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To cite this article: Emilio Gentile & Robert Mallett (2000): The Sacralisation of
politics: Definitions, interpretations and reflections on the question of secular
religion and totalitarianism, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 1:1,
18-55
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The Sacralisation of Politics:
Definitions, Interpretations and
Reflections on the Question of Secular
Religion and Totalitarianism
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EMILIO GENTILE
Translated by Robert Mallett
This article discusses the various historical and theoretical questions that characterise the
relationship between religion and politics, and religion and totalitarianism. Given the
complexity of this relationship, it limits itself to examining only certain aspects of it. In the
first instance, it defines the concepts of the sacralisation of politics and totalitarianism, and
examines only those aspects of the latter that connect it directly with lay religion. It does
not, therefore, offer any comprehensive interpretation either of totalitarianism or of secular
religion.1 Second, it subsequently provides a historiographical verification of these
theoretical questions, and examines, by way of various key examples, how the religious
dimension of totalitarianism during the interwar period has been perceived and interpreted.
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.1, No.1 (Summer 2000), pp.18-55
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
THE SACRALISATION OF POLITICS 19
Totalitarianism
The term 'totalitarianism' can be taken as meaning: an experiment in
political domination undertaken by a revolutionary movement, with
an integralist conception of politics, that aspires toward a monopoly
of power and that, after having secured power, whether by legal or
illegal means, destroys or transforms the previous regime and
constructs a new state based on a single-party regime, with the chief
objective of conquering society. That is, it seeks the subordination,
integration and .homogenisation of the governed on the basis of the
integral politicisation of existence, whether collective or individual,
interpreted according to the categories, the myths and the values of a
palingenetic ideology, institutionalised in the form of a political
religion, that aims to shape the individual and the masses through an
anthropological revolution in order to regenerate the human being
and create the new man, who is dedicated in body and soul to the
realisation of the revolutionary and imperialistic policies of the
totalitarian party. The ultimate goal is to create a new civilisation
along expansionist lines beyond the Nation-State.
At the point of origin of the totalitarian experiment is the
revolutionary party, the principal author and protagonist, organised
along militaristic and autocratic lines, and with an integralist
conception of politics. The party does not permit the existence of
other political parties with other ideologies, and conceives of the
state, even after it has exalted its primacy, as the means of achieving
its policy of expansionism, as well as its ideas for a new society. In
other words, the totalitarian party, from its very early beginnings,
possesses a complex system of beliefs, dogmas, myths, rituals and
symbols that define the meaning and purpose of collective existence
within this world, while also defining good and evil exclusively in
accordance with the principles, values and objectives of the party,
which it helps implement. In effect, even a party such as the
Bolshevik party, which professed atheism and conducted anti-
religious campaigns, constitutes a type of political sacralisation.
20 TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL RELIGIONS
rituals.
Yet, in reality, the presence of collective myths and rituals alone
does not permit one to speak of the sacralisation of politics. In order
for this to take place, it is necessary that the conferring of sacred
status upon a secular political entity takes place in such a way as
explicitly to transform this entity into the principal controller of
collective existence, and into an object of cult status and an object of
dedication though the creation of celebratory rituals in which
participate not occasional crowds, but a liturgical mass. The creation
of civil rituals does not always suggest that a truly secular political
religion has been established. For instance, this had not been the
intention of the leaders of the French Third Republic, who promoted
the establishment of national holidays in order to give symbolic
legitimacy to the new state.6
Moreover, the sacralisation of politics does not necessarily lead to
conflict with traditional religions, and neither does it lead to a denial
of the existence of any supernatural supreme being. After all, there
have been cases when the sacralisation of politics took place following
a direct fusion with traditional religion, as was the case with the
relationship between American civil religion and puritanism.7 In other
cases, as, for example, with the political religion of Fascism, while the
movement itself had origins that were autonomous from religious
tradition and anticlerical, it did not attempt to hijack traditional
institutionalised religion, but, on the contrary, attempted to establish
a form of symbiotic relationship with it, with the aim of incorporating
it into the movement's own mythical and symbolic universe, thereby
making it a component of secular religion.8
As regards traditional religions, it is possible to argue that the
religion of politics, whether it is intended as civil religion or political
religion, is:
(a) Mimetic, in that, whether consciously or unconsciously, it derives
its system of creating beliefs and myths, its dogmas, its ethics and
the structure of its liturgy from traditional religion.
24 TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL RELIGIONS
distinction between state and church clear, and which does not
associate with any specific denomination.
Secular religion has been much studied and discussed in recent years;
one need only recall the long debate on American civil religion
provoked by Robert Bellah in 1967." There have been various
arguments against the scientific validity of the concept of 'secular
religion' and its various derivatives. Moreover, real doubts have been
expressed as to whether the phenomenon of 'secular religion' exists
at all. Certain scholars have contested the very existence of the term,
maintaining that it constitutes a type of conceptual oxymoron: in
short, they argue that the term 'secular religion' is equivalent to the
'square circle'. For example, on the theme of Fascism as political
religion, Roger Griffin has spoken of the 'abuse of religious
concepts', even if, in his definition of generic Fascism, he has
attributed, very persuasively, a fundamental significance to the role of
the palingenetic myth, that is, a myth with strong religious
connotations that constitutes a principal element in all forms of
sacralised politics, as can be seen in modern revolutionary
movements.14 Others argue that defining an ideology or a political
movement as a 'religion' has only metaphorical meaning. In the
meantime, as regards political religion, some assessments stress that
the term refers to the politicisation of institutionalised religion.
Meanwhile, others believe that, in the case of political movements
that make use of religious language, rituals and symbols, the term
'religion' should be avoided altogether, or that the term 'pseudo-
religion' should be used. This would indicate not a political
movement that became a religion, but a movement that disguised
itself as a religion so as to deceive, subjugate and govern the masses.
The sacralisation of politics, in these terms, amounts merely to a
demagogic deception.
Gaetano Mosca, one of the founding fathers of political science,
was of this opinion. At the end of the nineteenth century he provided
the classic formula for a charlatanistic interpretation of the
sacralisation of politics. In fact, for Mosca, the question of faith,
symbolism and ritual within political movements amounted to a
secular form of Jesuitism designed to deceive the masses:
THE SACRALISATION OF POLITICS 27
If we look closely, we can see that the devices used to entice the
crowd, always and everywhere, are and continue to be greatly
analogous to one another, effectively because they are able to
exploit human weakness. All religions, even those that renounce
the supernatural, have their own style of denunciation which
they use to preach, sermonise or make speeches with; all make
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Victims of a Nightmare?
It is probable that, as has been the case with many of the concepts
used by the human sciences, the study of secular religion will not lead
to the development of definitions and interpretations that will be
universally accepted among scholars. It is also likely that the
controversy regarding the existence, or otherwise, of a secular
religion will never be resolved. Nevertheless, whether one believes in
a religious dimension to politics or not, it is clear that the fanaticism
32 TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL RELIGIONS
of the masses, enthusiasm for myths, the cult of the leader, the
dogmatic nature of ideology, implacable hatred and organised cruelty
have all been tragic enough realities of contemporary history. They
have had dimensions so frightful, and have been associated with
ideologies, political systems, historical traditions, economic, social
and geographical situations so diverse as to constitute a large and
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and became legion during the years between the two world wars.
Furthermore, in referring to victims, one does not mean the leaders
and practitioners of the various political religions who, clearly, from
the time of the American Revolution onward, have been numerous
and who became especially powerful during the twentieth century.
By victims one means those not involved in the sacralisation of
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politics, who were frequently opponents and critics, and for this
reason were often victimised by political religions and, thus, if victims
of an illusion were also the real victims of a 'religion that doesn't
exist'. The majority of these individuals were practitioners and
activists from mainstream traditional religions, theologians or lay
scholars of the religious phenomenon, or leaders of their respective
churches. All felt great anguish in the face of the triumphant progress
of totalitarian religion, all issued unheeded warnings of the
consequences, all foresaw new religious wars, and ultimately
despaired for the future of Christian civilisation and of humanity as
a whole, being terrorised at the prospect of an apocalyptic
catastrophe that would result in the triumph of the Antichrist. Many
who practised Christian faiths saw in totalitarian religion a diabolic
astuteness that had seen Satan transformed into God in order to
conquer humanity. These views were not only held by followers of
traditional religious beliefs, but also by atheists and laymen, who
regarded the war against Fascism and Nazism as a religious war.
Does all this amount to a case of mass hysteria? Were all of those
who viewed totalitarianism as a new religion the naive victims of an
illusion, who saw religions that did not exist or were they merely
individuals whose ignorance did not permit them to understand what
really constituted religion, and who confused appearance with
reality? In short, is the sacralisation of politics the Loch Ness monster
of contemporary history?
An affirmative answer to this last question would close the debate
on the sacralisation of politics. But, from the moment that the ranks
of those who believed in the illusion of a non-existent religion
included sceptics such as Bertrand Russell, followers of religious faith
and religious doctrine such as Jacques Maritain, learned theologians
such as Adolf Keller and at least one pontiff, one cannot close the
debate on secular religion by hurriedly concluding that it does not
exist. One would still need to explain why many individuals, religious
or lay, believers and non-believers, have for two centuries believed in
the existence of a secular religion that has been manifested
34 TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL RELIGIONS
nation, the revolution, society, art, sex, and so on. Figures such as
Saint-Simon, Comte, Michelet, Mazzini and Marx were prophets and
theologians of sacralised politics. In terms of revolutionary culture,
the sanctification of violence as a sacred instrument of regeneration
also became important, and became integrated into the sacralisation
of politics by revolutionary movements of both the Left and Right.
But equally important was the development of the ritualistic and
symbolic aspects of sacralised politics. For example, various
monarchies 'invented a tradition', and, in the second half of the
century, attempted to renew the sense of sacredness in their power by
adapting it to democratic politics by way of ceremonies and rituals
that were effectively artificial and false. In reality, this contribution
toward the sacralisation of politics, having assumed this form, was
somewhat limited and had only an indirect influence, given that it
remained a traditional aspect of the monarchic institution. Moreover,
the legitimate presence of traditional religion, however it may have
been modified, imposed a limitation on the transformation of
traditional sacralised power into new sacralised politics. The latter
remained, essentially, a revolutionary and democratic phenomenon,
and, as a consequence, was more congenial to movements
challenging the traditional sacred power of the monarchy by exalting
the sacredness of the nation or the people. Much closer to the idea of
sacralised politics were the symbolic and ceremonial apparatus of the
newer states, the national festivals and the diffusion of
institutionalised symbolism through architecture, urban development
and state monuments. Even in these cases, however, this did not
always result in any increase in the process of sacralising politics. The
lay, rationalist and individualist political culture of many within the
governing elite often created an obstacle, and they often balked at the
idea of establishing a new religion, even if it was a civil, national
religion, fearing that it might result in the perpetuation of irrational
superstition and would prevent the emancipation of the individual.
Another obstacle was the incapacity to establish, or the conscious
aversion to, a system of rituals and symbols, destined to transform the
THE SACRALISATION OF POLITICS 37
the nation was felt most intensely during the years of the Great War.
On the other hand, the Great War, a war that had disproportionately
increased the power of the state over society and the destiny of the
individual, was also interpreted negatively as an expression and a
consequence of a 'secular religion' that, ever since the emergence of
the concept of the secular state, had deified that state as the supreme
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Totalitarian Religions
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history of the world. With our own eyes we helped give birth to
new divinities. One needed to be blind and dumb to reality not
to have noticed that for many, indeed very many, of our
contemporaries, state, country, nation, race, class are not simply
the subject of enthusiastic exaltation, but of mystic adoration,
they are divine expressions because they are felt immeasurably
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to transcend everyday life, and as such arouse all the bipolar and
ambivalent feelings that form part of the divine: love and terror,
fascination and fear, and they generate an impetus for mystic
adoration and dedication. ...The twentieth century promises to
contribute more than one interesting chapter to the history of
religious war (a chapter the nineteenth century believed closed):
here is a prophesy that is in danger of being fulfilled.44
Increasingly, more and more interpretations associated the origins
and success of totalitarian religions with a mass need for belief, which
capable demagogues such as Mussolini and Hitler knew how to satisfy
by making use of modern propaganda techniques. The need for belief
on the part of the masses was sharpened by the traumatic experiences
they had experienced in a very short space of time: the devastation
wrought by the First World War, the revolutionary atmosphere of the
postwar period, not to mention the devastating effects of the economic
and social crisis that befell the capitalist system at the end of the 1920s.
It would seem to be the case, wrote the jurist Gerhard Leibholz in
1938,45 that 'today the powerful need to believe in and live
transcendental moments' and that this found its expression in the new
totalitarian states that presented themselves as new forms of religion,
as 'immediate instruments of God'. This also took place in Russia,
where 'the class phenomenon has been enveloped by an orthodox,
mythical mass faith, that has its own distinct cult and rituals and - even
if Asiatic in nature - constitutes a sort of surrogate political religion'.
According to Leibholz, the totalitarian states were expressions of the
era of the masses, an era dominated by the mythical and by the
irrational, the means by which the masses expressed their need for
faith. Totalitarianism was a development of the tendency toward
'confessional polities', as Leibholz described it in 1933 in his analysis
of the destruction of German liberal democracy. The crisis in the
rational, fundamental elements of parliamentary democracy led to the
rebirth of metaphysical politics, of new politico-religious faiths of
which both Fascism and Bolshevism were expressions.46
46 TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL RELIGIONS
Conclusions
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good and evil; and who, consequently, acted with implacable and
ruthless violence to eliminate from 'good' society those 'evil'
elements that threatened and corrupted it, and prevented it from
becoming a single and homogenous body politic. It is also beyond
doubt that despite this, and perhaps because of it, totalitarian
movements, with their myths, their rituals and their capacity to
mobilise collective enthusiasm, exercised enormous powers of
suggestion and attraction over both the individual and the masses.
For those historians who study political religions, the fundamental
question is not to ask whether the architects of totalitarian
experiments were themselves true believers, whether the enthusiasm
generated by their myths was genuine or manipulated, or even
whether their actions amounted to a coherent translation of their
ideology and faith. In the final analysis, no religion can undergo such
analysis, however distant it might be from the political process and
however close it might be to purity, without being immediately
deemed a pseudo-religion if it contains demagogic elements and a
certain incoherence between belief and behaviour. According to
Raffaele Pettazzoni, an eminent scholar of religion, a religion can be
true or false for a believer, 'but not for the historian, who, as an
historian, does not recognise false religions or real religions, but only
different religious forms within which religion develops'.57
The historian of political religions must study the origins,
development, activities, reactions to and results of the totalitarian
experiments that were undertaken in the name of politics lived and
experienced as a religion. This is what I have set out to do in my
studies of Fascism, while at the same time seeking to clarify the main
guiding precepts and the environment within which it operates, often
by taking the same path as those who lived as protagonists, witnesses
or victims.
The sacralisation of politics is a complex subject, far too complex
to be discussed adequately within the confines of a single article. If
we link it to another, equally complex theme, totalitarianism, the risk
of appearing dogmatic and summary in one's judgements and
THE SACRALISATION OF POLITICS 51
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This article was translated by Robert Mallett and is part of a book Le religioni della politica
fra democrazie e totalitarismi (forthcoming by Laterza, Roma Bari).
NOTES
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1. For more detail on totalitarianism and the sacralisation of politics under Fascism, see
E. Gentile, Le origini dell'ideologia fascista (Rome and Bari: 1975); id., Il mito dello
Stato nuovo (Rome and Bari: 1982); id., Storia del partito fascista, 1919-1922.
Movimento e milizia (Rome and Bari: 1989); id., 'Fascism as Political Religion', Journal
of Contemporary History 25 (1990), pp.229-51; id., Il culto del Littorio. La
sacralizzazione delta politica nell'ltalia fascista (Rome and Bari: 1993), English
translation, The Sacralisation of Politics in Fascist Italy (Cambridge, MA: 1996); id.,
La via italiana al totalitarismo. Il partito e lo Stato nel regime fascista (Rome: 1995).
For a definition of Fascism as totalitarianism and political religion, see E. Gentile, 'El
fascismo y la via italiana al totalitarismo', in M. Perez Ledesma (ed.), Los riesgos para
la democracia. Fascismo y neofascismo (Madrid: 1997), pp. 17-35.
2. A great number of works on totalitarianism and secular religion have emerged in recent
years. See: H. Maier and M Scäfer (eds.), Totalitarismus und Politische Religionen
(Paderborn: 1997); P. Brooker, The Faces of Fraternalism. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy
and Imperial Japan (Oxford: 1991); D. Bosshart, Politische Intellektualität und
totalitäre Erfahrung. Haupströmungen der französischen Totalitarismuskritik (Berlin:
1992); J. Thrower, Marxism-Leninism of Soviet Society. God's Commissar (Lewiston:
1992); A. Piette, Les religiosités séculières (Paris: 1993); H. Maier, Politische
Religionen. Die totalitären Regime und das Christentum (Frieburg: 1995); R. Moro,
'Religione e politica nell'eta della secolarizzazione riflessioni su di un recente volume
di Emilio Gentile', Storia Contemporanea (April 1995), pp.255-324; A. Elorza, La
religione politica (Donostia-San Sebastian: 1996); S. Behrenbeck, Der Kult um die
toten Helden. Nationalistiche Mythen, Riten und Symbolie, 1923 bis 1945 (Neuburg
a.d. Donau: 1996); A.J. Klinghoffer, Red Apocalypse. The Religious Evolution of Soviet
Communism (Lanham: 1996); M. Ley and J.H. Schoeps, Der Nationalsocialismus als
politische Reliugionen (Bodenheim: 1997); M. Ley, Apokalypse und Moderne. Ausätze
zu politischen Religionen (Vienna: 1997); C.E. Bärsch, Die politische Religionen des
Nazionalsozialismus (Munich: 1998); M. Huttner, Totalitarismus und Säkulare
Religionen. Zur Frügeschicte totalitarismuskritischer Bergriffs-und Theoriebildung in
Großbritannien (Bonn: 1999).
3. See S. Amir Arjomand (ed.), The Political Dimensions of Religion (New York: 1993);
A. Elorza, La Religion Politica (Donostia-San Sebastian: 1996).
4. W. Stark, The Sociology of Religion. A Study of Christendom, Vol.1 (London: 1966).
5. The complexity of this relationship is discussed in J.J. Linz, 'Der religiöse Gebrauch del
Politik und/oder der politische Gebrauch der Religion. Ersatz-Ideologie gegen Ersatz
Religion', in H. Maier (ed.), Totalitarismus und Politische Religionen. Konzepte des
Diktaturvergleichs (Paderborn: 1996), pp.129-54.
6. O. Ihl, La fete républicaine (Paris: 1996).
7. C.L. Albanese, Sons of the Fathers. The Civil Religion of the American Revolution
(Philadelphia: 1976).
8. E. Gentile, Il culto del Littirio (note 1).
9. R.C. Wimberley, 'Testing the Civil Religion Hypothesis', Sociological Analysis 37
(1976), pp.341-52; C. Lane, The Rites of Rulers (Cambridge: 1972), pp.42-4.
10. For discussion of political religion outside the context of European totalitarianism, see
D.A. Apter, 'Political Religion in the New Nations', in C. Geertz (ed.), Old Society and
New States. The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (London: 1963), pp.57-103.
11. A. Mathiez, La theophilanthropie et le culte décadaire (1796-1801) (Paris: 1903), p.23.
54 TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL RELIGIONS
(Gütersloh: 1987).
14. Compare R. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (Oxford: 1991), pp.29-32. See also, id.,
Fascism (Oxford: 1995); id., International Fascism. Theories, Causes and the New
Consensus (London: 1998). For other recent studies of the political religious aspects of
Fascism, see R. Eatwell, Fascism. A History (London: 1995); S.G. Payne, A History of
Fascism, 1919-1945 (Madison: 1995); G.L. Mosse, The Fascist Revolution. Toward a
General Theory of Fascism (New York: 1999).
15. G. Mosca, Elementi di scienza politica. Volume 1 (Bari: 1953) pp.283-5.
16. On this, see R. Stark and W.S. Bainbridge, The Future of Religion. Secularisation,
Revival and Cult Formation (Berkley: 1985), pp.3-8.
17. E. Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Paris: 1985), pp.49-53.
18. E.J. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: 1983).
On the functionalist concept of secular religion, see C. Rivière, Les liturgies politiques
(Paris: 1988).
19. R. Otto, Das Heilige. Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis
zum Rationalen (Munich: 1936).
20. R. Callois, Quatre essais de sociologie contemporaine (Paris: 1950); R. Girard, La
violence et le sacré (Paris: 1972); P. Crépon, Les religions et la guerre (Paris: 1991); E.
Gentile, 'Un'apocalisse delia modernità. La Grande Guerra e il Mito delia
Rigenerazione delia politica', Storia Contemporanea (October 1995), pp.733-86.
21. M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (San Diego: 1959), pp.203ff.
22. P.E. Hammond (ed.), The Sacred in a Secular Age (Berkley: 1985); J.A. Beckford (ed.),
New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change (London: 1986); G. Filoramo, I
nuovi movimenti religiosi. Metamorfisi del sacro (Rome and Bari: 1986); C. Rivière
and A. Piette (eds.), Nouvelles idoles, nouveaux cultes. Dérives de la sacralité (Paris:
1990); J.J. Wunenburger (ed.), Le sacré (Paris: 1990); G. Kepel, La revanche de Dieu
(Paris: 1991); G. Filoramo, Le vie del sacro. Modernità e religione (Turin: 1994).
23. B. Croce, 'Per la rinascita dell'idealismo, 1908', in Cultura e vita morale (Bari: 1953),
p.35.
24. Cited in M. Ley, Apokalypse und Moderne Aufsätze zu politischen Religionen (Vienna:
1997), p.12.
25. E. Voegelin, Die politische Religionen (Vienna: 1938); R. Aron, 'L'avenir des religions
séculaires', in L'ages des Empires et l'avenir de la France (Paris: 1945), pp.287-318.
26. For various interpretations of secular religion, see the works cited in note 2.
27. A. De Tocqueville, La Democrazia in America (Milan: 1983).
28. A. De Tocqueville, L'Antico regime e la Rivoluzione (Milan: 1981), Ch.3.
29. J-J. Rousseau, Scritti politici, Volume II, M. Garin (ed.) (Bari: 1971), p.198.
30. Ibid., p.62.
31. G.L. Mosse, The Nationalisation of the Masses. Political Symbolism and Mass
Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich (New York:
1975).
32. C.J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: 1960).
33. J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: 1952); id., Political
Messianism. The Romantic Phase (London: 1960); id., The Myth of the Nation and the
Vision of Revolution (London: 1980); J.H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men. Origins
of the Revolutionary Faith (New York: 1980).
34. Mussolini cited in Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo (note 1).
THE SACRALISATION OF POLITICS 55
35. A. Gramsci, Cronache torinesi 1913-1917, S. Caprioglio (ed.) (Turin: 1980), p.329.
36. L. Sturzo, I discorsi politic! (Rome: 1951), p.388.
37. R. De Nolva, 'Le mysticisme et l'esprit révolutionäre du fascisme', Mercure de France
(1 November 1924), pp.650-67.
38. C. Lane, The Rites of Rulers (Cambridge: 1981); N. Tumarkin, Lenin Lives
(Cambridge, MA: 1983); R. Stites, Revolutionary Dreams (New York: 1989).
39. B. Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (London: 1920).
40. J.M. Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (New York: 1965), p.4.
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41. G. Salvemini, 'Il mito dell'uomo-dio', Giustizia e Libertà (20 July 1932).
42. P. Tillich, 'The Totalitarian State and the Church', Social Research (November 1934),
pp.405-32.
43. Ibid., pp.415-16.
44. A. Tilgher, Mistiche nuove e mistiche antiche (Rome: 1946), pp.47-56.
45. G. Leibholz, 'II secolo XIX e lo Stato totalitario del presente', Rivista internazionale di
filosofia del diritto (January-February 1938), pp.1-40.
46. G. Leibholz, Die Auflösung der liberalan Demokratie in Deutschland und das autoritäre
Staatsbild (Munich and Leipzig: 1933).
47. A. Keller, Church and State on the European Continent (London: 1936).
48. Ibid., pp.56-9.
49. M. Prélot, L'empire fasciste (Paris: 1936).
50. I. Giordani, Rivolta cattolica (Turin: 1925), pp.72-3.
51. A. Messineo, 'Chiesa e civiltà', La Civiltà Cattolica I (1940), p.181.
52. A. Messineo, 'Il culto della nazione e la fede mitica', La Civiltà Cattolica III (1940),
p.212.
53. M. Campo, 'Torbide religiosità moderne', Vita e pensiero (November 1940).
54. J. Maritain, Umanesimo integrale (Rome: 1946), p.215.
55. Ibid., p.219.
56. Ibid., p.40.
57. R. Pettazzoni, Italia religiosa (Bari: 1952), p.7.
58. P. Burrin, 'Political Religion. The Relevance of a Concept', History and Theory 9/1-2
(1997), pp.321-49; H. Maier, '"Politische Religionen" - Möglichkeiten und Grenzen
eines Begriffs', in H. Maier and M. Schäfer (eds.), Totalitarismus und Politische
Religionen. Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs, Vol.II (Paderborn: 1997), pp.299-310.