DOCTRINES FROM GIVEN CASES (MIDTERMS TO FINALS)

Aranes v. Occiano (2002)

 A judge solemnized the marriage of a couple without a marriage license and held it outside
his jurisdiction. The marriage is void for lack of license. The judge was found to have
acted in gross ignorance of the law.
 A marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void and the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority
to solemnize a marriage.

Ninal v. Badayog (2000)

 Marriage by parties who have cohabited for at least 5 years without any legal impediment
to marry each other is exepmted from the marriage licence requirement.

Republic v. Molina (1997)

 Molina Doctrine in Psychological Incapacity

a.) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
This is to be investigated by the OSG for collusion.
b.) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
1. Medically or clinically identified;
2. Alleged in the complaint;
3. Sufficiently proven by the experts; and
4. Clearly explained in the decision.
c.) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration”
of the marriage.
d.) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
e.) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
f.) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221, and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
g.) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling/decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
h.) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification.

Marcos v. Marcos (2000)

  The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
 Psychological incapacity maybe established by the totality of the evidence presented.
Personal medical examination could be dispensed with.

Santos v. CA (1995)

 The application of Art. 36 is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
 The natural parents, who are of good character and who can reasonably provide for the
child, are ordinarily entitled to custody as against all persons. (Parental Preference Rule)

Tsoi v. CA (1997)

 The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. “A man who can but won’t is psychologically incapacitated”

Diaz-Salgado v. Anson

 As held in Valdez v RTC Quezon City, in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Lasanas v. People

Republic v. Dayot (2008)

 The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of cohabitation,
which would have qualified a marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence,
marriage is void ab initio.
 Action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not
prescribe and may be raised any time.

Sps. Mendoza v. Yamane (2003)

Matabuena v. Cervantes (1971)

 The donation between common-law spouses falls within the provision prohibiting
donations between spouses during marriage.

Guiang v. CA
  Absence of the consent of one spouse renders the entire sale of a conjugal property null
and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the other spouse
who contracted the sale.

Roxas v. CA (1991)

 Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership, administration does not
include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets
unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty.
 Lease is not only an encumbrance but also a qualified alienation, with the lessee
becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner of the
thing affected by the lease.

Vda. De Delizo v. Delizo

Jovellanos v. CA (1992)

 The lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased.
Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, however, the ownership may still be
with the seller until full payment of the price is made.

Domingo v. Molina

Hapitan v. Lagradilla

Valdez v. RTC (1996)

 Civil Law; Family Code; In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
 Property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal coownership.
 When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other, only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions.
 The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of Article 43 relates only by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code.

Saguid v. CA (2003)
  The failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial i.e. the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court
shall render judgment on the basis thereof; The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion
for reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect.
 Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result
in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.
 Fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the
application of the rules.

Guererro v. Fernando (1994)

 Suits between brothers-in-law can prosper even without a verified complaint or petition.
The enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same family does not
comprehend “sisters-inlaw”.
 The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to
the filing of a suit between members of the same family.

Orfila v. Arellano (2006)

 Employees in the government service are bound by the rules of proper and ethical
behavior and are expected to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when
confronted with rudeness and insolence.
 Evidence; Denials; If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, denial is self-
serving and cannot overturn positive eyewitness accounts.
 The act of a court employee of slapping a fellow employee without proof of sufficient
provocation and in the presence of her superior in the latter’s office during working hours
falls short of the standard of conduct required of court employees.
 Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the
performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with other
people so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the
community.
 Under the Civil Service Law, lending of money at usurious rates of interest is prohibited,
so is the lending by subordinates to superior officers.
 If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed
should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or counts and the rest may be
considered aggravating circumstances.
 While it has been held that a birth certificate is the best evidence of a person’s date of
birth and that late registration by the mother of her child’s birth does not affect its
evidentiary value, the same cannot be said for respondent employee’s birth certificate in
the face of contradictory evidence.
 A marriage contract is a public document that needs no authentication—it cannot be
overcome by the testimony of one of the contracting parties.
 Borrowing money from a subordinate is punishable as a light offense under Civil Service
Law.
 Birthday Celebrations; There is nothing wrong with celebrating one’s birthday in the office
especially if it has been a tradition therein.
Fernandez v. CA

Reyes v. CA

Aruego v. CA (1996)

 The phrase “vested or acquired rights” under Article 256 is not defined by the Family
Code, leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is
submitted to them.
 An action for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was
filed prior to the advent of the Family Code must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil
Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
 The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached, cannot be
ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction
until it finally disposes of the case.

Lahom v. Quibolo (2003)

 The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child accepted the
principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child; Republic Act No. 8552 affirmed
the legitimate status of the adopted child not only in his new family but also in the society
as well; The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
 Vested right” includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemption from new obligations created after the right has become vested; Rights
are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
 The action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer, could be pursued.
 The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection; Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to regulation by the State.
 An adopter while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child.

Santos v. Republic (1967)

 Relatives by blood or affinity are not prohibited from adopting another.

 Interest and welfare of child to be adopted should be paramount consideration.
 Elder sister may adopt a younger brother.
  Relationship established by adoption is limited to adopting parents.

Grande v. Antonio (2014)

 The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother.
The exception provided by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father.
 Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother. Since parental
authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
 An acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father.
 On the matter of children’s surnames, the Supreme Court has, time and again, rebuffed
the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child.
 The hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act.

Espiritu v. CA (1995)

 Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always
be the child’s interest.
 In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the
Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations.
 The welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined
as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian.
 Testimony of expert witnesses when presented to the court must be construed to have
been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court
in the determination of the issue before it.

Sagala-Eslao v. CA (1997)

 The law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution.
 The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights
incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.

Lacsamana v. Lacsamana

David v. CA

Silva v. CA (1997)

 Visitation right is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
  There is nothing conclusive to indicate that the constitutional and legal provisions on the
natural right and duty of parents are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate
relationships.
 In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the paramount
consideration.

Pineda v. CA (1993)

 In group insurance policies, the employer is the agent of the insurer.

 The father and mother are the legal guardian of the child’s property if the market value
of the property or the annual income of the child does not exceed P50,000.00, otherwise
a bond is required.

Elcano v. Hill (1977)

 The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character, whether
voluntary or negligent. Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading
of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia—that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplates only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts—deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact is actually extends to fault or
culpa.
 A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim do not
recover damages on both scores.
 The vicarious liability of the parents on account of a delict committed by their minor child
is not extinguished by the fact that said, child who is Hiring with and dependent upon said
parents is married.

Yasin v. Sharin (1995)

 The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register.
 The only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil
Register.
 The onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should
not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her
maiden name and surname.
 No law prohibits a married woman from continuing to use her maiden name and surname
if she wishes to. – Concurring Opinion by J. Romero

Republic v. Vicencio (1998)

 In Republic vs. Hernandez, the Court recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient
grounds to warrant a change of name:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
 (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhoodby a Filipino
name and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest
 The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable
cause’ for which the change is sought; Legitimate children shall principally use the
surname of their father.
 A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of
name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
 More confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if a legitimate child were
allowed to bear her step-father’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him.

RA 11222

Assimilated birth rectification – sex of person

RA 10172

Further allowing correction – date and month of birth

RA 9048

Clerical/typographical errors – first name and nickname

Republic v Cagandahan (2008)

 Jennifer Cagandahan, who suffered from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia and had two sex
organs and whose female sex organs did not develop normally, had her petition to change
her registered sex from female granted.