Population Data for Offshore Pipelines from [2]

Estimated Number Experience Frequency

Pipeline description
of Incidents (km-years) (per km-year)

Steel Pipeline <=6” 32.4 47,052 6.88 x 10-4

Steel Pipeline >6” to 10” 32.4 27,913 1.16 x 10-3

Steel Pipeline >10” to 16” 20.9 36,005 5.82 x 10-4

Steel Pipeline >16” 7.0 108,195 6.45 x 10-5

Steel Pipelines Overall 92.7 219,165 4.23 x 10-4

Flexible Pipeline <=4” 11.2 2,339 4.79 x 10-3

Flexible Pipeline >4” to 6” 13.8 3,999 3.45 x 10-3

Flexible Pipeline >6” to 8” 21.7 2,447 8.86 x 10-3

Flexible Pipeline >8 8.5 1,349 6.30 x 10-3

Flexible Pipeline Overall 55.2 10,134 5.45 x 10-3

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Table 4-2: Incident and Population Data for Offshore Risers from [2]

Estimated Number Experience Frequency

Pipeline description
of Incidents (riser-years) (per year)

Steel Risers <=6” 4.3 3,856 1.11 x 10-3

Steel Risers >6” to 10” 5.5 2,650 2.07 x 10-3

Steel Risers >10” to 16” 9.2 2,936 3.13 x 10-3

Steel Risers >16” 0.66 2,555 2.58 x 10-4

Steel Risers Overall 19.66 11,997 1.64 x 10-3

Flexible Risers <=4” 0.6 593 1.01 x 10-3

Flexible Risers >4” to 6” 5.7 1,607 3.55 x 10-3

Flexible Risers >6” to 8” 12.1* 860 1.41 x 10-2*

Flexible Risers >8 5.0 914 5.47 x 10-3

Flexible Risers Overall 23.4* 3,974 5.89 x 10-3*

* See note 5

Notes on tables Table 4-1 and Table 4-2.

1) Where the estimated number of incidents is less than 1, this indicates that no
releases took place within the period of analysis. A value has been estimated using
statistical techniques (see section 4.1.3 of [2]).
2) The estimated number of incidents are calculated in [2] by redistributing the data
for incidents with insufficient information. This results in values which can contain
notional fractions of an incident (see section 4.1.4 of [2]).
3) The PARLOC report is concerned with loss of containment incidents which are
relevant to environmental risks as well as safety risks. Many incidents included had
little or no safety implications; thus the frequencies quoted in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2
may be conservative if used in a safety risk assessment.
4) The low numbers of incidents give high levels of uncertainty in the derived
frequencies. This is particularly the case when divided by diameter class. Use of the
overall frequencies may be more appropriate in some cases.
5) The incidents relating to Flexible Risers >6” to 8” include 7 instances of a small leak
from the same riser over a period of 40 days. While the PARLOC study concludes
that these separately met the criteria for individual leaks, it appears that this was
an intermittent problem from a common cause. Therefore, it is recommended that
these releases are considered as a single incident and the frequency for the >6” to 8”
category adjusted accordingly. Reanalysing the data with this adjustment results in
the values given in Table 4-3. This also influences the estimated number of incidents
in other riser size categories.

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Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Table 4-3: Adjusted Incident and Population Data for Flexible Offshore Risers for use in
Safety Studies

Estimated Number of
Pipeline description Experience (riser-years) Frequency (per year)
Incidents

Flexible Risers <=4” 0.6 593 1.01 x 10-3

Flexible Risers >4” to 6” 6.0 1,607 3.73 x 10-3

Flexible Risers >6” to 8” 5.6 860 6.51 x 10-3

Flexible Risers >8 5.2 914 5.69 x 10-3

Flexible Risers Overall 17.3 3,974 4.35 x 10-3

Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 indicate how much different failure mechanisms and failure
location along the riser/pipeline contribute to the overall failure frequency. Note that the
values given in this table are percentages rather than estimated number of incidents given
in [2]. This can be used to determine how specific features of the pipeline design may
affect the frequency. Section 3.3 provides some general guidance on potential modification
factors. Expert judgment should be used where the likelihood of failure by a specific
mechanism is affected by specific features of the pipeline design (see Section 3.3.1).

Table 4-4: Allocation of Failure Mechanisms: Offshore Steel Pipelines, All Diameters by
Location – Overall Distribution (Based on Table 16 of [2])

Well Safety
Failure mechanism Riser Safety Zone Midline Other
Zone

Impact 0.7% 0.7% 6.7% 1.0% 2.9%

Material 8.3% 8.4% 12.2% 2.9% 15.0%

Operations and
7.0% 1.1% 2.0% 1.0% 3.1%
Maintenance

Construction damage 0.7% 3.7% 1.8% 2.9% 2.9%

Other 5.1% 2.2% 0.6% 1.0% 6.3%

Total 21.8% 16.1% 23.4% 8.7% 30.1%

Table 4-5: Allocation of Failure Mechanisms: Offshore Steel Pipelines, All Diameters, –
Distribution Within Each Location

Well Safety
Failure mechanism Riser Safety Zone Midline Other
Zone

Impact 3.3% 4.5% 28.9% 10.9% 9.5%

Material 38.0% 52.1% 52.1% 33.8% 49.8%

Operations and
32.0% 6.9% 8.5% 11.5% 10.3%
Maintenance

Construction damage 3.3% 22.8% 7.9% 32.8% 9.5%

Other 23.3% 13.7% 2.6% 10.9% 20.9%

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

18
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

The proportion of leaks in the platform safety zones (16.1%) is comparable with the
proportion for midline releases despite the total length of pipe in these segments being
much smaller. This implies a significantly higher frequency in the proximity of the platforms.

The PARLOC 2012 pipeline data does not report the proportion which lies within the safety
zones. However, if it is assumed that 600 metres of pipeline is associated with the safety
zone, i.e., allowing for some bends in the 500 metre safety zone, and taking values from Table
34 of PARLOC 2012, the 11,997 rise-years for all diameters combined gives 7,198 km-years
of associated pipeline in the safety zone. This is 3.28% of the total reported pipeline length of
219,165 km-years. Assuming that all the releases reported as “other” lie outside of the safety
zone, the proportion of non-riser releases given in Table 2-1 is 0.161/(1-0.218) = 0.205. This
implies a modification factor for the portion of pipelines in the safety zone of 0.205/0.0328 =
6.26 relative to the average over the whole length of the pipelines. The equivalent factor for
pipelines outside the safety zone is 0.821. These factors have been used to calculate separate
frequencies for zones I and II in Table 2-1. It should be noted that there is no requirement
for reporting of gas leaks outside of the safety zone so these will be significantly under
reported. There are uncertainties associated with modifying the average frequencies in this
way. However, it is considered that these estimates for releases in the safety zone are more
appropriate than applying the average values which would be overly optimistic.

Applying the equivalent process to flexible pipelines indicated that there was no significant
influence since the proportion of non-riser releases and length of flexible pipelines were
comparable within the safety zone.

In addition to the frequencies given above, it is important to establish a hole size distribution
as the severity of the consequences of a leak is dependent on hole size. Unfortunately,
the data provided to the PARLOC 2012 study [2], indicates that this information is not
available for 122 out of 160 leaks in the operational phase. The 38 reported holes are likely
to be biased towards larger releases and so are not considered representative. The UK
HSE Hydrocarbon Release Database (HCRD) includes details of releases from risers and
pipelines within the 500 metre safety zone, i.e., excluding releases in the mid-line. The data
covers a longer period than PARLOC and has estimates of hole size available in all cases.
These are provided in Table 4-6 together with values taken from the PARLOC 2001 study [1]
for incidents in the safety zone which includes fittings on the riser/pipeline.

Table 4-6: Hole Size Distribution for Offshore Pipelines from HCRD [15] and PARLOC 2001 [1]

Pipelines Risers
Hole size Combined Combined
Steel Flexible Valves Combined Steel Flexible Combined
(PARLOC (PARLOC
(HCRD) (HCRD) (HCRD) (HCRD) (HCRD) (HCRD) (HCRD)
2001) 2001)

Very Small
20 5 24 49 7 4 11
(<5 mm)
23 22
Small (5
5 1 5 11 2 0 2
to 20 mm)
Medium
(20 to 80 3 2 3 8 5 1 0 1 2
mm)
Large
0 1 1 2 3 2 0 2 1
(> 80 mm)
Full
1 2 0 3 6 1 1 2 5
rupture
Total 29 11 33 73 37 13 5 18 30

19
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

There is a broad correlation between the two sets of data for risers but that PARLOC 2001
data indicates a greater proportion of ruptures for pipeline data. The HCRD is considered to
be a more complete and accurate representation and includes more recent experience. It
has therefore been used as the basis of the distribution given in Table 4-7.

The distribution for the valves incidents in the HCRD are weighted more towards smaller
hole sizes than is the case for releases from the pipelines and risers themselves. The data
does not indicate whether the leaks from valves are associated with steel pipelines, flexible
pipelines or the connection between the two. Neither does it indicate whether they are part
of the riser or pipeline. The distributions used are therefore based on the pipeline/riser
incidents themselves which gives a degree of conservatism.

Figure 4-1 shows the hole size distribution for pipeline and riser types based on data from
the HCRD.

20 mm

80 mm
5 mm

Figure 4-1
Figure 4-1: Hole size distributions for Pipeline and Riser Leak Based on HCRD [15]

Table 4-7 presents recommended distributions which are derived from the above information
together with some redistribution to account for size categories which had no recorded incidents.

Table 4-7: Recommended Hole Size Distributions For Pipelines and Risers (excluding fittings)

Pipelines Risers
Hole size
Steel Flexible Steel Flexible

Very Small (<5 mm) 70% 45% 50% 70%

Small (5 to 20 mm) 15% 10% 15% 5%

Medium (20 to 80 mm) 10% 15% 10% 3%

Large (> 80 mm) (excluding ruptures) 2% 10% 15% 2%

Full rupture 3% 20% 10% 20%

Note that this table replicates table 2-2 data for offshore only

20
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Hole sizes less than 5 mm, particularly for oil leaks are unlikely to result in risks to
personnel and may be excluded from a safety risk analysis if considered appropriate.

Sufficient information is available from the PARLOC 2012 study relating to quantities
released to provide meaningful exceedance curves for this parameter (110 out of 160
reports for operational leaks provided this data). This information is presented in Figure
4-2 to provide an indication of the proportion of incidents in various release size categories.
This is for information only, as it is not practical to relate these data to hole size categories.

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
Proportion Exceeding

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000 10000000

Steel Pipelines Flexible Pipelines Quantity Released (kg)

Steel Ris ers Flexible Risers

Figure 4-2: Quantity Released Distributions From Input Data to [2]

Of the operational riser incidents resulting in loss of containment reported in PARLOC

2012 Table 10 and Table 20 [2]; 8 were recorded as being above the water line, 21 were
sub-sea and 1 was unknown. There were no such incidents reported for the splash zone.
The distribution is significantly different from the one found in PARLOC 2001, although this
may be partially explained by the location being unknown in 50% of cases. This may be due
to lack of information recorded at the time of the incident. The recommended distribution
is given in Table 4-8 which takes into consideration the two sets of data. However, caution
should be used when applying this distribution as there is a high degree of uncertainty
associated with it.

Table 4-8: Distribution of Locations for Riser Incidents [1 and 2]

Location PARLOC 2001 PARLOC 2012 Recommended Distribution

Above Splash Zone 3 8 25%

Splash Zone 5 0 11%

Subsea 7 21 64%

Unknown 15 1 N/A

However, given the uncertainty over the location of the recorded leaks it may be more
appropriate to combine the “Above Splash Zone” and “Splash Zone” proportions into a
single value of 36% to “Above Water” and this value is reported in Table 2-3.

21
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

4.1.2 Onshore gas pipelines

The release frequencies presented in Section 2 for onshore gas pipelines are based on data
from EGIG’s most recently available report [3], spanning the period 1970-2013; it includes
1309 gas loss incidents on below-ground, high pressure (above 15 bar) onshore gas
transmission pipelines with a total exposure of approximately 3.98 million km-years. This
gives an average primary failure frequency over this period of 3.29 × 10-4 per km-year.

The report also provides the primary failure frequencies for different periods, including the
40, 30, 20, 10 and 5 year periods prior to 2013, illustrating a generally falling trend in the
primary failure frequency. For comparison, over the 10-year period 2004-2013, the average
primary failure frequency is 1.57 × 10-4 per km-year.

The report presents detailed information and analysis by release hole size, pipeline
diameter and failure cause. Three sizes of failure (and “Unknown”) are defined in the report:
• Pinhole/crack: diameter of hole ≤ 20 mm
• Hole: 20 mm < diameter of hole ≤ pipeline diameter
• Rupture: hole diameter > pipeline diameter

Table 4-9 reproduces the breakdown of primary failure frequencies by pipeline diameter
and size of leak for the whole period 1970-2013 given in the EGIG report [3].

Table 4-9: Primary failure frequency, pipeline diameter and size of leak (1970-2013) from [3]

Primary Failure Frequency per 1,000 km-year

System
Nominal Diameter Exposure x Total Total
106 km-years Pinhole/
Unknown Hole Rupture (1970- (2004-
crack
2013) 2013)

Diameter < 5” 0.436 0.005 0.445 0.286 0.133 0.869 0.415

5” ≤ Diameter < 11” 1.066 0.008 0.280 0.197 0.064 0.549 0.262

11” ≤ Diameter < 17” 0.714 0.004 0.127 0.098 0.041 0.27 0.129

17” ≤ Diameter < 23” 0.442 0.005 0.102 0.050 0.034 0.191 0.091

23” ≤ Diameter < 29” 0.401 0.000 0.085 0.027 0.012 0.124 0.059

29” ≤ Diameter < 35” 0.214 0.000 0.023 0.005 0.014 0.042 0.020

35” ≤ Diameter < 41” 0.389 0.000 0.023 0.008 0.003 0.034 0.016

41” ≤ Diameter < 47” 0.146 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.003

Diameter ≥ 47” 0.170 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.009

Total (2004-2013) calculated using 0.477 factor, see explanatory text in body of document

The frequencies given in the “Total” column of Table 4-9 were used to generate the
“Factored” frequencies for onshore gas pipelines which are then given in in Table 2-1.
A multiplying factor of 0.477 was applied to reflect the reduction in failure frequencies
when comparing the full period 1970-2013 with the last 10-year period 2004-2013. The
recommended hole size distribution for onshore gas pipelines given in Table 2-2 were
derived from the frequencies provided in the EGIG report for the primary 5-year moving
average by leak size, with breakdown into additional hole sizes undertaken using judgement
informed by the more detailed hole size data provided by UKOPA for UK pipelines

22
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

(discussed in Section 4.2). However, it may be more appropriate to use the frequency data
provided by EGIG by diameter and hole size in Table 4-9 directly.

Table 4-10 reproduces the breakdown of primary failure frequencies by cause and size of
leak for the period 2004-2013 given in the EGIG report [3].

Table 4-10: Primary failure frequency, cause and size of leak (2004-2013) from [3]

Failure Frequency per 1,000 km-year

Leak Size Construction

External Defect/ Hot Tap Made Ground Other and
Corrosion
Interference Material by Error Movement Unknown
Failure

Unknown 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001

Pinhole/Crack 0.021 0.035 0.022 0.005 0.005 0.011

Hole 0.022 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.001

Rupture 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001

Proportion by
35% 24% 16% 4% 13% 8%
Cause

The report contains more detailed analysis of pipeline failure rate dependencies than is
presented here, addressing:
• External interference: pipeline diameter, depth of cover and wall thickness
• Corrosion: year of construction, type of coating and wall thickness
• Construction defect: year of construction
• Material failure: material grade
• Hot-tap made by error: pipeline diameter
• Ground movement: pipeline diameter and sub-cause

For more detailed analysis of these factors, reference should be made to the report directly

It is noted in the EGIG report that although the EGIG database gives information on the
failure frequencies in relation to one pipeline parameter (e.g., diameter, pressure, wall
thickness), it does in general not offer the possibility of making correlation analyses. (The
report provides the following illustration “In other words, with the EGIG database it is
possible to establish the incident frequency of 42-inch pipelines or to establish the incident
frequency of pipelines with a wall thickness of 15 mm, but it is not possible to calculate
the incident frequency of the 42-inch pipelines with a wall thickness of 15 mm.”). This
important limitation should be borne in mind by users of the data and the possibility of
using alternative approaches, such as predictive structural reliability models validated by
historical experience, should be considered where possible (see Section 4.2).

Frequencies of incidents from some of the causes will be location dependent. For example, if
considering external interference as a cause, the amount of construction activity in the vicinity
of a pipeline crossing a desert will be different from that in a European country. However, the
hit rate is not just a function of population density since the controls in place to prevent third
party activities damaging pipelines will also vary. A means of estimating the effect of several
parameters, including country of operation, is given in [11] as discussed in section 4.2.

23
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

4.1.3 Onshore oil pipelines

The frequencies presented in Section 2 for onshore oil pipelines are based on data in
CONCAWE [4]. The data include 582 failures on pipelines since 1971 from pipelines containing
crude oil and products which, in 2014, had a combined length of approximately 35,000 km.
The number of incidents is reduced to 482 when 100 incidents of product theft are excluded.

An overall 5 year moving average, excluding theft, shows that the frequency per 1,000 km-
years has been decreasing from around 1.1 in the 1970’s to 0.23 in 2014. Over the last 5
years, the gross pipeline spillage has averaged 0.00006%, of the oil transported.

Figure 16 of [4] presents a graph of frequencies by pipe diameters class for various periods.
The most recent of these, for the period 2001-2013, gives the frequencies shown in Table 4-11.
The number of incidents in this period are obtained from the information in Appendix 2 of [4].

Table 4-11: Onshore Oil Pipeline Release Frequencies by Size Category From [4]

Size category Number of incidents Frequency (per km-year)

Diameter < 8 inch 12 4.7 × 10-4

8 inch ≤ diameter < 12 inch 58 3.5 × 10-4

12 inch ≤ diameter < 16 inch 27 2.7 × 10-4

16 inch ≤ diameter < 24 inch 33 3.3 × 10-4

24 inch ≤ diameter < 30 inch 9 1.9 × 10-4

Diameter ≥ 30 inch 6 2.1 × 10-4

The CONCAWE report [4] includes a detailed breakdown of failure size and mechanism
which is partially reproduced in Table 4-12. The report defines hole sizes as follows:
• No hole: failure of a gasket or seal, or a mechanical breakage in a piece of equipment
other than the pipeline itself
• Pinhole: less than 2 mm x 2 mm
• Fissure: 2 to 75 mm long x up to 10% of pipe diameter
• Hole: 2 to 75 mm long x more than 10% of pipe diameter
• Split: 75 to 1000 mm long x up to 10% of pipe diameter
• Rupture: >75 mm long x more than 10% of pipe diameter

These descriptions do not lend themselves easily to determining an equivalent hole size
and it can be seen that the area of a release classified as “hole” may be less than that of a
“fissure” even though it is a higher category. The values used in Table 2-2 have assumed a
mapping of the equivalent hole diameters as follows.
• 0 – 5 mm: “No hole” and “Pinhole categories
• 5 – 20 mm: “Fissure” category
• 20 – 80 mm: “Hole” category
• > 80 mm: “Split” category
• Rupture: “Rupture” category

3 This figure increases to 0.6 per 1,000 km-years when the thefts are included. The proportion of incidents involving theft have been
increasing in recent years.

24
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

Hole sizes were available for 322 of the 582 incidents (55%). These include incidents of theft
within the “Third party” category.

Table 4-12: Allocation of Failure Mechanisms From [4]

Hole Category No hole Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture Overall

Mechanical 9 4 14 13 17 7 64

Operational 2 0 1 2 3 4 12
Cause

Corrosion 0 23 11 24 17 5 80

Natural hazard 0 1 2 0 2 2 7

Third party 3 6 23 72 13 42 159

Total no. of failures 14 34 51 111 52 60 322

Percentage of total 4% 11% 16% 34% 16% 19% 100%

It should be noted that the proportion of spillages due to theft is location dependent.
The data presented in Table 4-12 is based on experience in Europe where 100 out of 582
incidents were attributed to this cause. Location specific data should be used in other parts
of the world where this available.

IOGP maintains a database of oil spills reported globally which combines onshore and
offshore and includes spills from storage tanks. These are presented in the annual report
[16]. Information from the database for the 5 year period 2012-2016 indicates 8,115 oil spills
(> 1 bbl) were recorded with a combined quantity of 35,599 tonnes. Of these, the majority
were onshore; 6,325 spills with a combined quantity of 28,899 tonnes. Offshore incidents
accounted for 656 spills and 2,791 tonnes. The remaining incidents didn’t specify a location.

For spills > 10 bbl, causes were reported for 1,391 incidents and these are presented in Table
4-13. This indicates that for spills >100 bbl, 43% of the spills and 56% of the quantity are due to
third party damage. The equivalent values for spills in the 10 – 100 bbl range are 14% and 16%.

Table 4-13: Oil Spillages by Cause (2012-2016)

Spills >100 bbl Spills 10-100 bbl Total

Cause Quantity Quantity Quantity

Number of Number of Number of
spilled spilled spilled
Spills Spills Spills
(tonnes) (tonnes) (tonnes)

Corrosion 55 3,496 308 1,168 363 4,665

Equipment failure (excluding

57 2,471 356 1,451 413 3,922
corrosion)

Operator or technical error 34 1,434 220 907 254 2,342

Third party damage (sabotage,

130 10,493 151 703 281 11,196
theft, vandalism, etc)

Other 23 922 57 243 80 1,165

Total 299 18,817 1,092 4,473 1,391 23,289

Proportion from third party

43% 56% 14% 16% 20% 48%
causes

25
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

For spills in the 10 – 100 bbl range a breakdown by region is available and these are
reported in Table 4-14. This shows significant regional variations in the proportions of spills
by third party causes.

Table 4-14: Proportion of spills caused by third parties (2012-2016, 10 - 100 bbl)

Third party damage (sabotage, Proportion by third party

Other causes
theft, vandalism, etc) causes

Region Quantity Quantity Quantity

Number spilled to Number spilled to Number spilled to
of spills environment of spills environment of spills environment
(tonnes) (tonnes) (tonnes)

Africa 109 479 87 333 56% 59%

Asia/Australasia 5 30 26 104 16% 22%

Europe 3 8 54 204 5% 4%

Middle East 7 25 65 229 10% 10%

North America 23 115 479 2084 5% 5%

Russia &
0 0 131 469 0% 0%
Central Asia

South & Central

4 47 99 346 4% 12%
America

Total 147 657 842 3423 14% 16%

The third party damage incidents can be further segregated into onshore and offshore
together with the quantity recovered. These data are given in Table 4-15.

Table 4-15: Distribution of Spills From Third Party Damage For Onshore and Offshore
(2012-2016, 10 - 100 bbl)

Onshore Offshore

Region* Quantity Quantity

Quantity Quantity
Number of spilled to Number of spilled to
recovered recovered
spills environment spills environment
(tonnes) (tonnes)
(tonnes) (tonnes)

Africa 105 468 43 4 12 0

Asia/Australasia 5 30 30 0 0 0

Europe 3 8 0 0 0 0

Middle East 7 25 15 0 0 0

North America 23 115 58 0 0 0

Russia &
0 0 0 0 0 0
Central Asia

South & Central

4 47 25 0 0 0
America

Total 147 693 171 4 12 0

* See [16] for region definitions

26
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

4.2 Other data sources

Other data sources from which onshore pipeline failure frequency data can be obtained
include:

1. US Department of Transportation. The US Department of Transportation Pipeline

and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) maintains a database of
leaks from hazardous liquid and gas pipelines, together with exposure data. Data has
been collected from pipeline operators since 1970. PHMSA provides downloads of the
raw data, yearly summaries, multi-year trends of safety performance metrics, and
inventories tracking the removal of aging and other higher-risk infrastructure.

Data and reports can be obtained from http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/data-

stats

2. United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators’ Association (UKOPA). UKOPA publishes

an annual report (available from http://www.ukopa.co.uk) that analyses pipeline product
loss incidents for buried onshore Major Accident Hazard Pipelines in the UK. The most
recent report presents data collected over the period 1962-2014 [17], covering about
22,158 km of pipelines at the end of 2014 and 877,598 km-years pipeline exposure.
Products covered are: natural gas (dry), natural gas liquid, ethane, ethylene, hydrogen,
propane, propylene, butane, condensate and crude oil (spiked). A total of 192 product
loss incidents were recorded over the period between 1962 and 2014.

Overall incident frequencies are calculated for 5-year periods. For the whole period and
for the 20-year period 1995-2014 the report also presents frequencies by hole size. The
product loss incident frequency by cause is presented for the period 1962-2014 and for
the last 5 years (2010-2014). Further breakdown by relevant factors of the frequencies
for product loss incidents due to external interference, external corrosion, girth weld
defects, and “Other” causes (including internal cracking) are provided.

Uniquely, the UKOPA database also records “Faults” resulting from pipeline damage
incidents that did not lead to product loss. A Fault is a feature that has been confirmed
by field investigation, excavation and measurement. The total number of Faults
recorded for the period 1962-2014 was 3545. One of the main benefits of collecting
fault data is to record of the size of part-wall defects which are measured and recorded
in the database. Many Faults have several defects and the database contains 5700
defects recorded in the period 1962-2014. Pipeline damage due to external interference
occurs in the form of gouges, dents or combinations of these. This type of damage is
random in nature, and as operational failure data are sparse, recognised engineering
practice requires that a predictive structural reliability model is used to calculate leak
and rupture failure frequencies for specific pipelines. Predictive models use dent-
gouge fracture mechanics models to predict the pipeline probability of failure, which
is also dependent upon the pipeline geometry, material properties and operating
pressure. The report presents statistical analysis of the measured damage (up to 2011)
from external interference incidents to determine the best fit parameters to allow
pipeline failure probabilities to be derived for external interference events. An estimate
of “hit rate” (i.e., frequency of damage incidents) is also required to obtain pipeline
frequencies due to external interference, which is given in the report.

27
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

The historical data collected in the UKOPA database, together with the structural
reliability approach to predicting failure frequencies due to external interference
damage, provides the basis of the recommended failure frequencies for UK onshore
pipelines given in guidance published by IGEM for natural gas transmission pipelines
[13] and by BSi for onshore pipelines transporting other flammable substances
[12]. These also include recommended factors for measures designed to reduce the
predicted failure frequencies, and hence risk, such as the use of concrete slabbing,
surveillance and increased depth of cover.

3. UK HSE (2015). Research report on pipeline failure rates for land use planning [13]
(available from www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr1035.htm). The UK Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) uses a model, MCPIPIN (Monte Carlo PIPeline INtegrity), to determine
failure frequencies for major hazard pipelines. MCPIPIN uses two models to calculate
the failure rates: a model based on operational experience data which estimates failure
frequencies for the four main failure modes (mechanical failures, ground movement
and other events, corrosion, and third party activity); and a predictive model that uses
structural reliability techniques to predict the failure frequency due to third party
activity only. The historical failure rates used in the operational model are over 10 years
old. HSE asked the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) to review and update the failure
rates using more up-to-date fault and failure data. Data from CONCAWE (CONservation
of Clean Air and Water in Europe) for crude oil and products has been analysed, as
well as that from UKOPA (as described above). Failure rates by the four different failure
modes have been derived from each of the datasets. In addition, substance specific
failure rates have been derived, based on earlier analyses of appropriate combinations
of UKOPA, CONCAWE or EGIG data.

4. De Stefani et. al. (2009) [11]. This paper is based on a study which used historical
databases, such as CONCAWE (liquid hydrocarbons), European Gas Incident Group
(EGIG) (natural gas) and the US Department of Transport (DOT), to develop failure
frequencies as a function of several influences, including both design and operational
parameters. This provides a means of taking account of pipeline specific factors such
as including wall thickness, depth of cover, country of operation, or specific local
issues.

5. Sureflex JIP (2017) [18]. This report presents the findings of a joint industry project
involving manufacturers and operators of unbonded flexible pipes along with regulators
and certifiers. The report is the key public-domain output from the project which ran
between 2015 and 2017. Details of incidents were gathered through a questionnaire
to industry users of flexible pipes. The questionnaire included the gathering of data
relating to the experience of; use and damage statistics, inspection and monitoring
technology and life cycle experience of flexible pipe. Population data was obtained from
the main three manufacturers of unbonded flexible pipe and adjusted to reflect the “as-
installed” populations as opposed to the “as-supplied” population.

The report suggests that the use of loss of containment frequencies based on “pipe-
years” as opposed to “km-years” may be a more appropriate approach. On this basis,
flexible pipe compares more favourably with rigid steel pipe than is suggested by the
PARLOC report. The report also notes that the PARLOC report makes no distinction

28
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

between bonded and unbonded flexible pipes. It is believed that the PARLOC data may
include a number of bonded pipe ruptures within the dataset. As a result, a direct
comparison of the statistics within the Sureflex JIP, which deals only with unbonded
flexible pipes, may not be valid.

6. Recommended Failure Rates for Pipelines (2017) [19] This report was prepared by
DNV GL on behalf of Equinor (then Statoil ASA), it presents several different sources for
pipeline failure data, a model for estimation of failure frequencies for offshore oil and
gas pipelines and a simple model for other pipelines. This report used the combined
set of events and total exposure data from both PARLOC 2012 and 2001, as well as
results from the Norwegian section since 2001. This together with some differing
assumptions on how the data is interpreted means that are some differences in the
calculated frequencies when compared to those presented in this document.

29
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

5. Recommended data sources for

further information
For further information, the primary data sources used to develop the release frequencies
presented in Section 2 and discussed in Sections 3 and 4 should be consulted.

30
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies

6. References

[1] UK HSE, UKOOA and IP, PARLOC 2001 – The Update of Loss of Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines,
2003.
[2] Energy Institute, Pipeline and Riser Loss of Containment 2001-2012 (PARLOC 2012), March 2015.
[3] EGIG 14.R.0403 (February 2015). 9th Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (period
1970 – 2013). https://www.egig.eu/uploads/bestanden/ba6dfd62-4044-4a4d-933c-07bf56b82383
[4] CONCAWE 2016. Performance of European cross-country oil pipelines, Report No. 7/16., June 2016.
[5] ASME B31.4-2012. Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquids and Slurries.
[6] ASME B31.8-2016. Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems.
[7] DNV, Offshore Standard DNV-OS-F101. Submarine Pipeline Systems, October 2013.
[8] HSE, “Use of pipeline standards and good practice guidance” available at
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pipelines/resources/pipelinestandards.htm
[9] DNV GL, “Recommended Practice, Risk assessment of pipeline protection”, DNVGL-RP-F107, May 2017.
[10] IOGP, Risk Management Data Directory, “Mechanical lifting failures”, Report No. 434-08, March 2010.
[11] De Stefani, V., Wattis, Z and Acton, M., “A Model to Evaluate Pipeline Failure Frequencies based on Design
and Operating Conditions”, AIChE 5th Global Congress on Process Safety, Tampa, Florida, April 2009.
[12] BSi, Pipeline systems. Steel pipelines on land. Guide to the application of pipeline risk assessment
to proposed developments in the vicinity of major accident hazard pipelines containing flammables.
Supplement to PD 8010-1:2004, PD 8010-3:2009+A1:2013.
[13] IGEM/TD/2 Edition 2 (2013), Assessing the Risks from High Pressure Natural Gas Pipelines, Edition 2,
2013.
[14] HSE, Update of pipeline failure rates for land use planning assessments, RR1035, 2015.
[15] UK HSE, Hydrocarbon Release Database (HCRD), Incident and population data available at
http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/statistics.htm
[16] IOGP, Environmental performance indicators series. For example, Report No. 2016e, November 2017.
[17] UKOPA, UKOPA Pipeline Product Loss Incidents and Faults Report (1962-2014), December 2015.
[18] Oil & Gas UK, “Flexible pipe Integrity Management Guidance & Good Practice”, revision 1, Document Ref
J000621-00-IM-GLN-001, September 2017.
[19] DNV GL, “Recommended Failure Rates for Pipelines” , DNVGL 2017-0547, Rev. 2, December 2017
http://images.e.dnvgl.com/Web/DNVGL/%7Bc8fdad11-6fa4-4fa6-84ac-cf3940592a04%7D_
Recommended_Failure_Rates_for_Pipelines_2017_Rev2.pdf

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This datasheet presents frequencies

of riser and pipeline releases.
Frequencies for both offshore and
onshore pipelines are included.