Republic vs Orbecido

Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his
wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.

Declaration of nullity of marriage - "In a recent landmark ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn
Tanedo Manalo (GR 221029, April 24, 2018), the Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce secured by a
Filipino is also considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce
abroad."

See - https://businessmirror.com.ph/foreign-divorce-in-mixed-marriages/
"x x x.

Foreign divorce in mixed marriages

By Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan

-July 15, 2018

In a recent landmark ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (GR 221029, April
24, 2018), the Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino is also considered valid in
the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad. With 10 Justices in favor, 3
Dissenting (Associate Justices del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa) 1 Abstaining (Justice Jardeleza, then
solicitor general) and former Chief Justice Sereno on leave, the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) Tenth Division that reversed a Dagupan Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision,
which ruled that “the kind of divorce recognized here in the Philippines are those validly obtained by the
alien spouse abroad, not by the Filipino spouse pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.”

Petitioner was a certain Marelyn Tanedo Manalo who was married to a Japanese national, Minoru
Yoshino. Manalo (not her Japanese husband) filed for and was granted divorce in Japan sometime in
2011. Manalo filed with a Dagupan RTC to have her Japanese divorce recognized in the Philippines. The
RTC denied her Petition, which was subsequently reversed by the CA in 2014. The CA recognized the
foreign divorce and ruled that Manalo had the right to remarry. The Supreme Court affirmed this CA
Decision.

Excerpts from the Majority Decision penned by Justice Diosdado M. Peralta are herein quoted.

“Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute xxx .”
“The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure
to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: The Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.

“On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other. x x x”

“To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals and traditions
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability
and solidarity. However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated.”

In a separate Concurring Opinion, Justice Marvic Leonen, underscored the reality that it is the Filipino
wife who is prejudiced if Article 26 of our Family Code is given “an interpretation which capacitates and
empowers the Japanese husband the option to divorce and how such choice has effects in our country
while, at the same time, disallowing the Filipina wife from being able to do the same simply because she
is a Filipina.”

“That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
“This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender equality from its passive formulation in Article III,
Section 1 to its more active orientation.

Indeed, our laws were never intended for the Filipino to be at a disadvantage. In the words of Justice
Leonen, “to say that one spouse may divorce and the other may not contribute to patriarchy. It fosters
an unequal relationship prone to abuse in such intimate relationship. The law is far from rigid. It should
passionately guarantee equality.”

I fully agree with Justice Leonen and the majority opinion of Justice Peralta. But still, no amount of
judicial activism can be a real substitute for an Absolute Divorce Law that has long been advocated by
countless suffering wives chained to the shackles of loveless marriages with philandering and abusive
husbands!

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN

BANGAYAN, JR. CASE DIGEST [G.R. No.
201061, July 3, 2013, CARPIO, J.]
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)

DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.

FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s

father was against the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan,
Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be
registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage
to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with
Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration
of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her
answer.

The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a
marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner

HELD:

1. YES.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar
of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3
of Article 35which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus,
the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

2. YES.

The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the
trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more
in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722
was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title
“married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered
in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from
either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.

3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and
there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract.
However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.In this
case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.