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. :: e*

MSC-04112

N A T I O N A L AERO N A U T I C S A N D SPACE A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

A*.*.'.'

I

(NBS A-T M- X-74240)
(NASA)

........... ............ ........... ............. ........... ............ ........... ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ........... ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ........... ............ ........... ............

APOLLO 14 MISSION REPORT

APOLLO 1 4 HISSION REPORT

N76-7 80 3 6

00/98

Unclas 01216

\

DISTRIBUTION AND R E F E R E N C I N G

l h l r popor i s not ruitoblo for gonorol distribution or roforoncing. It may bo roforoncod only in othor working corrospondonco and docurnonts by participating orgonixotions.

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
H 0U STON ,TE X A S
NATIONAL TECHNIC A L INFORMATION SERVICE
U S DEPARlMEWl Of COMMERCE SPRINCfIELD. VA ZlSl
RtPRODUCED BY

MAY 1971

M C-0 4 112 S

APOLLO 1 4 MISSION mPORT

PREPARED BY

Mission Evaluation Team

APPROVED BY

.
A

WT

*

-

M

James A. McDivitt Colonel, USAF Apollo Spacecraft Program

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

HOUSTON, TEXAS A p r i l 1971

Apollo 14 lift-off.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

S e ct i on

Page

1.0

MISSION SUMMARY

2.0

3.0

.

4.0

..................... INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE . . . . . 3.2 LASER RANGING RETRO-REFLECTOR .......... 3.3 LUNAR PORTABLE MAGNETOMETER EXPERIMENT . . . . . . 3.4 S O U R WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT . . . . . . . . 3.5 LUNAR GEOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 LUNAR S O I L MECHANICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 MODULAR EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTER . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 APOLLO L A N D I N G SITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUNAR ORBITAL EXPERIMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1
4.2
S-BAND TRANSPONDER BISTATIC RADAR

1-1
2-1

3-1 3-5 3-12 3-12 3-14 3-14 3-15 3-16

3-18

................ ..................

4-1 4-1
4-1 4-2

4.3

4.4 4.5 4.6
4.7

................ APOLLO WINDOW METEOROID EXPERIMENT . . . . . . . . DIM-LIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE ORBITAL SCIENCE PHOTOGWHY

CECENSCHEIN/MOULTON POINT PHOTOGRAPHY FROM LUNAR ORBIT

4-3
4-4

...................

4-4 4-5

PHOTOGRAPHS OF A CANDIDATE EXPLORATION S I T E V I S I B I L I T Y AT HIGH S N ANGLES U

...

4.8 4.9
5 0

.

. TRANSEARTH LUNAR PHOTOGRAPHY . . INFLICHT DEMONSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . 5.1 ELECTROPHORETIC SEPARATION . . . 5.2 LIQUID TRANSFER . . . . . . . . 5.3 HEAT FLOW AND CONVECTION . . . .
5.4
COMPOSITE CASTING

................

. . . . . .

........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........

4-5 4-6
5-1

5-1 5-1

5-4 5-4

iv Se ct i on 6.0
TRAJECTORY
Page

7.0

...................... 6.1 LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR T R A J E C T O R I E S . . . . . . . 6.2 LUNARORBIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 TRANSEARTH AND ENTRY T R A J E C T O R I E S . . . . . . . 6.4 S E R V I C E MODULE ENTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COMMAND AND S E R V I C E MODULE PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . 7.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS . . . . . . . 7.2 E L E C T R I C A L POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 GUIDANCE. NAVIGATION AND CONTROL . . . . . . . .
REACTIOIJ CONTROL SYSTEMS S E R V I C E PROPULSION

6-1 6-1 6-1 6-12 6-12

7-1
7-1 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5

7.7 7.8 7.9

............ SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . .

7-11
7-12 7-12 7-15 8-1

8.0

9.0

..... 7.10 CONSUMABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS . . . . . . . 8.2 ELECTRICAL POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 RADAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 GUIDANCE. NAVIGATION AND CONTROL . . . . . . . . 8.7 DESCENT P R O P U L S I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8 ASCENT PROPULSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 . ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREW STATION . . . . . 8.10 EXTRAVEHICULAR M O B I L I T Y U N I T . . . . . . . . . . 8.11 CONSUMABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PILOT'S REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 LAUNCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREW S T A T I O N

8-1 8-4 8-4
8-5 8-5 8-6 8-13

8-14
8-15 8-16 8-17 9-1 9-1 9-1

V

Section

Page

9.3 9.4
9.5 9.6 9.7

EARTH O R B I T TRANSLUNAR TRA.NSLUNAR

.................. INJECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.............

9-2 9-2 9-2 9-4 9-1; 9-5 9-6
9-8

LUNAR O R B I T I N S E R T I O N DESCENT O R B I T I N S E R T I O N

9.8 9.9
9.10 9.11 9.12

............ LUNAR MODULE CHECKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . POWERED DESCENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUNAR SURFACE A C T I V I T Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASCENT. RENDEZVOUS. AND DOCKING . . . . . . . .
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE ACTIVITIES

9-17 9-19
9-27

10.0

.................. .. .. 9.13 T M S E A H T H I N J E C T I O N . . . . . 9.14 TRANSEARTH COAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.15 ENTRY AND LANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.1

LUNAR ORBIT

9-27 9-28
10-1
10-1

BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND P H Y S I O L O G I C A L DATA MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS

11.0

12.0

13.0

.............. 10.3 P H Y S I C A L EXAMINATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 F L I G H T CREW HEALTH S T A B I L I Z A T I O N . . . . . . . . 10.5 QUARANTINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M I S S I O N SUPPORT PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 F L I G H T CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 NETWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASSESSMENT OF M I S S I O N O B J E C T I V E S . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 PARTIALLY COMPLETED O B J E C T I V E S . . . . . . . . . 12.2 I N F L I G H T DEMONSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 APPROVED OPERATIONAL TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . LAUNCH PHASE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 WEATHER CONDITIONS ...............
10.2

.....................

10-11

10-14
10-14
10-15

11-1
11-1
11-2

11-3 12-1 12-3 12-4 12-4 13-1 13-1

vi
Sect i on

Page

13.2

ATMOSPHERIC E L E C T R I C I T Y EXPERIMENTS LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY

14.0

..... ANOMALY SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 . 1 COMMAND AND S E R V I C E MODULE . . . 14.2 LUNARMODULF: . . . . . . . . . .
13.3
14.3
GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT

.

13-1

13-6 14-1 14-1 14-24
14-42

.

14.4
15.0
AFPENDIX

APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS

CONCLUSIONS

............ A - VEHICLE: D E S C R I P T I O N - .
COMMAND AND S E R V I C E MODULE LUNAR MODULE

14-47 15-1
A-1 A-1 A-6 A-10
A-10

A. 1 A. 2 A. 3 A.4

........

.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY U N I T EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT

... A.5 MASS P R O P E R T I E S . . . . . A P P E N D I X B - SPACECRAFT H I S T O R I E S . . . . APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING . . . . . A P P E N D I X D - DATA A V A I L A B I L I T Y . . . .
APPENDIX E APPENDIX F REFERENCES

A-13

B-1

c-1
D-1

-

M I S S I O N REPOKT SUPPLEMENTS

E-1
F- 1
R-1

- GLOSSARY . . . .

.. ...............

* .
L

L

I

L.

L

11 -

1.0

MISSION SUMMARY

The Apollo 1 4 mission, manned by Alan Shepard, J r . , Commander; S t u a r t A. Roosa, Command Module P i l o t ; and Edgar D. M i t c h e l l , Lunar M.:dule P i l o t ; w a s launched from Kennedy Space Center, F l o r i d a , at 4:03:02 p.m. e . s . t . (21:03:02 G . m . t . ) on January 31, 1971. Because of u n s a t i s f a c t o r y weather conditions at t h e planned t i m e of launch, a launch delay (about 40 minutes) w a s experienced f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n t h e Apollo program. The a c t i v i t i e s during e a r t h o r b i t and t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n were similar t o t h o s e of previous l u n a r landing missions; howe v e r , during t r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking following t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n , s i x attempts were r e q u i r e d t o achieve docking because of mechanical d i f f i c u l t i e s . Television w a s used during t r a n s l u n a r c o a s t t o observe a crew i n s p e c t i o n of t h e probe and drogue. A l l i n d i c a t i o n s were t h a t t h e system w a s functioning normally. Except f o r a s p e c i a l check of a s c e n t b a t t e r y 5 i n t h e l u n a r module, t r a n s l u n a r coast a f t e r docking proceeded according t o t h e f l i g h t plan. Two midcourse c o r r e c t i o n s were performed, one at about 30-1/2 hours and t h e o t h e r at about 77 hours. These corr e c t i o n s achieved t h e t r a j e c t o r y r e q u i r e d f o r t h e d e s i r e d l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n a l t i t u d e and t i m e parameters. The combined s p a c e c r a f t were i n s e r t e d i n t o l u n a r o r b i t at approximately 82 hours, and t w o revolutions l a t e r , t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver placed t h e s p a c e c r a f t i n a 58.8- by 9.1-mile o r b i t . The l u n a r module crew e n t e r e d t h e v e h i c l e at approximately 101-1/4 hours t o prep a r e f o r t h e descent t o t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e . The lunar module w a s undocked from t h e command module at about 103-3/4 hours. P r i o r t o powered descent, an abort command w a s d e l i v e r e d t o t h e computer as t h e r e s u l t of a malfunction but a r o u t i n e w a s manua l l y loaded i n t h e computer t h a t i n h i b i t e d t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of an abort d i s c r e t e . The powered descent maneuver w a s i n i t i a t e d at about 108 hours. A ranging s c a l e problem, which would have prevented a c q u i s i t i o n of r a d a r d a t a u n t i l l a t e i n t h e d e s c e n t , w a s c o r r e c t e d by c y c l i n g t h e c i r c u i t breaker o f f and on. Landing i n t h e F r a Mauro highlands occurred at The landing coordinates were 3 degrees 40 minutes 24 sec108:15:09.3. onds south l a t i t u d e and 17 degrees 27 minutes 55 seconds w e s t longitude.
The command and s e r v i c e module, after undocking and s e p a r a t i o n , w a s placed i n a c i r c u l a r o r b i t having an a l t i t u d e of approximately 60 miles t o photograph t h e proposed Descartes landing s i t e , as w e l l as perform landmark t r a c k i n g and o t h e r t a s k s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e accomplishment of l u n a r o r b i t experiments and photography. Communications between t h e command and s e r v i c e module and e a r t h during t h i s p e r i o d were i n t e r m i t t e n t because of a problem with t h e high-gain antenna.

1-2
Preparations f o r t h e i n i t i a l p e r i o d of l u n a r e x p l o r a t i o n began about 2 hours a f t e r landing. A procedural problem w i t h t h e l u n a r module communications delayed cabin d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n about 50 minutes. The Commander egressed at about 113-3/4 hours and deployed t h e modular equipment stowage assembly as h e descended t h e l a d d e r , providing transmission of c o l o r t e l e v i s i o n . The Lunar Module P i l o t egressed a few minutes l a t e r . Subsequently, t h e S-band antenna w a s e r e c t e d and a c t i v a t e d , t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package was deployed, and various documented l u n a r samples were taken during t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d which l a s t e d about 4 3/4 hours. A modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r , used on t h i s m i s s i o n f o r t h e f i r s t time, a s s i s t e d t h e crew i n c a r r y i n g equipment and l u n a r samples. Preparations f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d were begun f o l lowing a 6 1/2-hour rest period. The g o a l of t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d w a s t o t r a v e r s e t o t h e area of Cone Crater. Although t h e crew experienced d i f f i c u l t i e s i n navigating, they reached a p o i n t w i t h i n approximately 50 f e e t of t h e r i m of t h e c r a t e r . Thus, t h e o b j e c t i v e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h reaching t h e v i c i n i t y of t h i s c r a t e r and o b t a i n i n g t h e d e s i r e d samples were achieved. Various documented rock and s o i l samples were c o l l e c t e d on t h e r e t u r n t r a v e r s e from Cone Crater, and, upon comp l e t i n g t h e t r a v e r s e , t h e antenna on t h e lunar-experiment-package c e n t r a l s t a t i o n w a s realigned. The second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r period l a s t e d about 4-1/2 hours f o r a t o t a l e x t r a v e h i c u l a r t i m e of approximately 9-1/4 hours. About 96 pounds of lunar samples were c o l l e c t e d during t h e two extravehicular periods. The ascent stage l i f t e d o f f at about 141-3/4 hours and t h e v e h i c l e w a s i n s e r t e d i n t o a 51.7- by 6.5-mile o r b i t . A d i r e c t rendezvous w a s performed and t h e command-module-active docking operations were normal. However, during t h e f i n a l braking phase, t h e l u n a r module abort guidance system f a i l e d after t h e system w a s no longer required. Following crew t r a n s f e r t o t h e command module, t h e ascent s t a g e w a s j e t t i s o n e d and guided t o impact approximately 36 miles w e s t of t h e Apollo 1 4 landing site. Transearth i n j e c t i o n occurred during t h e 34th l u n a r r e v o l u t i o n at about 148-1/2 hours. During t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t , one midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s made using t h e s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system. I n a d d i t i o n , a s p e c i a l o g g e n flow rate t e s t w a s performed and a navigation e x e r c i s e simulating a r e t u r n t o e a r t h without ground c o n t r o l w a s conducted using only t h e guidance and navigation system. I n f l i g h t demonstrations of f o u r types o f processes under zero-gravity conditions were a l s o performed and televised t o earth. Entry w a s normal and t h e command module landed i n t h e P a c i f i c Ocean at 216:01:58. The landing coordinates were 27 degrees 0 minutes 45 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 39 minutes 30 seconds west longitude.

2.0

INTRODUCTION

The Apollo 1 4 mission w a s t h e 14th i n a s e r i e s using Apollo f l i g h t hardware and achieved t h e t h i r d l u n a r landing. The o b j e c t i v e s of t h e mission were t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e near a p r e s e l e c t e d p o i n t i n t h e Fra Mauro formation, deploy and a c t i v a t e an Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package, f u r t h e r develop man's c a p a b i l i t y t o work i n t h e l u n a r environment, and obtain photographs of candidate e x p l o r a t i o n s i t e s . A complete a n a l y s i s o f a l l f l i g h t d a t a i s not p o s s i b l e within t h e time allowed f o r preparation of t h i s r e p o r t . Therefore, r e p o r t supplements w i l l be published f o r c e r t a i n Apollo 1 4 systems analyses, as shown i n appendix E. This appendix a l s o l i s t s t h e current s t a t u s of all Apollo mission supplements, e i t h e r published o r i n p r e p a r a t i o n . Other supplements w i l l be published as necessary.

I n t h i s r e p o r t , all a c t u a l times p r i o r t o e a r t h landing are elapsed time from range zero, e s t a b l i s h e d as t h e i n t e g r a l second before l i f t - o f f . January 31, 1971. The Range zero f o r t h i s mission w a s 21:03:02 G.m.t., clock onboard t h e s p a c e c r a f t w a s changed at 54:53:36 by adding 40 minu t e s and 2.90 seconds; however, t h e t i m e s given i n t h i s r e p o r t do not r e f l e c t t h i s clock update. Had t h e clock update not been performed, ind i c a t i o n s of elapsed t i m e i n t h e crew's d a t a f i l e would have been i n err o r by t h e amount of t h e delay i n l i f t - o f f s i n c e t h e midcourse c o r r e c t i o n s were t a r g e t e d t o achieve t h e prelaunch-desired l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n t i m e . Greenwich mean t i m e i s used f o r all times after e a r t h landing. All r e f erences t o mileage d i s t a n c e are i n n a u t i c a l miles.

3.0

LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS

The experiments discussed i n t h i s s e c t i o n c o n s i s t o f t h o s e associa t e d with t h e Apollo l u n a r surface experiments package ( a suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r , a cold cathode gage, a p a s s i v e seismometer, an a c t i v e s e i s mometer, and a charged p a r t i c l e environment d e t e c t o r ) , as w e l l as a laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r experiment, a lunar p o r t a b l e magnetometer experiment, a s o l a r wind composition experiment, l u n a r geology, and s o i l mechani c s . Descriptions of t h e purposes and equipment of experiments c a r r i e d f o r t h e f i r s t time on previous missions are given i n t h e r e p o r t s of t h o s e missions, and t h e a p p l i c a b l e r e p o r t s are referenced where a p p r o p r i a t e . A b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e experiment equipment used f o r t h e first t i m e on Apollo 14 i s given i n appendix A.

Lunar s u r f a c e s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t i e s were performed g e n e r a l l y as planned w i t h i n t h e a l l o t t e d t i m e p e r i o d s . Approximately 5 1 / 2 hours after. landing, t h e crew egressed t h e l u n a r module f o r t h e f i r s t t r a v e r s e of t h e lunar s u r f a c e . During t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d , which l a s t e d 4 hours 47 minutes 50 seconds, t h e crew:
a.
Deployed t h e modular equipment stowage assembly.

b. Deployed and operated t h e c o l o r t e l e v i s i o n camera as r e q u i r e d t o t e l e v i s e crew a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e lunar module.
c. d. T r a n s f e r r e d a contingency sample t o t h e l u n a r module. Erected t h e United S t a t e s f l a g and t h e s o l a r wind composition Deployed and loaded t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r used t o

foil.
e.
a i d t h e a s t r o n a u t s i n t r a n s p o r t i n g equipment and samples.
f . Collected surface samples i n c l u d i n g two "small-football-size" specimens weighing approximately 4.4 and 5.5 pounds. g.

Photographed a c t i v i t i e s , panoramas and equipment.

h. Deployed t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package f o r t h e continuing c o l l e c t i o n of lunar s c i e n t i f i c data via r a d i o l i n k .

3-2
Following a planned r e s t p e r i o d , t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d began with preparations f o r M extended g e o l o g i c a l t r a v e r s e . The duration o f t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d w a s 4 hours 34 minu t e s 4 1 seconds, covering a t r a v e r s e of approximately 1.6 miles, during which t h e crew:

a. Obtained l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer measurements at two s i t e s along t h e t r a v e r s e .
b. Collected documented, core t u b e , and t r e n c h - s i t e samples. specimen weighing approximately

c Collected a "large-football-size" 19 pounds.
d.

.

Photographed t h e area covered, including panoramas and sample Retrieved t h e s o l a r wind composition f o i l .

sites.

e.

f . A d j u s t e d t h e antenna on t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package c e n t r a l s t a t i o n .

The evaluations discussed i n t h i s s e c t i o n are based on t h e data obtained during t h e first lunar day l a r g e l y on crew comments and real-time information. Certain equipment d i f f i c u l t i e s mentioned i n t h i s s e c t i o n are discussed i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 1 4 . 4 . More comprehensive results w i l l be summarized i n a separate science r e p o r t t o be published when t h e d e t a i l e d analyses a r e complete (appendix E ) . The s i t e s at which t h e various l u n a r surface a c t i v i t i e s were conducted a r e shown i n t h e f i g u r e 3-1. The s p e c i f i c a c t i v i t i e s at each l o c a t i o n a r e i d e n t i f i e d i n t a b l e 3-1.

-

3-3

3-4
TABLE 3-1.- LUNAR SURFACE

St at i o n

Activities

Sampling and photography Apollo l u n a r surface experiments package deployment s i t e Laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r s i t e Comprehensive sample s i t e Small-football-size rock s i t e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment a c t i v i t i e s and photography Deployment of instrument and photography Sampling and photography Sampling and photography activity period Sampling, photography and f i r s t deployment o f lunar p o r t a b l e magnetometer Sampling and photography Sampling Photography Sampling and photography Photography Sampling, photography and second deployment of l u n a r . p o r t a b l e magnetometer Sampling and photography Sampling and photography Sampling Sampling Sampling and photography Sampling and photography Sampling and photography Sampling and photography

t' L

s

i

..
L

L

L

L

I-

L.

3-5
3.1
MOLL0 LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE

The Apollo l u n a r surface experiments package w a s deployed with t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n p o s i t i o n e d 600 f e e t west-northwest of t h e l u n a r module ( f i g . 3-2). No d i f f i c u l t i e s were experienced i n off-loading t h e p a l l e t s o r setting them up f o r t h e t r a v e r s e o t h e r than an i n i t i a l d i f f i c u l t y i n l a t c h i n g t h e dome removal t o o l i n t h e f u e l cask dome. The crew i n s t a l l e d t h e f u e l capsule i n t h e radioisotope t h e r m o e l e c t r i c g e n e r a t o r and lockon d a t a were obtained with i n i t i a l antenna alignment a t 116 hours 48 minutes.

NASA -5 -71 -1618

First geophone - I b -

Lunar module

detector experiment

Third geophone - . . -)

gage experiment Note: Distances nd to Scale

Figure 3-2.- Arrangement of t h e Apollo lunar s u r f a c e experiments.

3.1.1

Central S t a t i o n

I n i t i a l conditions of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n ( r e f . 1) were normal. Power output of t h e r a d i o i s o t o p e t h e r m o e l e c t r i c g e n e r a t o r w a s 69.1 w a t t s , and t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n thermal p l a t e temperature averaged 7 . ' F. A 38

3-6
r e s e r v e power reading of 43.5 w a t t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e b a s i c power consumption w a s normal f o r Apollo lunar s c i e n t i f i c experiment package s t a r t up. A s t h e generator warmed up, t h e power output i n c r e a s e d t o 72.0 watts and has remained nearly constant at t h a t l e v e l . The t r a n s m i t t e r s i g n a l s t r e n g t h at i n i t i a l a c q u i s i t i o n w a s lower t h a n expected, and about 4 dB lower t h a n t h a t of t h e Apollo 12 experiment package. This w a s p a r t i a l l y t h e r e s u l t of a c q u i s i t i o n occurring at t h e t i m e of t h e worst-case condition of t h e r e l a t i v e earth-moon p o s i t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , l u n a r surface photography shows t h a t t h e antenna w a s not f u l l y s e a t e d i n t h e gimbal i n t e r f a c e socket ( r e s u l t i n g i n a misalignment with gimbal s e t t i n g s ) and t h e gimbal p o i n t i n g toward t h e e a r t h w a s o f f t h e nominal p o i n t i n g angle. Subsequent monitoring i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e s i g n a l s t r e n g t h obtained from t h e Apollo 1 4 u n i t i s now equal t o t h a t of t h e Apollo 1 2 u n i t and t h a t s i g n a l s t r e n g t h v a r i a t i o n can be p r e d i c t e d based on t h e r e l a t i v e earth-moon p o s i t i o n s . The .Apollo lunar s c i e n t i f i c experiment package c e n t r a l s t a t i o n w a s commanded t o t h e high-bit-rate mode at 116 hours 56 minutes f o r t h e a c t i v e seismic experiment/thumper mode of o p e r a t i o n , which continued u n t i l 117 hours 34 minutes. Using t h e h i g h - b i t - r a t e mode, only t h e a c t i v e seismic experiment d a t a and l i m i t e d engineering d a t a can be received from t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n . The o t h e r experiments were t u r n e d on following t h e a c t i v e seismic experiment/thumper mode of o p e r a t i o n . During t h e deployment of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n , t h e s u n s h i e l d e r e c t e d normally. However, t h e crew had t o lift one s i d e on t h r e e occasions because it w a s sagging. L u n a - s u r f a c e photography i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e suns h i e l d had been bumped downward i n a counterclockwise d i r e c t i o n . However, t h e sagging condition has had no adverse e f f e c t on t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n thermal c o n t r o l system, and t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n has been o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n thermal l i m i t s . The Apollo lunar s c i e n t i f i c experiment package 12-hour t i m e r p u l s e s Subsequent t e s t s v e r i f i e d t h a t t h e mechanical s e c t i o n of t h e t i m e r w a s not o p e r a t i n g . The timer f u n c t i o n s s t a r t e d t o occur on February 1 and t h e timer provided 1 12-hour pulses t h i r t e e n times i n succession before f a i l i n g . Loss of t h e t i m e r has no adverse e f f e c t of t h e Apollo l u n a r experiment package s i n c e all f u n c t i o n s a r e being accomplished by ground command. This problem i s discussed f u r t h e r ' i n s e c t i o n 14.4.4.
d i d not occur a f t e r i n i t i a l c e n t r a l s t a t i o n turn-on.

The lunar dust d e t e c t o r of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n i s showing normal o outputs from a l l t h r e e p h o t o e l e c t r i c c e l l s . N changes i n t h e outputs of t h e s e c e l l s were observed during o r a f t e r lunar module a s c e n t , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t dust from t h e ascent engine exhaust d i d not s e t t l e on t h e central station.

3-7
3.1.2
Passive Seismic Experiment

The p a s s i v e seismic experiment ( r e f . 2 ) w a s deployed 10 f e e t n o r t h o f t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n ( f i g . 3-2). No d i f f i c u l t y W:LS experienced i n deploying t h e experiment o t h e r t h a n t h e i n a b i l i t y t o make t h e ribbon cab1.e l i e f l a t on t h e s u r f a c e under t h e thermal shroud s k i r t . All elements have operated as planned w i t h t h e following exceptions.
a. The long-period v e r t i c a l component seismometer i s u n s t a b l e i n t h e normal mode ( f l a t - r e s p o n s e mode). (See s e c t i o n 14.4.6 f o r a d i s cussion of t h i s anomaly.) The problem w a s e l i m i n a t e d by removing t h e feedback f i l t e r and operating i n t h e peaked-response mode. I n t h i s mode, t h e siesmometer has a resonant p e r i o d of 2 . 2 seconds i n s t e a d of t h e norm a l p e r i o d of 1 5 seconds. Without t h e extended f l a t response, t h e lowfrequency d a t a i s more d i f f i c u l t t o e x t r a c t . However, u s e f u l data are being obtained over t h e planned spectrum by d a t a processing t e c h n i q u e s .
. b. The gimbal motor which l e v e l s t h e Y-axis long-period seismometer has not responded t o commands on s e v e r a l occasions. I n t h e s e c a s e s , t h e r e s e r v e power s t a t u s i n d i c a t e s t h a t no power i s being s u p p l i e d t o t h e motor. The power c o n t r o l c i r c u i t of t h e motor i s considered t o be t h e most l i k e l y cause of t h i s problem. Response t o commands has been achieved i n a l l cases by r e p e a t i n g t h e motor d r i v e command. (See s e c t i o n 14.4.5 f o r a more d e t a i l e d discussion o f t h i s problem.)

3.1.3

A c t i v e Seismic Experiment

The a c t i v e s e i s m i c experiment (appendix A, s e c t i o n A.4.1) w a s deployed during t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r period with t h e f i r s t geophone approximately 10 f e e t southwest of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n and t h e geophone array extending i n a southerly d i r e c t i o n ( f i g s . 3-2 and 3-3). The Apollo lunar s c i e n t i f i c experiment package w a s commanded t o t h e h i g h - b i t - r a t e mode f o r 28 minutes during t h e a c t i v e seismic experiment/thumper mode o f operation. Thumping operations began at geophone 3 ( t h e f u r t h e s t from t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n ) and proceeded f o r 300 f e e t at 15-foot i n t e r v a l s t o ward geophone 1. The attempts t o f i r e t h e i n i t i a t o r s r e s u l t e d i n 13 f i r e d and 5 m i s f i r e d . Three i n i t i a t o r s were d e l i b e r a t e l y not f i r e d . I n some i n s t a n c e s , two attempts irere made t o f i r e an i n i t i a t o r . (See s e c t i o n 14.4.1 f o r f u r t h e r discussion of t h i s anomaly.)

A c a l i b r a t i o n p u l s e w a s s e n t p r i o r t o t h e l a s t thumper f i r i n g v e r i f'ying t h a t all t h r e e geophones were o p e r a t i o n a l . The mortar package, was deployed 10 f e e t north-northwest of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n and aimed t o f i r e f o u r grenades on command from e a r t h t o d i s t a n c e s of 5 0 0 , 1000, 3000 and

NASA-S-7 1-1619

F i g u r e 3-3. Apbllo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment package components deployed on t h e . lunar surf ace.

-

3-9
n r t h e r l y d i r e c t i o n . F i r i n of t h e four mortars has n o t been scheduled. Postmission t e s t s and analyses a r e being performed t o e s t a b l i s h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e time and p r o v i s i o n s f o r conducting t h i s p a r t of t h e experiment.
5000 f e e t i n

3.1.4

Suprathermal Ion Detector Experiment

The suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r experiment ( r e f . 2 ) was deployed s o u t h e a s t of t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package c e n t r a l s t a t i o n ( f i g . 3-2). Noisy d a t a were received at turn-on ( s e c t i o n 1 4 . 4 . 2 ) b u t t h e d a t a were s a t i s f a c t o r y a f t e r seal break and dust cover removal. The experiment i s r e t u r n i n g good s c i e n t i f i c d a t a , with low background r a t e s . Despite a l a r g e amount of l u n a r d u s t which adhered t o one end of t h e package when it f e l l over s e v e r a l times during deployment ( f i g . 3-41, t h e temperatures throughout t h e l u n a r day and n i g h t remained w i t h i n t h e range allowed f o r t h e instrument. ,Fhotographs show t h a t t h e instrument i s properly deployed and aligned.

,3.1.5 Cold Cathode Gage Experiment
The cold cathode gage ( r e f . 2 ) was deployed 4 f e e t s o u t h e a s t of t h e suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r , aimed s l i g h t l y southwest ( f i g s . 3-2 and 3-4). The deployment w a s accomplished a f t e r s e v e r a l attempts i n which t h e crewman experienced d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e s t i f f n e s s of t h e connecting cables while handling t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment, t h e cold cathode gage, and t h e ground screen at t h e same t i m e . The experiment w a s f i r s t t u r n e d on s h o r t l y b e f o r e l u n a r module dep r e s s u r i z a t i o n f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . Commands were s e n t t o t h e instrument t o t u r n on t h e high voltage and t o open t h e c o l d cathode gage s e a l . The cold cathode gage d a t a came o f f t h e i n i t i a l f u l l s c a l e i n d i c a t i o n s much more r a p i d l y t h a n expected, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e seal may have been open earlier t h a n commanded. Because a spontaneous change i n t h e o p e r a t i o n a l mode o f t h e cold cathode gage and t h e suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r experiment occurred a f t e r about 1 / 2 hour of o p e r a t i o n , t h e high v o l t a g e s were switched o f f u n t i l a f t e r l u n a r s u n s e t . When t h e high v o l t a g e s were switched back on a f t e r l u n a r sunset,' t h e response of t h e cold cathode gage went t o t h e most s e n s i t i v e range, i n d i c a t i v e of t h e low ambient p r e s s u r e . When t h e p r e s s u r e r o s e a t l u n a r s u n r i s e as expected, t h e mode of o p e r a t i o n w a s changed by a ground command t o a less s e n s i t i v e range, and t h e c a l i b r a t e p u l s e s appeared normal. The experiment is o p e r a t i n g normally.

3-10

NASA-S-7 1-1620

F i g u r e 3-4. Suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment and c o l d cathode gage experiment deployed on t h e lunar surf ace.

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3-11

3.1.6

Charged P a r t i c l e Lunar Environment Experiment

The charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experiment ( r e f . 3 ) i n s t r u ment ( f i g s . 3-2 and 3-5) w a s f i r s t commanded on a t 117 hours 58 minutes during t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y f o r a 5-minute f u n c t i o n a l t e s t and t h e instrument w a s normal. The complete i n s t r u m e n t checkout showed t h a t prelaunch and post-deployment counting r a t e s agreed w i t h i n 20 perc e n t , w i t h t h e exception o f channel 6 i n a n a l y z e r B . The counting rates on channel 6 were t w i c e as h i g h as t h e prelaunch v a l u e s . The c o n d i t i o n i s a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e behavior of s c a t t e r e d e l e c t r o n s i n t h e p h y s i c a l a n a l y z e r s which behave q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y i n t h e e f f e c t i v e l y zero magn e t i c f i e l d of t h e moon compared w i t h t h e 0.5-gauss magnetic f i e l d of t h e e a r t h . The high counting r a t e s on channel 6 do n o t d e t r i m e n t a l l y

NASA-S-7 1-1621

F i g u r e 3-5.- Charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experiment deployed on t h e lunar s u r f a c e .

3-12 a f f e c t t h e science data. A l l command functions of t h e instrument were executed with t h e exception of t h e f o r c e d h e a t e r mode commands. Subsequent t o t h e checkout, t h e experiment w a s commanded t o standby.
A f t e r lunar module a s c e n t , t h e charged p a r t i c l e lunar environment experiment w a s commanded on a t 142 hours 7 minutes and t h e d u s t cover w a s removed about 1 5 hours and 20 minutes l a t e r . Operating temperatures are nominal. The m a x i m u m temperature during l u n a r day i s 136' F and t h e minimum temperature during l u n a r n i g h t i s minus 1' F. The i n s t r u m e n t ' s 1 o p e r a t i o n a l h e a t e r cycled on automatically when t h e e l e c t r o n i c s temperat u r e reached 32' F a t l u n a r s u n s e t , and was commanded on i n t h e forced-on mode at 14' F , as planned.

The instrument, on one occasion, changed from t h e manual mode ( a t t h e p l u s 3500-volt s t e p ) t o t h e automatic mode. The instrument w a s subsequently commanded back i n t o t h e manual mode. There i s no evidence i n t h e data which would i n d i c a t e t h e cause of t h e mode change.

3.2

LASER RANGING RETRO-REFLECTOR

The l a s e r ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r ( r e f . 4 ) w a s deployed during t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y a t a d i s t a n c e of approximately 100 f e e t west of t h e Apollo l u n a r s c i e n t i f i c experiment package c e n t r a l s t a t i o n ( f i g s . 3-2 and 3-6). Leveling and alignment were accomplished with no d i f f i c u l t y . The instrument w a s ranged on by t h e McDonald Observatory team p r i o r t o l u n a r module l i f t - o f f and a high-quality r e t u r n s i g n a l w a s received. Ranging a f t e r l i f t - o f f , while not y e t conclusive, i n d i c a t e s no s e r i o u s degradation of t h e r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r r e s u l t i n g from t h e e f f e c t s of t h e a s c e n t s t a g e engine f i r i n g . 3.3
LUNAR PORTABLE MAGNETOMETER EXPERIMENT

The l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer (appendix A , s e c t i o n A.4.2) w a s deployed at s i t e A and near t h e r i m of Cone Crater ( f i g . 3-1) during t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d . The instrument o p e r a t e d nominally i n a l l r e s p e c t s . The temperature of t h e experiment e l e c t r o n i c s package reached equilibrium, between 120' and 1 0 F. Meter r e a d i n g s , r e l a y e d 5' over t h e voice l i n k , i n d i c a t e d t o t a l f i e l d s of 102 210 gammas at s i t e A and 4 1 t10 gammas at Cone Crater. Vector component measurements of t h e s e readings were well w i t h i n t h e dynamic range of t h e instrument. Leveling, o r i e n t a t i o n , and p o s i t i o n i n g were accomplished without d i f f i c u l t y ; howe v e r , t h e experiment cable was d i f f i c u l t t o rewind. This problem i s d i s cussed i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 14.4.3.

L

L

11

3-13

NASA-S-7 1-1622

Figure 3-6.- Laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r experiment deployed on t h e l u n a r surface.

3-14

3.4

SOLAR WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT
i

The s o l a r wind composition experiment ( r e f . 4) , a s p e c i a l l y prepared aluminum f o i l r o l l e d on a s t a f f , w a s deployed during t h e f i r s t ext r a v e h i c u l a r period f o r a f o i l exposure t i m e of approximately 2 1 hours. Deployment w a s accomplished with no d i f f i c u l t y ; however, during r e t r i e v a l , approximately h a l f t h e f o i l r o l l e d up mechanically and t h e remainder had t o be r o l l e d manually.

3.5

LUNAR GEOLOGY

The landing s i t e i n t h e Fra Mauro highlands i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by north-south t r e n d i n g l i n e a r ridges t h a t are t y p i c a l l y 160 t o 360 f e e t i n h e i g h t and 6000 t o 13 000 f e e t i n width. The r i d g e s and v a l l e y s are d i s f i g u r e d by c r a t e r s ranging i n s i z e from very s m a l l up t o several thousand f e e t i n diameter.
The major objective of t h e geology survey w a s t o c o l l e c t , d e s c r i b e , and photograph m a t e r i a l s of t h e Fra Mauro formation. The F r a Mauro f o r -

mation i s b e l i e v e d t o be e j e c t a from t h e Imbrium Basin, which, i n t u r n , i s b e l i e v e d t o have been c r e a t e d by a l a r g e impact. This material i s probably b e s t exposed i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e landing s i t e where i t has been excavated from below t h e r e g o l i t h by t h e impact t h a t formed Cone Crater. The major p a r t of t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y t r a v e r s e , t h e r e f o r e , w a s designed t o sample, d e s c r i b e , and photograph representat i v e materials i n t h e Cone Crater e j e c t a . Most o f t h e r e t u r n e d rock samples c o n s i s t of fragmental material. Photographs t a k e n on t h e e j e c t a b l a n k e t of Cone Crater show v a r i o u s degrees of l a y e r i n g , s h e e t i n g , and f o l i a t i o n i n t h e e j e c t e d boulders. A considerable v a r i e t y i n t h e n a t u r e of t h e r e t u r n e d fragmental rocks has been noted. During t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e crew traversed a t o t a l d i s t a n c e of about 1700 f e e t . On t h e i r w a y back t o t h e l u n a r module a f t e r deployment of t h e Apollo l u n a r s c i e n t i f i c experiment package, t h e crew c o l l e c t e d a comprehensive sample and two " f o o t b a l l - s i z e " rocks. The comprehensive sample a r e a was photographed with l o c a t o r s h o t s t o t h e Apollo l u n a r s c i e n t i f i c experiment package and t o t h e l u n a r module p r i o r t o samp l i n g , and s t e r e o photographs were t a k e n o f t h e two " f o o t b a l l - s i z e " rocks before t h e y were removed from t h e s u r f a c e . The l o c a t i o n of t h e Apollo . l u n a r s c i e n t i f i c experiment package and t h e sampling and photographic s i t e s f o r t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y are shown i n f i g u r e 3-1.

3-15
The t r a v e r s e during t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y covered a t o t a l d i s t a n c e o f about 10 000 feet. The a c t u a l l i n e of t r a v e r s e i s s h a m i n f i g u r e 3-1. The crew reached a p o i n t w i t h i n about 50 feet of t h e r i m of Cone Crater. The crew w a s behind t h e t i m e l i n e when t h e y neared t h e rim of t h e c r a t e r ; t h e r e f o r e , s e v e r a l o f t h e preplanned samp l e and photographic s t a t i o n s along t h e r o u t e back t o t h e l u n a r module were omitted. There w a s d i f f i c u l t y i n navigating t o s e v e r a l of t h e preplanned s t a t i o n p o i n t s because of t h e undulations i n t h e s u r f a c e which prevented s i g h t i n g of t h e smaller landmarks t h a t were t o be used. The crew c o l l e c t e d approximately 96 pounds of rock fragments and s o i l samples. Approximately 25 samples can be a c c u r a t e l y l o c a t e d u s i n g photographs and t h e air-to-ground t r a n s c r i p t , and t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of 12 t o 15 on t h e lunar s u r f a c e p r i o r t o t h e i r removal can be e s t a b l i s h e d . Driving t h e core tubes with a rock hammer w a s somewhat d i f f i c u l t . The double and t r i p l e cores could not be d r i v e n t h e i r f u l l l e n g t h , and t h e . m a t e r i a l i n t h e s i n g l e core f e l l out upon removal of t h e core t u b e because o f t h e g r a n u l a r n a t u r e o f t h e material. Some sample material w a s recovered f r o m t h e double and t r i p l e core t u b e s . The only geologic equipment problems r e p o r t e d were t h a t t h e contingency sample bag cracked when f o l d e d , and t h e vacuum seal p r o t e c t o r on one o f t h e s p e c i a l environmental sample c o n t a i n e r s came o f f when t h e c o n t a i n e r w a s opened.

3.6 LUNARSOIL MECHANICS
Lunar s u r f a c e e r o s i o n r e s u l t e d from t h e descent engine exhaust as observed i n previous l u n a r landings. Dust w a s f i r s t noted during des c e n t at an a l t i t u d e of 100 f e e t but d i d not h i n d e r v i s i b i l i t y during t h e f i n a l approach. The l u n a r module footpad p e n e t r a t i o n on landing appears t o have been greater t h a n t h a t observed on previous Apollo l a n d i n g s . Bootprint p e n e t r a t i o n s f o r t h e crew ranged from 1 / 2 t o 3/4 inch on l e v e l ground i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e l u n a r module t o 4 inches on t h e rims of s m a l l craters. Lunar s o i l adhered extensively t o t h e crewmen's c l o t h i n g and e q u i p e n t as' i n earlier Apollo missions. Tracks from t h e modular equip-merit t r a n s p o r t e r were 1/4 t o 3/4 inch deep and were smooth. The Apollo simple penetrometer ( a l s o used as t h e geophone cable anchor) w a s used f o r t h r e e p e n e t r a t i o n t e s t s . I n each c a s e , t h e 26 1/2inch-long penetrometer could be pushed t o a depth of 16 t o 19 inches w i t h one hand and t o t h e extension handle with both hands. No penetrat i o n i n t e r f e r e n c e a t t r i b u t a b l e t o rocks w a s encountered.

3-16
A s o i l mechanics t r e n c h w a s dug i n t h e r i m of a s m a l l c r a t e r n e a r North T r i p l e t Crater. Excavation w a s e a s y , b u t w a s t e r m i n a t e d at a depth of 18 inches because t h e t r e n c h w a l l s were c o l l a p s i n g . Three d i s t i n c t l a y e r s were observed and sampled: (1)The s u r f a c e m a t e r i a l w a s dark brown and fine-grained, (2) The middle layer w a s t h i n and composed predominantly of g l a s s y patches. ( 3 ) The lower layer w a s very l i g h t colored g r a n u l a r material.

3.7

MODULAR EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTER

The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r ( d e s c r i b e d i n appendix A, sect i o n A . 2 . 1 and shown i n f i g . 3-7) w a s deployed at t h e beginning of t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . Deployment w a s impeded by t h e thermal blanket which r e s t r a i n e d t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r from r o t a t i n g down from t h e bottom of t h e modular equipment stowage assembly. The crew r e l e a s e d . t h e t r a n s p o r t e r by p u l l i n g t h e upper pip-pins and allowing t h e t r a n s p o r t e r and thermal blanket t o f a l l freely t o t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e . The thermal b l a n k e t w a s e a s i l y d i s c a r d e d and e r e c t i o n o f t h e t r a n s p o r t e r went as planned. The t i r e s had i n f l a t e d as expected. Equipment w a s loaded on t h e t r a n s p o r t e r without d i f f i c u l t y . Two of t h e t h r e e pieces of Velcro which h e l d t h e l u n a r maps on t h e t r a n s p o r t e r handles came o f f at t h e beginning of t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . These p i e c e s had been glued on a s u r f a c e having a d i f f e r e n t f i n i s h than t h e one t o which t h e Velcro adhered. The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r s t a b i l i t y w a s adequate during both t r a v e r s e s . Rotation i n r o l l w a s f e l t by t h e crewman through t h e handle but w a s easily r e s t r a i n e d by using a t i g h t e r g r i p i f t h e r o t a t i o n sensed w a s excessive. The j o i n t e d l e g s i n t h e f r o n t o f t h e - t r a n s p o r t e r operated as expected i n t h a t they f l e x e d when h i t and would s p r i n g back t o t h e v e r t i c a l p o s i t i o n r e a d i l y . The smooth rubber t i r e s threw no n o t i c e a b l e d u s t . N d u s t w a s noted on t h e wheel fenders o r on t o p of t h e m e t a l o frame o f t h e t r a n s p o r t e r . The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r w a s c a r r i e d by both crewmen at one p o i n t in t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y t o reduce t h e e f f o r t r e q u i r e d f o r one crewman t o p u l l t h e v e h i c l e . This w a s done f o r a s h o r t p e r i o d of t i m e because it w a s b e l i e v e d t o be more e f f e c t i v e when t r a v e l i n g over c e r t a i n types of t e r r a i n .

3-17

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F i g u r e 3-7. - Modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r i n use during t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d .

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3.8

APOLLO LANDING SITES

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Figure 3-8.- Apollo landing site and hardware locations on lunar surface.

4.0

LUNAR ORBITAL EXPERIMENTS

Four lunar o r b i t a l experiments w e r e conducted on Apollo 1 4 : t h e S-band transponder experiment, t h e downlink b i s t a t i c r a d a r experiment, gegenschein/Moulton p o i n t photography from lunar o r b i t , and t h e Apollo window micrometeoroid experiment ( a space exposure experiment not req u i r i n g crew p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) . Detailed o b j e c t i v e s a s s o c i a t e d with photography while i n l u n a r o r b i t and during t r a n s e a r t h f l i g h t are d i s c u s s e d i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e aforementioned experiments. The e v a l u a t i o n s of t h e lunar o r b i t a l experiments given h e r e are based on preliminary data. F i n a l r e s u l t s w i l l be published i n a s e p a r a t e s c i e n c e r e p o r t (appendix E ) when t h e d a t a have been completely analyzed.

4.1

S-BAND TRANSPONDER

The S-band transponder experiment w a s designed t o d e t e c t v a r i a t i o n s

i n t h e l u n a r g r a v i t a t i o n a l f i e l d caused by mass concentrations and d e f i c i e n c i e s , and e s t a b l i s h g r a v i t a t i o n a l p r o f i l e s of t h e s p a c e c r a f t ground t r a c k s . This w i l l be accomplished by a n a l y s i s of d a t a obtained from S-band Doppler t r a c k i n g of t h e command and s e r v i c e module and l u n a r module using t h e normal s p a c e c r a f t S-band systems. There were same d i f f i c u l t i e s during t h e prime d a t a c o l l e c t i o n p e r i o d ( r e v o l u t i o n s 3 through 1 4 ) . Two-way t e l e m e t r y lock w a s l o s t many times during r e v o l u t i o n s 6 and 9 because of t h e high-gain antenna problem, making t h e d a t a f o r t h o s e revolutions e s s e n t i a l l y useless. A t o t h e r times maneuvers, o r i e n t a t i o n s , and other o p e r a t i o n s i n t e r f e r e d with t h e data. However, s u f f i c i e n t d a t a were received t o permit s u c c e s s f u l completion of t h e experiment o b j e c t i v e s . Preliminary i n d i c a t i o n s are t h a t t h e m a s s concentrations i n Nectaris w i l l be b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d and t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of g r a v i t a t i o n a l f o r c e s a s s o c i a t e d with t h e Fra Mauro formation w i l l be b e t t e r known. The d a t a w i l l a l s o permit o t h e r f e a t u r e s t o be evaluated. 4.2 BISTATIC RADAR

The o b j e c t i v e s of t h e b i s t a t i c r a d a r experiment were t o o b t a i n data

on lunar s u r f a c e roughness and t h e depth of t h e r e g o l i t h t o a l i m i t of 30 t o 60 feet. The experiment w a s a l s o designed t o determine t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e B r e w s t e r a n g l e , which is a f u n c t i o n of t h e bulk d i e l e c t r i c constant of t h e l u n a r material. N s p a c e c r a f t equipment o t h e r than t h e noro m a l s p a c e c r a f t systems w a s required f o r t h e experiment. The experiment data c o n s i s t s of records of VHF and S-band transmissions from t h e cammand

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and s e r v i c e module during t h e f r o n t s i d e pass on r e v o l u t i o n 25, w i t h ground-based d e t e c t i o n of both t h e d i r e c t c a r r i e r s i g n a l s and t h e s i g n a l s r e f l e c t e d from the l u n a r s u r f a c e . Both t h e VHF and S-band equipment performed a required during r e v o l u t i o n 25. The r e t u r n e d s i g n a l s s of b o t h frequencies were of p r e d i c t e d s t r e n g t h . Strong r a d a r echoes were r e c e i v e d throughout t h e pass and frequency, phase, p o l a r i z a t i o n and amplitude were recorded. S u f f i c i e n t d a t a were c o l l e c t e d t o determine, i n p a r t , t h e Brewster angle.

4.3

GEGENsCHEIN/MOULTON POINT PHOTOGRAPHY FROM LUNAR ORBIT

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The experiment r e q u i r e d t h r e e sets of photographs t o be taken t o h e l p d i f f e r e n t i a t e between two t h e o r e t i c a l explanations o f t h e gegens c h e i n ( f i g . 4-1). Each set c o n s i s t e d o f two 20-second exposures and
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.- Camera aiming d i r e c t i o n s

f o r gegenschein/ Moult on p o i n t photography.

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one 5-second exposure t a k e n i n r a p i d succession. One s e t w a s obtained of t h e e a r t h o r b i t s t a b i l i t y point i n t h e earth-sun system (Maulton p o i n t ) t o t e s t t h e theory t h a t t h e gegenschein i s l i g h t r e f l e c t e d from a conc e n t r a t i o n of p a r t i c l e s captured about t h e Maulton p o i n t . Two a d d i t i o n a l sets were taken t o t e s t another theory that t h e glow i s l i g h t r e f l e c t e d f r o m i n t e r p l a n e t a r y dust t h a t i s seen i n t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n . I n t h i s t h e o r y , t h e b r i g h t e n i n g i n t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n i s thought t o be due t o higher r e f l e c t i v i t y of p a r t i c l e s e x a c t l y opposite t h e sun. For an observer on e a r t h , t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n coincides with t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e Moulton point and t h e observer i s unable t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e t h e o r i e s . F'rom t h e moon t h e observer i s displaced from t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n by approximately 1 5 degrees, and t h e r e f o r e , can d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e two possible sources. The 16-DIEI a t a a c q u i s i t i o n camera w a s used with an 18-EUDo c a l d f l e n g t h l e n s . The camera w a s bracket-mounted i n t h e right-hand rendezvous window w i t h a r i g h t angle m i r r o r assembly a t t a c h e d ahead of t h e l e n s and a remote c o n t r o l e l e c t r i c a l cable a t t a c h e d t o t h e camera so t h a t t h e Command Module P i l o t could a c t u a t e t h e camera from t h e lower e q u i p m n t bay. The f l i g h t f i l m had s p e c i a l , low-light-level c a l i b r a t i o n exposures added t o it p r i o r t o and a f t e r t h e f l i g h t which w i l l permit photometric measurements o f t h e phenomena by means of photographic densitometer and i s o d e n s i t r a c e readings during d a t a reduction. The invest i g a t o r s a l s o obtained ground photography of t h e phenomena u s i n g i d e n t i c a l equipment and film p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of Apollo 1 4 data c o l l e c t i o n . The experiment was accomplished during t h e 15th r e v o l u t i o n of t h e moon. The aiming and f i l m i n g were e x c e l l e n t and t h e experiment has denio n s t r a t e d t h a t long exposures are p r a c t i c a b l e .

4.4

APOLLO WINDOW METEOROID EXPERIMENT

The obdective of t h i s experiment i s t o determine t h e meteoroid c r a t e r i n g f l u x f o r p a r t i c l e s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e degradation of glass surfaces exposed t o t h e space environment. The Apollo connnand module windows are used as meteoroid d e t e c t o r s . P r i o r t o f l i g h t , t h e windows are scanned at 20x t o determine t h e general background of chips, s c r a t c h e s and o t h e r d e f e c t s . During p o s t l f i g h t i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , t h e windows w i l l again be scehned at 20x t o map a l l v i s i b l e d e f e c t s . The p o i n t s of i n t e r est w i l l t h e n be magnified up t o 7 6 5 ~ o r further examination. The f Apollo 1 2 and 13 s i d e windows and hatch windows were examined following t h o s e flights and t h e r e s u l t s w e r e compared w i t h p r e f l i g h t scans. No meteoroid impacts larger than 50 microns i n diameter were d e t e c t e d on t h e Apollo 12 windows although t h e r e w a s an i n c r e a s e i n t h e number of c h i p s and o t h e r low-speed surface e f f e c t s . The Apollo 13 left-hand-side srindow had a suspected nreteoroid impact 500 microns i n diameter.

4-4
4.5
DIM-LIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY

Low-brightness astronomical l i g h t sources were photographe, using le t h e 16-mm d a t a a c q u i s i t i o n camera with t h e 18-IIUU n s . The sources i n cluded t h e z o d i a c a l l i g h t , t h e g a l a c t i c l i g h t , t h e l u n a r l i b r a t i o n region (L4) and t h e dark s i d e of t h e e a r t h .
A l l s t a r f i e l d s have been r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i e d and camera p o i n t i n g appears t o have been w i t h i n one degree of t h e d e s i r e d aiming p o i n t s with less t h a n one-third of a degree of i m a g e motion f o r f i x e d p o s i t i o n s . This i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s requested p r i o r t o f l i g h t , and it confirms t h a t longer exposures, which had been o r i g i n a l l y d e s i r e d , w i l l be poss i b l e f o r s t u d i e s such as t h e s e on f u t u r e Apollo missions. The z o d i a c a l l i g h t i s apparent t o t h e unaided eye on at least h a l f of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e frames. The g a l a c t i c l i g h t survey and lunar l i b r a t i o n frames are f a i n t and w i l l r e q u i r e c a r e f u l work. Earth-darkside frames of l i g h t n i n g p a t -V t e r n s , earth-darkside photography during t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t , and sI B photographs were overexposed and are unusable.

46 .

COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE ORBITAL SCIENCE PHOTOGRAPHY

This photography c o n s i s t e d of g e n e r a l coverage t o provide a b a s i s f o r s i t e s e l e c t i o n f o r f u r t h e r photography, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l u n a r surf a c e features and t h e i r e v o l u t i o n , end i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of s p e c i f i c areas and features f o r study. The Apollo l u n a r missions have i n t h e p a s t obt a i n e d photographs of t h e s e areas + targets-of-opportunity o r i n support of s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s . The Apollo 13 S-IVB impact area w a s given h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y i n o r b i t al s c i e n c e photography. The t a r g e t w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired on revolut i o n 34 using t h e Hasselblad camera with t h e 500l e n s , and t h e crew o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t t o compensate f o r t h e s p a c e c r a f t ' s motion. Second p r i o r i t y w a s given t o t h e l u n a r module landing t a r g e t which w a s obt a i n e d with t h e l u n a r topographic camera on r e v o l u t i o n 1 4 . However, t h e camera malfunctioned and subsequent photography with t h i s camera w a s d e l e t e d ( s e c t i o n 14.3.1).
A t o t a l of eight photographic t a r g e t s w a s planned f o r hand-held photography using c o l o r f i l m ; t h r e e were t o be t a k e n with t h e 500-mm lens ( a t o t a l of 35 l u n a r d e g r e e s ) , and f i v e with t h e 250+m l e n s ( a t o t a l o f ' 130 l u n a r degrees ). The 500-mu t a r g e t s were s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired. Three of t h e f i v e 250-nrm t a r g e t s were d e l e t e d i n real-time f o r o p e r a t i o n a l

4-5
reasons (60 lunar degrees), and two w e r e s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired (70 l u n a r degrees). A t o t a l of 65 percent of o f f - t r a c k photography has been succ e s s f u l l y acquired.

The e a r t h s h i n e t a r g e t w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired using both t h e Hasselblad d a t a camera with t h e 80-mm l e n s and t h e 16-~III data a c q u i s i t i o n camera with t h e 18-m l e n s .

4.7

PHOTOGRAPHS OF A CANDIDATE EXPLORATION SITE

High-resolution photographs of p o t e n t i a l landing s i t e s a r e r e q u i r e d f o r touchdown hazard evaluation and p r o p e l l a n t budget d e f i n i t i o n . They a l s o provide d a t a f o r crew t r a i n i n g and onboard n a v i g a t i o n a l data. The photographs on t h i s mission were t o be taken w i t h t h e l u n a r topographic camera on r e v o l u t i o n 4 (low o r b i t ) , and 27 and 28 (high o r b i t s ) . During r e v o l u t i o n 4, malfunction of t h e l u n a r topographic camera w a s noted by the Command Module P i l o t . On r e v o l u t i o n s 27, 28, and 30, t h e 70-mm Hasselbald camera w i t h t h e 500-mm l e n s ( l u n a r topographic camera backup system) w a s used t o obtain t h e r e q u i r e d photography. About 40 frames were obtained of t h e Descartes region on each r e v o l u t i o n using t h e crew o p t i c a l alignment sight t o compensate f o r i m a g e motion. The three t a r g e t s w e r e s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired.

To support t h e photography, a s t e r e o s t r i p w a s taken w i t h t h e Hasselblad d a t a camera with t h e 80-mm l e n s from terminator-to-terminator i n c l u d i n g t h e crew o p t i c a l alignment sight maneuver f o r camera c a l i b r a t i o n .

4.8

V I S I B I L I T Y AT HIGH SUN ANGLES

This photography w a s accomplished t o o b t a i n o b s e r v a t i o n a l data i n t h e lunar environment f o r evaluating t h e a b i l i t y of t h e crew t o i d e n t i f y f e a t u r e s under viewing and l i g h t i n g conditions s i m i l a r t o those t h a t would be encountered during descent f o r a T p l u s 24 hour launch. The results will have a bearing on decisions t o land at higher sun a n g l e s , which, i n t u r n , could e a s e launch and f l i g h t c o n s t r a i n t s . Photography of t h e lunar s u r f a c e i n support of t h i s d e t a i l e d o b j e c t i v e w a s obtained using the Hasselblad data camera and t h e 8 - m l e n s . This w a s done f o r 0m t h r e e t a r g e t s , two on t h e moon's far s i d e and one on i t s near s i d e .

I

4-6
4.9 TRANSEARTH LUNAR PHOTOGRAPHY
Photographs were taken of t h e v i s i b l e d i s c of t h e moon after t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n t o provide changes i n p e r s p e c t i v e geometry, p r i m a r i l y i n l a t i t u d e . The photographs w i l l be used t o relate t h e p o s i t i o n s of lunar features at higher l a t i t u d e s t o features whose p o s i t i o n s are known through landmark t r a c k i n g and e x i s t i n g o r b i t a l s t e r e o s t r i p s . The photography w a s s u c c e s s f u l using t h e Hasselblad d a t a camera w i t h t h e 80-mm l e n s and black-and-white film. Additional coverage with t h e 70-mm Hasselblad camera and t h e 250-mm l e n s using c o l o r film w a s a l s o obtained.

I Y

. .
L

I*

i-

L. .

I
5-1

5 .O

I N n I G H T DEMONSTRATIONS

I n f l i g h t demonstrations were conducted t o e v a l u a t e t h e behavior of p h y s i c a l processes o f i n t e r e s t under t h e near-weightless conditions of space. Four c a t e g o r i e s of processes were demonstrated, and segments of t h e demonstrations were t e l e v i s e d over a 30-minute period d u r i n g t r a n s e a r t h f l i g h t beginning at approximately 172 hours. F i n a l r e s u l t s of a l l four demonstrations w i l l be published i n a supplemental r e p o r t a f t e r analy s i s of d a t a has been completed. (See appendix E . )

5.1 ELECTROPHOFETIC SEPARATION
Most organic molecules, when placed i n s l i g h t l y a c i d o r a l k a l i n e water s o l u t i o n s , w i l l move through them i f an e l e c t r i c f i e l d i s a p p l i e d . This e f f e c t i s known as e l e c t r o p h o f e s i s . Molecules of d i f f e r e n t subs t a n c e s move at d i f f e r e n t speeds; t h u s , some molecules w i l l outrun o t h e r s as they move from one end of a tube of s o l u t i o n toward t h e o t h e r . This process might be e x p l o i t e d t o prepare pure samples of o r g a n i c m a t e r i a l s f o r a p p l i c a t i o n s i n medicine and b i o l o g i c a l research i f problems due t o sample Sedimentation and sample mixing by convection can be overcome.
A s m a l l f l u i d e l e c t r o p h o r e s i s demonstration apparatus ( f i g . 5-1) w a s used t o demonstrate t h e q u a l i t y of t h e s e p a r a t i o n s obtained w i t h t h r e e sample mixtures having widely d i f f e r e n t molecular weights. They were: (1) a mixture of r e d and blue organic dyes, ( 2 ) human hemoglobin, and ( 3 ) DNA ( t h e molecules t h a t carry g e n e t i c codes) from salmon sperm.

Postmission review of t h e f i l m e d data reveals t h a t t h e r e d and b l u e organic dyes s e p a r a t e d as expected; however, s e p a r a t i o n of t h e hemoglobin and DNA cannot be d e t e c t e d . P o s t f l i g h t examination of t h e apparatus i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e samples were not r e l e a s e d e f f e c t i v e l y t o permit good s e p a r a t i o n , causing t h e dyes t o streak. However, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e dyes s e p a r a t e d supports t h e p r i n c i p l e of e l e c t r o p h o r e t i c s e p a r a t i o n and shows t h a t sedimentation and convection e f f e c t s a r e e f f e c t i v e l y suppressed i n t h e space environment. The hemoglobin and DNA samples d i d not s e p a r a t e because they contained b a c t e r i a t h a t consumed t h e o r g a n i c molecules p r i o r t o a c t i v a t i o n , o f t h e apparatus.
5.2

~

LIQUID TRANSFER

The l i q u i d t r a n s f e r demonstration ( f i g . 5-2) was designed t o evalua t e t h e use of tank b a f f l e s i n t r a n s f e r r i n g a l i q u i d from one t a n k t o

NASA-S-71-1626

Figure 5-1.- Electrophoresis demonstration unit.

I
5-3

NASA-S-7 1-1627

I

-

5-4
another under near-zero-gravity conditions. The demonstration w a s conducted using two s e t s of t a n k s , one s e t containing b a f f l e s and t h e o t h e r without b a f f l e s . Transfer of l i q u i d between t h e unbaffled t a n k s w a s uns u c c e s s f u l , a expected. Transfer between t h e b a f f l e d t a n k s demonstrated s t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of two d i f f e r e n t b a f f l e designs. Photographic d a t a i n d i c a t e t h a t both designs were successful i n p e r m i t t i n g l i q u i d t r a n s f e r .

5.3 HEAT F O AND CONVECTION LW
The purpose of t h e h e a t flow and convection 'demonstration ( f i g . 5-3) was t o o b t a i n data on t h e types and amounts of convection t h a t can occur i n t h e near-weightless environment o f space. Normal 'convective flow i s almost suppressed under t h e s e conditions ; however, convective f l u i d flow can occur i n space by means of mechanisms o t h e r than g r a v i t y . For i n s t a n c e , s u r f a c e tension gradients and, i n some c a s e s , residual accelerat i o n s cause low-level f l u i d flow. .Four independent c e l l s of s p e c i a l design were used t o detect convection d i r e c t l y , o r d e t e c t convective e f f e c t s by measurement of heat flow rates i n f l u i d s . The heat flow rates were v i s u a l l y displayed by c o l o r - s e n s i t i v e , l i q u i d c r y s t a l t h e r m a l s t r i p s and t h e c o l o r changes filmed w i t h a 16-rn data camera. R e v i e w of t h e f i l m has shown t h a t t h e expected data were obtained.

5.4

COMPOSITE CASTING

T h i s demonstration w a s designed t o e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t of near-zerog r a v i t y on t h e preparation of c a s t metals, fiber-strengthened materials, and s i n g l e c r y s t a l s . Specimens were processed i n E s m a l l h e a t i n g chamb e r ( f i g . 5-4) and returned f o r examination and t e s t i n g . A t o t a l of 1 specimens w a s processed. N problems w i t h t h e procedures o r equip: 1 o ment were noted. A x-ray of t h e samples v e r i f i e d t h a t good mixing n occurred.

1 L

i

5-5

NASA-S-71-1628

Figure 5-3.- Heat flow and convection demonstration unit.

5-6

6 .o

TRAJECrORY

The general t r e j e c t o r y p r o f i l e of t h i s mission w a s similar t o t h a t of previous l u n a r missions except f o r a f e w innovations and refinements i n some of t h e maneuvers. These changes were : ( a ) The s e r v i c e propuls i o n system w a s used t o perform t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver placing t h e command and service modules i n t h e low-perilune o r b i t ( 9 . 1 miles). ( b ) A d i r e c t rendezvous w a s performed using t h e ascent propulsion system t o perform t h e t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver. Tables 6-1 and 6-11 give t h e t i m e s of major f l i g h t events and d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e events; t a b l e s 6-111 and 6-IV c o n t a i n t r a j e c t o r y parameter i n f o r mation; and table 6-v i s a summary of maneuver data.

6.1

LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR TRAJECTORIES

The launch t r a j e c t o r y i s r e p o r t e d i n r e f e r e n c e 5. The S-IVB w a s t a r g e t e d f o r t h e t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n maneuver t o achieve a 2022-mile pericynthion f r e e - r e t u r n t r a j e c t o r y . The comand and s e r v i c e module/ lunar module t r e j e c t o r y w a s altered 28 hours l a t e r by t h e f i r s t midcourse c o r r e c t i o n which placed t h e combined s p a c e c r a f t on a hybrid t r a j e c t o r y with a pericynthion of 67.0 miles. A second midcourse correct i o n , 46 hours l a t e r , lowered t h e pericynthion t o 60.7 m i l e s . A f t e r s p a c e c r a f t s e p a r a t i o n , t h e S-IVB performed a programmed prop e l l a n t dump and two a t t i t u d e maneuvers t h a t d i r e c t e d t h e v e h i c l e t o a l u n a r impact. The impact coordinates were 8 degrees 05 minutes 35 seeonds south l a t i t u d e and 26 degrees 0 1 minute 23 seconds w e s t longitude; 156 miles from t h e prelaunch t a r g e t p o i n t but w i t h i n t h e nominal impact zone.

6.2 6.2.1

LUNAR ORBIT

O r b i t a l Trajectory

The s e r v i c e propulsion system w a s used t o perform t h e l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver. 'The o r b i t achieved had an apocynthion of 169 miles and a pericynthion of 58.1 miles. After two lunar r e v o l u t i o n s , t h e servi c e propulsion system w a s again used, t h i s t i m e t o perform t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver which placed t h e combined s p a c e c r a f t i n an o r b i t with a pericynthion of 9.1 m i l e s . On previous missions, t h e l u n a r module descent propulsion system w a s used t o perform t h i s maneuver. The use o f t h e s e r v i c e propulsion system allows t h e l u n a r module t o maintain a

TABLE 6-1. SEQUENCE O EVENTS' F
Elapsed t i m e , h r :min :s e c Range z e r o 21:03:02 G . m . t . , January 31, 1971 Lift-off 21:03:02.6 G . m . t . , January 31, 1971 l'ranslunar i n j e c t i o n maneuver, F i r i n g t i m e = 350.8 s e c rrans l u n a r i n j e c t i o n S-IVB/command module s e p a r a t i o n l'ranslunar docking Spacecraft e j e c t i o n F i r s t midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , F i r i n g time = 10.1 s e c Second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , F i r i n g t i m e = 0.65 s e c Lunar o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , F i r i n g t i m e = 370.8 s e c S-IVB l u n a r impact Descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , F i r i n g time = 20.8 sec Lunar module undocking and s e p a r a t i o n C i r c u l a r i z a t i o n maneuver, F i r i n g t i m e = 4 s e c Powered descent i n i t i a t i o n , F i r i n g t i m e = 764.6 s e c Lunar l a n d i n g S t a r t first extravehicular a c t i v i t y F i r s t data f r c n n Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment package Plane change, F i r i n g t i m e = 18.5 s e c Complete f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y S t a r t second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y End second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y Lunar l i f t - o f f , F i r i n g time = 432.1 s e c Vernier adjustment maneuver, F i r i n g time = 12.1 s e c Terminal phase i n i t i a t i o n Terminal phase f i n a l i z a t i o n Docking Lunar module j e t t i s o n S e p a r a t i o n maneuver Lunar module d e o r b i t maneuver, F i r i n g t i m e = 76.2 s e c Lunar module l u n a r impact T r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n , F i r i n g t i m e = 149.2 s e c T h i r d midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , F i r i n g time = 3.0 s e c Command module/service module s e p a r a t i o n Entry i n t e r f a c e . Begin blackout End black out Drogue deployment Landing

-

-

-

02 :28:32 02 :34 :32 03 :02:29 04 :56:56 05 :47 :14 30 :36 :08 76 :58 :12 81 :56 :41 82:37:52 86:10:53 103 :47 :42 105:11:46 108 :02:27 108:15 :09 113:39 :ll 116 :47:58 117 :29:33 118:27:01 131 :08:13 135 :42:54 141 :45 :40 141 :56 :49 142:30 :51 143 :13:29 143 :32 :51 145 :44 :58 145 :49 :43 147 :14:17 147:42:23 148 :36 :02 165 :34:57 215 :32 :42 215 :47 :45 215 :48:02 215:51:19 215 :56 :08 216 :01:58

"see table 6-11 f o r event d e f i n i t i o n s .

6- 3
TABLE 6-11.Event Range z e r o

1

I

DEFINITION OF EVENT TIMES

Definition

Final i n t e g r a l second b e f o r e l i f t - o f f
t

Lift-off
Translunar i n j e c t i o n maneuver s-IVB/cCmmand module r e p a r a t i o n . t r m r l u n a r docking, r p a c e c r a f t e j e c t i o n . lmar module undocking and s e p a r a t i o n . docking. and coma d module l a n d i n g Conund and rervice module and l u n a r module compute r-cant rolled maneuvem

I n s t m e n t a t i o n u n i t u m b i l i c a l disconnect S t a r t t a n k d i s c h a r g e valve opening, allowing fuel t o be plrmped t o t h e S-IVB engine

The time of t h e event baaed on analysis of s p a c e c r a f t rate and accelerometer data

The time t h e computer commands t h e engine on and off
h g i n e i g n i t i o n M i n d i c a t e d by t h e appropriate engine b i l e v e l t e l e m e t r y measurement
1

Commnd and s e r v i c e module and lunar module non-computer-controlled maneuvers
S-IVB l u n a r impact Lunar module descent engine c u t o f f time Lunar module impact

Loss o f S-band transponder s i g n a l
B g i n e c u t o f f e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e beginning o f drop i n t h w t chamber p r e s s u r e

The time t h e f i n a l data p o i n t is t r a n s m i t t e d from t h e v e h i c l e t e l e m e t r y system
P i n t c o n t a c t o f a l u n a r module landing pad with t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e as d e r i v e d from analy s i s of s p a c e c r a f t rate data

I u n u landing

Beginning ,of e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y End of e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y Apollo lunar rurface experiment package fint data Comaad module/service module s e p a r a t i o n

The t i m e cabin p r e s s u r e reaches 3 psi.
depressurization

during

i

The t i m e cabin p r e s s u r e reaches 3 p s i a during repressurization
Receipt of f i n t data considered t o be v a l i d from t h e Apollo l u n a r r u r f a c e experiment package telemetry system Separation i n d i c a t e d by command module/service module r e p a r a t i o n r e l q y s A and B v i a t h e telemetry syrtem

Entry i n t e r f a c e

The time t h e cormund module reaches bo0 000 feet g e o d e t i c a l t i t u d e u i n d i c a t e d by t h e b e s t estimate of t h e t r . j c c t o y
S-band coarmnication l o r e due t o d r i o n i z a t i o n during e n t y
A and

i

Begin and end blackout

Drogue d e p l q m e n t
Earth landing

Deployment i n d i c a t e d by drogue deploy relays B r i a t h e telemetry ryrt-

The t i m e t h e command module touches t h e vater Y determined from accelerometem

t
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TABLE 6-111.- TRAJECZdRY PAMXBZEd

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5 W.8 5 m.5 5 435.8

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7.38 8

118.56 I 178.35 I 1.s7 Y

60.11

60.3

5 2n.3 5 342.1 5 565.6

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51.i 51.t
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6-5
TABLE 6-1v.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS

TrqJectory Darnmetere Geodetic l a t i t u d e

Definition
The s p h e r i c a l coordinate measured along e meridian on t h e e a r t h from t h e e q u a t o r t o t h e p o i n t d i r e c t l y beneath t h e s p a c e c r a f t , deg

Selenographic l a t i t u d e

The d e f i n i t i o n i s t h e same 8s t h a t of t h e g e o d e t i c l e t i tude except t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e body is t h e moon r a t h e r then t h e e a r t h , deg The s p h e r i c a l c o o r d i n a t e , as measured i n t h e e q u a t o r i a l p l a n e , between t h e plene of t h e r e f e r e n c e body's prime meridian and t h e plane o f t h e s p a c e c r a f t meridian, dey, The the the the the d i s t a n c e measured along e v e c t o r from t h e c e n t e r of e a r t h t o t h e spacecraft.. When t h e r e f e r e n c e body i s moon, it is t h e d i s t a n c e measured from t h e r a d i u s o f landing s i t e t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t along a v e c t o r from c e n t e r of t h e moon t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t , f t or miles

Longitude

Altitude

Space- f i x e d v e l o c i t y

Magnitude o f t h e i n e r t i a l v e l o c i t y v e c t o r referenced t o t h e body-centered, i n e r t i a l r e f e r e n c e coordinate system, ft/sec Flight-path angle measured p o s i t i v e upward from t h e bodycentered l o c a l h o r i z o n t a l plane t o t h e i n e r t i a l v e l o c i t y v e c t o r , deg Angle of t h e p r o J e c t i o n o f t h e i n e r t i a l v e l o c i t y v e c t o r onto t h e body-centered l o c a l h o r i z o n t a l p l a n e , measured p o s i t i v e eastward from n o r t h , deg The p o i n t of maximum o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e of t h e s p a c e c r a f t above t h e c e n t e r o f t h e e a r t h , miles The p o i n t of minimum o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e of t h e s p a c e c r a f t above t h e c e n t e r o f t h e e a r t h . miles The p o i n t o f maximum o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e above t h e moon as measured from t h e r a d i u s of t h e l u n a r landing s i t e , miles The p o i n t of minimum o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e above t h e moon as measured from t h e r a d i u s of t h e l u n a r l a n d i n g s i t e , miles

Space-fixed f l i g h t - p a t h angle

Space-fixed heading angle

Apogee Perigee Apocynthion Pericynthion Period Inclination Longitude o f t h e ascending node

Time r e q u i r e d f o r s p a c e c r a f t t o complete 360 degrees o f o r b i t r o t a t i o n , min
The t r u e an'gle between the s p a c e c r a f t o r b i t plane and t h e reference body's e q u a t o r i a l p l a n e , deg

The longitude at which t h e o r b i t p l a n e crosses t h e r e f e r ence body's e q u a t o r i a l plane going from t h e Southern t o t h e Northern Hemisphere, deg

6-6
TABLE

6-v.- MANEWER SUMMARY

Irtitud., de8:dn

mLlt-* dbg:8in

Lrrinl tim

hr :.in : . * c

4:lh I 2:56 I
2:os

172:24 w 17352 W 1=:52 w 167:bd 1 167rb1 I

82:15:19
&:ll:Za

I I

82:01:01
&:OO:b5

P r o P ~ i ~
I e r r l n pmpulsion

30:36:07.9

10.1 0.65

n.1
3.5

67 61

8130 8153

2:zl

8 . d c a propulsion

76:58:12

2:12 I

&:bo136

rgnitim time. hr:Lln:m*c

firing tin.
sec

81:56 : b o . 7 86:lo:53 103: h7 :b1.6 105:l.l A6.1 lo8:02:26.5 l.l7:29:33.1
1 b 1 :L5 :bO

370.8
20.8

3022.b 205.7
0.8

169 .o 58.8
60.2

58.1 9.1
7.8
56 .O

2.7

L .O
764 :6 18.5
L9.l
l2.1

77.2 6639.1 3T0.5 6066.1 10.3 88.5
32.0.

63.9

62.1 51.7 51.2

s7.7

8.5
8.b
b6.0

1b1:%: b9 .b

1L2:30 :s1.1 1b3:13:W .1 145 :b9 :b2.5

3.6 26.115.8 76.2

60 .l
61.5 63.4
56.1

58.2
56.8

3.b 186 .l

1 4 1:lb :16.9

-59.8

..
I

I

L

L

L-

L-

L

L

6-7
h i g h e r descent propulsion system p r o p e l l a n t margin. Both v e h i c l e s remained i n t h e low-pericynthion o r b i t u n t i l s h o r t l y a f t e r l u n a r module s e p a r a t i o n . After s e p a r a t i o n , t h e pericynthion of t h e command and servi c e modules w a s i n c r e a s e d t o 56 m i l e s and a plane-change maneuver w a s l a t e r executed t o e s t a b l i s h t h e proper conditions f o r rendezvous.
6.2.3

Lunar Descent

The powered descent and l u n a r landP r e p a r a t i o n s f o r l u n a r descent i n g were similar t o t h o s e of previous missions. However, t h e navigation performed i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r powered descent w a s more a c c u r a t e because of t h e command and s e r v i c e modules being i n t h e 58.8- by 9.1-mile descent o r b i t f o r 22 hours p r i o r t o powered descent i n i t i a t i o n . While i n t h i s o r b i t , t h e Network obtained long periods of radar t r a c k i n g of t h e unpert u r b e d s p a c e c r a f t from which a more accurate s p a c e c r a f t s t a t e v e c t o r w a s determined. The p o s i t i o n of t h e command module r e l a t i v e t o a known landmark n e a r t h e l a n d i n g s i t e w a s a c c u r a t e l y determined from s e x t a n t marks t a k e n on t h e landmark. Corrections f o r known o f f s e t angles between t h e landmark and t h e landing s i t e were used t o compute a v e c t o r t o t h e landi n g s i t e . This v e c t o r w a s s e n t t o t h e l u n a r module. Also, t h e Mission Control Center propagated t h i s v e c t o r forward t o t h e t i m e of landing t o p r e d i c t e r r o r s due t o navigation. This procedure w a s performed during t h e t w o r e v o l u t i o n s b e f o r e powered descent and a f i n a l landing s i t e update of 2800 f e e t w a s computed and relayed t o t h e crew. A f t e r i g n i t i o n f o r t h e powered descent, t h e crew manually i n s e r t e d t h e update i n t o t h e computer. Powered descent Trajectory c o n t r o l during descent w a s nominal, and only one t a r g e t redesignation of 350 f e e t l e f t (toward t h e s o u t h ) w a s made t o t a k e advantage of a smoother landing area. After manual t a k e o v e r , t h e crew f l e w approximately 2000 f e e t downrange and 300 f e e t n o r t h ( f i g . 6-1) because t h e t a r g e t e d coordinates of t h e landing s i t e given t o t h e l u n a r module computer were i n e r r o r by about 1800 f e e t . Coordinates of t h e landing p o i n t are 3 degrees 40 minutes 24 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 17 degrees 27 minutes 55 seconds w e s t l o n g i t u d e , which i s 55 feet n o r t h and 165 f e e t east of t h e prelaunch landing s i t e ( f i g . 6-2). ( F u r t h e r discussion of t h e descent i s contained i n s e c t i o n

.-

.-

8.6.)

6- 8

+J d
co
V

e ,

d
k 0

E
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i
M

4 C
k
4

C

a

5
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B k

a

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9 k
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6-9

0
d-

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0

6-10 6.2.3 Lunar Ascent and Rendezvous

Data source

Horizontal velocity, ft/sec

Radial velocity, ft /sec
30

A l t i t u d e , ft

Primary guidance and navigation system Powered f l i g h t processor Abort guidance system

5544 5544
5542

60 311
60 345
60 309

29 29

To accomplish a d i r e c t rendezvous with t h e command module, a rea c t i o n c o n t r o l system v e r n i e r adjustment maneuver of 1 0 . 3 f t / s e c w a s performed approximately 4 minutes a f t e r ascent engine c u t o f f . The maneuver w a s necessary because t h e l u n a r module ascent program i s t a r g e t e d t o achieve an i n s e r t i o n v e l o c i t y and not a s p e c i f i c p o s i t i o n v e c t o r . Direct rendezvous w a s nominal and docking occurred 1 hour 47 minutes 10 seconds a f t e r lunar l i f t - o f f . The l u n a r module rendezvous navigation w a s accomplished throughout t h e rendezvous phase and all s o l u t i o n s agreed c l o s e l y w i t h t h e ground s o l u t i o n . The comand module which w a s performing backup rendezvous navigation w a s not a b l e t o o b t a i n acceptable V F ranging d a t a u n t i l a f t e r H t h e t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver. The V F anomaly i s discussed i n H Figure 14-7 i s a comparison of t h e r e l a t i v e range as section 14.1.4. measured by l u n a r module rendezvous r a d a r and command module VHF, and determined from comnand module s t a t e v e c t o r s and t h e best-estimate t r a j e c t o r y propagations. The V F mark taken at 142:05:15 and incorporated H i n t o t h e command module computer's s t a t e v e c t o r f o r t h e l u n a r module caused an 8.8-mile r e l a t i v e range e r r o r . S e v e r a l s e x t a n t marks were taken after t h i s e r r o r w a s introduced. Because t h e computer weighs t h e V F marks more h e a v i l y than t h e s e x t a n t H marks, t h e a d d i t i o n a l s e x t a n t marks d i d not reduce t h e e r r o r s i g n i f i c a n t ly. The ranging problem apparently c l e a r e d up a f t e r t h e terminal phase

6-11
i n i t i a t i o n maneuver and t h e VHF w a s used s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f o r t h e midcourse c o r r e c t i o n s . Table 6-VI provides a summary or t h e rendezvous maneuver solutions.
TABLE

6-v1.

-

RENDEZVOUS SOLUTIONS

Computed v e l o c i t y change, f t /sec Maneuver Network
~~

Lunar module

Command and s e r v i c e module
V

Terminal phase initiation

v = fl = # = Z

63.0 1.0

v \r
:V
V

= 62.1 = 0.1
= 63.1

67.0

0.5 Vy = -69.2

fl =
v

= -67.4

Vt = 92.0

t

= 88.5 = -0.9 = 0.2 = 0.6 = 1.1 = -0.1 = 0.1

: V

=

96.6

F i r s t midcours e c o r r e c t i on

N ground o solution.

v v" vy

vt"

= 1.3 = -0.1 vy = -1.1 z vt = 1 . 7

vx

Second m i dcours e correction

N ground o solution.

v v"

v v" v;

= 0.6 = -0.2

Vy = -1.4 vt = 1.6

vy = -2.2 = 2.3

6.2.4

Lunar Module Deorbit

Two hours after docking, t h e command and s e r v i c e modules and lunar module were o r i e n t e d t o t h e lunar module d e o r b i t a t t i t u d e , undocked, and t h e command and s e r v i c e modules then s e p a r a t e d from t h e l u n a r module. The l u n a r module was d e o r b i t e d on t h i s mission, similar t o Apollo 12. n The d e o r b i t w a s performed t o e l i m i n a t e t h e l u n a r module as a o r b i t a l d e b r i s hazard f o r f u t u r e missions and to provide an impact t h a t could b e used as a c a l i b r a t e d impulse f o r t h e seismographic equipment. The r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system of t h e lunar module w a s used t o perform t h e 75-second d e o r b i t f i r i n g 1 hour 24 minutes 19.9 seconds a f t e r t h e command and s e r v i c e modules had separated from t h e l u n a r module. The l u n a r module impacted t h e l u n a r surface a t 3 degrees 25 minutes 12 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 19 degrees 40 minutes 1 second west longitude with a v e l o c i t y of about 5500 f e e t per second. This p o i n t w a s 36 miles from t h e Apollo 14 landing s i t e , 62 miles from t h e Apollo 1 2 landing s i t e , and 7 miles from t h e prelaunch t a r g e t p o i n t .

6-12

6.3 TRANSEARTH AND ENTRY TRAJECTORIES
A nominal t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n maneuver w a s performed a t about

Seventeen hours a f t e r t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n , t h e t h i r d and f i n a l midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s performed. F i f t e e n minutes Drior t o e n t e r i n g t h e e a r t h ' s atmosphere, t h e corn-The command module w a s t h e n o r i e n t e d t o blunt-end-forvrard f o r e a r t h e n t r y . Entry w a s nomi n a l and t h e s p a c e c r a f t landed i n t h e P a c i f i c Ocean less t h a n one m i l e from t h e prelaunch t a r g e t p o i n t .
mand module was s e p a r a t e d frolii t n e s e r v i c e nloduie.

148 hours 36 minutes.

6.4

SERVICE MODULE ENTRY

.

The s e r v i c e module should have e n t e r e d t h e e a r t h ' s atmosphere and i t s d e b r i s landed i n t h e P a c i f i c Ocean approximately 650 miles southwest of t h e command module landing p o i n t . No r a d a r coverage w a s planned n o r were t h e r e any s i g h t i n g s r e p o r t e d f o r confirmation.

7.0

COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE

7.1 STRUCTURALAND MECHANICAL S Y S T ~
S t r u c t u r a l loads on t h e s p a c e c r a f t during all phases of t h e mission were w i t h i n design l i m i t s . The p r e d i c t e d and c a l c u l a t e d loads at l i f t o f f , i n t h e region of maximum dynamic p r e s s u r e , at t h e end of f i r s t s t a g e boost, and during s t a g i n g w e r e similar t o t h o s e of previous missions. Camand module accelerometer d a t a p r i o r t o S-IC c e n t e r engine cutoff i n d i c a t e a s u s t a i n e d 5-hertz l o n g i t u d i n a l o s c i l l a t i o n with an amplitude of O.l7g, which i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t measured during previous f l i g h t s . Oscill a t i o n s during t h e S-I1 boost phase had a m a x i m u m measured amplitude of less t h a n 0.066 at a frequency o f 9 h e r t z . The amplitudes of both o s c i l l a t i o n s were w i t h i n acceptable s t r u c t u r a l design l i m i t s . . S i x attempts were required t o dock t h e command and s e r v i c e module with t h e lunar module following t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n . The measured rates and i n d i c a t e d r e a c t i o n control system t h r u s t e r a c t i v i t y during t h e f i v e unsuccessful docking attempts show t h a t capture should have occurred each t i m e . The mechanism w a s actuated and i n s p e c t e d i n t h e command module following docking. This i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e probe mechanical components w e r e f’unctioning normally, Subsequent undocking and docking while i n lunar o r b i t w e r e normal. The probe w a s r e t u r n e d f o r p o s t f l i g h t a n a l y s i s . The docking anomaly i s discussed i n d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 14.1.1.

7.2 7.2.1

ELECTRICAL P W R O E

Power D i s t r i b u t i o n

The e l e c t r i c a l power d i s t r i b u t i o n system performed normally except f o r two discrepancies. P r i o r t o e n t r y , when t h e b u s - t i e motor switches w e r e operated t o p u t t h e entry b a t t e r i e s on t h e main b u s s e s , b a t t e r y C w a s not p l a c e d on main bus B. This anomaly w a s discovered by t h e data review after t h e f l i g h t . P o s t f l i g h t c o n t i n u i t y checks revealed t h a t t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r t y i n g b a t t e r y C t o main bus B w a s i n o p e r a t i v e . This anomaly i s described i n s e c t i o n 14.1.7. The second discrepancy occurred during e n t r y . Procedures c a l l f o r

main bus d e a c t i v a t i o n , at 800 feet a l t i t u d e , by opening t h e bus t i e
motor switches. The crew reported t h a t operation of the proper switches d i d not remove power from t h e buses. The buses were manually d e a c t i v a t e d , after landing, by opening t h e i n - l i n e c i r c u i t breakers on Panel 275 ( a normal procedure). Review of d a t a i n d i c a t e d and p o s t f l i g h t t e s t s confirmed t h a t t h e motor s w i t c h which t i e d b a t t e r y A t o main bus A w a s ino p e r a t i v e . This anomaly i s described i n s e c t i o n 14.1.6.

7-2 7.2.2 Fuel Cells

The fuel c e l l s were a c t i v a t e d 48 hours p r i o r t o launch, conditioned f o r 4 h o u r s , and configured with f u e l c e l l 2 on t h e l i n e supplying a 20-ampere load as r e q u i r e d i n t h e countdown procedure. Fuel c e l l s 1 and 3 remained on open c i r c u i t u n t i l 5 hours p r i o r t o launch. A t launch, f u e l c e l l 1 w a s on main bus A with fuel c e l l 2 , and f u e l c e l l 3 w a s on main bus B. T h i s configuration w a s maintained throughout t h e f l i g h t . I n i t i a l l y , t h e load variance was approximately 5 amperes, b u t it stabil i z e d t o 3 o r 4 amperes e a r l y i n t h e f l i g h t . This i s normal and t y p i c a l of o t h e r f l i g h t s .
A l l f u e l c e l l parameters remained w i t h i n normal o p e r a t i n g l i m i t s and agreed with predicted f l i g h t v a l u e s . As expected, t h e f u e l c e l l 1 condenser-exit temperature e x h i b i t e d a p e r i o d i c f l u c t u a t i o n about every 6 minutes throughout t h e f l i g h t . This zero-gravity phenomenon w a s s i m i lar t o t h a t observed on all o t h e r f l i g h t s and has no e f f e c t on f u e l c e l l performance ( r e f . 6 ) .

"he f u e l c e l l s supplied 435 kW-h o f energy at an average c u r r e n t of 2 3 amperes p e r f u e l c e l l and a m e a n bus v o l t a g e of 29 v o l t s d u r i n g t h e mission. 7.2.3

Batteries

The comand and s e r v i c e module e n t r y and pyrotechnic b a t t e r i e s performed normally. Entry b a t t e r i e s A and B were both charged once at t h e launch s i t e and f i v e times d u r i n g f l i g h t with nominal charging performance. Load s h a r i n g and v o l t a g e d e l i v e r y were s a t i s f a c t o r y during each of t h e s e r v i c e propulsion firings. The b a t t e r i e s were e s s e n t i a l l y f u l l y charged at e n t r y .

7.3

CRYOGENIC STORAGE

Cryogenics were s a t i s f a c t o r i l y s u p p l i e d t o t h e f u e l c e l l s and t o t h e environmental control system throughout t h e mission. The configurat i o n changes made as a r e s u l t of t h e Apollo 1 3 oxygen t a n k f a i l u r e are described i n appendix A. A supplemental r e p o r t g i v i n g details of syst e m performance w i l l be i s s u e d at a l a t e r d a t e (appendix E ) . During p r e f l i g h t checkout o f t h e oxygen system, t h e s i n g l e - s e a t check v a l v e f o r tank 2 w a s found t o have f a i l e d i n t h e open position and was r e p l a c e d with an i n - l i n e double-seat v a l v e . During f l i g h t , t h i s valve allowed gas leakage i n t o t a n k 2 from t a n k 3. "he purpose of t h i s

7-3
valve i s p r i m a r i l y t o i s o l a t e tank 2 from t h e remainder of t h e system should t a n k 2 f a i l . Thus, i t w a s q u a l i f i e d at a r e v e r s e d i f f e r e n t i a l p r e s s u r e of 60 p s i d . This i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher t h a n t h a t normally experienced during a f l i g h t . Tests have been conducted t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e n a t u r e o f t h e check valve leakage at low p r e s s u r e d i f f e r e n t i a l and show t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s not detrimental t o operation under abnormal as w e l l as normal c o n d i t i o n s .

Two flow t e s t s on t h e oxygen system were conducted during f l i g h t . One w a s t o demonstrate t h e c a p a b i l i t y of t h e system t o support a d d i t i o n a l flow requirements f o r e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s . The o t h e r w a s t o determine t h e h e a t e r temperature w h i l e o p e r a t i n g w i t h t h e o q g e n d e n s i t y less t h a n 20 p e r c e n t . The i n t e n t of these two t e s t s w a s met and favorable results were obtained although t e s t procedures were modified because of t i m e c o n s t r a i n t s . The oxygen system i s capable of supporting t h e a n t i c i p a t e d requirements f o r Apollo 15 and subsequent missions. The lowd e n s i t y flow t e s t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e oxygen system can provide required f l o w - r a t e s at low d e n s i t i e s and t h e data obtained provides f o r a more a c c u r a t e assessment of h e a t e r operating temperature.
Consumable q u a n t i t i e s i n t h e cryogenic s t o r a g e system a r e discussed i n s e c t i o n 7.10.3.

7.4

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

The communications system s a t i s f a c t o r i l y supported t h e mission except f o r t h e following described conditions. The high-gain antenna f a i l e d t o acquire and t r a c k properly at various times during t h e mission. The problems occurred during t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f s i g n a l r a t h e r t h a n after a c q u i s i t i o n . In t h i s r e g a r d , t h e problem i s d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e experienced during Apollo 1 2 and 13 where t h e highg a i n antenna l o s t lock o r f a i l e d t o t r a c k a f t e r a c q u i s i t i o n . T h i s i s discussed i n f u r t h e r d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 14.1.2. From j u s t p r i o r t o lunar l i f t - o f f through t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , t h e VHF system performance w a s marginal. Voice communications were weak and n o i s y , and t h e V F ranging performance w a s e r r a t i c and erroneous. H The voice conhunicati'ons problem i s not r e l a t e d t o t h e VHF problems experienced on previous missions where they were determined t o be procedu r a l e r r o r s . Switching antennas i n t h e command and s e r v i c e module and e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e ranging s i g n a l d i d not c l e a r up t h e problems. The problems are b e l i e v e d t o have been caused by equipment malfunction, but t h e source has not been i s o l a t e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r component of t h e t o t a l system. S e c t i o n 14.1.4 contains a d e t a i l e d discussion of t h i s anomaly.

7- 4

7.5

INSTRUMENTATION

The instrumentation system functioned normally throughout t h e mission except f o r t h e loss of t h e r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system quad B oxidizer manif o l d p r e s s u r e measurement during s e p a r a t i o n of t h e command and s e r v i c e module from t h e launch v e h i c l e . The most probable cause o f t h e f a i l u r e w a s a break of t h e s i g n a l o r power l e a d s i n i t i a t e d by t h e pyrotechnic shock a s s o c i a t e d with t h e spacecraft/launch v e h i c l e a d a p t e r panel separat i o n . Since t h i s i s t h e only failure of f o u r measurements of t h i s t y p e on each o f e i g h t f l i g h t s , t h e pyrotechnic shock i s n o t considered a probl e m f o r normal elements of t h e instrumentation c i r c u i t . F u r t h e r , redundant measurements a r e a v a i l a b l e t o permit determination o f t h e r e q u i r e d d a t a . Consequently, no c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d .

7.6

GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

A t t i t u d e control w a s nominal throughout t h e mission i n c l u d i n g a l l periods of p a s s i v e thermal c o n t r o l , c i s l u n a r n a v i g a t i o n , as w e l l as photography and landmark t r a c k i n g from l u n a r o r b i t . The s t a b i l i t y of t h e i n e r t i a l measurement u n i t e r r o r parameters w a s e x c e l l e n t . The only anomaly i n t h e guidance, navigation and c o n t r o l systems w a s failure of t h e e n t r y monitor system O.OSg l i g h t t o i l l u m i n a t e . This i s discussed i n s e c t i o n 14.1.5. Because of inclement weather, t h e l i f t - o f f w a s delayed f o r t h e f i r s t time i n t h e Apollo program. This required t h e f l i g h t azimuth t o b e changed from 72 degrees t o 75.56 degrees and t h e platform t o be r e a l i g n e d accord-V i n g l y . A comparison o f command and s e r v i c e module and sI B navigation data i n d i c a t e d s a t i s f a c t o r y performance during t h e launch phase. I n s e r t i o n e r r o r s were plus 7.02, p l u s 61.02, and minus 7.50 f t / s e c i n t h e X , Y , and Z axes, r e s p e c t i v e l y . These e r r o r s were comparable t o t h o s e observed on o t h e r Apollo launches. The only s i g n i f i c a n t e r r o r w a s i n t h e Y-axis v e l o c i t y caused by a prelaunch azimuth alignment e r r o r o f 0.14 deg r e e due t o one-sigma gyrocompassing i n a c c u r a c i e s . Table 7-1 i s a summary of p r e f l i g h t i n e r t i a l measurement u n i t error parameters a f t e r i t s i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e coxmuand module. An update t o t h e i n e r t i a l parameters w a s performed at approximately 29 hours. The t h r e e accelerometer biases were updated t o minus 0.32, p l u s 0.12 and minus 0.13 cm/sec2, and t h e X-gyro n u l l b i a s drift w a s updated t o p l u s 0.4 meru ( m i l l i e a r t h - r a t e u n i t s 1.

The f i r s t platform realignment w a s performed after i n s e r t i o n and agreed with t h e p r e d i c t e d alignment e r r o r s due t o prelaunch a z i m t h e r r o r s . Table 7-11 i s 8 summary of s i g n i f i c a n t parameters during each of t h e platform realignments.

7- 5

TABLE 7-1.- INERTIAL COMPONENT PREFLIGHT HISTORY

-

COMMAND MODULE

Error

Sample
mean

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lo. of

ramplea

Countdown value

Flight load

Inflight performmce

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S p a c e c r a f t dynamics during s e p a r a t i o n from t h e S-IVB were very s m a l l . S p a c e c r a f t dynamics during each docking attempt were small and comparable t o t h o s e seen on previous Apollo missions. Figure 7-1 is a t i m e h i s t o r y of s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r o l system parameters during each docking attempt. Performance during each of t h e seven s e r v i c e propulsion system maneuvers was nominal. Trimming of r e s i d u a l v e l o c i t y e r r o r s w a s performed only a f t e r t h e c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n and t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n maneuvers. Table 7-111 i s a summary of s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r o l system parameters f o r each of t h e maneuvers. The second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n was accomplished w i t h a minimum-impulse s e r v i c e propulsion system maneuver i n o r d e r t o

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7-10 conserve r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l p r o p e l l a n t . This w a s t h e f i r s t s e r v i c e propulsion system minimum-impulse maneuver performed during a l u n a r mission. The t h i r d midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s performed with t h e r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system. During t h e t r a n s l u n a r phase, a s e r i e s of star-horizon measurements were taken t o e s t a b l i s h t h e p r e c i s e l o c a t i o n of t h e e a r t h horizon. This w a s done i n preparation f o r a c i s l u n a r navigation exercise t o be performed during t h e t r a n s e a r t h phase. The command and s e r v i c e module combination was s e p a r a t e d from t h e l u n a r module a f t e r t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver. Command and s e r v i c e module c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n and plane-change maneuvers were t h e n performed, and t h e Command Module P i l o t accomplished a s e r i e s of photographic and landmark t r a c k i n g operations. For t h e f i r s t time, rate-aided o p t i c s were a v a i l a b l e t o assist t h e crew i n making o p t i c a l s i g h t i n g s . The s e x t a n t and VHF ranging data were used t o t r a c k t h e l u n a r modu l e a f t e r t h e v e r n i e r adjustment maneuver following ascent from t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e . Unacceptable V F ranging data were received i n t h e i n t e r v a l beH tween l u n a r module i n s e r t i o n and t h e terminal phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver; however, t h e d a t a received during t h e f i n a l phase of rendezvous were good. For a d e t a i l e d discussion o f rendezvous, see s e c t i o n 6.2.3. For a discussion of t h e V F ranging anomaly, see s e c t i o n 1 4 . 1 . 4 . H Only one midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s r e q u i r e d on t h e r e t u r n t r i p t o meet t h e e n t r y i n t e r f a c e conditions. Cislunar navigation w a s performed during t h e t r a n s e a r t h phase t o simulate r e t u r n i n g t o e a r t h with no communications. Accuracy of t h e onboard navigation techniques w a s demons t r a t e d but t h e crew commented t h a t the computer/crew o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e r face could be improved by incorporating a recycle f e a t u r e i n t h e c i s l u n a r n a v i g a t i o n a l s i g h t ing program. The command module w a s s e p a r a t e d from t h e s e r v i c e module at 215:32:42 and t h e normal pitch-down disturbance w a s observed. The e n t r y monitor system 0.05g l i g h t d i d not i l l u m i n a t e within t h e allowed 3 seconds a f t e r t h e p r e d i c t e d t i m e f o r 0.05g. The crew s t a r t e d t h e system manually according t o t h e c h e c k l i s t . Refer t o s e c t i o n 14.1.5 f o r f u r t h e r discussion of t h i s anomaly. Table 7-IV i s a summary of e n t r y monitor system n u l l b i a s t e s t s performed during t h e mission. Accelerometer s t a b i l i t y and performance were e x c e l l e n t . The primary guidance system guided t h e command module t o a landing at 27 degrees 0 minutes 45 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 39 minu t e s 30 seconds west longitude, which is 0.62 m i l e from t h e t a r g e t e d landing p o i n t .
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7-11

TABLE 7-1v.- RESUEIS OF ENTRY MONITOR

SYSTEM NULL BIAS TESTS

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7.7

REACTION CONTROL SYSTEm

7.7.1

S e r v i c e Module

Performance of t h e s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l w a s normal throughout t h e mission. A l l telemetry parameters s t a y e d w i t h i n nominal limits throughout t h e mission w i t h t h e exception o f t h e quad B o x i d i z e r manifold p r e s s u r e . This measurement w a s l o s t when t h e command and s e r v i c e module s e p a r a t e d from t h e S-IVB. The quad B h e l i u n and f u e l manifold p r e s s u r e s w e r e used t o verify proper system operation. T o t a l p r o p e l l a n t consumption f o r t h e mission w a s 102 pounds l e s s t h a n p r e d i c t e d ; however, p r o p e l l a n t consumption during t r a n s p o s i t i o n , docking and e x t r a c t i o n was about 60 gounds more t h a n planned because of t h e a d d i t i o n a l maneuvering a s s o c i a t e d with t h e docking d i f f i c u l t i e s The p r o p e l l a n t m a r g i n d e f i c i e n c y was recovered p r i o r t o l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , and nominal margins e x i s t e d during t h e remainder of t h e mission. Consumables i n f o r mation is contained i n s e c t i o n 7.10.2.

.

7.7.2

Comnand Module

The command module reaction c o n t r o l systems performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Both systems 1 and 2 w e r e a c t i v a t e d during t h e command module/service module s e p a r a t i o n sequence. Shortly after s e p a r a t i o n , system 2 was d i s abled and system 1w a s used f o r t h e remainder of e n t r y . All t e l e m e t r y d a t a i n d i c a t e d nominal system performance throughout t h e mission. Cons m a b l e s information is contained i n s e c t i o n 7.10.2.

7-12

7.8 SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM
S e r v i c e propulsion system performance w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y based on t h e steady-state performance during all f i r i n g s . The steady-state p r e s s u r e data, gaging system d a t a , and v e l o c i t i e s gained i n d i c a t e d e s s e n t i a l l y nominal performance, The engine t r a n s i e n t performance during all s t a r t s and shutdowns w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y . Nothing i n t h e f l i g h t d a t a o r p o s t f l i g h t a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e d combustion i n s t a b i l i t y o r t h e cause o f t h e s l i g h t hum o r buzzing n o i s e reported by t h e p i l o t ( r e f . 9.13). The p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n and gaging system provided near-ideal p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n . The unbalance at t h e end of t h e t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n f i r i n g w a s reported by t h e crew t o be 40 lbm, decrease, which agrees w e l l with telemetry values. During t h e Apollo 9 , 1 0 , 1 , and 12 missions, t h e s e r v i c e propulsion 1 system xiixture r a t i o w a s l e s s than expected, based on s t a t i c f i r i n g d a t a . The p r e d i c t e d f l i g h t mixture r a t i o f o r t h i s mission w a s based on previous f l i g h t d a t a t o more c l o s e l y simulate t h e expected mixture r a t i o . To achieve t h e p r e d i c t e d mixture r a t i o at t h e end of t h e mission, t h e majori t y of t h e mission would have t o be flown w i t h t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n valve i n t h e increase p o s i t i o n . Consequently, t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n valve. w a s i n t h e increase p o s i t i o n a t launch. Figure 7-2 shows t h e variance i n f u e l and o x i d i z e r remaining at any i n s t a n t during t h e lunar o r b i t i n s e r t i o n and t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n f i r i n g s , as computed from t h e telemetry d a t a , and t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n valve movements made by t h e crew. The p r e f l i g h t expected values and p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n movements are a l s o shown. "he s e r v i c e prop u l s i o n system p r o p e l l a n t usage f o r t h e mission i s discussed i n sect i o n 7.10.1.

7.9

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREW STATION

The environmental c o n t r o l system performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y and provided a comfortable environment f o r t h e crew and adequate thermal c o n t r o l of t h e s p a c e c r a f t equipment. The crew s t a t i o n equipment a l s o s a t i s f a c t o r i l y supported t h e f l i g h t .

The environmental c o n t r o l system w a s used i n conjunction with t h e cryogenic oxygen system t o demonstrate t h e c a p a b i l i t y of providing oxygen at high flow rates such as t h o s e t h a t w i l l be r e q u i r e d during extraveh i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n s on f u t u r e missions. A modified hatch overboard dump nozzle with a c a l i b r a t e d o r i f i c e w a s used t o o b t a i n t h e d e s i r e d flow rate. The emergency cabin pressure r e g u l a t o r maintained t h e cabin p r e s s u r e at

7-13

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7-14
approximately 4.45 p s i a . The t e s t , scheduled t o l a s t 2-1/2 h o u r s , w a s terminated a f t e r 70 minutes when t h e 100-psi o w g e n manifold pressure decayed t o about 10 p s i . This w a s caused by opening of t h e u r i n e overboard dump valve which caused an oxygen demand i n e.xcess of t h a t .which t h e oxygen r e s t r i c t o r s were capable of providing. However, s u f f i c i e n t data were obtained during t h e t e s t t o determine t h e high-flow c a p a b i l i t y of t h e cryogenic oxygen system. (Also s e e s e c t i o n 7.3.) I n f l i g h t cabin p r e s s u r e decay measurements were made f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e during most of t h e crew s l e e p periods t o determine more p r e c i s e l y t h e cabin leakage during f l i g h t . Preliminary e s t i m a t e s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e f l i g h t leakage was approximately 0.03 l b / h r . This l e a k r a t e i s withi n design limits. P a r t i a l r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n of t h e oxygen s t o r a g e b o t t l e s w a s r e q u i r e d t h r e e times i n addition t o t h e normal r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s during t h e m i s s i o n . This problem i s discussed i n s e c t i o n 14.1.8. The crew reported s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of u r i n e dump nozzle blockage. Apparently t h e dump nozzle w a s clogged with frozen u r i n e p a r t i c l e s . The blockage c l e a r e d i n a l l i n s t a n c e s when t h e s p a c e c r a f t w a s o r i e n t e d so t h a t t h e nozzle w a s i n t h e sun. This anomaly i s discussed f u r t h e r i n s e c t i o n 14.1.3. I n t e r m i t t e n t communications dropouts were experienced by t h e Commander at 29 hours. The problem w a s c o r r e c t e d when t h e Commander's c o n s t a n t wear garment e l e c t r i c a l a d a p t e r w a s replaced. The anomaly i s discussed f u r t h e r i n section 14.3.4.
A vacuum c l e a n e r assembly and cabin f a n f i l t e r , used f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , along with t h e normal decontamination procedures e l i m i n a t e d pract i c a l l y a l l of t h e objectionable d u s t such as t h a t p r e s e n t a f t e r t h e Apollo 12 l u n a r docking. The fans were operated f o r approximately 4 hours a f t e r lunar docking.

,

Sodium n i t r a t e w a s added t o t h e water b u f f e r ampules t o reduce system c o r r o s i o n . This a d d i t i o n a l s o allowed a reduction i n t h e concentrat i o n of c h l o r i n e i n t h e c h l o r i n e ampules. N o b j e c t i o n a b l e t a s t e w a s o noted i n t h e water. The crew r e p o r t e d some d i f f i c u l t y i n i n s e r t i n g t h e b u f f e r ampules i n t o t h e i n j e c t o r . The ampules and i n j e c t o r are b e i n g t e s t e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e cause of t h e problem. The crew a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e food p r e p a r a t i o n u n i t leaked s l i g h t l y a f t e r dispensing h o t water. This problem i s discussed f u r t h e r i n s e c t i o n 14.1.7.

7-15

7.10

CONSUMABLES

"he command and s e r v i c e module consumable usage during t h e Apollo 1 4 mission w a s w e l l w i t h i n t h e r e d l i n e l i m i t s and, i n a l l systems, d i f f e r e d no more t h a n 5 percent from t h e p r e d i c t e d l i m i t s .

7.10.1

Service Propulsion P r o p e l l a n t

Service propulsion p r o p e l l a n t loadings and consumption values are l i s t e d i n t h e following t a b l e . The loadings w e r e c a l c u l a t e d from gaging system readings and measured d e n s i t i e s p r i o r t o l i f t - o f f .
~

Propellant, l b Cond i ti on F'ue 1 Loaded Consumed Remaining at command module/ s e r v i c e module separation Usable at command module/ s e r v i c e module separation Oxi d i z e r
25 061

Tot a1

1 5 695.2

40 756.2
38 853.2
1903

14 953.2 742

23 900
1 161

596

866

1 462

7.10.2

Reaction Control System P r o p e l l a n t s

Service module.- The p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n and loading data f o r t h e s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n control system were as shown i n t h e followi n g table. Consumption w a s c a l c u l a t e d from telemetered helium tank pressure h i s t o r i e s and were based on p r e s s u r e , volume, and temperature r e l a tionships.

7-16

Condition
Lo ade d Quad Quad Quad Quad

I

Propellant, l b Oxidizer
110.1 109 99 110.4 109 7

Total

A

B C D

225.3 225.2 226.5 223.5 900.5

335.4
335.1

336.9
333.2 1340.6 1233

Total
%sable loaded

440.1

i
Consumed Remaining at command module/ s e r v i ce module s eparat ion

250

476

726 507

%sable loaded p r o- e l l a n t i s t h e amount Loaded minus t h e p amount trapped and with c o r r e c t i o n s made f o r gaging e r r o r s .

Command module.- The loading and u t i l i z a t i o n of command module rea c t i o n c o n t r o l system p r o p e l l a n t w a s as follows. Consumption w a s calcul a t e d from p r e s s u r e , volume and temperature r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

I
baded

Propellant, l b Con di t i on Fuel System 1 system 2 Total Oxi d i z e r Tot a1

44.3 44.5
80.0

78.6 78.1
156.7

122.9 122.6 245 5 210 .o 41

I

%sable l o a d e d

Consumed System 1 System 2 Total

4
45

%sable loaded p r o p e l l a n t i s t h e amount loaded minus t h e amount trapped and with c o r r e c t i o n s made f o r gaging errors. bEstimated q u a n t i t y based on helium source pressure p r o f i l e during e n t r y .

7-17 7.10.3 Cryogenics

The t o t a l cryogenic hydrogen and oltygen q u a n t i t i e s a v a i l a b l e at lifto f f and consumed were as follows. Consmption values were based on quant i t y data t r a n s m i t t e d by telemetry.
~~ ~

Hydrogen, l b Condition Actual Available at l i f t - o f f Planned

Oxygen, l b
~~

Actual

Planned

Tank 1 Tank 2 Tank 3
Total Consme d Tank 1 Tank 2 Tank 3 Total Remaining at command module/ s e r v i c e module s e p a r a t i o n Tank 1 Tank 2 Tank 3 Total
%dated

26.97 26 55

-

320.2 318.9 197.2

53.52

a 53 52

-

836.3

'836.3

19.12 19.14

-

119.3 113.8 163.4 38.62 396.5
412.1

38.26

7.85

7.41

-

7.87 7.03

-

200 .g 205.1 33.8

204.2 195.2

24.8
424.2

15.26

14.90

439.8

t o l i f t - o f f values.

7-18
7.10 .4 Wat e r
The water q u a n t i t i e s loaded, produced, and e x p e l l e d during t h e miss i o n a r e shown i n t h e following t a b l e . Condition Loaded ( a t l i f t - o f f ) Potable water t a n k Waste water tank Produced i n f l i g h t Fuel c e l l s Lithium hydroxide r e a c t i o n Metabolic Dumped overboard Waste tank dumping Urine and f l u s h i n g Evaporated up t o command module/ s e r v i c e module s e p a r a t i o n Remaining onboard at command module / s e r v i c e module s e p a r a t i o n Potable water tank Waste water tank Quantity, l b

28.5 32.4

342.3 21.0 21.0

236.9 133.2

9 .o

29 .7

36.4

? *
L

?
A

L -

Y

i

.-

8- 1

8.0

LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE

8.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEm
Lunar module s t r u c t u r a l loads were w i t h i n design values f o r a l l phases o f t h e mission. The s t r u c t u r a l assessment w a s based on guidance and c o n t r o l d a t a , cabin pressure measurements, comand module accelerat i o n d a t a , photographs, and crew comments. Based on measured command module a c c e l e r a t i o n s and on simulations using a c t u a l launch wind d a t a , lunar module loads were determined t o be w i t h i n s t r u c t u r a l limits during e a r t h launch and t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n . The sequence films from t h e onboard camera showed no evidence of s t r u c t u r a l o s c i l l a t i o n s during l u n a r touchdown, and crew comments agree with t h i s assessment. Landing on t h e l u n a r surface occurred w i t h estimated landing veloci t i e s o f 3.1 f t / s e c v e r t i c a l , 1 . 7 f t / s e c i n t h e plus-Y footpad d i r e c t i o n , and 1.7 f t / s e c i n t h e plus-Z footpad d i r e c t i o n . The s p a c e c r a f t rates and a t t i t u d e at touchdown are shown i n f i g u r e 8-1. The minus-Y footpad apparently touched f i r s t , followed by t h e minus-Z footpad approximately 0.4 second l a t e r . The plus-Y and plus-Z footpads followed w i t h i n 2 seconds and t h e v e h i c l e came t o rest w i t h a t t i t u d e s o f 1.8 degrees p i t c h down, 6.9 degrees r o l l t o t h e r i g h t and 1 . 4 degrees yaw t o t h e l e f t of w e s t . Very l i t t l e , i f any, of t h e v e h i c l e a t t i t u d e w a s due t o landing g e a r s t r o k i n g . The f i n a l rest a t t i t u d e of approximately 7 degrees w a s due almost e n t i r e l y t o l o c a l undulations at t h e landing p o i n t ( f i g . 8-2). From a t i m e h i s t o r y o f t h e descent engine chamber p r e s s u r e , it appears t h a t descent engine shutdown w a s i n i t i a t e d after - f i r s t footpad contact but before plus-Y footpad contact. The chamber pressure w a s i n a s t a t e o f decay at 108:15:11, and all vehicle motion had ceased 1.6 seconds later. F l i g h t d a t a from t h e guidance and propulsion systems were used i n performing engineering simulations o f t h e touchdown phase. As i n Apollo 1 and Apollo 1 2 , t h e s e simulations and photographs i n d i c a t e t h a t 1 landing g e a r s t r o k i n g w a s minimal i f it occurred at all. Photographs a l s o i n d i c a t e no s i g n i f i c a n t damage t o t h e landing g e a r thermal insulation. Sixteen-millimeter films taken from t h e comand module p r i o r t o lunar-orbit docking support a v i s u a l observation by t h e crew t h a t a s t r i p of material about 4 f e e t long w a s hanging from t h e ascent s t a g e base heat s h i e l d area. The base heat s h i e l d area i s designed t o prot e c t t h e ascent s t a g e from t h e pressure and t h e r m a l environment resulti n g from a s c e n t engine plume impingement during s t a g i n g . The absence

8- 2

Tim. hkmirtsc

Figure 8-1.- A t t i t u d e e r r o r s and rates during lunar lending sequence.

11

a- 3

I

cu
a3
I

8- 4
of abnormal thermal responses i n t h e a s c e n t s t a g e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e heat s h i e l d w a s f u l l y e f f e c t i v e . S l m i l a r conditions have occurred duri n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t s whereby one o r more layers o f t h e heat s h i e l d m a t e r i a l have become unattached. I n t h e s e c a s e s , t h e thermal e f f e c t i v e ness of t h e heat s h i e l d w a s not reduced. 8.2

ELECTRICAL POWER

The e l e c t r i c a l power d i s t r i b u t i o n system and b a t t e r y performance w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y w i t h one exception, t h e ascent b a t t e r y 5 open-circuit v o l t a g e decayed from 37.0 v o l t s at launch t o 36.7 v o l t s at housekeeping, but w i t h no e f f e c t on o p e r a t i o n a l performance. A l l power switchovers were accomp l i s h e d as r e q u i r e d , and p a r a l l e l o p e r a t i o n o f t h e descent and ascent batt e r i e s w a s w i t h i n acceptable l i m i t s . The dc bus v o l t a g e w a s maintained above 29.0 v o l t s , and maximum observed c u r r e n t w a s 73 amperes during powe r e d descent i n i t i a t i o n .
The b a t t e r y energy usage throughout t h e l u n a r module f l i g h t i s given i n s e c t i o n 8.11.6. The a s c e n t b a t t e r y 5 open-circuit low v o l t a g e i s d i s cussed i n s e c t i o n 14.2.1.

8.3 COMUNI CATIONS EQUIPMENT
S-band s t e e r a b l e antenna operation p r i o r t o l u n a r l a n d i n g w a s i n t e r m i t t e n t . Although antenna operation during r e v o l u t i o n 13 w a s nominal, a c q u i s i t i o n and/or t r a c k i n g problems were experienced during r e v o l u t i o n s 1 and 12. Acquisition w a s attempted but a s i g n a l w a s n o t acquired dur1 i n g t h e f i r s t 3 minutes after ground a c q u i s i t i o n of s i g n a l on revolut i o n 14. Because of t h i s , t h e omnidirectional antennas were used f o r l u n a r landing. The s t e e r a b l e antenna w a s used f o r t h e a s c e n t and rendezvous phase and t h e antenna performed normally. The problems w i t h t h e s t e e r a b l e antenna are discussed i n s e c t i o n 14.2.3. P r i o r t o t h e first e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d , d i f f i c u l t y was experienced when configuring t h e communication system f o r e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y because of an open audio-center c i r c u i t breaker. E x t r a v e h i c u l a r c o r n m i c a t i o n s w e r e normal after t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r w e s c l o s e d . During t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f t h e first e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d , t h e telev i s i o n r e s o l u t i o n decreased. The symptoms of t h e problem were i n d i c a t i v e of an overheated focus c o i l c u r r e n t r e g u l a t o r . This c o n d i t i o n , while n o t causing a complete f a i l u r e o f t h e camera, r e s u l t e d i n defocusing o f t h e

8-5
e l e c t r o n readout beam i n t h e t e l e v i s i o n tube and, consequently, a degradat i o n of r e s o l u t i o n . The high-temperature c o n d i t i o n w a s caused by operati n g t h e camera f o r about 1 hour and 20 minutes w h i l e it w a s w i t h i n t h e thermal environment of t h e closed modular equipment stowage assembly. The camera w a s t u r n e d off between t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r periods t o allow cooling. P i c t u r e r e s o l u t i o n during t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y w a s s a t i s f a c tory. The VHF system performance was poor from p r i o r t o lunar l i f t - o f f through t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n . This problem i s discussed i n d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n s 7.4 and 14.1.4.

8.4

RADAR

The landing radar s e l f - t e s t w a s performed at 105 hours 44 minutes, and t h e r a d a r w a s t u r n e d on f o r t h e powered descent about 2 hours l a t e r . Four minutes f i f t y seconds p r i o r t o powered descent i n i t i a t i o n , t h e radar changed from high- t o low-scale. A t t h a t t i m e , t h e o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e of t h e lunar module w a s about 10.9 milesa. This c o n d i t i o n prevented acquis i t i o n of ranging s i g n a l s at slant ranges g r e a t e r t h a n 3500 f e e t , and vel o c i t y s i g n a l s at a l t i t u d e s g r e a t e r than about 4600 f e e t . The r a d a r w a s r e t u r n e d t o high-scale by recycling t h e c i r c u i t breaker. A d e t a i l e d d i s cussion of t h i s problem i s given i n s e c t i o n 14.2.4. Range and v e l o c i t y performance from a s l a n t range of about 25 000 feet t o touchdown i s shown i n figure 14-22. There were no zero Doppler dropouts and no evidence of radar lockup r e s u l t i n g from p a r t i c l e s s c a t t e r e d by t h e engine exhaust plume during lunar landing. Rendezvous r a d a r performance w a s nominal i n all r e s p e c t s , i n c l u d i n g self-tests , checkout, rendezvous and l u n a r s u r f a c e t r a c k i n g , and temperature.

8.5

INSTRUMENTATION

The i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n system performed normally throughout t h e f l i g h t with t h e exception of t h r e e of t h e f o u r ascent helium tank p r e s s u r e m e a s urements (two primary and two redundant). Coincident with propulsion system p r e s s b i z a t i o n , t h e s e measurements exhibited negative s h i f t s of up t o 4 p e r c e n t . "he l a r g e s t s h i f t s were i n t h e redundant measurements. These t r a n s d u c e r s h i f t s were caused by t h e shock induced by t h e p y r o t e c h n i c a l l y operated i s o l a t i o n valves. Since these measurements are used t o monitor f o r l e a k s p r i o r t o propulsion system p r e s s u r i z a t i o n , a %eferenced t o landing s i t e e l e v a t i o n .

8- 6
~

s h i f t i n t h e s e measurements a t t h e time of system p r e s s u r i z a t i o n w i l l n o t a f f e c t f u t u r e missions. (See appendix A, s e c t i o n A.2.3, f o r a descript i o n of changes made subsequent t o Apollo 13.)

8.6

GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

A t approximately 102 h o u r s , t h e primary guidance system w a s t u r n e d on, t h e computer d i g i t a l clock w a s i n i t i a l i z e d , and t h e platform w a s a l i g n e d t o t h e command module platform. Table 8-1 i s a summary of t h e primary guidance platform alignment d a t a . The abort guidance system w a s t u r n e d on at 102 hours 40 minutes and t h e a t t i t u d e r e f e r e n c e a l i g n e d t o t h e lunar module platform. Table 8-11 i s a sumnary of i n e r t i a l measurement u n i t component errors measured p r i o r t o launch and i n f l i g h t . The abort guidance system w a s a l i g n e d t o t h e primary guidance system s i x t i m e s , but d a t a were a v a i l a b l e f o r only f i v e , and are shown i n t a b l e 8-111.. Also shown i n t a b l e 8-111 a r e data from t h e independent alignment The of t h e abort system performed i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r l u n a r l i f t - o f f . n abort guidance system had been a l i g n e d t o t h e g r a v i t y v e c t o r and a a z i muth a n g l e supplied by t h e ground. Twenty-seven minutes l a t e r , j u s t bef o r e l i f t - o f f , t h e a b o r t system compared w e l l with t h e primary system which had been i n e r t i a l l y a l i g n e d t o t h e p r e d i c t e d l o c a l v e r t i c a l orientation for lift-off.
The performance of t h e abort s e n s o r assembly of t h e abort guidance system w a s not as good as on previous missions but w a s w i t h i n allowable l i m i t s . The accelerometers e x h i b i t e d s t a b l e performance , b u t t h e Z-axis gyro d r i f t r a t e change of 1 . 2 degrees p e r hour from t h e prelaunch value w a s about 30 percent g r e a t e r t h a n t h e expected s h i f t . The expected and t h e a c t u a l s h i f t s between p r e f l i g h t values and t h e f i r s t i n f l i g h t c a l i b r a t i o n , and s h i f t s between subsequent i n f l i g h t c a l i b r a t i o n s are shown i n t a b l e &IV.
Table 8-V i s a sequence of events p r i o r t o and during t h e powered descent t o t h e lunar s u r f a c e . A command t o abort using t h e descent eng i n e w a s d e t e c t e d a t a computer input channel at 104:16:07 (but w a s not observed at o t h e r telemetry p o i n t s ) although t h e crew had not depressed t h e abort switch on t h e p a n e l . The crew executed a procedure using t h e engine s t o p switch and t h e a b o r t switch which i s o l a t e d t h e f a i l u r e t o t h e abort switch. Subsequently, t h e command reappeared t h r e e more times; each t i m e , t h e command w a s removed by t a p p i n g on t h e p a n e l near t h e abort switch. (For a discussion of t h e probable cause o f t h i s f a i l u r e , see s e c t i o n 14.2.2.) I f t h e abort comand i s p r e s e n t after s t a r t i n g t h e powered descent programs, t h e computer automatically switches t o t h e abort programs and t h e lunar module i s guided t o an abort o r b i t . To avoid t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

f P'd .
III

Y

a

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I

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. I

I Q

H

3
9 I3

8-8

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3

2 f 3
I
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N

I

TABLE 8-111.- GUIDANCE S Y S T E ALIGNMENT ~

COMPARISON

Primary minus abort system
Time of alignment

Alignment e r r o r ( degrees )

X
103:54 :44.99
104 :04 :45 .9
0.000

Y
0.003
0.030 0.007

Z

0.014
0.002

0.061
0.000 -0.002

104:34:45.2 109 :28 :36

0.003 0.000

0.034
0.002

1 4 1 :15 :25.2

0 .ooo

0.001 0.018

I

a 141:45:29.2

0.010

0.003

a Systems aligned independently. Actual t i m e o f a b o r t guidance system alignment was 141:18:35.2.

TABLE &IV.-

ABOKT GUIDANCE SYSTEM CALIBRATION COMPARISONS

Calibrations

Three-s igma capability estimate 20.91

Actual gyro d r i f t r a t e , deg/hr
~ ~~

X axis

Y axis
-0.07

F i r s t i n f l i g h t minus prei n s t a l l a t ion Second i n f l i g h t minus f i r s t -inflight F i r s t s u r f a c e minus second inflight Second s u r f a c e minus f i r s t surface

0.08 -0.01 -0.02
0 .o

-1.2 0.26 -0.43 -0.21

20.63
k0.56
+O.

0.23

-0.08

55

-0 -08

8-10

TABU 8-V.-

SaUENCE OF EVENTS DURING P W R D DESCENT O EE

Elapsed time from l i f t - o f f , h r :min :s e c

Time from ignition, min:sec

Event

107 :51 ~ 8 . 6 6 107 :52 :46.66
107 :57 :34.66

-11:07.86

-9:39.86
-4 5 1 - 8 6 -4t12.72

107 :58: 13.80

108:02 :19.12 108:02:26.52 108:02 :53.80
108 :04 :49 .80

-0:07.40

0 :oo .oo

+O 2 7 . 2 8
+2 2 3 . 2 8

108: 08 :47.68 108:08: 50.66

+6:21.16 +6:24.14 +6:44.14 +6 :46 .I4 +7:09.28 +8:43.28 +8:43.90 +9:25.08 +9 t26.14 +10 :41.34 +10:43.28 +12:42.78 +12 :44.61
+12 :44.88

1

108:09:10.66 108:og :12.66 108 :09 :35 .80 108:11:09.80 108 :1 :10.42 1 108 :11 :51.60 108 :11 :52 .66 108 :1 3:07.86 108: 1 3:09.80 108:15:09.30 108:15 :11.13 108:15:11.40

Landing r a d a r on F a l s e data good i n d i c a t i o n s from landing radar Landing radar switched t o low s c a l e S t a r t loading abort b i t work-around routine Ullage on I g n i ti on Manual t h r o t t l e - u p t o full t h r o t t l e position Manual t a r g e t update (N69 ) T h r o t t l e down Landing radar t o high s c a l e ( c i r c u i t breaker c y c l e ) Landing r a d a r v e l o c i t y d a t a good Landing r a d a r range d a t a good Enable a l t i t u d e updates S e l e c t approach phase program ( ~ 6 4 ) S t a r t p i t c h over Landing r a d a r redesignation enable Landing radar antenna t o p o s i t i o n 2 S e l e c t a t t i t u d e hold mode S e l e c t landing phase program ( ~ 6 6 ) Left pad touchdown Engine shutdown ( d e c r e a s i n g t h r u s t chamber p r e s s u r e ) Right, forvard,and aft pad touchdown

v -

?
L .

1-

L

i

8-11
of an unwanted abort, a work-around procedure w a s developed by ground personnel and w a s relayed t o t h e crew f o r manual e n t r y i n t o t h e l u n a r module computer. P a r t one of t h e four-part procedure w a s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e computer j u s t a f t e r t h e f i n a l a t t i t u d e maneuver f o r powered descent. The remainder w a s accomplished a f t e r t h e i n c r e a s e t o t h e f u l l - t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n . P a r t one c o n s i s t e d of loading t h e abort s t a g e program number i n t o t h e mode r e g i s t e r i n t h e e r a s a b l e memory which i s used t o monitor t h e program number displayed t o t h e crew. This d i d not cause t h e a c t i v e program t o change, but it d i d i n h i b i t t h e computer from checking t h e abort command s t a t u s b i t . A t t h e same t i m e , it i n h i b i t e d t h e automatic command t o f u l l - t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n , automatic guidance s t e e r i n g , and i t a f f e c t e d t h e processing of t h e landing radar d a t a . Therefore, i n order t o r e e s t a b l i s h t h e d e s i r e d configuration f o r descent, t h e i n c r e a s e t o f u l l - t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n w a s accomplished manually and t h e n t h e second, t h i r d , and f o u r t h p a r t s of t h e procedure were e n t e r e d i n t o t h e computer. I n o r d e r , they accomplished:
a. S e t t i n g a status b i t t o inform t h e descent program t h a t t h r o t t l e up had occurred and t o re-enable guidance s t e e r i n g

b.

Resetting a s t a t u s b i t which d i s a b l e d t h e abort programs

c. Replacing t h e a c t i v e program number back i n t o t h e mode r e g i s t e r so t h a t landing r a d a r data would be processed properly a f t e r landing radar lock-on The abort c a p a b i l i t y of t h e primary guidance system w a s l o s t by u s e of t h i s procedure. Therefore, it would have been necessary t o use t h e abort guidance system i f an a b o r t s i t u a t i o n had a r i s e n . P r i o r t o powered descent maneuver i g n i t i o n , t h e landing radar s c a l e f a c t o r switched t o low, which prevented a c q u i s i t i o n of data through t h e f i r s t 400 seconds o f descent. (For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n , refer t o sect i o n 14.2.4.) The crew cycled t h e radar c i r c u i t b r e a k e r , which reset s c a l i n g t o t h e high s c a l e , and landing radar lock-on occurred at 22 486 f e e t . Figure 14-22 i s a p l o t of s l a n t range as measured by landing radar and as computed from primary guidance system s t a t e v e c t o r s . Figure 8-3 i s a p l o t of a l t i t u d e s computed by t h e abort and primary guidance systems and shows a 3400-foot update t o t h e abort guidance system at t h e 1 2 000foot altitude. T h r o t t l e o s c i l l a t i o n s t h a t had been noted on previous f l i g h t s were not d e t e c t e d during t h e descent although some o s c i l l a t i o n i n t h e automatic t h r o t t l e command w a s detected after descent engine manual shutdown. The r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system p r o p e l l a n t consumption during t h e braking phase and approach phase programs w a s approximately h a l f t h a t seen on previous missions. Further discussion of t h e s e two areas w i l l be pro.ided i n a supplement t o t h i s report.

8-12

2
_ I -

\'\

--1 --

7iEi -

guidance solufion altitude update

1

---- P,
\

Landing

0

I

-1

Figure 8-3.- Comparison of a l t i t u d e s computed by abort and primary guidance systems during descent. While on t h e lunar s u r f a c e , a t e s t w a s performed t o compute g r a v i t y using primary guidance system accelerometer d a t a . The value of g r a v i t y w a s determined t o be 162.65 cm/sec2. Performance during t h e ascent from t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e w a s nominal. The primary and abort systems and t h e powered f l i g h t processor d a t a compared w e l l throughout a s c e n t . The a s c e n t program i n t h e onboard computer does not include t a r g e t i n g f o r a s p e c i f i c c u t o f f p o s i t i o n v e c t o r ; t h e r e f o r e , a v e r n i e r adjustment maneuver of 10.3 f t / s e c w a s performed t o sati s f y t h e phasing conditions f o r a d i r e c t rendezvous with t h e command and s e r v i c e module. Performance throughout rendezvous, docking, and t h e d e o r b i t maneuver w a s also nominal. The v e l o c i t y change imparted t o t h e l u n a r module a t j e t t i s o n w a s minus 1.94, minus 0.05, and minus 0.10 f t / s e c i n t h e X, Y , and Z axes, r e s p e c t i v e l y .

8-13
The abort guidance system functioned properly u n t i l t h e braking phase of t h e rendezvous with t h e command and s e r v i c e module when a f a i l u r e caused t h e system t o b e down-moded t o t h e standby mode and r e s u l t e d i n t h e loss of t h i s system f o r t h e remainder of t h e mission. Another anomaly r e p o r t e d w a s a crack i n t h e g l a s s window of t h e address register on t h e d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l e y assembly. These anomalies are d i s c u s s e d i n s e c t i o n s 14.2.5 and 14.2.6, r e s p e c t i v e l y .

8.7

DESCENT PROPULSION
The engine

The descent propulsion system o p e r a t i o n w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y . t r a n s i e n t s and t h r o t t l e response were normal.

8.7.1

I n f l i g h t Performance

The d u r a t i o n of t h e powered descent f i r i n g w a s 764.6 seconds. A manual t h r o t t l e - u p t o t h e full t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n w a s accomplished approximately 26 seconds a f t e r t h e engine-on command. "he throttle-down t o 57 p e r c e n t occurred 381 seconds a f t e r i g n i t i o n , about 1 4 seconds e a r l i e r t h a n p r e d i c t e d b u t w i t h i n expected t o l e r a n c e s . Three seconds of t h e 1 4 are a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e landing s i t e offset t o c o r r e c t f o r t h e downrange error i n a c t u a l t r a j e c t o r y , and t h e remaining 1 seconds t o a t h r u s t i n 1 c r e a s e of approximately 80 pounds at t h e f u l l - t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n . 8.7.2 System P r e s s u r i z a t i o n

During t h e p e r i o d from l i f t - o f f t o 1 0 4 hours, t h e o x i d i z e r t a n k u l l 66 p s i a and t h e f u e l t a n k u l l a g e pressure decreased from 138 t o 211 p s i a . These decays r e s u l t e d from helium absorption i n t o t h e p r o p e l l a n t s and were w i t h i n t h e expected range.
age p r e s s u r e decayed from 1 1 t o 1

The s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium system performed as a n t i c i p a t e d . The syst e m p r e s s u r e rise rates w e r e 8.0 p s i / h o u r on t h e ground and 6.2 p s i / h o u r during t r a n s l u n a r c o a s t , which compare favorably with t h e p r e f l i g h t pred i c t e d values of 8.1 p s i / h o u r and 6.6 p s i / h r , r e s p e c t i v e l y . During powe r e d descent, t h e s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium system p r e s s u r e p r o f i l e w a s w e l l w i t h i n t h e nominal 53-sigma pressure band, even though t h e p r e s s u r e at i g n i t i o n was about 50 p s i lower t h a n a n t i c i p a t e d .

8.7.3
:ion.

Gaging System Performance

The gaging system performance was s a t i s f a c t o r y throughout t h e m i s The low-level q u a n t i t y l i g h t came on approximately 711 seconds

8-14
after i g n i t i o n , and w a s most probably t r i g g e r e d by t h e p o i n t sensor i n o x i d i z e r tank 2. Engine cutoff occurred 53 seconds a f t e r t h e low-level of 68 seconds. s i g n a l , i n d i c a t i n g a remaining firing-time-to-depletion Using probe d a t a t o c a l c u l a t e remaining f i r i n g time gave approximately 70 seconds remaining. This i s w i t h i n t h e accuracy a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p r o p e l l a n t quantity gagi ng sy st e m

.

The new p r o p e l l a n t s l o s h b a f f l e s i n s t a l l e d on Apollo 14 appear t o be e f f e c t i v e . The p r o p e l l a n t s l o s h l e v e l s present on Apollo 1 and 1 2 1 were not observed i n t h e s p e c i a l high-srunple-rate gaging system data of t h i s mission.

8.8 ASCENT PROPULSION
The ascent propulsion system duty cycle c o n s i s t e d of two f i r i n g s

-

t h e lunar ascent and t h e terminal phase i n i t i a t i o n . Performance of t h e system f o r both f i r i n g s w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y . Table 8-VI i s a summary of

TABLE 8-VI.- STEADY-STATE PERFORMANCE WRING ASCENT

~~

10 seconds a f t e r ignition

bo0 seconds after ignition
Predi cteda

Paraw ter
Rcdi cteda
Clcasured

b

Measured 181

b

Regulator o u t l e t pressure, p s i a Oxidizer bulk temperature, Fuel bulk temperature. OF Oxidizer interface pressure , psia
Fuel interface pressure, p s i a
OF

184
7 0 .O

182

184

69.4

69 .o
69.8 169.7 169.7 123.2 1.598 3468. 309.9

69 . I
69.4 167 167
120

70 .O
170.5
170.4
123.4

69 .8
168 169 121

Engim chamber pressure, psia Mixture r a t i o Thrust. l b Specific impulse, sec

1.607 3502. 310.3

-

-

-

-

-

%reflight prediction based on acceptance t e s t data and rcrsming nomlnal system pcrforrance. bActual f l i & t drta w i t h no a d J w t w n t . .

8-15
a c t u a l and p r e d i c t e d performance during t h e a s c e n t maneuver. The durat i o n of engine f i r i n g f o r lunar a s c e n t w a s approximately 432 seconds, and f o r t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , 3 t o 4 seconds. A more p r e c i s e e s t i mate of t h e t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n f i r i n g t i m e i s not a v a i l a b l e because t h e f i r i n g occurred behind t h e moon and no telemetry d a t a were received. System pressures were as expected both b e f o r e and after t h e t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver and crew r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e maneuver w a s naminal.

No o s c i l l a t i o n s were noted during f l i g h t i n e i t h e r helium r e g u l a t o r o u t l e t p r e s s u r e measurement. O s c i l l a t i o n s i n t h e o u t l e t p r e s s u r e of 6 t o 19 p s i have been noted i n previous f l i g h t d a t a . Also, o s c i l l a t i o n s of a si&lar n a t u r e and approximately twice t h a t magnitude w e r e noted during p r e f l i g h t checkout of t h e a s c e n t propulsion system c l a s s I secondary helium r e g u l a t o r . However, during f l i g h t , c o n t r o l i s maintained, normally, by t h e c l a s s I primary r e g u l a t o r .

8.9

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREM STATION

Performance of t h e environmental c o n t r o l system w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y throughout t h e mission. Glycol pump n o i s e , a nuisance experienced on previous missions, w a s reduced below t h e annoyance l e v e l by a muffler on t h e pump system. Although t h e water s e p a r a t o r speed w a s higher than expected much o f t h e t i m e , t h e s e p a r a t o r removed w a t e r adequately and there were no problems w i t h water condensation o r cabin humidity. Because o f water i n t h e suit loop on Apollo 1 2 ( r e f . 11, a f l o w res t r i c t o r had been i n s t a l l e d i n t h e primary l i t h i u m hydroxide c a r t r i d g e s t o reduce t h e gas flow i n t h e s u i t loop and, t h e r e b y , reduce water sepa r a t o r speed below 3600 r p m . (Separator speed i s a function of t h e water mass t o b e s e p a r a t e d and t h e gas flow.) However, t h e water s e p a r a t o r speed w a s above 3600 r p m while t h e s u i t w a s operated i n t h e cabin mode (helmets and gloves removed). The high speed when i n t h e cabin mode resulted from low moisture inputs from t h e crew (approximately 0.14 l b / h r ) and a high gas flow caused by low back p r e s s u r e which, i n t u r n , developed from a low p r e s s u r e drop across t h e suit. During p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e t r a n s f e r hose o n - t h e u r i n e c o l l e c t i o n t r a n s f e r assembly w a s kinked. The kink w a s e l i m i n a t e d by moving t h e hose t o a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n . The crew r e p e a t e d l y had t r o u b l e g e t t i n g t h e l u n a r module forward window shades t o remain i n t h e i r r e t a i n e r s . The shades had been processed t o reduce t h e curl and prevent cracking, a problem experienced on previous f l i g h t s . I n reducing t h e c u r l , t h e diameter of t h e r o l l e d shades w a s increased s o t h a t t h e shades would not f i t s e c u r e l y i n t h e r e t a i n e r s . For

8-16
Apollo 1 5 , t h e shades w i l l be f a b r i c a t e d t o permit them t o be r o l l e d s m a l l enough t o be h e l d s e c u r e l y by t h e r e t a i n e r s . The i n t e r i m stowage assembly could not be secured at all t i m e s because t h e s t r a p s could not be drawn t i g h t enough t o hold. This problem r e s u l t e d from s t r e t c h i n t h e f a b r i c and i n t h e sewing t o l e r a n c e s . I n t h e f u t u r e , more emphasis w i l l be placed upon manufacturing f i t checks and crew compartment f i t checks t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e problem does not recur.

8.10 ExTRAMIICUTJd MOBIUTY UNIT
Performance o f t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobility u n i t w a s very good during t h e e n t i r e lunar s t a y . Oxygen, feeifwater, and power consumption (sect i o n 8.11.7) allowed each e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d t o be extended approximately. 30 minutes w i t h no d e p l e t i o n of contingency reserves. Comfortable temperatures were maintained u s i n g t h e d i v e r t e r valve i n t h e minimum posit i o n throughout most of both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s . Preparations f o r t h e first e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y proceeded on schedule w i t h few exceptions. The delay i n s t a r t i n g t h e first extrav e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y occurred while t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e support system power w a s o n , r e s u l t i n g i n b a t t e r y power being t h e l i m i t i n g consumable i n determining t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r stay t i m e . Oxygen consumption of t h e Lunar Module P i l o t during t h e first e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y w a s one-third higher t h a n t h a t of t h e Commander. Telemetry d a t a during t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s s u i t i n t e g r i t y check i n d i c a t e d a p r e s s u r e decay rate of approximately 0.27 psi/min; a rate of 0.30 p s i / min i s allowable. I n p r e p a r a t i a n f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n w a s given t o cleaning and r e l u b r i c a t i n g t h e L u n a r Module P i l o t ' s p r e s s u r e garment assembly neck and w r i s t r i n g seals i n an e f f o r t t o lower t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r m o b i l i t y u n i t leak r a t e . A 0.22 psi/min pressure decay rate w a s r e p o r t e d by t h e Lunar Module P i l o t p r i o r t o t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . P o s t f l i g h t unmanned l e a k rate tests on t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s pressure garment assembly show no s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n leakage.

Just p r i o r t o lunar module cabin d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e hmar Module P i l o t r e p o r t e d a continuous f o r c e i n h i s r i g h t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r glove w r i s t p u l l i n g t o t h e l e f t and down. A more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n i s given i n s e c t i o n 14.3.2. The ext r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y s t a r t e d and w a s completed without any r e p o r t e d d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e glove.

? -

L

t T i

L

8-17
8.11
CONSUMABLES

On t h e Apollo 1 4 mission, all lunar module consumables remained w e l l w i t h i n r e d l i n e limits and were c l o s e t o p r e d i c t e d values.

8.11.1

Descent Propulsion System

P r o p e l l a n t . - "he q u a n t i t i e s of descent propulsion system p r o p e l l a n t loading i n t h e following t a b l e were c a l c u l a t e d from readings and measured densities prior t o lift-off. Actual q u a n t i t y , l b Condition Fue 1 Loaded Consumed Remaining at engine c u t o f f Total Oxidizer
11

Tot a1

7072.8 6812.8

344.4

18 417.2

10 810.4

17 623.2

260 .o 228.0

534.0 400 .O

794.0 628.0

Us ab l e

S u p e r c r i t i c a l helium.- The q u a n t i t i e s o f s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium were determined by computation u t i l i z i n g p r e s s u r e measurements and t h e known volume o f t h e t a n k . Q u a n t i t y , lb Condition Actual
~~ ~ ~~

P r e di c t e d

haded Consumed

48.5
42.8 39.2
a( 40.8)

Remaining at touchdown

5.7

9.3

a Adjusted p r e d i c t i o n t o account f o r longer-than-planned duration.

firing

8-18 8.11.2 Ascent Propulsion System
Propellant Ascent propulsion system t o t a l p r o p e l l a n t usage w a s w i t h i n approximately 1 p e r c e n t of t h e p r e d i c t e d v a l u e . The loadings i n t h e following t a b l e were determined from measured d e n s i t i e s p r i o r t o launch and from weights o f off-loaded p r o p e l l a n t s .
'

.-

Actual q u a n t i t y , lb Condition Fuel Loaded T o t a l consumed Remaining at lunar module j e t t i s o n Oxidizer Total

Predicted q u a n t i t y , lb

2007.0 1879 .O 128.0

3218.2 3014 .O 204.2

5225.2 4893.0

4956 .o
265.8

332 02

Condition beded

Actual q u a n t i t y , lb

13.4

Consm e d
Remaining at l u n a r module impact

8.8

4.6

8-19 8.11.3
Reaction Control System Propellant

The reaction control system propellant consumption w a s calculated fram telemetered helium tank pressure h i s t o r i e s using the relationships between pressure, volume, and temperature. Actual, lb Condition
Fuel

Predicted, lb Oxidizer Total

Loaded System A System B Total Consumed t o Docking Impact Remaining at lunar impact

108 108

209

209 418 634 260 378
256

216

633
283 393
240

8-20

8.11.4

Oxygen

The o q g e n t a n k w a s not loaded t o t h e nominal 2730 p s i 8 used f o r previous missions because of a p o s s i b l e hydrogen embrittlement problem with t h e descent stage oxygen tank. Launch p r e s s u r e f o r t h e t a n k was an i n d i c a t e d 2361 p s i a .

I

Condition Loaded (at lift-off)

Actual quantity, l b

P r e d i cte d quantity, lb

Des cent 8 tage Ascent s t a g e Tank 1 Tank 2
Total
Consme d

42.3

2.4 2.4

47.1
24.9
(a)

Des cent stage Ascent stw Tank 1 Tank 2
Total
Remaining i n descent s t a g e at lunar lift-off Remaining at docking Tank 1 Tank 2 Total
8

23.9

0

11 . 0
25 .O

17.4

18.4

(a> 2.4

1.3
2.4

3.7

Consumables d a t a are not a v a i l a b l e because t h e t a n k 1 p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r malfunctioned b e f o r e launch.

..
L

t '
&

8.U.5

Water

I n t h e following t a b l e , t h e a c t u a l q u a n t i t i e s loaded and consumed a r e based on t e l e m e t e r e d data. Condition Loaded ( a t lift-off) Descent s t a g e Ascent s t a g e Tank 1 Tank 2 Total Consumed Descent stage (lunar l i f t - o f f Ascent s t a g e (docking) Tank 1 Tank 2 Total Ascent s t a g e (impact ) Tank 1 Tank 2
%Ot

Actual l u a n t i t y , lb

Predicted q u a n t i t y , lb

255.5 42.5 42.5 340.5 200.9 6 .o 5.8 212.7

14.4 14.9
230.2.

al

Remaining i n descent stage at lunar lift-off Remaining i n a s c e n t s t a g e at impact Tank 1 Tank 2 Total

54.6

20.1 27.6

55 - 7

a

Consumed during f l i g h t , both stages.

8-22

8. U..6 Electrical Pwer
The t o t a l battery energy usage i s given i n the following t a b l e . Preflight predictions versus actual usage were within 3 percent. Available power, A-h Electrical parer consumed, A-h Actual Predicted

Batteries

Des cent
A s cent

1600

I

1191

I

1220

592

128

125

7 '

L

8-2 3 8.11.7
Extravehicular Mobility Unit

Oxygen , feedwater and power consumption of t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobili t y u n i t f o r both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d s a r e shown i n t h e following t a b l e . Commander Condition Actual
F i rs t ext ravehi c u l ar act i v i ty

Lunar Module P i l o t Actual Predi cted

Pre d i c t e d

T i m e , min

288 1.31 0.70 0.61 8.59 4.85 3.74
2 82

255

288
1.31
1.02

25 5

Oxygen, l b Lo ade d Cons m e d Remaining Feedwater, l b
Loaded

1.31 0 a97 0.34 8.55 7.08 1.47
2 82 223 59

0.29 8.66 5.71 2.95 282
2 37

1.31 0 -97 0.34 8.55 7.08 1.47
2 82

Consumed Remaining Power, Wh I n i t i a l charge Consumed Remaining Second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y
Time, min

228 54

45

223 59

275
1.26

255

275
1.26

255

Oxygen, l b
Loaded

1.31
1.02

1.31
1.02

Cons m e d Remaining Feedwater, lb Loaded Cons ume d R e m a i n i ng Power, Wh I n i t i a l charge Consumed R e m a i n i ng

0.86
0.40

0.29 8.55 7.55
1.0

0.96 0.30 8.80 a 7.13 a 1.67
2 82 222

0.29 8.55 7.55

a 6.43 a

8.80

2.37
2 82 225

1 .o

282
225

282
225

57

57

60

57

%stinate based on e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobility u n i t source heat pred i c t i o n s because p o r t a b l e l i f e support system feedwater weight w a s not taken following t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y .

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9 .O

PILOT'S RF,PORT

The Apollo 14 mission expanded t h e techniques and overcame some of t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s o f previous l u n a r landing missions. S p e c i f i c d i f f e r e n c e s included performing onboard c i s l u n a r n a v i g a t i o n t o s i m u l a t e a r e t u r n t o e a r t h with no communications, using t h e s e r v i c e propulsion system f o r t h e descent o r b i t maneuver, landing i n t h e l u n a r h i g h l a n d s , extending t h e lunar s u r f a c e excursion t i m e and making a l u n a r - o r b i t rendezvous during t h e f i r s t revolution of t h e s p a c e c r a f t . The d e t a i l e d f l i g h t p l a n , executed i n i t s e n t i r e t y , w a s used as a r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e p i l o t s during t h e mission ( f i g . 9-1, at end of s e c t i o n ) .

9.1 TRAINING
. The formal t r a i n i n g f o r t h i s crew w a s conducted over a t i m e span of 20 months i n general accordance w i t h t h e schedules used f o r previous missions. The t r a i n i n g equipment and methods were concluded t o be exc e l l e n t and are recommended f o r subsequent crews e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged. Although none of t h e crew m e m b e r s had completed actual. f l i g h t experience i n t h e Apollo program, each of t h e p i l o t s f e l t t h a t he w a s completely ready f o r a l l phases of t h e f l i g h t .

9.2

LAUNCH

The countdown proceeded on schedule w i t h no problems encountered i n t h e area of crew i n t e g r a t i o n o r i n g r e s s . The g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n of t h e c r e w s t a t i o n and d i s p l a y s was e x c e l l e n t . The crew w a s kept w e l l informed of t h e n a t u r e of t h e launch delay and w a s apprised of launch azimuth change procedures ; accordingly , t h a t phase w e n t smoothly. The Commander noted no v i s i b l e moisture on windows 2 and 3 e i t h e r prelaunch o r during atmospheric f l i g h t . The p r o p r i o c e p t i v e cues r e p o r t e d by e a r l i e r crews were e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged during t h e launch of Apollo 1 4 . No communication d i f f i c u l t i e s were noted during t h e launch. A very s l i g h t l o n g i t u d i n a l o s c i l l a t i o n occurred during second s t a g e f l i g h t s t a r t i n g at 8 minutes 40 seconds and continuing through shutdown. The launch p r o f i l e s flown during p r e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g on t h e dynamic crew procedures s i m u l a t o r and t h e command module s i m u l a t o r were more t h a n adequate f o r crew p r e p a r a t i o n .

9-2

I

9 . 3 EAKTH ORBIT
This crew had placed s p e c i a l emphasis on s u i t e d t r a i n i n g periods i n t h e command module simulator f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r phase. The spacec r a f t system checks and unstarage of equipment were performed slowly and p r e c i s e l y coincident with t h e process of f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n w i t h t h e o weightless state. N anomalies o r d i f f i c u l t i e s were noted. The Command Module P i l o t noted t h a t , although he had heard t h e o p t i c s cover j e t t i s o n , t h e r e w a s no d e b r i s , and a f i n i t e p e r i o d of seve r a l minutes of dark-adaption w a s r e q u i r e d t o permit viewing of stars through t h e telescope. The extension of t h e docking probe i s mentioned here only t o i n d i c a t e t h a t it w a s extended on schedule, p e r t h e checkl i s t , with no problems noted f r m e i t h e r audio o r v i s u a l cues.

9.4

TRANSLUNAR INJECTION

The delay i n launch produced off-nominal monitoring parameters with t h e second S-IVB f i r i n g . These updates were forwarded smoothly and i n a timely fashion so t h a t all preparations f o r t h e i n j e c t i o n were normal. A t t i t u d e c o n t r o l of t h e S-IVB was e x c e l l e n t and right on schedule. The i g n i t i o n w a s on t i m e , p o s i t i v e , and without roughness. The guidance parameters comparison between t h e command module computer and t h e instrumentation u n i t w a s very c l o s e . A very l i g h t v i b r a t i o n o r buzz w a s noted toward t h e end of t h e powered phase, and i s mentioned only t o inform f u t u r e crews as t o a resonance reference p o i n t . The s t a t e v e c t o r conditions at cutoff were e x c e l l e n t and t h e tanks vented on schedule. The Commander and Command Module P i l o t changed couch p o s i t i o n s i n accordance with t h e f l i g h t plan.

9.5
9.5.1

TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT

Transposition and Docking

The physical s e p a r a t i o n from t h e S-IVB closed two p r o p e l l a n t i s o l a t i o n valves on t h e s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system. These were immediately reset w i t h no problems. The e n t r y monitor system was not used as a reference during any p o r t i o n of t h e t r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking maneuver. The plus-X t h r u s t i n g on s e p a r a t i o n and t h e i n i t i a l t h r u s t i n g t o set up a c l o s i n g v e l o c i t y were performed using t h e event timer.

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Several attempts were required before docking w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y achieved. [ E d i t o r ' s note: S i x contacts were made and t h e s e are r e f e r r e d t o as s i x "docking attempts" i n o t h e r s e c t i o n s of t h e r e p o r t . The p i l o t s considered t h e f i r s t two contacts t o be one attempt. ] The first attempt w a s made at a c l o s i n g v e l o c i t y of approximately 0.1 t o 0.2 f t / s e c . A t c o n t a c t , t h e capture l a t c h e s did not lock with t h e drogue. Plus-X t h r u s t w a s used t o d r i v e t h e probe back i n t o t h e drogue, but a g a i n , capture w a s not achieved. A l l switches and c i r c u i t breakers were v e r i f i e d by t h e c h e c k l i s t and another docking attempt w a s made with a c l o s i n g v e l o c i t y of approximately 1.0 ft/sec. The l a t c h e s again f a i l e d t o capture on t h i s pass. The procedures were v e r i f i e d w i t h Houston and t h e docking probe switch w a s placed t o extend, then back t o r e t r a c t ( t h e talkbacks were v e r i f i e d gray i n both p o s i t i o n s ) . On t h e t h i r d attempt, plus-X t h r u s t w a s h e l d f o r approximately 4 seconds after drogue c o n t a c t , but t h e l a t c h e s f a i l e d t o capture. Three prominent s c r a t c h e s , approximately 2 inches long and spaced 120 degrees around t h e drogue, were noted at t h i s t i m e and Houston w a s informed. The scratches s t a r t e d near t h e hole i n t h e drogue and.extended r a d i a l l y outward. The docking probe switch w a s placed t o extend-release f o r 5 seconds, then back t o r e t r a c t ; t h e talkbacks were v e r i f i e d gray i n both p o s i t i o n s . Another attempt w a s made using normal procedures, and again, no capture w a s achieved. O t h e f i f t h and f i n a l n attempt, t h e probe w a s aligned i n t h e drogue and h e l d with plus-X t h r u s t . The primary 1 r e t r a c t switch w a s a c t u a t e d , and approximately 4 t o 5 seconds l a t e r , t h e talkbacks went barberpole, then gray, and t h e docking r i n g l a t c h e s were actuated by t h e l u n a r module docking ring. The postdocking procedures were performed using t h e normal crew c h e c k l i s t and t h e locking of all twelve l a t c h e s w a s v e r i f i e d . Immediately upon l u n a r module e j e c t i o n , a maneuver w a s s t a r t e d t o As soon as t h e S-IVB w a s i n s i g h t , Houston w a s n o t i f i e d . view t h e S-IVB. A n S-IVB yaw maneuver w a s t h e n commanded i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e a u x i l i a r y propulsion system evasive maneuver. Both t h e a u x i l i a r y propulsion system evasive maneuver and t h e propellant dump of t h e S-IVB were v i s u a l l y monit o r e d . The S-IVB w a s s t a b l e when last viewed by t h e crew. The probe and drogue were removed during t h e f i r s t day f o r examina t i o n and checkout using t h e crew c h e c k l i s t and procedures provided by t h e Mission Control Center. The probe functioned properly at t h a t time. 9.5.2 Translunar Coast

A clock update w a s performed at approximately 55 hours t o compensate f o r a weather hold of approximately 40 minutes during t h e launch countdown. This procedure w a s an a i d t o t h e Command Module P i l o t while i n l u n a r o r b i t because it eliminated t h e need f o r numerous updates t o t h e Command Module P i l o t ' s solo book.

9.5.3

Midcourse Correction

Two midcourse c o r r e c t i o n s were performed during t h e t r a n s l u n a r coast phase. The f i r s t midcourse c o r r e c t i o n was performed at t h e second option p o i n t and placed t h e s p a c e c r a f t on a hybrid t r a j e c t o r y . The maneuver w a s performed under c o n t r o l of t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system with r e s i d u a l s of p l u s 0.2, zero, and minus 0.1 f t / s e c . The second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s performed at t h e f o u r t h option p o i n t and w a s t a r g e t e d f o r a v e l o c i t y change of 4.8 f't/sec. It w a s a s e r v i c e propulsion system maneuver performed under c o n t r o l of t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system. The r e s i d u a l s were p l u s 0.3, zero, and minus 0.1 f t / s e c .

9.6

LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION

Residuals r e s u l t i n g from t h e lunar o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver were p l u s 0.3; z e r o , and zero f t / s e c . "he f i r i n g t i m e w a s w i t h i n 1 second of t h e pad valuea. The only unexpected i t e m noted during t h i s maneuver w a s t h e operation of t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n and gaging system. The p r e f l i g h t b r i e f i n g s on t h e system i n d i c a t e d t h a t , at crossover, t h e unbalance meter would o s c i l l a t e and t h e n s e t t l e out i n t h e 100 t o 150 i n crease p o s i t i o n . A t crossover, during t h e a c t u a l maneuver, t h e unbalance meter went from its decrease p o s i t i o n smoothly up t o approximately zero. It w a s c o n t r o l l e d about t h e z e r o p o i n t using t h e i n c r e a s e and normal p o s i t i o n s of t h e s w i t c h .

9.7

DESCENT ORBIT INSERTION

On Apollo 1 4 , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver w a s made w i t h t h e s e r v i c e propulsion system. "he command modu l e computer i n d i c a t e d a 10.4- by 58.8-mile o r b i t after t h e maneuver. The Network i n d i c a t e d a 9.3- by 59.0-mile o r b i t . The f i r i n g time observed by t h e crew w a s 20.6 seconds. Pad f i r i n g t i m e w a s 20.8 seconds. The maneuver w a s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system with command module computer shutdown. Immediately after t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver, t h e s p a c e c r a f t w a s o r i e n t e d t o an a t t i t u d e from which an abort maneuver could have been performed i f r e q u i r e d , and s h o r t l y after acquis i t i o n of s i g n a l , Houston gave a "go" t o stay i n t h e low o r b i t . Pad f i r i n g t i m e vas t h e crew monitoring shutdown c r i t e r i a . This technique v i r t u a l l y eliminated t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an unacceptable overspeed.

$ad values me t h e voice-updated parameter values used t o perform a maneuver.

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9.8
LUNAR MODULE C E K U HC O T

The checkout of t h e l u n a r module w a s conducted i n two phases scent.

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t h e first _during t r a n s l u n a r coast and t h e second on t h e day of t h e de-

Pressure readings, p r i o r t o e n t e r i n g t h e l u n a r module, i n d i c a t e d

t h a t t h e l u n a r module had a low leakage r a t e . P a r e r t r a n s f e r t o t h e l u n a r module occurred at 61:41:11. The only anomaly w a s a s l i g h t l y low voltage reading on battery 5 . There were about f i v e o r s i x very small screws and washers f l o a t i n g around upon i n g r e s s . During t h i s p e r i o d ,

16-RRU motion p i c t u r e s were made of 'a command module w a s t e water dump. Some a d d i t i o n a l housekeeping and equipment t r a n s f e r served t o reduce t h e workload on descent d a y . Power w a s t r a n s f e r r e d back t o t h e command modu l e at 62:20:42.
The second l u n a r module checkout w a s accomplished on t h e same day as powered descent i n i t i a t i o n . Two c h e c k l i s t s , one f o r each p i l o t , were used t o speed up t h e a c t i v a t i o n process. The Commander and t h e Lunar Module P i l o t both suited i n t h e command and s e r v i c e module p r i o r t o i n t r a v e h i c u l a r t r a n s f e r , b u t all equipment had been l o c a t e d t h e n i g h t bef o r e t o assure t h a t t h i s would be a timely and s u c c e s s f u l process. A n e l e c t r o d e problem w i t h t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s biosensors made t h i s p e r i o d full w i t h no e x t r a t i m e a v a i l a b l e . The window h e a t e r s were used t o c l e a r some condensation found after i n g r e s s . The probe and drogue w e r e i n s t a l l e d and checked w i t h no problem. P r i o r t o r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system p r e s s u r i z a t i o n , t h e system A main shutoff valve c l i c k e d during r e c y c l e , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t it was probably closed at t h a t t i m e . The remainder of t h e a c t i v a t i o n proceeded without i n c i d e n t u n t i l s e p a r a t i o n . Subsequent t o s e p a r a t i o n , t h e checkout of t h e l u n a r module systems continued with only two a d d i t i o n a l problems becoming e v i d e n t .

a. The S-band antenna behavior w a s e r r a t i c at various t i m e s when i n t h e "auto" track mode. On two occasions, t h e S-band antenna c i r c u i t breaker opened without apparent reason, b u t functioned properly upon n being reset. O at least two o t h e r occasions, t h e ground s i g n a l w a s l o s t unexpectedly. The antenna drove t o t h e mechanical s t o p , at which t i m e t h e breaker opened (as expected). An unusually loud n o i s e associa t e d with t h e antenna w a s noted. It was subsequently found, by observing t h e antenna shadow on t h e lunar s u r f a c e , t h a t t h e n o i s e w a s c o i n c i d e n t with an o s c i l l a t i o n i n both p i t c h and yaw. Upon one occasion, t h e antenna p i t c h p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t o r dial w a s observed t o be f u l l - s c a l e up, with t h e antenna functioning properly. This anomaly c o r r e c t e d i t s e l f a s h o r t t i m e later and d i d not r e c u r .
b. The o t h e r major problem, which occurred b e f o r e powered descent i n i t i a t i o n , was observed by t h e Mission Control Center. The crew w a s

9-6
advised of an abort discrete being s e t i n t h e l u n a r module guidance comp u t e r w i t h t h e abort b u t t o n reset. ?'he crew d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n s o l v i n g t h i s problem except t o follow t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given by t h e Mission Control Center. The remainder of t h e lunar module checkout w a s nominal up t o t h e p o i n t of powered descent i n i t i a t i o n .

9.9

P W R D DESCENT O EE

The primary guidance computer w a s used t o s e l e c t t h e descent proan i n i t i a l i g n i t i o n algorithm check8 about 50 minutes p r i o r t o a c t u a l i g n i t i o n , The computer w a s a l s o targeted f o r a n o - i g n i t i o n abort at t h i s t i m e . F i n a l systems checks and switch s e t t i n g s were t h e n made and t h e abort guidance system w a s i n i t i a l i z e d t o t h e ground s t a t e v e c t o r (which had been uplinked 30 minutes p r i o r t o i g n i t i o n ) . The anomalies p r e s e n t at t h i s t i m e included t h e computer abort b i t problem and t h e S-band' s t e e r a b l e antenna malf'unction. To assure continuous communicat i o n s , a d e c i s i o n w a s made t o use omnidirectional antennas during powered des c e n t .
gram f o r

The descent program w a s r e s e l e c t e d i n t h e primary computer at i g n i t i o n minus 10 minutes and a f i n a l a t t i t u d e t r i m w a s completed about 5 minu t e s later. The f i r s t computer e n t r y , t o i n h i b i t t h e abort command, w a s made j u s t after f i n a l t r i m . The remaining e n t r i e s were made after i g n i t i o n . Both t h e u l l a g e and t h e i g n i t i o n were automatic and occurred on t i m e . The engine w a s t h r o t t l e d - u p manually by t h e Commander 26 seconds after i g n i t i o n . The t h r o t t l e w a s r e t u r n e d t o t h e i d l e p o s i t i o n after t h e computer e n t r i e s had been completed, at about 1 minute 25 seconds i n t o t h e f i r i n g . The computer guidance w a s i n i t i a l i z e d , by manual keyboard e n t r y , about 42 seconds after i g n i t i o n , A landing p o i n t t a r g e t update of 2800 f e e t downrange w a s e n t e r e d manually about 2 minutes 1 5 seconds after i g n i t i o n . The s t e e r i n g equations and t o r q u e - t o - i n e r t i a r a t i o of t h e lunar module s i m u l a t o r are n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e f o r t h e a c t u a l v e h i c l e . Therefore , t h e p i l o t ' s p r e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g w a s completely adequate f o r t h e a c t u a l v e h i c l e response exhibited during t h e descent phase.

The t h r o t t l e recovery p o i n t occurred about 12 seconds p r i o r t o t h e p r e d i c t e d t i m e . "he a l t i t u d e and v e l o c i t y l i g h t s of t h e computer d i s pley continuously i n d i c a t e d t h a t landing r a d a r data were i n v a l i d t o an a l t i t u d e w e l l below t h e nominal update level. A c a l l w a s r e c e i v e d from t h e Mission Control Center t o "cycle t h e landing radar c i r c u i t breaker." This allowed a v a l i d update. The l i g h t s e x t i n g u i s h e d and t h e computer e n t r y w a s made t o enable t h i s f u n c t i o n at an a l t i t u d e of about 2 1 000 feet. The Commander d i d n o t e v a l u a t e manual c o n t r o l after t h r o t t l e recovery, as planned, because t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e l a n d i n g % e r i f i c a t i o n of computer performance.

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rad r updat precluded uch action. The abort guidance system followed t h e primary system very c l o s e l y during t h e period p r i o r t o landing r a d a r update. There w a s , t h e r e f o r e , only a s i n g l e a l t i t u d e update t o t h e abort system. This update w a s made at an a l t i t u d e of 1 2 000 f e e t . There w a s no abnormal divergence of t h e abort guidance system through t h e remainder of t h e landing phase.

The landing program of t h e primary computer w a s e n t e r e d 8 minutes 44 seconds a f t e r i g n i t i o n and at an a l t i t u d e of about 8000 f e e t . The vehicle p i t c h e d down, as expected, and t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e w a s r e a d i l y v i s i b l e . The t a r g e t landing point w a s recognized immediately by t h e Commander without r e f e r e n c e t o t h e computer landing p o i n t designator. The unique t e r r a i n p a t t e r n contributed t o t h i s s u c c e s s f u l r e c o g n i t i o n , but t h e determining f a c t o r w a s t h e high f i d e l i t y of t h e s i m u l a t o r v i s u a l d i s p l a y and t h e t r a i n i n g time associated with t h e device. The f i r s t comparison of t h e landing p o i n t designator showed zero e r r o r s i n cross range and down range. A redesignation of t h e t a r g e t p o i n t 350 f e e t t o t h e south w a s made at an a l t i t u d e of about 2700 f e e t t o allow a landing on what had appeared t o be smoother t e r r a i n i n t h e p r e f l i g h t s t u d i e s of c h a r t s and maps. Several cross references between t h e t a r g e t and t h e landing p o i n t designator were made u n t i l an a l t i t u d e of about 2000 f e e t w a s reached, and good agreement w a s noted. A t some a l t i t u d e l e s s t h a n 1500 f e e t , two t h i n g s became apparent - f i r s t , t h a t t h e redesignated ( s o u t h ) landing p o i n t w a s t o o rough and, second, t h a t t h e automatic l a n d i n g w a s t o occur s h o r t of t h e t a r g e t . The manual descent program w a s i n i t i a t e d at an a l t i t u d e of 360 f e e t at a range of approximately 2200 feet s h o r t of t h e desired t a r g e t . The l u n a r module w a s c o n t r o l l e d t o zero descent rate at an a l t i t u d e of about 170 feet above t h e t e r r a i n . Translation maneuvers forward and t o t h e r i g h t were made t o a i m f o r t h e point o r i g i n a l l y t a r g e t e d . Although t h i s area appeared t o be gradually sloping, it w a s , i n g e n e r a l , smoother than t h e r i d g e south of t h e t a r g e t . "he f a c t t h a t no dust w a s noted during t h e t r a n s l a t i o n w a s r e a s s u r i n g because it helped corroborate t h e primary computer a l t i t u d e . Velocity on t h e c r o s s p o i n t e r w a s about 40 f t / s e c forward at manual takeover and t h i s w a s gradually reduced t o near-zero over t h e landing p o i n t . A cross v e l o c i t y of about 6 f t / s e c n o r t h w a s a l s o i n i t i a t e d and gradually reduced t o zero over t h e landing p o i n t . The c r o s s p o i n t e r s (primary guidance) were steady and t h e i r i n d i c a t i o n s were i n good agre.ement with v i s u a l reference t o t h e ground. Control of t h e v e h i c l e i n primary guidance attitude-hold mode and rate-of-descent mode w a s e x c e l l e n t at a l l times. The use of t h e l u n a r landing t r a i n i n g veh i c l e and t h e l u n a r module simulator had more than adequately equipped t h e p i l o t f o r h i s t a s k . It w a s r e l a t i v e l y easy t o pick out an exact landing s p o t and f l y t o it with p r e c i s e c o n t r o l . Blowing surface d u s t w a s f i r s t noted at an a l t i t u d e of 110 f e e t , but this w a s not a d e t r i m e n t a l factor. The dust appeared t o be less t h a n

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6 inches i n depth and rocks were r e a d i l y v i s i b l e through i t . A f i n a l
descent from 100 f e e t w a s made at a descent rate of 3 f t / s e c , with a del i b e r a t e forward v e l o c i t y of about l f t / s e c and, e s s e n t i a l l y , zero cross range v e l o c i t y . The forward v e l o c i t y w a s maintained u n t i l touchdown t o preclude backing i n t o any small c r a t e r s . To provide a s o f t landing, a delay of about 2 seconds w a s allowed between a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e contact l i g h t s and a c t i v a t i o n of t h e engine s t o p button. Touchdown occurred at shutdown with some s m a l l dust-blowing a c t i o n continuing during engine t h r u s t t a i l o f f o r decay. The landing forces were extremely l i g h t and t h e v e h i c l e came t o rest within 1 degree of zero i n p i t c h and yaw a t t i t u d e s , and w i t h a 7-degree r i g h t r o l l a t t i t u d e ( n o r t h e a s t t i l t ) . (Refer t o f i g u r e 8-2.) Some l i n e a t i o n s were evident i n t h e area of t h r u s t impingement on t h e s u r f a c e along t h e f i n a l t r a c k and i n t h e landing area. As might be expected, these areas are generally coincident with those i n which blowi n g s u r f a c e dust w a s noted at low a l t i t u d e s . The area i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e descent engine after touchdown appeared t o have been c r a t e r e d only t o a depth of about 6 inches and, as photographs show, only i n a s m a l l , well-defined area. There were no spurious t h r u s t e r f i r i n g s after touchdown. The lunar dump valves were recycled with no anomalies noted and t h e descent engine propellant vents were i n i t i a t e d . Although t h e primary guidance computer w a s t a r g e t e d with a l i f t - o f f t i m e of 108:24:31, t h i s e a r l y l i f t - o f f t i m e was not required. The l u n a r "stay" w a s forwarded by t h e Mission Control Center and t h e computer w a s s e t t o i d l e at 108:21:13. The S-band communications were maintained on t h e forward omnidirect i o n a l antenna during t h e descent, switched t o a f t at pitchdown, and then switched t o t h e steerable antenna, i n "slew" mode, after t h e l u n a r stay w a s approved. 9.10

LUNAR SURFACE ACTIVITY
Cabin A c t i v i t y

9.10.1

Operations Subsequent t o lunar module touchdown, lunar s u r f a c e a c t i v i t i e s progressed i n accordance with t h e c h e c k l i s t . O t h e checkn l i s t i s an item requesting a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e t o t h e Mission Control Center. Although important from a s c i e n t i f i c p o i n t of v i e w , t h i s t a s k proved t o be most u s e f u l i n alluwing t h e crew t o a c c l i mate themselves t o t h e lunar envirorlment and, i n conjunction with Miss i o n Control, t o determine more p r e c i s e l y t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e lunar modu l e . I n subsequent e x t r a v e h i c u l a r work, it w i l l be important t h a t t h e

.-

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crewmen have a p r e c i s e knowledge of t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t on t h e t r a v e r s e map. The preparation f o r t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d w a s nominal a t
all times except f o r a communications problem which became evident duri n g switchover t o p o r t a b l e l i f e support system communications. This problem subsequently proved t o be t h e result of cockpit e r r o r , which

p o i n t s again t o t h e n e c e s s i t y of having c h e c k l i s t s t h a t leave no l a t i tude f o r m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The cue cards u t i l i z e d during all of t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r preparations and t h e post-extravehicular a c t i v i t y were quite adequate except f o r t h e one e n t r y . However, t h e cue cards need t o be a t t a c h e d more securely t o t h e instrument panel t o prevent t h e i r being dislodged by inadvertent contact. Very l i t t l e s l e e p w a s obtained. This resulted primarily from being uncomfortable i n t h e s u i t s , but w a s a l s o due, i n a lesser degree, t o t h e tilt of t h e cabin. "he tilt w a s e s p e c i a l l y n o t i c e a b l e during t h e s l e e p periods and made s l e e p d i f f i c u l t because t h e crew w a s uneasy i n t h i s awkward p o s i t i o n . It i s t h e crew's f e e l i n g t h a t an unsuited s l e e p period would g r e a t l y c o n t r i b u t e t o s u f f i c i e n t crew s l e e p f o r t h e longer missions. I n g e n e r a l , t h e lunar module cabin provided an adequate base of ope r a t i o n s during l u n a r s u r f a c e a c t i v i t i e s i n s p i t e of t h e s m a l l area and t h e 7-degree tilt. However, it i s f e l t t h a t , were t h e lunar module t o land on t e r r a i n i n c l i n e d more than about 10 t o 1 2 degrees, some d i f f i c u l t y would be experienced i n moving about t h e cabin. Equipment.- On t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e , t h e alignment o p t i c a l t e l e s c o p e w a s s a t i s f a c t o r i l y used t o align t h e platform. Reflections i n t h e alignment o p t i c a l t e l e s c o p e appeared t o come from t h e l u n a r module rendezvous radar antenna and t h e l u n a r module upper s u r f a c e s . These r e f l e c t i o n s e l i m i n a t e t h e less-bright stars as candidates f o r use. During alignment o p t i c a l t e l e s c o p e s i g h t i n g , t h e radar antenna had d r i f t e d from i t s parked p o s i t i o n i n t o t h e f i e l d of view of t h e t e l e s c o p e . The antenna w a s rep o s i t i o n e d before continuing with t h e alignments.
A d i f f i c u l t y w a s experienced with t h e i n t e r i m stowage assembly i n t h e lunar module cabin. Its r e t a i n i n g brackets d i d not hold s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The i n t e r i m stowage assembly w a s c o n t i n u a l l y s l i p p i n g out of t h e a f t , upper r e s t r a i n t and i n t e r f e r i n g with cabin a c t i v i t y . "here w a s no adequate place t o stow used u r i n e bags; consequently, they w e r e i n t h e way u n t i l such t i m e t h a t they could be placed i n j e t t i s o n bags f o r disposal. The disposable containers and j e t t i s o n bags which were stowed i n t h e 16- ID^ camera compartment on t h e left-hand s i d e f e l l out while t h e camera w a s being removed, c r e a t i n g a s h o r t delay during hard-suit operations.

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Even though e x t r a v e h i c u l a r preparations and post-extravehicular procedures were q u i t e adequate, meticulous e f f o r t i s r e q u i r e d t o properly stow a l a r g e number of l u n a r s u r f a c e samples. Although t h e r e i s adequate stowage space when samples are properly handled, i t is impossible t o e s t i mate t h e number, s i z e and shape of t h e samples p r i o r t o f l i g h t . Thus, much t i m e i s required t o s o r t , weigh and stow a l l of t h e material i n t h e lunar module cabin i n accordance with stowage area weight c o n s t r a i n t s . Marking of w e i g h bags as they a r e s o r t e d and stowed i s important.

Two hours a f t e r landing on t h e lunar s u r f a c e , t h e rendezvous radar s a t i s f a c t o r i l y performed t h e command and s e r v i c e module t r a c k i n g e x e r c i s e .
9 .lO .2
EgressjIngress

During cabin d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n , a cabin p r e s s u r e of less t h a n 0 . 1 p s i a w a s r e q u i r e d before t h e cabin door could be opened e a s i l y . The f i r s t person out. i s crowded as he egresses because t h e hatch cannot be f u l l y opened t o t h e L u n a r Module P i l o t ' s s i d e w i t h t h e o t h e r crewman standing b e h i n d i t . The f i r s t person t o egress must remember, o r be coached, t o lean t o h i s l e f t during egress i n order t o avoid t h e hatch seal. However, t h e hatch opening i s adequate. During e g r e s s and i n g r e s s t h e crew must also remember t o m a i n t a i n h o r i z o n t a l clearance i n order not t o scrape t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e support system and remote c o n t r o l u n i t on t h e upper and lower hatch seals. These techniques r e q u i r e p r a c t i c e but are worth t h e e f f o r t t o assure i n t e g r i t y of t h e seal. O previous missions, dust c a r r i e d i n t o t h e cabin during i n g r e s s w a s n a problem. However, it d i d not seem t o be a problem on Apollo 1 4 , perhaps because t h e r e w a s l e s s dust on t h e lunar s u r f a c e , o r perhaps, being aware of t h e problem made t h e crew more meticulous i n contamination c o n t r o l t h a n they would have been otherwise. Care w a s t a k e n t o remove t h e d u s t from t h e p r e s s u r e garment assembly and o t h e r equipment before e n t r y i n t o t h e cabin. The brush t h a t w a s used f o r p r e s s u r e garment assembly cleaning w a s adequate. The technique of stomping t h e boots a g a i n s t t h e l u n a r module l a d d e r seemed t o h e l p t o some e x t e n t . During egress and i n g r e s s , s t a b i l i t y and mobility while on t h e l u n a r module ladder i s adequate even when grasping t h e ladder with one hand. This leaves t h e o t h e r hand f r e e t o c a r r y equipment. However, one should maneuver slowly and d e l i b e r a t e l y i n order t o a s s u r e s t a b i l i t y when negot i a t i n g t h e ' l u n a r module l a d d e r with one hand. No d i f f i c u l t y w a s experienced i n passing equipment from t h e man on t h e s u r f a c e t o t h e man on t h e ladder. The lunar equipment conveyor and equipment t r a n s f e r bag worked more e a s i l y than i n one-g simulations.

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9.10.3

Lunar Surface Operations

Mobility.- Mobility on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e i s e x c e l l e n t . Each crewmen employs a technique f o r t r a v e l t h a t i s most s u i t a b l e f o r t h a t i n d i vidual. The step-and-hop g a i t appears t o r e q u i r e a minimum of e f f o r t . The 1/6g simulations i n t h e KC-135 a i r c r a f t were adequate t o give one a f e e l of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e g r a v i t a t i o n a l f i e l d . The zero-g experienced on t h e way t o t h e moon aided considerably i n conditioning f o r good mob i l i t y during operations i n 1/6g. There w a s very l i t t l e tendency t o over-control or use t o o much force when using t o o l s o r walking on t h e lunar s u r f a c e . V i s i b i l i t y . - V i s i b i l i t y on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e i s very good when looki n g cross-sun. Looking up-sun, t h e s u r f a c e features are obscured when d i r e c t s u n l i g h t i s on t h e v i s o r , although t h e sunshades on t h e lunar ext r a v e h i c u l a r v i s o r assembly helped i n reducing t h e sun g l a r e . Looking down-sun, v i s i b i l i t y i s acceptable ; however, h o r i z o n t a l t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s are washed out i n z e r o phase, and v e r t i c a l f e a t u r e s have reduced v i s i b i l i t y . A f a c t o r i n reducing down-sun v i s i b i l i t y i s t h a t f e a t u r e s a r e i n t h e l i n e of s i g h t of t h e i r shadows, t h u s reducing c o n t r a s t . A crewman's shadow appears t o have a h e i l i g e n s c h e i n around i t . The v i s i b i l i t y on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e a l s o d i s t o r t s judgment of d i s t a n c e . There i s a d e f i n i t e tendency t o underestimate d i s t a n c e t o t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s . A n adequate range f i n d e r i s e s s e n t i a l . Navigation.- Navigation appears t o have been t h e most d i f f i c u l t probl e m encountered during lunar surface a c t i v i t i e s . Unexpected t e r r a i n features, as compared t o r e l i e f maps, w e r e t h e source of n a v i g a t i o n a l probl e m s . The r i d g e s and v a l l e y s had an average change i n e l e v a t i o n of approximately 10 t o 1 5 feet. The landmarks t h a t were c l e a r l y apparent on t h e n a v i g a t i o n a l maps were not a t all apparent on t h e s u r f a c e . Even when t h e crewmen climbed t o a r i d g e , t h e landmark o f t e n w a s not c l e a r l y i n s i g h t . I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e photography c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e navigation problem because photographs of small c r a t e r s make them appear much s m a l l e r t h a n they do t o the eye. On t h e c o n t r a r y , boulders r e f l e c t l i g h t s o t h a t i n t h e o r b i t a l photographs they appear much l a r g e r t h a n they do i n t h e n a t u r a l state. Boulders 2 o r 3 f e e t i n s i z e sometimes appear i n t h e o r b i t a l photography, b u t c r a t e r s of t h a t s i z e a r e completely i n d i s c e r n i b l e Dust.- Dust on t h e l u n a r surface seemed t o be less of a problem t h a n had been a n t i c i p a t e d . The dust c l i n g s t o s o f t , porous m a t e r i a l s and i s e a s i l y removed from m e t a l s . The p r e s s u r e garments were impregnated with d u s t ; however, most of t h e surface dust could be removed. The l i t t l e d u s t t h a t accumulated on t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r could e a s i l y be removed by brushing. The lunar map c o l l e c t e d dust and r e q u i r e d brushi n g or rubbing with 'a glove t o make t h e map usable.

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Timeline.- Operations on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e r e q u i r e d a much l o n g e r t i m e than had been a n t i c i p a t e d . The planned a c t i v i t i e s r e q u i r e 25 t o 30 percent more time t h a n would b e r e q u i r e d under one-g c o n d i t i o n s . Scheduling a d d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s , i n t h e event t h a t c e r t a i n p o r t i o n s of t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y have t o b e c a n c e l l e d , i s advisable.

9.10.4

L u n a r Module I n t e r f a c e s

Modular equipment s t o w w e assembly.- The r e l e a s e handle w a s p u l l e d and t h e assembly dropped t o a height s u i t a b l e f o r operations on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e . The modular equipment stowage assembly w a s manually a d j u s t e d t o a higher p o s i t i o n t o remove t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r and r e a d j u s t e d t o *a lower p o s i t i o n f o r subsequent o p e r a t i o n s . The h e i g h t adjustments were made without d i f f i c u l t y . The thermal blank e t s were more d i f f i c u l t t o t a k e o f f t h a n had been a n t i c i p a t e d . Simil a r l y , t h e thermal b l a n k e t s which p r o t e c t e d t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r supported i t s weight and manual removal of t h e b l a n k e t s w a s required during modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r deployment.

As on previous f l i g h t s , a l l cables used on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e had s u f f i c i e n t s e t t o prevent them from l y i n g f l a t when deployed on t h e lunar s u r f a c e . Both crewmen became entangled i n t h e cables from t i m e t o time. The cables emanating from t h e modular equipment stowage assembly area should e i t h e r be b u r i e d o r routed through r e s t r a i n i n g c l i p s t o keep them from being underfoot during work around t h e modular equipment stowage assembly.
S c i e n t i f i c equipment bay.- Both t h e doors and t h e p a l l e t s were removed e a s i l y from t h e s c i e n t i f i c equipment bay by u t i l i z i n g t h e booms. The p a l l e t s could have been removed manually i f required. However, t h e h e i g h t of t h e p a l l e t s w a s at t h e l i m i t f o r easy manual deployment on level terrain. The somewhat module. a pallet offloading of t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment package w a s hindered by a small c r a t e r 8 t o 10 feet t o t h e r e a r of t h e l u n a r However, s u f f i c i e n t working area w a s a v a i l a b l e i n which t o p l a c e and conduct f u e l i n g operations.

Since t h e landing gear d i d not s t r o k e s i g n i f i c a n t l y during t h e landi n g , a jimp of about 3 f e e t w a s r e q u i r e d from t h e footpad t o t h e lowest rung of t h e ladder. This provided no appreciable d i f f i c u l t y ; however, a firm l a n d i n g which would stroke t h e landing g e a r a f e w inches would f a c i l i t a t e a manual o f f l o a d i n g operation as w e l l as egress and i n g r e s s .

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9 .lo.5

L u n a r Surface C r e w Equipment

Extravehicular mobility unit.- Both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobility u n i t s performed w e l l during both of the e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s . There w a s s u f f i c i e n t cooling i n t h e minimum p o s i t i o n f o r normal a c t i v i t y . Both crewmen were r e q u i r e d t o go t o intermediate, o r between minimum and i n t e r m e d i a t e , f o r v a r i o u s p e r i o d s of t i m e during t h e climb t o Cone C r a t e r and t h e high-speed r e t u r n from Cone Crater t o Weird Crater. However, o t h e r than during t h e s e p e r i o d s , minimum cooling w a s used predominantly. The Lunar Module P i l o t ' s pressure garment assembly evidenced a higherthan-usual l e a k rate f o r t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , dropping 0.25 p s i during t h e 1-minute check. The s u i t s h a r e d no drop during p r e f l i g h t checkout. The Commander's u r i n e c o l l e c t i o n t r a n s f e r assembly hose had a kink i n it which prevented proper t r a n s f e r of t h e u r i n e t o t h e c o l l e c t i o n bags. Before both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s it w a s necessary t o unzip t h e s u i t and s t r a i g h t e n t h i s kink out. I n one i n s t a n c e t h e s u i t w a s removed t o t h e w a i s t t o f a c i l i t a t e access. The only o t h e r minor problem with t h e p r e s s u r e garment assembly concerned t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s r i g h t glove. "he glove developed an anomalous c o n d i t i o n b e f o r e t h e second extravehicul a r a c t i v i t y which caused it t o assume a n a t u r a l p o s i t i o n t o t h e l e f t and down. It should be noted t h a t t h e w r i s t - r i n g and neck-ring s e a l s on both p r e s s u r e garment assemblies were l u b r i c a t e d between e x t r a v e h i c u l a r act i v i t i e s . A t t h a t t i m e , t h e r e was very l i t t l e evidence of grit o r d i r t on t h e seals. Lubricating t h e s e a l s between e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s i s a procedure t h a t should b e continued on subsequent missions. Modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r . - The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r deployed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y from the l u n a r module except as previously noted. The s p r i n g t e n s i o n on t h e r e t a i n i n g c l i p s w a s s u f f i c i e n t t o hold a l l t h e equipment on t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r during l u n a r s u r f ace act i v i t i e s . However, with t h e t r a n s p o r t e r unloaded, t h e retacining s p r i n g s have s u f f i c i e n t t e n s i o n t o lift it c l e a r of t h e lunar s u r f a c e when plati n g equipment i n stowage l o c a t i o n s . This w a s not n o t i c e d a f t e r t h e t r a n s p o r t e r w a s f u l l y loaded. The wheels d i d not kick up o r s t i r up as much dust as expected before t h e f l i g h t . Very l i t t l e d u s t accumulated on t h e modular equipment transporter. The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r w a s s t a b l e , easily p u l l e d , and proved t o be a very handy device f o r both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s . Only at m a x i m u m speeds d i d t h e t r a n s p o r t e r evidence any i n s t a b i l i t y

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and, t h e n , only because of rough t e r r a i n . This i n s t a b i l i t y w a s easy t o c o n t r o l by hand motion on t h e triangular-shaped tongue. Hand t o o l c a r r i e r . - The hand t o o l c a r r i e r mated t o t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r w e l l , and w a s adequately r e t a i n e d by t h e hand t o o l c a r r i e r r e t a i n i n g c l i p . A l l stowage areas except t h e deep pocket were acceptable. This pocket w a s very d i f f i c u l t t o reach when s t a n d i n g adjacent t o t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r . It i s t o o deep f o r one t o e a s i l y r e t r i e v e small items. With t h i s exception, t h e hand t o o l c a r r i e r p e r f orme d s at i s fact o r i l y
,

.

Cameras A l l cameras c a r r i e d i n t h e l u n a r module worked well. Only two anomalies were noted. O t h e Commander's camera, t h e screw which n r e t a i n s t h e handle and t h e remote c o n t r o l u n i t c l i p worked loose s e v e r a l t i m e s and had t o b e retightened. The second anomaly concerned a 16-ITU~ magazine which Jammed and produced only 30 f e e t of usable film.
The t e l e v i s i o n camera performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . It seems t o be a u s e f u l t o o l f o r lunar s u r f a c e e x p l o r a t i o n . A remotely operated camera w i t h adjustment of focus, zoom, and l e n s s e t t i n g c o n t r o l l e d from t h e ground would be very u s e f u l i n making a v a i l a b l e l u n a r s u r f a c e time presently required for these tasks.

.-

S-band e r e c t a b l e antenna.- The S-band antenna was e a s i l y offloaded

from t h e lunar module and presented no problems i n deployment except t h a t
t h e n e t t i n g which forms t h e d i s h caught on t h e feed horn and had t o be released manually. The antenna o b s t r u c t s t h e work a r e a immediately around t h e modular equipment stowage assembly. A longer cable would allow deplayment a t a greater d i s t a n c e from t h e lunar module. Although t h e deployment and e r e c t i o n of t h e S-band antenna i s a one-man j o b , t h e antenna i s more e a s i l y aligned w i t h t h e two crewmen cooperating.

L u n a r surface s c i e n t i f i c equipment Offloading of t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments subpackages w a s normal, and a l l operations were adequate except f o r t h e operation of t h e dome removal t o o l . It r e q u i r e d s e v e r a l attempts t o lock t h e dome removal t o o l onto t h e dome. During t h e t r a v e r s e t o t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e equipment package deployment s i t e , t h e p a l l e t s on e i t h e r end of t h e mast o s c i l l a t e d v e r t i c a l l y and t h e m a s t f l e x e d , making t h e assembly d i f f i c u l t t o c a r r y and t o hold i n t h e hands. However, t h e arrangement i s acceptable f o r traverse up t o approximately 150 yards.
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There w a s some d i f f i c u l t y i n f i n d i n g a suitable s i t e f o r Apollo lunar s u r f a c e experiments package deplayment because of undulations i n t h e t e r r a i n . It w a s necessary t o spend several moments considering t h e c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t had been placed on Apollo lunar surface experiments

?

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P
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package deployment and matching those t o t h e s i t e i n o r d e r t h a t the experiments could be properly deployed. A f t e r t h e s i t e had been s e l e c t e d , t h e lunar dust presented some problems f o r t h e remainder of t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package deployment. The suprathermal. i o n det e c t o r experiment sub-pallet had dust p i l e d up a g a i n s t it and i n t o t h e hidden Boyd b o l t , which must b e reached b l i n d with t h e hand t o o l . Severa l minutes were wasted before t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y released from t h e s u b - p a l l e t . Subsequent t o t h a t , t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment w a s c a r r i e d t o i t s deployment s i t e and a d d i t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t y w a s experienced i n handling t h e t h r e e components of t h i s experiment simultaneously. The suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment w a s not s u f f i c i e n t l y s t a b l e t o prevent it from t u r n i n g over s e v e r a l t i m e s during deployment.
N problems were experienced during removal of t h e mortar pack. o During deployment, however, t h e footpads r o t a t e d out of t h e proper posit i o n , and t h e package had t o be picked up and t h e pads r o t a t e d t o a p o s i t i o n i n which they would r e s t properly a g a i n s t t h e s u r f a c e .

The thumper deployed as expected, but t h e lunar r e g o l i t h w a s s o l o o s e t h a t t h e c e n t e r geophone w a s p u l l e d out during deployment of t h e l a s t h a l f of t h e thumper cable. This w a s confirmed during r e t u r n along t h e l i n e . Only 13 of t h e 2 1 thumper c a r t r i d g e s were f i r e d and t h e f i r s t s e v e r a l of t h e s e required an extraordinary amount of f o r c e t o f i r e them ( s e c t i o n 1 4 . 4 . 1 ) . The problem seemed t o c l e a r up f o r t h e last s e v e r a l i n i t i a t o r s and t h e equipment operated p r e c i s e l y as expected.
L a s e r ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r experiment The l a ser r e f l e c t o r w a s deployed and l e v e l e d i n t h e normal fashion and i n t h e p r e s c r i b e d locat i o n . The dust cover w a s removed, t h e l e v e l rechecked, and t h e u n i t photographed.

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o S o l a r wind composition experiment.- N d i f f i c u l t y w a s experienced i n e r e c t i o n of t h e s o l a r wind composition experiment. The only anomaly occurred during t h e retrieval of t h e apparatus, at which time it r o l l e d up only about h a l f way and had t o be manually r o l l e d t h e remainder of the distance.

Lunar p o r t a b l e magnetometer experiment This p i e c e of equipment performed q u i t e s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The only d i f f i c u l t y experienced w a s t h e r e e l i n g i n of t h e c a b l e s . The s e t i n t h e cable prevented a s u c c e s s f u l rewind; consequently, t h e cable was allowed t o p r o t r u d e i n loops from t h e reel during t h e remainder of t h e t r a v e r s e ( s e c t i o n 1 4 . b . 3 ) . Geology.- The geology hand t o o l s are good and, i f t i m e had p e r m i t t e d , t h e y would have all been used. As i n previous missions, t h e hammer w a s

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9-16 used by s t r i k i n g w i t h t h e f l a t of t h e hammer r a t h e r t h a n t h e small end. The only discrepancy a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e geology t o o l s w a s t h e use of t h e geology sample bags. It w a s d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d rocks small enough t o f i t i n t o t h e small sample bags. Furthermore, t h e y a r e h a r d t o r o l l up. The t a b s which should f a c i l i t a t e r o l l i n g up t h e bags become ent a n g l e d , making it d i f f i c u l t t o remove them from t h e d i s p e n s e r . 9.10.6

Lunar Surface Science

Geo10a.- The appearance of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e w a s much as expected. A l o o s e gray mantle of material covered t h e e n t i r e s u r f a c e t o an undeter-

mined depth; however, core tubes driven i n t o t h e s u r f a c e would not penet r a t e more than 1-1/2 t u b e l e n g t h s and, i n most c a s e s , considerably less t h a n t h a t . A "rain drop" p a t t e r n over most of t h e r e g o l i t h w a s observed and i s c l e a r l y shown i n photographs. Also observed, i n c e r t a i n s e c t i o n s of t h e t r a v e r s e , were small l i n e a t i o n s i n t h e r e g o l i t h material, which can be seen i n c e r t a i n photographs. There w a s evidence of c r a t e r i n g and r e c r a t e r i n g on a l l of t h e area There w a s no s u r f a c e evidence of m u l t i p l e l a y e r s . Even i n t h e c r a t e r s , t h e loose gray mantle covered t h e e n t i r e s u r f a c e , except where rocks protruded through, and concealed any evidence of strat i g r a p h y . I n t h e t r e n c h dug by t h e crew, however, evidence of t h r e e d i f f e r e n t l a y e r s was found. I n one o r two p l a c e s on t h e flank of Cone Crater t h e crewmen's boots dug through t h e upper l a y e r exposing a white l a y e r about 3 inches from t h e s u r f a c e . It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t very few rocks are e n t i r e l y on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e ; most a r e b u r i e d o r p a r t i a l l y b u r i e d . Nearly all rocks of any s i z e have s o i l f i l l e t s around them. The s m a l l rocks are g e n e r a l l y coated with d i r t , b u t some of t h e larger rocks are n o t . Many of t h e larger rock s u r f a c e s a r e soft and crumbly. However, when one uses t h e hammer and breaks through t h i s , it i s found t h a t they are h a r d underneath.
t h a t w a s traversed.

S u b t l e v a r i a t i o n s i n rocks are not e a s i l y d i s c e r n i b l e , p r i m a r i l y because of t h e dust. It must be remembered t h a t t h e crew s e l e c t e d candidate samples after having observed t h e rocks from a t least 5 o r 6 feet away i n order t o prevent d i s t u r b i n g t h e s o i l around them. Features which a r e obvious i n a hand-held specimen a r e not d i s c e r n a b l e at i n i t i a l viewing d i s t a n c e . Furthermore, once t h e rock has been sampled, good u t i l i z a t i o n of t i m e precludes examining t h e rock except t o n o t e i t s more prominent f e a t u r e s . The p o i n t i s t h a t only t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a rock t h a t a r e d i s c e r n i b l e at t h e i n i t i a l viewing d i s t a n c e e n t e r i n t o t h e d e c i s i o n t o sample. Sampling s t r a t e g y should allow f o r t h i s l i m i t a t i o n when a wide v a r i e t y of samples i s d e s i r e d . The crew did observe, however, t h e evidence of b r e c c i a i n some of t h e rock; end, on a few occasions, c r y s t a l l i n e s t r u c t u r e w a s e v i d e n t . I n

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most c a s e s , t h e c r y s t a l s were small. Only on two occasions w a s g l a s s seen on t h e lunar s u r f a c e at Fra Mauro. I n one s m a l l c r a t e r t h e r e seemed t o be g l a s s - l i k e s p a t t e r on t h e bottom. I n t h e t r a v e r s e t o t h e r i m of Cone C r a t e r , one 3-foot rock was observed t o be w e l l coated with "glass".
The population of rocks i n t h e Fra Mauro area w a s s u r p r i s i n g l y low, much less t h a n 0.5 percent of t h e t o t a l area. Predominantly, t h e rocks i n evidence were 3 t o 5 centimeters o r smaller and, b e i n g covered w i t h d i r t , were i n many cases i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e s u r f a c e or from clumps of s o i l . A s t h e crew progressed t o t h e c r e s t of Cone Crater, boulders became more prominent. In t h e boulder f i e l d , on t h e s o u t h e a s t edge of Cone, t h e boulder population reached, perhaps, 3 t o 5 percent of t h e e n t i r e s u r f a c e , with many boulders undoubtedly being concealed j u s t below t h e surface. Rays were not d i s c e r n i b l e on t h e edge of t h e c r a t e r s , p o s s i b l y because of t h e low population and a l s o because t h e n e a r e s t horizon w a s seldom more than 150 f e e t away.
. S o i l mechanics.- Footprints on t h e lunar s u r f a c e were not more than 1 / 2 inch t o 3/4 inch deep except i n t h e r i m s of c r a t e r s , where, at times, t h e y were 3/4 inch t o 1-1/2 inches deep. The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r t r a c k s were seldom more than 1 / 2 inch deep. The penetrometer w a s e a s i l y pushed i n t o t h e l u n a r surface almost t o t h e l i m i t of t h e penetrome t e r rod. During t h e trenching o p e r a t i o n , t h e t r e n c h walls would not r e main i n t a c t and s t a r t e d crumbling s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e t r e n c h w a s i n i t i a t e d . When o b t a i n i n g one core t u b e sample, t h e s o i l d i d not compact and s p i l l e d from t h e t u b e upon withdrawal.

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9.11

ASCENT, RENDEZVOUS, AND DOCKING

Although t h e i n g r e s s a t the conclusion of t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d w a s approximately 2 hours ahead of t h e t i m e l i n e , an hour of t h i s pad w a s used up i n stowing samples and equipment preparatory t o lifto f f . The remaining hour assured adequate t i m e f o r crew r e l a x a t i o n and an e a r l y s t a r t on pre-ascent procedures. There were no d e v i a t i o n s from t h e c h e c k l i s t , although a standby procedure w a s a v a i l a b l e i n t h e event of subsequent communications problems. Lift-off occurred on t i m e . As i n previous missions, d e b r i s from t h e i n t e r s t a g e area was e v i d e n t at s t a g i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , at docking, t h e Command Module P i l o t reported a tear i n ascent s t a g e ' i n s u l a t i o n on t h e bottom r i g h t s i d e of t h e lunar module ascent stage ( s e c t i o n 8.1). Ascent w a s completely nominal with auto i g n i t i o n and c u t o f f . Both guidance systems performed well. The Mission Control Center voiced up an adjustment maneuver which w a s performed at 141:56:49.4 using t h e rea c t i o n c o n t r o l system. The adjustment d e l t a v e l o c i t y w a s monitored with both guidance systems.

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9.11.1
Rendezvous

Following t h e adjustment f i r i n g , a manual maneuver w a s made t o t h e t r a c k i n g a t t i t u d e and rendezvous navigation procedures were i n i t i a t e d . For t h e backup c h a r t s , an e l a p s e d t i m e of 4 minutes 3 seconds w a s a v a i l able (from t h e beginning of t h e adjustment maneuver u n t i l t h e r e q u i r e d t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n minus 30 minutes rendezvous r a d a r mark). This proved t o be i n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o complete t h e r e q u i r e d procedures comf o r t a b l y . The backup c h a r t s should be r e v i s e d t o permit ample t i m e t o o b t a i n t h i s first mark. The guidance systems were updated independently using t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n s e r t i o n s t a t e v e c t o r s as i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s . Nineteen marks were obtained with t h e primary guidance system. The abort guidance system updates were commenced at t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n minus 27 minutes and continued t o t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n minus 7 minutes at which t i m e t h e maneuver s o l u t i o n w a s compared. E i g h t marks were e n t e r e d i n t o t h e abort guidance system. The s o l u t i o n s from both l u n a r module guidance systems compared extremely w e l l , agreeing on line-of-sight angles w i t h i n 0.3 degree and on t o t a l d e l t a v e l o c i t y w i t h i n 1.6 f t / s e c . Because of V F d i f f i c u l t i e s ( s e c t i o n 1 4 . 1 . 4 ) , t h e command module computer w a s H updated with s e x t a n t marks only, p r i o r t o t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n and produced a maneuver s o l u t i o n of minus 67.4, p l u s 0 . 5 , minus 69.2 (unc o r r e c t e d ) compared with t h e primary guidance navigation system s o l u t i o n of p l u s 62.1, p l u s 0 . 1 , p l u s 63.1. Using a two-out-of-three v o t e , t h e primary guidance navigation system s o l u t i o n w a s s e l e c t e d f o r t h e maneuver, and t h e corresponding r o t a t e d v e c t o r w a s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e abort guidance system. The ascent propulsion system t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver w a s executed without i n c i d e n t . A s a n t i c i p a t e d , t h e guided ascent propulsion system shutdown r e s u l t e d i n a s l i g h t underburn. Subsequent t o t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , both lunar module navigat i o n s o l u t i o n s were r e i n i t i a l i z e d and t r a c k i n g w a s resumed. Simultaneously, t h e command module VHF t r a c k i n g w a s found t o be o p e r a t i n g and both s e x t a n t and VHF marks were e n t e r e d i n t o t h e command module computer. The f i r s t midcourse s o l u t i o n i n t h e primary guidance navigation system w a s used. The abort guidance system s o l u t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t midcourse c o r r e c t i o n was i n excess of 5 f t / s e c ; consequently, t h i s s o l u t i o n w a s discarded and abort guidance system navigation w a s continued without r e i n i t i a l i z a t i o n . A t t h e second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , t h e primary guidance navigation system s o l u t i o n w a s used, and t h e abort guidance system s o l u t i o n w a s within 2 f't/sec. The l u n a r module remained a c t i v e during b r a k i n g and t h e rendezvous w a s completed without i n c i d e n t . After passing through t h e f i n a l braking g a t e , t h e l u n a r module began s t a t i o n keeping on t h e command and s e r v i c e module. The Command Module P i l o t executed a 360-degree p i t c h maneuver. N anomalies were observed during t h e i n s p e c t i o n of t h e command and o

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s e r v i c e modules. Consequently, t h e Commander proceeded with t h e predocking maneuver c o n s i s t i n g of a 90-degree p i t c h down and r i g h t yaw t o b r i n g t h e l u n a r module docking t a r g e t i n t o t h e Command Module P i l o t ' s f i e l d of view. A t t h i s point i n t h e mission, t h e abort guidance displays were blank and t h e f l i g h t d i r e c t o r a t t i t u d e i n d i c a t o r , driven by t h e abort guidance system, w a s s t i l l i n d i c a t i n g 150 degrees p i t c h and z e r o yaw. E f f o r t s t o r e s t o r e t h e abort guidance system t o operation were unsuccessful ( s e c t i o n 14.2.5). Docking with t h e command and s e r v i c e module a c t i v e w a s completed uneventfully , d e s p i t e e a r l i e r concern about t h e docking mechanism. The t r a n s f e r of crew and equipment t o t h e command and s e r v i c e module proceeded on schedule but with some concern regarding t h e t i m e remaining t o complete assigned t a s k s . The t i m e a l l o t t e d proved t o b e adequate but not ample. The procedures f o r contamination c o n t r o l i n t h e command modu l e were q u i t e s a t i s f a c t o r y , and p a r t i c l e s were not observed i n t h e command module subsequent t o hatch opening. 9.12
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE LUNAR ORBIT ACTIVITIES

9.12.1

C i r c u l a r i z a t i o n and Plane Change Maneuvers

Two s e r v i c e propulsion system f i r i n g s were made during t h e command and s e r v i c e module s o l o phase. The c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n maneuver, which placed t h e command and s e r v i c e module i n approximately a 60-nautical-mile c i r c u l a r o r b i t , w a s a 4-second f i r i n g performed a f t e r s e p a r a t i n g from t h e l u n a r module. The maneuver w a s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system and r e s u l t e d i n a 2.0 f t / s e c overspeed, which w a s trimmed t o 1.0 f t / s e c . Subsequent t o t h i s maneuver, a change t o t h e constants i n t h e command module computer s h o r t f i r i n g l o g i c w a s uplinked by t h e M i s s i o n Control Center. The plane change maneuver w a s nominal with an 18second f i r i n g c o n t r o l l e d by t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system.

9.12.2

Landmark Tracking

A l l t r a c k i n g , with t h e exception of t h e l u n a r module on r e v o l u t i o n

17, w a s done using t h e t e l e s c o p e with t h e 16-1~t1d a t a a c q u i s i t i o n camera
mounted on t h e s e x t a n t . Fourteen landmarks were t r a c k e d by t h e command and s e r v i c e module, t w o of t h e s e n e a r p e r i g e e while i n t h e 60- by 8nautical-mile o r b i t . The low-altitude landmark t r a c k i n g w a s accomplished with no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f i c u l t i e s . Acquisition of t h e t a r g e t w a s no probl e m and t h e manual o p t i c s d r i v e provided constant t r a c k i n g of t h e landmark through n a d i r .

9-20

Landmark DE-2 w a s not t r a c k e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The high sun angle at t h e time of t r a c k i n g prevented a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e landmark. Another landmark i n t h e area of DE-2 w a s t r a c k e d and i d e n t i f i e d from t h e 16-I-III~ photographs. A l l of t h e o t h e r landmarks were t r a c k e d q u i t e e a s i l y . With t h e exception of DE-2, a l l of t h e graphics f o r t h e landmark t a r g e t s were very s a t i s f a c t o r y . The l u n a r module, on t h e s u r f a c e , w a s t r a c k e d on r e v o l u t i o n 17. The sun r e f l e c t i n g from t h e l u n a r module as w e l l as t h e long shadow of t h e l u n a r module made i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p o s i t i v e . Acquisition of t h e lunar module w a s accomplished by using t h e s i t e map i n t h e l u n a r graphics book and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of s u r f a c e f e a t u r e s i n t h e landing a r e a . Also, on r e v o l u t i o n 29, between scheduled landmarks, t h e l u n a r module w a s again acquired by manual o p t i c s . A t t h a t t i m e , t h e sun could be seen r e f l e c t i n g o f f t h e Apollo lunar s u r f a c e experiment package s t a t i o n .

9.12.3

Bootstrap Photography

The l u n a r topographic camera w a s used on r e v o l u t i o n 4 t o o b t a i n p i c t u r e s of t h e proposed Descartes l a n d i n g s i t e from t h e l o w o r b i t . Approximately one-third of t h e way i n t o t h e photography p a s s , a loud n o i s e developed i n t h e camera. The camera counter continued t o count and t h e photography pass w a s completed. One e n t i r e magazine w a s exposed. Subsequent troubleshooting e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e s h u t t e r w a s not o p e r a t i n g properly ( s e c t i o n 14.3.1). The only o t h e r p i c t u r e s taken with t h e l u n a r topographic camera were of t h e l u n a r module landing on t h e s u r f a c e . The f l i g h t plan w a s changed s o t h a t t h r e e photography passes on t h e Descartes s i t e were made using t h e 500-mm l e n s on t h e 70-mm Hasselblad camera mounted on a b r a c k e t i n window 4 ( f i g . 9-2). The Descartes s i t e w a s t r a c k e d manually with t h e crew o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t and t h e camera manually operated t o expose a frame every 5 seconds. The ground s u p p l i e d i n e r t i a l angles and times t o s t a r t t h e camera and t h e s p a c e c r a f t maneuver. The s p a c e c r a f t was maneuvered i n minimum impulse t o keep t h e crew o p t i c a l alignment sight on t h e t a r g e t . These same procedures w e r e a l s o used on r e v o l u t i o n 34 t o photograph t h e a r e a n e a r Lansburg B where t h e Apollo 13 S-IVB impacted.
A v e r t i c a l s t e r e o s t r i p w a s obtained on r e v o l u t i o n 26 using t h e 70-mm Hasselblad and 80-mm l e n s . This v e r t i c a l s t e r e o s t r i p encompassed almost t h e e n t i r e ground t r a c k from t e r m i n a t o r t o t e r m i n a t o r . A crew o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t maneuver w a s accomplished at t h e end of t h e s t r i p f o r canera c a l i b r a t i o n .

.L

7 ' L

9-21
NASA-S-71-1652

Figure 9-2.-

Lunar s u r f a c e f e a t u r e s i n Descartes landing s i t e area. O r b i t a l Science Hand-Held Photography

9.12.4

Approximately h a l f t h e planned t a r g e t s f o r o r b i t a l science hand-held photography were d e l e t e d because of t h e f l i g h t plan change t o use crew o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t t r a c k i n g of t h e Descartes s i t e . There were t h r e e s t e r e o s t r i p s taken with t h e 500-mm l e n s using t h e hand-held mode ( f i g . 9-3). The r i n g s i g h t w a s used t o improve t h e s i g h t i n g accuracy. s U t i l i z a t i o n of t h e camera i n t h i s mode w a s q u i t e acceptable as long a

9-22

YASA-S-71-1653

a.

Western p o r t i o n of King c r a t e r w i t h smaller c r a t e r i n l e f t foreground having an 0.8-mile diameter and l o c a t e d 3 2 . 4 miles from c e n t e r of King c r a t e r .
S e l e c t e d s t e r e o s t r i p photographs from l u n a r o r b i t .

Figure 9-3.-

t h e s p a c e c r a f t a t t i t u d e was s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r t a r g e t a c q u i s i t i o n . During t h i s f l i g h t , a l l hand-held photography was t a k e n at t h e s p a c e c r a f t a t t i t u d e d i c t a t e d by o t h e r requirements. On a few of t h e t a r g e t s , t h e a t t i t u d e made it d i f f i c u l t t o s a t i s f a c t o r i l y a c q u i r e t h e t a r g e t at t h e p r o p e r time out of any window.

9-23
During t h e hand-held photography and a l s o d u r i n g t h e crew o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t t r a c k i n g , a v a r i a b l e i n t e r v a l o m e t e r would c e r t a i n l y have been an asset. A s i n g l e - l e n s r e f l e x camera would g r e a t l y s i m p l i f y t h e p o i n t i n g t a s k . Having o r b i t a l science t a r g e t s l i s t e d i n t h e f l i g h t p l a n , at times t h e y are a v a i l a b l e , i s c e r t a i n l y more p r e f e r a b l e t h a n j u s t l i s t i n g them as t a r g e t s o f o p p o r t u n i t y . This i s t r u e of both photographic and v i s u a l t a r g e t s .

NASA-S-71-1654

b.

C e n t r a l p o r t i o n of 41-mile diameter King c r a t e r . Figure 9-3.Continued.

9-24
NASA-S-71-1655

c.

E a s t e r n p o r t i o n of King c r a t e r photographed from Figure 9-3.Concluded.

178 m i l e s a w a y .

9.12.5

Zero-Phase

Observations

The camera c o n f i g u r a t i o n w a s changed from t h a t l i s t e d i n t h e f l i g h t p l a n because t h e t e l e m e t r y c a b l e w a s not long enough t o reach t h e camera mounted i n t h e h a t c h window. This c o n f i g u r a t i o n w a s n o t checked p r i o r t o t h e f l i g h t because t h e b r a c k e t a r r i v e d l a t e and no b r a c k e t was a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e s i m u l a t o r . A mark w a s given over t h e intercom and/or t h e

9-25
air-to-ground loop on t h e first and last camera a c t u a t i o n of each pass. It w a s noted t h a t t h e camera operated close t o zero phase on each targ e t . Eight s e p a r a t e areas were l i s t e d f o r zero-phase observations b u t only s i x of t h e s e were observed. The other t w g were cancelled as a result of a f l i g h t plan change. Four of t h e t a r g e t s were on t h e back s i d e of t h e moon and two were on t h e f r o n t s i d e . There w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f ference i n t h e a b i l i t y t o observe t h e t a r g e t s at zero phase between t h e back-side and front-side t a r g e t s . The two s i g n i f i c a n t parameters are albedo and s t r u c t u r a l r e l i e f , o r c o n t r a s t . Because of t h e lack of contrast i n relief on t h e back s i d e , t h e t a r g e t s w e r e d i f f i c u l t o r , i n some cases, impossible t o observe at zero phase. Two views of a back-side t a r g e t , one at zero phase and one at low phase, are s h a m i n f i g u r e 9-4. The two front-side t a r g e t s were c r a t e r s l o c a t e d i n a mare s u r f a c e . The s t r u c t u r a l r e l i e f between t h e f l a t s u r f a c e and t h e c r a t e r r i m made t h e t a r g e t s more v i s i b l e at zero phase.

9.12.6

Dim-Light Photography

The window shade f o r t h e right-hand rendezvous window w a s easy t o i n s t a l l and appeared t o f i t properly. I n addition t o using t h e window shade, t h e flood l i g h t s near t h e right-hand rendezvous window were taped. The green s h u t t e r a c t u a t i o n l i g h t on t h e camera w a s taped and, i n gene r a l , all s p a c e c r a f t l i g h t s were turned o f f f o r t h e d i m - l i g h t photography '
A l l of t h e procedures were completed as l i s t e d i n t h e f l i g h t plan. The only discrepancy noted w a s on t h e e a r t h dark-side photography. There w a s considerable s c a t t e r e d l i g h t i n t h e s e x t a n t when it w a s pointed at t h e dark p o r t i o n of t h e e a r t h . There w a s a l s o a double image of t h e earth's crescent i n t h e sextant.

9.12.7

Cammuni cat ions

Communications between t h e command and s e r v i c e module and t h e Manned Space F l i g h t Network were marginal many times while i n lunar o r b i t . The high-gain antenna pointing angles were very c r i t i c a l ; a very s m a l l adjustment of t h e angles w a s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between having a good ccmmunication lockup or no a c q u i s i t i o n at all ( s e c t i o n 14.1.2). The s e p a r a t e communications loop f o r t h e command and s e r v i c e module should be a c t i v a t e d soon a f t e r command module/lunar module s e p a r a t i o n . The time between s e p a r a t i o n and touchdown i s an extremely busy time f o r t h e lunar module and any prolonged communication with t h e command and s e r v i c e m o d u l e i s d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible. V F communications w i t h H t h e l u n a r module were good at t h e t i m e of s e p a r a t i o n and through touchH down. On rendezvous, t h e V F communications from l i f t - o f f t o s h o r t l y

9-26
NASA-S-71-1656

(a) High overhead view with no zero phase washou’ Note: Recogiilzable landniarks are identified with like numbers on each P h o t o g r a p h .

(b)

LOW

eievatlori showmg zero p h a s e washout.

Figure 9-4.- Comparison of v i s i b i l i t y of lunar s u r f a c e d e t a i l s looking w e s t t o east i n t h e P a s t e u r c r a t e r area.

9-27 before t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n were marginal. A l s o , t h e V F ranging H would not lock up o r , when it d i d , a f a l s e range w a s i n d i c a t e d most of t h e time. Both antennas were t r i e d , t h e squelch w a s adjusted, and ranging w a s turned o f f temporarily. However, none of t h e s e procedures i m proved t h e s i t u a t i o n t o any great degree ( s e c t i o n 14.1.4). A f t e r t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n t h e voice communications and VHF ranging were satisfactory

.

9.13

TRANSEARTH INJECTION

The t r a n s e a r t h inje'ction maneuver w a s e s s e n t i a l l y nominal i n a l l aspects. The only item worthy of comment occurred about 20 seconds p r i o r t o t h e end of t h e maneuver. There w a s a s l i g h t hum o r buzz i n t h e s e r v i c e propulsion system t h a t continued through shutdown. Everyt h i n g was steady, however, and it w a s not a matter of g r e a t concern. The r e s i d u a l s w e r e p l u s 0.6, plus 0.8, and minus 0.1 f t / s e c . These were trimmed t o plus 0.1, plus 0.8, and minus 0.3 f t / s e c . The f i r i n g time w a s within 1 second of t h e pad value.

9.14

TRANSEARTH COAST

The only midcourse correction during t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast phase w a s one r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system maneuver performed approximately 17 hours after t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n . The t o t a l d e l t a v e l o c i t y w a s 0.7 f t / s e c . During t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast phase, a schedule of no-communications navig a t i o n a l s i g h t i n g s w a s completed. The s t a t e vector from t h e t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n maneuver was not updated except by n a v i g a t i o n a l s i g h t i n g s The s t a t e vector w a s dawnlinked t o t h e Network p r i o r t o t h e one midcourse c o r r e c t i o n . The midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s t h e n incorporated and uplinked t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t . An updated Network s t a t e v e c t o r w a s maint a i n e d i n t h e l u n a r module s l o t at a l l times. J u s t p r i o r t o e n t r y , t h e onboard state vector compared q u i t e w e l l with t h e vector obtained by Network tracking. I n addition t o t h e navigational s i g h t i n g s f o r t h e onboard s t a t e v e c t o r , a d d i t i o n a l s i g h t i n g s were performed t o obtain data on stars outside of t h e present c o n s t r a i n t limits. The updates obtained on t h e c o n s t r a i n t stars were not incorporated i n t o t h e s t a t e vector. The c i s l u n a r n a v i g a t i o n a l s i g h t i n g program would be improved i f a recycle f e a t u r e were incorporated. Recalling t h e program f o r each mark i s a drawback t o expeditious navigational s i g h t i n g s .

.

The rest of t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast w a s l i k e t h a t of previous lunar missions with two except ions-nf l i g h t demonstrations were performed t o evaluate t h e e f f e c t s of zero-gravity on p h y s i c a l processes, and a command and s e r v i c e module oxygen flaw-rate t e s t w a s performed. Even

9-28
though t h e metal composites demonstration w a s s t a r t e d during t r a n s l u n a r c o a s t , t h e r e was not s u f f i c i e n t time while out of t h e passive t h e n n a l c o n t r o l mode t o complete a l l of t h e 18 samples. The o t h e r t h r e e demons t r a t i o n s were completed.

9.15

ENTRY AND LANDING

A change t o t h e nominal e n t r y stowage was t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e docki n g probe. The docking probe w a s t i e d down f o r e n t r y at t h e f o o t of t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s couch using procedures voiced by t h e Mission Control Center. Three discrepancies were noted during e n t r y . The e n t r y m n i t o r system was s t a r t e d manually at 0.05g ti= plus 3 seconds. The 0.05g l i g h t The steam pressure w a s l a t e i n reachnever illuminated ( s e c t i o n 14.1.5). i n g t h e peg. However, t h e cabin pressure w a s used as a backup. The time of steam pressure pegging was approximately 5 t o 10 seconds l a t e and occurred at an a l t i t u d e below 90 000 f e e t . [ E d i t o r ' s note: The crew c h e c k l i s t gives a s p e c i f i c time at which t h e steam pressure gage should peg high r e l a t i v e t o t h e i l l u m i n a t i o n of t h e 0.05g l i g h t as an i n d i c a t i o n of t h e 90 000-foot a l t i t u d e ; however, t h e steam pressure measurement is only an approximate i n d i c a t i o n . The crew i n t e r p r e t e d t h e c h e c k l i s t lite r a l l y . ] Also, parer w a s s t i l l on at least one of t h e main buses a f t e r t h e main bus t i e switches were turned off at 800 f e e t . The main buses were not completely powered down u n t i l t h e c i r c u i t breakers on panel 275 were p u l l e d a f t e r landing ( s e c t i o n 14.1.6).

The landing impact w a s milder than a n t i c i p a t e d . The parachutes were j e t t i s o n e d and t h e s p a c e c r a f t remained i n t h e s t a b l e I a t t i t u d e . Recovery personnel a r r i v e d at t h e s p a c e c r a f t before t h e completion of t h e 10-minute waiting p e r i o d r e q u i r e d p r i o r t o i n i t i a t i n g i n f l a t i o n of t h e u p r i g h t i n g bags f o r a s t a b l e I landing. One parachute became entangled on t h e spacecraft and was c u t l o o s e by t h e recovery team. The carbon dioxide b o t t l e on t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s l i f e preserver was l o o s e and t h e vest would n o t i n f l a t e when t h e l e v e r was p u l l e d . The b o t t l e was t i g h t e n e d , and then t h e l i f e p r e s e r v e r inflated properly.

!
L

NASA-S-71-1636

9-29
D,
Lilt-off Iiiscrtioci nd systrms checks

Revolution counl Nigl

MSFN

CRO

-'

HSK

S-Lw evasive m

m v n

Platlam rcaligmneibl

S-IPB tiwid axyqen h
Extcld doeking mbe

p

C i s l u u navigation odics ulibratim

t-

Y

N

tal 0 to 10 hours.

Figure 9-1.-

F l i g h t plan a c t i v i t i e s .

9-30
NASA-S-71-1b37

3
Ellpvd tim

Figure 9-1.- Continued.

I
L

9-31
NASA-S-71-1638

Day
MSFN
Night

N

Nisht

DW

Platfan realiymes

Each &ride

dim-light pho(ayaphy

E

Initiate parrive thmnal colilml

Cm exercise m i a d

s-mr ) * l q * Y

I
(cl 3Oto 51 hours.

Initiate passive themu1 conbol

1

Figure 9-1.- Continued.

9-32

Crew exercise

Bi-static rada fnquency check

I

udr a 5 : 3 3 45:b

S p m a r l t c b c k upd*c (+40:02.9)

Id) 51 b 61 hours.

Figure 9-1.- Continued.

v -

c

9-33
NASA-S-71-1640

Day Night
Housekeepin(

I
9

Ni
P

I

L n iilodile clrckwt ua

1

Water nialaprnniiL w a l n cycled

Presruize lunr nodule

E

1

1
le1 61 to 78 hours.

Initiate hnr m u a s m i battery e s t dk

Figure 9-1.

-

Continued.

9- 34

rT

NASA-S-7 1-1641

count ~kpsed time 18 MSFN

Revolution count

0
Niy

I NII

Terminate liiiia m d i l e ascciit ballcry test

P latrain realiqimeiil
Platlomi realigiineiit

74

m
L M h W k (rrhinq
Systems checks la liiiia wbit
IIIsert loll llJneUVeI

Systems checks lw descent a b i i inmution nwwu

81

111 ntom hours. Figure 9-1. Cont h u e d .

-

NASA-S-71-1642

9-35
Revolution count
D< Nigl
I

Revolution count

Ns i

Platlmii reali~unent
Ternittiate rest motu&

Phmograllll Descrtcs

Initiate e s t attitude

Open dockiiq tunnel and baisfm I O l l u u mobbe

Luna moduk activation and r y s t n r ckout

Luna module coasc alignment

Undocking nd sep.r*ion

Y

-

lgl I to 105 hours.

Figure 9-1.

-

Cont inued.

9-36
NASA-S-7 1-1643

Revolution count Elapsed lime

Revolution count

D*
Nig'
Cunniand rid service iiiodiile IUIIUorbit circuIarizatioil

[!I
Elapsed time
0
MSFN L,lllaf sinlace iiavigatiwi ( ~ i o t i a nialiile) ~ (LI
NVJ
Colnrnandei aiid Lunar

m
Luna iiiodule descent popilsion system and laiidiny r a d s chechoul
Cel)cnschein lJlotopapriy by Command Module Pilol

Modiilc Pilot eat

C m a n d and suvice module I a n h a k tracking

1

t

ll

Backwrd-loolring chase observalion by Carmind Module Pilol Cabin a d equipnenl p e w a (ions for Insc emavehlcular aclIvIIy

ConunMd and service module a.d luna niodule platform r r a l i p m n t

Don portable life siippori
systms

F m r r d - l o o k i n g z u o phase o h v a t i o n by Camand

Module Pilot
Portable Iile supper( syslml connrunic*ims check

Command md suvice noduk orbital science phaog.phs Luna nodule p a r e d descent initiation

Zodiacal Ii+ phologaphy by C m n d Moduk Pilot

Don helmetr/glons

Luu noduk landing Carnand Md suvice module p l * h nallqnncnl
Luna module platform rralipmnl Cmai Modu k e,

Suit presswe i n t w i t y check

Final pewalions for ewers

109

1
(h) 1 8 to 115 b u n .

S t r t first eatravehtcula activity 14 hous 48 minuter)
Tekr

C m n d m service moduk d butin) of laded l n module ua

Camund md service module k. -1 backing

MSFN

110

Figure 9-1.

-

Continued.

..
L .

1 L

i

L

L

.-

i

-

L

A-

L

.-

9-37
WA5A-5-11- 1644

Revolution count

I

blution count Elapsed time
'

r 1 a M S F N MSFN
hI

+

NI cannnd
nd Luna
Module P i l eat ~
Cainiiaid Module Pilot S I

1_

Camnd and w v i c e d platfann r r a l i p n m t

k

Galactic suvey p h o t o q q h y by Canmiand Yobk Pilot

CamnMdI n d h uoduk
Plb(

h a d ad service moble p l a t f m realigmnent

Eathshine p h a o q a d ~ yby C d yoduk Pilot
TenninYe first edrarehiwlr wtivity

Cam~md service mobk rd
p l a t f m mliqmmt Repessuize knr mobk cabin nd rrchrpc portlbk life w w m sysllcns
COnnlVl

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Yobk P i W ea

I
S

k

Doff W b k life suppat systems Initme VHF b ~ r t a t i c d r r
test (11h a d

1
liI 115 to 130 hours.

Orbital scnnce photoqaphy by C m m a d Uobk Pibt

Initiate t radar e sS-band bi-static

carnd

Figure 9-1.

-

Cont inued.

9-38
NASA-571-1645

Revolution count

Revolution count ISFN
r a t i o n fa secmid extravehicula actwily

Te levisior

C Nic

Module Pilot eat
Contiiigeiicy pliotograpliy 01

Dercartes by Coliiiiirid Modiile PllOl

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canmunicatiois Conunamd aiid service iiiodule plrtfrml realiqmieiil Final prpuations la egress Vertical stweo md orbital science photaq~rphyby C m ~ n Module Pilot d Start second extravchiciila activily (4 hours 35 niiiules)

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1

I

Repressurize liiiiar modiile cahiii

(CSMI

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sys Ienis
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Te,

-137

-

MSFN

C m n d and service module Iandmak tracking

Galactic s w e y photopraphy Module Pilot by Cd -

Luna libation )Ihotopaphy by Camnnd Module P i k u

MSFN

1

Rendezvous rdr actiuation and sell test
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ndLwu Yoduk Pikt eat
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1 -1% .

13 13010 140 hours.

F a w d - W i q zuo . k U U * l o n by C l d IU W l e PiM

Figure 9-1.

-

Continued.

1

NASA-5-71-1646

9-39
Revolution count

Revolut ion count

-1mMSFN MSFN

rtime
I

I
Nil

- 1
I
-141 MSFN
L n module platlmii ua realiqmnent
Platlmii realiyiniieiit

Pretvincli switcli checks

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t

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T r n r f n c q u i p m l md s n p k s c d nodule md s t w Iheill

Initiate pnssiue Ilmmal s a b o t

-145

Ikl 140 to 150 hours.

Figure 9-1.

-

Continued

.

9-40
UASA-S-71-1641

Elapsed time
1

D<
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SI

162

PUtlaiii realiqrmnetit

-

I
Terminate parrove thnntal control

170

Tmiioiate oxyqen llor rate test altitude
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111 Ill 150 to 171 hours.

-

F i g u r e 9-1.- Continued.

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F i g u r e 9-,1. Continued.

-

9-42
NASA-S-71-1649
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D, Nigl

Elapsed time
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Initiate parwe thermal conVol

Television

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-

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(n) 1m to 198 hours.

I 1
Cirlunr n i v i q Y i m

Figure 9-1.- Continued.

?

-

1
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9-43
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-

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(0) lpll to 214

hours.

Figure 9-1.- Continued.

9-44
NASA-S-71-1651

Elamd time

Day

v

Elapsed time

Entry monitor system entry check

Command module/scrvice nicdule scwatim

Entry mtaface

.

(PI to 2l7 hours. 214

Figure 9-1.

-

Concluded.

.- . L

1

.

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10-1

10 .O

BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION

This s e c t i o n i s a summary o f t h e Apollo 1 4 medical f i n d i n g s based on a preliminary a n a l y s i s of t h e biomedical data. A comprehensive evaluation w i l l be published i n a s e p a r a t e r e p o r t . The t h r e e crewmen accumulated a t o t a l o f 650 man-hours of space f l i g h t experience. The crewmen remained i n excellent h e a l t h throughout t h e mission and t h e i r performance w a s e x c e l l e n t d e s p i t e a a l t e r a t i o n of t h e i r normal n work/rest cycle. A l l physiological parameters obtained from t h e crew reo mained within t h e expected ranges during t h e f l i g h t . N adverse e f f e c t s which could be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e l u n a r surface exposure have been observed. 10.1
BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA

Problems with t h e Comander ' s biomedical instrument at i on h a r n e s s began p r i o r t o l i f t - o f f when t h e s t e r n a l electrocardiogram s i g n a l became unreadable 3 minutes a f t e r spacecraft i n g r e s s . A waiver w a s made t o t h e launch mission r u l e r e q u i r i n g a readable electrocardiogram on all crewmen. During t h e f i r s t o r b i t , t h e Commander's s t e r n a l electrocardiogram s i g n a l returned t o normal.
A t about 57 1 / 2 hours, t h e Commander noted t h a t h i s lower s t e r n a l sensor had leaked e l e c t r o d e paste around t h e s e a l i n g t a p e . This s i t u a t i o n w a s corrected by applying f r e s h e l e c t r o d e p a s t e and t a p e .

When t h e Commander t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e support system in preparation f o r t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , h i s electrocardiogram w a s s o noisy on two occasions t h a t t h e cardiotachometer outputs i n t h e Mission Control Center were unusable and manual counting of t h e h e a r t rate f o r metabolic r a t e assessment became necessary. A good e l e c t r o cardiogram signal on t h e Commander w a s reacquired a f t e r completion of t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y and r e t u r n t o t h e l u n a r module. The t h r e a d s on t h e t o p connector of t h e s i g n a l conditioner were a c c i d e n t a l l y s t r i p p e d . However, t h e electrocardiogram s i g n a l w a s r e s t o r e d f o r t h e remainder o f t h e f l i g h t by t i g h t e n i n g t h i s connector. The q u a l i t y o f t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s electrocardiogram w a s excell e n t from s p a c e c r a f t ingress u n t i l approximately t h r e e days i n t o t h e m i s s i o n . A t t h a t t i m e , i n t e r m i t t e n t n o i s e transmissions t y p i c a l of a loose sensor were received. The lower s t e r n a l sensor w a s r e s e r v i c e d with f r e s h o p a s t e and t a p e . This happened two a d d i t i o n a l times. N attempt w a s made t o c o r r e c t t h e s i t u a t i o n on t h e last occurrence.

10-2

"he L u n a r Module P i l o t a l s o l o s t h i s impedance pneumogram a f t e r t h e e i g h t h day of f l i g h t . P o s t f l i g h t examination showed t h a t t h e s i g n a l cond i t i o n e r had f a i l e d . Physiological measurements were w i t h i n expected ranges throughout t h e mission. The average crew h e a r t rates f o r work and s l e e p i n t h e command module and l u n a r module are l i s t e d i n t h e following t a b l e .

I
Activity Commander Ccanmand Module Pilot Command module: Work Sleep

Average h e a r t rates, beats/min

L u n a r Module Pilot

57
52

Lunar module:
Work Sleep

I

66
46

Figure 10-1 p r e s e n t s t h e crew h e a r t rates a f t e r t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n during t h e multiple unsuccessful docking attempts and t h e f i n a l h a r d dock.
NASA-S-71-1657 160

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120

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420

440

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Figure 10-1.-

C r e w heart rates during m u l t i p l e docking attempts.

10-3
During powered descent and ascent, t h e Commander's h e a r t - r a t e averages ranged from 60 t o 107 beats per minute during descent and from 69 t o 83 b e a t s p e r minute during a s c e n t , as s h a m i n f i g u r e s 10-2 and 10-3, res p e c t i v e l y . These h e a r t - r a t e averages f o r descent and a s c e n t . were t h e lowest observed on a lunar landing mission.
NASA-S-71-1658 180

160

140

80

60

40

107:57 107:59 108:Ol 108:03 108:05 108:07 108:09 108:ll 108:13 108:15 108:17 108:19
l i m e , hrmin

Figure 10-2.- H e a r t rates of t h e Commander during lunar descent.

1

10-4

NASA-S-71-1659

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90

1

b
I

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60 141:41

141:43

141:45

141:47

141:49

141:51

141:53

141:55

Time, hr:min

Figure 10-3.- Heart r a t e s of t h e Commander during l u n a r a s c e n t . Heart r a t e s during t h e two e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y periods are shown i n f i g u r e s 10-4 and 10-5. The Commander's average h e a r t rates were 81 and 99 beats p e r minute f o r t h e f i r s t and second p e r i o d s , r e s p e c t i v e l y ; and t h e L u n a r Module P i l o t ' s average h e a r t rates were 91 and 95 b e a t s p e r minute. The metabolic rates and t h e accumulated metabolic production of each crewman during t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y periods a r e p r e s e n t e d i n tables 10-1 and 10-11. A summary of t h e metabolic production during t h e two e x t r a v e h i c u l a r periods i s presented i n t h e following t a b l e .

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10-11 10.2 10.2.1
MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS

Adaptation t o Weightlessness

Adaptation t o t h e weightless s t a t e w a s r e a d i l y accomplished. S h o r t l y a f t e r o r b i t a l i n s e r t i o n , each crewman experienced t h e t y p i c a l f u l l n e s s of-the-head sensation t h a t has been reported by previous f l i g h t crews. N o nausea, vomiting, v e r t i g o , o r d i s o r i e n t a t i o n occurred during t h e miss i o n , and t h e crew d i d not observe d i s t o r t i o n of f a c i a l features, such as rounding of t h e face due t o lack of g r a v i t y , as reported by some previous crewmen. During t h e f i r s t two days of f l i g h t , t h e crew reported discomfort and soreness of t h e lower back muscles as has been noted on previous miss i o n s . The discomfort w a s s u f f i c i e n t i n magnitude t o i n t e r f e r e with s l e e p during t h e f i r s t day of t h e mission, and w a s a t t r i b u t e d t o changes i n posture during weightlessness. I n f l i g h t e x e r c i s e provided r e l i e f . 10.2.2 Visual Phenomenon

Each crewman r e p o r t e d seeing t h e s t r e a k s , p o i n t s , and f l a s h e s of The frequency of t h e l i g h t f l a s h e s averaged about once every 2 minutes f o r each crewman. The Visual phenomenon w a s observed with t h e eyes both open and closed, and t h e crew w a s more aware of t h e phenomenon immediately upon awakening than upon r e t i r i n g . I n a s p e c i a l observation period s e t aside during t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast phase, t h e Cammand Module P i l o t determined t h a t dark adaptation w a s not a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r seeing t h e phenomenon i f t h e l e v e l of s p a c e c r a f t i l l u m i n a t i o n w a s low. Furthermore, s e v e r a l of t h e l i g h t f l a s h e s were apparently seen by two of t h e crewmen simultaneously. Coincidence of l i g h t f l a s h e s f o r two crewmen, i f a t r u e coincidence, would s u b s t a n t i a t e t h a t t h e f l a s h e s originated from an e x t e r n a l r a d i a t i o n source and would i n d i c a t e t h a t they were generated by extremely-high-energy part i c l e s , presumably of cosmic origin. Low-energy highly-ionizing p a r t i c l e s would not have t h e range through t i s s u e t o have reached both crewmen.
l i g h t t h a t have been noted by previous Apollo crews.

10.2.3

Medications

N medications o t h e r than nose drops, t o r e l i e v e n a s a l s t u f f i n e s s o caused by s p a c e c r a f t atmosphere, were used during t h e mission. On t h e t h i r d day of f l i g h t , t h e Commander and t h e Lunar Module P i l o t used one drop i n each n o s t r i l . Relief w a s prompt and l a s t e d f o r approximately 1 2 hours. The Command Module P i l o t used t h e nose drops 3 hours p r i o r t o entry.

10-12

On t h i s mission, t h . e n a s a l spray b o t t l e s i n t h e i n f l i g h t medical k i t were replaced by dropper b o t t l e s because previous crews nad r e p o r t e d d i f f i c u l t i e s i n obtaining medication from spray b o t t l e s i n zero-g. The crew reported no problems associated with t h e dropper b o t t l e . 10.2.4 Sleep

The s h i f t of t h e crew's normal t e r r e s t r i a l s l e e p cycle during t h e first f o u r days of f l i g h t w a s t h e l a r g e s t experienced so f a r i n t h e Apollo s e r i e s . The displacement ranged from 7 hours on t h e f i r s t mission day t o 11-1/2 hours on t h e fourth. The crew reported some d i f f i c u l t y s l e e p i n g i n t h e zero-g environment, p a r t i c u l a r l y during t h e first two s l e e p periods. They a t t r i b u t e d t h e problem p r i n c i p a l l y t o a lack o f k i n e s t h e t i c sensations and t o muscle soreness i n t h e l e g s and lower back. Throughout t h e mission, s l e e p was i n t e r m i t t e n t ; i . e . , never more than 2 t o 3 hours of deep and continuous sleep. The l u n a r module crewmen received l i t t l e , i f my, s l e e p between t h e i r two e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d s . The lack of an adequate place t o rest t h e head, discomfort of t h e pressure s u i t , and t h e 7-degree starboard l i s t of t h e l u n a r module caused by t h e l u n a r t e r r a i n were believed responsible f o r t h i s insomnia. "he crewmen looked out t h e window several times during t h e sleep period f o r reassurance t h a t t h e l u n a r module w a s not s t a r t i n g t o t i p over. Following t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n , t h e crew s l e p t b e t t e r than t h e y had previously. The lunar module crewmen required one a d d i t i o n a l s l e e p period t o make up t h e s l e e p d e f i c i t t h a t w a s incurred while on t h e l u n a r s u r f ace. The crewmen reported during p o s t f l i g h t discussions t h a t they w e r e d e f i n i t e l y operating on t h e i r physiological reserves because of inadequate s l e e p . This lack of s l e e p caused them some concern; however, all t a s k s were performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . 10.2.5 Radiation

The Lunar Module P i l o t ' s personal r a d i a t i o n dosimeter f a i l e d t o int e g r a t e t h e dosage properly after t h e f i r s t 24 hours of f l i g h t . To ensure t h a t each l u n a r module crewman had a f u n c t i o n a l dosimeter w h i l e on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e , the Command Module P i l o t t r a n s f e r r e d h i s u n i t t o t h e Lunar Module P i l o t on t h e f o u r t h day of t h e mission. The f i n a l readings from t h e personal r a d i e t i o n dosimeters y i e l d e d n e t i n t e g r a t e d (uncorrected) values of 640 and 630 millirads f o r t h e Commander and t h e Command Module Pilot, r e s p e c t i v e l y . N o value can be determined f o r t h e Lunar Module

10-13

P i l o t . The t o t a l r a d i a t i o n dose f o r each crewman was approximately 1.15 r a d s t o t h e s k i n and 0.6 r a d at a 5-centimeter t i s s u e depth. These doses a r e t h e l a r g e s t observed on any Apollo mission; however, they are w e l l below t h e t h r e s h o l d of detectable medical e f f e c t s . The magnitudes of t h e r a d i a t i o n doses were apparently t h e r e s u l t of two f a c t o r s : (1)The t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n t r a j e c t o r y l a y c l o s e r t o t h e plane of t h e geomagnetic equator than t h a t of previous f l i g h t s and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e s p a c e c r a f t t r a v e l e d through t h e h e a r t of t h e t r a p p e d r a d i a t i o n belts. ( 2 ) The space r a d i a t i o n background w a s g r e a t e r t h a n previously experienced. Whole-body g m a spectroscopy w a s a l s o performed p o s t f l i g h t on t h e crew and i n d i a m c a t e d no cosmic r a y induced r a d i o a c t i v i t y . 10.2.6 Water

The crew reported t h a t t h e taste of t h e drinking water i n both t h e command module and t h e lunar module w a s e x c e l l e n t . A l l e i g h t scheduled i n f l i g h t c h l o r i n a t i o n s of t h e command module water system were accomplished. P r e f l i g h t t e s t i n g of t h e l u n a r module potable w a t e r system shared t h a t t h e iodine level i n both water tanks was adequate f o r bact e r i a l p r o t e c t i o n throughout t h e f l i g h t .

1.. 027

Food

The i n f l i g h t food w a s similar t o t h a t of previous Apollo missions. Six new foods were included i n t h e menu:

a .
b. c.
d.

Lobster bisque ( f r e e z e dehydrated) Peach embrosia ( f r e e z e dehydrated)
Beef j e r k y (ready-to-eat

bite-sized)

Diced peaches (thermostabilized) Mixed f r u i t ( t h e r m o s t a b i l i z e d ) Pudding (thermostabilized)

e.

f.

The l a t t e r t h r e e items were packaged i n aluminum cans with easy-open, f u l l - p a n e l , pull-out l i d s . The crew d i d not r e p o r t any d i f f i c u l t i e s e i t h e r with removing t h e pull-out l i d s o r e a t i n g t h e food contained i n t h e s e cans w i t h a spoon. P r i o r t o t h e mission, each crewman evaluated t h e a v a i l a b l e food items and s e l e c t e d h i s i n d i v i d u a l f l i g h t menu. These menus provided approximately 2100 c a l o r i e s per man p e r day. During most of t h e f l i g h t , t h e crew maintained a food consumption l o g . The Commander and t h e Lunar Module P i l o t a t e a l l t h e food planned f o r each meal, but t h e Command Module P i l o t was s a t i s f i e d with l e s s .

10-14

Recovery-day physical examinations revealed t h a t t h e Commander and t h e L u n a r Module P i l o t had maintained t h e i r approximate p r e f l i g h t weight, while t h e Command Module P i l o t l o s t n e a r l y 1 0 pounds. The Command Module P i l o t s t a t e d t h a t he would have p r e f e r r e d a great.er q u a n t i t y of food items r e q u i r i n g l i t t l e or no p r e p a r a t i o n t i m e .

I

10.3

PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS

Each crewman received a comprehensive p h y s i c a l examination a t 27,

1 5 , and 6 days p r i o r t o launch, with b r i e f examinations conducted d a i l y during t h e l a s t 5 days before launch.
S h o r t l y a f t e r landing, a comprehensive p h y s i c a l examination showed t h a t t h e crew w a s i n good h e a l t h . Both t h e Commander and t h e Command Module P i l o t had a small amount of c l e a r , bubbly f l u i d i n t h e l e f t middleear c a v i t y and s l i g h t reddening o f t h e eardrums. These f i n d i n g s disappeared i n 24 hours without treatment. The Lunar Module P i l o t had moderate e y e l i d i r r i t a t i o n i n a d d i t i o n t o s l i g h t redness of t h e eardrums. A l l crewmen showed a mild temporary r e a c t i o n t o t h e micrcpore t a p e coveri n g t h e i r biomedical s e n s o r s . This r e a c t i o n subsided w i t h i n 24 hours.
10.4

FLIGHT CRFW H W T H STABILIZATION

During previous Apollo missions, crew i l l n e s s e s were responsible f o r numerous medical and o p e r a t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . Three days b e f o r e t h e Apollo 7 launch, t h e crew developed an upper r e s p i r a t o r y i n f e c t i o n which subsided before l i f t - o f f , b u t r e c u r r e d i n f l i g h t . Early on t h e Apollo 8 mission, one crewman developed symptoms o f a 24-hour v i r a l gast r o e n t e r i t i s which w a s epidemic i n t h e Cape Kennedy area around launch t i m e . About two days p r i o r t o t h e Apollo 9 f l i g h t , t h e crew developed common colds which n e c e s s i t a t e d a d e l a y of t h e launch f o r t h r e e days. Nine days b e f o r e t h e Apollo 1 3 launch, t h e backup Lunar Module P i l o t developed German measles ( r u b e l l a ) and i n a d v e r t e n t l y exposed t h e prime Command Module P i l o t . The day b e f o r e launch, t h e prime Command Module P i l o t w a s r e p l a c e d by h i s backup counterpart because laboratory t e s t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e prime crewman w a s not immune t o t h i s highly communicable d i s e a s e with an incubation period of approximately two weeks. I n w. attempt t o p r o t e c t t h e prime and backup f l i g h t crew members from exposure t o communicable d i s e a s e during t h e c r i t i c a l prelaunch and f l i g h t p e r i o d s , such as experienced on previous f l i g h t , a f l i g h t crew h e a l t h s t a b i l i z a t i o n program w a s implemented. This program c o n s i s t e d of t h e following phases :

11 li L:

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L

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10-15

a. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , examination, and immunization of all primary cont a c t s (personnel who r e q u i r e d d i r e c t contact with t h e prime o r backup crew during t h e l a s t t h r e e weeks p r i o r t o f l i g h t ) .
b . Health and epidemiological s u r v e i l l a n c e of t h e crew members and t h e primary c o n t a c t s , t h e i r families, and t h e community.

c. Certain modifications t o f a c i l i t i e s used f o r t r a i n i n g and housi n g t h e crew, such as t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f b i o l o g i c a l f i l t e r s i n all a i r conditioning systems. d. Housing of both t h e prime and backup crew members i n t h e crew q u a r t e r s at t h e Kennedy Space Center from 2 1 days b e f o r e f l i g h t u n t i l launch. The f l i g h t crew h e a l t h s t a b i l i z a t i o n program w a s a complete success. No i l l n e s s e s occurred during t h e p r e f l i g h t period i n any of t h e prime o r backup crew members. This r e s u l t i s of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e because t h e incidence of i n f e c t i o u s disease w i t h i n t h e local community w a s near a seasonal high during t h e prelaunch period.

10.5 QUARANTINE
N change i n quarantine procedures were made on t h i s mission, except o as follows : a.
b.

Two mobile quarantine f a c i l i t i e s were used.

Two h e l i c o p t e r t r a n s f e r s of t h e crew and support personnel were

performed. The new procedures were implemented t o r e t u r n t h e crew t o t h e Lunar Receiving Laboratory f i v e days e a r l i e r t h a n on previous l u n a r landing missions. The crew and 1 4 medical support personnel were i s o l a t e d behind t h e microbiological b a r r i e r i n t h e Lunar Receiving Laboratory at Houston, Texas, on February 1 2 , 1971. Daily medical examinations and p e r i o d i c l a b o r a t o r y examinations shared no s i g n s o f i l l n e s s r e l a t e d t o l u n a r mat e r i a l exposure. No s i g n i f i c a n t t r e n d s were noted i n any biochemical, immunological, o r hematological parameters i n e i t h e r t h e crew o r t h e n medical support personnel. O February 27, 1971, a f t e r 20 days of isol a t i o n w i t h i n t h e Lunar Receiving Laboratory, t h e f l i g h t crew and t h e medical support personnel were released from quarantine. Quarantine f o r t h e s p a c e c r a f t and samples of l u n a r material w a s terminated A p r i l 4,

1971

--11-1 11.0
MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 1 . FLIGHT CONTROL 11

F l i g h t c o n t r o l performance w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y i n providing t i m e l y o p e r a t i o n a l support. Same problems were encountered and most are discussed i n o t h e r s e c t i o n s of t h e r e p o r t . Only t h o s e problems t h a t a r e of p a r t i c u l a r concern t o flight c o n t r o l operations o r a r e not r e p o r t e d elsewhere are r e p o r t e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n .
A l l launch v e h i c l e instrument u n i t analog d a t a were l o s t j u s t p r i o r A faulty multiplexer w i t h i n t h e instrument u n i t t h a t prot o lift-off. cesses t h e analog f l i g h t c o n t r o l d a t a had f a i l e d . The f l i g h t c o n t r o l l e r s were a b l e t o recover m o s t of t h e analog d a t a from t h e S-IVB Y F downlink; H however, because of i t s l i m i t e d range, an e a r l y l o s s of d a t a w a s experienced at 4 hours 27 minutes.

A l l launch v e h i c l e d i g i t a l computer data were l o s t at 3 hours and The v e h i c l e , however, executed a normal propuls i v e vent about 29 minutes l a t e r i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e computer w a s opera t i n g properly. As a result of t h e loss of d i g i t a l computer d a t a , commands t o t h e S-IVB had t o be t r a n s m i t t e d without v e r i f i c a t i o n of proper execution. The crew provided v i s u a l a t t i t u d e information f o r t h e evas i v e maneuver.

5 minutes after launch.

High-gain antenna lockup problems w e r e noted during r e v o l u t i o n 12 lunar o r b i t operations. Because of t h i s problem, a data s t o r a g e equipment dump could not be accolnplished t o o b t a i n data from t h e r e v o l u t i o n 12 low-altitude landmark t r a c k i n g operation. These data were t o be used f o r powered descent t a r g e t i n g . During r e v o l u t i o n 1 2 , t h e planned voice updates f e l l behind t h e timel i n e because of problems with t h e l u n a r module s t e e r a b l e antenna. Consequently, t h e powered descent was performed using t h e s p a c e c r a f t forward and aft m n i d i r e c t i o n a l antennas and t h e 210-foot ground receiving antenna. Receiving of communications and high-bit-rate d a t a were satisf a c t o r y except f o r some s m a l l l o s s e s when switching to t h e a f t antenna late i n t h e descent phase.
A n abort command w a s set i n t h e lunar module guidance computer and t h e i n d i c a t i o n w a s observed by F l i g h t Control during l u n a r module a c t i v a t i o n , about 4 hours p r i o r t o scheduled powered descent i n i t i a t i o n . A procedure w a s uplinked t o t h e crew which r e s e t t h e abort command and l e d t o t h e conclusion t h a t t h e abort switch had malfunctioned. Subsequently, t h e abort coxnand reappeared t h r e e t i m e s and, each time, t h e command w a s

11-2 r e s e t by tapping on t h e panel near t h e abort switch. A procedure t o i n h i b i t t h e primary guidance system from going i n t o an abort program w a s developed i n t h e i n t e r v a l p r i o r t o powered descent, and w a s uplinked t o t h e crew f o r manual e n t r y i n t o t h e computer. The f i r s t p a r t of t h e fourp a r t procedure w a s e n t e r e d j u s t p r i o r t o powered descent i n i t i a t i o n and' t h e o t h e r p a r t s a f t e r t h r o t t l e - u p of t h e descent engine. Had an abort been r e q u i r e d , it would have been accomplished using t h e abort guidance system and would have allowed reestablishment of t h e primary guidance system by keyboard e n t r y after t h e a b o r t .
A delay of approximately 50 minutes occurred i.n t h e first extraveh i c u l a r a c t i v i t y because of t h e l a c k of s a t i s f a c t o r y communications. The crew were receiving ground communications but t h e Mission Control Center w a s not receiving crew communications. The problem w a s c o r r e c t e d by r e s e t t i n g t h e Cammander's audio c i r c u i t b r e a k e r which w a s n o t engaged.

The c o l o r t e l e v i s i o n camera r e s o l u t i o n gradually degraded during t h e l a t t e r portions of t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . The degradat i o n w a s caused by overheating r e s u l t i n g from 1.5 hours of operation while i n t h e modular equipment stowage assembly p r i o r t o i t s deployment. The camera w a s turned o f f between t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r periods f o r cooli n g , i n s t e a d of leaving it operating as r e q u i r e d by t h e f l i g h t plan. The camera p i c t u r e r e s o l u t i o n w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y during t h e second extravehicular a c t i v i t y . Three problems developed during t h e Apollo 1 4 mission t h a t , had t h e crew not been p r e s e n t , would have prevented t h e achievement of t h e miss i o n o b j e c t i v e s . These problems involved t h e docking probe ( s e c t i o n 7.11, t h e landing radar ( s e c t i o n 8.4) and t h e lunar module guidance computer, described above. In each case, t h e crew provided ground personnel with v i t a l information and data f o r f a i l u r e analysis and development of altern a t e procedures. The crew performed t h e necessary a c t i v i t i e s and t h e req u i r e d work-around procedures t h a t allowed t h e mission t o be completed as planned.
11.2

NETWORK

The Mission Control Center and t h e Manned Space F l i g h t Network provided e x c e l l e n t support. There were only two s i g n i f i c a n t problems. A d e f e c t i v e - t r a n s f e r switch component caused a power outage at t h e Goddard Space F l i g h t Center during l u n a r o r b i t . The power loss r e s u l t e d i n a 4 1/2-minute data loss. On lunar r e v o l u t i o n 12, a power a m p l i f i e r f a i l u r e occurred at t h e Goldstone s t a t i o n . The problem w a s c o r r e c t e d by switching t o a redundant system. The Network C o n t r o l l e r ' s Mission Rep o r t f o r Apollo 1 4 , dated March 19, 1971, published by t h e Manned Spacec r a f t Center, F l i g h t Support Division, contains a summary of all Manned Space F l i g h t Network problems which occurred during t h e mission.

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11.3

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

The Department of Defense provided recovery support commensurate with mission planning f o r Apollo 1 4 . Ship support f o r t h e primary landi n g area i n t h e P a c i f i c Ocean w a s provided by t h e h e l i c o p t e r c a r r i e r USS New Orleans. Active air support c o n s i s t e d of f i v e SH-3A h e l i c o p t e r s from t h e New Orleans and two €IC-130 rescue a i r c r a f t staged from Pago Pago, Samoa. T o of t h e h e l i c o p t e r s , designated "Swim 1" and "Swim 2", w c a r r i e d underwater demolition team personnel and t h e r e q u i r e d recovery equipment. The t h i r d h e l i c o p t e r , designated "Recovery", c a r r i e d t h e decontamination swimmer and t h e f l i g h t surgeon, and w a s u t i l i z e d f o r t h e r e t r i e v a l of t h e f l i g h t crew. The f o u r t h h e l i c o p t e r , designated "Photo" , served as a photographic platform f o r both motion-picture photography and l i v e t e l e v i s i o n coverage. The f i f t h h e l i c o p t e r , designated "Relay", s served a a communications-relay a i r c r a f t . The ship-based a i r c r a f t were i n i t i a l l y p o s i t i o n e d r e l a t i v e t o t h e t a r g e t p o i n t ; they departed s t a t i o n to.commence recovery operations after t h e command module had been visually acquired. The two HC-130 a i r c r a f t , designated "Samoa Rescue 1" and It Samoa Rescue 2", w e r e positioned t o t r a c k t h e command module after it had e x i t e d from S-band blackout, as w e l l as provide pararescue c a p a b i l i t y had t h e ccaumand module landed uprange o r darnrange of t h e t a r g e t p o i n t . A l l recovery f o r c e s dedicated f o r Apollo 1 4 support are l i s t e d i n 11 t a b l e 11-1. Figure 1 - illustrates t h e recovery f o r c e p o s i t i o n s p r i o r t o p r e d i c t e d S-band a c q u i s i t i o n t i m e .

U.3.1

Command M o d u l e Location and R e t r i e v a l

The New Orleans' p o s i t i o n w a s e s t a b l i s h e d using a navigation satell i t e (SRN-9) f i x obtained at 2118 G.m.t. The s h i p ' s p o s i t i o n at t h e t i m e of command module landing w a s determined t o be 26 degrees 59 minutes 30 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 4 1 minutes w e s t l o n g i t u d e . The command module landing point w a s c a l c u l a t e d by recovery forces t o be 27 degrees 0 minutes 45 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 39 minutes 30 seconds w e s t longitude. The first e l e c t r o n i c contact r e p o r t e d by t h e recovery f o r c e s w a s an S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 1. Radar contact w a s t h e n r e p o r t e d by t h e New Orleans. A v i s u a l s i g h t i n g w a s r e p o r t e d by t h e communicationsr e l a y h e l i c o p t e r and. t h e n by t h e New Orleans, Recovery, S w i m 1 and Swim 2. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , voice transmissions from t h e command module w e r e received by t h e New Orleans.
The command module landed February 9 , 1971, at mained i n t h e s t a b l e I f l o t a t i o n a t t i t u d e . The VHF a c t i v a t e d shortly after landing, and beacon contact covery at 2107 G.m.t. The crew then t u r n e d off t h e t h e recovery f o r c e s had v i s u a l c o n t a c t .

2105 G.m.t. and rerecovery beacon w a s w a s r e p o r t e d by Rebeacon as they knew

11-4
TABU ll-I.- AF'OLIX) 14 RECOVERY SUPPORT

Type

Number

S h i p name/ a i r c r a f t staging baae Ships

Area s u p p o r t e d

ATF LCU

USS P a i u t e

Launch s i t e area Launch a b o r t area and West A t l a n t i c e a r t h o r b i t a l recovery zone Deep-space secondary landi n g areas on t h e A t l a n t i c Ocean l i n e Mid-Pacifi c e a r t h - o r b i t a l recovery zone D e e p s p a c e secondary landi n g areas on t h e mid-Pacific l i n e and t h e primary end-ofm i s s i o n l a n d i n g area

DD

USS Hawkina

LSD

USS S p i e g e l Grove

DD
LPH

E S Carpenter USS New Orleans

Aircraft

HH-53c
HC-130

3
a 1

P a t r i c k A i r Force B a s e McCoy A i r Force B a s e

Launch s i t e a r e a Launch a b o r t area, West A t l a n t i c recovery zone, contingency l a n d i n g a r e a Launch a b o r t area, West A t l a n t i c recovery zone Launch a b o r t area, e a r t h o r b i t a l contingency l a n d i n e

HC- 130 HC- 130

a

1

Pease Air Force B a s e LaJes F i e l d , Azores

a 1
a 1

area
HC-130 HC-130 Ascension I s l a n d Hickem A i r Force B a s e A t l a n t i c Ocean l i n e and contingency l a n d i n g area Mid-Pacific e a r t h o r b i t a l recovery zone, deep-space secondary l a n d i n g area and primary end-of-mission l a n d i n g area Deep-s pace secondai y l a n d i n g area and primary end-of-mission l a n d i n g area

a

2

SH-3A

5

USS New Orleans

%lUS

one backup

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11-5

NASA-S-71-1664 26' 4 0 '

I

I

I

26' 4 5 '

26' 50'

177' 176' 175' 174' 173' 1 7 2 ' 171' 170'

oy

West longitude

- 26'
5
v)

3 .-

55'

U
Swim 1

8.

27'

k , - wl Photo
Rclay Landing poi111 STarqct
1)o'tl

27' 05'

=
Swim

-

270- 10' 173' 00'

55'

172' 50'

45'
West longitude

172' 40'

35'

172' 30'

Figure 11-1.- End-of-mission recovery support.

I

11-6
A f t e r confirming t h & t t h e command module and t h e crew were i n good condition, Swim 2 attempted t o r e t r i e v e t h e main parachutes, and s w i m mers were deployed t o t h e command module t o i n s t a l l t h e f l o t a t i o n c o l l a r . Recovery forces were unable t o r e t r i e v e any of t h e .main parachutes, but d i d r e t r i e v e two drogue parachute covers and one s a b o t . The decontamina t i o n swimmer w a s deployed t o pass f l i g h t s u i t s and r e s p i r a t o r s t o t h e crew and assist them f r o m t h e command module i n t o t h e l i f e raft. The f l i g h t crew were onboard t h e recovery h e l i c o p t e r 7 minutes a f t e r they had egressed t h e command module and were aboard t h e N w Orleans 5 minutes e l a t e r . Command module r e t r i e v a l took place at 27 degrees 2 minutes south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 4 minutes west longitude at 2309 G . m . t .

The f l i g h t crew remained a b o a r d t h e New Orleans i n t h e mobile quara n t i n e f a c i l i t y u n t i l they were flown t o Pago Pago, Samoa, where they t r a n s f e r r e d t o a second mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y aboard a C - 1 4 1 airc r a f t . The crew w a s flown t o E l l i n g t o n Air Force B a s e , with a s t o p at Norton A i r Force Base, C a l i f o r n i a , where t h e a i r c r a f t w a s r e f u e l e d . After a r r i v a l of t h e New Orleans at H a w a i i , t h e comm nd module w a s offloaded and taken t o Hickam A i r Force B a s e f o r d e a c t i v a i o n . Upon comp l e t i o n of d e a c t i v a t i o n , t h e command module w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o E l l i n g t o n A i r Force B a s e v i a a C-133 a i r c r a f t , a r r i v i n g on February 22, 1971.

i!

The following i s a chronological l i s t i n g of events during t h e recovery and quarantine operations.

~~

Event

Time G.m.t. Feb. 9, 1971 2055 2056 2100 2101 2105 2112 2120 2127 2140 2141 2148 2153 2203 2309 Feb. 1 , 1971 1 0355 1746 2057 Feb. 12, 1971 0934 1135 Feb. 17, 1971 - 2130 Feb. 18, 1971 0740 Feb

Time r e l a t i v e t o landing days :hr :min
-0 :00 :10 -0:oo :09 -o:oo :05 -0 :OO :Ob 0 :oo :oo 0:oo :07

S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 1 Radar contact by New Orleans Visual contact by "Relay" helicopter Voice contact with f l i g h t crew Command module landing Swimmers deployed t o command module Flotation c o l l a r i n s t a l l e d and i n f l a t e d Decontamination s w i m m e r deployed Hatch ogened f o r crew egress Flight crew i n egress raft Flight crew aboard h e l i c o p t e r Flight Crew aboard New Orleans Flight crew i n mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y Command module aboard New Orleans F i r s t sample fli.ght departed ship Flight crew departed s h i p F i r s t sample f l i g h t a r r i v e d Houston ( v i a Samoa end H a w a i i ) Flight crew a r r i v e d Houston Flight crew a r r i v e d at Lunar Receiving Laboratory

0:00:15 0 :oo :22 0 :00:35 0:00:36 0:00:43 0:00:48 0:00:58 0:02:04 1:05:00 1 :18 :51 1:22:02

2:10:39 2: 2:40 1

Mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y and command module offloaded i n H a w a i i
Mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y arrived Houston Reaction control system deactivation completed Command module arrived Houston Camnand module delivered t o Lunar Receivi n g Laboratory

7 :22: 35
8:08:45

. 19, 1971
2300

10 :oo :05

Feb. 22, 1971 2145 2330

12:22:50 13 :00:35

,

11-8 11.3.2

Postrecovery Inspection

The docking probe was removed from t h e command module and secured i n t h e mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y f o r r e t u r n t o Houston. Otherwise, all aspects of t h e command module postrecovery o p e r a t i o n s , t h e mobile quara n t i n e f a c i l i t y operations and lunar sample r e t u r n operations were norm a l with t h e exception of t h e following d i s c r e p a n c i e s noted during comm a n d module inspection.
a. There was an apparent chip (1-inch wide, 3-inches long, and 1/2inch deep) i n t h e minus Z quadrant o f t h e heat s h i e l d adjacent t o t h e s m a l l heat s e n s o r , about 30-inches inboard from t h e l i p of t h e heat s h i e l d . However, t h e heat s h i e l d can be considered t o be i n normal post-reentry condition.
b . There w a s a f i l m layer on a l l windows ranging from approximately 10-percent coverage on t h e left s i d e window t o 100-percent on t h e r i g h t side window.

c. The backup method w a s used t o o b t a i n t h e water samples because t h e d i r e c t oqrgen valve had been l e f t s l i g h t l y open, causing t h e primary p r e s s u r i z a t i o n system t o lose pressure.
d. The chlorine content o f t h e p o t a b l e water w a s not analyzed on t h e s h i p because of lack o f t i m e .

e. The Commander's r a d i a t i o n dosimeter w a s broken and no reading w a s obtained. The o t h e r two dosimeters w e r e l e f t aboard t h e command
module.

1 21

12.0

ASSESSMEI9T OF MISSION OBJXCTIVES

The f o u r primary o b j e c t i v e s (ref. sion w e r e as follows:

7) assigned t o t h e Apollo 14 mis-

a. Perform s e l e n o l o g i c a l i n s p e c t i o n , survey, and sampling of materials i n a p r e s e l e c t e d region of t h e F r a Mauro formation.
b.

Deploy and activate t h e Apollo l u n a r surface experiments package. Develop 1 p ~ n ' s c a p a b i l i t y t o work i n t h e l u n a r environment. Obtain photographs of candidate e x p l o r a t i o n sites.

c. d.

Eleven detailed o b j e c t i v e s ( d e r i v e d from primary o b j e c t i v e s ) and s i x t e e n experiments ( l i s t e d in table 12-1 and described i n ref. 8) were assigned t o t h e mission. All detailed o b j e c t i v e s , with the following exceptions, w e r e s u c c e s s f u l l y completed:

a.
b.
C.

Photographs of a candidate e x p l o r a t i o n site V i s i b i l i t y at high sun a n g l e s Camand and s e r v i c e module o r b i t a l science photography Transearth l u n a r phutography

d.

On the basis of p r e f l i g h t planning data, these f o u r o b j e c t i v e s were only p a r t i a l l y satisfied.

Two d e t a i l e d o b j e c t i v e s were added and w e r e performed during t r a n s l u n a r c o a s t : S-IVB photography and command and s e r v i c e m d u l e water-dump photography. The S-IW3 could not be i d e n t i f i e d on t h e f i l m during postf l i g h t a n a l y s i s and, althaugh sane p a r t i c l e s were seen on photographs of t h e water dump, there w s no i n d i c a t i o n of t h e "snow storm" described by a the crew.

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e spacecraft and l u n a r surface o b j e c t i v e s , t h e following two launch v e h i c l e o b j e c t i v e s w e r e assigned and completed:
a. Impact t h e expended S-IVB/instrumentation u n i t on t h e l u n a r surfsce under nominal f l i g h t p r o f i l e conditions.
b. Make a p o s t f l i g h t determination of t h e S-IVB/instrumentation u n i t p o i n t of impact within 5 kilometers and t h e time of impact within m e second.

12-2

TABLE 12.1.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS

Description
Detailed o b j e c t i v e s

Completed

Contingency sample c o l l e c t i on Photographs of 8 candidate e x p l o r a t i o n s i t e V i s i b i l i t y at high sun anglesa Modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r e v a l u a t i o n Selenodetic reference p o i n t update Command and s e r v i c e module o r b i t a l s c i e n c e photography Assessment of e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y operation l i m i t s Command and s e r v i c e module oxygen flow rate Transearth l u n a r photography Thermal c o a t i n g degradation D i m - l i ght photography Experiments Apollo lunar s u r f a c e experiments package: M-515 Lunar dust d e t e c t o r S-031 Lunar passive seismology S-033 Luner a c t i v e seismology S-036 Suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r S-058 Cold cathode gauge S-038 Charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment S-059 Lunar geology i n v e s t i g a t i o n S-078 Laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r S-200 S o i l mechanics S-198 P o r t a b l e magnetometer S-170 B i s t a t i c radar S-080 S o l a r wind composition S-178 Gegenschein from l u n a r o r b i t S-164 S-band transponder s-176 Apollo window meteroid M-078 Bone mineral measurement

Yes Partial Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

5 r e l i m i n a r y analysis i n d i c a t e s t h a t s u f f i c i e n t data were c o l l e c t e d t o v e r i f y t h a t t h e v i s i b i l i t y a n a l y t i c a l model can be used for Apollo planning purposes.

12-3
The impact of t h e S-IVB was det c t e d by t h Apoll 12 pas ive seismic experiment. The impact of t h e spent l u n a r module ascent stage was det e c t e d by both t h e Apollo 12 and Apollo 1 4 passive seismic experiments.

1. 21

PARTIALLY COMPLETED OBJECTIVES

1 . . Photographs of a Candidate Exploration S i t e 211

Four p h o t o q a p h i c passes t o o b t a i n Descarrtes landing data w e r e scheduled: one high-resolution sequence w i t h t h e l u n a r topographic camera at low a l t i t u d e , two high-resolution sequences with t h e l u n a r topographic camera at high a l t i t u d e and one s t e r e o s t r i p with t h e Hasselblad e l e c t r i c data camera at high a l t i t u d e . On t h e low a l t i t u d e ( r e v o l u t i o n 4 ) l u n a r topographic camera pass, t h e camera malfunctioned and, although 192 frames were obtained of an area east of Descartes, no usable phutography was obOn t h e subsequent high-altitude photographic passes, t a i n e d of Descartes t h e e l e c t r i c Hasselblad camera with t h e 5OO-mm l e n s was used i n s t e a d of t h e l u n a r topographic camera. Excellent Descarbes photography w a s obt a i n e d during t h r e e o r b i t s , but t h e r e s o l u t i o n was considerably lower than that p o s s i b l e with t h e lunar topographic camera. Another problem was encountered during t h e s t e r e o s t r i p photographic pass. Because t h e command and s e r v i c e module S-band high-gain antenna did not operate prope r l y , no usable high-bit-rate telemetry, and consequently, no camera shutter-open data were obtained f o r postflight data reduction.

.

12.1.2

V i s i b i l i t y at H i g h Sun Angles

Four sets of zero-phase observations by t h e Camand Module P i l o t were scheduled i n order t o obtain data on l u n a r surface v i s i b i l i t y at high sun e l e v a t i o n angles. The last set, scheduled f o r r e v o l u t i o n 30, was deleted t o provide another opportunity t o photograph t h e Descartes area. Good data w e r e obtained fK>m the f i r s t three s e t s .
12.1.3 Command and Service Module O r b i t a l Science Photography
A l l obdectives were completed with t h e exception of those t h a t specified use o f - t h e lunar topographic camera. The Apollo 1 3 s-INB impact c r a t e r area was phutographed using t h e e l e c t r i c Hasselblad 70-mm camera with t h e 500-mm l e n s as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e inopersble l u n a r topographic

camera.

12-4

12.1.4

Transearth L u n a r Photography

Excellent photography of t h e lunar surface with t h e e l e c t r i c Hassela b l a d data camera using t h e 80-III~l e n s w s obtained. No l u n a r topographic camera photography was obtained because of t h e camera malfunction.
12.2

INFLIGHT DEMONSTRATIONS

I n a d d i t i o n t o d e t a i l e d o b j e c t i v e s and experiments, f o u r zero-gravity i n f l i g h t demonstrations were conducted. They w e r e performed on a noni n t e r f e r e n c e basis at t h e crew's option. The f o u r i n f l i g h t demonstrat i o n s and responsible N S c e n t e r s were: AA
a.

Electrophoretic separation Liquid t r a n s f e r

b. . Heat flow and convection

- Marshall

- Marshall

Space F l i g h t Center

Space F l i g h t Center

c.
d.

- Lewis

Research Center Space F l i g h t Center.

Composite c a s t i n g 12.3

- Marshall

APPHOVED OPERATIONAL TESTS

The Manned Spacecraft Center p a r t i c i p a t e d i n two of e i g h t approved o p e r a t i o n a l t e s t s . Operational tests are not r e q u i r e d t o met t h e obj e c t i v e s of t h e mission, do not affect t h e nominal t i m e l i n e , and add no payload weight. The two o p e r a t i o n a l t e s t s were: l u n a r g r a v i t y masurement ( u s i n g t h e l u n a r m d u l e primary guidance system) and a hydrogen maser t e s t ( a Network and u n i f i e d S-band i n v e s t i g a t i o n sponsored by t h e Goddard Spaceflight Center). Both t e s t s were completed, and t h e results of t h e hydrogen maser t e s t are given i n r e f e r e n c e g.
and t h e Kennedy Space Center.

The o t h e r s i x t e s t s were performed f o r t h e Department of Defense These t e s t s are designated as follows.

a.
b.

Chapel B e l l ( c l a s s i f i e d Department of Defense t e s t )
R a d a r Skin Tracking

c.
d.

Ionospheric Disturbance from Missiles Acoustic Measurement of M i s s i l e Exhaust Noise
Army Acoustic T e s t

e.
f.

Long-Focal-Length O p t i c a l System.

T

fr

i

L-

13-1

13.0

LAUNCH PHASE SLMARY

13.1 WEATHER CONDITIONS
Cumulus clouds e x i s t e d i n t h e launch complex a r e a w i t h t o p s at 15 000 f e e t 20 minutes p r i o r t o t h e scheduled launch and w i t h t o p s a t 18 000 feet 10 minutes l a t e r . During t h i s time, t h e ground-based e l e c t r i c f i e l d meters c l e a r l y showed f l u c t u a t i n g f i e l d s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of mildly d i s t u r b e d weather conditions. Since t h e mission r u l e s do not allow a launch through cumulus clouds w i t h t o p s i n excess of 10 000 f e e t , a 40-minute hold w a s r e q u i r e d before a p e r m i s s i b l e weather s i t u t a t i o n existed. A t launch, t h e cloud bases were at 4000 feet w i t h t o p s t o 10 000 f e e t . The launch under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s d i d not enhance t h e cloud e l e c t r i c fields enough t o produce a l i g h t n i n g d i s c h a r g e , t h u s providing f u r t h e r confidence i n t h e p r e s e n t launch mission rules. 13.2 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENTS

As a result of t h e l i g h t n i n g strikes experienced during t h e 2 Apollo 1 launch, s e v e r a l experiments were performed during t h e launch of Apollo 13 and Apollo 1 4 t o study t h e e f f e c t s of t h e space v e h i c l e on t h e atmospheric e l e c t r i c a l f i e l d during launch. I n i t i a l l y , it w a s hoped t h a t t h e e f f e c t s could be r e l a t e d simply t o t h e e l e c t r i c a l - f i e l d enhancement f a c t o r of t h e v e h i c l e . However, t h e results of t h e Apollo 1 3 measurements showed t h a t t h e space v e h i c l e produced a much s t r o n g e r e l e c t r i c a l f i e l d d i s t u r b a n c e than had been expected and a l s o produced some low-frequency r a d i o n o i s e . This d i s t u r b a n c e may have been caused by a buildup of e l e c t r o s t a t i c charges i n t h e exhaust cloud, charge buildup on t h e v e h i c l e , o r a combination o f both of these sources. To d e f i n e t h e o r i g i n and t h e c a r r i e r s o f t h e charge, a d d i t i o n a l experiments were performed during t h e Apollo 1 4 launch t o study t h e e l e c t r i c f i e l d phenomena i n more d e t a i l , t o measure r a d i o n o i s e , and t o measure t h e temperature of t h e S a t u r n V exhaust plume, which i s an important parameter i n calcul a t i n g t h e e l e c t r i c a l b r e a k d m c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e exhaust. The preliminary f i n d i n g s of these experiments are given here. When analyses of data have been completed, 8 supplemental r e p o r t w i l l be i s s u e d (appendix E ) .
13.2.1
E l e c t r i c a l F i e l d Measurements

Atmospheric e l e c t r i c a l f i e l d measurements were made by t h e New Mexico I n s t i t u t e of Mining and Technology and t h e Stanford Research Ins t i t u t e at t h e l o c a t i o n s s h a m i n f i g u r e 13-1. I n a d d i t i o n , a f i e l d measuring instrument ( f i e l d m i l l ) w a s i n s t a l l e d on t h e launch u m b i l i c a l

13-2

F i e l d mill no.

Distance from launch complex A, meters

Azimuth, de9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

.

750 377 655 1650 375 300 1675 1480 1600 800 380 400 800
On launch umbilical tower

19 49 70 116 148 258 270 348 270 300 270 210 180 0

I'

F i e l d mill instruments 1 through 8 were provided by New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology. The remainder of the instruments were provided by Stanford Research Institute.

Figure 13-1.- F i e l d mill l o c a t i o n s at t h e launch s i t e . tower t o d e t e c t any charge buildup on t h e v e h i c l e during i g n i t i o n and t h e i n i t i a l seconds a f t e r l i f t - o f f . Accurate timing s i g n a l s , which were not a v a i l a b l e on Apollo 1 3 , were provided t o most of t h e f i e l d measurement equipment locations on Apollo 1 4 . Time-lapse photographs of t h e launch cloud were also taken t o a i d i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e d a t a . Like Apollo 13, t h e Apollo 1 4 launch produced a s i g n i f i c a n t e l e c t r i c a l disturbance i n t h e f i e l d m i l l records ( f i g . 13-21, Although t h e d a t a are s t i l l being analyzed, some preliminary observations can be made. W i o r t o t h e Apollo 13 launch, t h e f i e l d m i l l s i n d i c a t e d s t a b l e fine-weather f i e l d s of 100 t o 200 v o l t s p e r meter. Before t h e Apollo 1 4 launch, however, t h e f i e l d s were f l u c t u a t i n g s e v e r a l hundred v o l t s p e r meter, p o s i t i v e and negative. This behavior w a s e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n weather conditions - good conditions f o r Apollo 13 but mild disturbances f o r Apollo 14.

13-3
NASA-S-71-1666

tEnginel ,-h--ti
clear tower

1

tgnitio!i>/

1

I

titude of vehicle engines above pad

1I

-1

Site 13
Y

-1

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4:03 4:W 405 4M : hster.n standard time, p. m., h m i n

402

4:03

4:W

405

4:M

Eastern standard time, p. m., hr:min

Note: Location of sites can be seen on figure 13-1. Figure 13-2.- P o t e n t i a l gradient data during launch.

13-4
During t h e Apollo 13 launch, t h e instruments at s i t e s w e s t of t h e launch complex r e g i s t e r e d a smooth p o s i t i v e f i e l d i n c r e a s e , succeeded by a less pronounced negative excursion. For Apollo 1 4 , t h e n e g a t i v e excursion w a s not evident ; however, t h e f i e l d v a r i a t i o n s occurred at approximately equivalent times f o r both launches. The p o s i t i v e excursion w a s approximately f i v e times g r e a t e r f o r Apollo 13 t h a n f o r Apollo 1 4 , and reached m a x i m u m when t h e space v e h i c l e w a s at a l t i t u d e s g r e a t e r t h a n 1000 meters. This observation, coupled with t h e f a c t t h a t t h e maximum e l e c t r i c f i e l d s were observed downwind on both launches makes it u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e space vehicle charge w a s t h e dominant f a c t o r b u t , r a t h e r , t h a t t h e p o s i t i v e l y charged clouds were t h e dominant sources of t h e e l e c t r i c fields. During l i f t - o f f , t h e s w i f t l y moving exhaust clouds are channeled both n o r t h and south through t h e flame trough. The p r i n c i p a l cloud which moved through t h e n o r t h end of t h e flame trough w a s composed l a r g e l y of condensed spray water and contained a p o s i t i v e charge of approximately 50 millicoulombs and a f i e l d of approximately 4000 v o l t s / m e t e r ( S i t e 2 of f i g . 13-2). The cloud t h a t exhausted t o t h e south had much less water and contained about a 5-millicoulomb negative charge. The cloud a l s o appeared t o contain s o l i d p a r t i c u l a t e matter which r a p i d l y f e l l o u t . The f i e l d mill on t h e launch u m b i l i c a l tower i n d i c a t e d a s m a l l posiModel m e a s t i v e value (<400 v o l t s / m e t e r ) a f e w seconds a f t e r l i f t - o f f . urements u s i n g a l / l b b - s c a l e model of t h e launch u m b i l i c a l tower and t h e Apollo/Saturn vehicle i n d i c a t e d t h a t , i n t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n , t h e launch u m b i l i c a l tower f i e l d and t h e v e h i c l e p o t e n t i a l are r e l a t e d by v o l t s / f i e l d = 20 meters. Thus, t h e v e h i c l e p o t e n t i a l i s less t h a n 8000 v o l t s (400 x 2 0 ) . A comparison of t h e launch u m b i l i c a l tower record with t h e d a t a from t h e o t h e r s i t e s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e charge on t h e v e h i c l e appears t o be less t h a n 1 millicoulomb.
13.2.2

Radio Noise Measurements

Narrow-band r a d i o r e c e i v e r s o p e r a t i n g at frequencies of 1 . 5 , 6 , 27, 51, and 120 kHz were l o c a t e d at camera pad 5 ( f i e l d m i l l s i t e 11) t o g e t h e r with a broadband d e t e c t o r . A s i n t h e case of Apollo 13, s i g n a l s were d e t e c t e d at s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t frequencies, b u t t h e t i m e behavior of d i f f e r e n t frequency components w a s not t h e same during t h e two launches. The loop-antenna data ( f i g . 13-31 i n d i c a t e a l a r g e increase i n n o i s e on t h e 1.5-kHz and 6 - k ~ ~ channels 3 Seconds after engine i g n i t i o n , while t h e n o i s e on t h e 51-kHz channel d i d not begin until 2 seconds after lifto f f (about 1 seconds a f t e r i g n i t i o n ) . I n i t i a l l y , it appeared t h a t t h e 1 1.5- and 6 - k ~ a t a might not r e p r e s e n t r a d i a t e d electromagnetic n o i s e , d~ r a t h e r , microphonic n o i s e generated by some component of t h e system such as t h e loop antenna p r e a m p l i f i e r . Preliminary d a t a from t h e e l e c t r i c

13-5
NASA-S-71-1667
d

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al

5 1.000 1(4:02:54
Ignition

p.iii.)A

Liift-off
I

(4:i)3:02p.iii.1

0.300
m

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0.030
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2

0.001 -~ .-40 0
v)

I
20 40
SCC

I
60

I
100

-20.

0

80

Time from lift-off,

Figure 13-3.-

Noise recorded by loop antenna system.

d i p o l e antenna at camera pad 5, however, i n d i c a t e t h e same g e n e r a l beh a v i o r , and as t h e two antenna systems use s e p a r a t e a m p l i f i e r s , it appears t h a t t h e data are v a l i d . An abrupt c e s s a t i o n of t h e 1.5- and 6 - k ~ o i s e n~ by both systems p r i o r t o t h e loss of t h e 51-kHz noise i s not understood and f u r t h e r s t u d i e s of t h e noise d a t a are p r e s e n t l y being made.

13.2.3

Plume Temperature Measurements

The temperature c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e Saturn V exhaust plume were s t u d i e d from a s i t e about 5 miles w e s t of t h e launch complex using a twochannel radiometer system operating at 1.26 and 1.68 microns. The radiometers viewed a narrow h o r i z o n t a l s e c t i o n of t h e exhaust plume which, i n t u r n , provided temperature as a f u n c t i o n of d i s t a n c e down t h e plume as t h e v e h i c l e ascended v e r t i c a l l y . Figure 13-4 shows t h e measured plume temperature as a f u n c t i o n of d i s t a n c e behind t h e v e h i c l e . These r e s u l t s are now being used t o improve t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e e l e c t r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e exhaust plume. It appears t h a t t h e plume may be a reasonable e l e c t r i c a l conductor over a l e n g t h of some 200 f e e t . This result i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e low value of v e h i c l e p o t e n t i a l when t h e v e h i c l e is passing t h e launch umbilical tower f i e l d meter s i n c e , at t h a t t i m e , t h e v e h i c l e i s probably s t i l l e f f e c t i v e l y connected e l e c t r i c a l l y t o e a r t h . (Reference 10 contains a d d i t i o n a l information concerning plume temperature measurements. 1

13-6
NASA-S-71-1668

Figure 13-4.- ESrhaust plume temperature c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

13.3

LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY

The seventh manned Saturn V Apollo space v e h i c l e , AS-509, was launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north. A r o l l maneuver was i n i t i a t e d at 12.8 seconds t h a t placed t h e v e h i c l e on a f l i g h t a z i m t h of 75.558 degrees e a s t of n o r t h . The t r a j e c t o r y parameters from launch t o t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n were c l o s e t o nominal with t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n achieved 4.9 seconds earlier than nominal.

13-7
All S-IC propulsion systems performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . T o t a l prop e l l a n t consumption r a t e w a s 0.42 percent higher than p r e d i c t e d w i t h t h e consumed mixture r a t i o 0.94 percent higher than predicted. S p e c i f i c i m pulse w a s 0.23 percent higher than predicted.
The S-I1 propulsion system performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . T o t a l propell a n t flow r a t e w a s 0.12 percent below p r e d i c t e d and s p e c i f i c impulse w a s 0.19 percent below p r e d i c t e d . P r o p e l l a n t mixture r a t i o w a s 0.18 percent above predicted. The pneumatically actuated engine-mixt ure- rat i o c o n t r o l valves operated s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Engine s t a r t tank conditions were marg i n a l at s-I1 engine start command because of t h e lower s t a r t tank rel i e f valve s e t t i n g s caused by warmer-than-usual s t a r t tank temperatures. These warmer temperatures were a result of t h e hold p r i o r t o launch. The S-IVB s t a g e engine operated s a t i s f a c t o r i l y throughout t h e opera t i o n a l phase of f i r s t and second f i r i n g s and had normal shutdowns. The S-IVB f i r s t f i r i n g time w a s 4 . 1 seconds l e s s than predicted. The restart at t h e full-open p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n valve p o s i t i o n w a s s u c c e s s f u l . S-IVB second f i r i n g t i m e w a s 5.5 seconds l e s s than predicted. The t o t a l p r o p e l l a n t consumption r a t e w a s 1.38 percent higher than p r e d i c t e d f o r t h e first f i r i n g and 1.47 percent higher f o r t h e second f i r i n g . S p e c i f i c impulses f o r each were proportionally higher. The s t r u c t u r a l loads experienced were below design values. The maxi m u m dynamic pressure period bending moment at t h e S - I C l i q u i d oxygen tank w a s 45 percent of t h e design value. The t h r u s t cutoff t r a n s i e n t s were s i m i l a r t o those o f previous f l i g h t s . The S-I1 s t a g e c e n t e r engine l i q u i d oxygen f e e d l i n e accumulator s u c c e s s f u l l y i n h i b i t e d t h e 14- t o 16-hertz l o n g i t u d i n d o s c i l l a t i o n s experienced on previous f l i g h t s . During t h e maximum dynamic pressure region of f l i g h t , t h e launch v e h i c l e experienced winds t h a t were l e s s than 95-percentile January winds. The S-IVB/instrument unit l u n a r impact w a s accomplished s u c c e s s f i l l y A t 82:37:52.2 elapsed t i m e from l i f t - o f f , t h e S-IVB/instrument u n i t i m pacted t h e lunar s u r f a c e at approximately 8 degrees 5 minutes 35 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 26 degrees 1 minute 23 seconds west longitude, approximately 150 miles from t h e t a r g e t of 1 degree 35 minutes 46 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 33 degrees 15 minutes west longitude. Impact v e l o c i t y w a s ,8343 f t l s e c

.

.

The ground systems, supporting countdown and launch , performed sati s f a c t o r i l y . System component f a i l u r e s and malfunctions r e q u i r i n g corr e c t i v e a c t i o n were corrected during countdown without causing unscheduled holds. Propellant tanking w a s accomplished s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Damage t o t h e pad, launch umbilical tower, and support equipment w a s minor.

14-1
14.0

ANOMALY SUMMARY

This s e c t i o n contains a discussion o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t anomalies t h a t occurred during t h e Apollo 14 m i s s i o n . The d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e items i s divided i n t o f o u r major areas : command and s e r v i c e modules; l u n a r module ; government-furnished equipment ; and Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package.

14.1
14.1.1

C O W D AND SERVICE MODULES

F a i l u r e t o Achieve Docking Probe Capture Latch Engagement

S i x docking attempts w e r e required t o s u c c e s s f u l l y achieve capture l a t c h engagement during t h e t r a n s p o s i t i o n . and docking event. Subsequent i n f l i g h t examination o f t h e probe showed normal o p e r a t i o n of t h e mechanism. The l u n a r o r b i t undocking and docking were completely normal. Data a n a l y s i s o f f i l m , accelerometers, and r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system t h r u s t e r a c t i v i t y i n d i c a t e s t h a t probe-to-drogue contact conditions were normal f o r all docking attempts, and capture should have been achieved f o r t h e f i v e unsuccessful attempts ( t a b l e 14-11. The capture-latch assembly must not have been i n t h e locked configuration during t h e f i r s t f i v e attempts based on t h e following:

a. The probe status talkback d i s p l a y s functioned properly b e f o r e and after t h e unsuccessful attempts, t h u s i n d i c a t i n g proper switch opera t i o n and power t o t h e talkback c i r c u i t s . The t a l k b a c k d i s p l a y s a l w a y s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e capture l a t c h e s w e r e i n t h e cocked p o s i t i o n during (Note th-at no e l e c t r i c a l power t h e unsuccessful attempts ( f i g . 1 4 - 1 ) . i s r e q u i r e d t o capture because t h e system i s cocked p r i o r t o f l i g h t and t h e capture operation i s s t r i c t l y mechanical and t r i g g e r e d by t h e drogue
b. Each o f t h e s i x marks on t h e drogue r e s u l t e d from s e p a r a t e cont a c t s by t h e probe head ( f i g . 14-2). Although t h r e e o f t h e marks a r e approximately 120 degrees a p a r t , a docking impact with locked capture l a t c h e s should result i n t h r e e double marks ( t o match t h e l a t c h hooks) I20 degrees a p a r t , and w i t h i n one inch of t h e drogue apex o r s o c k e t . Although t h e drogue marks could i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l capturel a t c h hooks were d i f f i c u l t t o depress, such marks are not abnormal f o r impact v e l o c i t i e s greater than 0.25 f e e t p e r second. Since t h e l a t c h e s w e r e n o t locked, t h e anomaly w a s apparently caused by f a i l u r e o f t h e capture-latch plunger ( f i g . 14-11 t o reach t h e forward or locked p o s i t i o n . Motion of t h e plunger could have been r e s t r i c t e d by

14-2

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Figure 14-1.-

Cross secti on of probe head and capture-latch assembly.

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A l l marks are single E aiid F shiny niarks Iin ~ lubrlcalrt I dry A , E, C, aiid D are wide single marks liavmy sllqlit depressioti liaviiiy slight lubrlcarlt with scratch through dry lubricarit in center

Figure 14-2.- Location of marks on drogue assembly.

contamination o r dimensional changes due t o temperature. I n t e r n a l damage t o t h e capture-latch mechanism can be r u l e d out because t h e systemfunctioned properly i n all subsequent operations following t h e s i x t h docking attempt and during p o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g . . Analyses were performed t o i n v e s t i g a t e t o l e r a n c e s and thermal e f f e c t s on mating p a r t s and surfaces a s s o c i a t e d with t h e operation o f t h e capture l a t c h e s . The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t n e i t h e r temperature nor t o l e r a n c e s could have caused t h e problem. I n a d d i t i o n , a thermal analysis snows t h a t n e i t h e r t h e l a t c h e s n o r t h e s p i d e r could have been jammed by i c e . T e s t s using q u a l i f i c a t i o n probes t o determine capture-latch response measurements w e r e made and showed no aging degradation of t h e system. Tension t i e t e s t s produced c l e a r l y sheared p i n s ; however, i n one t e s t , a sheared p o r t i o n o f t h e p i n d i d leave t h e t e n s i o n t i e with some v e l o c i t y and landed o u t s i d e t h e r i n g i t s e l f .

No contamination, corrosion, s i g n i f i c a n t d e b r i s , o r f o r e i g n materials were found, and t h e mechanism worked normally during all f u n c t i o n a l t e s t s . The loads and response t i m e s compared with t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s and with t h e probe p r e f l i g h t d a t a . Motor torque values and a c t u a t o r assembly torque values ( s t a t i c drag and capture-latch r e l e a s e ) compare favorably with p r e f l i g h t values.
During t h e i n s p e c t i o n , s m a l l s c r a t c h e s and r e s u l t i n g b u r r s were found on t h e t e n s i o n t i e plug w a l l adjacent t o t h e plunger. The s c r a t c h e s are being analyzed. A n anomaly report w i l l be i s s u e d under s e p a r a t e cover when t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n has been completed. The m o s t probable cause of t h e problem w a s contamination o r debris which l a t e r became dislodged. A cover w i l l be provided t o p r o t e c t t h e probe t i p from f o r e i g n material e n t e r i n g t h e mechanism p r i o r t o f l i g h t . This anomaly i s open. 14.1.2 High-Gain Antenna Tracking Problems

During t r a n s l u n a r coast and l u n a r o r b i t o p e r a t i o n s , occasional problems w e r e encountered' i n acquiring good high-gain antenna t r a c k i n g with e i t h e r t h e primary o r secondary e l e c t r o n i c s . The s p e c i f i c times of highg a i n antenna a c q u i s i t i o n and t r a c k i n g problems were :
a. b.

c.
d.

76:45:00 t o 76:55:00 92:16:00 t o 93:22:00 97:58:00 t o 98:04:02
99:52:00.

14-6
An instrumentation problem with t h e antenna readout occurred f o r about 3 hours e a r l y i n t h e mission when an e r r o r of about 30 degrees e x i s t e d . Subsequently, t h e readings were normal. A mechanical i n t e r ference i n t h e instrument servos i s t h e most l i k e l y cause. The i n s t r u ment servos are an independent loop which d r i v e t h e antenna p i t c h and o yaw meters i n t h e command module. N c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s planned s i n c e t h e servos do not a f f e c t t h e antenna performance f o r any modes of operation.
'

The ground data s i g n a t u r e s which show t h e f i r s t a c q u i s i t i o n and t r a c k i n g problems a r e i l l u s t r a t e d i n f i g u r e 14-3. The antenna s t a r t e d t r a c k i n g a p o i n t approximately 5 t o 8 degrees o f f t h e e a r t h p o i n t i n g angle at 76:45:00 elapsed t i m e and continued t r a c k i n g w i t h low uplink and downlink s i g n a l l e v e l s f o r 10 minutes at which t i m e a good narrow beam lock-up w a s achieved.
NASA-S-71-1671

-75 d&n
-95 dBm to -93 dBm

Uplink signal Tracking problem Good tracking

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Figure 14-3.- Data from f i r s t period of anomalous operation.

The low s i g n a l s c o r r e l a t e w i t h antenna p a t t e r n and g a i n data f o r a

5- t o S - e g-r e e b o r e s i g h t s h i f t i n t h e wide-beam mode. The d rect on of t h e s p i k e s observed on t h e downlink d a t a i n f i g u r e 14-3 are c o n s i s t e n t
with switching between t h e wide and narrow beams. Conditions f o r a norm a l alignment and a misalignment of t h e wide and narrow beams a r e shown i n f i g u r e 14-4. A 5- t o 8-degree s h i f t i n t h e wide-beam mode b o r e s i g h t
NASA-S-71-1672 Narrow and wide beam boresight Nanow beam Switch to narrow

beam when target is
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(b) Alignment conditions indicated by Apollo 1 4 data.

Figure 14-4.

- Antenna narrow-

Figure 14-4.- Antenna narrow and wide beam boresight relationship.

and wide-beam b o r e s i g h t r e l a t i o n s h i p .

I

14-8
w i l l n o t allow narrow-beam l o c k s i n c e continuous switching between t h e wide beam and narrow beam w i l l occur with t h e t a r g e t o u t s i d e t h e 23degree l i m i t of t h e narrow-beam b o r e s i g h t . These l a r g e e r r o r s i g n a l s w i l l i n i t i a t e c y c l i c switching between t h e wide-beam and narrow-beam modes. The a c q u i s i t i o n and t r a c k i n g problems f o r t h e o t h e r t i m e periods were similar. As a r e s u l t of t h e 5- t o &degree b o r e s i g h t s h i f t o f t h e wide beam, t h e antenna at times would lock-up on t h e first s i d e l o b e Since t h e antenna a r r a y i s n o t i n s t e a d o f t h e main l o b e ( f i g . 14-4). symmetrical, t h e b o r e s i g h t e r r o r i n t h e wide-beam mode i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e t a r g e t approach p a t h .
A number of problems could have caused t h e e l e c t r i c a l s h i f t of t h e wide beam; however, t h e y e f f e c t i v e l y reduce t o an i n t e r r u p t i o n o f one of t h e four wide-beam elements which supply s i g n a l s t o t h e wide-beam comp a r a t o r . The most l i k e l y cause i s t h a t a connector t o one of t h e c o a x i a l c a b l e s which are used t o connect t h e wide-beam antennas t o t h e comparator assembly o f t h e s t r i p l i n e s w a s f a u l t y .

I n support of t h i s cause, f i v e bad c o a x i a l c e n t e r conductors have been found. Also, a c o a x i a l connector w a s disconnected on t h e antenna and t h e e f f e c t i n t h e beam occurred. There are two causes of t h e problem with t h e c e n t e r conductor, both of which occur during cable-to-connector The sleeve i s assembled t o t h e c a b l e , a Lexan assembly ( f i g . 14-5). i n s u l a t o r i s t h e n s l i p p e d over t h e c e n t e r conductor, and t h e p i n i s ins e r t e d over t h e c e n t e r conductor and soldered. If t h e w i r e g e t s t o o h o t during s o l d e r i n g , t h e Lexan grows and no longer f i t s l o o s e l y through t h e h o l e i n t h e o u t e r body. When t h i s occurs and t h e o u t e r body i s screwed o n t o t h e s l e e v e , t h e w i r e can be t w i s t e d and t h e c e n t e r conductor m a y fail. Another p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e occurs when t o o much s o l d e r i s used o r t h e w i r e i s n o t centered i n t h e p i n . These conditions w i l l b i n d t h e p i n t o t h e o u t e r body i n s u l a t i o n and, during assembly, t h e w i r e i s t w i s t e d t o f a i l u r e . These conditions are being c o r r e c t e d by reworking a l l connectors and applying proper i n s p e c t i o n and c o n t r o l procedures during t h e rework. F a i l u r e s on previous f l i g h t s , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e one on t h i s m i s s i o n , w e r e o f t h e t y p e t h a t appear under c e r t a i n thermal c o n d i t i o n s . The m a l f u n c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s of each o f t h e f a i l u r e s were i s o l a t e d t o d i f f e r e n t components of t h e antenna. A l l of t h e s e d e f e c t s were of a t y p e which could escape t h e t e s t s c r e e n i n g process. Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t t h e shock which an antenna experiences during t h e s p a c e c r a f t - l u n a r module a d a p t e r s e p a r a t i o n when t h e pyrotechnics f i r e might have caused d e f e c t s i n t h e c i r c u i t r y which could open up under c e r t a i n thermal c o n d i t i o n s

1 I L i L ; L L l - Y -

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14-9

NASA-S-71-1673

Sleeve

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Note: A slip fit is required between the piti and insulator so that the pin does not rotate when turning outer body during assembly of the threaded sleeve.

Figure 14-5.- Coaxial cable failures.

I

14-10

d u r i n g t h e mission. The o r i g i n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t s considered t h a t t h e shock environment would be low. To f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t e t h e e f f e c t s of t h e s p a c e c r a f t - l u n a r module a d a p t e r pyrotechnic shock on an antenna, a shock t e s t has been conducted. The results show t h a t t h e antenna experiences about an order-of-magnitude g r e a t e r shock than had been o r i g i n a l l y a n t i c i p a t e d . However , thermal t e s t i n g of t h e antenna has shown no d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s because of t h e shock. To b e t t e r s c r e e n out d e f e c t s which p o t e n t i a l l y could a f f e c t t h e f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e antenna, a thermal acceptance t e s t w i l l be performed on all f u t u r e f l i g h t antennas while r a d i a t i n g and under o p e r a t i n g conditions. T h i s anomaly i s closed.

14.1.3

Urine Nozzle Blockage

After t r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking and p r i o r t o i n i t i a t i n g p a s s i v e thermal c o n t r o l , t h e crew i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e u r i n e nozzle ( f i g . 14-6)
NASA-S-71-1674

Main

Main

5

Dump nozzle

Figure 14-6.

-

Urine r e c e p t a c l e a n d nozzle.

14-11
w a s obstructed.

The same condition occurred s e v e r a l o t h e r t i m e s during t h e mission and, i n each c a s e , t h e dump nozzle had not been exposed t o s u n l i g h t f o r prolonged p e r i o d s . The h e a t e r s and c i r c u i t r y were checked and found t o b e normal. The system design has been previously v e r i f i e d under some, but not a l l , l i k e l y thermal conditions while dumping u r i n e . Although t h e h i s t o r y of previous missions has shown no i n d i c a t i o n s of f r e e z i n g , t h e dumps during t h i s f l i g h t may have coincided w i t h a c o l d e r nozzle condition t h a n on any previous f l i g h t . Also, t h e purge-and-dry procedure used during t h i s mission w a s d i f f e r e n t from t h a t used i n previous missions i n t h a t t h e u r i n e rec e i v e r w a s r i n s e d with water a f t e r each use and t h e system w a s purged w i t h oxygen f o r longer times than i n p a s t missions. These changes may have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e freezing. A t e s t i s planned t o determine t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e procedures t o t h e f r e e z i n g . I f f r e e z i n g occurs i n t h e f u t u r e , thawing can be accomplished very quickly by o r i e n t i n g t h e s p a c e c r a f t ' s o t h a t t h e nozzle i s i n s u n l i g h t . This w a s demonstrated s e v e r a l times during t h i s f l i g h t . The a u x i l i a r y hatch nozzle and t h e water overboard dump nozzle provide backup capabili t i e s . N hardware change i s i n o r d e r , but procedural changes m a y be o necessary t h a t would e i t h e r r e s t r i c t t h e times when u r i n e m a y be dumped o r modify t h e purging techniques. This anomaly i s closed.

14.1.4

Degraded VHF Connnunications

The VHF l i n k between t h e comnand and s e r v i c e module and l u n a r modu l e w a s degraded from p r i o r t o lunar l i f t - o f f through t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n . The received s i g n a l s t r e n g t h measured i n t h e l u n a r module w a s lower than p r e d i c t e d during t h e periods when VHF performance w a s degraded. VHF voice w a s poor and, ll minutes p r i o r t o l u n a r l i f t - o f f , n o i s e w a s r e c e i v e d i n t h e l u n a r module through t h e VHF system. Therefore, t h e system w a s d i s a b l e d . When t h e system w a s again enabled about 4-1/2 minu t e s b e f o r e l u n a r l i f t - o f f , t h e n o i s e had disappeared. P r i o r t o l u n a r descent, t h e VHF ranging and rendezvous r a d a r range measurements c o r r e l a t e d c l o s e l y . However, during t h e t i m e period preceding t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , t h e V F ranging system i n d i c a t e d erronH eous measurements. During t h i s same t i m e p e r i o d , numerous range t r a c k i n g dropouts also occurred. The range measurements were i n e r r o r by 5 t o 15 miles when compared with t h e rendezvous r a d a r range measurements ( f i g . 14-7). The VHF ranging d a t a p r e s e n t e d i n t h e f i g u r e r e s u l t s from a number of d i f f e r e n t a c q u i s i t i o n s . After t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , t h e

14-12

14-13
s i g n a l s t r e n g t h , as i n d i c a t e d by t h e lur,ar module receiver automatic g a i n c o n t r o l v o l t a g e measurement, was adequate and V F ranging o p e r a t i o n w a s H normal. These problems would be expected i f t h e s i g n a l s t r e n g t h were low. The s i g n a l s t r e n g t h w a s determined by measuring t h e automatic g a i n cont r o l v o l t a g e i n t h e l u n a r module V F r e c e i v e r . The measurement range H w a s -97.5 t o -32 a m . Figure 14-8 shows t h e p r e d i c t e d s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s and t h o s e measured during t h e mission at t h e l u n a r module r e c e i v e r . The m a x i m u m p r e d i c t e d values assume t h a t d i r e c t and multipath s i g n a l s add. For t h e m i n i m u m p r e d i c t e d , t h e multipath s i g n a l i s assumed t o s u b t r a c t from t h e d i r e c t s i g n a l . The antenna p a t t e r n model used c o n s i s t e d of g a i n values i n 2-degree increments and d i d not i n c l u d e all t h e peaks t h a t are known t o occur because o f antenna p o l a r i z a t i o n d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e l u n a r module and command and s e r v i c e module. Line-of-sight t o t h e command module p a s s i n g through one of t h e s e peaks would e x p l a i n t h e p u l s e s shown i n f i g u r e 14-8(a). Figure 14-8(b) shows t h a t t h e s i g n a l s t r e n g t h should have been on s c a l e subsequent t o about 1 0 minutes a f t e r i n s e r t i o n . Figure 14-8(c) shows t h a t t h e measured s i g n a l s t r e n g t h w a s below t h a t expected f o r t h e right-forward antenna, t h e one which t h e c h e c k l i s t c a l l e d out t o be used, from i n s e r t i o n t o docking and above t h a t p r e d i c t e d f o r t h e r i g h t - a f t antenna f o r t h i s same t i m e period. This i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e proper ant e n n a w a s s e l e c t e d , b u t some condition e x i s t e d which decreased t h e s i g n a l s t r e n g t h t o t h e l u n a r module receiver. The lower-than-normal R l i n k performance w a s a two-way problem F ( v o i c e w a s poor i n both d i r e c t i o n s ) ; t h e r e f o r e , c e r t a i n p a r t s o f t h e V F H system a r e prime candidates f o r t h e cause of the problem. Figure 14-9 i s a block diagram o f t h e VHF communications system as configured during t h e rendezvous phase o f t h e mission. Also shown are t h o s e areas i n which a malf’unction could have a f f e c t e d t h e two-way R l i n k performance. A F s i n g l e malfunction i n any o t h e r area would have a f f e c t e d one-way performance only. The V F ranging problems r e s u l t e d from lower-than-normal s i g n a l H s t r e n g t h t o g e t h e r with t h e e x i s t i n g range rate. The ranging equipment i s designed t o o p e r a t e with s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s g r e a t e r t h a n -105 dBm. The l u n a r module r e c e i v e d signal s t r e n g t h data are e s s e n t i a l l y q u a l i t a t i v e , s i n c e most of t h e i n f l i g h t data during t h e problem p e r i o d were o f f - s c a l e low. Unfortunately, t h e s c a l e s e l e c t i o n w a s n o t chosen f o r f a i l u r e analysis. A s p o t check of r e l a t i v e v e h i c l e a t t i t u d e s , as evidenced by normal performance of t h e rendezvous radar and by s e x t a n t s i g h t i n g s , i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e a t t i t u d e s were proper. The crew a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y followed t h e c h e c k l i s t f o r V F antenna s e l e c t i o n . H

14-14
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(c) Right forward and aft antennas from acquisition of signal to near docking time.

Figure 14-8.-

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E E

14-16
A f l i g h t t e s t w a s performed t o v e r i f y t h a t t h e V F ranging problem H w a s a s s o c i a t e d with t h e low VHF s i g n a l s t r e n g t h and w a s n o t r e l a t e d t o t h e VHF ranging elements. The Apollo 1 4 range and range r a t e were duplic a t e d and t h e results showed t h a t , f o r s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s below about -105 dBm, e r r o r s i n i n d i c a t e d range similar t o t h o s e experienced on Apollo 1 4 w i l l be generated.

The procedures f o r t e s t and checkout of t h e l u n a r module and command module elements of t h e VHF system have been r e a s s e s s e d and found t o be s u f f i c i e n t , and a d d i t i o n a l i n s p e c t i o n o r t e s t i n g i s n o t p r a c t i c a l o r necessary. The only a c t i o n t h a t w i l l be t a k e n i s t o add instrument a t i o n on both t h e l u n a r module and t h e command and s e r v i c e module t o provide more i n s i g h t i n t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e problem i f it occurs on subsequent f l i g h t s . Therefore , f o r subsequent v e h i c l e s , r e c e i v e r automatic g a i n c o n t r o l measurements w i l l be added t o both t h e l u n a r module and t h e command and s e r v i c e module. Measurement s c a l e f a c t o r s w i l l be sel e c t e d t o g i v e on-scale data at t h e low s i g n a l s t r e n g t h range. The l u n a r module 'data s t o r a g e and e l e c t r o n i c s assembly ( t a p e r e c o r d e r ) was r e t a i n e d f o r subsequent p o s t f l i g h t e v a l u a t i o n of voice q u a l i t y a s s o c i a t e d with t h e automatic gain c o n t r o l measurements.
C r e w t r a i n i n g w i l l be expanded t o include r e a l i s t i c simulations o f weak s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s and t h e e f f e c t s of ranging on voice q u a l i t y . The e f f e c t s o f t h e modes s e l e c t e d and o p e r a t i o n a l techniques such as v o i c e l e v e l and microphone p o s i t i o n become important n e a r t h e range l i m i t s of t h e system.

This anomaly i s closed.

14.1.5

Entry Monitor System 0.05g Light

The e n t r y monitor system 0.05g l i g h t d i d not i l l u m i n a t e w i t h i n 3 seconds a f t e r an O.O5g condition w a s sensed by t h e primary guidance system. The crew then manually switched t o t h e backup p o s i t i o n . The e n t r y monitor system i s designed t o s t a r t automatically when O.O5g i s sensed by t h e system accelerometer. When t h i s s e n s i n g occurs, t h e 0.05g l i g h t should come on, t h e s c r o l l should begin t o drive (although barely p e r c e p t i b l e ) and t h e range-to-go counter should begin t o count down. The crew r e p o r t e d t h e l i g h t f a i l u r e but w a s unable t o v e r i f y whether t h e s c r o l l o r counter responded b e f o r e t h e switch w a s manually changed t o t h e backup mode. The crew a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e n e u t r a l d e n s i t y f i l t e r w a s covering t h e 0.05g l i g h t and t h a t t h e r e were s u n l i g h t r e f l e c t i o n s i n t h e cabin.

14-17
Analysis of t h e range counter d a t a r e p o r t e d by t h e crew i n d i c a t e s a landing p o i n t about 5 n a u t i c a l miles s h o r t ; whereas, i f t h e e n t r y moni t o r system had not s t a r t e d when O.O5g w a s sensed and had s t a r t e d 3 seconds l a t e r , t h e i n d i c a t e d landing p o i n t would have been on t h e o r d e r of 20 n a u t i c a l miles long. P o s t f l i g h t t e s t s conducted on t h e system show t h a t t h e lamp d r i v e r c i r c u i t and t h e redundant lamp filaments w e r e o p e r a t i n g properly. Analys i s of t h e range counter d a t a and p o s t f l i g h t t e s t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e f a i l u r e of t h e crew t o see t h e l i g h t w a s caused by having t h e f i l t e r p o s i t i o n e d i n f r o n t of t h e l i g h t . Reflected l i g h t from t h e sun and t h e i o n i z a t i o n layer would make it very d i f f i c u l t t o see t h e l i g h t . F u r t h e r , a c l e a r g l a s s f i l t e r i s used i n t h e s i m u l a t o r ; whereas, t h e s p a c e c r a f t f i l t e r is silvered. The c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s t o r e p l a c e t h e f i l t e r i n t h e simulator with a f l i g h t u n i t . Also, a f l i g h t procedural change w i l l be made t o p o s i t i o n t h e f i l t e r s o t h a t it w i l l not obscure t h e l i g h t .
This anomaly i s closed.

14.1.6

I n a b i l i t y t o Disconnect Main Bus A

During e n t r y , when t h e main bus t i e switches (motor-driven s w i t c h e s ) were placed i n t h e o f f p o s i t i o n at 800 f e e t , main bus A should have deenergized; however, t h e bus remained on u n t i l a f t e r landing when t h e battery bus-tie c i r c u i t breakers were opened. P o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g s h a r e d t h a t t h e main motor switch contacts were closed ( f i g . 14-10). Also, t h e

f
Battery
bus A
Win bus tie battery AIC
I
I

M o r winding open

switch

intermittently open

Mtery C

Figure 14-10.-

Bus-tie c i r c u i t r y .

14-18
i n t e r n a l switches which c o n t r o l t h e drive motor were s h o r t e d t o g e t h e r and t h e motor windings were open. These conditions i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e motor switch s t a l l e d . Main bus B should have been powered because of t h i s f a i l u r e , but w a s n o t . P o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g showed t h a t t h i s occurred because t h e main bus B c i r c u i t breaker f o r b a t t e r y C w a s i n t e r m i t t e n t . This problem i s discussed i n section 14.1.7.
A similar motor switch f a i l u r e w a s experienced during t e s t s of t h e Apollo 15 command and s e r v i c e module a t t h e launch s i t e . Also, a second similar motor switch on t h e Apollo 15 v e h i c l e r e q u i r e d 100 m i l l i s e c o n d s t o transfer; whereas, normal transfer t i m e i s 50 m i l l i s e c o n d s . A motor c u r r e n t s i g n a t u r e w a s taken f o r one switch cycle o f t h e slow-operating switch and compared t o a similar s i g n a t u r e taken p r i o r t o d e l i v e r y . It showed t h a t contact r e s i s t a n c e between t h e brushes and commutator had degraded and become extremely e r r a t i c . Torque measurements o f t h e f a i l e d motor s w i t c h without t h e motors were normal. This i s o l a t e s t h e problem t o t h e motors o f t h e switch assembly.
A black t r a c k o f d e p o s i t s from t h e brushes w a s found on t h e Apollo

1 4 commutator, as w e l l as on both of t h e commutators from t h e Apollo 1 5
motors. One motor had f a i l e d , and t h e o t h e r was running slow. Normally, a commutator should show some d i s c o l o r a t i o n along t h e brush t r a c k , b u t a b u i l d u p o f brush m a t e r i a l along t h e t r a c k i s abnormal. As a r e s u l t o f t h e t r a c k buildup, t h e r e s i s t a n c e between t h e brushes and commutator became h i g h e r . The h i g h e r r e s i s t a n c e drops t h e v o l t a g e i n t o t h e armature causing t h e motor t o run slower. (Switch t r a n s f e r , open t o c l o s e d , o r 1 v i c e v e r s a , r e q u i r e s 1 r e v o l u t i o n s o f t h e motor.) The i n c r e a s e d res i s t a n c e at t h e brushes g e n e r a t e s more h e a t than normal. A v i s u a l ins p e c t i o n of t h e Apollo 1 4 motor brush assembly showed high h e a t i n g of t h e brushes had occurred, and t h i s w a s concentrated at t h e brushcommutator i n t e r f a c e . The condition w a s evident by t h e m e l t i n g p a t t e r n of a t h i n nylon dish which r e t a i n s t h e brush i n t h e brush h o l d e r .
An a n a l y s i s i s b e i n g made t o determine t h e d e p o s i t buildup on t h e

c o m u t a t o r . E i t h e r t h e brush composition i s i n e r r o r , o r a contamination e x i s t s i n t h e brush composition. X-ray r e f r a c t i o n a n a l y s i s shows t h e same elements throughout t h e brush. The percentage of each of t h e subs t a n c e s w i l l be determined and compared t o t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n a n a l y s i s of t h e brush. I n s p e c t i o n o f t h e commutator o u t s i d e of t h e t r a c k shows a clean copper s u r f a c e comparable t o o t h e r machined s u r f a c e s w i t h i n t h e motor. It can be i n f e r r e d from t h i s t h a t t h e r e are no problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

14-19
th g e / l i f e of t h e l u b r i c a n t s from t h e bearings o r with outgassing from organic materials which might deposit on t h e commutators. The switch assemblies are hermetically s e a l e d and under a 15-psi p r e s s u r e of n i t r o gen and helium gas. Each motor i s operated continuously f o r 4 t o 8 hours t o seat t h e brushes. The motors are t h e n disassembled, i n s p e c t e d , and cleaned. Procedures f o r cleaning t h e motor assembly are not e x p l i c i t as t o materials o r techniques t o be used. T h i s could be t h e cause of t h e problem. A f u r t h e r study of t h i s aspect i s being made. An anomaly r e p o r t w i l l be i s s u e d upon completion of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . There a r e 36 motor-driven switch assemblies i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t . Some of t h e switches are normally not used i n f l i g h t . Some are used once o r , at most, s e v e r a l t i m e s . The increased r e s i s t a n c e of brush t o t h e commut a t o r as a result of d e p o s i t s i s gradual from a l l i n d i c a t i o n s . A check of t h e switch operation t i m e can be r e l a t e d t o t h e d e p o s i t buildup on t h e commutator. Consequently, a check of t h e switch response t i m e can i n d i c a t e t h e dependability of t h e switch t o perform one o r s e v e r a l a d d i t i o n a l switch t r a n s f e r s i n f l i g h t . This w i l l be done f o r Apollo 15 on each of t h e switches. Work-around procedures have been developed i f any o f t h e motor switches are questionable as a r e s u l t of t h e timing t e s t . This anomaly i s open.

14.1.7

I n t e r m i t t e n t C i r c u i t Breaker

The motor switch f a i l u r e discussed i n s e c t i o n 14.1.6 should have r e s u l t e d i n main buses A and B being energized a f t e r t h e motor switch w a s commanded open ( f i g . 14-10). P o s t f l i g h t c o n t i n u i t y checks, however, showed t h a t t h e r e w a s an open c i r c u i t between b a t t e r y C and main bus B and t h a t t h e main bus B c i r c u i t breaker f o r b a t t e r y C w a s i n t e r m i t t e n t . Disassembly and i n s p e c t i o n of t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r showed t h a t t h e c o n t a c t s are c r a t e r e d ( f i g . 14-11). The c r a t e r contains a white subs t a n c e which held t h e c o n t a c t s apart when t h e c i r c u i t breaker w a s actuated. The white substance w i l l b e analyzed t o determine i t s composition and source. C i r c u i t breakers which have been used i n similar applicat i o n s i n Apollo 1 4 w i l l a l s o be examined. An anomaly r e p o r t w i l l be i s s u e d under s e p a r a t e cover when t h e a n a l y s i s has been completed. This anomaly i s open.

14-20

NASA-S-71-1679

ct

'In

Figure 14-11.- C i r c u i t b r e a k e r c o n t a c t .

T

L

L-

14-21

14.1.8

Food Preparation Unit Leakage

The crew r e p o r t e d t h a t a bubble of water c o l l e c t e d on t h e s t e m of t h e food p r e p a r a t i o n u n i t af'ter hot water w a s ,dispensed, i n d i c a t i n g a s l i g h t leak. This problem a l s o occurred on Apollo 1 2 . T e s t s of both t h e Apollo 12 and Apollo 1 4 u n i t s showed no leakage when room temperature w a t e r w a s dispensed through t h e hot water v a l v e ; however, at a e l e v a t e d water temperature o f approximately 150' F, a n s l i g h t leakage appeared a f t e r valve a c t u a t i o n . Disassembly of t h e Apollo 12 dispenser showed damage i n two valve O-rings, apparently as a result of t h e considerable p a r t i c l e contamination found i n t h e hot water valve. b s t o f t h e contamination w a s i d e n t i f i e d as m a t e r i a l related t o component f a b r i c a t i o n and valve assembly and probably remained i n t h e valve because of incomplete cleaning procedures. Since t h e part i c l e s were found only i n t h e hot water v a l v e , t h e contamination appare n t l y o r i g i n a t e d e n t i r e l y within t h a t assembly and was not s u p p l i e d from o t h e r p a r t s of t h e water system. P o s t f l i g h t , when t h e hot water valve w a s cycled s e v e r a l t i m e s , t h e outflow w a s considerably less than t h e s p e c i f i e d 1 ounce p e r cycle. D i s assembly o f t h e valve w i l l be performed and an anomaly r e p o r t w i l l be i s s u e d under separate cover upon completion of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The Apollo 15 u n i t has been checked d u r i n g a l t i t u d e chamber t e s t s with hot water and no leakage was noted.
This anomaly is open.

14.1.9

Rapid Repressurization System Leakage

Repressurization of t h e three s t o r a g e b o t t l e s i n t h e r a p i d repressu r i z a t i o n system ( f i g . 14-12) was r e q u i r e d t h r e e t i m e s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e normal r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s during t h e mission. The system r e q u i r e d r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n once i n lunar o r b i t and twice during t h e t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t phase. J u s t p r i o r t o t h e f i r s t o f t h e t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s , t h e system had been used ( f a c e mask checks) and r e f i l l e d I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , t h e f i l l valve w a s closed b e f o r e t h e ( f i g . 14-13). system w a s f u l l y recharged. Calculations from t h e surge tank pressure d a t a i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n package w a s at approximately 510 p s i at 199 hours 48 minutes and w a s only recharged t o about 715 p s i ( f i g . 14-13). The cabin i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n package pressure would have i n d i c a t e d a higher p r e s s u r e because o f t h e temperature rise of t h e compressed gas. The crew noted a value o f about TOO p s i (due t o temperature s t a b i l i z a t i o n ) at approximately 211 hours and recharged t h e system again.

14-22

NASA-S-71-1680
Repressur itation bottles ReIief va 1ve urization valve
I
I

i

r

Face masks

B nut connector

Recharge p va Ive

' -1 - ' 4 r
To main w u lators

900psia

Figure 14-12.- Rapid repressurization system.

.L

14-23

NASA-S-71-1681

.I n

900
Repressurization; I fill valve open -IL( ;I 1

I

n

E 3
aJ

- 800
700 600

!
I

I
rValve closed

I

/

L ,

I

I

Surge tank pressure

I n
u )

h
u 9

c aJ
'

I

0

X

IV 1
9

lsurge tank only'being refilled I 1 1

500
Y

aJ

.

h

1.0
0.5
4 -

Oxygen flow rate

I n ~.
I n

f

-

0

i

1

5 '
x 0

Cabin pressure

Figure 14-13.- Rapid repressurization package data.

14-24
Data are not a v a i l a b l e from t h e lunar o r b i t r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n as t h e s p a c e c r a f t w a s on t h e back s i d e o f t h e moon during t h e o p e r a t i o n . However, t h e general procedure used during t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast phase would only p a r t i a l l y recharge t h e system.
P o s t f l i g h t checks of t h e 900-psi system showed t h a t t h e leakage rate w a s about 40 standard cc/min as compared with t h e p r e f l i g h t value o f 1 4 s t a n d a r d cc/min. This change i n leakage rate i s not considered abnormal. A leakage r a t e of t h i s magnitude would lower t h e system p r e s s u r e about 100 p s i every 3 days. Therefore, t h e lunar o r b i t recharging of t h e system probably r e s u l t e d frcxn normal leakage. Future crews w i l l be b r i e f e d on t h e recharging techniques f o r o t h e r than normal rechargings t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e system i s f u l l y recharged. This anomaly is closed. 14.2 14.2.1
LUNAR MODULF:

Ascent Battery 5 Low Voltage

A t 62 hours, t h e ascent b a t t e r y 5 open-circuit v o l t a g e had decreased from a l i f t - o f f value o f 37.0 v o l t s t o 36.7 v o l t s i n s t e a d of remaining at a constant l e v e l ( f i g . 14-14( a ) ) . Figure 14-14(b) shows c h a r a c t e r i s t i c open-circuit voltages for a f u l l y charged b a t t e r y (peroxide l e v e l of all c e l l s ) and all c e l l s o p e r a t i n g on t h e monoxide l e v e l o f t h e s i l v e r p l a t e . Note t h a t one c e l l at t h e monoxide l e v e l and t h e remaining 19 at t h e peroxide l e v e l would have caused t h e observed open-circuit v o l t a g e of 36.7 v o l t s . Any one of t h e following conditions could have caused t h e v o l t age drop.

a. b.
c.

Battery c e l l short
C e l l short-to-case

through an e l e c t r o l y t e path

External b a t t e r y load.

A s i n g l e - c e l l s h o r t could be caused by i n c l u s i o n of conductive foreign material i n t h e c e l l - p l a t e pack at t h e t i m e o f manufacture o r excessive b r a z e material at t h e brazed j o i n t between t h e p l a t e t a b and p l a t e g r i d , e i t h e r of which could p i e r c e t h e cellophane p l a t e s e p a r a t o r during t h e launch powered-flight phase, providing a conductive path between p o s i t i v e and negative p l a t e s ( f i g . 14-15).

14-25

NASA-S-7 1-1602

37.0

0
Y
1 -

Y , 4

. .>
L.

attery 5 (flight)

5 36.0
0

I 1

0

ti

Battery 5 voltage for a constant external load
I
1

35.0

1

(a) Open-circuit voltage variation during mission.

37 .O

A l l cells fully charged (peroxide level of the silver cell plate)

3

4

U I

36.7

ir

-

One cell out of the 20 cells at the monoxide level

..- 31.0 0
c)

{All

cells discharged to monoxide level

0

K
O + 400
Ampere hours (b) Characteristic open-circuit voltage of a battery,

0

Figure 14-14.-

Ascent b a t t e r y voltage c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

14-26

NASA-S-71-1683

(a) 2 0 - c e l l ascent battery.

(b)

Plate assembly.

(c) Case plugs.

(d) Cross section of plug.

Figure 14-15.

- Ascent b a t t e r y cell s t r u c t u r e .

14-27 During b a t t e r y a c t i v a t i o n , one o f t h e descent b a t t e r i e s had a c e l l s h o r t t o t h e case through an e l e c t r o l y t e p a t h around a c e l l plug j o i n t ( f i g . 14-15). The c e l l plug w a s not p r o p e r l y sealed t o t h e bottom o f t h e p l a s t i c c e l l case. If t h i s c o n d i t i o n e x i s t e d i n a s c e n t b a t t e r y 5 i n f l i g h t , it could have decreased t h e b a t t e r y open-circuit v o l t a g e .
An e x t e r n a l b a t t e r y l o a d could have existed from l i f t - o f f t o 62 hours on t h e c i r c u i t shown i n f i g u r e 14-16 i n which t y p i c a l types o f high resistance s h o r t s are a l s o shown. For t h i s c o n d i t i o n , t h e c u r r e n t d r a i n would have occurred on all c e l l s . Figure 14-14 shows t h e time h i s t o r y of t h e

NASA-S-7 1-1684
Ascent

Vo 1tage monitor

400k
ohms

* I

P

On

Battery 5 normal switch

POSSIBLE HIGH RESISTANCE GROUNDS

Battery 5 On backup switch

Figure 14-16.-

Ascent b a t t e r y 5 configured f o r open-circuit l o a d s .

14-28
open-circuit bus voltage f o r b a t t e r y 5 . For a constant e x t e r n a l l o a d , t h e b a t t e r y 5 open-circuit bus voltage would have been lower t h a n t h e f l i g h t d a t a at 141 hours. Therefore, t h e e x t e r n a l l o a d would have had t o change w i t h time. To reduce t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of recurrence, c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n has been t a k e n f o r each of t h e p o s s i b l e causes. S t r i c t e r i n s p e c t i o n and improved procedures have been incorporated f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e plugs. P a r t l c c u l a r a t t e n t i o n w i l l be given t o t h e assembly of t h e c e l l p l a t e s on f u t u r e u n i t s . I n a d d i t i o n , a t e s t has been added at t h e launch s i t e t o measure l u n a r module p a r a s i t i c loads p r i o r t o b a t t e r y i n s t a l l a t i o n t o i n s u r e t h a t no abnormal loads are p r e s e n t . This anomaly i s closed.

14.2.2

Abort S i g n a l Set I n Computer

P r i o r t o descent, t h e primary guidance computer received an abort command four d i f f e r e n t times. The computer would have r e a c t e d i f t h e descent program had been i n i t i a t e d . The f a i l u r e w a s i s o l a t e d t o one
NASA-S-71-1685

Abart switch

Lunar ModulePilol's I ground bus 4 1 Commander's F I T ground bus ! Lunar +28 V Commander's +28 V dc bus engine control
n

+

I

P

i
Clelemetry) bikvel discrete Engine arm switch o Ascent engine Descent Descent O engine
y

[ control logic engine

r / (Telemetry) l
Aicrrah

Abort bilevel

!
Problem isohted to these contacts
I

ogram

I

..__... Awnlink) ___.
Start abort program

a
I,

Did not A acur

guidance computer

(Computer downlink) Start abort program

&

Did a c u r

Figure 14-17.- Abort switch l o g i c .

14-29
s e t of c o n t a c t s of t h e a b o r t switch ( f i g . 14-17) because t h e abort command appeared only on t h e l u n a r module primary guidance computer downl i n k ( t e l e m e t r y ) and n o t on t h e abort guidance computer downlink (teleme t r y ) o r t h e t e l e m e t r y b i l e v e l d i s c r e t e s a s s o c i a t e d with t h e descent engine c o n t r o l l o g i c . Recycling t h e switch o r tapping t h e p a n e l removed t h e s i g n a l from t h e computer. To prevent an unwanted abort during powered descent, a computer program w a s developed and v e r i f i e d w i t h i n 2 hours, and i n t i m e t o be manually i n s e r t e d i n t o t h e l u n a r module computer p r i o r t o powered descent i n i t i a t i o n . The program would have allowed t h e l u n a r module computer t o ignore t h e abort command, had it appeared during powered descent.

The most probable cause of t h e abort command w a s m e t a l l i c contami n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e hermetically s e a l e d abort-switch module ( f i g . 14-18). The f a i l u r e o f e i n t e r n a l switch component would not l i k e l y have caused n t h e abort i n d i c a t i o n because such a f a i l u r e would not have been i n t e r m i t t e n t . X-rays and d i s s e c t i o n of similar switches have shown m e t a l l i c contamination i n s e v e r a l switches of t h e s i z e which could have caused t h e f l i g h t f a i l u r e . The m e t a l l i c contamination appears t o come from t h e i n t e r n a l switch p a r t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y one o f t h e t h r e e s t u d s which h o l d t h e contact components. The s t u d i s , i n e f f e c t , r i v e t e d by h e a t and p r e s s u r e ( f i g . 14-18). T h i s type of switch i s used i n e i g h t d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s , which are:
a. b. c.
d.

e.
f.

Abort switch Abort s t a g e switch Engine s t o p switches ( 2 ) Master alarm switches ( 2 ) Plus X t r a n s l a t i o n switch Engine s t a r t switch.

w i t h switches screened by x-ray

Corrective a c t i o n c o n s i s t s of r e p l a c i n g all switches of t h i s t y p e and v i b r a t i o n . Since t h e s c r e e n i n g i s not fool-proof, c i r c u i t modifications were made t o e l i m i n a t e s i n g l e p o i n t failures of t h i s t y p e . These modifications are:
a. The abort s t a g e switch descent-engine o v e r r i d e f u n c t i o n w a s removed from t h e abort-stage c i r c u i t b r e a k e r and placed on t h e l o g i c power switch contact. This involved r e l o c a t i n g one w i r e from one switch t e r m i n a l t o another.

b . Each o f t h e two engine s t o p switches were rewired so t h a t two s e r i e s c o n t a c t s are r e q u i r e d t o c l o s e i n o r d e r t o s t o p t h e engine. Formerly, t h e two sets of contacts i n each s t o p switch were connected i n p a r a l l e l s o t h a t c l o s u r e of e i t h e r would s h u t down t h e engine.

14-30

NASA-S-7 1-1686

Most likely source of sliver

7

Metal contamination up to 0 . 0 3 0 - i n c h long slivers found in several switches

(a) Simplified sketch of internal switch parts.

(b) X-rays of switch showing metallic contamination.

Figure 14-18.- Abort switch contamination.

1 -

1
Y -

,L LA

L-

-

L

i

14-31
c. The plus-X t r a n s l a t i o n switch w a s rewired so t h a t two series c o n t a c t c l o s u r e s are r e q u i r e d t o f i r e t h e plus-X r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l syst e m t h r u s t e r s . This removed t h e f o u r - t h r u s t e r t r a n s l a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y , l e a v i n g only a two-thruster t r a n s l a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y .
d. The e n g i n e - s t a r t switch and c i r c u i t r y were n o t changed because of t h i s problem s i n c e inadvertent c l o s u r e would only g i v e t h e manual s t a r t command, and t h e engine a r m comnand is a l s o r e q u i r e d t o f i r e t h e engine. However, because of a switch failure i n another s p a c e c r a f t during ground t e s t s , t h e switch w a s rewired so t h a t a s e r i e s - p a r a l l e l combination o f f o u r switch c o n t a c t s are used f o r t h e f u n c t i o n . That failure w a s caused by nonmetallic contamination (rust) p r e v e n t i n g switch contact c l o s u r e . This contamination i s undetectable by x-rays.

e. The two m a s t e r a l a r m switches were not rewired s i n c e i n a d v e r t e n t contact c l o s u r e would only reset t h e m a s t e r alarm, and t h i s would not a f f e c t t h e mission or crew s a f e t y .
f . The a b o r t and abort stage switch c i r c u i t r y t o t h e computer w a s not modified. I n s t e a d , t h e primary guidance computer software w a s modif i e d t o allow t h e crew t o lock o u t t h e computer abort and abort stage program. I f t h e crew e x e r c i s e s t h i s o p t i o n , any r e q u i r e d abort would have t o be performed u s i n g t h e a b o r t guidance system.

This anomaly i s closed. 14.2.3 I n t e r m i t t e n t S t e e r a b l e Antenna Operation

P r i o r t o t h e descent phase o f t h e mission, t h e S-band s t e e r a b l e antenna o p e r a t i o n w a s i n t e r m i t t e n t . There were-nine i n s t a n c e s of unscheduled i n t e r r u p t i o n of antenna t r a c k i n g . Three of these have been explained. One w a s caused by t h e crew switching t o an omnidirectional antenna because o f an erroneous reading of t h e p i t c h p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t o r at f u l l s c a l e of 255 degrees when t h e antenna w a s a c t u a l l y at 122 degrees. Another occurred because t h e antenna w a s i n t h e manual s l e w mode and n o t i n automatic-track. After undocking, t h e l u n a r module a t t i t u d e w a s changed and, as a result, t h e antenna w a s pointed away from t h e e a r t h r e s u l t i n g i n a l o s s o f s i g n a l . The t h i r d i n t e r r u p t i o n which has been explained w a s caused by a failure i n t h e ground s t a t i o n power a m p l i f i e r r e s u l t i n g i n ' a t e m p o r a r y l o s s of uplink s i g n a l . The remaining unexplained t r a c k i n g i n t e r r u p t i o n s ( f i g . 14-19) have s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Five t r a c k i n g i n t e r r u p t i o n s occurred during Goldstone coverage and f i g u r e 14-20 i s a p l o t of ground-station-received s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s at t h e s e times. During t h e Madrid ground s t a t i o n coverage o f r e v o l u t i o n 32, another i n c i d e n t w a s noted with t h e same t y p e of

14-32
NASA-S-71-1687

Revolution 11 (Froill side only)

Revolution 12 (Front side only)

Revolution 13 (Front sidc oiily)

Revolution

14

Steerable anleiiiia selected
.

r l
a
b

Omiiidirectional aiiteiiiia selcckd

I
Unscheduled losses of lock, h:min

- 101:55 - 103:42 c - 104i26

Revolution 31 (Front side only)

I

Revolution

32

I

(Front si& only)

d e
f

- 107:31 - 144:ll

- 104:36

Figure 14-19

.- S-band

s t e e r a b l e antenna o p e r a t i o n .

antenna response. I t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e antenna began t o experience a mechanical o s c i l l a t i o n of approximately 2 t o 3 h e r t z , which became inc r e a s i n g l y l a r g e r i n amplitude u n t i l t h e antenna l o s t lock. When antenna o s c i l l a t i o n s exceed p l u s o r minus 5 degrees, excessive motor d r i v e curr e n t causes t h e 28-voit dc c i r c u i t breaker t o open and t h e antenna ceases t o t r a c k . The crew r e s e t t h i s c i r c u i t breaker s e v e r a l times. The ant e n n a w a s a l s o reported t o be noisy, i n d i c a t i n g t h e c o n t i n u a l d r i v i n g t h a t would have occurred during t h e o s c i l l a t i o n s . The o s c i l l a t i o n s occurred randomly at o t h e r t i m e s during t h e problem p e r i o d , b u t damped out and d i d not cause t r a c k i n g i n t e r r u p t i o n s . The two most probable causes of t h e s e o s c i l l a t i o n s a r e an unwanted v a r i a t i o n i n t h e uplink s i g n a l o r a condition of i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e antenna/S-band t r a n s c e i v e r t r a c k i n g loop system. The conditions which can cause t h e f i r s t i t e m a r e v e h i c l e blockage, r e f l e c t i o n s from t h e s p a c e c r a f t s t r u c t u r e , multipath s i g n a l r e f l e c t i o n s from t h e l u n a r surf a c e , n o i s e t r a n s i e n t s induced on t h e uplink signal, o r i n c i d e n t a l amp l i t u d e modulation on t h e c a r r i e r at t h e c r i t i c a l antenna l o b i n g frequency ( 50 t o 100 h e r t z o r odd harmonics )

.

Look-angle d a t a i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e antenna w a s not p o i n t e d at or near t h e v e h i c l e s t r u c t u r e during t h e t i m e periods when antenna lock was lost.

14-33

NASA-S-71-1688 -100 -120 -140

-

-120

--

(a) 1 0 1 5 5 .

5 m

-

-100 -120 -140
(c) 104:26.

3
L

s

5

v)

.-

01

-100 -120 -140
(d) 104:36.

-100 -120

--I
0 2
4

6

8

10

Relative time, sec

(e) 107:31.

Figure 14-20 Signal strength o s c i l l a t i o n s associated with f i v e unexplained l o s s e s of lock.

.-

14-34
Multipath normally accurs when t h e s p a c e c r a f t i s n e a r t h e l u n a r horizon. However, antenna loss-of-lock d i d not occur a t t h e s e times. Noise t r a n s i e n t s on t h e uplink a r e h e l d t o a minimum because t h e ground s t a t i o n power a m p l i f i e r operates i n s a t u r a t i o n . Also, t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n r e c e i v e r which monitors t h e uplink s i g n a l at t h e ground s t a t i o n displayed normal output during t h e p r o b l e a t i m e p e r i o d s . Although t h e i n c i d e n t a l amplitude modulstion has not been r e c e n t l y measured at Golds t o n e and Madrid, production s u b - c a r r i e r o s c i l l a t o r s have been checked. These t e s t s shoved t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t a l amplitude modulation at t h e c r i t i c a l frequencies w a s not d e t e c t a b l e ( l e s s than 0.1 p e r c e n t ) . A t e s t w a s a l s o performed which showed t h a t t h e s t e e r a b l e antenna response t o inc i d e n t a l amplitude modulation became worse with t h e a d d i t i o n o f v o i c e on t h e s u b - c a r r i e r and t h e presence of p u l s e r e p e t i t i m ranging. Howe v e r , t h e r e i s no c o r r e l a t i o n between e i t h e r of t h e s e and l o s s e s o f ant e n n a lock. The most probable causes f o r t r a c k i n g loop i n s t a b i l i t y are high loop g a i n , low gimbal f r i c t i o n , and low received s i g n a l s t r e n g t h r e s u l t i n g i n low signal-to-noise r a t i o i n t h e t r a c k i n g l o o p . Both upl i n k and downlink s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e RF l e v e l s were nominal and were within t h e antenna's c a p a b i l i t y t o t r a c k . The loop g a i n as measured during t h e acceptance t e s t of t h e Apollo 1 4 equipment i n d i c a t e d a lower-than-nominal value i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e s t a b i l i t y s h o u l d have been g r e a t e r than nominal. There are no l i k e l y f a i l u r e s i n t h e antenna ;hat would cause a g a i n change s u f f i c i e n t t o produce i n s t a b i l i t y without complete loss of t h e antenna. There a r e many component f a i l u r e s i n t h e t r a n s c e i v e r which might produce t h e r i g h t amount of g a i n change f o r o s c i l l a t i o n s . However, t h e s e failures would a l s o a f f e c t t h e r e c e i v e r automatic g a i n c o n t r o l reading which appeared normal throughout t h e problem t i m e . The gimbal f r i c t i o n on t h e Apollo 1 4 antenna w a s measured during ground t e s t s and found t o be h i g h e r t h a n nominal. This would i n c r e a s e t h e antenna s t a b i l i t y . For gimbal f r i c t i o n t o cause t h e problem, a v a r i a t i o n i n f r i c t i o n which c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y changed from normal t o low, o r no f r i c t i o n , at s h o r t i n t e r v a l s and a t random t i m e s c o n s i s t e n t with t h e antenna o s c i l l a t i o n s would have had t o occur. There w a s no obvious v a r i a t i o n i n uplink s i g n a l and no obvious change i n t h e a n t e n n a / t r m s c e i v e r t r a c k i n g loop which would cause t h e antenna t o o s c i l l a t e . There must have been some i n t e r m i t t e n t condition t h a t e x i s t e d i n t h e spacecraft/ground s t a t i o n system, which has n o t y e t n been i d e n t i f i e d . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s continuing and a anomaly r e p o r t w i l l be i s s u e d when t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n is completed.

c

14-35
An a d d i t i o n a l problem occurred one t i m e during r e v o l u t i o n l when l

t h e antenna p i t c h - p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t o r s t u c k at t h e f u l l - s c a l e reading of 255 degrees. However, it became o p e r a t i v e again and continued t o function properly. This m a y have been caused,by a f a i l u r e i n t h e position-sensing c i r c u i t s i n t h e antenna or i n t h e meter i t s e l f . This meter hung up twice d u r i n g acceptance t e s t i n g . A malfunction w a s found, c o r r e c t e d , and a r e t e s t w a s s u c c e s s f u l . The i n d i c a t o r i s used only as a gross i n d i c a t i o n o f antenna movement. Consequently, no f u r t h e r a c t i o n w i l l be taken. This anomaly i s open. 14.2.4 Landing Radar Acquisition

Two conditions occurred during t h e landing radar operation which w e r e not expected; however, they were not abnormal. The first condition occurred approximately 6 minutes a f t e r i n i t i a l a c t u a t i o n of t h e landing radar. The system switched t o t h e low-range s c a l e , f o r c i n g t h e t r a c k e r s i n t o t h e narrow-band mode o f operation. This w a s c o r r e c t e d by r e c y c l i n g t h e main power c i r c u i t breaker which switched t h e radar t o high s c a l e . Figure 14-21 shows t h e radar s c a l e switching l o g i c . The radar t h e n locked on and "velocity-data-good" and "range-data-good" i n d i c a t i o n s were t r a n s ferred t o t h e computer. The "velocity-data-good" s i g n a l i s generated when t h e Doppler t r a c k e r s lock on and t h e "range-data-good" s i g n a l i s generated when t h e range t r a c k e r a l s o locks on.
NASA-S-71-1689
Velocity circuit Gating Data strem
I

!
Pulse to switch

T2 TR

= Doppler tracker 2
= Range Gacker

Figure 14-21.-

Landing r a d a r s c a l e switching l o g i c .

14-36
The second condition which w a s not expected occurred a f t e r t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r w a s recycled. A t t h i s time t h e i n i t i a l slant range reading w a s approximately 13 000 f e e t g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t c a l c u l a t e d from t h e opera t i o n a l t r a j e c t o r y . S e v e r a l seconds l a t e r , t h e i n d i c a t e d s l a n t range jumped from 32 000 t o 25 000 f e e t . Subsequently, t h e landing r a d a r readings compared favorably with t h e Operational t r a j e c t o r y ( f i g . 14-22).

108:08

108:09

108:lO

108:ll

108:12

108:13

181 0:4

108:lS

Time, hrmin

Figure 14-22.- Comparison of measured and computed s l a n t range during powered descent.

14-37
The s c a l e switching occurred at a e l a n t range of 63 000 feet with a beam 4 v e l o c i t y of 3000 f t / s e c at an incidence angle of 35.4 degrees. Operating t h e landing r a d a r under t h e s e conditions exceeds t h e maximum range measurement design l i m i t ( f i g . 14-23). ,Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e r e c e i v e r i s sweeping w i t h maximum g a i n and t h e system w i l l be sens i t i v e t o any received noise. A test w a s performed w i t h a radar opera t i n g under t h e Apollo 14 conditions (two range-rate beams locked up and t h e range beam unlocked). By i n s e r t i n g low-level n o i s e f o r a f r a c t i o n of a second i n t o t h e r e c e i v e r , range s c a l e switching occurred.
NASA-S-71-1691

80)

70

60
5:

3
m

i
50
40

s

H f

30

20 0
1

2

3

4

5x

lo3

Vehick velocity component along r a w bcm, f t / e c

Figure 14-23. - Landing radar range measurement design l i m i t a t i o n as a f’unction of v e h i c l e v e l o c i t y component along range beam.

14-38
The high s l a n t range i n d i c a t e d at lock-cm by t h e landing radar w a s most l i k e l y caused by t h e r a d a r locking onto energy r e t u r n e d i n t o t h e antenna s i d e lobe. Based on t h e p r e f l i g h t t e r r a i n p r o f i l e and t h e pref l i g h t o p e r a t i o n a l t r a j e c t o r y , s i d e lobe lock-on can be expected. Checkl i s t procedures e x i s t t o c o r r e c t a s u s t a i n e d s i d e lobe lock-on. Once t h e r a d a r i s locked on t h e main l o b e , s i d e l o b e lock-on cannot occur. O f u t u r e s p a c e c r a f t , a wiring modification w i l l b e made t o enable n holding t h e system i n high s c a l e while i n antenna p o s i t i o n 1. b w s c a l e w i l l only be enabled i n p o s i t i o n 2. P o s i t i o n 2 of t h e antenna i s autom a t i c a l l y s e l e c t e d by t h e computer at high g a t e (7500 f e e t a l t i t u d e ) . The manual s e l e c t i o n o f antenna p o s i t i o n s 1 and 2 w i l l a l s o c o n t r o l high s c a l e and enable low s c a l e switching, r e s p e c t i v e l y . This anomaly is closed. 14.2.5

Loss of t h e 'Abort Guidance System

The abort guidance system f a i l e d during t h e braking phase of rendezvous. Telemetry d a t a were suddenly l o s t at 143:58:16; however, t h e r e w a s no i n d i c a t i o n o f an abort guidance system warning l i g h t o r master a l a r m . The crew w a s unable t o access t h e d a t a e n t r y and display assembly and depressing any of t h e pushbuttons had no e f f e c t . The status switch w a s cycled from operate t o standby t o operate w i t h no e f f e c t . Cycling t h e 28-volt c i r c u i t breakers likewise had no e f f e c t . The system remained i n o p e r a t i v e for t h e remainder of t h e mission.

The system w a s determined t o have been i n t h e standby mode af'ter t h e f a i l u r e by comparing expected and a c t u a l bus c u r r e n t changes t h a t were observed at t h e t i m e o f t h e failure and t h e subsequent cycling of t h e c i r c u i t breakers. Further evidence o f t h e system having been i n standby w a s t h e absence of t h e warning l i g h t and master alarm at t h e time of t h e f a i l u r e . If standby power i n t h e e l e c t r o n i c s assembly were not maintained, clock pulses t o t h e abort sensor assembly would have been l o s t and t h e warning l i g h t would have i l l u m i n a t e d and t h e master a l a r m sounded. A warning l i g h t and a master alarm would a l s o have occurred i f t h e failure had been i n t h e abort guidance s t a t u s switch o r t h e a s s o c i a t e d e x t e r n a l wiring. These conditions i s o l a t e t h e failure t o t h e power supply s e c t i o n o r t h e sequencer of t h e a b o r t e l e c t r o n i c s assembly ( f i g . 14-24).

14-39

NASA-S-71-1692
Abort guidance
status switch

28 volts

Control

i? - Z
I

I
I

d
I I
I
28 volts ' a telemetry hm

Operate

I 0 Standby

o--c
Off

,

-

J

Power to abort C ,electronics assembly memory and downlink

-

Power to data entry and display assembly Standby power

To telemetry

Figure 14-24.- P a r t i a l abort guidance system f u n c t i o n a l diagram. The f a i l u r e has been i s o l a t e d t o one of seven modules i n t h e p l u s b-volt l o g i c power supply, one module i n t h e sequencer, o r one of 27 interconnections between t h e modules. There are a t o t a l o f 27 component p a r t ty.pes ; twelve r e s i s t o r , two c a p a c i t o r , f o u r t r a n s i s t o r , four diode, f o u r transformer, and one s a t u r a b l e r e a c t o r t h a t could have caused t h e f a i l u r e .
A complete f a i l u r e h i s t o r y review of t h e component p a r t types revealed no evidence of a generic p a r t problem. A power d i s s i p a t i o n analysis and a thermal a n a l y s i s of m a x i m u m case temperature f o r each o f t h e suspect p a r t s showed adequate design margins.

Manufacturing procedures were reviewed and found t o be s a t i s f a c t o r y . F i n a l l y , a review w a s conducted o f t h e t e s t i n g t h a t i s performed at t h e component l e v e l , module l e v e l , and power supply l e v e l . T e s t procedures were f o u n d - t o b e adequate f o r d e t e c t i o n of f a i l e d u n i t s and not s o severe t h a t t h e y would expose t h e u n i t s t o unacceptable o r hazardous t e s t conditions.
A component o r s o l d e r j o i n t f a i l u r e could have been due t o e i t h e r an abnormal thermal s t r e s s o r a non-generic deficiency o r q u a l i t y d e f e c t t h a t w a s unable t o withstand a normal environment. A n abnormal thermal

stress could have been caused by improper i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e e q u i p e n t on t h e cold rails. If t h i s occurred, t h e f i r s t component which should f a i l i s in t h e p a r t i c u l a r power supply t o which t h e failure w a s i s o l a t e d .

I n any e v e n t , t h e methods and techniques used t o v e r i f y system performance show no apparent areas which r e q u i r e improvement. F u r t h e r stress a n a l y s i s of components and s o l d e r j o i n t s shows t h a t t h e design i s adequate. The methods , techniques end procedures used i n i n s t a l l a t i o n o f t h e equipment on t h e cold rails are a l s o adequate, providing t h e s e procedures are followed. Consequently, no c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s i n o r d e r .
This anomaly i s closed.
14.2.6
Cracked G l a s s on Data Entry and Display Assembly

The crew reported a crack i n t h e g l a s s across t h e address r e g i s t e r of t h e d a t a e n t r y and display assembly. Figure 14-25 s h a r s t h e assembly end t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e crack. Figure 14-26 i s an enlarged drawing of t h e glass and a s s o c i a t e d electroluminescent segments.

NASl 5-71-1693
r

Crack 7

.Tape

locations

Figure 14-25.- Locations of crack and t a p e on d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly.

NASA-S-7 1-1694

Room temperature vu lcanizinq material
K o v a frane

Void -Common electrode Glass

--Glass

Figure 14-26.- Cross s e c t i o n of d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly g l a s s . The cause o f t h e crack i s unknown. Glass cracks have n o t occurred s i n c e a r e v i s i o n w a s made t o t h e procedure used t o mount t h e glass t o t h e f a c e p l a t e of t h e d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly. The assembly i s quali f i e d f o r an environment i n excess of t h e f l i g h t conditions. Therefore, e i t h e r excessive i n t e r n a l s t r e s s e s (under normal conditions ) were b u i l t i n t o t h e g l a s s , o r t h e mounting w a s improper ( n o t as d e s i g n e d ) , or t h e glass w a s i n a d v e r t e n t l y h i t . Corrective a c t i o n c o n s i s t s of applying a c l e a r p l a s t i c tape p r i o r t o f l i g h t on t h e glass of t h e electroluminescent windows above t h e keyboard ( f i g . 14-25), l i k e t h a t previously used on t h e mission t i m e r windows. The t a p e i s t o prevent dislodging o f any glass p a r t i c l e s i f cracks occur i n t h e f u t u r e , as w e l l a h e l p prevent moisture from p e n e t r a t i n g s

14-42

t h e electroluminescent segments should a crack occur. The presence of moisture would cause t h e d i g i t segments t o t u r n dark i n about 2 hours i f v o l t a g e were applied t o a cracked u n i t , making t h e assembly unreadable.
I

This anomaly i s closed.

14.3 GOVERNMEWT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
14.3.1 Noisy Lunar Topographic Camera Operation

The lunar topographic camera exhibited noisy operation from t h e t i m e of t h e Descartes s i t e photography pass at about 90 hours. I n both t h e operate and standby modes w i t h power on t h e camera, t h e s h u t t e r operation w a s continuous.
The developed f i l m i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e camera w a s f u n c t i o n i n g properly at t h e time of camera checkout a t about 34 hours. On t h e f o u r t h l u n a r r e v o l u t i o n , good imagery of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e w a s obtained on 192 frames, s t a r t i n g at Theophilus C r a t e r and ending about 40 seconds b e f o r e p a s s i n g t h e Descartes s i t e . The r e s t of t h e f i l m c o n s i s t s of multiple-exposed and f u l l y over-exposed f i l m .

P o s t f l i g h t tests with t h e f l i g h t camera showed s a t i s f a c t o r y operat i o n i n a l l simulated environments ( p r e s s u r e , t h e r m a l , and v i b r a t i o n ) at one-g. An i n t e r m i t t e n t f a i l u r e w a s found i n a t r a n s i s t o r i n t h e s h u t t e r c o n t r o l c i r c u i t (fig. 14-27). The t r a n s i s t o r w a s contaminated with a
NASA-S-71-1695

I

supply

I

12 volts

lntcrvalaneter

2

Data
pn i t

,

Shutter

drive

Figure 14-27.-

Lunar topographic camera s h u t t e r c o n t r o l .

? .

L

A-

-

14-43
l o o s e p i e c e of aluminum 0.130 inch .By 0.008 i n c h , which ws8 f o r e i g n t o t h e t r a n s i s t o r material. With a s h o r t e d t r a n s i s t o r , 28 v o l t s i s a p p l i e d continuously t o t h e s h u t t e r d r i v e c i r c u i t , causing continuous s h u t t e r operation , independent of the i n t e r v a l o m e t e r and independent of t h e s i n g l e , auto, o r standby mode s e l e c t i o n s . The sprocket holes i n t h e 1/200 s l o t i n t h e s h u t t e r c u r t a i n were t o r n as 8 result of t h e prolonged, continuous , high-speed s h u t t e r operation ( f i g . 14-28).

NASA-S-7 1-1696

Normal stopped position

of 1/200 slit

With torn sprocket holes, stow position of a l l slits
is variable

Figure 14-28.-

Lunar topographic camera film t r a c k .

14-44
The t r a n s i s t o r had been passed by normal high r e l i a b i l i t y s c r e e n i n g and by premission and postmission system acceptance t e s t s o p e r a t i n g under v i b r a t i o n , t h e r m a l , p r e s s u r e , and humidity c o n d i t i o n s ; none of which det e c t e d t h e p i e c e of aluminum. Additional s c r e e n i n g b e i n g considered f o r f u t u r e a p p l i c a t i o n s includes t h e use of N-ray and a c o u s t i c i n s p e c t i o n . A n occurrence o f t h i s n a t u r e i s rare, but i t i s even rarer f o r such a c o n d i t i o n t o pass t h e high r e l i a b i l i t y screening. The anomaly occurred only a f t e r a p e r i o d of o p e r a t i o n at zero-g i n f l i g h t , and when t h e case o f t h e t r a n s i s t o r i t s e l f w a s tapped p o s t f l i g h t . This anomaly i s closed.
14.3.2

Extravehicular Glove Control

After s u i t p r e s s u r i z a t i o n f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e Lunar Module P i l o t r e p o r t e d t h a t h i s r i g h t glove had p u l l e d h i s hand t o t h e l e f t and down and t h a t he had not had t h i s t r o u b l e during t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y period. The condition w a s a nuisance throughout t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y period. I n i t i a l indicat i o n s from t h e Lunar Module P i l o t were t h a t a cable had broken i n t h e glove ( f i g . 14-29).

Cable guides (2)

Figure 14-29.-

Extravehicular glove w r i s t c o n t r o l .

14-45
A d e t a i l e d examination of t h e r e t u r n e d g l o v e , t o g e t h e r with chamber t e s t s , have shown t h a t t h e r e a r e no broken cables and t h a t t h e r e i s f r e e operation of t h e glove wrisz-control cable system. However, with t h e Lunar Module P i l o t i n t h e pressurized f l i g h t s u i t , t h e glove took t h e p o s i t i o n which w a s r e p o r t e d during t h e mission.

The w r i s t c o n t r o l assembly provides a free-moving s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r f a c e between t h e glove and t h e w r i s t disconnect s o as t o a s s u r e convolute a c t i o n f o r w r i s t movement i n t h e p r e s s u r i z e d s t a t e . The design i n h e r e n t l y allows t h e glove t o take various n e u t r a l p o s i t i o n s . This anomaly i s closed.

14.3.3

Intervalometer Cycling

During i n t e r v a l o m e t e r operation, the. Command Module P i l o t heard one double cycle from t h e intervalometer. Photography i n d i c a t e d t h a t double cycling occurred 1 3 times out of 283 exposures. P o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g with t h e f l i g h t intervalometer and camera has i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e double cycling w a s caused by a random response of t h e intervalometer t o t h e camera motor c u r r e n t . The camera motor used on t h e Apollo 1 4 cameras w a s a new motor having s l i g h t l y higher c u r r e n t charact e r i s t i c s . P r e f l i g h t t e s t i n g of t h e equipment i n d i c a t e d compatibility of t h e u n i t s and no double cycling. Double cycling does not r e s u l t i n d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s t o t h e camera o r t h e intervalometer. No loss of photographic data occurs as a r e s u l t of double c y c l i n g . Modifications t o t h e intervalometer t o make i t less s e n s i t i v e t o t h e random pulses of t h e camera motor w i l l be made, i f pract i c a l . O Apollo 1 5 , t h e intervalometer w i l l only provide Hasselblad n backup t o t h e s c i e n t i f i c instrument module cameras. This anomaly i s closed.

14.3.4

I n t e r m i t t e n t Voice Communications

A t approximately 29 hours, Mission Control had d i f f i c u l t y i n communicating with t h e Coxnander. The Commander replaced h i s constant wear garment e l e c t r i c a l a d a p t e r ( f i g . 14-30) with a s p a r e u n i t , and s a t i s f a c t o r y communications were r e e s t a b l i s h e d .

Following r e l e a s e of t h e hardware from q u a r a n t i n e , all four cons t a n t wear garment e l e c t r i c a l adapters were t e s t e d f o r c o n t i n u i t y and r e s i s t a n c e , and a l l u n i t s were s a t i s f a c t o r y . The adapters were t h e n

14-46

Ad

Figure 14-30.- Constant wear garment communications harness.

tltl

L

? ' L

14-47
connected t o a p o r t a b l e communications set which provided conditions s i m i l a r t o f l i g h t conditions. While connected, t h e adapters were subj e c t e d t o t w i s t i n g , bending, and p u l l i n g . None of t h e adapters showed any e l e c t r i c a l i n t e r m i t t e n t s . The most l i k e l y cause of t h e problem w a s poor contact between conn e c t o r s because of s m a l l contaminants o r improper mating of 8 connector, which w a s c o r r e c t e d when t h e spare adapter w a s i n s t a l l e d . This anomaly i s closed.

14.4
14.4.1

MOLL0 LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE Active Seismic Experiment Thumper Misfires

. During t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e crew deployed t h e thumper and geophones and attempted t o f i r e t h e i n i t i a t o r s w i t h t h e following results: 13 f i r e d , 5 m i s f i r e d , and 3 i n i t i a t o r s were deliberately skipped t o save time. I n some i n s t a n c e s , two attempts were made t o f i r e each i n i t i a t o r . I n a d d i t i o n , f o r t h e f i r s t four o r f i v e f i r i n g s , it w a s necessary t o squeeze t h e f i r i n g switch knob with both hands. Subs e q u e n t l y , t h e excessive s t i f f n e s s seemed t o be r e l i e v e d and one-hand actuation w a s possible.

The most l i k e l y causes of t h e problem a r e a s s o c i a t e d with t h e d e t e n t p o r t i o n of t h e s e l e c t o r switch ( f i g . 14-31) and dirt on t h e f i r i n g switch a c t u a t o r b e a r i n g s u r f a c e . The s e l e c t o r switch d i a l can r e p o s i t i o n out of d e t e n t i n t h e course of normal handling because of t h e lack of p o s i t i v e s e a t i n g i n t h e d e t e n t f o r each i n i t i a t o r p o s i t i o n . For an i n i t i a t o r t o be f i r e d , t h e s e l e c t o r switch must provide contact t o t h e proper u n f i r e d i n i t i a t o r p o s i t i o n . Examination of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n u n i t has shown t h a t t h e d e t e n t i s p o s i t i o n e d at t h e l e a d i n g edge of t h e contact s u r f a c e s o t h a t any movement toward t h e previous p o s i t i o n w i l l break t h e c o n t a c t . Also, t h e l i g h t e n i n g holes i n t h e f i r i n g switch knob make it p o s s i b l e f o r d i r t t o g e t onto t h e Teflon bearing s u r f a c e s , temporarily i n c r e a s i n g t h e f o r c e r e q u i r e d t o c l o s e t h e switch ( f i g . 14-31). Corrective a c t i o n f o r Apollo 16 c o n s i s t s of adding a p o s i t i v e det e n t mechani'sm, properly aligned w i t h t h e s e l e c t o r switch c o n t a c t s , and dust p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e f i r i n g switch a c t u a t o r assembly. The thumper i s not c a r r i e d on Apollo 15. This anomaly i s closed.

14-48

NASA-S-71-1699

Shorting

C

Rotate to arm Push to fire

Figure 14-31.- Active seismic experiment.

- .
i

L

14-49
14.4.2 Suprathermal Ion Detector Experiment Noisy Data

During i n i t i a l turn-on of t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments, t r a n s m i s s i o n o f t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r l c o l d cathode gage e x p e r i ment o p e r a t e - s e l e c t command r e s u l t e d i n e r r a t i c d a t a from t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment % t h e p a s s i v e s e i s m i c experiment % and t h e charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experiment. ( C e n t r a l s t a t i o n engineeri n g parameters remained normal.) Subsequent commanding o f t h e suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r / c o l d cathode gage experiments t o t h e standby mode r e t u r n e d t h e o t h e r lunar s u r f a c e experiment d a t a t o normal. S e v e r a l switching i t e r a t i o n s of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n and t h e experiment commands f a i l e d t o clear t h e problem u n t i l t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment w a s commanded t o t h e x 1 0 accumulation mode. Upon execution o f t h i s command, normal experiment d a t a were r e c e i v e d and t h e d a t a have remained normal s i n c e t h a t t i m e . The suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment d u s t cover and t h e cold cathode gage experiment d u s t seal had been removed at t h e t i m e t h e d a t a became normal. The most probable cause w a s a r c i n g o r corona w i t h i n t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r equipment p r i o r t o d u s t cover removal. During ground tests under s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s , a r c i n g o r corona has r e s u l t e d i n t h e same t y p e o f d a t a problems. Systems tests have i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e n o i s e generated can a l s o a f f e c t t h e p a s s i v e seismic experiment and charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experiment data; and t h a t a r c i n g o r corona w i t h i n t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment can result i n spurious commands w i t h i n t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment, causing removal of t h e d u s t p r o t e c t o r s . However no detrimental e f f e c t s t o t h e equipment have been experienced by t h i s event. Performance acceptance d a t a from t h e Apollo 15 suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r / c o l d cathode gage experiments with t h e remaining l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments have not i n d i c a t e d any a b n o r m a l i t i e s . The Apollo 1 5 u n i t w i l l most l i k e l y e x h i b i t t h e same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a r c i n g , with t h e d u s t covers i n t a c t and t h e high voltage on, as t h a t of t h e Apollo 1 4 u n i t . However, o p e r a t i o n s p r i o r t o d u s t cover removal w i l l be l i m i t e d t o t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r o p e r a t i o n v e r i f i c a t i o n p r i o r t o t h e l a s t extravehicular activity

.

4

This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.3

Lunar Portable Magnetometer Cable D i f f i c u l t i e s

The crew r e p o r t e d t h a t it w a s d i f f i c u l t t o rewind t h e l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer cable. The cable i s deployed and rewound at each loc a t i o n where t h e lunar p o r t a b l e magnetometer is used ( f i g . 14-32).

14-50

NASA-S-7 1-1700

cable

reel-spins crank

Figure 14-32.- Lunar portable magnetometer cable r e e l .

14-51
The l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer ribbon cable s n a r l s easily at 1/68 and i s d i f f i c u l t and t e d i o u s t o u n s n a r l . If it i s necessary t o remove t h e hand from t h e crank t o unsnarl t h e cable during t h e f i r s t p a r t o f rewinding t h e c a b l e , t h e cable w i l l unwind w i t h i n t h e reel and s p i n t h e r e e l handle ( f i g . 14-32). Free unwinding of t h e reel i s r e q u i r e d duri n g deployment; however, i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o b e able t o lock t h e reel a g a i n s t r o t a t i o n at t i m e s during rewind o f t h e c a b l e . Rewinding w a s d i f f i c u l t because t h e r e w a s no provision t o lock t h e r e e l during rewind, and g r i p p i n g t h e reel and crank w a s d i f f i c u l t w i t h t h e gloved hand. Corrective a c t i o n f o r Apollo 16 c o n s i s t s of adding a r a t c h e t and pawl locking device f o r a c t u a t i o n w i t h t h e gloved hand, and providing a b e t t e r g r i p f o r t h e reel and crank. The l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer i s not c a r r i e d on Apollo 15. This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.4

Central S t a t i o n Twelve-Hour T i m e r F a i l u r e

The c e n t r a l s t a t i o n t i m e r p u l s e s d i d not occur a f t e r i n i t i a l a c t i v a t i o n . Uplink command t e s t s v e r i f i e d t h a t t h e t i m e r l o g i c and t h e p u l s e switches w e r e functioning s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , but t h a t t h e mechanical s e c t i o n o f t h e timer w a s not d r i v i n g t h e s w i t c h e s . T i m e r f u n c t i o n s started t o occur and t h e 12-hour pulses w e r e provided 13 times i n s u c c e s s i o n , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e t i m e r b a t t e r y and o s c i l l a t o r are s a t i s f a c t o r y , but t h a t t h e mechanical s e c t i o n i s o p e r a t i n g i n t e r m i t t e n t l y . The failure o f t h e t i m e r is a s s o c i a t e d with t h e mechanical design. This anomaly i s similar t o t h e t i m e r problem experienced on Apollo 12. The l o s s o r e r r a t i c o p e r a t i o n of t h e 12-hour timer output p u l s e has no adverse e f f e c t on experiments operations. The Apollo 15 c e n t r a l s t a t i o n has a new s o l i d - s t a t e t i m e r . The Apollo 1 4 c e n t r a l s t a t i o n w i l l be t u r n e d off by ground command, as i s planned for t h e Apollo 12 s t a t i o n . This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.5

Passive Seismic Experiment Y - A x i s

Leveling I n t e r m i t t e n t

The hori'zontal Y-axis l e v e l i n g motor of t h e gimbal l e v e l i n g system o p e r a t e s i n t e r m i t t e n t l y ( f i g . 14-33). Although a command v e r i f i c a t i o n i s r e c e i v e d when commands are s e n t , power i s not n e c e s s a r i l y r e c e i v e d by t h e motor. When t h e r e i s an i n d i c a t i o n o f power t o t h e motor, t h e motor does o p e r a t e . As a r e s u l t , during t h e f i r s t l u n a r day, response t o ground commands w a s normal except f o r 6 o f t h e 22 conrmands when t h e r e w a s no response.

14-52

NASA-S-7 1-1701
+29 volts

+12 volts
I

1,
I
I
I

m

~

Level motor (Y-axis) on/ ~ off command

S . _ t R

-

7
Y-axis motor drive circuit

-12 ifolts

Figure 14-33.- Y-axis l e v e l i n g motor c i r c u i t r y . Although no s c i e n t i f i c data have been l o s t t o date, i n t e r m i t t e n t problems have been encountered when l e v e l i n g t h e Y-axis of t h e gimbal p l a t f o r m upon which are mounted t h e three orthogonal long-period seismmeters. Occasionally, e i t h e r t h e r e i s no electro-mechanical response, o r t h e response i s delayed when t h e Y - a x i s m t o r i s commanded on. Del a y times vary. Thus far, l e v e l i n g has been achieved by c y c l i n g on/off commands at varying t i m e i n t e r v a l s . The problem i s caused by an i n t e r m i t t e n t component i n t h e motor c o n t r o l c i r c u i t ( f i g . 14-33). There i s no c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e occurrence of t h e problem and t h e temperature of t h e lunar s u r f a c e , t h e cent r a l s t a t i o n e l e c t r o n i c s , or t h e experiment. Whenever there i s an i n d i c a t i o n of power t o t h e motor, t h e motor o p e r a t e s . When t h e m t o r opera t e s , it o p e r a t e s properly and p u l l s t h e normal c u r r e n t .
If t h e problem becomes worse u n t i l Y - a x i s l e v e l i n g cannot be achieved, an emergency o p e r a t i o n a l mde can be implemented such as d r i v i n g remaining axes t o t h e i r s t o p s i n both d i r e c t i o n s i n an attempt t o free electro-mechanical components which may be s t i c k i n g . P r e s e n t l y , however, t h e problem has not been s u f f i c i e n t l y s e r i o u s t o warrant i n t e r r u p t i o n of continuous s c i e n t i f i c data t o attempt such o p e r a t i o n s .

This anomaly i s closed.

14-53

14.4.6 Passive Seismic Experiment Feedback F i l t e r F a i l u r e
The long-period v e r t i c a l ( Z ) seismometer w a s u n s t a b l e when operated
w i t h t h e feedback f i l t e r i n . The feedback f i l t e r s f o r all t h r e e longp e r i o d axes (X, Y , and Z ) were removed by command, and good d a t a (undamped)

now continue t o be received. The f i l t e r - o u t mode provides feedback t o t h e seismometer f o r all periods of operation with an instrument having a n a t u r a l p e r i o d of approximately 2.5 seconds. Although t h e response curves are peaked r a t h e r t h a n f l a t , and c r i t i c a l l y damped, no seismic energy i n t h e 0.5- t o 15-second-period range i s l o s t . The f i l t e r - i n mode provides a 1000-second t i m e constant f i l t e r i n t h e feedback loop f o r an instrument having a n a t u r a l p e r i o d of approxin mately 1 5 seconds with a c r i t i c a l l y damped, f l a t - r e s p o n s e curve. O Apollo 14 long-period seismometers, t h e d a t a during t h e f i l t e r - i n mode have i n d i c a t e d a g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i n i t i a l o s c i l l a t i o n s going on t o s a t u r a t i o n . The problem appears t o b e e l e c t r i c a l r a t h e r t h a n mechani c a l as experienced with t h e bent f l e x u r e s of t h e Apollo 12 long-period v e r t i c a l s e i s m m e t e r . Performance d a t a during Apollo 1 4 acceptance t e s t i n g have i n d i c a t e d no abnormalities. Preliminary a n a l y s i s of science d a t a from Apollo 11, 12, and 1 4 i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e n a t u r a l lunar seismic regime favors t h e range of 0.5t o 3.0-second p e r i o d s . As a r e s u l t it i s q u i t e probable t h a t f u t u r e p a s s i v e seismic experiment u n i t s on t h e lunar s u r f a c e w i l l be operated i n t h e f i l t e r - o u t mode i n o r d e r t o maximize t h e s e n s i t i v i t y at t h e appare n t l y favored 2.0-second period. A t p r e s e n t , both Apollo 1 2 and Apollo 1 4 long-period seismometers a r e being operated i n t h e f i l t e r - o u t mode , producing s a t i s f a c t o r y d a t a . This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.7

Active Seismic Geophone 3 E l e c t r o n i c C i r c u i t E r r a t i c

The experiment w a s t u r n e d on i n t h e l i s t e n i n g mode on March 26,

1971, and geophone 3 d a t a were spiking off-scale high ( f i g . 14-34). When t h e geophone channels were c a l i b r a t e d , t h e geophone 3 channel went off-scale high simultaneously with t h e s t a r t of t h e c a l i b r a t i o n p u l s e
and s t a y e d off-scale high f o r t h e remainder o f t h e l i s t e n i n g period. During t h e 1-second p e r i o d when t h e c a l i b r a t i o n p u l s e w a s p r e s e n t , d a t a from geophones 1 and 2 showed t h e normal 7-hertZ r i n g i n g caused by t h e c a l i b r a t i o n p u l s e . However, geophone 3 d a t a showed four negative-going s p i k e s coincident with t h e f i r s t f o u r negative h a l f cycles of t h e ringi n g on t h e o t h e r two channels. The s p i k e s decreased i n d u r a t i o n from t h e f i r s t t o t h e l a s t , t h e l a s t having an amplitude o f 90 percent of

14-54

I

L?
N

0

v!?
N l n

0

14-55
f u l l s c a l e ( p l u s 2.5 v o l t s t o minus 2.0 v o l t s ) . During t h e t i m e t h a t t h i s p u l s e w a s p r e s e n t , t h e signal on channel 2 changed from minus 2 . 2 v o l t s t o minus 2.35 v o l t s , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t channel 3 was operating at an apparent g a i n of 30 t i m e s t h e channel 2 gain.

As shown i n f i g u r e 14-35, each geophone channel c o n s i s t s of a geophone, an input p r e a m p l i f i e r , a low-pass f i l t e r , and a logarithmic comp r e s s o r a m p l i f i e r . The output of t h e logarithmic compressor feeds t h e instrumentation system. The logarithmic compressor i s b a s i c a l l y an inv e r t i n g a m p l i f i e r with exponential negative feedback. Two diode-connected t r a n s i s t o r s between t h e output and input of t h e a m p l i f i e r supply t h e feedback. The f i r s t diode i s used f o r positive-going and t h e second f o r negative-going input s i g n a l s . The diodes f o r all t h r e e geophone channels (two p e r channel) are physically l o c a t e d i n an oven which cont r o l s t h e i r temperature a t 105' C.

WSA-S-71-1703

Figure 14-35.-

Typical geophone channel.

It i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e i s i n t h e logarithmic compression a m p l i f i e r because s i g n a l s are coupled i n t o it through an input coupling .capacitor. This c a p a c i t o r would block any o f f s e t v o l t a g e s from t h e preceding stages which would be required t o d r i v e t h e output o f f - s c a l e h i g h . Analysis i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e most probable cause o f t h e problem i s an i n t e r m i t t e n t open c i r c u i t i n t h e diode feedback p a t h . This would allow t h e a m p l i f i e r input t r a n s i s t o r t o s a t u r a t e , d r i v i n g t h e output o f f - s c a l e high. When s i g n a l s l a r g e enough t o d r i v e t h e input s t a g e out of s a t u r a t i o n were p r e s e n t , t h e output would t h e n respond and t h e output s i g n a l would not be compressed.

14-56
The experiment e l e c t r o n i c s uses "cordwood" c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e type which has caused s o l d e r cracks i n o t h e r equipment. Two copper paths conduct t h e feedback diodes t o t h e l o g a r i t h m i c compressor a m p l i f i e r . A s o l d e r crack i n e i t h e r p a t h would t h e n result i n t h e d a t a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . There are 10 such s o l d e r j o i n t s f o r each geophone ( f i g . 14-36) : four on t h e oven t e r m i n a l board, f o u r on t h e mother board, one on t h e t o p board o f t h e l o g compressor module, and one on t h e bottom board o f t h e l o g compressor module. The one most l i k e l y t o fail f i r s t i s on t h e t o p board of t h e l o g compressor module. Continuity at t h e j o i n t recovers as long as t h e crack c l o s e s during t h e lunar day.

NASA-S-71-1704
Most likely cracked joint
Log compressor top board

-. . .

A

.

.

..

Oven termina I board

Motherboard

- Log compressa
bottom bad

Figure 14-36.-

Suspected cracked s o l d e r j o i n t s i n a m p l i f i e r .

The log compressor modules f o r geophones 1 and 2 a r e of t h e same type construction. Since t h e s e are l o c a t e d s l i g h t l y f u r t h e r from t h e oven t h a n t h e one f o r geophone 3 , t h e maximum temperature may not be q u i t e as high. As a r e s u l t , it may t a k e longer f o r them t o crack, i f at all. Systems t e s t i n g included o p e r a t i o n a l t h e r m a l c y c l i n g t e s t s over t h e temperature range f o r l u n a r day and n i g h t . However, cracked s o l d e r j o i n t s are a f'unction of time as w e l l as temperature, and apparently t h e ground t e s t c y c l e d i d not allow enough t i m e f o r a creep f a i l u r e . This equipment w a s designed and b u i l t p r i o r t o t h e t i m e when i t w a s found t h a t cordwood construction w i t h soldered j o i n t s w a s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .

If li.

? '
L

?
L-

14-57
A breadboard of t h e logarithmic compressor has been c o n s t r u c t e d , and t h e diode feedback loop will be opened t o d u p l i c a t e t h e experiment data. The mechanical design of t h e l o g a r i t h m i c compressor w i l l be reviewed t o determine t h e changes t h a t must be made t o prevent s o l d e r cracks on Apollo 16. The a c t i v e s e i s m i c experiment is not c a r r i e d on Apollo 15. Procedural changes under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n c l u d e o p e r a t i o n of t h e oven t o maintain compressor module temperature because t h e s o l d e r j o i n t which i s most l i k e l y cracked i s i n compression ( s t r o n g e r ) at t h e h i g h e r temperature. This anomaly i s open.

14.4.8

I n t e r m i t t e n t Lnss of V a l i d Data from Suprathermal Ion Detector Experiment P o s i t i v e Analog-to-Digital Converter

The data i n words 2 , 3, 7, and 8 of t h e suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r experiment became e r r a t i c at 19:09 G . m . t . on A p r i l 5 , 1971. This cond i t i o n continued. u n t i l 22:15 G.m.t. on A p r i l 6. The same e r r a t i c cond i t i o n w a s a l s o observed during o p e r a t i o n a l support periods on A p r i l 7 , 9 , and 21. Only t h o s e measurements a s s o c i a t e d with t h e p o s i t i v e s e c t i o n o f t h e l o g analog-to-digital converter w e r e a f f e c t e d . There has been no loss of s c i e n c e d a t a . The affected measurements have a data c h a r a c t e r i s t i c wherein each parameter processed by t h e p o s i t i v e l o g analog-to-digital converter i n i t i a l l y i n d i c a t e s f i l l - s c a l e o u t p u t , followed by an erroneous d a t a v a l u e . The erroneous d a t a value c o r r e l a t e s w i t h t h e value of t h e preceding measurement i n t h e serial d a t a format processed by t h e n e g a t i v e analog-to-digital converter. The erroneous d a t a v a l u e i n some i n s t a n c e s i n d i c a t e s one PCM count less than t h e negative analog-to-digital conv e r t e r parameter.
An i n t e r m i t t e n t failure of t h e s t a r t reset p u l s e f o r t h e p o s i t i v e l o g analog-to-digital converter c o n t r o l l o g i c ( f i g . 14-37) could cause t h e problem. Although t h e failure permits t h e p o s i t i v e c o n v e r t e r i n i t i a l output t o f i l l t h e e i g h t - b i t binary counter and produce a f u l l - s c a l e readi n g ; t h e r e a f t e r , when a s t a r t pulse f o r t h e p o s i t i v e c o n v e r t e r should reset t h e e i g h t - b i t c o u n t e r , it f a i l s t o do s o , and t h e n e g a t i v e word which i s s t i l l i n t h e counter i s read out as a p o s i t i v e word. The cause appears t o be an i n t e r m i t t e n t component o r w i r e connection i n one o f t h e a s s o c i a t e d modules. However, it does not appear t o be a f u n c t i o n o f t h e temperature. The components have been passed by normal high r e l i a b i l i t y s c r e e n i n g , and systems tests have included o p e r a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e , temperature, v i b r a t i o n , humidity, and a c c e l e r a t e d l u n a r environment c y c l e s . N o f a i l u r e of t h i s

14-58

Analog to digital enable Engineering data inputs c Multiplexer

Clock
bit counter

Data to Serial format c central station logic

Figure 14-37.-

Simplified d a t a logic control.

type has been experienced with ground t e s t s . N a d d i t i o n a l t e s t i n g is o considered warranted f o r Apollo 15, which w i l l be t h e l a s t mission f o r t h e experiment. This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.9

Charged P a r t i c l e Lunar Environment Experiment Analyzer B Data Lost

The v o l t a g e measurement reading on t h e analyzer B power supply ( f i g . 14-38) became e r r a t i c on A p r i l 8, 1971, and t h e analyzer B s c i e n c e data w e r e l o s t .

On A p r i l 1 0 and 1 6 , t h e experiment w a s commanded on t o normal (lowv o l t a g e ) mode, and t o i n c r e a s e (high-voltage) mode i n a series of t e s t s . The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p l u s 28-voit i n p u t , t h e r e g u l a t o r , and t h e a n a l y z e r A power supply w e r e functioning p r o p e r l y , and t h a t t h e problem w a s i n t h e analyzer B power supply.
The high-voltage power supply is a t r a n s i s t o r o s c i l l a t o r . The reso-

nant elements are a t r a n s f o r m e r primary winding and a c a p a c i t o r connected i n p a r a l l e l between t h e t r a n s i s t o r emitter and ground. A second transformer winding provides p o s i t i v e feedback t o t h e t r a n s i s t o r base, causing

4
I
Cr)

f

I

rl

r

I

14-60 t h e c i r c u i t t o o s c i l l a t e . A t h i r d transformer winding s u p p i i e s t h e i n p u t t o a diode-capacitor voltage multiplier chain. The output o f t h e v o l t a g e m u l t i p l i e r is t h e n f i l t e r e d and d r i v e s t h e charged p a r t i c l e anal y z e r . The output o f t h e f o u r t h transformer winding i s r e c t i f i e d and f i l t e r e d . The f i l t e r e d voltage i s t h e n monitored by t h e instrumentation system and i s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e high v o l t a g e s u p p l i e d t o t h e analyzer. Data i n d i c a t e d t h a t after t h e f a i l u r e occurred, t h e instrumentation output w a s between 2.00 and 2.25 v o l t s dc. This could not occur i f t h e o s c i l l a t o r were not s t i l l o s c i l l a t i n g . The i n p u t t o t h e v o l t a g e multip l i e r i s also proportional t o t h e instrumentation o u t p u t . Shorts t o ground can be p o s t u l a t e d at various p o i n t s i n and downstream of t h e voltage m u l t i p l i e r , and t h e s h o r t c i r c u i t c u r r e n t can be r e f l e c t e d back i n t o t h e transformer primary winding t o determine how much t h e output v o l t a g e should b e decreased. The decrease occurs because t h e transformer p r i mary winding ( t h e d r i v i n g winding) has r e s i s t a n c e (about 300 ohms), and any v o l t a g e dropped across t h i s r e s i s t a n c e i s not a v a i l a b l e t o d r i v e t h e trans former. These c a l c u l a t i o n s show t h a t t h e s h o r t c i r c u i t must be i n one of t h e output f i l t e r c a p a c i t o r s i n t h e high-voltage f i l t e r , i n t h e i n t e r connecting cable between t h e f i l t e r and a n a l y z e r , o r i n t h e analyzer. Short c i r c u i t s i n any o t h e r l o c a t i o n s would result i n a much lower instrumentation output v o l t a g e . This i s t h e last time t h e charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experiment w i l l be flown. If t h e f a i l u r e propagates t o t h e p o i n t where t h e malfunctioning power supply s t o p s o s c i l l a t i n g , t h e c u r r e n t taken by t h i s supply would i n c r e a s e t o about 0.1 ampere. I f t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o damage t h e series voltage r e g u l a t o r used for low-voltage o p e r a t i o n , t h e o p e r a t i n g procedures w i l l be modified t o u s e low-voltage operation as l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e t o extend t h e v o l t a g e r e g u l a t o r ' s l i f e .

15-1

15 .O

CONCLUSIONS

The Apollo 1 4 mission was t h e t h i r d s u c c e s s f u l l u n a r l a n d i n g and demonstrated e x c e l l e n t performance of all c o n t r i b u t i n g elements, resulti n g i n t h e c o l l e c t i o n of a wealth of s c i e n t i f i c information. The followi n g conclusions are drawn from the information i n t h i s r e p o r t .

1. Cryogenic oxygen system hardware modifications and changes made as a r e s u l t of t h e Apollo 13 failure s a t i s f i e d , w i t h i n safe limits, all
system requirements f o r f u t u r e missions, including e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y .

2. The advantages of manned s p a c e f l i g h t were again c l e a r l y demons t r a t e d on t h i s mission by t h e crew's a b i l i t y t o diagnose and work around hardware problems and malfunctions which otherwise might have r e s u l t e d i n mission terminat ion. ' 3 . Navigation was t h e most d i f f i c u l t l u n a r s u r f a c e t a s k because of problems i n f i n d i n g and recognizing small features, reduced v i s i b i l i t y i n t h e up-sun and down-sun d i r e c t i o n s , and t h e i n a b i l i t y t o judge d i s t ances

.

4. Rendezvous w i t h i n one o r b i t of l u n a r ascent was demonstrated f o r t h e first t i m e i n t h e Apollo program. This t y p e of rendezvous reduces t h e time between lunw l i f t - o f f and docking by approximately 2 hours from that r e q u i r e d on previous missions. The t i m e l i n e a c t i v i t i e s , however, are g r e a t l y compressed.
5. On previous lunar missions, l u n a r s u r f a c e dust adhering t o equipIllent being r e t u r n e d t o e a r t h has c r e a t e d a problem i n both s p a c e c r a f t . The s p e c i a l d u s t c o n t r o l procedures and equipment used on t h i s mission were e f f e c t i v e i n lowering t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of d u s t .

6. Onboard navigation without air-to-ground comnunications was successf'ully demonstrated during t h e t r a n s e a r t h phase of t h e mission t o be s u f f i c i e n t l y accurate f o r u s e as a contingency mode of o p e r a t i o n during f u t u r e missions.
7 . Launching through cumulus clouds w i t h t o p s up t o 1 0 000 feet was demonstrated t o be a s a f e launch r e s t r i c t i o n f o r t h e prevention of t r i g g e r e d l i g h t n i n g . The cloud conditions at l i f t - o f f were at t h e l i m i t of t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n and no t r i g g e r e d l i g h t n i n g was recorded d u r i n g t h e launch phase.

A-1

APPENDIX A

- VEHICLE

DESCRIPTION

The Apollo 14 space vehicle c o n s i s t e d of a block I1 c o n f i g u r a t i o n s p a c e c r a f t and a Saturn V launch v e h i c l e (AS-509). The assemblies comp r i s i n g t h e s p a c e c r a f t consisted o f a launch escape system, command and s e r v i c e modules (CSM-1101, a spacecraft/launch v e h i c l e a d a p t e r , and a l u n a r module (IM-8). The changes made t o t h e command and s e r v i c e modules, t h e l u n a r module, t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobility u n i t , t h e lunar s u r f a c e experiment equipment, and t h e launch v e h i c l e s i n c e t h e Apollo 13 mission are presented. The changes made t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t systems are more numerous t h a n f o r previous l u n a r landing missions p r i m a r i l y because of improvements made as a r e s u l t of t h e Apollo 13 problems and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r more extensive e x t r a v e h i c u l a r operations.

A.l
A.l.l

COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE

S t r u c t u r a l and Mechanical Systems

The m o r s t r u c t u r a l changes were i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n t h e s e r v i c e module t o accommodate an a d d i t i o n a l cryogenic oxygen tank i n s e c t o r 1 and an a u x i l i a r y battery i n s e c t o r 4. These changes are discussed f u r t h e r i n s e c t i o n A.1.3. S t r u c t u r a l changes were made i n t h e spacecraft/launch v e h i c l e a d a p t e r A door w a s i n s t a l l e d at s t a t i o n 547 (305 deg) t o provide acc e s s t o quadrant 2 of t h e l u n a r module descent s t a g e where Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment subpackages 1 and 2 were stowed. Also, doublers were bonded on t h e adapter at s t a t i o n 547 (215 deg) i n case a similar door had been r e q u i r e d f o r contingency access t o t h e l u n a r module cryogenic helium tank during prelaunch operations.

as follows.

The i n t e r i o r of gussets 3 and 4, which contain t h e breech-plenum assemblies of t h e forward heat s h i e l d j e t t i s o n i n g system, were armored w i t h a polyimide-impregnated f i b e r g l a s s t o prevent burn-through of t h e gussets and p o s s i b l e damage t o adjacent equipment i n t h e event of escaping gas from t h e breech assemblies.

A-2 A.1.2 Environmental Control System

The postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n valves were modified t o i n c o r p o r a t e dry (non-lubricated) brake shoes t o prevent p o s s i b l e s t i c k i n g and a second shear p i n w a s added t o i n s u r e p o s i t i v e d r i v e between t h e a c t u a t o r s h a f t and c m . To provide c o n t r o l l e d v e n t i n g f o r an oxygen tank flow t e s t , t h e i n t e r n a l diameter of t h e a u x i l i a r y dump nozzle ( l o c a t e d i n t h e s i d e h a t c h ) w a s enlarged. Sodium n i t r a t e w a s added t o t h e b u f f e r ampules used i n s t e r i l i z i n g t h e p o t a b l e water, Addition of t h e sodium n i t r a t e w a s t o reduce system c o r r o s i o n and enhance t h e s t e r i l i z a t i o n q u a l i t i e s of t h e c h l o r i n e .
A vacuum cleaner w i t h detachable bags w a s added t o assist i n removi n g l u n a r dust from s u i t s and equipment p r i o r t o i n t r a v e h i c u l a r t r a n s f e r from t h e l u n a r module t o t h e command module after l u n a r s u r f a c e operat i o n s , and f o r cleanup i n t h e command module.

A.1.3

E l e c t r i c a l Power System

The e l e c t r i c a l power system w a s changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y after t h e Apollo 1 3 cryogenic oxygen subsystem failure. The maJor changes are as follows

.

a. The i n t e r n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e cryogenic oxygen tanks w a s modi f i e d as described i n t h e following t a b l e .
Previous block I1 v e h i c l e s
Each tank contained two destrati f i c a t i o n fans.

CSM-110 and subsequent v e h i c l e s Fans were deleted. Quantity gaging probe material w a s changed t o s t a i n l e s s steel. Heater w a s changed t o three parallel-connected elements w i t h s e p a r a t e c o n t r o l of one element. F i l t e r w a s relocated t o external line.

Q u a n t i t y gaging probe w a s made of aluminum.

Heater c o n s i s t e d of two parallel-connected elements wound on a s t a i n l e s s s t e e l tube.
F i l t e r w a s located i n tank discharge.
Tank contained h e a t e r thermal switches t o prevent heater element from overheating.

Heater t h e r m a l switches were remove d.

Fan motor wiring w a s Tefloninsulated.

All wiring was magnesium oxidei n s u l a t e d and sheathed w i t h s t a i n l e s s steel.

A-3

b . A t h i r d cryogenic oxygen s t o r a g e t a n k w a s i n s t a l l e d i n s e c t o r 1 o f t h e s e r v i c e module. T h i s tank s u p p l i e d olCygen t o t h e f u e l c e l l s and could b e used simultaneously With t h e two t a n k s i n s e c t o r 4. A new i s o l a t i o n valve w a s i n s t a l l e d between tanks 2 and 3 t o prevent t h e l o s s of oxygen from tank 3 i n t h e event o f damage t o t h e plumbing f o r t a n k s 1 and 2. The closed i s o l a t i o n valve a l s o would have prevented t h e flow o f oxygen from tank 3 t o t h e fuel c e l l s . However, tank 3 could have s u p p l i e d t h e environmental c o n t r o l system with t h e i s o l a t i o n valve closed while t h e a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y , mentioned i n paragraph e, w a s t h e source of e l e c t r i c a l power. c . The tank 1 and 2 pressure switches remained wired i n s e r i e s as i n t h e previous configuration; t h e tank 3 switch w a s wired i n p a r a l l e l and w a s independent of tanks 1 and 2.
d. The f u e l c e l l s h u t o f f valve used previously w a s an i n t e g r a l f o r g i n g containing two check valves and t h r e e r e a c t a n t s h u t o f f v a l v e s . I n t h e valve used f o r CSM-IlO, t h e two check valves remained i n t h e i n t e g r a l forging; however, t h e r e a c t a n t s h u t o f f valves were removed and r e p l a c e d by t h r e e valves r e l o c a t e d i n l i n e w i t h t h e i n t e g r a l forging. These valves were t h e same type as t h o s e used i n t h e s e r v i c e module rea c t i o n c o n t r o l helium system. "he valve seals were changed t o a t y p e t h a t provides a b e t t e r s e a l under extreme cold. Figure A-1 i l l u s t r a t e s t h e major changes t o t h e system except f o r t h e i n t e r n a l tank changes.

e . A n a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y , having a c a p a c i t y of 400-ampere hours, w a s i n s t a l l e d on t h e aft bulkhead i n s e c t o r 4 o f t h e s e r v i c e module t o prov i d e a source of e l e c t r i c a l power i n case of a cryogenic subsystem f a i l ure. Two c o n t r o l boxes, not used on previous f l i g h t s , were added t o accommodate t h e a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y . One box contained two motor switches which could disconnect fuel c e l l 2 from t h e s e r v i c e module and connect t h e a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y i n i t s place. The second box contained an overl o a d sensor f o r wire p r o t e c t i o n .
A.1.4

Instrumentation

S i x new telemetry measurements a s s o c i a t e d with t h e high-gain antenna were added t o i n d i c a t e p i t c h , yaw, and beam-width, and whether t h e antenna w a s o p e r a t i n g i n t h e manual, automatic t r a c k i n g , o r r e a c q u i s i t i o n m d e . This a d d i t i o n a l instrumentation provided d a t a t o support F l i g h t Control management of t h e high-gain antenna. Other instrumentation changes were as follows. The cabin p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r w a s replaced with one which had been reworked, cleaned, and inspected f o r contaminants. I n t h e p a s t , l o o s e n i c k e l - p l a t i n g p a r t i c l e s had i n t e r f e r e d with i n f l i g h t measurements. Additional instrumentation w a s incorporated t o monitor t h e a u x i l i a r y battery, t h e oxygen tank h e a t e r element temperatures, t h e oxygen tank 2 and 3 manifold p r e s s u r e , and t h e t m k 3 pressure.

A-

4
NASA-S-7 1-1707

c;1Oxygen relief
Pressure transducer Pressure switch

(Third oxygen tank and half-system valve module added)

Figure A-1.-

Cryogenic oxygen s t o r a g e system.

A-5
A.1.5 Pyrotechnics

F a b r i c a t i o n and q u a l i t y c o n t r o l procedures o f two pyrotechnic devices used i n t h e command and s e r v i c e module t e n s i o n t i e c u t t e r and t h e command module forward h e a t s h i e l d j e t t i s o n i n g system were improved. Although no known i n f l i g h t problem with t h e t e n s i o n t i e c u t t e r has e x i s t e d , a Skylab q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t (performed under more severe vacuum and thermal condit i o n s than f o r Apollo) revealed t h a t it v a r i e d i n performance. I n t h e forward h e a t s h i e l d j e t t i s o n i n g system, t h e technique of assembling t h e breech t o t h e plenum w a s improved t o e l i m i n a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of damage t o t h e O-ring during assembly. O Apollo 13, t h e p r o p e l l a n t gas had l e a k n ed from t h e gusset 4 breech assembly, a hole w a s burned through t h e aluminum gusset cover p l a t e , and t h e p i l o t parachute mortar cover w a s damaged. S t r u c t u r a l modifications t o gussets 3 and 4 are described i n s e c t i o n A . l . l . The docking r i n g s e p a r a t i o n system w a s modified by a t t a c h i n g t h e sepa r a t i o n charge holder t o t h e backup bars with b o l t s as w e l l as t h e s p r i n g system used previously. This change w a s made t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e charge h o l d e r remained secure upon a c t u a t i o n of t h e pyrotechnic charge at command m d u l e / l u n a r mdule s e p a r a t i o n .

~ . 1 . 6 C r e w Provisions
A contingency water storage system w a s added t o provide drinking w a t e r i n t h e event t h a t water could not be obtained from t h e r e g u l a r potab l e w a t e r t a n k . The system included f i v e c o l l a p s i b l e 1-gallon c o n t a i n e r s , f i l l hose, and dispenser valve. The c o n t a i n e r s were 6-inch p l a s t i c cubes covered with Beta c l o t h . The bags could also be used t o s t o r e u r i n e as a backup t o t h e waste management system overboard dump nozzles. (The auxi l i a r y dump nozzle i n t h e side hatch w a s modified f o r an oxygen tank flow t e s t and could n o t be used.) A side hatch window camera bracket was added t o provide t h e capab i l i t y t o photograph through t h e hatch window with t h e 7Omm Hasselblad camera.

The i n t r a v e h i c u l a r boot bladder was r e p l a c e d with t h e type of bladder used i n t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r boot because it has s u p e r i o r wear qualities.

A.l.7

Displays and Controls

The following changes were made which a f f e c t e d crew s t a t i o n d i s p l a y s and c o n t r o l s . The a l a r m l i m i t f o r cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen p r e s s u r e w a s lowered from 220 p s i a t o approximately 200 p s i a t o e l i m i n a t e nuisance alarms. The f l a g i n d i c a t o r s on panel 3 f o r t h e hydrogen and oxygen reactant v a l v e s were changed t o i n d i c a t e c l o s i n g of e i t h e r s h u t o f f valve

A-6
i n s t e a d of closure o f both v a l v e s , and valve c l o s u r e w a s added t o t h e c a u t i o n and warning matrix. Oxygen tank 2 and 3 manifold p r e s s u r e was added t o t h e caution and warning system. C i r c u i t r y and c o n t r o l s necessary t o c o n t r o l and monitor oxygen t a n k 3 were added ( h e a t e r s , pressure, and q u a n t i t y ) . Switches were added t o panel 278 t o connect t h e a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y end a c t i v a t e t h e new i s o l a t i o n valve between oxygen t a n k s 2 and 3. C i r c u i t r y and-controls (Slg, S20 on panel 2; C/B on p a n e l 226) f o r t h e cryogenic fan motors were d e l e t e d . The c o n t r o l s f o r t h e oxygen t a n k h e a t e r s were changed t o permit t h e use o f one, two, o r t h r e e h e a t e r elements at a t i m e depending upon t h e need f o r oxygen flow.
A.2

LUNAR MODULF:

A.2.1

S t r u c t u r e s and Mechanical Systems

Support s t r u c t u r e w a s added t o t h e descent s t a g e f o r attachment of t h e laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r t o t h e e x t e r i o r of quadrant 1 and attachment of t h e l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer t o t h e e x t e r i o r of quadrant 2 ( s e e s e c t i o n A.4 f o r d e s c r i p t i o n of experiment equipment). A modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r w a s a t t a c h e d t o t h e modular equipment stowage assembly i n quadrant 4. T h i s system ( f i g . A-2) w a s provided t o t r a n s p o r t equipment and lunar samples, and t o serve as a mobile workbench during e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s . The t r a n s p o r t e r w a s c o n s t r u c t e d of t u b u l a r aluminum, weighed 25 pounds, and w a s designed t o c a r r y a l o a d of about 140 pounds, including about 30 pounds of lunar samples.
A.2.2

E l e c t r i c a l Power

Because of an anomaly which occurred on Apollo 1 3 i n which t h e descent b a t t e r i e s experienced c u r r e n t t r a n s i e n t s and t h e crew noted a thumping n o i s e and snowflakes v e n t i n g from quadrant 4 of t h e l u n a r modu l e , both t h e ascent and descent b a t t e r i e s were modified as follows:

a. The t o t a l b a t t e r y c o n t a i n e r w a s p o t t e d and t h e p o t t i n g on t o p of t h e b a t t e r y c e l l s w a s improved.
b. Manifolding from c e l l t o c e l l and t o t h e b a t t e r y case vent w a s incorporated.

c. The outside and i n s i d e s u r f a c e s o f t h e b a t t e r y cover were rev e r s e d s o t h a t t h e r i b s were on t h e e x t e r i o r of t h e b a t t e r y . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e ascent b a t t e r i e s were m d i f i e d i n t h e following manner :

F i w r e A-2.

- Modular equipment
and equipment.

transporter

a. battery

.

The negative t e r m i n a l w s r e l o c a t e d t o t h e opposite end of t h e a

b. The case vent valve w a s r e l o c a t e d t o t h e same f a c e as t h e posit i v e t e r m i n a l t o allow purging t h e f u l l l e n g t h of t h e b a t t e r y case.

c. The p i g t a i l , .purge p o r t , and t h e manifold vent valve were rel o c a t e d t o t h e same f a c e a s the negative t e r m i n a l .
A c i r c u i t b r e a k e r w a s added t o t h e l u n a r module t o bypass t h e command module/lunar module bus connect r e l a y c o n t a c t s f o r t r a n s f e r r i n g power between v e h i c l e s after lunw ascent and docking. The command modu l e / l u n a r module bus connect r e l a y c o n t r o l c i r c u i t i s i n t e r r u p t e d a t lunar module s t a g i n g .

A-0
A.2.3

Instrumentation

Instrumentation changes i n t h e ascent propulsion system included t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of a p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r i n each o f t h e two helium tanks i n p l a c e of two t a n k temperkture E m i t s e n s o r s which had been used f o r measu r i n g s t r u c t u r a l temperature. The added p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r s , i n conj u n c t i o n with t h e primary p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r s already p r e s e n t , provided redundancy i n monitoring f o r l e a k s . Two temperature lneasurements were added t o t h e ascent water tank l i n e s t o monitor s t r u c t u r a l temperatures i n place of the measurements d e l e t e d from t h e ascent propulsion system helium t a n k s .
A descent propulsion system f u e l b a l l valve temperature measurement was added f o r p o s t f l i g h t a n a l y s i s purposes because of concern t h a t damage could result from heat soak-back i n t o p r o p e l l a n t l i n e s after powered descent.

A.2.4

Displeys and Controls

I n t h e ascent propulsion system, t h e i n p u t s from t h e f e e d l i n e i n t e r f a c e p r e s s u r e sensors t o t h e caution and warning system w e r e d i s a b l e d . Because o f t h e low p r e s s u r e at t h e s e sensors p r i o r t o system p r e s s u r i z a t i o n , t h e i r i n p u t s t o t h e c a u t i o n and warning system would have masked t h e low-pressure warning s i g n a l from t h e helium t a n k s at c r i t i c a l p o i n t s i n t h e mission. Because of e r r a t i c i n d i c a t i o n s given by t h e ascent propulsion system f u e l low-level i n d i c a t o r during p r e f l i g h t checkout, t h e i n d i c a t o r w a s d i s abled t o prevent master alarms.
The f o u r r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l syst e m c l u s t e r temperature measurement i n p u t s t o t h e caution and warning system were i n h i b i t e d t o prevent nuisance alarms s i n c e it w a s determined t h a t t h e s e measurements w e r e no l o n g e r needed.
A i n c o r r e c t i n d i c a t i o n of t h e ascent s t a g e gaseous oxygen tank 1 n pressure input t o t h e caution and warning system w a s experienced during p r e f l i g h t checkout. Therefore, t h e i n p u t t o t h e caution and warning system w a s d i s a b l e d t o prevent meaningless alarms.

A.2.5

Descent Propulsion

Anti-slosh b a f f l e s w e r e i n s t a l l e d i n s i d e t h e descent s t a g e p r o p e l l a n t t a n k s and t h e diameter of t h e o u t l e t h o l e s f o r t h e p r o p e l l a n t q u a n t i t y gagi n g system sensors w a s reduced from 5/8 inch t o 0.2 inch t o minimize premature low propellant l e v e l i n d i c a t i o n s due t o s l o s h i n g such as had been experienced on Apollo 1 and 12. 1

L

i

A-9

It w a s determined by test t h a t t h e descent propulsion system f u e l l u n a r dump valve would c l o s e under l i q u i d flow conditions when i n s t a l l e d i n t h e normal flow d i r e c t i o n and could not be reopened. It w a s f u r t h e r determined t h a t , by r e v e r s i n g t h e valve and i n s t a l l i n g an o r i f i c e upstream of t h e valve, it would remain open under all expected l i q u i d flow condit i o n s . Because of a p o s s i b l e requirement t o vent t h e p r o p e l l a n t tanks and t h e cryogenic helium tank under zero-g conditions, t h e v a l v e w a s r e i n s t a l l e d i n t h e r e v e r s e flow d i r e c t i o n .
The p r o p e l l a n t q u a n t i t y gaging system sensors w e r e modified t o include a =tal s p l i t r i n g between t h e e l e c t r o n i c s package cover and t h e sensor f l a n g e s . This increased t h e clearance between t h e e l e c t r o n i c s package and cover t o preclude t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of crushed wires due t o improper clearance.
A.2.6

Ascent Propulsion the f i l l system, were used fuel lines.

To improve t h e seal f o r t h e four-bolt flanged j o i n t between and-drain l i n e s and t h e main feed l i n e s i n t h e ascent propulsion O-rings were used i n place of i n j e c t e d s e a l a n t s . Teflon O-rings i n t h e o x i d i z e r l i n e s , and b u t y l rubber O-rings were used i n t h e
A.2.7

Environmental Control

A muffler w a s added i n t h e l i n e a t t h e o u t l e t of t h e water-glycol pump assembly t o reduce t h e pump noise t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e cabin through t h e water-glycol l i n e s . The r e g u l a t o r band of t h e high-pressure oxygen assembly w a s s h i f t e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e r e g u l a t e d pressure from approximately 950 p s i g t o 990 p s i g , providing a higher recharge pressure f o r t h e p o r t able l i f e support system and, t h u s , i n c r e a s i n g i t s o p e r a t i n g time f o r extravehicular a c t i v i t i e s .

~ . 2 . 8 Crew Provisions

The f l e x i b l e - t y p e container assembly previously used f o r stowage i n t h e l e f t hand s i d e of t h e lunar module cabin w a s replaced w i t h a metal modularized container which w a s packed before being placed i n t o t h e l u n a r module. Return stowage c a p a b i l i t y was provided f o r two a d d i t i o n a l l u n a r rock sample bags.

A-10

A.3

EmVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

The t h i g h convolute of t h e p r e s s u r e garment assembly w a s r e i n f o r c e d t o decrease bladder abrasion which had been noted on t r a i n i n g s u i t s . Also, t h e crotch p u l l e y and cable r e s t r a i n t system w a s reconfigured t o provide f o r heavier l o a d s . The p o r t a b l e l i f e support system w a s modified as follows. A carbon dioxide sensor w a s added and a s s o c i a t e d changes were made t o provide t e l e m e t r y of carbon dioxide p a r t i a l pressure i n t h e p r e s s u r e garment assembly. I n a d d i t i o n , an o r i f i c e was added t o t h e feedwater t r a n s d u c e r t o prevent f r e e z i n g of water trapped w i t h i n t h e t r a n s d u c e r housing, which would otherwise result i n i n c o r r e c t readings. The oxygen purge system w a s modified by t h e d e l e t i o n of t h e oxygen h e a t e r system because t h e oxygen does n o t r e q u i r e p r e h e a t i n g t o be compatible w i t h crew requirements.
A new piece of equipment, t h e buddy secondary l i f e support system, was provided as a means of s h a r i n g cooling water from one p o r t a b l e l i f e support system by both crewmen i n t h e event t h a t one cooling system became i n o p e r a t i v e . The u n i t c o n s i s t s of a water u m b i l i c a l , r e s t r a i n t hooks and t e t h e r l i n e , and a water-flow d i v i d e r assembly.

A.4

EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT

Table A-I l i s t s t h e experiment equipment c a r r i e d on Apollo 14, i d e n t i f i e s t h e stowage l o c a t i o n s of t h e equipment i n t h e l u n a r module, and r e f e r e n c e s a p p l i c a b l e Apollo mission r e p o r t s i f equipment has been described previously. Equipment not c a r r i e d on previous missions i s des c r i b e d i n t h e following paragraphs. The two subpackages of t h e Apollo lunar s u r f a c e experiments package are shown i n f i g u r e s A-3 and A-4.
A.

4.1

Active Seismic Experiment

The a c t i v e seismic experiment acquires information t o help determine t h e p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of l u n a r s u r f a c e and subsurface materials u s i n g a r t i f i c i a l l y produced seismic waves. The experiment equipment c o n s i s t s of t h r e e i d e n t i c a l geophones, a thumper, a mortar package, a c e n t r a l e l e c t r o n i c s assembly, and i n t e r connecting cabling. The geophones a r e electromagnetic devices which were deployed on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e t o t r a n s l a t e surface move-nt into e l e c t r i c a l s i g n a l s . The thumper i s a device t h a t was operated by one of

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NASA-S-71-1709

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Figure A-3.NASA-S-71-1110

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Figure A-4.-

Experiment subpackage no. 2 .

A-13
t h e crewmen t provide seismi i g n a l s were generated by , T h holding t h e thumper a g a i n s t the l u n a r surface at v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s along t h e l i n e of t h e geophones and f i r i n g explosive i n i t i a t o r s l o c a t e d i n t h e base of t h e thumper. The mortar package c o n s i s t s of a mortar box assemb l y and a grenade launch t u b e assembly. The mortar box e l e c t r o n i c s prov i d e f o r t h e arming and f i r i n g of rocket motors which w i l l launch f o u r high-explosive grenades from t h e launch t u b e assembly upon remote command. The monitor package i s designed t o launch t h e grenades t o d i s t a n c e s of 5000, 3000, 1000, and 500 f e e t . S i g n a l s sensed by t h e geophones are t r a n s m i t t e d t o earth-based recorders.

A. 4.2

Lunar Portable Magnetometer Experiment

The l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer w a s used t o measure t h e magnetic f i e l d at two l o c a t i o n s along a traverse on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e . The measurements w i l l be used t o determine t h e l o c a t i o n , s t r e n g t h and dimensions o f . t h e source, and, i n t u r n , t o study both l o c a l and whole-moon geologi c a l structure.
The experiment equipment c o n s i s t s o f a sensor head containing three orthogonal single-axis fluxgate sensor assemblies, an e l e c t r o n i c s and data d i s p l a y package, and a t r i p o d . The e l e c t r o n i c s package i s powered by E r c u r y c e l l s . The package has an on-off switch and a switch t o s e l e c t high and low wter ranges (?lo0 gammas and +50 gammas). The data d i s p l a y c o n s i s t s of t h r e e meters, one f o r each axis.

A.5

M S PROPERTIES AS

Spacecraft mass p r o p e r t i e s f o r t h e Apollo 1 4 mission are summarized i n table A-11. These data represent t h e conditions as determined from p o s t f l i g h t analyses of expendable loadings and usage during t h e f l i g h t . V a r i a t i o n s i n command and s e r v i c e module and l u n a r module mass p r o p e r t i e s a r e determined f o r each s i g n i f i c a n t mission phase from l i f t - o f f through landing. Expendables usage are based on r e p o r t e d real-time and postf l i g h t data as presented i n o t h e r s e c t i o n s of t h i s r e p o r t . The weights and center-of-gravity o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l modules (command, s e r v i c e , ascent s t a g e , and descent s t a g e ) were measured p r i o r t o f l i g h t and i n e r t i a values calculated.' A l l changes incorporated a f t e r t h e a c t u a l weighing were moni t o r e d , and t h e mass p r o p e r t i e s were updated.

.

A-14

TABLE A-11.-

M S PROPERTIES AS

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5.8

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19 b94

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22 090 21 910 18 74L

56 59h 2 291 913 lo5751
5103l

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b.8 4.9 5.7

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61660
6 1 lb
l 1382 1

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5.7
1.4 1.5

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13 592
13 386

56 553
b1 585
41 34b

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11

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-.2

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-.3

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6

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2899 2
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ma
m

8

5 301.6

2 0%

3

B-1

APPENDIX B

- SPACECRAFT HISTORIES

The h i s t o r y of command and s e r v i c e module, (CSM 110) operations at t h e manufacturer's f a c i l i t y , Downey, C a l i f o r n i a , is s h a m i n figure B-1, and t h e o p e r a t i o n s at Kennedy Space Center, F l o r i d a , i n figure B-2. The h i s t o r y of t h e lunar module (LM-8) at t h e manufacturer's f a c i l i t y , Bethpage, New York, i s shown i n figure B-3, and t h e operations at Kennedy Space Center, F l o r i d a , i n f i g u r e B-4.

NASA-S-71-1711
1969 Febury

I

Yrch

I

April

I

May

I

June

I

July

-Individual

systems checkout

lntepratcd systems test

=Data

review

m m rn

I
m ~ p

1
August
o 1

ISeptember I October

November

Modifications and retest
11 mission support

110 and 0

1Demate II I Weight and balance I Preshipnent inspection I

installations and checkout Command module

=

Preparation f shipment and ship a

Service module

[

Final installations and checkout

Preshipnent inspection Preparation for shipment and ship-

1

Figure B-1.-

Checkout flow f o r Command and s e r v i c e modules a t c o n t r a c t o r 's f a c i l i t y .

B-2
NASA -S -71 -1712

April

I

May

1

June

I

July

I August

1970

I S S e m b e r l October

1 - '

Waterlglycol spill cleanup and equipment replacement (see note 2) -Equipment installation and retest

8 Altitude chamber tests
Cryogenic and return enhancement modifications and retest

Spacecraflllaunch vehicle a s s e m b l y l Move space vehicle to launch complex

July

I November1 DecemberJanuary

1

1971

Sector 4 cryogenic shelf installation1 Jotes:
1-

Space vehicle systems and flight readiness tests-

2.

Command and service modules Spacecraft propulsion leak checks and propellant loading1 delivered t o Kennedy Space Center on November 19, 1969 Countdown demonstration ts. et Spill resulted from hole accidentally Countdown( punched in cold plate during installation of new inertial measurement Launch '1 r unit on April 14, 1970

-

Figure 3-2.NASA-S-?I -1113

Command and service module checkout h i s t o r y at Kennedy Space Center.
1969

I

January February1 March 1I a ua t r g - n f cui . M n

I

I

April

I

May

1

June

1

I

August ISeptemberl October

I November

I

cold flow I. and preparations lor subsystems testing

-Mated

subsystems testing -Manufacturing, cold (low n, and electrical preparations for final engineering and evaluation acceptance test
mt h e crew compartment 111 and function checks d

I

Final engineering and evaluation acceptance test 1 1 Cold Iav and modifications= l rm
Mated retest

Preparationlor shipment and ship=

-

I
I

Figure B - 3 . - Checkout f l o w f o r lunar module at c o n t r a c t o r ' s f a c i l i t y

.

L

B- 3

NASA-S-7 1-1 14 7
1970 June

1971
December January

I

July

Ascent stage delivered to Kennedy Space Center on November 21, 1969; descent stage delivered on November

Countdown

1

Launch 7

24, 1969

Figure

B-4.- Lunar module checkout h i s t o r y a t
Kennedy Space Center.

c-1
APPENDIX C

- POSTF'LIGHT TESTING

The command module a r r i v e d at t h e Lunar Receiving Laboratory, Houston, Texas, on February 22, 1971, a f i e r r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system d e a c t i v a t i o n and pyrotechnic s a f i n g i n H a w a i i . A t t h e end of t h e quarantine p e r i o d , t h e crew equipment w a s removed and t h e command module w a s s h i p p e d t o t h e c o n t r a c t o r ' s f a c i l i t y i n D m e y , C a l i f o r n i a , on A p r i l 8. P o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g and i n s p e c t i o n of t h e command module f o r e v a l u a t i o n of t h e i n f l i g h t performance and i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e f l i g h t i r r e g u l a r i t i e s were conducted at t h e c o n t r a c t o r ' s and vendor's f a c i l i t i e s and at t h e Manned Spacecraft Center i n accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware U t i l i z a t i o n Requests ( A S H U R ' s ) . The t e s t s performed as a r e s u l t of i n f l i g h t problems are described i n t a b l e C-I and discussed i n t h e appropriate systems performance s e c t i o n s of t h i s r e p o r t . Tests being conducted f o r o t h e r purposes i n accordance w i t h o t h e r ASHUR's and t h e b a s i c c o n t r a c t are not included.

c-2

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8

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D-1

APPENDIX D

- DATA AVAILABILITY

Tables D-I and D-I1 are summasies of t h e .data made a v a i l a b l e f o r systems performance analyses and anomaly i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . Table D-I l i s t s t h e d a t a from t h e command and s e r v i c e modules, and t a b l e D-11, t h e l u n a r For a d d i t i o n a l information regarding d a t a a v a i l a b i l i t y , t h e mdule status l i s t i n g of a l l mission data i n t h e C e n t r a l Metric Data F i l e , b u i l d i n g 1 2 , MSC, should be consulted.

.

D -2
TABLE D-I.Tim. h : d n -rm a -w3 :0
lb

COMMAND AND SERVICE M W E DATA AVAILABILITY O L
Bandpa88 plota

Bilevela

or tam
X X .X x X X

Caputrr vordn
.X
X

-04:OO 00 :oo

00 :10

00:02

w4 :0
01:28 02:25 02 :49 03:05 03:lb 03:k7 04:45 05:43 c6:b 07:18
07:b

00:14 03:15 01:4L 02 :34 03:b9 12:oo 06:21 Ob.:h7
05 :45

x
X

X
X X

X

X
X

X X
X X X

X
X X

X
X X X X X X X X X X X X
X

X
X X X X X X X

X X X X
X X X

X
X
X

X

06:45 07:ll
lo:% 08 :39

X X
X X

08:37 10 : 36

lo:%

14:51
15:10

16:07 17:07 18:07 19:08 20:07 22:49 23:08 23:% 27.:04 29 :37 30:W
30:W

30 :30 31:Ol

10:35 14 :35 13:b6 17:53 15:lh 16:20 19:W 22:b9 23:09 21:09 26 :56 24:09 24 :50 30:59 30:37 31:w 30:37
31:W 31 31

X
X X X ' X X
X

X X X X
X X

X

X
X X

X X

X
X X X X X

X X
X X X

X X
X X X

X X X X X

X
X

3: 4w
34:54

3: 9w
b2:53 U:b8 19:a 5O:IO 55:Ol 58 :b8 59:W
6Q:57

35:28 3057 b2:53 17:W 48:26 51 :19 5b:W 58:U

X X X X X
X X X X X

X

X
X X X X

6251
61:oo 61:W 61:19 67:m

5: 9w

63:W 64:w 65:49 67:28 67:19 69:45 69:49 70 :55 71:49 7S:lO 76:25 IO 76 : 76:57
78:20

X

X X

X

X X
X

66:W
66:49 69:1@
X

X X X
X X X X X X X X X

X X X
X

69:M
70:51
X
X X X

71: 09 75:& 78:b2 77:25 77:oC 77 :o; 78:bi &:SI &:04 &:Oh

X
X X
X

M:M

X
X X X X

X X

X

X X

&:02

79:u Q:15 Q:bb

8Q:X

X X X X

X

X

X

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-

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L

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D-3

TABLE D-I.Tim. b r : d n

COMMAND AND SEXVICE MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY
BM&puO

- Continued
Special Plot. or t a r
Special

-I
~~

'b I
~

plot. or t a r

Bilerals
X X X X X X X X X

&:14 8 : 2s 83:02 &:a3 85:lO %:lo 86:lO 88:25

8:l 2br

83:43
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86:09

90:50

8653
&:35 &:3b 90:23 101:oo 91:28

88:s
&:b2 9o:OO
W:M 91:OO 9b:lO 9b;59 %:01 97:55' 98:Ob .98:19

X X

'

x

X

X
X X

9b:59
95:18

98:bo
97:u 98:20

X X X X X X X

98:U
99:05 102:b2 98:55 100:59 1OO:Ob 102:5b 108:36 10b:25 lO4:47 105:30 106:&7 lD8:42 108:43 ll0:42 .lO9:30 ll1:36 112:08 118:37

X X
X

98:b
98:52

x

Wb :9
99:52 102:OO 102:b2 103:38 10b:23 .104:47 105:Y 106:kh 107:25 108:42 108:42 110:Ll 111:20 111 :54 116:%? 118:31 U9:02 120:02 l20:55 l22:31 l23:15 l25:15 126:28 121:15 129:lO

X X X
X

X
X

X
X

X X X X X X X X
X

X

X

X
X

X X X X X X

U8:%?

122 :31 l20:32 120:32 12253 l26:26 121:&9 126:30 l29:38 128:25 129:bO 1 9 s 13o:bo 2: 130:lO 129:b2 1P:oo 1Y:oo 131:OO 131:35 1Y:12 135:58 131:33 132:3b 13b:24 133:29 13&:22 135:lO 135:08 135:12 136:20 135:09 136:19 138:u 136:20 138:lL 139:05 1k3:49 139:05 139:b5 i41:ko 142:18 lb2:lO lh3:OO 112:lb 146:05

X X
X X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X X

X

X X X

X

X X X X
X

x
X I

X X

X

D-4
TABU D-I.COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE DATA A V A I L A B I L I T i

-

Concluded

Time. hr:min
From

Rurge

To
14h:lO

B.ndpass plots or tabs
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Oscillo-

Special

Bilevelr
X X X X

graph records
X X X X X X X X X X
X

Special proer-

143:31
lb4:12

145:08 145:13 146:14 146:05 150:54 146:56 147:55 148:lO 1&8:50 151:lk 151:52 154:56 158:57 159 :08 162:56 162:CO 1 6 4 : ~ 162:58 166:07 165:17 166:18 166:OO 176:OO 166:18 167:18 166:47 . 170:53 167:OO 168:18 161:23 168:03 168:18 1 6 9 : u 169:OO 169:20 169:1 1 170 :08 170:57 174:40 171:05 17b:Ob 174:Ol 175:59 175:09 . 178:56 175:58 178:52 179:05 182:52 184:OO 119:50 183:05 186:52 187:02 188:62 187:25 190:54 190:54 194 :49 19&:49 198:46 199:06 203:02 203:U 206:50 207:06 210:52 210:b8 2 U : U 211:ll 2l4:L9 21b:17 2l5:06 215:Ob 215:b6 21S:b3 2l5:08 215:08 215:bb 215:31 21S:51 215:31 216:oi

I

X X X X
X X X X X X X X

X

X X
X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X
X

X X X
X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X
X

X

X

D-5 T A B U D-11.LUNAR MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY

-Time. hr:aia
From

R.n(F

To

8t.tion
ALDG X X

Bnuh

recorda

8.il pc. plot8 or t a r

-01:OO 61 :50 61 :52 77:31 101 A 5 101:16 102 :12 103:38 10L:lL 101:23 105:31 106:05 106:bb
107:25

107:b2 loa& 108:b3 109:bO 110 :31 112:20 112:25 113:02 114:s ll5:02 119 :21 =:15 122: 3l l22:51 126:28 126:b3

-02:oo 62:15 62:15 T8:lO 102:50 102:b2 106:kb lOb:25 108:51 101 :1 1 ' 106 :01 M:1T lo8:12 107:15 108:b3 U0:15

mn om ODB mn mn .om mn
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X X
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ls rn

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X X X
X

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X X

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ll0:36 b ll1 :3 111:s 113:lO U5:03 U9:03 u9:m =:15 12253

mn
1p)K

ISK IBK

X

MAD

In 6
WID

X
X

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126:28 M:15
m:38 l29:bO

l28:39
129:2b 129:3T 130:35 13l:12 1P:Y 133:b 135:U 136:19 137:08 137:19 138:M 139:05 139:39 110:s 9 1bO :b 111 :lo 111: 15 111:C9 112:11 112:59 lb3:2l 113:& 111:58 115 :05 lb5:l2 lh6:ob

mL : o w3 : 6
103 3:8 131:s 135:58 U3:S 135:lT 137:lo 136:b6 138:OT 138:M 139:W lb3:19 1bl:W l&:W 1h:W 111:b8 111:s lb2:18 lb6:05 113:s l lbb : 6 lbb :Ol lb5:15 lb5:15 lb6:lk 117:W 1b7: 30 lbT:b2

mn am mn om mn am aD8 om a n
PDB lrscan

X

X
X X X X X X

X X X
X X

X
X

X
X
X X X

X

am am

X X X
X

X X X X
X

X
X X X

lplK

m K

ls rn

X
X X X X X
X

WID IUD

mn
IUD WID WID IYD
IUD IUD

X X X X X X
X

X
X X X

X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X

X X X
X X X X X X X X

lbT:l2

lb6 : 55

IUD

ls rn IUD IUD
IUD
IUD

X X X

X

X X

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X X X X

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X

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X X X

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X

APPENDIX E

- MISSION REPOKT SUPPLEMENTS

Table E-I contains a l i s t i n g of a l l reports t h a t supplement t h e Apollo 7 through Apollo 14 mission r e p o r t s . The table i n d i c a t e s t h e p r e s e n t status of each r e p o r t not y e t completed and t h e p u b l i c a t i o n date of t h o s e which have been published.

.

E-2
TABU E-I

.- MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS
Title

jupplement number

Publication d a t e / s t a t us

Apollo 7
1 2

3

4 5 6
1 . 2

Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Communication System Performance Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance A a l y s i s n Reaction Control System Performance Cancelled Entry P o s t f l i g h t Analysis Apollo 8 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance Navigation and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and S e r v i c e Module Reaction Control System Service Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Cancelled Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and Visual Observations Entry P o s t f l i g h t Analys i s Apollo 9

May 1969 June 1969 November 1969 August 1969 December 1969 December 1969 November 1969 March 1970 September 1970 December 1969 December 1969
~~ ~

3

4
5 6 7

5

6

7
8

9
10 1 1 12

November 1969 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969 Command and S e r v i c e Module Guidance, Navigation s and Control System Performance November 1969 Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Performance Analysis A p r i l 1970 Performance o f Command and Service Module Reaction Control System December 1969 Service Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control August 1970 System December 1969 Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Eval uat i on September 197( Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Cancelled December 1969 Stroking T e s t Analysis December 1969 Cammunications System Performance December 1969 E n t r y P o s t f l i g h t Analysis

L

E-3
TABLE E-1.MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS

-

Continued

upplement number

Title

Pub li c a t i o n date / s t a t us

1 2

3

4
5 6 7
0 9
10

ll

T r a j e c t o r y Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and S e r v i c e Module Reaction Control System S e r v i c e Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control System Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluat i on Cancelled Analysis of Apollo 10 Photography and Visual O se rvat i ons b Entry P o s t f l i g h t Analysis Comunications System Performance Apollo 1 1

March 1970 December 1969 Augus t 1970 September 1970 Augus t 1970 January 1970 January 1970 I n publication as SP-232 December 1969 December 1969

1 2

3

4 5

6 7
0 9
10 11

T r a j e c t o r y Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Performance of Command and Service Module Reaction Control System S e r v i c e Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Performance o f Lunar Module Reaction Control Sys t e m Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t . Evaluation Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Cancelled 1 Apollo 1 Preliminary Science Report Communications System Performance Ent 4 Pos t f U g h t Analy s i s

May 1970 September 1970 Review October 1970 Revi ew September 197C September 197C December 1969 January 1970 A p r i l 1970

E- 4
TABLE E-1.-

MISSION REPOR" SUPPLEMENTS

-

Concluded

iupplement number

Title Apollo 1 2 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluat i on Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Apollo 1 2 Preliminary Science Report Landing S i t e S e l e c t i o n Processes Apollo 1 3
I

Publication d a t e / s t a t us

September 1970 September 1970 Preparation Preparation Preparation J u l y 1970 F i n a l review

Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Performance Analysis Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluat i on Entry Pos t f li gh t Analy s i s Apollo 14 Guidance, Navigation , and Control System Performance Analysis Cryogenic Storage Sys tem Performance Analysis Service Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Evaluation Des cent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Ev a l u a t i on Apollo 14 Preliminary Science Report A n a l y s i s of I n f l i g h t Demonstrations Atmospheric E l e c t r i c i t y Experiments on Apollo 13 and 1 4 Launches

September 1970 October 1970 Cancelled

Preparation Preparation Preparation Preparation Preparation Preparation Preparation Pr e p a r a t i on

L

-

~

F- 1
APPENDIX F albedo Brewster angle

- GLOSSARY

percentage of l i g h t r e f l e c t e d from a s u r f a c e based upon t h e amount incident upon it t h e angle at which electromagnetic r a d i a t i o n i s i n c i dent upon a nonmetallic s u r f a c e f o r t h e r e f l e c t e d r a d i a t i o n t o acquire m a x i m u m plane p o l a r i z a t i o n

eJecta electrophoresis
f o l i at i on

.

m a t e r i a l thrown out o f a c r a t e r formed by impact o r volcanic action movement of suspended p a r t i c l e s i n a f l u i d by e l e c t r o motive f o r c e P l a t y o r l e a f - l i k e laminae of a rock t o t a l l i g h t emitted by stars i n a given area of t h e
SkY

galactic light ge gens ch e i n lunar libration region ( ~ b ) Moulton p o i n t nadir regolith z e r o phase zodiacal l i g h t

a f a i n t glow seen from t h e earth along t h e sun-earth axis i n t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n
an a r e a 60 degrees from t h e earth-moon a x i s i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e moon's t r a v e l and on i t s o r b i t a l path t h e e a r t h ' s l i b r a t i o n p o i n t ( L 1 ) l o c a t e d on t h e sunearth axis i n the anti-solar direction t h e p o i n t on t h e c e l e s t i a l sphere t h a t i s v e r t i c a l l y downward from t h e observer t h e s u r f a c e l a y e r of unsorted fragmented m a t e r i a l t h a t o v e r l i e s consolidated bedrock t h e condition whereby t h e vector from a r a d i a t i o n source ( s u n ) and t h e observer a r e c o l i n e a r

a f a i n t wedge of l i g h t seen from t h e earth i n t h e a n t i s o l a r . d i r e c t i o n extending upward from t h e horizon along t h e e c l i p t i c . It i s seen from t r o p i c a l l a t i t u d e s f o r a f e w hours a f t e r s u n s e t o r before s u n r i s e .

R- 1

1. Manned Spacecraft Center: March 1970. 2. Manned Spacecraft Center: NASA SP-235. J u l y 1970. Manned Spacecraft Center: September 1970.

Apollo 1 2 Mission Report.

MSC-01855.

Apollo 1 2 Preliminary Science Report. Apollo 13 Mission Report. MSC-02680.

3.

4.
5.

Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 1 Preliminary Science Report. 1 NASA SP-214. December 1969. Marshall Space F l i g h t Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle F l i g h t Evaluation Report AS-509 Apollo 1 4 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-71-1. A p r i l 1971. Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 1 0 and I l Anomaly Report No. 1 F u e l C e l l Cm'denser Exit Temperature O s c i l l a t i o n s . MSC-02426. A p r i l 1970.
NASA Headquarters: Apollo F l i g h t Mission Assignments. MA 500-11 (SE 010-000-1) October 1969.

6.

-

7.
8. 9.
10.

O F M-D m

Manned Spacecraft Center: Mission Requirements, H-1 Type Mission (Lunar Landinp;) SPD9-R-056. June 9, 1970.

.

Goddard Space F l i g h t Center: S-832-71-175.

Post Mission Analysis Report.

Manned Spacecraft Center: Radiometric Temperature Measurement of Apollo 14/Saturn V Exhaust. Lockheed E l e c t r o n i c s Company ( 1 ~ 2 0 6 1 ) . Contract NAS9-10950. A p r i l 1971.

NASA

-MSC

R- 2
MI SS I ON REPORT QUEST IONNA I RE
Mission Reports are prepared as an overall summary of specific Apollo flight results, with supplemental reports and separate anomaly reports providing the engineering detail in selected areas. Would you kindly complete this one-page questionnaire so that our evaluation and reporting service to our readership might be improved.
1.
DO YOU T H I N K T H E CONTENT OF T H E M I S S I O N REPORTS SHOULD E E i

0
2.

LESS DETAILED

0

MORE D E T A l L E D

O A B O U T T H E SAME?

WOULD YOU SUGGEST ANY CHANGES TO THE P R E S E N T CONTENT?

3 . YOUR COPY I s (checlr m o r e t h a n o n e ) ,

0 0
4.

READ COMPLETELY R O U T E D T O ,OTHERS

0 0

READ PART~ALL;I
FILED FOR REFERENCE

0 0

SCANNED
DISCARDED’

0

NOT READ OR S C A N N E D
T O SOMEONE E L S E

0 GIVEN 0 NEVER

ON T H E AVERAGE,

HOW O F T E N DO YOU

REFER L A T E R TO A M I S S I O N R E P O R T ?

1. R E G A R D I N G R E P O R T SUPPLEMENTS,

YOU,

O U S E THOSE YOU R E C E I V E ’

0

DO NOT R E C E I V E ANY,

B U T WOULD L I K E TO

0

DO NOT N E E D THEM

6.

DO YOU W I S H T O C O N T I N U E R E C E I V I N G M I S S I O N R E P O R T S ?

0

YES

0

NO

1 . F U R T H E R S U G G E S T I O N S OR COMMENTS,

IAME

ORGANIZATION

ADDRESS

I

1

Please fold this form in half with the address on the outside, staple, and m i l the form to me. Thank you for taking the time to complete this form.
1

Donald D Arabian, Chief .

Test Division
ISC Form 884 (way 70)
NASA

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MSC

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