Al-Ghazali and David Hume On Necessary Causality

Course: Orient and Occident

Teacher(s): dr. dr. F.L. Roig Lanzillota and dr. S. Travagnin
Author: Anita van der Bos
Student number: S2217473
Date of completion: 01-06-15
There are many philosophical problems that are of little or no importance to the world
outside the walls of the faculties of philosophy. One problem, however, differs with respect
to other philosophical problems. This is the problem concerning causality, which is seen as a
genuine problem that has been of importance for people who do not call themselves
philosophers.1 So, what exactly makes the problem of causality not only urgent for
philosophers but also for natural scientists? In general the problem is described as follows:
we witness the sun rising in the east and setting in the west, but this does not mean that we
can be certain that the sun will rise and set again tomorrow. From this the conclusion follows
that past experiences are no guarantee for future experiences. It is evident that the problem
of causation has major consequences for our daily life and scientific research.
Disproving the notion of causality has been traditionally linked to the Scottish philosopher
David Hume (1711-1776), but an Arabic philosopher also assessed it 600 years earlier. This
philosopher is Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and he argues among the same lines as Hume. 2 It
seems like Hume was not that original after all, and that many scholars of contemporary
philosophy are ignorant of the fact that some of the most important philosophical issues of
the modern period have long before been discussed. But despite their many similarities,
both Al-Ghazali and Hume arrive at radical different conclusions to their findings. In this
paper I will examine the differences and similarities between both authors and explain in
which way their conclusions differ.

Before I will set out the theories of Al-Ghazali and Hume it is important to understand what
causality means in every day terms.3 There is causality when a cause occurs and its effect
follows. This is explained by the following formula:

(A) (B) [h (A)  h (B)]

This means that for any two events, A and B, when A happens this leads to B taking place.

1
See for example Celia Green (2003) and Judea Pearl (2000).
2
Al-Ghazali’s influence on Hume when it comes down to causality is pretty clear. Hume knew Islamic
philosophy and Islamic religion when he wrote his Treatise in which he said: “To begin with contiguity; it has
been remark’d among the Mahometans as well as Christians, that those pilgrims, who have seen Mecca or the
Holy Land are ever after more faithful and zealous believers, than those who have not had that advantage.”
(Treatise, IX. 62). See also Ariew, R. and Watkins, E. (2000). Vol. II. 270.
3
Al-Allaf, M. Philosophy of Science and Al-Ghazali’s Conception of Causality, URL =
http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ma/works/ma-gz-ps.pdf. 1.

2
This formula is applicable in a lot of fields. Necessary causality is defined as “the idea that the
relation between a cause and its effect is necessary and always true.”4

1. Al-Ghazali

The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed
to be an effect is not necessary.5

Abu Hamid Muhammed ibn Muhammed Al-Ghazali lived in the 11th century in Persia during
the Islamic Golden Age. He was a Muslim, theologian, philosopher, jurist, and a mystic of
Persian lineage.
In his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers6 Al-Ghazali engages in a discussion with
the falsafa tradition, a loosely defined group of Islamic philosophers from the 8th through
the 11th centuries, in particular its members Avicenna and Al-Farabi. Al-Ghazali goes against
the falsafa tradition because he is concerned with the question about how to read the Koran.
This relates to a huge discussion that was going on during that time, concerning which
passages of the Koran should be read literally. But as soon as you accept that there is a
distinction between the literal and metaphorical meaning, the obvious question is which
passage you have to read as which. Al-Ghazali uses the following principle: if you can read
the passage literally, you should. According to Al-Ghazali this goes for the cases where it has
not been demonstrated that the literal meaning is impossible. As soon as the falsafa tradition
has demonstrated something with certainty that goes against the Koran, then the answer is
that we should not read that passage literally.

1.1. Al-Ghazali on causality and miracles

In the most important discussion, the one about causality, Al-Ghazali comes up with
alternative theories in order to refute the theories given by the philosophers of the falsafa
tradition. Al-Ghazali denies the existence of necessary causality because there is, according

4
Aftab, M. Primer on Islam and the Problem of Causation, Induction, and Skepticism, URL =
http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/journal/is-01/primr-ma.htm
5
Al-Ghazali. Incoherence, 166.
6
Al-Ghazali, A.H.M. (2000). The Incoherence of the Philosophers. (trans., Marmura, M.E.). Utah: Brigham
Young University Press.

3
to him, no necessary connection between a cause and an effect. He states that “the
connection between what is believed to be the cause and the effect is not necessary. Take
any two things. This is not That, nor can That be This.”7 This means that the confirmation of
one thing does not lead to the confirmation of the other. Likewise, the denial of the one does
not lead to the denial of the other. When an effect exist, then this is not entailed by the
existence of the cause. Likewise, when an effect does not exist, then this is not entailed by
the absence of the cause.8
Al-Ghazali mentions that there are philosophers who claim that miracles are impossible,
since they are in contradiction with the natural and established flow of cause and effect.9 Al-
Ghazali wants to defend the possibility of miracles, but why is the discussion of causality
connected with miracles? If causality is the necessary connection between cause and effect,
then miracles such as Abraham not being burnt by the fire are impossible. If such miracles
are impossible, then parts of the Koran in which miracles occur should not be read literally. 10
Al-Ghazali states that we were too hasty in our definitions of the terms cause and effect.
When two things happen in conjunction with one another, we assume right away that the
first is the cause and that the latter is the natural and necessary effect. Al-Ghazali objects this
and offers a distinction between an event happening with another event and an event
actually happening by another event.11 “With” asserts nothing about one event being the
effect of the other. To the contrary “by” is a claim that one event is the exclusive source of
the occurrence of another event.12 We see, for example, a person lighting a match. He holds
the match near a piece of cotton which results in the burning of the cotton. We see this time
and time again and in each situation the person lights the match and brings it into contact
with the cotton. The contact of the burning match with the cotton is what we identify as the
cause. In conjunction with it we also always see the cotton catching fire, and this is why we
call this the necessary effect. But why do we assign a certain effect to such a cause?

1.2. Custom, habit and the role of God

7
Ibid. 166, 174.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid. 166.
10
Ibid. 169-170.
11
Ibid. 167.
12
Paulsen, D. and Madsen, E. (2000). Review of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in Brighton Young Studies.
URL = https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/BYUStudies/article/viewFile/6833/6482, 267

4
According to Al-Ghazali “the continuous habit of their occurrence repeatedly, one time after
another, fixes unshakably in our minds the belief in their occurrence according to past
habit.”13 We assign an effect to a cause out of habit because we expect a certain effect when
given a certain cause; it is what we have always observed.
In order to allow for miracles to happen, Al-Ghazali argues that it is not irrational for an
effect not to happen when we see the cause of which we customarily believe it to be the
cause of that effect.14 According to Al-Ghazali “we allow the possibility of the occurrence of
the contact [between cotton and fire] without the burning, and we allow as possible the
occurrence of the cotton’s transformation into burnt ashes without contact with the fire.”15
This means that – and this is the reason why Al-Ghazali analyses causality – when a miracle
happens, it is something completely rational. We believe a miracle to be miraculous because
it is different from what we expect. It goes against our experience, and against what we
believe to be natural law.
Thus Al-Ghazali argues that there is no causality involved in cause and effect. But this gives
rise to a major problem. If the connection is not necessary, what does it stop from being
completely random? How can you claim that there is a regular conjunction in the first place?
Al-Ghazali’s opponents noticed this is as well. They gave all kinds of weird examples of
unexpected semi-causal events when talking about the consequences of Al-Ghazali’s
position. Al-Ghazali has absorbed this criticism in his book and explains that his opponents
gave examples of the following kind:

If someone leaves a book in the house, let him allow as possible its change on his returning home
into a beardless slave boy … or into an animal, or if he leaves a boy in his house, let him allow the
possibility of his changing into a dog; or again if he leaves ashes, let him allow the possibility of its
change into musk; and let him allow the possibility of stone changing into gold and gold into
stone. If asked about any of this, he ought to say: “I do not know what is at the house at present.
All I know is that I have left a book in the house, which is perhaps now a horse that has defiled the
library with its urine and dung, and that I have left in the house a jar of water, which may well
have turned into an apple tree.”16

13
Al-Ghazali. Incoherence, 170.
14
Ibid. 166-167.
15
Ibid. 167.
16
Ibid. 170.

5
If we assume these examples to be valid, then anything goes. It becomes impossible to
decide, or to know what is going on.
This is a serious problem, but Al-Ghazali gives us a solution. According to Al-Ghazali “God
created for us the knowledge that He did not enact these possibilities.”17 We have seen this
regular conjunction which makes us expect the same thing happening the next time. But
what allows us to rely on this conjunction is that God created in us the faith that things
happen in this way.
What this means is that the causal links we see in nature by observing her are not
necessary causal links. Nature behaves in a regular way and this makes it possible for us to
obtain certain knowledge about nature. But the uniformity of nature is not made possible
because causality is inherent in natural things. It is made possible because God wanted it to
be so and he is also able stop the regularity of nature to allow for miracles to happen.

The causality denied by Al-Ghazali is the one defended by the philosophers of the falsafa
tradition. They hold that there is a necessary causal order that is essential for nature. Al-
Ghazali argues that there is another type of causality in which Gods omnipotence is only
restrained by the natural order created by God himself. When you hold, like Al-Ghazali, that
the uniformity of nature is created by Gods will, then you allow the possibility for miracles to
happen. Because of the uniformity of nature it is also possible for us to infer causal relations
with certainty. But it should be stressed that these causal relations are not necessary causal
relations.

2. Hume

All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the
memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object.18

The empiricist David Hume wrote two major works about human understanding. The first
one is the Treatise19 which is more elaborate and more technically written. This work hardly

17
Ibid.
18
Hume, D. Enquiry, V.I.38.
19
Hume, D. (1896). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

6
enjoyed any response. That is why Hume wrote his second work the Enquiry20. He adjusted
the material of the Treatise and added a part on ethics. He also wrote it in a less technical
manner. According to Hume we should no longer read the Treatise, since the Enquiry is the
definite texts which will show clearly how everything works.21 This is why my main focus is
on the Enquiry.

2.1. Hume on causality, custom and habit

For Hume the issue of the natural connection between a cause and its effect was one of
philosophical curiosity. He tries to proof in his Enquiry that our knowledge and our thoughts
can be traced back to sensory experience. As a supplement to John Locke’s theory of ideas
Hume claims that all perceptions from the mind consist of impressions and ideas. Because
philosophy already consists of too much empty assumptions, Hume wants to use the
scientific method of Isaac Newton for his research. By means of this he introduces his
scientific approach to man and mankind’s experience based on ideas.

According to Hume, people assume that the past looks like the future and that causes will
have the same effects time after time. But we cannot assume this on the basis of proven
premises. If we cannot do this on the basis of proven premises, then there must be
something else that makes us believe that the past looks like the future and that causes will
have the same effects. This ‘thing’ is what Hume refers to as custom, habit or nature. Hume
explains that causality is the cause for something else to happen, but it is not something that
you can detect. At the moment when you do not see causality, there must be another
mechanism that gives you the idea of causality. This mechanism is again custom, habit or
nature. Since we cannot perceive causality, we do not have an impression of it. But since,
according to Hume, each idea has to be traced back to one or more impressions, to which
impressions can the idea of causality be traced back to?

2.2. Hume’s fork

20
Hume, D. (2007). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21
Morris, W. E. and Brown, C. R., "David Hume", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014
Edition), Zalta, N. E. (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/hume/>. Chapter 2.

7
Hume introduces his ‘fork’ to determine to which impressions the idea of causality can be
traced back to. He distinguishes between relations of ideas and reasoning concerning
matters of fact. An idea is something that the mind perceives in itself, whether it is the direct
object of perception, a thought of it, or the understanding of it. Perception of the mind
consists of impressions and ideas. Impressions are “all our lively perceptions, when we hear,
or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.”22 Ideas are less vivid and less strong than
impressions. They are thoughts, physical representations, images of the memory or fantasy,
imagination and concepts. The relation between impressions and ideas is that ideas are
copies of impressions, and it is also possible to combine ideas and impressions. We can
reduce complex ideas to singular ideas which are copies of impressions. When we experience
deficiencies in our organs of perceptions, this results in deficiencies in our ideas. The
possibility to trace ideas back to impressions is an important criteria for the practicality of
our concepts (ideas). Relations of ideas are to be determined by their contents, they are
propositions that are intuitively or demonstratively certain. This means that they are
propositions that are known to us a priori, without the use of the senses. This goes for the
sciences of geometry, algebra and arithmetic. Relations of ideas can be discovered just by the
use of thought and denying such a proposition results in a contradiction.23
Matters of fact, in contrast, are not to be discovered a priori. This means that we have to
look to the tangible world and use our senses to get to know them. Matters of fact are
therefore to be discovered a posteriori. Also, the denial of a matter of fact never results in a
contradiction:

The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a
contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so
conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and
implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise.24

When you deny in mathematics, for example, that two and two equals four, this does give
you a contradiction. But when you empirically, thus by using your senses, deny that friction is
the cause of metal fatigue, this does not give you a contradiction since there can be many

22
Hume, D. Enquiry, V.II.12
23
Ibid. IV.I.20
24
Ibid. (2007). IV.I.21.

8
causes for metal fatigue.

2.3. Causal relations

Hume mentions that “all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the
relation of cause and effect.”25 Meaning that reasoning concerning matters of fact consist of
links between things that we can perceive. All our causal judging is the cause of the fact that
we can only make an appeal to our experience. When we see A following after B, we assume
that B will happen when we see A. It is a feeling that arises in us, and it happens to us as a
kind of necessity. Yet it is only just a feeling, which does not mean that it is nothing, but that
it is something unreasonable since we have not conducted it by means of our reason. We
have impressions of things happening after each other, and a feeling that the one happens
after the other. As an example Hume tells us about a man who finds a watch on an
uninhabited island and concludes that there has been a person on that island. This is a good
example of what we humans do all the time. We constantly suppose that there is a
connection between a present fact and what is inferred from that fact. The knowledge of this
relation between a present fact and its derivative “arises entirely from experience, when we
find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.”26 In the case of the
man who found a watch on a deserted island, he concluded that there must have been a
person on that island because he has the past experience that a watch is manmade and that
only humans wear them. But our past experience only gives us information about how things
were in the past, they do not give any certainty about how things will be in the future.

I have explained that according to Hume causality is something we apply to nature. When we
have seen something happening time and time again, we get the strong feeling to expect
that same thing happening again. According to Hume “all inferences from experience,
therefore, are effect of custom, not of reasoning.”27 This is why Hume concludes that “all
belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the
memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object.”28

25
Ibid. (2007). IV.I.22.
26
Ibid. IV.I.23.
27
Ibid. V.I.36.
28
Ibid. V.I.38.

9
Since we are unable to prove by reasoning that there is a connection between cause and
effect, Hume concludes that the problem of causality is to be found in the domain of matters
of fact. But why then does our experience show us a working connection between a cause
and effect? Hume mentions that it is custom, nature or habit that makes us believe that the
same effect will happen after a cause. Causality is the force of custom and it is deeply rooted
in our nature. It compels us to believe that when we have seen the sun rise time and time
again, we expect it to rise again tomorrow.

3. Differences and similarities

As I said in the introduction of this paper, Al-Ghazali’s ideas on causality are similar to the
one’s of Hume. Al-Ghazali mentions that “the connection between what is habitually
believed to be the cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary.”29
Hume also denied necessary causality when he mentions that “when we look about us
towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single
instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect
to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other.”30 Hume is thus far
in agreement with Al-Ghazali, stating that all we can get from observation is the happening
of one event after the other. There is no necessary connection between the two.

3.1. Custom and habit

Hume also agrees with Al-Ghazali, speaking earlier in his Enquiry about cause and effect, that
people are inclined to make a link of cause and effect between two events out of “custom or
habit”31 Al-Ghazali mentions, in his religious approach, that the customary linking of cause
and effect is based on nature. It can be said that Hume would agree with this, because, in his
earlier work the Treatise, Hume mentions the principle of Uniformity of Nature and this
principle states that “we acquire a general habit, by which we always transfer the known to
the unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble the former.”32 Both Hume and Al-Ghazali

29
Al-Ghazali. Incoherence, 166.
30
Hume, D. Enquiry. VII.I.50.
31
Ibid. V.I.36.
32
Hume, D. Treatise, IX. 84.

10
allow for nature to generally work in a uniform way, and both authors state that causality is
never necessary.

3.2. Logic

At times Al-Ghazali’s arguments look very theological, and you may therefore think that his
arguments are not that logical. For example he states that “the one who enacts the burning
[of the cotton] by creating blackness in the cotton, causing separation in its parts, and
making it cider or ashes, is God, either through the mediation of His angles or without
meditation.33 But Steven Nadler argues that Al-Ghazali does have a logical orientation when
he talks about necessary connections in nature. When you look at it like this, Al-Ghazali
comes very close to Hume’s assert. I have already mentioned Al-Ghazali’s argument on the
existential distinction and independence between “causes” and “effects” (“This is not That;
nor can That be This”34). Nadler also uses this argument and concludes that Al-Ghazali deals
with logical relations: “Clearly, this is a logical point; it requires no theological assumptions;
nor does it, for Ghazali, rest upon any.”35 The difference between Al-Ghazali and Hume is,
according to Nadler, in this regard instructive. According to Nadler Al-Ghazali denies
necessary connections out of ontological concerns, Hume, on the contrary, had an
epistemological orientation: “In the most well-known use of this argument, Hume concludes
only to an epistemological claim: whether or not there are any necessary connections in
nature, we can never rationally justify our belief in them… The occasionalists Malebranche
and Al-Ghazali, on the other hand, go further and argue that where there are no
demonstrable causal relations, there are no causal relations tout court.”36 Nadler explains
that Hume’s conclusion is that we are unable to rationally defend necessary connections in
nature. Hume leaves the question open whether there are such connections. Al-Ghazali goes
further in this manner than Hume and concludes that it is impossible for necessary
connections to exist in nature because we are unable to justify them.

3.3. Epistemology, ontology, and religion

33
Al-Ghazali. Incoherence, 167.
34
Ibid. 166, 174.
35
Nadler, S. (1996). “No Necessary Connection”, in The Monist, vol. 79 , no. 3. 457
36
Nadler, S. “No Necessary Connection”, 463.

11
I wish to argue that, in respect to the relation between theology, ontology and epistemology,
Hume and Al-Ghazali do not differ as much as Nadler argues. Al-Ghazali’s theological
statements are justified not only by ontological concerns, but also by epistemological
concerns. Both Hume and Al-Ghazali argue that to follow after does not mean to follow from.
Al-Ghazali explains that God is the one who has established the arrangement of causality, in
that sense God is always the final cause. This means that the sequencing force in nature is
very important in it, but it surpasses nature at the same time. This is the essence of Islamic
epistemology, meaning that we cannot fully know nature due to the power that is both
inherent and transcendental in it. Al-Ghazali’s Islam gives us a level of certainty sufficient for
us to get along, but it does not promise us absolute certainty. The same goes for Hume, his
findings do not give us full certainty concerning causality and the patterns of nature.
Even though we are unable to decipher nature completely, both Al-Ghazali and Hume
state that we can know things for certain. In this sense ontology and epistemology are
intrinsically related with one another. According to Hume, knowledge of pure mathematics is
one of those things that we can know for certain because it relies only on the relations of
ideas, without making assumptions about the world. Experimental observations, directed
without any assumption of the existence of material objects, allows us to use our experience
in the forming of helpful habits. Other epistemological efforts, especially those claiming to
achieve useful abstract knowledge, are pointless and deceptive. Hume accepts the
limitations of human knowledge while following the valid aims of math and science.37
What do we know for certain according to Al-Ghazali? Why do miracles not prevent our
knowledge of the empirical world? Admitting that if they did, a man who left a book in his
home would have to say, “I do not know what is at the house at present. All I know is that I
have left a book in the house, which is perhaps now a horse.” We have already seen Al-
Ghazali’s answer to this problem: God is the source of our knowledge. It seems like Al-
Ghazali contrasts the ‘knowledge’ of experience, which only leads to the habit of expecting a
certain cause after a certain event, with a certain knowledge created in us by God. According
to Al-Ghazali, the habit of knowing caused by experience is not knowledge necessary things;
only knowledge caused by God is certain.

3.4. Scientific knowledge

37
Ibid. XII, 3.

12
Does Al-Ghazali’s stance, just as Hume’s, not allow for scientific knowledge at all? According
to Al-Ghazali, natural causes can be viewed as causes if we appeal to a weaker notion of
causality. He grants that a natural cause has a nature which brings about certain effects. So
can we say about fire that is has the nature of burning everything with witch it is in contact.
But by stating this Al-Ghazali does not imply that fire is a necessary cause, fire in contact with
cotton does not logically entail the existence of the burning of the cotton. Fire has received
its nature from God, and God decides if he will give rise to the normal effect of that nature or
not.38 By stating that a natural cause has a nature Al-Ghazali leaves room for scientific
knowledge about them. Al-Ghazali denies that this kind of knowledge creates necessary
knowledge – scientific discourse is limited, because it cannot determine if some natural
cause will be overruled by godly mediation. What Al-Ghazali does is in fact the same as
Hume: showing that knowledge is not of relationships which are logically necessary. 39

Conclusion

I have explained why the problem concerning causality is such a pressing one; it is a threat
for our everyday live and scientific research. I have also explained that causality is described
as the relation between a cause and an effect and that David Hume is the name mostly linked
to the problem of causality. In his Treatise of Human Nature and his Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding he stated that there is no causality to be perceived in nature and that
we make causal links out of custom or habit. But Hume might not be so original after all.
Centuries before him, the Islamic philosopher Al-Ghazali coined the same ideas. In his text
The Incoherence of the Philosophers he also stated that there is no causality to be perceived
in nature. He also mentions that we assign an effect to a cause out of habit because we
expect a certain effect when given a certain cause; it is what we have always observed.
The question then is how much Hume resembles Al-Ghazali. I have already mentioned
that they both claim that there is no causality to be perceived in nature. Concerning the
nature of this causality they are in agreement; causality is never necessary. But the reasons
why they argue this are different. Al-Ghazali makes this claim out of theological motivations,

38
Al-Ghazali, Incoherence, 167, 169, 171
39
Adamson, P. (date unknown). Al-Ghazali, Causality, and Knowledge, URL =
https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Medi/MediAdam.htm

13
he wants to sustain the omnipotence of God and allow for the possibility of miracles. For
Hume the issue of the natural connection between a cause and its effect was one of
philosophical curiosity. He tries to proof in his Enquiry that our knowledge and our thoughts
can be traced back to sensory experience.
Hume and Al-Ghazali also claim both that we make causal links out of habit and they also
both allow for nature to generally work in a uniform way. Hume states this because he does
not fully deny the existence of causality, he just argues that we cannot perceive it. Al-Ghazali,
on the other hand, is more radical. According to him causality does not exist at all and the
reason why nature generally works in a uniform way is because God created in us the faith
that things happen in this way. God can stop nature from working in a uniform way, and this
is how miracles are possible.
According to both authors certain knowledge is possible. Hume explains that this only
goes for the domain of pure mathematics, while Al-Ghazali states that only a knowledge
produced by God is certain. When it comes down to experiential knowledge, nothing is
necessary.
We have seen two theories on causality that look a lot like each other. Yet the conclusions
resulting from these two theories are completely different. Al-Ghazali’s theory proves the
omnipotence of God and the existence of miracles while Hume’s theory proves that
everything can be explained within the boundaries of nature. These conclusions could not be
more different.

14
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