Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-69236 August 19, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GENEROSO JO, FELIPE LAPITAN, VIRGILIO ROCA, DELMA SOLEDAD ROCA, CEFERINO LOPEZ, LUZVIMINDA SERRANO LOPEZ and ANING LIPAYON,
accused VIRGILIO ROCA, accussed-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Accused Virgilio Roca appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VII, Palo, Leyte, finding him guilty of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention under Article 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
indemnify complainant in the amount of P10,000.00, and to pay 1/6 of the costs. His co-accused Generoso Jo, Delma S. Roca and Luzviminda S.
Lopez were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, while Felipe Lapitan and Ceferino Lopez had remained at-large and did not stand trial.

The evidence for the prosecution is aptly synthesized in the People's Brief as follows:

Complainant Elisa Casal Jo was married to accused Generoso Jo on July 27, 1969. They begot three children, namely, Eligen, Allan and Riza, whose
ages at the time of the subject incident were 9 years old, 7 years old and 6 years old, respectively. They were then living together in La Paz, Leyte
(pp. 11-12, t.s.n., March 11, 1981).

Sometime in December 1975, the couple separated. Generoso then began living with his mistress, Rosemarie Fabro, at San Victoray, La Paz, Leyte
(p. 12, t.s.n., March 24, 1982). On the other hand, complainant Elisa and her three children stayed with her mother in La Paz, Leyte. On March 1,
1976, Elisa filed a complaint for support against Generoso. The case was decided by the JDRC of Leyte in favor of Elisa on September 1, 1976.
Generoso thus was compelled to give monthly support to her. In that same year, 1976, Elisa filed a complaint for concubinage against Generoso
and Rosemarie. When the subject incident occurred, the said complaint was still pending in the Fiscal's Office (pp. 6-7, t.s.n., July 10, 1981; pp. 2-6,
t.s.n., July 9, 1984).

On July 26, 1980, at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Elisa who had just arrived home in La Paz, Leyte, from Tacloban City, was informed by her
mother that appellant herein Virgilio Roca, who was Elisa's former townmate and high school classmate, had come to see her on an important
matter and that he (Roca) would be back (pp. 1315, t.s.n., March 11, 1981). By 10:00 o'clock, Roca returned and told Elisa that a relative of Elisa's
father had just arrived from Cebu and would like to see them in Tacloban City. Upon further inquiries by Elisa's mother, however, Roca revealed
that Elisa's husband, accused Generoso Jo, had hired somebody from Tacloban City to kill Elisa through 'barang' (sorcerer or witch-craft) and that it
would be better for them to find out. Upon the prodding of Roca, Elisa's mother, Mrs. Guillerma Luya Casal, went with Roca to Tacloban City to
investigate the matter. Elisa, on the other hand, immediately went to her sister, Lourdes C. Sia, in La Paz, and informed her of the alleged plot to kill
her (pp. 14-17, t.s.n., March 11, 1981; p. 23, t.s.n., Sept. 30, 1981).

At 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, July 26, 1980, the mother of Elisa arrived home from Tacloban City. She narrated to Elisa that she
was able to meet in Tacloban City the witch-doctor from Daram Samar, by the name of Felipe Lapitan, who had confirmed to her that Generoso
had indeed hired the said witch-doctor to kill Elisa by sorcery or 'barang,' and that in order to avoid the effect of 'barang,' it was necessary for them
to see the said person (pp. 1920, t. s. n., March 11, 1981 ).

The following day, July 27, 1980, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Elisa, her three children and her mother, went to Tacloban City and
proceeded to the house of appellant Virgilio Roca. Inside the house, they met Felipe Lapitan (the witch-doctor) as well as Virgillo Roca and his wife
Delina Soledad Roca. Lapitan told Elisa that Generoso had hired him to kill her, that he had already set in motion the evil spirit which would put an
end to her life in a few days; and that the effect of the evil spirit would be averted if she would submit herself for treatment. Lapitan likewise told
her that in order to convince her husband that she is already dead, a black mourning cloth should be placed in front of their house in La Paz (pp. 19-
23, t.s.n., March 11, 1981).

Helpless and not knowing what to do, Elisa believed the witch-doctor and consented to submit for treatment. Lapitan conducted an 'oracion' or
strange prayer on her and then let her drink a glass of water concoction containing some small pieces of paper with writings thereon. In the
afternoon of that same day, July 27, 1980, Elisa's mother and Lapitan went to La Paz and placed a black mourning cloth in front of their house. Elisa
and her three children, on the other hand, were instructed by Lapitan not to leave the house of appellant Roca in order that they would not be
seen by Generoso, and to insure that the effect of treatment on her would be successful (pp. 23-27, 31-33, t.s.n., March 11, 1981).

Because of fear for her life, Elisa and her three children stayed in the house of Virgilio Roca in Tacloban City. In the evening of July 29, 1980, Lapitan
returned to Roca's house and informed Elisa that he was able to collect Pl,500.00 from Generoso, and that it was even Rose Fabro, Generoso's
mistress, who gave him the money. On July 30, 1980, after breakfast, Lapitan told Elisa that he is taking her three children to Daram Samar. Elisa
objected and told him he could not bring her children without her. Lapitan did not say anything and after a while he called Virgilio and Delma Roca
inside a room for a huddle. After five minutes, Delma came out of the room. She then asked Elisa and Elisa's mother to help her wash some clothes
at the back of the house. Elisa and her mother obliged as the Roca family had been feeding them there. After an hour, Elisa noticed strange silence
in the house. She rushed inside and found her three children already gone. Virgilio Roca and Felipe Lapitan were also not there anymore. She
immediately asked Decree where the children could have gone to. Delma answered that probably they were brought by Virgilio for a stroll in the
Children's Park near the Tacloban Wharf (pp. 27-45, t.s.n., March 11, 1981).

Unknown to Elisa, while she and her mother were washing clothes at the back of the house of Virgilio Roca, accused Felipe Lapitan and Virgilio Roca
took her three children on a jeep to the Tacloban Wharf. Lapitan made them board a motorboat with him while Virgilio Roca sent them off. The
boat left for Samar before noon and they arrived the town of Talalora, Samar, at about three o'clock in the afternoon. From there they took a
pumpboat and at four o'clock they reached Daram From the shore they walked about two kilometers in land along a muddy path abounding with
bladed grass to the house of Felipe Lapitan on a corn field in a small hilt They stayed in the house of Lapitan for five (5) days. Lapitan's wife and
children were there. Lapitan did not permit Elisa's children to go out of the house. A certain Luzviminda Lopez was watching Elisa's children. The
said children were not well fed. They slept on a mat on the floor of the house (pp. 24-39, t.s.n., June 2, 1982).
Meanwhile, Elisa had became apprehensive as she dreaded the loss of her children. After about 2 or 3 hours from the time Elisa noticed the
absence of her children, Virgilio Roca returned and told her that her three children were brought by Lapitan to Daram Samar. She pleaded to
Virgilio to accompany her to Daram to get her children, but Virgilio refused, claiming he is busy with work. Elisa then told him she wanted to go
home to La Paz, but Virgilio warned her not to leave because she might not be well yet as the antidote or water concoction given to her by Felipe
Lapitan to counteract the evil spirit sent out to kin her might not work (pp. 3-7, t.s.n., April 15, 1981).

On August 1, 1980, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Elisa's sister, Mrs. Lourdes C. Sia, visited her in Roca's house to see why they have not
returned home to La Paz, Elisa thus asked Virgilio to allow them to go home but again Virgilio refused. When they were not allowed to leave, Mrs.
Sia returned to La Paz alone, In the evening of the same day, Benedicto Sia, husband of Lourdes, went to Roca's house and asked Virgilio to permit
Elisa and his mother-in-law to go home, otherwise he will report the incident to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Appellant Roca requested
Benedicto not to report anymore to the PC as he would fetch Elisa's children from Daram, Samar. With the said promise of Virgilio, Benedicto left
(pp. 8-11, t.s.n., April 15, 1981).

In the evening of August 2, 1980, Virgilio Roca went out of his home. The following day, August 3, 1980, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning,
Virgilio told Elisa that he was going to Daram to get her children. At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Elisa and her mother were allowed to leave
the Roca's house and they went home to La Paz after getting an assurance from Decree Roca that they would be informed of the development (pp.
11-13, Ibid.)

On August 4, 1980 at 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Elisa left for Tacloban and proceeded to the Roca's house. When she arrived there, she was
happy to see her three (3) children already there. Her eldest daughter told her that they were brought to Daram Samar by Felipe Lapitan and that
their companions in coming back were Felipe Lapitan, Virgilio Roca and Luzviminda Lopez. The latter three however were not in Roca's house
anymore as Delma had told them that they might be arrested by the PC. Abounding with joy upon seeing her three children, Elisa brought them
back to La Paz. They arrived home at 6:00 o'clock in the evening (pp. 14-18, t.s.n., Id.).

On August 9, 1980, Capt. Angelo Marcos, Station Commander of the La Paz Police Station filed a criminal complaint for kidnapping of minors
against Felipe Lapitan, Virgilio Roca and Ceferino Lopez. This was amended on August 28, 1980 to include Mrs. Delma Roca, Mrs. Luzviminda
Serrano Lopez (wife of Ceferino Lopez) and one Aning Lipayon. Virgilio Roca surrendered to the PC on August 28, 1980, his wife Delma on
September 2, 1980; and Luzviminda Lopez was arrested on August 29, 1980. The other defendants (particularly Felipe LAPITAN) eluded arrest (p. 2,
Decision dated July 17, 1984).

On January 21, 1982, after due reinvestigation, the information filed in court was amended to implead Generoso Jo, alleged principal by induction,
as another defendant. He was released on bail on February 10, 1982 (p. 4, Ibid).1

The accused ROCA, 29, married, a construction laborer, residing in Barangay 63, Sagkahan, Tacloban City, denied having had any participation in
taking the children to Daram, Samar, nor in fetching them from there on August 4, 1980. He averred that ELISA knew of her children's trip thereto
with LAPITAN and that she even provided them with a live pig, tuba, and beef loaf. ROCA also denied any acquaintanceship with LAPITAN stating
that he came to know the latter only on July 27, 1980 when ELISA JO, who was his classmate in the elementary grades in 1968 in La Paz and her
mother, Guillermo Luya, went to their home looking for a house for rent because ELISA was coughing and needed treatment by LAPITAN, a quack
doctor, and allegedly a nephew of Guillerma Luya; that it was only then that LAPITAN was introduced to him; that because ROCA and his wife pitied
ELISA they accommodated her and her family in their house for five days. ROCA further denied having met Benedicto Sia, ELISA's brother-in-law,
who according to the prosecution evidence had threatened to report to the police if the children were not returned to the mother.

Allan, the second child of the Jo spouses, 7 years old at the time of the incident, who was already in the custody of his father during the criminal
proceedings in 1982-1983, testified that he and his two sisters were not kidnapped; that his mother and grandmother told them to go to Daram,
Samar, with LAPITAN and that they even brought clothes, canned goods and a live pig, that they were there on vacation; that LAPITAN had asked
for his mother's permission to go to Samar; that his mother and grandmother were very near the jeep which they boarded to go to the wharf; that
ROCA did not see them off; and that it was LAPITAN who accompanied them back to Tacloban while ROCA was left behind in LAPITAN's house in
Daram, Samar.

After assessing the conflicting testimonies, the Trial Court adjudged ROCA guilty, as heretofore stated.

ROCA argues that the lower Court erred:

In completely disregarding the testimony of Allan Jo one of the alleged kidnapped minors.

II

In convicting the accused-appellant for the crime of kidnapping without the prosecution having been able to prove the essential elements of the
crime charged and/or to prove that a crime was really committed.

III

In its findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures as to the motive of the accused-appellant in the alleged commission of
the offense charged.

IV

In convicting the accused-appellant of a crime for which he is not charged.

The submittals lack merit.

We agree with the Trial Court that as between the testimonies of the eldest child Eligen, and the second child Allan that of ELIGEN is deserving of
more credence. ELIGEN was 9 and Allan was 7 at the time of the commission of the crime, and 12 and 10, respectively, when they testified three (3)
years later. At his tender age of 7, Allan could not have had the correct perception of what was happening to them besides the fact that he was
made to narrate the incident after the lapse of three years. ELIGEN, on the other hand, gave a written statement to the police soon after her return
to La Paz. Furthermore, Allan was in the custody of his father, who was exercising moral ascendancy over him; while the likelihood of the mother
coaching ELIGEN was remote as the mother was not with her children at Daram, Samar.

There should be no question that the minors were deprived of their liberty and actually restrained at Daram, Samar, at LAPITAN's house where
they were kept for more than five days from July 30, 1980 to August 4, 1980. It was a solitary house in an isolated place which could be reached
only by walking through a muddy path abounding with bladed grass. 2 As ELIGEN testified, on July 30, 1980, ROCA and LAPITAN took them away on
a jeep, not to the children's park but to the pier after they were told that they already had permission to take them to their father. 3 They brought
no clothes nor blanket with them nor any foodstuffs. From the Tacloban pier and, accompanied by LAPITAN alone since ROCA was left behind, they
took a motor launch to Talalora, Samar, thence, a pumpboat to Daram, Samar, and then a banca to Barangay Cabak, Daram, Samar. After which,
they walked approximately two (2) kilometers to LAPITAN's house where they were kept in his room and not allowed to go outside.4 Sometimes,
they were fed three times a day, at others, only once a day. ALL the while, Luzviminda Lopez kept watch over them and slept with them. LAPITAN's
excuse to the children for keeping them indoors was so that harm would not befall them by way of 'barang' (witchcraft). 5 It was on August 4 and
only because Benedicto Sia, Eliza's brother-in-law, had threatened to report the matter to the authorities, that ROCA fetched the children from
Daram, Samar, and with LAPITAN and Luzviminda, they all returned to ROCA's house in Tacloban.

Was the crime of Kidnapping committed? Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him
of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense. (As amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 18, and
1084, approved June 15, 1954).

We find the essential elements of the crime proven. The kidnapping was directly participated in by ROCA and LAPITAN, both private individuals; the
three children were deprived of their liberty for they could not leave LAPITAN's house at win; their detention was illegal there being no justification
therefor, the detention lasted for more than five days; and the persons kidnapped were minors.

ROCA was not without motive for directly participating with LAPITAN in kidnapping the minors. As ELISA had testified, consideration was paid
LAPITAN. 6

In his last assigned error, ROCA contends that he was charged with Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 7 of the Revised
Penal Code but was convicted of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 (4) [supra] of the same Code.

The Amended Information under which ROCA was charged reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Fical accuses GENEROSO JO, FELIPE LAPITAN alias PEPE, VIRGILIO ROCA, DELMA ROCA, CEFERINO LOPEZ,
and LUZVIMINDA LOPEZ of the crime of Kidnapping, committed as follows:

That on or about the period comprised between July 27, 1980 to August 4, 1980, in the Municipality of La Paz, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and acting in concert with each other, with
Felipe Lapitan and Ceferino Lopez who are still at-large and their whereabouts still unknown did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with accused Virgilio Roca, Delina Roca and Felipe Lapitan in custody of minors Eligen C. Jo, 10 years old, Allan C. Jo, 8 years old and Rizal C. Jo, 7
years old, respectively, and with Felipe Lapitan kidnapping the aforesaid minors and bringing the minors to Brgy. Cabac, Daram Samar against their
wig and depriving them of their liberty for a period of 9 days with the intended purpose of permanently separating the abovenamed minors from
the custody of their mother, Elisa C. Jo.

CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 270 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

While there is variance between the offense charged in the Information and that established by the evidence, it cannot be denied that the offense
as charged, which is Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, is necessarily included in the offense
proved, which is Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention of a minor under Article 267 (4) of the same code, inasmuch as the essential ingredients
of the offense charged constitute or form a part of those constituting the offense proved. Thus, deliberate failure to restore a minor under one's
custody and kidnapping of a minor who is not in custody both constitute deprivation of liberty. Consequently, ROCA can be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged. 8 Besides, there is authority to the effect that paragraph 1 of Article 270 might have been
superseded by Article 267, as amended, which punishes as serious illegal detention the kidnapping of a minor, regardless of the purpose of the
detention. 9

The Solicitor General calls attention to a last consideration. The Trial Court convicted ROCA of only one (1) crime of Kidnapping and sentenced him
to only one (1) reclusion perpetua in the absence of any modifying circumstances. Actually, three kidnappings were committed as alleged in the
Information and proved during the trial. Accordingly, ROCA should be sentenced for as many offenses as charged in the Information and proved
during the trial or three (3) reclusion perpetua. It is to be noted that ROCA did not object to the Information charging more than one offense, so
that, he is deemed to have waived the same. 10

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified and the accused-appellant Virgilio Roca hereby sentenced to three (3) penalties of
reclusion perpetua for three separate crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, provided that, pursuant to Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code, the maximum duration of the sentence shall not exceed forty (40) years. With 1/6 of the costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 121519 October 30, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY, accused-appellants.

KAPUNAN, J.:p

Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor in an information filed by 2nd Assistant City
Prosecutor of Kalookan City Rosauro J. Silverio, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan. City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the owners, proprietors, managers and administrators of Sir John Clinic and as such said accused had the custody of Arabella
Sombong, a minor, conspiring together and mutually helping one another and with deliberate intent to deprive the parents of the child of her
custody, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to restore the custody of said Arabella Sombong to her parents by giving said
custody of subject minor to another person without the knowledge and consent of her parents.

Contrary to Law.1

Both accused were arrested, and then arraigned on October 27, 1992 when they pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

After trial, on May 31, 1995, a decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, the decretal portion of which
disposes as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Spouses Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping a minor
and failure to return the same as defined and penalized by Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The accused are hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral
damages caused by anxiety, by her being emotionally drained coupled by the fact that up to this date she could not determine the whereabouts of
her child Arabella Sombong.

SO ORDERED.2

The accused now interpose this appeal alleging the ensuing assignment of errors, viz:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS "DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE THE CHILD TO HER MOTHER," AND CONVICTING THEM
UNDER ART. 270 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND SENTENCING THEM TO "RECLUSION PERPETUA";

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED, IF ANY, IS THAT DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 277 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE;

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY PURSUANT TO PRECEDENT IN "PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ," 197 SCRA 569;
and

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING "COMPLAINANT THE SUM OF P100,000.00 BY WAY OF MORAL, DAMAGES."3

The relevant antecedents surrounding the case are as follows:

On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella, then only seven (7) months old, for treatment to the
Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic located at No. 121 First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City which was owned and operated by the accused-
appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the child at the clinic for
speedy recovery. About three (3) days later, Arabella was well and was ready to be discharged but complainant was not around to take her home.
A week later, complainant came back but did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Complainant likewise
confided to accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty that no one would take care of the child at home as she was working. She then inquired about the
rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was P50.00 per day, she decided to leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery.
Consequently, Arabella was transferred from the ward to the nursery. 4

Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this time that accused-appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant that she
hire a "yaya" for P400.00 instead of the daily nursery fee of P50.00. Complainant agreed, hence, a "yaya" was hired. Arabella was then again
transferred from the nursery to the extension of the clinic which served as residence for the hospital staff.5

From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child nor called to inquire about her whereabouts. Her estranged
husband came to the clinic once but did not get the child. Efforts to get in touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address or
telephone number where she can be reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of the child's abandonment.6
Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in taking care of Arabella.7
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the clinic, suggested during a hospital
staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who could give the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring she badly
needed as she was thin and sickly. The suggestion was favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt, Lilibeth Neri.8

In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some five (5) years back.

When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition for habeas corpus against accused-appellants with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Said petition was however denied due course and was summarily dismissed without prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
the alleged detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan City.

Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed against accused-appellants.

Complainant likewise filed an administrative case for dishonorable conduct against accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine
of the Professional Regulation Commission. This case was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.

On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, this time against the alleged
guardians of her daughter, namely, Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Neri. On January 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision granting the
petition and ordering the guardians to immediately deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant, the court having found Cristina to
be the complainant's child. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, said decision was reversed on the ground that the guardians were not
unlawfully withholding from the complainant the rightful custody of Cristina after finding that Cristina and complainant's daughter are not one and
the same person. On January 31, 1996, this Court in Sombong v. Court of Appeals9 affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.

In this appeal, accused-appellants would want us to take a second look and resolve the issue of whether or not they are guilty of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor. Accused-appellants of course contend that they are not guilty and the Solicitor General agrees. In its Manifestation and
Motion in lieu of Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General recommends their acquittal.

We agree.

As we have mentioned above, this Court in Sombong v. Court of

Appeals10 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's ruling that complainant has rightful custody over the child,
Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not being identical with complainant's daughter, Arabella. The Court discoursed, thusly:

Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed before, the court a quo, Cristina has not
been shown to be petitioner's daughter, Arabella. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the
same person as Cristina.

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate existence of petitioner's child, Arabella, from
that of private respondents' foster child, Cristina.

We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is petitioner's own witness, testified in court that, together with Arabella, there were several babies
left in the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it was Arabella or some other baby that was given to private respondents. Petitioner's own
evidence shows that, after the confinement of Arabella in the clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the clinic.
This corroborates the testimony of petitioner's own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was physically confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to
April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her assertion in her counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the custody of the hospital until April,
1989. All this, when juxtaposed with the unwavering declaration of private respondents that they obtained custody of Cristina in April, 1988 and
had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella.

Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente of the herein assailed decision, set the case for hearing on August
30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of observing petitioner's demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She made the following personal but relevant
manifestation:

The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four children, wanted to see how petitioner as an alleged mother of a missing child supposedly in
the person of Cristina Neri would react on seeing again her long lost child. The petitioner appeared in the scheduled hearing of this case late, and
she walked inside the courtroom looking for a seat without even stopping at her alleged daughter's seat; without even casting a glance on said
child, and without even that tearful embrace which characterizes the reunion of a loving mother with her missing dear child. Throughout the
proceedings, the undersigned ponente noticed no signs of endearment and affection expected of a mother who had been deprived of the embrace
of her little child for many years. The conclusion or finding of undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner-appellee is not the mother
of Cristina Neri has been given support by aforestated observation. . .

xxx xxx xxx

Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken
identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. At this juncture,
we need not inquire into the validity of the mode by which private respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.

xxx xxx xxx

Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the evidence adduced in this case accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted of the crime
charged, there being no reason to hold them liable for failing to return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown and established to be
complainant's daughter, Arabella.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella Sombong as one and the same person, still, the instant
criminal case against the accused-appellants must fall.

Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must
concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to
his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually
punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.11 Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must
also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.12 The key word
therefore of this element is deliberate and Black's Law Dictionary defines deliberate as:

Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not sudden or rash; circumspect; slow in determining. Willful rather than merely intentional.
Formed, arrived at, or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or plan. Carried on
coolly and steadily, especially according to a preconceived design; given to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice or decision;
careful in considering the consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried; characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash. People v. Thomas,
25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17, 18.

By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea is conveyed that the perpetrator weighs the motives for the act and its consequences, the
nature of the crime, or other things connected with his intentions, with a view to a decision thereon; that he carefully considers all these, and that
the act is not suddenly committed. It implies that the perpetrator must be capable of the exercise of such mental powers as are called into use by
deliberation and the consideration and weighing of motives and consequences.13

Similarly, the word deliberate is defined in Corpus Juris Secundum as:

DELIBERATE.

As a Verb

The word is derived from two Latin words which mean literally "concerning" and "to weigh;" it implies the possession of a mind capable of
conceiving a purpose to act, and the exercise of such mental powers as are called into use by the consideration and weighing of the motives and
the consequences of the act; and has been defined as meaning to consider, reflect, take counsel, or to weigh the arguments for and against a
proposed course of action; to consider and examine the reasons for and against, consider maturely, ponder, reflect upon, or weigh in the mind; to
reflect, with a view to make a choice; to weigh the motives for an act and its consequences, with a view to a decision thereon.

As an Adjective

The word, used adjectively, implies action after thought and reflection, and relates to the end proposed; indicates a purpose formed in a mind
capable of conceiving a purpose; and is based upon an intention accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully conscious of its own
purpose and design. It has been defined as meaning carefully considered; circumspect; entered upon after deliberation and with fixed purpose,
formed after careful consideration, and fully or carefully considering the nature or consequences of an act or measure; maturely reflected; not
sudden or rash, carefully considering the probable consequences of a step; premeditated; slow in determining; weighing facts and arguments with
a view to a choice of decision; well-advised.

Under some circumstances, it has been held synonymous with, or equivalent to, "intentional," "premeditated," and "willful."

Under other circumstances, however, it has been compared with, or distinguished from, "premeditated," "sudden," and "willful."14

Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.

In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of the
complainant's child to her. When the accused-appellants learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent
wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinic's care. Accused-appellant
Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella's guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was already working abroad, she
personally went to the guardians' residence and informed them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back. Dr. Ty testified as follows:

Q: Now, since you said a while ago that when you placed the child under the (sic) guardianship, you are (sic) aware that the natural mother
will get back the child, why did you not return the minor to the natural mother?

A: During that time mam, the resident physician who will (sic) discharged the baby was not present because she was abroad.

Q: But then madam witness, are you aware where the child was and to whom it was given?

A: The exact address was not given to me, mam, before the resident physician left for abroad so, I asked the PAO to give me one month to
have (sic) a long distance call to this doctor and asked her for the whereabout(s) of the child.

Q: And where you granted the thirty-day period by the Officer of the PAO?

A: Yes, mam.

Q: What happened if any during that thirty-day period?

A: I was able to talk to Fe Mallonga in Bahrain and she told me the exact address of the guardian, mam.

Q: Were (sic) you informed (of) the exact address of the guardian, did you informed (sic) the PAO?

A: Yes, mam.

ATTY. WARD:

Q: Then, what happened next, madam witness?

A: I was the one who went to the address to be sure that the child was really there, mam.
Q: And did you see the child?

A: Yes, mam.

Q: What did you do with the child?

A: I just tell (sic) the child, "Ay ang laki mo na pala," I just told the child like that and I've (sic) talked also to the guardian during that time,
mam.

Q: And what did you tell the guardian?

A: I told the guardian that the rightful mother was claiming for the child and that we should talked (sic) with each other at the PAO for the
decision, mam.

Q: Did the guardian bring the child to the PAO's Office (sic)?

A: No mam, she did not appear.

Q: Why?

A: They told me first that they are (sic) going to contact a lawyer but for (sic) several days, she did not respond anymore, mam. 15

When the guardians refused to return the child, accused-appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which
conducted a conference among the parties but since a case was yet to be filed, the custody of the minor remained with the guardians. This fact is
evident from the following testimony, thus:

Q: You testified on cross-examination that you located the whereabouts of the child sometime later, what steps did you take up (sic) after
you found the child?

A: I explained to the guardian that the verbal agreement between the supposed to be guardianship was only a plain guardianship and not as
an adoption, sir.

Q: You said you went to the NBI after you found the child, why did you go to the NBI?

A: Because the guardian are (sic) not willing to surrender the child to the PAO's Office (sic), that is why I asked their help, sir. 16

...

Q: Now, when you informed the present custodian that the natural mother is now claiming the child, why were you not able to get the
minor?

A: I was not able to get the minor so I asked the help of the NBI to have the child surrender (sic), mam.

ATTY. WARD:

Q: And what happened when you get (sic) the assistance of the NBI?

A: They were the ones who asked the guardian to surrender the child, mam.

Q: You stated a while ago that there was no written agreement between you or your hospital and the guardian of the minor, is that correct?

A: Yes, mam.

Q: For what reason if you know, why (did) the guardian did (sic) not follow you or obey you when you want (sic) to get back the child?

A: I don't know of any reason, mam. 17

The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate
refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. Evidence is simply wanting in this regard.

It is worthy to note that accused-appellants' conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinic's care up to the time the child was given up
for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child and a high regard for her welfare and well-being.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellants VICENTE TY
and CARMEN TY are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and are ordered to be released immediately unless they are being detained for other
lawful causes. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81020 May 28, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LlLIA GUTIERREZ Y FRANCO, defendant-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

The accused Lilia Gutierrez y Franco is before us on appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, convicting her of the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua.

Appellant was charged under an information which read as follows:

The undersigned accuses LILIA GUTIERREZ Y FRANCO of a violation of Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code (Kidnapping and Failure to Return a
Minor) committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1984, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, having been entrusted the custody of one Hazel
Elpedes, a boy, two and a half years of age, and therefore, a minor, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately fail and
refuse to restore the said child to his parents, Frank Elpedes y Sumayod and Lourdes Elpedes, and instead sell the said child for P250.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW."1

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dated 14 September 1987 finding the accused guilty of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Lilia Gutierrez y Franco, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime as charged and hereby sentences
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment (sic) and is hereby ordered to pay the sum of P2,000.00 to the parents of the minor, Frank Elpedes
and Lourdes Elpedes, for moral damages and to pay the costs.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.2

Appellant in her Brief, assigns a single error, asserting that the trial court erred in convicting her because her guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

The facts of the case as found by the trial court may be summarized as follows:

On the morning of 13 July 1984, appellant went to the residence of her sister-in-law, Lourdes Elpedes, at the Nichols Airbase, Pasay City, and
obtained permission from the latter to take her youngest son, Hazel, 2 1/2 years old for the day because appellant's husband, Maximiano Mariano,
wanted to spend some time with his nephew at their residence in Paco, Manila. Both women agreed that the child would be brought back at 4:00
P.M. that same day. When appellant arrived at her residence, she discovered that her husband, and their belongings, were gone. For a while,
appellant just sat there and cried. She then proceeded to the residence of her former employers, Mr. and Mrs. Abraham Felipe, in Intramuros. They
executed an "Agreement" under which appellant surrendered custody of Hazel Elpedes, purportedly her own fatherless son, in favor of the couple.
Appellant received P250.00 from the couple which was evidenced by a receipt.3

Meanwhile, Lourdes Elpedes went to appellant's residence after the latter had failed to return with her son. Encountering no one there, she and
her husband, Frank Elpedes, spent the next two days looking for appellant along Herran St. (now Pedro Gil St.). On 15 July 1984, Frank Elpedes
spotted appellant in a telephone booth along said street and accosted her. The Elpedes spouses brought her to the Western Police District Station
along United Nations Avenue, Manila. Appellant then led Frank Elpedes and at least one policeman, Patrolman Diosdado Deotoy, to the Felipe
residence in Intramuros. But the group found neither the Felipe spouses nor the child there. Receiving information from the Barangay Chairman of
the place that the child was in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal the group returned to the police station and then proceeded to Antipolo. There they
recovered Hazel from the residence of the Felipe spouses. During this time, appellant admitted to the group that she had "sold" the child in order
to avenge herself on her husband, Lourdes Elpedes' brother, who had abandoned her. On the evening of 15 July 1984, the group returned to the
police station where appellant was investigated and placed under arrest. She has been under detention ever since.4

Lourdes Elpedes testified in court regarding the circumstances under which appellant obtained temporary custody of Hazel, the initial efforts by her
and her husband to locate appellant, and the efforts of her husband and the police to recover Hazel in Intramuros and in Antipolo.5

Patrolman Diosdado Deotoy also testified in court regarding the efforts to recover Hazel Elpedes. He recounted how they were able to locate the.
house of the Felipe spouses in Cogeo and how the Felipe spouses readily surrendered the child upon being informed of his true parentage. He
added that the Felipe spouses likewise surrendered the documents which came to be offered and admitted as exhibits D and E for the
prosecution.6

Patrolman Ernesto Callos' testimony dealt with the circumstances under which he investigated the appellant. He mentioned that appellant
repeated to him in the investigation room her admission regarding the "sale" of the child and her motive for "'selling" him. He added that the
admission was made voluntarily after appellant had intelligently waived the assistance of counsel. Furthermore, he did not insist, in deference to
her constitutional rights, when she declined to reduce this admission into writing.7

Appellant testified on her own behalf as the sole witness for the defense. She stated that she had fetched Hazel Elpedes from his parents upon
instructions of her husband. After discovering that her husband had abandoned her, she entrusted the child to the Felipe spouses merely for
temporary safekeeping while she tried to locate her husband in his homeplace in Cabanatuan City. She believed that the Felipe spouses, her former
employers, could be relied upon to look after the child responsibly. She misrepresented the child as her own because the Felipes were aware of her
married status. Returning to the Felipe residence the following day, she received P180.00 from them, never considering for a moment that the
amount represented payment for the child. She admitted affixing her thumbmarks on Exhibit E but repudiated her purported signatures on Exhibits
D and E because she is illiterate. She added that she did not know why the Felipe spouses presented these documents to her. Appellant testified
that it had never occurred to her to immediately return Hazel to his parents because she was in a confused state of mind upon realizing she had
been abandoned by her husband.8

Appellant contends that the prosecution's evidence did not establish that she had deliberately failed to restore the boy Hazel to his parents by
"selling" the child to the Felipe spouses. Elaborating, she argues that Lourdes Elpedes was an incompetent witness as far as her account of the
recovery of Hazel in Antipolo was concerned, because she was not present when this event took place. Lourdes' account of appellant's alleged
admission of the "sale" on the occasion then constituted hearsay. Furthermore, she contends, Pat. Callos' testimony that appellant had admitted
giving away the young boy to him during her investigation was likewise hearsay. Considering this alleged gap in the prosecution's evidence,
appellant claims the prosecution should have presented either or both of the Felipe spouses to testify that appellant had indeed "sold" the child.
Finally, appellant argues that the prosecution had not successfully rebutted her exculpatory testimony regarding her inadvertent failure to return
Hazel to his parents.9

The offense of kidnapping and failure to return a minor defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code consists of two
elements: 1.) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and 2.) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to
his parents or guardians.

It is clear that appellant admitted the existence of the first element for she had not disputed the testimony on circumstances under which she
obtained custody for the day of Hazel Elpedes on the morning of 13 July 1984. Furthermore, as pointed out by the trial court, it was perfectly in
consonance with human experience that Lourdes Elpedes should have readily allowed appellant to take Hazel temporarily because she is a relative
by affinity who, until then, had not exhibited any conduct which might impair the trust normally reposed on a sister-in-law.10

We believe that the second element of the offense charged has been established by the prosecution's evidence.1âwphi1 In the first place,
appellant's own conduct in leading Frank Elpedes and Pat. Deotoy to the Felipe residence in Intramuros, in an initial unsuccessful effort to recover
the child, indicated her awareness of the probable whereabouts of the child. The logical conclusion is that she must have been the person
responsible for originally leaving the child with the Felipe spouses.11 In the second place, the precise motive that appellant might have had for
bringing Hazel Elpedes to the Felipe spouses and leaving him with them, apparently for an indefinite period, is not an indispensable element of the
offense charged. All that was necessary for the prosecution to prove was that she had deliberately failed to return the minor to his parents. But
appellant herself had testified that she had indeed left the child with the Felipe spouses in Intramuros. We find it very difficult to understand how
appellant, even in her claimed disconsolate state, could have inadvertently left the child with the Felipe spouses in the latter's home in Intramuros
(starting from Herran St., in the opposite direction from the Nichols Airbase, where the child's parents live). Moreover, appellant did not pretend to
have tried to return Hazel to his parents by retrieving him from the Felipe spouses in Intramuros.

It is true that Lourdes Elpedes' account of Hazel's recovery in Antipolo was hearsay, because Lourdes was not then physically present in Antipolo.
But Pat. Deotoy had participated in that operation and he testified accordingly. Pat. Deotoy had also stated that appellant had admitted taking the
child and leaving him with the Felipe spouses. His testimony on this particular point was not disputed by appellant; appellant herself testified to
that effect. Pat. Callos' statement that appellant had reiterated while she was under investigation, that she had "sold" the child to the Felipe
spouses was not hearsay in so far as the simple fact that appellant had made certain oral statements to Pat. Callos was concerned. The trial court
had observed the demeanor of Pats. Deotoy and Callos while testifying in open court and had pronounced them to be credible witnesses.12 We
find no basis for disregarding their testimony as to what appellant had uttered in their presence.13 The two peace officers became involved in this
case in the course of performing their duty to assist the aggrieved parents in recovering their missing child. Appellant did not show any evil motive
on their part to falsify the truth and falsely impute to her, whom they met for the first time on this case, the commission of a grave offense.14
Finally, appellant's affixing her thumbmark on Exhibit E (the Agreement with the Felipe spouses) and receiving money from Mr. and Mrs. Felipe
("for her child"; Exhibit D) are particulars which corroborated the testimony of the two police officers as to what appellant had stated in their
presence, and which render her claim that she had merely inadvertently failed to return Hazel to his parents, impossible to accept.

Appellant concluded her Brief with a plea that should her conviction be affirmed, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon her
would be too harsh because her illicit act was really the result of the bitterness she felt over the betrayal and humiliation inflicted on her by her
husband, the brother of Lourdes Elpedes.15 The Solicitor General, in his own Brief, concurs with this view:

The record, however, shows that appellant had no intention to commit so grave a crime. After she was found, she voluntarily surrendered and
accompanied the police and the minor's parents to Intramuros, Manila and later to Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, where the minor was later recovered.
Although she was alleged to have received P250.00 from the Felipes when she left the minor with them, still appellant's previous admissions and
cooperation with the police show that she did not have a criminal mind or intent to commit so grave an offense. These mitigating circumstances
can not, however, be considered in her favor under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The imposition of a life sentence on appellant under these
circumstances would indeed be too harsh, considering further that she can not read and write, and had no educational background whatsoever.

It is therefore recommended that after partial service of sentence, appellant be recommended for an early pardon, if so entitled under the law.16

We agree that in this particular case, the penalty normally imposed for kidnapping and similar offenses appears too harsh. The record does not
indicate that Hazel Elpedes has been injured emotionally or physically by his experience. We believe the trial court's award of moral damages in
favor of Hazel's parents was proper as reparation for the three days of anxiety and mental anguish which they suffered before the recovery of their
child the amount, however, should be increased from P2,000.00 to P5,000.00. We believe the degree of malice exhibited by the appellant, an
unlettered woman, in committing the offense here involved does not warrant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, particularly because to date, she
has already spent seven years in prison.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court dated 14 September 1987 imposing the penalty of life imprisonment (should be reclusion perpetua)
upon the appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the award of moral damages in favor of Frank and Lourdes Elpedes is hereby increased to
P5,000.00. Pursuant to the authority granted to it under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court recommends, through the Secretary of
Justice, to the President of the Philippines that executive clemency be extended to appellant Lilia Gutierrez as a means of mitigating the undue
harshness of the criminal law in this particular case.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143644. August 14, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUBIROSA PASTRANA y TEFORA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, convicting accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana y Tefora of
the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The information filed against accused-appellant reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about March 16, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then entrusted with the custody of one WILLY SIASON Y
GARPEN, 2 a minor child, nine (9) years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and detain said Willy Siason y Garpen,
by then and there taking and carrying him away and deliberately failed to restore him to his mother or guardian.

Contrary to law. 3

When arraigned on April 7, 1999, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. 4 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The antecedent facts reveal that complainant Erma Postejo was then working as a domestic helper in Canada. She has four children namely, Jenny,
Doroteo, Aresola, and 9-year old Willy Garpen, Jr., her son by a common-law-relationship. 5

Sometime in January 1997, while in Canada, Erma was introduced by her sister, Elma Saludarez 6 to spouses Leopoldo and Rebecca Frias who
informed her that their daughter, Accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana of Tondo, Manila, can help process Willy’s travel documents to Canada.
Erma agreed to hand the processing of her son’s papers to accused-appellant and consequently sent her, on various occasions, Canadian dollars
equivalent to a total of P18,300.00. 7

On February 15, 1997, Accused-appellant went to the house of Erma at 1229 Sampaguita St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City and introduced herself to
the children of Erma as the one who will work out the processing of their travel documents to Canada. 8

In one of the telephone conversations of Erma and accused-appellant, the latter informed Erma that Willy was suffering from acute bronchitis.
Thus, Erma sent P5,610.00 to accused-appellant with the instruction that P3,000.00 thereof should be given to her other son, Doroteo, and the
balance to be spent for Willy’s medical treatment. Accused-appellant, however, gave Doroteo only P2,500.00 and not P3,000.00 as instructed by
Erma. 9

On March 16, 1997, Accused-appellant fetched Willy and Aresola from Caloocan and brought them to her apartment in Tondo, for the purpose of
bringing Willy to the hospital. On March 17, 1997, Aresola went home to attend her classes. That same day, Erma called up accused-appellant who
informed her that she was not able to bring Willy to the hospital because she used the money to pay her personal obligations. 10

On March 19, 1997, Erma learned that Willy had already been treated and that accused-appellant demanded P4,000.00 for the alleged expenses
she incurred for Willy’s medical treatment. Accused-appellant also told Erma that the tap water in Tondo is not safe for Willy, thus, she asked her
to send P60,000.00 to purchase a water purifier. Likewise, Accused-appellant requested financial assistance from Erma for her job application in
Singapore. Erma, however, refused to transmit the amounts asked by accused-appellant and ordered her to return Willy to Caloocan but the latter
ignored her. 11

On March 25, 1997, Erma found out from Aresola that accused-appellant did not return Willy to Caloocan. Aresola then tried to contact accused-
appellant in Tondo, but she was told that she has left her apartment. 12

On March 27, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., Accused-appellant went to Caloocan and informed Doroteo that Willy was missing. He was allegedly last
seen playing inside her apartment in the morning of March 26, 1997. They searched for Willy but their efforts were fruitless. 13

On April 24, 1997, Erma returned to the Philippines to look for her son. Through the help of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC),
Erma discovered that, contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, Willy was not actually treated by Dr. Rebecca Nakpil Miranda. 14

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charges against her. She testified that she resided in an apartment in Tondo, Manila, and used to work
as a liaison officer of a travel agency. Sometime in February 1997, she received a letter from her parents in Canada, requesting her to help Erma
Postejo in the procurement of the travel papers of her son, Willy Garpen. On February 15, 1997, she went to the house of Erma Postejo in
Caloocan, and introduced herself to the children of Erma. On March 16, 1997, she took Willy to her apartment in Tondo for the purpose of bringing
him to Mary Johnston Hospital, where he was treated by Dr. Rebecca Nakpil Miranda for acute bronchitis. On various occasions, she received the
total amounts of P18,000.00 and P5,610.00 from Erma for the expenses of Willy. On March 26, 1997, Willy disappeared. She allegedly last saw him
playing inside their apartment that morning. 15

On the same day, she reported Willy’s disappearance to the authorities and did her best to find him. The following day, March 27, 1997, she went
to Erma’s relatives in Caloocan and informed them that Willy was missing. They searched for Willy but to no avail. 16

On May 11, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The decretal portion thereof reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Rubirosa Pastrana, y Tefora, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences her to suffer reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided
by law and to pay the costs. On the civil liability of the accused she is ordered to pay the complainant moral damages and nominal damages in the
sum of P500,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully
paid.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED. 17

Hence, the instant appeal based on the following assignment of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF WILLY SIASON Y GARPEN (sic) (WILLY).

II

ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF WILLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED
KIDNAPPED, DETAINED AND/OR DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE WILLY TO HIS MOTHER OR GUARDIAN.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FOCUSING ON PERCEIVED WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE INSTEAD OF DETERMINING WHETHER THE PROSECUTION’S
EVIDENCE IS STRONG ENOUGH TO MEET THE REQUISITE STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED TO PAY COMPLAINANT P500,000.00 MORAL DAMAGES AND P100,000.00 NOMINAL
DAMAGES, WITH INTEREST THEREON AT 6% PER ANNUM FROM DATE OF THE JUDGMENT UNTIL FULL PAYMENT. 18

Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is
entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his
parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere negligence — it must be premeditated,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. 19

In the case at bar, there is no question that accused-appellant was entrusted with the custody of 9-year old Willy. Erma and her children trusted
accused-appellant that they sent her money for the processing of Willy’s travel documents, and more importantly, they allowed Willy to stay in her
apartment. Regardless of whether Willy stayed in accused-appellant’s apartment permanently or temporarily, the first element of the offense
charged is satisfied because during said period Willy was entrusted to accused-appellant who undertook the responsibility of seeing to it that he
was well-taken care of.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

As to the second element, Accused-appellant contends that her failure to return Willy was never deliberate inasmuch as her inability to return him
to his mother and/or guardian was due to his disappearance which was definitely beyond her control.

The contention is without merit. It was actually her failure to heed Erma’s order on March 19, 1997 to return Willy to their residence in Sampaguita
St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City, that consummated the offense. We agree with the finding of the trial court that accused-appellant deliberately
failed to return Willy in order to use him as a pawn when her demands were turned down by Erma. The willfulness of accused-appellant’s omission
is adequately established by the following circumstances, to wit: 1) accused-appellant’s representation that she had Willy treated by Dr. Rebecca
Nakpil Miranda of Mary Johnston Hospital which was found to be false; 2) accused-appellant’s act of giving Doroteo P2,500.00 and not P3,000.00
as instructed by Erma; 3) accused-appellant’s use for her personal indebtedness of the money sent by Erma and her demand for additional
P4,000.00 allegedly for the hospital expenses of Willy; 4) accused-appellant’s demand of P60,000.00 for the installation of a water purifier in her
apartment allegedly for Willy’s safety, and for additional money for her job application in Singapore; and 5) the lapse of seven days during which
accused-appellant willfully failed to return Willy to Caloocan, which is only an hour away from her residence in Tondo, until his disappearance.

Evidently, Accused-appellant deliberately ignored Erma’s instruction to return Willy to Caloocan so she can use him as a pawn to demand money.
She had 7 days from the time she was ordered by Erma on March 19, 1997, until March 26, 1997 when Willy mysteriously disappeared, to bring
him to Caloocan but she stubbornly refused to return him. It was this deliberate failure of accused-appellant to return custody of Willy to his
relatives that gave rise to her culpability under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the disappearance of Willy and accused-appellant’s
inability to return him to Caloocan by reason thereof has no bearing on the crime charged as it was her willful disobedience to Erma’s order that
consummated the crime. Accused-appellant’s self-serving denial cannot prevail over the prosecution witnesses’ positive testimony disproving her
representations. As observed by the trial court, her "demeanor and attitude . . . on the witness stand had given [the court] the impression that,
unlike the complainant and the other prosecution witnesses, [she] was not sincere, straightforward and truthful." 20

Then too, the Court is not convinced of accused-appellant’s argument that the information filed against her is defective because it states that the
crime was committed on March 16, 1997 when in fact, Willy disappeared on March 26, 1997. To repeat, the disappearance of Willy on March 26,
1997 is not material to the crime charged. The first element of the crime was met on March 16, 1997, when accused-appellant took custody of
Willy and the second requisite attached on March 19, 1997, when accused-appellant deliberately failed to return Willy. Furthermore, the objection
to the information should have been raised by accused-appellant before she entered her plea if she truly believed that the information failed to
conform substantially with the prescribed form. Failure to do so is deemed a waiver of such ground. 21

In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment
of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the
different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood. 22 In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial court’s finding that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit.
Considering that accused-appellant’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court correctly imposed upon her the penalty of
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.chanrob1es virtua1 law library

In People v. Bernardo, 23 the Court held that Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly analogous to cases of illegal and arbitrary detention or
arrest which justify the award of moral damages as provided for in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Likewise, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code,
nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Conformably, the Court sustains the trial court’s award of
damages but reduces the amount of moral damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and the nominal damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.

The award of interest on damages is proper and allowed under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, which states that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest
as part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, convicting accused-appellant Rubirosa
Pastrana y Tefora of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that the awards of moral and nominal damages are reduced to P100,000.00, and P50,000.00, respectively, with legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum from May 11, 2000, the date of the judgment of the trial court.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 3241 March 16, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS CABANAG, defendant-appellant.

TRACEY, J.:

The accused, an Igorot, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya of the crime of unlawful detention, under article 481 of the
Penal Code, which punishes "any private person who shall lock up or detain another or in any way deprive him of his liberty."

An Igorot orphan girl called Gamaya, 13 years of age was taken from the possession of her grandmother, Ultagon, in the rancheria of Anao, in the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, by one Buyag, also an Igorot; whether this was done with or against the will of the grandmother is not altogether clear
in the evidence. We accept the version least favorable to the accused — that of the child — who testified that in the daytime Buyag came to the
house and took her away, although the grandmother objected, saying "Do not take off that little girl," but not speaking when she went away. The
man brought her to his house, about a half mile distant, where she was not confined, but on the contrary was allowed to go back alone to her
grandmother, with whom she would spend a little while, returning the same day. She testified that on last evening, the grandmother was angry and
did not wish her to go, but did not prevent her. According to her recollection she remained with Buyag, in the vicinity of her grandmother's
residence, some two or three months.

Buyag testified that more than two years before, in order to help the family after the father's death and for the purpose of keeping the child at
home, he had bought her for three pigs, twenty-five hens, two measures of rice, and a cloak worth two pigs, from her mother, with whom she
remained until the third year, when (her mother presumably having died) she was brought away by one Eusebio, at the instance of himself and
another Igorot named YogYog, who had furnished part of the purchase price. Together they instructed Eusebio to sell her for a carabao and 50
pesos. Eusebio, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and sold her to the accused, Tomas Cabanag, for 100 pesos.

In respect to this last sale, the stories of Tomas, Antonia, and the girl substantially agree. Cabanag had previously been instructed to buy a girl by
one Mariano Lopez of Caoayan, to whom after a few days Gamaya was delivered in return for the price, which appears to have been 200 pesos. In
his hands she remained for about two months until she was taken away by an officer of Constabulary. Afterwards this prosecution was instituted.
Although Gamaya made objection to leaving the house of Cabanag she appears to have gone without actual constraint and at no time in any of
these places was she physically restrained of her liberty; she was not under lock or key or guard, went into the street to play, returned at will, and
was not punished or ill used in any way, but was employed about the household tasks; in short, she appears to have been treated by Mariano
Lopez as a household servant and to have been well earned for while in the custody of the accused.

It is proved in the case that it is an Igorot custom to dispose of children to pay the debts of their fathers, the transaction in the native language
being termed a sale, and the defendant appears to have engaged in the business of buying in Nueva Vizcaya children to sell in the lowlands of
Isabela.

In his sentence, the judge below said:

However much may be said in extension of the alleged custom among the ignorant Igorots of seizing and abducting children for the sale and even
in selling their own children voluntarily, there is nothing in all this to palliate or extenuate the conduct of the accused in this case.

The Congress of the United States has declared that human slavery shall not exist in these Islands and while no law, so far as I can discover, has yet
been passed either defining slavery in these Island of fixing a punishment for those who engage in this inhuman practice as dealers, buyers, sellers
or derivers, the facts established in this case show conclusively that the child Gamaya was by the defendant forcibly and by fraud, deceit and
threats unlawfully deprived of her liberty and that his object and purpose was an unlawful and illegal one, to wit, the sale of the child, for money,
into human slavery. This constitutes the crime of detencion ilegal, defined and penalized by article 481 of the Penal Code and this court finds the
defendant guilty and charged in the information.

There are neither extenuating nor aggravating circumstances found in the case.

The court therefore sentence the accused, Tomas Cabanag, to eight years and one day of prision mayor and to pay the costs of this instance with
the accessories of the law.

This sentence can not be sustained. There can be no unlawful detention under article 481 of the Penal Code without confinement of or restraint of
person, such as did not exist in the present case. (U.S. vs. Herrera, March 28, 1904, 3 Phil. Rep., 515.)

Under the complaint for this crime it is possible to convict for coaccion upon proof of the requisites of that offense (U.S. vs. Quevengco, 2 Phil.
Rep., 412), but among those requisites is that of the violence through force or intimidation, even under the liberal rule of our jurisprudence (U.S.
vs. Quevengco, supra; U.S. vs. Vega, 2 Phil. Rep., 167; U.S. vs. Ventosa,1 4 Off. Gaz, 573); consequently the charge of coaccion against the accused
can not be sustained upon the evidence.

The Penal Code, chapters 2 and 3, title articles 484 to 490, provides punishment for those who carry off children under 7 years of age or those who
devote children under 16 years of age to certain hazardous occupations; but none of these articles can apply to the case before us, except article
486, which punishes him who induces a child over 7 years of age to abandon the house of its parent or guardian. Under this article it is possible that
on full proof of the facts, Buyag might be held, but not the accused. It was not design of the law to prevent parents or grandparents from devoting
their children to customary work, nor from receiving compensation for such work in wages or otherwise. Such agreements binding out minors are
sanctioned in most countries, usually however, subject to stipulations for their welfare expressly prescribed by statute. In the absence of proof of
what the agreement of the parties or the custom of the people called for in respect of the use, treatment, and care of the child, the term of her
service and her final disposition, and particularly in respect of the maintenance of her relations with her grandmother and the prospect of an
ultimate return to her, it is not possible to hold that the arrangement was a criminal or even an illicit one. The name applied to it by the custom of
the Igorots is not enough to establish that in truth and in effect it was a sale, or anything more than a contract for services. While there is thing
more than a contract for services. While there is much in this practice to condemn, we do not feel it to be our province to strain the law in order to
bring this local custom of this mountain people to an end. This condition may present matter for the consideration of the legislature but not for
action by the criminal courts. Not even the abhorrent species of traffic apparently carried on by the accused justifies a sentence not authorized by
law.

The judge below quotes the Bill of Rights of the Philippines contained in the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declaring that "neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in said Islands." This
constitutional provision is self-acting whenever the nature of a case permits and any law or contract providing for servitude of a person against his
will is forbidden and is void. For two obvious reasons, however, it fails to reach the facts before us:

First. The employment or custody of a minor with the consent or sufferance of the parents or guardian, although against the child's own will, can
not be considered involuntary servitude.

Second. We are dealing not with a civil remedy but with a criminal charge, in relation to which the Bill of Rights defines no crime and provides no
punishment. Its effects can not be carried into the realm of criminal law without an act of the legislature.

It is not unnatural that existing penal laws furnish no punishment for involuntary servitude as a specific crime. In the Kingdoms of the Spanish
Peninsula, even in remote times, slavery appears to have taken but a surface root and to have been speedily cast out, the institution not having
been known therein for centuries. It is only in relation to Spain's possessions in the American Indies that we find regulations in respect to slavery. In
general they do not apply in their terms to the Philippine Islands where the ownership of man by his fellow-man, wherever it existed, steadily
disappeared as Christianity advanced. Among the savage tribes in remote parts, such customs as flourished-were not the subject of legislation but
were left to be dealt with by religious and civilizing influences. Such of the Spanish laws as touched the subject were ever humane and radical. In
defining slavery, law 1, title 21 of the fourth Partida, calls it "a thing against the law of nature;" and rule 2, title 34 of the seventh Partida says: "It is
a thing which all men naturally abhor." These were the sentiments of the thirteenth century.

To sum up this case, there is no proof of slaver or even of involuntary servitude, inasmuch as it has not been clearly shown that the child has been
disposed of against the will of her grandmother or has been taken altogether out of her control. If the facts in this respect be interpreted
otherwise, there is no law applicable here, either of the United States or of the Archipelago, punishing slavery as a crime. The child was not
physically confined or restrained so as to sustain a conviction for illegal detention, nor are the acts of the accused brought within any of the
provisions of the law for the punishment of offenses against minors; consequently the conviction in this case must be reversed, in accordance with
the recommendation of the Attorney-General, with costs de oficio, and the prisoner is acquitted.

After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the case be remained to the court from
whence it came for proper action. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite City,
convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594),
to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the
second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prison correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were
terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the
main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla
boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin,
dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine
Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian
population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon
went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval
station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy
Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the
station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted
to blow off steam."

At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive about
his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the
station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told
Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted,
"Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After
Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.

The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and
posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina
mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile,
Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lâwphi1.ñet

On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation,
respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 24, 1961.

DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal

BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral
Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant,
in the presence of and within hearing of several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned
complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as
follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a whore."

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE

Complainant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the prosecution
moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel
objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment "would
affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.

From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment of the
information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave
threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could
legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting petitioner
of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting
petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only.

On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by leave and
at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of
Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.

After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of
the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the
infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence,
petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the
threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the
crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to
require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the
Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides
for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the
deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was
merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.

Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in
proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the
amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.

The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of
the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in
convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only.

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats
were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2
Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he
stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of
anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was
correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against
Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:

The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to
the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In
other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the
letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court
believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements
therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from
the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.

The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of
the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against
petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Santos, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5671 August 24, 1910
BENITO DE LOS REYES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VERONICA ALOJADO, defendant-appellee.

TORRES, J.:

On or about January 22, 1905, Veronica Alojado received, as a loan, from Benito de los Reyes that the sum P67 .60, for the purpose of paying a debt
she owed to Olimpia Zaballa. It was agreed between Alojado and Reyes that the debtor should remain as a servant in the house and in the service
of her creditor, without any renumeration whatever, until she should find some one who would furnish her with the said sum where with to repeat
the loan. The defendant, Veronica Alojado, afterwards left the house of the plaintiff, on March 12, 1906, without having paid him her debt, nor did
she do so at any subsequent date, notwithstanding his demands. The plaintiff, therefore, on the 15th of march, 1906, filed suit in the court of the
justice of the peace of Santa Rosa, La Laguna, against Veronica Alojado to recover the said sum or, in a contrary case, to compel her to return to his
service. The trial having been had, the justice of the peace, on April 14, 1906, rendered judgment whereby he sentenced the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff the sum claimed and declared that, in case the debtor should be insolvent, she should be obliged to fulfill the agreement between her
and the plaintiff. The costs of the trial were assessed against the defendant.

The defendant appealed from the said judgment to the Court of First Instance to which the plaintiff, after the case had been docketed by the clerk
of court, made a motion on May 4, 1906, requesting that the appeal interposed by the defendant be disallowed, with the costs of both instances
against her. The grounds alleged in support of this motion. were that the appeal had been filed on the sixth day following that when judgment was
rendered in the trial, on April 14th, and that it, therefore, did not come within the period of the five days prescribed by section 76 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as proven by the certificate issued by the justice of the peace of Santa Rosa. The Court of First Instance, however, by order of July
16, 1906, overruled the motion of the plaintiff-appellee, for the reasons therein stated, namely, that the defendant was not notified of the
judgment rendered in the case on April 14th of that year until the 16th of the same month, and the appeal having been filed four days later, on the
20th, it could having seen that the five days specified by section 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not expired. The plaintiff was advised to
reproduce his complaint within ten days, in order that due procedure might he had thereupon.

The plaintiff took exception to the aforementioned order and at the same time reproduced the complaint he had filed in the court of the justice of
the peace, in which, after relating to the facts hereinbefore stated, added that the defendant, besides the sum above-mentioned, had also received
from the plaintiff, under the same conditions, various small amounts between the dates of January 22, 1905, and March 10, 1906, aggregating
altogether P11.97, and that they had not been repaid to him. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered sentencing the defendant to comply
with the said contract and to pay to the plaintiff the sums referred to, amounting in all to P79.57, and that until this amount should have been in
paid, the defendant should remain gratuitously in the service of plaintiff's household, and that she should pay the costs of the trial.

The defendant, in her written answer of August 15, 1906, to the aforesaid complaint, denied the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
complaint and alleged that, although she had left the plaintiff's service, it was because the latter had paid her no sum whatever for the services she
had rendered in his house. The defendant likewise denied the conditions expressed in paragraph 4 of the complaint, averring that the effects
purchased, to the amount of P11.97, were in the possession of the plaintiff, who refused to deliver them to her. She therefore asked that she be
absolved from the complaint and that the plaintiff be absolved from the complaint the wages due her for the services she had rendered.

The case came to trial on October 19, 1906, and, after the production of testimony by both parties, the judge, on November 21st of the same year,
rendered judgment absolving the defendant from the complain, with the costs against the plaintiff, and sentencing the latter to pay to the former
the sum of P2.43, the balance found to exist between the defendant's debt of P79.57 and the wages due her by the plaintiff, which amounted to
P82. The plaintiff, on the 6th of December, filed a written exception to the judgment aforesaid through the regular channels, and moved for a new
trial on the ground that the findings of fact set forth in the judgment were manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence. This motion was
overruled on the 17th of the same month, to which exception was taken by the appellant, who afterwards filed the proper bill of exceptions, which
was approved, certified, and forwarded to the clerk of this court.

The present suit, initiated in a justice of the peace court and appealed to the Court of First Instance of La Laguna at a time prior to the enactment of
Act No. 1627, which went into effect on July 1, 1907, which limited to two instances the procedure to be observed in verbal actions, concerns the
collection of certain sum received as a loan by the defendant from the plaintiff, and of the wages earned by the former for services rendered as a
servant in the said plaintiff's house.

Notwithstanding the denial of the defendant, it is a fact clearly proven, as found in the judgment appealed from, that the plaintiff did deliver to
Hermenegildo de los Santos the sum of P67.60 to pay a debt was paid by De los Santos with the knowledge and in behalf of the said defendant
who, of her free will, entered the service of the plaintiff and promised to pay him as soon as she should find the money wherewith to do so.

The duty to pay the said sum, as well as that of P11.97 delivered to the defendant in small amounts during the time that she was in the plaintiff's
house, is unquestionable, inasmuch as it is a positive debt demandable of the defendant by her creditor. (Arts. 1754, 1170, Civil Code.) However,
the reason alleged by the plaintiff as a basis for the loan is untenable, to wit, that the defendant was obliged to render service in his house as a
servant without remuneration whatever and to remain therein so long as she had not paid her debt, inasmuch as this condition is contrary to law
and morality. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.)

Domestic services are always to be remunerated, and no agreement may subsist in law in which it is stipulated that any domestic service shall be
absolutely gratuitous, unless it be admitted that slavery may be established in this country through a covenant entered into between the interested
parties.

Articles 1583, 1584, and 1585 of the Civil Code prescribe rules governing the hiring of services of domestics servants, the conditions of such hire,
the term during which the service may rendered and the wages that accrue to the servant, also the duties of the latter and of the master. The first
of the articles cited provides that a hiring for life by either of the contracting parties is void, and, according to the last of three articles just
mentioned, besides what is prescribed in the preceding articles with regard to masters and servants, the provisions of special laws and local
ordinances shall be observed.
During the regime of the former sovereignty, the police regulations governing domestic service, of the date of September 9, 1848, were in force,
article 19 of which it is ordered that all usurious conduct toward the servants and employees of every class is prohibited, and the master who,
under pretext of an advance of pay or of having paid the debts or the taxes of his servant, shall have succeeded in retaining the latter in his service
at his house, shall be compelled to pay to such servant all arrears due him and any damages he may have occasioned him, and the master shall also
be fined.

The aforementioned article 1585 of the Civil Code undoubtedly refers to the provisions of the regulations just cited.

When legal regulations prohibit even a usurious contract and all abuses prejudicial to subordinates and servant, in connection with their salaries
and wages, it will be understood at once that the compact whereby service rendered by a domestic servant in the house of any inhabitant of this
country is to be gratuitous, is in all respects reprehensible and censurable; and consequently, the contention of the plaintiff, that until the
defendant shall have paid him her debt she must serve him in his house gratuitously is absolutely inadmissible.

The trial record discloses no legal reason for the rejection of the findings of fact and of law contained in the judgment appealed from, nor for an
allowance of the errors attributed appealed from, nor for an allowance of the errors attributed thereto; on the contrary, the reasons hereinabove
stated show the propriety of the said judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, and accepting those set forth in the judgment appealed from, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm and we hereby affirm
the said judgment, with the costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-2690, January 01, 1949 ]
BARTOLOME CAUNCA, IN BEHALF OF HIS COUSIN ESTELITA FLORES Y CAUNCA, PETITIONER, VS. JULIA SALAZAR, OWNER OF FAR EASTERN
EMPLOYMENT BUREAU AND ESTRELLA DE JUSTO, RESPONDENTS.
PERFECTO, J.:

DECISION

Estelita Flores, 21, orphan of father and mother, illiterate, was brought from her native torni, Buruanga, Capiz, by Estrella Justo, maid recruiter, to
Manila, where she arrived on December 24, 1948, and stayed in the house of Julia Salazar at 1343 Felix Huertas St., where the latter is running the
Far Eastern Employment Bureau.

On December 26, 1948, when her cousin Bartolome Caunca went to pay her a visit, Estelita manifested her earnest desire to go along with him, but
was prevented by Julia Salazar and Estrella Justo, both demanding the condition that the sum of P83.85 advanced for the fare and other
transportation expenses of Estelita from Buruanga to Manila be paid first before she could leave the house of Julia Salazar.

Although there is no evidence that any physical force has been used to prevent her from leaving the house, Estelita failed to leave it. Bartolome
testified that, although Estelita was embracing him in her desire to go with him, he/was unable to take her with him because of respondents'
opposition and of the many peoolo in the house. Considering the crass ignorance of Estelita, her low mentality, her apparent undernoursihment
and weak vitality, her pusillanimous character, she is so timid that she hardly dared to speak during her testimony, given in Hiligaynon, the only
language she knows,--there should not be any doubt that by sheer mental anu social superiority. respondent Julia Salazar is an able and very
intelligent businesswoman, respondents exerted moral compulsion strong enough to have effectively deprived Estelita of her personal liberty and
of the freedom to go along with her cousin.

Bartolome promised Estelita to take steps to seek her release and filed the petition giving rise to this proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus.

The writ was issued on the very morning when the petition was filed on December 31, 1948, ordering respondents to bring to this Court the person
of Estelita at 2 o'clock that afternoon, the hour set for the hearing of the case. At said hearing both Estelita and respondent Julia Salasar failed to
appear. The latter, according to Estrella Justo, brought Estelita that morning to Silang, Cavite, and would not return until the evening. Continuation
of the hearing was set for January 1, 1949, at 9 o'clock in the morning.

Julia Salazar appeared at said hour and explained that she had no sufficient time to bring Estelita, because the latter was left in Silang, and
requested for time to bring the girl to this Court, She was granted time to bring the girl at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of January 1, 1949, and at the
hearing which started at said hour the testimonies of Estelita and Julia Salazar, as the last witnesses, were taken.

Upon the evidence, there is no question that Estelita is restrained of her personal liberty and not free to go with her cousin at her will. The fact that
no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of Julia Salazar, at 1343 Felix Huertas St., or to stay in Silang, Cavite, in the house of
Julia Salazar's cousin, a place that Estelita could not identify better than just describing it as a place very far from Manila, does not make less real
the deprivation of Estelita's personal freedom which includes the freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom
to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the
mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of
another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical
coercion.

On the hypothesis that Estelita is really indebted in the amount of P83.85, such is not a valid reason for the respondents to obstruct, impede or
interfere with Estelita's desire to leave the house of Julia Salazar and to live in the residence of his cousin Bartolome. Said indebtedness may be
multiplied by thousands or millions, but would not in any way subtract an iota from Estelita's fundamental right to have a free choice of abode.

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee has absolutely no power to curtail the freedom of
movement of said employee. The fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is
no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business can not be controlled by controlling a fundamental human
freedom. Human dignity is not a merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the
province of commerce or any other business enterprise.

In the scale of values, there is no acceptable equivalence between matters involving human dignity and those belonging to the domain of business.
The latter are characterized by transience and precariousness, while the former are the nearest things to what are everlasting, if ever there are
any, in humanity. Human dignity and human freedoms are essentially spiritual, notwithstanding their material manifestations in the external world,
and the universal concept of the spirit is inseparable from the idea of the eternal, of the unlimited by space or time. Money, power, domination,
satisfaction of the pleasures of the flesh, like all lusts, belong to the ephemeral and perishable, an order of things which has no possible equation
with the moral values of the spirit, among which are human freedoms.

The petition is granted and it is accordingly ordered that Estelita Flores be allowed to go with her cousin Bartolome Caunca or to any place of her
choice, and respondents are ordered not to impede, obstruct or, in any way, interfere with such freedom of Estelita Flores.

This decision shall be executed today, January 1, 1949, immediately upon its promulgation at the close of the hearing of this case.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner,
allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino
Gonzal.1

As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code reading as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court the above-named accused, being then the driver and person in charge of an Owner Jeep Toyota bearing Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pilipinas '85,
and without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precautions to avoid damage to property
and injuries to persond (sic), did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and opefate (sic) said Owner Jeep in a careless,
reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, as a result of which said motor vehicle being then driven and operated by him, hit and bumped a
tricycle SUZUki (sic) bearing Plate No. NA-6575 MC Pilipinas '85, driven by Ernesto Reyes y Esguerra and owned by Ernesto Antonel, thereby causing
damage to the Suzuki tricycle in the amount of P7,845.00; and due to the impact the driver and the passengers of a (sic) tricycle Suzuki, sustained
physical injuries which required medical attendance as stated opposite their respective names to wit:

1. Ernesto Reyes — More than thirty (30) days

2. Paulino Gonzal — More than thirty (30) days

3. Patricio Quitalig — Less than nine (9) days

and incapacitated them from performing their customary labor for the same period of time.

which was filed on 10 September 1985 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 64294 and
assigned to Branch 68 thereof; and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of
one's victim reading as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court the above-named accused, being the driver of an owner-type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pil. '85 which hit and bumped a motorized
tricycle with Plate No. NA-6575-MC '85 driven by Ernesto Reyes and as a consequence of which Paulino Gonzal and Ernesto Reyes sustained
physical injuries and lost consciousness, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abandoned (sic) them and failed (sic) to help or
render assistance to them, without justifiable reason.

which was filed on 14 November 1985 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 71) and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2793.

On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of
Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs.

Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila which docketed the appeal as Criminal Case No. 70648.

In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. He
entered a plea of not guilty.2

Petitioner's appeal, Criminal Case No. 70648, was decided on 31 July 1989. The court affirmed with modification the decision appealed from. The
modification consisted merely in the reduction of the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months.3

Still unsatisfied with the new verdict, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals on 31 August 1989 a petition for its review, docketed as C.A.-G.R. CR
No. 07351, assigning therein the following alleged errors:

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, THAT
"THE TRICYCLE DRIVEN BY ERNESTO REYES WAS BUMPED BY THE JEEP DRIVEN BY THE PETITIONER."

II

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG. METRO MANILA, THAT THE
PETITIONER, "LOSING PRESENCE OF MIND AS THE BLOODY SCENARIO WOULD INDUCE IN THE AVERAGE MOTORIST, HE (SIC) OPTED, PERHAPS
INSTINCTIVELY TO HIDE IDENTITY, APPREHENSIVE MAY BE OVER THE ENORMITY OF HIS MISDEMEANOR AND THUS DECIDED (SIC) TO WITHHOLD
ASSISTANCE TO HIS FALLEN VICTIMS."

III

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN DECLARING THAT, "AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISMISS THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF SAID COURT GIVING
CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES" FOR NOT BEING (SIC) SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND CLEARLY THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.

IV

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA,
FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ABANDONMENT UNDER ART. 275, PAR. 2, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND SENTENCING HIM
TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND TO PAY THE COSTS.

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING NULL AND VOID ALL THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG
AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT.4

The Court of Appeals found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in its Decision promulgated on 9 November 1989.5 Pertinently, it ruled:

We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of Art. 275 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to him since the evidence
allegedly shows that it was Ernesto Reyes, the tricycle driver, who negligently caused the accident. Petitioner misses the import of the provision.
The provision punishes the failure to help or render assistance to another whom the offender accidentally wounded or injured. Accidental means
that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen (Moreno, Phil. Law
Dictionary, 1972 ed., p. 7 citing De La Cruz v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., 17 SCRA 559). Consequently, it is enough to show that petitioner
accidentally injured the passengers of the tricycle and failed to help or render them assistance. There is no need to prove that petitioner was
negligent and that it was his negligence that caused the injury. If the factor of criminal negligence is involved, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
will come into play. The last paragraph of Art. 365 provides that "the penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured party such help as may be in his bands to give." Petitioner was charged
under par. 2 of Art. 275 not under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

His motion to reconsider the above decision wherein he strongly urged for reconsideration because:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . We find it hard to visualize that the accused may be penalized twice for an "accident" and another for "recklessness", both of which arose from
the same act. We submit that there could not be a valid charge under Article 275, when, as in the case at bar, there is already a pending charge for
reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. It is our view that the charge under Article 275 presupposes that there is no
other charge for reckless imprudence.

having been denied in the Resolution of 17 May 1990,6 petitioner filed the instant petition.7

Before Us he raises this sole issue:

Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution.
"2. Anyone who shall fail to help another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured" when, he was previously charged with "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries" under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code?8

He maintains the negative view and supports it with the argument that "[f]or the same act, that is, the vehicular collision, one could not be indicted
in two separate informations at the same time based on "accident" and "recklessness', for there is a world of difference between "reckless
imprudence" and "accidentally'." As expanded by him:

. . . since petitioner is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence pending before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila .
. . which offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for
abandonment . . . for having allegedly failed "to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured".9

In Our resolution of 1 August 1990 We required respondents to comment on the petition.

In its Comment filed on 10 September 1990, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, putting the issue
squarely, thus:

. . . whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article
275 of the same Code.

answers it in the negative because said Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect,
invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

In Our resolution of 13 March 1991 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda. Petitioner submitted his on 22 April 199110 while the People moved that its Comment be considered as its memorandum.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually invoking his right against double jeopardy.1âwphi1 He, however, failed to directly
and categorically state it in his petition or deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of the two informations. The
reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so would have been a futile exercise.
When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987,
while his arraignment in the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must
have been arraigned in the previous case.11 In People vs. Bocar, supra., We ruled:

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered,
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez,12 We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may
offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the
other.13

In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun which caused public panic among the people present and
physical injuries to one, informations for physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed. Accused
pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if
one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under
the other.

Since the informations were for separate offenses — the first against a person and the second against public peace and order — one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.

The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses.1âwphi1 The first, Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence
(Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The
second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine
(Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.

Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.14

Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its
presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. The last paragraph of the Article specifically provides:

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in hand to give.

Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information. The information against petitioner in this case does not so allege.

Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under paragraph
2 of Article 275 of the same code which reads:

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured.

The foregoing distinctions satisfy the guidelines We made in People vs. Relova, et al.,15 wherein We held:

It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first
and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily
included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a registration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional
plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of
the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different
from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.

Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the two informations against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is DENIED without pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 534. April 1, 1902. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. CUSTODIO PAYOG ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

The information filed in this case charges the crime of abandonment of children, defined and punished in article 488 of the Penal Code, which is
literally as follows: "He who, being responsible for the rearing and education of a child, should deliver such child to a public establishment or to any
other person without the consent of the person who has placed such child in his care, or the consent of the authorities in defect thereof, shall be
punished by a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."cralaw virtua1aw library

The accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The complainant introduced no evidence in the trial in support of the charge. The only
testimony taken at the trial was that of the defendant Payog, which constitutes the only data upon which we must decide this case.

From this testimony it appears that while Payog was in the forest one day he found a little girl who was all alone, and who told him that her people,
the Negritos, had refused to care for her. He therefore took charge of her and brought her to Manila for the purpose of delivering her to some
person who might care for and support her, he being very poor and without means to do so himself, and that he did deliver the little girl to
Santiago Barcelona, who on this account gave him the sum of 55 pesos as a present. The participation of the other defendant, Domingo Garcia, in
the matter was limited solely, according to Payog, to accompanying him, at his request, to Barcelona’s house.

The court below, considering that the facts shown fall within the sanction of article 488 of the Penal Code above cited, rendered judgment
condemning Payog to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, and Garcia to pay a fine of 3,250 pesetas, with the costs to each one of them in equal parts. Against
this judgment Garcia appealed. Payog consented to the judgment.

Without determining the question as to whether the delivery of the girl by Payog to Santiago Barcelona, under the circumstances and for the
reasons stated in his testimony, does or does not constitute the crime of abandonment of children, defined in the article above cited, as we do not
consider it necessary in disposing of this case, we are of the opinion that the mere fact that Garcia accompanied Payog to Barcelona’s house is not
in itself sufficient to make him responsible for the crime with which he is charged, whether Payog was guilty or not. It does not appear that when
Garcia did this he had any knowledge of how or why it was that the girl in question was in Payog’s possession, nor consequently of any duty which
Payog may have had with respect to the rearing and education of the girl. Among other cases which might be supposed it might very well be that
the girl had been confided by her parents to Payog for the purpose of delivering her to Barcelona, in which case Payog’s action in so doing in
accordance with this request would evidently not be punishable before the law. It is true that these were not the facts, but the accused, Garcia,
was not obliged to know them, nor to investigate them for the purpose of doing what he did, which was simply to point out to Payog the house of
Barcelona and accompany him thereto. In order to render him this service, which certainly was not in itself unlawful, he was under no obligation of
knowing or finding out whether Payog was responsible in the technical sense of the Penal Code for the rearing and education of the girl in
question, or whether he was under any other obligation to keep her in his custody; still less in view of the fact that it does not appear that Payog
communicated to him the purpose for which he desired to see Barcelona when asking Garcia to accompany him to Barcelona’s house.

We therefore decide that the judgment appealed must be reversed, and the accused, Domingo Garcia, acquitted, with the costs of this instance
and one-half of the costs of the court below de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Willard and Ladd, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17332 August 18, 1921
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
OLIMPIO DE PERALTA, defendant-appellant.

VILLAMOR, J.:

About the month of October, 1919, and for sometime previously Cecilio Toledo held the position of president of the "Philippine Marine Union," and
in such capacity, he had the privilege of occupying, as his dwelling, a room of house No. 507 of Jaboneros Street of this city, which was rented to
said association. About the middle of said month of October, Toledo was discharged from the position of president and was succeeded by Olimpio
de Peralta. The latter, for the purpose of looking for a desk glass which he believed was the property of the union, entered the room in question in
the morning of the 16th of the same month. This gave rise to the information for trespass to dwelling against Peralta, in which it is alleged that he
entered the room of Toledo against the will of the occupant. Trial was had and the accused was sentenced to suffer two months and one day of
arresto mayor, to pay a fine 400 pesetas, and costs. From this judgment the present appeal was taken.

Two witnesses for the prosecution, Lucia Matias and Daniel Alvarado, testify as to how the accused entered the room on the day in question. The
former stated that she was inside the room, the door of which was closed, when the accused pushed the door; and that she, upon seeing him
already inside, asked him: "Why did you enter without permission?" to which the accused answered: "I need something in this room," and Lucia
Matias told him not to take away the glass because Toledo was absent. The second witness, Daniel Alvarado, states that he was inside the room
cleaning a phonograph when the accused struck the door and he heard a strong blow which he believes was a kick against the door given by the
accused.

On the other hand, two witnesses for the defense, Bernardo Bildad and Bonifacio Viloria testify similarly that the accused on the day in question,
between half past ten and eleven in the morning, entered the room of Toledo looking for the desk glass in question, accompanied by Lucia Matias
whom he found outside.

After a careful study of the testimony given in the case, we are of the opinion that the accused, after calling at or near the door, pushed it and
without the permission of the occupants entered the room with the object of taking away the desk glass. There is no evidence that Toledo had
expressed his will in the sense of prohibiting the accused Peralta from entering his room, and the mere fact that the latter entered it, without the
permission of the occupant, does not constitute the offense of trespass to dwelling provided for and penalized in article 491 of the Penal Code. In
order that this crime may exist it is necessary that the entrance should be against the express or presumed prohibition of the occupant, and the
lack of permission should not be confused with prohibition. In the decisions of the courts of Spain, as well as in those of this jurisdiction, it has been
held uniformly that this crime is committed when a person enters another's dwelling against the will of the occupant, but not when the entrance is
effected without his knowledge or opposition.

As Groizard says in his commentaries on article 504 of the Penal Code of Spain, corresponding to article 491 of that of the Philippines: "It is not
necessary, in the ordinary life of men, in order to call at the door of a house or enter it, to obtain previous permission from the owner who lives in
it. With the utmost good faith may a person, to whom entrance has not been denied beforehand, suppose that the owner of the room has no
objection to receiving him in it." And in the present case it is to be supposed that the members of the "Philippine Marine Union," among them the
accused, had something familiarity which warrants entrance into the room occupied by the president of the association, particularly when we
consider the hour at which the act in question happened (between half past ten and eleven in the morning), the fact that the door of the room was
not barricaded or locked with a key, and the circumstance that the room in question was part of the house rented to said association.

For the reason above stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Olimpio de Peralta is acquitted, with costs of both instances
de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson, Araullo, Street and Avanceña JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4655 December 19, 1908
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO DIONISIO AND NICOLAS DEL ROSARIO,Defendants-Appellants.

CARSON, J.:

The accused are charged with the crime of allanamiento de morada (forcible entry into the dwelling house of another). The evidence discloses that
at the hour of 9 o'clock on the morning of the 6th day of January, 1908, the defendants entered a house situated on Calle Santo Cristo, in the
district of Binondo, in the city of Manila, by the principal door, which they found half open; that the lower part of the house was at that time
occupied by a Chinaman, named Lin Chio Liong, and the upper portion of the house by a woman named Narcisa de los Santos; that when the
defendants pushed open the door and passed into the house, no opposition of any kind whatever was made to their doing so; that they passed on
up the stairway to the room where Narcisa de los Santos was sitting; that as they entered the house and passed up the stairs, they were seen by
Lim Chio Liong who offered no opposition to their entry into the house or to their going up the stairs, he evidently thinking that they were visitors
of the occupant of the upper portion of the house; that when they reached the upper portion of the house, they were met by the occupant, Narcisa
de los Santos, of whom they made some inquiries as to the whereabouts of another woman, an alleged cousin; that they entered into conversation
with Narcisa de los Santos who invited them to sit down, and that they continued in her rooms for about two hours; that they made inquiries of her
as to whether or not the Chinamen who lived in the house smoked opium; that the woman told them that she did not know, but that, if they
desired so to do, they could wait until the Chinamen came home and talk to them; that the defendants told her that they were secret service men,
and desired to make search for opium; that she offered no opposition and that they then entered the other rooms on the upper floor which they
searched, and in which they found some opium and a pipe; that they questioned the woman as to her name and the name of the Chinaman who
lived there, making notes of the information furnished, and threatening to take everybody in the house to jail; that finally Lin Chio Liong, hearing
the noise, went upstairs, and that when he arrive there, the defendants demanded of him the sum of P50 under threat that if he did not pay the
amount, he would be taken to jail, and fined P500 in court; that the Chinaman told them that he had no money, and tried to escape downstairs;
that they then seized him, and that in the struggle which ensued, his clothes were torn and his watch was broken; that as a result of the
disturbance caused by the dispute between the Chinaman and the defendants, the police entered the house and arrested both the defendants and
the Chinaman; that the defendants, while it is true that they had sought employment as secret service agents, had failed in their efforts to secure
such employment, and were acting wholly on their own initiative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon these facts the trial court convicted the defendant of the crime with which they were charged and sentenced both and each of them to four
years, nine months and ten days of presidio correccional (imprisonment.) chanrobles virtual law library

While the facts proven would appear to be sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a charge of the commission of an assault, and perhaps of
attempted estafa or robbery, we do not think that they warrant a conviction of the crime of forcible entry into the dwelling of another. In the case
of the United States vs. Pedro Dulfo 1 No. 4133, decided August 10, 1908, we held that "it is an essential element of the offense under
consideration, as defined and penalized in the Penal Code, that the entry must have been made without the consent or, more accurately speaking,
against the will of the occupant of the dwelling house, and it is, therefore, the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish this fact, before a
conviction can be had upon a complaint charging its commission;" and in that decision we cited the decision of the supreme court of Spain of the
28th of September, 1876, holding that "the preposition contra (against) which is used in the article of the Penal Code defining the crime
allanamiento de morada signifies negativa, oposicion manifiesta que se haga alguna cosa" (negation, manifest opposition to the doing of
something.) chanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, there is no proof whatever of opposition on the part of the owners of the house to the entry of the defendants. On the contrary,
the action of the occupant of the lower part of the house in permitting the defendants to enter the house and go upstairs without objection, was at
least an implied permission to enter if there was no objection on the part of the woman occupying the upper floor of the house; and her conduct in
entering into amicable conversation with the defendants when they came upstairs, and later inviting them to sit down and await the return of the
other persons living there, leaves no room for doubt that the entry of the defendants was not against her will and that she interposed no objection
or opposition to their doing so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That trial court was of opinion that it is but reasonable to infer that had the occupant of the lower part of the house known the intention of the
defendants when he saw them enter the door and go upstairs, he would have protested vigorously, and that "in the light of what followed it would
seem that their entrance "is to be presumed" to have been as much "against the will of the occupants" as that in the case of the United States vs.
Clauck" (6 Phil. Rep., 486); in support of his conclusion the trial judge cites the latter case and the case of the United States vs. Arceo (3 Phil. Rep.,
381).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts, however, in the case at bar are in no wise similar to those in the cases cited. In the case of The United States vs. Clauck, the defendant
after vainly endeavoring to secure an entrance through the locked door of a dwelling by knocking and demanding admission, kicked the door down
and thus forced his way into the house. Manifestly such an entrance is against the will of the occupants, and the defendant could not pretend to
have had either their express or implied permission to do what he did. So in the case of The United States vs. Arceo, the evidence showed that the
accused, armed with guns and bolos, entered the house of the complaining witness, "without first obtaining the permission of any person," and
"immediately after" entering the house, wounded the owner with a bolo, and then stole some money and carried away a woman who was living
there. There could be no question of express or implied consent to the entry of the accused in that case, for where one enters a dwelling for the
purpose of committing a robbery and meets with immediate resistance resulting in the physical injury of the occupant no one can doubt that such
entry was against the will of the occupant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court appears to have been of opinion that there is some conflict in the doctrine laid down in these cases and that announced in the case
of The United States vs. Agas (4 Phil. Rep., 129), but we think that an examination of the facts set out in the decisions in those various cases and of
the judgments based thereon, together with the other cases involving the crime of forcible entry decided by this court, will disclose that we have
uniformly held that it is an essential requisite in the commission of this crime that the entry may be against the will of the occupant, and that this
fact must be proven by competent testimony in order to determine the existence of the crime. (U.S. vs. Agas, supra.) But that it is not necessary to
prove that there was an express or a formal prohibition of the entry of the accused on the part of the occupant, in order to establish the fact that
an entry was made against his will; so that proof that the entry was made with violence and without his consent is sufficient to establish the fact.
(U.S. vs. Clauck, supra.) And that proof that one who entered a house without the consent of the occupant, met with resistance immediately after
entering, and maintained or attempted to maintain his position with violence is sufficient to establish the fact that the entry was against the will of
the occupant, notwithstanding the fact that he may be have succeeded in crossing the threshold without violence; the entry to the dwelling in such
cases being incomplete until one has gained a position inside. (U.S. vs. Arceo, Phil. Rep., 381.) chanrobles virtual law library

As was said in the case of The United States vs. Dulfo, supra, "the doctrine laid down in these cases in no wise relieves the prosecution of the
burden of affirmatively establishing that entry was made against the prohibition of the occupant either express or implied," and certainly they do
not support a holding that were one tacitly or expressly give his consent to the entry of another, such entry will nevertheless been presumed to
have been against his will, if it appears that it is improbable that he would have given his consent had he known certain facts which he discovered
later, or had he been able to anticipate certain incidents which occurred long after entry had been gained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In the case under consideration, the accused gained access to the house with the tacit if not express consent of the occupants, and it was not until
they had been in the house for more than two hours, and then only after they attempted to impersonate police officers, that any objection
whatever was made to their presence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated February 12, 1895, is also cited in support of the judgment of conviction of the trial court in the
case, but we think that the doctrine laid down in that decision does not go beyond that laid down in the above cited decisions of this court, and in
no wise sustains the judgment below. It appears that the accused and his companions in that case seized the opportunity afforded by the unlocking
and opening of the door of the house of the complaining witness, on the departure of some visitors, to rush tumultuously and uninvited into the
house, with their heads masked or disguised with shawls, and that on entering they put out the light and smashed the lamp, and other furniture in
the house, immediately thereafter making their escape, while the mistress of the house and her daughter ran to the street carrying and calling for
help. These facts were held to conclusively establish the fact that the entry was made against the will of the occupant, the court at the same time
reiterating its holding in former decisions that this fact is an essential element of the crime, but adding that to prove that this fact it is not
necessary to prove a prior formal prohibition on the part of the occupant, it being sufficient if his opposition can be deduced from the facts
proven.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We do not question the doctrine laid down in this decision, and we agree that to prove that an entry is against the will of the occupant it is not
necessary that the entry should be preceded by an express prohibition, provided the opposition of the occupant is clearly established by the
circumstances under which the entry was made; but we hold that the facts or circumstances from which in a given case the opposition of the
occupant may be inferred must have been in existence prior to or at the time of the entry, and in no event could facts arising after an entry has
been secured with the express or tacit assent of the occupant change the character of the entry from one with the assent of the occupant to one
contrary thereto. It would be an intolerable burden upon the personal business and social relations of the members of a civilized community to
permit one who has expressly or tacitly consented to the entry of another in his house to convert such entry into a criminal action at his whim, or
even when it appears in the light of later events that the occupant would have been justify in originally withholding his assent, and denying access
to his home to one who has proved unworthy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An excellent illustration of the rule that the improper conduct of one person in the house of another even when it amounts to a criminal offense
against the occupant or where it is such that it may safely be inferred that admission to the house would have been denied had such conduct be
anticipated will not justify the conviction for the crime of allanamiento de morada unless it affirmatively appears that the original entry was made
against the will of the occupant, is furnished in the decision of the supreme court of Spain of May 3, 1892. The doctrine is stated in that decision so
succinctly that we quote verbatim the portion of the decision cited by Viada (vol. 6, p. 364), together with Viada's statement of the case:
chanrobles virtual law library

Question IV. Where the record only shows that while a girl was sitting in a yard of her own house, in company with other persons, the defendant,
who desired to speak to her, entering the store, which communicated the said yard through a doorway, and finding the door bolted, forced the
same open, and stepping into the yard, told the girl what he had to say; and that, he having addressed her in a rude manner, one of those present
called a neighbor, thereafter reporting the matter to the mayor of the town, and that nothing further occurred, can this acts be held to constitute
the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling, as defined in paragraph 2 of article 504 of the code? The audiencia of Soria so held, and its judgment was
reversed on appeal by the supreme court, on the ground that the said article had been improperly applied: "Considering that the crime of forcible
entry of a dwelling, whether committed with or without violence, is characterized, in the language of article 504 of the Penal Code, by the entry of
the stranger into another house against the will of the occupant, which latter fact need not be expressly and directly proven, it being sufficient if
same can be logically and reasonably inferred from previous occurrences or from the nature of the act itself; and considering that in the case at bar
it does not appear that Eliseo Lopez had been expressly enjoined from entering the dwelling of his fiancee, Maria Blanco, nor that there is anything
from which such prohibition can be inferred, nor that the acts themselves disclose such prohibition, since the object of the appellant was only to
speak to Maria, and there being no ground for the belief that either she or her father objected to such interview; considering, on this assumption,
that the mere fact that Eliseo Lopez forced open the door leading to the yard where Maria Blanco was at the time in question did not itself
constitute the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling, though perhaps it amounted independently to unlawful act; and considering therefore that the
trial court, and qualifying and punishing as a crime an act which did not in fact constitute such crime, committed the errors of law assigned on this
appeal, etc. etc." (Judgment of the 3rd of May, 1892, published in the Gazette of the 30th of September, pages 95 and 96.) chanrobles virtual law
library

The judgment and sentence of the trial court are reversed with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J. Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Johnson, J., did not sit in this case.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1491. March 5, 1904. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. LORENZO ARCEO ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J. :

The defendants were charged with entering the house of one Alejo Tiongson on the night of February 20, 1903, armed with deadly weapons,
against the will of the said Alejo Tiongson.

The evidence shows that Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in company with his wife, Alejandra San Andres, and his wife’s sister, Marcela San
Andres. On the night of the 20th of February, 1903, between 8 and 9 o’clock at night, the accused, one of whom was with a gun and the other two
each with a bolo, entered the house of the said Alejo Tiongson without first obtaining the permission of any person. It appears from the proof that
there was a light burning in the house at that time the accused entered, which was immediately put out by one of the accused; that Alejo and his
wife had retired for the night; that Marcela was still sitting up sewing; that as soon as Marcela had discovered the accused in the house she awoke
Alejo and his wife; that immediately after the accused were in the house, one of them wounded, by means of a bolo, Alejo Tiongson, the owner of
the house; that the accused appropriated to their own use a certain quantity of money; that the accused took and carried away out of the said
house toward the fields the said Marcela San Andres and illtreated her.

The evidence on the part of the defense tended to prove an alibi. The court below found that this testimony was not to be believed. We find no
occasion , from the proof, to charge this finding of fact.

The court below found that the defendants were each guilty of the crime of entering the house of another, with violence and intimidation, which
crime is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for the term of three years
six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and also imposed upon each a fine of 271 pesos and costs. In reaching this conclusion the
court took into consideration the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and the extenuating circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal
Code.

Article 491 of the Penal Code provides that —

"He who shall enter the residence (dwelling house) of another against the will of the tenant thereof shall be punished with the penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine of 325 to 3,250 pesetas."cralaw virtua1aw library

Subsection 2 provides that —

"If the act shall be executed with violence or intimidation the penalty shall be prision correccional in the medium and maximum grade, and a fine of
from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the facts presented in this case, was the trial court justified in finding that the accused were guilty of the crime of entering the residence of
another against his will and with violence and intimidation? We think that it was. We are not of the opinion that the statute relates simply to the
method by which one may pass the threshold of the residence of another without his consent. We think it relates also to the conduct, immediately
after entrance, of him who enters the house of another without his consent. He who being armed with deadly weapons enters the residence of
another in the nighttime, without consent, and immediately commits acts of violence and intimidation, is guilty of entering the house of another
with violence and intimidation and is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code. (See Viada, vol. 3, p.303; Gazette of Spain of
the 28th of March, 1883; Viada, vol. 6, p.363; Gazette of the Spain of the 19th of May, 1892, p. 165.)

The inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized
nations. No one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or occupants.

The privacy of the home — the place of abode, the place where a man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife
and children unmolested by anyone, even the king, except in the rare cases — has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most
sacred personal rights to which men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection to the
privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or
subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as
sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. The poorest and most humble citizen or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how frail or humble it is, bid
defiance to all the powers of the state; the wind, the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten parts, but the king may
not enter against its owner’s will; none of the forces dare to cross the threshold even the humblest tenement without its owner’s consent.

"A man’s house is his castle," has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth. His protection therein has become a matter of
constitutional protection n England, America, and Spain, as well as in other countries.

However, under the police power of the state the authorities may compel entrance to dwelling houses against the will of the owners for sanitary
purposes. The government has this right upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect the health and lives of all its people. A man can not
insist upon the privacy of his home when a question of the health and life of himself, his family, and that of the community is involved. This private
right must be subject to the public welfare.

It may be argued that one who enters the dwelling house of another is not liable unless he has been forbidden — i. e., the phrase "against the will
of the owner" means that there must have been an express prohibition to enter. In other words, if one enters the dwelling house of another
without the knowledge of the owner he has not entered against his will. This construction is certainly not tenable, because entrance is forbidden
generally under the spirit of the law unless permission to enter is expressly given. To allow this construction would destroy the very spirit of the
law. Under the law no one has the right to enter the home of another without the other’s express consent. Therefore, to say that when one enters
the home of another without his knowledge he does not enter against the will of the owner, is to say the one’s home is open for the entrance of all
who are not expressly forbidden. This is not the rule. The statute must not be given that construction. No one can enter the dwelling house of
another, in these Islands, without rendering himself liable under the law, he has the express consent of the owner and unless the one seeking
entrance comes within some of the exceptions dictated by the law or by a sound public policy.
So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy, unmolested, the privacy of their houses, that they might even take the life of the
unlawful intruder, if it be nighttime. This was also the sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: "Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione
munitius, quam domus uniuscu jusque civium."cralaw virtua1aw library

It may be argued that the offense punishable under article 491 of the Penal Code corresponds to the crime of burglary at the common law. It is true
that the offense of entering the house of another without the latter’s consent and the common-law crime of burglary are both offenses against the
habitation of individuals. But these crimes are distinctively different. The punishment for burglary is "to prevent the breaking and entering of a
dwelling house of another in the nighttime for the purpose a felony therein." while the object of article 491 is to prevent entrance into the dwelling
house of another at any time, either by day or by night, for any purpose, against the will of its owner.

In burglary there must have existed an intent to enter for the purpose of committing a felony, while under article 491 of the Penal Code entrance
against the will, simply, of the owner is punishable. Under the provisions of the Penal Code entrance in the nighttime can only be regarded as an
aggravation of the offense of entering.

We are of the opinion, under all of the facts in the case, that the extenuating circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code should not
be considered in favor of these defendants.

We find that the defendants are guilty of the crime of entering the house of another with violence and intimidation, without the consent of the
owner, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and hereby impose the maximum degree of prision correccional, and the fine provided for
in subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code should be imposed.

The sentence of the court below is therefore modified, and each of the said defendants is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for the term of six
years of prision correccional, and each to pay a fine of 271 pesos and the costs of this suit or in default thereof to suffer subsidiary imprisonment.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Cooper and McDonough, JJ., dissent.

EN BANC
[CA No. 507. November 19, 1945.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANACLETO UY ALMEDA ET AL., Defendants. ANACLETO UY ALMEDA, Appellant.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, convicting the appellant, Anacleto Uy Almeda, of the offense of qualified
trespass to dwelling and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for the indeterminate period of from four months and one day of arresto mayor
to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories of the law and one-third of the costs.

The facts established during the trial are substantially as follows: On the morning of November 13, 1940, the appellant, in company with other
persons, arrived at the house of Honorata Limpo in the municipality of Biñan, Province of Laguna. The latter was thereupon informed by appellant’s
companion, Potenciano Villano, that they were going to demolish and repair her house, to which Honorata Limpo objected, specially in view of the
absence of her husband at the time. Unheeding this opposition, and upon express orders of the appellant, his companions Potenciano Villano and
Antonio Dysionglo proceeded to gain entry into the house by means of two ladders which they placed against the front wall and to remove some
boards and iron sheets that served to cover the front side. Appellant’s designs were put to a stop, however, only by the arrival of Honorata’s son
named Francisco, who called a policeman to the scene.

It appears that the house in question was built on a lot inclosed by a stone fence having an iron grill gate. On the same lot the appellant had a
warehouse; and as he had freely used said gate in going to his property, it is now contended that his entry into the yard of Honorata Limpo, which
was a part of her "dwelling," could not have been unauthorized or against her will, so as to warrant his conviction under article 280 of the Revised
Penal Code. Appellant’s argument would require some inquiry if the lot on which Honorata’s house was erected were exclusively hers and the
appellant had not admittedly used its gate in common with Honorata, and if said argument would not further lead to a plainly unacceptable, nay
undesirable, result that simply because he had free entry into and passage on the common lot, he could have the same right as regards Honorata’s
house.

Another defense pressed in this appeal is that the opposition registered by Honorata Limpo was directed against the demolition or repair of her
house and not against the original entry of the appellant and his companions into the yard or premises of her dwelling, and that although the
removal of some boards and iron sheets, done by the appellant through his companions after their lawful entry, may constitute an independent
offense, the said subsequent act cannot be the trespass defined and penalized by article 280 of the Revised Penal Code. This contention is of course
partly disposed of in the preceding paragraph. It is only necessary to add that Honorata could not have consented to appellant’s intrusion into the
house, which made him a trespasser, for the very purpose already objected to by her. Moreover, the method employed by appellant’s men in
affecting entry suggests prior refusal on the part of Honorata to admit them through its stairs. Neither is there any point in appellant’s pretense
that, one week before the occasion in question he had notified Honorata about the intended repairs, because said notice did and could not mean
her subsequent conformity.

The appellant next tries to exculpate himself by maintaining that there is absolutely no proof as to his criminal intent in entering the yard or even
the house of Honorata. Indeed, it is insisted that he merely wanted to repair said house over which he was claiming ownership. Appellant thus
pretended to have brought the house for P70 from the estranged wife of Honorata’s son against whose father he subsequently filed a suit to
recover the premises. This case was however, decided against him. We are of the opinion that the alleged ownership is immaterial, for even
supposing that the house belonged to the appellant, that fact alone did not authorize to him to do anything with or enter the house against the will
of its actual occupant. he could have invoked the aid of the court for the exercise or protection of his alleged proprietary rights. What is intended to
be protected and preserved by the law is the privacy of one’s dwelling, and, except in those cases enumerated in the third paragraph of article 280
of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent inheres in the unwelcome visit of a trespasser.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo and Briones, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40512 March 3, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PERFECTO TAYAG and ATANASIO MORALES, defendants-appellants.

DIAZ, J.:

The defendants and appellants Perfecto Tayag and Atanasio Morales were convicted of attempted robbery in an inhabited house, located at No.
325-A San Marcelino Street, Manila, having, on the night of September 12, 1933, attempted to enter the said house with intent to rob, according to
the allegations of the information, by means of force and by using a bolo and a screw driver to force one of the doors thereof, which were then
closed and barred.

The court, which tried the case against the said two appellants, imposed upon Perfecto Tayag, the penalty of four years and two months of prision
correccional plus the additional penalty of six years and two months of prision correccional plus also an additional penalty of ten years, he being
likewise a habitual delinquent with a greater number of former convictions. From this sentence, the defendants appealed.

The facts disclosed by the evidence of the prosecution, which are certainly overwhelming and leave no room for doubt, are: that a little after two
o'clock on the morning of September 12, 1933, the said two appellants, armed with a bolo and a screw driver, went to Juan Nicasio Go Cuay's store,
which also served as his dwelling, located, as aforestated, at No. 325-A San Marcelino Street, of the City of Manila. Believing that they were
unnoticed, they proceeded to open one of the doors of the said store with the tools — bolo and screw driver — which they then carried and which,
of course, were not the proper means for that purpose. After they had succeeded in loosening one of the bars of the door and upon becoming
aware that the inhabitants of the store had been awakened, they tried to escape but policemen A. Santos, J. Rubic and G. Malap, who up to that
time had been watching them, detained and placed them under arrest. The said policemen found the bolo, Exhibit A, in the possession of the
appellant Perfecto Tayag, and the screw driver, Exhibit B, in the possession of the other appellant Atanasio Morales.

In the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay there were, at that time, a little more than P40 in cash, which represented the proceeds of his sales the
day before, and merchandise valued at around P1,000. However, there is absolutely nothing of record to show that the said appellants' intention
on that occasion was to commit robbery, or that they somehow knew that they would find money amounting to P40 therein. In every criminal
proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by means of competent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere
inferences, however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains, as in this case, a sufficient indication of the existence of an
intention different from that of committing robbery. It would be arbitrary, not to say absurd, to suppose that had the appellants succeeded in
entering the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay, they would have carried away all the goods therein, because they would not have been able to do
so by themselves, not having any vehicle at their disposal.

The act committed by the appellants simply constitutes the crime of attempted trespass to dwelling, as defined in article 280, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, that is, trespass committed by means of violence. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 8, 1899, Viada, Fourth
Supplement, p. 399; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of December 10, 1900, Id., p. 401; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 5,
1890, Hidalgo, Penal Code, vol. 2, p. 512.)1ªvvphi1.ne+

The documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, consisting of Exhibits C, D and E, which are the records of criminal cases No. 38880,
38924 and 38923, does not show that the appellants are habitual delinquents. The most that the said documents disclose is that at about the same
time, the appellants committed the crimes of theft with which they were charged therein, and therefore the 10th aggravating circumstance, that is,
previous convictions, should be taken into consideration against them. The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity should likewise be considered
against the said appellants.

Wherefore, and taking into consideration that the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for trespass to dwelling by means of violence
in article 280, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (from one month and one day to four
months), the penalty imposed upon the appellants is hereby modified by sentencing them, each to three months and one day of arresto mayor,
with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of both instances, without prejudice to their being
credited with one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code. So ordered.

Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38417 December 16, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARCIANO MEDINA ( alias MARIANO MEDINA, alias ALEJANDRO DOLA),
Defendant-Appellant.

VICKERS, J.:

The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with "the crime of trespass to dwelling, with frustrated homicide, and physical
injuries", committed as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of August, 1932, in the municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of
this court, the said accused, Marciano Medina alias Mariano Medina alias Alejandro Dola, being a private individual, at night time, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling of Capt. J.H. Davidson against the latter's will, by forcing his way through a window
protected by wire screens, an opening not intended for entrance, and once inside the house, when his presence therein was detected by the
inmates thereof who tried to put him under arrest, the said Marciano Medina in resisting arrest and thus be able to escape, with intent to kill
Joseph Davidson, son of Capt. Davidson, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and stab with an open knife said
Joseph Davidson on the upper left chest, thus inflicting upon him a mortal wound penetrating the lung, which would have produced his death as a
consequence, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the death of said Joseph Davidson by reason of causes independent
of the will of the accused, that is, because of the timely, able and efficacious medical aid given to the victim by Dr. Alexander Mileau. In his efforts
to escape, the accused Marciano Medina further criminally, unlawfully and feloniously attacked and assaulted Captain Davidson, Mrs. Davidson and
their daughter Mary Davidson with an open knife, thus inflicting upon Captain Davidson several wounds, one on the right hand, one on the right
sterno-clavicular articulation and one on the upper right arms; Mrs. Davidson sustained and lacerated wound on the palmar surface left ring finger
and on the middle finger severing the tendons; and Mary Davidson, the daughter, sustained a wound on the left occipito-parietal region on the
scalp. These wounds sustained by Mr. and Mrs. Captain Davidson and their daughter required medical attendance for a period of time longer than
10 days but less than 30 days and incapacitated all of them from performing their customary labor for an equal period of
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That in the commission of the acts herein complained of the following aggravating circumstances existed: (1) that the crime was committed at
night time which the accused purposely sought to insure success in the commission of the offense herein complained of; (2) in disregard of the sex
due to two of the offended parties, Mrs. Davidson and her daughter Mary Davidson; (3) through an unlawful entry, that is, by passing through a
window; (4) that as a means to the commission of the offense, the window was broken and (5) that the accused has previously been punished four
times of the crimes of theft and for other violations of the law, to which lighter penalties were attached, by virtue of final judgments handed down
by competent courts.

The accused was represented by an attorney de oficio. After the information had been read to him, the court asked the accused if he understood it,
and when he answered in the affirmative the court asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, and the accused answered "guilty" The accused was
then permitted to testify.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the termination of the hearing, Judge Francisco Zandueta, in view of the plea of guilty interposed by the defendant, found him guilty of the
crimes of "allanamiento de morada mediante fuerza", "homicidio frustrado", and "lesiones menos graves", as alleged in the information, with the
presence of four aggravating circumstances, while there was only one mitigating circumstance consisting of the defendant's plea of "guilty", and
sentenced him to suffer the following penalties:chanrobles virtual law library

1. For the crime of trespass to dwelling by means of violence, four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision correccional;chanrobles
virtual law library

2. For the crime of frustrated homicide, ten years and one day of prision mayor;chanrobles virtual law library

3. For the crime of less serious physical injuries, four months and one day of arresto mayor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The defendant was further sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Defendant's attorney de oficio now alleges that the lower court erred in convicting the appellant of three different crimes on the facts alleged in
the information, to wit: trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide, and less serious physical injuries; and in imposing upon the appellant the total
penalty of fifteen years, one month, and thirteen days of imprisonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant's attorney de oficio in this court, Jose M. Casal, has submitted a brief of twenty pages on behalf of the appellant, and maintains that the
appellant was deprived of a fair trial and that the cae should be remanded to the lower court for a new trial, the fiscal to choose the charge he
wishes to rely on or to file a separate information for each crime with which he desires to charge the accused; that the only crime of which the
defendant can be convicted in this case is less serious physical injuries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Although we commend the zeal with which appellant's attorney de oficio has studied the case, we cannot agree with his
conclusions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The information in question apparently does not comply with section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a complaint or
information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various allied
offenses, but the attorney for the accused did not demur to the information, and the trial judge was justified in finding the defendant guilty of the
several crimes with which he was charged and in imposing upon him the corresponding penalties. That is the established doctrine of this court.

When the defendant in a criminal cause goes to trial under a complaint or information which contains a description of more than one offense, he
thereby waives the objection, and may be found guilty of, and should be sentenced for, as many offenses as are charged in the complaint and
proved during the trial. A failure to object for multifariousness in a complaint is a waiver, and that objection cannot be raised for the first time on
an appeal. (People vs. Miana, 50 Phil., 771.)

As to the nature of the plea of "guilty" and its sufficiency to sustain a conviction, this court in the case of United States vs. Jamad (37 Phil., 305),
said:
The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of
the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or
information; such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offenses charged in the
information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof.

Appellant's attorney contends that there is no article in the Revised Penal Code corresponding to article 87 of the Penal Code, and that it is
therefore not proper to impose upon the accused the several penalties corresponding to the three crimes with which he was charged, but only that
corresponding to the gravest of them in accordance with article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no merit in this contention, as article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that when the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he should serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit; otherwise, said penalties shall be executed successively, following the order of their respective severity. Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code relates to complex crimes, that is, when a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other (or when one of them is necessary means for committing the other), and has no application to the case at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant's present attorney severely criticizes the conduct of defendant's attorney in the lower court, but it does not necessarily follow that the
defendant was prejudiced by the failure of his attorney to demur to the information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court found that four aggravating circumstances were present in the commission of the crime and that the accused was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of having pleaded guilty. The lower court did not specify the four aggravating circumstances taken into account. Although
the unlawful entry, that is, the passing of the accused through a window, and the breaking of the window could not properly be regarded as
aggravating circumstances in the crime of trespass to dwelling, nevertheless the other aggravating circumstances were sufficient to justify the
imposition of the maximum degree of the corresponding penalties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The decision of the lower court sentencing the defendant to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor for lesiones menos graves is
affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In accordance with articles and 280 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 4103, the appellant is condemned to suffer the following
indeterminate sentences:chanrobles virtual law library

1. For the crime of trespass to dwelling by means of violence, not more than four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision
correccional, and a fine of P200 or the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and not less than two years of prision
correccional;chanrobles virtual law library

2. For the crime of frustrated homicide, not more than ten years and one day of prision mayor, and not less than five years of prision
correccional.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4133. August 10, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO DULFO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

Pedro Dulfo, the appellant in this case, was convicted of the crime of allanamiento de morada (entering the house of another, against the will of
the occupant) and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment in the provincial jail.

Dulfo admitted that he had entered the house of Dagohoy, the complaining witness, between the hours of 12 and 2 on the night of the 14th day of
February, 1907, and that on that occasion the owner of the house was absent, having left it in charge of his daughters Maximina and Filomena; but
he insisted that he had gone to the house at the invitation of the younger daughter Filomena, who opened the door and admitted him. Filomena
absolutely denied having invited the accused to the house and she also denied having admitted him when he came there. Upon this point the
evidence is conflicting, but we think that giving the accused the benefit of the doubt, we must hold that the statement of the accused is
substantially true, and acquit him of the offense with which he is charged.

The trial judge also appears to have been of opinion that the denials of the girl Filomena could not be accepted as true, beyond a reasonable doubt,
for he expressly declined to make any finding on this point and convicted the accused on the ground that the girl being between 12 and 13 years of
age, her invitation, and the opening of the door by her, did not relieve the accused of criminal responsibility for entering the house without the
consent of the owner.

This court, however, by a majority opinion in the case of the United States v. Agas (4 Phil. Rep., 129), acquitted the accused of the crime of
allanamiento de morada, where it appeared from the evidence that the defendant entered the house at the request of one of the occupants
thereof, and this doctrine is in accord with the doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain, decisions of June 28 and September 28, 1876.

It is an essential element of the offense under consideration, as defined and penalized in the Penal Code, that the entry must have been made
without the consent or, more accurately speaking, against the will of the occupant of the dwelling house, and it is therefore the duty of the
prosecution to affirmatively establish this fact, before a conviction can be had upon a complaint charging its commission. We held in the case of the
United States vs Arceo (3 Phil. Rep., 381), that to establish this fact it is not necessary that there be proof of an express prohibition to enter, and, in
the case of the United States v. Clauck (6 Phil. Rep., 486), that the fact that the entry was without the consent of the occupant may be presumed
from circumstances, as where one enters violently with force or intimidation. But the doctrine laid down in these cases in no wise relieves the
prosecution of the burden of affirmatively establishing that entry was made against the prohibition of the occupant, either express or implied.

The supreme court of Spain in its sentecia. of the 28th of September, 1876, held that the preposition contra. (against) which i6 used in the article of
the Penal Code defining the crime of allanamiento de morada, signifies negativa, oposicion manifesta a que se haga alguna cosa. It would seem,
therefore, that where the owner of a house is not the sole occupant, it would be intolerable to hold that one is guilty of this offense who is invited
to enter by one of the members of the household, unless it clearly appeared that such member of the household was forbidden to extend such
invitation and that the person entering was aware of that fact. All the members of a household must be presumed to have authority to extend an
invitation to enter, for to hold otherwise would be contrary to an almost universal custom and would impose an unreasonable burden on the
relations of outsiders with the various members of a household other than the legal head of the house. It will not, therefore, be presumed that an
entry at the invitation of a member of the household was "against" (contra) the wish of the householder, merely because it afterwards develops
that such entry was in fact without his consent, or, as in the case at bar, that he was absent and had no opportunity to give or to withhold his
consent. A similar doctrine was laid down by the supreme court of Spain in a case wherein the facts were almost precisely similar to the case at bar.
(Judgment of June 28, 1876.)

It has been suggested that this doctrine should not be applied in the case at bar because the girl who admitted the accused appears to have been
not quite 13 years of age. But while we do not undertake at this time to lay down any fixed rule whereby it can be determined that a member of a
household is of such tender years that the foregoing doctrine can not be applied, we think we must hold that the girl Filomena (who was at least 12
years of age, and as appears from the evidence old enough to have carried on amorous relations with the accused prior to the night in question,
and who together with her 18-year old sister appears to have been left in charge of the house during the absence of her father), was old enough to
justify the inference that when the accused entered the house at her invitation, such entry was not against the will of the occupant of the house, it
appearing that her father was absent, and there being no proof of an express prohibition on his part.

The judgment and sentence of the trial court is reversed with the costs of both instances de oficio, and the accused is acquitted of the offense with
which he is charged; if in detention, he will be set at liberty forthwith, or, if at liberty on bail, his sureties are hereby discharged. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Willard, JJ., concur.

Mapa and Tracey, JJ., dissent.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 6717. October 19, 1911.]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FAUSTINO MESINA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J.:

An appeal raised by the defendant from a judgment of conviction rendered in this case by the Honorable Judge George N. Hurd.

On the night of the 18th until the early morning of the 19th of May, 1910, Elena Llanera was asleep in her house situated in the pueblo of Aliaga,
Nueva Ecija, her husband, Emilio Soriano, being at the time absent in this city; she was sleeping under a mosquito netting in the parlor of the house
with her three minor children and the women Damiana Collado and Elena Molina, and in the dining room of the said house the men named Cenon
and Luis Pascual, with their respective wives, were also asleep. At about 4 o’clock in the morning Llanera was awakened by the noise produced on
the floor by a man’s steps, in the direction of her feet; she therefore awoke Damiana and, on raising one of the sides of the mosquito netting, they
saw and recognized Faustino Mesina, for there was then a light in the house the latter hurriedly went into another room followed by the three
women who then saw the said party go out of the window, which on that occasion was open, and from there alight on the ground by supporting
himself upon a window of the ground floor. The inmates of the house testified that before going to bed that night they had closed all the windows
and doors of the house.

The provincial fiscal, therefore, on September 22, 1910, filed an information with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, charging Faustino
Mesina with the crime of forcible entry, and, this cause having been instituted, the court in view of the evidence and on the 23d of November
following rendered judgment by sentencing the defendant to the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 500 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.

The facts related, duly proved in this cause, certainly constitute the crime of forcible entry, performed without violence or intimidation, provided
for and punished in article 491, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, inasmuch as, from the testimony of three eyewitnesses, it was fully proven that, on
the owner of the house, Elena Llanera, being awakened, early in the morning of the 19th of May, by the sound of the steps of a person who was
walking inside of the house near her bed which was covered with a mosquito netting, both she and her companions who were sleeping with her
under the same netting on raising one side of the same saw and recognized the said person, by the light there was in the house, as being the
defendant, Faustino Mesina, who, on observing that the said women had awakened and had seen him, immediately and hastily entered the small
room of the house, followed by them, and went down out of the building through one of the windows of the said room, which at that moment was
open, by supporting himself on a window of the entresol, located thereunder, which must have been the way he got in, for the inmates of the
house had closed that room window and all the others in the house the night previous before retiring.

The defendant’s denial, his exculpatory allegations and the testimony of his witnesses were unsuccessful in overthrowing the very positive
evidence of the prosecution, for his allegation that he was at the said house on the morning of the day aforementioned, for the purpose of making
some requests to the husband of the offended woman, Elena Llanera, who, as she was in the granary nearby, had to be called and on arriving at
her house he had a long conversation with her and not until after she had her breakfast did he leave for the sitio of Bibiclat, was not corroborated
by the testimony of his two witnesses, Buenaventura Maligsi and Eusebio Landicho, the first of whom testified that he was engaged that morning in
hauling rice to the warehouse of Elena Llanera, who was then inside of this building, and the second witness, that he was near the warehouse
waiting for his neighbor named Julio; they then saw the defendant enter the house of the offended party and after a short while, during which the
latter, called by a little girl, returned to the house, these witnesses saw the defendant come down out of the house. This testimony, far from
proving the defendant’s statements, completely disproves them and belies the fact affirmed by Mesina relative to the long conversation; besides,
the offended party denied that the defendant was in her house that morning.

Moreover, the testimony of the municipal policeman, Timoteo Palis, corroborates the evidence of the prosecution. This witness testified that while
he was on guard duty at the municipal building a short while before 4 o’clock on the morning of the said date, the defendant passed by and advised
him that the policemen should be ready who were to accompany him, Mesina, to the sitio of Bibiclat, and that the defendant immediately left and
witness did not know where the latter went. This testimony, combined with that of the offended party and her two witnesses, and all taken as a
whole, produce in the mind a thorough conviction that the defendant did commit the crime under prosecution. It is to be presumed that after
passing by the municipal building the defendant went to the house where the crime was committed and climbed up into it through the window, for
this was not very high up.

For the reasons stated, the testimony of the wife of the defendant can not be considered as proof of an alibi in his behalf, to the effect that at the
hour and on the date mentioned her husband was in his house and that Elena Llanera, subsequent to the denunciation of the crime, had talked
with her in order that she might feel no resentment — inasmuch as such statements were not proved and the offended party denied that she had
any conversation whatever with Marcelina Santiago, the defendant’s wife.

Article 491, aforecited, provides that any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter’s will shall incur the penalty
specified therein, and although the inmates of the house did not forbid the defendant to enter the same, nevertheless and withal when one enters
a house by climbing up into it and passing through a window thereof which had been closed and was opened by the perpetrator of the crime for
the purpose of his entry, even though no violence was employed in doing so, it is unquestionable that the entry into the house, by taking
advantage of the darkness and when all the inmates thereof were asleep, bears the character of the crime of forcible entry, for the reason that,
under such circumstances, it is not necessary that there should have been a previous prohibition to enter by the inmates, since this is presumed,
and because the entry into the premises was effected against the will of the occupants thereof, there being no proof that the defendant entered
the same with the permission or the consent of any of them.

In the commission of the crime there is no extenuating circumstance whatever to be considered, but there is the aggravating one of nocturnity,
since the defendant perpetrated the crime by taking advantage of the silence and darkness of the night: therefore, the penalty fixed by law of
arresto mayor should be imposed upon him in its maximum degree.

For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed; provided, however, that the defendant shall be
sentenced to the penalty of five months of arresto major, to the other penalties of the judgment of the lower court, and to the costs of this
instance. So ordered.

Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-5804. November 23, 1910. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRISTOBAL PARAY, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

At noon on Saturday, March, 21, 1908, Cristobal Paray, who lived in the house next to that of Severina Estabillo, after having been talking about the
latter in an improper manner, left his house and went to that of the said Estabillo, who, on seeing him approach the stairs of her house in a violent
temper and threatening her with death, forbade him to ascend and enter the house; at the same time she closed the door which was the entrance
to the house from the said stairs and, together with her daughter, Damasa Pascual, held it closed from the inside, notwithstanding which Paray
pushed the door violently from without and soon succeeded in entering the house, where he ill-treated the occupants thereof, Severina Estabillo
and her daughter, Damasa Pascual, by slapping and kicking them, after which he went away. As a result of the assault the women received various
slight bruises and suffered bodily pains.

For the foregoing reasons, and in view of the preliminary investigation had in the justice of the peace court of Gerona, before which the offended
woman made complaint, the provincial fiscal filed an information with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, on August 5 of the year, charging
Cristobal Paray with the crime of forcible entry, and the case having come to trial, the judge, upon evidence adduced therein, sentenced the
defendant to the penalty of two years and five months of prision correccional, to the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas and, in case
of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to the payment of the costs, allowing him credit for one-half the previous
detention served by him. From this judgment the defendant appealed to this court.

From the facts hereinbefore related, and which were conclusively proved in this cause, it is concluded that the crime of forcible entry was actually
committed, qualified by acts of violence performed against the persons of the inmates of the house, for, notwithstanding the opposition of the
latter and their express prohibition to him not to enter the house, on their seeing him approach the stairs in a furious manner with the intention of
mounting, he at the same time threatening them with death, and notwithstanding the fact that the offended parties, on seeing the determination
of the accused, closed the door, yet withal Cristobal Paray entered the house by violently pushing against the door and, after having succeeded in
entering, even maltreated the said inmates by slapping and kicking them; all of which acts constitute the crime before specified, which is provided
for and punished by article 491, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. This article is of the following tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Any private individual who shall enter another’s dwelling against the will of the tenant thereof shall be punished with arresto mayor and a fine of
from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.

"If the deed were committed with violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum degree and a fine
of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."cralaw virtua1aw library

Notwithstanding the denial of the accused and his exculpatory allegations, which, though accorded faith, would not weaken the force of the
accusation nor the certainty of the criminal act, it is unquestionable that the cause furnishes conclusive proof of the guilt of the accused as the sole
proved perpetrator by direct participation of the crime under prosecution, for he knowingly violated the aforesaid provision of the law which
prohibits a person from passing across another’s threshold against the owner’s will, lest one of the most sacred personal rights of all those
recognized by law want only disregarded. The only limitation upon this prohibition is that provided for in the following article 492 of the same code
and the necessary power of due inspection which pertains to the sovereign authority and to its representatives.

The accused was warned by the women, the inmates of the house that he should not climb the stairs of nor enter the same, and, confirming the
prohibition which they had communicated to him a few moments before, they had shut the entrance door of the house and so held it from the
inside; but the accused, determined to execute his criminal purpose, with manifest disregard of the rights of the offended parties, violently entered
the house and, what was still more, maltreated them without any right whatever to do so, which acts of violence qualify the crime and determine
the imposition of a severer penalty, though in applying the same it is proper to make an allowance in favor of the accused on account of the
attendance of the special circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code, due to his scant education, without any aggravating
circumstance to counterbalance its effects.

For the foregoing reasons and esteeming the judgment appealed from to be accordant with the law, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm and we
hereby affirm the same with the costs against the Appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-4335. February 19, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO LINDIO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TRACEY, J. :

This is a prosecution for breaking into a dwelling (allanamiento de morada) with violence and intimidation. It appears that the accused made his
entry by cutting a string fastening the door and that being inside he engaged in a quarrel with the inmates. The defense makes the point that the
entrance not being forbidden can not be said to have been against the will of the occupant and that there was no violence in the manner of entry.
In both respects we think he is in error. The cutting of the fastenings of the door was an act of violence and the threats against the inmates,
accompanied with the flourishing of his bolo, constituted intimidation. The case of the United States v. Arceo (3 Phil. Rep., 381) in which this crime
is analyzed and sufficiently expounded, is direct authority to the effect that no express prohibition of entry is required.

The defense of an alibi might merit serious consideration in this case did it not appear to be reenforced with too many suspicious details.

The judgment of the court below did not take into consideration the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. For that reason, the punishment
should be increased to five years of prision correccional and the payment of a fine of 325 pesetas, with the accessories of article 61 [Penal Code].
So modified the judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1114. March 31, 1903. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. BARTOLOME OSTREA, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

It sufficiently appears from the record that the defendants, at the time in question, went to the house of Juan Rodriguez, alleged to have been
broken into, with the intent of making an entrance there at all cost, even against the will of the said Juan Rodriguez. It does not, however, appear
to be certain that they did in fact succeed in entering, as the record is not very explicit upon this point. It is evident that they succeeded in entering
the first door of the house, either violently by breaking it open, as alleged by the complainant, or because they found it already open, as testified by
the defendant Bartolome Ostrea. It does not appear, however, whether this door formed an integral part of the house or whether, on the contrary,
it was an outer door, separate and independent from the body of the house. We are inclined to believe that the latter is the fact, in view of the
testimony in the case. The complainant calls this first door the front door, and adds that upon seeing it had been broken by the accused he
immediately closed the second door and did not allow them to enter his house. In another part of his testimony he states that when they (the
accused) saw that they could not enter the house they went away. The other witness for the prosecution, Benigno Sebastian, testifies that
Bartolome Ostrea called to his wife, who was in the house, but that he could not get in, because the doors were closed. Bartolome Ostrea, on his
part, in his testimony at the trial says that the first door was open, and that the following door at the entrance to the house was closed. From this
statement it would appear that the second door was that at the entrance to the house in question.

In view of the terms in which these witnesses expressed themselves and the lack of other more precise data in the record it may be concluded that,
notwithstanding the fact that the defendants entered the first door, they did not succeed in entering the house. It is possible that this conclusion is
not in conformity with the facts as they really occurred, but it is the legal conclusion from the data disclosed by the record and upon which alone
we must rely for our decision.

In consequence, the defendants are only responsible for the crime of an attempted forcible entry into the dwelling, and not for a consummated
entry, as considered by the court below in the judgment appealed. It has been proven that in the execution of this act the defendants employed
violence and intimidation, and for nearly half an hour tried to push open the door at the entrance to the house, and that Bartolome Ostrea fired
several shots from his revolver upon seeing that Rodriguez refused to open the door. The latter says that Ostrea fired three or four shots. The other
witnesses for the prosecution only heard one. It is a matter of indifference, however, whether one or more shots were fired for the purposes of
considering the circumstance of intimidation, more especially in view of the fact that Bartolome himself admits that he discharged the revolver
which he carried, although he adds that he only fired in the air.

The concurrence of this circumstance brings the act in question within the sanction of paragraph 2 of article 191 of the Penal Code. In favor of the
accused we must consider the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness (No. 6 of art. 9 of the Penal Code), as it appears from the testimony of the
complainant himself and that of Benigno Sebastian that they were drunk at the time in question, and that they are not habitual drunkards. In the
present case we must also consider as mitigating the circumstance that the complainant, Juan Rodriguez, is the father-in-law of Bartolome Ostrea,
by virtue of the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 10, for, in view o f this close relationship, it is not considered that the defendant would regard
himself as a stranger in the home of the complainant, to which it is to be presumed he ordinarily had free access as a member of the Rodriguez
family. The fact, sufficiently proven in the case, that he believed his wife the daughter of the said Rodriguez, was in the house at the time in
question, may also have contributed to lead him to believe, although erroneously, that he had a right to enter the house.

Upon the grounds set forth, and in view of the provisions of articles 66 and 75, paragraph 2 of article 91, and article 92 of the Penal Code, we
condemn each of the defendants to a fine of 325 pesetas, or to subsidiary imprisonment, in case of nonpayment, at the rate of one day for each 12
1/2 pesetas. The judgment appealed, thus modified, is affirmed, with the costs of this instance to the defendants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Willard and Ladd, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5266. February 16, 1910. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TORIBIO ABANTO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

At about 11 p. m. on the 15th of October, 1908, Macario Labitoria, asleep in his house situated in the barrio of Dumuit, town of Tayabas, in the
province of the same name, was awakened by some one on the outside calling him by name; he got up and opened the window to see who it was,
and saw standing in front of his house two individuals who asked him to allow them to pass the night in the house; he thereupon struck a light and
opened the door at the top of the staircase, and inquired who they were, to which one of the men answered that his name was Miguel. At this
moment, as the owner of the house, the lieutenant of the barrio, sought to recognize the stranger, another man, who was already upstairs
alongside the staircase, struck Labitoria on the forehead with a wooden stick; as a result of the attack, the latter feel backward over a bench inside
the house, and the aggressor, who turned out to be Toribio Abanto, passed through the door and threw himself upon Labitoria, seizing him by the
throat; at this, Urbano Quiambao, who was staying in the house that night, seeing what was taking place, caught up a stick of palma brava which he
used for carrying his stock of drygoods, and struck the aggressor with it. As a result of the struggle that ensued between the three, Toribio Abanto
feel wounded to the ground, and after some time he was picked up by order of the justice of the peace, to who Marcos Labitoria reported the
affair, and the wounded aggressor was carried in a hammock to the town.

For these reasons the provincial fiscal filed a complaint on the 11th of February, 1909, with the Court of First Instance of Lucena, charging Toribio
Abanto with the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling. Proceedings were instituted, and the trial judge entered judgment on the same date,
sentencing the defendant to the penalty of five years of prision correccional, to the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs. From the said judgment the defendant has appealed.

Article 491 of the Penal Code reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Any private individual who shall enter another’s dwelling against the will of the tenant thereof shall be punished with arresto mayor and a fine of
from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.

"If the deed were committed with violence or intimidation, the penalties shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum degree and a
fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."cralaw virtua1aw library

The facts related and fully proven in the present case constitute the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling, defined and punished by paragraph 2 of
the foregoing article, inasmuch as on the night in question the defendant forcibly entered the house of Macario Labitoria; taking advantage of the
fact that the house owner opened the door and put his head outside to ascertain who were the two persons that were asking shelter, Abanto
suddenly, and without reason, struck Labitoria a heavy blow on the forehead with a stick (garrote) and when the assaulted man fell over a bench
inside his house, the aggressor passed through the open door and repeated the assault, grasping the latter, who had fallen over said bench, by the
neck. Thanks to the assistance rendered by the guest, Urbano Quiambao, Labitoria fared no worse, nor was the accused Abanto, as prearranged
with his two companions who remained outside the house, able to accomplish his ulterior purpose. It is probable that the latter did not dare enter
the house upon hearing or observing the effective defense offered by the owner of the house and his guest, Quiambao.

The circumstance that the door of the house was already open and that there was no previous express opposition or prohibition on the part of the
owner thereof to the entry of the defendant is no bar to the qualification of the crime; in order that the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling may be
considered as having been perpetrated, it is not an essential requisite that the door of the house should be closed; even if it were open, so long as
the entry of a person is opposed or prohibited by the tenant, the crime is committed if said individual introduces himself therein against the
express will of its tenant.

Paragraph 2 of the above-cited article is applicable in this case, it having been fully proven that the defendant Abanto entered the house of the
injured party in a violent manner, and assaulted the latter from the door to the interior of his house, and in view of such behavior it is not
necessary that express opposition or prohibition on the part of the tenant should have preceded the forcible entry. Even in a semicivilized country
it must be supposed that a person entering a house with violence and maltreating the tenant, as stated hereinbefore, would not obtain the tacit
nor express consent of the latter.

The defendant pleaded not guilty, and, notwithstanding his allegations, not only unsupported by proof, but notoriously false and contrary to his
own testimony in another case instituted against Mateo Lacuarin and Isaac de Ocampo, who accompanied him on the night in question, these
proceedings furnish evidence conclusive beyond all reasonable doubt of his guilt as the sole principal of the crime herein prosecuted. In the
proceedings alluded to, brought against said persons for attempted robbery, the defendant Abanto testified that by order of the latter, he called to
the injured party from the street and asked him for lodging, and that when the door of the house was opened, he being near it, was at once
maltreated by the inmates of the same, and not by reason of the gambling that was going on therein; his testimony in these proceedings is,
therefore false, being not only contrary to his former allegation, but contradicted by the injured party and his house companion.

In the commission of the crime herein the trial judge has rightly considered the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, for the reason that it was
perpetrated at a late hour and in the silence of night, without any mitigating circumstance to lessen its effects. The penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum degrees, as fixed by the code, should be imposed upon him in the maximum degree.

For the foregoing reasons, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, it is our opinion that the
same should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs against the Appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 12697 September 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BENITO BARNEDO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

MALCOM, J.:

The defendants and appellants desired to have carnal relation with a mother and her two daughters. With this purpose in view, about midnight of
the 2d of June, 1916, they broke into the house in which the women lived and maltreated them. The accused, however, soon desisted from their
original intention and left the house. These facts are clearly proved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Appellants claim that the facts constitute, if anything, a crime distinct from that charged. In a way this contention is sound, and if the information
was so worded, it might be possible to convict the accused of some other crime such as attempted rape. But while this may be true, it does not
impeach in the slightest the basis point that with the object of violating these women, the accused committed a trespass to their dwelling with
violence. All tresspasses ordinarily have some motive, and although the motive herein was in itself criminal, it does not become so expanded as to
override the offense which was charged and which without any doubt was perpetrated. Having in view the leading case of U. S. vs. Arceo ([1904], 3
Phil. Rep., 381), in which the offense of forcible entry is clearly analyzed by Justice Johnson, and the later case of U. S. vs. Ticson ([1913], 25 Phil.
Rep.,), in which Justice Torres on somewhat similar facts held the accused guilty of a violation of paragraph 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code
(trespass to the dwelling), it result herein that the defendants and appellants are guilty of a violation of the same provision of the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There existing the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, but there being no sufficient proof to show that the accused took advantage of superior
strength, and there being no extenuating circumstances, the penalty to be imposed should be the minimum of the maximum of prision
correccional. The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by sentencing each of the accused to four years nine months and eleven days
of prision correccional, to pay a fine of two hundred pesos, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-fourth of the
costs of both instances. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 11661. February 12, 1917. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDRES CABARABAN, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

This appeal brings up for review a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Misamis, condemning the defendant, Andres
Cabaraban, to six months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of the
costs of the cause for a violation of the first paragraph of article 491 of the Penal Code.

Victorico Chaves and his wife, Getulia Neri, were living in September, 1915, in the municipality of Cagayan, Province of Misamis, in a house
consisting of three bedrooms, a sala, kitchen, a servants’ room below, and two other small rooms. On the night of September 5, 1915, Getulia Neri
and her daughter Remedios, about 17 years of age, were sleeping in the same bed in one of the rooms of the house, which room was also occupied
on that night by several other children of Getulia and some four servant girls. Another bedroom was occupied by another member of the family
and a servant. The room below was occupied by a man and a boy. The husband Chaves was absent. About 12 o’clock on that night the defendant
was discovered in the room occupied by Getulia and her children, hiding behind an "harigue." On being discovered the defendant ran down the
steps and escaped through the room below, leaving his hat upstairs by one of the windows. A bamboo ladder was found on the outside, set up
against the house under this window. The defendant admitted that he was in the house at the time indicated, but testified that he was there on the
invitation and by the consent of Getulia Neri. And this is the principal question involved in this case.

In support of his defense to the effect that he was in the house on the invitation of Getulia Neri, the defendant testified that he had been having
amorous relations with Getulia for some time; that he had frequently entered the house on Getulia’s invitation prior to the night in question; and
that these facts were known by other people. The defendant offered in evidence a photograph of Getulia Neri and two documents which he
claimed were letters written by Getulia to him. The defendant’s wife and brother-in-law testified that they had seen the defendant enter the house
of Getulia late at night by passing through a window on three previous occasions. The brother-in-law was unable to recall the date of the first visit.
He stated that it was during a month which he could not remember. He stated that the other visits were on December 19, 1914, and April 6, 1915.
He testified that he told the defendant’s wife of these visits. The wife testified that she saw her husband come out of Getulia’s house on December
19 and April 6, and that she remembered these dates because she had made a note of them on the calendar. The wife made no disturbance
whatever about this conduct of her husband. Getulia denied ever having any such relations with the defendant and testified that the two
documents, which were neither dated nor signed, had not been written by her. Chaves, his wife Getulia, and his family resided in the barrio of
Umalag, municipality of Tagoloan, which is some 10 or 15 kilometers from their home in Cagayan, during the months of April, May, June, and July,
1915. Getulia gave birth to a child in May, 1915.

The trial court sustained an objection to the admission of the photograph and the two documents, upon the ground that the photograph had just
been turned over to the defendant by his sister-in-law on the day before the trial and because the two documents were neither signed, dated, nor
addressed to anyone, and for the further reason that Getulia denied all knowledge of these documents, and the defendant failed to prove that they
had been written by her. The trial judge made a thorough examination of the evidence and set forth in detail his reasons why he declined to
believe the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses, overlooking no fact or circumstance and giving due weight to all of the evidence. The
detailed findings of fact set forth in the decision of the trial court are fully supported by the record and leave no room for doubt as to the guilt of
the defendant.

Counsel de officio for the defendant in this court asked that a new trial be granted because of the failure of the trial court to unite with the record
the photograph and the two letters, thereby depriving this court of the opportunity of examining the handwriting of the two documents for the
purpose of determining whether or not they were, as a matter of fact, written by Getulia Neri. While it is the better practice to unite with record
exhibits of this character which have been rejected, yet the failure to do so in the instant case cannot in any manner prejudice the rights of the
defendant for the reason that it has been clearly established that the letters were not written by Getulia Neri. The trial court found that the letters
were fabricated and that they, even if written by Getulia, contained no invitation to visit her or enter the house.

The judgment appealed from being strictly in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Carson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152997 November 10, 2004
SALVADOR MARZALADO,* JR., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645, which
affirmed the Decision2 dated November 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 79, in Criminal Case No. Q-98-74695. The
RTC upheld the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35, convicting herein petitioner Salvador Marzalado, Jr., for violation of
Article 2803 of the Revised Penal Code on Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of two (2) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P500 and to pay the costs.4 This petition likewise assails the Resolution5 dated April 23, 2002, of the
Court of Appeals, denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by Luz Marzalado, the mother of herein petitioner, Salvador Marzalado, Jr.
Sometime in February 1993, Luz Marzalado filed an ejectment case against Albano. Judgment was rendered against Albano, who was ordered to
vacate the leased premises and to pay the unpaid rentals. Albano appealed to the RTC.

In September 1993, during the pendency of the appeal, the electricity supply of the unit was cut off due to non-payment of bills. As a result, Albano
transferred her children to her father's house, four houses away, leaving a maid to sleep in the unit.

Albano claims that on November 2, 1993, at around 1:00 p.m., she went to her unit. She noticed that the lead pipe she used to hang clothes to dry
was missing. When she returned at about 8:00 a.m. the following day, November 3, 1993, she discovered the padlock of the main door changed,
preventing her from entering the premises. She went to see petitioner but he was not around.

On November 4, 1993, Albano again returned to her unit. She peeked through the window jalousies and saw that the place was already empty. She
immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials, who in turn, advised her to go to the police. Thereafter, she filed a complaint for grave
coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling and theft against petitioner.

On November 14, 1993, Albano tried to see the accused, but again failed. This time she noticed that the roofing of her unit had been removed and
the main door locked from the inside. She was informed that on November 1, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., and his female companion took her lead pipe
and on November 2, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., took her personal belongings and brought them inside his house.

Accordingly, Albano filed a suit for trespass to dwelling with the MeTC of Quezon City against Marzalado, Jr., thus:

The undersigned accuses SALVADOR MAR[Z]ALADO, JR., of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused without any justifiable cause, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling place of CRISTINA N. ALBANO located at No. 241 Road 1, Pag-Asa, this City, against the
latter's will and without her consent or any members of the household, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Quezon City, Philippines, March 16, 1994.6

On May 12, 1994, the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. A summary hearing followed, with Albano and her witness,
Narciso Raniedo, testifying for the prosecution.

Raniedo, the owner of the house fronting Albano's unit, testified that at around 5:00 p.m., on November 1, 1993, he was about to enter his house,
when he glanced at the unit leased by Albano. He saw Marzalado, Jr., take a lead pipe and hand it to a woman waiting at the terrace of Marzalado,
Jr.'s house. Raniedo further said that on November 2, 1993, sometime between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. he was relaxing in front of his house, when
he heard noises coming from Albano's apartment. There he saw Marzalado, Jr., forcibly open the door of the unit, bring out the belongings of
Albano, and take these to his own house.

For his defense, Marzalado, Jr., testified that after the MeTC ruled against Albano in the MeTC ejectment case filed by his mother and because of
the disconnection of the electricity, Albano already vacated the leased unit and moved to her father's place. According to petitioner, on November
3, 1993, he was on his way home when he saw water in a continuous stream flowing out of Albano's unit. He then searched for Albano but to no
avail. He reported the matter to the barangay officers and asked for two barangay tanods to accompany him to the vacated unit. They went inside
the unit where they found an open faucet, with water flooding the floor. He accused Albano of deliberately leaving the faucet open. He claimed
Albano filed the criminal case of trespass to dwelling to harass him and to retaliate against him and his family.

On October 28, 1997, the MeTC handed down the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Salvador Mar[z]alado, Jr. "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trespass To Dwelling under Article
280 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced the penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Arresto Mayor and to pay a fine of
P 500.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.7

The trial court observed that the defense would have been "a good defense" had the alleged entry been made on November 2, 1993, the date
stated in the Information, instead of November 3, 1993, the date the accused said he entered the premises because Albano deliberately left the
faucet open.
Marzalado, Jr., appealed to the RTC, which ruled the matter in this wise:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision dated October 28, 1997, the same is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.8

Undaunted, Marzalado, Jr., elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645. The Court of Appeals found no error in the
challenged RTC decision and held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower court's decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, petitioner comes to this Court assigning as errors of the court a quo the following:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BOTH OF QUEZON CITY BECAUSE THE INCIDENT HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1993, AND NOT NOVEMBER 2, 1993, AND THE PETITIONER'S
ENTRY IN THE PREMISES IS FULLY JUSTIFIED BECAUSE HE WAS ASSISTED BY THEIR BARANGAY SECRETARY AND TWO BARANGAY TANOD[S] AND
THE ENTRY IS FOR A VALID PURPOSE. HENCE, THERE IS NO TRESPASS TO DWELLING.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE INFORMATION THAT THE ALLEGED TRESPASS TO DWELLING HAPPENED ON
NOVEMBER 2, 1993. THUS, WITH DUE RESPECT TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THERE WAS A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND IT
SHOULD NOT HAVE ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.10

The foregoing may be reduced to one issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the conviction of Marzalado, Jr., for qualified trespass to
dwelling?

The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the lower court, since in the proceedings below, there
was a grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in finding that he committed trespass to dwelling despite the glaring proof that
his entry was justifiable under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code11 - to prevent an imminent danger to property. He stresses that
while he did enter the unit, he did so with the aid of barangay officers and for the sole purpose of turning off the faucet that was causing the
flooding of the unit. He adds that the Information filed against him should be considered fatally defective for having stated that his entry was on
November 2, 1993, when in fact it was on November 3, 1993.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that petitioner's entry cannot be justified since the flooding of the floor was not a danger to life
nor property. Rather, the OSG claims that the flooding of the unit could have been averted had the petitioner resorted to merely turning off the
inlet valve of the water source. The OSG also stresses petitioner's failure to refute the charge that he entered the complainant's unit on November
2, 1993. Moreover, the OSG asserts that the exact time of the commission of the crime in the Information need not be so accurate to preclude
other dates near the actual date. It is sufficient that the Information states a time as near to the actual date, more so, where the time is not an
essential element of the offense, as in this case.

Anent the Information, the contention of petitioner that the Information is defective is untenable. Admittedly, there is a discrepancy on the precise
date of the alleged trespass - the Information charges petitioner Marzalado, Jr., with trespass to dwelling allegedly committed on November 2,
1993, while petitioner's defense relate to an entry made the following day. The discrepancy however, does not make the information defective.
Facts and circumstances necessary for inclusion in the information are determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific
crime.12 In trespass to dwelling, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) that he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such
entrance is against the latter's will.

The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an essential element of the offense of trespass. It is sufficient that the Complaint or
Information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.13 Rule 110, Section 11
of the Rules of Court provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at
which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. A variance between the time set out in the indictment and that
established by the evidence during trial does not constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score.14 Thus,
the error invoked by the petitioner in the date of the alleged trespass in the Information is of no grave import, for it is far from being the decisive
issue in this case.

However, still incumbent upon the prosecution is to establish the criminal intent and the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Criminal
cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not the weakness of the evidence of the defense or the lack of it.15 In the
prosecution for trespass, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the trespass. The gravamen of the crime is
violation of possession16 or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession.17

To prove trespass, the prosecution presented as witness Narciso Raniedo who testified that he saw petitioner enter the unit at around 4:30 p.m. to
5:00 p.m. on November 2 and take out Albano's belongings. No other eyewitness corroborated Raniedo's testimony. However, by her own account,
Albano declared that she discovered the trespass in the evening of November 3,18 the same day the barangay certified Marzalado, Jr.'s entry. This
obviously does not discount the fact that although the exact date of entry varied as between petitioner and respondent, they both were referring
to the same entry.

What remains now is the issue of whether the entry of petitioner Marzalado, Jr., was legally justified. We rule that it is, based on the circumstances
of this case.

As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was "forcibly opened by the owner because of the strong
water pressure coming out of the faucet…"19 As Albano herself admitted, she and her children already left the unit when the electricity supply was
cut off in the month of September. Hence, nobody was left to attend to the unit, except during some nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit.
Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property caused by the open faucet.
No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to
avoid damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalado, Jr.'s judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet
instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.

Thus, we find the evidence on record insufficient to hold petitioner guilty of the offense charged. Palpable doubt exists in our mind as to the guilt of
petitioner. In our view, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court and of the Metropolitan Trial Court when it
found petitioner guilty of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling. In a situation of ambiguity, where the act of the accused permits of two possible
signification, one culpable and another innocent, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused. The evidence in this case simply fails to
convince us of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645, and its Resolution
dated April 23, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner SALVADOR MARZALADO, JR., is hereby
ACQUITTED of the charge against him for lack of evidence to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.