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REPORT OF
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

C:QLOR ILLUSTRATIONS REPRODUCE_g,


IN BLACK AND WHITE

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(_C_S'SI_ NUMBERL. - (THRU)

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(CODE)
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION


REPRODUCED
BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U. S. DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE
\\ • SPRINGFIELD,VA. 22161

ILl ]t L
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

June 15, 1970

The Honorable Thomas O. Paine


Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546

Dear Dr. Paine:

Pursuant to your directives of April 17 and April 21, 1970, I am


transmitting the final Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Concurrent with this transmittal, I have recessed the Board, subject


to call.

We plan to reconvene later this year when most of the remaining


special tests have been completed, in order to review the results
of these tests to determine whether any modifications to our
findings, determinations, or recommendations are necessary. In
addition, we will stand ready to reconvene at your request.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar M. Cortright
Chairman
°

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ii
PREFACE

The Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's third mission to explore


the surface of the Moon, is a harsh reminder of the immensedifficulty
of this undertaking.

The total Apollo system of ground complexes, launch vehicle, and


spacecraft constitutes the most ambitious and demandingengineering
development ever undertaken by man. For these missions to succeed, both
men and equipment must perform to near perfection. That this system has
already resulted in two successful lunar surface explorations is a tribute
to those menand womenwho conceived, designed, built, and flew it.

Perfection is not only difficult to achieve, but difficult to main-


tain. The imperfection in Apollo 13 constituted a near disaster, averted
only by outstanding performance on the part of the crew and the ground
control team which supported them.

The Apollo 13 Review Board was charged with the responsibilities


of reviewing the circumstances surrounding the accident, of establishing
the probable causes of the accident, of assessing the effectiveness of
flight recovery actions, of reporting these findings, and of developing
recommendations for corrective or other actions. The Board has made
every effort to carry out its assignment in a thorough, objective, and
impartial manner. In doing so, the Board madeeffective use of the
failure analyses and corrective action studies carried out by the Manned
Spacecraft Center and was very impressed with the dedication and objec-
tivity of this effort.

The Board feels that the nature of the Apollo 13 equipment failure
holds important lessons which, when applied to future missions, will
contribute to the safety and effectiveness of mannedspace flight.

ii
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iv
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ladder 3USradar antenna ental


control control system
system Command Module radiator
quad crew compartment
platforrr
steerable
power high gain antenna
inflight systemradiators
antenna reactioncontrol
(2) systemquad

extension
r

LM descent
engine

r_ II1!

Docking Aft heatshield

VHF windows

Docking combinedtunnel hatch

LM overhead hatch

bLunar moduledescentstage@Lunar moduleascent stage@Comrrand module-_.


Service module
.I
Apollo 13 space vehicle configuration.
r=.
CSM in ground test with bay 4 panel removed.

_V
Inflight photograph of service module showing damageto bay 4.

V
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viii
TABLEOF CONTENTS

Page
LETTEROF TRANSMITTAL

PREFACE............................ iii

TABLEOF CONTENTS....................... ix

CHAPTER
i - AUTHORITIES

Memorandum,April 17, 1970, from Administrator and


Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright ...... i-i

Memorandum,April 21, 1970, from Administrator and


Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright ...... I-4

Memorandum,April 20, 1970, from Administrator and


Deputy Administrator to Dr. Charles D. Harrington,
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel ......... 1-6

Memorandum,April 20, 1970, from Administrator to


Mr. Dale D. Myers, Associate Administrator for
MannedSpaceFlight .................... 1-7

NASAManagementInstruction 8621.1, Subject:


Mission Failure Investigation Policy and Procedures,
April 14, 1966 ...................... i-8

NASAManagementInstruction 1156.14, Subject:


Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, December7, 1967 ..... i-i0

CHAPTER
2 - BOARD
HISTORY
ANDPROCEDURES

Part i. Summaryof Board History and Procedures • • • . . , 2-1

Part 2. Biography of Board Members, Observers, and


Panel Chairmen • . • . . • , • . , • • • , • . • , • 2-3
Part 3. Board Organization and General Assignments
for Board Panels
• • • • , . • • • . , • • • , • • •

Part 4. Summary of Board Activities


Page

CHAPTER 3 - DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE AND MISSION

Part i. Apollo/Saturn V Space Vehicle .......... 3-2

Part 2. Apollo 13 Mission Description .......... 3-26

CHAPTER 4 - REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF APOLLO 13 ACCIDENT

Part i. Introduction .................. 4-1

Part 2. Oxygen Tank No. History ............. 4-2

Part 3. Apollo 13 Flight ................ 4-25

Part 4. Surm_ary Analysis of the Accident ........ 4-36

Part 5. Apollo 13 Recovery ............... 4-44

CHAPTER 5 - FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part i. Introduction ................. 5-1

Part 2. Assessment of Accident ............. 5-5

Part 3. Supporting Considerations ............ 5-12

Part 4. Recommendations ................. 5-40

APPENDIX A - BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND OPEBATIONS

APPENDIX B - REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL

APPENDIX C - REPORT OF MANUFAC_JRING AND TEST PANEL

APPENDIX D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL

APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT _G_NT PANEL

APPENDIX F - SPECIAL TESTS AND ANALYSES

APPENDIX G - BOARD ADMINISTRATIVE PRODECURES

APPENDIX H - BOkRD RELEASES AND PRESS STATEMEntS

II
CHAPTER i

AUTHORITIES

l-O

N N- N _ L E. E L l_ li
°
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
_iBI l_- _
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR


April 17, 1970

TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright

SUBJECT : Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board

REFERENCES: (a) NMI 8621.1 - Mission Failure Investigation Policy


and Procedures

(b) NMI 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

i. It is NASA policy as stated in Reference (a) "to investigate and


document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the
conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take appropriate
corrective actions as a result of the findings and recommendations."

2. Because of the serious nature of the accident of the Apollo 13 space-


craft which jeopardized human life and caused failure of the Apollo 13
lunar mission, we hereby establish the Apollo 13 Review Board (hereinafter
referred to as the Board) and appoint you Chairman. The members of the
Board will be qualified senior individuals from NASA and other Govern-
ment agencies. After consultation with you, we will:

(a) Appoint the members of the Board and make any subsequent changes
necessary for the effective operation of the Board; and

(b) Arrange for timely release of information on the operations,


findings, and recommendations of the Board to the Congress, and, through
the NASA Office of Public Affairs, to the public. The Board will report
its findings and recommendations directly to us.

3. The Board will:

(a) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to the space-


craft which occurred during the flight of Apollo 13 and the subsequent
flight and ground actions taken to recover, in order to establish the
probable cause or causes of the accident and assess the effectiveness
of the recovery actions.

(b) Review all factors relating to the accident and recovery actions
the Board determines to be significant and relevant, including studies,
findings, recommendations, and other actions that have been or may be
undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and contractors
involved.

i-i
(c) Direct such further specific investigations as may be necessary.

(d) Report as soon as possible its findings relating to the cause or


causes of the accident and the effectiveness of the flight and ground
recovery actions.

(e) Develop recommendations for corrective or other actions, based


upon its findings and determinations or conclusions derived therefrom.

(f) Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations and


submit a final report.

4. As Chairman of the Board you are delegated the following powers:

(a) To establish such procedures for the organization and operation


of the Board as you find most effective; such procedures shall be part
of the Board's records. The procedures shall be furnished the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel for its review and comment.

(b) To establish procedures to assure the execution of your


responsibilities in your absence.

(e) To designate such representatives, consultants, experts, liaison


officers, observers, or other individuals as required to support the
activities of the Board. You shall define their duties and responsi-
bilities as part of the Board's records.

(d) To keep us advised periodically concerning the organization,


procedures, operations of the Board and its associated activities.

5. By separate action we are requesting the Aerospace Safety Advisory


Panel established by Reference (b) to review both the procedures and
findings of the Board and submit its independent report to us.

6. By separate action we are directing the Associate Administrator for


Manned Space Flight to:

(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space Flight
cooperate fully with the Board and provide records, data, and technical
support as requested.

(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews,


studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop recommenda-
tions to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14
mission with respect to hardware, operational procedures, and other
aspects of the Apollo program.

i-2
7. All elements of NASA will cooperate with the Board and provide full
support within their areas of responsibility.

George M. Low
Deputy Administrator T.O. Paine
Administrator

z-3
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
i:<¸
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR April 21, 1970

TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright

SUBJECT : Membership of Apollo 13 Review Board

Reference: Memorandum to you of April 17, subject: Establishment of


Apollo 13 Review Board

In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Reference (a), the membership of


the Apollo 13 Review Board is established as follows:

Members:

Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman (Director, Langley Research Center)


Mr. Robert F. Allnutt (Assistant to the Administrator, NASA Hqs.)
Mr. Neil Armstrong (Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center)
Dr. John F. Clark (Director, Goddard Space Flight Center)
Brig. General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (Director of Space, DCS/R&D,
Hqs., USAF)
Mr. Vincent L. Johnson (Deputy Associate Administrator-Engineering,
Office of Space Science and Applications)
Mr. Milton Klein (Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office)
Dr. Hans M. Mark (Director, Ames Research Center)

Counsel:

Mr. George Malley (Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center)

0MSF Technical Support:

Mr. Charles W. Mathews (Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of


Manned Space Flight)

Observers:

Mr. William A. Anders (Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics


and Space Council)
Dr. CharlesD. Harrington (Chairman,NASAAerospaceSafety
Advisory Panel)
Mr. I. I. Pinkel (Director, AerospaceSafety Researchand
Data Institute, Lewis ResearchCenter)
Congressional Liaison:

Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoff (Office of Legislative Affairs, NASA Hqs.

Public Affairs Liaison:

Mr. Brian Duff (Public Affairs Officer, Manned Spacecraft Center)

In accordance with applicable NASA instruction, you are authorized to


appoint such experts and additional consultants as are required for
the effective operations of the Board.

George M. Low T. O. Paine


Deputy Administrator Administrator

1-5

Ll 11 L: L_ L L
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

April 20, 1970


OFFIC r OF" THE ADMINISTRATOR

TO Dr. Charles D. Harrington


Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

SUBJECT : Review of Procedures and Findings of Apollo 13 Review Board

Attachment: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M.


Cortright, subject: Establishment of Apollo 13
Review Board

References: (a) Section 6, National Aeronautics and Space Administration


Authorization Act, 1968

(b) NMI 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

i. In accordance with References (a) and (b), the Aerospace Safety


Advisory Panel (hereafter referred to as the Panel) is requested to
review the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13 Review Board (here-
after referred to as the Board) established by Attachment (a).

2. The procedures established by the Board will be made available to the


Panel for review and comment as provided in paragraph 4(a) of Attachment (a).

3. As Chairman of the Panel, you are designated an Observer on the Board.


In this capacity, you, or another member of the Panel designated by you,
are authorized to be present at those regular meetings of the Board you
desire to attend. You are also authorized to receive oral progress re-
ports from the Chairman of the Board or his designee from time to time to
enable you to keep the Panel fully informed on the work of the Board.

4. The final report and any interim reports of the Board will be made
available promptly to the Panel for its review.

5. The Panel is requested to report to us on the procedures and findings


of the Board at such times and in such form as you consider appropriate,
but no later than i0 days after the submission to us of the final report
of the Board.

George M. Low T. O. Paine


Deputy Administrator Administrator

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board


M/Mr. Dale Myers

i-6
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON,
D.C. 20546

April 20, 1970


OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

TO Mr. Dale D. Myers


Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight

SUBJECT : Apollo 13 Review

References: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M.


Cortright, subject: Establishment of Apollo 13
Review Board

(b) Memorandum dated April 20, 1970, to Dr. Charles


D. Harrington, subject: Review of Procedures
and Findings of Apollo 13 Review Board

i. As indicated in paragraph 6 of Reference (a), you are directed to:

(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space


Flight cooperate fully with the Board in providing records,
data, and technical support as requested.

(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews,


studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop
timely recommendations to us on corrective measures to be
taken prior to the Apollo 14 mission with respect to hard-
ware, operational procedures, flight crews, and other aspects
of the Apollo program.

2. The recommendations referred to in paragraph l(b) above should be


submitted to us in such form and at such time as you deem appropriate,
but a report should be submitted no later than ten days after the
Apollo 13 Review Board submits its final report.

3. The assignments to the Apollo 13 Review Board and to the Aero-


space Safety Advisory Panel by References (a) and (b), respectively,
in no way relieve you of your continuing full responsibility for the
conduct of the Apollo and other OMSF programs.

Deputy Administrator Administrator

cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board


Mr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

I-7

L L E 12 L I: L L,: L.; n n Li n L ,
NMI 862 i. i

April 14, 1966


_ec_h,e dc#e

Management
Instruction
SUBJECT: MISSION FAILURE INVESTIGATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Io P_P_E

This Instruction establishes the policy and procedures for investigating


and documenting the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the
conduct of NASA space and aeronautical activities.

2. APPLICABILITY

This Instruction is applicable to NASA Headquarters and field installations.

3. DEFINITION

For the purpose of this Instruction, the following term shall apply:

In general, a failure is defined as not achieving a major mission


objective.

POLICY


It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major
mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and aeronau-
tical activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a
result of the findings and recommendations.

b,
The Deputy Administrator may conduct independent investigations
of major failures in addition to those investigations required of
the Officlals-ln-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices as set
forth in paragraph 5a.

5. PROCEDURES

a. Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices are responsible,


within their assigned areas, for:

(l) Informing promptly the Deputy Administrator of each major


failure and apprising him of the nature of the failure, status
of investigations, and corrective or other actions which are
or will be taken.

1-8
NMI 8621.1 April 14, 1966

(2) Determining the causes or probable causes of all failures,


taking corrective or other actions, and submitting written
reports of such determinations and actions to the Deputy
Administrator.

Do
When the Deputy Administrator decides to conduct an independent
investigation, he will:

(i) Establish a (name of project) Review Board, comprised of appro-


priate NASA officials;

(2) Define the specific responsibilities of each Board, encompassing


such tasks as:

(a) Reviewing the findings, determinations and corrective or


other actions which have been developed by contractors,
field installations and the Official-in-Charge of cognizant
Headquarters Program Office and presenting the Board's
conclusions as to their adequacy to the Deputy Administrator.

(b) Reviewing the findings during the course of investigations


with cognizant field installation and Headquarters officials.

(c) Recommending such additional steps (for example additional


tests) as are considered desirable, to determine the techni-
cal and operational causes or probable causes of failure,
and to obtain evidence of nontechnical contributing factors.

(d) Developing recommendations for corrective and other actions,


based on all information available to the Board.

(e) Doc_nenting findings, determinations and recommendations


for corrective or other actions and submitting such documen-
tation to the Deputy Administrator.

c. Procedures for implementing the Board's reco_mnendations shall be


determined by the Deputy Administrator.

6. CANCELLATION

NASA Management Manual Instruction 4-1-7 (T.S. 760), March 24, 1964.

Deputy Administrator

DISTRIBUTION:
SDL I

1-9

L I/ E L L '
N_ n>6._4

December 7, 1967
C'ffectiv¢dole

Management
Instruction
SUBJECT: AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

i. PURPOSE

This Instruction sets forth the authority for, and the


duties, procedures, organization, and support of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.

2. AUTHORITY

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (hereafter called the


"Panel") was established under Section 6 of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act,
1968 (PL 90-67, 90th Congress, 81 Stat. 168, 170). Since
the Panel was established by statute, its formation and
use are not subject to the provisions of Executive Order
ll007 or of NMI 1150.2, except to the extent that such
provisions are made applicable to the Panel under tflis
Instruction•

3. DUTIES

aB The duties of the Panel are set forth in Section 6


of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Authorization Act, 1968, as follows:

"The Panel shall review safety studies and


operations plans referred to it and s_all
make reports thereon, shall advise the
Administrator with respect to the hazards
of proposed or existing facilities and pro-
posed operations and with respect to the
adequacy of proposed or existing safety
standards, and shall perform such other
duties as the Administrator may request."

b • Pursuant to carrying out its statutory duties, the


Panel will review, evaluate, and advise on all
elements of NASA's safety system, including
especially the industrial safety, systems safety,

1-10
NMI1156.14 December
7, 1967

and public safety activities, and the managementof


these activities. These key elements of NASA's
safety system are identified and delineated as follows:
(1) Industrial Safety. This element includes those
activities which, on a continuing basis, provide
protection for the well being of personnel and
prevention of damage to property involved in NASA's
business and exposed to potential hazards
associated with carrying out this business.
Industrial safety relates especially to the
operation of facilities in the many programs of
research, development, manufacture, test, opera-
tion, and maintenance. Industrial safety
activities include, but are not limited to, such
functions as:

(a) Determination of industrial safety criteria.

(b) Establishment and implementation of safety


standards and procedures for operation and
maintenance of facilities, especially test
and hazardous environment facilities.

(c) Development of safety requirements for the


design of new facilities.

(d) Establishment and implementation of safety


standards and procedures for operation of
program support and administrative aircraft.

(2) Systems Safety. This element includes those


activities specifically organized to deal with the
potential hazards of complex R&D systems that
involve many highly specialized areas of tech-
nology. It places particular emphasis on
achieving safe operation of these systems over
their life cycles, and it covers major systems
for aeronautical and space flight activities,
manned or unmanned, including associated ground-
based research, development, manufacturing, and
test activities. Systems safety activities
include, but are not limited to, such functions
as:

(a) Determination of systems safety criteria,


including criteria for crew safety.

(b) Determination of safety data requirements.

(C) Performance of systems safety analyses.

1-11

ILl II ]J E L E L L l_ I_ L: A: _ n n m n L ' ,__


_cember 7, 1967 NMI i156.14

(d) Establishment and implementation of systems


safety plans.

(3) Public Safety. This element includes those


activities which, on a continuing basis, provide
protection for the well being of people and
prevention of damage to property not involved in
_ASA's business, but which may nevertheless be
exposed to potential hazards associated with carry-
in_ out this business. Public safety activities
include, but are not limited to, such functions as:

(a) Determination of public safety criteria.

(b) Establishment and control of public safety


hazards associated with facility and systems
tests and operations.

(c) Establishment and implementation, as required,


of emergency or catastrophe control plans.

(4) Safety Management. This element includes both the


program and functional organizations of NASA and
its contractors involved in the identification of
potential hazards and their elimination or control
as set forth in the foregoing description of
safety activities. It also includes the management
systems for planning, implementing, coordinating,
and controlling these activities. These management
systems include, but are not limited to, the
following:

(a) The authorities, responsibilities, and working


relationships of the organizations involved
in safety activities, and the assessment of
their effectiveness.

(b) The procedures for insuring the currency and


continuity of safety activities, especially
systems safety activities which may extend
over long periods of time and where manage-
ment responsibilities are transferred during
the life cycles of the systems.

(c) The plans and procedures for accident/Incident


investigations, including those for the follow-
up on corrective actions and the feedback of
accident/Incident information to other
involved or interested organizations.

(d) The analysis and dissemination of safety data.

1-12
NMI 1156.14 December 7, 1967

• PROCEDURES

a• The Panel will function in an advisory capacity to the


Administrator, and, through him, to those organizational
elements responsible for management of the NASA safety
activities.

b, The Panel will be provided with all information required


to Uischarge its advisory responsibilities as they
pertain to both NASA and its contractors' safety
activities. This information will be made available
through the mechanism of appropriate reports, and by
means of in situ reviews of safety activities at the
various NASA and contractor sites, as deemed necessary
by the Panel and arranged through the Administrator.
The Panel will thus be enabled to examine and evaluate
not only the general status of the NASA safety system,
but also the key elements of the _lanned and on-going
activities in this system.

• ORGANIZATION

a. [!embership

(l) The Panel will consist of a maximum of nine members,


who will be appointed by the Administrator.
Appointments will be for a term of six years,
except that, in order to provide continuity of
membership, one-third of the members appointed
originally to the Panel will be appointed for a
term of two years, one-third for a term of four
years, and one-third for a term of six years•

(2) Not more than four members of the Panel shall be


employees of NASA, nor shall such NASA members
constitute a majority of the composition of the
Panel at any given time.

(3) Compensation and travel allowances for Panel


members shall be as specified in Section 6 of the
NASA Authorizatfon Act, 1968.

b. Officers

(I) The Officers of the Panel shall be a Chairman and


a Vice Chairman, who shall be selected by the Panel
from their membership to serve for one-year terms.

(2) The Chairman, or Vice Chairman in his absence,


shall preside at all meetings of the Panel and shall
have the usual powers of a presiding officer.

1-13
December 7, 1967 NMI I156.14

Co Committees

(z) The Panel is authorized to establish special


committees, as necessary and as approved by the
Administrator, to carry out specified tasks within
the scope of duties cf the Panel.

(2) All such cc_:_mittee activities will be considered


an inseparable extension of Panel activities, and
will be in accordance with all applicable pro-
cedures and regulations set forth in this
Instruction.

(3) The Chairman of each special committee shall be a


member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. The
other committee members may or may not be members
of the Panel, as recommended by the Panel and
approved by the Administrator.

(4) Appointment of Panel members to committees as


officers or members will be either for one year,
for the duration of their term as Panel members, or
for the lifetime of the committee, whichever is the
shortest. Appointments of non-Panel members to
committees will be for a period of one year or for
the lifetime of the committee, whichever is shorter.

(5) Compensation and travel allowances for committee


members who are not members of the Panel'shall be
the same as for members of the Panel itself, except
that compensation for such committee members
appointed from outside the Federal Government shall
be at the rate prescribed by the Administrator for
comparable services.

dQ
Meetings

(l) Regular meetings of the Panel will be held as often


as necessary and at least twice a_ar. One meeting
each year shall be an Annual Meeting. Business
conducted at this meeting will include selecting
the Chairman and the Fice Chairman of the Panel,
recommending new committees and committee members
as required or desired, approving the Panel's
annual report to the Administrator, and such other
business as may be required.

(2) Special meetings of the Panel may be called by the


Chairman, by notice served personally upon or by
mall or telegraph to the usual address of each
member at least five days prior to the meeting.

1-14
-" NMI 1156.14 December 7, 1967

(3) Special meetings shall be called in the same


manner by the Chairman, upon the written request
of three members of the Panel.

(4) If practicable, the object of a special meeting


should be sent in writing to all members, and if
possible a special meeting should be avoided by
obtaining the views of members by mail or otherwise,
both on the question requiring the meeting and on
the question of calling a special meeting.

(5) All meetings of special committees will be called


by their respective qhairmen pursuant to and in
accordance with performing their specified tasks.

(6) Minutes of all meetings of the Panel, and of special


committees established by the Panel, will be kept.
Such minutes shall, at a minimum, contain a record
of persons present, a description of matters dis-
cussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all
reports received, issued, or approved by the Panel
or committee. The accuracy of all minutes will be
certified to by the Chairman of the Panel (or by
the Vice Chairman in his absence) or of the
committee.

e. Reports and Records

(1) The Panel shall submit an annual report to the


Administrator.

(2) The Panel will submit to the Administrator reports


on all safety reviews and evaluations with comments
and recommendations as deemed appropriate by the
Panel.

(3) All records and files of the Panel, including


agendas, minutes of Panel and committee meetings,
studies, analyses, reports, or other data compila-
tions or work papers, made available to or
prepared by or for the Panel, will be retained by
the Panel.

f. Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest

(l) Nongovernmental members of the Panel, and of


special committees establishea by the Panel, are
"Special Government Employees" within the meaning
of NHB 1900.2A, which sets forth guidance to NASA
Special Government Employees resarding the
avoidance of conflicts of interest and the
observance of ethical standards of conduct. A

1"19
_ceaber 7, i_? _ 1156.14

copy of NHB 1900.2A and related NASA instructions


on conflicts of interest will be furnished to each
Panel or committee member at the time of his
appointment as a NASA consultant or expert.

(2) Nongovernmental members of the Panel or a soecial


committee will submit a "NASA Special Government
Employees Confidential Statement of Employment
and Financial Interests" (NASA Form 1271) prior to
participating in the activities of the Panel or a
special committee.

. SUPPORT

a.
A staff, to be comprised of full-time NASA employees,
shall be established to support the Panel. The members
of this staff will be fully responsive to direction from
the Chairman or t_e Fanel.

be
The director of this staff will serve as Executive
Secretary to the Panel. The Executive Secretary of the
Panel, in accordance with the specific instructions from
the Chairman of the Panel, shall:

(1) Administer the affairs of the Panel and have general


supervision of all arrangements for safety reviews
and evaluations, and other matters undertaken by
the Panel.

(2) Insure that a written record is kept of all


transactions, and submit the same to the Panel for
approval at each subsequent meeting.

(3) Insure that the same service is provided for all


special committees of the Panel.

trator

CFR Title i_, Chapter 5, Subpart 1209.5.

1-16
CHAPTER
2

BOARD
HISTORY
ANDPROCEDURES

Z-O
PART i. SUMMARY OF BOARD HISTORY AND PROCEDURES

The Apollo 13 Review Board was established on April 17, 1970, by


the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator under the authority of
NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966. In the letter
establishing the Board, Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Director of Langley
Research Center, was appointed as Chairman and the general responsibili-
ties of the Board were set forth. The seven additional members of the
Board were named in a letter from the Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator to the Chairman, dated April 21, 1970. This letter also
designated a Manned Space Flight Technical Support official, a Counsel
to the Board, several other supporting officials, and several observers
from various organizations. In addition, in a letter dated April 20,
1970, to Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman of the NASA Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, that Panel was requested to review the Board's
procedures and findings.

The Review Board convened at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston,


Texas, on Tuesday, April 21, 1970. Four Panels of the Board were formed,
each under the overview of a member of the Board. Each of the Panels
was chaired by a senior official experienced in the area of review
assigned to the Panel. In addition, each Panel was manned by a number
of specialists, thereby providing a nucleus of expertise for the review
activity. During the period of the Board's review activities, the
Chairmen of the four Panels were responsible for the conduct of evalua-
tions, analyses, and other studies bearing on their Panel assignments,
for preparing preliminary findings and recommendations, and for developing
other information for the Board's consideration. To overview these
Panel efforts, each member of the Board assumed specific responsibilities
related to the overall review.

In addition to the direct participants in the Board activity, a


number of observers and consultants also attended various meetings of
the Board or its constituent Panels. These individuals assisted the
Review Board participants with advice and counsel in their areas of
expertise and responsibilities.

While the Board's intensive review activities were underway, the


Manned Spacecraft Center Apollo 13 Investigation Team, under James A.
McDivitt, Colonel, USAF, was also conducting its own analysis of the
accident on Apollo 13. Coordination between the Investigation Team
work and the Apollo 13 Review Board activities was effected through the
MSF Technical Support official and by maintaining a close and continu-
ing working relationship between the Panel Chairmen and officials of
the MSC Investigation Team.

2-1
The Board Chairman established a series of administrative procedures
to guide the Board's activities. In addition, specific assignments of
responsibility were madeto all individuals involved in the Board's
activities so as to insure an efficient review activity. Overall logis-
tic and administrative support was provided by MSC.
The Board conducted both Executive and General Sessions. During
the Executive Sessions, plans were agreed upon for guiding the Board's
activities and for establishing priorities for tests, analyses, studies,
and other Board efforts. At the General Sessions, status of Panel
activities was reviewed by the Board with a view towards coordination
and integration of all review activities. In addition, Board members
regularly attended daily status meetings of the MannedSpacecraft Center
Investigation Team.
In general, the Board relied on MannedSpacecraft Center postmission
evaluation activities to provide the factual data upon which evaluation,
assessment, and analysis efforts could be based. However, the Board,
through a regular procedure, also levied specific data collection, re-
duction, and analysis requirements on MSC. Test support for the Board
was conducted primarily at MSCbut also included tests run at other
NASACenters. Membersof the Board and its Panels also visited a number
of contractor facilities to review manufacturing, assembly, and test
procedures applicable to the Apollo 13 mission.

The Chairman of the Board provided the NASADeputy Administrator


with oral progress reports. These reports summarizedthe status of
Review Board activities at the time and outlined the tasks still ahead.
All material used in these interim briefings was incorporated into the
Board's official files.

As a means of formally transmitting its findings, determinations,


and recommendations, the Board chose the format of this Final Report
which includes both the Board's Judgments as well as the reports of the
individual Panels.

A general file of all the data and information collected and examined
by the Board has been established at the Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia. In addition, the MSCInvestigation Teamestablished a file of
data at MSC.

2-2
PART2. BIOGRAPNT_S OF BOARDMEMBERS_ OBSERVERS_ AND PANEL CHAIRMEN

CHAIRMAN OF THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

EDGAR M. CORTRIGHT
NASA Langley Research Center

Edgar M. Cortright, 46, Director of the NASA Langley Research Center,


Hampton, Virginia, is Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Cortright has been an aerospace scientist and administrator for


22 years. He began his career at NASA's Lewis Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1948 and for the next i0 years specialized in research on high-
speed aerodynamics there.

In October 1958, Mr. Cortright was named Chief of Advanced Technology


Programs at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., where he directed ini-
tial formulation of NASA's Meteorological Satellite Program. In 1960, he
became Assistant Director for Lunar and Planetary Programs and directed
the planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner, Ranger, and
Surveyor.

Mr. Cortright became Deputy Director of the Office of Space Sciences


in 1961, and Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and Appli-
cations in 1963, in which capacities he served as General Manager of
NASA's space flight program using automated spacecraft. He joined the
Office of Manned Space Flight as Deputy Associate Administrator in 1967
and served in a similar capacity until he was appointed Director of the
Langley Research Center in 1968.

He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-


nautics and of the American Astronautical Society. He has received the
•Arthur S. Fleming Award, the NASA Medal for Outstanding Leadership, and
the NASA Medal for Distinguished Service.

Mr. Cortright is the author of numerous technical reports and


articles, and compiled and edited the book, "Exploring Space With a
Camera."

He is a native of Hastings, Pennsylvania, and served as a U.S. Navy


officer in World War II. He received Bachelor and Master of Science
degrees in aeronautical engineering from the Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute.

Mr. and Mrs. Cortright are the parents of two children.

2-3
MEMBERS
OF THEAPOLLO
13 REVIEW
BOARD

ROBERT
F. ALLNUTT
NASAHeadquarters

Robert F. Allnutt_ 34, Assistant to the NASAAdministrator,


Washington, D. C., is a memberof the Apollo 15 Review Board.

Mr. Allnutt was namedto his present position this year. Prior to
that, he had been Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs since
1967.

He joined NASAin 1960 as a patent attorney at the Langley Research


Center, Hampton, Virginia. In 1961, he was transferred to NASAHead-
quarters, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Allnutt served as Patent Counsel for CommunicationsSatellite
Corporation from January to September1965, when he returned to NASA
Headquarters as Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters.

He is admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia


and the state of Virginia and is a memberof the American Bar Association
and the Federal Bar Association.

Mr. Allnutt was graduated from Virginia Polytechnic Institute with


a B.S. degree in industrial engineering. He received Juris Doctor and
Master of Laws degrees from George Washington University Law School.

Mr. and Mrs. Allnutt are the parents of two sons. The family lives
in Washington, D. C.

NEIL A. ARMSTRONG
NASA Astronaut

Nell A. Armstrong, 39, NASA astronaut, is a member of the Apollo 13


Review Board.

Commander of the Apollo ll mission and the first man on the Moon,
Mr. Armstrong has distinguished himself as an astronaut and as an
engineering test pilot.

Prior to joining the astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft Center,


Houston, Texas, in 1962, Mr. Armstrong was an X-15 rocket aircraft
project pilot at the NASA Flight Research Center, Edwards, California.

\
Mr. Armstrong joined NASA at the Lewis Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1955, and later transferred to the Flight Research Center as an
aeronautical research pilot.

His initial space flight was as command pilot of Gemini VIII,


launched March 16, 1966. He performed the first successful docking of
two vehicles in space. The flight was terminated early due to a mal-
functioning thruster_ and the crew was cited for exceptional piloting
skill in overcoming the problem and accomplishing a safe landing. He
has served on backup crews for both Gemini and Apollo.

Mr. Armstrong is a Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test


Pilots, Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, and member of the Soaring Society of America. He has re-
ceived the Institute of Aerospace Sciences Octave Chanute Award, the
AIAAAstronautics Award, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, the John F.
Montgomery Award, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

He is a native of Wapakoneta, Ohio, and received a B.S. degree in


aeronautical engineering from Purdue University and a M.S. degree from
the University of Southern California. He was a naval aviator from
1949 to 1952 and flew 78 combat missions during the Korean action.

Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong have two sons.

JOHN F. CLARK
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

Dr. John F. Clark, 49, Director of the NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

He is an internationally known authority on atmospheric and space


sciences, holds four patents in electronic circuits and systems, and has
written many scientific papers on atmospheric physics, electronics, and
mathematics.

Dr. Clark joined NASA in 1958 and served in the Office of Space
Flight Programs at NASA Headquarters until 1961 when he was named
Director of Geophysics and Astronomy Programs, Office of Space Sciences.
From 1962 until 1965, he was Director of Sciences and Chairman of the
Space Science Steering Committee, Office of Space Science and Applica-
tions.

In 1965, Dr. Clark was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for


Space Science and Applications (Sciences), and later that year, Acting
Director of Goddard. He was named director of the center in 1966.

2-5
Dr. Clark began his career in 19h2 as an electronics engineer at
the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. From 19h7 to 19h8 he
was Assistant Professor of Electronic Engineering at Lehigh University,
Bethelem, Pennsylvania. He returned to NRL in 1948; and prior to Join-
ing NASA, served as head of the Atmospheric Electricity Branch there.

He is a member of the American Association of Physics Teachers,


American Geophysical Union, Scientific Research Society of America,
Philosophical Society of Washington, the International Scientific Radio
Union, and the Visiting Committee on Physics, Lehigh University. He
received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Service, Outstanding Leadership,
and Distinguished Service.

Dr. Clark was born in Reading, Pennsylvania. He received a B.S.


degree in electrical engineering from Lehigh University, M.S. degree in
mathematics from George Washington University, and Ph.D. in physics
from the University of Maryland.

Dr. and Mrs. Clark have two children and live in Silver Springs,
Maryland.

WALTER R. HEDRICK, JR.


Headquarters, USAF

Brig. Gen. Walter R. Hedrick, Jr., h8, Director of Space, Office


of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, Headquarters,
USAF, Washington, D.C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

He has participated in most of the Air Force's major nuclear test


projects and has extensive experience as a technical project officer
and administrator.

General Hedrick Joined the Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet in


1941 and flew in combat with the 86th Fighter Bomber Group during
World War II. After the War, he was assigned to the 19th Air Force, the
lhth Air Force, and as a project officer under Air Force Secretary
Stuart Symington. From 1952 to 1955, he was assigned to the Air Force
Office of Atomic Energy.

In 1955, he was assigned to the Technical Operations Division, Air


Force Special Weapons Command, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. In
1957, he was named Commander of the h951st Support Squadron, Eniwetok;
and the following year, he was reassigned to Kirtland AFB as Assistant
to the Group Commander and later as Air Commander of the h925th Test Group.

General Hedrick Joined the Special Systems Office, Air Force


Ballistics Division, Los Angeles, in 1960. He was named Commander of

2-6
-the Satellite Control Facility in 1965, and in 1966, he was appointed
Deputy Commander, Air Force Systems Command. He received his present
assignment in 1967.

General Hedrick is a Command Pilot and has received numerous Air


Force awards.

His home town is Fort Worth, Texas, and he attended Texas Techno-
logical College, Lubbock, prior to joining the service. He received
B.S. and M.S. degrees in physics from the University of Maryland.

General and Mrs. Hedrick are the parents of two sons.

VINCENT L. JOHNSON
NASA Headquarters

Vincent L Johnson, 51, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space


Science and Applications (Engineering), NASA Headquarters, is a member
of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Johnson was appointed to his present position in 1967. Prior


to that time, he had been Director of the Launch Vehicle and Propulsion
Programs Division, Office of Space Science and Applications, since 1964.
He was responsible for the management and development of the light and
medium launch vehicles used for NASA's unmanned earth orbital and deep
space programs. His division also directed studies of future unmanned
launch vehicle and propulsion system requirements.

Mr. Johnson joined NASA in 1960, coming from the Navy Department
where he had been an engineer with the Bureau of Weapons. His first
assignments with NASA were as Program Manager for the Scout, Delta, and
Centaur launch vehicles.

He was a naval officer during World War II, serving with the Bureau
of Ordnance. Prior to that, he was a physicist with the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory.

Mr. Johnson was born in Red Wing, Minnesota, and attended the
University of Minnesota.

He and Mrs. Johnson live in Bethesda, Maryland. They are the


parents of two children.

2-7

L E L L I: L L "
MILTON KLEIN
NASA Headquarters

Milton Klein, 46, Manager, Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, NASA


Headquarters, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Klein has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to
that he had been Deputy Manager since 1960. The Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office is a joint activity of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The office conducts the
national nuclear rocket program. He is also Director of the Division of
Space Nuclear Systems of the AEC_ responsible for space nuclear electric
power activities.

Mr. Klein became associated with atomic energy work in 19467 when
he was employed by the Argonne National Laboratory. In 1950, he joined
the AEC's Chicago Operations Office as staff chemical engineer. Later,
he was promoted to Assistant Manager for Technical Operations. Generally
engaged in reactor development work for stationary power plants, he had
a primary role in the power reactor demonstration program.

Mr. Klein was born in St. Louis, Missouri. He served in the U.S.
Navy during World War II.

He has a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from Washington


University and a Master of Business Administration degree from Harvard
University.

Mr. and Mrs. Klein and their three children live in Bethesda,
Maryland.

HANS M. MARK
NASA Ames Research Center

Dr. Hans M. Mark, 40, Director of the NASA Ames Research Center,
Moffett Field, California, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Prior to being appointed Director of the Ames Research Center he


was, from 1964 to 1969, Chairman of the Department of Nuclear Engineering
at the University of California, Berkeley, California.

An expert in nuclear and atomic physics, he served as Reactor


Administrator of the University of California's Berkeley Research
Reactor, professor of nuclear engineering and _ research physicist at
the University's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California,

2-8
and consultant to the U.S. Army and the National Science Foundation.
He has written many scientific papers.

Except for 2 years as an Assistant Professor of Physics at the


Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1958 to 1960, Dr. Mark's
administrative, academic, and research career has been centered at the
University of California (Berkeley).

Dr. Mark received his A.B. degree in physics from the University
of California, Berkeley, in 1951, and returned there as a research
physicist in 1955, one year after receiving his Ph.D. in physics
from M.I.T.

He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and a member of the


American Geophysical Union, the American Society for Engineering Educa-
tion and the American Nuclear Society.

Dr. Mark was born in Mannheim, Germany, and came to the United
States when he was ll years old. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen
in 1945.

Dr. and Mrs. Mark are the parents of two children.

COUNSEL TO THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD


GEORGE T. MALLEY
NASA Langley Research Center

George T. Malley, 57, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center,


Hampton, Virginia, is the Legal Counsel to the Apollo 13 Review Board.
He also served as Counsel to the Apollo 204 Review Board.

Mr. Malley is the Senior Field Counsel of NASA and has been assigned
to Langley since 1959. He was with the Office of the General Counsel,
Department of the Navy, from 1950 to 1959, where he specialized in
admiralty and international law.

He is a retired Navy officer and served on active duty from 1939 to


1946, mainly in the South Pacific. His last assignment was commanding
officer of the U.S.S. Fentress.

Mr. Malley has an A.B. degree from the University of Rochester and
an LL.B. degree from Cornell University Law School. He is a native of
Rochester, New York, and is a member of the New York Bar and the Federal
Bar Association.

Mr. and Mrs. Malley and their two children live in Newport News,
Virginia.

2-9
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT TECHNICAL SUPPORT
CHARLES W. MATHEWS
NASA Headquarters

Charles W. Mathews, 49, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned


Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., directs the Office
of Manned Space Flight technical support to the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Mathews has been a research engineer and project manager for
NASA and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), since 1943. In his present assignment, he serves as general
manager of manned space flight.

Prior to his appointment to this position in 1968, he had been


Director, Apollo Applications Program, NASA Headquarters, since
January 1967.

Mr. Mathews was Gemini Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft


Center, Houston, Texas, from 1963 until 1967. Prior to that time, he
was Deputy Assistant Director for Engineering and Development and Chief
of the Spacecraft Technology Division at MSC@

Mr. Mathews transferred to MSC (then the Space Task Group) when
Project Mercury became an official national program in 1958. He served
as Chief of the Operation Division. He had been at the Langley Research
Center, Hampton, Virginia, since 1943 engaged in aircraft flight research
and automatic control of airplanes. He became involved in manned space-
craft studies prior to the first Sputnik flights, and he conducted early
studies on reentry. Mr. Mathews was chairman of the group which developed
detailed specifications for the Mercury spacecraft.

Mr. Mathews has been awarded the NASA Distinguished Service Medal
and the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal. He has received the NASA
Group Achievement Award - Gemini Program Team.

He is a Fellow of the American Astronautical Society and an Associate


Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He is
the author of numerous technical articles published by NASA.

Mr. Mathews, a native of Duluth, Minnesota, has a B.S. degree in


aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy,
New York.

Mr. and Mrs. Mathews live in Vienna, Virginia. They have two
children.

2-10

iu I/ Ju E L L L h ' L E E ;
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD OBSERVERS

WILLIAM A. ANDERS
National Aeronautics and Space Council

William A. Amders, 36, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics


and Space Council, Washington, D.C., is an official observer of the
Apollo 13 Review Board.

Prior to being appointed to his present position in 1969, Mr. Anders


was a NASA astronaut and an Air Force lieutenant colonel. He was lunar
module pilot on the Apollo 8 lunar orbital mission, man's first visit
to the vicinity of another celestial body.

Mr. Anders joined the NASA astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, in 1963. In addition to his Apollo 8 flight, he
served as backup pilot for Gemini ll and backup command module pilot for
Apollo ll, the first lunar landing mission.

Mr. Anders was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Force


upon graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. After flight training, he
served as a pilot in all-weather interceptor squadrons of the Air Defense
Command. Prior to becoming an astronaut, he was a nuclear engineer and
instructor pilot at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force
Base, New Mexico.

He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and has been awarded


the Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Astronaut Wings, the NASA
Distinguished Service Medal, and the New York State Medal for Valor.

Mr. Anders was born in Hong Kong. He received a B.S. degree from
the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. degree in nuclear engineering from
the Air Force Institute of Technology.

Mr. and Mrs. Anders are the parents of five children.

CHARLES D. HARRINGTON
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc.

Dr Charles D Harrington, 59, President and General Manager,


Douglas United Nuclear, Inc., Richland, Washington, is an official
observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Dr. Harrington, who has been associated with all phases of the
chemical and nuclear industrial fields since 1941, is Chairman of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a statutory body created by Congress.

2-11
From 1941 to 1961, he was employed by the Mallinckrodt Chemical
Works, St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. Harrington started with.the company
as a research chemist and in 1960, after a procession of research and
managementpositions, was appointed Vice President, Mallinckrodt Nuclear
Corporation and Vice President, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works.

In 1961, when the fuel material processing plant of Mallinckrodt


becamethe Chemicals Division of United Nuclear Corporation, Dr. Harrington
was namedVice President of that division.

He becameSenior Vice President, United Nuclear Corporation,


Centreville, Maryland, in 1963.

In 1965, Dr. Harrington was appointed President and General Manager,


Douglas United Nuclear, Inc. The companymanagesproduction reactors
and fuels fabrication facilities at Hanford, Washington, for the Atomic
Energy Commission.
He is the co-author of a book, "Uranium Production Technology," and
has written numerous technical papers. He has received the Mid-West
Award of the American Chemical Society for contributions to technology
in the nuclear energy field.

He is director of several corporations, including United Nuclear,


as well as professional councils and societies.

Dr. Harrington has M.S., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees in chemistry from
Harvard University.

I. IRVINGPINKEL
NASALewis Research Center

I. Irving Pinkel, 57, Director, Aerospace Safety Research and Data


Institute at the NASALewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, is an
official observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Until recently, he directed research at Lewis Research Center on


rocket propellant and electric power generation systems for space
vehicles, compressors and turbines for advanced aircraft engines, and
lubrication systems for rotating machines for these systems.

Mr. Pinkel entered Governmentscientific service in 1935 as a


physicist with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In
1940, he joined the staff of the Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia, as a physicist. Whenthe Lewis Research Center was built in
1942, he transferred there.

2-12
He has been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, SigmaXi, honorary scientific
society, and Pi Mu Epsilon, honorary mathematics fraternity. He is an
Ohio Professional Engineer, served on the former NACAsubcommittees on
Meteorological Problems, Icing Problems, Aircraft Fire Prevention and
Flight Safety, and is a memberof the NASAResearch and Technology Advi-
sory Subcommitteeon Aircraft Operating Problems. He has been a Special
Lecturer, Case Institute of Technology Graduate School.

Mr. Pinkel has received the Flight Safety Foundation Award for con-
tributions to the safe utilization of aircraft, the Laura Taber Barbour
Award for development of a system for suppressing aircraft crash fires,
the NACADistinguished Service Medal, and the NASASustained Superior
Performance Award.

He was born in Gloversville, NewYork, and was graduated from the


University of Pennsylvania.

Mr. and Mrs. Pinkel live in Fairview Park, Ohio. They are the
parents of two sons.

JAMESE. WILSON,JR.
Committeeon Science and Astronautics
United States House of Representatives

JamesE. Wilson, Jr., 39, Technical Consultant, United States House


of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, is an official
observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Wilson has been technical consultant to the Committee since


1963. From 1961 to 1963, he was Director of Research and Development,
U.S. Naval Propellant Plant, Indian Head, Maryland. Mr. Wilson managed
the Polaris Program at Indian Head from 1956 to 1961.

From 1954 to 1956, Mr. Wilson served as an officer in the U.S. Army
Signal Corps. He was a development engineer with E. I. DuPont, Wilmington,
Delaware, from 1953 to 1954.

Mr. Wilson is a memberof Phi SigmaAlpha, a National Honor Society;


American Institute of Chemical Engineers; American Chemical Society; and
American OrdnanceAssociation.

Mr. Wilson is co-author of several publications of the House Commit-


tee on Science and Astronautics.

He received a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from the Univer-


sity of Maine and a Master of Engineering Administration degree from
George Washington University.

2-13
Mr. and Mrs. Wilson live in LaPlata, Maryland. They have two
children.
APOLLO13 REVIEW
BOARDPANEL
CHAIRMEN
SEYMOUR C. HIMMEL
NASALewis Research Center

Dr. SeymourC. Himmel, Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles,


Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, heads the Design Panel of the
Apollo 13 Review Board.

Dr. Himmel joined Lewis in 1948 as an aeronautical research scien-


tist. He has occupied supervisory positions since 1953.

He has been awarded the NASAExceptional Service Medal and the NASA
Group Achievement Award as manager of the Agena Project Group. Dr. Himmel
has served on a number of advisory committees. He is an Associate Fellow
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member
of Tau Beta Pi and Pi Tau Sigma. He is the author of more than 25 tech-
nical papers.

Dr. Himmel has a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from the


College of the City of NewYork and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from Case
Institute of Technology.

Dr. and Mrs. Himmel live in Lakewood, Ohio.

EDWINC. KILGORE
NASALangley Research Center

Edwin C. Kilgore, 47, Deputy Chief, Engineering and Technical Serv-


ices, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, heads the Project
ManagementPanel of the Apollo 15 Review Board.

Mr. Kilgore joined the Langley science staff in 1944 and served in
a variety of technical and managementpositions until promotion to his
present position in 1968.

He has received the Honorary Group Achievement Award for his role
in achieving a record of 97 consecutive successes for solid propellant
rocket motors and the NASA-LunarOrbiter Project Group Achievement Award
for outstanding performance. He is a memberof Pi Tau Sigma, honorary
mechanical engineering society.

2-1h
Mr. Kilgore was born in Coeburn, Virginia. He was graduated from
Virginia Polytechnic Institute with a B.S. degree in mechanical engi-
neering.

Mr. and Mrs. Kilgore and their two daughters live in Hampton.

HARRIS M. SCHURMEIER
California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Harris M. Schurmeier, 45, Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for


Flight Projects, California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Lab-
oratory, Pasadena, California, heads the Manufacturing and Test Panel
of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Mr. Schurmeier was appointed to his current position in 1969. Prior


to that he was Mariner Mars 1969 Project Manager, Voyager Capsule System
Manager and Deputy Manager of the Voyager Project, and Ranger Project
Manager at JPL.

He has received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Scientific Achieve-


ment and Exceptional Service. In addition, he has received the Astro-
nautics Engineer Award, and the NASA Public Service Award.

He was born in St. Paul, Minnesota. He has received a B.S. degree


in mechanical engineering, M.S. degree in aeronautical engineering, and
a professional degree in aeronautical engineering from the California
Institute of Technology.

Mr. Schurmeier was a naval officer in World War II. He and his
wife and four children live in Altadena, California.

FRANCIS B. SMITH
NASA Headquarters

Francis B. Smith, 47, Assistant Administrator for University Affairs,


NASA Headquarters, is leader of the Mission Events Panel of the Apollo 13
Review Board.

Mr. Smith has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to
that he had been Assistant Director, Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia, since 1964. He joined the Langley science staff in 1947. He
is an expert in several fields, including radio telemetry, radar, elec-
tronic tracking systems, and missile and range instrumentation.

2-15

L L: E L L ' U. L: ig If 1_: L: L L_ L_
Mr. Smith was born in Piedmont, South Carolina, and received a B.S.
degree in electrical engineering from the University of South Carolina,
where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He remained at the University
as an instructor from 1943 to 1944 and then served in the U.S. Navy until
1946.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their three children live in Reston, Virginia.

2-16

i,i I.l 12 L L L U L L_ L '_ "" _'


PART 3. BOARD ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR BOARD PANELS

BOARD ORGANIZATION

After reviewing the scope of the Board's charter, the Chairman and
Board Members agreed upon the Panel and Support Office structure depicted
on the following organization chart. Each Panel was assigned specific
responsibilities for reviewing major elements of the overall Board task,
with particular emphasis upon establishing a sound and independent
technical data base upon which findings, determinations, and recommenda-
tions by the Board could be based. The Panels were staffed with in-
dividual NASA specialists and established working arrangements with the
Manned Space Flight line organization personnel working in analogous
areas.

The Board's support offices were structured to provide necessary


staff, logistics, and administrative support without duplication of
available MSC assistance.

In addition to this structure, the Board and Panels also utilized


the special assistance of expert consultants.

Panel assignments, complete Panel membership, and the official Board


organization approved by the Chairman are included in this part of the
Board report.

2-17
APOLLO 13
REVIEW BOARD

E. M. CORTRIGHTo CHAIRMAN

OBSERVERS R. F. ALLNUTT V.L. JOHNSON CONSULTANTS

W. A. ANDERS N. A. ARMSTRONG M. KLEIN


C. D. HARRINGTON W. D. ERICKSON
J. F. CLARK H.M. MARK
I. I. PINKEL
t ................. R. VAN OOLAH
J. E. WILSON, JR. W. R. HEDRICK

I I I I I I

I-in
TECHNICAL

C, W. MATHEWS
SUPPORT

G.
COUNSEL

T. MALLEY
SECRETARIAT

E. P. SWIEDA R. G.
EDITORIAL

GROUP

ROMATOWSKI
I

B.
PUBLIC
AFFAIRS

M. DUFF
I G.
J.
LEG,SLAT,VE
MOSS
I
AFFAIRS

NGHOFF

r I I I I
MANUFACTURING PROJECT
DESIGN
& TEST MANAGEMENT

MISSION EVENTS I
F. B. SMITH H. M. SCHURMEIER S. C. HIMMEL E. C. KILGORE

ro
i I
R. D. GINTER I
(Do PRE-INCIDENT EVENTS

]
EVALUATION
ACCEPTANCE TESTING M. H. MEAD
R. N. LINDLEY
FABRICATION & ] DESIGN I
W. F. BROWN, JR. J. B. WHITTEN
J. J. WILLIAMS E. F. BAEHR

INCIDENT EVENTS & MECHANISMS


SYSTEM TESTING
SUBSYSTEM & I FAILURE MODES I
T. B. BALLARD K. L. HEIMBURG W. R. LUCAS

POST INCIDENT ELECTRICAL

EVENTS QUALITY ASSURANCE

t RELIABILITY &
M. P. FRANK B. T. MORRIS R. C. WELLS

APPROVED
E. M. CORTIIGHT

RELATED SYSTEMS

J. F. SAUNDERS, JR.

APOLLO 15 REVIEW BOARD ORGANIZATION


GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR BOARD PANELS
(AS DOCUMENTED IN THE BOARD'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES)

Panel i - Mission Events Panel

It shall be the task of the Mission Events Panel to provide a de-


tailed and accurate chronology of all pertinent events and actions
leading to, during, and subsequent to the Apollo 13 incident. This
information, in narrative and graphical time history form, will provide
the Apollo 13 Review Board an official events record on which their
analysis and conclusions may be based. This record will be published
in a form suitable for inclusion in the Review Board's official report.

The Panel will report all significant events derived from telemetry
records, air-to-ground communications transcripts, crew and control
center observations, and appropriate documents such as the flight plan,
mission technique description, Apollo Operation Handbook, and crew check-
lists. Correlation between various events and other observations related
to the failure will be noted. Where telemetry data are referenced, the
Panel will comment as appropriate on its significance, reliability,
accuracy, and on spacecraft conditions which might have generated the
data.

The chronology will consist of three major sections: Preincident


Events, Incident Events, and Postincident Events. The decision-making
process leading to the safe recovery, referencing the relevant contin-
gency plans and available alternates, will be included.

Preincident Events. - This section will chronicle the progress of


the flight from the countdown to the time of the incident. All action
and data relevant to the subsequent incident will be included.

Incident Events. - This section will cover that period of time be-
ginning at 55 hours and 52 minutes after lift-off and continuing so long
as abnormal system behavior is relevant to the failure.

Postincident Events. - This section will document the events and


activities subsequent to the incident and continuing to mission termina-
tion (Splash). Emphasis will be placed on the rationale used on mission
completion strategy.

Panel i Membership

Mr. F. B. Smith, Panel Chairman


Assistant Administrator for University Affairs
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

2-19

N N-IJ I: E L L '"
Dr: Tom B. Ballard
Aerospace Technologist
Flight Instrument Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

Mr. M. P. Frank
Flight Director
Flight Control Division
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas

Mr. John J. Williams


Director, Spacecraft Operations
Kennedy Space Center
Florida

Mr. Nell Armstrong, Board Member and Panel Monitor


As t r on aut
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas

Panel 2 - Manufacturing and Test Panel

The Manufacturing and Test Panel shall review the manufacturing and
testing, including the associated reliability and quality assurance
activities, of the flight hardware components involved in the flight
failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the analysis
of the design. The purpose of this review is to ascertain the adequacy
of the manufacturing procedures, including any modifications, and the pre-
flight test and checkout program, and any possible correlation of these
activities with the inflight events.

The Panel shall consist of three activities:

Fabrication and Acceptance Testin6.- This will consist of reviewing


the fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing steps actually used
during the manufacturing of the specific flight hardware elements in-
volved. Fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing procedures and
records will be reviewed, as well as observation of actual operations
when appropriate.

Subsystem and System Testing.- This will consist of reviewing all


the flight qualification testing from the completion of the component-
level acceptance testing up through the countdown to lift-off for the
specific hardware involved. Test procedures and results will be reviewed

2-20
.- as well as observing specific tests where appropriate. Results of tests
on other serial number units will also be reviewed when appropriate.

Reliability and quality Assurance.- This will be an overview of both


the manufacturing and testing, covering such things as parts and material
qualification and control, assembly and testing procedures, and inspection
and problem/failure reporting and closeout.

Panel 2 Membership

Mr. Harris M. Schurmeier, Panel Chairman


Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena, California

Mr. Edward F. Baehr


Assistant Chief, Launch Vehicles Division
Deputy Manager, Titan Project
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

Mr. Karl L. Heimburg


Director, Astronautics Laboratory
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama

Mr. Brooks T. Morris


Manager, Quality Assurance and Reliability Office
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena, California

Dr. John F. Clark, Board Member and Panel Monitor


Director
Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland

Panel 3 - Design Panel

The Design Panel shall examine the design of the oxygen and asso-
ciated systems to the extent necessary to support the theory of failure.
After such review the Panel shall indicate a course of corrective action
which shall include requirements for further investigations and/or re-
design. In addition, the Panel shall establish requirements for review
of other Apollo spacecraft systems of similar design.

2-21
.-
The Panel shall consist of four subdivisions:

Design Evaluation.- This activity shall review the requirements and


specifications governing the design of the systems, subsystems and com-
ponents, their derivation, changes thereto and the reasons therefor; and
the design of the system in response to the requirements, including such
elements as design approach, material selection, stress analysis, de-
velopment and qualification test programs, and results. This activity
shall also review and evaluate proposed design modifications, including
changes in operating procedures required by such modifications.

Failure Modes and Mechanisms.- This activity shall review the design
of the systems to ascertain the possible sources of failure and the m_mer
in which failures may occur. In this process, they shall attempt to
correlate such modes with the evidence from flight and ground test data.
This shall include considerations such as: energy sources, materials
compatibility, nature of pressure vessel failure, effects of environment
and service, the service history of any suspect systems and components,
and any degradation that may have occurred.

Electrical.- This activity shall review the design of all electrical


components associated with the theory of failure to ascertain their
adequacy. This activity shall also review and evaluate proposed design
modifications, including changes in operating procedures required by such
modi fi c ati ons.

Related Systems .- This activity shall review the design of all


systems similar to that involved in the Apollo 13 incident with the view
to establishing any commonality of design that may indicate a need for
redesign. They shall also consider the possibility of design modifica-
tions to permit damage containment in the event of a failure.

Panel 3 Membership

Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Panel Chairman


Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

Mr. William F. Brown, Jr.


Chief, Strength of Materials Branch
Materials and Structures Division
Administration Directorate
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

2-22

iu la lJ /_- /d L If L '
Mr. R. N. Lindley
Special Assistant to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

Dr. William R. Lucas


Director, Program Development
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama

Mr. J. F. Saunders, Jr.


Project Officer for Command and Service Module
Office of Manned Space Flight
NASA He adquarters
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Robert C. Wells


Head, Electric Flight Systems Section
Vehicles Branch
Flight Vehicles and Systems Division
Office of Engineering and Technical Services
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

Mr. Vincent L. Johnson, Board Member and Panel Monitor


Deputy Associate Administrator for Engineering
Office of Space Science and Applications
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

Panel 4 - Project Management Panel

The Project Management Panel will undertake the following tasks:

I. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management struc-


ture employed in Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13
incident. This review will encompass the organization, the responsi-
bilities of organizational elements, and the adequacy of the staffing.

2. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management systems


employed on Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13 incident.
This task will include the management systems employed to control the
appropriate design, manufacturing, and test operations; the processes
used to assure adequate communications between organizational elements;
the processes used to control hardware and functional interfaces; the
safety processes involved; and protective security.

2-23
3. Review the project managementlessons learned from the Apollo
13 mission from the standpoint of their applicability to subsequent
Apollo missions.
Tasks i and 2, above, should encompassboth the general review of
the processes used in Apollo 13 and specific applicability to the pos-
sible cause or causes of the mission incident as identified by the Board.

Panel 4 Membership

E. C. Kilgore, Panel Chairman


Deputy Chief, Office of Engineering and Technical Services
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
R. D. Ginter
Director of Special Programs Office
Office of AdvancedResearch and Technology
NASAHeadquarters
Washington, D.C.
Merrill H. Mead
Chief of Programs and Resources Office
AmesResearch Center
Moffett Field, California
JamesB. Whitten
Assistant Chief, Aeronautical and Space Mechanics Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Milton Klein, Board Memberand Panel Monitor
Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office
Washington, D.C.

Board Observers

William A. Anders
Executive Secretary
National Aeronautics and Space Council
Washington, D.C.

Dr. Charles D. Harrington


Chairman
NASAAerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Washington, D.C.

2-24
I. Irving Pinkel
Director
Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio
Mr. JamesE. Wilson
Technical Consultant to the Committeeon Science and Astronautics
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Apollo 13 Review Board Support Staff


Brian M. Duff
Public Affairs Officer
MannedSpacecraft Center
Houston, Texas

Gerald J. Mossinghoff
Director of Congressional Liaison
NASAHeadquarters
Washington, D.C.

Edward F. Parry
Counsel to Office of MannedSpaceFlight
NASAHeadquarters
Washington, D.C.

RaymondG. Romatowski
Deputy Assistant Director for Administration
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Ernest P. Swieda
Deputy Chief, Skylab Program Control Office
Kennedy Space Center, Florida

Consultants to the Board

Dr. WayneD. Erickson, Head Dr. Robert Van Dolah


Aerothermochemistry Branch Acting Research Director
Langley Research Center Safety Research Center
Hampton, Virginia Bureau of Mines
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

2-25
MSCSupport to the Board

These persons were detailed by MSCto support the Apollo 13 Review


Board during its review activity at MSC. They are identified by MSC
position title.
Roy C. Aldridge
Assistant to the Director of Administration

Mary Chandler Jamie Moon


Secretary Technical Editor

Rex Cline Dorothy Newberry


Technical Writer/Editor Administrative Assistant

Evon Collins Lettie Reed


Program Analyst Editorial Assistant

Leroy Cotton Charlene Rogozinski


Equipment Specialist Secretary
MaureenCruz Joanne Sanchez
Travel Clerk Secretary
Janet Harris Billie Schmidt
Clerk Stenographer Employee Development Specialist
Marjorie Harrison Frances Smith
Secretary Secretary
Phyllis Hayes George Sowers
Secretary ManagementPresentations Officer
William N. Henderson Elaine Stemerick
ManagementAnalyst Secretary
Sharon Laws Mary Thompson
Secretary Administrative Assistant

Carolyn Lisenbee Alvin C. Zuehlke


Secretary Electrical Engineer

Judy Miller
Secretary

2-26
PART 4. SUMMARY OF BOARD ACTIVITIES

APRIL 19, 1970

Chairman E. M. Cortright met with Langley officials to begin planning


the Apollo 13 Review Board approach. Tentative list of Panel Members and
other specialists were developed for consideration.

APRIL 20, 1970

Chairman Cortright met with the NASA Administrator, Deputy Adminis-


trator, and key NASA officials in Washington, D.C., to discuss Board
membership.

The Chairman met with NASA Office of Manned Space Flight top offi-
cials while enroute to MSC on NASA aircraft and discussed program organi-
zation plans for review of the accident, and coordination with Apollo 13
Review Board activity.

APRIL 21, 1970

Chairman Cortright met with MSC officials to discuss Apollo 13


Review Board support.

A formal MSC debriefing of the Apollo 13 crew was conducted for MSC
officials and Apollo 13 Review Board personnel already at MSC.

Detailed discussions between early arrivals on the Review Board and


the MSC Investigation Team were held to provide quick-look data on the
Apollo 13 accident and to develop detailed procedures for MSC support of
the Apollo 13 Board.

Chairman Cortright met with members of the Press to report on early


activity of the Board and to inform them of plans for keeping the Press
current on Board activities.

The first meeting of the Board was held at 8 p.m. to discuss Board
composition, structure, assignments, and scope of review. Preliminary
plans were developed for appointing various specialists to assist the
Board in its analysis and evaluation.

2-27
APRIL 22, 1970

The Board met with Colonel McDivitt's MSCInvestigation Teamto re-


view the progress madeby MSCin identifying causes of the accident and
in developing an understanding of sequences and relationships between
known inflight events. In addition, MSCofficials briefed the Board on
MSCInvestigation Teamstructure and assignments.

The Board met with Panel i of the MSCInvestigation Teamfor de-


tailed discussion of inflight events and consideration of early con-
clusions on implications of preliminary data analysis.

The Board held its second meeting to discuss MSCinvestigative


efforts and additional appointments of Panel specialists.

Board membersattended Panel i evening roundup of day's evaluation


activities, _nich included detailed discussions of specific studies,
data reductions, and support test activities already underway.

APRIL 23, 1970

The Apollo 13 Review Board established itself in proximity to the


MSCInvestigation Teamin Building 45, and arranged for all administra-
tive and logistics support to the Board.

A daily schedule of meetings, reviews, briefings, and discussions


was established, including preliminary plans for contractor meetings,
special support tests, and accumulation of accident-related information.

Initial task assignments and responsibilities were madeto Board


Panels as guidance for detailed review work. Individual Board members
were assigned Panel overview responsibilities or other special tasks.

Administrative procedures were developed for Board activity, par-


ticularly to provide efficient interface with MSCpersonnel.
Board and Panel Membersagain met with MSCofficials to further re-
view the sequence of events in the Apollo 13 mission and to examine early
hypotheses concerning causes of these events.

The Board convened for an evening meeting to discuss the progress to


date and to coordinate Panel activities for the next few days. Discussion
centered upon immediate requirements for data collection and analysis.
Chairman Cortright appointed additional NASAspecialists in order to
bring Panels up to strength.

2-28
APRIL 24, 1970

Board Members, Panel Chairmen, and MSC officials reviewed additional


data analysis made by MSC and contractor personnel with particular empha-
sis upon the service module (SM) cryogenic system.

The Board convened and reviewed the progress to date. Tentative


approvals were given for Board trips to North American Rockwell (NR),
Downey, California, Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, and other loca-
tions.

Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on progress to date.

Panel Chairmen and Members continued their detailed analysis of


failure modes, test histories, mission events, and other data bearing
upon the accident.

Board Members and Panel Chairmen met with Mr. Norman Ryker of NR on
NR's activities involving design, qualification, and tests of SM cryo-
genic oxygen tanks.

APRIL 25, 1970

The Board met to discuss details of onsite inspections of command


service module (CSM) flight hardware at principal contractor installa-
tions.

Panels examined in detail probable failure modes based on data


analyzed at that time.

Specific plans were discussed by the Board relating to evaluation


of oxygen tank assembly and checkout operations, including review of
component histories.

The MSC Investigation Team members briefed Board personnel on


Kennedy Space Center checkout operations of the service module cryogenic
and electric power systems, including a detailed briefing covering oxygen
tank detanking operations.

APRIL 26, 1970

Board and Panel Members traveled to North American Rockwell, Downey,


for detailed briefings by NR engineers and management. NR reviewed its

2-29

L
progress in an intensive analysis of the Apollo 13 malfunction, including
a review of approved special tests. Oxygen tank, fuel cell components,
assemblies, and other hardware were also inspected.

APRIL 27, 1970

An Executive Session of the Board met to discuss progress of specific


analyses required to verify tentative conclusions on oxygen tank failure
and service module EPS failure.

Additional Board specialists arrived at MSC and received detailed


briefings by MSC and Board personnel on selected aspects of the Apollo 13
data.

Panel Members received and assessed a preliminary MSC evaluation of


the Apollo 13 accident, including tentative conclusions on the most
probable failure modes.

Procedures were established to provide information flow on the status


of review to Board observers.

The Board reviewed work plans for the coming week with each Panel and
established review priorities and special task assignments.

APRIL 28, !970

Chairman Cortright outlined a plan for the Board's preliminary report


scheduled for presentation to the Deputy Administrator during his visit to
MSC on May i. Each Panel Chairman was to summarize the status of his
Panel's activities for Dr. George Low on Friday, April 29, 1970.

Board Member Neil Armstrong completed arrangements to provide each


Board Member and Panel Chairman an opportunity for detailed simulation of
the Apollo 13 inflight accident using MSC's CSM simulation equipment.

Board and Panel Members reviewed enhanced photographs of the


Apollo 13 service module at the MSC Photographic Laboratory.

Dr. yon Elbe of Atlantic Research Company briefed Board and Panel
Members on cryogenics and combustion phenomena.

A representative of the Manufacturing and Test Panel performed an


onsite inspection at Beech Aircraft, Boulder.

2-30
Manufacture and Test Panel personnel reviewed detanking procedures
followed at KSCduring the Apollo 13 countdowndemonstration test (CDDT).

Board and Panel personnel reviewed progress to date at a general


Board meeting involving all Review Board personnel.

APRIL 29, 1970

Dr. Charles Harrington, Board Observer and Chairman of the Aerospace


Safety Advisory Panel, arrived for a 2-day detailed review of Board pro-
cedures and progress in the accident review.

The Board reviewed North American Rockwell preliminary recommenda-


tions involving oxygen tank redesign.

The Board continued to review and examine oxygen tank ignition


sources and combustion propagation processes with specialists from MSC,
other NASACenters, and contractor personnel.
The Mission Events Panel continued to examine and record details of
all significant mission events as a basis for other Panel evaluations and
study.

Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review Panel pro-


gress to date and to discuss work plans for the next several days.
The Project ManagementPanel visited North American Rockwell at
Downeyto review detailed procedures for acceptance tests, subcontractor
inspections, project documentation, and other managementinterface areas.

APRIL 30, 1970

The Safety Advisory Panel continued discussions with Board Chairman


and MSCofficials on progress of total Apollo 13 review efforts.

Panel Membersreviewed instrumentation used in Apollo 13 spacecraft


in order to establish the validity of telemetry data being used in Board
analysis.

Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review progress of


the work and to discuss preliminary findings of the Board.

Project Managementpersonnel visited BeechAircraft Corporation to


review procedures used for assembly of cryogenic oxygen tanks and to dis-
cuss communication and information systems within the Apollo Program.
Panels continued to review detailed data in their respective areas.

MAYi_ 1970

Board and Panel personnel participated in a joint MSC/Apo!!o 13


Review Board status presentation to the NASADeputy Administrator. The
meeting covered all significant Apollo 13 findings and early conclusions
on the cause of the accident and appropriate remedial actions.

The MSCstaff briefed Board Memberson initial evaluations of pro-


posed design changes in oxygen tank system.

Panel Memberscontinued to assess data accumulated from the Apollo 13


mission with particular emphasis upon the design and performance of elec-
tric power systems used in the service module.

Board Membersand Panel Chairmenreviewed specific test matrix being


proposed by Apo!lo 13 Review Board specialists covering most significant
unknownsinvolved in understanding failure mechanisms.

MAY2, 1970

Board Membersmet in General Session to discuss preparation of a com-


plete "failure tree" as an additional guide in conducting a complete re-
view and investigation. Specific aspects of this approach were reviewed.

The Project ManagementPanel reviewed oxygen tank reliability history


and quality assurance criteria used in assembly, test, and checkout of
these systems.

Panel specialists continued reviewing data from the mission with


emphasis upon integrating various data points into logical failure mode
patterns established by MSCand Board personnel.

MAY3, 1970

Chairman Cortright and Board Membersconducted a detailed review of


individual Panel status and progress and established milestones for
additional analytical work and preparation of preliminary findings.

The Board and Panel agreed to tentative report structure, including


required exhibits, tables, drawings, and other reference data.

2-32
The Board established a system for tabulating all significant mission
events and explanatory data, including the support tests required to
clarify questions raised by events.

Panel Membersworked on individual analyses with particular attention


to developing requirements for additional test activity in support of ten-
tative conclusions.

The Board agreed to strengthen its technical reviews of combustion


propagation and electrical design by adding specialists in these areas.

MAY4, 1970

The Design Panel continued its intensive review of the "shelf drop"
incident at NRinvolving the cryogenic oxygen flight tank used in
Apollo 13 in order to understand possible results of this event.

The Mission Events Panel continued to analyze telemetry data received


by MSC,with particular attention on data received in proximity to the
data dropout period during the Apollo 13 mission and on fan turnons during
the flight.

The Board transmitted a formal listing of 62 requests for data,


analyses, and support tests required for Board re_iew activity.

The Board continued to meet with individual Panels and support


offices to review the status of preliminary findings and work completed.

MAY5, 1970

The Board met in General Session to discuss the scope and conduct of
support test activity, including careful documentation of test methods and
application of test results.

MSCpersonnel briefed Panel Memberson availability of additional


telemetry data in the MSCdata bank in order to insure Board considera-
tion of all possible useful data.

Panels commencedinitial drafting of preliminary findings in specific


areas, including summarydescriptions of system performance during the
Apollo 13 flight.

The Board met with the MSCInvestigation Teamfor complete review of


the proposed test program.

2-33
. MAY6, 1970

Board Members,MSCpersonnel_ and Membersof NASA'sAerospace Safety


Advisory Panel met for detailed discussions and evaluation of accident
review status and progress. The review covered oxygen tank questions,
recovery operations, and a mission simulation by MSCastronauts.

Panel Memberscontinued to work on the preparation of preliminary


Panel drafts.

Chairman Cortright transmitted additional requests for tests to MSC


and modified procedures for control of overall test activity relating to
the Apollo 13 accident.

MAY7, 1970

The General Board Session reviewed complete analysis and test support
activities being conducted for the Board and MSCat various governmental
and contractor installations.

Board and Panel Membersmet to discuss Ameslaboratory tests con-


cerning liquid oxygen combustion initiation energies required in the
cryogenic oxygen tank used in the Apollo 13 SM.

Panel i Membersreviewed mission control equipment and operating


procedures used during the Apollo 13 mission and reviewed actual mission
events in detail.

The Panels continued to develop preliminary drafts of their reviews


and analyses for consideration by the Board.

MAY8, 1970

Dr. Robert Van Dolah, Bureau of Mines, joined the Board as a con-
sultant on combustion propagation and reviewed Apollo 13 Review Board
data developed to date.

The General Board Session convened to review proposed report format


and scope. An agreement was reached on appendices, on the structure of
the report, and on the degree of detail to be included in individual Panel
reports.

Chairman Cortright assigned additional specific test overview re-


sponsibilities to membersof the Apollo 13 Review activity.

2-34
Panel 1 conducted a formal interview with the MSCFlight Director
covering all significant mission events from the standpoint of ground
controllers.

Panels 2 through 4 continued developing preliminary reports. Panel 4


announceda formal schedule of interviews of MSC,contractors, and NASA
Headquarters personnel.

Board Membersexplored in detail possible failure modesequences


developed by MSCpersonnel involving ignition and combustion within the
SMcryogenic oxygen tank.

The Board recessed for 3 days, leaving a cadre of personnel at MSC


to edit preliminary drafts developed by the Panels and to schedule further
activity for the week of May ll.

MAY9, 1970

Board in recess.

MAYi0, 1970

Board in recess.

MAYii, 1970

Board in recess. MSCsupport personnel continued work obtaining


additional technical data for Board review.

MAY12, 1970

Board Membersreturned to MSC.

Board Membersattended a General Session to review progress and


status of the report.

Panel Chairmenreported on individual progress of work and estab-


lished schedules for completion of analyses and evaluations.

Chairman Cortright reported on the Langley Research Center support


test program aimed at simulation of SMpanel ejection energy pulses.

2-35
MAY13, 1970

Board Membersreviewed preliminary drafts of report chapter on Re-


view and Analysis and Panel i report on Mission Events.

Mission Events Panel Membersinterviewed Electrical, Electronic, and


CommunicationsEngineer (EECOM)and one of the Apollo 13 Flight Directors
on activities which took place in the Mission Control Center (MCC)during
and after the flight accident period.

Panel 4, Project ManagementPanel, conducted interviews with princi-


pal Apollo 13 program personnel from MSCand contract organizations.

Panel Memberscontinued drafting preliminary versions of Panel re-


ports for review by the Board.

Manufacturing and Test Panel representatives discussed program for


oxygen tank testing to be conducted at Beech Aircraft.

Board Membersmet in General Session to review report milestones and


required test data for the week ahead.

MAY14, 1970

Board met in General Session to review Panel report progress and to


agree to firm schedules for completion of all Review Board assignments.

Project ManagementPanel continued to interview key Apollo project


personnel from NASACenters and contractors.

Panel Memberscirculated first drafts of all Panel reports to Board


Membersfor review and correction.

MAY15, 1970

Mission Events Panel personnel interviewed Apollo 13 Command


Module
Pilot John Swigert to verify event chronology compiled by the Panel and
to review crew responses during Apollo 13 mission.

Project ManagementPanel continued interviewing key project personnel


with NASACenters and contractors.

2-36

MSC personnel provide Board Members and Panel Chairmen with a de-
tailed briefing on all support tests and analyses being performed in
connection with the MSC and Board reviews.

Board Members met in Executive Session to review preliminary drafts


of Panel reports and findings and determinations and to provide additional
instructions and guidance to Panel Chairmen.

Panel Members continued to review and edit early Panel drafts and to
compile reference data in support of findings.

MAY 16, 1970

Board met in General Session to review further revisions of prelimi-


nary findings and determinations and to establish working schedules for
completion of the Board report.

Panel Members continued to edit and refine Panel reports on basis of


discussions with MSC personnel and further analysis of Apollo 13 documen-
tation.

MAY 17, 1970

Draft material for all parts of Board report was reviewed by Panel
Members and staff. Changes were incorporated in all draft material and
recirculated for additional review and comment.

Board Members met in General Session to review report progress and


to examine results from recent support tests and analyses being conducted
at various Government and contractor installations.

The Apollo 13 Review Board discussed a continuing series of support


tests for recommendation to MSC following presentation of report and re-
cess of the Board.

MAY 18, 1970

Board Members reviewed Special Tests and Analyses Appendix of the


report and examined results of completed tests.

Board met in General Session to discuss control procedures for re-


production and distribution of Board report.

2-37
Mission Events Panel distributed a final draft of their report for
review by Board Members.

Board reviewed a preliminary draft of findings and determinations


prepared by Panel Chairmen, Board Members, and Board Chairman.

A Manufacture and Test Panel representative reviewed special oxygen


tank test programs at Beech Aircraft.

MAY19, 1970

Board Membersmet in Executive Session to continue evaluation and


assessment of preliminary findings, determinations, and recommendations
prepared by individual Board Membersand Panel Chairmen.

Board met in General Session to review final draft of Mission Events


Panel report.

Manufacture and Test Panel preliminary report was distributed to


Board Members for review and comment.

Design Panel preliminary report was distributed to Board Members for


review and comment.

Design Panel Members met with MSC Team officials to discuss further
test and analyses support for the Board.

MAY 20, 1970

Board Members met in Executive Session to review and evaluate reports


from the Design Panel and from the Manufacturing and Test Panel.

Project Management Panel distributed final draft of its report to


Board Members for review and comment.

Chairman Cortright met withMr. Bruce Lundin of the Aerospace Safety


Advisory Panel to discuss progress of Board review and analysis.

MAY 21, 1970

Board Members met in Executive Session for final review of Project


Management Panel report.

2-38
Board Membersand others met with MSCofficials to review in detail
the activities and actions taken after the Apollo 204 accident concerning
ignition flammability for materials and control in the CSM.

A third draft of preliminary findings, determinations_ and recommen-


dations was developed and circulated by the Chairmanfor review and
comment.

Arrangements were madewith NASAHeadquarters officials for pack-


aging, delivery, and distribution of the Board's final report.
Mission Events Panel conducted an interview with Lunar Module Pilot
Haise to review selected mission events bearing on the accident.

MAY22, 1970

Mission Events Panel representatives met with MSCofficials to review


in detail several events which occurred during later flight stages.

Board met in Executive Session to assess latest drafts of findings,


determinations, and recommendations circulated by the Chairman.

Board met in General Session to review total progress in all report


areas and to establish final schedule for preparation of Board report.
Langley Research Center representative M. Ellis briefed the Board on
ignition and combustion of materials in oxygen atmosphere tests being con-
ducted in support of the Apollo 13 Review.

Board Observer I. I. Pinkel briefed the Board on Lewis Research


Center fire propagation tests involving Teflon.

MAY23, !970

Board Membersreviewed Chapter 4 of Board report entitled "Review


and Analysis."

Panel Chairmen reviewed draft findings and determinations prepared


by the Board.

2-39

N N L L K L.',"
. L . h 1_: L . _ I: _'" li /d< I:: L _ L
MAY 24, 1970

Board Members reviewed NASA Aerospace Safety Panel report covering


Apollo activities during the period of 1968-69.

Board met in Executive Session for detailed review of support test


status and progress and of documentation describing the results of test
activity.

Board met in Executive Sessicn for further review of findings,


determinations, and recommendations.

MAY 25, 1970

Board met in Executive Session to review test progress and decided


to postpone submittal of final report until June 8 in order to consider
results of Langley Research Center panel ejection tests.

Board Members continued to review MSC Investigation Team preliminary


drafts and refine Apollo 13 data in the various Board appendices.

Board met in Executive Session for further consideration of findings,


determinations, and recommendations.

MAY 26, 1970

Board met in General Session and interviewed Astronaut James Lovell


regarding crew understanding of inflight accident.

Board Members reviewed proposed MSC tank combustion test and agreed
to test methodology and objectives.

Panel Members continued preparation of individual Panel reports.

MAY 27, 1970

Board and Panel Members received a detailed briefing on thermostatic


switch failure during MSC heater tube temperature tests.

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel met with Chairman Cortright, Board


Members, and Panel Chairmen to review Board progress and status of
findings and conclusions.

2-40
Board met in General Session to review status of Panel reports,
documentation of test data and results, and plans for report typing and
review.

Board agreed to recess for several days to accumulate additional


test information on panel separation and full scale tank ignition data.

MAY28, 1970

Board in recess.

_Y 29, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY30, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY31, 1970

Board in recess.

JUNEi, 1970

Board Membersreturned to MSC.

Board and Panel Membersmet in General Session to discuss revisions


of Panel reports in light of latest information regarding thermostatic
switch failure during CDDTat KSC.

Board approved new schedule for Board report calling for final
versions of Panel reports by Monday, June 8.

2-41
JUNE2, 1970

Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on the status of the Board's


work and future plans.

Board and Panel Membersparticipated in a detailed interview and


discussion with MSCand contractor personnel regarding specific coordina-
tion steps taken during oxygen tank no. 2 detanking operations at KSC.
Board Membersmet in Executive Session to review latest test results
and to assess status of Board findings and determinations.

JUNE3, 1970

Board and Panel Membersmet with MSCProgram Office personnel for a


detailed update of recent MSCinformation and analyses stemming from on-
going test programs.

Board Membersand Panel Chairmen completed final reviews of Panel


reports and also reviewed final draft of findings, determinations, and
recommendations.

Board and Panel Membersreceived a detailed briefing on thermostatic


switch questions with emphasis upon actions of various organizations
during and after detanking operations at KSC.

JUNE4, 1970

Board Membersmet in Executive Session and completed final revisions


of Chapter 4 of the Board summary.

Board and Panel Memberswitnessed a special full-scale tank ignition


test performed at MSC.

Panel Chairmen completed final revisions of individual Panel reports


and submitted copy to the Reports Editorial Office.

Board met in Executive Session and agreed to final schedule for re-
port printing and delivery to the Administrator on June 15, 1970.

2-42
- JUNE5, 1970

Board Members met in Executive Session and completed work on Chap-


ter 5 of the Board Summary Report (Findings, Determinations, and Recom-
mendations).

Board Members reviewed final version of Project Management Panel


report and authorized printing as Appendix E.

Board Members Hedrick and Mark completed final tabulation of test


support activities performed for the Board.

Board Members reviewed films of special test activities performed


at various NASA Centers.

JUNE 6, 1970

Board met in Executive Session throughout the day and completed


its review of Chapter 5 of its report (Findings, Determinations, and
Recommendations).

Board Members completed review of analyses to be incorporated in


Appendix F, Special Tests and Analyses.

JUNE 7, 1970

The Board met in Executive Session and approved plans and schedules
for final editorial review and publication of the Board report.

The Chairman recessed the Board until June 15 at which time the
Board is scheduled to reconvene in Washington, D.C., to present its
report to the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator.

2-43
This page left blank intentionally.

2-44
CHAPTER 3

DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE

AND MISSION SUMMARY

3-0
This chapter is extracted from Mission Operation Report
No. M-932-70, Revision 3, published by the Program and Special Reports
Division (XP), Executive Secretariat, NASA Headquarters, Washington,
D.C.

Discussion in this chapter is broken into two parts. Part 1 is


designed to acquaint the reader with the flight hardware and with
the mission monitoring, support, and control functions and capabilities.
Part 2 describes the Apollo 13 mission and gives a mission sequence
of events summary.

3-1
PART i APOLL0/SATURN V SPACE VEHICLE

The primary flight hardware of the Apollo Program consists of the


Saturn V launch vehicle and Apollo spacecraft (fig. 3-1). Collectively,
they are designated the Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle (SV). Selected
major systems and subsystems of the space vehicle may be summarized as
follows.

SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE

The Saturn V launch vehicle (LV) is designed to boost up to


300,000 pounds into a 105-nautical mile earth orbit and to provide for
lunar payloads of over 100,000 pounds. The Saturn V LV consists of
three propulsive stages (S-IC, S-II, S-IVB), two interstages, and an
instrument unit (IU).

S-IC Stage

The S-IC stage (fig. 3-2) is a large cylindrical booster, 138 feet
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant F-I
rocket engines. These engines develop a nominal sea level thrust total
of approximately 7,650,000 pounds. The stage dry weight is approximately
288,000 pounds and the total loaded stage weight is approximately
5,031,500 pounds. The S-IC stage interfaces structurally and electri-
cally with the S-II stage. It also interfaces structurally, elec-
trically, and pneumatically with ground support equipment (GSE) through
two umbilical service arms, three tail service masts, and certain
electronic systems by antennas. The S-IC stage is instrumented for
operational measurements or signals which are transmitted by its inde-
pendent telemetry system.

S-II Stage

The S-II stage (fig. 3-3) is a large cylindrical booster, 81.5 feet
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant J-2
rocket engines which develop a nominal vacuum thrust of 230,000 pounds
each for a total of 1,150,000 pounds. Dry weight of the S-II stage is
approximately 78,050 pounds. The stage approximate loaded gross weight
is 1,075,000 pounds. The S-IC/S-II interstage weighs 10,460 pounds.
The S-II stage is instrumented for operational and research and develop-
ment measurements which are transmitted by its independent telemetry
system. The S-II stage has structural and electrical interfaces with
the S-IC and S-IVB stages, and electric, pneumatic, and fluid interfaces
with GSE through its umbilicals and antennas.

3-2
Instrument unit

aunch escape system S-IVB


32 ft

1 Inter-stage

/_._Boost protective cover


r-
S-II

363 ft
L_ Commandmodule Inter-stage
I
L_J

r::. iiiiiiiill adapter

S-IC
Lunar module

r:. LAUNCH
VEHICLE

Spacecraft Space vehicle Launch vehicle

r- Figure 5-i.- Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle.

..,.

..
FLIGHT TERMINATION
RECEIVERS (2) FT

INSTRUMENTATI ON
FORWARD
.7 IN
SKIRT
GOX
DISTRIBUTOR

HELIUM
CYLINDERS (4)

LINE

IN OXIDIZER
TANK

BAFFLE
ANNULAR
BAFFLES 262.4 IN
INTERTANK
LINE SECTION

TUNNELS (5)

CENTER SUCTION
ENGINE LINES (5)
SUPP(
FUEL
IN TANK
TUNNEL
FUEL
SUCTION THRUST
RI NG

HEAT

LOWER
THRUST RIN

F-l ENGINES
(5)
HEA
INSTRUMENTATIC FLIGHT CONTROL
SERVOACTUATOR
RETROROCKETS

Figure 3-2.- S-IC stage.

3-4
T FORWARDSKI RT
11-I/2 FEET
;YSTEMS TUNNEL

VEHI CLE
STATION
2519

LIQUID HYDROGEN
TANK
(37,737 CU FT)

;EET

LH2/LOX COMMON
BULKHEAD
81-I/2
LIQUID OXYGEN
FEET
(12,745.5 CU FT)
22 FEET

AFT SKIRT

,____1 THRUST
STRUCTURE
14-I/2 FEET

_[ INTERSTAGE
18-I/4 FEET
VEHICLE
STATION
1541 33 FEET _I

Figure 3-3.- S-II stage.

3-5
S-IVB Stage

The S-IVB stage (fig. 3-4) is a large cylindrical booster 59 feet


long and 21.6 feet in diameter, powered by one J-2 engine. The S-IVB
stage is capable of multiple engine starts. Engine thrust is
203,000 pounds. This stage is also unique in that it has an attitude
control capability independent of its main engine. Dry weight of the
stage is 25,050 pounds. The launch weight of the stage is 261,700 pounds.
The interstage weight of 8100 pounds is not included in the stated
weights. The stage is instrumented for functional measurements or sig-
nals which are transmitted by its independent telemetry system.

The high performance J-2 engine as installed in the S-IVB stage


has a multiple start capability. The S-IVB J-2 engine is scheduled
to produce a thrust of 203,000 pounds during its first burn to earth
orbit and a thrust of 178,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of 4.5:1)
during the first i00 seconds of translunar injection. The remaining
translunar injection acceleration is provided at a thrust level of
203,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of 5.0:1). The engine valves are
controlled by a pneumatic system powered by gaseous helium which is
stored in a sphere inside a start bottle. An electrical control system
that uses solid stage logic elements is used to sequence the start and
shutdown operations of the engine.

Instrument Unit

The Saturn V launch vehicle is guided from its launch pad into
earth orbit primarily by navigation, guidance, and control equipment
located in the instrument unit (IU). The instrument unit is a cylindri-
cal structure 21.6 feet in diameter and 3 feet high installed on top of
the S-IVB stage. The unit weighs 4310 pounds and contains measurements
and telemetry_ command communications, tracking, and emergency detection
system components along with supporting electrical power and the environ-
mental control system.

APOLLO SPACECRAFT

The Apollo spacecraft (S/C) is designed to support three men in space


for periods up to 2 weeks, docking in space, landing on and returning
from the lunar surface, and safely entering the earth's atmosphere. The
Apollo S/C consists of the spacecraft-to-LM adapter (SLA), the service
module (SM), the command module (CM), the launch escape system (LES), and
the lunar module (LM). The CM and SM as a unit are referred to as the
command and service module (CSM).

3-6
ml-
I0.2 FEET

FORWARD SKIRT
L

i.-..--
21.6 FEET-I_

LH2 TANK

I0,418
CU FT-- 44.0 FEET

LOX TANK
2830 k/ \_J_
59.0
FEET

AFT SKIRT _"/!. _ " ]

THRUST STRUCTURE
(WITH ENGINE
ATTACHED) ) _'
5.2tFEET

, 33.0 FEET =I

19 FEET
AFT INTERSTAGE

Figure 3-4.- S-IVB stage.

3-7

ILl N _ E l/ E E L L 11. L.' L: U II g l: n L _.


Spacecraft-to-LM Adapter

The SLA (fig. 3-5) is a conical structure which provides a structural


load path between the LV and SM and also supports the LM. Aerodynami-
cally, the SLA smoothly encloses the irregularly shaped LM and transitions
the space vehicle diameter from that of the upper stage of the LV to that
of the SM. The SLA also encloses the nozzle of the SM engine and the high
gain antenna.

Spring thrusters are used to separate the LM from the SLA. After
the CSM has docked with the LM, mild charges are fired to release the
four adapters which secure the LM in the SLA. Simultaneously, four
spring thrusters mounted on the lower (fixed) SLA panels push against
the LM landing gear truss assembly to separate the spacecraft from the
launch vehicle.

Service Module

The service module (SM)(fig. 3-6) provides the main spacecraft pro-
pulsion and maneuvering capability during a mission. The SM provides
most of the spacecraft consumables (oxygen, water, propellant, and
hydrogen) and supplements environmental, electrical power, and propul-
sion requirements of the CM. The SM remains attached to the CM until
it is jettisoned just before CM atmospheric entry.

Structure.- The basic structural components are forward and aft


(upper and lower) bulkheads, six radial beams, four sector honeycomb
panels, four reaction control system honeycomb panels, aft heat shield,
and a fairing. The forward and aft bulkheads cover the top and bottom
of the SM. Radial beam trusses extending above the forward bulkhead
support and secure the CM. The radial beams are made of solid aluminum
alloy which has been machined and chem-milled to thicknesses varying
between 2 inches and 0.018 inch. Three of these beams have compression
pads and the other three have shear-compression pads and tension ties.
Explosive charges in the center sections of these tension ties are used
to separate the CM from the SM.

An aft heat shield surrounds the service propulsion engine to


protect the SM from the engine's heat during thrusting. The gap between
the CM and the forward bulkhead of the SM is closed off with a fairing
which is composed of eight electrical power system radiators alternated
with eight aluminum honeycomb panels. The sector and reaction control
system panels are 1 inch thick and are made of aluminum honeycomb core
between two aluminum face sheets. The sector panels are bolted to the
radial beams. Radiators used to dissipate heat from the environmental
control subsystem are bonded to the sector panels on opposite sides of
the SM. These radiators are each about 30 square feet in area.

3-8

ILl ILl 13 L L 1J ]2 L " _ L_ L _ _-_


CIRCUMFERENTIAL

I
UPPER (FORWARD)
LINEAR-SHAPED CHARGE

LONGITUDINAL
LINEAR-SHAPED CHARGE
21 ' JETTISONABLE
(4 PLACES)
PANELS
(4 PLACES)
PYROTECHN IC THRUSTERS
(4 PLACES)

CIRCUMFERENTIAL
LINEAR-SHAPED CHARGE
LOWER (AFT)
7' FIXED PANELS
THRUSTER/HINGE
(2) (4 PLACES)

IU

Figure 3-5.- Spacecraft-to-LM adapter.

3-9
RED ELECTRICAL
DOCKING POWER
LIGHT SUBSYSTEM
RADIATORS
SM REACTION
CONTROL FLYAWAY
SUBSYSTEM UMBILICAL
QUAD

FLOODLIGHT

GREEN
SCIMITAR DOCKING
ANT LIGHT

ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTR
EXTENSION
RADIATOR

UM TANKS

__RE'A OXIDIZER

TANKS
FUEL TANKS
CTION
\ _1 ICONTROL
FORWARD BULKHEAD INSTALL, J-_ ISUBSYSTEM

FUEL CELLS

PRESSURIZATION (_ [_
I _QUAOS 141

OXYGEN TANKS

HYDROGEN TANKS _

S-BAND HIGH GAIN ANTENNA AFT


BULKHEAD

12 FT 10 IN. . i SERVICE PROPULSION ENGINE

SECTOR 2 _ SERVICE PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM

SECTOR 3 _ OXIDIZER TANKS

SECTOR 4 OXYGEN TANKS, HYDROGEN TANKS, FUEL CELLS

SECTOR 5 _ SERVICE PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM

SECTOR6 J FUEL TANKS

CENTER SECTION- SERVICE PROPULSION ENGINE AND


HELIUM TANKS

Figure 3-6.- Service module.

3-10

ILl ILl [ L L L: LL L L I_ la L
' u
_' E E -
The SM interior is divided into six sectors, or bays, and a center
. -
section. Sector one is currently void. It is available for installation
of scientific or additional equipment should the need arise. Sector
two has part of a space radiator and a reaction control system (RCS)
engine quad (module) on its exterior panel and contains the service pro-
pulsion system (SPS) oxidizer sump tank. This tank is the larger of
the two tanks that hold the oxidizer for the SPS engine. Sector three
has the rest of the space radiator and another RCS engine quad on its
exterior panel and contains the oxidizer storage tank. This tank is
the second of two SPS oxidizer tanks and feeds the oxidizer sump tank
in sector two. Sector four contains most of the electrical power gener-
ating equipment. It contains three fuel cells, two cryogenic oxygen
and two cryogenic hydrogen tanks, and a power control relay box. The
cryogenic tanks supply oxygen to the environmental control subsystem
and oxygen and hydrogen to the fuel cells. Sector five has part of an
environmental control radiator and an RCS engine quad on the exterior
panel and contains the SPS engine fuel sump tank. This tank feeds the
engine and is also connected by feed lines to the storage tank in
sector six. Sector six has the rest of the environmental control radi-
tor and an RCS engine quad on its exterior and contains the SPS engine
fuel storage tank which feeds the fuel sump tank in sector five. The
center section contains two helium tanks and the SPS engine. The tanks
are used to provide helium pressurant for the SPS propellant tanks.

Propulsion.- Main spacecraft propulsion is provided by the


20500-pound thrust SPS. The SPS engine is a restartable, non-throttleable
engine which uses nitrogen tetroxide (N204) as an oxidizer and a 50-50
mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical-dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel.
(These propellants are hypergolic, i.e., they burn spontaneously when
combined without need for an igniter.) This engine is used for major
velocity changes during the mission, such as midcourse corrections,
lunar orbit insertion, transearth injection, and CSM aborts. The SPS
engine responds to automatic firing commands from the guidance and
navigation system or to commands from manual controls. The engine as-
sembly is gimbal-mounted to allow engine thrust-vector alignment with the
spacecraft center of mass to preclude tumbling. Thrust-vector alignment
control is maintained by the crew. The SM RCS provides for maneuvering
about and along three axes.

Additional SM systems.- In addition to the systems already described,


the SM has communication antennas, umbilical connections, and several
exterior mounted lights. The four antennas on the outside of the _ are
the steerable S-band high-gain antenna, mounted on the aft bulkhead; two
VHF omnidirectional antennas, mounted on opposite sides of the module
near the top; and the rendezvous radar transponder antenna, mounted in
the SM fairing.

3-11
Seven lights are mounted in the aluminumpanels of the fairing.
Four lights (one red, one green, and two amber) are used to aid the
astronauts in docking: one is a floodlight which can be turned on to
give astronauts visibility during extravehicular activities, one is a
flashing beacon used to aid in rendezvous, and one is a spotlight used
in rendezvous from 500 feet to docking with the LM.

SM/CM separation.- Separation of the SM from the CM occurs shortly


before entry. The sequence of events during separation is controlled
automatically by two redundant service module jettison controllers (SMJC)
located on the forward bulkhead of the SM.

Command Module

The command module (CM) (fig. 3-7) serves as the command, control,
and communications center for most of the mission. Supplemented by the
SM, it provides all life support elements for three crewmen in the mis-
sion environments and for their safe return to the earth's surface. It
is capable of attitude control about three axes and some lateral lift
translation at high velocities in earth atmosphere. It also permits LM
attachment, CM/LM ingress and egress, and serves as a buoyant vessel in
open ocean.

Structure.- The CM consists of two basic structures joined together:


the inner structure (pressure shell) and the outer structure (heat
shield). The inner structure, the pressurized crew compartment, is made
of aluminum sandwich construction consisting of a welded aluminum inner
skin, bonded aluminum honeycomb core, and outer face sheet. The outer
structure is basically a heat shield and is made of stainless steel-
brazed honeycomb brazed between steel alloy face sheets. Parts of the
area between the inner and outer sheets are filled with a layer of
fibrous insulation as additional heat protection.

Display and controls.- The main display console (MDC) (fig. 3-8)
has been arranged to provide for the expected duties of crew members.
These duties fall into the categories of Commander, CM Pilot, and LM
Pilot, occupying the left, center, and right couches, respectively. The
CM Pilot also acts as the principal navigator. All controls have been
designed so they can be operated by astronauts wearing gloves. The con-
trols are predominantly of four basic types: toggle switches, rotary
switches with click-stops, thumb-wheels, and push buttons. Critical
switches are guarded so that they cannot be thrown inadvertently. In
addition, some critical controls have locks that must be released before
they can be operated.

3-12
+X ÷y

_y ,_ __< --Z

/ COMBINED TUNNEL HATCH

ATTACHMENT (TYPICAL)
_ AUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

_ _"._'_'E7
P,TC.

(, ATTACH
POINT

(TYPICAL)

+X +y

-Y -X -Z

LEFT HAND
FORWARD COMPARTMENT FORWARD EQUIPMENT BAY COMBINED TUNNEL HATCH

CREW "
.OWER
, FORWARD " _ _ _ _OMPARTMENT

{TYPICAL)

HAND EQUIPMENT BAY RIGHT HAND EQUIPMENT /

AFT COMPARTMENT AFT COMPARTMENT

Figure 3-7.- Command module.

3-13
Cry°genics- 7 /--Service
/ / propulsion

Audio J r a C autai:nln-g-r_-__.> _ /.--Audio

control--_//_
F,'I coo''o'
RCS
mgmt ECS I I........._ i \
I c0_t,r__L_l I=';owre_'
"k________
\ I '
contro/-_/
7 Flightl

/ _E n vC_i;::ie nla i cJontr o i__


_f_'_--SCS
pane" ' power I

• Launch vehicle emergency detection • Propellant gauging


• Flight attitude • Environment control
• Mission sequence • Communications control
• Velocity change monitor • Power distribution
• Entry monitor • Caution and warning

I _ LIJJ
--':--: "--J'_-]-I

I Flight controls p. Systems controls


I --_l=-_,LII ,_--_ll . "'_JJaJJl_l ul'Irl
I_

/-J71 ', ," ', ," I\ ..X


• J • •

% • % •
% • • ••
•S
_o sx
• % S %
I •

Commander CM pilot LM pilot

Figure 3-8.- CM main display console,

3-14
Flight controls are located on the left center and left side of the
MDC, opposite the Commander. These include controls for such subsystems
as stabilization and control, propulsion, crew safety, earth landing,
and emergency detection. One of two guidance and navigation computer
panels also is located here, as are velocity, attitude, and altitude
indicators.

The CM Pilot faces the center of the console, and thus can reach
many of the flight controls, as well as the system controls on the right
side of the console. Displays and controls directly opposite him include
reaction control, propellant management, caution and warning, environ-
mental control, and cryogenic storage systems. The rotation and trans-
lation controllers used for attitude, thrust vector, and translation
maneuvers are located on the arms of two crew couches. In addition, a
rotation controller can be mounted at the navigation position in the
lower equipment bay.

Critical conditions of most spacecraft systems are monitored by a


caution and warning system. A malfunction or out-of-tolerance condition
results in illumination of a status light that identifies the abnormal-
ity. It also activates the master alarm circuit, which illuminates two
master alarm lights on the MDC and one in the lower equipment bay and
sends an alarm tone to the astronauts' headsets. The master alarm
lights and tone continue until a crewman resets the master alarm circuit.
This can be done before the crewmen deal with the problem indicated. The
caution and warning system also contains equipment to sense its own
malfunctions.

Lunar Module

The lunar module (LM) (fig. 3-9) is designed to transport two men
safely from the CSM, in lunar orbit, to the lunar surface, and return
them to the orbiting CSM. The LM provides operational capabilities such
as communications, telemetry, environmental support, transportation of
scientific equipment to the lunar surface, and returning surface samples
with the crew to the CSM.

The lunar module consists of two stages: the ascent stage and the
descent stage. The stages are attached at four fittings by explosive
bolts. Separable umbilicals and hardline connections provide subsystem
continuity to operate both stages as a single unit until separate ascent
stage operation is desired. The LM is designed to operate for 48 hours
after separation from the CSM, with a maximum lunar stay time of 44 hours.
Table 3-I is a weight summary of the Apollo/Saturn 5 space vehicle for
the Apollo 13 mission.

3-15
Overhead
S-band hatch
steerable Docking Ascent VHF EVA Docking
an window stage antenna antenna target

Rendezvous
equipment
radar antenna_ bay
S-band in-flight
antenna (2)
RCS thrust chamber
Docking assembly cluster
light (

Docking

Tracking I ight (3)

Forward hatch Landing gear

Forward,

Ladder Egress Descent Descent Landing


platform engine stage radar_
skirt antenna

Figure 3-9.- Lunar module.

3-]_6
TABLE 3-I.- APOLLO 13 WEIGHT SUMMARY (WEIGHT IN POUNDS)

Final
Total
Stage/module Inert weight Total weight separation
expendables
weight

S-IC 288OOO 4746870 5034870 363403

s-lc/s-ii 11464 11464


interstage

S-If stage 78050 996960 1075010 92523

S-II/S-IVB 8100 8100


interstage

S-IVB stage 25050 236671 261721 35526

Instrument unit 4482 4482

Launch vehicle at ignition 6,395,647

Spacecraft-LM 4o44 4044


adapter

Lunar module 9915 23568 33483 "33941

Service module 10532 40567 51099 **14076

Command module 12572 12572 **11269


(Landing)

Launch escape 9012 9012


system

* CSM/LM separation
** CM/SM separation

3-17
" TABLE 3-1.- APOLLO 13 WEIGHT SUMMARY (WEIGHT IN POUNDS) - Concluded

Final
Total
Stage/module Inert weight Total weight separation
expendables
weight

Spacecraft at ignition 110,210

Space vehicle at ignition 6505857

S-IC thrust buildup (-)84598

Space vehicle at lift-off 6421259

Space vehicle at orbit insertion 299998

Main propulsion.- Main propulsion is provided by the descent pro-


pulsion system (DPS) and the ascent propulsion system (APS). Each
system is wholly independent of the other. The DPS provides the thrust
to control descent to the lunar surface. The APS can provide the thrust
for ascent from the lunar surface. In case of mission abort, the APS
and/or DPS can place the LM into a rendezvous trajectory with the CSM
from any point in the descent trajectory. The choice of engine to be
used depends on the cause for abort, on how long the descent engine
has been operating, and on the quantity of propellant remaining in the
descent stage. Both propulsion systems use identical hypergolic pro-
pellants. The fuel is a 50-50 mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical-
dimethylhydrazine and the oxidizer is nitrogen tetroxide° Gaseous
helium pressurizes the propellant feed systems. Helium storage in the
DPS is at cryogenic temperatures in the super-critical state and in the
APS it is gaseous at ambient temperatures.

Ullage for propellant settling is required prior to descent engine


start and is provided by the +X axis reaction engines. The descent
engine is gimbaled, throttleable, and restartable. The engine can be
throttled from 1050 pounds of thrust to 6300 pounds. Throttle positions
above this value automatically'produce full thrust to reduce combustion
chamber erosion. Nominal full thrust is 9870 pounds. Gimbal trim of
the engine compensates for a changing center of gravity of the vehicle
and is automatically accomplished by either the primary guidance and
navigation system (PGNS) or the abort guidance system (AGS). Automatic
throttle and on/off control is available in the PGNS mode of operation.

3-18
The AGScommandson/off operation but has no automatic throttle control
capability. Manual control capability of engine firing functions has
been provided. Manual thrust control override may, at any time, com-
mandmore thrust than the level commanded by the LM guidance computer
(LGC).

The ascent engine is a fixed, non-throttleable engine. The engine


develops 3500 pounds of thrust, sufficient to abort the lunar descent
or to launch the ascent stage from the lunar surface and place it in
the desired lunar orbit. Control modes are similar to those described
for the descent engine. The APS propellant is contained in two spheri-
cal titanium tanks, one for oxidizer and the other for fuel. Each tank
has a volume of 36 cubic feet. Total fuel weight is 2008 pounds, of
which 71 pounds are unusable. Oxidizer weight is 3170 pounds, of which
92 pounds are unusable. The APS has a limit of 35 starts, must have a
propellant bulk temperature between 50 ° F and 90 ° F prior to start,
must not exceed 460 seconds of burn time, and has a system life of
24 hours after pressurization.

Electrical power system.- The electrical power system (EPS) con-


tains six batteries which supply the electrical power requirements of
the LM during undocked mission phases. Four batteries are located in
the descent stage and two in the ascent stage. Batteries for the
explosive devices system are not included in this system description.
Postlaunch LM power is supplied by the descent stage batteries until
the LM and CSM are docked. While docked, the CSM supplies electrical
power to the LM up to 296 watts (peak). During the lunar descent phase,
the two ascent stage batteries are paralleled with the descent stage
batteries for additional power assurance. The descent stage batteries
are utilized for LM lunar surface operations and checkout. The ascent
stage batteries are brought on the line just before ascent phase
staging. All batteries and busses may be individually monitored for
load, voltage, and failure. Several isolation and combination modes
are provided.

Two inverters, each capable of supplying full load, convert the


dc to ac for ll5-volt, 400-hertz supply. Electrical power is distributed
by the following busses: LM Pilot's dc bus, Commander's dc bus, and ac
busses A and B.

The four descent stage silver-zinc batteries are identical and have
a 400 ampere-hour capacity at 28 volts. Because the batteries do not
have a constant voltage at various states of charge/load levels, "high"
and "low" voltage taps are provided for selection. The "low voltage"
tap is selected to initiate use of a fully charged battery. Cross-tie
circuits in the busses facilitate an even discharge of the batteries
regardless of distribution combinations. The two silver-zinc ascent
stage batteries are identical to each other and have a 296 ampere-hour

3-19
_apacity at 28 volts. The ascent stage batteries are normally connected
in parallel for even discharge. Because of design load characteristics,
the ascent stage batteries do not have and do not require high and low
voltage taps.

Nominal voltage for ascent stage and descent stage batteries is


30.0 volts. Reverse current relays for battery failure are one of many
componentsdesigned into the EPSto enhance EPSreliability. Cooling
of the batteries is provided by the environmental control system cold
rail heat sinks. Available ascent electrical energy is 17.8 kilowatt
hours at a maximumdrain of 50 ampsper battery and descent energy is
46.9 kilowatt hours at a maximumdrain of 25 ampsper battery.

MISSIONMONITORING,
SUPPORT,
ANDCONTROL

Mission execution involves the following functions: prelaunch


checkout and launch operations; tracking the space vehicle to determine
its present and future positions; securing information on the status of
the flight crew and space vehicle systems (via telemetry); evaluation
of telemetry information; commandingthe space vehicle by transmitting
real-time and updata commandsto the onboard computer; and voice com-
munication between flight and ground crews.

These functions require the use of a facility to assemble and


launch the space vehicle (see Launch Complex), a central flight control
facility, a network of remote stations located strategically around the
world, a method of rapidly transmitting and receiving information
between the space vehicle and the central flight control facility, and
a real-time data display system in which the data are made available
and presented in usable form at essentially the sametime that the data
event occurred.

The flight crew and the following organizations and facilities


participate in mission control operations:

a. Mission Control Center (MCC), MannedSpacecraft Center (MSC),


Houston, Texas. The MCCcontains the communication, computer display,
and commandsystems to enable the flight controllers to effectively
monitor and control the space vehicle.

b. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), CapeKennedy, Florida. The space


vehicle is launched from KSCand controlled from the Launch Control
Center (LCC). Prelaunch, launch, and powered flight data are collected
at the Central Instrumentation Facility (CIF) at KSCfrom the launch
pads, CIF receivers, Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA), and the down-
range Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR)stations. These data are

3-20
transmitted to MCCvia the Apollo Launch Data"System (ALDS). Also
located at KSC(AFETR)is the Impact Predictor (IP), for range safety
purposes.

c. Goddard SpaceFlight Center (GSFC), Greenbelt, Maryland. GSFC


managesand operates the MannedSpace Flight Network (MSFN)and the
NASAcommunications (NASCOM) network. During flight, the MSFNis
under the operational control of the MCC.

d. George C. Marshall SpaceFlight Center (MSFC), Huntsville,


Alabama. MSFC,by meansof the Launch Information ExchangeFacility
(LIEF) and the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC)provides
launch vehicle systems real-time support to KSCand MCCfor preflight,
launch, and flight operations.

A block diagram of the basic flight control interfaces is shown


in figure 3-10.

Vehicle Flight Control Capability


Flight operations are controlled from the MCC. The MCChas two
flight control rooms, but only one control room is used per mission.
Each control room, called a Mission Operations Control Room(MOCR),is
capable of controlling individual Staff Support Rooms(SSR's) located
adjacent to the MOCR. The SSR's are mannedby flight control special-
ists who provide detailed support to the MOCR. Figure 3-11 outlines
the organization of the MCCfor flight control and briefly describes
key responsibilities. Information flow within the MOCRis shownin
figure 3-12.

The consoles within the MOCRand SSR's permit the necessary inter-
face between the flight controllers and the spacecraft. The displays
and controls on these consoles and other group displays provide the
capability to monitor and evaluate data concerning the mission and,
based on these evaluations, to recommendor take appropriate action on
matters concerning the flight crew and spacecraft.
Problems concerning crew safety and mission success are identified
to flight control personnel in the following ways:
a. Flight crew observations

b. Flight controller real-time observations

c. Review of telemetry data received from tape recorder playback


d. Trend analysis of actual and predicted values

3-21
e. Review of collected data by systems specialists

f, Correlation and comparison with previous mission data

g. Analysis of recorded data from launch complex testing

3-22,
LIEF
Goddard Houston Marshall

ALDS

Kennedy AFETR
r-

r=

r_
O0
I
h)
tO

r:

ALDS - Apollo Launch Data System


LIEF - Launch Information Exchange Facility

.m,
Figure 3-i0.- Basic telemetry, command, and communication
interfaces for flight control.
MISSION DIRECTOR )MD) ]

OVERALL
MISSION
CONDUCT OF

I
PUBLIC

MISSION
TO PUBLIC
AFFAIRS

STATUS
I I
RECOVERY AND
MISSIONOD MANAGER
SUPPORT
OTHER
I

DECISIONS/ACTIONS ON SPACE
VEHICLE SYSTE MS/DYNAMICS
I AND FLIGHT
MCC/MSFNDIRECTOR (FD)
OPERATIONS

I
FLIGHT DYNAMICS
MISSION COMMAND SYSTEMS OPERATIONS
GROUP GROUP
AND CONTROL GROUP

FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICER (FDO)


OPERATIONS & PROCEDURES (o&P)I ._BOOSTER SYSTEMS ENGINEERS (BSE_

MONITOR STATUS OF L._ iMONITORS PRE LAUNCH CHECKOUT


MCCIMSFN MISSION CON- I
S.IC, S-II, S-IVB FLIGHT I-_ POWERED FLIGHT EVENTS AND
TROL PROCEDURES; FLIGHT L_
CONTROL SCHE DU LING; MANNING; SYSTEMS / TRAJECTORIES; REENTRY EVENTS

CONTROL FORMAT; DISPLAYS; | I AND TRAJECTORIES

TELETYPE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS | I HUNTSVILLE OPERATIONS I


RETROFIRE OFFICER (RETRO)
NETWORK £ONTROL SUPPORT CENTER (HOSC) I
MAINTAINS UPDATED ABORT
MSFN CONTROL, RADAR AND AND REENTRY PLAN; UPDATES
COMMAND HAN DOVERS IMPACT POINT ESTIMATES
COMPUTE R UPDATE OF

CONSUMABLES DATA;
._ EMU ENGINEERS
SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATOR EVA DECISIONS

MONITORS GUIDANCE
COMMUNICATIONS FUNCTIONS DURING POWERED
WITH SPACECRAFT SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS ENGINEERS FLIGHT AND PREMANEUVER
t GUIDANCE OFFICER (GUIDO)
MONITOR STATUS OF PREPARATION

E LECTRICAL. COMMUNICATION,
INSTRUMENTATION. SEQUENTIAL,
FLIGHT ACTIVITIES (FAD)
LIFE SUPPORT. STABILIZATION
FLIGHT PLAN DETAILED AND CONTROL. PROPULSION. AND
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION
SYS'I_ MS

LIFE SYSTEMS (SURGEON)


SPACE RADIATION MONITORS PHYSIOLOGICAL AND
I SPACE ENVIRONMENT
ENVIRONMENT DATA (SEO) ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS OF
FLIGHT CREW

INF LIGHT EXPERIMENT


I XPERIMENT
IMPLEMENTATIONACTIVITIES MEAD)

I
I I I I
DIRECTOR
SSR
SSR SYSTEMS
SSR
LIFE 1
AND

I SSR
ANALYSIS

SC PLANNING I I VEHICLE
SYSTEMS
SSR II FLIGHT
DYNAMICS
SSR J
I I
PROGRAM
OFFICE
i.=,o,
i
EVALUATION
ROOM
KSCLAUNCH
OPERATIONS

Figure B-ll.- Mission Control Center organization.

3-2)4
MISSION
DI RECTOR

LAUNCH _L EQUIPMENT STATUS M AND 0


STAGE STATUS
VEHICLE SUPERVISOR
STAGES
f,Z)

FLIGHT FLIGHT

I
LU 0
I:C _-w
DYNAMICS
VEHI CLE u")

r'_ V') GROUP


SYSTEMS INFORMATION
I SYSTEMSSTATUS
FLIGHT DIRECTOR NETWORK
II: NETWORK
STATUS CONTROLLER
ASSISTANT
FLIGHT MCC/MSFN
STATUS I SlC DATA
DIRECTOR

MISSION MISSION PROCEDURESTATUS


PROCEDURE
STATUS i SPACECRAFT
COMMUN ICATOR
L FLIGHT
CREW Ji_ rl,

I OFFICER
0 AND P I

Figure 3-12.- Information flc_within the


Mission Operations Control Room.

3-25
PART 2. APOLLO 13 MISSION DESCRIPTION

PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES

The primary mission objectives were as follows:

Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials


in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro Formation.

Deploy and activate an Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package


(m_SEP).

Develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment.

Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites.

Table 3-II lists the Apollo 13 mission sequence of major events and
the time of occurrence in ground elapsed time.

TABLE 3-II. - APOLLO 13 MISSION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Ground elapsed time


Event
(hr:min:sec)

Range zero (02:13:00.0 p.m.e.s.t., April ll) 00:00:00


Earth parking orbit insertion 00:12:40
Second S-IVB ignition 02:35:46
Translunar injection 02:41:47
CSM/S-IVB separation 03:06:39
Spacecraft ejection from S-IVB 04:01:03
S-IVB APS evasive maneuver 04:18:01
S-IVB APS maneuver for lunar impact 05:59:59
Midcourse correction - 2 (hybrid transfer) 30:40:50
Cryogenic oxygen tank anomaly 55:54:53
Midcourse correction - 4 61:29:43
S-IVB lunar impact 77:56:40
Pericynthion plus 2-hour maneuver 79:27:39
Midcourse correction - 5 105:18:32
Midcourse correction - 7 137:39:49
Service module jettison 138:02:06
Lunar module jettison 141:30:02
Entry interface 142:40:47
Landing 142:54:41

3-26
Launch and Earth Parking Orbit

Apollo 1B was successfully launched on schedule from Launch Complex


39A, KennedySpace Center, Florida, at 2:13 p.m.e.s.t., April ll, 1970.
The launch vehicle stages inserted the S-IVB/instrument unit (IU)/
spacecraft combination into an earth parking orbit with an apogeeof
100.2 nautical miles (n. mi. ) and a perigee of 98.0 n. mi. (100-n. mi.
circular planned). During second stage boost, the center engine of the
S-II stage cut off about 132 seconds early, causing the remaining four
engines to burn approximately 3_ seconds longer than predicted. Space
vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 feet per second (fps) lower
than planned. As a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approx-
imately 9 seconds longer than predicted with cutoff velocity within
about 1.2 fps of planned. Total launch vehicle burn time was about
44 seconds longer than predicted. A greater than B-sigma probability of
meeting translunar injection (TLI) cutoff conditions existed with re-
maining S-IVB propellants.

After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems


were verified and preparation was madefor translunar injection (TLI).
Onboardtelevision was initiated at 01:35 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.)
for about 5.5 minutes. The second S-IVBburn was initiated on schedule
for TLI. All major systems operated satisfactorily and all end con-
ditions were nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory.

Translunar Coast

The CSMseparated from the LM/IU/S-IVB at about 03:07 g.e.t. On-


board television was then initiated for about 72 minutes and clearly
showedCSM"hard docking," ejection of the CSM/LMfrom the S-IVB at
about 0_:01 g.e.t., and the S-IVB auxiliary propulsion system (APS)
evasive maneuver as well as spacecraft interior and exterior scenes.
The SMRCSpropellant usage for the separation, transposition, docking,
and ejection was nominal. All launch vehicle safing activities were
performed as scheduled.

The S-IVBAPS evasive maneuverby an 8-secondAPS Ullage burn was


initiated at 04:18 g.e.t, and was successfully completed. The liquid
oxygen dumpwas initiated at 04:39 g.e.t, and was also successfully
accomplished. The first S-IVB APSburn for lunar target point impact
was initiated at 06:00 g.e.t. The burn duration was 217 seconds, pro-
ducing a differential velocity of approximately 28 fps. Tracking infor-
mation available at 08:00 g.e.t, indicated that the S-IVB/IU would impact
at 6°53' S., B0°5B' W. versus the targeted B° S., B0° W. Therefore, the
second S-IVB APS (trim) burn was not required. The gaseous nitrogen pres-
sure dropped in the IU ST-124-MBinertial platform at 18:25 g.e.t, and
the S-IVB/IU no longer had attitude control but began tumbling slowly.

3-27
At approximately 19:17 g.e.t., a step input in tracking data indicated a
velocity increase of approximately 4 to 5 fps. No conclusions have been
reached on the reason for this increase. The velocity change altered
the lunar impact point closer to the target. The S-IVB/IU impacted the
lunar surface at 77:56:40 g.e.t. (08:09:40 p.m.e.s.t. April 14) at
2.4 ° S., 27.9 ° W., and the seismometer deployed during the Apollo 12
mission successfully detected the impact. The targeted impact point was
125 n. mi. from the seismometer. The actual impact point was 74 n. mi.
from the seismometer, well within the desired 189-n. mi. (350-km) radius.

The accuracy of the TLI maneuver was such that spacecraft midcourse
correction No. 1 (MCC-1), scheduled for ll:41 g.e.t., was not required.
MCC-2 was performed as planned at 30:41 g.e.t, and resulted in placing
the spacecraft on the desired, non-free-return circumlunar trajectory
with a predicted closest approach to the moon on 62 n. mi. All SPS burn
parameters were normal. The accuracy of MCC-3 was such that MCC-3,
scheduled for 55:26 g.e.t., was not performed. Good quality television
coverage of the preparations and performance of MCC-2 was received for
49 minutes beginning at 30:13 g.e.t.

At approximately 55:55 g.e.t. (10:08 p.m.e.s.t.), the crew re-


ported an undervoltage alarm on the CSM main bus B. Pressure was rapid-
ly lost in SM oxygen tank no. 2 and fuel cells 1 and 3 current dropped
to zero due to loss of their oxygen supply. A decision was made to
abort the mission. The increased load on fuel cell 2 and decaying pres-
sure in the remaining oxygen tank led to the decision to activate the
LM, power down the CSM, and use the LM systems for life support.

At 61:30 g.e.t., a 38-fps midcourse maneuver (MCC-4) was performed


by the LM DPS to place the spacecraft in a free-return trajectory on
which the CM would nominally land in the Indian Ocean south of Mauritius
at approximately 152:00 g.e.t.

Transearth Coast

At pericynthion plus 2 hours (79:28 g.e.t.), a LM DPS maneuver was


performed to shorten the return trip time and move the earth landing
point. The 263.4-second burn produced a differential velocity of 860.5
fps and resulted in an initial predicted earth landing point in the mid-
Pacific Ocean at 1_2:53 g.e.t. Both LM guidance systems were powered
up and the primary system was used for this maneuver. Following the
maneuver, passive thermal control was established and the LMwas powered
down to conserve consumables; only the LM environmental control system
(ECS) and communications and telemetry systems were kept powered up.

The LMDPS was used to perform MCC-5 at 105:19 g.e.t. The 15-second
burn (at 10-percent throttle) produced a velocity change of about 7.8 fps

3-28
and successfully raised the entry flight path angle to -6.52 ° •

The CSM was partially powered up for a check of the thermal condi-
tions of the CM with first reported receipt of S-band signal at 101:53
g.e.t. Thermal conditions on all CSM systems observed appeared to be in
order for entry.

Due to the unusual spacecraft configuration, new procedures leading


to entry were developed and verified in ground-based simulations. The
resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction (MCC-7) at
entry interface (EI) -5 hours, Jettison of the SM at EI -4.5 hours, then
jettison of the LM at EI -1 hour prior to a normal atmospheric entry by
the CM.

MCC-7 was successfully accomplished at 137:40 g.e.t. The 22.4-second


LM RCS maneuver resulted in a predicted entry flight path angle of -6.49 °.
The SM was jettisoned at 138:02 g.e.t. The crew viewed and photographed
the SM and reported that an entire panel was missing near the S-band high-
gain antenna and a great deal of debris was hanging out. The CM was pow-
ered up and then the LM was Jettisoned at 141:30 g.e.t. The EI at 40,000
feet was reached at 142:41 g.e.t.

Entry and Recovery

Weather in the prime recovery area was as follows: broken stratus


clouds at 2000 feet; visibility l0 miles; 6-knot ENE winds; and wave
height 1 to 2 feet. Drogue and main parachutes deployed normally.
Visual contact with the spacecraft was reported at 142:50 g.e.t. Landing
occurred at 142:54:41 g.e.t. (01:07:41 p.m.e.s.t., April 17). The land-
ing point was in the mid-Pacific Ocean, approximately 21°40 ' S., 165°22 ' W.
The CM landed in the stable 1 position about 3.5 n. mi. from the prime
recovery ship, USS IWO JIMA. The crew, picked up by a recovery heli-
copter, was safe aboard the ship at 1:53 p.m.e.s.t., less than an hour
after landing.

3-29

U 1/- IL L: E. L L E L. ta U n n u L
I

This page left blank intentionally.

3-30
CHAPTER 4

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF APOLLO 15 ACCIDENT

4-0
ILl li It"., /_ IL 1: 12 L ' _: I_ L
'_ ,_
_' 13 E IL _ _
L..
PART i. INTRODUCTION

It became clear in the course of the Board's review that the acci-
dent during the Apollo 13 mission was initiated in the service module
cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2. Therefore, the following analysis centers
on that tank and its history. In addition, the recovery steps taken in
the period beginning with the accident and continuing to reentry are
discussed.

Two oxygen tanks essentially identical to oxygen tank no. 2 on


Apollo 13, and two hydrogen tanks of similar design, operated satisfac-
torily on several unmanned Apollo flights and on the Apollo 7, 8, 9, 10,
ll, and 12 manned missions. With this in mind, the Board placed particu-
lar emphasis on each difference in the history of oxygen tank no. 2 from
the history of the earlier tanks, in addition to reviewing the design,
assembly, and test history.

4-1
PART 2. OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 HISTORY

DESIGN

On February 26, 1966, the North American Aviation Corporation, now


North American Rockwell (NR), prime contractor for the Apollo command
and service modules (CSM), awarded a subcontract to the Beech Aircraft
Corporation (Beech) to design, develop, fabricate, assemble, test, and
deliver the Block II Apollo cryogenic gas storage subsystem. This was
a follow-on to an earlier subcontract under which the somewhat different
Block I subsystem was procured.

As the simplified drawing in figure 4-1 indicates, each oxygen tank


has an outer shell and an inner shell, arranged to provide a vacuum
space to reduce heat leak, and a dome enclosing paths into the tank for
transmission of fluids and electrical power and signals. The space be-
tween the shells and the space in the dome are filled with insulating
materials. Mounted in the tank are two tubular assemblies. One, called
the heater tube, contains two thermostatically protected heater coils
and two small fans driven by 1800 rpm motors to stir the tank contents.
The other, called the quantity probe, consists of an upper section which
supports a cylindrical capacitance gage used to measure electrically the
quantity of fluid in the tank. The inner cylinder of this probe serves
both as a fill and drain tube and as one plate of the capacitance gage.
In addition, a temperature sensor is mounted on the outside of the quan-
tity probe near the head. Wiring for the gage, the temperature sensor,
the fan motors, and the heaters passes through the head of the quantity
probe to a conduit in the dome. From there the wiring runs to a con-
necter which ties it electrically to the appropriate external circuits
in the CSM. The routing of wiring and lines from the tank through the
dome is shown in figure 4-2.

As shown in figure 4-2, the fill line from the exterior of the SM
enters the oxygen tank and connects to the inner cylinder of the capaci-
tance gage through a coupling of two Teflon adapters or sleeves and a
short length of Inconel tubing. The dimensions and tolerances selected
are such that if "worst case" variations in an actual system were to
occur, the coupling might not reach from the fill line to the gage cylin-
der (fig. 4-3). Thus, the variations might be such that a very loose
fit would result.

The supply line from the tank leads from the head of the quantity
probe to the dome and thence, after passing around the tank between the
inner and outer shells, exits through the dome to supply oxygen to the
fuel cells in the service module (SM) and the environmental control
system (ECS) in the command module (CM). The supply line also connects

4-2
• °

Closeout cap
Blowout disc

Fan

Supply motor
Temperature
line
sensor

"hermostat

Heater

To fuel
Insulation

ceil/ECS'_
Capacitance
gage

Fan
motor

Pressure
Pressure switch
transducer
Closeout cap
Relief
valve
Overboard

Figure &-l.- Oxygen tank no. 2 internal components.

tl !1 L .... ._ __ __
Fill tube conduit

Electrical
wiring

Oxygen
vent tube
Supply

Filter

O0
O0
fan 1

Temperature sensor _ /i

Quantity probe

Figure 4-2.- Oxygen tank wiring and lines.

4-4
Fill
Fill
\
tube
tube

r \
Adverse
tolerance case \ I I
Nominal
tolerance case
\

• Dimension a
\r I

I
depends on
e value of e

Part Max Nom Min


dim dim dim

a :_ 0.28 0.24 0.16

b 1.095!1.0801.065
Probe
c 0.26 0.20 0.14

d 1.45 1.43 1.41

e 18 ° 21 ° 24 °

Figure 4-3.- Nominal and adverse tolerance cases.


r-:

I"
to a relief valve. Under normal conditions, pressure in the tank is
measured by a pressure gage in the supply line and a pressure switch
near this gage is provided to turn on the heaters in the oxygen tank if
the pressure drops below a preselected value. This periodic addition of
heat to the tank maintains the pressure at a sufficient level to satisfy
the demand for oxygen as tank quantity decreases during a flight mission.

The oxygen tank is designed for a capacity of 320 pounds of super-


critical oxygen at pressures ranging between 865 to 935 pounds per
square inch absolute (psia). The tank is initially filled with liquid
oxygen at -297 ° F and operates over the range from -340 ° F to +80 ° F.
The term "supercritical" means that the oxygen is maintained at a temper-
ature and pressure which assures that it is a homogeneous, single-phase
fluid.

The burst pressure of the oxygen tank is about 2200 psi at -150 ° F,
over twice the normal operating pressure at that temperature. The relief
valve is designed to relieve pressure in the oxygen tank overboard at a
pressure of approximately i000 psi. The oxygen tank dome is open to the
vacuum between the inner and outer tank shell and contains a rupture
disc designed to blow out at about 75 psi.

The approximate amounts of principal materials within the oxygen


tank are set forth in table 4-1.

TABLE 4-1.- MATERIALS WITHIN OXYGEN TANK

Approximate Available
Mat eri al quantity, lb energy, Btu

Teflon-wire insulation 1.1 2,400


sleeving and solid

Aluminum (all forms ) 0.8 20,500

Stainless steel 2.4 15,000

Inconel alloys 1.7 2,900

Two oxygen tanks are mounted on a shelf in bay 4 of the SM, as


shown in figure 4-4. Figures 4-5 through 4-8 are photographs of portions

4-6

• _
:uel
cell
2

Fuel Fuel
cell cell
3 1

_Fuel cell

-Oxygen
Oxygen Il tank 1

tank 2"-_ - Oxygen valve


Oxygen subsystem module
shelf module
Oxygen servicing
panel

.Hydrogen
1

/drogen subs
_.she If module

tank 2

Fisure_-4. - Arrangement of fuel cells and cryogenic systems in bay h.

4-7

I1 N E :" E :I2 L L K I:: _". I: g. 1i _ t: iz L ± ,__


This page left blank intentionally.

_-8

ILl ILl 13 L L ld 12 k L _ '_ '_ "


/_.S _..... ., _._<.c

/ F t J -_

Figure 4=5.= Fuel cells shelf.

4-9
.,¢- _* _<-C - L -_C,2 / L, '

Figure 4-6.- Oxygen tank shelf.

Preceding
pageblank
4-11

L k E '_ k 'L. '


_ L" L" L_ /Li _ K L
FigureX_=_XX Hydrogen tank shelf.

Preceding
pageblank
4-13

ILl li E " L: E L L
. i_ E l.: : '
F

4_8° --

Figure _X_ Inside view of panel covering bay 4.

Preceding
pageblank
4-15
of the Apollo 13 service module (SM109) at the North American Rockwell
plant prior to shipment to KSC. Figure 4-5 showsthe fuel cell shelf,
with fuel cell 1 on the right, fuel cell 3 on the left, and fuel cell 2
behind cells 1 and 3. The top of oxygen tank no. 2 can be seen at the
lower left. Figure 4-6 showsthe oxygen tank shelf, with oxygen tank
no. 2 at left center. Figure h-7 shows the hydrogen tank shelf with
hydrogen tank no. 1 on top and hydrogen tank no. 2 below. The bottom
of the oxygen shelf shows someof the oxygen system instrumentation and
wiring, largely covered by insulation. Figure h-8 is a photograph of
the bay 4 panel, which was missing from the service module after the
accident.

A more detailed description of the oxygen tank design is contained


in Appendix D to this report.

MANUFACTURE

The manufacture of oxygen tank no. 2 began in 1966. Under subcon-


tracts with Beech, the inner shell of the tank was manufactured by the
Airite Products Division of Electrada Corporation; the quantity probe
was madeby SimmondsPrecision Products, Inc. ; and the fans and fan
motors were produced by Globe Industries, Inc.

The Beech serial number assigned to the oxygen tank no. 2 flown
in the Apollo 13 was 10024XTA0008. It was the eighth Block II oxygen
tank built. Twenty-eight Block I oxygen tanks had previously been built
by Beech.

The design of the oxygen tank is such that once the upper and lower
halves of the inner and outer shells are assembledand welded, the
heater assembly must be inserted in the tank, movedto one side, and
bolted in place. Then the quantity probe is inserted into the tank and
the heater assembly wires (to the heaters, the thermostats, and the fan
motors) must be pulled through the head of the quantity probe and the
32-inch coiled conduit in the dome. Thus, the design requires during
assembly a substantial amount of wire movementinside the tank, where
movementcannot be readily observed, and where possible damageto wire
insulation by scraping or flexing cannot be easily detected before the
tank is capped off and welded closed.

Several minor manufacturing flaws were discovered in oxygen tank


no. 2 in the course of testing. A porosity in a weld on the lower half
of the outer shell necessitated grinding and rewelding. Rewelding was
also required when it was determined that incorrect welding wire had
been inadvertently used for a small weld on a vacuumpumpmounted on

Preceding
pageblank
4-17
the outside of the tank dome. The upper fan motor originally installed
_as noisy and drew excessive current. The tank was disassembled and the
heater assembly, fans, and heaters were replaced with a new assembly
and new fans. The tank was then assembled and sealed for the second
time, and the space between the inner and outer shells was pumpeddown
over a 28-day period to create the necessary vacuum.

TANK TESTS AT BEECH

Acceptance testing of oxygen tank no. 2 at Beech included extensive


dielectric, insulation, and functional tests of heaters, fans, and vac-
ion pumps. The tank was then leak tested at 500 psi and proof tested
at 1335 psi with helium.

After the helium proof test, the tank was filled with liquid oxygen
and pressurized to a proof pressure of 1335 psi by use of the tank
heaters powered by 65 V ac. Extensive heat-leak tests were run at
R00 psi for 25 to 30 hours over a range of ambient conditions and out-
flow rates. At the conclusion of the heat-leak tests, about 100 pounds
of oxygen remained in the tank. About three-fourths of this was released
by venting the tank at a controlled rate through the supply line to
about 20 psi. The tank was then emptied by applying warm gas at about
30 psi to the vent line to force the liquid oxygen (LOX) in the tank out
the fill line (see fig. h-2). No difficulties were recorded in this
det anking operation.

The acceptance test indicated that the rate of heat leak into the
taukwas higher than permitted by the specifications. After some re-
working, the rate improved, but was still somewhat higher than specified.
The tank was accepted with a formal waiver of this condition. Several
other minor discrepancies were also accepted. These included oversized
holes in the support for the electrical plug in the tank dome, and an
oversized rivet hole in the heater assembly Just above the lower fan.
None of these items were serious, and the tank was accepted, filled with
helium at 5 psi, and shipped to NR on May 3, 1967.

ASSEMBLY AND TEST AT NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL

The assembly of oxygen shelf serial number 0632AAG3277, with Beech


oxygen tank serial number 10024XTA0009 as oxygen tank no. 1 and serial
number 1002_XTA0008 as oxygen tank no. 2, was completed on March ll, 1968.
The shelf was to be installed in SM 106 for flight in the Apollo l0
mission.

4-18
Beginning on April 27, the assembled oxygen shelf underwent stand-
ard proof-pressure, leak, and functional checks. One valve on the shelf
leaked and was repaired, but no anomalies were noted with regard to
oxygen tank no. 2, and therefore no rework of oxygen tauk no. 2 was
required. None of the oxygen tank testing at NR requires use of L0X
in the tanks.

On June _, 1968, the shelf was installed in SM 106.

Between August 3 and August 8, 1968, testing of the shelf in the


SM was conducted. No anomalies were noted.

Due to electromagnetic interference problems with the vac-ion


pumps on cryogenic tank domes in earlier Apollo spacecraft, a modifica-
tion was introduced and a decision was made to replace the complete
oxygen shelf in SM 106. An oxygen shelf with approved modifications was
prepared for installation in SM 106. On October 21, 1968, the oxygen
shelf was removed from SM 106 for the required modification and instal-
lation in a later spacecraft.

The oxygen shelf was removed in the manner shown in figure 4-9.
After various lines and wires were disconnected and bolts which hold
the shelf in the SM were removed, a fixture suspended from a crane was
placed under the shelf and used to lift the shelf and extract it from
bay h. One shelf bolt was mistakenly left in place during the initial
attempt to remove the shelf; and as a consequence, after the front of
the shelf was raised about 2 inches, the fixture broke, allowing the
shelf to drop back into place. Photographs of the underside of the
fuel cell shelf in SM 106 indicate that the closeout cap on the dome
of oxygen tank no. 2 may have struck the underside of that shelf during
this incident. At the time, however, it was believed that the oxygen
shelf had simply dropped back into place and an analysis was performed
to calculate the forces resulting from a drop of 2 inches. It now
seems likely that the shelf was first accelerated upward and then
dropped.

The remaining bolt was then removed, the incident recorded, and
the oxygen shelf was removed_ithout further difficulty. Following
removal, the oxygen shelf was retested to check shelf integrity, in-
cluding proof-pressure tests, leak tests, and functional tests of
pressure transducers and switches, thermal switches, and vac-ion pumps.
No cryogenic testing was conducted. Visual inspection revealed no
problem. These tests would have disclosed external leakage or serious
internal malfunctions of most types, but would not disclose fill line
leakage within oxygen tank no. 2. Further calculations and tests con-
ducted during this investigation, however, have indicated that the
forces experienced by the shelf were probably close to those originally

4-19
hoist

--- Fuel cell shelf

Sling
r-

|
ro
o

r_

Sling adapter _"

stment of ballance weights

Figure 4-9.- Hoist and sling arrangement - oxygen shelf.


calculated assuming a 2-inch drop only. The probability of tank damage
from this incident, therefore, is now considered to be rather low,
although it is possible that a loosely fitting fill tube could have
been displaced by the event.

The shelf passed these tests and was installed in SM 109 on


November 22, 1968. The shelf tests accomplished earlier in SM 106
were repeated in SM 109 in late December and early January, with no
significant problems, and SM 109 was shipped to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) in June of 1969 for further testing, assembly on the launch
vehicle, and launch.

TESTING AT KSC

At the Kennedy Space Center the CM and the SM were mated, checked,
assembled on the Saturn V launch vehicle, and the total vehicle was
moved to the launch pad.

The countdown demonstration test (CDDT) began on March 16, 1970.


Up to this point, nothing unusual about oxygen tank no. 2 had been
noted during the extensive testing at KSC. The oxygen tanks were
evacuated to 5mmHg followed by an oxygen pressure of about 80 psi.
After the cooling of the fuel cells, cryogenic oxygen loading and tank
pressurization to 331 psi were completed without abnormalities. At the
time during CDDT when the oxygen tanks are normally partially emptied
to about 50 percent of capacity, oxygen tank no. 1 behaved normally,
but oxygen tank no. 2 only went down to 92 percent of its capacity.
The normal procedure during CDDT to reduce the quantity in the tank is
to apply gaseous oxygen at 80 psi through the vent line and to open
the fill line. When this procedure failed, it was decided to proceed
with the CDDT until completion and then look at the oxygen detanking
problem in detail. An Interim Discrepancy Report was written and
transferred to a Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Discrepancy Report,
since a GSE filter was suspected.

On Friday, March 27, 1970, detanking operations were resumed, after


discussions of the problem had been held with KSC, MSC, NR, and Beech
personnel participating, either personally or by telephone. As a first
step, oxygen tank no. 2, which had self-pressurized to 178 psi and was
about 83 percent full, was vented through its fill line. The quantity
decreased to 65 percent. Further discussions between KSC, MSC, NR,
and Beech personnel considered thatthe problem might be due to a leak
in the path between the fill line and the quantity probe due to loose
fit in the sleeves and tube. Referring to figure _-2, it will be noted
that such a leak would allow the gaseous oxygen (G0X) being supplied
to the vent line to leak directly to the fill line without forcing any

4-21
significant amount of LOXout of the tank. At this point, a discrep-
ancy report against the spacecraft system was written.

A "normal" detanking procedure was then conducted on both oxygen


tanks, pressurizing through the vent line and opening the fill lines.
Tank no. 1 emptied in a few minutes. Tank no. 2 did not. Additional
attempts were madewith higher pressures without effect, and a decision
was madeto try to "boil off" the remaining oxygen in tank no. 2 by
use of the tank heaters. The heaters were energized with the 65 V tic.
GSEpower supply, and, about l-l/2 hours later, the fans were turned
on to add more heat and mixing. After 6 hours of heater operation,
the quantity had only decreased to 35 percent, and it was decided to
attempt a pressure cycling technique. With the heaters and fans still
energized, the tank was pressurized to about 300 psi, held for a few
minutes, and then vented through the fill line. The first cycle
produced a 7-percent quantity decrease, and the process was continued,
with the tank emptied after five pressure/vent cycles. The fans and
heaters were turned off after about 8 hours of heater operation.

Suspecting the loosely fitting fill line connection to the quantity


probe inner cylinder, KSCpersonnel consulted with cognizant personnel
at MSCand at NRand decided to test whether the oxygen tank no. 2
could be filled without problems. It was decided that if the tank could
be filled, the leak in the fill line would not be a problem in flight,
since it was felt that even a loose tube resulting in an electrical
short between the capacitance plates of the quantity gage would result
in an energy level too low to cause any other damage.

Replacement of the oxygen shelf in the CMwould have been difficult


and would have taken at least 45 hours. In addition, shelf replacement
would have had the potential of damaging or degrading other elements of
the SMin the course of replacement activity. Therefore, the decision
was madeto test the ability to fill oxygen tank no. 2 on March 30,
1970, twelve days prior to the scheduled Saturday, April ll, launch,
so as to be in a position to decide on shelf replacement well before
the launch date.

Accordingly, flow tests with G0Xwere run on oxygen tank no. 2


and on oxygen tank no. 1 for comparison. No problems were encountered,
and the flow rates in the two tanks were similar. In addition, Beech
was asked to test the electrical energy level reached in the event of
a short circuit between plates of the quantity probe capacitance gage.
This test showedthat very low energy levels would result. On the
filling test, oxygen tanks no. 1 and no. 2 were filled with LOXto
about 20 percent of capacity on March 30 with no difficulty. Tank no. 1
emptied in the normal manner, but emptying oxygen tank no. 2 again
required pressure cycling with the heaters turned on.

4-22
As the launch date approached, the oxygen tank no. 2 detanking
problem was considered by the Apollo organization. At this point,
the "shelf drop" incident on October 21, 1968, at NRwas not considered
and it was felt that the apparently normal detanking which had occurred
in 1967 at Beechwas not pertinent because it was believed that a
different procedure was used by Beech. In fact, however, the last
portion of the procedure was quite similar, although a slightly lower
G0Xpressure was utilized.

Throughout these considerations, which involved technical and


managementpersonnel of KSC,MSC,NR, Beech, and NASAHeadquarters,
emphasiswas directed toward the possibility and consequencesof a loose
fill tube; very little attention was paid to the extended operation of
heaters and fans except to note that they apparently operated during
and after the detanking sequences.

Many of the principals in the discussions were not aware of the


extended heater operations. Those that did know the details of the
procedure did not consider the possibility of damagedue to excessive
heat within the tank, and therefore did not advise managementofficials
of any possible consequencesof the unusually long heater operations.

As noted earlier in this chapter, and shownin figure 4-2, each


heater is protected with a thermostatic switch, mounted on the heater
tube, which is intended to open the heater circuit when it senses a
temperature of 80° F. In tests conducted at MSCsince the accident,
however, it was found that the switches failed to open when the
heaters were powered from a 65 V dc supply similar to the power used
at KSCduring the detanking sequence. Subsequentinvestigations have
shown that the thermostatic switches used, while rated as satisfactory
for the 28 V dc spacecraft power supply, could not open properly at
65 V tic. Qualification and test procedures for the heater assemblies
and switches do not at any time test the capability of the switches
to open while under full current conditions. A review of the voltage
recordings made during the detanking at KSCindicates that, in fact,
the switches did not open when the temperature indication from within
the tank rose past 80° F. Further tests have shown that the tempera-
tures on the heater tube may have reached as much as 1000° F during
the detanking. This temperature will cause serious damageto adjacent
Teflon insulation, and such damagealmost certainly occurred.

None of the above, however, Wasknown at the time and, after


extensive consideration was given to all possibilities of damagefrom
a loose fill tube, it was decided to leave the oxygen shelf and oxygen
tank no. 2 in the SMand to proceed with preparations for the launch
of Apollo 13.

4-23
.. The manufacture and test history of oxygen tank no. 2 is discussed
in more detail in Appendix C to this report.

4-24
PART 3. THE APOLLO 13 FLIGHT

The Apollo 13 mission was designed to perform the third manned


lunar landing. The selected site was in the hilly uplands of the Fra
Mauro formation. A package of five scientific experiments was planned
for emplacement on the lunar surface near the lunar module (LM) landing
point: (1) a lunar passive seismometer to measure and relay meteoroid
impact and moonquakes and to serve as the second point in a seismic net
begun with the Apollo 12 seismometer; (2) a heat flow device for measur-
ing the heat flux from the lunar interior to the surface and surface
material conductivity to a depth of 3 meters; (3) a charged-particle
lunar environment experiment for measuring solar wind proton and electron
effects on the lunar environment; (4) a cold cathode gage for measuring
density and temperature variations in the lunar atmosphere; and (5) a
dust detector experiment.

Additionally, the Apollo 13 landing crew was to gather the third


set of selenological samples of the lunar surface for return to earth
for extensive scientific analysis. Candidate future landing sites were
scheduled to be photographed from lunar orbit with a high-resolution
topographic camera carried aboard the command module.

During the week prior to launch, backup Lunar Module Pilot Charles
M. Duke, Jr., contracted rubella. Blood tests were performed to deter-
mine prime crew immunity, since Duke had been in close contact with the
prime crew. These tests determined that prime Commander James A. Lovell
and prime Lunar Module Pilot Fred Haise were immune to rubella, but that
prime Command Module Pilot Thomas K. Mattingly III did not have immunity.
Consequently, following 2 days of intensive simulator training at the
Kennedy Space Center, backup Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr.,
was substituted in the prime crew to replace Mattingly. Swigert had
trained for several months with the backup crew, and this additional
work in the simulators was aimed toward integrating him into the prime
crew so that the new combination of crewmen could function as a team
during the mission.

Launch was on time at 2:13 p.m., e.s.t., on April ll, 1970, from the
KSC Launch Complex 39A. The spacecraft was inserted into a lO0-nautical-
mile circular earth orbit. The only significant launch phase anomaly was
premature shutdown of the center engine of the S-II second stage. As a
result, the remaining four S-II engines burned 34 seconds longer than
planned and the S-IVB third stage burned a few seconds longer than plan-
ned. At orbital insertion, the velocity was within 1.2 feet per second
of the planned velocity. Moreover, an adequate propellant margin was
maintained in the S-IVB for the translunar injection burn.

4-25
Orbital insertion was at 00:12:39 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.).
The initial one and one-half earth orbits before translunar injection
(TLI) were spent in spacecraft systems checkout and included television
transmissions as Apollo 13 passed over the Merritt Island Launch Area,
Florida, tracking station.

The S-IVB restarted at 02:35:46 g.e.t, for the translunar injection


burn, with shutdown coming some5 minutes 51 seconds later. Accuracy of
the Saturn V instrument unit guidance for the TLI burn was such that a
planned midcourse correction maneuverat 11:41:23 g.e.t, was not neces-
sary. After TLI, Apollo 13 was calculated to be on a free-return trajec-
tory with a predicted closest approach to the lunar surface of 210
nautical miles.

The CSMwas separated from the S-IVB about 3 hours after launch,
and after a brief period of stationkeeping, the crew maneuveredthe CSM
to dock with the LMvehicle in the LM adapter atop the S-IVB stage. The
S-IVB stage was separated from the docked CSMand LM shortly after 4
hours into the mission.

In mannedlunar missions prior to Apollo 13, the spent S-IVB third


stages were accelerated into solar orbit by a "slingshot" maneuver in
which residual liquid oxygen was dumpedthrough the J-2 engine to pro-
vide propulsive energy. On Apollo 13, the plan was to impact the S-IVB
stage on the lunar surface in proximity to the seismometer emplaced in
the Oceanof Storms by the crew of Apollo 12.

Two hours after TLI, the S-IVB attitude thrusters were ground com-
mandedon to adjust the stage's trajectory toward the designated impact
at latitude 3° S. by longitude 30° W. Actual impact was at latitude
2.4 ° S. by longitude 27.9° W.--74 nautical miles from the Apollo 12
seismometer and well within the desired range. Impact was at 77:56:40
g.e.t. Seismic signals relayed by the Apollo 12 seismometer as the
30,700-pound stage hit the Moonlasted almost 4 hours and provided lunar
scientists with additional data on the structure of the Moon.

As in previous lunar missions, the Apollo 13 spacecraft was set up


in the passive thermal control (PTC) modewhich calls for a continuous
roll rate of three longitudinal axis revolutions each hour. During crew
rest periods and at other times in translunar and transearth coast when
a stable attitude is not required, the spacecraft is placed in PTCto
stabilize the thermal response by spacecraft structures and systems.

At 30:40:49 g.e.t., a midcourse correction maneuverwas madeusing


the service module propulsion system. The crew preparations for the
burn and the burn itself were monitored by the Mission Control Center
(MMC)at MSCby telemetered data and by television from the spacecraft.
This midcourse correction maneuverwas a 23.2 feet per second hybrid

4-26
transfer burn which took Apollo 13 off a free-return trajectory and
placed it on a non-free-return trajectory. A similar trajectory had been
flown on Apollo 12. The objective of leaving a free-return trajectory
is to control the arrival time at the Moonto insure the proper lighting
conditions at the landing site. Apollo 8, 10, and ll flew a pure free-
return trajectory until lunar orbit insertion. The Apollo 13 hybrid
transfer maneuverlowered the predicted closest approach, or pericyn-
thion, altitude at the Moonfrom 210 to 64 nautical miles.

From launch through the first 46 hours of the mission, the perform-
ance of oxygen tank no. 2 was normal, so far as telemetered data and
crew observations indicate. At 46:40:02, the crew turned on the fans in
oxygen tank no. 2 as a routine operation. Within 3 seconds, the oxygen
tank no. 2 quantity indication changed from a normal reading of about
82 percent full to an obviously incorrect reading "off-scale high," of
over 100 percent. Analysis of the electrical wiring of the quantity gage
shows that this erroneous reading could be caused by either a short cir-
cuit or an open circuit in the gage wiring or a short circuit between
the gage plates. Subsequentevents indicated that a short was the more
likely failure mode.

At 47:54:50 and at 51:07:44, the oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned
on again, with no apparent adverse effects. The quantity gage continued
to read off-scale high.

Following a rest period, the Apollo 13 crew began preparations for


activating and powering up the LM for checkout. At 53:27 g.e.t., the
Commander (CMR)and Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) were cleared to enter the
LM to commenceinflight inspection of the LM. Groundtests before launch
had indicated the possibility of a high heat-leak rate in the LM descent
stage supercritical helium tank. Crew verification of actual pressures
found the helium pressure to be within normal limits. Supercritical
helium is stored in the LM for pressurizing propellant tanks.

The LMwas powered down and preparations were underway to close the
LMhatch and run through the presleep checklist when the accident in
oxygen tank no. 2 occurred.

At 55:52:30 g.e.t., a master alarm on the CMcaution and warning


system alerted the crew to a low pressure indication in the cryogenic
hydrogen tank no. 1. This tank had reached the low end of its normal
operating pressure range several times previously during the flight.
At 55:52:58, flight controllers in the MCCrequested the crew to turn
on the cryogenic system fans and heaters.

The Command Module Pilot (CMP)acknowledgedthe fan cycle request


at 55:53:06 g.e.t., and data indicate that current was applied to the
oxygen tank no. 2 fan motors at 55:53:20.

4-27

ILl ]LJ:- L E L: L L: L. L: u n n z L L L
About l-l/2 minutes later, at 55:54:53.555, telemetry from the
spacecraft was lost almost totally for 1.8 seconds. During the period
of data loss, the caution and warning system alerted the crew to a low
voltage condition on dc main bus B. At about the same time, the crew
heard a loud "bang" and realized that a problem existed in the
spacecraft.

The events between fan turnon at 55:53:20 and the time when the
problem was evident to the crew and Mission Control are covered in some
detail in Part 4 of this chapter, "Summary Analysis of the Accident."
It is now clear that oxygen tank no. 2 or its associated tubing lost
pressure integrity because of combustion within the tank, and that ef-
fects of oxygen escaping from the tank caused the removal of the panel
covering bay 4 and a relatively slow leak in oxygen tank no. i or its
lines or valves. Photos of the SM taken by the crew later in the mis-
sion show the panel missing, the fuel cells on the shelf above the
oxygen shelf tilted, and the high-gain antenna damaged.

The resultant loss of oxygen made the fuel cells inoperative, leav-
ing the CM with batteries normally used only during reentry as the sole
power source and with only that oxygen contained in a surge tank and
repressurization packages (used to repressurize the CM after cabin vent-
ing). The LM, therefore, became the only source of sufficient electri-
cal power and oxygen to permit safe return of the crew to Earth.

The various telemetered parameters of primary interest are shown


in figure 4-10 and listed in table 4-11.

4-28
e',:_',', !_'_ _l::t_4 _.

--_- t+-

d
o
¥ 0

0.)
+m_. i

b
I1)

O)

O)

:.i:ili:_2
I
c;
::=: :4: ,-4
!
.-=t

_0
oH

_,_
,_td:,!

N N
............... ,_ _E;_ _,_
o o_

I I I 1 I

_. =. _. =

Im,l Ji1_ I_ I III,I roll I" "_J I_I_ _rl:l

4-29
0_-_

Htiium la_ lJmi*r_url


AC_s I and 2v_ta_
Bay3 mWItzlr tank surfacm Ox_m rank I and 2 qulntlty, ten_afllt ure and pressure
Dc i_s A ancl II v_t_
t_ure
TABLE 4-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT

Time_ 6.e.t. Event

Events During 52 Seconds Prior to First Observed Abnormality

55:52:31 Master caution and warning triggered by low hydrogen


pressure in tank no. 1. Alarm is turned off after
4 seconds.

55:52:58 Ground requests tank stir.

55:53:06 Crew acknowledges tank stir.

55:53:18 Oxygen tank no. 1 fans on.

55:53:19 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure decreases 8 psi.

55:53:20 Oxygen tank no. 2 fans turned on.

55:53:20 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance


indicates a power transient.

55:53:21 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure decreases 4 psi.

Abnormal Events During 90 Seconds Preceding the Accident

55:53:22.718 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance


indicates a power transient.

55:53:22.757 1.2-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage.

55:53:22.772 ll.l-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one


sample.

55 :53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins rise lasting


for 24 seconds.

55:53:38.057 ll-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage for one


sample.

55:53:38.085 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance


indicates a power transient.

4-31
TABLE4-11.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGY
FROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT
- Continued

Time, g.e.t. Event

55:53:41.172 22.9-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one sample.

55:53:41.192 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance


indicates a power transient.

55:54:00 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise ends at a pressure


of 953.8 psia.

55:54:15 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise.

55:54:30 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity drops from full scale


for 2 seconds and then reads 75.3 percent.

55:54:31 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins to rise


rapidly.

55:54:43 Flow rate of oxygen to all three fuel cells begins


to decrease.

55:54:45 0xygen. tank no. 2 pressure reaches maximum value


of 1008.3 psia.

55:54:48 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature rises 40 ° F for one


sample (invalid reading).

55:54:51 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity Jumps to off-scale high


and then begins to drop until the time of telemetry
loss, indicating failed sensor.

55:54:52 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads -151.3 ° F.

55:54:52.7O3 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature suddenly goes off-


scale low, indicating failed sensor.

55:54:52.763 Last telemetered pressure from oxygen tank no. 2


before telemetry loss is 995.7 psia.

55:54:53.182 Sudden accelerometer activity on X, Y, and Z axes.

55:5_:53.220 Stabilization control system body rate changes


begin.

4-52
TABLE 4-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Continued

Time, _. e. t. Event

55:54:53.323 Oxygen tank no. i pressure drops h.2 psi.

55:54:53.5 2.8-amp rise in total fuel cell current.

55:54:53.542 X, Y, and Z accelerations in CM indicate 1.17g,


0.65g and 0.65g, respectively.

1.8-Second Data Loss

55:54:53.555 Loss of telemetry begins.

55:54:53.555+ Master caution and warning triggered by dc main


bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 6
seconds. All indications are that the cryogenic
oxygen tank no. 2 lost pressure in this time period
and the panel separated.

55:54:54.741 Nitrogen pressure in fuel cell 1 is off-scale low


indicating failed sensor.

55:54:55.35 Recovery of telemetry data.

Events During 5 Minutes Following the Accident

55:54:56 Service propulsion system engine valve body tempera-


ture begins a rise of 1.65 ° F in 7 seconds.

55:54:56 Dc main bus A decreases 0.9 volt to 28.5 volts and


dc main bus B decreases 0.9 volt to 29.0 volts.

55:5h:56 Total fuel cell current is 15 amps higher than the


final value before telemetry loss. High current
continues for 19 seconds.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads off-scale high


after telemetry recovery, probably indicating failed
s ens ors.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads off-scale low fol-


lowing telemetry recovery, indicating a broken supply
line, a tank pressure below 19 psi, or a failed sensor.

4-33
. TABLE4-II.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGY
FROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT
- Continued

Time s g.e.t. Event

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. I pressure reads 781.9 psia and


begins to drop steadily.

55:54:57 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity reads off-scale high


following telemetry recovery indicating failed sensor.

55:54:59 The reaction control system helium tank C temperature


begins a 1.66 ° F increase in 36 seconds.

55:55:01 Oxygen flow rates to fuel cells i and 3 approached


zero after decreasing for 7 seconds.

55:55:02 The surface temperature of the service module oxi-


dizer tank in bay 3 begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a
15-second period.

55:55:02 The service propulsion system helium tank temperature


begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a 32-second period.

55:55:09 Dc main bus A voltage recovers to 29.0 volts; dc


main bus B recovers to 28.8 volts.

55:55:20 Crew reports, "I believe we've had a problem here."

55:55:35 Crew reports, "We've had a main B bus undervolt."

55:55:29 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins steady drop


lasting 59 seconds, probably indicating failed sensor.

55:56:10 Crew reports, "Okay right now, Houston. The voltage


is looking good, and we had a pretty large bang
associated with the caution and warning there. And
as I recall, main B was the one that had had an amp
spike on it once before."

55:56:38 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity becomes erratic for 69


seconds before assuming an off-scale-low state,
indicating failed sensor.

4-34
TABLE 4-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Concluded

Time, g. e. t. Event

55:57:04 Crew reports, "That jolt must have rocked the


sensor on--see now--oxygen quantity 2. It was
oscillating down around 20 to 60 percent. Now
it's full-scale high again."

55:57:39 Master caution and warning triggered by dc main


bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in
6 seconds.

55:57:40 Dc main bus B drops below 26.25 volts and continues


to fall rapidly.

55:57:44 Ac bus 2 fails within 2 seconds

55:57:45 Fuel cell 3 fails.

55:57:59 Fuel cell 1 current begins to decrease.


/

55:58:02 Master caution and warning caused by ac bus 2


being reset. Alarm is turned off after 2 seconds.

55:58:06 Master caution and warning triggered by dc main


bus A undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 13
seconds.

55:58:07 Dc main bus A drops below 26.25 volts and in the


next few seconds levels off at 25.5 volts.

55:58:07 Crew reports, "ac 2 is showing zip."

55:58:25 Crew reports, "Yes, we got a main bus A undervolt


now, too, showing. It's reading about 25-1/2.
Main B is reading zip right now."

56:00:06
Master caution and warning triggered by high hydrogen
flow rate to fuel cell 2. Alarm is turned off in
2 seconds.

4-35

1/ N E '" L L L '
PART 4. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

Combustion in oxygen tank no. 2 led to failure of that tank, damage


to oxygen tank no. i or its lines or valves adjacent to tank no. 2,
removal of the bay 4 panel and, through the resultant loss of all three
fuel cells, to the decision to abort the Apollo 13 mission. In the
attempt to determine the cause of ignition in oxygen tank no. 2, the
course of propagation of the combustion, the mode of tank failure, and
the way in which subsequent damage occurred, the Board has carefully
sifted through all available evidence and examined the results of spe-
cial tests and analyses conducted by the Apollo organization and by or
for the Board after the accident. (For more information on details of
mission events, design, manufacture and test of the system, and special
tests and analyses conducted in this investigation, refer to Appendices
B, C, D, E, and F of this report.)

Although tests and analyses are continuing, sufficient information


is now available to provide a reasonably clear picture of the nature of
the accident and the events which led up to it. It is now apparent that
the extended heater operation at KSC damaged the insulation on wiring
in the tank and thus made the wiring susceptible to the electrical short
circuit which probably initiated combustion within the tank. While the
exact point of initiation of combustion may never be known with cer-
tainty, the nature of the occurrence is sufficiently understood to per-
mit taking corrective steps to prevent its recurrence.

The Board has identified the most probable failure mode.

The following discussion treats the accident in its key phases:


initiation, propagation of combustion, loss of oxygen tank no. 2 system
integrity, and loss of oxygen tank no. i system integrity.

INITIATION

Key Data

55:53:20* Oxygen tank no. 2 fans turned on.

55:53:22.757 1.2-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage.

*In evaluating telemetry data, consideration must be given to the


fact that the Apollo pulse code modulation (PCM) system samples data in
time and quantitizes in amplitude. For further information, reference
may be made to Part B7 of Appendix B.

4-56
55:53:22.772 ll.l-ampere "spike" recorded in fuel cell 3 current
followed by drop in current and rise in voltage typ-
ical of removal of power from one fan motor--indicat-
ing opening of motor circuit.

55:53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise.

The evidence points strongly to an electrical short circuit with


arcing as the initiating event. About 2.7 seconds after the fans were
turned on in the SM oxygen tanks, an ll.l-ampere current spike and
simultaneously a voltage-drop spike were recorded in the spacecraft
electrical system. Immediately thereafter, current drawn from the fuel
cells decreased by an amount consistent with the loss of power to one
fan. No other changes in spacecraft power were being made at the time.
No power was on the heaters in the tanks at the time and the quantity
gage and temperature sensor are very low power devices. The next anom-
alous event recorded was the beginning of a pressure rise in oxygen
tank no. 2, 13 seconds later. Such a time lag is possible with low-
level combustion at the time. These facts point to the likelihood that
an electrical short circuit with arcing occurred in the fan motor or its
leads to initiate the accident sequence. The energy available from the
short circuit was probably iO to 20 joules. Tests conducted during
this investigation have shown that this energy is more than ade-
quate to ignite Teflon of the type contained within the tank. (The
quantity gage in oxygen tank no. 2 had failed at 46:40 g.e.t. There
is no evidence tying the quantity gage failure directly to accident
initiation, particularly in view of the very low energy available
from the gage.)

This likelihood of electrical initiation is enhanced by the high


probability that the electrical wires within the tank were damaged dur-
ing the abnormal detanking operation at KSC prior to launch.

Furthermore, there is no evidence pointing to any other mechanism


of initiation.

PROPAGATION OF COMBUSTION

Key Data

55:53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins rise (same event


noted previously).

55:53:38.057 ll-volt decrease recorded in ac bus 2 voltage.

4-37

N N E '
L L L: L h L N_ 1: L,: L: Lt n J..: L .
55:53:41.172 22.9-ampere "spike" recorded in fuel cell 3 current,
followed by drop in current and rise in voltage typ-
ical of one fan motor -- indicating opening of another
motor circuit.

55:54:00 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure levels off at 954 psia.

55:54:15 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise again.

55:54:30 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage reading drops from


full scale (to which it had failed at 46:40 g.e.t.)
to zero and then read 75-percent full. This behav-
ior indicates the gage short circuit may have cor-
rected itself.

55:54:31 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins to rise rapidly.

55:54:45 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reading reaches maximum


recorded value of 1008 psia.

55:54:52.763 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reading had dropped to


996 psia.

The available evidence points to a combustion process as the cause


of the pressure and temperature increases recorded in oxygen tank no. 2.
The pressure reading for oxygen tank no. 2 began to increase about 13
seconds after the first electrical spike, and about 55 seconds later the
temperature began to increase. The temperature sensor reads local tem-
perature, which need not represent bulk fluid temperature. Since the
rate of pressure rise in the tank indicates a relatively slow propaga-
tion of burning, it is likely that the region immediately around the
temperature sensor did not become heated until this time.

There are materials within the tank that can, if ignited in the
presence of supercritical oxygen, react chemically with the oxygen in
exothermic chemical reactions. The most readily reactive is Teflon
used for electrical insulation in the tank. Also potentially reactive
are metals, particularly aluminum. There is more than sufficient Tef-
lon in the tank, if reacted with oxygen, to account for the pressure and
temperature increases recorded. Furthermore, the pressure rise took
place over a period of more than 69 seconds, a relatively long period,
and one which would be more likely characteristic of Teflon combustion
than metal-oxygen reactions.

While the data available on the combustion of Teflon in supercrit-


ical oxygen in zero-g are extremely limited, those which are available
indicate that the rate of combustion is generally consistent with these

4-38
observations. The cause of the 15-second period of relatively constant
pressure first indicated at 55:53:59.763 has not been precisely deter-
mined; it is believed to be associated with a change in reaction rate as
combustion proceeded through various Teflon elements.

While there is enough electrical power in the tank to cause ignition


in the event of a short circuit or abnormal heating in defective wire_
there is not sufficient electric power to account for all of the energy
required to produce the observed pressure rise.

LOSSOF OXYGEN
TANKNO. 2 SYSTEM
INTEGRITY

Key Data

55:54:52 Last valid temperature indication (-151 ° F) from


oxygen tank no. 2.

55:54:52.763 Last pressure reading from oxygen tank no. 2 before


loss of data--996 psia.

55:54:53.182 Sudden accelerometer activity on X_ Y, and Z axes.

55:54:53.220 Stabilization control system body rate changes begin.

55:54:53.555* Loss of telemetry data begins.

55:54:55.35 Recovery of telemetry data.

55:54:56 Various temperature indications in SM begin slight


rises.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads off-scale high.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads off-scale low.

After the relatively slow propagation process described above took


place, there was a relatively abrupt loss of oxygen tank no. 2 integ-
rity. About 69 seconds after the pressure began to rise, it reached the
peak recorded, 1008 psia, the pressure at which the cryogenic oxygen
tank relief valve is designed to be fully open. Pressure began a decrease
for 8 seconds, dropping to 996 psia before readings were lost. Virtually

*Several bits of data have been obtained from this "loss of teleme-
try data" period.

4-39
all signals from the spacecraft were lost about 1.85 seconds after the
last presumably valid reading from within the tank, a temperature read-
ing, and 0.8 second after the last presumably valid pressure reading
(which may or may not reflect the pressure within the tank itself since
the pressure transducer is about 20 feet of tubing length distant).
Abnormal spacecraft accelerations were recorded approximately 0.22 sec-
ond after the last pressure reading and approximately 0.38 second before
the loss of signal. These facts all point to,a relatively sudden loss
of integrity. At about this time, several solenoid valves_ including
the oxygen valves feeding two of the three fuel cells, were shocked to
the closed position. The "bang" reported by the crew also probably
occurred in this time period. Telemetry signals from Apollo 13 were
lost for a period of 1.8 seconds. When signal was reacquired, all instru-
ment indicators from oxygen tank no. 2 were off-scale, high or low. Tem-
peratures recorded by sensors in several different locations in the SM
showed slight increases in the several seconds following reacquisition
of signal. Photographs taken later by the Apollo 13 crew as the SM was
jettisoned show that the bay 4 panel was ejected, undoubtedly during
this event.

Data are not adequate to determine precisely the way in which the
oxygen tank no. 2 system lost its integrity. However, available infor-
mation, analyses, and tests performed during this investigation indicate
that most probably the combustion within the pressure vessel ultimately
led to localized heating and failure at the pressure vessel closure. It
is at this point, the upper end of the quantity probe, that the 1/2-inch
Inconel conduit is located, through which the Teflon-insulated wires
enter the pressure vessel. It is likely that the combustion progressed
along the wire insulation and reached this location where all of the
wires come together. This, possibly augmented by ignition of the metal
in the upper end of the probe, led to weakening and failure of the
closure or the conduit, or both.

Failure at this point would lead immediately to pressurization of


the tank dome, which is equipped with a rupture disc rated at about 75
psi. Rupture of this disc or of the entire dome would then release
oxygen, accompanied by combustion products, into bay 4. The accelera-
tions recorded were probably caused by this release.

Release of the oxygen then began to pressurize the oxygen shelf


space of bay 4. If the hole formed in the pressure vessel were large
enough and formed rapidly enough, the escaping oxygen alone would be
adequate to blow off the bay 4 panel. However, it is also quite possi-
ble that the escape of oxygen was accompanied by combustion of Mylar and
Kapton (used extensively as thermal insulation in the oxygen shelf com-
partment, figure 4-11, and in the tank dome) which would augment the

4-40
4-11.-
Figure X_-_X_ Closeup view of oxygen tank shelf.

4-41

N N L. ,. ,.....
M_
pressure caused by the oxygen itself. The slight temperature increases
recorded at various SM locations indicate that combustion external to
the tank probably took place. Further testing may shed additional light
on the exact mechanism of panel ejection. The ejected panel then struck
the high-gain antenna, disrupting communications from the spacecraft for
the 1.8 seconds.

LOSS OF OXYGEN TANK NO. i INTEGRITY

Key Data

55:54:53.323 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure drops 4 psia (from 883 psia
to 879 psia).

55:54:53.555 to Loss of telemetry data.


55:54:55.35

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure reads 782 psia and drops
steadily. Pressure drops over a period of 130 min-
utes to the point at which it was insufficient to
sustain operation of fuel cell no. 2.

There is no clear evidence of abnormal behavior associated with


oxygen tank no. 1 prior to loss of signal, although the one data bit
(4 psi) drop in pressure in the last tank no. 1 pressure reading prior
to loss of signal may indicate that a problem was beginning. Immediately
after signal strength was regained, data show that tank no. 1 system had
lost its integrity. Pressure decreases were recorded over a period of
approximately 130 minutes, indicating that a relatively slow leak had
developed in the tank no. 1 system. Analysis has indicated that the
leak rate is less than that which would result from a completely rup-
tured line, but could be consistent with a partial line rupture or a
leaking check or relief valve.

Since there is no evidence that there was any anomalous condition


arising within oxygen tank no. l, it is presumed that "the loss of oxygen
tank no. 1 integrity resulted from the oxygen tank no. 2 system failure.
The relatively sudden, and possibly violent, event associated with loss
of integrity of the oxygen tank no. 2 system could have ruptured a line
to oxygen tank no. l, or have caused a valve to leak because of mechani-
cal shock.

Preceding
pageblank
4-43
PART 5. APOLLO 13 RECOVERY

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM

In the period immediately following the caution and warning alarm


for main bus B undervoltage, and the associated "bang" reported by the
crew, the cause of the difficulty and the degree of its seriousness
were not apparent.

The i. 8-second loss of telemetered data was accompanied by the


switching of the CSM high-gain antenna mounted on the SM adjacent to
bay 4 from narrow beam width to wide beam width. The high-gain antenna
does this automatically 200 milliseconds after its directional lock on
the ground signal has been lost.

A confusing factor was the repeated firings of various SM attitude


control thrusters during the period after data loss. In all probability,
these thrusters were being fired to overcome the effects that oxygen
venting and panel blowoff were having on spacecraft attitude, but it
was believed for a time that perhaps the thrusters were malfunctioning.

The failure of oxygen tank no. 2 and consequent removal of the bay 4
panel produced a shock which closed valves in the oxygen supply lines to
fuel cells 1 and 3. These fuel cells ceased to provide power in about 3
minutes, when the supply of oxygen between the closed valves and the
cells was depleted. Fuel cell 2 continued to power ac bus 1 through dc
main bus A, but the failure of fuel cell 3 left dc main bus B and ac
bus 2 unpowered (see fig. 4-12). The oxygen tank no. 2 temperature and
quantity gages were connected to ac bus 2 at the time of the accident.
Thus, these parameters could not be read once fuel cell 3 failed at
55:57:44 until power was applied to ac bus 2 from main bus A.

The crew was not alerted to closure of the oxygen feed valves to
fuel cells 1 and 3 because the valve position indicators in the CM were
arranged to give warning only if both the oxygen and hydrogen valves
closed. The hydrogen valves remained open. The crew had not been
alerted to the oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise or to its subsequent drop
because a hydrogen tank low pressure warning had blocked the cryogenic
subsystem portion of the caution and warning system several minutes be-
fore the accident.

When the crew heard the bang and got the master alarm for low dc
main bus B voltage, the Commander was in the lower equipment bay of the
command module, stowing a television camera which had Just been in use.

4-4
Fuel cell
1

DC main A AC bus i l
Fuel cell
2
r

-L-
I

%I1

Fuel cell
J DC main B : 2 AC bus 2
3 II l Inverter

I I
m
Cryo 0 2
tank 2
pressure
gage
Cryo 0 2
tank 2
fan
Cryo 0 2
tank 2
quantity,
temperature
gages
[ SCS
telemetry
channels

Figure 4-12.- Electrical configuration at 55:54:53 g.e.t.

it.
The Lunar Module Pilot was in the tunnel between the CSMand the LM,
returning to the CSM. The Command Module Pilot was in the left-hand
couch, monitoring spacecraft performance. Because of the master alarm
indicating low voltage, the CMPmovedacross to the right-hand couch
where CSMvoltages can be observed. He reported that voltages were
"looking good" at 55:56:10. At this time, main bus B had recovered and
fuel cell 3 did not fail for another l-l/2 minutes. He also reported
fluctuations in the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity, followed by a return
to the off-scale high position. (See fig. 4-13 for CMpanel arrange-
ment).

Whenfuel cells 1 and 3 electrical output readings went to zero,


the ground controllers could not be certain that the cells had not some-
howbeen disconnected from their respective busses and were not otherwise
all right. Attention continued to be focused on electrical problems.
Five minutes after the accident, controllers asked the crew to
connect fuel cell 3 to dc main bus B in order to be sure that the config-
uration was known. Whenit was realized that fuel cells 1 and 3 were
not functioning, the crew was directed to perform an emergencypowerdown
to lower the load on the remaining fuel cell. Observing the rapid decay
in oxygen tank no. 1 pressure, controllers asked the crew to switch power
to the oxygen tank no. 2 instrumentation. Whenthis was done, and it
was realized that oxygen tank no. 2 had failed, the extreme seriousness
of the situation became clear.

During the succeeding period, efforts were madeto save the remain-
ing oxygen in the oxygen tank no. 1. Several attempts were made, but
had no effect. The pressure continued to decrease.

It was obvious by about l-l/2 hours after the accident that the
oxygen tank no. 1 leak could not be stopped and that shortly it would be
necessary to use the LM as a "lifeboat" for the remainder of the mission.

By 58:40 g.e.t., the LMhad been activated, the inertial guidance


reference transferred from the CSMguidance system to the LM guidance
system, and the CSMsystems were turned off.

RETURN
TOEARTH

The remainder of the mission was characteriz_ d by two main activ-


ities--planning and conducting the necessary propulsion maneuvers to
return the spacecraft to Earth, and managing the use of consumables in
such a way that the LM, which is designed for a basic mission with two
crewmenfor a relatively short duration, could support three men and serve
as the actual control vehicle for the time required.

4-46

ILl L L
One significant anomaly was noted during the remainder of the
mission. At about 97 hours 14 minutes into the mission, the IAfP
reported hearing a "thump" and observing venting from the LM. Subsequent
data review shows that the LM electrical power system experienced a
brief but major abnormal current flow at that time. There is no evidence
E that this anomaly was related to the accident. Analysis by the Apollo
organization is continuing.

A number of propulsion options were developed and considered. It


was necessary to return the spacecraft to a free-return trajectory and
to make any required midcourse corrections. Normally, the service pro-
pulsion system (SPS) in the SM would be used for such maneuvers. How-
ever, because of the high electrical power requirements for using that
engine, and in view of its uncertain condition and the uncertain nature
of the structure of the SM after the accident, it was decided to use
the LM descent engine if possible.

The minimum practical return time was 133 hours g.e.t, to the
Atlantic Ocean, and the maximum was 152 hours g.e.t, to the Indian
Ocean. Recovery forces were deployed in the Pacific. The return path
selected was for splashdown in the Pacific Ocean at 142:40 g.e.t. This
required a minimum of two burns of the LM descent engine. A third burn
was subsequently made to correct the normal maneuver execution variations
in the first two burns. One small velocity adjustment was also made with
reaction control system thrusters. All burns were satisfactory. Figures
4-14 and 4-15 depict the flight plan followed from the time of the acci-
dent to splashdown.

The most critical consumables were water, used to cool the CSM and
LM systems during use; CSM and LM battery power, the CSM batteries being
for use during reentry and the LM batteries being needed for the rest

[ of the mission;
filter cannisters
LM oxygen for breathing;
used to remove carbon
and lithium
dioxide
hydroxide
from the spacecraft
(Li0H)

cabin atmosphere. These consumables, and in particular the water and


LiOH cannisters, appeared to be extremely marginal in quantity shortly
after the accident, but once the LM was powered down to conserve electric
power and to generate less heat and thus use less water, the situation
improved greatly. Engineers at MSC developed a method which allowed the
crew to use materials on board to fashion a device allowing use of the
CM Li0H eannisters in the LM cabin atmosphere cleaning system (see
fig. 4-16). At splashdown, many hours of each consumable remained
U
available (see figs. 4-17 through 4-19 and table 4-111).

4-48
m ii

1:

I
_A_J

,i*];

ILl IJ E .2L
_Ad

iJ

Figure 4-13.- _in display panel.

4-47 fi
;tart of
problem
(55:55)
to
free-return
r_
(61:30)

F_
I

kO

MCC-5 ]
r_ MCC-2 PC + 2 hr
for entry for entry for Pacific
corridor corridor landing
(137:40) (105:18) (79:28)

Figure 4-14.- Translunar trajectory phase.


CM power up
G.E.T. 140:10

r_
MCC-7
G.E.T. 137:40
r
Entry altitude

P_
I
kJ3
0
_ G. E.T. 142:30

LM jettison
G.E.T. 141:30
L SM jettison
G.E.T. 138:01
LM power up
(3.E.T. 133:35

/--- Landing
G.E.T. 142:54

Figure 4-15.- Final trajectory phase.


r_

,
Figure 4-16.- Lithium hydroxide canister modification.

4-51
300

250

200

-k-
I
k.n
Po
r
Anomaly55:54
I LM jettison (141:30)
100 I I
I

r
!few
II
enters LM (57:43) I
I
I
Behind moon(77:09) I
50 II I
II I
I I
II I
II I
II I 28.2 Ibs remaining-
0 I I I I I I I I
50 60 70 80 90 I00 Ii0 120 130 140 150
Time, hours

Figure 4-17.- Usable remaining water.

r ..
....
j

•snqe_s saIq_mnsuoo ma_sXs _a_od leOI_Oal_ -'@I-_ a_L_I_

s_noq 'atoll

0_I ONI 0£I Ogl 011 001 06 08 OL 09 O_


II _ I I I I I I I I I II 0
I _ 5UlUlgLUa_S_udraw n'_OT I II
I; ......... I II

,I_
_ (60:L/) uoom pu,qa_ IllI -
', \ II
00t7

tTcj_;c_;,_l_zmouv _
>

i
(0£:It71)
_ 008
Lf_
uosq I
(I)
9_
E2-
m

3
00_I
--.

0091

O00g
70

60

50
r

40

e-
_J

>,
X
! o 30

Anomaly 55:54
I
r 2O I
ICrew enters LM (57:43) 28.53 Ibs
II remaining
I
10

0
-

50
I
II
II
II
II j
60
I
70
Behind moon (77:09)
j
I
I
I
I

i
80
_
90
I
i00
I
II0
i
120
LM jettison (141:30)

i
130
I
I
I
I
II
140
J 150

Time, hours

Figure _-19.- Usable remaining oxygen.


TABLE4-III.- CABINATMOSPHERE
CARBON
DIOXIDE
REMOVALBY LITHIUMHYDROXIDE

Requi re d 85 hours

Available in LM 53 hours

Available in CM 182 hours

A more detailed recounting of the events during the Apollo 13


launch countdown and mission will be found in Appendix B to this report.

4-55
This page left blank intentionally.

4-56

NASA-- MSC-- Coral., Houston, Texas


CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5-0
PART I. INTRODUCTION

The following findings, determinations, and recommendations are the


product of about 7 weeks of concentrated review of the Apollo 13 accident
by the Apollo 13 Review Board. They are based on that review, on the
accident investigation by the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) and its con-
tractors, and on an extensive series of special tests and analyses per-
formed by or for the Board and its Panels.

Sufficient work has been done to identify and understand the nature
of the malfunction and the direction which the corrective actions must
take. All indications are that an electrically initiated fire in oxygen
tank no. 2 in the service module (SM) was the cause of the accident. Ac-
cordingly, the Board has concentrated on this tank; on its design, manu-
facture, test, handling, checkout, use, failure mode, and eventual effects
on the rest of the spacecraft. The accident is generally understood, and
the most probable cause has been identified. However, at the time of this
report, some details of the accident are not completely clear.

Further tests and analyses, which will be carried out under the over-
all direction of MSC, will continue to generate new information relative
to this accident. It is possible that this evidence may lead to conclu-
sions differing in detail from those which can be drawn now. However, it
is most unlikely that fundamentally different results will be obtained.

Recommendations are provided as to the general direction which the


corrective actions should take. Significant modifications should be made
to the SM oxygen storage tanks and related equipments. The modified
hardware should go through a rigorous requalification test program. This
is the responsibility of the Apollo organization in the months ahead.

In reaching its findings, determinations, and recommendations, it was


necessary for the Board to review critically the equipment and the organi-
zational elements responsible for it. It was found that the accident was
not the result of a chance malfunction in a statistical sense, but rather
resulted from an unusual combination of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat
deficient and unforgiving design. In brief, this is what happened:

a. After assembly and acceptance testing, the oxygen tank no. 2


which flew on Apollo 13 was shipped from Beech Aircraft Corporation to
North American Rockwell (NR) in apparently satisfactory condition.

b. It is now known, however, that the tank contained two protective


thermostatic switches on the heater assembly, which were inadequate and
would subsequently fail during ground test operations at Kennedy Space
Center (KSC).

5-1
c. In addition, it is probable that the tank contained a loosely
fitting fill tube assembly. This assembly was probably displaced during
subsequent handling, which included an incident at the prime contractor's
plant in which the tank was jarred.

d. In itself, the displaced fill tube assembly was not particularly


serious, but it led to the use of improvised detanking procedures at KSC
which almost certainly set the stage for the accident.

e. Although Beech did not encounter any problem in detanking during


acceptance tests, it was not possible to detank oxygen tank no. 2 using
normal procedures at KSC. Tests and analyses indicate that this was due
to gas leakage through the displaced fill tube assembly.

f. The special detanking procedures at KSCsubjected the tank to an


extended period of heater operation and pressure cycling. These proce-
dures had not been used before, and the tank had not been qualified by
test for the conditions experienced. However, the procedures did not
violate the specifications which governed the operation of the heaters at
KSC.

g. In reviewing these procedures before the flight, officials of


NASA,NR, and Beech did not recognize the possibility of damagedue to
overheating. Many of these officials were not aware of the extended
heater operation. In any event, adequate thermostatic switches might
have been expected to protect the tank.

h. A number of factors contributed to the presence of inadequate


thermostatic switches in the heater assembly. The original 1962 specifi-
cations from NR to Beech Aircraft Corporation for the tank and heater
assembly specified the use of 28 V dc power, which is used in the space-
craft. In 1965, NRissued a revised specification which stated that the
heaters should use a 65 V dc power supply for tank pressurization; this
was the power supply used at KSCto reduce pressurization time. Beech
ordered switches for the Block II tanks but did not change the switch
specifications to be compatible with 65 V dc.

i. The thermostatic switch discrepancy was not detected by NASA,NR,


or Beech in their review of documentation, nor did tests identify the in-
compatibility of the switches with the ground support equipment (GSE)at
KSC, since neither qualification nor acceptance testing required switch
cycling under load as should have been done. It was a serious oversight
in which all parties shared.

j. The thermostatic switches could accommodatethe 65 V dc during


tank pressurization because they normally remained cool and closed. How-
ever, they could not open without damagewith 65 V dc power applied. They
were never required to do so until the special detanking. During this

5-2
procedure, as the switches started to open when they reached their upper
temperature limit, they were welded permanently closed by the resulting
arc and were rendered inoperative as protective thermostats.

k. Failure of the thermostatic switches to open could have been


detected at KSCif switch operation had been checked by observing heater
current readings on the oxygen tank heater control panel. Although it
was not recognized at that time_ the tank temperature readings indicated
that the heaters had reached their temperature limit and switch opening
should have beenexpected.
i. As shownby subsequent tests, failure of the thermostatic switches
probably permitted the temperature of the heater tube assembly to reach
about i000 ° F in spots during the continuous 8-hour period of heater
operation. Such heating has been shownby tests to severely damagethe
Teflon insulation on the fan motor wires in the vicinity of the heater
assembly. From that time on, including pad occupancy, the oxygen tank
no. 2 was in a hazardous condition when filled with oxygen and electri-
cally powered.
m. It was not until nearly 56 hours into the mission, however, that
the fan motor wiring, possibly movedby the fan stirring, short circuited
and ignited its insulation by meansof an electric arc. The resulting
combustion in the oxygen tank probably overheated and failed the wiring
conduit where it enters the tank_ and possibly a portion of the tank it-
self.

n. The rapid expulsion of high-pressure oxygen which followed,


possibly augmentedby combustion of insulation in the space surrounding
the tank, blew off the outer panel to bay 4 of the SM, caused a leak in
the high-pressure system of oxygen tank no. i, damagedthe high-gain an-
tenna, caused other miscellaneous damage, and aborted the mission.
The accident is judged to have been nearly catastrophic. Only out-
standing performance on the part of the crew, Mission Control, and other
membersof the team which supported the operations successfully returned
the crew to Earth.

In investigating the accident to Apollo 13, the Board has also


attempted to identify those additional technical and managementlessons
which can be applied to help assure the success of future space flight
missions; several recommendationsof this nature are included.

The Board recognizes that the contents of its report are largely of
a critical nature. The report highlights in detail faults or deficiencies
in equipment and procedures that the Board has identified. This is the
nature of a review board report.

5-3
It is important, however, to view the criticisms in this report in
a broader context. The Apollo spacecraft system is not without short-
comings, but it is the only system of its type ever built and success-
fully demonstrated. It has flown to the Moon five times and landed
twice. The tank which failed_ the design of which is criticized in this
report, is one of a series which had thousands of hours of successful
operation in space prior to Apollo 13.

While the team of designers, engineers_ and technicians that build


and operate the Apollo spacecraft also has shortcomings, the accomplish-
ments speak for themselves. By hardheaded self-criticism and continued
dedication_ this team can maintain this nation's preeminence in space.

5-4
PART 2. ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT

FAILURE OF OXYGEN TANK NO. 2

l. Findings

a. The Apollo 13 mission was aborted as the direct result of


the rapid loss of oxygen from oxygen tank no. 2 in the SM,
followed by a gradual loss of oxygen from tank no. i, and
a resulting loss of power from the oxygen-fed fuel cells.

b. There is no evidence of any forces external to oxygen tank


no. 2 during the flight which might have caused its failure.

Co Oxygen tank no. 2 contained materials, including Teflon and


aluminum, which if ignited will burn in supercritical
oxygen.

d.
Oxygen tank no. 2 contained potential ignition sources:
electrical wiring, unsealed electric motors, and rotating
aluminum fans.

e. During the special detanking of oxygen tank no. 2 following


the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) at KSC, the thermo-
static switches on the heaters were required to open while
powered by 65 V dc in order to protect the heaters from over-
heating. The switches were only rated at 30 V dc and have
been shown to weld closed at the higher voltage.

f.
Data indicate that in flight the tank heaters located in
oxygen tanks no. i and no. 2 operated normally prior to the
accident, and they were not on at the time of the accident.

g° The electrical circuit for the quantity probe would generate


only about 7 millijoules in the event of a short circuit and
the temperature sensor wires less than 3 millijoules per
second.

h.
Telemetry data izmnediately prior to the accident indicate
electrical disturbances of a character which would be caused
by short circuits accompanied by electrical arcs in the fan
motor or its leads in oxygen tank no. 2.

i.
The pressure and temperature within oxygen tank no. 2 rose
abnormally during the 1-1/2 minutes immediately prior to the
accident.

5-5
Determinations

(i) The cause of the failure of oxygen tank no. 2 was combustion
within the tank.

(2) Analysis showed that the electrical energy flowing into the
tank could not account for the observed increases in pressure
and temperature.

(3) The heater, temperature sensor, and quantity probe did not
initiate the accident sequence.

(4) The cause of the combustion was most probably the ignition
of Teflon wire insulation on the fan motor wires, caused by
electric arcs in this wiring.

The protective thermostatic switches on the heaters in


oxygen tank no. 2 failed closed during the initial portion
of the first special detanking operation. This subjected
the wiring in the vicinity of the heaters to very high tem-
peratures which have been subsequently shown to severely
degrade Teflon insulation.

(6) The telemetered data indicated electrical arcs of sufficient


energy to ignite the Teflon insulation, as verified by sub-
sequent tests. These tests also verified that the 1-ampere
fuses on the fan motors would pass sufficient energy to ig-
nite the insulation by the mechanism of an electric arc.

(7) The combustion of Teflon wire insulation alone could release


sufficient heat to account for the observed increases in
tank pressure and local temperature, and could locally over-
heat and fail the tank or its associated tubing. The possi-
bility of such failure at the top of the tank was demon-
strated by subsequent tests.

(8) The rate of flame propagation along Teflon-insulated wires


as measured in subsequent tests is consistent with the in-
dicated rates of pressure rise within the tank.

SECONDARY EFFECTS OF TANK FAILURE

o Findings

a. Failure of the tank was accompanied by several events in-


cluding:

5-6
A %ang" as heard by the crew.

Spacecraft motion as felt by the crew and as measured by


the attitude control system and the accelerometers in the
command module (CM).

Momentary loss of telemetry.

Closing of several valves by shock loading.

Loss of integrity of the oxygen tank no. i system.

Slight temperature increases in bay 4 and adjacent sectors


of the SM.

Loss of the panel covering bay 4 of the SM, as observed and


photographed by the crew.

Displacement of the fuel cells as photographed by the crew.

Damage to the high-gain antenna as photographed by the crew.

b ° The panel covering of bay 4 could be blown off by pressuri-


zation of the bay. About 25 psi of uniform pressure in bay 4
is required to blow off the panel.

Co The various bays and sectors of the SM are interconnected


with open passages so that all would be pressurized if any
one were supplied with a pressurant at a relatively slow
rate.

d. The CM attachments would be failed by an average pressure of


about i0 psi on the CM heat shield and this would separate
the CM from the SM.

Determinations

(1) Failure of the oxygen tank no. 2 caused a rapid local


pressurization of bay 4 of the SM by the high-pressure
oxygen that escaped from the tank. This pressure pulse may
have blown off the panel covering bay 4. This possibility
was substantiated by a series of special tests.

(2) The pressure pulse from a tank failure might have been
augmented by combustion of Mylar or Kapton insulation or
both when subjected to a stream of oxygen and hot particles
emerging from the top of the tank, as demonstrated in sub-
sequenttests.

5-7
(3) Combustion or vaporization of the Mylar or Kapton might
account for the discoloration of the SM engine nozzle as
observed and photographed by the crew.

(4) Photographs of the SM by the crew did not establish the


condition of the oxygen tank no. 2.

(5) The high-gain antenna damage probably resulted from striking


by the panel_ or a portion thereof, as it left the SM.

(6) The loss of pressure on oxygen tank no. i and the subsequent
loss of power resulted from the tank no. 2 failure.

(7) Telemetry, although good, is insufficient to pin down the


exact nature, sequence, and location of each event of the
accident in detail.

(s) The telemetry data, crew testimony, photographs, and special


tests and analyses already completed are sufficient to under-
stand the problem and to proceed with corrective actions.

OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 DESIGN

3. Findings

a,
The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks contained a combination
of oxidizer, combustible material, and potential ignition
sources.

b ,
Supercritical oxygen was used to minimize the weight,
volume, and fluid-handling problems of the oxygen supply
system.

c. The heaters, fans, and tank instrumentation are used in the


measurement and management of the oxygen supply.

Determinations

(i) The storage of supercritical oxygen was appropriate for the


Apollo system.

(2) Heaters are required to maintain tank pressure as the oxygen


supply is used.

(3) Fans were used to prevent excessive pressure drops due to


stratification, to mix the oxygen to improve accuracy of

5-8
quantity measurements, and to insure adequate heater input
at low densities and high oxygen utilization rates. The
need for oxygen stirring on future flights requires further
investigation.

(4) The amount of material in the tank which could be ignited


and burned in the given environment could have been reduced
significantly.

(5) The potential ignition sources constituted an undue hazard


when considered in the light of the particular tank design
with its assembly difficulties.

(6) NASA, the prime contractor, and the supplier of the tank
were not fully aware of the extent of this hazard.

(7) Examination of the high-pressure oxygen system in the service


module following the Apollo 204 fire, which directed atten-
tion to the danger of fire in a pure oxygen environment,
failed to recognize the deficiencies of the tank.

PREFLIGHT DAMAGE TO TANK WIRING

0
Findings

a. The oxygen tank no. 2 heater assembly contained two thermo-


static switches designed to protect the heaters from over-
heating.

b. The thermostatic switches were designed to open and interrupt


the heater current at 80 ° ± i0 ° F.

c. The heaters are operated on 28 V dc in flight and at NR.

d. The heaters are operated on 65 V ac at Beech Aircraft Cor-


poration and 65 V dc at the Kennedy Space Center. These
higher voltages are used to accelerate tank pressurization.

e. The thermostatic switches were rated at 7 amps at 30 V dc.


While they would carry this current at 65 V dc in a closed
position, they would fail if they started to open to inter-
rupt this load.

fo Neither qualification nor acceptance testing of the heater


assemblies or the tanks required thermostatic switch opening
to be checked at 65 V dc. The only test of switch opening

5-9
was a continuity check at Beech in which the switch was
cycled open and closed in an oven.

g. The thermostatic switches had never operated in flight be-


cause this would only happen if the oxygen supply in a tank
were depleted to nearly zero.

hi
The thermostatic switches had never operated on the ground
under load because the heaters had only been used with a
relatively full tank which kept the switches cool and closed.

i.
During the CDDT, the oxygen tank no. 2 would not detank in
a normal manner. On March 27 and 28, a special detanking
procedure was followed which subjected the heater to about
8 hours of continuous operation until the tanks were nearly
depleted of oxygen.

j. A second special detanking of shorter duration followed on


March 30, 1970.

k. The oxygen tanks had not been qualification tested for the
conditions encountered in this procedure. However, speci-
fied allowable heater voltages and currents were not exceeded.

i.
The recorded internal tank temperature went off-scale high
early in the special detanking. The thermostatic switches
would normally open at this point but the electrical records
show no thermostatic switch operation. These indications
were not detected at the time.

m. The oxygen tank heater controls at KSC contained ammeters


which would have indicated thermostatic switch operation.

Determinations

(i) During the special detanking of March 27 and 28 at KSC, when


the heaters in oxygen tank no. 2 were left on for an extended
period, the thermostatic switches started to open while
powered by 65 V dc and were probably welded shut.

(2) Failure of the thermostatic switches to open could have been


detected at KSC if switch operation had been checked by
observing heater current readings on the oxygen tank heater
control panel. Although it was not recognized at the time,
the tank temperature readings indicated that the heaters had
reached their temperature limit and switch opening should
have been expected.

5-10
(3) The fact that the switches were not rated to open at 65 V dc
was not detected by NASA, NR, or Beech in their reviews of
documentation or in qualification and acceptance testing.

(4) The failed switches resulted in severe overheating. Subse-


quent tests showed that heater assembly temperatures could
have reached about i000 ° F.

(5) The high temperatures severely damaged the Teflon insulation


on the wiring in the vicinity of the heater assembly and set
the stage for subsequent short circuiting. As shown in
subsequent tests_ this damage could range from cracking to
total oxidation and disappearance of the insulation.

(6) During and following the special detanking, the oxygen tank
no. 2 was in a hazardous condition whenever it contained
oxygen and was electrically energized.

5-ii
PART 3. SUPPORTING CONSIDERATIONS

DESIGN, MANUFACTURING, AND TEST

5. Finding

The pressure vessel of the supercritical oxygen tank is con-


structed of Inconel 718, and is moderately stressed at normal
operating pressure.

Determination

From a structural viewpoint, the supercritical oxygen pressure


vessel is quite adequately designed, employing a tough material
well chosen for this application. The stress analysis and the
results of the qualification burst test program confirm the
ability of the tank to exhibit adequate performance in its in-
tended application.

6. Findings

a. The oxygen tank design includes two unsealed electric fan


motors immersed in supercritical oxygen.

b.
Fan motors of this design have a test history of failure
during acceptance test which includes phase-to-phase and
phase-to-ground faults.

Co
The fan motor stator windings are constructed with Teflon-
coated, ceramic-insulated, number 36 AWG wire. Full phase-
to-phase and phase-to-ground insulation is not used in the
motor design.

d. The motor case is largely aluminum.

Determinations

(i) The stator winding insulation is brittle and easily fractured


during manufacture of the stator coils.

(2) The use of these motors in supercritical oxygen was a ques-


tionable practice.

7. Findings

a. The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks contained materials that


could be ignited and which will burn under the conditions

5-12
prevailing within the tank, including Teflon, aluminum,
solder, and Drilube 822.

b. The tank contained electrical wiring exposed to the super-


critical oxygen. The wiring was insulated with Teflon.

c. Somewiring was in close proximity to heater elements and


to the rotating fan.
do
The design was such that the assembly of the equipment was
essentially "blind" and not amenable to inspection after
completion.

e. Teflon insulation of the electrical wiring inside the cryo-


genic oxygen storage tanks of the SM was exposed to rela-
tively sharp metal edges of tank inner parts during manu-
facturing assembly operations.

f. Portions of this wiring remained unsupported in the tank on


completion of assembly.

Determinations

(i) The tank contained a hazardous combination of materials and


potential ignition sources.

(2) Scraping of the electrical wiring insulation against metal


inner parts of the tank constituted a substantial cumulative
hazard during assembly, handling, test, checkout, and opera-
tional use.

(5) "Cold flow" of the Teflon insulation, when pressed against


metal corners within the tank for an extended period of
time, could result in an eventual degradation of insulation
protection.

(4) The externally applied electrical tests (500-volt Hi-pot)


could not reveal the extent of such possible insulation
damage but could only indicate that the relative positions
of the wires at the time of the tests were such that the
separation or insulation would withstand the 500-volt po-
tential without electrical breakdown.

(5) The design was such that it was difficult to insure against
these hazards.

(6) There is no evidence that the wiring was damaged during man-
ufacturing.

5-13
9. Findings

a. Dimensioning of the short Teflon and Inconel tube segments


of the cryogenic oxygen storage tank fill line was such that
looseness to the point of incomplete connection was possible
in the event of worst-case tolerance buildup.

b, The insertion of these segments into the top of the tank


quantity probe assembly at the point of its final closure
and welding was difficult to achieve.

c. Probing with a hand tool was used in manufacturing to com-


pensate for limited visibility of the tube segment positions.

Determination

It was possible for a tank to have been assembled with a set of


relatively loose fill tube parts that could go undetected in
final inspection and be subsequently displaced.

i0. Findings

a. The Apollo spacecraft system contains numerous pressure


vessels, many of which carry oxidants, plus related valves
and other plumbing.

b. Investigation of potential hazards associated with these


other systems was not complete at the time of the report,
but is being pursued by the Manned Spacecraft Center.

C. One piece of equipment, the fuel cell oxygen supply valve


module, has been identified as containing a similar combina-
tion of high-pressure oxygen, Teflon, and electrical wiring
as in the oxygen tank no. 2. The wiring is unfused and is
routed through a lO-amp circuit breaker.

Determination

The fuel cell oxygen supply valve module has been identified as
potentially hazardous.

ll. Findings

a. In the normal sequence of cryogenic oxygen storage tank in-


tegration and checkout, each tank undergoes shipping,
assembly into an oxygen shelf for a service module, factory
transportation to facilitate shelf assembly test, and then
integration of shelf assembly to the SM.

5-14
b. The SMundergoes factory transportation, air shipment to KSC,
and subsequent ground transportation and handling.

Determination

There were environments during the normal sequence of operations


subsequent to the final acceptance tests at Beech that could
cause a loose-fitting set of fill tube parts to become displaced.

12. Findings

a. At North American Rockwell, Downey, California, in the


attempt to remove the oxygen shelf assembly from SM 106,
a bolt restraining the inner edge of the shelf was not re-
moved.

b. Attempts to lift the shelf with the bolt in place broke the
lifting fixture, thereby jarring the oxygen tanks and valves.

C. The oxygen shelf assembly incorporating S/N XTAO008 in the


tank no. 2 position, which had been shaken during removal
from SM 106, was installed in SM 109 one month later.

d. An analysis, shelf inspection, and a partial retest empha-


sizing electrical continuity of internal wiring were accom-
plished before reinstallation.

Determinations

(i) Displacement of fill tube parts could have occurred, during


the "shelf drop" incident at the prime contractor's plant,
without detection.

(2) Other damage to the tank may have occurred from the jolt,
but special tests and analyses indicate that this is un-
likely.

(3) The "shelf drop" incident was not brought to the attention
of project officials during subsequent detanking difficulties
at KSC.

13. Finding

Detanking, expulsion of liquid oxygen out the fill line of the


oxygen tank by warm gas pressure applied through the vent line,
was a regular activity at Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, in
emptying a portion of the oxygen used in end-item acceptance
tests.

5-15
Determination

The latter stages of the detanking operation on oxygen tank


no. 2 conducted at Beech on February 3, 1967, were similar to
the standard procedure followed at KSC during the CDDT.

14. Findings

a.
The attempt to detank the cryogenic oxygen tanks at KSC
after the CDDT by the standard procedures on March 23, 1970,
was unsuccessful with regard to tank no. 2.

b,
A special detanking procedure was used to empty oxygen tank
no. 2 after CDDT. This procedure involved continuous pro-
tracted heating with repeated cycles of pressurization to
about 300 psi with warm gas followed by venting.

c. It was employed both after CDDT and after a special test to


verify that the tank could be filled.


There is no indication from the heater voltage recording
that the thermostatic switches functioned and cycled the
heaters off and on during these special detanking procedures.

e.
At the completion of detanking following CDDT, the switches
are only checked to see that they remain closed at -75 ° F as
the tank is warmed up. They are not checked to verify that
they will open at +80 ° F.

fo
Tests subsequent to the flight showed that the current
associated with the KSC 65 V dc ground powering of the
heaters would cause the thermostatic switch contacts to
weld closed if they attempted to interrupt this current.

g.
A second test showed that without functioning thermostatic
switches, temperatures in the 800 ° to i000 ° F range would
exist at locations on the heater tube assembly that were in
close proximity with the motor wires. These temperatures
are high enough to damage Teflon and melt solder.

Determinations

(i) Oxygen tank no. 2 (XTA 0008) did not detank after CDDT in a
manner comparable to its performance the last time it had
contained liquid oxygen, i.e., in acceptance test at Beech.

(2) Such evidence indicates that the tank had undergone some
change of internal configuration during the intervening
events of the previous 3 years.

5-16
(3) The tank conditions during the special detanking procedures
were outside all prior testing of Apollo CSM cryogenic oxygen
storage tanks. Heater assembly temperatures measured in sub-
sequent tests exceeded i000 ° F.

(4) Severe damage to the insulation of electrical wiring internal


to the tank, as determined from subsequent tests, resulted
from the special procedure.

(5) Damage to the insulation, particularly on the long un-


supported lengths of wiring, may also have occurred due to
boiling associated with this procedure.

(6) MSC, KSC, and NR personnel did not know that the thermostatic
switches were not rated to open with 65 V dc GSE power
applied.

15. Findings

a, The change in detanking procedures on the cryogenic oxygen


tank was made in accordance with the existing change control
system during final launch preparations for Apollo 13.

b. Launch operations personnel who made the change did not have
a detailed understanding of the tank internal components, or
the tank history. They made appropriate contacts before
making the change.

C, Communications, primarily by telephone, among MSC, KSC, NR,


and Beech personnel during final launch preparations re-
garding the cryogenic oxygen system included incomplete and
inaccurate information.

d, The MSC Test Specification Criteria Document (TSCD) which


was used by KSC in preparing detailed tank test procedures
states the tank allowable heater voltage and current as 65
to 85 V dc and 9 to 17 amperes with no restrictions on time.

Determinations

(l) NR and MSC personnel who prepared the TSCD did not know that
the tank heater thermostatic switches would not protect
the tank.

(2) Launch operations personnel assumed the tank was protected


from overheating by the switches.

5-17
b) Launch operations personnel at KSC stayed within the
specified tank heater voltage and current limits during the
detanking at KSC.

16. Findings

ao After receipt of the Block II oxygen tank specifications


from NR, which required the tank heater assembly to operate
with 65 V dc GSE power only during tank pressurization_ Beech
Aircraft did not require their Block I thermostatic switch
supplier to make a change in the switch to operate at the
higher voltage.

b. NR did not review the tank or heater to assure compatibility


between the switch and the GSE.

c. MSC did not review the tank or heater to assure compati-


bility between the switch and the GSE.

d. No tests were specified by MSC, NR, or Beech to check this


switch under load.

Determinations

(i) NR and Beech specifications governing the powering and the


thermostatic switch protection of the heater assemblies were
inadequate.

(2) The specifications governing the testing of the heater


assemblies were inadequate.

17. Finding

The hazard associated with the long heater cycle during detanking
was not given consideration in the decision to fly oxygen tank
no. 2.

Determinations

(i) MSC, KSC, and NR personnel did not know that the tank heater
thermostatic switches did not protect the tank from over-
heating.

(2) If the long period of continuous heater operation with failed


thermostatic switches had been known, the tank would have
been replaced.

5-18

L . z,.-,,_ A-_
18. Findings

a° Management controls requiring detailed reviews and approvals


of design, manufacturing processes, assembly procedures,
test procedures, hardware acceptance, safety, reliability,
and flight readiness are in effect for all Apollo hardware
and operations.

b° When the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen system was originally


designed, the management controls were not defined in as
great detail as they are now.

Determination

From review of documents and interviews, it appears that the


management controls existing at that time were adhered to in
the case of the cryogenic oxygen system incorporated in
Apollo 13.

19. Finding

The only oxygen tank no. 2 anomaly during the final countdown
was a small leak through the vent quick disconnect, which was
corrected.

Determination

No indications of a potential inflight malfunction of the oxygen


tank no. 2 were present during the launch countdown.

MISSION EVENTS THI_OUGH ACCIDENT

20. Findings

a. The center engine of the S-If stage of the Saturn V launch


vehicle prematurely shut down at 132 seconds due to large
16 hertz oscillations in thrust chamber pressure.

b. Data indicated less than O.ig vibration in the CM.

Determinations

(i) Investigation of this S-If anomaly was not within the purview
of the Board except insofar as it relates to the Apollo 13
accident.

5-19
(2) The resulting oscillations or vibration of the space vehicle
probably did not affect the oxygen tank.
21. Findings

a. Fuel cell current increased between 46:40:05 and 46:40:08


indicating that oxygen tank no. i and tank no. 2 fans were
turned on during this interval.

b. The oxygen tank no. 2 quantity indicated off-scale high at


46:40:08.

Determinations

(i) The oxygen tank no. 2 quantity probe short circuited at


46:40:08.

(2) The short circuit could have been caused by either a com-
pletely loose fill tube part or a solder splash being carried
by the moving fluid into contact with both elements of the
probe capacitor.

22. Findings

a. The crew acknowledged Mission Control's request to turn on


the tank fans at 55:53:06.

b. Spacecraft current increased by i ampere at 55:53:19.

c. The oxygen tank no. i pressure decreased 8 psi at 55:53:19


due to normal destratification.

Determination

The fans in oxygen tank no. i were turned on and began rotating
at 55:53:19.

23. Findings

a. Spacecraft current increased by 1-1/2 amperes and ac bus 2


voltage decreased 0.6 volt at 55:53:20.


Stabilization and Control System (SCS) gimbal command telem-
etry channels, which are sensitive indicators of electrical
transients associated with switching on or off of certain
spacecraft electrical loads, showed a negative initial tran-
sient during oxygen tank no. 2 fan turnon cycles and a posi-
tive initial transient during oxygen tank no. 2 fan turnoff

5-20
cycles during the Apollo 13 mission. A negative initial
transient was measuredin the SCSat 55:53:20.

c. The oxygen tank no. 2 pressure decreased about 4 psi when


the'fans were turned on at 55:53:21.

Determinations

(i) The fans in oxygen tank no. 2 were turned On at 55:53:20.

(2) It cannot be determined whether or not they were rotating


because the pressure decrease was too small to conclusively
show destratification. It is likely that they were.

24. Finding

An ll.l-amp spike in fuel cell 3 current and a momentary


1.2-volt decrease were measured in ac bus 2 at 55:53:23.

Determinations

(i) A short circuit occurred in the circuits of the fans in


oxygen tank no. 2 which resulted in either blown fuses or
opened wiring, and one fan ceased to function.

(2) The short circuit probably dissipated an energy in excess


of i0 joules which, as shown in subsequent tests, is more
than sufficient to ignite Teflon wire insulation by means
of an electric arc.

25. Findings

a. A momentary ll-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage was


measured at 55:53:38.

b. A 22.9-amp spike in fuel cell 3 current was measured at


55:53:41.

C. After the electrical transients, CM current and ac bus 2


voltage returned to the values indicated prior to the turn-
on of the fans in oxygen tank no. 2.

Determination

Two short circuits occurred in the oxygen tank no. 2 fan cir-
cuits between 55:53:38 and 55:53:41 which resulted in either
blown fuses or opened wiring, and the second fan ceased to
function.

5-21
26. Finding

Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure rise from 887 to


954 psia between 55:53:36 and 55:54:00. It then remained nearly
constant for about 15 seconds and then rose again from 954 to
1008 psia, beginning at 55:54:15 and ending at 55:54:45.

Determinations

(i) An abnormal pressure rise occurred in oxygen tank no. 2.

(2) Since no other known energy source in the tank could produce
this pressure buildup, it is concluded to have resulted from
combustion initiated by the first short circuit which started
a wire insulation fire in the tank.

27. Findings

a. The pressure relief valve was designed to be fully open at


about i000 psi.

b. Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure drop from


1008 psia at 55:54:45 to 996 psia at 55:54:53, at which time
telemetry data were lost.

Determination

This drop resulted from the normal operation of the pressure


relief valve as verified in subsequent tests.

28. Findings

ao At 55:54:29, when the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2 exceeded


the master caution and warning trip level of 975 psia, the CM
master alarm was inhibited by the fact that a warning of low
hydrogen pressure was already in effect, and neither the crew
nor Mission Control was alerted to the pressure rise.

b •
The master caution and warning system logic for the cryogenic
system is such that an out-of-tolerance condition of one
measurement which triggers a master alarm prevents another
master alarm from being generated when any other parameter in
the same system becomes out-of-tolerance.

Co The low-pressure trip level of the master caution and warning


system for the cryogenic storage system is only i psi below
the specified lower limit of the pressure switch which con-
trols the tank heaters. A small imbalance in hydrogen tank

5-22
pressures or a shift in transducer or switch calibration can
cause the master caution and warning to be triggered pre-
ceding each heater cycle. This occurred several times on
Apollo 13.
d. A limit sense light indicating abnormal oxygen tank no. 2
pressure should have come on in Mission Control about
30 seconds before oxygen tank no. 2 failed. There is no way
to ascertain that the light did, in fact, come on. If it
did come on, Mission Control did not observe it.

Determinations

(i) If the pressure switch setting and master caution and warning
trip levels were separated by a greater pressure differential,
there would be less likelihood of unnecessary master alarms.

(2) With the present master caution and warning system, a space-
craft problem can go unnoticed because of the presence of a
previous out-of-tolerance condition in the same subsystem.

Although a master alarm at 55:54:29 or observance of a limit


sense light in Mission Control could have alerted the crew
or Mission Control in sufficient time to detect the pressure
rise in oxygen tank no. 2_ no action could have been taken
at that time to prevent the tank failure. However_ the in-
formation could have been helpful to Mission Control and the
crew in diagnosis of spacecraft malfunctions.

(4) The limit sense system in Mission Control can be modified to


constitute a more positive backup warning system.

29. Finding

Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a temperature rise of 38 ° F


beginning at 55:54:31 sensed by a single sensor which measured
local temperature. This sensor indicated off-scale low at
55:54:53.

Determinations

(i) An abnormal and sudden temperature rise occurred in oxygen


tank no. 2 at approximately 55:54:31.

(2) The temperature was a local value which rose when combustion
had progressed to the vicinity of the sensor.

(3) The temperature sensor failed at 55:54:53.

5-23
30. Finding

Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry indicated the following changes:


(i) quantity decreased from off-scale high to off-scale low in
2 seconds at 55:54:30, (2) quantity increased to 75.3 percent at
55:54:32, and (3) quantity was off-scale high at 55:54:51 and
later became erratic.

Determinations

(i) Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity data between 55:54:32 and


55:54:50 may represent valid measurements.

(2) Immediately preceding and following this time period, the


indications were caused by electrical faults.

31. Findings


At about 55:54:53, or about half a second before telemetry
loss, the body-mounted linear accelerometers in the command
module, which are sampled at i00 times per second, began
indicating spacecraft motions. These disturbances were
erratic, but reached peak values of 1.17g, 0.65g, and 0.65g
in the X, Y, and Z directions, respectively, about 13 milli-
seconds before data loss.

b. The body-mounted roll, pitch, and yaw rate gyros showed low-
level activity for 1/4 second beginning at 55:54:53.220.


The integrating accelerometers indicated that a velocity
increment of approximately 0.5 fps was imparted to the space-
craft between 55:54:53 and 55:54:55.


Doppler tracking data measured an incremental velocity com-
ponent of 0.26 fps along a line from the Earth to the space-
craft at approximately 55:54:55.

e. The crew heard a loud "bang" at about this time.


Telemetry data were lost between approximately 55:54:53 and
55:54:55 and the spacecraft switched from the narrow-beam
antenna to the wide-beam antenna.

g. Crew observations and photographs showed the bay 4 panel to


be missing and the high-gain antenna to be damaged.

5-24

ILl II E E E E k L '" " ' "


Determinations

(i) The spacecraft was subjected to abnormal forces at approxi-


mately 55:54:53. These disturbances were reactions resulting
from failure and venting of the oxygen tank no. 2 system and
subsequent separation and ejection of the bay 4 panel.

(2) The high-gain antenna was damaged either by the panel or a


section thereof from bay 4 at the time of panel separation.

32. Finding

Temperature sensors in bay 3, bay 4, and the central column of


the SM indicated abnormal increases following reacquisition of
data at 55:54:55.

Determination

Heating took plac e in the SM at approximately the time of panel


separation.

33. Findings

a. The telemetered nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i was off-


scale low at reacquisition of data at 55:54:55.

b. Fuel cell I continued to operate for about 3 minutes past


this time.

Co The wiring to the nitrogen sensor passes along the top of


the shelf which supports the fuel cells immediately above
the oxygen tanks.

Determinations

(i) The nitrogen pressure sensor in fuel cell i or its wiring


failed at the time of the accident.

(2) The failure was probably caused by physical damage to the


sensor wiring or shock.

(3) This is the only known instrumentation failure outside the


oxygen system at that time.

34. Finding

Oxygen tank no. i pressure decreased rapidly from 879 psia to


782 psia at approximately 55:54:54 and then began to decrease
more slowly at 55:54:56.

5-25
Determination

A leak caused loss of oxygen from tank no. i beginning at approxi-


mately 55:54:54.

35. Findings

a. Oxygen flow rates to fuel cells I and 3 decreased in a


5-second period beginning at 55:54:55, but sufficient volume
existed in lines feeding the fuel cells to allow them to
operate about 3 minutes after the oxygen supply valves were
cut off.

b° The crew reported at 55:57:44 that five valves in the reaction


control system (RCS) were closed. The shock required to close
the oxygen supply valves is of the same order of magnitudeas
the shock required to close the RCS valves.

c. Fuel cells i and 3 failed at about 55:58.

Determination

The oxygen supply valves to fuel cells i and 3, and the five RCS
valves, were probably closed by the shock of tank failure or panel
ejection or both.

MISSION EVENTS AFTER ACCIDENT

36. Findings


Since data presented to flight controllers in Mission Control
are updated only once per second, the 1.8-second loss of data
which occurred in Mission Control was not directly noticed.
However, the Guidance Officer did note and report a "hardware
restart" of the spacecraft computer. This was quickly
followed by the crew's report of a problem.

b.
Immediately after the crew's report of a "bang" and a main
bus B undervolt, all fuel cell output currents and all bus
voltages were normal, and the cryogenic oxygen tank indica-
tions were as follows:

5-26
Oxygentank no. i: Pressure: Several hundred psi below
normal

Quantity: Normal

Temperature: Normal

Oxygentank no. 2: Pressure: Off-scale low

Quantity: Off-scale high

Temperature: Off-scale high

C. The nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i indicated zero, which was


incompatible with the hydrogen and oxygen pressures in this
fuel cell_ which were normal. The nitrogen pressure is used
to regulate the oxygen and hydrogen pressure, and hydrogen
and oxygen pressures in the fuel cell would follow the nitro-
gen pressure.

d. Neither the crew nor Mission Control was aware at the time
that oxygen tank no. 2 pressure had risen abnormally just
before the data loss.

e° The flight controllers believed that a probable cause of


these indications could have been a cryogenic storage system
instrumentation failure, and began pursuing this line of in-
vestigation.

Determination

Under these conditions it was reasonable to suspect a cryogenic


storage system instrumentation problem, and to attempt to verify
the readings before taking any action. The fact that the oxygen
tank no. 2 quantity measurement was known to have failed several
hours earlier also contributed to the doubt about the credita-
bility of the telemetered data.

37. Findings

a. During the 3 minutes following data loss, neither the flight


controllers nor the crew noticed the oxygen flows to fuel
cells i and 3 were less than 0.i ib/hr. These were unusually
low readings for the current being drawn.

b. Fuel cells i and 3 failed at about 3 minutes after the data


loss.

5-27
C° After the fuel cell failures, which resulted in dc main
bus B failure and the undervoltage condition on dc main bus A,
Mission Control diverted its prime concern from what was
initially believed to be a cryogenic system instrumentation
problem to the electrical power system.

d.
Near-zero oxygen flow to fuel cells i and 3 was noted after
the main bus B failure, but this was consistent with no power
output from the fuel cells.

e .
The flight controllers believed that the fuel cells could
have been disconnected from the busses and directed the crew
to connect fuel cell i to dc main bus A and fuel cell 3 to
dc main bus B.

f. The crew reported the fuel cells were configured as directed


and that the talkback indicators confirmed this.

Determinations

(1) Under these conditions it was logical for the flight con-
trollers to attempt to regain power to the busses since the
fuel cells might have been disconnected as a result of a short
circuit in the electrical system. Telemetry does not indicate
whether or not fuel cells are connected to busses, and the
available data would not distinguish between a disconnected
fuel cell and a failed one.

(2) If the crew had been aware of the reactant valve closure,
they could have opened them before the fuel cells were starved
of oxygen. This would have simplified subsequent actions.

38. Finding

The fuel cell reactant'valve talkback indicators in the space-


craft do not indicate closed unless both the hydrogen and oxygen
valves are closed.

Determinations

(l) If these talkbacks were designed so that either a hydrogen


or oxygen valve closure would indicate "barberpole," the
Apollo 13 crew could possibly have acted in time to delay
the failure of fuel cells i and 3, although they would never-
theless have failed when oxygen tank no. i ceased to supply
oxygen.

5-28
(2) The ultimate outcome would not have been changed, but had the
fuel cells not failed, Mission Control and the crew would not
have mad to contend with the failure of dc main bus B and ac
bus 2 or attitude control problems while trying to evaluate
the situation.

Reaction Control System

39. Findings

a. The crew reported the talkback indicators for the helium


isolation valves in the SM RCS quads B and D indicated closed
shortly after the dc main bus B failure. The secondary fuel
pressurization valves for quads A and C also were reported
closed.

b° The SM RCS quad D propellant tank pressures decreased until


shortly after the crew was requested to confirm that the
helium isolation valves were opened by the crew.

C° During the l-i/2-hour period following the accident, Mission


Control noted that SM RCS quad C propellant was not being
used, although numerous firing signals were being sent to it.

d. Both the valve solenoids and the onboard indications of valve


position of the propellant isolation valves for quad C are
powered by dc main bus B.

e ° During the l-i/2-hour period immediately following the


accident, Mission Control advised the crew which SM RCS
thrusters to power and which ones to unpower.

Determinations

(i) The following valves were closed by shock at the time of


the accident:

Helium isolation valves in quads B and D

Secondary fuel pressurization valves in quads A and C

(2) The propellant isolation valves in quad C probably were


closed by the same shock.

(3) Mission Control correctly determined the status of the RCS


system and properly advised the crew on how to regain auto-
matic attitude control.

5-29
Managementof Electrical System

40. Findings

a.
After fuel cell I failed, the total dc main bus A load was
placed on fuel cell 2 and the voltage dropped to approxi-
mately 25 volts, causing a caution and warning indication
and a master alarm.

b.
After determining the fuel cell 2 could not supply enough
power to dc main bus A to maintain adequate voltage, the crew
connected entry battery A to this bus as an emergency measure
to increase the bus voltage to its normal operating value.

C. Mission Control directed the crew to reduce the electrical


load on dc main bus A by following the emergency powerdown
checklist contained in the onboard Flight Data File.


When the power requirements were sufficiently reduced so that
the one remaining fuel cell could maintain adequate bus
voltage, Mission Control directed the crew to take the entry
battery off line.

e o
Mission Control then directed the crew to charge this battery
in order to get as much energy back into it as possible,
before the inevitable loss of the one functioning fuel cell.

Determinations

(i) Emergency use of the entry battery helped prevent potential


loss of dc main bus A, which could have led to loss of com-
munications between spacecraft and ground and other vital CM
functions.

(2) Available emergency powerdown lists facilitated rapid re-


duction of loads on the fuel cell and batteries.

Attempts to Restore Oxygen Pressure

41. Findings

a° After determining that the CM problems were not due to in-


strumentation malfunctions, and after temporarily securing
a stable electrical system configuration, Mission Control
sought to improve oxygen pressures by energizing the fan
and heater circuits in both oxygen tanks.

5-30
b. When these procedures failed to arrest the oxygen loss,
Mission Control directed the crew to shut down fuel cells i
and 3 by closing the hydrogen and oxygen flow valves.

Determinations

(i) Under more normal conditions oxygen pressure might have been
increased by turning on heaters and fans in the oxygen tanks;
no other known actions had such a possibility.

(2) There was a possibility that oxygen was leaking downstream


of the valves; had this been true, closing of the valves
might have preserved the remaining oxygen in oxygen tank
no. i.

Lunar Module Activation

42. Findings

a° With imminent loss of oxygen from oxygen tanks no. i and


no. 2, and failing electrical power in the CM, it was
necessary to use the lunar module (LM) as a "lifeboat" for
the return to Earth.

b. Mission Control and the crew delayed LM activation until


about 15 minutes before the SM oxygen supply was depleted.

C° There were three different LM activation checklists contained


in the Flight Data File for normal and contingency situations;
however, none of these was appropriate for the existing situa-
tion. It was necessary to activate the LM as rapidly as
possible to conserve LM consumables and CM reentry batteries
to the maximum extent possible.

d. Mission Control modified the normal LM activation checklist


and referred the crew to specific pages and instructions.
This bypassed unnecessary steps and reduced the activation
time to less than an hour.

e ° The LM inertial platform was aligned during an onboard check-


list procedure which manually transferred the CM alignment to
the LM.

5-31
Determinations

(i) Initiation of LM activation was not undertaken sooner because


the crew was properly more concerned with attempts to conserve
remaining SM oxygen.

(2) Mission Control was able to make workable on-the-spot modifi-


cations to the checklists which sufficiently shortened the
time normally required for powering up the LM.

45. Findings


During the LM powerup and the CSM powerdown, there was a brief
time interval during which Mission Control gave the crew di-
rections which resulted in neither module having an active
attitude control system.

bo
This caused some concern in Mission Control because of the
possibility of the spacecraft drifting into inertial platform
gimbal lock condition.

C.
The Command Module Pilot (CMP) stated that he was not con-
cerned because he could have quickly reestablished direct
manual attitude control if it became necessary.

Determination

This situation was not hazardous to the crew because had gimbal
lock actually occurred, sufficient time was available to re-
establish an attitude reference.

44. Findings

a.
LM flight controllers were on duty in Mission Control at the
time of the accident in support of the scheduled crew entry
into the LM.


If the accident had occurred at some other time during the
translunar coast phase, LM system specialists would not have
been on duty, and it would have taken at least 30 minutes to
get a fully manned team in Mission Control.

Determination

Although LM flight controllers were not required until more than


an hour after the accident, it was beneficial for them to be
present as the problem developed.

5-52
LM Consumables Management

45. Findings

a,
The LM was designed to support two men on a 2-day expedition
to the lunar surface. Mission Control made major revisions
in the use rate of water, oxygen, and electrical power to
sustain three men for the 4-day return trip to the Earth.

b. An emergency powerdown checklist was available in the Flight


Data File on board the LM. Minor revisions were made to the
list to reduce electrical energy requirements to about
20 percent of normal operational values with a corresponding
reduction in usage of coolant loop water.


Mission Control determined that this maximum powerdown could
be delayed until after 80 hours ground elapsed time, allowing
the LM primary guidance and navigation system to be kept
powered up for the second abort maneuver.

d. Mission Control developed contingency plans for further re-


duction of LM power for use in case an LMbattery problem
developed. Procedures for use of CM water in the LM also
were developed for use if needed.

e. Toward the end of the mission, sufficient consumable margins


existed to allow usage rates to be increased above earlier
planned levels. This was done.

f. _hen the LM was jettisoned at 141:30 the approximate remaining


margins were:

Electrical power 4-1/2 hours

Water 5-1/2 hours

Oxygen 124 hours

Determinations

(i) Earlier contingency plans and available checklists were


adequate to extend life support capability of the LM well
beyond its normal intended capability.

(2) Mission Control maintained the flexibility of being able to


further increase the LM consumables margins.

5-33
Modification of LM Carbon Dioxide Removal System

46. Findings

a.
The lithium hydroxide (LiOH) cartridges, which remove water
and carbon dioxide from the LM cabin atmosphere, would have
become ineffective due to saturation at about i00 hours.

b,
Mission rules set maximum allowable carbon dioxide partial
pressure at 7.5mm Hg. LiOH cartridges are normally changed
before cabin atmosphere carbon dioxide partial pressure
reaches this value.

C.
Manned Spacecraft Center engineers devised and checked out a
procedure for using the CM LiOH cannisters to achieve carbon
dioxide removal. Instructions were given on how to build a
modified cartridge container using materials in the space-
craft.

do
The crew made the modification at 93 hours, and carbon
dioxide partial pressure in the LM dropped rapidly from
7.5mm Hg to O.imm Hg.

e.
Mission Control gave the crew further instructions for
attaching additional cartridges in series with the first
modification. After this addition, the carbon dioxide partial
pressure remained below 2mm Hg for the remainder of the Earth-
return trip.

Determination

The Manned Spacecraft Center succeeded in improvising and checking


Out a modification to the filter system which maintained carbon
dioxide concentration well within safe tolerances.

LM Anomaly

47. Findings

a.
During the time interval between 97:13:53 and 97:13:55, LM
descent battery current measurements on telemetry showed a
rapid increase from values of no more than 3 amperes per
battery to values in excess of 30 amperes per battery. The
exact value in one battery cannot be determined because the
measurement for battery 2 was off-scale high at 60 amperes.

5-34
b. At about that time the Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) heard a
"thump" from the vicinity of the LM descent stage.

c. When the LMP looked out the LM right-hand window, he observed


a venting of small particles from the general area where the
LM descent batteries i and 2 are located. This venting con-
tinued for a few minutes.

d. Prior to 97:13 the battery load-sharing among the four


batteries had been equal, but immediately after the battery
currents returned to nominal, batteries i and 2 supplied 9
of the ii amperes total. By 97:23 the load-sharing had re-
turned to equal.

e. There was no electrical interface between the LM and the CSM


at this time.

f. An MSC investigation of the anomaly is in progress.

Determinations

(I) An anomalous incident occurred in the LM electrical system


at about 97:13:53 which appeared to be a short circuit.

(2) The thump and the venting were related to this anomaly.

(9) The apparent short circuit cleared itself.

(4) This anomaly was not directly related to the CSM or to the
accident.

(5) This anomaly represents a potentially serious electrical


problem.

CM Battery Recharging

48. Findings

a.
About one half of the electrical capacity of reentry
battery A (20 of 40 amp-hours) was used during emergency
conditions following the accident. A small part of the
capacity of reentry battery B was used in checking out dc
main bus B at 95 hours. The reduced charge remaining in the
batteries limited the amount of time the CM could operate
after separation from the LM.

5-35
b.
Extrapolation of LM electrical power use rates indicated a
capacity in excess of that required for LM operation for the
remainder of the flight.

C.
Mission Control worked out a procedure for using LM battery
power to recharge CM batteries A and B. This procedure used
the electrical umbilical between the 154 and the CM which
normally carried electrical energy from the CM to the LM.
The procedure was nonstandard and was not included in check-
lists.

d. The procedure was initiated at 112 hours and CM batteries A


and B were fully recharged by 128 hours.

Determination

Although there is always some risk involved in using new, untested


procedures, analysis in advance of use indicated no hazards were
involved. The procedure worked very well to provide an extra
margin of safety for the reentry operation.

Trajectory Changes For Safe Return to Earth

49. Findings


After the accident, it became apparent that the lunar landing
could not be accomplished and that the spacecraft trajectory
must be altered for a return to Earth.

b.
At the time of th@ accident, the spacecraft trajectory was
one which would have returned it to the vicinity of the Earth,
but it would have been left in orbit about the Earth rather
than reentering for a safe splashdown.

c. To return the spacecraft to Earth, the following midcourse


corrections were made:

A 38-fps correction at 61:30, using the LM descent propulsion


system (DPS), required to return the spacecraft to the Earth.

An 81-fps burn at 79:28, after swinging past the Moon, using


the DPS engine, to shift the landing point from the Indian
Ocean to the Pacific and to shorten the return trip by
9 hours.

A 7.8-fps burn at 105:18 using the DPS engine to lower Earth


perigee from 87 miles to 21 miles.

5-36
A 3.2-fps correction at 137:40 using LM RCSthrusters, to
assure that the CMwould reenter the Earth's atmosphere at
the center of its corridor.

d. All course corrections were executed with expected accuracy


and the CM reentered the Earth's atmosphere at 142:40 to
return the crew safely at 142:54, near the prime recovery
ship.

e. Without the CM guidance and navigation system, the crew could


not navigate or compute return-to-Earth maneuver target param-
eters.

Determinations

(1) This series of course corrections was logical and had the
best chance of success because_ as compared to other options_
it avoided use of the damaged SM; it put the spacecraft on a
trajectory, within a few hours after the accident, which had
the best chance for a safe return to Earth; it placed splash-
down where the best recovery forces were located; it shortened
the flight time to increase safety margins in the use of elec-
trical power and water; it conserved fuel for other course
corrections which might have become necessary; and it kept
open an option to further reduce the flight time.

(2) Mission Control trajectory planning and maneuver targeting


were essential for the safe return of the crew.

Entry Procedures and Checklists

50. Findings

a. Preparation for reentry required nonstandard procedures be-


cause of the lack of SM oxygen and electrical power supplies.

b. The SM RCS engines normally provide separation between the


SM and the CM by continuing to fire after separation.

c. Apollo 13 SM RCS engines could not continue to fire after


separation because of the earlier failure of the fuel cells.

d. The CM guidance and navigation system was powered down due to


the accident. The LM guidance and navigation system had also
been powered down to conserve electrical energy and water. A
spacecraft inertial attitude reference had to be established
prior to reentry.

5-37
et
The reentry preparation time had to be extended in order to
accomplish the additional steps required by the unusual situa-
tion.

fe

In order to conserve the CM batteries, LM jettison was de-


layed as long as practical. The LM batteries were used to
supply part of the power necessary for CM activation.

g.
The procedures for accomplishing the final course correction
and the reentry preparation were developed by operations
support personnel under the direction of Mission Control.


An initial set of procedures was defined within 12 hours
after the accident• These were refined and modified during
the following 2 days, and evaluated in simulators at MSC and
KSC by members of the backup crew.

i. The procedures were read to the crew about 24 hours prior to


reentry, allowing the crew time to study and rehearse them.

j •
Trajectory evaluations of contingency conditions for LM and
SM separation were conducted and documented prior to the
mission by mission-planning personnel at MSC.

k. Most of the steps taken were extracted from other procedures


which had been developed, tested, and simulated earlier•

Determinations

(i) The procedures developed worked well and generated no new


hazards beyond those unavoidably inherent in using procedures
which have not been carefully developed, simulated, and
practiced over a long training period.

(2) It is not practical to develop, simulate, and practice pro-


cedures for use in every possible contingency.

51. Findings

ao

During the reentry preparations, after SM jettison, there was


a half-hour period of very poor communications with the CM
due to the spacecraft being in a poor attitude with the LM
present•

b. This condition was not recognized by the crew or by Mission


Control.

5-38
Determination

Some of the reentry preparations were unnecessarily prolonged by


the poor communications, but since the reentry preparation time-
line was not crowded, the delay was more of a nuisance than an
additional hazard to the crew.

52. Findings

a° The crew maneuvered the spacecraft to the wrong LM roll


attitude in preparation for LM jettison. This attitude put
the CM very close to gimbal lock which, had it occurred, would
have lost the inertial attitude reference essential for an
automatic guidance system control of reentry.

b° If gimbal lock had occurred, a less accurate but adequate


attitude reference could have been reestablished prior to
reentry.

Determination

The most significant consequence of losing the attitude reference


in this situation would have been the subsequent impact on the
remaining reentry preparation timeline. In taking the time to
reestablish this reference, less time would have been available
to accomplish the rest of the necessary procedures. The occur-
rence of gimbal lock in itself would not have significantly in-
creased the crew hazard.

5-39
PART 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

i. The cryogenic oxygen storage system in the service module should be


modified to:

a. Remove from contact with the oxygen all wiring, and the unsealed
motors, which can potentially short circuit and ignite adjacent materials;
or otherwise insure against a catastrophic electrically induced fire in
the tank.

b. Minimize the use of Teflon, aluminum, and other relatively com-


bustible materials in the presence of the oxygen and potential ignition
sources.

2. The modified cryogenic oxygen storage system should be subjected to


a rigorous requalification program, including careful attention to po-
tential operational problems.

3. The warning systems on board the Apollo spacecraft and in the Mission
Control Center should be carefully reviewed and modified where appropriate,
with specific attention to the following:

a. Increasing the differential between master alarm trip levels and


expected normal operating ranges to avoid unnecessary alarms.

b. Changing the caution and warning system logic to prevent an out-


of-limits alarm from blocking another alarm when a second quantity in the
same subsystem goes out of limits.

c. Establishing a second level of limit sensing in Mission Control


on critical quantities with a visual or audible alarm which cannot be
easily overlooked.

d. Providing independent talkback indicators for each of the six


fuel cell reactant valves plus a master alarm when any valve closes.

4. Consumables and emergency equipment in the LM and the CM should be re-


viewed to determine whether steps should be taken to enhance their po-
tential for use in a "lifeboat" mode.

5. The Manned Spacecraft Center should complete the special tests and
analyses now underway in order to understand more compl@tely the details
of the Apollo 13 accident. In addition, the lunar module power system
anomalies should receive careful attention. Other NASA Centers should
continue their support to MSC in the areas of analysis and test.

5-40
6. Wheneversignificant anomalies occur in critical subsystems during
final preparation for launch, standard procedures should require a presen-
tation of all prior anomalies on that particular piece of equipment, in-
cluding those which have previously been corrected or explained. Further-
more, critical decisions involving the flightworthiness of subsystems
should require the presence and full participation of an expert who is
intimately familiar with the details of that subsystem.

7. NASAshould conduct a thorough reexamination of all of its spacecraft,


launch vehicle, and ground systems which contain high-density oxygen, or
other strong oxidizers, to identify and evaluate potential combustion
hazards in the light of information developed in this investigation.
8. NASAshould conduct additional research on materials compatibility,
ignition, and combustion in strong oxidizers at various g levels; and on
the characteristics of supercritical fluids. Whereappropriate, new NASA
design standards should be developed.

9. The MannedSpacecraft Center should reassess all Apollo spacecraft


subsystems, and the engineering organizations responsible for them at
MSCand at its prime contractors, to insure adequate understanding and
control of the engineering and manufacturing details of these subsystems
at the subcontractor and vendor level. Wherenecessary, organizational
elements should be strengthened and in-depth reviews conducted on selected
subsystems with emphasis on soundness of design, quality of manufacturing,
adequacy of test, and operational experience.

5-41
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2
5-42

NASA -- MSC
.

REPORT OF
- APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

APPENDIX A
BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13
l

. FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS

- VATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION


c
CONTENTS

Part Page

APPENDIX A - BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT


SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-l

Al APOLLO SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATION .......... A-3

LAUNCH ESCAPE ASSEMBLY .............. A-3

COMMANDMODULE.................. A-3

SERVICE MODULE ................... A-8

SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER .............. A-9

A2 SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION DATA .............. A-11

INTRODUCTION ................... A-11

A2.1 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL ............... A-12

Guidance and Control Systems Interface . . . . . A-12

Attitude Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-12

Attitude Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14

Thrust and Thrust Vector Control . . ...... A-16

A2.2 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM (G&N) . ...... A-18

A2.3 STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM (SCS) ...... A-20

A2.4 SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM (SPS) . . . ...... A-22

A2.5 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS). . . . . ...... A-24

SM RCS Functional Description . . . ...... A-24

CM RCS Functional Description . . . ...... ~-26

~2.6 ELECTRICAL POWERSYSTEM . . . . . . . ...... A-28

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-28

iii

. ..I . . I ., *“I -._-- _-. - ._I_x__~__.


-- ---. -..*---_l----... --.-.--~ --.. -~
___-___o__ll_. -__Y._--
--

Part Page

Functional Description .............. A-30

Major Component/Subsystem Description ...... A-32

Performance and Design Data ........... A-66

Operational Limitations and Restrictions ..... ~-67

Systems Test Meter ................ A-70

Command Module Interior Lighting ......... A-72

A2.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM ............ A-81

Introduction ................... A-81

Functional Description .............. A-83

Oxygen Subsystem ................. A-86

A2.8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ............. A-88 -


Introduction ................... A-88

Functional Description .............. A-89

~2.9 SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS ................. A-90

Introduction ................... A-90

Sequential Events Control Subsystem ....... A-90

Origin of Signals ................ ~-92

A2.10 CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM ............. A-93

Introduction ................... A-93

Functional Description .............. A-93

Major Component Subsystem Description ...... A-93

Operational Limitations and Restrictions ..... A-97

iv

..-l ,....-- _-__---_____- -,.. -..- -_ -


Part Page

A2.11 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-?9

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-99

Timers ...................... A-99

Accelerometer (G-meter) ............. A-99

Command Module Uprighting System . . . . . . . . . A-99

A2.12 CREWPERSONAL EQUIPMENT .............. A-103

A2.13 DOCKING AND TRANSFER ................ A-106

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-106

Functional Description .............. A-109

A3 LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION ........... A-111

INTRODUCTION .................... A-111

LM CONFIGURATION .................. A-111

Ascent Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-114

Descent Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-119

IN - SLA - S-IVB Connections ........... A-119

LM-CSM Interfaces ................ A-119

Stowage Provisions ................ A-122

A4 MISSION CONTROL CENTER ACTIVITIES .......... A-123

INTRODUCTION .................... A-123

MISSION OPERATIONS CONTROLROOM .......... A-128

MCC SUPPORT ROOMS ................. A-131

MISSION SUPPORT AREAS ............... A-133

Communications, Command, and Telemetry


System (CCATS) ................. A-133

__~-_-_.-, .._ . ..----- .I.,. .__ ,.-__- -~--_ .-.. --l----l--l-..--- _-“--l_-.
Part Page

Real-Time Computer Complex (RTCC). . . . . . . . . A-134

A5 EXCERPTS FROM APOLLO FUEL CELL AND CRYOGENIC GAS


STORAGE SYSTEM FLIGHT SUPPORT HANDBOOK . . . . . . . A-139

__.^.

vi

.,___--.-....__I..^
,111- .._^x_-..-l _..l..-^..l-I_ -__ -.-.--~- -__~,-- *-_. ---.-
BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT

SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS

Appendix A is divided into five parts. Part Al briefly describes


the Apollo spacecraft configuration; Part A2 provides a systems descrip-
tion of the Apollo spacecraft configuration with special emphasis on the
electrical power system (EPS); Part A3 describes the lunar module systems;
Part A4 briefly describes the Mission Control Center at Houston, Texas,
and its interface with the spacecraft during the mission; and Part A5
gives a detailed description of the fuel cells and cryogenic gas storage
systems aboard the Apollo spacecraft. This baseline material may not
always represent the precise Apollo 13 configuration in every case, since
there is a continuous updating which is documented periodically. For ex-
ample, Fuel Cell 2 on Apollo 13 was normally connected to bus A in the
distribution system, rather that as described in Part ~2.6.

The data were extracted from the following sources:

APPENDIX A

PART Al Technical Manual SM2A-03-Block II-(l)


and A2 Apollo Operations Handbook Block II Spacecraft,
Volume 1, dated January 15, 1970.

PART A3 Technical Manual LMA790-3-L&l, Apollo Operations


Handbook, Lunar Module, Volume 1, dated February 1,
1970.

PART A4 Manned Spacecraft Center Flight Operations Plan -


H Missions, dated August 31, 1969.

PART A5 Apollo Fuel Cell and Cryogenic Gas Storage System


Flight Support Handbook, dated February 18, 1970,
prepared by Propulsion and Power Division, Manned
Spacecraft Center.

A-l

I~.. I .,. .__ ".----. -.. . _.---.-l-__-l.~ ---- 1--- _l.-l--l__


This page left blank intentionally.

.-

A-2
PART Al

APOLLO SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATION

The Apollo spacecraft consists of a launch escape assembly (LEA),


command module (CM), service module (SM), the spacecraft lunar module
adapter (SLA), and the lunar module (LM). The reference system and
stations are shown in figure Al-l.

LAUNCH ESCAPE ASSEMBLY

The LEA (fig. Al-2) provides the means for separating the CM from
the launch vehicle during pad or first-stage booster operation, This
assembly consists of a Q-ball instrumentation assembly (nose cone),
ballast compartment, canard surfaces, pitch control motor, tower jetti-
son motor, launch escape motor, a structural skirt, an open-frame tower,
and a boost protective cover (BPC). The structural skirt at the base
of the housing, which encloses the launch escape rocket motors, is
secured to the forward portion of the tower. The BPC (fig. Al-31 is
attached to the aft end of the tower to protect the CM from heat during
boost, and from exhaust damage by the launch escape and tower jettison
motors. Explosive nuts, one in each tower leg well, secure the tower
to the CM structure.

COMIWNDMODULE

The CM (fig. Al-b), the spacecraft control center, contains neces-


sary automatic and manual equipment to control and monitor the space-
craft systems; it also contains the required equipment for safety and
comfort of the flight crew. The module is an irregular-shaped, primary
structure encompassed by three heat shields (coated with ablative mater-
ial and joined or fastened to the primary structure) forming a trun-
cated, conic structure. The CM consists of a forward compartment, a
crew compartment, and an aft compartment for equipment. (See fig. Al-b.)

The command module is conical shaped, 11 feet 1.5 inches long, and
12 feet 6.5 inches in diameter without the ablative material. The
ablative material is nonsymmetrical and adds approximately 4 inches to
the height and 5 inches to the diameter.

A-3
.

_...

Figure Al-l.- Block II spacecraft reference stations.

jr\ - 1-I

.-__. I. -.. .I --.lr _.. -- ._ ...--“-_l_*._“. .-~~. -.


Q-MLL (NOSE CONE)
PITCH CONTROL MOTOR

CANARDS JETTISON MOTOR

LAUNCH ESCAPE ASSEMBLY


LAUNCH ESCAPE MOTOR --“. jj/

STRUCTURAL SKIRT
A..

LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

TOWER ATTACHMENT (4) COMMAND MODULE

BOOST PROTECTIVE

CM-SM FAIRING

REACTION CONTR
SYSTEM ENGINES

SERVICE MODULE

EC5 RADIATOR MI

SPS ENGINE EXPANSION NOZZLE

SPACECRAFT LM
ADAPTER (SLA) \

NOTE: LM IS NOT UTILIZED


SOME MISSIONS
ON \
c S-IV8 INSTRUMENT UNIT
(SHOWN AS REFERENCE)

Figure Al-2.- Block II spacecraft configuration.

A-5

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COMMAND MODULE

Figure Al-b.- Block II command module.


SERVICE MODULE

The service module (fig. Al-51 is a cylindrical structure formed


by l-inch-thick aluminum honeycomb panels. Radial beams, from milled
aluminum alloy plates, separate the structure interior into six unequal
sectors around a circular center section. Equipment contained within

’ccgq
Sector 4

-Y
1 and 4 are 50-degree sectors
Fuel cell power plant (three)
Helium servicing panel
Super-critical
Super-critical
oxygen tank (two)
hydrogen tank (two)
Reaction control system control unit
2 and 5 are 70-degree sectors Electrical power system power control relay box
3 and 6 are 60-degree sectors Service module jettison controller sequencer (two)

Service module items Sector 5


Environmental control system space radiator
Sector 1
Service propulsion system fuel sump tank
Empty NASA equipment Reaction control system package C-Y axis)
Sector 2
Environmental system space radiator Sector 6
Service propulsion system Environmental control system space radiator
Reaction control system package (+Y -axis) Reaction control system package (-Z axis)
Service propulsion system oxidizer sump tank Service propulsion system fuel storage tank
Sector 3 Center Section
Service propulsion system Service propulsion system helium tank (two)
Reaction control system package (+Z -axis) Service propulsion system engine
Environmental system space radiator Fairing
Service propulsion system oxidizer storage tank Electrical power system space radiator’s (eight)

Figure Al-5.- Service module.

id-8
the service module is accessible through maintenance doors located around
the exterior surface of the module. Specific items, such as propulsion
systems (SPS and RCS), fuel cells, and most of the SC onboard consumables
(and storage tanks) contained in the SM compartments, are listed in
figure Al-5. The service module is 12 feet 11 inches long (high) and
12 feet 10 inches in diameter.

Radial beam trusses on the forward portion of the SM structure


provide a means for securing the CM to the SM. Alternate beams one,
three, and five have compression pads for supporting the CM. Beams two,
four, and six have shear-compression pads and tension ties. A flat
center section in each tension tie incorporates redundant explosive
charges for SM-CM separation. These beams and separation devices are
enclosed within a fairing (26 inches high and 13 feet in diameter) be-
tween the CM and SM.

SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER

The spacecraft LM adapter (SLA) (fig. Al-6) is a large truncated


cone which connects the CSM and S-IVB on the launch vehicle. It houses
the lunar module (LM), the nozzle of the service propulsion system, and
the high-gain antenna in the stowed position. The adapter, constructed
of eight 2-inch-thick aluminum panels, is 154 inches in diameter at the
forward end (CM interface) and 260 inches at the aft end. Separation
of the CSM from the SLA is accomplished by means of explosive charges
which disengage the four SLA forward panels from the aft portion. The
individual panels are restrained to the aft SLA by hinges and acceler-
ated in rotation by pyrotechnic-actuated thrusters. When reaching an
angle of 45 degrees measured from the vehicle's X-axis, spring thrusters
(two per panel) jettison the panels. The panel jettison velocity and
direction of travel is such as to minimize the possibility of recontact
with the spacecraft or launch vehicle.

A-9
Panel separation by
explosive charges

FAM-1503F

Figure Al-6.- Spacecraft LM adapter.


PART A2

SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION DATA

INTRODUCTION

Systems description data include description of operations, compo-


nent description and design data, and operational limitations and restric-
tions. Part 2.1 describes the overall spacecraft navigation, guidance,
and control requirements and the resultant systems interface. Parts A2.2
through A2.10 present data grouped by spacecraft systems, arranged in the
following order: guidance and navigation, stabilization and control, serv-
ice propulsion, reaction control, electrical power, environmental control,
telecommunications, sequential, and caution and warnings. Part A2.11 deals
with miscellaneous systems data. Part A2.12 deals with crew personal
equipment. Part A2.13 deals with docking and crew transfer.

These data were extracted from the technical manual SM2A-03BLOCK II-
(l), Apollo Operations Handbook, Block II Spacecraft, Volume 1, dated
January 15, 1970.

A-11
PART A2.1

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

Guidance and Control Systems Interface

The Apollo guidance and control functions are performed by the


primary guidance, navigation, and control system (PGNCS), and stabili-
zation and control system (SCS). The PGNCS and SCS systems contain
rotational and translational attitude and rate sensors which provide
discrete input information to control electronics which, in turn, inte-
grate and condition the information into control commands to the space-
craft propulsion systems. Spacecraft attitude control is provided by
commands to the reaction control system (RCS). Major velocity changes
are provided by commands to the service propulsion system (SPS).
Guidance and control provides the following basic functions:

a. Attitude reference

b. Attitude control

C. Thrust and thrust vector control.


-
The basic guidance and control functions may be performed automat-
ically, with primary control furnished by the command module computer
(CMC) or manually, with primary control furnished by the flight crew.
The subsequent paragraphs provide a general description of the basic
functions.

Attitude Reference

The attitude reference function (fig. A2.1-1) provides display of


the spacecraft attitude with reference to an established inertial ref-
erence. The display is provided by two flight director attitude indi-
cators (FDAI) located on the main display console, panels 1 and 2. The
displayed information consists of total attitude, attitude errors, and
angular rates. The total attitude is displayed by the FDAI ball. Atti-
tude errors are displayed by three needles across scales on the top,
right, and bottom of the apparent periphery of the ball. Angular rates
are displayed by needles across the top right, and bottom of the FDAI
face.

Total attitude information is derived from the IMU stable platform


or the gyro displ~ coupler (GDC). The IMU provides total attitude by
maintaining a gimbaled, gyro-stabilized platform to an inertial reference
orientation. The GDC provides total attitude by updating attitude infor-
mation with angular rate inputs from Qyro assembly 1 or 2.

A-12

.___^.-.__-.
-__ -.- _.-..
-_-- ._I
ye-------------- -_---L---- -,--v--q
1
I ' GIMBAL - ' GIMBAL
I
ANGLES
I INERTIAL TOTAL ATTITUDE
INERTIAL
COUPLING
ANGLES COMMAND
MODULE
+ DISPLAY
KEYBOARD
I

I MEASUREMENT
UNITIIMU)
*
DATA UNIT
(ICDUl
COMPUTER
(CMC)
4 (DSKY)
I

I _
ATTITUDE
ERRORS
CREW INPUTS
I
I--_---L---------- _----m----- o-e---
PGNCS
J
l
I 1 ATTITUDE ERROR
I

I , GDC TOTAL
ATTITUDE
RATE -1,

I GYRO
DISPLAY
. ELECTRONIC
DISPLAY
ATTITUDE ERROR-1
ATTITUDE ERROR-2
w DIRECTOR
ATTITUDE
ASCP ATTITUDE
I COUPLER
(GDCI
ERROR
e
ASSEMBLY
IEDA)
ATTITUDE-1
ATTITUDE-2
+ INDICATOR
(FDAI) ND. 1
I A
-l
I ASCP ATTITUDE
ERROR
I ATTITUDE
I
I SET
CONTROL t
I
I PANEL
(ASCP)
IMUlGDC
TOTAL
I
I ATTITUDE I
r--‘--e-----
I
I
l
I
I
I I I
I I I
DISPLAY ANGULAR RATES MAIN
I L _____ I ----
' SWITCHING DISPLAY

I I CONSOLE
(MDC)

I I c
scs - 1

Figure A2.1-1.- Guidance and control.


Attitude error information is derived from three sources, The
first source is from zhe II.L? through the coupling Jata unit (CDU) which
c-spares I;?J gimbai angiea with CLIC commanded angles set into the CDU.
Any angular difference between the IMU gimbals and the CDU angles is
sent to the FDAI for display on the attitude error- needles. The second
source is from gyro assembly 1 which contains three (one for each of the
;i, Y, and Z axes) single-degree-of-freedom attitude gyros. Any space-
craft rotation about an axis will offset the case of a gyro from the
float. This rotation is sensed as a displacement off null, and a signal
is picked off which is representative of the magnitude and direction of
rotation. This signal is sent to the FDA1 for display on the attitude
error needles. The third source is from the GDC which develops attitude
errors by comparing angular rate inputs from gyro assembly 1 or 2 with
an internally stored orientation. These data are sent to the FDA1 for
display on the attitude error needles.
Angular rates are derived from either gyro assembly 1 or 2. Nor-
mally, the no. 2 assembly is used; however, gyro assembly 1 may be
switched to a backup rate mode if desired. For developing rate informa-
tion, the gyros are torqued to null when displaced; thus, they will
produce an output only when the spacecraft is being rotated. The output
signals are sent to the FDA1 for display on the rate needles and to the -.
GDC to enable updating of the spacecraft attitude.

Attitude Control

The attitude control function is illustrated in figure A2.1-2. The


control may be to maintain a specific orientation, or to command small
rotations or translations. To maintain a specific orientation, the
attitude error signals, described in the preceding paragraph, are also
r\,uted to the control reaction jet on-off assembly. These signals are
conditioned and applied to the proper reaction jet which fires in the
direction necessary to return the spacecraft to the desired attitude.
The attitude is maintained within specified deadband limits. The dead-
band is limited within both a rate and attitude limit to hold the
spacecraft excursions from exceeding either an attitude limit or angular
rate limit. To maneuver the spacecraft, the reaction jets are fired
automatically under ccmmand of the CMC or manually by flight crew use of
the rotation control, In either case, the attitude control function is
inhibited until the maneuver is completed, Translations of small magni-
tude are performed along the +X axis for fuel settling of SPS propellants
prior to burns, or for a backup deorbit by manual commands of the trans-
lation control. An additional control is afforded by enabling the mini-
mum impulse control at the lower equipment bay. The minimum impulse
control produces one directional pulse of small magnitude each time it is
moved from detent. These small pulses are used to position the spacecraft
for navigational sightings.

A-14
ENERGY STORAGE POWER GENERATION

ENTRY AND ’
POST LANDING
BATTERY A

FUEL CELL

a’I FUEL CELL 1


1 I . 1A 1 Oh - R/C
CRYOGLNtC
SUBSYSTEM i- 1,mz-l No-2 I \ 1 SENSE CKT

ENTRY AND
POST LANDING -
BATTERY B
I
ENTRY AND
POST LANDING I
BATTERY C
4
I I
f
PYRO
BATTERY A

PYRO
BATTERY B
I
INERATION 7 I POWERCONVERSION I POWER DISTRIBUTION

I I
I I

I
I
I
I
I AC INVERTER
. ...
-’
SENSE
II
CKT
.
j NO. 1

I I
I I I +
I 4 I
AC INVERTER
t INVERTER
DC&AC
+, CONTROL
NO. 3
CIRCUITS
I
I
I
I AC INVERTER
INVERTER
3M4lNB
PWR

I -A-
(RHE5275j

I 70A

I
‘II I I
POWER DISTRlBUTION

MAIN BUS
I SWITCH
F-l (BATA/c)
(MDC-5) I

Motor switches 51 and 52


CIOIC when main bus tic
witches 54 and 55 ore set to
Bat A/C and Bet B/C.

2 FCI coon be connected to


0
SMbusB6 FC3foSMbusA

DC bus cantlot circuit


0
breoksn ore illurtmted in
I MAIN BUS I battety charger ond CM DC
TIE SWITCH bus contml circuits schematic
(BAT B / C)
I 55 (MDC-5)

Figure A2.6l.- Electrical power subsystem block diagram.

A-29

_ -- .
..~ --

( I-

- .-
Functional Description

Energy storage.- The primary source of energy is the cryogenic gas


storage system that provides fuel (H2) and oxidizer (02) to the power
generating system. Two hydrogen and two oxygen tanks, with the asso-
ciated controls and plum.bing, are located in the service module. Storage
of reactants is accomplished under controlled cryogenic temperatures and
pressures; automatic and manual pressure control is provided. Automatic
heating of the reactants for repressurization is dependent on energy de-
mand by the power generating and/or envircnmental control subsystems.
Manual control can be used when required.

A secondary source of energy storage is provided by five silver


oxide-zinc batteries located in the CM. Three rechargeable entry and
postlanding batteries supply sequencer logic power at all times, supple-
mental dc power for peak loads, all operating power required for entry
and postlanding, and can be connected to power either or both pyro cir-
cuits. Two pyro batteries provide energy for activation of pyro devices
throughout all phases of a mission.

Power generation.- Three Bacon-type fuel cell power plants, gener-


ting power through electrochemical reaction of H2 and 02, supply primary
dc power to spacecraft systems until CSM separation. Each power plant is
capable of normally supplying from 400 to 1420 watts at 31 to 27 V dc (at
fuel cell terminals) to the power distribution system. During normal
operation all three power plants generate power, but two are adequate to
complete the mission. Should two of the three malfunction, one power
plant will insure successful mission termination; however, spacecraft
loads must be reduced to operate within the limits of a single power-
plant.

Normal fuel cell connection to the distribution system is: fuel


cell 1 to main dc bus A; fuel cell 2 to main dc busses A and B; ax-&fuel
cell 3 to main dc bus B. Manual switch control is provided for power
plant connection to the distribution system, and manual and/or automatic
control for power plant isolation in case of a malfunction.

During the CSM separation maneuver, the power plants supply power
through the SM buses to two SM jettison control sequencers. The sequen-
cers sustain SM RCS retrofire during CSM separation and fire the SM
positive roll RCS engines 2 seconds after separation to stabilize the SM
during entry. Roll engine firing is terminated 7.5 seconds after separa-
tion. The power plants and SM buses are isolated from the umbilical
through a SM deadface. The sequencers are connected to the SM buses when
the CM/SM SEP switch (MDC-2) is activated; separation occurs 100 milli-
seconds after switch activation.

A-30
Power conversion.- Primary dc power is converted into ac by solid
state static inverters that provide 115/200-volt 400-cps 3-phase ac power
up to 1250 volt-amperes each. The ac power is connected by motor switch
controls +Uo twc ac buses for distribution to the ac loads. One inverter
has the capability of supplying all spacecraft primary ac power. One
inverter can power both buses while the two remaining inverters act as
redundant sources. However, throughout the flight, each bus is powered
by a separate inverter. Provisions are made for inverter isolation in
the event of malfunctions. Inverter outputs cannot be phase synchro-
nized; therefore, interlocked motorized switching circuits are incor-
porated to prevent the connection of two inverters to the same bus.

A second conversion unit, the battery charger, assures keeping the


three entry and postlanding batteries in a fully charged state. It is a
solid state device utilizing dc from the fuel cells and ac from the in-
verter to develop charging voltage,

Power distribution.- Distribution of dc power is accomplished via


two redundant dc buses in the service module which are connected to two
redundant buses in the command module through a SM deadface, the CSM
umbilical, and a CM deadface. Additional buses provided are: two dc
buses for servicing nonessential loads: a flight bus for servicing in-
flight telecommunications equipment; two battery buses for distributing
power to sequencers, gimbal motor controls, and servicing the battery
relay bus for power distribution switching; and a flight and postlanding
bus for servicing some communications equipment and the postlanding loads.

Three-phase ac is distributed via two redundant ac buses, providing


bus selection through switches in the ac-operated component circuits.

Fower to the lunar module is provided through two umbilicals which


are manually connected after completion of transposition and docking,
An average of 81 watts dc is provided to continuous heaters in the abort
sensor assembly (ASA), and cycling heaters in the landing radar, rendez-
vous radar, S-band antenna, and inertial measurement unit (IMU). Power
consumption with all heaters operating simultaneously is approximately
309 watts. LM floodlighting is also powered through the umbilical for
use during manned lunar module operation while docked with the CSM.

A dc sensing circuit monitors voltage on each main dc bus, and an


ac sensing circuit monitors voltage on each ac bus. The dc sensors pro-
vide an indication of an undervoltage by illuminating a warning light.
The ac sensors illuminate a warning light when high- or low-voltage limits
are exceeded. In addition, the ac sensors activate an automatic discon-
nect of the inverter from the ac bus during an overvoltage condition.
The ac overload conditions are displayed by illumination of an overload
warning light and are accompanied by a low voltage light. Additional

A-31

.- .-r __
_-.._
i.._ _ __--___-.- __I--.- 1-w_ _-_-..-_.. --.._,~_-....-F-L-..-s.--_II
.. ___.ll-""" ----.i. ---1-_.- 1_11_-
sensors monitor fuel cell overload and reverse current conditions, pro-
viding an automatic disconnect, together with visual indications of the
disconnect whenever either condition is exceeded.

Switches, meters, lights, and talk-back indicators are provided for


controlling and monitoring all functions of the EPS.

Major Component/Subsystem Description

The subsequent paragraphs describe the cryogenic storage subsystem


and each of the various EPS components.

Cryogenic storage.- The cryogenic storage subsystem (figs. ~2.6-2


and ~2.6-3) supplies hydrogen to the EPS, and oxygen to the EPS, ECS, and
for initial LM pressurization. The two tanks in the hydrogen and oxygen
systems are of sufficient size to provide a safe return from the furthest
point of the mission on the fluid remaining in any one tank. The physical
data of the cryogenic storage subsystem are as follows:

Approximate
Minimum Approximate --
Weight Design quantities at
allowable flow rate
of usable storage minimum heater
operating at min dq/dm
cryogenics pressure
pressure (+li;5',F e;viro;m;nt: an~pef~nt~~$ing
(lb/tank) bia>
(psi4 lb hr- an s
(min dq/dm)

O2 320 (min) 900235 150 1.71 45 to 25%


H2 28 (min) 245 (+15, 100 0.140 53 to 33%
-20)

Initial pressurization from fill to operating pressures is accom-


plished by GSE. After attaining operating pressures, the cryogenic fluids
are in a single-phase condition, therefore, completely homogeneous. This
avoids sloshing which could cause sudden pressure fluctuations, possible
damage to internal components, and prevents positive mass quantity gaug-
ing. The single-phase expulsion process continues at nearly constant
pressure and increasing temperature above the 2-phase region.

A-32
.
+28 VDC CAUTIC
c‘""'"'" FILL VENTtGSEI (OV-1) WARN11
SYSTEh
- 02 CRYOPRESS(MDC-2) .

;OXYCEN FILL VALVE (GSE) (OF-l)


1 I 07 4 09 -
L 02 PRESS
IND WC-2 1
S"R0E FROM:SURGE TANK

K
DENSITY TANK PRESSURE
SIGNAL DENSITY
CONDITIONER SENSOR
PROBE rWK1
Q -I I

FAN MOTORS

,
I HEATERS t I

-J
L -C
-
I -
, OXYGEN RELIEF VENT (ORI
,-, n
"2 - "2
/ I -;(
HEATERS,

'I 1 9 2
4.
CRYOGENIC TAMS

DENSITYSIGNAL
CONDITIONER

,-OXYGEN FILL VALVE IGSEI (OF-Z)


II I
I - 07L II II L I, L
I
I- -
02 02 - 0
~z OXYGEN FILLVENT IGSE) (OV-2)

I, - 1
02
I
I
L
OXYGEN PUPGE VALVE IGSE) (OP) I
- 02 02 o2 - 0.
I I ,

Figure ~2.6-2.- Cryogenic stcrage subsystem (oxygen).

A-34
& TANK 1 & TANK 2
PRESS XDUCERS
ZRYO PRESS[MDC- 2)

I I I I I I
D-
02 TANK NO. 1 MOTOR SWITCH CONTACTS 0
02 TANK NO. 2
MOTOR SWITCH
CONTACTS

I I CONTACTS

AL
SM MAIN DC BUS Bl p ~ ’
F ” OF

II C

1
m MAIN D-C t
I I I I

I I I I
I
TO. FUEL CELL SHUTOFF VALVES

02 VAC ION PUMPS


A MN A (RHEB 229)
5A”

A MN 8 IRHEB 229)
05A0
:ENIC TAMS 02 HEATERS -2 j
CRYOGENIC 02 HTR-2 (MDC- 2)
MNB tRHEB-226) AUTO ( rl’
I L

OFF

ON
0 PRESSURE AND MOTOR
SWITCHES ARE SHOWN
02 IN LOW PRESSURE POSITION ON
TO
ECS

I
H? TAN-K 2
DiNSlTY 8 TEhtP
5 IGNAL COND

1 i

. . .
I . .-._
1\ H2TANK 1

-L
0, TANK NO. 2
~TOR sw lTcH
DENSITY & TEh4P
SIGNAL COND

QTY AMPL 1
AC I (RHER-2261
‘\TACTS @ CONTACTS

CRYOGENIC
FAN MOTORS
02 FANS -1 TANK 1
1MDC-2 I A-C BUS
AC2 (RHEB-2261
NO. 1

II OFF c.+o-
- 2A -

:RYOGENIC FAN MOTORS


TANK 2 A-C BUS
AC2 (RHEB-226)

ON
I

I
I
-l H2 TANK 2
DENSITY C TEMP H2FANS - 2 SWITCH
IMDC - 21 -
SIGNAL COND I
4
H2FANS - 1 SWITCH d
IMDC - 21
r, HYDROGEN FILL VENT IGSE) IHV-1)
1

HYDROGEN FILL VALVE (GSE) (HF-1)

C H2
I
I

CONDITIONER

I iMPL 1

\ HYDROGEN RELIEF! VENT (FLYAWAY UMBILICAL) (HR)


H2 - H2
/

CRYOGENIC TANKS

c HYDROGEN FILL VALVE (CSE) (HF-21 ION


PUMP
H2 - H2
r\ HYDROGEN FILL VENT IGSE) IHV-2) H2

I, - I
Li
HYDROGEN PURGE VALVE IGSE) (HP)
H2 - H2 9

FROM CB
CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS TANK 2 AC2 (RHEE-226)
CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS TANK 1 AC1 (RHEB-2261
H2

TEMP
TEMP SIGNAL
‘OGEN SENSOR CONOITIONFR ITT” I

SM MAIN DC
I I
-I I- CM r)-CMAlN

l-

VAC PS/,.q I;;y= II


ION
KiNAD” VALVE
PUMP

A
- H2

Hz -

CRYOGENIC H2 HTR 2 -
q$F//glm ._ ._. TANKsm ,
D-&IN MN B (RHEB-226)
BUS B
[
I-
IRE TANK NO. 2 0
PRESSURE
SWITCH

1 FILTER

I
Hz - H2 H2 - H2 H2
Ii2 TANK NO. 2
MOTOR SWITCH
Ii2 TANK NO. 1 MOTOR tiITCH CONTACTS (j) , CONTACTS
_ 1

H FANS -1
L DC-2)
AUTO
- 6C
OFF v
/
-C MAIN
BUS A \
H2 HEATERS - 1
CRYOGENIC H2 HTR l- (MDC-2)
MN A IRHEB-226)
AUTO
\
w OFF - H2 HEATERS -
\ - H2 FANS --,
0

H2 FANS -2
(MDC-2)
AUTO
- *A
OFF wT+
CRYOGENIC H2 HlR 2-
MN B (RHEB-22%) 71
---A
- OFF
0 -1
ON
---

01 PRESSUREAND MOTOR SWITCHES ARE


SHOWN IN LOW PRESSUREPOSITION

02 VAC ION PUMP FUSES OPENED


DURING PRELAUNCH COUNTDOWN

Figure ~2.6-3.- Cryogenic storage subsystem (hydrogen)

A-35
Two parallel dc heaters in each tank supply the heat necessary to
maintain design pressures. Two parallel 3-phase ac circulating fans
circulate the fluid over the heating elements to maintain a uniform den-
sity and decrease the probability of stratification. A typical heater
and fan installation is shown in figure A2.6-4. Relief valves provide
overpressure relief, check_valves provide tank isolation, and individual
fuel cell shutoff valves provide isolation of malfunctioning power plants.
Filters extract particles from the flowing fluid to protect the ECS and
EPS components. The pressure transducers and temperature probes indicate
the thermodynamic state of the fluid. A capacitive quantity probe in-
dicates quantity of fluid remaining in the tanks.

FAN &MOTOR

CAPYl1lvE
PRORE- ‘I
v

ENCASED
INTERNALLY

Figure A2.6-4.- Cryogenic pressurization and quantity


measurement devices.
c

A-36
Repressurization of the systems can be automatically or manually
controlled by switch selection. The automatic mode is designed to give
a single-phase reactant flow into the feed lines at design pressures.
The heaters and fans are automatically controlled through a pressure
switch-motor switch arrangement. As pressure in the tanks decreases,
the pressure switch in each tank closes to energize the motor switch,
closing contacts in the heater and fan circuits. Both tanks have to de-
crease in pressure before heater and fan circuits are energized. When
either tank reaches the upper operating pressure limit, that respective
pressure switch opens to again energize the motor switch, thus opening
the heater and fan circuits to both tanks. The 02 circuits are energized
at 865 psia minimum and de-energized at 935 psia maximum. The H2 circuits
energize at 225 psia minimum and de-energize at 260 psia maximum. The
most accurate quantity readout will be acquired shortly after the fans
have stopped. During all other periods partial stratification may de-
grade quantity readout accuracy.

When the systems reach the point where heater and fan cycling is at
a minimum (due to a reduced heat requirement), heat leak of the tank is
sufficient to maintain design pressures, provided flow is within the min
dq/dm values shown in the preceding tabulation. This realm of operation
is referred to as the min dq/dm region. The minimum heat requirement
region for oxygen starts at approximately 45-percent quantity and ter-
minates at approximately 25-percent quantity. Between these tank quan-
tities, minimum heater and fan cycling will occur under normal usage.
The amount of heat required for repressurization at quantities below
25-percent starts to increase until below the j-percent level practically
continuous heater and fan operation is required. In the hydrogen system,
the quantity levels for minimum heater and fan cycling are between ap-
proximately 53 and 33 percent, with continuous operation occurring at
approximately the 5 percent-level.

Assuming a constant level flow from each tank (02 - 1 lb/hr,


0.09 lb/hr) each successive repressurization period is of longer
H2 -
duration. The periods between repressurizations lengthen as quantity
decreases from full to the minimum dq/dm level, and become shorter as
quantity decreases from the minimum dq/dm level to the residual level.
Approximate repressurization periods are shown in table A2.6-I, which
also shows the maximum flow rate in pounds per hour from a single tank
with the repressurization circuits maintaining minimum design pressure.

The maximum continuous flow that each cryogenic tank can provide at
minimum design pressure is dependent on the quantity level and the heat
required to maintain that pressure. The heat required to maintain a con-
stant pressure decreases as quantity decreases from full to the minimum

A-37
dq/dm point. As quantity decreases beyond the minimum dq/dm region, the
heat required to maintain a constant pressure increases. As fluid is
withdrawn, a specific amount of heat is withdrawn. When the withdrawal
rate exceeds the heat that can be supplied by the heaters, fan motors,
and heat leak, there is a resultant pressure decrease below the minimum
design operating level.

The ability to sustain pressure and flow is a factor of the amount


of heat required versus the heat provided by heaters, fan motors, and
heat leak. Since heat leak characteristics of each tank vary slightly,
the flow each tank can provide will also vary to a small degree. Heat
input from heaters, fan motors, and heat leak into an 02 tank is
595.87 Btu/hour (113.88-watt heaters supply 389.67 Btu, 52.8-watt fan
motors supply 180.2 Btu, and heat leak supplies 26 Btu). Heat input from
similar sources into a H2 tank is 94.6 Btu/hr (18.6-watt heaters supply
63.48 Btu, 7-watt fan motors supply 23.89 Btu, and heat leak supplies
7.24 Btu). These figures take into consideration the line loss between
the power source and the operating component.

TABLE ~2.6-I.- OXYGENAND HYDROGENREPRESSURIZATION AND FLOW.

Wren
Quantity Repressurization
Flow at
(percent) time, minutes
(865 to 935 psia) 865 psia
100 4.0 3.56 20.0 0.38
4.3 21.0 0.42
:z 4.6 '4.;:
. 22.0 0.46
85
80
75
5:: I 5.27
6.02
7.01
23.0
24.5
26.5
0.49
0.52
0.65
2:; 7.94 28.5 0.76
:p 7.4 9.01 31.0 0.80
60 8.7 10.80 33.5 0.87
55 9.6 12.54 36.0 0.93
10.8 14.19 39.0 0.97
z; 11.5 15.69 41.0 0.98
40 12.4 17.01 41.0 0.97
12.6 17.56 41.0 0.94
52 13.0 17.56 40.5 0.91
25 13.1 16.55 40.5 0.83
20 42.0 0.71
1.5 47.0 0.54
10 58.0 0.37
'I . 5 71.0 0.23
5 Continuous 0.16

A-38

-. --.. I..-.-- -I_i_^-----_-.--~ll~-IIII1l~. __;__-. __.I.~- --.-


.I____ I__ -
To avoid excessive temperatures, which could be realized during con-
tinuous heater and fan operation at extremely low quantity levels, a
thermal sensitive interlock device is in series with each heater element.
The device automatically opens the heater circuits when internal tank
shell temperatures reach +9G" F., and closes the circuits at +7G" F.
Assuming normal consumption, oxygen temperature will be approximately
-157" F., at mission termination, while hydrogen temperature will be
approximately -385" F.

The manual mode of operation bypasses the pressure switches, and


supplies power directly to the heaters and/or fans through the individual
control switches. It can be used in case of automatic control failure,
heater failure, or fan failure.

Tank pressures and quantities are monitored on meters located on


MIX-2. The caution and warning system (CRY0 PRESS) will alarm when
oxygen pressure in either tank exceeds 950 psia or falls below 8GG psia.
The hydrogen system alarms above 270 psia and below 220 psia. Since a
common lamp is provided, reference must be made to the individual pressure
and quantity meters (MDC-2) to determine the malfunctioning tank. Tank
pressures, quantities, and reactant temperatures of each tank are telem-
etered to MSFN.

Oxygen relief valves vent at a pressure between 983 and 1010 psig
and reseat at 965 psig minimum. Hydrogen relief valves vent at a pressure
between 273 and 285 psig, and reseat at 268 psig minimum. Full flow
venting occurs approximately 2 pounds above relief valve opening pressure.

All the reactant tanks have vat-ion pumps to maintain the integrity
of the vacuum between the inner and outer shell, thus maintaining heat
leak at or below the design level. SM main de bus A distributes power
to the H2 tank 1 pump and bus B to the H2 tank 2 pump. Fuses provide
power source protection. These fuses are removed during prelaunch to
disable the circuit for flight. Circuit breakers, G2 VAC ION PUMPS -
MNA- MJTB (m-29), Provide power source protection for the CM main
buses, which distribute power to the O2 vat-ion pumps. The circuit
breakers allow use of the O2 vat-ion pump circuits throughout flight, and
provide a means of disabling circuit if necessary. The O2 circuit breakers
are opened on the launch pad, and closed at 90 percent tank quantity.

The most likely period of overpressurization in the cryogenic system


will occur during operation in the minimum dq/dm region. The possibility
of overpressurization is predicted on the assumption of a vacuum break-
down, resulting in an increase in heat leak. Also, under certain con-
ditions, that is, extremely low power levels and/or a depressurized cabin,

A-39

~*-_....
-- __ ‘.__”-.,.. _.-.--. --. . _...,“.---. __cI_ -- .-__..
- --.x_I-
demand may be lower than the minimum dq/dm flow necessary. Any of the
preceding conditions would result in an increase of pressure within a
tank.

In the case of hydrogen tank overpressurization, prior to reaching


relief valve cracking pressure, tank pressure can be decreased by per-
forming an unscheduled fuel cell hydrogen purge. A second method for
relieving overpressure is to increase electrical loads, thus increasing
fuel cell demand. However, in using this method, consideration must be
given to the fact that there will be an increase in oxygen consumption,
which may not be desirable.

Several procedures can be used to correct an overpressure condition


in the oxygen system. One is to perform an unscheduled fuel cell purge.
A second is to increase oxygen flow into the command module by opening
the ECS DIRECT O2 valve. The third is to increase electrical loads,
which may not be desirable because this method will also increase hydro-
gen consumption.

A requirement for an overpressure correction in both reactant sys-


tems simultaneously is remote, since both reactant systems do not reach
the minimum dq/dm region in parallel.
.
During all missions, to retain a single tank return capability, there
is a requirement to maintain a balance between the two tanks in each of
the reactant systems. When a 2- to b-percent difference is indicated on
the oxygen quantity meters (MIX-2), the O2 HEATERS switch (MDC-2) of the
lesser tank is positioned to OFF until tank quantities equalize. A
3-percent difference in the hydrogen quantity meters (MDC-2) will require
positioning the H2 BEATERS switch (MDC-2) of the lesser tank to OFF until
tank quantities equalize. This procedure retains the automatic operation
of the repressurization circuits, and provides for operation of the fan
motors during repressurization to retain an accurate quantity readout in
all tanks. The necessity for balancing should be determined shortly after
a repressurization cycle, since quantity readouts will be most accurate at
this time.

Batteries.- Five silver oxide-zinc storage batteries are incorporated


in the EPS. These batteries are located in the CM lower equipment bay.

Three rechargeable entry and postlanding batteries (A, B, and C)


power the CM systems after CSM separation and during postlanding. Prior
to CBI separation, the batteries provide a secondary source of power while
the fuel cells are the primary source. The entry batteries are used for
the following purposes:

A-40
a. Provide CM power after CSM separation

b. Supplement fuel cell power during peak load periods (Delta V


maneuvers)

C. Provide power during emergency operations (failure of two fuel


cells)

d. Provide power for EPS control circuitry (relays, indicators,


etc.)

e. Provide sequencer logic power

f. Provide power for recovery aids during postlanding

g* Batteries A, B, or C can power pyro circuits by selection.

Each entr;{ and postlanding battery is mounted in a vented plastic


case and consists of 20 silver oxide-zinc cells connected in series.
The cells are individually encased in plastic containers which contain
relief valves that open at 35 + 5 psig, venting during an overpressure
into the battery case. The three cases can be vented overboard through
a common manifold, the BATTERY VENT valve (RHEB-252), and the ECS waste
water dump line.

Since the BATTERY VENT is closed prior to lift-off, the interior of


the battery cases is at a pressure of one atmosphere. The pressure is
relieved after earth orbit insertion and completion of cabin purge by
positioning the control to VENT for 5 seconds. After completion the
control is closed, and pressure as read out on position 4A of the System
Test Meter (LEB-101) should remain at zero unless there is battery out-
gassing. Gutgassing can be caused by an internal battery failure, an
abnormal high-rate discharge, or by overcharging. If a pressure increase
is noted on the system test meter, the BATTERY VENT is positioned to VENT
for 5 seconds, and reclosed. Normal battery charging procedures require
a check of the battery manifold after completion of each recharge.

Since the battery vent line is connected to the waste water dump
line, it provides a means of monitoring waste water dump line plugging,
which would be indicated by a pressure rise in the battery manifold line
when the BATTERY VENT control is positioned to VENT.

Each battery is rated at 40-ampere hours (AH) minimum and will de-
liver this at a current output of 35 amps for 30 minutes and a subsequent
output of 2 amps for the remainder of the rating.

A-41
At Apollo mission loads, each battery is capable of providing 45 AH
and will provide this amount after each complete recharge cycle. How-
ever, 40 AH is used in mission planning for inflight capability, and
45 AH for postlanding capability of a fully charged battery.

Open circuit voltage is 37.2 volts. Sustained battery loads are


extremely light (2 to 3 watts); therefore, a battery bus voltage of
approximately 34 V dc will be indicated on the spacecraft voltmeter, ex-
cept when the main bus tie switches have been activated to tie the battery
outputs to the main dc buses. Normally, only batteries A and B will be
connected to the main de buses. Battery C is isolated during prelaunch
by opening the MAIN A-BAT C and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers (RHEB-275).
Battery C will therefore provide a backup for main dc bus power in case
of failure of battery A or B or during the time battery A or B is being
recharged. The two-battery configuration provides more efficient use of
fuel cell power during peak power loads and decreases overall battery
recharge time. The M&IN A- and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers are closed
prior to CSM separation or as required during recharge of battery A or B.

Battery C, through circuit breakers BAT C to BAT BUS A and BAT C to


BAT BUS B (RHEB-250), provides backup power to the respective battery bus
in the event of failure of entry battery A or B. These circuit breakers
are normally open until a failure of battery A or B occurs. This circuit -
can also be used to recharge battery A or B in the event of a failure in
the normal charging circuit.

The two pyrotechnic batteries supply power to initiate ordnance de-


vices in the SC. The pyrotechnic batteries are isolated from the rest of
the EPS to prevent the high-power surges in the pyrotechnic system from
affecting the EPS, and to insure source power when required. These
batteries are not to be recharged in flight. Entry and postlanding
oattery A, B, or C can be used as a redundant source of power for ini-
tiating pyro circuits in the respective A or B pyro system, if either
pyro battery fails, This can be performed by proper manipulation of the
circuit breakers on RHEB-250. Caution must be exercised to isolate the
failed pyro battery by opening the PYRO A (B) SE& A (B) circuit breaker,
prior to closing the yellow colored BAT BUS A (B) to PYRO BUS TIE circuit
breaker.

A-42
Performance characteristics of each SC battery are as follows:

Rated open Ambient


capacity circuit Nominal Minimum
Battery battery
per voltage voltage voltage
temperature
battery (max.)
Entry and 40 amp-hrs 37.8 V dc mar 29 V dc 27 V dc 50” to
Postlanding (25 ampere (37.2 V dc i; (35 amps (35 amps 110" F
A, B, and rate) flight) load) load)
c (3)

Pyre A and 0.75 amp- 37.8 V dc max 23 v dc 20 v dc 60” to


B (2) hrs (75 (37.2 V dc ir (75 amps (75 amps 110" F
amps for flight) load) load)
36 seconds) (32 V dc
open
circuit)

NOTE: Pyro battery load voltage is not measurable in the SC due to the
extremely short time they power pyro loads.

Fuel cell power plants.- Each of the three Bacon-type fuel cell
power plants is individually coupled to a heat rejection (radiator) sys-
tem, the hydrogen and oxygen cryogenic storage systems, a water storage
system, and a power distribution system. A typical power plant schematic
is shown in figure A2.L5.
The power plants generate dc power on demand through an exothermic
chemical reaction. The by-product water is fed to a potable water stor-
age tank in the CM where it is used for astronaut consumption and for
cooling p'zposes in the ECS. The amount of water produced is equivalent
to the power produced which is relative to the reactant consumed. (See
table ~2.6-11.)
TABLE ~2.6-II.- REACTANTCONSWTIOPJurn WATERPRODUCTION

Load
(amps 1

0.5
O2 lb/hr

0.0102
T H2 lb/hr

0.001285
H2°
Ib/hr

0.01149
T x/hr

5.21
1 0.0204 0.002570 0.02297 10.42
2 0.0408 0.005140 0.04594 20.84
3 0.0612 0.007710 0.0689i 31.26
4 0.0816 0.010280 0.09188 41.68
5 0.1020 0.012850 0.11485 52.10
6 0.1224 0.015420 0.13782 62.52
7 0.1428 0.017990 0.16079 72.94
8 0.1632 0.020560 0.18376 83.36
9 0.1836 0.023130 0.20673 93.78
10 0.2040 0.025700 0.2297 104.20
15 0.3060 0.038550 0.34455 156.30
20 0.4080 0.051400 0.45940 208.40
25 0.5100 0.064250 0.57425 260.50
30 0.6120 0.077100 0.68910 3~2.60
35 0.7140 0.089950 0.80395 364.70
40 0.8160 0.10280 0.91880 416.80
'15 0.9180 0.11565 I.03365 448.90
50 1.0200 0.12850 1.1485 521.00
55 1.1220 0.14135 1.26335 573.10
60 1.2240 0.15420 1.3782 625.20
65 1.3260 0.16705 1.49305 677.30
70 i .4280 0.17990 1.6079 729.40
75 1.5300 0.19275 1.72275 781.50
80 1.6320 0.20560 1.83760 833.60
85 1.7340 0.21845 1.95245 885.70
90 1.8360 0.23130 2.06730 937.90
95 1.9380 0.24415 2.18215 989.00
100 2.0400 0.25700 2.2970 1042.00
XMIJLAS:
O2 = 2.04 x lO-2 I H20 = 10.42 cc/amp/hr
H = 2.57 x 10 -3 I H20 = 2.297 x 10m2 lb/amp/hr
2

A-44

-----.“.~ .._. ---~~--___-


I 1111II I I I I I I I
IIIII I I I
1111II I I I I I I I
I

uxYGEN GAS PURITY LEVEL (% BY VOLUME)

1,i e;ure AZ. 6- '(.- O2 gas purity effect on purge interval.

A-49
I
tiiii i i i I I
/ /Ml I I

/ //
///: I
/‘A%’
SPiC I-klRIfY

HYDROGEN GAS INERT LEVEL (P;hl)


II I
10,000 libb 100 10
0.1 11 1 I
99.0 99.9 99.99 99.999
HYDROGEN GAS PURITY LEVEL f% BY VOLUME)

Figure A2.6-8.- H2 gas purity effect on purge interval.

A-50

I - . ..-.... 1 . __l_"-^"--.- .---..-_.


voltage, resulting from a decreased load, is followed by a gradual de-
crease in fuel cell skin temperature which causes a decrease in terminal
voltage.

The range in which the terminal voltage is permitted to vary is de-


termined by the high and low voltage input design limits of the compo-
nents being powered. For most components the limits are 30 volts dc and
25 volts de. To remain within these design limits, the dc bus voltage
must be maintained between 31.0 and 26.2 volts dc. To compensate for
cyclic loads, it is recommended sustained bus voltage be maintained be-
tween 26.5 and 30.0 V dc. Bus voltage is maintained within prescribed
limits by the application of entry and postlanding batteries during load
increases (power up). Load increase or decrease falls well within the
limits of power supply capability and, under normal conditions, should
not require other than normal checklist procedures.

Power up.- Powering Up SpaCeCraft systems is performed in one con-


tinuous sequence providing the main bus voltage does not decrease below
26.5 volts. If bus voltage decreases to this level, the power up sequence
can be interrupted for the time required for fuel cell temperatures to
increase with the resultant voltage increase or the batteries can be con-
nected to the main buses thus reducing the fuel cell load. In most cases,
powering up can be performed in one continuous sequence; however, when
starting from an extremely low spacecraft load, it is probable that a
power up interruption or earlier battery coupling may be required. The
greatest load increase occurs while powering up for a delta V maneuver.

Power down.- Powering down spacecraft systems is performed in one


continuous sequence providing the main bus voltage does not increase
above 31.0 volts. Powering down from relatively high spacecraft load
levels, that is, following a delta V, the sequence may have to be inter-
rupted for the time required for fuel cell temperature, and as a result,
bus voltage to decrease. To expedite power down, one fuel cell can be
disconnected from the buses increasing the loads on the remaining fuel
cells and decreasing bus voltage, thus allowing continuation of the power
down sequence.

Fuel cell disconnect.- If the requirement arises to maintain a


power plant on open circuit, temperature decay would occur at an average
rate of approximately 6 deg/hr, with the automatic in-line heater cir-
cuit activating at a skin temperature of 385’ F and maintaining power
plant temperature at 385” F. In-line heater activation can be confirmed
by a 4.5- to 6-amp indication as observed on the dc amps meter (MDC-3)
with the de indicator switch positioned to the open circuited fuel cell
position. Reactant valves remain open. Fuel cell pumps can be turned
off until the in-line heater circuit activates, at which time they must
be on.

A-51
Closing of reactant valves during a power plant disconnect is de-
pendent on the failure experienced. If power plant failure is such as
to allow future use, that is, shutdown due to partially degraded output,
it is recommended the reactant valves remain open to provide a positive
reactant pressure. The valves should be closed after power-plant skin
temperature decays below 300" F. The reactant valves are closed during
initial shutdown, if the failure is a reactant leak, an abnormally high
regulator output pressure, or complete power-plant failure.

Prior to disconnecting a fuel cell, if a single inverter is being


used, each of the remaining power plants is connected to both main de
buses to enhance load sharing since bus loads are unbalanced. If two
inverters are being used, main de bus loads are relatively equal; there-
fore, each of the remaining power plants is connected to a separate main
dc bus for bus isolation. If one power plant had been placed on open
circuit for an extended period of time , prior to powering up to a con-
figuration requiring three power plants, reconnecting is accomplished
prior to the time of heavy load demands. This permits proper conditioning
of the power plant which has been on open circuit. The time required for
proper conditioning is a function of skin temperature increase and the
load applied to the power plant.

Inverters.- Each inverter (fig. ~2.6-9) is composed of an oscillator, ._


an eight-stage digital countdown section, a de line filter, two silicon
controlled rectifiers, a magnetic amplifier, a buck-boost amplifier, a
demodulator, two dc filters, an eight-stage power inversion section, a
harmonic neutralization transformer, an ac output filter, current sensing
transformers, a Zener diode reference bridge, a low-voltage control, and
an overcurrent trip circuit. The inverter normally uses a 6.bkHz square
wave synchronizing signal from the central timing equipment (CTE) which
maintains inverter output at 400 Hz. If this external signal is com-
pletely lost, the free running oscillator within the inverter will provide
pulses that will maintain inverter output within f7 Hz. The internal os-
cillator is normally synchronized by the external pulse. The subsequent
paragraphs describe the function of the various stages of the inverter.

The 6.4-kHz square wave provided by the CTE is applied through the
internal oscillator to the eight-stage digital countdown section. The
oscillator has two divider circuits which provide a 1600-Hz signal to the
magnetic amplifier.

The eight-stage digital countdown section, triggered by the 6.4-kHz


signal, produces eight 400-Hz square waves, each mutually displaced one
pulse-time from the preceding and following wave. One pulse-time is
156 microseconds and represents 22.5 electrical degrees. The eight square
waves are applied to the eight-stage power inversion section.

..-
25-30 VOCTS

r - I--- ------ ------


D-C INPUT
I

7 BlAS
r 1

TRANSFORMER

VOLTAGE

DEMODULATOR A-C
FILTER

I .6 KH, VOLTAGE'& L-L 30


CURRENT
REGULATION I BUS 2
--s--- -I

r ---OSCILLATOR
CONTROL
1 I
I I

I-
I COUNTDOWN

I WI
EMP HI4-
I
:aw
I I
I -- -I
I
I 4.4 KHz

r- ------- --
1
NEGATIVE
If--
SQUARE WAVE

NOTE: Unless othcwiw specified:


I. hetier 1 is shown.
2. A denotes input voltage.

Figure ~2.6-9. - Inverter block diagram.

A-53
The eight-stage power inversion section, fed a controlled voltage
from the buck-boost amplifier, amplifies the eight 400-Hz square waves
produced by the eight-stage digital countdown section. The amplified
square waves, still mutually displaced 22.5 electrical degrees, are next
applied to the harmonic neutralization transformer.

The harmonic neutralization section consists of 31 transformer


windings on one core. This section accepts the 400-Hz square-wave output
of the eight-stage power inversion section and transforms it into a
?-phase 400-Hz 115-volt signal. The manner in which these transformers
are wound on a single core produces flux cancellation which eliminates
all harmonics up to and including the fifteenth of the fundamental fre-
quency. The 22.5" displacement of the square waves provides a means of
electrically rotating the square wave excited primary windings around the
3-phase, wye-connected secondary windings, thus producing the 3-phase
400-Hz sine wave output. This 115-volt signal is then applied to the ac
output filter.

The ac output filter eliminates the remaining higher harmonics.


Since the lower harmonics were eliminated by the harmonic neutral trans-
former, the size and weight of this output filter was reduced. Circuitry
in this filter also produces a rectified signal which is applied to the
Zener diode reference bridge for voltage regulation. The amplitude of
this signal is a function of the amplitude of ac output voltage. After
filtering, the 3-phase 115-volt ac 400-Hz sine wave is applied to the ac
buses through individual phase current-sensing transformers.

The current-sensing transformers produce a rectified signal, the


amplitude of which is a direct function of inverter output current magni-
tude. This dc signal is applied to the Zener diode reference bridge to
regulate inverter current output: it is also paralleled to an overcurrent
sensing circuit.

The Zener diode reference bridge receives a rectified de signal,


representing voltage output, from the circuitry in the ac output filter.
A variance in voltage output unbalances the bridge, providing an error
signal of proper polarity and magnitude to the buck-boost amplifier via
the magnetic amplifier. The buck-boost amplifier, through its bias volt-
age output, compensates for voltage variations. When inverter current
output reaches 200 to 250 percent of rated current, the rectified signal
applied to the bridge from the current sensing transformers is of suf-
ficient magnitude to provide an error signaL,causing the buck-boost am-
plifier to operate in the same manner as during an overvoltage condition.
The bias output of the buck-boost amplifier, controlled by the error sig-
nal, will be varied to correct for any variation in inverter voltage or a
beyond-tolerance increase in current output. When inverter current output
exceeds 250 percent of rated current, the overcurrent sensing circuit is
activated.

A-54

------__1_1-^-".---. ___..--- -_. -I_ _--


The overcurrent sensing circuit monitors a rectified dc signal rep-
resenting current output. When total inverter current output exceeds
250 percent of rated current, this circuit will illuminate an overload
lamp in 15+5 seconds. If current output of any single phase exceeds
300 percent of rated current, this circuit will illuminate the overload
lamp in 5-+1 seconds. The AC BUS 1 OVERLOADand AC BUS 2 OVERLOADlamps
are in the caution/warning matrix on MDC-2.

The de power to the inverter is supplied from the main dc buses


through the de line filter. The filter reduces the high-frequency ripple
in the input, and the 25 to 30 volts de is applied to two silicon-
controlled rectifiers.

The silicon-controlled rectifiers are alternately set by the 1600-Hz


signal from the magnetic amplifier to produce a de square wave with an
on-time of greater than 90" from each rectifier. This is filtered and
supplied to the buck-boost amplifier where it is transformer-coupled with
the amplified 1600-Hz output of the magnetic amplifier, to develop a fil-
tered 35 volts dc which is used for amplification in the power inversion
stages.

The buck-boost amplifier also provides a variable bias voltage to


the eight-stage power inversion section. The amplitude of this bias
voltage is controlled by the amplitude and polarity of the feedback sig-
nal from the Zener diode reference bridge which is referenced to output
voltage and current. This bias signal is varied by the error signal to
regulate inverter voltage and maintain current output within tolerance.

The demodulator circuit compensates for any low-frequency ripple


(10 to 1000 Hz) in the dc input to the inverter. The high-frequency
ripple is attenuated by the input filters. The demodulator senses the
35-volt dc output of the buck-boost amplifier and the current input to
the buck-boost amplifier. An input dc voltage drop or increase will be
reflected in a drop or increase in the 35-volt dc output of the buck-
boost amplifier, as well as a drop or increase in current input to the
buck-boost amplifier. A sensed decrease in the buck-boost amplifier
voltage output is compensated for by a demodulator output, coupled through
the magnetic amplifier to the silicon-controlled rectifiers. The demod-
ulator output causes the SCR's to conduct for a longer time, thus in-
creasing their filtered dc output. A sensed increase in buck-boost am-
plifier voltage output, caused by an increase in dc input to the inverter,
is compensated for by a demodulator output coupled through the magnetic
amplifier to the silicon-controlled rectifiers, causing them to conduct
for shorter periods, thus producing a lower filtered dc output to the
buck-boost amplifier. In this manner, the 35-volt dc input to the power
inversion section is maintained at a relatively constant level irrespec-
tive of the fluctuations in de input voltage to the inverter.

A-55
The low-voltage control circuit samples the input voltage to the
inverter and can terminate inverter operation. Since the buck-boost
amplifier provides a boost action during a decrease in input voltage to
the inverter, in an attempt to maintain a constant 35 volts dc to the
power inversion section and a regulated 115-volt inverter output, the
high boost required during a low-voltage input would tend to overheat
the solid state buck-boost amplifier. As a precautionary measure, the
low-voltage control will terminate inverter operation by disconnecting
operating voltage to the magnetic amplifier and the first power inversion
stage when input voltage decreases to between 16 and 19 volts dc.

A temperature sensor with a range of +32O to +248' F is installed


in each inverter and provides an input to the C&WSwhich will illuminate
a light at an inverter overtemperature of 190" F. Inverter temperature
is telemetered to MSFN.

Battery charger.- A constant voltage, solid-state battery charger


(fig. A2.6-lo), located in the CM lower equipment bay, is incorporated
into the EPS. The BATTERY CHARGERselector switch (MDC-3) controls power
input to the charger, as well as connecting the charger output to the
selected battery (fig. A2.6-14). When the BATTERY CHARGERselector
switch is positioned to entry battery A, B, or C, a relay (Kl) is acti-
vated completing circuits from ac and dc power sources to the battery
charger. Battery charger output is also connected to the selectedbattery -
to be charged through contacts of the MAIN BUS TIE motor switch. Posi-
tioning the MAIN BUS TIE switch (A/C or B/C) to OFF for battery A or B,
and both switches to OFF for battery C will disconnect main bus loads from
the respective batteries and also complete the circuit from the charger to
the battery.

The battery charger is provided 25 to 30 volts from both main!dc


buses and 115 volts 400-Hz T-phase from either of the ac buses. All three
phases of ac are used to boost the 25- to TO-volt de input and produce
40 volts dc for charging. In addition, phase A of the ac is used to
supply power for the charger circuitry. The logic network in the charger,
which consists of a two-stage differential amplifier (comparator), Schmitt
trigger, current sensing resistor, and a voltage amplifier, sets up the
initial condition for operation. The first stage of the comparator is
in the on mode, with the second stage off, thus setting the Schmitt
trigger first stage to on with the second stage off. Maximum base drive
is provided to the current amplifier which turns the switching transistor
to the on mode. With the switching transistor on, current flows from the
transformer rectifier through the switching transistor, current sensing
resistor, and switch choke to the battery being charged. Current lags
voltage due to switching choke action. As current flow increases, the
voltage drop across the sensing resistor increases, and at a specific
level sets the first stage of the comparator to off and the second stage

A-56

I_ . _--II _.-._I..
_..-4-_"1"e._-
.-II _l-.l..-_-~~,-"--
r --w--m r-- 1 I-
---
1
i
I I
t-[ i
I

i CURRENT
AMPLIFIER
i

I[ I-- I

L- .---- J
DC INDICATORS
SW (MDC-3) +
VOLTMETER

TELEMETRY
DC INDICATORS
SW (MDC-3) AMMETER
_ _
1
BATTERY
CHARGE
(MDC-3)

C
B

.I1
:
BATTERY CHARGER b
r- BAT A CHG
(MDC-5)

I BATTERY
BUS A
* I
BAT A PWR
SWITCHING
ENTRY/POST LANDING BOA
DIODE
(RHEB 250)
m- J
CB41
(ON BATTERY)

40 VDC

BATTERY A

DC NEG
_-
MNDC -

.,

Figure ~2.6-ILO.- Battery charger block diagram.

A-57
to on. The voltage amplifier is set off to reverse the Schmitt trigger
to first stage off and second stage on. This sets the current amplifier
off, which in turn sets the switching transistor off. The switching
transistor in the off mode terminates power from the source, causing the
field in the choke to continue collapsing, discharging into the battery,
then through the switching diode and the current sensing resistor to the
opposite side of the choke. As the EMF in the choke decreases, current
through the sensing resistor decreases, reducing the voltage drop across
the resistor. At some point, the decrease in voltage drop across the
sensing resistor reverses the comparator circuit, setting up the initial
condition and completing one cycle of operation;. The output load current,
due to the choke action, remains&relatively constant except for the small
variation through the sensing resistor. This variation is required to set
and reset the switching transistor and Schmitt trigger through the action
of the comparator.

Battery charger output is regulated by the sensing resistor until


battery voltage reaches approximately 37 volts. At this point, the bi-
ased voltage sensor circuit is unbiased, and in conjunction with the
sensing resistor, provides a signal for cycling the battery charger. As
battery voltage increases, the internal impedance of the battery increases,
decreasing current flow from the charger. At 39.8 volts, the battery is
fully charged and current flow becomes negligible. Recharging the bat-
teries until battery amp hour input equates amp hours previously dis- __-.
charged from the battery assures sufficient battery capacity for mission
completion. The MSFN will monitor this function. If there is no contact
with the MSFN, battery charging is terminated when the voltmeter indicates
39.5 V dc with the DC INDICATORS switch set to the BAT CHARGERposition.

Charger voltage is monitored on the DC VOLTS METER (MDC-3). Current


output is monitored on the inner scale of the DC AMPS meter (MDC-3) by
placing the DC INDICATORS switch (MIX-3) to the BAT CHARGERposition.
Battery charger current output is telemetered to the MSFN.

When charging battery A or B, the respective BAT RLY BUS-BAT A or B


circuit breaker (MDC-5) is opened to expedite recharge. During this
period, only one battery will be powering the battery relay bus. Relay
bus voltage can be monitored by selecting positions 4 and B on the Systems
Test Meter (LEB-101) and from the couches by the Fuel Cell-Main Bus B-l
and Fuel Cell - Main Bus A-3 talk-back indicators (MDC-3) which will be
barber-poled. If power is lost to the relay bus, these indicators will
revert to the gray condition, indicating loss of power to the relay bus
and requiring remedial action.

Recharge of a battery immediately after it is exposed to any appre-


ciable loads requires less time than recharge of a battery commencing
30 minutes or more after it is disconnected from these loads. Therefore,
it is advantageous to connect batteries to the charger as soon as possible

A-58
after they are disconnected from the main buses since this decreases
overall recharge time.

Power distribution.- The dc and ac power distribution to components


of the EPS is provided by two redundant buses in each system. A single-
point ground on the spacecraft structure is used to eliminate ground loop
effects. Sensing and control circuits are provided for monitoring and
protection of each system.

Distribution of dc power (fig. ~2.6-11) is accorr,plished with a two-


wire system and a series of interconnected buses, switches, circuit
breakers, and isolation diodes. The dc negative buses are connected to
the vehicle ground point (VGP). The buses consist of the following:

a. Two main de buses (A and B), powered by the three fuel cells
and/or entry and postlanding batteries A, B, and C.

b. Two battery buses (A and B), each powered by its respective


entry and postlanding battery A and B. Battery C can power either or
both buses if batieries A and/or B fail.

C.Flight and postlanding bus, p owered through both main dc buses


and diodes, or directly by the three entry and postlanding batteries A,
B, and C, through dual diodes.

d. Flight bus, powered through both main dc buses and isolation


diodes.

e. Nonessential bus, powered through either dc main bus A or B.

f. Battery relay bus, powered by entry and postlanding batteries


through the individual battery buses and isolation diodes.

g- Pyro b?Lzes, isolated from the main electrical power system when
powered by the pyre batteries, A capbility is provided to connect either
entry battery to the A or B pyro system in case of loss of a pyro battery.

h. SM jei;tison controllers, completely isolated from the main


electrical power system until activated during CSM separation, after
which they are powered by the fuel cells.

Power from the fuel cell power plants can be connected to the main
de buses through six motor switches (part of overload/reverse current
circuits in the SM) which are controlled by switches in the CMlocated
on MDC-3. Fuel cell power can be selected to either or both of the main
de buses. Six talk-back indicators show gray when fuel cell output is
connected and striped when disconnected. When an overload condition
occurs, the overload-reverse current circuits in the SM automatically

A-59

I I-. _.__I.. __-__---.-_.I-__..--


_“.,_,..-_.___._._...._
____I I^_I-^. .-_---.-___.-.-
disconnect the fuel cell power plants from the overloaded bus and provide
visual displays (talk-back indicator and caution and warning lamp illumi-
nation)(FC BUS DISCONNECT) for isolation of the trouble. A reverse current
condition will disconnect the malfunctioning power plant from the dc sys-
tem. The de undervoltage sensing circuits (fig. ~2.6-12) are provided to
indicate bus low-voltage conditions. If voltage drops below 26.25 volts
dc, the applicable de undervoltage light on the caution and warning panel
(MDC-2) will illuminate. Since each bus is capable of handling all EPS
loads, an undervoltage condition should not occur except in an isolated
instance; if too many electrical units are placed on the bus simul-
taneously or if a malfunction exists in the EPS. A voltmeter (MDC-3) is
provided to monitor voltage of each main dc bus, the battery charger, and
each of the five batteries. An ammeter is provided (MDC-3) to monitor
current output of fuel cells 1, 2, 3, batteries A, B, C, and the battery
charger.

During high power demand or emergencies, supplemental power to the


main de buses can be supplied from batteries A and B via the battery buses
and directly from battery C (fig. ~2.643). During entry, spacecraft
power is provided by the three entry and postlanding batteries which are
connected to the main dc buses prior to CSM separation; placing the
MAIN BUS TIE switches (MDC-5) to BAT A/C and BAT B/C provides this
function after closing the MAIN A-BAT C and MAIN B-BAT C circuit breakers
(MB-275). The switches are manually placed to OFF after completion of
RCS purge and closing the FLIGHT AND POST LDG-BAT BUS A, BAT BUS B, and
BAT C circuit breakers (RHEB-275) during main chute descent. The AUTO
position provides an automatic connection of the entry batteries to the
main dc buses at CSM separation. The auto function is used only on the
launch pad after the spacecraft is configured for a LES pad abort.

A nonessential bus, as shown on fig. ~2.6-11, permits isolating non-


essential equipment during a shortage of power (two fuel cell power
plants out). The flight bus distributes power to inflight telecommuni-
cations equipment. The flight and postlanding bus distributes power to
some of the inflight telecommunications equipment, float bag No. 3 con-
trols, the ECS postlanding vent and blower control, and postlanding com-
munications and lighting equipment. In flight, the postlanding bus re-
ceives power from the fuel cells and/or entry and postlanding batteries
through the main de buses. After completion of RCS purge during main
chute descent, the entry batteries supply power to the postlanding bus
directly through individual circuit breakers. These circuit breakers
(FLIGHT & POST LANDING-BAT BUS A, BAT BUS B, and BAT C - RHEB-275) are
normally open in flight and closed during main chute descent just prior
to positioning the MAIN BUS TIE switches to OFF.

Motor switch contacts which close when the MAIN BUS TIE switches are
placed to ON, complete the circuit between the entry and postlanding
batteries and the main dc buses, and open the connection from the battery

A-60
charger to the batteries. The battery relay bus provides dc power to the
ac sensing units, the fuel cell and inverter control circuits, fuel cell
reactant and radiator valves, and the fuel cell+nain BUS A and B talk-back
indicators on MDC-3. The pyrotechnic batteries supply power to ordnance
devices for separation of the LES, S-IVB, forward heat shield, SM from
CM, and for deployment_and release of the drogue and main parachutes
during a pad abort, high-altitude abort, or normal mission progression.
The three fuel cell power plants supply power to the SM jettison con-
trollers for the SM separation maneuver.

Distribution of ac power (fig. A2.6-14) is accomplished with a four-


wire system via two redundant buses, ac bus 1 and ac bus 2. The ac neu-
tral bus is connected to the vehicle ground point. The ac power is pro-
vided by one or two of the solid-state ll5/200-volt 400-Hz 3-phase in-
verters. The dc power is routed to the inverters through the main dc
buses. Inverter No. 1 is powered through dc main bus A, inverter No. 2
through dc main bus B, and inverter No. 3 through either de main bus A
or B by switch selection. Each of these circuits has a separate circuit
breaker and a power control motor switch. Switches for applying power
to the motor switches are located on MDC-3. All three inverters are
identical and are provided with overtemperature circuitry. A light in-
dicator, in the caution/warning group on MDC-2, illuminates at 190" to
indicate an overtemperature situation. Inverter output is routed through
a series of control motor switches to the ac buses. Six switches (MDC-3)
control motor switches which operate contacts to connect or disconnect
the inverters from the ac buses. Inverter priority is 1 over 2, 2 over
3, and 3 over 1 on any one ac bus. This indicates that inverter 2 cannot
be connected to the bus until the inverter 1 switch is positioned to OFF.
Also, when inverter 3 switch is positioned to ON, it will disconnect in-
verter 1 from the bus before the inverter 3 connection will be performed.
The motor switch circuits are designed to prevent connecting two invert-
ers to the same ac bus at the same time. The ac loads receive power from
either ac bus through bus selector switches. In some instances, a single
phase is used for operation of equipment and in others all three. Over-
undervoltage and overload sensing circuits (fig. ~2.6-12) are provided
for each bus. An automatic inverter disconnect is effected during an
overvoltage. The ac bus voltage fail and overload lights in the caution/
warning group (MDC-2) provide a visual indication of voltage or overload
malfunctions. Monitoring voltage of each phase on each bus is accom-
plished by selection with the AC INDICATORS switch (MDC-3). Readings are
displayed on the AC VOLTS meter (MDC-3). Phase A voltage of each bus is
telemetered to MSFN stations.

Several precautions should be taken during any inverter switching.


The first precaution is to completely disconnect the inverter being taken
out of the circuit whether due to inverter transfer or malfunction. The
second precaution is to insure that no more than one switch on AC BUS 1
or AC BUS 2 (MIX-3) is in the up position at the same time. These
k

~-64
, 1

P
+ INVERTER NO. 1 L INVERTER NO. 1
ONLY ONE INMRTER
ONLY ONE INMRI~K
+ INVERTER NO. 2 CAN POWEF BUS AT 4- INVERTER NO. 2 CAN POWER BUS AT
ANY ONE TIME ANY ONE TIME
+ INMRTER NO. 3 - INVERTER NO. 3

EPS SENSOR

Ib AC SENSE UNIT
AND
AC SENSE UNIT
AND AC

I ;NDI~TORS sw INDICATORS SW
(VOLTMETER)
-1 (VOLTMETER)

FUEL CELL PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 1

pH SENSOR (+A) c pH SENSOR (+A)

PUMP MOTORS - F&L CELL 2 PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 2

-c pH SENSOR (d)A) c ptl SENSOR (CA)

PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 3 PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL 3

-c pH SENSOR ( +A) c pH SENSOR (‘+A)

4 CRYOGENIC FUEL 0TY AMPL 1 (6 C) + CRYOGENIC FUEL OTY AMPL 2 (CC)

4 CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS - S% 1 ----) CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS - SYS 2

--) BATTERY CHARGER ----, PATTERY CHARGER

- TELECOMMUNICATIONS ----, TELECOMMUNICATIONS

-----, ENVlRONLNNTAL CONTROL SYSTEM (+ 6. * --) ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM @AA.$‘C, %?

---, STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM * STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM


NOTE:
----, SPS GAUGING (CC) + SPS GAUGING (+O
1. For complerc
_3 EXTERIOR LIGHTING (+A) --k EXTERIOR LIGHTING (‘#B) AC distribution
bm&out rchr
d INTERIOR LIGHTING @A, 98) 4 INTERIOR LIGHTING (#A) to individwl
d GCN AC POWER ($4) system section
_3 GLN AC POWER ( $0)
+ ORDEAL 1661

Figure A2.6-lb.- Alternating current power distribution.


precautions are necessary to assure positive power transfer since power
to any one inverter control motor switch is routed in series through the
switch of another inverter. A third precaution must be exercised to pre-
clude a motor switch lockout when dc power to inverter 3 is being trans-
ferred from dc main bus A to dc main bus B, or vice versa. The AC
INSERTER 3 switch (MIX-3) should be held in the OFF position for 1 second
when performing a power transfer operation from one main dc bus to the
other.

Performance and Design Data

Alternating; current and direct current data.- The ac and dc per-


formance and design data for the EPS is as follows:

Alternating current

Phases 3

Displacement 120 * 2"

Steady-state voltage 115.5 (+L -1.5) V ac (average


3 phases)

Transient voltage 115 (+35, -65) V ac

Recovery To 115 * 10 V within 15 ms, steady


state within 50 ms

Unbalance 2 V ac (worst phase from average)

Frequency limites
Normal (synchronized 400 f 3 Hz
to central timing
equipment)

Emergency (loss of 400 f 7 Hz


central timing
equipment)

Wave characteristics
(sine wave)
Maximum distortion 5 percent
Highest harmonic 4 percent
Crest factor 1.414 f 10 percent

Rating 1250 V ac
Direct current

Steady-state voltage
limits
Normal 29 * 2.0 V dc

Minimum CM bus 26.2 V dc


Min Precautionary CM 26.5 V dc (allows for cyclic loads)
bus

Maximum CM bus 31.0 v dc


Max Precautionary CM 30.0 V dc (allows for cyclic loads)
bus

During postlanding and 27 to 30 V dc


preflight checkout
periods

Ripple voltage 1 V peak to peak

Operational Limitations and Restrictions

Fuel cell power plants.- Fuel cell power plants are designed to
function under atmospheric and high-vacuum conditions. Each must be able
to maintain itself at sustaining temperatures and minimum electrical loads
at both environment extremes. To function properly, fuel cells must op-
erate under the following limitations and restrictions:

External nonoperating -20" to +140" F.


temperature

Operating temperature +30" to 145" F.


inside SM

External nonoperating Atmospheric


pressure

Normal voltage 27 to 31 V dc

Minimum operating voltage


at terminals
Emergency operation 20.5 V dc at 2295 watts (gross Power
level)

Normal operation 27 v ac

. ._ .._-., .._ . ..- _~...--- .-.. -.“--_~- _*.l


-“pi._._ ..---.- ^ “~- ____il_-
Maximum operating voltage 31.5 V dc
at terminals

Fuel cell disconnect 75 amperes no trip, 112 amperes


overload disconnect after 25 to 300 seconds

Maximum reverse current 1 second minimum before disconnect

Minimum sustaining power/ 420 watts


fuel cell power plant
(with in-line heater OFF)

In-line heater power 160 watts


(sustain F/C skin temp (5 to 6 amps)
above 385" F min)

Maximum gross power 2295 watts at 20.5 V dc min.


under emergency
conditions

Nitrogen pressure 50.2 to 57.5 psia (53 psia, nominal)

Reactant pressure
Oxygen 58.4 to 68.45 psia (62.5 psia,
nominal)

Hydrogen 57.3 to 67.0 psia (61.5 psia,


nominal)

Reactant consumption/fuel
cell power plant

Hydrogen PPH = Amps x (2.57 x lo-')


Oxygen PPH = Amps x (2.04 x 10m2)

Minimum skin temperature +385” F


for self-sustaining
operation

Minimum skin temperature +360° F


for recovery in flight

Maximum skin temperature +500" F

Approximate external -260” to +400" F


environment temperature
range outside SC (for
radiation)

A-68
Fuel cell power plant +385” to +450" F
normal operating
temperature range

Condenser exhaust normal +150" to +175" F


operating temperature

Purging nominal frequency Dependent on mission load profile


and reactant purity after tank fill

O2 purge duration 2 minutes

H2 purge duration 80 seconds

Additional flow rate


while purging
Wwn Up to 0.6 lb/hr
Hydrogen Up to 0.75 lb/hr ( nominal 0.67 lb/hr)

Cryogenic storage subsystem.- The cryogenic storage subsystem must


be able to meet the following requirements for proper operation of the
fuel cell power plants and the ECS:

Minimum usable quantity


Oxygen 320 lbs each tank (min)
Hydrogen 28 lbs each tank (min)

Temperature at time of
fill
Oxygen -297" F. (approx.)
Hydrogen -423" F. (approx.)

Operating pressure range


@men
Normal 865 to 935 psia
Minimum 150 psia
Hydrogen
Normal 225 to 260 psia
Minimum 100 psia

Temperature probe range


Oxygen -325” to +80° F
Hydrogen -425" to -200" F

Maximum allowable
difference in quantity
balance between tanks

A-69

,. . - - _..- ,. ._..-.-.-.
..___I"._.-__"_ _I___,___cI_ --~..-~~-----~~~~- p__,p_-- ._._._I__I- .I...__--.
Oxygen tanks No. 1 and 2 to 4 percent
Hydrogen tanks No. 1 3 percent
and 2

Pressure relief valve


operation
Crack pressure
Oxygen 983 psig min.
Hydrogen 273 psig min.
Reseat pressure
Oxygen 965 psig min.
Hydrogen 268 psig min.
Full flow, maximum
relief
Q-vge n 1010 psig max.
Hydrogen 285 psig max.
Additional data.- Additional data about 1imitatiOnS and restrictions
may be found in the CSM/LM Spacecraft Operational Data Book SNA-8-D-027,
vol I, (CSM ~1168-447).

Systems Test Meter

The SYSTEMS TEST meter and the alphabetical and numerical switches
located on panel 101 in the CM LEB, provide a means of monitoring vario&s
measurements within the SC, and verifying certain parameters displayed
only by event indicators. The following can be measured using the
SYSTEMS TEST meter, the respective switch positions, and the range of
each sensor. Normal operating parameters of measurable items are covered
in the telemetry listing.

Conversion of the previously listed measurements to the SYSTEMS TEST


meter indications are listed in Table A2.6-IV. The XPNDR measurements
are direct readouts and do not require conversion.

A-70

.l_l - - ~~-I- . . ~"--.. "l.--__l^.-.. _-.._-L;- __l_-.,_l


TABLE &Z.&III.- SYSTEMSTEST DATA

Systems test Switch >sitions


indicatioafid(";yT identity Numerical Alphabetical Sensor range
select select
v2 pressure, psia 0 to 75 psia
F/C 1 SC 206OP 1 A
F/C 2 SC 2061~ 1 B
F)C 3 SC 2062~ 1 C

o2 pressure, psia 0 t0 75 psia


F/C 1 SC 2066~ 1 D
F/C 2 SC 2067P 2 A
F'/C 3 SC 2068P 2 B

92 pressure, psia 0 to 75 Pia


F/C 1 SC 2069~ 2 C
F/C 2 SC 2070P 2 D
F'/C 3 SC 2071P 3 A

<pS radiator outlet temperature -50" to t300" F


F/C 1 SC 208~ 3 B
F'/C 2 SC 20881 3 C
F~C 3 SC 2089~ 3 D

3attery manifold
pressure, psia A 0 t0 20 psia

Bat7; relay bus CCO232V B o to +45 V dc

LM power D 0 to t10 amps

SpS oxidizer line temperature 5 A o to +200e F


SP 0049T
CM-RCS oxidize~y~a~eCRte2;l~Tature -50" to ~50" F
-P engine, 6 B
+Y engine, sys B CR 2116~ 5 D
-P engine, sys B CR 2110T C
CWengine, sys B CR 2119T 2 D
CCWengine, sys A CR 2114T 6 A
-Y engine, sys A CR 2103T 6 C

pwr output XPNDR A >I.0 V dc (nornina

AGC signal XPNDR B Test A.0 V ac


Operate 0.0 to
4.5 v ac

Phase lockup XPNDR C Locked A.0 V


Unlocked 4.8

position 7 on the numerical selector switch .


is an off Fosltlon*
NOTE:

A- 71
___---..---------- -___ .---
_.---.c_--- __^__1__--
Command Module Interior Lighting

The command module interior lighting system (fig. A2.6-15) furnishes


illumination for activities in the couch, lower equipment bay and tunnel
areas, and back-lighted panel lighting to read nomenclature, indicators,
and switch positions. Tunnel lighting is provided on SC which will be
concerned with LM activity.

Floodlighting for illumination of work areas is provided by use of


fluorescent lamps. Integral panel and numerics lighting is provided by
electroluminescent materials. Tunnel lights are incandescent. Pen
flashlights are provided for illuminating work areas which cannot be
illuminated by the normal spacecraft systems, such as under the couches.

Electroluminescence (EL) is the phenomena whereby light is emitted


from a crystalline phosphor (Z#) placed as a thin layer between two
closely spaced electrodes of an electrical capacitor. One of the elec-
trodes is a transparent material. The light output varies with voltage
and frequency and occurs as light pulses, which are in-phase with the
input frequency. Advantageous characteristics of EL for spacecraft use
are an "after-glow" of less than 1 second, low power consumption, and
negligible heat dissipation.

RAL AND NUMERICS (PANEL tlctm

FLOODLIGHT FIXTURES

Figure ~2.6-15.- CM interior 1.ighting.

A-72
TABLE .42.6-m.- SYSTEMSTEST METER INDICATIONS

Systems EPS CM-R%


test radiator Oxidizer LM SPS Battery Batter:
meter Outlet valve Power temperature manifold relay
display temperature tawerature (amps) (" F.) Pressure bus
(" F.) (” F.) @=A) ('J dc
0.0 -50 -50 0 0.00 0
0.2
0.4 6
; -36
-22
-46
-4;
0.4 8” 0.80 1.8
0.8 16 1.60 3.6
0.6 9 -8 -33 1.2 24 2.40 5.4
0.8 12 +6 -34 1.6 3.20 7.2
1.0 15 +20 -30 2.0 4’: 4.00 9.0
1.2 18 +34 -26 2.4
1.4 21 4.80 lo.8
+4a -22 2.8 5.60
1.6 24 +62 12.6
-18 3.2 6.40 14.4
1.8 27 +76 -14
2.0 30 7.20 16.2
+90 -10 5:: 8.00 18.0
2.2 33 +104 4.4
2.4 88 8.80 19.8
2.6
36 +118
+I32
1;
0
4.8
5.2
96 9.60 21.6
2.8 104 10.40 23.4
529 t146 +4
3.0 112 11.20 25.2
45 +16o +10 21: 120 12.00 27.0

,':c
48
51
+174
+188
+14
+18
6.4
6.8
128 12.80 28.8
3.6 136 13.60 30.6
54 +202 +22 7.2 144
+216 14.40 32.4
+26 7.6 152 15.20
43:: 2 +230 34.2
+30 8.0 160 16.00 36.0
4.2 63 +244 t34 8.4 x8 16.80 37.8
1258 +38 8.8 176 17.60
t:: 6”: +272 +4-i? 39.6
9.2 184 18.40 41.4
4.8 72 e86 +46 9.6
5.0 75 192 19.20 43.2
+300 t50 10.0 200 20.00 45.0
Floodlight system.- The interior floodlight system consists of six
floodlight fixture assemblies and three control panels (fig. ~2.6-16).
Each fixture assembly contains two fluorescent lamps (one primary and
one secondary) and converters. The lamps are powered by 28 V dc from main
de buses A and B (fig. A2.6-17). This assures a power source for lights
in all areas in the event either bus fails. The converter in each flood-
light fixture converts 28 V dc to a high-voltage pulsating dc for operation
of the fluorescent lamps.

Floodlights are used to illuminate three specific areas: the left


main display console, the right main display console, and the lower
equipment bay. Switches on MDC-8provide control of lighting of the
left main display console area. Switches on MDC-5provide control of
lighting of the right main display console area. Switches for control
of lighting of the lower equipment bay area are located on LEB-100.
Protection for the floodlight circuits is provided by the LIGHTING - MN A
and MN B circuit breakers on FXEB-226.

Each control panel has a dimming (DIM-l-2) toggle switch control, a


rheostat (FLOOD-• FF-BRT) control, and an on/off (FIXED-OFF) toggle switch
control. The DIM-l position provides variable intensity control of the
primary flood lamps through the FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat, and on-off control
of the secondary lamps through the FIXED-OFF switch. The DIM-2 position
provides variable intensity control of the secondary lamps through the
FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat, and on-off control of the primary lamps through
the FIXED-OFF switch. When operating the primary lamps under variable
intensity control (DIM-l position), turn on of the lamps is acquired after
the FLOOD-OFF-BRT rheostat is moved past the midpoint. In transferring
variable intensity control to the secondary lamps, the FLOOD-OFF-BRT
rheostat should first be rotated to the OFF position before placing the
DIM switch to the DIM-2 position. The rheostat is then moved to the full
bright setting and should remain in this position unless dimming is de-
sired. Dimming of the secondary flood lamps should not be used unless
dimming control of the primary floodlights is not available. Dimming of
the secondary lamps results in approximately a go-percent reduction in
lamp life. The range of intensity variation is greater for the primary
than the secondary floodlights.

The commander's control panel (MIX-~) has a POST LANDING-OFF-FIXED


switch which connects the flight and postlanding bus to his floodlights
(fig. A2.6-17). The POST LANDING position provides single intensity
lighting to the commander's primary or secondary lamps as selected by the
DIM-l or DIM-2 position, respectively. It is for use during the latter
stages of descent after main dc bus power is disconnected, and during
postlanding.

A-74

_ .__._...-
-...a-- =.-
-FLOOOT
DIM FIXED
1
COUCH LIGHT
ASSEMBLIES MDC-5 2
- POST LDG
__^.._

COMPONENTS
6 LIGHT ASSEMBLIES
3 CONTROLPANELS
LH SIDE DISPLAY MDC-8
RH SIDE DISPLAY MDC-5
LEB 100
3 CIRCUIT BREAKERS
RHEB 226

Figure A2.6-16.- CM floodlight configuration.


+ 7 POST LANDING BUS + DC MAIN BUS B DC MAIN BUS A 9)
f
I

i
RHEB 226 FLOOD, MNA $
I 7.5A i
I-- _-------------------------------- ---------------------- -___i
1 I , T -
I t 1

DIM

II t I I
+
I
I
,
MDC 8
:----~~~~-~~~E!!---- c------ I I---C---- ---!E-----J ______
I
I II I I
, I I

LIGHT LIGHT LIGHT


1
0
I
NEGATIVE DC BUS

Figure
I
63
P I

~2.6~17.- CM floodlight
NEGATIVE DC BUS

system
q
P

schematic.
L--=+-t
NEGATIVE DC BUS
Integral lighting system.- The integral lighting system controls the
EL lamps behind the nomenclature and instrument dial faces on all MDC!
panels, and on specif'ic panels in the lower equipment bay, left hand
equipment bay, and right hand equipment bay (figs. ~2.6-18 and ~2.6-19).
The controls (fig. ~2.6-18) are rotary switches controlling variable
transformers powered through the appropriate ac bus. Each rotary control
switch has a mechanical stop which prevents the switch being positioned
to OFF. Disabling of a circuit because of malfunctions is performed by
opening the appropriate circuit breaker on RHEB-226. The INTEGRAL switch
on MIX-~ controls the lighting of panels viewed by the commander, MD&l,
7, 8, 9, 15, and the left half of 2. The INTEGRAL switch on MDC-5 con-
trols the lighting of panels viewed by the LM pilot, MDC-3, 4, 5 and 6,
16, RHEB-229 and 275, and the right half of MIX-2. The INTEGRAL switch
on LEB-100 controls the lighting of MDC-10, LEB-100, 101, 122 and the
DSKY lights on 140, RHEB-225, 226 and LHEB 306. Intensity of the lighting
can be individually controlled in each of the three areas.

Numerics lighting system.- Numerics lighting control is provided


over all electroluminescent digital readouts. The NUMERICS rotary switch
on MDC-8 controls the off/intensity of numerals on the DSKY and Mission
Timer on MIX-2, and the range and delta V indicators of the Entry Monitor
System of MDC-1. The switch on LEB-100 controls the off/intensity of the
numerals on the LEB-140 DSKY and the Mission Timer on LHEB-306. Protec-
tion for the integral and numerics circuits is provided by the LIGHTING-
NUMERICS/INTEGRAL-LEB AC 2, L MIX AC 1, and R MIX AC 1 circuit breakers
on RHEB-226. These circuit breakers are used to disable a circuit in
case of a malfunction. The L MDC AC 1 circuit breakers also feed the
EMS roll attitude and scroll incandescent lamps.

Tunnel lighting.- The six light fixtures in the CM tunnel provide


illumination for tunnel activity during docking and undocking. Each of
the fixtures, containing two incandescent lamps, is provided 28 V dc
through a TUNNEL LIGHTS-OFF switch on MIX-2 (fig. ~2.6-20). Main dc bus A
distributes power to one lamp in each fixture,.and main dc bus B to the
other lamp. Protection is provided by the LIGHTING/COAS/TUNNEL/RNDZ/
SPOT MN A and MN B circuit breakers on RKEB-226.

A-77

-.-- -.
-. . _.._. _- -_ ..L--.
.:.:.>:
cls;$;:1Nj’EGRAL
.-.
B-: NUMERICS

INTERIOR LIGHTS
INTEGRAL

(MDC 81
r LED LIGHTS t
NUMRICS FLOOD INTEGRAL

OFF BIT OFF RRT OFF BRT

(LEB 100)

Figure ~2.6-18.- CM integral/numerics illuminat ,ion system.


LIGHTING NUhlERlCS'lNTCGRAL lRHEB 2261
+?BUSl dB) BUS 2 QA 7)
NOMFN '
< P AC NEUT p ) +AC,NEUl )
I tEB-A?$
I
I I I I I I

hlECHANICA1
STOP
110 PLACES,
INTERIOR LIGHTS - INTERIOR

L
LIGHTS
NOMEN
,
MDC 5

LHEB 306 I

EMS (INCANDESCENT1

hlDC 1
1 MDC 3 I ROLL ATT IND 141
L SCROLL (6)

Figure A2.6-lg.- Integral and numerics panel lighting schematic.


TUNNEL
LIGHT I
ASSEMBLIES I
--- r -- iI
T
r 1
I I I
MN DC1 I I TUNNEL
6
BUS B
I I LIGHTS

t --c-
o+
I I
I I
I MN B I
INITIATORI
I I

II
I
I I i I
I I i I
MN DC I I I 1 DC NEG
BUS A I CB28 1 LH COAS 1 1 I

Figure ~2.6-20.- Tunnel lighting schemat .c.


PART A2.7

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

Introduction

The environment control system (ECS) is designed to provide the


flight crew with a conditioned environment that is both life-supporting,
and as comfortable as possible. The ECS is aided in the accomplishment
of this task through an interface with the electrical power system,
which supplies oxygen and potable water. The ECS also interfaces with
the electronic equipment of the several Apollo systems, for which the
ECS provides thermal control, with the lunar module (LM) for pressurizing
the LM, and with the waste management system to the extent that the
water and the urine dump lines can be interconnected.

The ECS is operated continuously throughout all Apollo mission


phases. During this operating period the system provides the following
three major functions for the crew:

a. Spacecraft atmosphere control

b. Water management

c. Thermal control.

Control of the spacecraft atmosphere consists of regulating the


pressure and temperature of the cabin and suit gases; maintaining the
desired humidity by removing excess water from the suit and cabin gases;
controlling the level of contamination of the gases by removing CO*,
odors, and particulate matter; and ventilating the cabin after landing.
There are provisions for pressurizing the lunar module during docking
and subsequent CSM/LM operations.

Water management consists of collecting, sterilizing, and storing


the potable water produced in the fuel cells, and delivering chilled and
heated water to the crew for metabolic consumption, and disposing of the
excess potable water by either transferring it to the waste water system
or by dumping it overboard. Provisions are also made for the collection
and storage of waste water (extracted in the process of controlling
humidity), delivering it to the glycol evaporators for supplemental
cooling, and dumping the excess waste water overboard.

A-81
Thermal control consists of removing the excess heat generated by
the crew and the spacecraft equipment, transporting it to the cab heat
exchanger (if required) , and rejecting the unwanted heat to space,
either by radiation from the space radiators, or in the form of steam
by boiling water in the glycol evaporators.

Five subsystems operating in conjunction with each other provide


the required functions:

a. Oxygen subsystem

b. Pressure suit circuit (PSC)

c. Water subsystem

d. Water-glycol subsystem

e. Postlanding ventilation (PLV) subsystem.

The oxygen subsystem controls the flow of oxygen within the command
module (CM); stores a reserve supply of oxygen for use during entry
and emergencies; regulates the pressure of oxygen supplied to the sub- -
system and PSC components; controls cabin pressure in normal and
emergency (high flow-rate) modes; controls pressure in the water tanks
and glycol reservoir; and provides for PSC purge via the DIRECT 02
valve.

The pressure suit circuit provides the crew with a continuously


conditioned atmosphere. It automatically controls suit gas circulation,
pressure, and temperature; and removes debris, excess moisture, odors,
and carbon dioxide from both the suit and cabin gases.

The water subsystem (potable section) collects and stores potable


water; delivers hot and cold water to the crew for metabolic purposes;
and augments the waste water supply for evaporative cooling. The waste
water section collects and stores water extracted from the suit heat
exchanger, and distributes it to the water inflow control valves of the
evaporators, for evaporative cooling.

The water-glycol subsystem provides cooling for the PSC, the


potable water chiller, and the spacecraft equipment; and heating or
cooling for the cabin atmosphere.

The postlanding ventilation subsystem provides a means for


circulating ambient air through the command module cabin after landing.

a-82
Functional Description

The environmental control system operates continuously throughout


all mission phases. Control begins during preparation for launch and
continues through recovery. The following paragraphs describe the
operating modes and the operational characteristic of the ECS from the
time of crew insertion to recovery.

Spacecraft atmosphere control.- During prelaunch operations the


SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed; and the DIRECT O2 valve is opened
slightly (approximately 0.2 pound per hour flowrate) to provide an
oxygen purge of the PSC. Just before prime crew insertion the 02
flowrate is increased to 0.6 pound per hour. This flow is in excess of
that required for metabolic consumption and suit leakage. This excess
flow causes the PSC to be pressurized slightly above the CM cabin. The
slight overpressure maintains the purity of the PSC gas system by
preventing the cabin gases from entering the PSC.

Any changes made in the pressure or composition of the cabin gas


during the prelaunch period is controlled by the ground support equipment
through the purge port in the CM side hatch.

As soon as the crew connects into the PSC, the suit gas becomes
contaminated by C02, odors, moisture, and is heated. The gases are
circulated by the suit compressor through the CO2 and odor absorber
assembly where a portion of the CO2 and odors are removed; then through
the heat exchanger, where they are cooled and the excess moisture is
removed. Any debris that might get into the PSC is trapped by the
debris trap or on felt pads on the upstream side of each LiOH cartridge.

During the ascent, the cabin remains at sea level pressure until
the ambient pressure decreases a nominal 6 psi. At that point the CABIN
PRESSURE RELIEF valve vents the excess gas overboard, maintaining cabin
pressure at 6 psi above ambient. As the cabin pressure decreases, a
relief valve in the O2 DEMAND REGULATORvents suit gases into the cabin
to maintain the suit pressure slightly above cabin pressure.

Sometime after attaining orbit it will be necessary to close the


DIRECT 02 valve to conserve oxygen. (Refer to Volume 2, Apollo Operations
Handbook for the procedure.) After the DIRECT O2 valve is closed,
makeup oxygen for the PSC is supplied by the DEMANDREiGULATORwhen the
SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed or from the cabin via the cabin
pressure regulator when the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is open.

A-83
Before changing from a suited to a shirtsleeve environment it is
necessary to open the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE, for the following
reasons. When a suit is vented (by removing helmet, gloves, etc.) some
of the PSC gases flow into the cabin, which results in contaminating the
cabin gas, and in lowering suit pressure relative to cabin pressure.
Opening the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE allows cabin gas to circulate
through the PSC for scrubbing, and tends to equalize the pressure
differential between the PSC and cabin. If the valve is not opened,
the resultant pressure differential will cause the suit DEMANDREG
to dmp oxygen into the PSC at a flowrate that will turn on the 02
FLOW HI warning light. Opening the SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE will
correct this situation.

During normal space operations, the cabin pressure is maintained


at a nominal 5 psia by the cabin pressure regulator, at flowrates up to
1.4 pounds of owgen per hour. In the event a high leak rate develops,
the EMERGENCYCABIN PRESSURE regulator will supply oxygen at high flow
rates to maintain the cabin pressure above 3.5 psia for more than 5 min-
utes, providing the leak is effectively no larger than a l/2-inch hole.

When performing depressurized operations the suit circuit pressure


is maintained above 3.5 psia by the O2 DEMANDREGULATOR; the cabin
pressure regulator shuts off automatically to prevent wasting oxygen.

Prior to entry SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN VALVE is closed, isolating


the suit circuit from the cabin; the O2 DEMAND REGULATORthen controls
suit pressure. Cabin pressure is maintained during the descent by
the cabin pressure regulator until the ambient pressure rises to a
maximum of 0.9 psi above cabin pressure. At that point the cabin relief
valve will open, allowing ambient air to flow into the cabin. As the
cabin pressure increases, the 02 DEMANDREGULATOR admits oxygen into
the suit circuit to maintain the suit pressure slightly below the cabin,
as measured at the suit compressor inlet manifold.

After spacecraft landing, the cabin is ventilated with ambient air


by postlanding ventilation fan and valves. When the CM is floating
upright in the water, the POST LANDING VENT switch is placed in the HIGH
(day) or LOW (night) position. Either of these positions will supply
power to open both vent valves and start the fan. In the HIGH position,
the fan will circulate 150 cubic feet per minute (cfm); LOW, 100 cfm.
An attitude sensing device automatically closes both valves and removes
power from the fan motor when the CM X axis rotates more than 60 degrees
from vertical. Once the device is triggered, it will remain locked up
until the CM is upright, and the POST LANDING VENT switch is placed in
the OFF position. This action resets the control circuit for normal
system operation. The PLVC switch on panel 376 provides an override

~-84
control for opening the PLV valves and turning on the fan in case the
attitude sensor is locked up and cannot be reset; or when the CM is
inverted and egress must be made through the tunnel hatch. In either
case the POST LANDING VENT switch must be in the LOW or HIGH position.

Water management.- In preparing the spacecraft for the mission,


the potable and waste water tanks are partially filled to insure an
adequate supply for the early stages of the mission. From the time the
fuel cells are placed in operation until CSM separation, the fuel cells
replenish the potable water supply. A portion of the water is chilled
and made available to the crew through the drinking fixture and the
food preparation unit. The remainder is heated, and is delivered through
a separate valve on the food preparation unit.

From the time the crew connects into the suit circuit until entry,
the water accumulator pumps are extracting water from the suit heat
exchanger and pumping it into the waste water system. The water is
delivered to the glycol evaporators through individual water control
valves. Provision is made for dumping excess waste water manually
when the tank is full.

A syringe injection system is incorporated to provide for periodic


injection of bactericide to kill bacteria in the potable water system.

Thermal control.- Thermal control is provided by two water-glycol


coolant loops (primary and secondary). During prelaunch operations
ground servicing equipment cools the water-glycol and pumps it through
the primary loop, providing cooling for the electrical and electronic
equipment, and the suit and cabin heat exchangers. The cold water-glycol
is also circulated through the reservoir to m&e available a larger
quantity of coolant for use as a heat sink during the ascent. Additional
heat sink capability is obtained by selecting maximum cooling on the
CABIN TEMP selector, and placing both cabin fans in operation. This
cold soa?ss the CM interior structure and equipment. Shortly before
launch, one of the primary pmps is placed in operation, the pump in
the ground servicing unit is stopped, and the unit is isolated from the
spacecraft system.

During the ascent, the radiators will be heated by aerodynamic


friction. To prevent this heat from being added to the CM thermal load,
the PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS valve is placed in the PULL TO BYPASS
position at approximately 75 seconds before launch. The coolant then
circulates within the CM portion of the loop.

The heat that is generated in the CM, from the time that the ground
servicing unit is isolated until the spacecraft reaches 1lOK feet, is
absorbed by the coolant and the prechilled structure. Above 1lOK feet

~-85

__111-__.“.“-11141-.1-
___-_..--._ .~..--
I____ _-.- ,.--”
Il------l_l
_ ..-- -.... .-. _“.^_.---_. ~._.
it is possible to reject the excess heat by evaporating water in the
primary glycol evaporator.

After attaining orbit the reservoir is isolated from the loop to


maintain a reserve quantity of coolant for refilling the primary loop
in case of loss of fluid by leakage. The PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS
valve is placed in the position (control pushed in) to allow circulation
through the radiators end the radiator outlet temperature sensors. If
the radiators have cooled sufficiently (radiator outlet temperature is
less than the inlet) they will be kept on-stream; if not, they will be
bypassed until sufficient cooling has tsken place. After the radiators
have been placed on-stream, the glycol temperature control is activated
(GLYCOL EVAP TEMP IN switch in AUTO); and the CABIN TEMP selector is
positioned as desired.

The primary loop provides thermal control throughout the mission


unless a degradation of system performance requires the use of the
secondary loop.

Several hours before CM-SM separation the system valves are


positioned so that the primary loop provides cooling for the cabin heat
exchanger, the entire cold plate network, and the suit heat exchanger.
The CABIN TEMP control valve is placed in the MAX COOL position, and -
both cabin fans are turned on to cold-soak in the CM interior structure.

Prior to separation t'ne PRIMARY GLYCOL TO RADIATORS, and the


GLYCOL TO RADIATORS SEC valves are placed in the BYPASS position to
prevent loss of coolant when the CSM umbilical is cut. From that time
(until approximately 1lOK feet spacecraft altitude) cooling is provided
by water evaporation.

Oxygen Subsystem

The oxygen subsystem shares the oxygen supply with the electrical
power system. Approximately 640 pounds of oxygen is stored in two
cryogenic tanks located in the service module. Heaters within the tanks
pressurize the oxygen to 900 psig for distribution to the using equipment.

Oxygen is delivered to the command module through two separate


supply lines, each of which is connected to an oxygen inlet restrictor
assembly. Each assembly contains a filter, a capillary line, and a
spring-loaded check valve. The filters provide final filtration of gas
entering the CM. The capillaries which are wound around the hot glycol
line serve two purposes; they restrict the total O2 flow rate to a
maximum of 9.0 pounds per hour, and they heat the oxygen entering the
CM. The check valves serve to isolate the two supply lines.

A-86
Downstream of the inlet check valves the two lines tee together
and a single line is routed to the OXYGEN-S/M SUPPLY valve on panel
326. This valve is used in flight as a shutoff valve to back up the
inlet check valves during entry. It is closed prior to CM-SM separation.
PART A2.8

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Introduction

The communications subsystem is the only link between the space-


craft and the manned space flight network (MSFN). In this capacity, the
communications subsystem provides the MSFN flight controllers with data
through the pulse code modulated (PCM) telemetry system for monitoring
spacecraft parameters, subsystem status, crew biomedical data, event
occurrence, and scientific data. As a voice link, the communications
subsystem gives the crew the added capability of comparing and evalua-
ting data with MSFN computations. The communications subsystem, through
its MSFN link, serves as a primary means for the determination of space-
craft position in space and rate of change in position. CM-I.&l rendezvous
is facilitated by a ranging transponder and an active ranging system.
Through the use of television camera, crew observations and public infor-
mation can be transmitted in realtime to MSFN. A means by which CM and
IM telemetry and voice can be stored in the spacecraft for later play-
back, to avoid loss because of an interrupted communications link, is
provided by the communications subsystem in the form of the data storage
equipment (DSE). Direction-finding aids are provided for postlanding
location and rescue by ground personnel.

The following list summarizes the general telecormn functions:

a. Provide voice communication between:

(1) Astronauts via the intercom

(2) CSM and MSFN via the unified S-band equipment (USBE)
and in orbital and recovery phases via the VHF/AM

(3) CSM and extravehicular astronaut (EVA) via VHF/AM

(4) CSM and L&l via VHF/AM

(5) CSM and launch control center (LCC) via PAD COMM

(6) CSM and recovery force swimmers via swimmers umbilical

(7) Astronauts and the voice log via intercomm to the data
storage equipment

A-88

.-I~ .._-. .-_.... -x ,...-._-


b. Provide data to the MSFN of:

(1) CSM system status

(2) Astronaut biomedical status

(3) Astronaut activity via television

(4) EVA personal life support system (PISS) and biomed status

(5) I.&4 system status recorded on CSM data storage equipment

C. Provide update reception and processing of:

(1) Digital information for the command module computer (CMC)

(2) Digital time-referencing data for the central timing


equipment (WE)

(3) Real-time commands to remotely perform switching functions


in three CM systems

d. Facilitate ranging between:

(1) MSFN and CSM via the USBE transponder

(2) LM and CSM via the rendezvous radar transponder (RRT)

(3) CSM and LM via the VHF/AM ranging system

e. Provide a recovery aid VHF for spacecraft location.

f. Provide a time reference for all time-dependent spacecraft sub-


systems except the guidance and navigation subsystem.

Functional Description

The functional description of the telecommunications system is


divided into four parts: intercommunications equipment, data equipment,
radio frequency equipment, and antenna equipment. All of these functional
groups of equipment interface with each other to perform the system
tasks. In the functional descriptions of these parts, such interfaces
will be apparent.
-

PART A2.9

SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS

Introduction

Sequential systems include certain detection and control subsystems


of the launch vechicle (LV) and the Apollo spacecraft (SC). They are
utilized during launch preparations, ascent, and entry portions of a
. .
rmssion, preorbital aborts, early mission terminations, docking maneu-
vers, and SC separation sequences. Requirements of the sequential
systems are achieved by integrating several subsystems. Figure AZ!.%1
illustrates the sequential events controlsubsvstem (SECS), which is the
nucleus of sequential systems, and its interface with the following
subsystems and structures:

a. Displays and controls

b. Emergency detection (EDS)

c. Electrical power (EPS)

d. Stabilization and control (SCS)

e. Reaction control (RCS)

f. Docking (DS)

g* Telecommunications (T/C)

h. Earth lauding (ELS)

1. Launch escape (LES)

J- Structural

Sequential Events Control Subsystem

The SECS is an integrated subsystem consisting of 12 controllers


which may be categorized in seven classifications listed as follows:

a. Two master events sequence controllers (MESC)

b. Two service module jettison controllers (SMJC)

A-90
c. One reaction control system controller (RCSC)

d. Two lunar module (LM) separation sequence controllers (LSSC)

e. Two lunar docking events controllers (LDEC)

f. Two earth landing sequence controllers (ELSC)

65. One pyro continuity verification bGX (PCVB)

Five batteries and three fuel cells are the source of electrical
power. The SMJC is powered by fuel cells; however, battery power is
used for the start signal. The RCSC is powered by the fuel cells and
batteries. The remaining controllers of the SECS are powered by batteries
exclusively.

DISPLAYS
AND STRUCTURES
CONTROLS
.

EMERGENCY LAUNCH
DETECTION - SEQUENTIAL ESCAPE
SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM
4 EVENTS
CONTROL
ELECTRICAL EARTH
SUBSYSTEM LANDING
POWER
SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM

Figure A2.9-l.- SECS interface.

A-91

_~ . ". ~.__ .___-".,.~ _---" _"- ~...


....-.I_"._.__C_"-.-- ~.-__.-..---_--- _-_-.-_-_ll_l .^... -.---,
Origin of Signals

The SECS receives manual and/or automatic signals and performs


control functions for normal mission events or aborts. The manual
signals are the result of manipulating switches on the main display
console (MDC) or rotating the Commander's translation hand control
counterclockwise, which is the prime control for a manual abort.
Automatic abort signals are relayed by the emergency system (EDS).

A-92
FART A2.10

CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM

Introduction

The caution and warning system (C&WS) monitors critical parameters


of most of the systems in the CM and SM. When a malfunction or out-of-
tolerance condition occurs in any of these systems, the crew is
immediately alerted in order that corrective action may be taken.

Functional Description

Upon receipt of malfunction or out-of-tolerance signals, the C&WS


simultaneously identifies the abnormal condition and alerts the crew
to its existence. Each signal will activate the appropriate systems
status indicator and a master alarm circuit. The master alarm circuit
visually and aurally attracts the crew's attention by alarm indicators
on the MDC and by an audio tone in the headsets. Crew acknowledgment
of an abnormal condition consists of resetting the master alarm circuit,
while retaining the particular systems status malfunction indication.
The capability exists for the crew to select several modes of observing
systems status and master alarm indicators and of monitoring CM or SM
systems.

Major Component Subsystem Description

The C&WS consists of one major component, the detection unit. It


is located behind MDC-3, and therefore is neither visible nor accessible
to the crew during the mission. The balance of the system is made u-p
of visual indicators, aural alerting and associated circuits, and those
switches required to control the various system functions. Visual
indicators include the two uppermost fuel cell electromechanical event
devices on MDC-3, as well as all systems status and master alarm lights.

The detection unit circuits consist of comparators, logic, lamp


drivers, and a master alarm and tone generator. Also incorporated are
two redundant power supplies, a regulated +12 and a -12 V dc for the
electronics.

Inputs to the detection unit consist of both analog and event-type


signals. The analog signals are in the 0 to 5 V dc range. Alarm limits
for these signals trigger voltage comparators, which, in turn, activate
logic and lamp-driver circuits, thus causing activation of the master

A-93

^- .__ _. . . . .‘_ __. . __I___~ __.__- _- -_.-. “--. . .__-_..-_ms....m---- _.---- ~--- .-,_,^._ -.._ I.-
alarm circuit and tone generator, illumination of applicable systems
status lights on MDC-2, and for certain measurements, activation of
applicable electromechanical event indicators on MDC-3. Several event
inputs are monitored by the C&WS detection unit. These signals originate
from solid state and mechanical switch closures in malfunction sensing
devices. These signals will directly illuminate applicable system status
lights and, through logic circuitry, activate the master alarm lights
and tone generator. One event signal, originating within the detection
unit, directly illuminates the C/W light, but activates only the MASTER
ALARM switch lights of the master alarm circuit. One event signal,
"CRRW ALERT," originates from MSFYNstations through the UDL portion of
the communications system. This system status light can only be
extinguished by a second signal originating from the MSFN.

The master alarm circuit alerts crew-members whenever abnormal


conditions are detected. This is accomplished visually by illumination
of remote MASTER ALARM switch-lights on MDC-1, MDC-3, and LEB-122. An
audio alarm tone, sent to the three headsets, aurally alerts the crew.
The output signal of the tone generator is a square wave that is
alternately 750 and 2000 cps, modulated at 2.5 times per second. Although
the tone is audible above the conversation level, it does not render
normal conversation indistinct or garbled. When the crew has noted the
abnormal condition, the master alarm lights and the tone generator are
deactivated and reset by depressing any one of the three MASTER ALARM
switch-lights. This action leaves the systems status lights illuminated
and resets the master alarm circuit for alerting the crew if another
abnormal condition should occur. The individual systems status lights
will remain illuminated until the malfunction or out-of-tolerance
condition is corrected, or the NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch (MIX!-3) is
positioned to ACK.

The C!&WSpower supplies include sensing and switching circuitry


that insure unit self-protection should high-input current, or high- or
low-output voltage occur. Any of these fault conditions will cause the
illumination of the master alarm lights and the C/W system status light.
The tone generator, however, will not be activated because it requires
the 12 V dc output from the malfunctioned power supply for its operation.
The crew must manually select the redundant power supply to return the
C&WSto operation. This is accomplished by repositioning the CAUTION/
WARNING-POWERswitch on MDC-2. In so doing, the C/W status light is
extinguished, but the master alarm circuit remains activated, requiring
it to be reset.

Incorporated into the C&WSis the capability to test the lamps of


systems status and master alarm lights. Position 1 of the CAUTION/
WARNING-LAMP TEST switch tests the illumination of the left-hand group
of status lights on MDC-2 and the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-1.

A-9 4

___-___(,__
_-__-_-.., --1__1 ~^ ~---.---l--.---....-..I .__I-
__ ,..- ..__ _--._,__-,..--l.--=/~~- .I I "I. -- -""." .~
Position 2 tests the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-3 and the right-
hand group of status lights on MDC-2. The third MASTER ALARM light,
located on LEB-122, is tested by placing the CONDITION LAMPS switch
on LEB-122 to TEST.

The position of the CAUTION/WARNING - CSM-CM switch (MIX-2)


establishes the systems to be monitored. Before CM-SM separation,
systems in both the CM and SM are monitored for malfunction or out-of-
tolerance conditions with this switch in the CSM position. Positioning
the switch to CM deactivates systems status lights and event indicators
associated with SM systems.

The CAUTION/WARNING - NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch (MDC-2) permits


variable modes of status and alarm light illumination. For most
of the mission, the switch is set to the NORMAL position to give
normal C&WSoperation; that is, upon receipt of abnormal condition
signals, all systems status lights and master alarm lights are
capable of illumination. During the ascent phase, the switch is set to
the BOOST position, which prevents the MASTER ALARM switch-light on
MDC-1 from illuminating. This prevents possible confusion on MDC-1
between the red MASTER ALARM light and the adjacent red ABORT light.
The ACK switch position is selected when the crew desires to adapt
their eyes to darkness, or if a continuously illuminated systems status
light is undesirable. While in this mode, incoming signals will activate
only the master alarm lights and the tone generator. To determine the
abnormal condition, the crew must depress either MASTER ALARM switch-
light on MDC-1 or -3. This illuminates the applicable systems status
light, and deactivates and resets the master alarm circuit. The systems
status light will remain illuminated as long as the switch-light is
depressed. However, it may be recalled as long as the abnormal
condition exists by again pressing either switch-light.

A stowable tone booster is added to the caution and warning system


to allow all three astronauts to sleep simultaneously with the headsets
removed. Stowage of this unit during non-use periods is under locker
A3.

The unit consists of a power plug, tone booster, and a photo-


sensitive device which can be used on the left or right side of the
command module. The power connection is made to the UTILITY receptacle
on MDC-15 or 16. The tone booster, which provides an audible signal,
is mounted by velcro pad to the left-hand or right-hand girth shelf.
The photo-sensitive device is mounted by velcro over the MDC-1 or
MDC-3 MASTER ALAP&J lamp.

Since the MASTER ALARM is triggered by any caution/warning


monitored symptom, it will activate the tone booster until the

A-95
MASTER ALARM is extinguished by a manual reset.
In the event of a
caution/warning system power supply failure, this unit will provide
the audio alarm.

Electrical power distribution .- The C&WSreceives power from


the MNA & MNB buses (see fig. A2.10-1).
Two circuit breakers, located
on MDC-5, provide circuit protection. Closure of either circuit
breaker will allow normal system operation.

Figure A2.10-l.- C&WSpower distribution diagram.


Operational Limitations and Restrictions

With the CAUTION/WARNING - NORMAL-BOOST-ACK switch in the


BOOST position during ascent, the MASTER ALARM switch-light on
MDC-1 will not illuminate should a malfunction occur. The master alarm
circuit reset capability of the light is also disabled during this
time. This requires the MASTER ALARM switch-light on MDC-3 to be
used exclusively for monitoring and resetting functions during boost.
Several peculiarities should be noted in regard to the CAUTION/WARNING -
POWERswitch. Whenever this switch is moved from or through the OFF
position to either power supply position, the master alarm circuit is
activated, requiring it be reset. Also, switching from one power supply
to another (when there is no power supply failure) may cause the C/W
system status light to flicker as the switch passes through the OFF
position.

Should both power supplies fail, the C&WSis degraded to the extent
that the complete master alarm circuit, as well as those system status
lights that illuminate as the result of analog-type input signals, are
rendered inoperative. This leaves only those status lights operative
that require event-type input signals. They include the following SM
and CM lights: CMC, ISS, BMAG 1 TEMP, BMAG 2 TEMP, SPS ROUGHECO,
PITCH GMBL 1, PITCH GMBL 2, YAW CMBL 1, YAW GMBL 2, 02 FLOW HI,
FC BUS DISCONNECT., AC BUS 1, AC BUS 1 OVERLOAD, AC BUS 2, AC BUS 2
OVERLOAD, MN BUS A UNDERVOLT, MN BUS B UNDERVOLT, and CREWALERT. The
C/W light will be operative only while the CAUTION/WARNING - POWER
switch is in position 1 or 2.

The CAUTION/WARNING - CSM-CM switch must be in the CSM position


in order to conduct a lamp test of those system status lights associated
with SM systems. The status lights of CM systems may be tested with the
switch in either position. Circuit design permits a complete lamp
test to be conducted with the CAUTION/WARNING switch in the NORMAL or
ACK position only. In the BOOST position, all lamps except the MASTER
ALARM light on MDC-1 may be tested.

Normally, each abnormal condition signal will activate the C&WS


master alarm circuit and tone generator, and illuminate the applicable
systems status light. However, after initial activation of any status
light that monitors several parameters, and reset of the MASTER ALARM,
any additional out-of-tolerance condition or malfunction associated with
the same system status light will not activate the MASTER ALARM until
the first condition has been corrected, thus extinguishing the status
light.

A-97

__=I . ..“.-_ _..“... ,.,, “‘ ..--. -~-___ -- -----^1


Each crewmember's audio control panel has a power switch which
will allow or inhibit the tone signal from entering his headset. The
AUDIO-TONE position allows the signalto pass on to the headset,
while the AUDIO position inhibits the signal.
PART A2.11

MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS DATA

Introduction

Miscellaneous systems data pertain to items that are not covered


in other systems. These items consist of timers, accelerometers
(G-meter), and uprighting system.

Timers

Two mission timers (electrical) and two event timers (electrical/


mechanical) are provided for the crew in the command module. One
mission timer is located on panel 2 of the MDC and the other on panel
306 in the left-hand forward equipment bay. Each mission timer has
provisions for manually setting the readout (hours, minutes, and
seconds), and the capability of starting, stopping, and resetting to
zero. The numerical elements are electroluminescent lamps and the
intensity is controlled by the NUMBRICS light control on panels MDC-8
and LEB-100. The event timers are located on MDC-1 and -306 in the
left-hand forward equipment bay, and provide the crew with a means of
monitoring and timing events. Ali timers reset and start automatically
when lift-off occurs, and the timer located on MDC-1 will be automatically
reset and restarted if an abort occurs. The event timers are integrally
illuminated by an internal electroluminescent lamp and controlled by the
INTEGRAL light controls located on MDC-8 and LEB-100.

Accelerometer (G-meter)

The accelerometer or G-meter @DC-l) provides the crew with a


visual indication of spacecraft positive and negative G-loads. This
meter is illuminated by an internal electroluminescent lamp and controlled
by the INTEGRAL light control on MDC-8.

Command Module Uprighting System

The CM uprighting system is manually controlled and operated after


the CM has assumed a stable, inverted floating attitude. The system
consists of three inflatable air bags, two relays, three solenoid-control
valves, two air compressors, control switches, and air lines. The inflat-
able bags are located in the '34 forward compartment and the air compressors
in the aft compartment. The control switches and circuit breakers are
located in the crew compartment. The switches control relays which
are powered by the postlanding bus and the relays control power to the
compressors which are powered by battery buses A and B. (See figure
A2.11-1.)
EATTLRV
FLTIPL BUS B
BUS
CT
c

EPS BAT 25A


UPRIGHT svs
2CA
I )BUSBEPS BAT 2%
CWPR 1
xLA > BUSA EAT A WEB-2??I
IRHLE-2N IAHEB-ml
I FLOAT BAG R
I FLOAT BAG 1 5A ) BAT B
5A )' BAT A P iMDC~81
Y IMDC-8)

FLOAT BAG
L WC-81

------

/
----- 1
I
I
----- 1

I
i
Q,
VfNl
I

!
I
I Pizmid----
NORMCLOSED MRM CIOSED
_---e-m- ,----m-m
_--m---e
COMROLVALVf
CONTRNVALVL 4 CONTROL VALVE
NO.Z+VBAG r
M. l-V BAG W.3+ZBAG
1

T
COMPRtSSOR COlvTROt
52 MOTOR SWITCHLS
IRHLB-2981

Figure A2.11-l.- Sequential systems operational/functional diagram.


Functional description.- FLOAT BAG 1L switch controls inflation
of the air bag on -Y axis, switch 2R controls inflation of the air
bag on the +Y axis, and switch 3 CTR controls inflation of the air bag
on the +Z axis of the CM (see fig. A2.11-1). Two of the bags are
45 inches in diameter; the other bag is 24 inches in diameter. If the
CM becomes inverted after landing, the crewmember at station 1 initiates
filling of the three bags by setting the FLOAT BAG lL, 2R, and 3 CTR
switches to FILL. When the CM is uprighted, the three FLOAT BAG switches
will be set to OFF. A 4.25f0.25-psi relief valve is located in the inlet
of each bag. Backup relief valves set at 13.5 psi are located in the
outlet of each compressor.

-.

A-102

___l.s^_.--..-" .--..^..._I -.-. "."._


FART A2.12

CREWPERSONAL EQUIPMENT

This section contains the description and operation of Contractor-


and NASA-furnished crew personal equipment and miscellaneous stowed
equipment that is not described in other sections of the handbook. All
mador items are identified as Contractor-furnished equipment (CFE) or
Government-furnished (NASA) property (GFP - synonymous with GFE).

The crew equipment is presented in the general order of operational


usage in SM2A-03-BLOCK. A brief outline is as follows:

a. Spacesuits

(1) Intravehicular Spacesuit Assembly

(a) Biomedical Harness and Belt


(b) Constant Wear Garment (CWG)
(c) Flight Coveralls
(d) Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA)
(e) Associated Umbilicals, Adapters, and Equipment

(2) Extravehicular Spacesuit Assembly

(a) Liquid-Cooled Garment (LCG)


(b) PGA with Integrated Thermal Meteroid Garment (ITMG)
(c) Associated Equipment

b. G-Load Restraints

(1) Crewman Restraint Harness

(2) Interior Handhold and Straps

(3) Hand Bar

C. Zero-g Restraints

(1) Rest Stations

(2) Velcro and Snap Restraint Areas

(3) Straps

A-103
d. Internal Sighting and Illumination Aids

(1) Window Shades

(2) Mirrors

(3) Crewman Optical Alignment Sight (COAS)

(4) LM Active Docking Target

(5) Window Markings

(6) Miscellaneous Aids

e. External Sighting and Illumination Aids

(1) Exterior Spotlight

(2) Running Lights

(3) EVA Floodlight

(4) EVA Handles with RL Disks

(5) Rendezvous Beacon

f. Mission Operational Aids

(1) Flight Data File

(2) Inflight Toolset

(3) Cameras

(4) Accessories & Miscellaneous

(a) Waste Bags


(b) Pilot's Preference Kits (PPKs)
(c) Fire Extinguishers
(d) Oxygen Masks
(e) Utility Outlets
(f) Scientific Instrumentation Outlets

63. Crew Life Support

(1) Water

(2) Food

A-104

(...._.__--. .-_.-_.-^ -------.-


(3) The Galley System

(4) Waste Management System

(5) Personal Hygiene

h. Medical Supplies and Equipment

1. Radiation Monitoring and Measuring Equipment

ii. Postlanding Recovery Aids

(1) Postlanding Ventilation Ducts

(2) Swimmer Umbilical and Dye Marker

(3) Recovery Beacon

(4) Snagging Line

(5) Seawater Pump

(6) Survival Kit

k. Equipment Stowage
PART AZ.13

DOCKING AND TRANSFER

Introduction

This section identifies the physical characteristics of the docking


system and the operations associated with docking and separation.

Docking operational sequence .- The following sequence of illustra-


tions and text describe the general functions that are performed during
docking. These activities will vary with the different docking modes.

After the spacecraft and third stage have orbited the earth, pos-
sibly up to three revolutions, the third stage is reignited to place the
spacecraft on a translunar flight.

Shortly after translunar injection, the spacecraft transposition and


docking phase takes place (fig. A2.13-1). When the CSM is separated
from the third stage, docking is achieved by maneuvering the CSM close
enough so that the extended probe (accomplished during earth orbit) -
engages with the drogue in the LM. When the probe engages the drogue
with the use of the capture latches, the probe retract system is activated
to pull the LM and CSM together.

Upon retraction, the LM tunnel ring will activate the 12 automatic


docking ring latches on the CM and effect a pressure seal between the
modules through the two seals in the CM docking ring face. After the
two vehicles are docked, the pressure in the tunnel is equalized from
the CM through a pressure equalization valve. The CM forward hatch is
removed and the actuation of all 12 latches is verified. Any latches
not automatically actuated will be cocked and latched manually by the
crewman. The LM to CM electrical umbilicals are retrieved from their
stowage position in the LM tunnel and connected to their respective
connectors in the CM docking ring.

The vehicle umbilicals supply the power to release the L&J from the
SLA. Once the hold-down straps are severed, four large springs located
at each attachment point push the two vehicles apart, and the combined
CSM/LM continues towards the moon.

A-106
H

A-107

. _..-_ _. _. ..~- - ..._”..--_ _.._.-


1-- I-__~ _-__..^_.__
~,l_____~ __--- ~-s_--.--
Once in lunar orbit, the tunnel is repressurized. The probe assem-
bly and drogue assembly are removed from the tunnel and stowed in the
CM. The pressure in the LM is equalized through the LM hatch valve,
With the pressure equalized, the IM hatch is opened and locked in the
open position to provide a passageway between the two modules.

After two crewmen transfer to the LM, the CM crewman retrieves the
drogue from its stowage location in the CM, passes it through the
tunnel, and helps to install and lock it in the tunnel. The drogue may
be installed and locked by the LM crewmen, if they choose. The probe
assembly is then retrieved from its stowage location in the CM and
installed and preloaded to take all the load between the modules. This
accomplished, the LM hatch is closed by the I.&l crewmen. The 12 docking
latches are released and cocked by the crew-man in the CM so that the
latches are ready for the next docking operation. The CM forward hatch
is reinstalled and checked to assure a tight seal. The modules are now
prepared for separation.

The probe EXTEND RELEASE/RETRACT switch in the CM (MDC-2) is placed


in the EXTEND position, energizing the probe extend latch. The probe
extends and during extension will activate a switch energizing an enter-
nal electrical motor to unlock the capture latches. After the probe
extends, the I.M pulls awsy from the CM and descends to the lunar surface.
If the switch is not held until the probe reaches f'ull extension, the
capture latches will reengage to hold the two vehicles together. The
switch would then have to be reactivated and separation performed with
the RCS.

After landing, it will be several hours before the first man steps
foot on the moon. The first few hours are spent checking the IM ascent
stage and resting. This completed, the cabin is depressurized and one
of the crewmen descends to the lunar surface. Following a short period,
the se'cond crewman descends to the surface. Lunar surface activities
will vary for each mission.

Following completion of the lunar surface exploration the ascent


engine is fired using the depleted descent stage as a launch platform,

After rendezvous and docking in lunar orbit, the LM crewmen trans-


fer back to the CM, After the CSM and I&i pressures have equalized, the
LM crew opens the LM hatch while the CM pilot removes the tunnel hatch.
The drogue and probe are removed and stowed in the LM. Lunar samples,
film, and equipment to be returned to earth are transferred from the LM
to the CM. Equipment in the CM that is no longer needed is put into the
LM, and the LM hatch is closed, the CM hatch is replaced, and the seal
checked.

A-108
The IN is then released by firing the separation system (detonating
cord) located around the circumference of the docking ring, thus serving
the ring and abandoning the I&I (fig. A2.13-1). This completed, the CM
SPS engine is fired, placing the spacecraft in a return trajectory toward
the earth.

Functional Description

The docking system is a means of connecting and disconnecting the


LM/CSM during a mission and is removable to provide for intravehiclular
transfer between the CSM and L&l of the flight crew and transferrable
equipment.

The crew transfer tunnel, or CSM/LM interlock area, is a passageway


between the CM forward bulkhead and the LM upper hatch. The hatch
relationship with the docking hardware is shown in fig. AZ.l3-2. (The
figure does not show the installed positions.) For descriptive purposes
that portion of the interlock area above the CM forward bulkhead to the
docking interface surface is referred to as the CM tunnel. That portion
of the interlock outboard of the L&I upper hatch extending to the docking
interface surface is referred to as the I&l tunnel. The CM tunnel incor-
porates the CM forward hatch, probe assembly, docking ring and seals, and
the docking automatic latches. The L&I tunnel contains a hinged pressure
hatch, drogue support fittings, drogue assembly, drogue locking mechanism,
and L&f/CM electrical umbilicals.

A-109
A- 110

-.-- . ..- -- . ..--. --. .-. .._ _... “... /.. -__- -.“.” ,,..--, -.~, .__ 1-1--1- - -~-~---~
PART A3

LUNAR MODULE SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION

INTRODUCTION

This part includes descriptions of the LM, the LM - spacecraft-to-


lunar module adapter (SLA) - S-IVB connections, the LM-CSM interfaces,
and LM stowage provisions are included in this chapter. These data were
extracted from the technical manual LMA 790-3-I&I, Apollo Operations Hand-
book, Lunar Module, Volume 1, dated February 1, 1970.

LM CONFIGURATION

The LM (fig. A3-1) is designed for manned lunar landing missions.


It consists of an ascent stage and a descent stage; the stages are
joined together at four interstage fittings by explosive nuts and bolts.
Subsystem continuity between the stages is accomplished by separable
interstage umbilicals and hardline connections.

Both stages function as a single unit during lunar orbit, until


separation is required. Stage separation is accomplished by explosively
severing the four interstage nuts and bolts, the interstage umbilicals,
and the water lines. All other hardlines are disconnected automatically
at stage separation. The ascent stage can function as a single unit to
accomplish rendezvous and docking with the CSM. The overall dimensions
of the LM are given in figure A3-2. Station reference measurements
(fig. Al-l) ar e established as follows:

a. The Z- and Y-axis station reference measurements (inches)


start at a point where both axes intersect the X-axis at the vehicle
vertical centerline: the Z-axis extends forward and aft of the
intersection; the Y-axis, left and right. The point of intersection
is established as zero.

b. The +Y-axis measurements increase to the right from zero; the


-Y-axis measurements increase to the left. Similarly, the tZ- and
-Z-axis measurements increase forward (+Z) and aft (-Z) from zero.

C. The X-axis station reference measurements (inches) start at a


design reference point identified as station +X200.000. This reference
point is approximately 128 inches above the bottom surface of the
footpads (with the landing gear extended); therefore, all X-axis station
reference measurements are +X-measurements.

A-111

. ,.-.____,,.-__._.
-. .,",..
__._---. -___ --ll~--ll-".-----*l __Xsll_---_~-. ~-^_-l_-_--ll--_
Figure A3-l.- LM configuration.

::- 112
(--14, I”-=

28’ a 2”

19’ 10.65”
t
Y 8.86”

1 d FORWARD

Figure A3-2.- LM overall dimensions.

A-113
.-

Ascent Stage

The ascent stage, the control center and manned portion of the
IN, accommodates two astronauts. It comprises three main sections:
the crew compartment, midsection, and af't equipment bay. The crew
compartment and midsection make up the cabin, which has an approximate
overall volume of 235 cybic feet. The cabin is climate-controlled,
and pressurized to 4.8 - 0 .2 psig. Areas other than the cabin are
unpressurized.

Crew Compartment. - The crew compartment is the frontal area of


the ascent stage; it is 92 inches in diameter and 42 inches deep. This
is the flight station area; it has control and display panels, armrests,
body restraints, landing aids, two front windows, a docking window,
and an alignment optical telescope (AOT). Flight station centerlines
are 44 inches apart; each astronaut has a set of controllers and arm-
rests. Circuit breaker, control, and display panels are along the
upper sides of the compartment. Crew provision storage space is
beneath these panels. The main control and display panels are canted
and centered between the astronauts to permit sharing and easy scanning.
An optical alignment station, between the flight stations, is used in
conjunction with the AOT. A portable life support system (PLSS) donning
station is also in the center aisle, slightly aft of the optical align-
ment station.

Control and display panels: The crew compartment has 12 control


and display panels (fig. A3-3): two main display panels (1 and 2)
that are canted forward 10 degrees, two center panels (3 and 4) that
slope down and aft 45 degrees towards the horizontal, two bottom side
panels (5 and 6), two lower side panels (8 and 12), one center side panel
(14), two upper side panels (11 and 161, and the orbital rate display -
earth and lunar (ORDEAL) panel aft of panel 8.

A-114

-- ._-. - ___I__ -."111..-- -_-- ---. - .-I_^_


Figure A3-3.- Cabin interior (looking forward).
Panels 1 and 2 are located on each side of the front face assembly
centerline, at eye level. Each panel is constructed of two 0.015-inchi
thick aluminum-alloy face sheets, spaced 2 inches apart by formed
channels. The spacer channels are located along the sheet edges;
additional channels, inboard of the edge channels, reinforce the sheets.
This forms a rigid box-like construction with a favorable strength-to-
weight ration and a relatively high natural frequency. Four shock mounts
support each panel on the structure. Panel instruments are mounted to
the back surface of the bottom and/or to the top sheet of the panel.
The instruments protrude through the top sheet of the panel. All dial
faces are nearly flush with the forward face of the panel. Panel1
contains warning lights, flight indicators and controls, and propellant
quantity indicators. Panel 2 contains caution lights, flight indicators
and controls, and Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS) and Environmental
Control Subsystem (ECS) indicators and controls.

Panel 3 is immediately below panels 1 and 2 and spans the width


of these two panels. Panel 3 contains the radar antenna temperature
indicators and engine, radar, spacecraft stability, event timer, RCS
and lighting controls.

Panel 4 is centered between the flight stations and below panel 3.


Panel 4 contains attitude controller assembly (ACA) and thrust trans-
lation controller assembly (TTCA) controls, navigation system indicators,
and LM guidance computer (I&C) indicators and controls. Panels 1 through
4 are within easy reach and scan of both astronauts.

Panels 5 and 6 are in front of the flight stations at astronaut


waist height. Panel 5 contains lighting and mission timer controls,
engine start and stop pushbuttons, and the X-translation pushbutton.
Panel 6 contains abort guidance controls.

Panel 8 is at the left of the Commander's station, The panel is


canted up 15 degrees from the horizontal; it contains controls and
displays for explosive devices, audio controls, and the TV camera
connection.

Panel 11, directly above panel 8, has five angled surfaces that
contain circuit breakers. Each row of circuit breakers is canted
15 degrees to the line of sight so that the white band on the circuit
breakers can be seen when they open.

A-116
Panel 12 is at the right of the LM Pilot's station. The panel is
canted up 15 degrees from the horizontal; it contains audio, communica-
tions, and communications antennas controls and displays.

Panel 14, directly above panel 12, is canted up 36.5 degrees from
the horizontal. It contains controls and displays for electrical power
distribution and monitoring.

Panel 16, directly above panel 14, has four angled surfaces that
contain circuit breakers. Each row of circuit breakers is canted
15 degrees to the line of sight so that the white band on the circuit
breakers can be seen when they open.

The orbital rate display - earth and lunar (ORDEAL) panel is


immediately aft of the panel 8. It contains the controls for obtaining
I,M attitude, with respect to a local horizontal, from the LCC.

Windows: Two triangular windows in the front face assembly provide


visibility during descent, ascent, and rendezvous and docking phases of
the mission. Both windows have approximately 2 square feet of viewing
area; they are canted down to the side to permit adequate peripheral
and downward visibility. A third (docking) window is in the curved
overhead portion of the crew compartment shell, directly above the
Commander's flight station. This window provides visibility for
docking maneuvers. All three windows consist of two separated panes,
vented to space environment. The outer pane is made of Vycor glass with
a thermal (multilayer blue-red) coating on the outboard surface and an
antireflective coating on the inboard surface. The inner pane is made
of structural glass. It is sealed with a Race seal (the docking
window inner pane has a dual seal) and has a defog coating on the
outboard surface and an antireflective coating on the inboard surface.
Both panes are bolted to the window frame through retainers.

All three windows are electrically heated to prevent fogging.


The heaters for the Commander's front window and the docking window
receive their power from 115-volt ac bus A and the Commander's 28-volt
dcbus, respectively. The heater for the LM Pilot's front window receives
power from 115-volt ac bus B. The heater power for the Commander's front
window and the docking window is routed through the AC BUS A: CDR WIND
HTR and HEATERS: DOCK WINDOWcircuit breakers, respectively; for the
LM Pilot's front window, through the AC BUS B: SE WIND HTR circuit
breaker. These are 2-ampere circuit breakers on panel 11. The tempera-
ture of the windows is not monitored with an indicator; proper heater
operation directly affects crew visibility and is, therefore, visually
determined by the astronauts. When condensation or frost appears on a
window, that window heater is turned on. It is turned off when the
abnormal condition disappears. When a window shade is closed, that
window heater must be off.
Midsection.- The midsection structure (fig. A3-4) is a ring-stiffened
semimonocoque shell. The bulkheads consist of aluminum-alloy, chemically
milled skin with fusion-welded longerons and machined stiffeners. The
midsection shell is mechanically fastened to flanges on the major
structural bulkheads at stations +'Z27,OO and -Z27.00. The crew compart-
ment shell is mechanically secured to an outboard flange of the +Z27.00
bulkhead. The up-per and lower decks, at stations +x294.643 and +X233.500,
respectively, are made of aluminum-alloy, integrally stiffened and
machined. The lower deck provides structural support for the ascent
stage engine. The upper deck provides structural support for the docking
tunnel and the overhead hatch.

Figure A3-A.- Cabin interior (looking aft).


Two main beams running fore and aft, integral with those above
the crew compartment, are secured to the upper deck of the midsection;
they support the deck at the outboard end of the docking tunnel. The
aft ends of the beams are fastened to the aft bulkhead (-Z27.000)
which has provisions for bolting the tubular truss members that s&port
both aft interstage fittings. Ascent stage stress loads applied to the
front beam are transmitted through the two beams on the upper deck to
the aft bulkhead.

Descent Stage

The descent stage is the unmanned portion of the LM. It contains


the descent engine propellant system, auxiliary equipment for the
astronauts, end scientific experiment packages to be placed on the
lunar surface. The descent stage structure provides attachment and
support points for securing the LN within the spacecraft-lunar module
adapter (SLA).

LM - SLA - S-IVB Connections

At earth launch, the LM is within the SLA, which is connected to


the S-IVB booster. The SLA has an upper section and a lower section.
The outriggers, to which the landing gear is attached, provide attachment
points for securing the IN to the SLA lower section. The LM is mounted
to the SLA support structure on adjustable spherical seats at the apex
of each of the four outriggers; it is held in place by a tension holddown
strap at each mounting point. Before the IN is removed, the upper
section of the SLA is explosively separated into four segments. These
segments, which are hinged to the lower section, fold back and are then
forced away from the SLA by spring thrusters. The IN is then explosively
released from the lower section.

LM-CSM Interfaces

A ring at the top of the ascent stage provides a structural interface


for joining the LM to the CSM. The ring, which is compatible with the
clamping mechanisms in the CM, provides structural continuity. The
drogue portion of the docking mechanism is secured below this ring.
The drogue is required during docking operations to mate with the
CM-mounted probe. See figure A3-5 for orientation of the LM to the
CSM.

Crew transfer tunnel.- The crew transfer tunnel (LPI-CM interlock


area) is the passageway created between the I&I overhead hatch and the
CM forward pressure hatch when the I&l and the CSM are docked. The

A-119

..- .--. * _- -.--- --l_--_“.“.l..- I... .-_--.-__ll-___ll_“_~


tunnel permits intervehicular transfer of crew and equipment without
exposure to space environment.

Final docking latches: Twelve latches are spaced equally about the
periphery of the CM docking ring. They are placed around and within the
CM tunnel so that they do not interfere with probe operation. When
secured, the latches insure structural continuity and pressurization
between the LM and the cT4, and seal the tunnel interface.

Umbilical: An electrical umbilical, in the IX portion of the


tunnel, is connecCed by an astronaut to the CM. This connection can
be made without drogue removal.

CREWMAN OPTICAL STANDOFF CROSS LM ACQUISITION LM -Y-AXIS


ALIGNMENT SIGHT ;CSM-ACTIVE DOCKING
ALIGNMENT TARGET)
\

CH

LM COAS LINE
OF SIGHT POST
PITCHOVER POSITION

CSM
\
ACOUISITION
STANDOFF
ALIGNMENT
CROSS ANU
STRIPS
AND ORIENTATION (LM -ACTIVE DOCKlnv.I.-.
LIGHT (TIP) ALIGNMENT TARCEll

Figure A3-5.- LM-CSM reference axes.

A-120
Docking hatches.- The IN has a single docking (overhead) hatch;
the CSM has a single, integral, forward hatch. The LM overhead hatch
is not removable. It is hinged to open 75 degrees into the cabin.

Docking drogue.- The drogue assembly is a conical structure with


provisions for mounting in the LM portion of the crew transfer tunnel.
The drogue may be removed from either end of the crew transfer tunnel
and may be temporarily stowed in the CM or the LM, during Service
Propulsion System (SPS) burns. One of the three tunnel mounts contains
a locking mechanism to secure the installed drogue in the tunnel.

Docking probe.- The docking probe provides initial CM-LM coupling


and attenuates impact energy imposed by vehicle contact. The docking
probe assembly consists of a central body, probe head, capture latches,
pitch arms, tension linkages, shock attenuators, a support structure,
probe stowage mechanism, probe extension mechanism, probe retraction
system, an extension latch, a preload torque shaft, probe electrical
umbilicals, and electrical circuitry. The assembly may be folded for
removal and stowage from either end of the transfer tunnel.

The probe head is self-centering. When it centers in the drogue


the three capture latches automatically engage the drogue socket. The
capture latches can be released 'oy a release handle on the CM side of
the probe or by depressing a probe head release button from the I&l
side, using a special tool stowed on the right side stowage area inside
the cabin.

Docking aids.- Visual alignment aids are used for final alignment
of the IN and CSM, before the probe head of the CM makes contact with
the drogue. The LM +Z-axis will align 50 to 70 degrees from the
CSM -Z-axis and 30 degrees from the CSM +Y-axis. The CSM position
represents a 180-degree pitchover and a counterclockwise roll of
60 degrees from the launch vehicle alignment configuration.

An alignment target is recessed into the LM so as not to protrude


into the launch configuration clearance envelope or beyond the LM envelope.
The target, at approximately stations -~46.30O and -20.203, has a
radioluminescent black standoff cross having green radioluminescent
disks on it and a circular target base painted fluorescent white with
black orientation indicators. The base is 17.68 inches in diameter.
Cross members on the standoff cross will be aligned with the orientation
indicators and centered within the target circle when viewed at the
intercept parallel to the X-axis and perpendicular to the Y-axis and
Z-axis.

A-121
Stowage Provisions

The IM has provisions for stowing crew personal equipment. The


equipment includes such items as the docking drogue; navigational
star charts and an orbital map; umbilicals; a low-micron antibacteria
filter for attachment to the cabin relief and dump valve; a crewman's
medical kit; an extravehicular visor assembly (EWA) for each astronaut;
a special multipurpose wrench (tool B); spare batteries for the PLSS
packs; and other items.

-_

A-122
PART A4

MISSION CONTROL CENTER ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

The Mission Control Center (MCC) is located at the Manned Spacecraft


Center in Houston, Texas. The MCC contains the communications, computer
display and command systems to effectively monitor and control the
Apollo spacecraft. These data were extracted from information furnished
by Flight Operations Directorate, Manned Spacecraft Center.

Flight operations are controlled from the MCC. The MCC contains
two flight control rooms, but only one control room is used per mission.
Each control room, called a Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR),
is capable of controlling individual Staff Support Rooms (SSR) located
adjacent to the MOCR. Both the MOCR's and the SSR's operate on a
24-hour basis. To accomplish this, the various flight control functions
and consoles are staffed by three g-hour shifts. Figures A4-1 and A4-2
show the floor plans and locations of personnel and consoles in the
MOCR and the SSR's. Figure Ah-3 shows MOCR activity during the Apollo
13 flight, and figure Ah-4 shows the MOCR and SSR organizational
structure.
1. Flight Operations Director: Responsible for 9. Flight Surgeon: Directs all operational med-
successful completion of mission flight operations ical activities concerned with the mission, including
for all missions being supported. the status of the flight crew.
2. Mission Director: Overall mission respon- 10. Spacecraft Communicator: Voice communi-
sibility and control of flight test operations, which cations with the astronauts, exchanging information
include launch preparation. In Project Mercury there on the progress of the mission with them.
were no alternative mission objectives that could 11. Flight Dynamics Officer: Monitors and
be exercised other than early termination of the evaluates the flight parameters required to achieve
mission. The Apollo missions, however, offer many a successful orbital flight; gives “GO” or “ABORT”
possible alternatives which have to be decided in recommendations to the Flight Director.
real time. 12. Retrofire Officer: Monitors impact pre-
3. Public Affairs Officer: Responsible for pro- diction displays and is responsible for determination
viding information on the mission status to the of retrofire times.
public. 14. Booster Systems Engineer: Monitors pro
4. Flight Director: Responsible for detailed pellant tank pressurization systems and advises the
control of the mission from lift-off until conclusion Bight crew and/or Flight Director of systems ab-
of the flight. normalities.
5. Assistant Flight Director: Responsible tothe 15. Guidance Officer: Detects Stage I and
Flight Director for detailed control of the mission Stage II slowrate deviations and other programmed
from lift-off through conclusion of the flight; assumes events, verifies proper performance of the Inertial
the duties of the Flight Director during his absence. Guidance System, commands onboard computation
6. Experiments and Flight Planning: Plansand function and recommends action to the Flight
monitors accomplishment of flight planning and Director.
scientific experiment activities. 16. Network Controller: Hasdetailedoperation-
7. Operations and Procedures Officer: Respon- al control of the Ground Operational Support System
sible to the Flight Director for the detailed imple- network.
mentation of the MCC/Ground Operational Support 17. DepartmentofDefenseRepresentative: Over-
Systems mission control procedures. all control of Department of Defense forces supporting
8. Vehicle Systems Engineers: Monitor and the mission, including direction of the deployment
evaluate the performance of all electrical, mech- of recovery forces, the operation of the recovery
anical and life support equipment aboard the space- communications network, and the search, location
craft (this includes the Agena during rendezvous and retrieval of the crew and spacecraft.
missions).

Figure Ah-l.- Personnel and console locations.

A-124

-__ ~. _ _---_l----_l_- --
Legend of symbols

0 Clock

i Zone fire alarm panel

lg “A” power panel

[Bi “6” power panel

8 Frre extinguisher

[XI Air duct

m Ozone exhaust

Room no. Room name

310 Flight dynamtcs SSR


311 Vehicle systems SSR
312 Life systems SSR
312A Flight crew SSR
313 Operation and procedures SSR
314 AiSEP SSR
316 Control and display terminal
319 Display and timing
324
324A Meteaological center
3248 1
327 Recovery control
::;A Recovery control display projection
Simulation control
329 Summary display projection
330 Mission operations control room no. 1
zz:“, f Comm booth
332 Visitors viewing area

Figure Ab-2.- Floor plan of MOCKand SSR's.


I I 1 I
Spacecraft Network
Fliyht Act~wt~fs CCWllOlli?l
DfflCU Commll,~Icator
AD I
IST

l I I I
CSM Systeiw LM Systems EMU Booster Systeins
Retrofire Flight Dynalu~cs Guidance / Yaw
Engineers Engineers E”iJlWXS
Officer officer Dff1cer ;
EECDM : GNC TELCDM ! CONTROL ’ -J
1
t

Figure A4-4.- NOCR and SSR organizational structure.


MISSION OPERATIONS CONTROL ROOM

The MOCR was the center for mission control operations. The prime
controlpositions were stationed in this area. The MOCRwas broken
down into three operations groups. Responsibilities of the groups were
as follows :

a. Mission Command and Control Group

(I) Mission Director (MD)


The MD was responsible for overall conduct of the mission.

(2) Flight Operations Director (FOD)


The FOD was responsible for the interface between the Flight
Director and management.

(3) Flight Director (FD)


The FD was responsible for MOCR decisions and actions
concerning vehicle systems, vehicle dynamics, and MCC/MSFN
operations.

(4) Assistant Flight Director (AFD)


The AFD was responsible for assisting the Flight Director
in the performance of his assigned duties.

(5) Flight Activities Officer (FAO)


The FAO was responsible for developing and coordinating
the flight plan.

(6) Department of Defense Representative (DOD)


The DOD Representative was responsible for coordination
and direction of all DOD mission support forces and sites.

(7) Assistant DOD Representative


The Assistant DOD Representative was responsible for assist-
ing the DOD Representative in the performance of his task.

(8) Network Controller (NC) (NETWORK)


The Network Controller was responsible to the Flight
Director for the detailed operational control and failure
analysis of the MSFN.

(9) Assistant Network Controller


The Assistant Network Controller assisted the Network
Controller in the performance of his duties and was respon-
sible for all MCC equipment and its ability to support.

~-128

-.__ -_“~ i_ .,l----.l.. -.-.._-_ . .._- - .-..- -.~_l_- l____.-_ll_l__~-,-“,~-.~..l_-- -.-


(10) Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
The PA0 was responsible for keeping the public informed
on the progress of the mission.

(11) Surgeon
The Flight Surgeon was responsible to the Flight Director
for the analysis and evaluation of all medical activities
concerned with the flight.

(12) Spacecraft Communicator (CAPCOM)


The Spacecraft Communicator was responsible to the Flight
Director for all voice communications with the flight
crew. The CAPCOMalso served in conjunction with FAO as
a crew procedures advisor. This position was manned by
a member of the backup flight crew.

(13) Experiments Officer (EO) (EXPO)


The primary function of the EO was to provide overall opera-
tional coordination and control for the Apollo Lunar Surface
Experiment Package (ALSEP), and the Lunar Geology Experi-
ment (LGE). The coordination was with the various MOCR
operational positions and the ALSEP SSR; the Principal
Investigators, Management, the Program Officer, Goddard,
and the Manned Space Flight Network. The EO was also
responsible to the Flight Director for providing ALSEP
and LGE status and any ALSEP or LGE activities that could
have an effect on the Apollo mission.

b. Systems Operations Group (MOCR)

(1) Environmental, Electrical, and Communications (EECOM)


The CSM EECOM Engineer was responsible to the FD for
monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM environmental,
electrical, and sequential systems.

(2) Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC)


The GNC Engineer was responsible to the Flight Director
for monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM guidance,
navigation, control, and propulsion systems.

(3) TELCOM
The LM Environmental and Electrical Engineer was respon-
sible to the FD for monitoring and troubleshooting the
LM environmental, electrical, and sequential systems.

A-129

._ . ."- -" _..-. ...._..---- ~I.*ll _--. l.--".- _-- .*----1.--1".1_1_..


(4) CONTROL
The LM Guidance, Navigation, and Control Engineer was
responsible to the Flight Director for monitoring and
troubleshooting the LM guidance, navigation, control,
and propulsion systems.

(5) Booster Systems Engineer (BSE)


The Booster Systems Engineers' responsibilities were
delegated as follows:

(a) BSE 1 had overall responsibility for the launch ve-


hicle including command capability. In addition,
BSE 1 was responsible for all S-IC and S-II stage
functions.

(b) BSE 2 had prime responsibility for all S-IVB stage


functions with the exception of command.

(c) BSE 3 had prime responsibility for all instrument


unit (IU) functions with the exception of command.

(6) Apollo Communications Engineer (ACE) (INCO) and Operations .-


and Procedures Officer (O&P) (PROCEDURES)
The INCO and O&P shared a console and responsibility.
The INCO's prime responsibility to the Flight Director
was for monitoring and troubleshooting the CSM, LM, TV,
PLSS, and erectable antenna communication systems. He
was also responsible for execution of all commands asso-
ciated with the communication systems. The O&P's prime
responsibility to the Flight Director was for the detailed
implementation of the MCC/MSFN/GSFC/KSC mission control
interface procedures. The O&P was also responsible for
scheduling and directing all telemetry and DSE voice
playbacks. He also developed all communication inputs
and changes to the ground support timeline.

C. Flight Dynamics Group

(1) Flight Dynamics Officer (FIDO)


The Flight Dynamics Officer participated in prelaunch
checkout designed to insure system readiness, monitored
powered flight events and trajectories from the stand-
point of mission feasibility; monitored reentry events
and trajectories, and updated impact point estimates as
required.

A-130

._- ",__,_
^ _,._,._
- _._____________
_-_l_l._ ,_--, *-II.-L.I"._._
".---.--+-- ..---_ - _,........._ __ ,__~..,. - _;..II~
._.. .------ ...- ^_._
--III
(2) Retrofire Officer (REPRO)
The Retrofire Officer participated in prelaunch checkout
designed to insure system readiness and maintained an
updated reentry plan throughout the mission.

(3) Guidance Officer (GUIDO) and YAW


The Guidance Officer participated in prelaunch checkout
designed to insure system readiness and performed the
guidance monitor functions during power flight and space-
craft initialization. The GUIDO was also responsible for
CSM and LM display keyboards (DSKY) as well as CMC and LGC
command updates. The second Guidance Officer (YAW) had
the same duties except that he was not responsible for
command functions.

MCC SUPPORT ROOMS

Each MOCR group had a staff support room (SSR) to support all activ-
ities required by each MOCR position. These SSR's were strategically
located in areas surrounding the MOCR's and were manned by the various
personnel of a given activity.

a. Staff Support Room

(1) Flight Dynamics SSR


The Flight Dynamics SSR was responsible to the Flight
Dynamics Group in the MOCR for providing detailed analysis
of launch and reentry parameters, maneuver requirements,
and orbital trajectories. It also, with the assistance of
the Mission Planning and Analysis Division (WAD), provided
real-time support in the areas of trajectory and guidance
to the MOCR Flight Dynamics team on trajectory and guidance
matters. An additional service required provided interface
between the MOCR Flight Dynamics team and parties normally
outside the Flight Control team such as Program Office
representatives, spacecraft contractor representatives,
et cetera.

(2) Flight Director's SSR


The Flight Director's SSR was responsible for staff support
to the Flight Director, AFD, Data Management Officer., and
FAO. This SSR was also responsible to the Apollo Communi-
cations Engineer in the MOCR for monitoring the detailed
status of the communication systems. The SSR was also
responsible for two TV channel displays: Ground Timeline
and Flight Plan.

A-131
(3) Vehicle Systems SSR
The Vehicle Systems SSR was responsible to the Systems
Operations Group in the MOCR for monitoring the detailed
status and trends of the flight systems; avoiding, correct-
ing, and circumventing vehicle equipment failures; and
detecting and isolating vehicle malfunctions. After the
S-IVB was deactivated, the portable life support system
engineer and the Experiments Officer occupied the two
booster consoles in the Vehicle Systems SSF.

(4) Life Systems SSR


The Life Systems SSR was responsible to the Life Sy-stems
Officer for providing detailed monitoring of the physio-
logical and environmental data from the spacecraft concern-
ing the flight crew and their environment.

(5) Spaceflight Meteorological Room


The Spaceflight Meteorological Room was responsible to the
Mission Command and Control Group for meteorological and
space radiation information.

(6) Space Environment Console (SEC) (RADIATION)


The Space Environment Console was manned jointly by a Space
Environment Officer (SEO) from the Flight Control Division
and a Space Environment Specialist from the Space Physics
Division. During mission support, the SE0 was responsible
for the console position, the proper operation of the con-
sole, and the completion of all necessary activities and
procedures. The SEC was the central collecting and coordi-
nating point at MSC for space radiation environment data
during mission periods.

(7) Spacecraft Planning and Analysis (SPAN) Room


The SPAN Room was the liaison interface between the MOCR,
the data analysis team, vehicle manufacturers, and KSC
Launch Operations. During countdown and real-time opera-
tions, the SPAN team leader initiated the appropriate action
necessary for the analysis of spacecraft anomalies.

(8) Recovery Operations Control Room (ROCR)


The Recovery Operations Control Room was responsible for
the recovery phase of the mission and for keeping the Flight
Director informed of the current status of the recovery
operations. Additionally, the Recovery Operations Control
Room provided an interface between the DOD Representative
and the recovery forces.

A-132

.^ - .-.-_-.- . __..-__ ,-___ _.-_


_..--~.-.--- .._.... __-.v- .~--l~ -..-.,.-l__ll_l__l__l__ll_l(".~."--".~------
(9) ALSEP SSR
The ALSEP SSR was responsible to the Experiments Officer,
Lunar Surface Program Office, and Principal Investigators
for providing detailed monitoring of ALSEP central station
and experiments data. The SSR was also responsible for all
scheduling of activities, commanding, and data distribution
to appropriate users.

MISSION SUPPORT AREAS

The two primary support areas for the MOCR flight control team were
the CCATS area and the RTCC area located on the first floor of the MCC.
These two areas of support and their operational positions interfaced
with the MOCR flight control team.

Communications, Command, and Telemetry System (CCATS)

The CCATS was the interface between the MCC and MSFN sites.
CCATS was a hardware/software configuration (Univac 494 computer) having
the capability to provide for the reception, transmission, routing,
processing, display and control of incoming, outgoing, and internally
generated data in the areas of telemetry, command, tracking, and admin-
istrative information. The CCATS consoles were augmented with various
high-speed printers (HSP) and TTY receive-only (RO) printers adjacent
to the consoles. Figure Ah-5 illustrates the CCATS operational organi-
zation. CCATS personnel interfaced with the MOCR flight control team
were as follows:

a. Command Support Console


This console was a three-position support element whose opera-
tors were concerned with the total command data flow from the generation
and transfer of command loads from the RTCC to the verification of space
vehicle acceptance following uplink command execution. The three com-
mand positions were:

(1) Real-Time Command Controller (RTC)

(2) Command Load Controller (LOAD CONTROL)

(3) CCATS Command Controller (CCATS CMD)

A-133

II, ,_ t.__,.._
..*,...,- . ..-."I____".x.
..-..-.. - .--- -.--l.l---
b. Telemetry Instrumentation Control Console
This console was a two-position support element whose operators
were concerned with the telemetry control of incoming data from the MSFN.
Certain telemetry program control was exercised on the incoming data.
The two telemetry positiozis were:

(1) Telemetry Instrumentation. Controller (TIC)

(2) CCATS Telemetry Controller (CCATS TM)

C. Instrumentation Tracking Controller Console


This console was a two-position support element whose operators
were concerned with the tracking radar support involving the spacecraft
and ground systems operations and configurations. The two tracking
positions were:

(1) Instrumentation Tracking Controller (TRK)

(2) USB Controller

a. Central Processor Control Console


This console was a two-position support element and provided
the facilities for monitoring and controlling selected software and
hardware functions applicable to the configuration of the CCATS computer
complex. The two positions were:

(1) Central Processor Controller (CPC)

(2) Central Processor Maintenance and Operations (M&O)

e. Communications Controller Console


The operators of this console provided overall communications
management between MCC and MSFN elements.

Real-Time Computer Complex (RTCC)

The RTCC provided the data processing support for the MCC. It
accomplished the telemetry processing, storage and limit sensing, tra-
jectory and ephemeris calculations, command load generation, display
generation, and many other necessary logic processing and calculations.
The RTCC supported both MOCR's and as such had two divisions known as
computer controller complexes, each capable of supporting one MOCR.
Each complex was supported by two IBM 360 computers, known as the mis-
sion operations computer (MOC) and the dynamic standby computer (DSC).
The DSC served as backup to the MOC. Figure Ah-6 illustrates the RTCC
operational organization for each complex. A brief description of the
RTCC positions f'~llo~~.

A-134

._". _ . ."--., -, ...---fl"..."Li ",._-II .._^


-..-_.-.-.I^--.-_-I_-- .."-.-l-.-_-."--‘.~l-.--.--
Flujilt
D,rector

Network
Colltroller

Figure A&?.- WATS operational organization.


Flight Director

Flight Dynamics Tracking Data Telemetry Network and Command


Processing Controller Selection Controller Processing Controller Processing Controller

Figure ~4-6.- RTCC operational organization.


a. RTCC Director
Controlled and coordinated the activities of the two computer
complexes.

b. RTCC Computer Supervisor (Computer Sup)


Responsible for the operational control of the complex.

c. Tracking Data Selection Controller (Data Select)


Monitored the tracking data being processed in the RTCC and
insured the data used as input to the MOCR and SSR displays was the
best obtainable. Evaluated the quality of tracking data received during
the launch phase and selected the source of data. Evaluated the trajec-
tory determinations and was responsible for the various related displays.
Informed the MOCR Flight Dynamics Officer concerning the quality and
status of the data.

d. Flight Dynamics Processing COntrOller (COIIIPUter WnmiCS)


Controlled and monitored all trajectory computing requirements
requested by MOCR flight dynamics personnel and MOCR recovery activities.
Performed evaluation and analysis of the predicted trajectory quantities
as they related to the mission plan.

e. Network and Command Processing Controller (Computer Command)


Coordinated with MOCR personnel who had command responsibility
and directed the generation, review, and transfer of requested command
loads.

f. Telemetry Processing Controller (Computer TM)


This position had access to all telemetry data entering and
leaving the RTCC and interfaced with the MOCR and SSR positions using
telemetry data. Duties included monitoring telemetry input data, coor-
dinating input requests, monitoring computer generated telemetry dis-
plays, and keeping the MOCR aware of the telemetry processing status.

NOTE

From ALSEP deployment to splashdown TRK and


TIC will be re.sponsible for scheduling sites
to support the scientific package. This will
include calling up of sites and data/command
handling to MCC.

A-137

I .. . . _,.. -.I---... ,.__-_-


._..-
-I _..I".-.- -.-11..~. .- _I-.^ ..__ _^^..-.-_l-"____
This page left blank intentionally.

A-138

(1. ..-.,- ._..~. I--- ..-- ~--..- -..- _--__l__l- .-l-t_l----,--- . . - “. _ ^... . _. . .._ - _.-l-l.- .-__.- - .I -_,,.- -_.
PART A5

EXCERPTSFROMAPOLLO FUEL CELL AND

CRYOGENICGAS STORAGESYSTEMFLIGHT SUPPORTHANDBOOK

The information contained in this part was extracted from the


Apollo Fuel Cell and Cryogenic Gas Storage System Flight Support Handbook,
dated February 18, 1970. It was prepared by the Propulsion and Power
Division of the Manned Spacecraft Center. The text was taken from Sec-
tion 2.0 Fuel Cell Operation and Performance, Section 3.0 Cryogenic Gas
Storage System Operation and Performance, Section 4.0 Instrumentation
and Caution and Warning, Section 5.0 Fuel Cell/Cryogenic Subsystem Mal-
function Procedures, Section 7.0 Fuel Cell/Cryogenic Subsystem Hardware
Description.
2.0 FUEL CELL OPERATION AND PERFORMANCE

The fuel cell operation and performance are described by nominal


system performance and operational data for both ground and flight
environments and fuel cell response to a variety of component mal-
functions.

Nominal system performance and operational data are presented in


curve and table format to assist in rapid reference. The data
include procedures and curves for making rough estimates of radiator
performance. Apollo 10 and 11 flight data were used to generate a
portion of the curves used for evaluating radiator performance.

Fuel cell response of measured parameters (temperature, voltage, etc.)


to specific component malfunctions make up the remainder of the data
presented. The curves are adequately noted to allow application
without written procedures.

The fuel cell operation and performance data assist the user in
evaluating fuel cell performance, identification of flight anomalies
and provide a basis for developing corrective'actions.

The sources of the data were the original'NASA Apollo Elock II Fuel
Cell, Cryogenic Gas Storage System,and Flight Batteries Flight Support
Handbook','dated September 1968, NASA-MSC, North American Rockwell,
Pratt and Whitney, Beech Aircraft and Boeing-Houston. These data were
reviewed and found to be accurate as of December 1969.

A-140

_I ..,,.. -ill_--.- -__..... _ “.-.-----ill-.- --.,__I .-----


..-- -..“... ,------mm .__--._l”-.-.--l_l..-
2.1 FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

NOMINAL FUEL CELL PRESSURIZED SYSTEM VOLUMES

Hydrogen Loop 250 in3


Oxygen Loop 88 in3
Nitrogen Loop 3098 in3
Glycol Loop (Fuel Cell) 107 in3
Glycol Accumulator (Fuel Cell) 30 in3
Net Fuel Cell Glycol Volume 117 in3 (20 in3 water
66 in3 -glycol removed
Average NR Glycol Plumbing and Radiator
from accumu-
Volume lator)
Estimated Fuel Cell Glycol Loop Volume 183 in3 = 0.79 gallons
TOTAL SYSTEM SPEC LEAKAGE INTO BAY IV
Hydrogen System, Oxygen System, and Fuel
Cells (3)
5.3 x 10-j scc/sec of Helium
Fuel Cell (3) nitrogen system
1.6 x lO-4 scc/sec of Helium

SYSTEM PRESSURESUMMARY

SUPPLY PRESSURES
SUPPLY PRESSURES REGULATEDPRESSURES
(PSIA) S/N 650769 AND ON
ABOVE DEAD
ABSOLUTE NITROGEN BAND
NOMINAL MINIMUM PSIA PRESSURE PSI
PSI

Hydrogen 245 + 15 100 57.90 - 67.60 6.20 - 11.35 .2-.4

Oxygen 900 + 35 150 57.90 - 67.95 6.20 - 11.7 .5-.?


Nitrogen 1500 165 50.20 - 57.75 --- 2.0-
2.15

DEL IVERY PRESSURE


Water 62 psia

PRESSURELIMITS
Maximum water system discharge back pressure 59.55 psia
Maximum reactant vent back pressure 16 psia

A-142
2.1 FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLSYSTEM WATER SYSTEM PRESSURES

Potable Water Tank 25 psia + 2, Plus cabin pressure


Water Relief Valve 5.5 psid ?r 1
Water Tank Vent Valve 44 psia + 4
Cabin Relief Valve 6 . 0 +'24
-.

FUEL CELL GROUNDHEATER POWERSETTINGS

STARTUP HEAT SCHEDULE

1 ZONE 1 AMPERES 1

NORMALOPERATION HEAT SCHEDULE

1 ZONE 1 SEA LEVEL OPERATION 1 VACUUMOPERATION 1

1 1.2 - 1.6 amperes 0 amperes


2 8.0 - 12.0 amperes 0 amperes
3 1 1.2 - 1.6 amperes I 0 amperes
1

DRYOUT HEAT SCHEDULE

ZONE SEA LEVEL OPERATION VACUUMOPERATION

1 1.75 - 2.05 amperes 1.5 - 1.65 amperes


2 As required
460°F to maintain
to 485'F skin 21.0 - 22.5 amperes

temperature. Approxi-
mately 23.9 amps.
3 1.75 - 2.05 amperes 1.5 - 1.65 amperes

A-143
2.1 FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

FUEL CELL DISCONNECT OVERLOADDATA

OVERLOADCURRENT DATA

Required Test Transfer


Disconnect Delay Time
Delay (set) (se4 (set)

100 minimum No transfer


25 - 300 0.046
8- 150 i"8 0.046
2-8 5.81 0.046

:, 622 - 1.2 0.776


1.07 0.046
0:42 - 0.76 0.572 0.046
0.24 - 0.55 0.470 0.046

FUEL CELL DISCONNECT REVERSE CURRENTDATA

REVERSE CURRENT DATA

Load Required Test Transfer


Disconnect Delay Time
':%j Delay (set) (set) (set)

4 No trip No transfer
20 i - 10 2.10 0.046

:i 1 - 1.3 1.11
1.22 0.046
2.1 FUEL CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY(Continued)

REACTANT CONSUMPTIONAND WATER PRODUCTION

LOAD O2 lb/hr H2 lb/hr H2°


AMps lb/hrs cc/hr

0.5 0.0102 .001285 .01149 5.21


1 0.0204 .002570 .02297 10.42
2 0.0408 .005140 .04594 20.84
3 0.0612 .007710 .06891 31.26
4 0.0816 .010280 .09188 41.68
5 0.1020 .012850 .11485 52.10
6 0.1224 .015420 .13782 62.52
7 0.1428 .017990 .l6079 72.94
8 0.1632 .020560 .18376 83.36
9 0.1836 .023130 .20673 93.78
10 0.2040 .025700 .2297 104.20
15 0.3060 .038550 .34455 156.30
20 0.4080 .051400 .45940 208.40
25 0.5100 .064250 .57425 260.50
30 0.6120 .077100 .68910 312.60
35 0.7140 .089950 .80395 364.70
40 0.8160 .10280 .91880 416.80
45 0.9180 .11565 1.03365 468.90
50 1.0200 .I2850 1.1485 521.00
55 1.1220 .A4135 1.26335 573.10
60 I .2240 .I5420 1.3782 625.20
65 1.3260 .16705 1.49305 677.30
70 1.4280 .I7990 I .6079 729.40
75 1.5300 .I9275 1.72275 781.50
80 1.6320 .20560 1.83760 833.60
85 1.7340 .218L,5 1.95245 885.70
90 1.8360 .23130 2.06730 937.90
95 1.9380 .24415 2.18215 989.90
100 2.0400 .25700 2.2970 1042.00
FOFMJLAS:
O2 = 2.04 x 10 -2 I H20 = IO.42 cc/Amp Hr
H2 = 2.57 x 1O-3 I H20 = 2.297 x 10 -2 lb/Amp Hr

A-145
3.0 CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGESYSTEM OPERATION AND PERFORMANCE

The cryogenic system operation and performance are described by

and flight environments.


nominal system performance and operational data for both ground

Nominal system performance and operational data are presented in


curve and table format to assist in rapid reference. The curves,
with the exception of those used for heat leaks and pressure change
rates, are adequately noted to allow application without written
procedures. The data include formulas, methods, and curves for
calculating cryogenic tank heat leak s and pressure change rates for
both equilibrium and non-equilibrium (stratified) conditions.
Apollo 7 and 8 flight data were used to provide a comparison of
equilibrium (calculated) tank pressure cycle time to actual flight
pressure cycle time for a variety of tank quantities.

The fuel cell operation and performance data assist the user in
evaluating cryogenic system performance, identification of flight
anomalies, and provide a basis for developing corrective actions.

The sources of the data were the original'NASA Apollo Block II Fuel
Cell, Cryogenic Gas Storage System, and Flight Batteries Flight
Support Handbook',' dated September 196S, NASA-MSC, North American
Rockwell, Pratt and Whitney, Beech Aircraft and Boeing-Houston.
These data were reviewed and found to be accurate as of December 1969.
3.1 CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY

Hydrogen Oxygen

TANK WEIGHT (PER TANK)

Empty (Approx.) 80.00 lb. 90.82 lb.


Usable Fluid 28.15 lb. 323.45 lb.
Stored Fluid (100% 29.31 lb. 330.1 lb.
indication)

Residual 4% 2%
Maximum Fill Quantity 30.03 lb. 337.9 lb.

TANK VOLUME (PER TANK) 6.80 FT3 4.75 FT3

TANK FLOW RATE (PER TANK)


Max. for 10 Minutes 1.02 lbs/hr 4.03 lbs/hr
Max. for l/2 hour 10.40 lbs/hr
Relief Valve Max Flow 6 lbs/hr @ 26 lbs/hr @
130°F 130°F

TANK PRESSURIZATION
Heaters (2 elements per tank)
Flight
Resistance 78.4 ohms per 10.12 ohms per
element element
Maximum Voltage 28 V DC 28 V DC
Power 10 watts per 77.5 watts per
element* element*
Total Heater
Heat Input Per Tank
(2 Elements) 68.2 BTU/Hr 528.6 BTU/Hr

Ground
Resistance 78.4 ohms per 10.12 ohms per
element element
Maximum Voltage 65.0 V DC 65.0 V DC

Power 54.0 watts per 417.5 watts per


element* element*
Total Heater
Heat Input Per Tank
(2 Elements) 368 BTU/Hr 2848 BTU/Hr

* Conversion Factor: 1 watt = 3.41 BTU/Hr


3.1 CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY

Hydrogen Oxygen

Pressure Switch
Open Pressure idax. 260 psia 935 psia
Close Pressure Min. 225 psia 865 psia
Deadband Min. 10 psia 30 psia
Destratification Motors (2
Motors Per Tank)
Voltage 115/200 V 115/200 V
400 cps 400 cps
Power - Average 3.5 watts per 26.4 watts per
motor* motor*
Total Average Motor 23.0 BTU/Hr 180 BTU/Hr
Heat Input Per Tank

SYSTEEl PRESSURES
Normal Operating 245 515 psia 900 +35 psia
Spec Min. Dead Band of 10 psi 30 psi
Pressure Switches

Relief Valve Note: Relief Valves are Referenced to Environ-


mental Pressure, therefore Pressure at
Sea Level (psig) will be same value in
vacuum (psia)
Crack 273 psig 983 psig
Full Flow :::: 285 psig 1010 psig
Reseat Min. 268 psig 965 psig
Outer Tank Shell
Burst Disc
+ 10
Nominal Burst Pressure 90 _ 2. psid 75 2 7.5 psid

SYSTEM TEMPERATURES
Stored Fluid -425 to 80°F -3OO'F to 80°F
Heater Thermostat (Over N.A. for 113 N.A. for 114
Temp. Protection) and Subs. and Subs.
Open Max. 80°F + 10 80°F + 10
Close t.1i n . -2OO'F -75'F

* Conversion Factor: 1 watt = 3.41 BTU/Hr


3.1 CRYOGENIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERSSUMMARY

Hydrogen Oxygen

TANK HEAT LEAK (SPEC PER TANK)


Operating (dQ/dM @ 14O'F) 7.25 BTU/HR 27.7 BTU/HR
(.0725 #/hr) (.79 #/hr)
VALVE MODULE LEAKAGE RATES
External 400 see H2/HR/ 400 see 02/HR/
Valve Valve
0.736 x 1O-6 lbs 9.2 x 1O-6 lbs
H2/HR/Valve 02/HR/Valve

LIFE 600 HRS @ 600 HRS @


Cryogenic Temps Cryogenic Temps.
and operating and operating
pressure -225 pressure -865
psia psia

A-149

. .~._.~ .... _-..I._.-...-__._ ..""


,--._ I,, ..- .._-. .__., . _ ,...- __,,_.__. ....__,"__.__--.l
1._._-,._. I. _ ,, _.......-_..
_.~.-- ___.
-x
4.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CAUTION AND WARNING

The tabular data presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 list instrumentation
measurements and specify instrumentation range, accuracy and bit
value, if applicable. All of the data in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 can be
used for system monitoring during ground checkout. Table 4.1 lists
data displayed to the crew and telemetered from the vehicle to the
Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) during missions. Table 4.2 lists
data available only for system monitoring during ground checkout.
Event indications displayed to crew during flight are noted in
Table 4.2.

The instrumentation sensor location, with the exception of voltage


and current data, can be found by referring to the fuel celllcryo-
genie schematics located in Section 7.0. Voltage and current readout
and schematic locations can be obtained by referring to North
American Rockwell drawings V37-700001, Systems Instrumentation, and
V34-900101, Integrated System Schematics Apollo CSM, respectively.

The Caution and Warning System monitors the most critical fuel cell/
cryogenic measurements and alerts the flight crew to abnormal system
operation. The data presented in Table 4.1 are specification nominal
caution and warning limits for the applicable measurements. Malfunc-
tions procedures, Section 5.0, are provided for problem isolation as
a result of a caution and warning alarm.

The source of the data was North American Rockwell Measurement


Systems End-to-End Calibrated Accuracy Tolerances, TDR68-079,
dated January 10, 1969 and the original Flight Support Handbook.

A-150

.-_” -..,^ i*_,r ._“_ ,__- “.-,-.----f.ell _... _Ili”---.---L- __l_-l__l---I_LLll,-_-___.l---,.--------~. “-I.---
__.-- . _ _ . ..-.. -.. ^_ . ..---_--
TABLE 4.1
INSTRUMENTATION/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUMMARY

EAStiREMENT
NUMBER *
MEASUREMENT
NAME RANGE
T At JRACY
PERCENT ACTUAL
T TBIT
VALUE
CAUTION AND
WARNING
SET NGS
LOW HIGH
1
CCO206V DC Bus Voltage A o-45 volts 20.94 iO.42V 0.178 26.25 -
CCO207V DC Bus Voltage B

SC2113C FC 1 Current O-100 amps 11.07 11.07 a 0.395


SC2114C FC 2 Current
sc2115c FC 3 Current

SC206OP FC 1 N2 Press O-75 psia -14.30 ~3.22 psia 0.295 -


SC2061P FC 2 N2 Press
SC2062P FC 3 N2 Press

SC2066P FC 1 02 Press O-75 psia i4.30 23.22 psia 0.295 - -


SC2067P FC 2 02 Press
SC2068P FC 3 02 Press

SC2069P FC 1 H2 Press O-75 psia 14.30 k3.22 osia 0.295 - -


SC207OP FC 2 H2 Press
~~2071~ FC 3 i-12 Press

t See note, page 4-11


TABLE 4.1
INSTRUMENTATION/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUMMARY (Continued)

IEASUREMENT
NUMBER *
MEASUREMENT
NAME RANGE
T AC RACY
PERCENT ACTUAL
BIT
VALUE
CAUTION AND

im-
WAF NG
SE1 NGS
HIGH
1
SC2081T FC 1 Cond Ex Temp 145-250°F ~2.18 t2.29'F 0.417 150°F 175'F
SC2082T FC 2 Cond Ex Temp
SC2083T FC 3 Cond Ex Temp

SC2084T FC 1 Skin Temp 80-550°F 21.15 i5.40°F 1.94 360°F 5OO'F


SC2085T FC 2 Skin Temp
SC2086T FC 3 Skin Temp

SC2087T FC 1 Rad Out Temp -50 to +300°F i . 71 5.98'F 1.38 -3OOf


SC2088T FC 2 Rad Out Temp
SC2089T FC 3 Rad Out Temp

SC2090T FC 1 Rad In Temp -50 to +300°F k1.71 ?5.98'F 1.38


SC2091T FC 2 Rad In Temp
SC2092T FC 3 Rad In Temp

SC2139R FC 1 H2 Flow Rate O-O.2 lb/hr +_lO.O kO.020 lb/hr 0.00079 0.0 0.16
SC2140R FC 2 H2 Flow Rate
SC2141R FC 3 H2 Flow Rate

* See nnte, page 4-11


TP E 4.1
TRUMENTATION/CA UN AND W-SUMMARY lConti
EASUREMENT
NUMBER *
MEASUREMENT
NAME RANGE
AC RACY
PERCENT ACTUAL
l-BIT
VALUE SF
1
ION AND
WARNING

YEi-
SC2142R FC 1 O2 Flow Rate O-l.6 lb/hr dO.0 kO.160 lb/hr 0.0063 0.0 1.27
SC2143R FC 2 02 Flow Rate
SC2144R FC 3 O2 Flow Rate

SCOO3OQ H2 Tank 1 Qty o- 100% +2.68 2.68% 0.4% - -


SCOO31Q H2 Tank 2 Qty

SCOO32Q O2 Tank 1 Qty o- 100% 52.68 2.68% 0.4% - -


SCOO33Q O2 Tank 2 Qty

SCOO37P O2 Tank 1 Press 50-1050 psia 22.68 k26.8 psia 4.23 800 950
SCOO38P O2 Tank 2 Press

SCOO39P H2 Tank 1 Press O-350 psia +2.68 kg.38 psia 1.48 220 270
SCOO4OP H2 Tank 2 Press

SC0041T O2 Tank 1 Temp -320 to +~O'F k2.68 +10.85'F 1.57 - -


SC0042T 02 Tank 2 Temp

SC0043T H2 Tank 1 Temp -420 to -2OO'F +2.68 t6.03'F 0.867 - -


SC0044T H, Tank 2 Temp

* See note, page 4-11


TABLE 4.1
Il~STRtiMENTATIOid/CAUTION AND WARNINGSUM?lARY (Continued)

CAUTIOH AND
WARNING
1EASUREMEHT MEASUREMENT KY BIT SE TINGS
NUMBER* NAME RANGE }7TmP ACTUAL VALUE Low HIGH

SC216OX FCl pH High Normal - High Event


SC2161X FC2 pH High Normal - High Event -
SC2162X FC3 pH High Normal - High Event -
*SC0050Q H2 Tank 3 Qty O-100%
'*SCOO51Q 02 Tank 3 Qty O-100%
,*SCOO52P H2 Tank 3 Press. O-350 psia
'*scoo53P 02 Tank 3 Press. 50-1050 psia

* See note, page A-160


** CSM 112 through 115 only

, ,I
TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRUMENTATION

MEASUREMENT BIT
NAME I RANGE VALUE

FC 1 Bus A
FC 2 Bus A
FC 3 Bus A

SC2125X ** FC 1 Bus B
SC2126X ** FC 2 Bus B
SC2127X ** FC 3 Bus B

scoo92x Pressure low Normal - Low Event


O2 tanks 1 & 2
scoo93x Motor Switch Open - Close Event
Close O2 tanks l&2
scoo94x Pressure low Normal - Low Event
H2 tanks 1 & 2
scoo95x Motor Switch Open - Close Event
Close H2 Tanks l&2

SCO36OV Fan Notor Oper


Tank 1 O2
SCO361V Fan blotor Oper
Tank 2 O2

* See note, page A-160 ** Data also displayed to crew


TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

MEASUREMENT MEASUREMENT
NUWGER* NAME RANGE VALUE

SCO362U Fan Motor Oper


Tank 1 H2
SCO363U Fan Motor Oper
Tank 2 H2

SC2075X FC H2 Inline Htr ON ON Event


SC2076X FC H2 Inline Htr OFF OFF Event

SC2116V FC 1 DC Volts Out 25-40 volts 0.059


SC2117U FC 2 DC Volts Out 25-40 volts 0.059
sc2iiau FC 3 DC Volts Out 25-40 volts 0.059

SC213OX FC 1 H2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event


Oper
SC2131X FC 2 H2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event
Oper
SC2132X FC 3 H2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event
Oper

* See note, page A-160


TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

-
MEASUREMENT MEASUREMENT BIT
NUMBER* NAME I RANGE VALUE

SC2133X FC 1 O2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event


sc2134x FC 2 O2 Purge Valve Close - Open Event
SC2135X FC 3 02 Purge Valve Close - Open Event

SC2326X ** FC 1 0 /H Shutoff Off - Hold Event


Valve ape{ Hold
SC2327X ** Off - Hold Event

sc232ax ** FC 3 0 /H Shutoff Off - Hold Event


Valve apeG Hold

GC5000V FC 1 Htr Voltage O-120 vrms 0.472


Zone 1
GC500lV FC 1 Htr Voltage
Zone 2
GC5002V FC 1 Htr Voltage
Zone 3

* See note, page A-160 ** Data also displayed to crew


TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

I~IEASUREMENT MEASUREMENT BIT


NUMBER* NAME RANGE VALUE

GC5003U FC 2 Htr Voltage O-120 vrms 0.472


Zone 1
GC5004V FC 2 Htr Voltage
Zone 2
GC5005U FC 2 Htr Voltage
Zone 3

GC5006V FC 3 Htr Voltage O-120 vrms 0.472


Zone 1
GC5007U FC 3 Htr Voltage
Zone 2
GC5008V FC 3 Htr Voltage
Zone 3

GC5009C FC 1 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197


Zone 1
GC5010C FC 1 Htr Current O-50 arms 0.197
Zone 2
GC50llC FC 1 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 3

* See note, page A-160


TABLE 4.2
GROUNDTEST INSTRU~IENTATION (Continued)

MEASUREMENT MEASUREMENT BIT


NUMBER* NAME RANGE VALUE

GC5012C FC 2 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197


Zone 1
GC5013C FC 2 Htr Current O-50 arms 0.197
Zone 2
GC5014C FC 2 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 3

GC5015C FC 3 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197


Zone 1
GC5016C FC 3 Htr Current O-50 arms 0.197
Zone 2
GC5017C FC 3 Htr Current O-5 arms 0.0197
Zone 3

GC5019E FC 1 Htr Power O-5000 watts 19.7


GC5020E FC 2 Htr Power
GC502lE FC 3 Htr Power

* See note, page A-160


TABLE 4.1 NOTE

The measurement identification used in Table 4.1 consists of seven


characters: two letters followed by four numbers and one letter as
shown below.

FUNCTIOiJAL SYSTEM CODE DISCRETE NUMBER

MODULE CODE
CLASSIFICATION

Ji F"'"""'"'"'
SC 9099P

blodule Code-

The first letter designates the measurement location by module:

C Command Module
G GSE Auxiliary and Checkout Equipment
S Service Module

Function Subsystem Code

The second letter denotes the subsystem within which the measurement
originates:

C Electrical Power

Discrete Number

Characters three through six are discrete numbers listed sequentially


within each system.

Measurement Classification

The seventh character, a letter, denotes measurement classification


or type:

C Current R Rate
E Power T Temperature
P Pressure U Voltage
Q Quantity X Discrete Event

A-160

I ^_ _---” --_...- _ -----__-- _-,llll-_-_ll._


._ ” ..,,,.,_. l.l ..ll-_-l‘._,~,-” ..-A ---_I
5.0 FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEMMALFUKTION PROCEDURES

The procedures describe the proper order and nature of emergency


steps the crew must perform to determine the source of a fuel cell
or cryogenic storage system problem/malfunction. A Caution and Warning
alarm and light or abnormal instrumentation indication is evaluated by
a malfunction procedure logic diagram. The logic diagrams enable the
crew to determine the source of the problem and corrective actions, if
required. Fuel cell shutdown and bus short isolation (not related to
Caution and Warning) procedures are also presented as part of the
malfunction procedures.

The procedures are primarily used as a guide for the flight crew to
locate a problem and are presented for the flight monitor as a guide to
the crew actions.

The source of the data was CSM 108 (Apollo 12) Flight Malfunction
Procedures.

A-161

-- ..1_---"
----- -,. --_- -~...- _ . I_ ^l-.l--_~~---.-"".--_. ~- -.- ~_.-.ll-l_~_ -.-_
REMARKS
PROCEDURE
YMPTOM 1

340 pia
220 1111 I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II I
I PROCEDURE -EMARKS

. ..I .I L- .-- . ..- -..----F ^..-“~--.l ..-ll ~_ -- -_.,. ~


-.--- .~.
SYMPTOM PROCEDURE REMARKS

~-164

~. ,.- .., .----. .- ---."-


I_....----I. _.. ."-. .._-- I -.--".^.._._... ~"_",-~ _-..___
--,...----.---
PROCEDURE I REMARKS

~-165
A-166
PROCEDURE REMARKS

~-167
PROCEDURE REMARKS
SYMPTOM PROCEDURE REMARKS
m

I
3- - a-,
A-170

_ .-_-_
j( _I__,_*_. I"e.-"--I...~--
_-__"__l__.---,_.--- -- -._.w- .._
__---_____,,-_.-__.-__ ...I -..,,. _._.
_...
E
:
7.0 FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEMHARDWAREDESCRIPTION

The fuel cell/cryogenic hardware description includes the subsystem


isometric drawings, fluid schematics, component descriptions and
filtration provisions.

Isometric drawings locate operational hardware: tubing runs, sizes


and part numbers: and system interfaces. A schematic drawing of the
Environmental Control System describes the water and oxygen system
interfaces.

Fuel cell and cryogenic storage system schematics aid understanding


of the system plumbing. These schematics are also used to reference
to specific hardware component descriptions.

Filtration data describe the component protected, its minimum


clearances and the filters rating,size, location and type.

Hardware descriptions are intended for rapid reference to the specific


physical hardware affected as a result of a malfunction. Fuel cell/
cryogenic subsystem interactions with interfacing components and sub-
systems are clarified by this background information.

The sources of the data included North American Rockwell Uperational


Checkout Procedures (OCP's), Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Fuel Cell
Electrical Power Supply-PC3A-2 Support Manual, dated February 1, 1969,
Pratt and Whitney Apollo Fuel Cell Component Descriptions, and Beech
Aircraft Corporation Project Apollo Cryogenic Gas Storage Subsystem
Flight Support Manual, dated September 6, 1968. The descriptions are
applicable through CSM-115 including identified hardware changes for
CSM 112-115 . The configurations shown were current and correct as
of December 1969.

A-172

.___... .-,-_ ._ .--. * . ..-_ -... _._-.. ..--f- ._” l--ll.-ll. “-- .___ -^-- -. ._-I. . .” --.... - .-.. ._“.--. *___“_.-^ .--. ..--.
7.1 SYSTEM HARDWAREISOMETRIC
DRAWINGSAND SCHENATIC

A-173
FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC SUBSYSTEM LOCATION IN
SERVICE MODULE
/ \
/ \
\
\

C/M-S/M?MBILICAL

FUEL CELL SHELF


\

O2 SUBSYSTEM
SHELF MODULE\

H2 TANKS-

H2 SUBSYSTEM
SHELF MODULE \

I
BEAM NO. 3

VIEW LOOKING INBOARD SECTOR IV

A-174
FUEL CELL SHELF INTERFACE

FUEL PUMP F/C SHELF


LEVEL 4

/N2 REG

I
BEAM BEAM
NO. 3 NO. 4

-7Y
/ GLY FILL (LOOP NO. 1)
ME 273-0036-0002

N; FILL ME 273-0036-0001

INTERFACES
Fl - H2 IN
F2 - O2 IN
EPS 02 VENT
ME 27%0075-0004 F3 - O2 VENT
ME 273-0041-0001
F4 - H,O OUT
F5 - N; FILL
F6 - H2 VENT
F7 - WATER GLYCOL OUT
F8 - WATER GLYCOL IN

A-175
- _.. . . . .~. ._ _ ..__ ,,

-1__-.-._ -... - ..__.. -_.. ,_“_..


OXYGEN SUBSYSTEM SHELF MODULE

y-O2 VALVE MODULE

c-\. -OS-S (ECS 2)

-.
Ll!!iiJ Y
I I
BEAM NO. 3 BEAM NO. 4

02 '

A-176
HYDROGENSUBSYSTEMSHELF MODULE

- H, TANK NO. 1

BEAM NO. 3 BEAM NO.

HS-3 (F/C 3)
HS-2 (F/C 2) !I
HS-1 (F/C 1) I 4,
RELIEF
H2
FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE

Ii2 VALVE MODULE/


EPS WATER GLYCOL RADIATOR TEMPERATURESENSOR LOCATION

FR( SIGNAL CONDITIONERS


TO RAumj sc2092T-
SC2091 T- -v

BEAM 4

SC20 an
F/C 1IRAU.
OUT1iET

F/C 2 KAU. INLET


\
SC2092T
F/C 3 KAU. INLET

VIEW LOOKING INBOi


(FUEL CELL SHE1 c *DE’
WATERGLYCOL SERVICE MODULE LINES
(F/C3) (TZ)
V37-458020-143 (3/S)'

(Tl) (F/C3)
V37-458056-25

(Tl) (F/Cl)
V37-458056-21

(Tl) (F/C2)
V37-458056-23

iUOIATOR RREA

RADIATOR AREA

FUEL CELL 12 /A

C No. 3

I
FUEL CELL 13 .a,-+:
'4 "37-G

EFFECTIVE
IIN S/C 098 THRU106
EFFECTIVE 01( 5/C 107 MO WRS
LINE SIZE III INCHS(OUlSIM DIMTER)
NOTE: WL TliICKJ@%.S - .OZO IMCIES MTERIM 30-L CRES
l WL THICKMSS - .035 MIXES (MTERIN N ALLOY)

A-179
CRYOGENIC HYDROGENSERVICE MODULE LINES
ME 273-O(
BEAr' T

v37-454030-39 ( l/4 Jm
F/C Shelf Area v37-454049-19 (l/4)(21

[21v37-454049-23 (l/4)
q v37-454030-45 (l/4)
&Jv37-454031-29 (l/4)
[zlv37-454049-55 (l/4)
m ~37-454031-43 (l/4)
Ql V37-454049-63 (l/4)
m ~37-454030-47 (i/4)
QV37-454049-25 (l/4)

02 Shelf Area

V37-454208-107 (l/4
v37-454208-113 (318

m EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106


q EFFECTIVE ON SjC 107 AND SUBS
( ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE DIAMETER)
NOTE: WALL THICKNESS = .020 INCHES
JRYGGENIC OXYGEN SERVICE XODULE LIIiES
V37-454207-115 (l/4)

/c-3-v37-454207-H3 (l/4)
Beam 2
c OS5

-- Beam 3
-- --
LECS 02 LINES
(CM-SM Umbilical)

F/C Shelf Area- 1 v37-454031-25(1/4)(l)


TJv17-454049-53(1/4)(2)

(?)V37-454049-49
(l)V37-454031-21
(l)V37-454031-39
(2)v37-454049-61
(21v37-454049-51
(l)V37-454031-23
(l)V37-454031-33
(2)V37-454049-57
II I F/C 3 I

02 Shelf Area- II11 V37-454207-111 (l/4)


k -v37-454207-109 (l/4)
--V37-454207-107 (l/4)
454207-105 (l/4)
-v37-454207-103(1/4)
-OS-5 (ECS-2) ' '
%OS-4 (ECS-1)
%S-3 (F/C-3)
qos-2 (F/C-Z)
H2 Shelf Area- OS-1 (F/C-l)

(1) EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106


2 EFFECTIVE ON S/C 107 AND SUBS
I ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE DIAMETER)
NOTE: WALLTHICKNESS = .020 INCHES
FUEL CELL NITROGEN SERVICE MODULE LIiJES

F/C Shelf Area --

N2 Supply
I -P \

El v37-454&9-33(1/4)7-
a v37-454030-57(1/4)
m v37-454030-59(1/4)
Ql v37-'!54049-35(1/4 i --
(F5)

q v37-454030-51(m)
al v37-454030-49(1/4)-
a V37-454@+2'7(1/4)-

I, EFFECTIVE ON S/C 098 THRU 106


EFFECTIVE ON S/C 107 AND SUBS
( ) LINE SIZE IN INCHES (OUTSIDE
DIAMETER)
NOTE: WALL THICKNESS = .020 INCHES

A-187
A-184
V37-454240-104 ME282-0047-0040
V37-454240-103
V37-454240-102

ME284-0119-0001

7-454240-101
ME284-0115-0001

1
O2 TANK 3

V37-454225-11

V37-454240-101

ME282-0046-0002

HYDROGEN/OXYGEN
TANK SHELF MODULE- SECTOR r (SIDE VIEW - BEAM 6 SIDE)
EFFECTIVE ON CStq 112-115
A-lP!iY

.-... .., ~. ._.. .-.- ---_. ._.__.. ,^-.-.“-l..~ .^._ . .“. ,.__ --.--_ _.x._...__ - _... -_-_ .- _--_lll-
HYDROGENRELIEF (HR)

/ ’ SECTOR VI
/- ._

V37-454240-12.5

V37-454203-119-
TO ECS'-
4

V37-454240- 15
V37-454240-l
FROM O2 TANK 2

HYDROGEN/OXYGEN
SERVICE MODULE LINES
EFFECTIVE ON CSM 112-115
k V37-454240-20

V37-454240-21
HYDROGENTANK 3
SUPPLY TO VALVE
SHELF MODULE
FROMH2 TANK 3 -
SECTOR I

FORCSM 112-115

V37-454240-24

HYDROGENTANK 3 SUPPLY
INTERFACE WITH TANKS 1 & 2 - HYDROGEN
SHELF VALVE MODULE- SECTOR IV
EFFECTIVE ON CSM 112-115
A-18cj

... - ,; .-.. ~ .-- .,_^


-_, . _~__ ...l.--.-.._..
-.---.._..-.,
__-._-._
.-_I
7.2 FUEL CELL COMPONENTDESCRIPTIONS

A-190

.,.. - _...._ ^ _
--___ __-. I_ .____,-____. -I ..” ._.._ I_.” .__. _” .--. --..-. .___._,.---1--.-1”
A-1()1
7.3 CRYOG
NIC GASSTORAGE
SYSTFN
COMPhENT DESCRIPTIONS

A-192

_. . ^... “1 . .^. -.~ .-__ _-..... l*.-l- .“_ . . . -_--. __.__ .


t -_~--..^-“-- I_._. .-. . . ” - .^ _. .ll.“l.-_^- .” -.-. . -l-._-^--_~_l__“-
CRYOGENIC STORAGE SYSTEM SCHEMATIC

E
El
D 1
F2
0 -
R 1 NOTE: 0 Denotes component
1 descriptions in
g5 numerical order
M (See Pages7-56 through 7-78) HzTANK
3
s
TABLE 7.3.1
CRYOGENIC GAS STORAGE SYSTEM INTERFACES

CGSS INTERFACES
ELECTRICAL INTERFACE

Valve Modules Pigtails Pigtails


Tank Connectors Hermetically Hermetically
sealed pin sealed pin
receptacle receptacle

TANK INTERFACE LINE SIZES

Fill Connections l/4" O.D. 3/8" O.D.


(0.015 wall) (0.022 wall)
Vent Connections l/4" 0.0. 3/4" O.D.
(0.015 wall) (0.028 wall)
Relief Connections 3/16" O.D. 3116" O.D.
(0.022 wall) (0.022 wall)
Feed Connections l/4" 0.b. l/4" O.D.
(0.015 wall) (0.022 wall)

CRYOGENIC VALVE MODULE

Feed Connections l/4" O.D. l/4" 0-D.


(0.015 wall) (0.022 wall)
F/C Supply Connections l/4" O.D. l/4" O.D.
(0.022 wall) (0,022 wall)
Relief Valve Outlet l/4" O.D. l/4" O.D.
(0,022 wall (0.022 wall)

FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE

Feed Connections (2) l/4" O.D. l/4" O.D.


(0.022 wall (0.022 wall)
F/C Supply Connections (3) l/4" O.D. l/4" O.D.
(0.022 wall (0.022 wall)
m&/-?-j OXYGEN AND HYDROGEN STORAGE TANK

Electrical Connector Vent Connector

Fill Connector Feed Line

Vent Connector Fill Connector

q H2 STORAGE TANK q 02 STORAGE TANK

Each storage tank consists of two concentric spherical shells. The annular
space between them is evacuated and contains the thermal insulation system,
pressure vessel support, fluid lines and the electrical conduit. The inner
shell, or pressure vessel is made from forged and machined hemispheres. The
pressure vessel support is built up on the pressure vessel from subassemblies
and provides features which transmit pressure vessel loads to the support
assembly. The fluid lines and the electrical lead line exit the pressure
vessel at its top, traverse the annular space and exit the outer shell as
follows: 02, top of tank coil cover; H2, girth ring equator.

Structural and physical parameters are listed in Tables 7.3.2 and 7.3.3,
respectively. Tank volumes, with expansion and contraction data, are
listed in Table 7.3.4. Tube sizing is listed in Table 7.3.5.

.,...- ".._. ._-- _- _.._--.._l_-..-. .~._...-.--.-..--"-.l..l"-l Lo---.------ ..,-..11..-


TABLE 7.3.2 CRYOGENIC TANK STRUCTURAL LIMITS
Hydrogen Oxygen

5 Al-2.5 Sn ELI Ti Inconel 718


Material
105,000 180,000
Ultimate Strength, psi
95,000 145,0006
Yield Strength, psi
Young's Modulus, psi 17 x lo6 30 x 10
No creep at
Creep Stress, psi 71,200
145,000
0.30 0.29
Poisson's Ratio

Safety Factors -
1.5 1.5
Ultimate
1.33 1.33
Yield
1.33 N.A.
Creep
53,000 110,000
Design Stress Level, psi
Proof Pressure, psia 400 psia 1357 psia
Burst Pressure, psia 450 psia 1537 psia

A-196

- _ ._ ,_^.___ _^ .._II________x.
.__-_- .._.I.^ _,__-_-~_. ^_..
.- ._1.'-'_------L"II__L--
.I .^.. ___- __ _. "_l_l___,
.__ _. ---...-- -...._-..
_..-___
TABLE 7.3.3 CRYOGENIC TANK PHYSICAL PARAMETERS

Parameter Hydrogen Oxygen


Pressure Vessel
Material 5Al-2.5 Sn ELI Ti Inconel 718
Inside Diameter - Inches 28.24 25.06
Wall Thickness - Inches 004 .004
.044 c:ooo .059 faooO

Outside Diameter - Inches 28.328 25.178

Outer Shell
Material 5Al-2.5 Sn ELI Ti Inconel 750
Inside Diameter - Inches 31.738 26.48
Outside Diameter - Inches 31.804 26.52
Wall Thickness - Inches .033 + .002 .020 + .002

Support
Flange Diameter - Inches 37.966 28.228
Flange Thickness - Inches .070 i .OlO .080 c .OlO
Bolt Circle Diameter - Inches 32.216 27.50
Number of Bolts 8 12

Annulus
Annular Space - Inches 1.705" .653"
Vapor-cooled and pas- Vapor-cooled shield
Insulation
sive radiation shields. with oreloaded
insulation.
Vacuum Level (TORR) - MM Hg 5 x lo-7 5 x 10-7
Average Pump Down Time 24 Days 24 Days

Burst Disc
10
Burst Pressure 90 psi r 2. 75 psi f 7.5

Weight (Empty)
Spec 75.0 lb. 93.5 lb.
Actual (Maximum) 80.0 lb. 90.8 lb.

Electrical/Instrumentation

Beech/NAA Interface Pigtails & Hermetically Hermetically sealed


sealed pin receptacle pin receptacle

A-197
TABLE 7.3.4 CRYOGENIC TANK VOLUMES
(With Expansion and Contraction Data1

INTERNAL VOLUME
(Less .02 ft3 for components

02 Tank H2 Tank

Ambient Pressure Max. tol. 4.7528 ft3 6.8314 ft3

Ambient Temperature Max. tel. 4.7471 ft3 6.8045 ft3

Full Ambient Pressure


-297OF 02
Max. tol. 4.7213 ft3 6.777 ft3
-423OF H2 Min. tol. 4.7156 ft.3 6.7698 ftd
Full
935 psia (02) Max. tol. 4.7532 ft3 N/A
-294'F Min. tel. 4.7497 ft3 N/A
Full
865 psia (02) Max. tel. 4.7508 ft3 N/A
-294'F Min. tol. 4.74705 ft3 N/A
Full
260 psia (H2) Max. tol. N/A 6.805 ft3
-418'F
Full
Min. tol. N/A 6.80048 ft3
--

225 psia (Hz) Max. tol. WA 6.8014 ft3


-418'F Min. tol. N/A 6.7963 ft3
Full
935 psia (02) Max. tol. 4.7848 ft3 N/A
+ 80°F Min. tol. 4.7812 ft3 N/A
Full
260 psia (H2) Max. tol. N/A 6.8597 ft3
-ZOOoF Min. tol. N/A 6.8550 ft3

Volumes Used for Tank Calculations

Average Size 4.74892 Ft3 6.7988 Ft3


Cold
835 psia O2
225 psia H,
L

Average Size 4.7830 Ft3 6.8573 Ft3


Warm
935 psia 02
260 psia H2

A-198

_I-~ .- .._- -..... ..“_ T..-I- ..---- --.- _ ,_ ______.. _. ._ . . . --I _-. ” . .._.-- .I
TABLE 7.3.5 CRYOGENIC TANK TUBE SIZING

Hydrogen Oxygen

Vent Tube l/4 O.D. x .015 l/2 O.D. x .015 wall


wall 304 L SST (Inside coil cover)
3/4 O.D. x .028 wall
(Outside coil cover)
Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Fill Tube l/4 0.0. x -015 wall 3/8 O.D. x .022 wall
304L SST Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Feed Tube* Common with vent l/4 O.D. x .015 wall


line Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Electrical Tube l/2 O.D. x .015 wall l/2 O.D. x .015 wall
304L SST Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Vapor Cooled* l/4 O.D. x .015 wall 3/16 O.D. x .015 wall
Shield Tube 304L SST Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Pressure Vessel to Vapor* l/4 O.D. x .015 wall


Cooled Shield Tube Inconel 750 AMS 5582

* Three tubes joined to provide a single feed line for the oxygen tank only.

A-199

. .._. -- . -. --. _ ,. -----... .-..-. .s _- _, ~--_--- 1_1 i-l- - ._..___._-- ___--.-- --11 _---- --*----- -.
q PRESSURIZATION AND DESTRATIFICATION UNIT

Each of the storage tanks con tains a forced convection


pressurization and destratifi cation unit.
Each unit consists of the fol lowing: FAN & MOTOR
a. A 2.0 inch diameter s upport tube approximately
3/4 the tank diameter in length.

b. Two heaters.

c. Two fan motors.

d. Two thermostats. Eliminated for H2 on CSM


113 and on and eliminated for 02 on CSM
114 and on. TUBE

FAN & MOTOR


The tube provides a large surface area for efficient ENCASED
heat transfer, and is small enough to be installed INTERNALLY
through the pressure vessel neck. The heaters are
placed along the tube's outer surface .* and brazedI . in
place. A motor-fan is mounted at the upper ana lower enas of the tube,
which draw fluid through the inlet ports located along the tube, force it
across the heat transfer surface and expel it near the top and bottom of the
vessel.
Block II tanks utilize separate sets of lead wires for each heater element
and for each motor fan through the electrical connector interface.

FAN MOTORS

The motors are three phase, four wire, 200 volts A.C. line to line, 400
cycles miniature induction type with a centrifugal flow impeller. The
minimum impeller speed of the oxygen unit in fluid is 1800 rpm with a
torque of 0.90 in. oz., and the hydrogen unit is 3800 rpm with a torque
of 0.45 in. oz.. Two fans and motors are used in each vessel.
Stator Stack ,
Yoke Ring
Bushing
Field /---
Winding

Bearings -4

Impel ler
\ Rotor
MOTOR FAN

A-200
q PRESSURIZATION AND DESTRATIFICATION UNIT(COIITINUED)

S’I’ATOR SLOT

STAMR TEZl’H -\

SPIDER

STATOR
RFTAIRER
i I-
R?XESiED SWI’

STRAIN RELIEF

A-201

. . _ ., ..).-....---. _-_-‘ -.- .."-.-____-_~ l___l___."_~-.-~_~..---- _-1__~ -_-__-_-- --11----


q PRESSURIZATION AND DESTRATIFICATION UNIT (CONTINUED)

HEATERS

The heaters are a nichrome resistance type, each contained in a


thin stainless steel tube insulated with powered magnesium oxide.
The heaters are designed for operation at 28 volts DC during
in-flight operation , or 65 volts DC for GSE operation to provide
pressurization within the specified time. The heaters are
spiralled and brazed along the outer surface of the tube. The
heaters are wired in parallel to provide heater redundancy at
half power. The heaters have small resistance variation over a
temperature range of + 80°F to -420°F.

THERMOSTATS

.GLASS SEAL
BASE ASSEMBLY
INSULATOR
THRUST PIN CAP
WAVE WASHER BI-METAL DISC

The thermostats are a bimetal type unit developed for cryogenic


service. They are in series with the heaters and mounted inside
the heater tube with a high conducting mounting bracket arranged
so that the terminals protrude through the tube wall. When the
heater tube reaches 80 *lOoF, the thermostats open cutting
power to the heaters to prevent over heating of the pressure
vessel. When the tube reaches -200°F in the hydrogen tank or -75°F in the
oxygen tank the thermostats close allowing power to
be supplied to the heaters.
q DENSITY SENSOR PROBE

The density sensor consists of two concentric tubes which


serve as capacitor plates, with the operating media acting
as the dielectric between the two. The density of the fluid
is directly proportional to the dielectric constant and
therefore probe capacitance. The gage is capable of sensing
fluid quantity from empty to full during fill and flight
operation. The accuracy of the probe is 1.5% of full scale.

TEMPERATURESEN
DENSITY PROBE
PRESSUREAND
OESTRATIFICATION UNIT fl

Hydrogen

Quantity Gaging System


Range O-100% full O-100% full
(.17-4.31 #/ft3)
Accuracy ~2.68 % full range
Output Voltage O-5 V DC O-5 V DC
Output Impedance 500 ohms 500 ohms
Power 2-l/2 watts 115 V 2-l/2 watts 115 V
400 cps 400 cps

q TEMPEKATURESENSOR

The temperaturesensoris a four-wire platinum resistance sensing element


mounted on the density sensor (see photograph of density sensor probe).
It is a single point sensor encased in a Inconel sheath which only dis-
sipates 1.5 millivolts of power per square inch to minimize self-heating
errors. The resistance of the probe is proportional to the fluid temper-
ature and is accurate to within 1.5%.

Hydrogen Oxygen
Temperature Gaging System
Range -42O'F to -ZOOoF -32O'F to +80°F
Accuracy t2.68 % full range t2.63 % full range
Output Voltage O-5 VDC o-5 v DC
Output Impedance 5000 ohms 5000 ohms
Power 1.25 watts 115 V 1.25 watts 115 V
400 cps 400 cps
@ SIGNAL CONDITIONER

The temperature and density amplifiers are separate modules, contained -


in the same electrical box. The density module functions as an infinite
feedback balancing bridge and utilizes solid state circuitry. The
temperature module also uses solid state circuits and amplifies the
voltage generated across the sensor which is linearly proportional to the
resistance of the sensor. The output in both cases is a O-5 volt DC
analog voltage which is fed into the NR interface. The voltage required
to run the signal conditioner is 115 V, 300 cycle single phase, and
draws a total of 3.75 watts of power. The accuracy of the unit is 1.0%
of full scale.

The modules are encased in Emerson-Cumings epoxy potting and the unit is
hermetically sealed.

q ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR

The electrical receptacle is a hermetically sealed device capable of


withstanding system pressures and temperature. It contains straight pins
with solder cups attached.to facilitate the soldering of lead wires from
the temperature and density probes, the destratification units and the
heaters. The pins are sealed in a ceramic materi al which has the same
coefficient of thermal expansion as the shell and pin material.

A-284
.- .-._ “__ ..” -..“-._-_“~ .-.. ~--.I __.^ 11-~ . .~. . ..----
T------ ..,-I -~ ..-1_ 1-1-1”^1.-1~ . . ..- I -..- I .” --.- 1-1 ..l--.l..
-I-.. . . ..- .*
q VAC-10~ PUMP

DESCRIPTION

The vat-ion pump is attached directly to the vacuum annulus of the oxygen
tank which maintains the insulation space at reduced pressure required for
adequate insulation. Pumping action results from bombarding the titanium
cathode with ionized gas molecules which become chemically bound to the
titanium. The impacting ions sputter titanium from the cathode. The
sputtered titanium particles also contribute pumping by gettering action.
The pump can be used as a vacuum readout device since the input
current to the pump is directly proportional to pressure. The unit is
powered by a DC-DC converter capable of putting out the required amounts
of power.
CONSTRUCTION

Vat-ion pumps have no moving parts. The pumps consist of two


titanium plates spot welded to a vacuum tight stainless steel enclosure
with an anode structure mounted between the plates connected to a copper-
gold brazed electrical feedthrough. A permanent magnet maintains a
magnetic field between the electrodes causing the ions to follow spiral
paths thus increasing transit time.

POWERSUPPLY ( CONVERTER)

The converter is a solid state device capable of supplying power to the vat-ion
pump over a large range of pressure. The unit is energized by a 28 V DC source
and is current limited to 350 ma. The unit is capable of puttinq out 4.2 ma at 10 Volts
DC and lma at 4000 volts. The unit employs a squ,are wave invert&r, a
toroid transformer and a quadrupler circuit on the output. Choke filters are supp lied
on the 28 volt DC input to keep to acceptable limits the amount of
conducted interference being fed back from the output. The metal case is well
bonded to reduce to acceptable limits radiated interference. The circuits are enc losed
in Emerson-Cumings stycast 2850 Ft.

A-205
q VAC-ION
-- PUMP (CONTINUED)

PERFORMANCE

The pumping rate of the pump is constant at 1 liter per second. Pump current
is related to pressure as shown by the graph below.

rnc>auKt VSlJJKKtNI
1 I/s VaclonPUMP

I
ma
Pump Current

LIFE SPAN

The practical life span of a vac- ion pump while pumping in the various
pressure ranges is as follows:

1 x 10e6 region - 10,000 hours


1 x 10-5 region - 1,000 hours
1 x 10-4 region - 100 hours
1 x 10-3 region - 10 hours

A-20.6
_ .._ _I . ..--.-~. __.,-_ _. .._..
‘ . "..-."-_"_ (. . _---
.---."._.-
q FILTER

.FILTBR

The filter is a multiple disc type element rated at 175 microns absolute.
The discs are stacked on a mandrel-like cartridge. The filter is used
to trap fibers and particles which could get downstream of the tank and
hinder valve module and fuel cell operation. The filter is mounted
inside the density probe adapter and is welded onto the feed and vent
line.

A-207

_~..--. .--;"-_ -~ _-,___-


I-.. ._._._- ~~__r _"-_-^ -- .-...~III_IIIIII-..-x--.--- _-_- _-~I
q SYSTEM (TANK) VALVE MODULE

TANK 2 HALF h TANK 1 HALF

CHECK

-,_m------
I OVERBOARDRELIEF

I OVERBOARDRELIEF
I____---- A
0R RELIEF VALUE 0PS PRESSURE SWITCH
0T PRESSURE TRANSDUCER m CHECK VALVE

The system (tank) valve module for the hydrogen system and oxygen system
are functionally indentical. Each module contains two relief valves, two
pressure transducers, two pressure switches: and one check valve. These
module components are each separately described on the following pages.

A-208
la RELIEF VALVES

ATMOSPHERIC
SENSING
PORT-

NEGATIVE
RATE SPRING IL I
ASSEMBLY

BELLOWS
POPPET PRESSURIZED
VOLUME
POSITIVE RATE
SPRING ASSEMBLY

VENTA L TANK PRESSURE

The relief valve, part of the system valve module, is differential type
designed to be unaffected by back pressure in the downstream plumbing.
The valve has temperature compensation and a self-aligning valve seat.
The valve consists of an ambient pressure sensing bellows preloaded with
a belleville spring, which operates a poppet valve. Virtually zero
pressure increase between crack and full flow is obtained by cancelling
out the positive spring rate of the pressure sensing element with a
negative-rate belleville spring (see above right). The large sensing
element and small valve produces large seat forces with a small crack-
to-reseat pressure differential assuring low leakage at the reseat
pressure. The Belleville springs are made of 17-4 PH and 17-7 PH
stainless steels. The bellows is a three-ply device designed to prevent
fractures due to resonant vibrations.

The relief crack pressure is 273 psig minimum for hydrogen tanks and
983 psig minimum for oxygen tanks. The valve is atmospheric sensing;
therefore, relief crack pressure in space is 273 psia minimum for hydrogen
and 983 psia minimum for oxygen.

Oxygen Hydrogen

Full Flow Pressure 1010 psig (max.) 285 psig (max.)

Reseat Pressure 965 psig (min.) 268 psig (min.)

A-209
. i. .I- -... . .L-i-““_l.l”~-.._-l_- .,.,. _ -..-- . --. ~__ -“,“111111 .“lll”----.,l--- _x__-_-
q PRESSURESWITCH

TTANK PRESSURE

H rSENSING DIAPHRAM

PIVOTED
TOGGLE LEVER
REFE HORSESHOESPRING
PRES
INSULATOR '

.ELECTRICAL
A CONTACT ARM

The pressure switch, part of the system valve module, is a double pole,
single throw absolute device. A positive reference pressure (less than
atmospheric) is used to trim the mechanical trip mechanism to obtain the
required absolute switch actuation settings. The reference pressure is
typically between 4 to 10 psia. A circular convoluted diaphragm senses
tank pressure and actuates a toggle mechanism which provides switching
to drive motor switch (Cryogenic Electrical Control Box Assembly). The
motor driven switch controls power to both the tank heaters and
destratification motors. The pressure switch body is 302 stainless steel and
the diaphragm is 17-7 stainless steel. This unit is capable
of carrying the current required by the motor driven switch without any
degradation. The convoluted diaphragm actuates the switch mechanism in
a positive fast manner which eliminates bounce and the resultant voltage
transients.
11 CRYOGENIC PRESSURETRANSDUCER

TANK

The pressure transducer, part of the system valve module, is an absolute


(vacuum reference) device. 'The transducer consists of a silicon pickup
comprised of four sensors mounted on a damped edge diaphragm and an
integral signal conditioner. The unit senses tank pressure through the
discharge line from the tank. The signal conditioner output is a O-5
VDC analog output which is linearly proportioned to tank pressure.

Hydrogen Oxygen

Range 0 to 350 psia 50 to 1050 psia


Accuracy' + 2.68 % full range * 2.63 %full range
Output Voltage O-5 V DC O-5 V DC
Output Impedance 500 ohms 500 ohms
Power 1.5 watts 1.5 watts
Voltage 23 V DC 23 V DC

A-211

,. , ._..~_..- .._ .-...._.- -. I ,_..i _-... -.--.-L ,_.,__-.^ ..I_.. --,.. _...-*....^..
- _ .. ..- _..I,._L.‘ _ _~--l_l-__-__--.., -_.~~.._-l_-,.l
~I-.
•l CHECK VALVE (SYSTEM MODULE)

From Tank 2
t
G?7
Spring

Seat Assv -

Seal

The check valve, part of the system valve module, is designed to open at
a differential pressure of approximately 1 psia. The single poppet IS
spring loaded and has a large area to prevent chattering during flow in
the normal direction. This large area also helps in obtaining a positive
seal if pressurized in the reverse direction.

A- 2.12
El FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE

VALVE MODULE ENVELOPE

TO FUEL CELLS

-FROM TANK
FLOWSCHEMATIC

The fuel cell valve module consists of two check valves and three solenoid
shutoff valves contained in a cast body. The separate hydrogen and oxygen
modules are functionally identical. Individual valve module components
are described on succeeding pages.

A-213

. __ . _“-.* .-- *.-._--... ,.. .._. ____-“-^ ‘_--.” -.-.. --- -.....
.‘_“..,...I -...- --
q SOLENOID VALVES

POSITION SWITC
SOLENOID NO. 1

OUTLET
SIMPLIFIED

The solenoid valves, part of the fuel cell valve module, employ a poppet-
seat arrangement. This poppet is actuated by a magnetic armature which is
suspended on a Belleville spring. The upper solenoid is used to open the
valve; the lower to close it. The snap-over-center belleville spring both
guides the armatures and latches the valve open or closed. A switch to
indicate valve closed position is incorporated. The valve opens against
pressure and pressure helps seal the valve against leakage in the normal flow
direction. The valve body is 321 stainless steel. The maximum in-rush
current is 10 amps with steady state current at 2 amps. The solenoid coil
circuit has diode noise suppression.

A- 214
q CHECK VALVE (FUEL CELL MODULE)

FROM SYSTEM
f VALVE MODULE

MAIN S
AUXI
SEAT

Seated - both main and Cracked - at low flows Full flow - both main
auxiliary seats are closed. the auxiliary seat is and secondary seats are
barely open and catches wide open; the high flow
contaminant particles, velocities carry par-
the main seat is wide ticles through the valve
open and protected from without fouling the seat.
contaminants.

The check valve, part of the fuel cell module, is designed to open at a
differential pressure of approximately 1 psia. The valve consists of a
main seat and 'auxiliary seat operating as shown pictorially above. A
large seat area provides a positive low leakage seal if pressurized in
the reverse direction.
Ezl
8 ti2-02 INLINE FILTER

.-+qfq!p-&
- FLOW DIRECTION

The hydrogen and oxygen reactant filter consists of a multiple of chemically


etched discs. The discs are stacked on a mandrel-like cartridge. The filter
is used to trap contamination which could get downstream of the reactant tank
valve modules. The filter is rated at 5~ nominal and 12~ absolute with a
dirt holding capacity of .25 grams. The filter design does not allow it to
generate system contamination and provides closer adherence to specified
filter rating.

A-216

--_ ".,_.l._-~-.l----l--_--.l-,-~-_ .-"---. ,._--- -,.,


--__.-_ -..--ll.l".lll .._
_,._-4__
-,"-..--.-.,--
---.--w--e.-.-- I_._.
q FILL AND VENT DISCONNECTS - AIRBORNE

Each vent and fill disconnect utilizes a spring loaded poppet and a pressure
cap that can be locked into place. The ground unit is connected by aligning
grooves on the ground sleeve with keys on the airborne body, pushing until a
stop is reached (about 40 lbs. force is required), and turning the ground
sleeve until engagement is complete. The spring loaded poppets can be self
opening on installation of mating ground disconnects, or can be opened sub-
sequent to installation of the ground disconnect, depending on the type of
ground unit that is used, The poppet is self closing on removal of the
ground unit regardless of the type used.

A- 21’7

. ..- . , _. .._ ^.” ,.“__-___ . __*_*_.


_l^--~.-l_---.“~---~-~ ------ -il_-. _“-ll-“l_-~- --.- __L.-_-_ -___ _- ._-_-_
7.4 FUEL CELL/CRYOGENIC
SYSTEM FILTRATION

A-218

_ I .--. _,..- _ . ,_____..


. .-_- I .--_--~_-. ,__-,..____-..
.-.^_( ,I__..-I- _--.~--__ ". ^..^--..---"-
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION

CRITICAL MINIMUM FILTER PROTECTION OTHER


COMPONENT CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS

acondary Bypass Valve 0 to 0.006 in. annulus No filter


tapered pintle depending
on travel

ater/Glycol Pump 75~ nom. Internal to Non Bypassing


100~ absolute2 Pump Inlet Type
Area = 6.6 in I

ater Separator Hole Size = 0.030 in.dia 40~ absolute Internal to Water Made from
heck Valve Stem Clearance = 0.013 in. Area2= 0.076 Separator Pump Sinter Cd
Max. Stroke = 0.048 in. in. Powder

2 Pump 5~ nom. Between H -0 Valve Chem Milled


12~ absolute Module & fi -a2 Fuel Stacked Disc
Holding capa- Cell Moduli Filter Element
city =
.25 grams
1D
rimary Bypass Valve Bi-Metalic Flapper
1
D
5p nom. Between H -0 Valve Chem Milled
Stroke = 0.040 in. 12~ absolute Module & 6 -a2 Fuel Stacked Disc
Clearance (min) at full Holding capa- Cell Modulz Filter Element
regeneration = 0.013 in. city =
.25 grams D
1

2 Regulator
1
D Internal to Made from
Valve seat clearance open = 1Op nom.
0.008 in. Min. radial slid- 25~ absolute2 Regulator Inlet Sinter Powder
ing clearance exposed to Area 0.076 in
gas = 0.006 inches
I9

D Filtration also provided by filter at the H2 Regulator Inlet (see H2 Regulator)

D2 Valve
for
open seat
Apollo
clearance
8 regulator.
is based on regulator flow conditions at 2200 watts plus purge
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued)

CRITICAL MINIMUM 1 FILTERt PROTECTION OTHER


COMPONENT CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTIC!

H2 Purge Valve Ball travel from seat = 611 nom. Internal to Cylindrical-
0.020 in. to 0.025 in. 18~ absolute2 Valve Inlet Shaped Screen,
Min diametric clearance = Area 0.35 in. Bypassing Type
0.005 in.

1. H2 Purge Valve 0.0305 in. dia. Protective Internal and Lee Jet Size
Orifice (Valve screen (per- Upstream of Orifice 0.0305 in.
exit) forated cap) @ Valve Exit orifice, 750
hole size = LOHM
0.008 in.

02 Regulator Valve Seat clearance open 10~ nom. Internal to lade from
= 0.005 in. Min. radial 25~ absolute ?egulator Inlet jinter Powder
sliding clearance exposed Area = 0.076 in 21
to gas = 0.0035 in. b

02 Purge Valve Ball Travel from Seat = 6~ nom. Internal to Iylindrical-


0.020 in. to 0.025 in. 18~ absolute \Jalve Inlet Shaped Screen,
Min. diametr c clearance = Area = 0.35 in2 3ypassing Type
0.005 in.

1. O2 Purge Valve 0.0120 in. d a. Protective Internal and Lee Jet Size =
Orifice (Valve screen (per- llpstream of Orifice 3.0120 in.
exit) forated cap) P Valve Exit orifice, 4500
hole size = LOHM
0.008 in.

I% Valve open
for Apollo
seat clearance
8 regulator.
is based on regulator flow conditions at 2200 watts plus purge
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued)

CRITICAL MINIMUM FILTER PROTECTIO!i OTHER


COMPONENT CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS
2 Vent Valve Ball seal .020 to .025 inches 6~ nom. Internal to Cylindrical-
from seat. Valve pintle travel 18~ absolute Valve Inlet Shaped Screen,
from sealing seat is .OlO-.012 Area = 0.35 in? Bypassing Type
in. Maximum diametric
clearance .006 inches.

1. N Vent Valve 0.0186 in. dia. Protective Internal and Lee Jet Size =
Okfice screen (per- Upstream of Orifice 0.0186 in.
forated cap) 0 Valve Exit orifice, 2000
hole size = LOHM
0.008 in.

2. N Vent Valve 6~ nom. Internal to Cylindrical


V&t Port Plug 18~ absolute Valve Exit Screen
Area = 0.15 in?

I2 Fill Valve Ball seal .020 to .025 inches


from seat. Valve pintle travel
from sealing seat is .OlO-.012
in. Minimum diametric
clearance .005 inches.
1. Inlet Port 6~ nom. Internal to Disc-shaped
18~ absolute Valve Inlet Screen
Area = 0.034 in?
(Min)
2. Interstage 6~ nom. Internal to Cylindrical
18~ absolute Valve at Inter- Screen
3. Exit Port Area = 0.074 in?stage and Exit
(Min) Port
I2 Regulator Valve Seat Clearance Open, 10~ nom. Internal to Made from
0.0015 in. Min. radial 25~ absolute Regulator Inlet Sinter Powder
sliding clearance exposed Area 0.076 in.'
to gas = 0.0035 in. I9

I3 Valve open seat clearance is based on regulator flow conditions at 2200 watts plus purge
for Apollo 8 regulator.
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued)

CRITICAL MINIMUM FILTER PROTECTION OTHER


COMPONENT CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS

1 Regulator Overboard 200 MESH screen Internal to Screen Twill or


J&t Port Plug 0.001%0.0026in Regulator Exit Plain
dia.wire

rletering Orifice 0.0215 in. dia. Protective Between N2 None


screen (per- Regulator and 02 &
forated cap) H2 Regulators
hole size =
0.008 in.

Radiator Bypass Valve


Main Valve 0.0015 to 0.003 in. None at Valve Filtrati'on Filter
Bypass Valve 0.002 to 0.004 in. Provided by at Coolant Pump
Orifice/Stroke Pump Inlet Inlet
Main Valve 0.156 in/O.060 in. Filter
Bypass Valve 0.420 in/O.018 in.

Valve Module, H2 175~ absolute Internal to H2 Chem Milled


(Consists of 2 relief Area = 0.97 in? Cryogenic Tanks Stacked Disc
lalves, 2 press. Outlet Filter Element
iwitches, 2 press.
transducers, and one
:heck valve)

Jalve Module, O2 175~ absolute Internal to 02 Chem Milled


(Consists of 2 relief Area = 0.97 in? Cryogenic Tanks Stacked Disc
valves, 2 press. Outlet Filter Element
switches, 2 press.
transducers, and one
check valve)

< I
TABLE 7.4.1
FUEL CELLS/CRYOGENICS - FILTRATION (Continued)
CRITICAL
COMPONENT
MINIMUM -T FILl PROTECTION OTHER
CLEARANCE RATING - SIZE LOCATION CHARACTERISTIC
12-0 Fuel Cell Valve
lodu?e (Consist of 2 5~ nom. 3etween H -0 Valve Chem Milled
:heck valves and 3 12~ absolute 'lodule ani H2-0 Stacked Disc
iolding capa- -uel Cell Mo&l$ Filter Element
solenoid valves each)
city =
.25 grams
}

REPORT OF
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

APPENDIX B - REPORT OF MISSION


EVENTS PANEL

APPENDIX C - REPORT OF MANUFACTURING


AND TEST PANEL

APPENDIX D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL

APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT


MANAGEMENT PANEL
NTO-
(_.CCE-SSUO--N
7n4_9
NUMBS) _ '_

_ (P (CODE)

(N._SA Cl_6R_TMX OR A'DdUMBER) (CATEGORY)

NATIONAL ........ INISTRATION


..2
AI_PENDIX.
., B
REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL
CONTENTS

Page
Part

APPENDIX B - REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL

B-I
BI TASK ASSIGNMENT ................

B-3
B2 PANEL ORGANIZATION ................

B-5
B3 SUMMARY OF EVENTS .................

B4 PRELAUNCH AND MISSION EVENTS PRIOR TO THE


B-II
ACCIDENT ....................

B-II
LAUNCH COUNTDOWN ................

B-II
Mechanical Build-up and Gas Servicing .....

B-13
Cryogenic Servicing ..............

B-25
Spacecraft Closeout and Terminal Count ....

LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR COAST PHASE PRIOR


B-26
TO THE ACCIDENT ................

B-26
Launch and Flight Summary ...........

B-27
Spacecraft Systems Operation ........

B-30
Hydrogen Low Pressure Master Alarm ......

B-31
Cryogenic Tank Destratification .......

B-37
B5 INCIDENT EVENTS ................

INTRODUCTION ................ B-37

STATUS OF THE SPACECRAFT PRIOR TO THE


ACCIDENT ................. B-45

FAN TURNON AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL


B-45
ANOMALIES ...................

OXYGEN TANK PARAMETERS FROM 55:53:30 UNTIL


LOSS OF TELEMETRY ............... B-51

B-54
LOSS OF TELEMETRY ...............

iii
Part Page

SPACECRAFT EVENTS AT THE TIME OF TELEMETRY


LOSS .................... B-56

CHANGES IN SPACECRAFT DYNAMICS ........ B-62

TEMPERATURE CHANGES OBSERVED IN SERVICE


MODULE ................... B-67

FAILURE OF CRYOGENIC OXYGEN SYSTEM ...... B-67

OPERATION OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM B-80

B6 POSTINCIDENT EVENTS ............... B-83

IMMEDIATE RECOVERY .............. B-8_

Chronology of Spacecraft Reconfiguration


Actions .................. B-84

Evaluation of Electrical and Cryogenic


Oxygen Problem .............. B-88

Maintenance of Attitude Control ....... B-92

Lunar Module Activation ........... B-97

PLANS AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO RETURN THE CREW


TO EARTH .................. B-IO0

Consumables and Systems Management


Actions .................. B-I02

Return to Earth Trajectory Control ..... B-111

Entry Procedures and Checklist


Definition ................ B-120

B-7 INSTRUMENT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS ........ B-127

OXYGEN TANK TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT ...... B-127

OXYGEN TANK QUANTITY INSTRUMENTATION ..... B-130

OXYGEN TANK 2 PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION .... B-i34

iv
Part Page

PULSE CODE MODULATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION B-l_7

MISSION CONTROL ............... B-152

REFERENCES ................... B-158

v
This page left blank intentionally.

vi
PART BI

TASK ASSIGNMENT

Panel i was assigned the task to develop a detailed and accurate


chronology of mission events directly related to the flight of Apollo 13.
This event sequence would then form a baseline of data for analytical
use by Panel i, other Panels, and the Review Board.

To provide such a chronology, Panel i worked to produce a consoli-


dated sequence of all data whether derived from telemetry records, crew
observations, inflight photographs, air-to-ground communications, or
other sources of information. Of special significance to Panel i was
the requirement to correlate data taken from different sources, such
as crew observations and telemetry, in order to provide greater assur-
ance of the validity of data wherever possible.

In order to provide meaningful boundary conditions for its work,


Panel i divided its effort into three areas:

i. Preincident events, which covered the flight from countdown


to the time of the inflight accident.

2. Incident events, which covered the flight from approximately


55 hours and 52 minutes to the conclusion of immediately related data
events.

3. Postincident events, which covered the subsequent mission


period to splashdown.

In each of the three areas the main purpose of the Panel was to
provide the most efficient presentation of events for the Board's use
in reviewing, evaluating, and interpreting the significance of mission
events. Consequently, Panel I devoted a considerable portion of its
time to the task of data interpretation and verification. As was
intended from the Charter of the Board, the primary focus of the Panel's
work was the period of time during which the service module encountered
serious inflight difficulties, and its presentation of data reflects
this particular emphasis.

B-I
This page left blank intentionally.

B-2
PART B2

PANEL ORGANIZATION

Panel i was chaired by Mr. Francis B. Smith, Assistant Adminis-


trator for University Affairs, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The Board Monitor was Mr. Neil Armstrong from the Manned Spacecraft
Center. Additional Panel Members were:

Mr. John J. Williams, Kennedy Space Center, for preincident events

Dr. Thomas B. Ballard, Langley Research Center, for incident events

Mr. M. P. Frank, Manned Spacecraft Center, for postincident events

Although each of the above specialized in one phase of the Panel's


total assignment, the Panel acted as one unit in the review and assess-
ment of data and in the analysis and interpretation of those events
identified with the accident.

B-3
This page left blank intentionally.

B-4
PART B3

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

Apollo 13 was launched on schedule from Kennedy Space Center at


2:13:00 e.s.t, on April ii, 1970. The crew consisted of James E. Lovell,
Commander (CDR); John L. Swigert, Command Module Pilot (CMP); and Fred W.
Haise, Lunar Module Pilot (LMP). The preflight countdown was routine and
although some malfunctions and anomalies occurred during boost and earlier
portions of the flight, none except the premature cutoff of one of the S-II
engines was considered at the time to be of a serious nature.

At about 55:54, the crew had just completed a television broadcast;


CMP Swigert was in the left seat of the command module, LMP Haise was in
the lunar module, and CDR Lovell was in the CM lower equipment bay, when
all three heard a loud bang. At about the same time in Mission Control
in Houston, the Guidance Officer (GUIDO) noted on his console display that
there had been a momentary interruption of the spacecraft computer. He
told the Flight Director, "We've had a hardware restart. I don't know
what it was." At almost the same time, CDR Lovell, talking to Mission
Control, said, "I believe we've had a problem here." Also at about the
same time, the Electrical, Environmental, and Communications Engineer
(EECOM) in Mission Control noticed on his console display the sudden
appearance of limit sensing lights indicating that a few of the telem-
etered quantities relating to the spacecraft's cryogenic, fuel cell, and
electrical system had suddenly gone beyond pre-set limits. Astronaut
Swigert in the command module, noting a master alarm about 2 seconds
after the bang, moved from the left seat to the right seat where he could
see the instruments indicating conditions of the electrical system, and
noticed a caution light indicating low voltage on main bus B, one of the
two busses supplying electrical power for the command module. At that
time, he reported to Mission Control, "We've had a problem. We've had
a main B bus undervolt." At the same time, however, he reported the
voltage on fuel cell 3, which supplied power to main bus B, looked good
and assumed that the main bus B undervolt condition had been a transient
one. However, 2 or 3 minutes later, when another master alarm sounded,
LMP Haise moved into the right-hand seat to recheck the fuel cells and
noted that two of the three fuel cells (no. i and no. 3) were showing no
hydrogen or oxygen flow and no electrical output and that fuel cell 2 was
carrying the command module's total electrical load through bus A. Bus B
was dead. In addition, several other electrical and cryogenic system ab-
normalities were evident.

Detailed studies and analyses of telemetry records made since the


flight indicated that during the 90 seconds before the "bang", several ab-
normal events occurred. At about 55:53:23, within a few seconds after the
crew had turned on two fan motors which stir the supercritical cryogenic

B-5
oxygen in oxygen tank no. 2, electrical "glitches" (transient high-
amplitude current and voltage fluctuations) occurred which could be in-
dicative of momentary electrical short circuits. Analyses of telemetry
data also indicate that first one fan motor and then the other probably
became disconnected from the electrical bus concurrently with the glitches.
Thirteen seconds after the first glitch (16 seconds after the fans were
turned on) the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2 started to rise; during the
next 24 seconds it increased from a normal value of 891 psia to 954 psia;
it remained at that pressure for approximately 21 seconds and then again
increased to a maximum value of 1008 psia (approximately the pressure at
which the relief valve was set to open), at which point the relief valve
apparently opened and pressure began decreasing. During the last 23 sec-
onds of this period, during the second oxygen pressure increase, telem-
etry indicated that oxygen tank no. 2 temperature also began to increase
sharply; and concurrently with the sudden temperature rise, the oxygen
tank no. 2 quantity gage, which had been inoperative for the previous
9 hours, began to show fluctuating readings. At about 90 seconds after
the start of the pressure rise, telemetry transmission from the space-
craft was suddently interrupted for a period of 1.8 seconds.

Putting all of this and other information together with the service
module photographs taken later by the crew and with subsequent changes in
the condition of the spacecraft system leads to a determination that
immediately before and during this 1.8-second interval the following
things happened:

i. The oxygen tank no. 2 system failed, leading to loss of all


oxygen pressure.

2. The service module panel covering bay 4 blew off, possibly


producing the "bang" heard by the crew.

3. The spacecraft's velocity changed by 0.5 fps.

4. Transmission of telemetry from the spacecraft was interrupted


(possibly caused by the panel striking and damaging the high-gain antenna
through which data were being telemetered).

5. Various valves in the reaction control systems (RCS) were shocked


closed (contributing to some difficulties in maintaining automatic atti-
tude control).

6. Valves controlling oxygen flow to fuel cells _ and 3 were shocked


closed (leading to failure of both fuel cells 2-1/2 minutes later for lack
of oxygen).

7. Oxygen tank no. i started leaking oxygen.

B-6
8. Venting of oxygen produced forces on the spacecraft which the
automatic stabilization system counteracted by firing opposing spacecraft
reaction control thrusters.

9. Various sensors or their wiring were damaged to cause subsequent


erroneous readings.

These changes occurred so rapidly, of course, that neither the crew


nor the mission controllers could have had a clear picture of specifi-

cally what had happened.

In the Mission Control Center, after the 1.8-second data loss, the
EECOM first suspected an instrumentation failure since earlier in the
flight (46:40) the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage had failed and since
other pressures, temperatures, voltages, and current readings were so
abnormal (e.g., more than i00 percent or less than 0 percent of fu_
scale) as to appear unrealistic. They appeared more indicative of an
instrumentation failure than of real quantities. The Flight Director
also initially believed, from the information available to him in the
Control Center, that the difficulty was electrical or electronic in
nature. Consequently, Mission Control Center's initial efforts during
the first 3 or 4 minutes after the malfunction were to validate instru-
ment readings and to identify a possible instrumentation failure. Dur-
ing the next several minutes, both the flightcrew and the ground con-
trollers worked at switching fuel cell bus power configurations in an

attempt to understand what had happened and to get fuel cells I and 3
back on line. They determined that fuel cell i had no output and dis-
connected it from the bus. Later they also disconnected fuel cell 3
for the same reason. For several minutes they connected the command
module's entry battery to bus A to aid fuel cell 2 in supplying elec-
trical power and to insure against further failures due to low voltage.

Shortly after the malfunction, while the Apollo 13 crew and the
EECOM were trying unsuccessfully to restore electrical power output from
fuel cells i and 3, the Guidance and Navigation Officer (GNC) reported

an unusually high level of attitude control thruster activity on the


spacecraft. This added to their problems, since it indicated other
abnormal conditions aboard the spacecraft and used excessive thruster
fuel. Consequently, during the next hour the ground control and the
crew were required to pay a great deal of attention to maintaining
attitude control of the spacecraft and to identifying and eliminating
the cause of the instability. At the same 'time, the Flight Director
began to suspect that the genesis of the problem might lie in the RCS,
rather than in the high-gain antenna or instrumentation.

B-7
During this period (about 14 minutes after the accident) CDR Lovell
reported, "...it looks to me, looking out the hatch, that we are venting
something. We are venting something out into space ...... it's a gas of
some sort." He subsequently described this venting as extremely heavy
and unlike anything he had seen in his three previous space flights.

For about i hour 45 minutes after the accident, the crew and ground
controllers wrestled with electrical problems caused by oxygen supply
and fuel cell failures and with attitude stability problems caused by
the venting of oxygen, the shock closing of thruster system valves, and
electrical system failures. During this period they went through a
series of control system reconfigurations until automatic control
was finally established at 57:32. In the meantime, as it became more
apparent that the loss of oxygen from oxygen tank no. i could not be
stopped and that fuel cell 2 would soon expire, the LM was powered up
(57:40), LM telemetry was turned on (57:57) and attitude control was
transferred from the CM to the LM (58:34). At 58:40, 2 hours 45 minutes
after the accident, the CM was completely powered down.

One of the main concerns then was to make the trajectory changes
that would return the spacecraft safely to Earth within the lifetime
of the onboard consumables--water, oxygen, thruster fuel, and electric
power. At the time of the accident the spacecraft was on a trajectory
which would have swung it around the Moon (about 21 hours after the ac-
cident) and returned it to Earth where it would have been left in a
highly elliptical orbit about the Earth with a perigee (nearest approach
to Earth) of about 2400 miles. Four trajectory correction burns were
made during the remainder of the flight as illustrated in figure B6-9.

61:30 - A 38 fps incremental velocity (delta V) burn using the


descent propulsion system (DPS) engine and the LM primary guidance and
navigation system (PGNS). This burn was performed 16 hours before they
swung around the Moon, and was targeted to place the spacecraft on a
trajectory which would return it to the atmospheric Earth reentry corri-
dor rather than the 2400-mile perigee.

79:28 - A 861 fps delta V burn using the DPS 2 hours after swinging
around the Moon to speed up return to Earth by about 9 hours (143 versus
152 g.e.t.) and to move the landing point from the Indian Ocean to the
Pacific Ocean where the primary recovery forces were located.

105:18 - A 7.8 fps delta V burn using DPS to lower perigee altitude
from _-7 miles to about 21 miles.

137:40 - A 3.2 fps delta V final burn using LM RCS thruster to cor-
rect for small dispersions in previous burns and assure that the space-
craft would reenter in the center of its entry corridor.

B-8
During the remainder of the flight there were several other unusual
situations which the crew and Mission Control successfully contended with.
The use of electrical power aboard the LM had to be managedvery carefully
to conserve not only the LMbatteries but also the water supply, since
water was used to dissipate heat generated by the electrical equipment.
The LM LiOH was not adequate to remove carbon dioxide for three men for
the duration of the return trip, so a method was devised to circulate
the LM cabin oxygen through the CM's Li0H filters. Since the CMhad to
be used for reentry, its main bus B had to be checked out very carefully
to assure that there were no electrical shorts and the CMentry battery
which had been used earlier to supply power for the ailing CMhad to be
recharged from the LMbatteries.
Several actions essential to reentry and landing were undertaken
during the last 9 hours of the flight as illustrated in figure B6-10.
The SMwas jettisoned a few minutes after the last midcourse correction,
about 4-1/2 hours before reentry. In viewing and photographing the SM,
the crew realized for the first time the extensiveness of the physical
damage(panel blown off, Mylar strips hanging from antenna, etc.). At
about 2-1/2 hours before reentry, the CM's inertial platform was powered
up and aligned and the LMwas jettisoned about 1/2 hour later. Reentry
was at 142:40 and splashdown at 142:54 g.e.t.

B-9
This page left blank intentionally.

B-IO
PART B4

PRELAUNCH AND MISSION EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

This section of the report contains significant events prior to


the accident with emphasis placed on the spacecraft and particularly
on the cryogenic system. It starts with the launch count (T - 98:00:00)
and ends prior to the significant events of the accident (55:52:00).

LAUNCH COUNTDOWN

Countdown operations for both the command service module (CSM)


and lunar module (LM) were started at approximately i0:00 a.m.e.s.t.
on Monday, April 6, 1970. The start of the countdown was delayed
approximately 8 hours because of a pad clear operation involving a
special test of the LM supercritical helium (SHe) system. A timeline
of significant countdown milestones is shown in figure B4-1.

Mechanical Build-up and Gas Servicing

Following completion of CSM powerup, water servicing, and securing


of the LM SHe operation, installation of the CSM heavy ordnance initi-
ators was started at approximately 3:00 p.m.e.s.t. The ordnance
operation and remote resistance checks of the launch escape rocket
initiators were completed by 9:30 p.m.e.s.t., April 6, after being
slightly delayed to correct a mechanical interference problem (incorrect
thread depth) with the initiator in the launch escape rocket motor.
Combined CSM and LM helium and gaseous oxygen (GOX) servicing was
started at 2:00 a.m.e.s.t, on April 7, and was successfully completed
by noon that day. At this time, both the CSM and LM were functional
at T - 66:00:00, at which point a built-in hold of 12 hours had been
originally planned. As a result of the late countdown start, both the
LM and CSM spacecrafts experienced only a 6-hour built-in hold.

From noon Tuesday, April 7, through ii:00 a.m. Thursday, April 9,


mechanical build-up operations (panel closure, LM thermal blanket in-
stallation, etc.) were conducted on the CSM and LM. The CSM fuel cells
were activated and preparations were completed for CSM cryo loading,
that is, filling the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tanks. Details of
this operation are covered below. During this time the LM SHe tank was
initially loaded and a 24-hour cold soak period started. All of these
operations were completed without a significant problem, with the

B-II
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B-12
spacecraft progressing functionally from T - 66:00:00 to T - 41:00:00;
including completion of the built-in hold at T - 66:00:00 and another
planned 16-hour built-in hold at T - 48:00:00.

Cryogenic Servicing

CSM cryo loading or flowing liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen was
scheduled to be performed from ii:OO a.m.e.s.t, through 7:00 p.m.e.s.t.
Thursday, April 9, 1970. A timeline of significant milestones, including
preliminary preparations, is shown in figure B4-2. (See Appendix A,
Part A5 for a description of the fuel cell and cryogenic systems.) The
configuration of the cryogenic and fuel cell systems was as follows:

i. The fuel cell gaseous oxygen and hydrogen systems were at a


pressure of 28 psia with oxygen and hydrogen gases. The fuel cells had
been operated in the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) and were left
pressurized with reactant gases (gaseous oxygen and hydrogen) to main-
tain system integrity between CDDT and countdown.

2. The oxygen and hydrogen tanks were at a pressure of 80 psia


with oxygen and hydrogen gases. The tanks had been evacuated (less than
5mm Hg for 2 hours minimum) and serviced during CDDT, with reactant gas
left in the system after detanking to maintain system integrity between
CDDT and countdown.

3. The ground support equipment (GSE) lines were connected to the


spacecraft and had been previously evacuated, pulse purged, and then
pressurized with reactant gas to 80 psia. Purity samples taken of the
gases from the GSE were within specification. The pressure-operated
disconnects (POD's) that connect the GSE to the spacecraft had been leak
checked at 80 psia with reactant gas and indicated no leakage.

4. The portable oxygen dewar used to service the spacecraft oxygen


tanks was serviced on April 7, 1970. Liquid samples taken from the vent
line of the dewar during servicing were within specification. All of the
preceding activities were accomplished without undue delay or difficulty.

The first activity for the fuel cell and cryogenic system in the
countdown started at approximately 3:00 p.m.e.s.t, on April 8, 1970.
The move of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen dewars from the cryo-
genic buildings to the pad had been completed. The primary oxygen_
backup oxygen, and backup hydrogen dewars were located on the pad at the
base of the mobile service structure (MSS) while the primary hydrogen
dewar was moved to level 4A of the MSS. The hydrogen and oxygen GSE
configuration is shown in figures B4-3 and B4-4, respectively.

B-13
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B-16
Pictures of the servicing dewars, valve boxes, and pressurizing equipment
are shown in figures B4-5 through B4-10.

Dewpoint samples of the oxygen and hydrogen spacecraft tanks were


obtained. This was accomplished by pressurizing the tanks with reactant
gas to 80 psia through the vent line and then venting the tank back
through the vent line and obtaining a moisture sample at the vent line
sample valve. Both the oxygen and hydrogen tanks met the requirements
that the moisture content be less than 25 parts per million (ppm).
Oxygen tanks no. i and no. 2 read less than 2 ppm.

After the dev_oint samples of the tanks were obtained, sample bot-
tles were installed on the tank vent lines. The sample bottles were
flow purged with reactant gases at 80 psia for 5 minutes, followed by
i0 pulse purges ranging in pressure from 80 psia to 20 psia.

The hydrogen dewar was then connected to the servicing GSE. The
fill line between the dewar and the spacecraft was flow purged with
55 psia of helium gas for 15 minutes, and a moisture sample taken from
the fill line. A sample result of 2 ppm was obtained. An additional
flow purge using gaseous hydrogen at 55 psia was then performed for
i0 minutes, followed by 13 pulse purges ranging in pressure from 55 psia
to 20 psia (Note: This cleans the dead-end areas at the manifold).

The fuel cells were then pressurized to their operating pressure


(62 psia oxygen and hydrogen). Heat was applied electrically to the
fuel cells from external GSE to melt the potassium hydroxide. Fuel
cell 3 heater current, supplied from GSE for heatup, was slightly low
(1.2 amps vs. 1.4 amps). This heater current was adjusted after the
heatup and calibration of the fuel cells was completed.

With the fuel cells at operating temperature (420 ° F) and pressures,


a calibration test on each fuel cell was performed. Fuel cells were
calibrated by applying loads in approximately lO-amp increments until a
maximum current of 60 amps was reached while monitoring the output volt-
age. The fuel cell loads were supplied by GSE load banks. After cali-
bration_ the fuel cells were connected to the spacecraft busses and
40-amp GSE load applied to each cell for fuel cell water conditioning
(approximately 4 hours). After these loads were removed from each fuel
cell, 6-amp in-line heater loads with a 50-percent duty cycle were ap-
plied. With the fuel cells in this configuration a visual engineering
inspection of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen loading systems was
performed with the exception of the liquid oxygen dewar_ not yet con-
nected.

Immediately prior to flowing liquid hydrogen, the spacecraft hy-


drogen and oxygen tank fans and quantity probe circuit breakers were

B-17
Figure B4-5.- Liqnid hydrogen dewar.

B-18
Figure B4-6.- Liquid oxygen dewar.

B-19
Figure B4-7.- Hydrogen valve box at Launch Complex 39.

B-20
!

Figure B4-8.- Oxygen valve box at Launch Complex 39.

B-21
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B-22
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B-23
closed. (See Appendix A, Part A5, for description of the oxygen and
hydrogen tanks.) The hydrogen dewar was pressurized to approximately
30 psia prior to servicing. Hydrogen was flowed through both tanks for
i0 minutes (normal) prior to obtaining an increase in tank quantity.
This period is required to chill the system. The flow rate during
servicing was approximately 2.1 pounds per minute for 22 minutes (both
tanks). The flow was stopped for 30 minutes when the tank quantity
reached 85-percent and the dewar and spacecraft tanks vented to ambient
pressure. The fans were turned off during this period. This time
period is required to chill the hydrogen tank. The dewar was again
pressurized to approximately 30 psia, and flow (at normal rates) began
through the fill manifold detank line for 2 minutes to chill the GSE
prior to then opening the spacecraft fill POD's. Whenthe quantity gage
stabilized (about 98-percent) the dewar pressure was increased to approx-
imately 35 psia and the vent POD's closed, followed closely by the
closure of the fill POD's. The GSEvent valve was closed simultaneously
with the closing of the spacecraft vent POD's. This operation traps
cold gas between the spacecraft vent POD's and the GSEvent valve. As
the cold gas warmsand expands, it is vented into the two sample con-
tainers connected to the vent line sample valve. The samples were
analyzed for helium, nitrogen, and total hydrocarbons. Both samples
were within specifications.

The hydrogen dewar was removed and the prime oxygen dewar was
brought up to level 4A of the MSS. The oxygen dewar was connected to
the servicing GSE. The fill line between the dewar and the spacecraft
was flow purged with 55 psia of oxygen gas for 15 minutes, and a mois-
ture sample taken from the fill line. A sample result of less than 2 ppm
was obtained. After sampling, 13 pulse purges from a pressure of 55 psia
to a slight positive pressure to maintain flow were performed. The
spacecraft oxygen tank fans were turned on prior to oxygen flow. The
oxygen dewar was pressurized to approximately 45 psia. Oxygenwas flowed
through both tanks for approximately 2 minutes (normal) before an indica-
tion was noted on the quantity probe. The flow rate during servicing was
25 pounds per minute for approximately 25 minutes (both tanks). After
the tank quantity reached i00 percent, flow was continued for an ad-
ditional i0 minutes, to further chill the tanks. The spacecraft vent
POD's and the GSEvent were then closed, followed immediately by the
closure of the fill POD's. The spacecraft tank fans were turned off at
this time. The cold gas trapped in the vent line was sampled. The
oxygen is sampled for helium, nitrogen, and total hydrocarbons. Both
samples were within specification. The service module supply valve was
opened to allow the CMsurge tank to pressurize for flight.

While pressurizing the surge tank, fuel cell i was connected


to dc bus A to minimize the usage of liquid hydrogen. A constant

B-24
flow from the liquid hydrogen tanks equal to the heat gained by the tank
results in minimumliquid hydrogen usage. The load on the fuel cell was
approximately 20 amps. This configuration was maintained until 4 hours
before launch, at which time fuel cells 2 and 3 were connected to the
busses. Fuel cells i and 2 were connected to bus A with fuel cell 3
supplying power to bus B. The fuel cells supplied power to the space-
craft from this time through launch.

Ground electrical power was supplied to the tank heaters to bring


the tanks to flight pressure. The liquid oxygen system pressurization
to approximately 935 psia and the liquid hydrogen system to approximately
235 psia was completed by 6:40 p.m. on April 9, 1970. The fuel cells
were supplied by onboard reactants from this period through launch. Fan
motor checks were performed, and the GSEand airborne systems closed out
for flight.

The entire CSMcryo loading operation was normal except that liquid
hydrogen tank no. i was loaded to 98.7 percent instead of the desired
minimum99 percent (reason for this is still under study by both the
MannedSpacecraft Center and the KennedySpace Center) and a slight leak
developed through the liquid oxygen tank no. 2 vent quick disconnect.
The leak was stopped by the installation of the flight cap prior to tank
pressurization. These conditions were determined to be acceptable for
flight.

Spacecraft Closeout and Terminal Count

Following completion of the cryo loading operation the countdown


proceeded normally from T - 32:00:00 through such milestones as: LM crew
provision stowage and final closeout; LM SHe servicing; launch vehicle
battery installation and electrical systems checks; CSMcrew provision
stowage; backup astronaut crew checks; and ALSEPfuel cask installation.
At 7:00 p.m.e.s.t, on April i0, 1970, the countdown clock was held
at T - 9:00:00 for a planned built-in hold of 9 hours and 13 minutes.
Following resumption of the countdown at 4:13 a.m.e.s.t, on April ii,
1970, final launch vehicle cryogenic loading preparations were completed
and launch vehicle cryogenic loading was successfully conducted through
9:30 a.m.e.s.t.
The remainder of the countdown activities, including flightcrew
ingress_ final CSMcabin closeout, and the space vehicle terminal count,
progressed normally with the exception of a minor problem with a broken
key in the CSMpyro guard, and a stuck open no. 2 liquid oxygen vent
valve in the S-IC stage. Both problems were satisfactorily resolved with-
in the planned countdo_¢ntime, v_hich included a final built-in hold of
i hour at T - 3:30:00 minutes.

B-25
LAUNCH
ANDTRANSLUNAR
COASTPHASEPRIORTO THEACCIDENT

Launch and Flight Summary

The space vehicle was launched at 2:13:00 e.s.t., April ii, 1970.
The only unexpected occurrence during the boost phase was an early
shutdown of the S-II inboard engine. Low frequency oscillations
(approximately 16 hertz) occurred on the S-II stage, resulting in a
132-second premature center engine cutoff. Preliminary analysis indi-
cates that an engine pressure sensor detected a varying engine thrust
chamber pressure resulting from a large pressure oscillation in the
liquid oxygen system and turned the engine off. The four remaining
engines burned approximately 34 seconds longer than normal, and the
S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approximately 9 seconds longer to
achieve the required velocity. The cause of the liquid oxygen system
oscillation is presently being studied by the Marshall Space Flight
Center. A parking orbit with an apogeeof 100.2 nautical miles and a
perigee of 98.0 nautical miles was obtained.

After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems


were verified and preparations were madefor translunar injection. The
second S-IVB burn was initiated on schedule for translunar injection.
All major systems operated satisfactorily and conditions were
nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory. With the spacecraft
in a free-return trajectory, and with no further major propulsion
burns, the spacecraft would pass around the Moonand reenter the
Earth's atmosphere.

The commandservice module (CSM)separated from the service module


LM adapter (SLA) at 3:06:39. The spacecraft was maneuveredand docked
with the lunar module (LM) at 3:19:09 and the LM separated from the
SLA at 04:01:00. The S-IVB was then maneuveredusing residual pro-
pellants to impact the lunar surface. The first midcourse correction
(23.1 fps), performed at 30:40:50 using the service propulsion system,
inserted the spacecraft into a non-free-return trajectory with a peri-
cynthian altitude close to the planned value of about 60 miles. Under
these conditions, with no further propulsion engine burns, the spacecraft
would orbit the Earth in a highly elliptical orbit. These trajectories
are discussed in more detail in Part B6 of this Appendix.

The mission was routine and generally proceeded according to the


timeline. Because the crew was ahead of schedule and midcourse cor-
rection number 3 was cancelled, an early entry into the lunar module
was madeat 55:00:00. A scheduled television broadcast to the Earth
was madebetween 55:15 and 55:46, and at the time of the accident,

B-26
both the Commanderand Command Module Pilot were in the commandmodule
while the Lunar Module Pilot was just entering the commandmodule from
the lunar module.

Spacecraft Systems Operation

This section of the report will deal only with problems and events
in the various systems encountered with the CSMduring the powered
phase, parking orbit, and translunar coast phase of the mission up to
the time of the accident. The systems will be treated separately
except that electrical current and voltage fluctuations associated with
the operation of the fans to stir the supercritical oxygen and hydrogen
will be covered under the cryogenic section.

CSM structural-mechanical.- Structural loads during boost phases


of the flight were within acceptable limits. Command module structural
oscillations of less than 0.1g at 16 hertz in all directions were
measured during the period of S-II longitudinal oscillations (POG0)
prior to the center engine cutoff. The levels of these oscillations
were comparable to those measured during ground test and on previous
Apollo missions.

At approximately 00:25:00 minutes, a computer program was entered


into the computer to align the inertial measuring unit. During this
alignment, the sextant is rotated, which in turn releases the external
ablative optics covers. The optics covers are spring loaded, and held
in place by clips. When the sextant is rotated, an arm located on the
sextant engages a cam that releases the clips and jettisons both covers.
Minor difficulty was experienced in jettisoning the two covers. The
optics were rotated twice manually to 90 degrees according to the
checklist, but the covers did not jettison. The optics were then
rotated in the automatic mode (past 90 degrees) and the covers Jetti-
soned. The cause of the covers not jettisoning was that the sextant
was not rotated far enough in the manual mode to completely engage the
cam.

After CSM/LM docking, the crew reported that two docking latches
were not fully engaged. Both latches were opened and reset. There
are 12 docking latches on the command module. Each latch has a trigger
that is engaged when the lunar module docking ring comes in contact
with the CSM docking ring. The handle has a red indicator that indi-
cates when the latch is engaged. On several spacecraft during ground
checkout one or two of the latches had to be reset manually, as in the
case of Apollo 13. The prime cause is not having the two docking rings
perfectly parallel at the time of engagement. The manual resetting of
one or two of the latches is considered satisfactory.

B-27
The crew reported a slight "burnt" smell in the tunnel area between
the CSM/LM when entering the tunnel, which is normal.

Electrical power.- The electrical power distribution and sequen-


tial system, except for the fuel cells, operated as expected until the
time of the accident. The electrical parameters associated with the
fan turnon and turnoff times will be discussed in Part B9.

At about 30:45:00 the fuel cell 3 condenser exit temperature


pattern was observed to change to a sinusoidal ripple with a frequency
of i cycle every 30 seconds and a peak-to-peak amplitude of 6.2 ° F.
The oscillations continued for approximately 9 hours and then stopped.
Similar oscillations had been observed on Apollo I0 during lunar orbit,
and subsequent analyses and tests showed that the oscillations were not
detrimental to the performance or life of the fuel cells. These tran-
sients are attributed to slugs of cold water leaving the condenser.

Instrumentation.- Four discrepancies in the instrumentation sys-


tem were noted. At 46:40:06 the Oxygen quantity measurement located
in oxygen tank no. 2 indicated i00 percent. This anomaly will be
discussed in detail in Part B9. The cabin pressure indicated 1/2 psi
above the suit pressure until powerdown of the CSM after the incident.
(Should be approximately the same with the crew out of the suits.)
During the boost phase, when the cabin vented the transducer did not
follow the cabin pressure and operated erratically for the remainder
of the flight. This erratic operation was very similar to the erratic
operation of the identical transducer on Apollo 12. Failure analysis
of the Apollo 12 transducer indicated contamination inside the
transducer.

Early in the mission (22:38 and 37:38) the potable water quantity
transducer acted erratically for a brief period. This instrument has
operated erratically on other spacecraft during ground checkout and
flight due to oxidation of electrical winding on the transducer poten-
tiometer. This oxidation causes intermittent contact between the
wiper arm and the wiring on the potentiometer, thus giving erratic
readings.

At approximately T + 32 hours, the crew reported that the space-


craft panel meters indicating fuel cell hydrogen versus oxygen flow
were not exactly matched for fuel cell 3. All indications on the
ground were normal. Prelaunch ground data once indicated a mismatch
in panel indication on fuel cell 2. Since the instrumentation data
in both cases were correct, the most probable cause was an inter-
mittent fault in the meter circuitry causing the shift.

B-28
Communications.- At 55:05:32 the crew reported that they could not

operate the high-gain antenna (HGA) in narrow beamwidth auto track or


reacquisition modes. A maneuver to the passive thermal control (PTC)
attitude was prescribed and as the maneuver was initiated, the crew
manually positioned the antenna and acquired automatic tracking in
the narrow beamwidth mode. The antenna operated normally until the
accident. When troubleshooting (before lockup) both the primary and
secondary electronics and both the automatic and reacquisition tracking
modes were unsuccessfully attempted. Analysis indicates an effective
misalignment existed between the boresight of the wide and narrow
beams. The beam effective misalignment could have been caused by a
defective radio frequency (RF) stripline coaxial cable, mechanical
failure, or RF feed lines. A boresight shift was not indicated during
antenna acceptance testing or during KSC ground checkout.

Service module propulsion and reaction control.- The service


module propulsion system was used only once during the mission at
30:40:50 to place the spacecraft into a non-free-return trajectory.
The engine burned for 3.6 seconds, and all parameters were nominal.
The thrust chamber pressure seemed about 4 percent below preflight
prediction, but within acceptable limits.

Guidance and control.- Guidance and control system performance was


satisfactory, with the exception of small fluctuations of the optic
shaft when in the zero optics mode and in establishing passive thermal
control (PTC). At approximately 7:30:00 the crew reported difficulty
in establishing PTC. The attempt resulted in a very wide and diverging
coning angle. It was determined that the digital autopilot was in-
correctly loaded and all roll thrusters were not enabled. The checklist
did not call out the correct autopilot load and the thruster enabling
was a late pen-and-ink change to the onboard checklist. Using the
revised procedure, the PTC mode was successfuly established.

At about 40:00 the ground controllers noticed small fluctuations


of the optic shaft when in zero optics mode. As on Apollo 12, the
ground data showed a slight jitter in the optics shaft angle from
0 to 0.6 degree. A special test was conducted at 49 hours to verify
the shaft oscillations. The crew compared the shaft and trunnion

angles to the mechanical counters on the optics. The oscillation was


evident from both sources and occurred in the optics zero mode only.
The optics jitter presented no constraint to the operation of the
optical system; however, at 49:51:37 the ground requested the crew to
turn off optics power to guard against possible degradation of the
system.

B-29
Environmental control.- No anomalies were noted in the environmental
control system operation.

Thermal control.- The thermal control system of the CSM performed


normally until the incident.

Cryogenic system.- Both the liquid hydrogen and the liquid oxygen
systems operated satisfactorily up to the time of the accident as far
as the fuel cells and environmental control systems were concerned.
Because of the unbalance in hydrogen quantities during loading, and
unequal usage during launch pad operation, several hydrogen low-pressure
master alarms were detected on the caution and warning system. (A
description of the caution and warning system is contained in Appendix A,
Part A2.10.) At 46:40:08 the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity measurement
indicated i00 percent quantity and remained at this value until the
pressure rise at 55:53:35. With the exception of the above, system
operations were normal to the time of the accident.

The following sections will describe the low hydrogen pressure


master alarm and supercritical liquid hydrogen and oxygen destratifica-
tion up to the time of the accident.

Hydrogen Low Pressure Master Alarm

The caution and warning system, upon receipt of a malfunction or


out-of-tolerance signal, simultaneously identifies the abnormal condi-
tion and alerts the crew to its existence. Each signal (both oxygen
and hydrogen pressure are on one indicator) will activate the system
status indicator, light the master alarm light, and place an audio tone
in the crew's headsets. The crew can turn off or reset the master
alarm; however, the particular system status malfunction indicators
remain lit, blocking further master alarms on this indication, until
the malfunction is cleared.

At lift-off, the quantity readings for the hydrogen tanks no. i


and no. 2 were 91 percent and 93.4 percent, respectively. This was due
to initial loading values (98.7 percent for tank no. i and 99.4 percent
for tank no. 2) and the difference in usage during countdown.

At approximately 32:00 g.e.t., a quantity unbalance of 2.38 percent


existed between the hydrogen tanks, and a quantity balancing procedure
was conducted to prevent tank no. i low-pressure master alarms during
the sleep period. In the "auto" mode the tank heaters are turned on and
off by pressure switches connected in series. When the pressure in
either tank reaches about 260 psi, the heaters in both tanks are switched
off. The heaters remain off until the opened pressure switch closes at

B-30
approximately 225 psi. Since one tank pressure switch normally remains
closed, the tank that controls the upper pressure will also control at
the lower pressure. During the flight, tank no. 2 was controlling.
Tank no. i pressure was almost reaching the caution and warning low
pressure point (224.2 psia) prior to tank no. 2 reaching its pressure
switch activation point of 233.6 psia to turn on the heaters.

Since tank no. 2 had the greater quantity, at 32:00 the tank no. i
heaters were manually turned off by the crew while tank no. 2 re_[ned
in auto. This condition would allow the fuel cells to obtain hydrogen
from tank no. 2 because of its higher pressure and in turn reduce its
quantity of hydrogen. Several master alarms occurred immediately after
this change (33:10, _3:41, 34:01, and _4:32).

At 36:48 the hydrogen tank no. i heater was placed back to auto
for the sleep period. On the first "down" pressure cycle a master
a_arm occurred (38:00) due to hydrogen tank no. i pressure dropping
lower than 224.24 psia, awaking the crew. The crew reset the alarm,
and no master alarms occurred through the sleep period although the
heaters cycled several times. To obtain a balanced condition for the
next sleep period, the ground controllers devised the following plan
for the next day's operation:

i. After crew wakeup, turn hydrogen tank no. 2 heater to off and
leave hydrogen tank no. i in auto for two to three pressure cycles to
determine if this will transfer heater control to tank no. i in antici-
pation of using this configuration for sleep.

2. If successful, tank no. i heaters will be turned off during the


day and tank no. 2 heaters left in auto to create a quantity unbalance
in favor of tank no. i.

3. During the next sleep period, the tanks will be balanced by


placing tank no. i heaters in auto and tank no. 2 heaters to off.

This plan was executed when the crew awoke the next day. At the
time of the accident, tank no. i was in off and tank no. 2 was in auto,
and the caution and warning master alarm was reset with a low hydrogen
pressure indication present at 55:52:30. This hydrogen low pressure
indication locked out the master alarm during the time of the increasing
pressure in oxygen tank no. 2.

Cryogenic Tank Destratification

To prevent stratification in the oxygen and hydrogen tanks, two


fans are located in each tank. A diagram of the oxygen tank showing

B-31
the two fans and quantity gaging probe is shown l.n figure B4-11. The
flight plan called for the fans to be operated in both the hydrogen and
oxygen tanks at the following times: 3:40, 12:09, 23:12, 29:40, 37:30,
and 46:39 g.e.t. The ground controllers requested the oxygen tank no. 2
fans to be operated at 47:54 and both the oxygen and hydrogen fans be
operated at 51:07.

Review of cryogenic and electrical instrumentation data does not


indicate that the fans were switched on at 3:40 and at 29:40. No
changes in cryogenic pressures and quantities, and no indications of an
increase in spacecraft current were noted. The operation of the fans
during the other destratification periods were normal; however, three
oxygen tank no. 2 differences were noted: (i) transients on pitch and
yaw thrust vector control gimbal command parameters at fan turnon and
turnoff, (2) quantity gaging probe malfunctioned just after or at the
time the fans came on, and (3) ac main bus 2 indicated a 1.8-volt nega-
tive transient when the fans were turned on at 47:54.

The pitch and yaw thrust vector control gimbal command (TVC command)
parameters are an excellent transient detector on ac main bus 2 when
the stabilization and control system is turned off because of its sensi-
tivity and high sampling rate (i00 samples per second). The sensitivity
of the system is determined by the position of the rate high/low switch
and the attitude deadband maximum/minimum switch. The TVC command sig-
nals are not transmitted to the ground when the instrumentation system
is in low bit rate mode.

The system was in the low sensitivity mode during two destratifi-
cation periods. When oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on during tank
destratification periods, a negative initial transient was detected and
when the fans were turned off, a positive initial transient was detected
on the TVC command parameters. These transients are readily detectable
in the high sensitivity mode and barely detectable in the low sensitiv-
ity mode. Examination of the Apollo ii records indicates that the system
was in the high sensitivity mode once during the fan destratification
periods and a similar transient occurred when the Fans were turned on.
The data indicate that the transients are normal for fan turnon and
turnoff, and only indicate a relatively large current change on ac main
bus 2.

At 47:40:08 the oxygen quantity changed from approximately 82 per-


cent to i00 percent, or full-scale high. This change in reading or
quantity system malfunction occurred just after or at the time the
oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on. Because of the way the system
recovered at the time of the accident, the data indicate that the probe
or its associated wiring shorted. Since the instrumentation system was
in low bit rate, it is possible to determine exactly when the oxygen

B-32
BLOWOUT

PL UG_I___AC U UM TUBE

FEEDLINE

TEMPERATURE
SENSOR

FEEDLINE

INSULATION

QUANTITY
GAGE_

VACUUM TUBE

Figure B4-11.- Arrangement of components within oxygen tank.


tank no. i and no. 2 fans were turned on. The electrical data indicate
that the oxygen tank no. i and no. 2 fans were turned on between the
times of 47:40:05 and 47:40:08. A plot of cryogenic pressures, quanti-
ties, total CSM current, and ac main bus 2 is shown in figure B4-12.
Therefore, the oxygen tank no. i and no. 2 fans were turned on in a period
of time between 3 seconds prior to the probe malfunction and the time
that the probe malfunctioned.

When the oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on the next time at
47:54:50, the ac main bus 2 decreased 1.8 volts for one sample (O.i sec-
ond). At the same time the TVC command parameters indicated a negative
initial transient. Because of the sampling rate (i0 samples per second)
of the instrumentation system and the small number of fan cycles examined
in the high bit rate mode, it cannot be determined if this negative ini-
tial transient is characteristic of other fan turnon's or is an indica-
tion of a deteriorating fan or wiring.

The complete oxygen and hydrogen tank destratifJcation history


prior to the accident is shown in table B4-1. Changes in oxygen and
hydrogen pressures and quantities indicate normal destratification of
the tanks during all fan cycles. The next destratification period
occurred at 55:53:18, or when the events started leading to the accident.

References i through 6 and instrumentation records were used as a


source of information and data in the preparation of this part of the
report.

B-34
900
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I

f--7
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46:40:00 46:40:10 46:40:20
46:40:25
g. e.t.

Figure B4-12.- Fan cycle at 46:40.

B-35
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B-36
PART B5

INCIDENT EVENTS

INTRODUCTION

This part of the report covers the significant events which took
place at the time of the accident. The period covered is 55:52:00 g.e.t.
to 56:00:05 g.e.t. Prior to this period, spacecraft operation had been
essentially according to plan and neither the ground controllers nor the
crew had any warning of the events about to occur. The first indication
of a problem was a loud bang heard by all three crew members which was
followed by a master caution and warning. The immediate indications in
the spacecraft were that this warning had been triggered by an electrical
transient. Several minutes later two fuel cells failed in the power
system, and the crew became fully occupied trying to reconfig_ure the
spacecraft electrical system. Fourteen minutes later they noticed vent-
ing and began to understand what had actually happened in the cryogenic
oxygen system.

On the ground, the flight controllers first noticed that the space-
craft computer had been automatically restarted. Shortly afte_¢ards,
indication of a master caution and warning caused the flight controllers
to scan their data for a problem. Since many telemetry measurements had
by this time departed from their nominal values, the ground controllers'
immediate reaction was to suspect an instrumentation failure. Steps were
undertaken to sort the false telemetry readings from the true ones; and,
simultaneously, instructions were given to help the crew handle new prob-
lems. About an hour later the ground personnel had sorted out the facts
sufficiently to know that it would only be a short time before the cryo-
genic oxygen system would fail completely.

Reconstruction of the mission events in the detail presented in the


following pages has required several hundred man-days of data analysis.
Consequently, the crew and mission controllers could not possibly have
understood the situation in the same depth at the time the events were
actually happening. The primary sources of data for the analysis have
been telemetry records, transcripts of voice communications, crew de-
briefings, and interviews with personnel on duty in Mission Control.

Table B5-1 is a detailed chronology of the events during this time


period_ and figure B5-1 shows the sequence of events grouped according to
spacecraft systems. For events obtained from telemetry data, where time
is shown to a fraction of a second_ this refers to the time at which the
parameter in question was actually sampled by the telemetry system. As
discussed in Part B7 of this Appendix, the characteristics of the

B-37
telemetry system place an uncertainty on the time of an event. The un-
certainty is a function of the telemetry system sampling rate.
The remainder of this section is a discussion of the events at the
time of the accident, grouped according to the spacecraft systems involved.

B-38
TABLEB5-1.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGYFROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT

Time, g.e.t. Event

Events During 52 Seconds Prior to First Observed Abnormality

55:52:31 Master caution and warning triggered by low hydrogen


pressure in tank no. i. Alarm is turned off after
4 seconds.

55:52:58 Ground requests tank stir.

55:53:06 Crew acknowledges tank stir.

55:53:18 Oxygen tank no. 1 fans on.

55:53:19 Oxygen tank no. I pressure decreases 8 psi.

55:53:20 Oxygen tank no. 2 fans turned on.

55:53:20 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance


indicates a power transient.

55:53:21 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure decreases _ psi.

Abnormal Events During 90 Seconds Preceding the Accident

55:53:22.718 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance


indicates a power transient.

55:53:22.757 1.2-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage.

55:53:22.772 ll.l-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one


sample.

55:53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins rise lasting


for 24 seconds.

55:53:38.057 ll-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage for one


sample.

55:53:38.085 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance


indicates a power transient.

B-39
TABLE B5-1.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Continued

Time, g.e.t. Event

55:53:41.172 22.9-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one sample.

55:53:41.192 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance


indicates a power transient.

55:5h:00 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise ends at a pressure


of 953.8 psia.

55:54:15 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise.

55:54:30 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity drops from full scale


for 2 seconds and then reads 75-3 percent.

55:54:31 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins to rise


rapidly.

55:54:43 Flow rate of oxygen to all three fuel cells begins


to decrease.

55:54:45 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reaches maximum value


of 1008.3 psia.

55:54:48 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature rises 40 ° F for one


sample.

55:54:51 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity jumps to off-scale high


and then begins to drop until the time of telemetry
loss.

55:54:52 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads -151.3 ° F.

55:54:52.70_ Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature suddenly goes off-


scale low.

55:54:52.763 Last telemetered pressure from oxygen tank no. 2


before telemetry loss is 995.7 psia.

55:54:53.182 Sudden accelerometer activity on X, Y, and Z axes.

55:54:53.220 Stabilization control system body rate changes


begin.

B-40
TABLEB5-1.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGY
FROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT
- Continued

Time, g.e.t. Event

55:54:53.323 Oxygen tank no. i pressure drops 4.2 psi.

55:54:53.5 2.8-amp rise in tota_ fuel cell current.

55:54:53.542 X, Y, and Z accelerations in CM indicate 1.17g,


0.65g and 0.65g, respectively.

1.8-Second Data Loss

55:54:53.555 Loss of telemetry begins.

55:54:53.555 + Master caution and warning triggered by dc main


bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 6
seconds. All indications are that the cryogenic
oxygen tank no. 2 lost pressure in this time period
and the panel separated.

55:54:54.741 Nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i is off-scale low


indicating failed sensor.

55:54:55.35 Recovery of telemetry data.

Events During 5 Minutes Following the Accident

55:54:56 Service propulsion system engine valve body tem-


perature begins a rise of 1.65 ° F in 7 seconds.

55:54:56 Dc main bus A decreases 0.9 volt to 28.5 volts


and dc main bus B decreases 0.9 volt to 29.0 volts.

55 :54 :56 Total fuel cell current is 15 amps higher than the
final value before telemetry loss. High current
continues for 19 seconds.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads off-scale high


after telemetry recovery.

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads off-scale low


following telemetry recovery.

B-41
TABLEB5-1.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGY
FROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT
- Continued

Time, g.e.t. Event

55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. i pressure reads 781.9 psia and


begins to drop steadily.

55:54:57 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity reads off-scale high


following telemetry recovery.

55:5h:59 The reaction control system helium tank C temperature


begins a 1.66 ° F increase in 36 seconds.

55:55:01 Oxygen flow rates to fuel cells I and 3 level off


after steadily decreasing.

55:55:02 The surface temperature of the service module


oxidizer tank in bay 3 begins a 3.8 ° F increase
in a 15-second period.

55:55:02 The service propulsion system helium tank temperature


begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a 32-second period.

55:55:09 Dc main bus A voltage recovers to 29.0 volts; dc


main bus B recovers to 28.8 volts.

55:55:20 Crew reports, "I believe we've had a problem


here. "

55:55:35 Crew reports, "We've had a main B bus undervolt."

55:55:h9 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins steady drop


lasting 59 seconds.

55:56:10 Crew reports, "Okay right now, IIouston. The


voltage is looking good, and we had a pretty large
bang associated with the caution and warning there.
And as I recall, main B was the one that had had
an amp spike on it once before."

55:56:38 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity becomes erratic for


69 seconds before assuming an off-scale-low state.

B-42
TABLE B5-1.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Concluded

Time_ _.e.t. Event

55:57:04 Crew reports, "That jolt must have rocked the


sensor on--see now--oxygen quantity 2. It was
oscillating down around 20 to 60 percent. Now
it's full-scale high again."

55:57:39 Master caution and warning triggered by dc main


bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in
6 seconds.

55:57:40 Dc main bus B drops below 26.25 volts and continues


to fall rapidly.

55:57:44 Ac bus 2 fails within 2 seconds.

55:57:45 Fuel cell 3 fails.

55:57:59 Fuel cell i current begins to decrease.

55:58:02 Master caution and warning caused by ac bus 2


being reset. Alarm is turned off after 2 seconds.

55:58:06 Master caution and warning triggered by dc main


bus A undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 13
seconds.

55:58:07 Dc main bus A drops below 26.25 volts and in the


next few seconds levels off at 25.5 volts.

55:58:07 Crew reports, "ac 2 is showing zip."

55:58:25 Crew reports, "Yes, we got a main bus A undervolt


now, too, showing. It's reading about 25-1/2.
Main B is reading zip right now."

56:00:06 Master caution and warning triggered by high hydrogen


flow rate to fuel cell 2. Alarm is turned off in
2 seconds.

B-43
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B-44
STATUSOF THESPACECRAFT
PRIORTOTHEACCIDENT

At 55:52:00, Just prior to the accident, the electrical system was


configured as shownin figure B5-2. Fuel cells i and 2 were supplying
main bus A; fuel cell 3 was supplying main bus B. The power for the
fans in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 was being supplied by ac bus 2, as
was power for the quantity sensor in that tank. The stabilization control
system thruster vector control system was receiving its power from ac
bus 2. Two quantities in this system, the pitch and yaw thrust vector
control gimbal commands,though not intended for measurementof electri-
cal system currents and voltages, are sensitive indicators of electrical
transients on ac bus 2. These quantities are telemetered to the ground
with a sampling rate of i00 samples per second. At 55:52:00 the telemetry
system was operating in the high-bit-rate modeand the narrow beam antenna
was in use.

The cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage had failed to a 100-
percent reading in the 46th hour of the flight. (See Part B4, the sub-
section entitled "Spacecraft Systems Operation.") All other cryogenic
oxygen instrumentation was operating normally.
The cryogenic hydrogen tank i pressure decreased sufficiently to
trigger the master caution and warning at 55:52:31. (For a description
of the master caution and warning system, see Part 2.10 of Appendix A.)
The ground then requested a fan cycle, and the crew acknowledgedthe
request. A fan cycle consists of the crew turning on the stirring fans
located in both the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tanks and allowing
them to run for approximately I minute. Normally, the hydrogen fans
are turned on first, followed by the fans in oxygen tank no. i and a
few seconds later by the fans in oxygen tank no. 2.

FANTURNON
ANDASSOCIATED
ELECTRICAL
ANOMALIES

At 55:53:18 when the two fans in cryogenic oxygen tank no. i


were turned on by the crew, a drop in ac bus i voltage (fig. B5-3)
and an increase of i amperein total commandmodule current indicated
that the fans had been electrically energized. (Total commandmodule
current, plotted in figure B5-4, is obtained by adding the current
outputs of all three fuel cells and subtracting the current drain of
the lunar module. ) A subsequent decrease in tank pressure and oscillations
in the fuel cell flowmeters indicated that the fans had begun to stir
the oxygen (fig. B5-3).
At 55:53:20 the crew turned on the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 fans.
An increase in fuel cell current of 1-1/2 amperes, a drop in ac bus 2

B-45
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B-47
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B-49
voltage of 0.6 volt, and a glitch in the stabilization control system
telemetry indicated that the fans had been electrically energized.
These events are shown in figures B5-4 and B5-5. However, it is not
certain that the fans began rotating at this time, since the tank no. 2
pressure showed a minimum observable drop and the fan motor stall current
does not significantly differ from the running current. The quantity
gage in tank no. 2 was already in a failed condition, and the fuel cell
flowmeters were already being affected by the fan operation in tank no. i
so that neither of these instruments could positively veri_y rotation
of the fans in tank no. 2. During the next 20 seconds a series of
electrical anomalies occurred which cannot be explained as a result of
known loads in the spacecraft. These anomalies are shown in figure B5-4.
The first, at 55:53:23 was an ll-amp positive spike in the output current
of fuel cell 3. Several events were associated with this spike:

(a) The command module current decreased approximately 1/2 ampere


immediately afterward.

(b) The ac bus 2 voltage had a transient decrease and then began
to alternate between 115.7 and 116.3 volts, whereas it had been main-
taining a steady value of 115.7 volts since fan turnon.

These events indicate that at the time of the ll-amp spike, a load
may have been disconnected from ac bus 2. This could have been one of
the fan motors in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2.

At 55:53:38 another abnormal electrical disturbance occurred, a


3-amp spike of current and variations in ac bus 2 voltage. The ac bus 2
voltage first increased 2 volts and then dropped suddenly from 116 to 105
volts. The ac bus 2 is a three-phase electrical system, although the
only voltage telemetered is phase A. The operation of the inverter
which generates ac bus 2 is such that it attempts to maintain a constant
average voltage among the three phases ; if one phase becomes heavily
loaded, the inverter will increase the voltages of the other two phases.
Consequently, it is possible that the voltage rise in ac bus 2 at
55:53:37.8 was caused by a heavy load applied to phase B or phase C.
The decrease in voltage immediately afterward was probably caused by
loading of phase A.

At 55:53:41 a 23-amp spike occurred on fuel cell 3 output current,


after which the total command module current returned to a steady value
within 0.3 ampere of the value prior to turnon of cryogenic oxygen
tank no. 2 fans. Also, the voltage of ac bus 2 returned to the value it
had shown prior to fan turnon. At the same time transients appeared in
the stabilization control system, as shown in figure B5-5.

The most probable cause of the electrical disturbances between


55:53:22 and 55:53:42 is that a short circuit occurred in the electrical

B-50
system of the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 fans. The short circuit was
sufficiently severe to result in loss of part of the fan load at
55:53:22 and the remainder at 55:53:41. Reduction of the load could
have been caused by fuses blowing or by wires opening.
It should be noted that the nature of the telemetry records makes
it difficult to define the exact parameters of the electrical disturbances.
Since the value of fuel cell 3 current is sampled by the telemetry system
at i0 times per second, the duration of the observed current spikes is
in question by 0.2 second. Also, the peak values of the spikes may well
have exceeded the maximumrecorded values. For similar reasons a large
current spike could possibly have occurred at 55:53:38 simultaneous
with the ll-volt decrease of ac bus 2. If the spike were very short,
less than 0.i second duration, it could have occurred between the times
of successive telemetry samples and thus not have been recorded.
The electrical anomalies ended by 55:53:42 and no further electrical
disturbances were observed for the next minute.

OXYGEN TANKPARAMETERS
FROM55:53:30 UNTIL LOSSOF TELEMETRY

Thirteen seconds after the ll-amp spike and 6 seconds before the
23-amp spike, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 began a
steady increase at an abnormally rapid rate. The increase began at
55: 53:35 and lasted 19 seconds before the pressure reached a plateau of
954 psia for 21 seconds. At 55:54:15 the pressure rise resumed, reaching
a maximumvalue of 1008 psia 9 seconds before loss of telemetry. During
this rise the master caution and warning trip level of 975 psia was
exceeded, but a master alarm was not generated because of the existing
cryogenic pressure warning occasioned by low hydrogen pressure. After
reaching 1008 psia, the pressure decreased to 996 psia Just before loss
of telemetry. The oxygen flow rate for all three fuel cells declined
for about I0 seconds and then began to rise just before loss of telemetry.

The pressure transducer for cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 is not


located in the tank but is connected to the tank along with a pressure
relief valve through 19 feet of tubing. The relief valve is set to open
fully at 1008 psia. (See figure B7-4 for a diagram of this portion of
the cryogenic oxygen system and Part B7 of this Appendix for a more
complete description of the cryogenic oxygen pressure sensing system).
The remote location of the oxygen pressure transducer causes sometime
lag in the telemetered pressure data but unless there are unknown
restrictions, such as clogging of the filter at the tank end of the line,
this lag will not cause serious errors in the pressure reading under the
conditions observed.

B-51
This page left blank intentionally.

B-52
1.0--

10
0.5-

= 5
2 Pitch rate
E
o

o __ ._ _ _ ,

E = -0.5 Pilchgimbalcommand
t--
-5-
-I.0
I--
-10 -
1.0--

10-
0.5

_- 5-

Yaw rate
E o
8
._ 0-
E
_, <=-o.5 - Yaw gimbal command

_ 5-
-1.0
>
I---
1.0-
-I0

20.5-
Roll rate

_: -o,5 -

-1.0 -

• I I I I
55:53:15 55:53:17 55:53:19 55:53:21 55:53:23
The quantity gage for oxygen tank no. 2, which had been in a failed
state ever since the 46th hour, suddenly dropped to 6.6 percent and
then to off-scale low at 55:54:30. These readings do not correlate
with other telemetered data and are, consequently, thought to be
erroneous. The gage then jumped to a 75-percent reading, which may be
reliable data since it is about the value to be expected. Afterwards
the quantity decreased gradually for 19 seconds until 3 seconds before
telemetry loss, at which time an erratic gage output occurred. The
behavior of this type of gage when a short across the capacitor probe
is removed is to drop to zero for several seconds and then return to
a correct reading. However, the gage has other failure modes which
result in a wandering false indication. See Part B7 of this Appendix
for a discussion of the quantity gage. Because of the gage's erratic
behavior, it cannot be stated with complete confidence that the
75-percent reading obtained at 55:54:32 is reliable.

The temperature in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 remained at -190o F


+2 ° until 55:54:31 when a steady rise in temperature commenced. At
55:54:48 a single data sample indicated a reading 40 degrees higher than
the adjacent readings. The last data sample before loss of telemetry
was off-scale low, probably indicating a short circuit in the gage or
wiring. As discussed in Part B7 of this Appendix, the time constant of
the temperature sensor is in the order of at least tens of seconds, which
means that the 40-degree Jump in reading at 55:54:48 and the final off-
scale reading were both due to sensor failure or telemetry system errors.
Also, because of the slow gage response, the indicated rate at which
the temperature rose between 55:54:31 and 55:54:52 could have been caused
by an actual temperature rise of greater magnitude.

The temperature and quantity of cryogenic oxygen tank no. i remained


steady until telemetry loss. The pressure remained nominal until
0.2 second prior to telemetry loss, when a slight drop was observed.

LOSS OF TELEMETRY

At the time of the accident the spacecraft telemetry signal was


being received on both a 210-ft-diameter and an 85-ft-diameter antenna
at the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility in Goldstone, California.
The carrier level on the Goldstone 85-ft antenna was -i00 dBm. At
55:54:53 the signal strength dropped abruptly below -160 dBm, the lower
limit of the signal strength recorder, and began an erratic increase.
Figure B5-6 is a plot of the carrier strength received at the 85-ft
antenna, corrected by 8 dB to show the carrier strength received at the
210-ft antenna. The 210-ft antenna was not equipped with a signal
strength recorder.

B-54
Pitch rate

.... --_ ....... ._._,,,..,.., __._


Pitch gimbal command

Yaw rate

Yaw gimbal command

Roll rate

Note time
scale change
I I I
_1 I
55:53:37 55:53:39 55:53:41 55:53:43
55:53:25 55:53:35
Time, hr:min:sec
Pitch rate
IT

• #_L
+%-_-

Pitchgimml

Yaw rate

Yaw gimbal command

Roll rate
",M

Note ti me
scale change
__J I I I I I
55:53:45 55:54:45 55:54:47 55:54:49 55:54:51 55:54:53

Figure BS-_.- Disturbances observed on thrust vector


control gimbal command signals.

B-53
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_a!_e:) )lU!lU_Op paA!aaa_t
Telemetry data recovered completely 1.8 seconds after the loss of
carrier power. Sporadic telemetry data are available within the
1.8-second period.

The recorded input signal to the PCM bit detector provides an


indication of the rapidity with which the telemetry signal was lost.
There appears to be some degradation in signal-to-noise ratio in the
time period from 55:54:53.51 to 55:54:53.555. This may have been the
result of attitude changes of the spacecraft causing mispointing of the
high-gain antenna. At 55:54:53:555 an abrupt change in the character of
the signal occurred, and the signal-to-noise ratio rapidly decreased in
a period of i millisecond. The limitations in the available records
make it impossible to definitely determine the speed with which the loss
occurred, but an estimate is I millisecond.

Although figure B5-6 indicates that the signal required 0.3 second
to decrease 60 dB, the actual time was probably much shorter. The
decrease of 60 dB in 0.3 second is the same as that obtained when the
input signal is abruptly removed from the receiver. This slow response
is caused by long time constant circuitry in the automatic gain control.

When the telemetry signal was reacquired, the spacecraft had


switched from the narrow-beam antenna to the wide-beam antenna. This
has been verified by signal-strength calculations and comparisons of
antenna patterns with spacecraft attitude. The spacecraft is designed
to automatically switch to the wide-beam antenna if the pointing error
of the narrow-beam antenna exceeds 3 degrees.

If a power supply interruption larger than 0.4 second occurs in


the communication system, the system design is such that the power output
will automatically drop 19 dB for a 90-second period. This power
reduction cannot be observed in the received signal strength after
recovery of telemetry.

SPACECRAFT EVENTS AT THE TIME OF TELEMETRY LOSS

A large number of spacecraft events took place approximately at


the time of telemetry loss. These events are discussed in detail in
the following sections as they relate to the various spacecraft systems.
This section describes the events as an aid in understanding their
interrelationship.

Within the last second prior to telemetry loss, several indications


of spacecraft motion appeared on the telemetry records of body accelerom-
eters, and roll, pitch, and yaw rate. The total fuel cell current in-
creased by 3 amperes at the last data sample.

B-56
When telemetry data were restored at 55:54:55.35, a large number
of channels associated with the electrical system, stabilization control
system, and cryogenic system showed marked changes (fig. B5-3). Both
dc main A and main B had dropped 0.9 volt and the master caution and
warning had been triggered because of an undervoltage on main bus B.
The undervoltage triggering level is 26.25 volts and the initial voltage
on main B registered 28.1 volts. All three fuel cell currents had
increased by 5 amperes over the values before telemetry loss. Both
ac bus voltages had maintained their previous values. All telemetry
readings from cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 showed off-scale readings.
The temperature was off-scale in the high temperature direction, the
quantity gage read i00 percent, and the pressure gage read off-scale
low. The capability of the gage is to read pressures as low as 19 psia.
Cryogenic oxygen tank no. i had not changed temperature or quantity.
However, the pressure had decreased from 879 psia to 782 psia. The
regulated nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i dropped to zero during telem-
try loss and remained at zero. The continued operation of this fuel
cell indicates a sensor malfunction. As shown in figure B5-7, the
wires from the nitrogen pressure sensor to the telemetry system pass
along the front of the shelf which supports the fuel cells, in close
proximity to the panel covering bay 4. It is quite possible that
damage to these wires caused the change observed in the nitrogen pres-
sure reading.

Approximately at the time of telemetry loss all three crew members


heard a single loud bang. One or two seconds later they noted the master
caution and warning caused by main bus B undervoltage and at 55:55:00
turned off the alarm. They also verified that fuel cell currents were
normal at this time. Figure B5-8 is a photograph of the command module
control panel showing the type of displays provided the crew. At
55:55:20 the crew reported, "! believe we've had a problem here," and
at 55:55:35, "We've had a main B bus under_olt." Later they reported
that a computer restart had occurred at the time of the bang, which
had already been noted in Mission Control.

Photographs later taken by the crew show the panel covering bay 4,
the bay containing the cryogenic oxygen tanks, cryogenic hydrogen tanks,
and fuel cells, to be missing. One of these photographs is reproduced
in figure B5-9 and a photograph prior to launch is shown in figure B5-10.
The high-gain antenna located adjacent to bay 4 shows a misalignment
of one of the four dishes. The photographs also show that the axes of
fuel cells I and 3 have shifted 7 degrees in such a way that the tops
of the fuel cells point outward. It is not possible to determine
conclusively from the photographs whether or not cryogenic oxygen tank
no. 2 is present, partially missing, or totally missing. It is probable
that the loud bang heard by the crew was caused by the separation of
the panel from the spacecraft approximately at the time of telemetry
loss.

B-57
Fuel Fuel
cell cell
3 I

Wires
---- _to

npressure
i trogen
'i
sensor

Figure B5-7.- Location of wirlng to nitrogen pressure


sensor in fuel cell I.

S-58
+_

r-_

o
r_)

cO
I
u_

ID
%

B-59
Figure B5-9.- Photograph of service module taken by crew.

B-60
Figure Bg-IO.- Bay 4 of service module.

B-61
CHANGES IN SPACECRAFT DYNAMICS

At 55:54:53.182, less than half a second before telemetry loss,


the body-mounted linear accelerometers in the command module, which
are sampled at i00 times per second, began indicating spacecraft mo-
tions. These disturbances were erratic but reached peak values of
1.17g, 0.65g, and 0.65g in the X, Y, and Z directions, respectively,
about 13 milleseconds before data loss.

At 55:54:53.220 the pitch, roll, and yaw rate gyros indicated


low-amplitude variations in output. These gyros are body mounted in
the command module, have a full-scale range of +I degree per second_
are sampled i00 times per second, and provide a fairly sensitive
indication of spacecraft motions. They are also sensitive to electrical
disturbances not necessarily associated with the gyros; however, the
characteristics of the output at 55:54:53.220 are believed to have
resulted from low-amplitude dynamic forces acting on the spacecraft.
These channels were, of course, lost at 55:54:53.555, along with all
other telemetered data. Figure B5-11 is a record of all three rate
gyro outputs.

When telemetry was recovered at 55:54:55.35, these channels


definitely indicated that moments had been applied to the spacecraft.
The total change in angular moment was:

Roll -1535 ft-lb-sec

Pit ch -6482 ft-lb-sec

Yaw -5919 ft-lb-sec

The roll, pitch, and yaw rates were automatically compensated for by
the attitude control system, as shown in figure B5-11.

The inertial platform on the command module contains three


mutually orthogonal integrating accelerometers, whose outputs are
telemetered with an increment value of 0.2 fps. After telemetry was
recovered, a change of two increments was observed in one axis, one
increment in the second axis, and zero increments in the third axis.

B-62
Pitch rate

Yaw 9imbal command

Rolltale

I
_I 55: 55:25
I 55: 55:
55:55:15

Figure BS-II.- Roll, pitch, and yaw rates.

8-63
Pitch 9imbal command _

Yaw gimbal command

.L
1
55:55:10
----J 55:55:05
55:55:00 Time, hr:min:sec
1.0

I
+p 0ff "---IF 0n

-p 0fl "-'-'F 0n ..---_--


10-
-P 0It "-'-'

1:3

E
o _L _,, ,
0
§
E 13-

+Y Off ._..mp0n
On
-10
+Y 0ff __r-.- On
-Y oft On
.¥ o.--J- tO

....... - - -.- " %

g,
-- Yaw rate

,-, 0
).-

-l.O
>-

S On -10
+R Off j--0n
+R Off--
_ lOI
-_,'v*. ._ Roll rate

-- /

_ i//

q.O \ ..........
-R Off -.-_F 0n
On
-R Off-"-' I
55:54:50
When transformed from platform coordinates to spacecraft coordinates,
this represents a velocity change of 0.4 to 0.6 fps. The uncertainty
in this measurement is due to the fact that the PCM system has an
increment value of 0.2 fps. The velocity change was combined with
the observed roll, pitch, and yaw rates; and a single equivalent im-
pulse acting on the spacecraft calculated. The impulse components
are:

X 500 !b-sec

Y 800 ib-sec

Z -900 ib-sec

This indicates that the force was directed generally normal to the
panel covering bay 4 of the service module. The extremely coarse data
upon which this calculation is based makes it impossible to better
define the force acting upon the spacecraft.

After recovery of data, the integrating accelerometer on the space-


craft stable platform also began to show an abnormal output. Calcula-
tions show that the force producing the acceleration amounted to about
60 pounds in the -X direction (retro thrust) over a period of about 8
minutes. At about the same time Commander Lovell reported seeing ex-
tensive venting of gases from the service module which definitely was
not a normal or expected part of the spacecraft operation at that time.
He later described the venting as continuous, looking like, " ...... a
big sheet with the sun shining on it--very heavy--like fine spray
from a water hose," unlike gases and liquids vented during other planned
spacecraft operations.

The radial velocity of the Apollo spacecraft relative to the Earth


can be accurately determined by measuring the doppler shift of the S-band
signal transmitted to Earth. Spacecraft velocity components normal to
the line between the spacecraft and Earth cannot be determined by this
method. The doppler velocity measurement is routinely made every
i0 seconds and has an equivalent noise level of 0.015 fps.

Between 55:5L:45 and 55:55:05 doppler measurements indicated a


radial velocity increment of 0.26 fps. This is shown in figure B5-12.
Following this abrupt change in velocity at approximately the time of
telemetry loss, additional velocity changes were observed, as shown
in figure B5-13. These velocity increments were caused in part by
venting from the spacecraft and in part by firings of reaction control
system jets.

B-64
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B-65
0

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B-66
The Jet firings caused velocity increments rather than pure rotation
rate changes because the jets did not always fire in opposedpairs. This
resulted from the power system configuration in the spacecraft and closure
of the quad C valves. (See Part B6 of this Appendix. )

TEMPERATURE
CHANGES
OBSERVED
IN SERVICEMODULE

Following the recovery of telemetry data there were a number of


temperature changes observed at various locations in the service module.
The locations of all temperature sensors in the service module are shown
in figure B5-14, and telemetered records from these sensors for the time
period of 55:53:40 to 55:56:10 are shown in figure B5-15. Fromthese
temperature records the following conclusions can be drawn:

i. Both temperature measurementsin bay 3, the bay adjacent to


bay 4, increased after 55:54:55, whereas they had been steady prior to
that time.

2. The corresponding temperature measurementsin bay 5 showed


much smaller increases. Bay 5 is adjacent to bay 4.

3. A changewas observed in the service propulsion valve body


temperature. This sensor, unlike manytemperature sensors in the lower
part of the service module, is not covered by multiple layers of
insulation.

4. Four sensors located in close proximity on the separator


between bay 4 and bay 5 showedrapid temperature rises of small
magnitude immediately after the recovery of telemetry data. These
sensors measure the temperatures of fuel cells i and 3 radiator inlets
and outlets.

5. The temperature of quad C and D reaction control engines


continued the samerate of rise after data loss as before data loss.

FAILUREOF CRYOGENIC
OXYGEN
SYSTEM

The telemetered quantities from cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 were


all off-scale following the recovery of telemetry at 55:54:55. Since
no accurate assessment of the damageto this tank has been possible,
the readings of the sensors within it are in doubt. The temperature
was reading full-scale high and continued this way until 55:55:49,

B-67
This page left blank intentionally.

B-68
Service module temperature ineasurements

Remarks
Measurement Title
Number number

I SC2090 --uel celt 1 radiator inlet


SC2091 --uel cell 2 radiator inlet
2
SC2092 --uel cell 5 radiator inlet
3
4 SC2087 --uel cell 1 radiator outlet
SC2088 Fuel cell 2 radiator outlet
5
6 SC2089 Fuel cell 3 radiator outlet
7a SA2377 Bay 2 oxidizer tank surface Opposite 9
8 SA2378 Bay .3 oxidizer tank surface
SA2379 Bay 5 fuel tank surface
91o
a SA2380 Bay 6 fuel tank surface Opposite 8
11 SPO002 Helium tank
12 SP0045 Service propulsion valve body
13 SP0048 Service propulsion fuel feed line
14 SP0049 Service propulsion oxidizer feed line
15 SPO054 Service propulsion oxidizer line
16 SP0057 Service propulsion fuel line
Service propulsion injector flange 1 , Opposite 18 on flange
17 a SPO061
18 SP0062 Service propulsion injector flange 2
19 a SR5013 Reaction control helium tank quad A Bay 6 opposite 21
Reaction control helium tank quad B Bay 2 opposite 22
20 a SR5014
SR5015 Reaction control helium tank quad C Bay 5
21
SR5016 Reaction control helium tank quad D Bay 5
22
23 a SR5065 Reaction control engine package quad A Bay 6 opposite 25
Reaction control engine package quad B Bay 2 opposite 26
24 a SR5066
Reaction control engine package quad C Bay 3
25 SR5067
SR5068 Reaction control engine package quad D Bay 5
26
27 SC0043 Hydrogen tank 1
28 SC0044 Hydrogen tank 2
SC2084 Fuel cell 1 skin Internal
29
30 SC2085 Fuel cell 2 skin Internal
SC2086 Fuel cell 3, skin Internal
51
32 SC2081 Fuel cell 1 condenser exhaust nternal
5C2082 Fuel cell 2 condenser exhaust Internal
33
34 SC2083 Fuel cell 5 condenser exhaust nternal
55 SF0260 Environmental control primary
radiator inlet
36 SF0262 Environmental control secondary
radiator inlet
57 a SF0263 Environmental control secondary Bay 6 opposite
radiator outlet
38 ST0840 Nuclear particle detector
39 ST0841 Nuclear particle analyzer
40 SC0041 Oxygen tank l-
41 SC0042 Oxygen tank 2

a Located on opposite side of vehicle and not shown in the view.

Figure B5-14.- Temperature sensor location in Apollo service modu

B-69
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B-73
B-74
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B-76
B-77
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B-78
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B-79
when it began a steady decrease which ended at 55:56:48 in an off-scale-
low reading. This behavior is a possible result of a failure of the
sensor. For an explanation of possible failure modesof this sensor,
see Part B7 of this Appendix. The pressure of cryogenic oxygen tank
no. 2, sensed remotely, read off-scale low and continued to showthis
reading. Off-scale low for this sensor represents a pressure of 19 psia
or below.

The quantity gage read full-scale high after telemetry recovery


and continued in this state until 55:56:38 when it began oscillating in
an erratic manner. The oscillation continued until 55:57:47 when the
gage assumedan off-scale-low reading. The quantity gage and its fail-
ure modesare described in Part B7 of this Appendix.

The pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank no. i had dropped from 879
psia to 782 psia during telemetry loss. This pressure continued to drop
at a slow rate for about 2 hours until it was insufficient for operation
of the last remaining fuel cell.

The heaters in both cryogenic oxygen tanks were off prior to te-
lemetry loss as a result of the high pressure in tank no. 2. After
telemetry recovery the total fuel cell current indicated an increase of
about 5 amperes after known loads had been accounted for. The low pres-
sure levels in both oxygen tanks should have caused both heaters to be
on at this time. The total current drain by the heaters in any one tank
is about 5 amperes. It therefore appears that the heaters in one tank
had comeon since telemetry loss and were operating at this time. It is
possible that the heaters in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 were either
physically open-circuited before or at the time of the bang.

Additional evidence that the heaters in only one tank were on can
be obtained by observing that at 56:19:03 the spacecraft dc current
decreased 5 amperes. This is the time at which the crew began to power
down the spacecraft according to the emergencypowerdownchecklist. If
heaters in both oxygen tanks had been on at that time, the current should
have decreased approximately ii amperes instead of the observed 5 amperes.

OPERATION
OF THEELECTRICAL
POWER
SYSTEM

Following the period of telemetry loss, a high-current condition


existed on the fuel cell outputs for 19 seconds. In the sametime
period, the two dc main voltages were approximately 0.9 volt lower than
their previous values. By 55:55:14 the voltages and currents had become
normal. The observed currents during the 19-second period have been

B-80
correlated with reaction control system jet firings and an inertial
measurementunit heater cycle. The excellent correlation indicates that
no unaccountable loads were added to the power system during this time
period.
The crew observed a master caution and warning signal i or 2 seconds
after the bang, along with an indication of undervoltage on dc bus B.
The master caution and warning was turned off at 55:55:00.

Within 5 seconds after the resumption of telemetry data, the oxygen


flow rates to fuel cells I and 3 had decreased to approximately 20 per-
cent of their prior values. These flow rates remained at a sufficiently
low level to cause failure of fuel cells i and 3 at approximately 55:58.
The most probable explanation for the reduced oxygen flow rates is that
at the time of the bang a sufficiently intense shock occurred to close
the valves in the oxygen lines feeding fuel cells i and 3.

There is sufficient volume in the oxygen lines between the supply


valves and the fuel cells to maintain fuel cell operation for the ob-
served time of about 3 minutes. The intensity of the shock is indicated
by the fact that the reaction control system valves on quad C were
closed. Tests on these valves have shown that 80g for i0 milliseconds
will cause them to close. Tests on the oxygen supply valves have shown
that a shock of 86g for ii milliseconds will cause them to close.

The crew was not alerted to the abnormally low flow rate of oxygen
to fuel cells i and 3 because the hydrogen supply valves had not been
closed. The valve closure indicator is only activated when both the
oxygen and hydrogen supply valves to a fuel cell are closed. The first
indication to the crew that the power system was failing came at 55:57:39
when the master caution and warning was triggered by a main bus B under-
voltage, occasioned by the failure of fuel cell 3. Main bus B voltage
dropped to an unusable level within 5 seconds, causing ac bus 2 to drop
to zero at 55:57:45.

The crew quickly checked the ac and dc voltage levels, recognized


that ac bus 2 had failed, and responded by switching ac loads from
ac bus 2 to ac bus i. This heavier load on ac bus i was reflected as
a heavier load on dc main A, causing it to drop in voltage. At 55:58:O6_
a dc main A undervoltage master caution and warning was triggered as the
main voltage dropped to between 25 and 26 volts. Shortly afterwards,
at approximately 55:58:06, fuel cell i failed, placing the entire load
of dc main A on fuel cell 2. Fuel cell 2 was now called upon to supply
a current of 50 amperes.

Fuel cell 2 remained the major source of electrical power in the


command module for the next 2 hours. During this time, telemetry

B-81
continued to indicate a decreasing cryogenic oxygen pressure in tank no. i.
At 58:04 battery A was connected to main bus A and fuel cell 2 was removed
from operation when oxygen flow becameinsufficient.

B-82
PART B6

POSTINCIDENT EVENTS

The description of postincident events is presented in two sections.


The first, entitled "Immediate Recovery," describes the flightcrew and
flight controller actions during the 2-1/2-hour period following the in-
cident. This section is primarily concerned with actions of the flight-
crew and flight controllers during this period in response to the im-
mediate problems caused by the spacecraft failures. The long-term prob-
lems addressed by Mission Control are described in the second section,
entitled "Plans and Actions Taken to Return the Crew to Earth."

IMMEDIATE RECOVERY

The first indication in the Mission Control Center of any problem in


the spacecraft came from the Guidance Officer who reported that he had
observed a "hardware restart." This term describes the action of the on-
board computer when certain computer electrical problems occur, such as a
reference voltage or an oscillator frequency getting out of tolerance.
When this occurs, the computer stops its computations and recycles to a
specified location in the program. Computations will not resume until
the out-of-tolerance condition is cleared. At 55:55 this event occurred
so rapidly that the flight controllers did not observe the computer halt;
they only saw that it had occurred.

The report of the hardware restart was followed almost immediately


by the crew's report, "I believe we've had a problem here." This was
followed quickly by a statement from the crew that they had a main bus B
undervolt indication from the master caution and warning (MC&W) system.
Flight controllers responsible for the electrical, environmental control,
and instrumentation systems immediately searched their displays, but at
that time there were no indications of any electrical problems, all
voltages and fuel cell currents appeared normal. Apparently, the main
bus B undervolt problem was a transient that had cleared up, for the crew
next reported the bus voltages were "looking good." However, the flight
controllers knew that all was not well because the oxygen tank measurements
indicated some major problems in this system, or its instrumentation.

The next report in Mission Control was from the flight controller
responsible for the communication systems. He stated that the high-gain
antenna on the spacecraft had unaccountably switched from narrow beam
width to wide beam width at approximately the same time the problem had
occurred.

B-8]
In sorting out these pieces of information, the flight controllers
initially suspected that there had been an instrumentation failure. How-
ever, with the subsequent failure of main bus B and ac bus 2 it became
more obvious that a serious electrical problem existed. The flight con-
trollers considered the possibility that a short had occurred, and that
this was in some way related to the unusual behavior of the high-gain
antenna. The rapid rate at which so many parameters in the electrical
and cryogenic system had changed state made it impossible to tell which
were causes and which were effects.

The Mission Control Center response to the situation is described in


this section of the report. The time interval covered is from 55 hours
58 minutes ground elapsed time (55:58 g.e.t.) to 58:40 g.e.t., when all
power was removed from the command module (CM). The major portion of the
activities of both the flightcrew and the flight controllers in this time
period was directed toward (i) evaluation and management of the electrical
and cryogenic oxygen problems; (2) maintenance of attitude control; and
(3) activation of the lunar module (LM). A chronological listing of all
significant actions is presented first. This is followed by a more de-
tailed description of the three categories of activities mentioned above.

Chronology of Spacecraft Reconfiguration Actions

This listing was obtained from transcripts of air-to-ground voice


records (ref. 2) and the "Flight Director" loop in the Mission Control
Center. Additional information was obtained from interviews with members
of the flight control team. Some editing has been done to eliminate the
description of routine actions which obviously have no significance to
this investigation: examples are omni antenna switching and the loading
of weight and inertia information in the digital autopilot. The times
at which specific actions are listed are only approximately correct,
(±i minute) since there was no precise time correlation available.

55:59 - Fuel cell main bus connection.- Mission Control requested


the crew to connect fuel cell i to main bus A and fuel cell 3 to main
bus B. Although there was no direct evidence the crew had changed the
fuel cell and main bus configuration, the flight controller believed that
this _ight be the case. The configuration prior to the loss of main bus B
was as follows: fuel cell i, main A; fuel cell 2, main A; and fuel cell 3,
main B.

56:03 - Entry battery on line.- The crew placed entry battery A on


main bus A to increase the bus voltage. Mission Control was just about
to ask that this be done. The bus voltage was approximately 25 volts,
which is about 1-1/4 volts below the MC&W trip limit.

B-84
56:08 - Open circuit fuel cell i.- Mission Control requested the crew
to open circuit fuel cell i. Flight controllers did not understand
the problems with the fuel cells; the data were confusing and incomplete.
In an effort to get some new information, the controllers decided to take
all loads off fuel cell i to see if it would behave any differently.
It was not putting out any power so there was no reason to leave it con-
nected to the main bus.

56:11 - Power RCS jets from main bus A.- Mission Control requested
the crew to position some RCS jet select switches to main A power. All
of the quad C jets and B-3 and B-4 jets had been powered from main bus B
and since that bus had no power on it, they could not fire except by the
"Direct" coils. By switching these jets to main bus A, there was at least
one jet available for automatic control in each direction about each axis.

56:14 - Start emergency powerdown.- Mission Control advised the crew


to use page i-5 of their Emergency Powerdown Checklist, part of the Flight
Data File (ref. 7) carried by the crew. Mission Control wanted to get the
current on main bus A reduced by at least i0 amps, and then take the entry
battery A off-line. The list down to "BMAG #2-off" was to be turned off;
it included the following: all cryo tank heaters and fans, G&N optics
power, potable water heater, SPS line heater, SPS gaging, suit compressor,
all fuel cell pumps, SMRC heaters, ECS radiator heaters, and SPS gimbal
motors.

56:23 - Power AC bus 2 with inverter (INV) i.- The crew was requested
to power both ac busses with inverter no. i. The primary purpose was to
get telemetry data from oxygen tank no. 2 which is powered by ac bus 2
only.

56:24 - Turn fuel cell no. 2 pump on.- The crew had turned the pumps
off in following the emergency powerdown list. The pumps circulate glycol
and hydrogen for internal cooling in the fuel cells. They could have been
left off for an hour or more, but fuel cell performance would have been
degraded.

56:30 - Select main bus A power to RCS jet A-3.- The spacecraft was
drifting in pitch without any apparent control. Quad C, which should have
been controlling pitch, did not seem to be firing at all. To try to re-
gain control in pitch, the quad A-3 jet was switched to main bus A power.

56:33 - O_en circuit fuel cell no. 3.- Same reason as for open cir-
cuit fuel cell no. i.

56:33 - Regonfi_ure quad B and D thrusters.- Flight control felt that


a quad B thruster might be causing the spacecraft attitude deviations, and
asked the crew to take off all power to the quad B jets. To compensate

B-85
for quad B being off, all jets in quad D were selected to be powered from
main bus A.

56:34 - Battery A taken off line.- The bus loads had been reduced
sufficiently to allow fuel cell 2 alone to keep the bus voltage up.
It was highly desirable to use the battery as little as possible, because
there was no guarantee it could be recharged.

56:35 - Isolate the surge tank.- The crew was directed to isolate
the CM oxygen surge tank. The purpose was to preserve an oxygen supply
for reentry.

56:38 - Oxygen tank no. I heaters and fans.- Mission Control requested
the crew to turn on the heaters in cryogenic oxygen tank no. I in an effort
to build up the tank pressure. The current was observed to increase about
5 amperes, indicating they did come on. About 2 minutes later, since there
was no increase in pressure, the crew was asked to turn on the fans in this
tank.

56:45 - BMAG 2 off.- In an effort to further conserve power, the


second BMAG was powered down.

56:51 - Turn off thruster C-I.- Thruster C-I seemed to be firing very
frequently without any apparent reason. The crew was requested to turn
off all power to this thruster. The attitude disturbances were noted to
have been virtually ended at about 56:40.

56:57 - Fuel cell no. 3 shutdown.- Fuel cells I and 3 had been open
circuited earlier because they were not putting out any power. With the
cryogenic oxygen leaking at its present rate, there would be no reactants
for the fuel cells within a short time. Because there was a possibility
that the oxygen was leaking down stream of one of the fuel cell reactant
valves, it was decided to shut off these valves in an effort to save the
oxygen remaining in tank no. i. Fuel cell 3 was selected because it had
been the first of the two to fail.

57:03 - Main bus A power to thruster A-4.- The crew was told to put
power to thruster A-4 by connecting to main bus A. The spacecraft had a
positive pitch rate and the crew was unable to stop it with quad C thrus-
ters. With A-4 activated, pitch control was regained.

57:18 - Fuel cell no. i shutdown.- Shutting down fuel cell 3 did
not effect the oxygen leak rate, so the reactant valves to fuel cell i
were closed in an effort to try to stop the leak.

57:22 - Charge battery A.- The crew was directed to charge battery A.
The fuel cell 2 was maintaining main bus A voltage at an adequate level
to support the battery charger. Mission Control decided to charge battery A

B-86
for as long as possible. Since the oxygen was still leaking, it was ob-
vious that all fuel cell operation would be lost within about an hour.

57:29 - Disable power to _ua d C.- It appeared that quad C was not
thrusting, although it was receiving firing signals. The explanation of
this was that the propellant isolation valves had been closed by the "bang"
at 55:55 and no propellant was being fed to the thrusters. Since these
valves are powered by the main bus B, they could not be opened without
getting power to this bus. The firing signals to quad C therefore were a
useless drain of power on bus A, and the crew was directed to disconnect
the thrusters from it.

57:39 - Fans on in oxygen tank no. 2.- In a final effort to try to


increase the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2, the crew was directed to turn
on the fans in that tank.

57:40 - LM power on.- The crew reported, "I've got LM power on."

57:49 - Stopped charging battery A.- In order to be ready to bring


battery A on-line when fuel cell 2 failed, it was decided to terminate
the charge. A total of about 0.75 amp-hours had been restored.

57:53 - CSM glycol pump off.- To reduce the main bus A loads, the
crew was directed to turn off the glycol pump and to bypass the environ-
mental control system radiators.

57:55 - Turn off oxygen tank no. 2 fans.- To further reduce the load
on main bus A, the pumps in fuel cell 2 and the fans in oxygen tank no. 2
were turned off.

57:57 - LM data received.- Low-bit-rate telemetry data were received


in the Mission Control Center at this time.

58:04 - Battery A on.- The crew powered main bus A with battery A in
anticipation of the loss of fuel cell 2. The pressure in oxygen tank no. i
was approximately 65 psi at this time.

58:07 - CSM communication reconfiguration.- The Command Module Pilot


(CMP) was directed to turn off the CSM S-band primary power amplifier and
to select low bit rate and down-voice backup. This was to reduce the load
on battery A and maintain adequate circuit margins on the communication
downlink.

58:18 - CSM _uidance and navigation powerdown.- The CSM inertial


platform (IMU) alignment had been transferred to the LM and verified by
Mission Control. The crew was directed to turn off the CSM computer, the
IMU, and the IMU heaters.

B-S7
58:21 - Powerdown CM attitude control.- In an effort to reduce elec-
trical power requirements in the CM, the CMP was directed to turn off
"SCS Electronics Power," and "all Rotational Control Power Off." This
completely removed all attitude control capability from the CM.

_8:22 - LM RCS activation.- The LM crew was advised to pressurize


the RCS, turn on the thruster heaters, and power up the attitude reference
system.

58:27 - Activate "Direct" attitude control.- It was discovered that


neither module was configured to provide attitude control. The quickest
way to regain it was to have the C_ power up the rotational hand con-
troller and the Direct coils.

58:36 - Fuel cell 2 shutdown.- The pressure of the oxygen being


fed to this fuel cell had dropped below the operating level at 58:15 and
it had stopped supplying current. As part of the CSM "safing," the fuel
cell was disconnected from the bus and the reactant valves were closed.

58:40 - CSM powered down.- Battery A was disconnected from main bus A
at this time, removing all power from the CSM.

Evaluation of Electrical and Cryogenic Oxygen Problems

The failure of fuel cell 3 resulted in the interruption of elec-


trical power to several components in the spacecraft, including part of
the telemetry signal conditioning. Main dc bus B was being powered only
by fuel cell 3, so when its output dropped from about 25 amperes to
less than 5 amperes, the bus voltage dropped from the normal 28 volts to
less than 5 volts (fig. B5-2). Inverter no. 2, supplying power to ac
bus 2, was being driven by main bus B and dropped off the line when the
bus B voltage fell below about 16 volts. The bus failures, coupled with
the cryogenic oxygen tank indications and some questionable instrumentation
readings in fuel cells i and 3 (nitrogen and oxygen pressures)_ caused
some initial uncertainty in the Mission Control Center.

The initial reaction was that there possibly had been a problem with
major related instrumentation discrepancies. It was not clear that the
telemetry quantities of cryogenic oxygen tank measurements or the fuel
cell parameters were valid indications of conditions. For instance, the
indication of no reactant flow and no fuel cell currents was compatible
with fuel cells i and _ having become disconnected from the main busses.
Therefore, there was no reason to believe that they could not be recon-
nected. The lack of power output from the fuel cells could not be ex-
plained by the available information, i.e., the rapidity with which the
fuel cells had failed. An additional factor that had to be considered

B-88
_as that the high-gain antenna had unaccountably switched from narrow to
wide beam width at about this same time. Some trouble had been experienced
earlier in getting this antenna to "lock on" in narrow beam width, and the
possibility of a short in the antenna electronics could not be ruled out.

The first direction given to the crew was at 56:00 to return the bus
power configuration to the normal operating mode; that is, fuel cell i
powering bus A and fuel cell _ powering bus B. The primary purpose of
this direction was to get the spacecraft in a known configuration and
determine if the fuel cells could be reconnected to the main busses.
There are no telemetry parameters which show which fuel cells are supplying
power to which busses, but the flight controllers were of the opinion that
some reconfiguration might have been done by the crew.

In operating with split busses, that is, with two fuel cells powering
main bus A and one fuel cell powering main bus B, the amount of equipment
tied to bus A represents approximately twice the load as that to bus B.
When fuel cell i failed, fuel cell 2 had to take up the additional load on
bus A. In doing so, the voltage dropped to about 25 volts, which is low
enough to cause a caution and warning indication. There was no particular
harm in the bus voltage being this low, but if it dropped any lower the
performance of some of the telemetry equipment would be affected and the
flight controllers and crew were concerned. Normal bus voltage is above
27 volts, and the master caution and warning indication is triggered at
26-1/4 volts or less. Had fuel cell 2 been tied to both main busses as
on previous missions, the total spacecraft current of 73 amperes would
have driven both busses as low as 21 volts. The crew put entry battery A
on bus A at 56:03 to bring the bus voltage up. Mission Control concurred
in this action.

In an effort to obtain more data for troubleshooting the situation,


the crew was asked to read out the onboard indications of oxygen pressure
and nitrogen pressure in fuel cells 3 and i, respectively. At 56:08 the
crew was requested to disconnect fuel cell i. This fuel cell was not
supplying any power, so to disconnect it should have no effect on the bus
voltage, but there was a possibility that it might give some different
indications in the fuel cell telemetry parameters. There was no change
in the fuel cell parameters when it was disconnected and the onboard
readouts of nitrogen and oxygen pressure were the same as those on the
ground, which did not add to the understanding of the situation.

Efforts to sort out the various telemetry indications and crew re-
ports continued for the next several minutes. The next direction given
to the crew was to proceed with the emergency powerdown of the electrical
system, using page EMER 1-5 of the CSM Emergency Checklist which is part
of the Flight Data File carried in the CSM (ref. 7). It was important to
reduce the electrical loads to a low enough value for the single operating
fuel cell to be able to supply all the necessary power. Mission Control

B-89
was anxious to get entry battery A back off line to preserve as many amp-
hours as possible.

The next step in the attempt to determine what was happening was to
get power back to ac bus 2. Flight controllers considered powering ac
bus 2 with inverter 3 driven from main bus A. Further consideration,
however, led to the decision to simply tie ac bus 2 to inverter no. i
which was already powering ac bus i. Mission Control was interested in
getting power to ac bus 2, since this is the only bus that powered the
cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 quantity and temperature telemetry. A tem-
perature measurement was needed to confirm the zero pressure indication.
The indications from oxygen tank no. i were that pressure and quantity
were decreasing at a relatively high rate and it was imperative to im-
mediately establish the condition of tank no. 2. It was not until after
ac bus 2 had been powered up and oxygen tank no. 2 indicated empty, that
the extreme seriousness of the situation was clear.

In proceeding through the emergency powerdown, the crew had placed


the fuel cell pump switch to the "off" position in the one remaining good
fuel cell; however, the pumps actually went off with loss of main bus B/ac
bus 2 power. At 56:24, the Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) pointed this out to
Mission Control, who in turn directed him to turn the pump back on. The
only problem associated with leaving it off as much as an hour is that
the fuel cell power output would start to degrade and no harm was done.
But in the situation that existed, it is not inconceivable that had the
crew not advised Mission Control of the fuel cell pump being off it would
have been overlooked until a rise in the fuel cell 2 loop temperatures
gave this indication.

Further direction in the management of the electrical system was not


given until about 56:33. At this time the crew was directed to open cir-
cuit fuel cell _ for the same reason as fuel cell i was open circuited
earlier. At 56:35 the crew was requested to isolate the surge tank and
at approximately this same time Mission Control also directed the crew
to remove battery A from main bus A. The emergency powerdown had re-
sulted in a load reduction such that the fuel cell alone could maintain
bus voltage above 27 volts.

It had become apparent that the operation of fuel cells I and 3


probably could not be regained under any condition, and that with oxygen
tank i quantity decreasing at its then present rate, the service module
would soon become incapable of providing any life support or electrical
power. The heaters and fans in this tank were turned on at 56:38 in an
effort to increase the pressure, but to no avail. Because there was a
possibility that a rupture had occurred in one of the inoperative fuel
cells and the oxygen was leaking through it, Mission Control decided to
shut down the cryogenic inputs to fuel cell 3 to see if this would stop

B-90
the leak, and the reactant valves to it were closed at 57:00. It should
be pointed out that this is an irreversible step; once a fuel cell is
shut down, it cannot be restarted in flight. Fuel cell 3 was shut
down first since its internal oxygen pressure indication was zero; there
was no change in the oxygen tank pressure decay rate, however, and the
reactant valves to fuel cell i were closed at 57:18, with equally negative
results. Mission Control madeone last attempt to increase oxygen pressure
by directing the crew to turn on the fans in tank no. 2. At about 57:22,
the crew was directed to initiate charging of battery A. By this time
it becameclear, with the leaking oxygen tank no. I, that fuel cell 2
could continue to operate only for a short period of time. Since the
fuel cell was maintaining an adequate bus voltage and could provide the
additional power to operate the battery charger, it was decided to charge
battery A as long as possible. The charging of battery A was stopped after
22 minutes. At this time the oxygen tank no. i pressure had decayed to
a point where continued operation of fuel cell 2 was questionable. Battery
A was to be connected to main bus A at the first indication that the
output of the fuel cell was decaying. Since the battery cannot be connect-
ed to power a bus while it is being charged, it was necessary to terminate
the charging in anticipation of the fuel cell failure.

In preparation for using the entry battery to power main bus A, a


further reduction of the loads on this bus was performed. The following
equipment was turned off: glycol pump, oxygen tank no. 2 fans, and fuel
cell no. 2 pumps.

The pressure in oxygen tank no. i was approximately 65 psi at 58:04


when the crew connected battery A to main bus A. This is below the mini-
mumoperating pressure for the fuel cell. This battery continued to power
main bus A until about 58:40. By this time, the LMhad been activated
and the inertial platform alignment transferred from the commandmodule.

The attempts to determine the cause of the problem in the electrical


power system were confused by the misleading symptomsthat resulted from
the cryogenic tank failure. The failure in the electrical power system
and cryogenic oxygen was so massive that by itself it would have created
someinitial confusion and madethe flight controllers skeptical of the
data, but in addition to fuel cell output dropping to zero and bus voltages
dropping to zero, there were other indications that had to be considered.
The attitude excursions (now presumedto have been caused by escaping
oxygen) and the peculiar RCSthruster firings added to the confused sit-
uation. The RCSproblems are discussed in more detail in the following
section, but regardless of how quickly the problem in the electrical
power system was resolved, there was nothing that could have been done to
correct it. The only thing the crew and Mission Control could do under
the circumstances was to preserve as much capability as possible for re-
entry and to power down in an orderly manner to allow time for LM activa-
tion.

B-91
Maintenance of Attitude Control

Within 3 minutes after reporting the large bang, the Commander(CDR)


reported someof the "talkback" indicators for the service module reaction
control system (SMRCS)were showing "barberpole." His report indicated
that the helium isolation valves to quads B and D were closed, and the
secondary propellant fuel pressurization valves to quads A and C were
closed (fig. B6-1). These valves have a history of inadvertant closure
when the spacecraft is subjected to a large "jolt" in flight, such as the
spacecraft separation from the S-IVB. This phenomenonwas first en-
countered on Apollo 9. To reopen a valve that has closed in this manner,
it is necessary to cycle the position selector switch to "close" and then
back to the "open" position. All of the switches in this system have
momentary"open" and "close" positions, and are springloaded to a center
neutral position.
The valve position indicators in the spacecraft are the flag type
which show gray when the valve is open and gray-and-white stripe ("barber-
pole") when closed; there is no telemetry indication of the valve position.
Each valve and its respective indicator are powered from the samemain dc
bus and cannot be selected to the other bus. The valves in the propellant
system for quads B and D are powered from main bus A and quads A and C are
powered from main bus B. Therefore, there was no way to determine the
status of the RCSpropellant and pressurization systems of quads A and C,
and there was no way to reposition the valves without powering up main
bus B. The ability to open the isolation valves in quads B and D was not
affected by the loss of main bus B.

Jet-firing signals, received at each individual thruster, open fuel


and oxidizer valves by energizing a coil. There are two coils at each
thruster. One, called "Auto," receives its signal from either the computer
or the two rotational hand controllers (RHC's) and can be powered from
either main dc bus, selected by the "Auto RCSSelect" switches. There are
16 switches; one for each individual thruster that can be positioned to
"off," "main A," or "main B." The other coil at the thruster is called
"Direct" and receives its signal from the rotational hand controllers when
they are rotated sufficiently far from the null detent. There are several
ways of configuring the RHC's to power the Direct coils. Each RHCis
limited as to which main bus and thruster combination it can be tied.
Typically, the RHC's are powered so that half the jets are fired by main
bus B and the other half by main bus A. As per normal procedure, the auto
RCSselect switches were configured so that single-jet authority in roll,
pitch, and yaw attitude control would be available without reconfiguring
if either main bus were lost. This protection can only be obtained if all
four quads are functional. The loss of capability resulting from the
failure of a main bus would be compoundedby the concurrent closing of
propellant isolation valves. Control about one or more axes would be lost

B-92
Secondary (,He) 4150 psi

f uPerQp_i__nutr
-_ e __ x,_ /i _ sHv°!
ii!!n

-_}_1 I I i I _

IFueltanks_ H Oxidizer

_,c 3 Pri _tanks

,m Primal
_ Primary
i s o_rat_oe_la:tl yes

I
Auto coils

Thrusters

Direct coils

Figure B6_I.- Service module reaction control system one


quad (typical of all four).

B-93
until some reconfiguration could be accomplished. Because power to the
talkback indicators would also be lost, it would take some effort to de-
termine the status of the control system.

At the time of the accident, the spacecraft was performing a computer-


controlled roll maneuver and maintaining pitch and yaw attitude hold. The
digital autopilot began firing RCS thrusters to counteract the attitude
perturbations presumably caused by the oxygen tank no. 2 failure, and
attitude was completely controlled until main bus B was lost. Soon after
the loss of main bus B, Mission Control noted the spacecraft began to ro-
tate about the pitch and yaw axes. It was also noted that the fuel and
oxidizer pressures in quad D were decreasing and the crew was asked to
verify that they had opened the helium isolation valves which had pre-
viously been reported as closed. Although the crew did not acknowledge
this request, the pressures were observed to increase to the normal
operating values shortly thereafter. The pressures had decreased in this
quad because the helium pressurization valves had been jolted closed and
subsequent firings of the thrusters had used some of' the propellant. This
increased the ullage volume and resulted in a noticeable decrease in tank
pressures. The flight controllers correctly diagnosed the cause and were
not mislead into thinking the tanks were leaking.

At 56:07 Mission Control noted that the crew had turned off all
Auto RCS Select switches, because they were concerned that unwanted
thruster firings were causing the continuing spacecraft attitude ex-
cursions. At about 56:19 the spacecraft was observed to be approaching
gimbal lock of the inertial platform. Gimbal lock is a condition in
which the inertial platform loses its reference alignment. To prevent
a gimbal lock, the spacecraft attitude relative to the inertial platform
must be kept out of certain regions. Mission Control advised the crew
of this situation, and in an effort to achieve positive control about all
axes of the spacecraft, the crew was directed to reconfigure the RCS Auto
Select switches for thrusters 3 and 4 in quad B and all thrusters in
quad C to be powered from main bus A. This would provide single-jet con-
trol authority about each axis (fig. B6-2). The other jets were not
switched to main bus A power in order not to drag down the main bus A
voltage any more than necessary. The LMP acknowledged and the drift
toward gimbal lock was arrested, although all rotations were not stopped.

At 56:22 the CMP reported that the spacecraft was being subjected to
pitch and yaw rates and that he had to use direct control with the rota-
tional hand controller to stop them. The rates would start to increase
again as soon as he stopped the direct control. He asked if the ground
could see any spurious jet firings that might be causing the rates. Al-
though the data available in Mission Control were not complete (the
position of the propellant system valves in quads A and C was unknown
and firing signals to the Direct coils are not on telemetry), it appeared
to the flight controllers that the jet firings were not causing the

B-94
Quad A
o 15'_ All 4 quads

_fm_tang le

4 i

I __ / /! 3/_ Quad D

Service -- , __._
module "" 1 4

+Roll

+ Pitch Quad C 1

+ Yaw

Axis Direction Thruster

+ A-I, B-I, C-l, D-I


Roll * - A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2

Pitch + A-3, C-3


- A-4, C-4

+ B-3, D-3
Yaw - B-4, D-4

* Autopilot can be configured to use quads


B and D for roll or A and C.

Figure B6-2.- SM RCS quad location and thruster


n_mbering system.

B-95
spurious rates. It was observed that thruster 3 in quad C was receiving
firing signals almost continuously, but was having no success in stopping
the negative pitch rate. In an effort to gain control over the negative
pitch rate, at 56:32 Mission Control requested the crew to put the Auto
RCS Select switch of thruster 3 of quad A on main bus A. It was suspected
that C-3 thruster was not really firing because there was no }erceptable
reduction in quad C propellant.

At about 56:35 the crew was requested to remove all power from the
quad B thrusters auto coils and to power all quad D thrusters from main
bus A. This request was made in an effort to determi_le if quad B thrus-
ters were causing the unwanted pitch and yaw rates. Mission Control con-
tinued to monitor the RCS thruster firings and the spacecraft attitude
response, trying to determine the status of the system. During the next
IO minutes, the crew pointed out that the quad temperature indications
for A and B were out of the normal operating range, and Mission Control
assured the crew that they were within acceptable operating limits. In
this same time period the ground had noticed numerous firing signals of
thruster C-I. Since the flight controllers could se{_ no explanation for
this, the crew was requested to remove all power from the C-I auto coil
at 56:53. About i0 minutes later, the CMP reported no negative pitch
capability, and requested clearance to enable thruster A-4. Mission Con-
trol responded immediately to "bring A-4 on," and t_e pitch rate was
stopped within a few seconds. At 57:20, Mission Control noted a dis-
crepancy in the roll control jet configuration. _e autopilot was con-
figured to use quads A and C ['or roll control, but the auto coils for
these jets were turned off. ;Fne crew was directed to configure the auto-
pilot to use quads B and D for roll control.

Based on a close observation of firing signals to q_ad C and the


resulting spacecraft response, the flight controllers thought that the
quad C propellant isolation valves had been jolted closed by the incident
that caused the loud bang. lhe computer was still sending firing signals
to the auto coils, but they were apparently having no effect and pro-
pellant was not being used by this quad. Therefore, to save the small
amount of electrical power that was being spent by sending firing signals
to the coils, at 57:29 Mission Control directed the crew to turn off the
auto coils to this quad.

Complete attitude control appeared to be establlshed at this time


and all further attitude control support to the CSM was directed toward
transferring control to the LM. The overall LM activation support is
described in more detail in the following section; however, establishment
of the attitude control of the LM is briefly summarized as follows:

i. Mission Control referred the crew to specific pages in the LM


Activation Checklist (part of the Flight Data FSle, ref. 7) for the

g-96
procedure to transfer the inertial platform alignment from the CSM to
the LM.

2. The CMP was directed to power down all of the guidance, naviga-
tion, and control systems after the LM platform had been properly aligned.

9. Mission Control assisted the LM crew in getting attitude control


established by pointing out specific circuit breakers that needed to be
closed and switches that needed to be positioned.

It was appro_imagely 1-1,/2 hours after the initial incident before


complete automatic attitude control was established, although the crew
had manual control capability at all times. The information on the
ground was incomplete and was confused by the intermixing of automatic
control and manual direct control. Furthermore, the major concern was
the electrical and oxygen problems_ and the only mandatory action in the
control system area was to maintain a safe posture in the systems and
avoid gimbal lock. These mandatory tasks were accomplished and in due
time complete attitude control was established.

Lunar Module Activation

It was recognized at about 45 m_nutes after the accident that the


LM might have to be used to provide the necessary life support, and the
154 activation was started about 1-9/4 hours after the crew first reported
the loud bang in the CSM. The first hour and 45 minutes were spent in
regaining positive attitude control in the CSM, in troubleshooting the
electrical problems in the CSM, and in attempting to halt the loss of
oxygen from the service module. Since LM activation did not begin until
the lifetime of the one functioning fuel cell was predicted to be about
15 minutes, there was a strong motivation to complete the LM activation
and CSM powerdown as soon as possible.

The first order of business for LM activation was to get electrical


power and the communications sytems operating. A specific procedure for
this was read to the LMI° at 57:_7. Although three checklists for LM
activation were available as part of the Flight Data File in the space-
craft, Mission Control did not direct the crew to follow any of them.
These checklists were designed for three different situations at LM
activation. The first, entitled "Apollo XIII LM-7 Activation Checklist"
(contained in ref. 7), contains the nominal mission sequences from initial
LM manning to undocking prior to the lunar landing. The other two activa-
tion checklists are in the "LM Contingency Checklist" (contained in
ref. 7). They were written to cover the situations of having to use the
LM to perform an Earth-return abort maneuver for the docked CSM/LM con-
figuration. One checklist includes activation of the primary guidance
and navigation system (inertial platform alignment, etc.) and is called

B-97
the "2-Hour Activation List" because it was designed to be completed at
a comfortable pace in time to execute a descent propulsion system maneu-
ver in 2 hours elapsed time. The other contingency list is called the
"_O-Minute Activation List," and serves the samepurpose, except that
many steps, including the GANactivation, are omitted. There was no LM
activation checklist available which was designed to cover the specific
situation resulting from this incident. The features that were different
are as follows:

i. The need to get the LM totally activated as soon as possible--


including attitude control as well as supplying life support, communica-
tions, and electrical power.
2. The desire to power down the CSMas soon as possible in order
to preserve all available battery power for reentry.
9. The LM was to serve as a "lifeboat" supplying oxygen, water,
electrical power, and attitude control for 80 or 90 hours.

This presented a paradoxical situation in which almost total LM


capability was required, but at the sametime its consumableshad to be
conserved as much as possible. In responding to the situation, the flight
controllers referred the crew to specific pages in the normal "194Activa-
tion Checklist," augmentedwith additional instructions. The purpose was
to bypass all steps that were not absolutely necessary for getting the LM
power, communication, and environmental control system in operation. The
total instructions given to the crew referred to only _ pages of the 59
in the checklist. 'I_ere were three single instruction additions to this
shortly afterward which completed the 154configuration for supplying oxygen
to the cabin. Although this particular contingency had never been simu-
lated in the training exercises in preparation for the mission, similar
cases had been considered, and Black Teampersonnel_ including the Flight
Director, Glynn Lunney, had prepared procedures and criteria for using
the LM to augment the CSM. The simulations had been limited to cases
where the LM ascent stage was to be retained following rendezvous in lunar
orbit. These samepersonnel had participated in these simulations for the
preceeding missions of Apollo iO, ii, and 12, and therefore were familiar
with the problems.
The next procedure given to the crew was designed to get the LM
guidance and navigation system operating and to get the LM inertial plat-
form aligned to a known reference. Again, Mission Control referred the
crew to specific pages in the "LMActivation Checklist," along with
certain necessary circuit breaker closures which were not listed on those
pages. Although the necessary circuit-breaker panel configuration for LM
activation is shown on two pages in the checklist, the crew was not re-
ferred to those pages by Mission Control. In order to save time, only

B-98
the necessary circuit breakers were given as part of each set of special
instructions. The omission of a necessary circuit breaker closure later
caused some delay in establishing 194 attitude control.

Throughout this period of LM powerup, the CMP was given frequent in-
structions on the CM configuration to reduce power requirements. The crew
completed an alignment of the LM IMU to the CSM IMU at 58:09. The platform
gimbal angles for both spacecraft were read to the ground for computation
of the fine-align torquing angles for the LM. As soon as the LM IMU was
aligned, the CMP was directed to power down the CM computer and the IMU,
including the IMU heaters.

At about 58:17 the temperature of the coolant loop in the 194 began
to rise and the LM crew was advised to activate the sublimator, referring
to the appropriate page in the "LM Activation Checklist." During the
next 2- to 3-minute period there was an unusually high density of conver-
sation, both in the Mission Control Center and on the air-to-ground fre-
quency between the CAPCOM and crewmen in both spacecraft modules. The
CMP reported powering down the CM control system; the CDR reported he had
no attitude reference system and requested permission to "close the FDAI
circuit breakers so we could have a ball to see if we go to gimbal lock";
both the CMI° and the LMP reported conditions and asked question, s regarding
configuration items; and on the ground the CSM flight controllers were
trying to get their systems powered down as much as possible while the LM
flight controllers were trying to "get through" to the LMP to pressurize
the LM RCS and to turn the thruster heaters on.

At approximately 58:21, the CMI° was told to continue his powerdown


by turning off the power to the rotational hand controller almost simul-
taneously with the LM crew being directed to power up the FDAI and the RCS
heaters, pressurize the RCS, and open the main shutoff valves. After about
5 minutes, when it became clear that neither spacecraft had control of
the attitude, the CMI° was directed to reactivate the CSM Direct attitude
control capability. This was done and the LM crew then proceeded, following
instructions from the ground, to pressurize the RCS and to perform the
steps necessary to get the attitude reference system operating in the LM.
Mission Control at 58:32 gave the LM crew the inputs for the onboard com-
puter which set the proper system gains for the LM autopilot to control
the docked spacecraft configuration. The LM achieved complete automatic
attitude control capability at 58:34, when the crew received direction
from Mission Control to close an essential circuit breaker that had been
previously overlooked. The position of this circuit breaker is not in-
dicated on telemetry, but the flight controller correctly diagnosed the
problem when the crew stated they still did not have automatic control
at 58:33.

After it was definitely established that the LM had attitude control,


the CMP was given final instructions for completely powering down the CM,

B-99
and work toward getting the LM configured for the long trip home proceeded.
Mission Control gave the crew the LM IMU torquing angles to get the plat-
form fine aligned to the reference orientation. Discussions were held
between the ground and the spacecraft concerning the ability of the crew
to use the stars as a reference for platform realignment. It was con-
cluded that this would be difficult if not impossible to do, and the
current alignment should be preserved until after the abort maneuver.

An abnormally high pressure reading was noted in one of the LM ascent


stage oxygen tanks shortly after telemetry data were received in Mission
Control, and the crew was directed to use oxygen from this tank instead
of the descent tank. Later it was diagnosed that the shutoff valve leaked,
allowing the higher pressure oxygen from the manifold to leak into this
ascent tank. The condition in itself was not a problem_ the net effect
was that this ascent tank was raised to a slightly higher than normal
pressure which was well within the tank limits. 'Fmis degraded the system
redundancy, however, and had a subsequent leak developed in this tank, the
LM oxygen supply would have been depleted (fig. B6-_).

The next phase of activity was devoted to reducing the power drain
from the LM batteries to as low a value as practical. This included
turning off many of the displays in the LM and put Mission Control in
the position of monitoring system parameters for the crew. The crew was
also given all the information required to execute a return-to-Earth abort
maneuver 2 hours after passing the point of closest approach to the Moon
(pericynthion). Providing this data well in advance is a normal procedure
which gives the crew the capability to perform the abort if communications
are lost with the ground.

PLANS AND ACTIOI',JS TAKt_N TO RETURN r_ C_W TO EARTH

After the crew had powered down the CM and activated the LM, the
immediate situation had stabilized, and Mission Control could direct its
full resources to the long-term problem of getting the crew safely home.
The first item of concern was to determine an expected LM consumables
lifetime and to develop a trajectory plan that would return the spacecraft
to Earth within this lifetime. Also it was mandatory to reduce the ex-
penditure of battery power and water as much as practical.

Subsequent efforts by Mission Control in support of the crew were


varied and extensive. Much of this activity, however, is normally part
of the routine functions of Mission Control. Such items as monitoring
systems performance via telemetry parameters; keeping accurate records
of consumables usage, and predicting future consumption rates; scheduling
crew rest periods; and orbit determination are only some of the examples
of this normal activity. However, only the special activities which were
unique to this mission failure or which were of major importance to the

B-IO0
Shutoff valve

Descent shutoff valve

To cabin press
regulator

"_ O0 " IX]

Ascent tank 2
854 psi

Leaking ASC tank 2 shutoff valve

Figure B6-3.- Schematic of LM oxygen storage system.

B-lOl
successful return of the crew will be described. These activities are
grouped in three categories in this report and described as independent
subjects. These categories are consumables and system management,return-
to-Earth trajectory control, and definition of procedures and checklists
for reentry preparation. No attempt is madeto describe the events
chronologically. The Mission Operation Report (ref. 5) contains a com-
prehensive documentation of these events.

Consumablesand SystemsManagementActions

Consumablesand systems managementof both the LM and the CMwere of


vital importance and generated much activity in Mission Control.
Lunar module.-

Electrical power system: All LM electrical power is supplied by


batteries. There are four in the descent stage with a total rated ca-
pacity of 1600 amp-hours and two in the ascent stage with a total rated
capacity of 592 amp-hours. After the LM activation, analyses of power
requirements and lifetime capability were completed. These analyses
showed that after the abort maneuver at 61:30, the LM could be powered
down to a total current requirement of about 27 amps and still keep the
inertial platform aligned. This was extremely important because it made
it possible to perform a guidance-controlled abort maneuver at 79:30 which
could be used to reduce the return time back to Earth from 152 hours to
143 hours g.e.t. The analyses also indicated that if the guidance system
was completely powered down after 79:30, the total power requirement could
be reduced to about 17 amps_ stretching the battery lifetime to approxi-
mately 165 hours g.e.t. This was a comfortable margin, even if the return
time could not be reduced below 155 hours.

The flight controllers provided the crew with a list of specific


switches to close and circuit breakers to open which would reduce the
electrical load to the minimum possible consistent with safe operation.
The fact that virtually all of the onboard displays were turned off is
an indication of how extensively the spacecraft was powered down. Mission
Control kept an accurate account of the switch and circuit breaker con-
figuration, and was able to insure that the necessary equipment was powered
up again when the subsequent trajectory maneuvers were made. The full
powerdown configuration actually required only 12 amperes, instead of 17.
The basis for this powerdown was contained in the LM Contingency Checklist
(ref. 7). The Emergency Powerdown Checklist was developed for the case of
the LM in lunar orbit awaiting rescue by the CSM. Some additions to this
listing of turned-off equipment were made by Mission Control.

As soon as the electrical power system configuration was established


and apparently performing well, Mission Control began planning for what
actions to take if a LM battery failure were to occur. _ese p_ans

B-f02
included listing the few remaining items of equipment which could be
taken off line in the powered-downcondition. Since the current was
already down to less than 17 amperes, there was not muchleft that could
be removed except the communications equipment, but certain equipment
could have been operated on a periodic, basis rather than continuously.
A schedule for this kind of operation was planned in case it became
necessary.
At 97:14:26 the LMPcalled Mission Control to report an anomaly
that he had observed in the LM. This anomaly was a "little thump" that
was heard but not felt, and it seemedto comefrom the vicinity of the
LM descent stage. The LMPalso observed a "new shower of snowflakes
comeup that looked like they were emitted from dow_that way." The
venting appeared to be going radially outward, perpendicular to the
X-axis in the +Y, +Z quadrant, and it continued for approximately 2 min-
utes. Neither the flight controllers nor the LMPobserved any anomalous
behavior in the data. The LMPclosed the essential display circuit
breakers in order to scan his instruments. The flight controllers
searched the various displays of telemetry data. Since no unusual read-
ings were noted, the investigation of the "thump" incident was not pur-
sued further at that time. A postflight review of the data indicates
that at about the time of the "thump," a large, momentaryincrease in
LM battery output occurred. The surge was of 2 to 3 seconds duration,
and was experienced by all four descent batteries. The behavior of
the four battery currents is summarizedin the table:

Current output, amps


Battery Before
Peak
After
surge surge

I 37.5 3

2 2 Off-scale 6
high 60 amps

3 3 36.8 Z

4 3 30.5 1

The MSC investigation of this anomaly is still in progress, and the


exact cause of the current increase, the "thump," and the venting :is
not known. It does appear that they were all related, but not connected
with the previous service module failure.

At 99:51 g.e.t, a descent battery no. 2 malfunction warning light


illuminated. Because the display system on board was powered down except
for the caution and warning panels, the analysis of the problem was done

B-I03
in Mission Control where telemetry was available. There were three
possible valid causes of the warning light: an overcurrent, a reverse
current, or a battery overtemperature condition. The troubleshooting
systematically eliminated all three, and Mission Control concluded the
problem was a faulty temperature sensor. The crew was advised to recon-
nect the battery about an hour later. No problems with the battery ever
developed_ but the sensor indication later became erratic, causing several
MC&W alarms. A plot of total usable amp-hours remaining in the LM
batteries is contained in figure B6-4.

Coolant system: It was as essential to power down the LM as much as


possible in order to reduce the cooling requirements as it was to reduce
the battery amp-hours expended. The LM coolant loop uses the action of
ice sublimination to take heat away from the spacecraft. Feed water for
the sublimator is stored in tanks, and the rate of water usage to provide
this cooling is proportional to the amount of electrical power expended
because of the heat generated. The analysis showed that for the above-
mentioned electrical power requirements, the LM water supply was most
critical and would be depleted about 155 hours g.e.t. This analysis was
based on data obtained several hours after the initial LM activation.
Estimates based on the usage rate immediately after activation indicated
the LM would be depleted of water by 94 hours g.e.t. As expected, the
rate reduced drastically, however, after the initial cooling down was
accomplished.

During the mission period before the postpericynthion abort, when


the spacecraft was on a trajectory with a 155-hour g.e.t, landing time,
efforts were made to find a method of increasing the _ water margin by
means other than a further powerdown. Two procedures were developed as
a result of this effort. The first allowed the crew to get drinking water
from the CM potable water tank, and the second was a method of trans-
ferring water to the LM tanks for use in the LM coolant loop. _e latter
procedure involved the use of the portable life support systems (PLSS)
water tanks as an intermediate container for transporting the water from
the CM waste tank. Although it did not become necessary to use the
second procedure, it was tested on the ground by engineering personnel
at MSC, and was available in Mission Control. A plot of the usable water
remaining in the LM is shown in figure B6-5.

Oxygen supply and carbon dioxide removal: The oxygen supply in the
LM was adequate for more than 200 hours g.e.t., and was of no concern
(fig. B6-6). This included a supply in the systems normally used for the
lunar extravehicular activity (EVA). The initial problem with the ascent
oxygen tank 2 had stabilized to the condition that the pressure in the
tank was about i00 psi above the normal operating range. Engineering
support personnel had advised Mission Control that this was no problem,
and no further actions were taken in this area.

B-104
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B-f07
The problem of removing carbon dioxide from the cabin oxygen was
a serious one. The LM, like the CSM, uses lithium hydroxide (Li0H)
cartridges to scrub the recirculated oxygen to remove odors and carbon
dioxide. The Li0H cartridges are rated for a specified total man-hours
capacity, and eventually must be replaced when they become saturated.
The LM cartridges were not adequate for carbon dioxide removal for
three men for the duration of the Earth-return trip. There were more
than adequate cartridges in the CM, but they would not fit in the LM
canisters. There were several methods suggested for solving the
problem, including powering up the CM system to circulate cabin oxygen
through its LiOH canisters. The method that was actually used was
developed by Crew Systems Division personnel at MSC. It consisted of
using tape, flight data file cards, and plastic bag material to connect
the CM Li0H canisters to the LM oxygen circulation system. The crew
implemented the modification and it worked very well. The partial
pressure of carbon dioxide reading indicated by the onboard gage dropped
rapidly from 8mm Hg to 0.1mm Hg soon after the rig was completed at 94
hours g.e.t. The modification was not tried until this time in order
to get maximum use from the LM cartridges. About 20 hours later, the
carbon dioxide partial pressure reading had increased to l. Smm Hg, and
a procedure for putting two additional cartridges in series to those in
the CM canisters was given to the crew. This procedure was also
developed by engineers at MSC (fig. B6-7). After this second modifica-
tion was completed, the carbon dioxide partial pressure remained below
2mm Hg for the rest of the mission, without any further modifications
necessary.

The modifications to the oxygen circulation systems were evaluated


in the simulators at MSC before they were accepted by mission operations
personnel. This included tests in the pressure chamber. As mentioned
earlier, there were other methods that could have been adopted had this
one proved to be unacceptable.

Reaction control system: The LM reaction control system (LMRCS)


propellants were another consumable that had to be managed carefully.
Maintaining attitude control of both the CSM and the 154, with a total
weight in excess of 90,000 pounds, can be done by the LMRCS, but is a
particularly taxing job. The 154 control system was not designed to
perform this task, and does not do it efficiently in terms of propellant
expenditure. This was aggravated by the fact that there is some control
moment loss and some cross coupling when the LM is in control due to
thrust plume deflectors designed to protect the LM descent stage from
extended thruster firings.

Shortly after the LM assumed attitude control, Mission Control gave


the crew a procedure which increased the attitude excursion tolerance
in the computer. This increased the attitude error tolerance and caused

B-iO8
Figure B6-7.- View of CM LiOH cannister modification as
installed in the I/4.

B-109
less thruster firings to be commanded by the computer which was maintain-
ing automatic attitude control. The simulators at KSC and MSC were used
to evaluate different techniques for maneuvering the spacecraft under
manual control as well as automatic. Manual maneuvers became necessary
after the LM inertial platform and computer were powered down after the
post-pericynthion abort maneuver. Backup and support crews performed
the evaluations and recommended certain techniques.

Mission Control kept a close watch on the RCS propellant consumption


and was prepared to have the crew revert to an uncontrolled, drifting
flight mode if necessary. This would have been requested if the RCS
propellant decreased below the "red line" value. The flight controllers
had computed a "red line" which provided enough propellant for meeting
the midcourse correction maneuver requirements and the requirements to
maneuver in preparation for the reentry sequence.

Command service module.- After the CM powerdown at 58:40 there was


very little system management that could be or needed to be done. The
electrical power system, however, did require some attention. The first
action was to get the CM into a known configuration. So much had hap-
pened so quickly during the period following the accident, that neither
the crew nor Mission Control had a complete knowledge of the switch con-
figuration in the CM. Therefore, a checklist was developed which listed
the desired position of every switch, circuit breaker, and actuator han-
dle in the spacecraft. The lift-off configuration in the CSM launch
checklist portion of the Flight Data File served as the baseline for this
list, and the modifications were read to the crew. The crew then config-
ured the CM as defined by this list.

The next task was to determine the status of main dc bus B.


Because power had not been applied to the bus since the failure of fuel
cell 3 at 55:58, it was not certain that a major short did not exist
on it. Mission Control defined a procedure which used entry battery B
to apply power to the bus. The procedure contained 12 steps, and the
displays the crew should monitor were defined, along with the expected
indications. The baseline configuration described in the preceding
paragraph insured that all loads were isolated from the bus. The proced-
ure was implemented at 94:21 hours and verified that there were no shorts
on the bus.

After the CM had been powered down for about 24 hours, it began to
cool down to a temperature well below the minimum expected operating
temperatures. Engineering support personnel became concerned about the
motor switches which are normally used to connect the battery busses to
the main dc busses. _en it was realized that the CM was going to get
unusually cold before the initiation of the entry sequence, the ability
of the batteries to provide sufficient potential to drive these switches

B-IIO
was questioned. The analysis of the situation was difficult because of
the uncertainty as to how cold the battery compartment would get, and it
could not be proven that a problem would exist. However, to circumvent
the situation, it was decided to close the bus tie motor switches after
the main bus B checkout. Subsequently, the appropriate circuit breakers
would have to be used as switches to connect and disconnect the batteries
from the busses (fig. B6-8). A step-by-step procedure was defined and
read to the crew and the bus tie switches were closed at 94:21 g.e.t.

A procedure was also developed for charging the CMentry batteries


with the LM electrical power system. Approximately 20 amp-hours of tl_
40 amp-hours capacity had been used from entry battery A during the
period immediately following the accident; a much smaller amount had
been taken from battery B since that time. Since the 124battery capacity
provided a comfortable power margin for the return to Earth, Mission
Control decided to invest someof that power in charging the CMbatteries.
Preliminary examinations of an entry preparation sequence indicated that
in order to not rush the crew, the CMpowerup should be initiated about
6 hours before entry. To do this demandedthat all three CMbatteries
be fully charged. The procedure to charge the CMbatteries was defined
in complete detail by Mission Control. In its most basic terms, it was
simply a procedure that used the LM/CMelectrical umbilical to get
power to the CMmain bus B. Then the CMbattery charger was tied to
this bus and the battery to be charged. The procedure as read to the
crew consisted of four typewritten pages of notes and a step-by-step
switch position definition. The battery charging was initiated at
about 112 hours g.e.t, to demonstrate that it could be done and was
completed at 128 hours after 18 of the 20 amp-hours had been replaced.
This was done well before the reentry preparation, to allow the entry
planning to proceed with the assurance that all batteries would be
fully charged at the beginning of the entry preparations.
Return to Earth Trajectory Control

All trajectory determination and maneuver targeting for getting


the crew back to Earth was performed by the Mission Control Center. This
is the normal procedure, but usually the crew also has the capability to
do this. This serves as a backup in case communications are lost with
the ground. However, with the commandmodule G&Nsystem completely
shut down, the crew was totally dependent on Mission Control for naviga-
tion, and abort and midcourse correction maneuver targeting. There was
no backup.
There were four trajectory change maneuversperformed to return
the spacecraft to the recovery area in the mid-Pacific Oceanfollowing
the commandmodule powerdown(fig. B6-9). The first, performed at
61:_0 g.e.t., placed the spacecraft on a safe reentry trajectory. The
second_ performed at 79:28 g.e.t._ adjusted the Earth landing point to

B-Ill
__0 tPowered from

Entry
7., battery bus A
-0 l--l-- •---0 0
battery A

Z Mo or switch

EBatLery bus A

Main bus A j

Entry
battery C -0 0----

Main bus B

--Battery bus B
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Entry


--0 0
battery B -0 0------

Powered from
-Circuit breakers
battery bus B
0 0

Figure B6-8.- Simplified wiring diagram showLng battery


power to main busses.

B-II2
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B-II3
the mid-Pacific recovery area. The last two maneuvers, performed at
105:18 and at 137:40 g.e.t., were course corrections which adjusted the
entry conditions to be in the middle of the safe entry corridor. These
maneuvers and the decisions related to the choice of specific course
changes are described in the following paragraphs.
Abort maneuver at 61:30 hours.- Soon after the failure in the CSM
it became obvious that the lunar landing mission could not be achieved
and that all effort would have to be focused on getting the crew back
to Earth as soon as possible. At the time, the spacecraft was not on a
trajectory that would return to a safe reentry of the Earth's atmosphere
--so a trajectory change was mandatory. The following questions needed
to be answered: What path should be followed back to Earth? When
should the trajectory-changing maneuver be executed?

Because the spacecraft was on its way to the Moon, there were two
basic types of abort paths that could have been followed: (i) a direct
abort in which the trajectory would be turned around and the spacecraft
returned to Earth without circumnavigating the Moon; and (2) a circum-
lunar abort in which the spacecraft would follow a path around the Moon
before it returned to Earth. The disadvantage of the circumlunar abort
path is that the flight back to Earth takes a longer time than for direct
aborts. However, circumlunar aborts require much less velocity change
and consequently much less propellant to perform, and part of the flight
time can be made up by executing an additional "speedup" maneuver after
the spacecraft has passed the Moon.

The direct abort was ruled out for Apollo 13 because the propellant
requirements were so large. It would have been necessary to jettison
the LM in order to reduce the spacecraft weight so that the service
propulsion system (SPS) engine could make the necessary velocity change.
The LM was essential to the crew's survival, and must not be jettisoned.
Therefore, the choice was narrowed to the circumlunar abort which could
be executed with the LM descent propulsion system (DPS), but there were
still some decisions to be made. The options were as follows:

i. Do nothing until after the spacecraft passed the Moon; then


execute a maneuver to place it on an Earth-return trajectory.

2. Execute a maneuver as soon as practical to place the spacecraft


on an Earth-return trajectory and power down the LM immediately there-
after.

3. The combination of both the above: Get on an Earth-return


trajectory as soon as practical, and after the spacecraft passed the
Moon, perform a maneuver to speed up the return to Earth.

B-II4
Option 2 was selected. The principal reason was that the LM
systems necessary for executing the maneuverwere working at the time,
and they might not be working 20 hours from then when the spacecraft
was in position to do option i. Another consideration was the fact
that the velocity requirement to get on an Earth-return trajectory
would increase from 40 fps to 160 fps, making it impossible to perform
with the RCSsystem if this becamenecessary. So even though option i
would have allowed an immediate partial LM powerdown, saving someelec-
trical power and water, it was decided that the risk was not worth the
savings. Also, option 2 left option 3 available if the guidance and
navigation system could be powered up to perform the second maneuver.

The decision having been madeto perform a circumlunar abort, and


to perform as soon as possible the maneuverto place the spacecraft on
a safe reentry trajectory, the only question remaining open was what
Earth landing point to target for. Because of the LM consumablesstatus,
getting back to Earth as soon as possible was the overriding factor.
The quickest return resulted in a landing in the Indian Oceanat 152
hours g.e.t. This meant giving up the ability to bring the spacecraft
down in the vicinity of the prime recovery force in the Pacific, although
at least a water landing was provided. This was considered to be accept-
able because the abort maneuverafter passing the Moonprobably could
be used to decrease the flight time and to land in the prime recovery
area.

Post-pericynthion abort maneuver.- Although the spacecraft was


placed on a reentry trajectory by the abort maneuver at 61:30 with a
landing at 152 hours g.e.t, in the Indian Ocean, it was decided that
a post-pericynthion abort maneuver (PC + 2) should be performed. There
were two reasons: (i) to reduce the return time to increase the LM
consumable margin (the prediction at the time indicated only a 3-hour
margin); and (2) to change the landing point to the mid-Pacific where
the recovery force could be on station.

During the first few hours after LM activation, detailed analysis


of LM consumable usage had shown that the guidance and navigation system
could be kept powered up until after the PC + 2 abort maneuver at 79:30
g.e.t. It was predicted that all consumables would last at least until
155 hours g.e.t, even if the LM powerdown to 15 amperes total current
were delayed until after 80 hours g.e.t.

There were several options available for decreasing the flight


time, but only the three listed in the following table provided a landing
in the mid-Pacific.

B-if5
Option Delta V, Engine Landing time,
fps used hours g.e.t.

i 85O DPS 142

2 4OOO DPS 118

3 4OOO SPS 118

Option i was selected even though it resulted in the longest flight


time, because of some very undesirable characteristics of options 2 and
3. The problem with option 2 was that it would be necessary to jettison
the service module in order to be able to get a 4000 fps velocity change
with the 124 descent propulsion system. Such a maneuver would almost
deplete the descent propellant, leaving a very limited capability should
subsequent maneuvers be necessary. There was a high probability that a
large course correction would have to be made later. Option 2 was
seriously considered, but eventually rejected because it left the CM
heat shield exposed to the space environment for such a long period of
time, and the possible thermal degradation that might result from this
was an unknown risk. The heatshield capability to withstand reentry
might be compromised by the prolonged period of cold temperature it
would experience. Option 3 was rejected because of the unknown status
of the SPS; it was thought that the SPS or the SM might have been
damaged by whatever had caused the "bang" and that the SPS should not
be used unless absolutely necessary.

Since option i provided a comfortable consumables margin and


allowed retention of the service module, it was selected. Option i
also allowed a descent propulsion system delta V capability of approxi-
mately i000 fps to be retained after the abort maneuver.

Part of the preparation for each mission is the establishment of


"ground rules" and maneuver monitoring criteria for each planned
maneuver. The "ground rules" are general statements which define what
should be done if certain events occur. The maneuver monitoring
criteria define explicitly the conditions under which the crew will
deliberately terminate the maneuver early. The criteria are not the
same for all maneuvers because there is a wide variation in the serious-
ness of the effect of dispersions, and in the seriousness of the effects
of early or late engine shutdown. The trajectory and mission situations
for the post-pericynthion abort burn were different from any of those
for which criteria had been defined; therefore, Jt was necessary to
establish these "rules."

B-II6
The pertinent characteristics that would affect the rules were as
follows:

(a) The spacecraft was on a safe reentry trajectory, although


small course corrections probably would be required before reentry.
(b) The primary purpose of the maneuver was to place the landing
point in the vicinity of the recovery force.

(c) The secondary purpose of decreasing the flight time was of


major importance.

(d) The LM inertial platform had not been fine aligned for
approximately 20 hours.
(e) The maneuver could be delayed for 2 hours with an increase in
delta V of only 24 fps.

(f) The LM descent propulsion system was to be used.

The following ground rules based on these characteristics were


established by the Mission Control team and were given to the crew:
(a) If the engine does not light, do not attempt any emergency
start procedures.

(b) If the primary guidance and navigation system (PGNS)has


failed, do not perform the maneuver.

(c) Do not attempt to null the indicated velocity errors after


engine shutdown.
(d) If an engine shutdown occurred, a subsequent midcourse correc-
tion would be performed no sooner than 2 hours later.

The criteria for early termination of the maneuver were defined as


follows:

i. Propulsion SystemParameters

(a) Engine chamberpressure psi (TM)

_77 percent thrust (on board)

(b) Inlet pressure <i o psi

_160 psi (on board)

(c) Delta P fuel/oxidizer >25 psi (ground monitored)

B-II7
2. Guidance and Control SystemParameters

(a) Attitude rate >i0 deg/sec (except during start


transient)

(b) Attitude error >i0 degrees

(c) Engine gimbal light

(d) Inertial platform failure with a program alarm


(e) Computer warning light

(f) Control electronics system dc fail light


A final rule that was defined stated that if an early engine shutdown
was experienced not due to any of the above, a relight should be
attempted, using the engine-start pushbutton and the Descent Engine
Command Override switch.

A contingency LM activation checklist had been defined prior to


the mission and was part of the crew's Flight Data File. This checklist
was designed to prepare the LM for a docked descent propulsion system
burn from a completely dormant state. The majority of this checklist
had been accomplished with the initial LM powerup at 58 hours g.e.t.
The flight controllers reviewed the list in detail and defined a modi-
fied list of steps necessary to prepare the 124for the abort maneuver.
The modification was basically a deletion of steps already accomplished
or not necessary; however, there was one change which revised the time
at which the helium regulator shutoff valve was to be closed. This was
done to preclude the possibility of a shift in the regulator operating
pressure causing a freezing of the propellant lines after this burn.
Such an event would prevent further use of the descent engine and it was
mandatory to maintain this engine for probable subsequent trajectory
changes.
Midcourse correction maneuver.- Postmaneuver tracking data indicated
that the second abort maneuver had placed the spacecraft grossly on the
right path. However, because the LM inertial platform could not be fine
aligned prior to the maneuver, the execution errors were larger than
normal and the spacecraft was not on a safe reentry trajectory. This
was expected and subsequent corrections were planned for in the LM
consumables budget. The correction delta V magnitude was projected to
be about 7 fps if executed at 104 hours g.e.t. Unlike the abort maneuver,
the course correction maneuvers are not extremely sensitive to pointing
accuracy, and with the delta V of only 7 fps it could probably be executed
with sufficient accuracy without the inertial guidance system. A special

B-il8
team_ composedof off-duty flight controllers and membersof the backup
flightcrew_ was formed to define the maneuverground rules and procedures
to be followed for the course correction maneuver. A detailed crew
checklist was to be developed also. None of the procedures or checklists
in the Flight Data File were applicable because of the unique situation
that existed for this case.

The major issues addressed by this team were as follows:

i. Howto get the spacecraft aligned in the proper direction for


the maneuver? Wasit necessary to power up the inertial platform?

2. Which engine should be used, descent propulsion system or LM


RCS?

3. W%latburn monitoring criteria should be used?


4. _at attitude control modesshould be used?
The team determined that it was unnecessary to use the inertial
platform for the maneuver. The spacecraft could be oriented in the
proper pitch direction by sighting on the center of the Earth with the
Crew Optical Alignment System (COAS)fixed along the LM +Z axis. The
approximately correct azimuth could be achieved by aligning the sunset
terminator parallel to the LM Y-axis. This procedure had been developed
in the preparation for Apollo 8 when it was discovered that course
correction maneuvers could best be madein a local horizontal attitude
(that is, perpendicular to a vector from the center of the Earth to the
spacecraft). It could easily be applied to the LH-active maneuver, and
would give adequate thrust pointing accuracy, so it was not necessary
to power up the LM G&Nsystem and try to align its inertial platform.
It was decided to use the descent propulsion system for the maneuver
instead of the RCS engines, because the engine-on time for an RCS maneuver
would exceed a constraint which protects the LM RCS plume deflectors.
The engine was to be left at the low throttle point (about 12.6 percent
of full thrust) to give the crew more time to monitor the burn and the
lower acceleration should increase the shutdown accuracy. The engine
shutdown criteria were the same as for the previous burn. It was
decided to monitor the delta V with the backup guidance system acceler-
ometers, but to shut the engine down at a fixed delta time specified by
Mission Control. Studies had shown that the burn time computed by
Mission Control was very accurate. Since the accelerometers had not
been maintained at their proper temperature (heaters had been turned off
to reduce consumables expenditure), their status was questionable and
the team decided to not use the backup guidance system as an engine
shutdown cue. However, if this system appeared to perform nominally

B-119
during the maneuver, it would be used to null the velocity residuals in
the X direction. Velocity errors in either Y or Z direction had an
insignificant effect on the entry conditions and were not to be nulled.

Attitude control of the docked vehicle with the backup system


required both the CDR and the LMP to actively participate, and Y- and Z-
axis translation thrusters had to be used to get adequate control torque.
The team defined the modes and procedures to be used in getting the
spacecraft in the correct attitude and in controlling the attitude during
the engine burn. A procedure to return the spacecraft to the passive
thermal control condition was also defined.

All plans were completed after two lengthy sessions. A subgroup


from the team defined a detailed crew checklist to be followed in
preparing for the maneuver and in preparing for the coasting flight
following the maneuver. The checklist was evaluated by members of the
backup crew in mission simulators at MSC and some minor modifications
were made as a result. The checklist and the procedures were reviewed
by the on-duty Mission Control team and then read to the crew approxi-
mately 5 hours prior to the scheduled course correction. This allowed
the crew ample time to study them and to rehearse their roles.

Entry Procedures and Checklist Definition

After the situation in the spacecraft was stabilized, one of the


several parallel activities that was initiates _as the definition of
procedures for the pre-reentry phase. The total loss of electrical
power in the service module forced some major revisions to the activities
and the crew procedures for this part of the mission. The most signifi-
cant consequences of this loss were the following: (i) SM RCS engines
would not continue to fire to separate it from the CM after jettison;
and (2) LM electrical power and RCS should be used to conserve the CM
batteries and RCS propellant as much as possible. This meant that the
LM should be retained through as much of the pre-entry sequence as
possible, and that a plan for jettisoning the SM and the LM had to be
worked out.

A first iteration plan for the pre-entry phase was available as


early as 12 hours after the LM activation. This plan called for CM
powerup 2 hours before arrival at the entry interface (El - 2 hours),
and required the total remaining capacity from the CM entry batteries,
98 amp-hours. After the plan was thoroughly reviewed by all elements
of the operations team, including mission planning and flight crew
support personnel, several modifications and additions were considered
necessary. The principal difficulty was that the crew would probably
be rushed, and there was little or no extra time allowed for contingen-
cies. It was evident that the timeline needed to be extended and the CM

B-120
batteries would have to be recharged to at least 115 amp-hours. The
recharging was accomplished and the procedure is described in Part A2
of Appendix A.

The White Team, one of the four flight control teams assigned to
the mission, was taken off its normal rotation of duty in order to
devote full attention to developing the reentry preparation sequence
of events, crew procedures, and checklists. With this flight control
team as the lead element, all MSCorganizations normally involved in
this type of premission activity were enlisted in this effort. In the
course of defining the procedures, extensive use was madeof the space-
craft simulators at MSCand KSC. These simulations_ performed by members
of the backup crews, served two essential purposes. The first was
simply to evaluate them--to determine if they were practical, safe,
efficient, and adequate. The second purpose was to determine the time
required to complete certain parts of the procedures. The latter was
important because a completely defined timeline had to be given to the
crew in order to insure that everything was accomplished on time. It
was essential that this timeline be realistic because the crew could
not afford to get behind and fail to complete it, but neither could
they start too early and use too much power from the CM batteries.

Another source of data used to develop the procedures was a series


of contingency separation studies that was performed prior to the flight
by mission planning personnel. These studies had examined the trajectory-
related considerations for several different methods of jettisoning the
SM and the LM. They had defined the effects of different attitudes,
time, and velocity of jettison on the subsequent separation distances.
It was only necessary to verify that these studies were valid for the
Apollo 19 conditions, and then select the one with the most optimum
characteristics.

The planning and evaluation of the pre-entry activities continued


for approximately 2 days. At the end of this time, a complete plan
had been defined and thoroughly reviewed. It was read to the crew at
about 120 hours g.e.t., which gave them about a day to study and rehearse
their procedures.

The pre-entry sequence plan (fig. B6-10) called for initiating the
powerup at El - 6½ hours, with the LM supplying power to main bus B in
the CM and entry battery C supplying power to main bus A. A total of
115 amp-hours was required of the CM entry batteries, including a 2] amp-
hour allowance for contingency after splashdown. A detailed expected
battery current profile was plotted and used during the actual prepara-
tion to verify that a safe power margin was maintained throughout the
reentry preparations. Battery utilization was planned so that all
three entry batteries would be available throughout the entry phase. It

B-121
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B-122
was predicted that battery C would be depleted after deployment of the
main chutes, and in fact it was. This left the redundant capability of
two batteries available to inflate the uprighting bags after splashdown.

The initial part of the reentry preparations, LM powerup, was


performed about _ hours earlier than planned. The crew was not resting
comfortably due to the cold environment, and sin_e there was ample
margin in the LM batteries and water tanks, it was decided to turn on
some equipment to try to warm up the spacecraft.

After activating the LM guidance and control system, the first


major milestone in the entry sequence was to execute the final course
correction to place the spacecraft on a trajectory that was in the center
of the safe entry corridor. Prior to the final course correction, the
trajectory had an entry angle error of about +0.5 degree, which is a
safe condition, but slightly shallow (fig. B6-11). It is a standard
practice to perform a final trim maneuver a few hours prior to entry to
try to remove any entry angle error greater than ±0.i degree, and this
course correction was incorporated in the timeline before it was known
whether or not it could be required.

The planned procedures for the final course correction were the
same as for the earlier one performed at about 104 hours g.e.t.,
including the alignment procedure which only required sighting the
Earth through the COAS. Manual control of the actual delta V maneuver
was also planned. However, since the LM powerup was started 3 hours
earlier than originally expected, it was decided to use part of this
time to align the LM inertial platform. This was done with the crew
sighting on the Moon and the Sun for orientation determination. A
further modification to the planned procedures of using the primary
guidance system to perform the course correction had to be abandoned,
because the attitude error indications did not behave properly. It was
suspected that there might be something wrong with the guidance computer,
so the crew performed the maneuver manually, following the original plan.
Subsequent analysis has shown that the attitude error indications were
not indicative of a system problem, but were a result of the guidance
system activation procedures. These same indications did not show up
in the simulator evaluations performed before the crew was given the
procedures because of the limitations of simulator initialization.

The service module jettison was the next major milestone in the
pre-entry sequence. It was performed at about 4-1/2 hours prior to
reentry. The techniques used and the attitude and delta V requirements
for it were obtained from premission studies. Basically, the technique
was very similar to that used by a railroad switch engine to get rid of
the end boxcar. The spacecraft was given an impulse with the LM RCS
that caused a velocity change in the desired direction of about 0.5 fps;
the CM/SM separation pyrotechnics were fired, physically disconnecting

B-123
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the two modules; and a velocity change of the LM and CM was accomplished
by reverse thrust from the LM RCS. The service module continued to
translate relative to the manned modules, and separated from them at a
rate of 0.5 fps. The normal method of using SM RCS jets to drive the
SM away would not work because there was no way to get electrical power
to keep the jets firing after CM/SM separation. The fuel cells which
normally perform this function were inoperative.

The next major step was to get the CM inertial platform aligned.
An automatic guidance controlled reentry was planned, which meant that
the platform needed to be aligned to a known reference direction. There
were several methods that could have been used to accomplish this, and
a considerable amount of time was spent by the White Team in determining
the best one. The selected plan used the docked align transfer proced-
ure to get the CM platform coarsely aligned to the LM platform. The CM
platform was then very accurately aligned to the desired direction by
optical sightings with the CM sextant. Mission Control was standing by
with an alternate procedure in case stars could not be seen through the
CM optics; however, this was not necessary.

There was much interference on the voice and telemetry communica-


tion signals during this time period, which was later diagnosed to be
due to the spacecraft attitude. Apparently the spacecraft was oriented
so that the LM structure was blocking the signal from all of the omni
antennas arrayed around the CM, and the received signal strength was very
low. The antenna blockage problem was not recognized and several recon-
figurations of the communication equipment were made to try to correct
the problem, none of which were successful. In order to maintain
adequate signal strength, it was necessary to receive data at the low
bit rate only. This was not a major handicap, but it did cause some
delay in completing the preparation of the CM guidance system for reentry.

The LM jettison from the CM was accomplished at about i hour prior


to reentry. The attitude was based on premission studies, but no tech-
nique had been defined for achieving the actual separation with LM
jettison from the CM only (no service module). The technique was defined
by the White Team and consisted of using pressure in the LM/CM tunnel to
impart a relative velocity to the two modules when the final separation
pyrotechnics were fired. This method of separation had inadvertantly
occurred at the LM final jettison on Apollo i0 and was known to give
sufficient separation velocity.

It was planned to jettison the LM in a direction 45 degrees south


of the spacecraft plane of motion; however, the crew maneuvered the
spacecraft to an attitude 65 degrees north of this plane. Mission
Control was monitoring the spacecraft attitude, but did not realize the
mistake until the crew was in the process of final closeout of the LM.
Flight controllers quickly analyzed the situation and determined that,

B-125
although the 65 degrees north attitude did not give as much separation,
it was acceptable. The major problem in being in error by ii0 degrees
was that it placed the CMin an attitude much closer to gimbal lock than
is normally done. The crew had to be especially alert during the
jettison and to use manual control of the CMto avoid gimbal lock.

The remainder of the sequence, from LM jettison to splashdown,


followed normal procedures. The only difference was that the CMwas
completely independent of other spacecraft componentsat i hour prior
to reentry instead of the usual 15 minutes.

B-126
PART B7

INSTRUMENT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

Part 7 provides additional technical information of systems design


and characteristics _hich are pertinent to interpretation of data pre-
sented in earlier parts of this Appendix. The following systems are
discussed:

Oxygen Tank Temperature Instrumentation

Oxygen Tank Quantity Instrumentation

Oxygen Tank Pressure Instrumentation

Apollo PCM Telemetry System

Mission Control

OXYGEN TANK TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT

The temperature measurement is made with a platinum resistance


thermometer (R/T) encased in an Inconel sheath attached to the Teflon
insulator part of the quantity probe (fig. B7-1). The resistance of
the R/T and the transducer output voltage increase with temperature.
The signal conditioner which serves as a reference voltage generator
and amplifier is located on the oxygen tank shelf. An electrical sche-
matic of the transducer is shown in figure B7-2.

The system electrical and performance parameters can be summarized


as follows:

Data sample rate one per second

Range -320 ° F to +80 ° F

Corresponding R/T values 71 to 553 ohms

Output voltage 0 to 5 V dc

Accuracy ±2.68 percent or ±ii ° F

Output impedance 5000 ohms

B-127
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B-129
Power 1.25 watts, 115 V ac, 400 cps

Time constant in liquid Approximately 20 seconds


nitrogen or alcohol

The 20-second time constant was measured by plunging the sensor


first into liquid nitrogen at -317 ° F and then into dry ice/alcohol at
-91 ° F. Tests were made under one-g and i atmosphere and are not appli-
cable to supercritical oxygen and zero-g.

Telemetry would indicate the temperature of the sensor itself, but


under rapidly changing conditions the sensor could remain almost un-
affected by local temperature changes in other parts of the tank. The
effect of various failure modes on the transducer and its output signal
are presented in table B7-1.

OXYGEN TANK QUANTITY INSTRUMENTATION

The oxygen tank quantity gage is shown in figure B7-1. This gage
senses the average dielectric constant of oxygen in the cylindrical
annular volume between two concentric aluminum tubes. The dielectric
constant is proportional to density, which in turn is proportional to
the quantity of oxygen in the tank. The gage is approximately 2 feet
long; the outer tube is about 0.85-inch ID and the inner tube is about
O.65-inch OD to form two plates of a capacitor with O.lO-inch spacing.
The gage mounts in the center of the tank.

The gage capacitance is connected in series with a reference


capacity to form a capacitive 400-cycle ac voltage divider as shown in
figure B7-3 and is adjusted to apply zero volts input to the amplifiers
when the tank is empty. As the tank is filled, the gage capacity in-
creases, applying a voltage to the amplifier input. This voltage is
amplified and rectified to provide an output signal voltage which
increases to 5 volts dc when the tank is full.

The reactive voltage developed across the probe capacitance will


change as rapidly as capacitance changes. The rectifier filter on the
output of the signal conditioner introduces a time constant of about
0.022 second in the instrument response.

B-130
TABLEB7-1.- FAILUREMODES
OF THEOXYGEN
TANKTEMPERATURE
TRANSDUCER

_Failure mode Indication Resulting damage

Any of the four temperature Full scale Would fail signal condi-
sensor leads shorted to 115 output followed tioner amplifier, sensor
V ac line (i, 2, 3, 4) by zero output element, and pulse code
modulation gate

Temperature sensor shorted *No change Probably no circuit


to the density probe in output element damage
element

Temperature sensor shorted *Zero output No circuit damage


to ground (either side) signal

Dc power shorted to temper- Full scale Would fail signal condi-


ature sensor output tioner output
Either or both sensor Full scale None
leads open output
400 Hz power input Output drifts None
to power supply discon- to zero as
nected. charge in
power supply
filter capac-
itors dis-
charge.

Temperature sensor leads *Zero out- None


shorted to each other put

Any one of leads i, 3, or Zero out- No circuit damage


4 broken (open) (fig. B7-2) put
Openlead 2 (fig. B7-1) * Immediate rise No circuit damage
to full scale
followed by a
linear decay
to zero in
approx, i0 msec

*Indication verified by test

B-131
T__T

._

h
bB
c_
.,-I
oLPl

co
©
"_ 0

m t"_l bD
O',_i
bO

-'-C G) ®
bD
0
0
0

.4

bO

0.. "-0
o._,

0
:)0
cOO

B-132
Gage parameters are as follows:

Tank condition Empty Full

Density 0 69.5 ib/ft 3

Dielectric
Constant 1.0 1.45

Capacitance 121 175 picofarads

Output voltage 0 5 V dc

Output impedance 500 ohms

Power 2-1/2 watts

Supply voltage 115 V, 400 cycles

Accuracy 2.68 percent full scale

Value of fixed
capacitance i000 picofarads

Data sampled Once per second

This method of gaging works well for single-phase fluids in any


gravity environment so long as the fluid is uniformly mixed with no sig-
nificant density variations. But under zero-g, density and temperature
variations can exist in the fluid, especially when heat is added with-
out any fluid movement (convection). Under these conditions, the gage
measures the average density of the oxygen between the two tubes which
may or may not be representative of the average density in the tank.

If the gage is either opened or shorted, the signal conditioner


is overdriven and a greater-than-lOO-percent quantity is indicated.
Other malfunction characteristics follow.

B-155
Failure Mode Effect

lJ Elements of probe shorted to Full scale output


each other

e Wire to either element Full scale output


disconnected from probe

o Outside element of probe Measurement indicates


or its lead wire shorted some value between zero
to ground and full scale

o Inside element of probe Random output tending


or its lead shorted to towards zero
ground

5. Clear shorted probe Output decreases to zero,


remains 0.7 second, then
increases to correct value
in about 1-1/2 second

6. Clear open probe fault Output assumed correct


value within 1/2 second

e Intermittent shorts, any Output becomes irregular


combination sawtooth

OXYGEN TANK 2 PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION

The location of the oxygen tank pressure measuring instrumentation


is shown schematically in figure B7-4. Pressure transducers for both
tanks are located in a valve module assembly along with the pressure
switches and pressure relief valves as shown in figure B7-5. The valve
module assembly is connected to the oxygen tanks by 19-foot lengths of
i/4-inch and 3/16-inch OD tu0ing.

The pressure transducer consists of a diaphragm 0.2 inch in diameter


and O.015 inch thick to which are attached 4 chips of strain-sensitive
semi-conductor materials electrically connected into a bridge circuit.
When pressure is applied, deflection of the diaphragm changes the electri-
cal resistance of the semi-conductor clips to unbalance the bridge and
develop an electrical output proportional to the applied pressure.
This output is amplified so that full-scale pressure of 1050 psia gives
a 5 V dc output which is indicated on the CM instrument panel and tele-
metered to the ground through the PCM telemetry system.

B-134
4J
rj_

u]

hO

o
I

I
b--

t_
,,.--I
X
x

X X

g g
X x
oo

B-135
Relief value

Pressure
tran

Pressure switch
for cycling
heaters

Figure B7-5.- Pressure transducer_ relief valve, and pressure switch.

B-136
Other pressure transducer parameters are as follows:

Range 19 to 1080 psia

Accuracy ±2.68 percent fuel range

Output voltage 0 to 5 V dc

Output impedance 500 ohms

Power 1.5 watts

Voltage supply 28 V dc

Data sampled Once per second

Under normal operating conditions oxygen flow through the 19 feet


of tubing is about 1.5 pounds per hour and the pressure drop through
the line is negligible.

The physical dimensions and electronic characteristics of the


pressure transducer are such that its time lags are negligible as com-
pared with acoustical lags of the tubing. If the relief valve opens
(normally set at 1008 psia) or if the pressure in the tank changes
suddenly, the delta P is communicated through the tube at sonic velocity
(813 fps at 288 ° R) so that a delay of about 23 msec would be expected
exclusive of pressure drops due to flow through the tubing. Tests run
at MSC show that when a step pressure increase is applied at the tank
end of the system, pressure indicated by the transducer begins to change
in about 16 msec and reaches 63 percent of the pressure change in about
40 msec.

PULSE CODE MODULATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The instrumentation system on the Apollo spacecraft interfaces


with a pulse code modulation (PCM) telemetry system. In such a system,
measurements are not presented continuously, but are sampled in time and
quantitized in amplitude. Signal conditioners standardize the outputs
from all sensors to a range of O to 5 volts. This voltage is fed into
the PCM system where it is sampled and encoded for transmission to the
ground.

The PCM system basically consists of a number of electronic input


switches and an analog-to-digital encoder, all of which are controlled
by a programmer. The analog switches, through programmer control, are
sampled sequentially with a sample period of 40 microseconds for each

B-137
input. The sampled voltage is then converted by the encoder into an
$-bit binary word which is subsequently transmitted to the ground. The
sampling rate for each channel is selected on the basis of the rapidity
with which that channel value changes under normal operation. Programmer
sampling rates are 200, i00, 50, i0, and I sample per second. The end
result of this operation when the system is in the high-bit-rate mode
is a serial stream of data consisting of 128 eight-bit words in each
frame with 50 frames transmitted each second. This corresponds to a
bit rate of 51,2OObits per second. In the low-bit-rate mode, 1600 bits
per second are transmitted and the measurementsare madeat a reduced
sampling rate.
In evaluating telemetry data, consideration must be given to the
fact that the system samples data in time and quantitizes in amplitude.

Figure B7-6 depicts an analog signal and its equivalent digital


representation to illustrate several limitations of PCMtelemetry
systems.
!. Fast transients which happen to occur between the sample times
will not be recorded.

2. A long transient whose peak amplitude occurs between sample


times will be recorded with an incorrect peak amp]itude.

3. A low-amplitude transient may go completely unrecorded even if


its peak amplitude occurs at a sample time.

4. A change of one count in a parameter does not necessarily mean


that the analog quantity has changedby an amount equal to the differ-
ence in count values. If the analog quantity happens to be very close
to the switchover point between counts, a small change can cause the
count to change.

5. If the analog quantity remains for a long time close to the


switchover point from one count to the next, the output may toggle
(jump back and forth) from one count to another. This does not indicate
that the analog value is actually changing this rapidly but is charac-
teristic of the system when noise is present.

6. In addition to the phenomena illustrated in figure B7-6, it


must be recognized that noise in the RF link may cause erroneous data to
be received on the ground. Such errors usually appear in the data as
values which differ greatly from adjacent outputs from the same channel.

Table BT-II lists the measurements telemetered from the Apollo 13


command and service modules as well as their ranges, sampling rates,
and value of one count.

B-138
_5
c_
bD

u_

o bO
0
,--t
ZD

CH
0

0
.,-I

_1_
r_
c_
0
(u o
E

b8
.,-I

o
o

,-I

I -,-I

,d
!
b--

I1)

hO
.el

Illl Jl
0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0
_0000000000 _oooooooooo

B-139
TABLE BT-II.- CI)MMAND AND SERVICE MODULE TEI_IMET_Y IZTA DE_$Fd_Y

Meas uremen t Samples/Second

Un it s/Count
Approx. Range
Number Title Unit High Bit Low Bit
Rate }{ate
Low High

CAI820T TEMP CREW HS ABL °F -300 +850 i 4 - *NL


SUR LOC IA
CAI821T TEMP CREW HS ABL °F -_00 +850 1 4 - NL
SUR LOC 4A
CAI822T TEMP CREW HS ABL °F -300 +85C i 4 - NL
SUR LOC 7A
CA1823T TEMP CREW HS ABL °F -300 +850 i 4 - NL
SUR LOC 10A

SAI830T TEMP SM SKIN OF -120 +2'/0 i 1.5 - NL


SURF LOC IA
SAI831T TEMP SM SKIN °F' -120 +270 i 1.5 - NL
SURF LOC 4A
SAI832T TEMP SM SKIN °F -120 +270 i 1.5 - NL
SURF LOC 7A
SAI833T TEMP SM SKIN °F -120 4270 I 1.5 - NL
SURF LOC IOA
SA2377T TEMP BAY 20X °F' -i00 +200 i 1.2
TANK SURFACE
SA2378T TEMP BAY 30X °F -i00 +200 1 1.2
TANK SURFACE
SA2379T TEMP BAY 5 FUEL °F -i00 +200 1 1.2
TANK SURFACE
SA2380T TE_4P BAY 6 FUEL °F -i00 +200 1 1.2
TANK SURFACE

SC0030Q QUANTITY }{2 TANK i PCT 0 i00 i 1 o.4


SC0031Q QUANTITY H2 TANK 2 PCT 0 i00 i i 0.4
i i 0.4
SC0032Q QUANTITY 02 TANK i PCT 0 i00
SC0033Q QUANTITY 02 TANK 2 PCT 0 i00 1 1 0.4
PREss 02 TANK i PSIA 20 1080 1 I 4.0
sco037P
SC0038P PRESS 02 TANK 2 PSIA 20 1080 i 1 4.o
SC0039P PRESS H2 TANK i PSIA © JSO 1 1 1.5
SC0040P PRESS H2 TANK 2 PSIA 0 550 1 1 1.5
SCO041T TEMP 02 TANK i °F -325 +80 1 1 1.6
SC0042T TEMP 02 TANK 2 OF -325 +80 1 1 1.6
SC0043T TEMP H2 TANK i °F -425 -200 1 l i.o
SC0044T TEMP H2 TANK 2 °F -425 -200 1 1 1.0

CC0175T TEMP STATIC °F +32 +248 1 1


INVERTER i
CC0176T TEMP STATIC °F +32 +248 l 1
INVERTER 2
CC0177T TEMP STATIC °F +32 +248 1 1 - NL
INVERTER 3
AC VOLTAGE MAIN VAC 0 +150 i0 1 0.6
CC0200V
BUS i PHASE A
AC VOLTAGE MAIN VAC 0 +150 i0 1 0.6
CC0203V
BUS 2 PHASE A
CC0206V DC VOLTAGE MAIN VDC 0 +45 i0 i 0.18
BUS A
DC VOLTAGE MAIN _)C 0 +45 i0 1 0. i8
CC0207V
BUS B

NL - Non Linear

B-140
TABLE B7-11.- CO_,_4AND AND SERVICE MODULE TEn.EMEry DATA SUMMARY- Continued.

Measurement Samples/Second

Units/Count
[ Approx. Range
Low Bit
Number Title Unit I High Bit
Low High Rate Rate

CC0210V DC VOLTAGE BAT- VDC 0 +45 i0 0.18


TERY BUS A
CC0211V DC VOLTAGE BAT- VDC 0 +45 i0 0.18
TERY BUS B
CC0215C DC CURRENT BATT AMP 0 +5 i0 0.02
CHARGER OUT
CC0222C DC CURRENT AMP 0 +100 i0 0.4
BATTERY A
CC0223C DC CURRENT AMP 0 +i00 i0 0.4
BATTERY B
CC0224C DC CURRENT AMP 0 +i00 l0 0.4
BATTERY C
CC0232V DC VOLTAGE BAT- VDC 0 +45 l0 0.18
TERY RELAY BUS

SC2060P N2 PRESSURE FC i PSIA 0 75 l0 0.3


REGULATED
SC2061P N2 PRESSURE FC 2 PSIA 0 75 l0 0.3
REGULATED
SC2062P N2 PRESSURE FC 3 PSIA 0 75 lO 0.3
REGULATED
SC2066P 02 PRESSURE FC i PSIA 0 75 i0 0.3
REGULATED
SC2067P 02 PRESSURE FC 2 PSIA 0 75 i0 0.3
REGULATED
SC2068P 02 PRESSURE FC 3 PSIA 0 75 l0 0.3
REGULATED
SC2069P H2 PRESSURE FC 1 PSIA 0 75 I0 0.3
REGULATED
SC2070P }{2 PRESSURE FC 2 PSIA 0 75 i0 0.3
REGULATED
SC2071P H2 PRESSURE FC 3 PSIA 0 75 i0 0.3
REGULATED
SC2081T T_P FC 1 COND °F +145 +250 1 0.4
EXHAUST
SC2082T TEMP FC 2 COND °F +145 +250 I 0.4
EXHAUST
SC2083T TEMP FC 3 COND °F +145 +250 1 0.4
EXHAUST
SC2084T i TEMP FC i SKIN °F +80 +550 i 2
SC2085T TEMP FC 2 SKIN OF +80 +550 i 2
SC2086T TEMP FC 3 SKIN °F +80 +550 1 2
SC2087T TEMP FC i RADIATOR OF -50 +300 1 1.4
OUTLET
SC2088T TEMP FC 2 RADIATOR OF -50 +300 i 1.5
OUTLET
SC2089T THUMP FC 3 RADIATOR °F -50 +300 i 1.5
OUTLET
SC2090T BAD INLET TEMP FC i OF -50 +300 i 1.5
SC2091T RAD INLET TEMP FC 2 OF -50 +300 i 1.5
SC2092T RAD INLET TEMP FC 3 °F -50 +300 I 1.5
SC2113C DC CURRENT FC 1 AMP 0 +I00 i0 0._
OUTLET

B-141
TABLE BT-II.- <70f_[v_Al_LA_ib S!_<V[CE MODULE TELE_TRy [_%qy_ g'_;AAY - Continued.

Measurement Samples/Second
Units/Count

Approx. Range
High Bit Low Bit
Number Title Unit
Rate Rate
Low Hi gh

SC2114C DC CURRENT FC 2 AMP 0 +i00.0 i0 i O.4


OUTPUT
SC2115C DC CURRENT FC 3 A]_ 0 +i00.0 i0 i 0._
OUTPUT

SC2139R FLOW RATE H2 FC i LB/HR 0 .2 i0 ..001 - NL


SC2140R FLOW RATE H2 FC 2 LB/HH 0 .2 i0 .001 - NL
SC2141R FLOW RATE }{2 FC 3 LB/HR 0 .2 i0 .001 - NL
SC2142R FLOW RATE 02 FC 1 LB/tIR 0 i.? i0 .005 - NL
SC2143R FLOW RATE 02 FC 2 LB/HR 0 1.7 i0 .005 - NL
SC2144R FLOW RATE 02 FC 3 [_/HR 0 i.'_ i0 .005 - NL
SC2160X PH FACrOR WATER NORM HIGH i0 1
COND FC i
SC2161X PH FACTOR WATER NoRM HIGH i0 1
COND FC 2
SC2162X PH FACTOR WATER NORM HIGH i0 1
COND FC 3

CC2962C CSM TO LEM CURRENT A_ 0 +i0 i0 ] O.Oh


MONITOR

CDOOO5V DC VOLTAGE PYRO VDC 0 +40 i0 O.15


BUS A
CDO006V DC VOLTAGE PYRO VDC 0 +40 i0 o.15
BUS B
CDOO23X CM-SM RELAY CLOSE A SEP i0 ]
CDOO24X CM-SM SEP RELAY SEP i0 1
CLOSE B
CD0123X SLA SEPARATION SEP i0 I
RELAY A
CDOI24X SLA SEPARATION SEP i0 ]
RELAY B

CDOI30X HAND CONTROLLER ABORT i0 1


INPUT A
CD0131X HAND CONTROLLER ABORT I0 1
INPUT B

CD0132X EDS ABORT LOGIC VOTE/ ARM i0 1

INPUT NO i OFF

CDOI33X EDS ABORT LOGIC VOTE/ ARM i0 1

INPUT NO 2 ,OFF

CD0134X EDS ABORT LOGIC VOTE/ ARM i0 I

INPUT NO 3 i OFF
CDOI35X EDS ABORT LOGIC ABORT i0 ]
OUTPUT A
CD0136X EDS ABORT LOGIC ABORT I0 ]

OUTPUT B
CD0170X RCS ACTIVATE SIG A ENABLE i0 1

CD0171X RCS ACTIVATE SIG B ENABLE i0 1

CD0173X CM RCS PRESS SIG A i PRESS i0 1


CD0174X CM RCS PRESS SIG B PRESS i0 1
CDO200V DC VOLTAGE LOGIC VDC 0 +40 i0 o.15
BUS A

NL - Non Linear

B-142
TABLE B7-11.- C0}_ND AND S_VICE MODULE TELF}_ETRY DA'I_{ SU_},9_RY - Continued.

Measurement Samples/Second

Units/Count
I Approx. Range
Number Title Unit High Bit Low Bit
! Low High Rate Rate

CDO2OIV DC VOLTAGE LOGIC VDC 0 + 40 i0 0.15


BUS B

CDO230X FWD HS JETTISON A JETr i0 i


CDO231X FWD HS JETTISON B JETT i0 1
CDII54X CSM-LEM LOCK RING SEP i0 i
SEP RELAY A

CDII55X CSM-LEM LOCK RING SEP i0 i


SEP RELAY B

CEOOOIX DROGUE DEPLOY RELAY DEPLOY i0 i


CLOSE A
CEOOO2X DROGUE DEPLOY RELAY DEPLOY i0 i

CLOSE B
CEOOO3X MAIN CHafE DEPL DRG DEPLOY i0 i

REL RLY A
CE0004X MAIN CHU'?E DEPL DRG DEPLOY i0 i
REL RLY B
CE0321X MAIN CHUTE DISCON- DISC i0 i
NECT RELAY A

CE0322X MAIN CHUTE DISCON- DISC i0 i


NECT RELAY B

CF0001P PRESSURE CABIN PSIA 0 17 ] 1 0.067


CF0002T TEMP CABIN °F +40 +]25 1 i 0.3 - NL
CF0003P PRESS 02 SUIT TO IN -5 +5 i0 o.o_
CABIN DIFF H20

CF0005P PRESS CO2 PARTIAL MM HG 0 30.00 1 i O. 12 - NL

CFO006P PRESS SURGE TANK PSIA %0 !080 i0 1

CF0008T TEMP SUIT SUPPLY °F +20 +95 1 1 0.3


MANIF

CFOOO9Q QUANTITY WASTE PCT 0 i00 i 1 0.4 - NL

WATER TANK

CFOOIOQ QUAN POTABLE H20 PCT 0 i00 1 1 O.3 - NL


TANK

CFOOI2P PRESS SUIT DEMAND PSIA 0 i7 i0 i O.07

REG SENSE

CF0015P PRESS SUIT COM- PSID 0 1.00 i0 i 0.0035 - NL

PRESSOR DIFF
CFOO16P PRESS GLYCOL PUMP PSIG 0 60 i0 i O.24
OUTLET

CFOOI7T TEMP GLYCOL EVAP °F +20 +95 i 0.3

OUTLET STEAM
CFOO18T TEMP SLY EVAP °F +25 +75 i 1 0.2

OUTLET LIQUID
CF0019Q QUANTITY GLYCOL PCT 0 107 I0 i 0.5 - NL

ACCUM
CFOO20T TEMP SPACE RADI- °F -50 +i00 1 1 0.6 - NL
ATOR OUTLET
BACK PRESS GLYCOL PSIA 0 0.25 1 0. 0008
CFOO34P
EVAPORATOR

CFOO35R FLOWRATE ECS 02 LB/H]_ 0.16 I i0 0.003 - NL


i0 1 0.6
CFOO36P PRESS OUTLET 02 PSIG 0 150
REG SUPPLY

NL - Non Linear

B-143
TF_BLE B7-II.- COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE TELEKW/_Y DA'_ SU_@@d_Y - (;ontD:ued.

Measurement Samples/Second

Units/Count
Approx. Range
Number Title Unit High Bit I,ow Bit

Low Hi gh Rate Rat_

CFO070P PRESS SEC GLYCOL P[;IG 0 6O i0 I 0.24


Pt_P OUTLET
CF007IT TEMP SEC EVAP °F +25 +75 10 i 0.2
OUTLET LIQUID
CF0072Q QUANTITY SEC GLYCOL FCT 0 I00 10 i 0.8 - NL
ACCUM

CF0073P PR SECONDARY EVAP t>:;IA 0.05 0.25 i 0.0008


OUT STEAM
CFOI20P PRESS H20 AND PSIA 0 5O i 0.2
GLYCOL TANKS
CF0157R RATE GLYCOL FROM LB/HR 45 330 i0 0.9 - NL
THERMAL LOAD
CF0181T TEMP GLYCOL EVAP °F + _5 +i00 i 0.3
INLET

SF0260T TEMP PRIMARY RADI- °F +55 +120 i i 0.25


ATOR INLET
SF0262T TEMP SECONDARY °F +55 +120 i i 0.25
RADIATOR INLET
SFO263T TEMP SEC RADIATOR °F +30 +70 1 i 0.Z5
OUTLET
SFO266X RADIATOR FLOW CONT SYS I SYS 2 I0 I
SYS 1 OR 2

CFO460T TEMP URINE DUMP o F 0 +i00 i ] O.4


NOZZLE
CF0461T TEMP WASTE WATER ° F 0 +i00 1 i 0.4

DUMP NOZZLE

CGI040V 120 VDC PIPA SUPPLY VDC +84 +135 i 0.2

DC LEVEL
CGIIIOV 2.5 VDC TM BIAS '_)C 0 5 0.02

CGI2OIV IMU 28V .8KC i PCT VRMS 0 30 i 0.12 - NL

CGI331V 3.2KC 28V SUPPLY VRMS 0 30 1 0.12 - NL

CG1513X 28V IMU STANDBY OFF :','i'BY 10 I

CGI523X 28V CMC OPERATE OFF OPR i0 1

CGI533X 28V OPTX OPERATE OFF OPR i0 i

CG2112 V IG 1X RESOLVER O_f- VRMS -21 +21 I0 0.17


PUT SIN

CG2113V IG 1X RESOLVER OUT- FRMS -2 ] +21 i0 0.17

PUT COS
CG2117V IGA SERVO ERROR IN VRMS -3 +3 i00 0.025
PHASE
CC2142V MG IX RESOLVER OUT- VRMS -2] +21 I0 o.16
PUT SIN
MG IX RESOLVER oUT- VRMS -20 +40 i0 0.16
CG2143V
PUT COS
MGA SERVO ERROR IN VRMS -J +3 lO0 O. 024
CG2147V
PHASE
i0 o.]6
CG2172V OG IX RESOLVER OUT- VRMS -21 +21
PUT SINE

NL - Non Linear

B-144
IABLE B7-11.- CO_@ZND AND SERVICE MODULE TELE_I]{y DATA St_94%RY - Continued.

Measurement Samples/Second

Units/Count
Approx. Range
Number Title Unit High Bit Low Bit

Low High Rate Rate

CG2173V OG IX RESOLVER OUT- VRMS -2 ] +2 ] 10 0.16


PUT COS
CG2177V OGA SERVO ERROR VRMS -3 +3 I00 O.O25
IN PHASE
CG2300T PIPA TEMPERATURE oF +119 +140 i i O.08

CG3721V SHAP_ CDU DAC O_F- VRMS -12 +12 i0 O.09


PUT

CG3722V TRUNNION CDU DAC VRMS -] 2 +12 i0 O.09


OUTPUT
CG5040X CMC WARNING WARN i0 i

CH3500H FDAI CM/SM ATT DEG 50


ERROR PITCH -15 _15
CH350IH FDAI CM/SM ATT DEG -5 _5 5o MM
ERROR YAW -i5 +15
CH3502H FDAI CM/SM ATT DEG -5 _5 IO0 MM

ERROR ROLL - 50 _5o


CH3503R FDAI SCS BODY RATE DEG/ -] _i i00
PITCH SEC -5 _5
-10 +] 0
CH3504R FDAI SCS BODY HATE DEG/ -i +l i00 MM

YAW SEC -5 +5
-i0 +i0
MM
CH3505R FDAI SCS BODY RATE DEG/ -! +i i00
ROLL SEC -5 _5
- 50 _ 50
CH3517H GIMBAL POSITION DEG -5 +5 i00 0.04
PITCH 1 OR 2
CH3518H GIMBAL POSITION DEG -5 +5 i00 o.oh
YAW i OR 2
CH3546X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 200
C3/13/X OFF
CH3547X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 200

A41Z_/X OFF

CH35hSX RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 2O0

A3/23/-X OFF
CH3549X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 2O0
c_/e4/-x OFF
CH3550X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 2O0

D3/25/X OFF

CH3551X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 2OO

Bh/261X OFF

CH3552X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 2O0

B3/15/-X OFF

CH3553X RCS SOLENOID ACT _IRE/ AP_ 200

D4/16/-X OFF
CH355hX RCS SOLENOID ACT FI RE ARM 2OO

BI/II/Z OFF

CH3555X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 2OO

D2/22/Z OFF

MM - Multiple Mode Calibration

B-145
'U_I:LE BT-fi.- Cu]_?,Z.ND AII[/ _:F_,V_CE }4C,I)[JLE TELEME'I_Y bATA S[$94ARY - Continued.

Measurement Samples / S_cond

Units/Count
Approx. Range
High Bit Low Bit
Number []nit
Title Rate Rate
Low High

CH355oX RCS SOLENOID ACT F1 t{Et ARM 200


D1/21/-Z OFF

CHJ55'(X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 200


B2/Z2/-Z O _T
CH3558X RCS SOLENOID ACT FIRE/ ARM 200
A1/Y OFF
CH3559× RCS SOLENOID ACT FI_/ ARM 200
c2/Y o_T
CH35b0X RCS SOLENOlb ACI' FIRE/ ARM 200
CI/-Y 0 FF
CH3561X RCS SOLENOID ACI' FIRE/ ARM 200
A2/-Y OFF

CHB574X TRANSLATIONAL 0 FF ON I0 i
CONTROLLER XC MD

CH3575X TRANSLATIONAL OFF ON i0 i


CONTROLLEH-XC M]]

CH3576X TRANSLATIONAl, OFF ON I0 I


CONTROLLER YC MD

CH3577X TRANSLNfIONAL 0 FF ON i0 1
CONTROLLER -YC Y/)
CH3578X TRANSLATIONAL 0 FF ON I0 i
CONTROLLER ZC MD

CH3579X TRANSLATIONAL OFF ON i0 i


CY)NTROLLER -SC _)

CH3582V SCS TVC AUTO COM- VDC -10 +i0 i00 0.08
_t_D PITCH

CH3583V SCS TVC AUTO G)M- -10 +i0 i00 0.08


MAND PITCH

CH3585H ROT CONTEOL/MTVC YDC -i0 +i0 50 0.078


PITCH

CH3586H ROT CONTROL/Mff_C VDC -10 +i0 50 0.08


YAW CMC
CH3587H ROT CONTROL/MTVC DEG -li +ii 50 0.087
ROLL CMC

CH3588X ATTITUDE DFADBAND .MAX MIN i0 i

MINIMUM

CH3590X HIGH PRO RATE LIMIT I/) W H I GH i0 1

CH3592X FDAI SCALE ERROR 5, OFF ON l0 i

RATE 5
CH3593X FDAI SCALE ERROR <)FF ON IO 1

5o/15, RT50/10
CH3600X SCS DELTA V CSM 124/ I0 i

CG-LM/CSM POS CSM

CH360IX DIR RCS SW NO 1 OFF ENABLE i0 1

CH3602X DIRENABLE
RCS SWPOSNO 2 I ()FF ENABLE i0 i

ENABLE POS
CH3604X SPS SOLENOID _'i_/ ARM i0 1

DRIVER NO i () FF
i
CH3605X SPS SOLENOID FI_/ ARM i0

DRIVER NO 2 OFF

B-146
TABLE B7-11.- COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE TELEbGTTRY DATA SUMM_RY - Continued.

Me as ur ement Samples/Second

Units/Count
Approx. Range
Number Title Unit High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
Low H i @h

CH3606X LIMIT CYCLE SW ON OFF i0 i


OFF POS
CH3607X SC CONTROL SOUHCE CMC SCS i0 i
SWITCH

CH3609X ROLL MAN ATT SW OFF ON i0 i


ACCEL CMD P0S

CiI3610X R MAN ATT SW MIN OFF ON i0 i


IMP CZ_I) POS
CH36i2X PITCH MAN ATT SW OFF ON i0 I

ACCEL CIMD POS


CH3613X P MAN ATT SW MIN OP}' ON i0 i
IMP CMD POS

CH3615X YAW MAN ATT SW OFf' ON i0 i


ACCEL CMD POS
CH3616X YAW MAN ATT SW OFF ON i0 i

MIN IMP CMI) POS


CH3623X GYRO i COM]3 SPIN LOW NORM i0 i
_fRS RUN DET
CH 3624 X GYRO 2 COMB SPIN LOW NORM i0 I
MTRS RUN DET
CH3635X BMAG MODE SW-ROLL OFF ON I0
ATT i RT 2
CH3636X BMAG MODE SW-ROLL OFF ON i0

RATE 2
CH3638X BMAG MODE SW-PITCH OFF ON i0

ATT i F{P 2
CH3639X BMAG MODE SW-PITCH OFF ON i0

RATE 2

CH3641X BMAG MODE SW-YAW OFF ON i0


ATT i RT 2
CI13642X BMAG MODE SW-YAW OFF ON i0

HATE 2
C_13666C TVC PITCH DIFF MA_ -800 +800 200
CURRENT

CR3667C TVC YAW DIFF MAMP -800 +800 i00


CURRENT

CJ0060J EKG COMMANDER LH MV NA NA 200


COUCH

CJO061J EKG CO_94ANDER CTR MV NA NA 200


COUCH
CJ 0062J EKG LM PILOT MV NA NA 200
RH COUCH
CJO200R RESP RATE CMD, OHM HA NA 50
CM/1/_ PILOT
CJO201R RESP RATE CM OHM NA NA 50
PILOT OTR COUCH

CJO202R RESP BATE LM PILOT OHM NA NA 50


RH COUCH

CKOO26A (]M ACCEL X-AXIS G -2 +i0 i00 0.05

CKOO27A CM ACCEL Y-AXIS G -2 +2 i00 0.016

B-i47
'IZBLE By-11.- COMMAND AND S_IVICE MODULE TELEME'IgY DA'IF; S[}g,g_iQ[- ('ont[nu{_d.

Measurement Samples/Second

Units/Count
Approx. Range
Number Title Unit High Bit l,ow Bit
Rate Rate
Low High

CK0028A CM ACCEL Z-AXIS G -2 +2 100 0.016


CKI051K RADIATION DOS- VDC 0 5 i0 0.02 - NL
IMETER i
CKI052K RADIATION DOS- VbC 0 5 i0 0.02 - NL
IMETER 2
CKIO53R DOSIMETER RATE VDC 0 5 i 0.02 - NL
CHANGE
CKI043 70mm HASSELBLAD OFF ON i00
CKI044 70mm LUNAR PHOTOG- OFF ON i00
RAPHY
SPOOOIP HE PRESS TANK PS i A o. 5000 i0 21
SP0002T HE TEMP TANK o ], -io@ +200 1 1.2
SPOOO3P PRESS OXIDIZER PSIA o 250 I0 1
TANKS
SPOO06P PRESS _IJEL TANKS PSIA o 250 lO
SPO022H POSITION FUEL/OX DEC 0 pO I0 0.h6
VLV 1 POT B
SP0023H POSITION FUEL/OX DEG 0 90 I0 0.46
VLV 2 POT B
SPO024H POSITION FUEL/OX DFG i0 0._6
o 90
VLV 3 POT B
SP0025H POSITION FUEL/OX DEG i0 o.46
o 9O
VLV 4 POT B
SPOO45T TEMP ENG VALVE BODY ° F 0 +200 I 0.8
SP0048T TEMP ENG FUEL FEED ° F 0 L+200 1 0.8
LINE
SP0049T TEMP ENG OX FEED op 0 +200 1 0.8
LINE
SP0054T TEMPi OX DISTRI- oF 0 +200 i 0.8
BUTION LINE
SPO057T TE_P i FUEL DISTRI- oF 0 +200 1 0.8
BtrfION LINE
SPOO61T ENG INJEC'rOR FLANGE Op o 600 I 2.3
TEMP NO i
SPO062T ENG INJECTOR FLANGE oF 0 6OO 1 2.3
TEMP NO 2
SP0600P ENG VLV ACT SYS PSIA 0 5000. i 21
TANK PR PRI
SP0601P ENG VLV ACT SYS PSIA 0 5OOO. i 21
TANK PR SEC
PCT i 0.2
SP0655Q QUAN OX TANK i 0 5O
PRI-TOTAL AUX
PCT 0 6o I 0.2
SP0656Q QUAN 0X TANK 2
PCT i 0.2
SP0657Q QUAN FUEL T,MIK i o 5o
PHI-TOTAL AUX
SP0658Q PCT 0 6o 1 0.2
QUAN FUEL TANK 2
SP0661P PRESS ENGINE PSIA 0 150 i00 0.6
CttAMBER
SPO930P PRESS FUEL SM/ENG PSIA o 300 i0 1.3
INTERFACE
SP0931P PRESS 0X SM/ENG PSIA 0 300 i0 1.3
INTERFACE

B-z48
TABLE B7-11.- cOMMAND AND sF/IVICE M(IDUI_ TELEMETRY DATA SUMMARY - Continued.

Measurement Samples/Second

Units/Count
Approx. Range
Number High Bit Low Bit
Title Unit
Rate Rate
Low High

CR00OIP HE PRESS TANK A PSIA 0. 5000 i i 21


CR0002P HE PRESS TANK B PSIA O. 5000 i i 21
CR0003T HE TEMP TANK A °F 0 +300 i0 1 1.2
CR0004T HE TEMP TANK B °F 0 +300 I0 i 1.2
CR0035P PRESS CM-RCS HE PSIA 0 400 i0 1 1.7
MANIFOLD i
CR0036P PRESS CM-RCS HE PSIA 0 bOO iO i 1.7
MANIFOLD 2

SRS001P HE PRESS TANK A 0 5000 i i 21


SR5002P HE PRESS TANK B 0 5000 i i 21
SR5003P HE PRESS TANK C 0 5000 1 1 21
SR500hP HE PRESS TANK D 0 5000 1 1 21
SR5013T HE TEMP TANK A 0 +i00 i0 i 0.4
SR501hT HE TEMP TANK B 0 +iO0 lO 1 0.4
SR5015T HE TEMP TANK C 0 +i00 i0 1 0.4
SR5016T HE TEMP TANK D 0 +i00 i0 1 0.4
SRS025q QUAN S_ RCS PRO 0 i i 0.02
SYS A
SR5026Q QUAN SM RCS PRO 0 5 1 i 0.02
SYS B
SR5027Q QUAN SM RCS PRO 0 5 1 1 0.02
SYS C
SR5028Q QUAN SM RCS PRO 0 5 i 1 0.02
SYS D
SR5065T TEMP ENGINE PACK- 0 +300 1 1.2
AGE A
SR5066T TEMP ENGINE PACK- 0 +300 1 1.2
AGE B
SR5067T TEMP ENGINE PACK- 0 +300 1 1.2
AGE C
SR5068T TEMP ENGINE PACK- 0 +300 i 1.2
AGE D
SR5729P A HE MANIFOLD PRESS 0 400 i0 1 1.7
SR5733P OX MANIFOLD PR 0 300 i0 1.3
SYS A
SR5737P FJEL MANIFOLD PR 0 400 i0 1 1.7
SYS A
SR5776P B HE MANIFOLD PRESS 0 400 i0 1 1.7
SR5780P OX MANIFOLD PR 0 300 i0 1.3
SYS B
SR578hP FUEL MANIFOLD PR 0 400 i0 1 1.7
SYS B
SR5817P C HE MANIFOLD PRESS C 400 i0 1 1.7
SR5820P OX MANIFOLD PR 0 300 i0 1.3
SYS C
SR5821P OX MANIFOLD PR O 300 i0 1.3
SYS D

B-149
TABLE B7-I]7.- COM},IANb i\ND LU,_<V[CE MODULE TE_{Y DATA gUb_%¾RY - Continued.

Measurement Samples/Second

Units/Count
Approx. Range
Number Title Unit High Bit Low Bit

Low High Rate Rate

SR5822P _UEL MM_IFOLD PI_ PSIA 0 400 i0 i 1.7


SYS C

SR5823P FUEL MA]_IFOLD PR PSIA 0 400 i0 i 1.7


SYS D
SR5830P D HE MANIFOLD PRESS PSIA 0 400 i0 1 1.7

BS0080X EDS ABORT REQUEST A NORM ABORT i0 1


BS0081X EDS ABORT REQUEST B NORM ABORT i0 i

CS0150X MASTER CAUTION- WARN/ NORM i0 i


WARNING ON OFF

LS0200H ANGLE OF ATTACK PSID C_ 5 i0 0.017

CS0220T TEMP DOCKING PROBE °F -i00 +300 i 1.7

CT0012X DSE TAPE MOTION OFF MOTION i0 i


MONITOR
crOOl5V SIG COND POS SUPPLY VDC _ 22 10 i 0.09
VOLTS
crool6v SIG OOND NEG SUPPLY VDC -22 C, i0 I 0.09
VOLTS

ur0017V SENSOR EXCITATION VDC O 5-P l0 i 0.02


5 VOLTS
CT0018V SENSOR EXCITATION VDC 0 ii. l0 1 0.04
i0 VOLTS
ur0120X PCM BIT RATE CHANGE LOW HIGH i 1
8 BIT
CT0125V PCM HI LEVEL 85 VI)C 0 +5 i0 1 0.02
PERCENT REF
OT0126V PCM HI LEVEL 15 VDC (, +5 i0 i O. 02
PERCENT REF
C_0262V UDL VALIDITY SIG NA NA 50 iO
4-BIT
CTO340X PCM SYNC SOURCE EXT INT EXT i0
OR INT
CT0620E S-BAND REC 1-2 AGC COUNTS i 254 i0 I i - NL
VOLTAGE
fff0640F S-BAND RCVR 1-2 COUNTS i 254 i0 i - NL
STATIC PH ERR

STO820K PROTON COUNT RATE K]iz 0 !©0 i0 0.015 - NL


CHANNEL 1
STO821K PROTON COUNT RATE K]iz 0 1,< i0 0.0015 - NL
CHANNEL 2
STO822K PROTON COUNT RATE Kiiz 0 J0 i0 0.0015 - NL
CHANNEL 3
STO823K PROTON COUNT RATE KHz 0 1% i0 0.0015 - NL
CHANNEL 4

STO830K ALPHA COUNT RATE KHz 0 l_ IO 0.0016 - NL

CHANNEL I
STO831K ALPHA COUNT RATE KHz 0 lO i0 0.0015 - NL
CHANNEL 2

B-150
'iTdtLE BY- fl •- <;(3,_,_,_r,,
_) AI'gD S]_{VICE MOD] ILE TELEMf_{Y DATA NL_,g@,I{Y - C,on,::lud _'<].

Measurement Samples/Second

Un i t s / Count

Approx. Range
High Bit Low Bit
Number Title Unit
Rate Rate
LOW High

ST0832K ALPHA COUNT RATE KHz 0 10 i0 0.0015 - NL

CHANNEL 3
ST0838K PHOTON-ALPHA INTEGH KHz 0 i00 i0 0.015 - NL

C_UNT RATE
oF -120 +200 1 1.2 - NL
ST08hOT TEMP NUCLEAR PAR-
TICLE bET
ST0841T TEMP NUCLEAR PAR- oF -120 +200 1 1.2 - NL

TICLE ANALYZER

NL - Non Linear

B-151
MISSIONCONTROL

The Flight Director in Mission Control is supported by a team of


specialists who are responsible for different aspects of spacecraft
operation. These specialists are located in Mission Control and sit in
front of console displays which provide real-time telemetry data. Each
specialist is in voice contact with a group of support personnel in
adjacent rooms who also have access to real-time telemetry data. See
Appendix A, Part A4 for a description of the organization of Mission
Control.

The display console for the CSMElectrical and Environmental


Engineer (EECOM)is shownin figure B7-7 and is representative of the
type of displays available to all the specialists in the Mission Con-
trol Center. The two television monitors on the console are used to
display real-time telemetry data. Although various data formats are
available to the EECOM_ the two displays most frequently in use are
shown in figures B7-8 and B7-9. These displays are updated once per
second.

As an aid in recognizing out-of-tolerance parameters and space-


craft events, three groups of event indicators are provided at the top
of the console. The lights on these panels which alert the EECOM to
out-of-tolerance parameters are referred to as limit sense lights. A
limit sense light comeson whenever the parameter in question falls
outside of high and low limits which are manually set by the EECOM for
that particular parameter. Amongthe 72 lights on panel 3, there are
a total of 12 limit sense lights for pressure, temperature, and quantity
in each cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tank. In normal operation, the
EECOMsets fairly tight limits on the limit sense lights in order to
get an immediate indication of parameter variations. Consequently, it
is not unusual for several limit sense lights to be burning.

Besides the limit sense lights, there are lights which indicate
spacecraft events. One of these_ located in the _pper row of panel 9,
indicates the presence of a master caution and warning in the spacecraft.
The following is a list of the system specialists in Mission Control:

(a) Retrofire Officer (RETRO)- responsible for abort planning,


deorbit/entry times, and landing point prediction.

(b) Flight Dynamics Officer (FIDO) - responsible for coordinating


and participating in mission planning and the control of the trajectory
aspects of the mission, including powered flight trajectory, abort, and
orbital GO/NOGOdecision.

B-152
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BII[]I 1I1,[!!1 tlt
BUD!Jl ![I I1!t I111 i:l 1.4o
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B-154
0

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B-155
(c) Guidance Officer (GUIDO) - responsible for the utilization of
the guidance and navigation system_ correlation of inertial alignment,
and evaluation of terminal phase actions in support of rendezvous.

(d) CSM Electrical, Environmental, and Communications Engineer


(EECOM) - responsible for monitoring and evaluating the performance of
the electrical power, environmental control, instrumentation, and sequen-
tial systems of the command and service modules.

(e) CSM Guidance and Navigation Officer (GNC) - responsible for


monitoring and evaluating the performance of the guidance and navigation,
propulsion, and stabilization and control systems of the command and
service modules.

(f) LM Electrical, Environmental, and EMV Officer (TELMU) - respon-


sible for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the primary
guidance and navigation, abort guidance, control electronics, ascent
propulsion, descent propulsion_ and reaction control systems of the
lunar module.

(g) LM Control Officer (CONTROL) - responsible for monitoring and


evaluating the performance of the electrical, communications, instru-
mentation, sequential, and environmental control systems of the lunar
module.

(h) Instrumentation and Communication Officer (INCO) responsible


for monitoring and evaluating the performance of spacecraft communica-
tions systems.

(i) Procedures Officer (PROCEDURES) responsible for the detailed


procedures implementation of Mission Control.

(j) Flight Activities Officer (FA0) - responsible for the detailed


implementation of the flight plan and its revision.

(k) Aeromedical Officer (SURGEON) - directs all operational medical


activities concerned with the mission.

B-156
The following table lists the membersof the White and Black
Mission Control teams. The White Teamwas on duty at the time of the
accident_ and manyof the Black Teammemberswere in Mission Control
preparatory to their going on duty about an hour later.

Position White Black

Flight Director E. F. Kranz G. S. Lunney


Asst. Flt. Dir. J. M. Leeper L. W. Keyser
RETRO B. T. Spencer T. E. Weichel
FIDO W. M. Stoval W. J. Boone
GUIDO W. E. Fenner J. G. Renick
EECOM S. A. Liebergot W. C. Burton
GNC B. N. Willoughby J. A. Kamman
TELMU R. H. Heselmeyer W. M. Merritt
CONTROL L. W. Strimple H. A. Loden
INCO G. B. Scott T. L. Hanchett
PROCEDURES J. R. Fucci E. W. Thompson
FAO E. B. Pippert T. R. Lindsey
SURGEON W. R. Hawkins G. F. Humbert

B-157
REFERENCES

. Anon.: Apollo 13 Mission 5-Day Report. MSC-02429, Manned Spacecraft


Center, April 1970.

. Anon.: Apollo 19 Technical Air-to-Ground Voice Transcription, Manned


Spacecraft Center, April 1970.

3. Anon.: Spacecraft Operations for S.V. Countdown/Countdown Demonstra-


tion. FO-K-O007-SCI09, North American Rockwell Corp., Feb. 5, 1970.

. Anon.: Mission Director's Summary Report, Apollo 13. Manned Space-


craft Center, April 20, 1970.

. Anon.: Apollo 13 Mission Operations Report. Manned Spacecraft Center,


April 28, 1970.

. Anon.: Saturn AS-505 M + 5 Day Report. Marshall Space Flight Center,


April 22, 1970.

. Manned Spacecraft Center: Flight Data File. (The complete set of


checklists, procedures, activity timeline books, and flight plan
carried on board the spacecraft).

NASA -- MSC

B-158
APPEN DIX C

REPORT OF MANUFACTURING
AND TEST PANEL
CONTENTS

Part Page

APPENDIX C - REPORT OF MANUFACTURING AND TEST


PANEL

CI TASK ASSIGNMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ........ C-I

C2 ORGANIZATION ................... C-3

C3 SUMMARY ...................... C-5

C4 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS ................ C-9

MANUFACTURE AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING OF THE


CRYOGENIC OXYGEN STORAGE TANKS ........ C-9

Summary of the Standard Tank Manufacturing


Process ................... c-9

Acceptance Testing .............. c-63

Summary of Significant Aspects of the


Manufacture and Acceptance Test of
Cryogenic Oxygen Storage Tank Serial
No. 10024XTA0008 .............. C-65

Investigation of Manufacturing Process and


Supporting Analysis ............. C-66

INTEGRATION, SYSTEM TESTING, AND PRELAUNCH


CHECKOUT OF THE CRYOGENIC OXYGEN STORAGE
TANKS ..................... C-72

Summary of Nominal Processes and


Procedures ................. C-72

Summary of Significant Aspects of Serial


No. 0008 Tank Prelaunch Integration
Test and Checkout History .......... C-77

Investigation and Supporting Work ....... C-94

iii
This page left blank intentionally.

iv
PART CI

TASK ASSIGNMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

Panel 2 was assigned the responsibility of reviewing manufacturing


and testing associated with spacecraft equipment involved in the flight
failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the analysis
of the design. In particular, the Panel was to examine discrepancies
noted during the fabrication, assembly, and test of components of the
oxygen portion of the cryogenic gas storage system within the service
module in order to determine any correlations between such preflight
discrepancies and the actual inflight events.

Members of the Panel observed actual assembly of an oxygen tank


and the oxygen shelf at various stages of assembly at the contractor
facilities and reviewed documentation relating to the course of Apollo
13 equipment from manufacturing through test to launch. In addition,
the Panel reviewed parts and material qualification data, inspection
reports, reliability and quality control records_ and preflight test
and checkout procedures and results. Throughout the course of its
review, Panel 2 concentrated on determining whether manufacturing or
test procedures could adversely affect reliable conduct of flight. The
steps in the manufacturing and testing of the suspected components were
studied so as to evaluate various equipment acceptance procedures.
Finally, the Panel attempted to relate observed flight events back to
individual points in the manufacturing and testing process in order to
determine if any correlation was probable.

C-I
This page left blank intentionally.

C-2
PART C2

ORGANI ZAT I ON

Panel 2 was chaired by Mr. H. M. Schurmeier, Jet Propulsion


Laboratory, and the Board Monitor was Dr. J. F. Clark, Goddard Space
Flight Center. Panel members were:

Mr. E. F. Baehr, Lewis Research Center


Mr. K. L. Heimburg, Marshall Space Flight Center
Mr. B. T. Morris, Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Specific assignments covering such areas as subsystem testing,


fabrication process, and reliability and quality assurance were given
to each Panel Member. In reaching Panel conclusions, however, all
Members participated in the weighing and evaluation of data.
This page left blank intentionally.

c-4
PART C3

SUMMARY

The basic tank provides a thermally isolated pressure vessel struc-


ture that is relatively straightforward to manufacture. The manufactur-
ing process has reasonable controls and provides tanks of high structural
quality.

The manufacture of the internally mounted equipment is somewhat


more complex because of the large number of parts that are required to
make these assemblies. The careful use of jigs, fixtures, and the
detailed Manufacturing Operations Procedures (MOP) adequately controls
these steps and provides hardware fully meeting the structural design
requirements as stated on the engineering drawings.

The most noteworthy manufacturability shortcoming of the design


is the routing of the wires from the electrical devices within the tank.
The passageways are small, adjacent metal corners are relatively sharp,
and the condition of the insulation cannot be inspected after assembly.
The assembly process is very difficult and even though detailed MOP's
are provided and the technicians are skilled and experienced in these
operations, the resultant product is of questionable quality because of
the many opportunities to damage the insulation on the wires. Even in
the assembled condition_ the wires can be damaged because of the lack
of support and restraint and the exposure to turbulent fluid during
tanking, detanking_ and purging operations.

Another notable shortcoming of the design is the very loose toler-


ances specified for the tank fill tube connecting parts. The tolerance
range permitted by the engineering drawings can result in a fill tube
assembly that can fall out of place if the parts are at or near the low
tolerance limits. The parts cannot be assembled if their size averages
much larger than nominal. Even with all parts of the fill tube assembly
near the nominal sizes specified, adequate diametral clearance exists
for a sizable gas leakage path.

The Globe Industries, Inc., fan motors have had a history of numer-
ous problems. Many design changes were introduced to overcome these
problems. The most prevalent problem was dielectric breakdown within
the stator windings. Process changes and the addition of 300 volts rms
phase-to-phase dielectric tests during stator assembly greatly reduced
the incidence rate of this problem.

The standard acceptance procedures adequately cover all functional


requirements for normal flight use but do not check the ability of the
heater thermostats (thermostatic switches) to function under load,

C-5
nor do they state a requirement for proper functioning of the fill tube
assembly, which must function as a dip tube during detanking operations.

The manufacturing history of tank no. 2 of Service Module 109


(10024XTA0008) before delivery from Beech was unusual only to the extent
that the tank was reworked twice after initial closure, once to replace
a heater tube assembly including both motor fans and once to replace
pinch-off tube assemblies used in evacuation of the annulus volume
between the tank shells.

The test history was unusual only to the extent that the high but
acceptable heat leak characteristic caused months of delay in tank
acceptance. No direct evidence of any particular characteristic of
this tank at delivery from Beech, as distinguished from any other
Block II oxygen tank, was found that would correlate with the Apollo 13
flight accident.

The normal procedure at the conclusion of the heat leak tests at


Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder_ Colorado, calls for expelling the
last 25 pounds of the remaining liquid oxygen through the "fill" line
by applying pressure to the vent line with gaseous nitrogen. Although
the tank assembly is on a weighing system which has a resolution of
0.3 pound, and the procedure calls for continuing the application of
vent line pressure until both the weighing system and quantity probe
indicate the tank is empty, no data were recorded that verify that
remaining oxygen was expelled as a liquid. At the time no one indicated
that the response of the tank to the procedures was anything but normal,
and today careful review of existing data, discussions with the responsible
Beech Aircraft and North American Rockwell personnel, and a special test
at Beech Aircraft indicates that the detanking of the 0008 tank was most
probably normal.

The manufacturing and test procedures and activities for inte-


grating the oxygen storage tanks into the service module were thoroughly
detailed and closely monitored with respect to procedures. They involved
checkouts with dry gas only, until cryogenic oxygen reaches the tanks
during the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) at Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
a few weeks before launch. Between the tank acceptance and CDDT only
pressure vessel integrity and electrically observable phenomena of the
inner tank elements are tested. No tests are performed to check the
ability of the thermostats to interrupt either the spacecraft-supplied
heater power (about 2.8 amps at 28 V dc) or the GSE power (about 6 amps
at 65 V dc).

In August 1968, oxygen shelf assemblies at North American Rockwell


(NR), Downey, were scheduled to be modified to add potting to the
dc-to-dc converters of oxygen tank v_-ion pumps for electromagnetic
interference prevention. During factory procedures with the oxygen

c-6
shelf assembly incorporating tank 10024XTA0008 in the tank no. 2 position
in Service Module 106 at NR, Downey, a handling fixture incident (ini-
tiated by failure to remove an unnoticed shelf bolt) subjected this tank
to unexpected Jolts. These included the apparent shelf damaging contact
of the tank with the fuel cell shelf and drop of the tank with the shelf
to the normal oxygen mounts. Such elements as the fill tube segments
appear vulnerable to this incident. No record of investigation into the
internal condition of the tank other than pressure and electrical circuit
test could be found. Manufacturing and test records do not show engineer-
ing assistance related to conditions internal to the oxygen storage tank.

Service Module 106 was promptly repaired and fitted with a different
oxygen shelf already modified (ultimately it flew as Apollo I0). The
tank and the oxygen shelf now under review were re-inspected and retested
during the first 3 weeks of November 1968. They were then installed in
Service Module 109 (used in the Apollo 13 flight). This service module
was completed, tested, and checked out normally thereafter, so far as
the oxygen system was concerned, and transported to KSC in mid-1969.

During integrated test and checkout at KSC, no major anomaly


occurred until the tank-emptying phase of the CDDT, March 23, 1970.
After this first cryogenic oxygen loading since February 1967, expulsion
of liquid oxygen through the "fill" line under gas pressure applied
through the vent line was not achieved. Evidence supporting the
assumptions of leakage or dislodgment of the fill line segments (two
Teflon elbows and one short Inconel tube) in the top of the quantity
probe assembly within the oxygen tank was produced at KSC in the
processes of emptying the tank.

Special methods used for emptying on March 27 and 28, 1970, and
again on March 30, involved protracted operation of the tank heaters
and fans for many hours and at maximum heater voltage. In conjunction
with this heating, cyclic gas pressurization and blowdown was used to
achieve rapid boiling to remove oxygen from the tank. Analyses of
data taken during the early portion of these procedures confirm boiling
as sufficient to detank the observed quantities.

These methods were not supported by previous comparable operations


with any other Apollo CSM cryogenic oxygen storage tank. Thus it was
not demonstrated separately that such operation could be accomplished
without degradation or hazard in the subsequent flight use of the tank.

A review of all the evidence available indicates that this tank


(at least the fill line segments) most probably arrived at the CDDT in
a different condition than that in which it was last tested at Beech
Aircraft Corporation.

c-7
Tests were conducted at the Manned Spacecraft Center to evaluate
the effects of the sustained heater operation during the special de-
tanking operation at KSC on March 27, 1970. These tests demonstrated
that the thermostats would weld closed when they attempted to interrupt
the 5.9 amps, 65 volts dc GSE power (a condition for which they were
neither designed nor qualified) resulting in their failing to limit
the temperature inside the tank. The tests also showed that with the
heaters on continuously and as the cryogenic liquid boiled away,
temperatures in the 700 ° to i000 ° F range would exist on portions of
the heater tube in contact with the motor wires. These temperatures
severely damaged the Teflon insulation even in the nitrogen atmosphere
of these tests. Small-scale tests subjecting Teflon insulated wires
to 700 ° to i000 ° F temperature oxygen atmosphere indicated even more
severe damage to the Teflon insulation.

Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the special detanking


procedures employed on tank 0008 at KSC prior to launch of Apollo 13
severely damaged the insulation of the motor wiring inside the tank.

A more complete test is being conducted at Beech Aircraft,


Boulder, Colorado, to simulate the special detanking operations used
at KSC on March 27-28 and 30, 1970. This test will utilize a flight
configuration tank, simulated KSC ground support equipment, and will
be conducted using oxygen.

c-8
PART C-4

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

MANUFACTURE AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING


OF THE CRYOGENIC OXYGEN STORAGE TANKS

The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks are manufactured by the Beech


Aircraft Corporation, Boulder Division_ located north of Boulder, Colorado.
The tank consists of a spherical high-pressure inner vessel wrapped with
multiiayer insulation contained within a thin external metal vacuum jacket.
Inside the pressure vessel are a heater and fan assembly (two heaters and
two fans), a quantity measuring probe_ and a temperature sensor. Many of
the parts and subassemblies that comprise this tank are purchased by Beech
from subcontractors and vendors located throughout the United States.

The detailed instructions for the manufacture and assembly of these


tanks and their subassemblies at Beech are controlled by Manufacturing
Operations Procedures (MOP). In addition to instructing the technicians_
the MOP also calls out the presence and activities of the inspectors.

Summary of the Standard Tank Manufacturing Process

The inner pressure vessel is made from two forged hemispheres of


!nconel 718 alloy. The rough-machined heat-treated forgings are supplied
by the Cameron Iron Works, Houston, Texas. The physical, chemical, and
metallurgical properties (X-ray, ultrasonic scan, and microstructure) of
these forgings are tested and certified by Cameron. The Airite Division
of Electrodata Corp., Los Angeles, California_ does the final machining
and electron beam welding. Prior to welding a very thorough inspection
is made of each hemisphere. About 430 thickness checks are made to assure
compliance to dimensional accuracy requirements. Each hemisphere is
thoroughly X-rayed and dye-penetrant inspected for defects. The internal
parts that support the heater probe assembly are made by Beech and supplied
to Airite for installation prior to making the electron beam equatorial
weld. A rather elaborate five-step welding process is used in making this
equatorial weld (figs. C4-I and C4-2). The first step is a series of tack
welds. The second step is a seal weld of shallow penetration. The third
step is a deep-penetration weld. The fourth step is a shallower and wider
weld to blend surfaces. The fifth weld is called a cover pass which is
still wider and shallower for final surface blending. The completed vessel
is X-rayed and then pressure tested. A hydrostatic proof pressure of
+00
i_51 psig -55 is applied for _ minutes using water. The volumetric ex-
pansion during the proof-pressure test is determined by measuring the
weight increase of water contained within the test specimen. A leak test

c°9
Joint configuration _ _. 020+'005

I I -- _O.D. surface

-- .... P//'I_TX - - .... T+


.111_.oo2,. .1_±.oo2 o_jl 0o2

s ,, ce

L
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.012 •

. Weld reinforcement

P/M th ickness Tank radius Dimensions


L T O,D, I.D.
+.002 +005
1.000 ,084 14.808 refar c 12.528 -0 Sphrad
+,002 +005
2.000 .067 14.808 refar c 12.528 -0 Sphrad
+ 004 +005
3.000 .059_ 000 12.587 refarc 12.528 -0 Sphrad

Weld schedule (Electron beam weld)

Pass sequence
Parameter 1-tack 2-seal 3-pene. 1 4-pene .2 5-c over
Voltage- Kv 80 80 115 95 85
Amperes - MA 1.5 1.5 6.0 4.0 3.0
Beam deflection - in. 0.012 0.012 .024/.036 .040/.080 0.110
Travel- in./min 18 --"_- --"- _"
Vacuum -mm hg 2 X I O-4 _,- --_- I_ II

Notes: (1) 0.002" gap, 0,00_3" offset (maxtyp)


(2) No weld repairs allowed
(15) Typical weld sequence shown on attached sketch

Figure C4-i,- Girth weld joint configuration and schedule.

C-IO
O.D. surface
___ass 1 and 2 (tack and seal)

!
.112 ref
weld reinf

|
L
t
I.D. surface eld joint

3 (penetration 1)
Fusion zofle . ass

t t
Fusion zone _ IF Pass 4 (penetration)

Fusion zone__

Figure C4-2.- Weld sequence.

C-II
is madeat 925 psig ±15 using helium. These tests are performed by the
Beech Test Department before acceptance. The completed vessels, along
with substantiating data, are shipped to Beech for assem01y.

The inner pressure vessel is cleaned for oxygen service and sealed
in plastic. Whenscheduled for application of insulation, the vessel,
the insulation, and the other necessary piece parts and supplies are moved
to a small room annex to an area known as the Respectable Room. (The
Respectable Room, its annexes, a_d the Ultra Clean Roomtogether are
known as the Apollo Assembly Area.)

All assembly operations performed in these rooms are in accord with


standard clean room techniques, _.e., lint-free gowns, caps, and gloves.
A simple entrance airlock has a motorized shoe brush and vacuumcleaner
but the brushes are disabled so as not to rotate under motor power. There
is no air scrub.

The insulation is applied to the inner vessel in gore panels, a layer


at a time. The insulation consists of many layers of Dexiglas Insulation
paper (C. H. Dextar & Son, Inc.), fiberglass, mats, aluminum foil, and
aluminized Mylar. Each layer is carefully applied to the vessel, tem-
porarily held in place with tape, trimmed for fit, and then finally held
in place by thin nylon threads. After the threads are in place the tape
is removed. The joints in succeeding layers are shifted so as to effec-
tively block the flow of heat. _he aluminum foil layers are checked with
an ohmmeterto assure no electrical contact with inner vessel or adjacent
foil layers. About halfway thro_gh the insulation process, a tube is in-
stalled which goes from the vacuumdomearea to the equator, around the
equator, and back to the domearea. This is called the vapor cool shield
(VCS). (See fig. C4-3.)

After all the insulation is applied, the external metal jacket is


installed. These parts are madeby Chemtronics, Inc. The main upper and
lower hemispheres are deep drawn and chem-milled. The equatorial flange
is machined from a ring forging (fig. C4-4). All parts are madeof
Inconel 750 alloy. An assembly of the lower hemisphere and equatorial
flange is madeby Heli-arc welding. A shield is placed over the in-
sulation in the region of the final closure weld between the lower
hemisphere-flange assembly and t_Leupper hemisphere shell. After these
parts are positioned over the in;ulated pressure vessel, the circum-
ferential weld to join them is madeby the automatic Heli-arc welding
process using argon gas for iner_ing the weld zone. The welds in the
vacuumjacket are then X-ray inspected to insure integrity.
Figure C4-5 shows the major subassemblies required to complete the
oxygen tank assembly. A]I componentsand piece parts required to build
subassemblies are cleaned for liquid oxygen service, grouped as required

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Install upper shell assembly
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Install heat shield assembly

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Install lower shell assembly

Figure C4-4.- Installation of vacut_m jacket.

C-14
Upper coil assembly
Electrical connector

Quantity probe

Heater and
,/'_'fan assembly

I j
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Figure C4-5.- Major subassemblies required for tank assembly.

C-15
for each subassembly (kitted), and sealed in a clear nylon plastic bag
which is then sealed in a clear polyethylene bag. These kits are stored
for the subassembly and assembly operations which are performed in various
rooms of the Apollo Assembly Area.

The heater and fan assembly is made from numerous small parts welded,
brazed, riveted, or bolted together (fig. C4-6). The first operation in-
stalls the lower pump nozzle assembly into the lower motor housing. These
parts are positioned in a jig and then fusion welded in place. After this
weld is X-rayed, the part is turned to trim the inside diameter and to
assure roundness. The lower motor housing is then positioned and welded
to the central tube. The weld zone is X-rayed and the entire assembly is
pickled and passivated. The two helically preformed stainless-tube-encased
nichrome heating elements are then slid in place. Before proceeding the
heaters are tested for resistance and isolation from ground. The upper
motor housing tube is then positioned and welded to the central heater
tube. After this weld is X-rayed, the heaters are positioned and silver
soldered in position. After the heater tube is thoroughly cleaned to re-
move any silver solder flux, the tube (conduit) that routes the wires from
the lower motor past the heater elements is installed by riveting the two
small clips to the inside of the central tube. Small aluminum shims are
riveted to the inner surface of the heater tube to provide a flat surface
for the mounting of the thermostats. The unit is then vacuum baked at
200 ° F to remove any moisture from the heater assembly. The resistance
and insulation tests are again run to assure that the brazing has not
damaged the heaters and that the units are thoroughly dry.

At this point the heater tube is ready for the installation of the
thermostats. The thermostats are purchased from the Spencer Thermostat
Division of Metals and Controls, Inc., Attleboro, Massachusetts. Each
thermostat is subje_'ted to detailed acceptance testing by Metals and
Controls, Inc., and these data are supplied to Beech with the serialized
switches. The acceptance testing consists of a I000 V ac dielectric
test for I minute, a visual check for workmanship, a dimensional check
to drawing size callouts, a 5-rminute soak in liquid nitrogen, the open-
ing temperature, the closing temperature, a second 5-minute soak in
liquid nitrogen, a recheck of the opening temperature, a recheck of the
closing temperature, a leak test to check hermetic seal, a megohm test,
the final inspection marking, a recording of number of cycles on the
unit as shipped, the actual weight of unit, and visual packing and ship-
ping inspection. Throughout all testing by Metal and Controls, the
thermostats are checked by using 6.5 V ac and a small lamp drawing ap-
proximately I00 milliamps. Incoming inspection at Beech is limited to
a visual examination.

The thermostats are inserted into the tube with their hook-type
terminals extending to the outside of the heater tube and bolted in
place. This heater tube assembly is then cleaned and bagged for future
assembly operations.

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The electric motor fans are purchased from Globe Industries, Inc.
These motors go through a thorough acceptance test at Globe before
delivery to Beech. In addition to the normal visual and mechanical in-
spection, the motors are functionally tested at both ambient and cryo-
genic conditions. A i000 V dc dielectric strength test is applied be-
tween the windings and case. The isolation must be at least 2 megohms.
The motor is then operated on 115 V ac 400 cycles, and the following
characteristics are measured and recorded: (i) speed and current of
motor when operating with a calibrated test fan, and (2) line current
and total power both running and still. The motors are then operated in
liquid nitrogen. These checks are limited to assuring that the motor
starts and runs smoothly and that coastdown time is at least 30 seconds.

At Beech the normal visual incoming inspection was performed and


then these parts were stored until ready to be incorporated into the
heater and fan assembly.

The kits of parts and components required for the heater and fan
assembly are moved to an annex room of the Respectable Area where this
assembly operation is performed on a laminar flow bench. The necessary
tools are cleaned and laid out for ease in the assembly process. An
assembly aid is used to support the fan and heater tube in the hori-
zontal position.

The lower electric motor is now installed. The electrical leads


are provided by the motor supplier (four 26-gage nickel with Teflon
insulation twisted i0 turns to the foot with a 2-inch-long Teflon sleeve
adjacent to the motor) (fig. C4-7). These leads are routed parallel to
the motor shaft through a shallow groove milled half in the motor end
cap and half in the motor support tube (figs. C4-8 and C4-9). From
this channel the wires are routed against the inner surface of the
motor tube in the region of the impeller. The wires then emerge through
a hole in the motor housing tube (ungrommeted). The motor is inserted
in the end of the tube (fig. C4-I0) and the motor end plate is installed.
Shims are used as required under this motor end cap to provide 0.090-inch
to O.040-inch end clearance between the impeller and the nozzle. _en
ti_e proper shims are selected and installed, the four end cap screws
are torqued to the required value (fig. C4-II). The end cap is bolted
to the support tube by four radial countersunk machine bolts, small
segment-shaped shims, and self-locking nuts (all metal).

When the location of the lower motor is verified as having the


correct impeller-to-nozzle clearance, the wire routing task continues.
The wires travel axially about 2 inches (fig. C4-12) where they go in-
board through a Teflon grommet into the inner conduit and travel the
length of the heater section to a symmetrical location where they again
emerge to the exterior through a Teflon grommet. A single insulated
wire is used to pull the motor leads through this conduit route.

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The installation of the upper motor follows the same general sequence
except that once the leads emerge from the tube they do not reenter the
heater tube but remain as a twisted bundle of four wires encased in a
Teflon sleeve.

Next a small copper band is formed around the upper and lower motor
wire bundles in the areas where the impellers of the fans are located to
assure that the wires maintain the required clearance with the impellers
(approximately 0.030 inch) (figs. C4-13 and C4-1h). The ends of these
bands are sweat soldered together to retain the wires. The motor leads
external to the heater tube are then encased in Teflon shrink tubing.
White tubing is used for the lower motor leads and clear tubing is used
for the upper motor leads.

The leads are then installed for the heaters. One wire from each
heater is soldered to its thermostat. The lead wires (20-gage silver-
plated copper with Teflon insulation) are soldered, one to the other
terminal of the thermostat and the other wire to the second lead of the
nichrome heater element. Separate leads (four total; two for each
heater) are provided to extend to the electrical connector fitted out-
side the dome at the top of the vacuum jacket. Again a cleaning operation
is performed to remove any solder flux. Standard 60-percent tin and
40-percent lead solder is used for all electrical connections.

The entire heater and fan probe assembly is subjected to a detailed


component acceptance test to assure proper operation. The unit is placed
in a controllable temperature oven. Starting from about i00 ° F, the
oven temperature is slowly lowered until the closing of each heater therm-
ostat is noted by means of a Wheatstone bridge. While in this closed
position, the resistance value of each heater element is measured and re-
corded. The oven temperature is then slowly raised to detect the opening
temperature for each thermostat. With the unit removed from the oven,
the resistance value of each motor winding is measured and recorded. The
heaters and motors are subjected to a dielectric strength test at 500 V dc
with a maximum allowable leakage current of 0.25 milliamps permitted.
The insulation resistance of both heaters and both motors is measured and
must indicate a minimum of 2 megohms isolation. The proper operation of
the motors is verified in two vertical orientations at full voltage and
at two vertical and one horizontal orientations at reduced voltage
(80 + 2 Vac). The time in tenths of hours and number of motor starts are
recorded for each test sequence and this is added to the previous history
for continuity. The entire assembly is then cleaned for liquid oxygen
service, bagged, and stored for future use.

The upper coil assembly as shown on figure C4-5 consists of five


coiled tubes to provide the necessary resistance in the heat flow path,
an adapter to fit the tank neck, a seal-off plate for the side of the
coil housing (vacuum dome), end fittings for the feed lines (that connect

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to the vapor cool shield), and a connector adapter fitting. These tubes
are formed by a subcontractor in Denver. The material for all tubes is
Inconel 750. All bending is performed using a flexible chain mandrel of
Ampcobronze and Ucon lubricant (water soluble). The various piece parts
are carefully cleaned and Jigged for Heli-arc welding into an assembly.
The supply line filter is installed and safety wired. The assembly is
X-rayed, recleaned, and bagged for future use.

The quantity probe is a purchased item which is procured from


SimmondsPrecision complete with leads and temperature sensor installed
with leads attached (fig. C4-15). This unit is madeof two concentric
aluminumtubes for the capacitance-type quantity (density) probe with
Teflon spacer buttons located in drilled holes in the inner tube to pro-
vide centering action. The lower ends of the concentric tubes terminate
in a glass-filled Teflon bushing. This bushing acts as a lower pilot
support and also provides a nonconducting extension of the inner tube
which is also utilized as a dip tube for the filling and detanking
operations. The axial relationship of the inner and outer aluminum
tubes is controlled by a single rivet installed through Teflon bushings
near the upper end of the assembly.
The upper end of the outer aluminum tube is supported in a large
glass-filled Teflon bushing which is riveted to an Inconel tube for final
support to the tank adapter. This upper bushing has two axial holes to
provide routing for the motor and heater leads. The temperature sensing
element is mounted on the side of this bushing. Axially aligned pins
through two 0.44-inch cross-drilled holes are used as Junction points be-
tween the short leads from the temperature sensor and the 48-inch-long
extension leads. Two 22-gage wires are used for each extension lead of
the sensor (a total of four wires). The capacitance element leads consist
of a shielded 20-gage wire for the inner tube and an unshielded 20-gage
wire for the outer. Two channel-shaped clips are riveted to the upper
ends of the aluminum tubes to solder the lead wires on. The quantity
sensor leads are encased in a clear Teflon shrink sleeve. The temperature
sensor leads are encased in a separate clear Teflon shrink sleeve. All
solder Joints are madewith 60-percent tin, 40-percent lead solder.

After incoming inspection of this Simmonds-manufacturedassembly


verifies conformance to the purchase specifications, the unit is cleaned
for liquid oxygen service, bagged, and stored for future use.

The parts required for the complete assembly of the quantity probe
are then drawn from storage. The first operation is the installation of
two insulated pull wires through the holes provided in the quantity probe
to route the heater and motor leads. The quantity probe wires, temperature
sensor wires, and two pull wires are pulled through the electrical conduit
by first pushing a single wire through. All wires are attached to this
pull wire to be pulled into the conduit (figs. C4-16 through C4-19). The

C-28
Vent line and electrical
conduit also pass Fill
Adapter cap inconel

Inconel

Teflon adapte_ t
)erattlre serisor
and quantity probe
Inconel tube__ II
Teflon adapter
Tubular elements of
capacitor (_lunfinum)

.224 dia holes, two


.232

places for heaterJ Hole for temperature


and motor wiring sensor wiring

Glass filled
Probe is manufactured teflon insulator
by Simmonds Precision
Temperature
Products Inc.
sensor element
is mounted on
this insulator

Fixed insulator

-_[__ _ _

Figure Cl4-15.- gross seetion of quantity probe.

C-29
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into upper coil assembly.

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next items to install are the Teflon adapters and the connecting tube
for the fill tube (figs. C4-20 through C4-22). With these parts in
place, the quantity probe is bottomed in the counter-bore of the tank
tube adapter (fig. C4-23). The fill tube parts are then checked to
assure that they are in the proper position by use of a blunt probe
through the side holes in the outer tube (fig. C4-2_). The electrical
feedthrough holes are aligned by eye with the electrical conduit and
the entire unit is clamped into a jig for welding (figs. C4-25 through
C_-27). Four i/4-inch-long welds are positioned away from wires and
the Teflon fill tube adapter to secure the assembly (figs. C4-28 and
C4-29). The Unit is then inspected, cleaned, and bagged for future
assembly into the tank.

Prior to final assembly of the tank, all major subassemblies are


subjected to component acceptance tests. Specifically these major
components are the following: pressure vessel, motor heater fan assembly,
coil assembly, probe assembly, and the electrical connector. These
tests check all functional aspects that are possible at that level of
assembly, electrical isolation, pressure integrity, etc., as appropriate
for particular components. These components are then moved to an area
referred to as the Ultra Clean Room (a class I00,000 laminar flow clean
room) for the final assembly. Operations in this area are performed
in full lint-free nylon suits, boots, caps, and rubber gloves. Entry
to this clean room is from the Apollo Assembly Area with a simple dress-
ing room airlock for changing clothes. All equipment moves into and
out of the area through airlocks.

The actual final assembly starts with opening the tank by removing
the temporary shipping plug from the tank neck (fig. C_-30). Through-
out the entire assembly operation, a vacuum cleaner nozzle is positioned
adjacent to the tank to help reduce the possibility of dust or lint
entering the tank. The heater assembly is then lowered part way into
the tank (figs. C4-31 and C4-32). With the assembly held about halfway
into the tank, the wires are fed in beside the heater until they are
completely inside the tank. The heater is then lowered until the lower
motor adapter pin is in the lower support bracket (fig. C_-33). The
last portion of this lowering is accomplished by use of duckbill pliers
(fig. C4-34). The top portion is then positioned for the upper bolt
to be installed. The bolt is inserted by means of a wire holding loop
and started by hand (figs. C4-35 and C4-36). This bolt is tightened
with an open-end wrench with final torquing achieved by a combination
of the open-end wrench and a standard torque wrench. The torque value
is adjusted to account for the combined lever arm effect of the wrenches.
At this point the wires are fished from the tank with hook (fig. C4-37).
The wires are then checked and any tangles are removed. A small stain-
less safety wire is attached to the wires and they are lowered into
the tank again (fig. C4-38).

Next a probe support fixture is attached to the tank neck and the
probe is lowered about two thirds of the way into the tank (fig. C4-39).

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Figure C4-31.- I_iserting fan and heater probe.

C-46
Figure C4-32.- Feec_i_<_
.... wires into tank
beside heater _mobe.

C-4T
Figure C4-33.- View inside tank showin_ heater
r)robe in lower support.

C-_8
Figure C4-34.- Fina_ lowering of heater probe.

C-49
Figure C4-35.- Wire loop used to _stall
heater probe retaining ]_olt.

C-50
_igure C4-36.- View inside tank showing heater probe
upper retaining bolt.

C-51
Figure C_-37.- Pulling wires from tank.

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C-99
Figure CI_-39.- Quantity probe being installed in fixture
and heater probe wires being pulled from the tank.

C-5_
At this point the wires are once again withdrawn from the tank. Again
amy possible tangles are removed. Then the pull wires previously in-
stalled in the probe are soldered to the motor and heater lead bundles.
The solder joints are thoroughly cleaned and taped to made a smooth
transition from each single pull wire to each bundle of six leads.
These wire bundles are pulled into the conduit one bundle at a time
with one man feeding the wires at the feedthrough hole in the quantity
probe and the other man pulling approximately 25 to 35 pounds on the
pull wire (figs. C4-L0 through C4-42). The bundles are pulled through
until the slack is taken out of the wire bundle with the probe in this
elevated position (about 9 inches of slack when probe is lowered into
into tank) (fig. C4-43). Then holding the probe assembly, the fixture
is removed from the tank neck and the probe is lowered into the tank
(fig. C4-L4). The probe assembly is then rotated counterclockwise
approximately one turn. The unit is then very carefully rotated clock-
wise to start the quadruple thread and pilot the lower end of the probe
into the ring provided at the bottom of the tank. If the probe assembly
in the tight position does not result in alignment of the supply tube,
then the probe assembly is re-indexed in 90-degree increments to achieve
alignment. These procedures are carried out to a specific Manufacturing
Operations Procedure and in the presence of quality control inspectors.
(Figures CL-45 and C4-46 show the typical routing of wires from the
heater and fan probe assembly into the quantity probe.)

The electrical connector is then installed so that a complete


checkout can be performed on the electrical operations. The lead wires
are cut about 3 inches beyond the connector adapter flange. At this
point a 3-inch length of large-diameter Teflon sleeving is installed
in the neck of the conduit. About 2 inches is slid into the conduit
with about i inch protruding into connector space. The wires are
thermally stripped, tinned, and soldered into the connector. After a
thorough cleaning with alcohol, the connector is inspected with black
light to assure complete removal of flux. After the resistance, isola-
tion, and functional tests are completed, the metal sleeve is slid in
place and welded. The connector proper is protected during the welding
process by a set of copper chills which have cooled in liquid nitrogen.
Even so, the weld is made in a series of short segments to limit the
heat.

The next operation is the welding of feed line connections and


the tank neck adapter. A helium leak test is run on the weld joints
using a mass spectrometer leak detector. After satisfactory comple-
tion of these checks, the welds are all X-rayed.

Next, insulation is installed in the vacuum dome area. Two layers


of aluminized Mylar are applied over the outer shell material that
extends under the dome. The tank adapter flange is covered with four
layers of aluminized Mylar. All the tubes in the dome area are wrapped
with 1-inch aluminized Mylar strips held in place with nylon thread.

C-55
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c-98
Figure C4-43.- Heater and fan motor lead
routing into quantity probe.

c-59
Figure C:4-44.- Lowerimg quantity probe
assembly into tank.

C-60
Figure C-4.45 - View inside of tank of typical wire routing
from heater probe to quantity probe_

C-61
Figure C-4.46 - View inside of tank of typical wire routing
of heater ?robe v_ires into quantity probe.

C-62
The coil housing (dome) cover is now welded in place. The housing
contains the vacuumpumpdowntube, the blowout disc, and the vac-ion
pumpbracket (fig. C4-47). In addition, a pumpdowntube is welded to the
lower hemisphere to speed the pumping process. After the welds are X-
rayed, a preliminary pumpdownis made.
After a check is madeto insure vacuumintegrity, the vacuumis broken
and additional insulation is stuffed into the domearea through the vacuum
pumpdowntube. This insulation consists of 40 square feet of 0.0005-inch
gold-coated Kapton which has been crinkled and cut into small pieces with
pinking shears. (This represents about 5760 individual pieces approxi-
mately 1-inch square with pinked edges. This represents 2.3 ounces of
Kapton.)

The actual pumpdownis accomplished in an oven at 190° to 220° F to


speed the pumping and to assure a low final pressure. Because of the many
layers of insulation, a complete pumpdownrequires 20 to 28 days. At the
completion of the pumpdown,the vacuumpumpdowntubes are pinched and
sealed and protective caps are installed. The installation of the vac-ion
pumpcompletes the fabrication process of the tank assembly.

Acceptance Testing

End-item acceptance testing is a long and elaborate process controlled


by a detailed written test procedure. The sequence consists of the
following: (i) A dielectric strength test of the following wires or
groups of wires shorted together. The test is run at 500 V dc and leak-
age current to ground (tank assembly) shall not exceed 0.25 milliamp;
the four temperature sensor wires, the quantity gage outer tube lead,
the quantity gage inner tube lead, the quantity gage inner tube lead
shield, the eight wires from the two fan motors, the four wires from the
two heaters, and the low-voltage input wires to the vac-ion pump; (2)
Dielectric strength test of vac-ion converter output to ground (tank
assembly) at 400 V dc. Leakageshall be no more than 0.8 milliamp; (3)
Insulation resistance test to check that every wire or group of wires
that should be isolated from other wires or ground shows a minimumof
2 megohmsisolation at 500 V dc; (4) The isolation between the vac-ion
pumpelectrical terminals and ground is tested at 500 V dc and must be at
least 50 megohms;(5) The isolation between the vac-ion converter elec-
trical output terminals and the tank assembly (ground) is tested at
500 V dc and must be 50 megohmsor greater; (6) The vac-ion pumpis
functionally tested; (7) The inner vessel is pumpeddown for 4 hours to
assure that the inner vessel is dry; (8) Helium leak test at 500 psi and
a helium proof-pressure test at 1335 + 20 psi; (9) A heater pressurization
test and heat-leak test (vessel filled with liquid oxygen and 65 V ac
supplied to heaters); (i0) Cryogenic proof-pressure test at 1335 -+ 20 psi
(heaters powered by 65 V ac to raise pressure of liquid oxygen);

C-65
Weld seal-off assemblies

_,_,_..._ Install and weld coil housing cover

I I i I
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Install elect conn sleeve

I i

Weld seal-off assemblies

Figure C4-47,- Final vacuum closure operations.

C-64
(ii) Heat-leak test; (12) Inerting of the vessel with iOO ° to 160 ° F
nitrogen gas; (13) Check to see that thermostats are open when nitrogen
purge temperature of iOO ° to ii0 ° F flows from exit of tank (30 V ac
applied momentarily to verify that thermostats are open); (14) Vac-ion
pump final functional test; and (15) Final motor run verification and
coastdown. The heat-leak tests consist of many runs to cover a range of
ambient conditions and outflow rates. Total testing involves 40 to 60
hours with liquid or supercritical oxygen in the tank. Data sheets on
cryogenic performance specified in the procedure are furnished to North
American Rockwell in the end-item acceptance data package which accom-
panies each tank on delivery to North American Rockwell.

At the conclusion of the heat-leak test, approximately i00 pounds


of oxygen remain in the tank which must be emptied and purged for de-
livery. Approximately three-fourths of the mass of oxygen in the tank
is released from the tank through the supply line in the process of
reducing tank pressure from the initial 925-935 psia to the final pres-
sure of 25-35 ps_a. To complete emptying, the portion of this oxygen
which remains liquid after the pressure bleeddown is expelled through
the fill l_ne. The application of warm gas at 30 psia through the vent
line to accomplish this expulsion approximates the normal detanking pro-
cedure used by KSC at the completion of the CDDT. The CDDT is the next
time, after del_very of the tank by Beech Aircraft to North American,
that cryogenic oxygen is loaded into and expelled from each tank.

Summary of Significant Aspects of the Manufacture and Acceptance


Test of Cryogenic Oxygen Storage Tank Serial No. IO024XTAO008

The manufacturing and test flow for cryogenic oxygen storage tank
serial no. IO024XTAO008 is shown in figure C4-48. The item of particular
significance is the recycle that was required in the manufacturing
process brought on by motor failures.

The manufacturing history of the fan motors installed before or


during 1966 contains many incidents of failures encountered in motor
tests which resulted in design or fabrication process changes. The
failure modes experienced were categorized as:

(a) Contamination failures

(b) Bridge ring (stator laminations) failures

(c) Bearing failures

(d) Phase-to-phase (stator windings) dielectric breakdown or shorts

C-65
(e) Grounds (of stator wiring)

(f) Lead wire damage(primarily at Beech)

(g) (Motor fan) speed

(h) Coastdownfailures (less than 30 seconds in air or gas)

Design and manufacture process changes to minimize the effect of


some of these failure modeswere initiated during Block I motor manufac-
ture. Most others were initiated before the motors used in tank 10024XTA0008
were assembled at Globe Industries. Failure mode (d) was the basis for
the most recent changes affecting these particular motors. Corrective
actions to employ extreme care in stator winding and to use phase-to-
phase dielectric checks at 300 V rms were incorporated in the winding
process. These were followed by a phase-to-phase dielectric check at
250 V rms after the winding was complete and before the terminals were
soldered. Effectivity of these actions caught the lower motor in re-
work and the upper motor in original stator winding. After installation
of the heater tube assembly, including the motor fans, Beech tested the
motor wiring, shorted together, with 500 V dc to ground.
A listing of the inspection discrepancies issued against serial
no. 10024XTA0008are listed in table C4-I. In the Beech nomenclature
these discrepancies are known as Withholding Forms. As stated previously,
the motor problem is considered the significant item. The heat-leak
problem was not considered serious because manymissions required use
rates above the minimumflow capability of tank 0008.

The oxygen storage tank assembly is normally handled and tested at


Beech Aircraft in the upright position. Vertical motions may compact the
tube set to minimumlength so as to contribute to dislodgment by minimizing
overlap with the upper stub tube nipple of the tank adapter.
Shortly before shipment from Beech, the tank is rotated (tumbled)
while in a handling fixture, "to determine if all parts are secure." Since
this is the only known source of side forces applied to the fill tube com-
ponents and since the detanking was apparently normal in the Beech tests,
it lends evidence to the assumption that the fill tube componentswere in
the proper position at that time.

Investigation of Manufacturing Process and Supporting Analysis

To gain a first-hand appreciation of the manufacturing process, a


visit was arranged to the Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder Division,
to observe key assembly operations. In addition to a detailed discussion

C-66
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C-68
of the step-by-step process, three assembly examples were witnessed within
the clean room areas. Specifically, the installation of a lower motor
into the heater tube was observed. The assembly of the quantity probe to
the tank tube adapter fitting was witnessed. In this particular case, two
attempts were required to properly position the small fill tube parts.
The entire wire routing process was witnessed. A tank with a large hole
in the side provided visibility to the witnesses but not to the assembly
technicians. The installation of the heater fan assembly and then the
quantity probe provided an appreciation of the real challenge to workmen,
that of avoiding damage to the insulation of the wires. This could not
have been learned from a study of the drawings alone.

A lO-times-size layout was made of the fill tube connection situation


with the parts at the various limits of size permitted by the engineering
drawings. In addition to the length tolerances permitted by the drawing
dimensions, the diametral clearance also permits the parts to assume angles
beyond the ranges stated on the drawings. As an aid to check all the
various positions to which these parts could move, individual cutout paper
parts were made for the two Teflon bushings and the interconnecting Inconel
tube. Figure C4-49 shows that the worst-case short tolerance parts can
fall out of position as the tank is moved about. At the other extreme,
parts that are at the high end of the permitted tolerances will not
assemble. This is shown on the left-hand view. The nominal case provided
little or no axial clearance but still does not provide gas-tight seals at
the various diameters.

In addition to the tolerance condition that can exist for the fill
tube connecting parts, the center tube of the quantity probe could move
downward due to Teflon cold flow. The center tube is supported in the
axial position by two Teflon bushings installed in the center tube and a
semi-tubular rivet. Prolonged heating, such as the vacuum pumpdown cycles
(three cycles for this tank assembly resulting in a total of 1532 hours at
190 to 220 ° F), could result in the thin walls of the center tube slowly
cutting into the Teflon bushings.

Table C4-II shows the range of diametral clearances that can exist
at ambient conditions (73 ° F) and at a typical detanking condition
(-278 ° F, which corresponds to the saturation temperature of liquid oxygen
at 40 psia). The fit between the Teflon bushing and the tank adapter
fitting can result in a maximum O.O03-inch interference. The only other
clearance that results in an interference fit occurs if the minimum size
holes are provided where the Teflon bushings slide on the 3/8-inch Inconel
tube. Tests at liquid nitrogen temperature (-320 ° F) indicate that the
Teflon is not overstressed and does not crack when subjected to inter-
ference fits of this type.

C-69
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C-7l
Throughout the normal manufacture and test of a cryogenic oxygen
storage tank_ no intentional procedure calls for the thermostats to
interrupt a load. The acceptance testing by the thermostat vendor uses
approximately 6.5 V ac to power a small lamp bulb which draws about i00
milliamperes. The fan and heater assembly componentacceptance test by
Beech uses the thermostats to complete the circuit of Wheatstone bridges
to measure the heater resistance values. All other testing by Beech
applies power (65 V ac) when tank conditions are such that the thermostats
should be closed and remain closed_ or momentarily applies a lower power
(90 ± i0 V ac) to verify that thermostats are open.

INTEGRATION_ SYSTEM TESTING_ AND PRELAUNCH


CHECKOUT OF TH_ CRYOGENIC OXYGEN STORAGE TANKS

Summary of Nominal Processes and Procedures

North American Rockwell_ Downey_ California.- The build-up of an


oxygen shelf assembly at NR begins* many weeks before insertion of the
cryogenic oxygen tanks with the fabrication of a pie-shaped aluminum
honeycomb sandwich structural shelf with large circular cutouts matching
the equatorial girth rings of the spherical tanks. On this shelf are
next mounted the valves, pressure transducers, flowmeters, and tubing to
interconnect these with the fill and vent panel and the storage tanks.
Then the tanks are inserted_ no. i inboard and no. 2 in the outboard
position to the left of the fill panel and the valve module (fig. C4-50).
To complete the shelf assembly_ more tubes and the electrical cabling
are added. The Beech signal conditioner assembly for each tank is
mounted underneath the shelf.

All oxygen system tubing joints brazed by NR are subjected to X-ray


inspection and reheated if necessary to achieve satisfactory joints.

Pressure and leak checks are conducted as are electrical checks of


tank circuit elements_ i.e._ the vac-ion pump_ the heater_ motor fans_
thermostats_ and temperature sensor under dry gas conditions within the
oxygen tanks. The thermostats are tested for both opening and closing
temperatures by use of nitrogen gas purge with variable temperature con-
trol and monitoring each thermostat with a digital volt meter. Essen-
tially no current is interrupted in these tests. Such tests are repeated
in accordance with detailed Operational Checkout Procedures (OCP's) un-
til all gas leaks or electrical wiring problems have been isolated and
corrected and the oxygen shelf assembly is ready for installation in the

*Use of the present tense in this section of the Panel report


implies current practices as of 1967-68.

C-72
Figure C4-50.- Oxygenshelf with tanks IOO24XTAO005
and IOO24XTAOOO9installed.

C-7._
service module. A proof gas pressure of 1262 psi is used, followed by
leak testing at 745 psi. The vac-ion pumps of the oxygen storage tank
vacuum jackets are turned on at least twice during typical oxygen shelf
checkout and oxygen system checkout at NR. These tests are conducted
with an NR test engineer, manufacturing test conductor, technicians, and
quality control personnel, and a NASA quality control representative
present. No cryogenic oxygen is used in any of these tests.

After the oxygen shelf assembly is installed in the service module,


various gas tubing and electrical connections are completed. The oxygen
tank, tubing, and valves thereafter participate in oxygen subsystem
testing of the service module, fuel cell simulator tests, and fuel cell
interface verification in accordance with Detail Checkout of Systems
(DCS's) requirements. Liquid nitrogen is used to introduce a cold nitro-
gen gas into the oxygen tank to cause the thermostats to close so that a
heater circuit continuity test can be conducted. Spacecraft bus power
(30 V dc) is applied to the heater circuits and an increase in current
is used to verify thermostat closure. After water/glycol system test
and final shelf inspection, cryogenic oxygen System Summary Acceptance
is accomplished with NASA/MSC participation and recorded in the System
Summary Acceptance Document ("SSAD book").

The discipline at NR, Downey, is that of controlled procedures and


hardware traceability from the controlled material and equipment stores
through assembly and test operations. This discipline produces requests
for review or assistance from design engineering for instances of quality
or test discrepancy considered to be significant.

Transportation from North American Rockwell to KSC.- Shipment of


the service module from NR, Downey, is made on a pallet which holds the
axis horizontal in the fore and aft direction of trucks and aircraft
(fig. C4-51). The sector in which the oxygen shelf is installed is on
the underside in this orientation so that the shelf centerline points
vertically down. Shock and vibration instrumentation of various service
module flights in the Pregnant Guppy and Super-Guppy special aircraft of
Aero Spacelines have shown no peak vibration loads exceeding one-g for
vibration-isolated movements of the service module.

Kennedy Space Center.- After command and service module mating, at


the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building-KSC, the oxygen shelf assembly
as a part of the service module participates in combined system test,
altitude chamber test, systems integrated test, and flight readiness
test in accordance with established Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP's).
These tests are conducted as dry gas pressure and electrical function
verifications similar to those of the factory OCP's and DCS's at Downey.
No specific test is run to verify thermostat operation; however, during
the conduct of a pressure switch test sequence, the thermostats may open
the 28 V dc heater load.

C-74
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C-75
The vac-ion pumps of the oxygen storage tank vacuum jackets are
normally turned on during three test periods at KSC including countdown.
The circuit breakers to the vac-ion pumps are opened before launch.

After integration of the CSM with the Saturn launch vehicle in the
Vertical Assembly Building, the complete vehicle is moved to Pad 39. As
a part of the CDDT_ which normally occurs 14 days before launch_ the CSM
storage tanks are fully loaded with liquid oxygen. The functioning of
the fans is checked and heater operation verified by using a ground sup-
ply of 65 V dc to raise the tank pressure to about 900 psi. Shortly
thereafter it is necessary to partly empty the oxygen tanks through a
process known as "detanking." Two or three days later, at the conclu-
sion of the CDDT, detanking is again used to empty the tank.

Initial detanking consists of two sequences. First_ the internal


pressure of the tank (residual to the CDDT) is vented through the vent.
Next, warm gaseous oxygen is fed through the tank vent lines at 80 psia
to expel liquid through the fill lines down to 50-percent full. Detank-
ing for tank emptying proceeds similarly at the end of CDDT. Then warm
gas is blown through to verify that the thermostats remain closed up to
at least -75 ° F. This step employs the application of only i0 to 15
V dc to the heater circuit.

This loading_ checkout, and detanking is the first time the cryo-
genic functions of the oxygen storage tanks are evaluated since the
acceptance test at Beech Aircraft_ Boulder, Colorado.

The oxygen tanks are filled to capacity during actual countdown in


order to prepare for launch.

During the CDDT and during the final countdown, as long as the
Mobile Service Structure (MSS) is connected to the launch Umbilical
Tower (LUT), the heaters are powered from the ground supply system. The
power distribution station from where the heaters are powered is located
at the base of the LUT. The voltage from this power supply is automati-
cally regulated at 78 _ 2 V dc and recorded. There is approxi_tely
13 volts line drop along the connecting leads, resulting in about 65 V dc
across the heaters, producing a current of about 6 amps through each
heater element. This higher power operation is used to more rapidly
raise the tank pressure to the operating range.

The MSS is disconnected from the LUT at about 18 hours before T - 0


in both the CDDT and the final countdown. For operational reasons the
power supply to the heaters is switched at this time to the busses of the
spacecraft with 28 to 30 V dc (about 2.8 amperes through each heater
element) which are powered through the umbilical from the ground supply
system. At T - 4 hours, during the launch preparation, the busses of the
spacecraft are switched to the fuel cells. The destratification fans are
independent from the heaters and at all times powered from the spacecraft.

C-76
Summaryof Significant Aspects of Serial No. 0008 Tank
Prelaunch Integration Test and Checkout History
North American Rockwell, Downey, California.- Oxygen storage tank
IO024XTAO008 was installed in the no. 2 (outside) position of oxygen
shelf S/N 06362AAG3277 at North American Rockwell, Downey, California,
soon after receipt in May 1967. Two disposition reports were written
during October 1967 to require reheat and reinspection of brazed tubing
joints on the oxygen shelf found unacceptable in reading of X-rays. These
joints were reheated and accepted. Completion of oxygen tank installa-
tion, including tank IO024XTAO009 in the no. i position, was accomplished
March Ii, 1968. Manufacturing and test flow for the oxygen shelf is dis-
played chronologically in figure C4-52.

Two disposition reports noting an "indentation" and a "ding" in the


tank outer shell were filed and accepted--use as is--in March and
April 1968.

During April and May 1968, ii disposition reports were written to log
tank no. 2 anomalies found during proof-pressure, leak-check, and func-
tional checkout of the assembled oxygen shelf. Eight of these were as-
cribed to test procedure problems, two to a valve module (check valve)
tubing leak and one to an electrical connector pin. The leak was rewelded
by a Parker technician and passed leak test. The pin was repaired by NR
and checked.

In accordance with the normal OCP and after leak and electrical re-
pairs, the shelf assembly was completed and tested. It was installed in
CSM 106 June 4, 1968. Thereafter, in compliance with several DCS's for
subsystem test, a fuel cell simulator test, and fuel cell interface
verification, the oxygen shelf participated in service module detailed
checkout steps.

After installation of this oxygen shelf in SM 106, eight disposition


reports were written during installation, additional tubing connection
and subsystem line proof-pressure and leak check, and electrical cabling
checking. Of these, two problems with a hydrogen relief line mounted ad-
jacent to the oxygen shelf were solved by making up new tubing and later
reheating a brazed joint to meet X-ray control requirements. Three oxygen
subsystem leaks were solved by retorquing caps and a "B" nut on oxygen
lines leading to fuel cell no. 2. The three remaining disposition records
expressed questions concerning leak and electrical function testing of the
oxygen shelf assembly which were held open pending the next opportunity
for shelf assembly testing.

On October 21, 1968, in response to directives requiring rework of


the vac-ion pump dc-to-dc converters to reduce electromagnetic

C°77
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interference problems (a supplementary potting operation performed by
Beech personnel at North American Rockwell), an attempt was made to re-
move the oxygen shelf from SM 106.

In preparation for this attempt, the i0 bolts attaching the shelf to


the adjacent beams were removed. The existence of a small, llth bolt in-
troduced from underneath and behind tank no. i was overlooked by all
persons involved. The factory crew brought into position a lifting fixture
particularly dew[sed for inserting tanks and shelves into sectors of the
service module (fig. C4-53).

This fixture is composed of two parts joined at a bolted flange. The


universal part is an adjustable counterbalance. The weights of this
counterbalance are movable from the factory floor through endless chains.
The particular part for handling to the oxygen shelf is a two-tined fork
welded together from large thick-walled aluminum tubes. The tine tips
are padded where they contact the underside of the shelf to support its
inner portion. The outer edge of the shelf is fastened to the lifting
fork by means of two screws passing through tabs on the top of the fork
cross-member.

Under the particular circumstances of October 21_ 1968, the unnoticed


llth bolt into the shelf served as a tie-down beyond the tips of the lifting
fork such that raising the fixture produced rotation of the entire assembly,
most noticeably the counterbalance. The llth bolt still was unobserved.
Attempts were made to balance the fixture by moving a weight and to lift the
assembly by operating the overhead bridge crane. In these steps sufficient
load was placed on the fixture to break it above the cross-arm of the fork.

The oxygen shelf moved and came to rest on the supporting beams
through what was at the time described as a "2-inch drop" Observation of
adjacent portions of SH 106 identified minor damage_ including a dent in
the underside of the fuel cell shelf above.

Figure C4-54 shows the repair patch over this dent immediately above
the vacuum pinch-off cover can of tank no. 2 in the oxygen shelf that re-
placed the one undergoing the "shelf drop" incident in SM 106.

Further attention to the oxygen shelf containing tank IO024XTAO008


in the no. 2 position after its removal from SM 106 involved a number of
quality_ test_ and repair actions. These were logged on ii separate Dis-
position Records (NR numbered forms recording discrepancies observed
through manufacturing inspection and test activities at Downey). One
other such form was initiated at the time of the "shelf drop" and was
treated primarily as a requirement to inspect, repair, and re-inspect the
adjacent portions of SM 106, including specifically the dented fuel cell
shelf.

c-79
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C-80
Fi6ure C4-54.- Replacement oxygen shelf installed in
Service Module 106. Note repairs to fuel cell
shelf over oxygen tank no. 2.

C-SI
Of the ii DR's, five report anomalous conditions of detailed portions
of the shelf assembly observed and recorded from Novemberi to November19,
1968. In response to these DR's, EMI tests and leakage tests were con-
ducted, results were accepted, and somerepairs were made. The leak tests
of bent tubing carrying tank no. i pressure, upstream from valves, were
accepted in material review. The latter involved polishing out tank outer
shell scratches, adjusting several electrical connectors, replacing
damagedcable clamps, and coating damagedpotting. It is not certain but
it is possible that someof these conditions relate to the "shelf drop"
incident.

The remainder of the DR's of the period relate to testing the oxygen
shelf to revalidate it for installation into SM109. A shortened version
of the normal pre-installation OCP,including pressure and external leak
testing and verification of electrical functions of most of the tank
elements, was conducted. Fan motor, heater, fuel cell reactant valve,
relief valve, pressure switch, and motor switch functional checks were
omitted. Coupling leak checks and check valve internal leak valve checks
were omitted. Signal conditioner checks, for density and temperature sig-
nals, were omitted. Verification of these matters was left for and accom-
plished in oxygen system tests at higher levels of CMand SMintegration.
The shelf was then installed (fig. C4-55). The upper one of the two
accepted bent tubes shows at the extreme right of the figure. The lower
one, bent 7 degrees as it joins the back of the fuel cell valve-module,
is in the lower right corner.
In December1968, after concern for a possible oil contamination of
facility lines, GSEhose connections were checked for contamination and
found acceptable. Vent line samples taken later, at KSCduring cryogenic
tanking, verified that no contaminants reached the spacecraft interfaces.

Engineering requests for recalibration of the oxygen system pressure


instrumentation and the oxygen quantity signal conditioner of the assembly
were responded to in January and February, 1969.

Final inspection and cleanup of the shelf in the service module was
accomplished on May 27, 1969. The oxygen SSADbook was signed off June 6,
1969, and SM109 was shipped to KSC.

Transportation from North American Rockwell to KSC.- Shipment of


SM 109 from Downey to KSC was accomplished by the normal means, horizontal
mounting on a vibration isolating pallet carried on ground vehicles and a
Super-Guppy aircraft. No shock was observed in the instruments carried.

Kennedy Space Center.- The oxygen tank and shelf assembly participated
in normal service module tests beginning with the Combined Systems Test.
Test and checkout flow at KSC are shown chronologically in figure C4-56.

C-82
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A leak check was performed July 18, 1969, using helium at 94 psia
in oxygen tank no. 2. Tank no. 2 was pressurized to 1025 psia to estab-
lish the relief valve cracking pressure and to verify the pressure switch
operation. The pressure was decreased to 870 psia and then increased to
954 psia during the first integrated test with the launch vehicle simu-
lator. The oxygen tanks no. i and no. 2 were evacuated to less than 5mm
Hg, to dry the tanks, then pressurized to about 80 psia with reactant
grade gaseous oxygen. Instrumentation was verified and fan motors were
checked out.

A progress photograph (fig. C4-57) taken at KSC on November 14, 1969,


shows the visible condition of the oxygen shelf with tanks, valves, tubing,
and cables.

During the Flight Readiness Test in early February 1970, the pres-
surization cycle was repeated; vacuum to 5mm Hg and oxygen pressure to
about 80 psia.

At the CDDT in March after activation of the fuel cells, the same
cycle was followed: vacuum of the oxygen tanks to 5mm Hg followed by a
gaseous oxygen pressure of about 80 psi. After the cooling of the fuel
cells, cryogenic oxygen loading was normal and tank pressurization to
331 psia by using heaters powered from 65 V dc ground power supply was
completed without abnormalities.

During these CDDT operations on March 23, tank no. i was detanked to
the normal 50 percent within less than i0 minutes. Over the space of
45 minutes, tank no. 2 did not detank normally but was observed to retain
more than 90 percent of its oxygen. Detanking was suspended until the
completion of CDDT.

On March 27, detanking of tank no. 2 was again attempted. The tank
had self-pressurized to 178 psia with a quantity of 83 percent indicated.
By opening the fill line valve the pressure was depleted to approximately
36 psia in about 13 minutes. The quantity indication went down to about
65 percent (see fig. C4-58).

Next, during detanking attempts for both tanks, a comparison of


tank no. i and tank no. 2 performance was made. The indicated oxygen
quantity of tank no. I depleted from 48 percent to zero in less than
i0 minutes. The indicated quantity in tank no. 2 remained above 60 percent
over a 20-minute period.

Attempts were made over an 80-minute period to deplete the oxygen


content of tank no. 2 by cycling up to various pressures and down, but
did not reduce the indicated quantity below 54 percent (fig. C4-59). An
attempt was made to expedite oxygen expulsion through the use of the tank
heaters operated at maximum voltage and the fans. These were turned on
for nearly 6 hours while the vent port remained open (fig. C4-60). Still
the indicated quantity remained above 30 percent.

C-85
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60

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20

-220

-230

E -240

-25O

200

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160
\

no

_- 120
\
\

4O

1352 1354 1356 1358 1400 1402 1404 1406 1408 1410 1412 1414 1416

Time, e.s.t.,March 27,1970

Figure C4-58.- Oxygen tank 2 detanking characteristics (pressure


decay through the fill line - CDDT).

C-87
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80

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_- -80

E -160
I-...-

-240

-320

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"- 80

e-

2000 2030 2100 2130 2200 2230

Time,e.s.t.,
March 27,1970

Figure C4-59.- Oxygen detanki_g attempt using


varying purge pressure.

C-88
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20

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160

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0 /
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J
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E

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-320

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Q-

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Fill valve open
Venivalveopen

Heaterson
:anson

I
2200 2300 24_X) 0100 0200 0300
March27,1970 Time,e.s.t. March28,1970

Figure Ch-60.- Oxygen detanking attempt using tank heaters.

C-89
Then a pressure cycling technique was employed over a 2-1/2 hour
period with maximum power being applied continuously to both tank
heaters and fan circuits (fig. C4-61). This technique involved raising
the tank pressure by external gaseous oxygen to approximately 300 psia
and then opening the fill line to induce rapid boil-off. After five
cycles, the oxygen tank quantity indicated zero.

Fan responses were observed to be normal throughout these opera-


tions. The temperature sensor on the quantity probe reached its indi-
cating limit (+84 F) halfway through the 6-hour heating period. No
observations of whether the heaters cycled on and off were made and
subsequent review of the power supply voltage recording showed no indi-
cation of heater cycling.

Concern developed over two alternate hypothetical tank no. 2 con-


ditions, a leakage path in the fill line within the tank or a clogged
fill line.

Gaseous flow tests were used in one attempt to evaluate the latter.
Both tank no. i and tank no. 2 were pressurized to approximately 240
psia and blown down through the fill lines with no significant differ-
ences in blowdown time (fig. C4-62).

A check of the Wintec filter in the GSE for oxygen tank no. 2 was
made by the Wintec Corporation. No significant foreign material was
found.

The alternate hypothesis, that the short segments of fill tube in


the top of the quantity probe of tank no. 2 had large gaps or had be-
come dislodged, was considered as were the operational difficulties
associated with the use of a tank in this condition. The concern here
was that the loading process might be hampered by the position of the
fill line parts. It was noted that the filling was normal for the CDDT.

To verify this judgment and to assure countdown operability, both


tanks were filled on March 30 to about 20 percent in approximately 2.5
minutes. Tank no. i detanked normally; tank no. 2 did not. Again the
procedure of applying heat at maximum voltage and the cyclic application
of gas pressure of approximately 250 psia and then venting was used.
Five cycles were applied in a 1-1/4 hour period and tank no. 2 was
emptied (fig. C4-63). The fan responses were observed to be normal and
no indications of heater cycling were observed.

During the countdown, April 8_ 1970, the pressurization of oxygen


tank no. 2 was hampered by a leak through the vent line pressure-operated
disconnect. Installation of the first cap stopped the leak and the
pressurization of tank no. 2 was normal with no anomalies noticed during
the completion of the countdown.

C-90
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-160

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240
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Fill valve open
ilia n m
I

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Vent valve open
I
Heaters on

Fans on

0330 0400 0430 0500 0530 0600 0630

Time, e.s.t.,March 28, Igl0

Figure C4-61.- Oxygen detanking using pressure


cycles and tank heaters.

C-91
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[
Fans on

1530 1600 1630 1700 1/30 1800

Time, e.s.t., March30, 19/0

Figure C4-63.- Oxygen detanking using pressure


cycles and tank heaters.

C-93
Several items of overall tank test and checkout experience should be
noted.

Contaminants: Liquid, as well as gaseous, oxygen which entered tank


no. 2 was verified by sample analysis. Nothing indicates that contaminants
did enter the oxygen tanks. The samples taken from the vents during the
servicing met the specification requirements and did not give an indication
of tank contamination.

Quantity probe: Throughout all tests, during a period of ii months


resulting in 167 hours 8 minutes operating time including 28 fan on/off
cycles over the 17-day period of CDDT and launch count, the quantity gaging
system in tank no. 2 exhibited less sensitivity to noise and transients
than that of tank no. i.

Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure cycling: At no time during the testing


of oxygen tank no. 2, in systems and subsystems, were the specified
pressure limitations or allowable tank cycles exceeded.

Testing of oxygen tank fans: Test records were reviewed of all fan
motor operations at KSC for any indications of ac bus transients. Tank
no. 2 fans were powered _O times. No electrical transients were found
except those normally connected with fan starting or stopping. Fan motor
performance was considered normal.

Investigation and Supporting Work

Causes of detanking difficulties.- Review of information from the


Beech acceptance test logs and review with the Beech personnel in charge
of these tests does not indicate that the detanking was abnormal. Con-
trarywise, the data are not substantive to prove that the liquid was
expelled through the fill line. No weight or quantity measurement is
recorded at the completion of the liquid expulsion; however, the proce-
dure calls for continuing the application of vent line pressure until
both the weighing system and the quantity probe indicate the tank is
empty. The final tank empty condition is based on the final exit tem-
perature of the warm nitrogen gas purge. At the time, no one indicated
that the response of the tank to the procedures was anything but normal,
and today careful review of existing data, discussions with the responsi-
ble Beech Aircraft and North American Rockwell personnel, and a special
test at Beech Aircraft indicate that the detanking of the 0008 tank was
most probably normal.

Each oxygen storage tank is stored at NR, Downey, in its shipping


container until removal for installation in the assigned oxygen shelf.
Thus it is retained in a vertical position until any motion takes place
in the shelf assembly fixture.

c-94
The shelf assembly fixture used at Downey (fig. C4-50) aligns tank
no. i so that the fill tube segments in the top of the quantity probe
assembly lie nominally in a plane transverse to the axis of fixture rota-
tion. Thus the fixture in the normal position holds the tubes upright
but otherwise can rotate them through a full circle, exposing them to
dislodging forces in the plane of their nominal location. The situation
for tank no. 2 is nearly a right angle to the tank no. i situation so
that the tube segment plane is nominally parallel to the trunnion axis of
the assembly fixture. Thus in all positions other than vertical or in-
verted, a lateral dislodging force exists relative to the plane of their
nominal location.

The highest elevation of the tank assembly, and thus the first area
of contact with the underside of the fuel cell shelf at the time of the
lifting fixture breakage and the shelf dent, was the cover over the upper
vacuum pinch-off tube (fig. C4-55). This point was to the left of the
mass centers and lifting forces involved as the counterbalance rotated
and broke away from the fork portion of the lifting fixture. (See
Appendix D.) Some rotation to lift the outer right corner of the shelf
(lower right in fig. C4-55) higher than the outer left would be expected
from this configuration. An uneven fall to the shelf supports would
follow.

In figure C4-55, showing the installation of the oxygen shelf in


SM 109, the condition of the farthest right tubing in the lower part of
the picture reflects the comments of two DR's that one tube had a "slight
bend" at the valve module and another (lower) was "badly bent." As the
highest tubes, farthest from the llth bolt and the high point of tank
no. 2, these two may have participated in the "shelf drop" incident.
Neither was found to be in need of repair after leak check.

No mention could be found in review of these DR's of any concern for


the condition of the tubes, wires, or motors internal to the oxygen storage
tank except as verifiable through routine external gas and electrical
testing with NR factory 0CP's.

Shipment of SM 109 from NR/Downey, with the SM axis horizontal during


ground and air transporation, afforded the next major opportunity for
fill tube segment lateral dislodgment.

It appears pertinent to this review to note that during SM transpor-


tation the fill tube segments within the upper portion of the oxygen tank
no. 2 quantity probe assembly lay with the tank-exit end of the fill tube
segments about 20 degrees above the horizontal, if they were still in
place after previous handling and the "shelf drop." Neither the wires
nor the feed line filter were below it to restrict rotation of the fill
tube about the central tube of the quantity probe (fig. C4-64).

C-95
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C-96
This history of exposure of the tank fill tube segments to an un-
usual dislodgment environment sequence was not recorded during the de-
tanking incidents at KSC nor during the presentation of CSM 109 history
reviews to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager through either reliabil-
ity and quality assurance or engineering channels at MSC. However, it
does corroborate the recorded real-time judgment of Beech_ MSC, and KSC
engineers that the tank fill line parts may have been out of place in
tank !O024XTAO008 during the detanking problems of March 23-30, 1970.

Since the fill tube parts have dimensional tolerances that could
allow these parts to fall out of place_ a calculation was made to attempt
to establish the configuration of the tank during the detanking operations
at KSC. The data from the first detanking attempt of March 27 were used
to test the hypothesis that the fill tube parts were disconnected such
that no liquid was expelled from the tank. A simple heat balance equation
of the tank from the initial condition to the end condition shows that all
the mass lost by the tank can be explained by vaporization and it is like-
ly that no liquid was expelled. Figure C4-58 and table C4-III show the
data upon which these calculations were based. At the initial and final
point the temperature indicated in the data is too warm for the pressure
indicated. The saturation temperature was used for each case.

Possible effects of special detanking procedures at KSC.- The use of


special detanking procedures at KSC to empty tank no. 2 of CSM 109 has
created concern these special procedures may have altered significantly
the condition of the oxygen tank.

A number of special tests have been run and other tests are yet to
be run in an attempt to determine the nature and degree of degradation
that may be expected to occur to the tank internal components and wiring
resulting from exposure of this type. The most significant finding to
date is the fact that the thermostats fail by welding closed almost im-
mediately when attempting to interrupt 65 V dc.

Several tests were run to determine the temperature that would occur
at various points on the heater tube as a result of operation at ground
power level as the liquid in the tank is boiled off. These tests were
run at MSC using a similar sized tank with an actual flight-type heater
fan assembly. The test setup is shown on figure C4-65. Liquid nitrogen
was used in the tank for safety reasons. The initial run was made with
a later model heater fan assembly that does not utilize thermostats;
however, it was felt that as long as liquid nitrogen _as present it _as
not likely that the thermostats would be called upon to operate. During
this test very high temperatures were encountered on many locations on
the heater tube (figure C4-66). These conditions were considered to be
very unrealistic, so the test was rerun using a heater fan assembly
equipped with thermostats. When the test was started_ one thermostat
indicated an open circuit at the initial fill condition. It was decided
that a satisfactory test could be run since an extra lead had been ex-
tended from the heater elements so that the heaters could be manually
operated to coincide with the functioning of the operable thermostat.

C-97
TABLE C4-III.- THERMODYNAMIC BALANCE CALCUlaTIONS

Initial condition Final condition

Quantity, ib 274 (83_ indic.) 212 (65_ indic.)

Pressure, psia 178 36

Temperature, ° F -236.5 -280


Temperature, ° R 223.2 179.7

Density of liquid, ib/ft 3 58.4 68.0

Volume of liquid, ft 3 4.7o _.lO

Volume of gas, ft 3 .05 1.65

Weight of liquid, ib 2?3.85 210.9

Weight of gas, ib o,15 1.1

Enthalpy of liquid, 88 68
Btu/ib

Enthalpy of gas, Btu/ib 158 155

Total enthalpy of 24,112 14,341


liquid, Btu

Total enthalpy of gas, 24 171


Btu

Heat capacity of metal,


44 Ib
AT ° = 43.5° F,
sp. ht. 0.086 (Reference Cond.) -164

Heat capacity of boil-


off gas
62 ib at 156.5 Btu/ib 0

Total enthalpy, Btu/ib 24,136 24,051

C-98
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20-- • Tilermocouple 23
Thermocouple 1 and 2 7 Gas temperature

Thern_ocouple _3 and 4 r_!l __Thermocouple 7

_ _-_ Tllerlnocou!)le 8
16 n
_ ___Ttlermoco_Jp, e 25
../,_..._ Inside lower fan wire conduit

(latter Lest only)


Z
.B
__Thermocouple 9
o 12 __Ttlern/ocouple 21 on 400 Hz conduit
__Thermocouple 22

g
.i lns i de heater sheath environment
...1
_Thermocouple 10

8 --

Thernlocoul)le 11

Thermocouple 15 and 16 Z _Thermocouple 12


4
"*_-_"_'--_T h ermoc o up I e 13

I _,,_ Thermocouple
_._Thermocouple 24
14

Thermocouple 17 and 18 I

(a) Temperature sensor locations.

Figure C4-66.- Heater tube assembly temperature test.

C- i00
1100

1000

900

32 _- 800

28 lO0

24 600

• 20 500
C I_-

"-1
-_ 16 _ 400

.__ E

"_ 12 _'- 300

8 20O

4 100

0 0

-I00

-200

-300
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Time, hr

(b) Typical test results.


Figure C4-66.- Concluded.

C-101
The test was started and after a few cycles in this modethe previously
nonfunctioning (oDen) thermostat started indicating normal function. At
this time it was decided to revert to the originally intended test config-
uration, i.e., the thermostats directly controlling the heaters. Data
from that point on indicated that the thermostats were not cycling the
heaters. The heater tube temperature data looked Just like the nonther-
mostat test run. The test terminated at this point and the thermostats
were removed and X-rayed. The X-rays indicated that the contact gap was
bridged. Onethermostat had its case carefully removed to examine the
conditions of the contacts (fig. C4-67).

A review of the thermostat design and the manufacturer's ratings


indicate that the thermostats are severely overloaded in current-
interrupting capability at the ground power condition. Open contact
spacing at 65 V dc is such that a sustained arc can be established and
the contacts melted at this first attempt to interrupt power of this
magnitude.

Inasmuch as thermostat failure would be expected at the first attempt


to interrupt the ground power level, the conditions of heater tube temper-
ature measured during the first test of this series would be indicative
of those experienced during the KSCspecial detankings of March 27, 28,
and 30. Since a review of the heater ground power supply voltage re-
cordings madeduring the special detanking operations showedno indica-
tion of heater cycling, a special postflight test was conducted at KSC
which showedthat the cycled load equivalent to the heaters would cause
a cycling in the voltage recording. Figure C4-68 shows sections of motor
lead wire removed from the heater tube conduit.

Other tests run at AmesResearch Center (see Appendix F) indicate


that Teflon-insulated wires run at similar temperatures in an oxygen
atmosphere result in even more severe degradation.

A test is being run at Beech Aircraft to simulate all the tanking


and detanking conducted on XTA-0008 at KSC. A Block I tank modified to
the Block II configuration with the fill tube connecting parts rotated
out of position is being used for this test. Temperature measurements
on the electrical conduit in the vacuum dome area and posttest inspection
will be utilized to evaluate the effects on the wiring of the special
det anking operations.

At no time during standard checkout, prelaunch, and launch opera-


tions are these thermostats required to interrupt the 65 V dc ground
power supply current. As far as could be determined, the special de-
tanking operation was the only time that any thermostats were ever
called upon to interrupt this load.

C- 102
(b) Welded contacl.s after test..

Figure C4-67.- Thermostat configuration and welded contacts.

c- lo3
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NASA -- MSC
APPENDIX D

REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL


CONTENTS

Part Page

APPENDIX D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL

DI TASK ASSIGNMENT ................... D-I

D2 PANEL ORGANIZATION ................. D-3

D3 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS ................. D-5

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ................ D-5

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AT TIME


OF ACCIDENT ................... D-II

STRUCTURAL EVALUATION OF THE OXYGEN TANK ..... D-13

Materials and Welding .............. D-13

Qualification Program .............. D-20

FRACTURE MECHANICS ................ D-23

Failure Modes ................. D-24

Effectiveness of the Proof Test ......... D-25

Possibility of Tank Failure During Apollo 13


Mission .................... D-30

DYNAMIC TESTING .................. D-30

Oxygen Tank Assembly Dynamic Testing ...... D-30

Apollo CSM Acoustic and Vibration Test


Program .................... D-31

SHOCK TESTING ................... D-35

INTERNAL COMPONENTS ................ D-35

Quantity Gage ................. D-35

Heaters ..................... D-37

iii
Part Page

Fans , , , . , ° , . . , , o , • • • , , , , , . D-41

Temperature Sensor ............... D-43

Wiring ..................... D-43

Discussion ................... D-48

COMPATIBILITY OF MATERIALS WITH OXYGEN ...... D-48

Classification Methods ............. D-h9

Materials Internal to the Tank ......... D-49

OTHER DESIGN AND SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS ...... D-59

Oxygen System Relief Valves ........... D-59

Arrangement at Head of Tank ........... D-61

Dome Assembly .................. D-6h

Filter ..................... D-70

Caution and Warning Provisions ......... D-70 "

ABNORMAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE OXYGEN


TANK ...................... D-71

Oxygen "Shelf Drop" Incident .......... D-71

Detanking at KSC ................ D-72

Discussion ................... D-74

RELATED SYSTEMS .................. D-78

Pressure Vessels ................ D-78

Line Components ................. D-85

Low Pressure Oxygen Systems ........... D-86

Electrical Power System--Batterles ....... D-86

iv
Part Page

GroundSupport Equipment ............ D-86

Certi fi cation .................. D-87

Apollo J-Missions ................ D-87

Lunar Module "Lifeboat" ............. D-87

DISCUSSION.................... D-87

04 SUMMARY ....................... D-89

D5 REFERENCES ..................... D-93

v
This page left blank intentionally.

vi
PART DI

TASK ASSIGNMENT

The Design Panel was assigned the task of reviewing the design of
the systems involved in the Apollo 13 accident, including their qualifi-
cation history. The service history of the specific components flown
on Apollo 13 was also to be examined from a design point of view to as-
certain whether any abnormal usage experienced might have had a detri-
mental effect on the functional integrity of the components. The Panel
was also charged with review of other spacecraft systems of similar de-
sign or function to ascertain whether they contained potential hazards.
Finally, the Panel was to analyze, as required by the Board, proposed
failure mechanisms to the extent necessary to support the theory of
failure.

The Panel conducted its activities by reviewing design documentation


and drawings, historical records, and test reports; analyzing data; ex-
amining specimens of hardware; and consulting with other Board Panels
and with members of the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Investigation Team
and the contractors.

D-I
This page left blank intentionally.

D-2
PART D2

PANEL ORGANIZATION

Panel 3 was chaired L,v Dr. S. C. Hilmnel, Le<,Jis Research Center, and
tl_e Board Monitor was Mr. V. L. Johnson, Office of Space Science and
Applications, NASA ]{eadquarters. Panels Members were:

Mr. W. F. Bro<_n, Jr.


T ewis Research Center

Mr. R. N. Lindley
Office of Manned Space Flight
NASA Headquarters

Dr. W. R. Lucas
Marshall Space Flight Center

Mr. J. F. Saunders, ,Jr.


OFfice of Manned Space Flig]_t
NASA IIeadquarters

Mr. R. C. Wells
Langley Research Center

Specific assignments coverin£ such areas as materials selection,


fracture mechanics, materials compatibility, failure mechanisms, related
systems, and electrical systems were given to each Panel Member. All
Panel Members participated in the preparation of this report.

n-3
This page left blank intentionally.

D-4
PART D3

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

Early in the proceedings of the Board, it became evident that the


failure was centered in the cryogenic oxygen subsystem of the electrical
power system of the spacecraft, and, more specifically, in the no. 2
cryogenic oxygen tank. For this reason, detailed examinations of the
Panel were limited to this subsystem. Interfacing systems were examined
only to the extent required to understand the function of the oxygen
system and/or to relate data from flight or test to the operation or
design of the system.

In addition, the Panel had one of its members present at the


deliberations of the MSC Panel on Related Systems which conducted reviews
on other Apollo spacecraft pressurized systems.

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The cryogenic storage subsystem supplies reactants to the fuel cells


that provide electric power for the spacecraft. The oxygen system also
supplies metabolic oxygen for the crew, command module (CM) cabin pressur-
ization, and the initial pressurization of the lunar module (LM). The
cryogenic storage and fuel cell subsystems are located in bay 4 of the
service module (SM). Figure D3-1 shows the geometric arrangement of
these subsystems within this portion of the SM. The system comprises
two oxygen tanks, two hydrogen tanks, and three fuel cells with their
associated plumbing, control valves, regulators, pressure switches, and
instrumentation.

The uppermost shelf contains the three fuel cells; the center shelf
contains the two oxygen tanks, the oxygen system valve modules, the fuel
cell oxygen valve module, and a ground service interface panel. The
lower shelf contains the two hydrogen tanks, one above and one below the
shelf, and a set of valve modules analagous in function to those of the
oxygen system.

A description of these components is contained in Appendix A of the


Board's report. Also provided are the operating and design parameters of
the components, materials of construction, etc.

A schematic of the oxygen system is shown in figure DB-2. The ground


service lines are capped off prior to flight. Figure D3-3 is a photograph
of the panel showing the terminations of these lines. The two tanks and

D-5
\

cell
2
I

I Fuel
cell
Fuel
cell
3 1

_uel cell

,Oxygen
Oxygen
len valve
tank module

Oxygen subsystem tgen fuel cell shut-


shelf off valve module

panel
jgen servicing
•Hydrogen •

rclrogen subs
module

tanlr _

Figure D3-1.- Arrangement of fuel cells and cryogenic systems in bay _.

o-6
.E

E
c_
m

.E

X
X
.S E
c: o ,,_ EE
X g_

0_
.lJ

o)

E)

C)

I
Cv"l

,r-I

D-T
Figure D3-3.- SM oxygen system ground service panel.

D-8
their plumbing are identical except for one point in the feed line from
tank no. 2, at which a ground service line tees into the feed line down-
stream of a check valve. This ground service line permits the operation
of the fuel cells and the environmental control system (ECS) oxygen system
from a ground source of oxygen without requiring the use of the flight
tankage. This line terminates at the fitting designated 0P in figure D3-3.
The check valve prevents the pressurization of tank no. 2 from this ground
S our ce.

The pressure transducer, pressure switch, and relief valve are lo-
cated in an oxygen system valve module external to the tank. A photograph
of the module is shown in figure D3-4. Two of each of these components
plus the check valve for tank no. 2 referred to in the previous paragraph
comprise the module. Figure D3-4 shows the top of the oxygen shelf. There
are approximately 19 feet of feed line from the tank pressure vessel to
the valve module.

The feed line exits the oxygen system valve module and branches, one
going to the ECS and the other to the fuel cell valve module where the
lines from tanks no. 1 and no. 2 are manifolded within the body of this
assembly. This module contains the check valves at the feed line entrance
points and three solenoid shutoff valves, one for each of the fuel cells.

The cryogenic oxygen electrical system consists of the following


items for each tank:

i. Two electrical heaters, rated at 77.5 watts each, 28 V dc. For


ground operation, the heaters are rated at 415 watts each, 65 V dc. Four
wires exit the tank connector. The wiring of the heater leads at the
pressure control assembly is such that the two heaters are connected in
parallel to a single power source. Power to the tank no. 2 heaters is
provided from main bus B through a circuit breaker and through an on-off
automatic switch. Automatic operation is provided through the pressure
control assembly actuated by the pressure switches. The control logic
requires that both oxygen tank pressure switches be below the low set-
point to energize the heaters. Either switch sensing pressure above the
high set-point will deenergize the heaters.

2. Two motor-driven fans rated at 28.4 watts each (three-phase,


200/115 V ac). Eight wires, one for each of the three power phases plus
a neutral for each motor, exit the tank at the tank connector. They pro-
ceed to a fuse box assembly where each of the leads (except for the
grounded neutrals) is individually fused by a 1-ampere fuse. Upon leaving
the fuses, the leads from like phases of the two motors as well as the
neutrals are Joined within the fuse box, and four wires leave this assembly.
The three power leads then pass through individual switch contacts and
thence to individual circuit breakers. Each breaker is rated at 2 amperes.
The fans can be operated in either a manual or automatic mode.

D-9
i!!
¸

Fuel cell
shutoff
,m, valve

Note: Ground protective


covers installed on tanks

Figure D3-4.- Plan view of the top of the oxygen shelf.

D-IO
3. A temperature sensor, a platinum resistance thermometer encased
in an Inconel sheath. It is attached to the outside of the quantity
probe. The resistance of the thermometer and consequently the voltage
drop across the unit changes with temperature. The signal conditioner
which serves as the reference voltage generator and amplifier is located
on the oxygen shelf and its input to the resistor is current-limited to
a maximum of i.i milliamperes. Four wires exit the tank connector and
are connected to the signal conditioner. The signal conditioner is
powered from ac bus 2 through a circuit breaker as a parallel load with
the quantity gage signal conditioner. Additional description is provided
in Appendix B.

4. A quantity gage, a capacitor consisting of two concentric alu-


minum tubes submerged in the oxygen. The dielectric constant of the
oxygen, and consequently the measured capacitance, changes in proportion
to its density. The signal conditioner, which serves as the reference
voltage generator, rectifier, and amplifier, is located on the oxygen
shelf. Two wires exit the tank connector and are connected to the signal
conditioner. The signal conditioner is powered from ac bus 2 through a
circuit breaker as a parallel load with the temperature sensor signal
conditioner. Additional description is provided in Appendix B.

5. A vac-ion pump assembly, attached to the dome of the tank, is


used only in prelaunch activities to maintain the tank annulus at the
required vacuum level. The pump functions by bombarding a titanium
cathode with ionized gas molecules and ion pumping results from the
gettering action of sputtered titanium particles. The high-voltage
power supply of the pump is an integral part of the pump assembly.
Leads for the vac-ion pump do not penetrate the pressure vessel and the
pump is not normally powered in flight.

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AT TIME OF ACCIDENT

The electrical power system, in general, provides multiple power


busses with switching options for selecting an operating configuration.
At 55:53:21, the electrical system was configured in accordance with
reference i, as shown in figure D3-5, with fuel cells i and 2 connected
to main bus A and fuel cell 3 connected to main bus B. Inverter i was
connected to main bus A and powering ac bus i. Inverter 2 was connected
to main bus B and powering ac bus 2. Inverter 3 was not connected. Bat-
tery busses A and B were not connected to main bus A or B. The switches
controlling heater operation for both oxygen tanks were in the "auto-
matic" position, controlling heater operation through the pressure con-
trol assembly. Pressures in the oxygen tanks were at levels which did
not demand operation of the heaters. Temperature and quantity sensors
on oxygen tank no. 2 were energized from ac bus 2. The quantity gage

D-II
Pressure control assembly
Oxygen tank 1
:)Open

Oxygen tank 2
l
PS

i- I
i'*--0 ver current
reverse voltage

, Main A ] I Main B

CB1 f CB19 "T CB51 CB2


RHEB 27S RHEB 229
c _CB18 RHEB 2260 c_I
15 amps RHEB 229 _') RHEB 27S
70 amps 5 amps
I RHEB 226 T 5 amps 70 amps
I 15 amps J I
CB50 _, s14 j, sls _L,
-_ MDC2 _ MDC2 I l
0 0 Y On-off-auto 0 0 I _On-off-autol I
Vac-ion
pump (in auto) (in auto) Vac-ion
Pressure - pump
Oxygen tank 1
7 _
7-"

_-_ controlassembly ;-_


< Oxygen tankOver
2 voltage _i)
under voltage

Heaters oxygen tank 1 Heaters oxygen tank 2


AC i AC 2

7, t, c,,o "
a

? 2amps (lY 2amps 'F 2amps s226 MDC2


amps8

Fc 2_s_ _ S20 'A

/| _'o o On-off-auto
MDC 2 o o MDC 2
I 0 On-off-auto
RHEB 220 -I RHEB 226 ,.JRHEB226 l_,,-JRHEmB
p

I__L_I (_ (in on) (in on) A

L__J SCS-TVC
Quantity I - I FU/IA _
Quantity T T _ T
servo motors
temperature ] ('_ temperature
sensors
sensors 0 _
Fan motors Fan motors
V I \ I
V'

Oxygen tank 1 Oxygen tank 2

Figure D3-5.- Electrical schematic of relevant portions of electrical


power system at 55:53:21.

D-12
had remained off-scale high from 46:40:06, indicating a probable short
circuit either on the leads or the probe assembly. Operation of the fan
motors in the oxygen tanks was accomplished throughout the mission using
manual control in lieu of the automatic operation afforded by the logic
of the pressure control assembly. A routine operation of the fans was
requested by the ground at 55:52:58 and acknowledged by the crew at
55:53:06. Energizing of the fans in oxygen tank no. i is confirmed by a
drop in voltage of ac bus i and an increase in total fuel cell current
at 55:53:18. Energizing of the fans in oxygen tank no. 2 is confirmed
by a drop in voltage of ac bus 2 and an increase in total fuel cell
current at 55:53:20. Data substantiating operation and operation times
are presented in Appendix B.

STRUCTURAL EVALUATION OF THE OXYGEN TANK

The oxygen tank consists of two concentric shells, an inner shell


(the pressure vessel) and an outer shell (fig. D3-6). The space between
the two shells is evacuated during normal operation and contains the
thermal insulation system, fluid lines, and the conduit which houses all
of the electrical wires entering the pressure vessel.

The oxygen tank is discussed from the standpoint of materials, pro-


cessing, welding, qualification program, stress levels, fracture analysis,
and environmental testing.

Materials, Processing, and Welding

Inner shell.- The pressure vessel is made from Inconel 718, a pre-
cipitation hardenable nickel base alloy having good strength, ductility,
and corrosion resistance over the range of temperatures from -300 ° F to
above 1400 ° F. The nominal composition of Inconel 718 is 19 percent
chromium, 17 percent iron, 0.8 percent titanium, 5 percent columbium,
0.6 percent aluminum, and the remainder nickel. The heat treatment
specified for Inconel 718 for this application was the following:

Hold at 1800 ° F ± 25 ° F for i hour

Air cool to 1325 ± 25 ° F and hold for 8 hours

Furnace cool to 1150 ° F and hold for 8 hours

Air cool

This treatment should produce typical ultimate tensile strength of


198,000 psi and yield strength of 170,000 psi at 70 ° F. Ultimate and

D-13
Dome assembly

Outer shell

i
I

Inner shell Tank


mounting

I
I

Insulation
Outer shell

Figure D3-6.- Oxygen pressure vessel schematic.

D-14
yield-strength values increase with decreasing temperature and reach
228,000 psi and 189,000 psi, respectively, at -190 ° F. These values ex-
ceed those assumed in the design of the vessel, which were 180,000 psi
ultimate tensile strength and 150,000 psi yield strength at room tempera-
ture (ref. 2). After burst tests, tensile specimens were cut from test
vessels PV-I and PV-4, and strength measurements were made at room tem-
perature. Each specimen exceeded minimum requirements.

Inconel 718 is considered to be an excellent selection for use at


the temperatures required by this design and when properly cleaned is
compatible with liquid oxygen.

The pressure vessel is made by electron beam welding two hemispheres


at a weld land (fig. D3-7) that is 0.139 ± 0.002 inch thick. The weld
land is faired to a membrane of O.059-inch thickness over a distance of
about 2 inches. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., forges the hemispheres to a
wall thickness of 0.75 inch, and applies the complete heat treatment.
The hemispheres are X-rayed following forging. The Airite Company
machines the hemispheres to dimension and welds them together from the
outside. First, an intermittent tack weld pass is made, followed by a
complete tack weld. The third pass provides complete penetration, and a
fourth pass penetrates about one-third of the thickness. Finally, a
cover pass is made. Figure D3-8 illustrates the welding sequence. The
weldments are X-rayed and dye-penetrant inspected from the outside. In-
spection of the inside of the pressure vessel is by visual means only
and dye penetrant is not used. Use of one of the available liquid-
oxygen-compatible dye penetrants would enhance the detection of cracks
or similar weld defects inside the vessel.

The literature has very little data on electron-beam welding of


Inconel 718. However, it is frequently used in the aerospace industry
and there is no reason to question the practice in this instance. One
potential problem sometimes found when this nickel-base alloy is welded
is micro-fissuring in the heat-affected zone. Such fissures either do
not propagate to the surface, or are very difficult to detect. Unfor-
tunately, high-contrast X-rays of this material are difficult to obtain,
particularly in the configuration of this tank. No evidence of a weld
cracking problem has been found in the manufacture of these pressure
vessels. Thus there is no justification for postulating that micro-
fissuring was a factor in the accident being investigated.

A total of 59 data packages on oxygen pressure vessels were reviewed


and it was ascertained that only 12 vessels had had weld discrepancies.
Table DS-1 describes the weld discrepancies and their disposition.
Neither of the two Apollo 13 oxygen tanks flown (S/N lOO24XTAO008 and
S/N lO024XTAO009) appear on this list. There were no recorded weld dis-
crepancies during the manufacture of these tanks.

D-15
Joint configuration _'1 _. 020:1:'005
I I

• 002 test
coupons
__L
L130r,i'!t_,
L_+.00a ___,.0.

L
K'::o+O..
oo.ura -I
.+: ° Weld reinfor cement

P/M thickness Tank radius D linens ions


L T O.D. I.D.
+.002 +005
1.000 .084 14.808 refar c 12.528 -0 Sph rad
+005
2.000 .067 +'002 14.808 refar c 12.528 -0 Sph rad
+ 004 +005
3.000 .059_ 000 12.587 refarc 12.528 -0 5ph rad

Weld schedule (Electron beam weld)

Pass sequence
Parameter 1-tack 2-seal 3-pene. 1 4-pene.2 5-cover
Voltage - Kv 80 80 115 95 85
Amperes - MA 1.5 1.5 6.0 4.0 3.0
Beam deflection - in. 0.012 0.012 .024/.036 .040/.080 0.110
Travel- in./min 18 _ _ _
Vacuum -mm hg 2x10-4 _ _ ----.-,.

Notes: (1) 0.002" gap, 0.003" offset (,_ax typ)


(2) No weld repairs allowed
(3) Typical weld sequence shown on attached sketch

Figure D3-7.- Girth weld Joint configuration and schedule.

D-Z6
ass 1 and 2 (tack and seal)

l
.i12 ref
weld reinf

l
t O.D. surface
t
Ll.D. surface
_ Weld joint

,_Pass 3 (penetration l)

t t
Fusion zone-_

Fusion zone ss 4 (penetration)

I
>

t
Fusion zone _s 5 (cover)

(Completed weld)

Figure D3-8.- Weld sequence.

D-17
TABLE D3-1.- AIRITE PRESSURE VESSEL WELD DISCREPANCIES

Serial no. Spacecraft Discrepancy

XTAO005 i01 Weld bead 0.005 inch concave by 0.600-inch


length. Remainder undercut 0.002 inch below
weld land parent metal. Accepted based upon
X-ray and comparison to qual. unit used in
burst. Beech MRR.

XTAO010 103 Undercut below weld land in one area 0.0015


inch deep by 0.750 inch length adjacent to
upper hemisphere. Due to heavy weld drop-
through. Accepted for unrestricted use by
NR MRD.

XTAO013 1o6 Hemisphere dimensional characteristics re-


suited in excessive weld mismatch. Units were
successfully welded after NR MRD. Finished
vessel met all requirements.

XTA0016 107 Four areas of concavity in center of weld


bead: no. i, 0.0025 inch depth; no. 2, 0.0055
inch depth; no. 5, 0.0045 inch depth; no. 4,
0.0025 inch depth. Concavity due to excessive
drop-through. Rewelded using two 360-degree
weld passes in accordance with NR MRD.

After rework of above, three areas of con-


cavity remained: no. l, 0.0025 inch below
parent metal; no. 2, 0.004 inch below parent
metal; no. 3, 0.0015 inch below parent metal.
Warpage occurred due to lack of constraint.
Accepted for unrestricted usage per NR MRD
based upon positive margins of safety.

XTA0022 ii0 Borescope showed entire weld land visible and


not consumed through 360-degree circumference
due to lack of penetration. Rewelded per NR
MRD instructions.

XTAO017 ii0 Borescope revealed lack of drop-through in an


area 1/2 inch in length. Rewelded by one 360-
degree pass per NR MRD.

Edge of weld on upper hemisphere undercut from


O.OO1 inch to 0.003 inch into parent material
for 360 degrees following rewelding per above--
reworked and accepted by NR MRD based upon
stress analysis.

D-18
TABLE D3-1.- AIRITE PRESSURE VESSEL WELD DISCREPANCIES - Concluded

Serial no. Spacecraft Discrepancy

XTAO024 iii Hemisphere dimensional characteristics out of


specification. Units successfully welded after
certification test specimens duplicating con-
ditions were acceptable. Discrepancies were
consumed during welding. Beech MRR.

XTA0021 iii Incomplete weld penetration for a distance of


17-3/8 inches. Rewelded per NR MRD.

XTAO033 Unassigned Upper hemisphere dimensions out of specifica-


tion. Accepted for welding with fit up with
another hemisphere. Beech MRR.

XTAO019 Unassigned Borescope revealed complete weld land (0.012


inch) still visible--repair welded per NR MRD.

XTAO003 Unassigned Borescope and X-ray revealed incomplete pene-


tration major distance of weld. Rewelded per
Airite procedure. Beech MER.

Weld concavity from 0.001 to 0.0055 inch deep


on drop-through side of weld on upper hemis-
phere. Maximum width is 0.003 inch--accepted
for unrestricted use by NIR MRD.

XTAOO32 Unassigned Borescope revealed area approximately 0.600


inch long with incomplete consumption of weld
lands. X-ray indicated complete penetration.
Rewelded by Airite procedure. Beech MIqR.

D-19
Outer shell.- The outer shell is made of Inconel 750, also a nickel
base alloy having the following nominal composition: 15 percent chromium,
7 percent iron, 2.5 percent titanium, 1 percent columbium, 0.7 percent
aluminum, and the remainder nickel. According to references 3 and 4, the
outer shell can be annealed. Typical strength values for the annealed
alloy are 130,000 psi ultimate strength and 60,000 psi yield strength.
This is more than adequate for this application. The wall thickness of
the outer shell is 0.020 ± 0.002 inch. When the space between the two
shells is evacuated, the outer shell preloads the insulation between the
two shells. The dome of the outer shell contains a burst disc designed
to vent the space between the shells to ambient pressure at a pressure
differential of 75 ± 7.5 psi.

Cryogenic tank tubing.- Three fluid lines (fill line, vent line, and
feed line), and an electrical conduit are fusion welded to the close-out
cap (tube adapter) that is screwed into the top of the pressure vessel.
The cap is secured to the pressure vessel by a circumferential seal weld.
The four lines are made of Inconel 750, annealed Aerospace Materials
Specification (AMS) 5582. The tubes traverse the space between the two
shells and exit the outer shell at the side of the tank coil cover. The
nominal strength of the annealed tubing is 140,000 psi ultimate, and
80,000 psi yields, which is more than adequate for the application, as
the stress level in the tubing is only about 17,000 psi.

After the tubes are welded to the cap, a visual inspection, helium
leak test (3 psi), and proof-pressure tests are used to assess the
quality of these welds (ref. 5). This is reasonable because of the low
stress levels involved. Liquid-oxygen-compatible dye penetrant inspec-
tion and subsequent cleaning would enhance the possibility of finding
surface cracks. X-rays of these welds would be difficult to obtain and
should be of dubious value.

The four lines extend only a few inches from the tank dome. When
the tank is assembled on the oxygen subsystem shelf, the fluid tubes are
joined by brazing to the 304L annealed corrosion resistant steel tubes
of the spacecraft systems. Although joining Inconel 750 and 304L steel
constitutes a bimetallic couple, it is satisfactory in this application
because of the dry environment that is maintained.

Qualification Program

The pressure vessel qualification program was conducted by Beech


Aircraft Corporation. Four pressure vessels were subjected to burst
tests as described in references 6 through 12.

Prior to each burst test, the vessel was subjected to an acceptance


pressure test at 1357 psig and checks were made for leaks. No leaks were

D-20
observed in any of the vessels. In Appendix F of reference 9, there is
an analysis of the proof test of vessel PV-4. _ne following table lists
someof the strain gage readings taken during the qualification testing.

_ASUREDSTRESS
LEVELSIN KSI

Internal 2.8 inches 2.0 inches Lower Membrane


Tank pressure, from from pole (0.061-inch
psig upper pole girth weld area thick)
Tank PV-4 1020 106.1 97,7 105.8
70° F 1357 139.4 128.9

Tank PV-I I020 116.7 i13


-320° F

aDesign value ii0 ksi

bDesign value 145 ksi

For the cryogenic burst tests, the vessels were filled with liquid
nitrogen and placed in an open dewar of liquid nitrogen. The ambient
temperature burst tests used water as the pressuring medium. The burst
pressures of the qualification vessels were as follows:

Tank Test condition Burst pressure, psig

PV-I Cryogenic (LN2, -320 ° F) 2233

PV-2 Cryogenic (LN2, -320 ° F) 2235

PV-3 Ambient temperature (70 ° F) 1873

PV-4 Ambient temperature (70 ° F) 1922

All ruptures were similar; the failures apparently started about


2 or 3 inches from the pole of the tank on the top at the transition
from the heavier section to the membrane section. The fractures pro-
gressed around the boss area, proceeded essentially perpendicular to the
girth weld, and then crossed the girth weld in both ambient tests and in
one of the cryogenic tests. In the other cryogenic temperature test
vessel, a large fragment came out of the upper hemisphere. In no case
was there violent fragmentation. After the burst of PV-1 at 2233 psig,
initial failure was judged to have occurred at the end of the neck taper
around the top pole. The rupture progressed downward, branching into a
Y. After coming into contact with the weld, the rupture followed the
weld fusion zone.

D-21
The following is a quotation from reference 9:

"2.3.7 Conclusions - Based on the above analysis and


evaluation_ the following conclusions are made:

(i) Burs_ failure initiated at the end of the


boss taper in the upper hemisphere and resulted
from plastic deformation beyond the tensile
strength of the base material at _ent tem-
perature.

(2) Rupture was of a hydrostatic type.

(3) The appearance of all failed areas was


judged to indicate good ductility of the base
metal and weldments.

(4) No significant mismatch was observed on


the specimens investigated.

(5) All fractures across the weld were shear


fractures and of a secondary nature.

(6) The grain size throughout the vessel was


fine (ASTM-5 to 8) and relatively equiaxed.

(7) The ambient burst test was judged to be


completely successful by Beech Aircraft Cor-
poration Engineering, and the results of the
test indicate approximately i00 percent ef-
ficiency for the material at the test tem-
perature."

The data from these pressure vessel tests satisfy the qualification
requirement for an ultimate factor of safety of 1.5 at ambient tempera-
ture with adequate margins.

In 1967 North American Rockwell verified analytically the structural


integrity of the oxygen tank (ref. 13). An MSC structural analysis re-
port (ref. 14), also issued in 1967, confirmed the structural integrity
of these tanks and compared the analysis with the results of the burst
tests. This comparison showed good correlation between analytical and
test results. The MSC calculations were based on minimum guaranteed
sheet thicknesses and minimum material properties. Even better correla-
tion is obtained by using the actual thicknesses and material properties
of the test items.

D-22
These analyses showthe maximumstresses in the tank during pressur-
ization to be in the upper spherical shell at the transition from the
constant thickness shell to the thickened area adjacent to the penetra-
tion port. Actual stresses determined from strain gage readings during
burst tests are consistent with the analyses.

FRACTURE
MECHANICS

The design of the supercritical oxygen tank was based on conven-


tional elastic stress analysis which assumesa homogenousmaterial and
uses the conventional tensile properties for the calculation of safety
factors. In reality, all fabricated materials contain crack-like flaws
which may be associated with weld defects or with metallurgical segrega-
tions which can transmit only negligible loads across their boundaries.
The load-carrying capacity of high-strength materials, particularly in
thick sections, may be severely reduced by the presence of even small
flaws which can trigger a brittle catastrophic failure at loads well
below those considered safe by conventional design procedures. Further-
more, in many cases the type of flaw present cannot be found by non-
destructive inspection techniques and, for this reason, a proof test
must be dependedupon to identify those structures which might fail in
service•

At the outset it should be appreciated that linear elastic fracture


mechanics and the associated American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM)
Standard Method of Test for Plane Strain Fracture Toughness, Klc, are not
directly applicable to an analysis of the fracture of the oxygen pressure
vessel material in the thicknesses employed, or for that matter in very
much larger thicknesses. The evidence for this lies in early results
from a fracture test program nowunderway at Boeing. These results in-
dicate that specimens containing deep cracks in parent metal, or in
electron beamweld metal representative of the oxygen pressure vessel,
fail at net stresses very close to or slightly above the corresponding
yield strength whether they are tested at 70° F or -190° F. While the
plane strain fracture toughness, Klc, cannot be determined from the data
available, a lower bound estimate may be madefrom test results reported
on 2-3/4 inch diameter notched round bar specimens (ref. 15). These
large specimens were cut from forgings of Inconel 718 and tested at
-ii0 ° F. The corresponding yield strength was about 172 ksi and the
notch strength was 40 percent above the yield stren__h. Formal calcula-
• W! fT •

tions glve an apparent Klc value of 190 ksl -_/ in. which may be taken
as a lower bound for a yield strength of 172 ksi. This is approximately
equal to the 70 ° F parent metal yield strength of the oxygen pressure
vessel. Properly made electron beam weldments should have at least this

D-23
high a Klc value since they are not heat treated after welding and there-
fore have a lower yield strength than the parent metal. At -190° F the
yield strength of the parent and weld metal will increase about iO per-
cent: however, for this austenitic alloy the corresponding change in
toughness would be expected to be negligible.

Failure Modes

While "apparent KIt" values should not be used to develop relations


between tank wall stress and critical flaw size, the lower bound value
of Kic can be used to showthat the pressure vessel would not fail in
a brittle manner. Whenthe parameter _Ic' the ratio of crack tip
plastic zone size factor to specimen thickness, is greater than l-l/2,
brittle fracture is very unlikely. This parameter is given by
K2
1 Ie
BIc = B 2
Fty
For the oxygen tank B the effective weld land thickness after welding
is 0.111 inch; the yield strength of the weld Fty is ll0 ksi at -190° F
(table D3-II), and the lower bound of KIe is 190 ksi - Vq-_.

TABLED3-II.- TYPICALPARENT
METALANDWELDTENSILEPROPERTIES
a

Parent metal Weld metal


Temperature, o F
Ftu - ksi Fty - ksi Ftu - ksi Fty - ksi

-190 228 189 187 bllo

70 198 170 158 ioo

aDetermined by Boeing on inconel 718 forgings using same heat


treatment given the oxygen pressure vessel and on electron beam weld-
ments given no heat treatment.

bGage length equal to weld width.

D-24
Using these values, _Ic = 27. A similar calculation for the parent metal

in the membrane yields _Ic = 16. On this basis, the mode of failure

of the pressure vessel would be expected to be ductile tearing rather


than shattering. However, it is not known whether this mode would lead
to a stable through-thickness crack, and a consequent slow leak into
the space between the pressure vessel and the outer shell, or to a
rapid tearing fracture with consequent destruction of the outer shell
and the quick release of a large volume of oxygen. Which of these two
possibilities is most likely depends in part on the flaw size giving
rise to the final fracture and on the rate of depressurization as compared
with the rate of crack propagation. To settle this matter would require
burst tests on intentionally flawed tanks.

If a local area of the pressure vessel wall or the tube adapter


were heated to a sufficiently high temperature by some internal or
external source, the tank would blow out at this local area. According
to data furnished by Boeing under contract to NASA, the strength of
Inconel 718 would degrade rapidly if the metal temperature exceeded about
1200 ° F. At lh00 ° F the tensile strength would be about 50 percent of
the room temperature value, and at 1600 ° F would be less than 30 percent
of this value. At a tank pressure of 1008 psi, the parent metal wall
stress based on membrane theory is about 108 ksi. A ductile rupture at
this stress would likely occur if the tank were at a uniform temperature
of 1400 ° F. The restraining effect of the cool surrounding metal would
raise the temperature required for a local blowout and this situation
is best evaluated by suitable experiments.

Effectiveness of the Proof Test

The proof test is the last, and should be the best, flaw detection
procedure applied to a pressure vessel. Ideally, the proof test should
cause failure if there are any flaws present that could grow to a critical
size during subsequent pressurization. For the oxygen tanks in question,
a fracture mechanics analysis cannot be made to assess the adequacy of
the proof test because of the high toughness of the material and the
thin sections used. These factors in themselves, of course, contribute
to the confidence that can be placed in the integrity of the pressure
vessel and, as discussed in the previous section, essentially rule out
the possibility of brittle failure. However, it is worthwhile to estimate
the effectiveness of the proof test in identifying those pressure vessels
which might develop leaks during pressure cycles subsequent to proof.
The failure model proposed considers the plastic instability fracture of
a ligament of material produced by incomplete fusion during electron
beam welding. The main features of this model are illustrated in fig-
ure D3-9. It essentially represents a long flaw in the tank wall at the

D-25
I' '1
_L
Area of lack of fusion produces
an effective crack of depth A
& length 2C in tank wall of
thicknessB. 2C_'>A

Figure D3-9.- Ligament model for ductile fracture of pressure vessel.

D-26
equatorial weld. It is postulated that the ligament will fail when its
stress reaches the tensile strength of the material. Calculations show
that the ligament stress _£ is related to the average wall stress
as follows :
g B
_£ = _g B - A

where the dimensions are defined in figure D3-9. The maximumrelative


flaw depth that can be sustained without failure is then
cI
a
_ : 1- _z_ (1)
B Ftu

where Ftu is the ultimate tensile strength. Failure will occur by


tearing of the ligament accompanied by rapid decompression of the tank.
It should be appreciated that this is a rather crude model of ductile
fracture, and will probably overestimate the failure stresses in a
spherical vessel. However_ it should be useful in assessing the effec-
tiveness of the proof tests in light of subsequent service_ because of
tl_(:very large margins between proof and operating pressures.

The pressure cycles applied to the Apollo 13 oxygen tank no. 2


are shown in table D3-111. It should be noted that the oxygen tank no. 2
had several extra pressure cycles in addition to those normally applied.
These were associated with rechecks for heat leaks and with the "shelf
drop" incident. The additional cycles do not affect this analysis nor
should they have reduced the integrity of the tank during mission
s ervi ce.

The ratio of tank pressures necessary to cause ligament failure for


a given relative flaw size A/B at two temperatures will be equal to the
ratio of the tensile strength of the material at these temperatures. On
this basis, the maximum flaw size that could exist before CDDT is estab-

lished by the last high pressure helium proof specified as 1260 +500 psi
-

at ambient temperature (1276 psi for oxygen tank no. 2). From equation
(i), the corresponding value of A/B for the weld metal is 0.55, based on
a weld tensile strength of 158 ksi at room temperature, a weld land
thickness of about 0.Iii inch, and a nominal weld land stress of 71 ksi.

The question now arises as to whether a flaw of this size coul_


propogate through the wall during subsequent pressurization and produce
a leak. Flaw growth could occur by sustained loads or cyclic loads. In
the absence of an aggressive environment, it is generally recognized
that sustained load flaw growth will not occur at loads less than 90
percent of that necessary to produce failure in a continuously rising

D-27
TABLE D3-III.- HISTORY OF PRESSURE CYCLES APPLIED TO APOLLO 13
SUPERCRITICAL OXYGEN TANK NO. 2

[ Record from North American Rockwell Space Division I

Peak pressure,
Time,
Organization Test media Date psi Test name
hr:mln
(a), (b)

Beech 6-20-66 1336 00:24 Pressure vessel,


H20 + He
acceptance

Beech 7-15-66 134o 0o:56 Internal leak check


GN 2
on complete assembly

Beech 7-15-66 92o 00:51 Cold shock


LN 2

Beech 9-15-66 c1333 00:54 Internal leak check


GN 2

Beech 9-15-66 c918 OO:51 Cold shock


LN 2

Beech Helium lO-19-66 1303 09:49 Proof and leak

Beech Helium lO-19-66 888 01:00 Proof and leak

Beech LOX 12-20-66 1333 40:05 dq/dm

Beech LOX 10-24 -66 922 25:04 dq/dm

Beech Helium 1-31-67 C13o 5 09:07 Proof and leak

Beech LOX 2- 2-67 c1321 28:39 dq/dm

Beech LOX 2- 3-67 c920 22:16 dq/dm

NAR-SD Helium 4-29-68 1262 06:45 Leak

NAR-SD Helium 5- 1-68 1002 01:00 Leak

NAR-SD Helium 5- 1-68 968 13:13 Leak

StAR- sD Helium 5- 2-68 1104 08:02 Leak

NAR-SD Helium 5-27 -68 c,d1262 02:54 Leak

NAR- SD Helium 5-28-68 cliO2 01:07 Leak

NAR-SD Helium i1-18-68 d1276 02:24 Leak

NAR-SD Helium ii-18-68 1002 01:40 Leak

NAR-SD Helium 7-17-69 1025 01:39 Leak

NAR-SD LOX 4- 9-7o 925 43:53 Launch loading

apressure cycles below 400 psi not recorded


bit could not be determined whether pressure measurements represented psia or psig
Cpressure cycles not normally applied

d1260 +50
- 0 psi specification

D-28
load test. Following the 1276 psi helium proof test, no subsequent
pressurization exceeds 85 percent of this pressure, and consequently
sustained load flaw growth is extremely unlikely. Confidence in this
conclusion can be obtained from the test results of a Boeing program
now underway. These results apply to specimens containing small but
deep cracks in both parent metal and electron beam weld metal of Inconel
718 forgings heat treated in the same way as the oxygen tank material.
The early data show no crack growth in 20 hours at -190 ° F for specimens
subjected to 160 percent of the nominal operating stress.

Cyclic loads during the flight operation would be caused by cyclic


operation of the heaters (about once per one-half hour). The associated
pressure cycles are very small with a minimum-to-maximum stress ratio
of about 0.95. Flaw growth due to these small cyclic loads is con-
sidered extremely unlikely during the mission for the following reason:
maximum nominal operating stress in the weld land (at 935 psi) is about
28 percent of the weld tensile strength at -190 ° F. Therefore, with a
flaw size of A/B = 0.55, the ligament stress would be only about 63 per-
cent of the weld tensile strength. On the basis of the known fatigue
behavior of Inconel 718 welds (ref. 16), it would be expected that
ligament failure due to cyclic loads induced by heater operation would
not be a consideration until hundreds of cycles had been accumulated.
Confidence in this conclusion can be obtained from the early results of
the previously mentioned on-going Boeing program. These results in-
dicate that parent and electron beam weld metal specimens of Inconel 718
containing small but deep cracks do not show crack growth at -19 O° F
after 15,000 cycles at minimum-to-maximum stress ratio of 0.95 and a
mean stress of about 170 percent of the nominal operating value.

While the conclusions based on the ligament model are consistent


with the Boeing data obtained from specimens with small flaws, these
test results cannot be used to prove the validity of the model because
it applies to large flaws. Therefore, it is planned to check the con-
clusions reached on the basis of this model by testing specimens at
MSC which will contain large, deep cracks. Specimens of both electron
beam welds and parent metal will be subjected at -190 ° F to the mean
and cyclic stresses encountered in flight operation of the oxygen tank.

In assessing the effectiveness of the proof test, no consideration


was given to the possibility of failure in regions remote from the welds
(e.g., the main membrane or neck of the vessel). Conventional stress
analysis (ref. lh) shows that the highest stresses occur in the transition
region between the weld lands and the uniform thickness membrane. Stresses
in the neck region are very low and comparable to those in the weld land.
The ligament model is not applicable to these regions of the vessel
remote from the weld since there is no clear mechanism by which a large
flaw could be introduced into the parent metal. Experience shows that

0-29
crack-like imperfections are sometimes introduced by the forging process,
but these are relatively small and confined to the surface layers of the
forging. Such defects are easy to detect and are usually removed by
the machining process. It is the standard practice of the aerospace
industry to reject forgings that have cracks that cannot be removed by
machining. With this in mind, there is no reason to doubt the effective-
ness of the final high-pressure helium proof test insofar as the pressure
vessel main membrane area is concerned.

Possibility of Tank Failure During Apollo 13 Mission

On the basis of the foregoing information, it is extremely unlikely


that the oxygen tank no. 2 pressure vessel ruptured at the maximum record-
ed flight pressure of 1008 psi and temperature of -160 ° F because of crack
propagation. Based on the previously described ligament model, a
pressure vessel passing the last high-pressure helium proof test should
withstand a pressure load nearly twice that of the maximum flight
pressure at -160 ° F. As described previously, a high-temperature blowout
of the pressure vessel is entirely possible, and if this occurred the
fluid released could have caused rupture of the dome or of the outer shell.

DYNAMIC TESTING

During the development and qualification of the command and service


modules (CSM), a series of dynamic tests was conducted on major vehicle
elements as well as subassemblies. The following sections describe
those tests applicable to the cryogenic oxygen tank.

Oxygen Tank Assembly Dynamic Testing

Dynamic testing was accomplished during September 1966. Flight-type


oxygen tank assembly hardware, selected as a test specimen, successfully
completed this testing as documented in reference 17.

Vibration testing.- The test specimen was subjected to vibration


in each of three axes, and the vibration level was maintained for 15 minutes
in each axis. The specified test levels, representing the combined envelope
of the atmospheric and space flight conditions, were as follows:

D-50
Frequency, Hz

i0 0.OO3

lO-9O 0.003 to 0.025 at 3 dB/octave

90-250 0.025

250-400 0.025 to 0.015 at 3 riB/octave

400-2000 0.015

The test spectrum is shown as the solid line in figure D3-i0. No signifi-
cant anomalies were recorded during these tests. These tests qualified
the oxygen tank assembly for the launch and space flight conditions.

Acceleration testing.- The oxygen tank assembly used in the vibra-


tion testing mentioned in the preceding paragraph was also tested for
acceleration in each of three axes for at least 5 minutes in each di-
rection. The acceleration was 7g in the launch axis direction and
3g in the other two orthogonal axes. These accelerations are greater
than those expected during normal ground handling or during flight. No
anomalies were recorded during these tests.

Apollo CSM Acoustic and Vibration Test Program

In addition to the dynamic testing previously described, the oxygen


tank and shelf assemblies plus other CSM subsystems were tested as part of
the Block II, Spacecraft 105/AV Certification Test Program conducted
during February and March 1968 (ref. 18). These tests qualified the
Block II CSM hardware against the acoustic and vibration criteria, and
confirmed the structural integrity of the CSM for vibration inputs which
enveloped the complete ground and flight environmental requirements as
specified in reference 19.

Figure D3-11 shows the transducer locations used for both the acous-
tic and vibration testing. Test instrumentation in the area of the
oxygen tank was as follows:

SA n0 (+x) Oxygen shelf on bracket, 18 inches from beam 4

SA iii (-R) Oxygen shelf on bracket, 18 inches from beam 4

SA 112 (-T) Oxygen shelf on bracket, 18 inches from beam 4

SA n3 (+x) Oxygen shelf on centerline

Note: R = radial, T = tangential

D-31
1.0

0.I

L)
00l
L)

0.001
10 20 100 1000 2000
Frequency, Hz (cps)

Figure D3-10.- Service module data overlays and specified test spectrum.

D-32
÷y _.__ -Z

÷Z ""_ I _ "Y

SAII41
SAIl5
SAI16

EAM 4

.OSA104
SA105
FUEL CELL
BEAM 3 SAI06

FUEL CELL

SAI32 LINE
O2 BRACKET

DSAI10

5AIll
SAIl2

SA107

SA108
SAIO9

AFT HELIUM

LINE

SUPPORT BRACKET

H2 TANI_

AFT BULKHEAD

A UNIAX ACCELEROMETER
• TRIAX ACCELEROMETERS

Figure D3-11.- Spacecraft I05/AV service module instrumentation, bay 4.

D-33
Vibration testing consisted of sinusoidal sweeps in the 4- to 30-Hz
range, followed by sinusoidal dwells at the prominent resonance fre-
quencies. CSM vibration response was controlled to O.075-inch double
amplitude for the 4- to 8-Hz frequency range and 0.1g peak for the T-
to 30-Hz frequency range.

Acoustic tests were performed to measure the vibratory response


in the 20- to 2000-Hz frequency range. The acoustic spectrum of
interest for the oxygen tank was adjusted to obtain a test spectrum as
shown in figure D3-10.

The vibration and acoustic tests were completed without failures


or any pertinent anomalies in the oxygen tank or tank shelf. The
maximum observed accelerations during the tests are given in the
following table:

Vibration Acoustic

X-axis Z-axis X-axis


Inst. no. 4- to 30-Hz sweep, 4- to 30-Hz sweep, 4- to 30-Hz sweep,
g (rms) g (rms) g (rms)

SA ii0 0.02 0.05 O.OO5

SA iii .5 .5 .35

SA 112 .5 .6 .6

SA 113 •15 .4 .17

The responses of four transducers (SA 107 through SA 109 and


SA ll3) are shown in figure D3-10.

The tests confirmed the following:

i. Structural integrity of Block II CSM wiring, plumbing,


bracketry, and installed subsystems when subjected to the dynamic loads
resulting from spacecraft exposure to the aerodynamic noise environment
expected during atmospheric flight.

2. Structural integrity of the Block II CSM when it is


experiencing the low vibratory motions produced by atmospheric flight.

D-34
Based upon the results, it is concluded that the tests were ade-
quate to qualify the CSM for flight on the Saturn V. Of course, this
qualification would not necessarily cover abnormal conditions such as
mishandling.

SHOCK TESTING

Although NR specification (ref. 20) requires qualification testing


of the oxygen tank assembly inside its shipping container for ground
handling and transportation conditions, further investigation revealed
that this requirement was deleted on January 8, 1965. This deletion is
documented in paragraph 3.8.4.3 of reference 21, which states, "Revised
Apollo Test Requirements, no testing of transportation and ground hand-
ling environments (shall be required). Packaging is designed to pre-
clude exposure of components to environments beyond transportation
levels." The shipping container (ref. 22) was reportedly shock tested
during the development program in 1964 and successfully sustained the
test environment described in reference 23. From these tests it was
concluded that the shock attenuation system in the shipping container
was acceptable. There was no requirement for shock testing of the
oxygen tank assembly outside its shipping container.

INTERNAL COMPONENTS

There are a number of components internal to the oxygen tank.


These are individually discussed in the following sections.

Qaantity Gage

The quantity gage capacitor (fig. D3-12) consists of two concentric


aluminum tubes which are adequately mounted and supported. The inner
tube of the capacitor constitutes the extension of the fill line. The
outer tube is perforated to insure access of the oxygen to the space
between the capacitor plates. The relative position of the two plates
is maintained by insulating Teflon separators. Shorting of the capaci-
tor at the plates within the tank requires bridging of the gap between
the tubes by a conductive material. Shorting could also be induced by
the contact of bare lead wires resulting from insulation damage. The
power input to the quantity gage is regulated and limited by the high
impedance source of the signal conditioner. The spark that could be

D-35
Vent line and electrical
conduit also pass Fill
Feed Adapter cap inconel

through this ada_ i_.I

Teflon adapte -_
_erature sensor
and quantity probe
Inc°nel tube_,_
Teflon adapter
/ II
elements of
capacitor (aluminum)

II

.224 dia holes, two


.232
places for heaterj Hole for temperature
and motor wiring sensor wiring

Glass-filled
Probe is manufactured teflon insulator
by Simmonds Precision
Temperature
Products, Inc. sensor element
is mounted on
this insulator

Fixed insulator

Inner tank_

Figure D3-12.- Quantity gage.

D-36
generated is at the 7- to lO-millijoule level. The evidence provided
by the data can be construed to indicate that the effects of the probe
failure during flight were limited to data loss.

Heaters

The two electrical heaters (fig. D3-13) are mounted to the heater
fan support tube. The heaters are nichrome resistance wire imbedded in
magnesium oxide insulation encased within a sheath of stainless steel.
The stainless steel sheath is spiralled and brazed to 12.0 inches of
the support tube length. The specifications established by North
American Rockwell for the Block II EPS cryogenic storage system (ref. 24)
provide a requirement for operation of the heater circuit at 65 V dc from
a GSE source for initial pressurization of the oxygen tank. For flight
the specification calls for operation from a 28 V dc source. The speci-
fications established by Beech Aircraft Corporation for the heater
(ref. 25) stipulate standby operation from an ac source, later estab-
lished as 65 V ac, for 50 minutes. While the heater is apparently
satisfactory for its intended use, the specifications are not compatible
with the intended use. The heater circuit is protected by a 15-ampere
circuit breaker. Individual thermostats for each heater are also
mounted on the inside of the support tube.

The thermostats were included in the heater circuit to prevent


raising the pressure vessel wall temperatures above 90 ° F, the design
temperature for the vessel walls. Such a condition (i.e., walls
reaching temperature above 90 ° F under operating pressure) might occur
if there was a very low quantity of oxygen left in the tank and it was
desired to maintain pressure. There is no known instance of the ther-
mostats ever having had to operate in flight.

A cross section of a thermostat is shown with the contacts in the


open position in figure D3-14. The contacts would assume this position
when the temperature of the thermostat reached 80 ° ± i0 ° F. When the
thermostat temperature is reduced to 60 ° ± 7 ° F, the differential con-
traction of the two metals of the bimetallic disc causes the disc to
snap through, assuming a convex up configuration. This forces the wave
washer and the attached thrust pin to move upward. The movable arm
containing the lower contact is pushed up by the thrust pin and the
contacts are closed. The wave washer acts as a spring to keep the
thrust pin bearing against the bimetallic disc. All of the moving
parts of the thermostat are enclosed in an hermetically sealed case.

The thermostats are rated by the manufacturer as follows.

D-37
CURRENT RATING OF THERMOSTAT

Applied voltage
Number of cycles
30 V ac or dc 125 V ac 250 V ac

i00,000 5.0 amp 2.0 amp i. 0 amp

50,000 5.5 amp 3.0 amp 1.5 amp

25,000 6.0 amp 4.0 amp 2.0 amp

i0,000 6.5 amp 5.0 amp 2.5 amp

5,OOO 7.0 amp 6.0 amp 3.0 amp

The specifications established by North American Rockwell for the


Block II EPS cryogenic storage system (ref. 24) provide a requirement
for operation of the heater circuit at 65 V dc from a GSE source for
initial pressurization of the oxygen tank. For flight, the specifica-
tion calls for operation from a 28 V dc source. The specifications
established by Beech Aircraft Corporation for the thermostat (ref. 26)
stipulate a current-carrying requirement of 7 amperes without specifying
voltage level or type of source (i.e., ac or dc). Acceptance test re-
quirements imposed on the supplier by this latter document include
dielectric testing, thermal shock, verification of operating tempera-
tures of the thermostat_ helium leak test, insulation resistance test,
and visual and dimensional inspection. No requirement is imposed for
acceptance test verification of the operational characteristics of the
thermostat with respect to current-carrying capability or ability to
open under load at any of the several voltages (65 V dc, 65 V ac, or
28 V dc) to which the thermostat will normally be subjected.

Qualification testing of the thermostats was accomplished as part


of the overall testing of the assembled oxygen tanks. These tests
included vibration, acceleration, and mission simulation. Operation
of the heater circuit at Beech during the oxygen tank qualification
program and for all normal acceptance testing is accomplished using
65 V ac for initial pressurization. Since this is done only when the
tank is filled with liquid oxygen, it is highly unlikely that tempera-
tures would be raised to levels that would cause operation of the
thermostats. One instance of a single thermostat operating to open a
heater was experienced in the First Mission Subsystem Qualification
Test (ref. 27). At this time, heaters were being energized from a
28 V dc bus.

D-38
Moveable
contact lass seal

_ase
assembly

Thrust
contact
I
nsulator

\ I

Cup
Wave washer
Bi-metal disc

Figure D3-14.- Cross section of thermostat.

D-40
__m

010
Upper fan motor
010
][D£
° [o .__
' '! 27
._ _u -7"

elements
----Heater

26. 743
26. 113

27. 043
27. 103 12 n,

_. 75

I Lower fan motor

0 I0 2.963

i r
010__

Figure D3-13.- Heater fan support.

I)-39
All qualification and acceptance tests identified were primarily
concerned with the repeatability of the thermostat actuation at the
specified temperatures. No qualification or acceptance tests have been
identified which would verify the ability of the thermostats to open
the heater circuit when energized at 65 V dc.

The combination of incomplete, unclear, and therefore inadequate


specifications of the thermostat with respect to voltage type and level
and a test program that does not verify the ability of the switch to
operate satisfactorily under service conditions constitutes a design
deficiency. The fact that the ratings for the thermostat by the manu-
facturer (preceding table) contains no entry for 65 V dc indicates that
service at this voltage was not intended.

At KSC, the heater circuits were intended to be operated at 65 V dc


only when the tanks were full of liquid oxygen. Under this condition,
the thermostats would not be required to actuate. A discussion of the
possible consequences of actuation of the thermostat under load at
65 V dc is presented in a later section of this Appendix.

Fans

At the time the tanks were first designed, the knowledge of the
behavior of fluids in zero-g was limited. It was believed that signi-
ficant stratification of the fluid would occur during flight. Under
these circumstances a number of difficulties could arise: a rapid
pressure drop in the tank would be induced by the acceleration resulting
from an SPS burn; the heaters might not be able to transfer heat uni-
formly to the oxygen; and, finally, serious errors in quantity measure-
ment could result. The occurrence of any of these conditions could
jeopardize flight safety or mission success. For this reason, the tanks
were provided with two motor-driven centrifugal fans to mix the fluid
and insure its homogeneity.

The two oxygen fan motors (fig. D3-15) are three-phase, four-wire,
200/l15-volt, 400-hertz, miniature, open induction motors, driving cen-
trifugal flow impellers. The minimum speed of the motors is 1800 rev-
olutions per minute at a torque output of 0.9 ounce-inches. The motors
are mounted at each end of the motor-heater support tube by a canti-
levered attachment joined to the motor back plate. The motor clearance
within the support tube wall is a nominal 0.01 inch. The stator windings
and bearings of the motors are exposed to oxygen.

The stator windings are fabricated with number 36 American Wire


Gage (AWG) wire, using a Teflon-coated ceramic insulation. The ceramic
insulation is brittle and subject to breakage if proper tension is not
used in fabricating windings or if sharp bends are made at the winding

D-41
Stator slot-._

Stator teeth--_ _

Terminal-_ _ _

Spider-_ ____.,, .--_-,_ ',. _ J/

2• 943
. -:,I .523 max / /- Stator retainer
___ max I"-(°vertabs)_..----_ / rRecessedslot

1. _ia _J-"----- _l "_I'd!_y_L


J__ /_,'tt'_"J / in retainer

-I--TII]___I max _ 11_ II_-Ii

, _¢AI '//Stator' J_"_'%_ _xh--Fan impeller'

/---Rotor /---Hous ng Bearings


L--Bea rings l

relief
End of terminal_/_ Strain

//____,_ Leadwire
mmet

Figure D3-15.- Oxygen fan motor.

D- 42
end turns. Acceptance testing of the wire is conducted on the first
i00 feet of each reel. The wire is considered acceptable if no more
than i0 breaks in insulation are exhibited in the sample whenpulled
through mercury at 25 feet per minute. The rejection rate for stator
winding faults for motors processed early in the production run was
substantial. Improved yield was achieved only by rigid adherence to
the winding tension process control used in fabricating the windings,
proper assembly techniques, and frequent in-process dielectric testing.
Phase-to-phase short circuits or shorted turns within a single phase
are more likely than phase-to-ground faults. A limited amount of in-
sulation is provided between windings and ground. Phase-to-phase in-
sulation is limited to the end turns. Considerable improvement was
accomplished in the acceptance rate of motors built after the fabrica-
tion control techniques were developed (Appendix C). No problem was
exhibited in the testing of the two motors finally installed for flight
in oxygen tank S/N XTAO008.

The motor design uses an insulation system in the windings which


is subject to failure unless carefully controlled. The individual
power leads to each fan motor are protected by 1-ampere fuses.
Temperature Sensor

The temperature sensor is a calibrated resistor, the resistance of


which is proportional to temperature. The sensor is mounted to the
upper glass-filled Teflon fitting of the capacitor probe. Since the
calibrated input to the resistor is current limited to i.i milliamperes
under fault conditions of the sensor, no problem would be anticipated
with this unit.
Wiring
Wire sizes and types of wire used within the oxygen tank are shown
in table D3-1V. The insulation used in all cases is Teflon with a
nominal thickness of 0.010 inch. Distribution and arrangement of the
wires is shownin figure D3-16.
The insulation on all wires within the tank is specified by
reference 28 to conform to MIL-W-16878, Type E. The insulation thick-
ness requirements of this specification establish the following:
Insulation Thickness I in.

Condition Minimum Nominal Maximum

Nominal 0.008 0.010 0.012

With out-of-center
tolerance 0.007 0.010 0.014

D-43
O
,_
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-H
o
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o
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O.HO'H •,-I "1::::1

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,-_
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O O O O
'd O O O o

e_ c; ,S c; ,S
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N
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i

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17-44
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o
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D-45
The mechanical design of the tank with respect to provisions for
wiring is considered deficient. Damageto the wiring may be either
insulation damageor conductor damage,portions of which cannot be
inspected or adequately tested during or after assembly.
The four number 26 AWGwires for the fan motors are encased in
0.012-inch-thick shrink-fit Teflon tubing from the motor housing to a
point 0.3 inch outside the heater-fan tube. The 0.012-inch shrink-fit
tubing provides the protection for the wires at the point where the
four-wire bundle crosses the machined sharp edges of the access hole
in the heater tube (fig. D3-17). The shrink-fit tubing does not,
however, alleviate the strain on the 90-degree bend of the wires at the
motor housing. During assembly of the fan to the support tube, the
four-wire bundle in the shrink-fit tubing maybe forced against the
machined sharp edges of the support tube at point "A" of figure D3-17.
Two specimens of the support tube that have been examined showno re-
moval of burrs at this point. Betweenthe motor and the access hole in
the support tube, the wire bundle is restrained by a 0.010-inch thick
soldered copper clip.

The twisted lower fan motor leads (without shrink-fit tubing)


reenter the support tube and traverse a 3/16-inch-diameter conduit for
12.0 inches before again exiting the support tube. No specification
restraint on slack left in the bundle contained within the heater tube
conduit was noted. The motor leads are in contact with the conduit, at
least at the ends of the conduit, and exposed to local heat conditions
of the heater elements.

Design changes were madebetween Block I and Block II configurations


to provide independent circuits to each motor and heater within the
oxygen tanks. Provision was madein the glass-filled Teflon separator
on the quantity probe for access of the extra six wires to the upper end
of the probe assembly. The conduit (i/2-inch 0D x 0.015-inch wall) in
the domefor wiring to the connector was not, however, increased in
size.

During assembly of the tank, three bundles of six wires each are
sequentially pulled through the conduit. The first bundle, consisting
of the two quantity gage wires and the four temperature sensor wires,
is pulled through the conduit along with the pull wires for the other
bundles. The second and third bundles each consist of one set of motor
leads encased in 0.012-inch shrink-fit tubing and one set of heater leads.
The pull wires have a break-strength of 65 pounds. Since the third bundle
of wire must be forceably pulled through the conduit, damageto wires in
this bundle or the others may result which may not be detectable without
physical inspection. Physical inspection cannot be accomplished with this
design.

D-46
¢_

Four no. 26 _,,


nickel wires
in no. 14 heat J \
shrink sleeve _

0.218 in. × 0.230 in.


motor lead access
(no bushing)

Fan

0.05 in,

Copper clip

Teflon
grommet

Fan motor

Figure D3-17.- Typical wire routing for fan motor (four times full size).

D-47
The calculated break strength of a number 26 AWG nickel wire is
II pounds and elongation of 28 percent can be experienced before break.
If the number 26 AWG wires do not share the load associated with pulling
the bundle through the conduit, damage to the wire(s) will result be-
fore the pull wire breaks. Stretching of the wire results in local
neck-down of both the conductor and insulation. In subsequent operation
of the circuit, the locally smaller gage conductor can produce local
hot spots and progressive deterioration of the insulation.

Discussion

All electrical power system wiring is protected by fuses or


circuit breakers specified on the basis of wire size. Such devices
will transmit their rated current without opening the circuit to
either the load or a fault. The opening of the device to protect the
circuit on overload is determined by an inverse time to over-current
ratio that will open a large current fault in a short time, and a smaller
over-current fault in a longer time. The protection afforded is to the
wire and power system rather than to the connected end item.

The wiring in the oxygen tank has inherent potential for damage
in assembly due to inadequate support, inadequate clearances, and thin
Teflon insulation. It is well known (refs. 29 and 30) that Teflon in-
sulation cold flows when subject to mechanical stress. The design of
the tank internal installation exposes the insulation to potential pro-
gressive damage by cold flow where the wiring is placed near or at bends
around sharp corners.

COMPATIBILITY OF MATERIALS WITH OXYGEN

It is well known that virtually all materials except oxides will


react with liquid oxygen (LOX) under specific conditions. The tend-
encies to react and the rates of reaction vary widely. Most organic
materials and the more active metals are sufficiently reactive with
LOX to require careful attention to the condition under which they are
used. Spontaneous reaction does not usually occur upon contact between
a material and LOX; however, the sudden application of energy in the
form of mechanical shock or electrical spark to the combination of LOX
and a chemically active material will often result in violent reaction
or rapid burning.

D-48
Classification Methods

A method commonly used to classify the relative reactivity of


materials with LOX is described in references 31 and 32. Based upon
this method, a specification, MSFC specification 106B, "Testing Com-
patibility of Materials for Liquid Oxygen Systems ," was developed to
establish acceptance criteria of materials for use in L0X and gaseous
oxygen (GOX) systems. Materials meeting the requirements of paragraph
3.3 of the specification are said to be compatible with LOX. In this
context it must be recognized that the term "compatible" describes only
the relative reactivity of a material and does not describe an absolute
s it uati on.

Materials for use with LOX are selected from the "compatible" list
of references 33 to 36 under the additional stipulation that the level
of any potential mechanical shock is less than that associated with the
impact test and/or that potential electrical energy sources are less
than the ignition energy of the material in LOX. If a material is used
with oxygen and a potential energy source, it must be determined by
test that the energy available is less than that required to initiate
the reaction. Furthermore, the test should represent the circumstances
of use as nearly as possible.

For example, the pressures and temperatures of the oxygen to which


the material will be exposed should be duplicated in the tests. Ad-
ditionally, thickness and surface area of the material, as well as that
of any backing material (such as may act as a heat sink, for example)
should be duplicated. The latter is important because there are ex-
amples of materials changing from an acceptable rating to an unaccept-
able rating solely because of a change in the thickness used in a par-
ticular application. For some proprietary materials and composites
whose composition may vary from batch to batch, it is necessary to re-
peat the compatibility tests for each batch. Elastomers are a good ex-
ample of the latter category. In summary, the methodology for determin-
ing compatibility must be adhered to scrupulously to preclude self-
deception.

Materials Internal to the Tank

The materials of the internal components of the oxygen pressure


vessel have been identified from the records (ref. 37) and assessed as
to suitability for use in the high-pressure oxygen environment. The
types and estimated quantities of materials in each of these components
within the oxygen tank are listed in tables D3-V through D3-1X.

Of the materials used in the tank, most have been subjected previ-
ously to compatibility testing in LOX in accordance with the methodology
of references 31 and 32.

D-49
TABLE D3-V.- MATERIALS IN HEATER ASSEMBLY

Estimated
Part name Material weight, Ib

Tube assembly 321 stainless steel 1.39

Upper and lower 302 stainless steel .26


motor support

Silver braze QQ-S-561, Class II .O62

Wire clamp Tinned copper .001

Thermostat doubler QQ-A-327 (T6) aluminum alloy .oo4

Grommet Teflon (MIL-P-19462) Negligible

Shim 321 stainless steel .06

Bolts 302 stainless steel .03

Screws 302 or 303 stainless steel .04

Screws 302 or 30h stainless steel .02

Nuts Silver-plated 303 stainless .002


steel

Washers 321 stainless steel .O2

Washers 302 stainless steel .007

Rivets 2117 aluminum .001

Safety wire 30h stainless steel Negligible

Heat shrinkable tubing Teflon (TFE)


AWG no. 14 clear .001
AWG no. 14 white .001

Solder QQ-S-571, type AR Negligible


Comp Sn 60-Fb40

Screw Stainless steel pw QQ-S-763 .0_

D-50
TABLE D3-V.- Concluded

Estimated
Part name Material weight, ib

Clamp Stainless steel clamp with Negligible


teflon cushion

Drilube 822 Negligible

Wire AWG no. 20, silver-plated 0.o278


copper

Wire insulation and Teflon .0278


shrink fit tubing

Disk blank* Bi-metal (21 percent Ni Negligible


7 percent Cr Balance Fe
and 36 percent Sn)

Stationary contact* 0.010 fine silver on monel Negligible

Movable arm* 0.004 Permanickel Negligible

Welding cap* Monel Negligible

ilnsulator* Alsimag 645 or Duco 9P-16 Negligible

Thrust pin* Alsimag 35 Negligible

Mounting bracket* 302 stainless steel Negligible

Wave washer* Stainless steel Negligible

Cup* 321 stainless steel Negligible

Rivet contact* Fine silver Negligible


(movable)

321 stainless steel base Negligible


Base assembly*

*Thermostat parts

D-51
TABLE D3-VI.- MATERIALS IN DENSITY SENSOR PROBE

Estimated
Part name Material weight, lb

Density sensor/assembly 1.9

Bracket 3003 A1 alloy .07

Spacer 25% glass-filled TFE Teflon .O1

Rivet II00-H-14 A1 alloy .01

Rivet, solid 2117, ll00 A1 alloy •01

Grommet Glass-filled Teflon .01

Grommet Glass-filled Teflon .O1

Sleeve Red tubing - TFE Teflon .05


Size 9 thin wall

Spacer 25% glass-filled Teflon •01

Solder Tin/Lead 60/40 .01

Inner tube plug 25% glass-filled Teflon .03

Rivet-semi-tubular II00-H-I4 A1 alloy .01

Outer tube 6063-T832 A1 alloy .20

Eyelet Brass Comp 22 HD QQ-B-626 .01

Rivet ll00-H-14 A1 alloy .01

Terminal Brass 1/2-H Comp. .01


1-QQ-B-613B

Rivet, solid II0-H-14 or 2117 AI alloy Negligible

Solder QQ-S-571 (60/40) .01

Sleeve, insulator top Glass-filled TFE Teflon (25%) .4

iRivet ll00-H-14 A1 alloy .01

D-52
TABLE D3-VI.- Concluded

Estimated
Part name Material weight, ib
i

Sleeve support bottom _MS-5542 inconel X annealed 0.o25

Insulator sleeve bottom Fiber-filled TFE Teflon

Rivet ll00-H-lh AI alloy .01

Inner tube 6063-T832 AI alloy .18

Terminal coax Brass I/2-H Comp I-QQ-B-613B .01

Wire AWG no. 20, nickel, grade A .0115

Teflon .0263
Wire, insulation and
shrink fit tubing

D-53
TABLED3-VII.- MATERIALS
IN DENSITYSENSOR
PROBE
TUBEASSEMBLY

Estimated
Part Name Mat eri al weight, ib

Tube assembly Inconel X750 1.35

Sleeve connector Inconel X750 .i

Electrical connector Inconel X750 .25

Solder terminals Gold-plated Inconel X750 .001

Tube Inconel X750 •005

Adapter (fill) upper Teflon (TFE) •016

Adapter (fill) lower Teflon (TFE) •016

D-54
TABLE D3-VIII.- MATERIALS IN FAN MOTORS

Estimated
Part name Material weight, lb

Screw 18-8 stainless steel 0.02

Plate, end 2024-T4 AI alloy .04

Shim 302 stainless steel .02

Shim 302 stainless steel .02

Shim 302 stainless steel .02

Bushing, bearing 303 stainless steel .04

IBearing, ball 440C & Rulon "A" .02

Bearing, ball 440C & Rulon "A" .02

Spacer sleeve 303 stainless steel .i0

Lamination Ludnum AI-4750-H no. 2 .02


temp. RL fin.

Insulator, stator slot Teflon impreg, glass cloth .02

Insulator, cell cover Teflon impreg, glass cloth .02

Terminal Brass 1/2-H QQ-B-613 .02

Sleeving, heat Teflon TFE .02


shrinkable

Compound, insulating Liquinite Teflon FBC powder .02

Wire, magnet Teflon overcoated ceramic .2


insulation over copper wire

Housing 2024-T4 AI alloy .2

Ring yoke Transformer grade A silicon .02


electrical steel

0-55
TABLE D3-VIII.- Concluded

Estimated
Part name Material weight, lb

Retainer stator 2024-T4 AI alloy 0.02

Plate, bearing 303 stainless steel .16

Pin, spring 302 stainless steel .02

!Pin, spring 302 stainless steel .02

Insulator Teflon .02

Grommet Teflon .02

Strain relief Teflon impreg, glass cloth .02

Sleeve, rotor 416 stainless steel QQ-5-763 .02

Shim, cover 302 stainless steel .02

Plate, front 3003 aluminum alloy .02

Vane, impeller No. 12 brazing sheet .02

Plate, back No. 12 brazing sheet .02

Hub II00-F aluminum .02

Lubricant Drilube no. 822 .002

Safety wire 300 series stainless steel Negligible

Wire AWG no. 26, nickel, grade A .0327

Wire insulation and Teflon .0518


shrink fit tubing

0-56
TABLE D3-1X.- MATERIALS IN FILTER

Estimated

Part Name Material weight, Ib

Inconel X750 o.o16


Body

Nut 304 stainless steel .oo6

Washer 304 stainless steel .002

Disc 302 stainless steel .021

Seal Teflon .oo8

D-57
Some of the materials in the tables, however, have a questionable
compatibility with LOX, under the criteria of MSFC specification I06B.
These are the following:

60-percent tin, 40-percent lead solder


Teflon (TFE) heat shrinkable tubing
Drilube 822
Rulon A
Colored Teflon
Teflon liquinite powder

The solder is listed as incompatible in the references 33 to 36. There


are no test results for heat shrinkable Teflon tubing in the references.
The last four materials have given inconsistent results in compatibility
tests and exemplify the "batch" problem previously discussed. In ad-
dition to the above, some of the materials within the sealed thermostats
(table D3-V) have apparently not been tested.

It must be emphasized that the data in the references cited are for
tests in LOX at relatively low pressures. The compatibility of the ma-
terials under the conditions of service in the tank is thus not neces-
sarily characterized by the referenced data.

The Teflon insulation used on the wiring within the tank is a prime
suspect substance that burned inside Apollo oxygen tank no. 2 (Appen-
dix F). Over many years of use, Teflon has been proven to be one of the
most satisfactory nonmetallic materials for use in LOX. It will not
react with LOX unless excited by energy sources such as extremely high
impact energy (above i0 Kg-M) or a spark. Adiabatic compression tests
up to pressure of the order of i0 to 12 ksi have failed to ignite Tef-
lon. However, additives to Teflon to produce color or other property
changes have been known to increase the susceptibility of Teflon to
react with LOX.

It must be noted that all oxygen compatibility tests are conducted


with the specimens in a scrupulously "LOX-clean" condition. Cleanliness
of materials within oxygen systems is vital. Something as innocuous as
the oils from a fingerprint can serve as the starting point for a chain
of chemical reactions that can lead to a catastrophic failure. For
this reason, the same standards of cleanliness employed in compatibility
tests must be applied to flight systems.

Although the quantities of incompatible materials may be small,


these materials can provide the mechanism for initiating other reactions.
For example, in a recent test at MSC, 2 grams of Teflon were ignited in
900 psi oxygen, temperature -190 ° F, by means of a hot wire. This, in
turn, ignited a piece of aluminum 0.006 inch by 0.75 inch by 0.75 inch
that was in contact with the Teflon.

0-58
Titanium is not listed as a material used in the oxygen system;
however, a titanium clamp of the same drawing number, distinguished only
by a different dash number, is used in the hydrogen tank. The clamp is
made in two halves. The identifying number is stamped on only one half.
The titanium halves are matched, drilled, and bagged together at the
manufacturers. If a half clamp made of titanium had been placed in-
advertently in the oxygen tank, it could have contributed to the fire
and subsequent tank failure as the clamp is attached to the boss area
of the tank. Because of the bagging and other controls, it is unlikely
that a titanium clamp found its way into an oxygen tank. It is poor
design practice, however, to have dimensionally identical parts of
different materials that may be interchanged and then installed in a
potentially hostile environment.

Although not normally exposed to supercritical oxygen, the alum-


inized Mylar used in the oxygen tank vacuum annulus, and within the SM,
is of interest in the investigation. Aluminized Mylar is not compatible
with oxygen and were the pressure vessel or the tank internal tubing to
fail, the Mylar in the annulus and/or the SM would be exposed to con-
centrated oxygen. If an ignition source is present, the Mylar would
burn. If such burning were to have occured within bay 4, it could have
contributed to pressurization of the bay and consequent loss of the SM
panel.

OTHER DESIGN AND SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS

A number of other features and components of the oxygen tank system


and of other spacecraft systems are discussed in the following sections.

Oxygen System Relief Valves

The oxygen tank relief valve was designed to protect the oxygen
tank against the effects of potential malfunctions of the tank subsystem.
Specifically, the valve was designed to relieve a pressure build-up
resulting from the worst of the following three system malfunction con-
ditions:

1. Heaters on GSE power supply at ground-rated conditions with a


full tank and fans running with thermostats failing to open. This yields
a heat input of 3002 Btu/hr, which would require a valve flow of 18 lb/hr
to prevent exceeding 1010 psig.

2. Heaters on at spacecraft voltage level (28 V dc) and fans


running with tank filled such that minimum dQ/dm exists (i.e., most
critical condition for raising pressure). This yields a heat input of
685 Btu/hr and a valve flow requirement of 19 lb/hr.

D-59
3. Loss of vacuum in the annulus with the tank filled such that
minimum dQ/dm exists. This yields a heat input of 935 Btu/hr which
requires a valve flow capacity of 26 ib/hr.

The third condition requires the largest relief valve flow capacity
and this was used to size the valve. It was also stipulated that the
valve must pass this flow with the fluid at +130 ° F. These criteria
were considered conservative because of the effects of flow through the
relief valve on the heat leak, dQ/dm_ and system temperatures.

A question arises from an examination of the three malfunction con-


ditions assumed: Why was the case of heaters powered by ground support
equipment (GSE) at critical dQ/dm not considered? Under such a circum-
stance, the heat input would be approximately 4-1/2 times that of
condition 2 with a flow requirement increase in the same proportion. It
was determined that it was not intended to ever use GSE power to the
heaters except when the tank was full.

The design philosophy of the relief valve thus contemplated single-


failure modes associated with anticipated malfunctions. It did not
contemplate a catastrophic failure mode such as would be produced by
combustion within the tank. This is not an uncommon design practice in
the sizing of relief valves. In ground systems, however, in addition to
relief valves, pressure vessels are frequently provided with large burst
discs or blowout patches to protect against pressure rises that would
result from conditions other than anticipated malfunctions.

The Block II relief valve was subjected to qualification testing


as part of an oxygen system valve module qualification test program
conducted by Parker Aircraft Company for North American Rockwell (NR)
in March of 1967. Reference 38 describes the test program and the results.
Briefly, the module, consisting of check valve (for no. 2 tank), relief
valve, pressure switch, and pressure transducer, was subjected to the
following tests: performance, vacuum, vibration, acceleration, humidity,
and endurance cycling. Random vibration excitation was applied for
15 minutes for each axis. The acceleration testing was for 5 minutes in
each of the +X, -X, +Y and +Z axes. During both vibration and acceleration
tests, the various module elements were operated. The pressurizing medium
was nitrogen at room temperature during all tests, except for one of the
endurance tests which was conducted at -230 ° F.

The only discrepancy recorded for the test program was out-of-
specification leakage of the check valve subsequent to the vibration test-
ing. This was ascribed to the fact that fluid was not flowing through
this normally open check valve during vibration which would be its con-
dition during flight. This absence of fluid permitted the valve poppet to
repeatedly strike the seat causing abnormal wear. Further, there was
contamination present in the valve from the flex line used in the test

D-60
setup. This aggravated the problem. Because these factors were present,
the test conditions were considered not representative of actual service
conditions and the check valve performance was considered acceptable
(ref. 39). It should be noted that the Block I valve was tested using
oxygen as the fluid medium and that the changes from Block I to Block II
valves were such as to not invalidate the materials compatibility demon-
strated with the Block I systems.

A number of observations are warranted. No shock testing was required


for the qualification of the relief valve. In view of the fact that other
valves in the service module exhibited shock sensitivity during the
Apollo 13 flight and the fact that only a few thousands of an inch of
poppet travel is required to open the relief valve fully, it would be
valuable to determine whether the relief valve is sensitive to shock.
It is possible that the relatively slow decay of oxygen tank no. 1
subsequent to the accident might be the result of a relief valve that
failed to seat correctly after the shock.

In the qualification program there was no requirement for the relief


valve to vent or relieve into a hard vacuum as it would have to in space.
It is possible that under such conditions the oxygen would cool enough
to solidify, thus plugging the orifice-like passage of the valve or the
downstream lines that lead to the overboard exit, precluding further
relieving by the valve. This is particularly important because the exit
lines from both relief valves are manifolded prior to entering the
overboard line. Were the common line to be plugged by solid oxygen by
flow from one valve, it might prevent the second valve from relieving
should it be required to do so. An experiment would be required to
verify this.

Arrangement at Head of Tank

The head ends of the tank and the temperature sensor and quantity
probe are shown in figure D3-18. One of the more significant features
of the design is the arrangement of the connections in the fill line
which routes the cryogenic fluid to the bottom of the tank, via the
inner element of the quantity gage capacitor, and which permit the
fluid to flow from the bottom of the tank during ground detanking. The
manufacturing drawings of the elements of this connection, two Teflon
adapters and an Inconel tube, allow a tolerance stack which is excessive.
One combined worst case results in a connection which cannot reach from
the fill tube connection in the tank head to the center element of the
quantity gage capacitor. The other results in a connection length which
prevents assembly of the probe to the adapter in the head of the tank.
These are shown in figure D3-19. The tolerances on concentricity between
the inner element of the capacitor and the outer shell of the probe are
not known and are omitted from this figure. Inclusion would show an even
worse situation than shown.

D-61
Vent line and electrical
conduit also pass Fill Feed
through this ada line
pter cap inconel

°_ Inconel

Teflon adapter
| I,#11
}erature sensor
Inconel tube and quantity probe
Teflon adapter
Tubular elements of
Ba capacitor (aluminum)

224 dia holes, two


1232
places for heater
Hole for temperature
and motor wiring
sensor wiring

• .. _-- Glass-filled

II teflon insulator
"_'_" Temperature
II
sensor element
is mounted on
this insulator

Figure D3-18.- Arrangement of head end of tank.

D-62
G;

._
r_

r_
._

c_
o

.r_

Q;

0
0

I
e

D-6_
The experience with the oxygen tank no. 2 in Apollo 13 (apparently
normal detanking at Beech, but normal detanking not possible at KSC)
suggests that the components used in the fill line connection were close
to a worst-case short situation. Tests conducted recently at Beech show
that near normal detanking is possible when considerable leakage is
present at the joints in the connection, and that a substantial dis-
placement of the top Teflon adapter relative to the fill line in the tank
adapter cap is necessary to reproduce the KSC situation.

The manufacturing drawing tolerances are such that parts conforming


to the drawings could result in an assembly which will not provide the
proper connection. However, the probability of a combined worst case is
extremely low. It is probable that the actual variations between pro-
duction parts are significantly less than the drawing tolerances would
permit, particularly the variations between parts within a common batch.
Data have been requested on other similar parts to determine whether the
variations from part to part are large or small, and whether the average
tolerance stack found in practice leads to long or short connection
assemblies.

The design is such that the task of assembling the probe to the
adapter in the head of the tank (the connection is by four tack welds)
is extremely difficult. All wiring must be loosely installed, and the
majority of this originates from the fan/heater assembly which must be
already installed within the tank shell. The fill line connection must
be steered into place simultaneously with the insertion of the probe
into the adapter, and this becomes a blind operation, complicated by the
fact that thermal expansion coefficients dictate very sloppy fits between
the Teflon adapters and the metal components of the fill line. This
problem is dealt with at greater length in Appendix C.

One way to obviate this problem would be to redesign the internal


components of the tank to permit bench assembly and thorough inspection
of a single assembly, embodying all internal components and their plumbing
and wiring, before introduction into the tank body. It is recognized
that a redesign of this magnitude would largely destroy the foundation
of experience, both ground and flight, with respect to the operational
characteristics of the tank, but it is difficult to see how the internal
details of the tank could be modified to provide the necessary degree
of post-manufacturing inspectability without abandoning the present side-
by-side arrangement of quantity probe and heater.

Dome Assembly

The tank dome assembly (fig. D3-20) forms a portion of the outer
shell of the tank and houses the fluid lines and electrical conduit connec-
ting the inner shell to the exterior of the tank. The upper surface of

0-64
Dome assembly

Figure D3-20.- Oxygen shelf showing location of tank dome assemblies.

D-65
the dome contains the upper pinch-off tube, through which the annulus
is evacuated, and a burst disc (rated at 75 psi -+ 7.5 psi) that provides
burst protection for the outer shell in the event of leakage from the
inner shell into the annulus. The arrangement of the fluid lines and
electrical conduit within the dome is shown in figures D3-21 and D3-22.
The coiling of these lines provides the high impedance path for heat
leaks between the inner and outer shells of the tank. In the case of
the large diameter vent llne, this path is made longer by use of a
double-walled tube outside the dome, with connection between inner and
outer walls at the extremity of the projection of the tube from the
tank.

Tube sizes are listed as follows (all dimensions in inches):

Oxygen Tank Tube Sizing

Vent tube 1/2 0D x 0.015 wall


(inside coil cover)
3/40D x 0.028 wall
(outside coil cover)
Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Fill tube 3/80D x 0.022 wall


Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Feed tube* i/h OD x 0.015 wall


Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Electrical tube 1/20D x 0.015 wall


Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Vapor- coole d* 3/16 OD x 0.015 wall


shield tube Inconel 750 AMS 5582

Pressure vessel to vapor* 1/40D x 0.015 wall


cooled-shield tube Inconel 750 AMS 5582

*These three tubes are Joined sequentially to provide a single


feed line which is looped around the tank inner shell to provide
regenerative cooling for the vessel.

A total of 18 wires pass through the electrical conduit, eight AWG


no. 26's, four AWG no. 22's, and six AWG no. 20's. The conduit is shown
in figure D3-23. At the start of the investigation some members of
the Panel felt that the unorthodox detanking procedure used at KSC could
have resulted in unacceptably high temperatures in this electrical
conduit due to resistive heating of the heater wires. This possibility
is discussed in a later section.

D-66
ectrical connector

Feed li

Fill line

Vent line

Figure D3-21.- Arrangement of tubing within tank dome assembly.

D-67
f
/,,.-"
Electrical
I
!
co

I
!
!
I
!
Vent line

I
I
I

J
s.

J Feed l i ne Fill and drain line

-(

Figure D3-22.- Arrangement of tubing within tank dome assembly.

D-68
Figure D3-23.- Arrangement of electrical conduit.

D-69
The design of this portion of the tank results in a configuration
in which it is not possible to perform visual inspection of wiring after
assembly. In consequence, the possibility of dama_e_in many cases un-
detectable by normal quality assurance procedures, is significant.

Filter

The filter, which is welded onto the supply line projection into the
tank, is located within the top of the quantity gage adapter when the
tank is assembled. It consists of a series of thin washers stacked on
a tube-like mandrel containing relatively large holes communicating with
the interior of the tube. The washers have a series of raised projections
on one surface arranged in concentric circles. The projections in each
circle are staggered with respect to those adjacent circles. Whenstacked
on the mandrel, the spacing between the washers provided by the projections
present a tortuous path for the fluid to traverse in order to enter the
center of the mandrel and thus provides a filtering action. The filter
is rated at 175 microns and is intended to prevent particles greater than
this size from entering the feed line.

The filter is of simple and reliable construction, and should provide


only very small restriction to flow out of the tank. In the application,
the two componentsprotected by the filter are the relief valve and the
check valve in the tank no. 2 valve modu/e, both of which have moving
poppets that must seat properly in order not to leak.

In normal circumstances the filter location is appropriate. Under


abnormal circumstances, such as the combustion in tank no. 2 experienced
on Apollo 13, the filter might becomeclogged with solid combustion
products and thus preclude flow to the relief valves. Considering its
construction, and ample flow area, this is not very probable. Tests are
to be conducted to verify this.

Caution and Warning Provisions

Because of their design, the caution and warning system and the
switch-controlled indicators ("talkbacks") did not present correct
systems status to the crew during the Apollo 13 accident. As described
in Appendix B, the following items are noted as examples:

i. The loss of oxygen to fuel cells i and 3 occasioned by closure


of the oxygen shutoff valves was not indicated. The series logic used
in the information system required that both the hydrogen shutoff valve
and the oxygen shutoff valve be closed to activate the warning system.
Simultaneous operation of the valves is appropriate to a deliberate
shutdown of a fuel cell which should require no warning indication.

D-70
2. The crew was not alerted to the abnormal rise and subsequent
loss of oxygen pressure in tank no. 2 because a normal out-of-limits
operational signal (low hydrogen pressure) was in e_istence.

3. When power was lost to main bus B, the "talkback" indicators


designed to indicate the state of RCS valves were no longer energized
and could not properly indicate valve position.

Thus, accurate information as to the state of spacecraft systems,


which is vital in time of emergency, was not provided by the caution
and warning system.

ABNORMAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE OXYGEN TANK

The oxygen tank which failed during the Apollo 13 mission had been
subjected to two abnormal incidents prior to launch. The first occurred
during spacecraft assembly. The oxygen shelf was "dropped" and the
tank zubJected to a shock load. The second abnormal condition occurred
at KSC. An unorthodox detanking technique was used when the tank failed
to empty during the normal procedures. The possible consequences of
those incidents are discussed in the following sections.

Oxygen "Shelf Drop" Incident

The oxygen shelf which flew in Apollo 13 (Spacecraft 109) orig-


inally was installed in Spacecraft 106. On October 21, 1968, this shelf
was in process of being removed from Spacecraft 106 for a rework of the
vac-ion pumps. During the removal, the sling adapter (ground equipment)
broke. The cause for the failure was traced to failure to remove one of
the bolts attaching the shelf to the service module. At the time of the
incident, it was assumed that the failure permitted the shelf outboard
edge to fall back about 2 inches, at which point the shelf motion was
stopped by the supports in the service module. An analysis of the stiff-
ness of the oxygen shelf led to the prediction of a shock load of the
order of lOg. The incident is reported in more detail in Appendix C. An
analysis of the incident is contained in the files of the Board. The
general conclusions are as follows:

i. The Apollo 13 oxygen "shelf drop" incident can be explained by


assuming that the counterbalance weights on the 9EH-1275-100 sling were
run out in an attempt to "balance" the effect of the shelf attach bolt
(which was inadvertently not removed) to a point at which they caused
the sling adapter to fail in bending.

D-T1
2. The geometry and loading of the system at the time of failure
would rotate the oxygen shelf about the remaining shelf attach bolt un-
til the top of oxygen tank no. 2 impacted the underside of the fuel cell
shelf, causing the observed dent in the shelf.

3. Tests to reproduce the dent in the fuel cell shelf have been
conducted by striking a specimen of the shelf aluminumhoneycombma-
terial with an appropriately weighted tank pinch-off tube cover. The
test results indicate that in order to reproduce the observed dent, a
maximumacceleration of 7g was required.

4. On the basis of these data, it does not appear that the loads
transmitted to the internal componentsof the tank during the "shelf
drop" incident were of sufficient magnitude to cause any structural
failure. Onepossible effect, however, could have been the displacement
of a marginally secured connection between the fill line and the inner
element of the quantity gage capacitor. Should this have occurred, it
could have been the cause of the detanking anomaly experienced at KSC
with oxygen tank no. 2 during the preflight operations on Apollo 13.

Detanking at KSC

The difficulty with the detanking of oxygen tank no. 2 subsequent


to the countdowndemonstration test (CDDT)is described in Appendix C.
As noted in the preceding section, the inability to detank may be as-
cribed to a displacement of the short Inconel tube in that portion of
the fill line located in the top of the quantity probe or the absence
of this tube. Tests conducted at BeechAircraft Corporation subsequent
to the flight have demonstrated that if the tube is displaced laterally
about 0.090 inch from its mating Teflon adapter, it is not possible to
detank in normal fashion. The manufacturing tolerances for this sub-
assembly have been discussed previously, and it is apparent that it is
possible for such a displacement to occur if the parts are at appropriate
extremes of the tolerances.

The nonstandard procedure used to detank oxygen tank no. 2 involved


continuous power application to the heaters at GSEpower supply voltage
for 8 hours and i0 minutes. The fans were operated for all but the
first hour and 20 minutes of this period. There is no conclusive evi-
dence that either of the thermostats ever operated to open the heater
circuits during this period. This occurred, despite the fact that the
tank temperature sensor output, indicating ullage space temperature
under the conditions of this procedure, was still rising when the instru-
ment reached its readout limit of 84° F.

During this detanking, the GSEpower supply was providing approxi-


mately 6.0 amperes to each of the two heaters at approximately 65 V dc

D-72
at the spacecraft. Tests conducted at MSCsubsequent to the flight
showedthat when a thermostat attempted to interrupt a 6.0-ampere
current at 65 V dc, the contacts welded shut. Whereassuch contacts
are rated by the manufacturer to interrupt at least a 6-ampere alter-
nating current, under direct current conditions a considerable arc will
be drawn and welding of the contacts will frequently result. At the
time of this writing, three thermostats have been tested under voltage
and current conditions like those experienced during the nonstandard
detanking. All three failed by welding closed. Were the contacts in
oxygen tank no. 2 thermostats to have failed in this manner, which
seemshighly probable, the heaters would have drawn current for the
total period that the circuits were energized. There are a number of
possible consequencesof this condition. These are discussed in the
following paragraphs.

Because the wiring in the conduit in the tank domeis of relatively


small diameter for the current carried, it might lead to excessive wire
temperatures by resistance heating, as this conduit represents a stagnant
region with poor heat paths for removal of the heat generated. Were the
temperatures to rise sufficiently, it could degrade the insulation to
the point that the wire might be exposed. Preliminary calculations in-
dicated that the temperature of the wires might rise to the point of in-
sulation degradation and/or melting of soldered connections. A pre-
liminary test using an actual conduit has indicated the temperature
would not rise above about 325° F, which is well below the threshold
temperature for wire insulation and solder damage. More definitive data
on this possibility will be provided by a test planned for the near
future at Beech Aircraft Corporation. A flight-type tank will be sub-
jected to a reproduction of the nonstandard detanking process to deter-
mine, amongother things, how hot the wiring in the conduit would get.

The second possible modefor damaging the wiring during the de-
tanking is related to the pressure pulsing employed during the latter
part of the de_anking operation. Whenthe tank is pressurized and
quickly vented, the cryogenic oxygen will boil violently, probably pro-
ducing "slugging" or "geysering" at the liquid-vapor interface. This
action could easily flex the large unsupported loop of wire that results
from the assembly process and thus could induce mechanical damageto the
wire. This, too, must be confirmed by test before it can be considered
as more than a possibility.

The third possibility for inducing wire damageapplies primarily to


the wiring in proximity to the heaters--especially the fan motor leads
that are routed through the 12 inches of 3/16-inch diameter conduit that
runs internal to the heater probe (see fig. D3-16). If the thermostat
contacts failed by welding closed, as seemsprobable from the results of
the thermostat tests described earlier, the heater probe metal tempera-
tures would continue to rise, limited only by the heat balance between

0-73
that being generated by the heater and that being absorbed by the liquid
and gaseous oxygen in the tank. Were the heater probe temperatures to
rise above about 500 ° F, the wire insulation in its proximity would
begin to degrade.

A test simulating prolonged application of power to heaters and


fans with a heater probe half immersed in liquid nitrogen at one atmos-
phere pressure was conducted at MSC. After 8 hours_ a thermocouple
mounted directly on the outer casing of a heater element at a location
where it was in contact only with the gaseous nitrogen in the ullage
indicated a surface temperature of about i000 ° F. At the same time, the
temperature of the conduit wall reached 735 ° F.

Posttest inspection of the wiring indicated that the insulation had


been seriously degraded (fig. D3-24). The insulation had become rela-
tively brittle and had cracked in numerous places. Upon any subsequent
flexing of the wire, the insulation would either break off or shift to
widen the cracks, in either case exposing the conductor. Such an ex-
posure would set the stage for a future short circuit. The state and
nature of the degradation of the insulation depends on the temperature
it reaches. It should be noted that this test was conducted in a nitro-
gen atmosphere, whereas the actual prolonged heater operation occurred
in an oxygen environment. An oxygen environment is less benign chemi-
cally than one of nitrogen, and greater degradation than that observed
might occur. The all-up test at Beech should provide more definitive
information on this matter.

In summary, the nonstandard detanking procedure probably provided


the mechanism for initiating the flight failure by causing sufficient
damage to wire insulation to expose the conductor(s) of the fan motor
leads. This would permit a short circuit to occur and initiate com-
bustion within the tank. It is also possible that some solder was
melted during the prolonged heating. Under the normal gravity conditions
on the launch stand, it would be possible for a drop(s) of solder to fall
free and solidify and remain in the tank. This could possibly lead to
the subsequent shorting of the capacitor gage.

Discussion

As described in the preceding sections, the design of the oxygen


tank as a pressure vessel is very adequate. It is constructed of a
tough material well chosen for the application. There is no evidence
of substandard manufacture of the particular tank involved, nor has any
evidence been found of subsequent damage that would result in degrada-
tion of the structural integrity of the pressure vessel (as distinguished
from the internal components of the tank).

D-74
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D-75
If the telemetered pressure data truly represent the pressure the
tank experienced at the time of the accident, it should not have failed
structurally. The qualification burst test results indicate that the
pressure vessel is capable of withstanding over twice the maximum pres-
sure indicated at the temperatures recorded. The tubing is capable of
withstanding even greater loads.

There was, as described in Appendix B, an observed abnormal in-


crease in pressure and temperature in the tank. As has been discussed
previously, there are combustibles, both metallic and nonmetallic_ within
the tank_ as well as potential energy sources to provide ignition, es-
pecially of the Teflon insulation of the internal wiring. The method of
assembling the tank system and the details of construction of the tank's
internal components provide an opportunity for wiring damage. Also,
there is an even greater probability that, in this instance, the non-
standard detanking process created bare conductors. With such damaged
wiring, a mechanism for creating a spark is provided and a consequence
would be a fire within the confines of the tank. This would result in
increases in the pressure and temperature within the tank.

There is sufficient Teflon within the tank to cause the internal


pressure to rise above the burst strength of the pressure vessel were it
all to be consumed. However, the locations of the Teflon components are
such that igniting all of them is not very probable. The energy available
from the combustion of the aluminum within the tank also exceeds that
required to burst the tank. Tests conducted during the investigation
indicate that enough electrical energy was available to initiate a
combustion process within the tank under electrical fault conditions
(Appendix F).

Among the possible ways that the tank integrity could have been
lost, two are worthy of special mention. First, should combustion have
existed within the electrical conduit, a relatively stagnant region with
an intentionally poor heat conduction path, the conduit walls would have
been heated quite rapidly. The conduit contains the greatest concentra-
tion of wiring and wire insulation within the tank. It was estimated
that raising the conduit temperature to about 1500 ° F under the pressures
prevailing during flight would cause the conduit walls to fail. This
has subsequently been demonstrated in a test at MSC wherein the wiring
insulation in an actual conduit was intentionally ignited under conditions
simulating the conduit environment within the tank. In this test, local
heating caused the conduit to fail a short tlme after initiation of
combustion within the conduit. Such a failure would result in pressuriza-
tion of the tank vacuum dome, leading to actuation of the blowout patch
and loss of oxygen tank pressure.

D-76
The second possibility is associated with the reaction of aluminum
with oxygen. This process has been described as quite violent (see
Appendix F). Were the al_mninum to have been ignited and if its reaction
rate under the conditions within the tank were sufficiently high, the
pressure could rise very rapidly and lead to pressure vessel failure at
burst pressure levels. Such a pressure rise might not have been evidenced
in the data because of the low sampling rate of the pressure sensor
telemetry signal. Tests are required to verify this hypothesis.

A number of observations were made during the course of the Panel's


activities that gave rise to further questions. It is recognized that
many of these matters are of a subjective nature. Nonetheless, they are
considered worthy of comment in this report.

Oxygen tank no. i lost pressure subsequent to the failure of tank


no. 2. The mechanism of damage to tank no. 1 has not been established.
It is asstuzed to be the result of a line or valve failure in the tank
no. 1 system. The two tanks and their associated hardware represent,
to a large degree, redundant systems. They are, however, in great part
colocated. For example, the tanks are adjacent to one another, the system
valves are grouped in a common housing, the fluid lines and wiring are
routed parallel to one another in close proximity. Systems other than
the oxygen subsystems have similar configurations. Such practice provides
the possibility of inducing failure in a redundant system by a failure
of its companion. This is a most complex subject and difficult to assess.
It is also recognized that much of the hardware for Apollo has already
been built. There appears to be a need for a review and evaluation of
this matter.

No evidence has been found that indicates that shock testing of


components and/or subsystem assemblies is a normal qualification require-
ment for Apollo service module hardware. The flight environment contains
shocks of a considerable magnitude during events such as staging of the
latmch vehicle. That the effects of such environments on system components
were recognized is evidenced by the use of holding current on the fuel
cell reactant shutoff valves, for example. Shocks can be applied to
hardware during shipment and normal handling, even though elaborate
precautions in the form of special shipping containers, labels, and
cautionary tags to alert transportation groups to the sensitivity of
the shipment are employed. Good design and development practice includes
experimental determination of margins against damage under such circum-
stances. Again, there appears to be a need for a review and evaluation
of the susceptibility of the components in the spacecraft to all credible
shock levels they may encounter in their service life so that the margins
of safety inherent in their design may be established.

0-77
RELATED
SYSTEMS

As a result of the Apollo 13 accident, a critical examination of


other Apollo systems is being conducted by MSCto insure that the potential
for a similar modeof failure does not exist elsewhere in the spacecraft.
A memberof the Design Panel was present at the MSCreview meetings. The
following is a summaryof the activity and a status of the MSCeffort.

The review was limited to selected systems in the following major


Apollo elements:

Command
and service module

Ascent and descent stage of the lunar module

Governmentfurnished equipment

Ground support equipment

As an aid in determining which subsystems should be reviewed, a


tabulation of all pressure vessels in these major elements was assembled
(table D3-X). The cryogenic oxygen tank, which is reviewed in earlier
sections of this report, was excluded from this review. Table D3-XI
lists those systems and major elements that were selected for review.
All vessels and oxygen and propellant line componentsin the selected
systems are to be analyzed. The primary emphasis during the review is
on the oxygen and oxidizer systems and the identification of all sources
of energy--both internal and external to the system--that could result
in an excessive pressure rise and possibly result in the failure or
degradation of a system. Sources of energy which were considered were
electrical, mechanical, and solar.

Pressure Vessels

The pressure vessels are of concern in that they represent large


energy sources in the event of their catastrophic failure. Qualification
records were reviewed and analyzed to determine the actual factors of
safety demonstrated by burst test, as well as the characteristics of the
failure modes. The failure modesof the pressure vessels have been cate-
gorized as explosive, uncertain, and benign. With these data, an assess-
ment was madeof those componentsthat might be damagedby the explosion
of a tank and the effect of this explosion on the vehicle systems and
the crew.

0-78
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D-81
TABLED3-XI.- SubsystemsSelected for Review by MSC

Command module Lunar module des cent st age

Environmental control Environmental control


Reaction control Descent propulsion
Electrical power Electrical power
Mechanical

Service module Government furnished equipment

Service propulsion Crew equipment


Reaction control Lunar surface experiments
Electrical power Scientific instrument module

Lunar module ascent stage Ground support equipment

Environmental control Hydrogen servicing dewar


Reaction control PAD emergency air pack
Ascent propulsion High-pressure oxygen line components
Electrical power Oxygen/fuel line components with
electrical interface

D-82
The explosive failure of a pressure vessel on the spacecraft, depend-
ing upon the energy stored in the vessel, could result in effects ranging
from localized damage to loss of spacecraft and crew.

The following approaches were considered to provide protection to


the spacecraft and crew from the catastrophic explosion of a major
pressure vessel:

i. Isolation of the pressure vessel by separation.

2. Controlled failure provisions by changes to the vent or


relief system to permit rapid depressurization.

3. Containing the blast by the addition of shielding by heavier


or strengthened walls.

It was concluded that it would be theoretically possible to provide


increased, but not total, protection for the spacecraft against the
catastrophic explosive failure of a pressure vessel if major vehicular
and pressure vessel changes were made. There are many practical limita-
tions which preclude the provision of total protection against the cat-
astrophic explosive failure of a pressure vessel. To determine the
effect on the spacecraft of a nonexplosive or a benign leakage-type
failure of a pressure vessel, the components and materials in the im-
mediate vicinity of the tank in question were identified. Both the LM
and CSM have nonmetallic materials which probably would not survive if
they were exposed to propellants as the result of a pressure vessel
failure. It is not feasible to use materials throughout the spacecraft
which are totally compatible with all fluids that they could encounter
following a primary failure. Considering the vehicle and systems effects
of a pressure vessel failure (leakage or explosive), it is clear that
neither containment nor complete nonmetallic material compatibility can
be provided in the form of practical or reasonable solutions for space-
craft and crew protection against all tank failures. A tank failure
would result in at least the abort of a mission, even through the damage
from a pressure vessel could be contained.

The review of the pressure vessels of table D3-X identified a direct


electrical interface or exposed wiring in the media as follows:

i. Propellant quantity gaging systems in the lunar module descent


stage tanks and in the service module service propulsion system (SPS)
tanks.

2. Capacitance gage, heaters, motors, and temperature sensor in


the cryogenic hydrogen tanks in the service module.

D-83
3. Quantity gage in the potable and waste water tanks in the
command module.

4. Quantity sensing gage in the GSE hydrogen dewar.

The MSC is conducting an analysis and plans to perform tests on


the quantity gaging systems to insure that the combination of fuel and
energy potential for ignition are understood and represent no hazard.
Associated with this is a review of the circuitry and circuit protection.
The waste and potable water tanks are being reviewed to determine the
hazards, if any, of the electrical circuit and the advisability of de-
leting the quantity gage.

The cryogenic hydrogen gas pressure vessel was reviewed and it was
verified that the manufacturing and assembly techniques, as well as the
arrangement of the internal components, are very similar to those of
the oxygen tank. The same potential for an electrical malfunction in
the hydrogen tank exists as did in the oxygen tank. Mission rules have
been reviewed and it was determined that the minimum failure in a hydro-
gen tank which would result in a mission abort would be the loss of two
heaters and one fan. The MSC is planning to conduct tests to determine
if an electrical malfunction can induce a sustained reaction between
hydrogen and materials contained within the tank. Tests will also be
conducted to determine if both heaters would fail following an electrical
malfunction. Structural and materials compatibility analysis and re-
views dndicate that the titanium alloy (5 AI, 2-1/2 Sn) as used does not
experience hydrogen embrittlement.

The remaining pressure vessels were reviewed to determine those


that had internal components, which could expose an electrical interface
to the contained media following a single failure. In addition, the non-
metallics that might be exposed following such a single failure are being
identified to insure that they are compatible with the media at operating
conditions.

The review of the LM pressurized tanks disclosed that helium and


oxygen tanks are isolated from their relief valves during the translunar
coast period. Under normal flight conditions at ambient temperatures
the pressure rise in the tanks is relatively insignificant. If protec-
tive thermal blankets on the LM should be lost or damaged_ the pressure
rise could be significant. A Grumman study indicates that if the com-
plete loss of thermal blankets occurred in the areas of the following
tanks they could reach burst pressures during translunar coast:

Ascent stage oxygen

Ascent propulsion system helium

D-8_
Reaction control system helium

Descent propulsion system helium

Loss or damage of a thermal blanket could probably be determined


during transposition and docking on all except the descent helium
tank. It should be noted that no rational failure mode has been identi-
fied which could result in the loss or damage of a thermal blanket.

Line Components

The line components that are integral to the systems in table D3-XI
are also being examined to determine those with and those without an
electrical interface. The electrical interfaces are of two types, direct
exposure to the media and exposure following a single failure. In addition,
all nonmetallics near a potential ignition source will be identified
and evaluated.

The only component which has been identified as of this date as


having nonmetallics and a direct electrical interface in high-pressure
oxygen is the fuel cell reactant shutoff valve. The Teflon-coated wires
internal to this valve, when energized, carry steady-state currents of
2 amperes and transients of I0 amperes in a 900 psi oxygen environment.
The circuit protection consists of a 10-ampere circuit breaker. During
the launch and boost phase, a current limited circuit, approximately
0.5 ampere at 9 to i0 volts, is applied to the "open" coil to insure
that the valve remains in the open position. The valve position sensor
switch, which is also internal, is continuously energized during the
entire mission from a 28-volt circuit protected by a lO-ampere breaker.
This valve is now the subject of an intensive review by MSC and the
contractor. There is no indication that this reactant valve had any
internal malfunction during the Apollo 13 accident other than the shock
closure.

Components without direct electrical interfaces are also being


examined to identify those in which nonmetallic materials are normally
exposed to the media and those in which nonmetallic materials could be
exposed following a single failure. To determine the probability of a
single failure in static components such as temperature and pressure
transducers, the acceptance and certification testing of critical elements
is being reviewed. It has been ascertained that component elements such
as bellows, probe cases, and internal diaphragms are designed and tested
for pressure levels far in excess of system usage. The reliability
reports confirmed that leakage failure of these elements has not occurred
on Apollo flight hardware.

D-85
In addition to normal material compatibility determinations, those
components which have nonmetallics used in impact applications are being
identified and it is planned that, where necessary, additional testing
will be conducted in the media at appropriate operating conditions to
determine that there are no impact-sensitive applications.

Low Pressure Oxygen Systems

Following the Apollo 204 accident, the metallic and nonmetallic


materials in the cabin of both the command module and lunar module were
subjected to an intensive review. As a result of the research and
testing, the materials within the LM and CM were modified or changed to
reduce the probability of an ignition and to minimize the combustion
or propagation of fire in the cabin. Considering the redesign that was
accomplished and the continuing rigorous control of materials added to
the spacecraft cabins, the low-pressure oxygen systems (less than 25 psi)
were not reevaluated during this current investigation by MSC.

Electrical Power System--Batteries

Both the LM and the CSM use the same type battery to initiate the
pyrotechnic functions. A review of the records indicated that the G-10
laminated glass epoxy battery case had not been qualified as a pressure
vessel. The case is protected by a relief valve which operates at
30 + 5 psi. In the event of a relief valve failure, and case pressuriza-
tion to rupture, potassium hydroxide could be released. A certification
program will be conducted to establish the strength of this battery case
and procedures established for the acceptance proof testing on all flight
batteries prior to each mission.

Ground Support Equipment

This review is structured to identify all pressure vessels and


line components in propellant and high-pressure oxygen systems with
direct electrical interfaces and the associated metallic and nonmetallic
materials. All high-pressure oxygen, gaseous and liquid, valve seat
material will be identified as well as any other application of nonmetallic
material in an impact loading application. This MSC review is limited
to equipment supplied by North American Rockwell and Grumman.

During the review of the GSE, it was also established that cleaning
and filtering techniques used have been generally effective in limiting
contamination. Shock-sensitive materials have been detected in the
liquid hydrogen dewar in small quantities (less than 1 mg/liter), which
are within specification limits for nonvolatile residuals. The source

D-86
and quantity of the shock-sensitive materials should be identified, as
well as the potential for a buildup in concentration. It is recognized
that contamination is not considered as a candidate cause for the
Apollo 13 accident.

Certi fi cation

The certification records for all pressure vessels and components


of the subsystems that were considered have been reexamined during this
MSC review. It was established that all certification requirements were
adequately met, that all discrepancies were adequately explained, and
that all components were qualified for flight. It should be noted that
a c_nparison of the certification requirements with the expected flight
and ground environment was not part of this review.

Apollo J-Missions

Both the CSM and LM systems are being modified to support the
extended lunar stay time and lunar orbit experiments for later Apollo
missions. The MSC review included the nitrogen bottle being added to
the scientific instrument module of the service module for the Pan
camera. The other system changes and additions to the LM and CSM for
the J-Mission consist of the addition of more pressure vessels and
components of the types already installed in the spacecraft and examined
during this review. No new pressure vessels or components are planned.

Lunar Module "Lifeboat"

Associated with the Related Systems Review, MSC is also analyzing


how the "lifeboat" capability of the LM could be enhanced. The LM,
CSM, and PLSS/uPS are being reviewed to determine what minor modifications
to the concerned systems and/or changes in procedures should be incor-
porated. The intent of the changes would be to enhance the ability of
the crew to interchange or transfer oxygen, water, electrical power,
and lithium hydroxide cannisters between spacecraft and to increase the
probability of crew survival following multiple failures in the command
module.

DISCUSSION

As a result of the MSC Related Systems Reviews that have been


completed and are still in progress, the following observations are
offered.

D-87
A fracture mechanics analysis was madeof all Saturn-Apollo pressure
tanks by the Boeing Companyfor NASAin 1968-1969 (ref. 40). However,
most of these tanks were designed without consideration of fracture
mechanics. Consequently, at the time of the Boeing analysis, somepertinent
data were not available. For example, sustained load and cyclic load
flaw growth data were not available for Inconel 718 electron besmwelds
such as are used in the supercritical oxygen tanks and in the GOXtanks
of the LM ascent stage. These data are nowbeing generated in a current
program at Boeing, sponsored by NASA. It is also understood that sustained
load flaw growth data are not available for a D6aCsteel GOXtank in the
IM descent stage. Until very recently (ref. 41) sustained load flaw
growth data were not available for the cryoformed 301 GOXtanks used in
the PLSSand the PADpack. It is entirely possible that the new data
will not change the conclusions derived from the original fracture
mechanics analysis; however, it is advisable to reexamine the Boeing
analysis of the spacecraft pressure vessels with a view to incorporating
the latest information. As an example, particular attention is warranted
for the 6AI-hV-Ti tanks containing nitrogen tetroxide, since nitrogen
tetroxide is a potentially aggressive environment for titanium. It is
recognized that elaborate precautions are presently being taken to
control the service conditions of these tanks in such a way that sustained
load crack growth should not occur during a mission.

To assure that no unsatisfactory materials are used in oxygen/


oxidizer systems in future spacecraft, it is advisable to examine all
componentsand/or elements for compatibility (including dynamic applica-
tions) in their media. Where compatibility data at the appropriate
service conditions are not available, tests should be conducted.

It appears appropriate to conduct tests with typical hydrogen


tank materials in hydrogen, at system operating conditions, to determine
if an exothermic reaction can be initiated by electrical fault.

It would be appropriate to expand the MSCinvestigation to include


a review of the manufacturing processes used in the fabrication of
critical tanks and componentsto insure that the processes used are not
conducive to inducing failures.
A reevaluation of the filtration, sampling, and analysis of the
gases and fluids used is considered appropriate to insure that the
requirements for cleanliness and purity in the servicing of spacecraft
systems are being satisfied.
It maybe advisable to conduct investigations of the compatibility
of the nonmetallics in the launch vehicle oxygen and oxidizer systems,
as well as spacecraft and launch vehicle GSE(with emphasis on impact
sensitivity at operating conditions).

D-88
PART D4

SUMMARY

The Design Panel conducted a review and evaluation of the design


of those elements of the Apollo spacecraft systems that were implicated
as contributing to the Apollo 13 accident. These comprise primarily the
oxygen tanks of the service module, the associated valves, plumbing, and
electrical systems. In addition, the Panel surveyed other systems with-
in the spacecraft to determine whether their designs contained potential
for failures similar to those of the oxygen tank.

During its considerations, the Panel examined the tank in two con-
figurations. The first was in the configuration as defined by the draw-
ings and other controlling documentation. The second configuration was
what might be termed the "as flown" condition, that is, containing such
variations from standard as may have resulted from unusual events in the
history of oxygen tank no. 2. The following were the two most signifi-
cant such events:

i. The oxygen "shelf drop" incident during spacecraft manufacture.

2. The unorthodox detanking procedure employed at KSC made necessary


by inability to detank in the standard manner.

The following observations result from this review:

i. As a pressure vessel, that is, from a structural viewpoint, the


tank is adequately designed. The pressure vessel is constructed of a
tough material well chosen for this application. The stress analyses
and results of the qualification burst test program confirm the ability
of the tank to exhibit adequate structural performance in its intended
application.

2. From a systems viewpoint, the design of the oxygen tank is


unsatisfactory. The design features of the tank system are such that:

(a) It is difficult to install the internal components of the


tank. The design is such that this operation is "blind" and not amenable
to visual inspection after completing the installation.

(b) There is power wiring internal to the tank exposed to


supercritical oxygen.

(c) There is great potential for damage to internal wiring


during assembly. There are sharp corners on metal parts in proximity

_89
to the wires; the wiring is routed over rather tortuous paths; the
wiring is located in close proximity to rotating components and to the
heater elements ; and the wiring is free to be flexed by moving fluid
during fan operation and/or during filling or emptying of the tank with
gaseous or liquid media.

(d) The rating of the thermostats in the heater circuits is


not compatible with the voltages that are (and in this instance were for
a prolonged period) applied to these circuits at the launch site.

(e) There are combustible materials within the tank, such as


Teflon, solder, aluminum, and drilube 822.

3. The combination of combustible materials and potential ignition


sources, including the use of unsealed electric motors, constitutes a
hazard that can lead to a fire within the tank.

4. The manufacturing tolerances of the Teflon adapters, short


Inconel tube, and quantity gage center tube that comprise the tank fill
and drain tube are such that extremely loose fit can occur. If these
elements were at or near the appropriate dimensional extremes in tank
no. 2, it is possible that mechanical shock could cause a disengagement
of these parts that could have led to inability to detank. Such might
have been caused by the "shelf drop" incident.

5. The nonstandard detanking of oxygen tank no. 2 at KSC probably


led to the degradation of the insulation of the internal wiring. The
insulation probably became brittle, and flexing of the wire either during
or subsequent to the detauking could cause it to break off, exposing
the conductor. This would provide a means for creating an electrical
short that could initiate combustion of the insulation. The planned
all-up test reproducing the detanking should provide data to conclusively
verify this.

6. The fuel cell oxygen shutoff solenoid valve has power wiring
and combustibles exposed to a 900 psi oxygen environment and is protected
by a 10-ampere circuit breaker. The combination of combustibles,
potential ignition source, and oxygen within this device constitutes a
hazard similar to that prevailing within the oxygen tank.

7. The caution and warning indicators in the CM for the fuel cell
reactant shutoff valves use series logic. This logic requires that both
the hydrogen and oxygen reactant valves be closed in order that a warning
indication may be given. Therefore, it is possible for a fuel cell to
be deprived of one of its reactants because of a closed valve and thus
suffer irreversible damage without the crew being made aware of this
state via the caution and warning indicators.

D-90
8. Loss of a main bus deprives some of the talkback indicators
of actuating power. In such an eventuality, misinformation as to the
state of certain valves may be presented to the crew when valid informa-
tion as to status of system components is most vital.

9. The logic of the master alarm feature of the caution and warning
system is such that preexistence of an operationally expected signal
(within a given subsystem) such as "hydrogen pressure low" prevents
receipt of a master alarm for a second, and possibly dangerous, condition
such as high oxygen pressure.

As a result of these observations, it is the consensus of the Design


Panel that the Board should give consideration to including the following
among its recommendations.

The internal components of the oxygen tank system should be


redesigned. The requirement for the functions performed by these
components should be reevaluated carefully. If it is determined that
some or all of these components are mandatory for accomplishing the
mission, the redesign should be of such nature as to minimize the amount
of potentially combustible material within the tank. The installation
of any wiring that must be within the tank should be so designed as to
preclude direct contact with the oxygen if at all possible. As a
minimum, wiring must not be in contact with the oxygen if, under fault
conditions, sufficient energy is available to ignite proximate materials.
Determination of what constitutes sufficient energy for ignition should
be based on data from tests conducted under all conditions that would
be encountered in service. It would be preferable that any redesign of
the internal components permit assembly of these components into a
total subsystem outside the tank. This would permit thorough inspection
and test prior to installation within the pressure vessel.

The fuel cell reactant shutoff valve should either be redesigned


to eliminate electrical wiring in contact with high-pressure oxygen
or a suitable substitute valve be found.

The logic of the caution and warning system should be reviewed with
a view towards eliminating lack of a warning indication for a single
malfunction that can cause irreparable loss of a mission-critical
component. The logic of the master alarm feature of the caution and
warning system should also be reviewed with the view towards eliminating
the feature that precludes the receipt of a second alarm in the presence
of a preexisting alarm from the same system or subsystem. The possibility
of providing a redundant power supply to permit proper functioning of
talkback type indicators in the event of loss of the main bus normally
supplying power to the indicators should also be examined with a view
to providing a valid indication to the crew in the event of such a mal-
fun ct i on.

D-91
The ability of componentsto perform their appropriate functions
without damagewhen exposed to shock loading levels in excess of those
anticipated to be encountered in flight or in ground handling should be
demonstrated by tests. Componentsfound wanting in this respect should
be either modified or replaced.

The comprehensive review initiated by the MSCApollo 13 Investiga-


ting Teamof all CSMand LM tanks, valves, and associated system elements
in which oxygen or oxidizers are stored, controlled, or distributed
should be prosecuted vigorously. The acceptability of materials within
such componentsshould be established by tests conducted under fluid
conditions like those that will be encountered in service both on the
ground and in flight. In addition, the review should be expandedto
include the manufacturing and assembly procedures employed in the
fabrication of those of the previously noted componentswhich are
determined to contain hazards.

D-92
REFERENCES

io Anon.: Apollo Operations Handbook, Command and Service Modules.


Apollo 13, CSM 109 and Subsequent. Volume 2 - Operational Pro-
cedures. SM2A-O3-Block II-(2), published under authority of NASA
MSC Flight Crew Support Division, Oct. iO, 1969 (Change date:
Dec. 15, 1969). (Also available as SD-69-57, vol. 2, North
American Rockwell). (Available to NASA and NASA Contractors only).

. McCrary, T. W.; and Thompson, J. M.: Inconel 718 - Alloy Forgings,


for Pressure Vessels: Consumable Electrode, Vacuum Melted.
Specification MB0170-026, Revision A, Space and Information Sys-
tems Division, North American Aviation, Inc., Mar. 18, 1966.

. Anon.: Shell - Oxygen Tank, Lower. Drawing 13532-3003, code ident-


ification no. 07399, Boulder Division, Beech Aircraft Corp.,
Nov. 13, 1962.

. Anon.: Shell -Oxygen Tank, Upper. Drawing 13532-3021, code ident-


ification no. 07399, Boulder Division, Beech Aircraft Corp.,
Nov. 13, 1962.

. Anon.: Probe Assembly - Oxygen Tank. Drawing 13532-2602, code


identification no. 07399, Boulder Division, Beech Aircraft Corp.,
Sept. 3, 1965.

. Dulaigh, D. E.: Test Report for Acceptance and Qualification Testing


of Inconel Pressure Vessel PV-I (QT-I). Report no. BR-13955-5,
Boulder Division, Beech Aircraft Corp., July 21, 1964.

. Fuson, T. A.: Test Report for Acceptance and Qualification Testing


of Inconel Pressure Vessel PV-2 (QT-2). Report no. BR-13955-6,
Boulder Division, Beech Aircraft Corp., July 23, 1964.

. Dulaigh, D. E.: Test Report for Acceptance and Qualification Testing


of Inconel Pressure Vessel PV-3 (QT-3). Report no. BR-13955-7,
Boulder Division, Beech Aircraft Corp., Aug. 31, 1964.

. Dulaigh, D. E.: Test Report for Acceptance and Qualification Testing


of Inconel Pressure Vessel PV-4 (QT-4). Report no. BR-13955-8,
Boulder Division, Beech Aircraft Corp., Oct. 15, 1964.

i0. Anon.: Analytical Report on Proof, Leak, and Burst Testing of In-
conel Pressure Vessel PV-1. Report no. BR-13758, Beech Aircraft
Corp., June 29, 1964.

D-93
ii. Anon.: Analytical Report on the Proof, Leak, and Burst Test of In-
conel Pressure Vessel PV-2. Report no. BR-13759, Beech Aircraft
Corp.

12. Balthazar, R. J.: The Proof, Leak, and Burst Testing of Inconel
Pressure Vessel PV-3. Report no. BR-13780, Boulder Division,
Beech Aircraft Corp., Aug. 27, 1964. (Available to U.S. Government
and Contractors only).

13. SD67-II03, North American Rockwell Corp., Nov. 2, 1967.

14. Kavanaugh, H. C., Jr.: Structural Analysis of the Service Module


Fuel Cell Cryogenic Oxygen and Hydrogen Pressure Vessels. MSC
Structures Branch Report 68-ES4-1, Oct. 23, 1967.

15. Anon.: Thick Section Fracture Toughness. Final Summary Report,


July l, 1963 - June 30, 1964. ML-TDR-64-236 (Contract AF33 (657)
11461, Proj. 648D), Boeing - North American, Oct. 1964. (Notice -
Release only to U.S. Government Agencies is authorized. Other
certified requestors shall obtain release approval from Federal
Aviation Agency.)

16. Wolf, J.; Brown, W. F., Jr.; Manson, S. S.; Sessler, J. G.; and
Shannon, J. L., Jr., eds.: Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook.
1969 Publication (1968 Supplement I, Inc.). AFML-TR-68-115
(formerly ASD-TR-63-74i), Mechanical Properties Data Center, Bel-
four Stulen, Inc. (Traverse City, Mich.), 1968.

17. Report no. BR-13958-2OO, Beech Aircraft Corp., Nov. 28, 1966.

18. SD68-466-1, 2, 3, North American Rockwell Corp.

19. Anon.: CSM 105/AV Acoustic and Vibration Engineering Test Require-
ments, Apollo. SD 67-640 (Contract NAS 9-150), Space Division,
North American Rockwell Corp., Jan. 12, 1968.

20. Carnevale, A.: Storage Subsystem - Cryogenic. Specification


MC901-0685, Revision C, Space and Information Systems Division,
North American Aviation, Inc., Mar. 15, 1967.

21. Anon.: Quarterly Reliability Status Report (U). SID 62-557-13


(Contract NAS 9-150), Space and Information Systems Division,
North American Avaiation, Inc., Apr. 30, 1965, pp. 3-55 to 3-54.

22. Drawing 13532-1005, Beech Aircraft Corp.

23. Report no. BR-13956, Beech Aircraft Corp., Apr. 16, 1964.

D-94
24. Anon. : Storage Subsystems--Cryogenic. Specification no. MC901-
0685, North American Rockwell Corp., Mar. 15, 1967.

25. Anon. : Design and Procurement Specification for Stainless Steel


Heating Elements. Specification no. BS-Ih457, Revision A,
Beech Aircraft Corp., Dec. 17, 1965.

26. Anon. : Design and Procurement Specification for Thermostats for


Cryogenic Application. Specification no. BS-Ihh56, Revision B,
Beech Aircraft Corp., Aug. 24, 1967.

27. Anon.: Phase B Life Test, First Mission Simulation, Oxygen Cryo-
genic Storage Subsystem. Qualification Test Report No. BR-
13958-100, Beech Aircraft Corp., Nov. 7, 1966.

28. Anon.: Wiring Diagram--Tank, Storage, Oxygen. Drawing no. BR-


13532-2701, Beech Aircraft Corp., Oct. 27, 1965.

29. Anon.: Comparative Analysis of Physical Properties Between Cross-


linked Extruded Polyvinylidene Fluoride (Kynar) and Teflon Coated
Wires. IDEP 951.16.55.22-62-01, Honeywell, Inc., Sept. 13, 1966.

30. Brown, Robert G.; Holstein, Williams H. Jr.; and Linton, T. Jerry:
TFE-FEP Fluorocarbons. Machine Design, Vol. 40, no. 29, Dec. 12,
1968, pp. 54-58.

31. Lucas, W. R.; and Riehl, W. A.: Instrument for Determination of


Impact Sensitivity of Materials in Contact with Liquid Oxygen.
ASTM Bulletin, no. 244, Feb. 1960, pp. 29-3_.

32. Anon.: Tentative Method of Test for Compatibility of Materials with


Liquid Oxygen (Impact Sensitivity Threshold Technique). ASTM
Designation: D 2512-66 T. In 1969 Book of ASTM Standards with
Related Material. Part 18: Petroleum Products - Measurement and
Sampling. American Society for Testing and Materials (Philadephia,
Pa.), 1969, pp. 700-715.

33. Key, C. F.: Compatibility of Materials with Liquid Oxygen, IV.


NASA TMX-53773, Aug. 23, 1968. (Special Release - Not to be in-
dexed, referenced, or given further distribution without approval
of NASA. For internal U.S. Government use only.)

34. Key, C. F.: Compatibility of Materials with Liquid Oxygen, III.


NASA TMX-53533, Nov. 3, 1966. (Special Release - Not to be in-
dexed, referenced, or given further distribution without approval
of NASA. For internal U.S. Government use only.)

D-95
35. Key, C. F.; and Riehl, W. A.: Compatibility of Materials with
Liquid Oxygen. NASA TMX-985, Aug. 1964. (Special Release - Not
to be indexed, referenced, or given further distribution without
approval of NASA. For internal U.S. Government use only.)

36. Key, C. F.: Compatibility of Materials with Liquid Oxygen (U).


NASA TMX-53052, May 26, 1964.

37. Perrine, C. H.; and Simpkinson, Scott H.: Compatibility Tests of


Materials in the Oxygen Tank. MSC Systems Engineering Division
Memo PD/M-215/70, May 19, 1970.

38. Report QTR 5630061, (Report no. EER-5630061 or Qualification Test


Report for Part No. 5630061), Parker Aircraft, Mar. 1967.

39. NR Engineering Analysis Report ATR 296026, addendum to CTR 234 96


026, North American Rockwell Corp., July 27, 1967.

40. Shah, R. C.: The Fracture Mechanics Assessment of Apollo Launch


Vehicle and Spacecraft Pressure Vessels, Vol. i. Report D2-114248,
the Boeing Company, Nov. 1968.

41. Schwartzberg, F. R.; Keys, R. D.; and Kiefer, T. F.: Interim Report
on Cryogenic Alloy Screening. NASA Contract NAS 3-11203 (Lewis
contract no.), Martin Marietta Corp., 1970.

NASA _ MSC _ Coral., Houston, Texas

D-96
APPENDIX E

REPORT OF PROJECT MANA GEMENT PANEL


CONTENTS

Part Page

APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT PANEL

E1 TASK ASSIGNMENT ................. E-I

E2 PANEL MEMBERSHIP ................. E-3

E3 SUMMARY ..................... E-5

INTRODUCTION .................. E-5

General Technical Capability ......... E-5

Division of Responsibilities ......... E-6

Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Design ......... E-6

Configuration Control Procedures ....... E-7

Oxygen Tank Handling Incident at Downey . . E-7

KSC Detanking Problems ............ E-7

Materials Compatibility ........... E-IO

Security Program ............... E-II

Safety and Reliability and Quality


Assurance ................. E-II

Failure Reporting .............. E-12

E4 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION ............. E-13

BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE .......... E-13

NASA - APOLLO MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION ..... E-14

NASA Headquarters Organization ........ E-15

Office of Manned Space Flight


Organization ................

Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) ........

iii
Part Page

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) ...... E-18

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) .......... E-18

CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS ............ E-21

North American Rockwell (NR) ......... E-21

North American Launch Operations


Space Division (KSC) ............ E-26

Beech Aircraft Corporation .......... E-26

E5 RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATING RELATIONSHIPS . . . E-51

NASA ADMINISTRATOR ............... E-31

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE


FLIGHT ....................

Manned Space Flight Management Council ....

Science and Technology Advisory


Committee ................. E-32

Manned Space Flight Experiments Board .... E-52

APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR ............ E-32

Test Directorate ............... E-3}

Operations Directorate ............ E-53

Systems Engineering Directorate ....... E-33

Program Control Directorate ......... E-33

Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&QA)


Directorate ................ E-35

Support Contractors ............. E-35

APOLLOSPACECRAFT
PROaRAMOFFZCE
(ASPO) .................... E-35

iv
Part Page

Assistant Program Manager for Flight


Safety ................... E-36

Systems Engineering Division ......... E-36

CSM Project Engineering Division ....... E-38

Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program


Offices (RASPO) .............. E-38

MSC RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE


OFFICE ................ E-39

MSC SAFETY OFFICE ............... E-39

MSC ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT


DIRECTORATE ................. E-40

KSC APOLLO PROGRAM MANAGER ........... E-41

KSC DIRECTOR OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS ....... E-41

INTER-CENTER RELATIONSHIPS ........... E-41

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTINUITY ......... E-60

E6 APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS . . . E-63

DESIGN REVIEWS ................. E-63

Preliminary Design Review .......... E-64

Critical Design Review ............ E-64

CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ............ E-64

READINESS REVIEWS ............... E-67

Customer Acceptance Readiness Reviews .... E-67

Flight Readiness Reviews ........... E-68

Launch Minus 2-Day Review .......... E-69

LAUNCH CHECKOUT PROCEDURES ........... E-69


Part Page

E7 OXYGEN TANK MANAGEMENT REVIEW .......... E-73

GENERAL TA/IK HISTORY .............. E-73

Tank Vacuum and Heat Leak Problems ..... E-75

Fan Motors .................. E-75

Vac-ion Pump and Electromagnetic


Interface (EMI) Problems .......... E-76

Heater Failures ............... E-76

CHRONOLOGY 0FAPOLLO 13 OXYGEN TANK ...... E-77

Handling Incident .............. E-78

Detanking Incident .............. E-80

E8 OXYGEN TANK MATERIAL SELECTION .......... E-85

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION ............. E-85

Material Property Requirements ........ E-85

Materials Listing .............. E-87

E9 SAFETY AND RELIABILITY AND QUALITY


ASSURANCE(R&_) ................ E-89

INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION ......... E-89

General ................. E-89

NASA Headquarters .............. E-89

Manned Spacecraft Center ........... E-92

John F. Kennedy Space Center ......... E-101

North American Rockwell Corporation -


Space Division ............... E-102

Beech Aircraft Corporation .......... E-lOS

vi
Part Page

SAFETYANDR&QAAUDITS............ E-f06

MSCSAFETY/R&QA
PARTICIPATION......... E-f07

Phase III CARRfor CSM109 .......... E-f07

FRRR&QASummary.............. E-I08

Weekly Safety/R&QAReport .......... E-I09

Apollo 13 Mission Real-Time Activities .... E-IIO

CONCLUSION
................... E-II3

EIO SECURITY ..................... E-II5

REFERENCES .................... E-II6

vii
This page left blank intentionally.

viii
PART E1

TASK ASSIGNMENT

The Project Management Panel was established by the Apollo 13


Review Board to review those management systems in the Apollo Program
which were pertinent to the Apollo 13 accident. In effect, this task
required the review of all appropriate design, manufacturing, and test
procedures covering vehicle systems which may have failed in flight,
including the means by which various organizations coordinated their
individual efforts in the total process. The Panel took special care
to evaluate carefully the safety management system which was applicable
to Apollo 13.

Principal questions addressed by the Management Panel focused on


the organization, procedures, and systems used to monitor and control
CSM design, manufacturing, test, assembly, and final certifications of
flight equipment, and particularly of the cryogenic oxygen system used
in the service module electric power system and environmental control
system.

E-I
This page left blank intentionally.

E-2
PART E2

PANEL MEMBERSHIP

Panel 4 was chaired by Mr. E. C. Kilgore, Deputy Chief, Engineering


and Technical Services, Langley Research Center. The Board Monitor was
Mr. Milton Klein, Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office.
Panel members were:

Mr. R. D. Ginter, Director, Special Program Office


Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART)
NA_, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Merrill Mead, Chief, Programs and Resources Office


Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California

Mr. James B. Whitten, Asst. Chief, Aeronautical and Space


Mechanics Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

In addition, Mr. R. C. Puffer of MSC Security assisted the Panel by


preparing the section of the report on Security.

E_3
This page left blank intentionally.

E-4
PART E3

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The Management Panel carried out a detailed in-depth review of the


Apollo Spacecraft Program Office organizational structure and the manage-
ment system used to control both command and service module (CSM) hard-
ware development and decision-making processes. The review examined the
system for Apollo and focused attention on the specific cryogenic oxygen
tank directly involved in the Apollo 13 accident. Key management per-
sonnel at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC), and Apollo contractors and subcontractors were interviewed. These
interviews were specifically aimed at understanding what decisions were
made regarding the oxygen tank system for Apollo 13, who participated in
these decisions, what information was available from the management
system, how effectively the organizational elements functioned in review-
ing, communicating, and carrying out assigned responsibilities, and
whether management system changes are required in view of the oxygen
tank accident. Records of the oxygen tank reviews, discrepancy reports,
failure reports, and procedures were examined to determine if the review
systems and configuration control system functioned as they were intend-
ed. Separate reviews were made of the Security, Safety, and Reliability
and Quality Assurance (R&QA) management systems to determine effectiveness.

Visits were made to the CSM prime contractor, North American Rock-
well (NR), Downey, California, and to the oxygen tank subcontractor,
Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, during which discussions were held
with key design, test, and manufacturing personnel. Reliability inspec-
tion, safety, configuration-control and process-control procedures and
systems were reviewed and examined in detail. KSC operations were re-
viewed and discussions were held with key test and launch operations
personnel regarding their responsibilities, procedures, and controls.
Similar discussions were held with MSC Apollo CSM key management and
engineering personnel. Throughout its analysis, the Panel devoted par-
ticular attention to the history of the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen tank
no. 2 including design and manufacturing waivers, discrepancies, and
anomalies and how these were handled by the Apollo management team.

General Technical Capability

The Panel found key Apollo personnel to be technically capable and


dedicated to producing a reliable and safe spacecraft system. Although
there have been cutbacks in the total number of Apollo personnel, the

E-5
morale of the remaining Apollo team is considered by officials inter-
viewed to be high. Reductions in personnel complements as the flight
rate has been reduced have not detrimentally impacted the experience
level within the Program to this point. Moreover, critical flight and
ground system personnel requirements have been carefully reviewed by
project officials to insure adequate manning. During the Apollo Program,
there have been changes in key management personnel. The Panel found
that attention was given to maintaining continuity of experience by
essentially promoting from within the Apollo Program. Some technicians
with considerable CSM experience have been replaced at NR-Downey by
technicians from other programs with more seniority, but no CSM experi-
ence. This was recognized as a potential problem and an intensified
training program was instituted. Continued surveillance of the con-
tractor technician experience level and capability is necessary.

Division of Responsibilities

The Apollo spacecraft organization involves a large number of con-


tractor, subcontractor, and Government organizations. It was found
that these organizations understand their individual responsibilities
and that necessary coordination processes were in effect. This process
provides a system of checks and cross-checks to assure that detailed
consideration and attention is given to problems by the right organiza-
tions prior to final flight commitment.

Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Design

Apollo oxygen tank no. 2 was designed in the 1962-1963 time period
by Beech prior to the formation of the formal design review and sub-
system manager systems which now exist at MSC. During the design phase,
there was limited participation by MSC technical personnel in the early
design. The primary emphasis at this time by both the prime contractor
and MSC was on the thermodynamic performance of the oxygen system. The
tank did receive informal design reviews primarily by NR and Beech per-
sonnel. Even though these reviews were made, it was found that the
final design resulted in a complex assembly procedure with a wiring
cluster which cannot be inspected after assembly in the £ank. However,
the complexity of the assembly and the inability to inspect the tank
interior components after assembly was recognized by Government, NR,
and Beech personnel. Consequently, a detailed step-by-step manufactur-
ing and assembly procedure was established and carried out with checklist-
type Beech inspections, supplemented by NR and Government inspections
at defined critical points. A First Article Configuration Inspection
(FACI) was held on the oxygen tank in 1966 which was jointly signed off
by MSC and contractor subsystem managers. No subsequent formal design
reviews were held.

E-6
A thermostatic switch (thermal switch) was incorporated into the
Block I oxygen tank heaters to avoid overheating while using 28 V dc
spacecraft power. After receipt of the Block II oxygen tank specifica-
tions from NR in February 1965, which required the tank heater to oper-
ate not only on 28 V dc spacecraft power but also with 65 V de GSE for
rapid tank pressurization during launch operations at KSC, Beech did not
require their Block I thermal switch supplier to make a change in switch
rating. NR never subsequently reviewed the heater assembly to assure
compatibility between the GSE and the thermal switch. This resulted in
NR, MSC, and KSC personnel subsequently assuming that the tank was pro-
tected from overheating while using the 65 V dc power supply.

Configuration Control Procedures

The Panel found that a strict and rigorous management system exists
on the CSM for configuration control, problem reporting, customer accept-
ance readiness reviews, and flight readiness reviews. Both contractors
and Government CSM organizations participate in this system. R&QA or-
ganizations independently monitor, record, and report all problems and
approved resolutions. Examination of documentation, such as failure
reports, discrepancy reports, and waivers generated in the management
system and applicable to the Apollo 13 oxygen tank, demonstrated to the
Panel that the management system was being followed closely. Closeouts
were being accomplished with authorized approvals.

Oxygen Tank Handling Incident at Downey

In the case of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank handling incident at NR-


Downey, the Panel found that a Discrepancy Report was written and func-
tional tests were made by NR Engineering. The incident was Judged to
have caused no tank damage by the contractor's systems engineers and
representatives of the RASPO at Downey. Also, the oxygen tank subsystems
manager at MSC was made aware of the incident. Subsequent functional
tests were successfully passed. The Discrepancy Report was closed out
in the authorized manner. Although the handling incident was not re-
ported to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager, it should be noted that
such reporting of Discrepancy Report closeouts is not required in all
cases. Once this incident was closed out in the manner prescribed by
the Apollo management control system, it was not reopened as a possible
factor relating to the later detanking problem at KSC.

KSC Detanking Problems

In the case of the detanking problem at KSC_ it was found that


all authorized Discrepancy Reports were filed and signed off. The

E-7
change from normal detanking procedures was made to use the tank heaters
and fans in an attempt to boil off the liquid oxygen in the tank. This
was unsuccessful and the normal procedure was further altered by use of
a pressure pulsing method. These changes to the test procedures were
made by the KSC Systems Engineer and NR Systems Engineer who were on
station. They obtained concurrence of the NR lead systems engineer at
KSC. This is in agreement with the present requirements for test pro-
cedural changes. After the pressure pulsing method was used to detank
oxygen tank no. 2, the problem received further attention, including
additional analyses and test. The Apollo team problem-solving effort
that resulted was led by the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager and
the KSC Director of Launch Operations. NR and Beech personnel were also
involved. The MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office formulated a check-
list of analyses to be made and questions to be answered prior to making
the flight decision on the tank.

This included:

i. Details and procedures for normal detanking at Beech and KSC.

2. Details of abnormal detanking at KSC on March 27 and 28.

3. Hazards resulting from a possible loose fill tube in the


oxygen tank.

4. Can the tank be X-rayed at KSC?

5. Could loose tolerances on the fill tube cause detanking


problem?

6. Should a blowdown and fill test be made on the tank?

7. Disassemble an oxygen tank on Service Module 2 TV-I and


examine components.

A detailed analysis, including possible failure modes, was made at


Beech. Tests were run which indicated that even in the event of a loose
metal fill tube (which was concluded to be the most likely cause of the
detanking problem), a resultant electrical short would provide only 7
milliJoules of energy and it was Judged that this energy level could
cause no damage except loss of the quantity gage indication. All of the
checklist requirements were met by test or analysis prior to making the
decision to fly without a change in the oxygen tank. It was Jointly
concluded by the Beech Apollo Program Manager, the NR CSM Program
Manager, the KSC Director of Launch Operations, and the MSC Apollo
Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) Manager that the tank was flightworthy.
Further examination of this event since the Apollo 13 accident, however,

E-8
has revealed that incomplete and, in some cases_ incorrect information
was used in the decision process. This included:

i. Neither the KSC Launch Operations Director nor the MSC ASPO
Manager knew of the previous tank handling incident at NR-Downey and
neither knew that the oxygen tank internal heaters were on for $ con-
secutive hours during detanking at KSC. Key personnel at ?R-Downey
knew of both events. No personnel at MSC_ KSC, or _ knew that the tank
heater thermal switches would not protect the tank from overheating.

2. A portion of the normal detanking process at Beech is similar


to the normal detanking process at KSC. The KSC Launch Operations
Director and MSC ASPO Manager were mistakenly informed that they were
different. (If they had known of the similarity in detanking processes,
they possibly would have concluded that some change took place in the
tank between Beech and MSC.)

3. The KSC Launch Operations Director, the MSC ASPO Manager, and
key personnel at Downey mistakenly understood that the oxygen tank on
previous test Service Module 2 TV-I had similar detanking problems
which led to the decision to disassemble the 2 TV-I tank and examine
the components. That examination was interpreted as evidence that a
loose-fitting metal fill tube probably was causing the detanking diff-
culty. Further examination has revealed, however, that 2 TV-I oxygen
tank probably detanked normally.

Although none of the principals in making the oxygen tank decision


(NR, MSC, KSC) can say with certainty that the availability of informa-
tion in i, 2, and 3, above would have altered their decision, each con-
curs that the availability of such information could have altered their
decisions.

On the basis of its review, the Project Management Panel feels the
following observations to be pertinent:

i. Launch operations personnel did not fully understand the oxygen


tank internal components or fully appreciate the possible effect of
caanged detanking procedures on the reliability of such internal
components.

2. The hazard associated with the long heater cycle was not given
consideration in the decision to fly this tank.

E-9
5. Problem solving during launch operations utilized telephone
conferences among knowledgeable parties, but without subsequent written
verification, which would have permitted more deliberate consideration
and review.

4. Deviations from test procedures during tests at KSC were made


in accordance with the established approval process. This does not
require prior approval or concurrence of NR-Downey or MSC subsystem
specialists.

5. It was found that insufficient consideration was given to the


tank internal details such as sharp edges, internal wiring, and heater
thermal switch ratings during the design reviews.

6. An historical record of the oxygen tank existed in the manage-


ment system files. However, it was not referred to in making the flight
decision.

7. Dependence upon memory of personnel led to erroneous data


being reported to higher management levels.

8. Key Apollo management personnel made several suggestions dur-


ing the Panel interviews:

(a) Provide total background history on subsystems which have


problems or anomalies during launch operations.

(b) Launch operations personnel need more knowledge of the


internal details of subsystems.

(c) NR (Downey) and MSC Subsystem Managers should review


KSC test procedures and subsequent procedure changes.

(d) Verification of data is needed in problem solving.

(e) Follow-up documentation of information exchanged during


telephone conferences on key problems is recommended.

Materials Compatibility

The compatibility of oxygen tank materials with oxygen received


consideration in the original design. Beech reviewed and selected the
tank materials in accordance with the published material knowledge that
existed in the 1962-1963 time period. No data on hot-wire tests or
ignition tests were available to Beech at that time. Beech ran special
tests on the fan and motor assembly which was tested at i000 psia in
oxygen gas at 300 ° F. The motor passed this test with no evidence of

E-lO
ignition. Someattention was paid in the assembly procedures to avoid
pulling wires over threads or sharp corners and to provide protective
sleeving. However, most sharp corners were not eliminated and as was
previously mentioned, the tank design necessitated a blind assembly
with no way for subsequent inspection for damage. After the original
design, Beech was not requested by NRto makeany further materials
compatibility study or tests. In April 1969, NRwas directed by MSCto
review the nonmetallic materials in the cryogenic oxygen subsystem and
document them in accordance with the COMAT (Characteristics of Materials
System). All nonmetallic materials in the oxygen tank were evaluated
and documentedby NR. All nonmetallic materials met the requirements of
the materials control program. These materials criteria were specifi-
cally formulated for the lunar module and commandmodule, where non-
propagation of fire was a requirement even if a fire started.

These COMAT requirements do not adequately cover the 900 psi cryo-
genic oxygen tank. No electrical ignition testing of any materials was
madefor the oxygen tank. NRreviewed the service module systems to
provide electrical circuit protection such as breakers and fuses in 1967
in an effort to avoid electrical fires in case of shorts.

Security Program
During its review, the Panel also investigated the physical secur-
ity at Beech, NR-Downey,and KSCfor adequacy during the times the
Apollo 13 oxygen tank was in custody at these locations. T_e security
program at each location was found to be satisfactory and adequate to
provide the physical protection of the oxygen tanks. A determination
was madeas a result of the survey that no evidence was discovered that
the failure of the oxygen tanks on Apollo 13 was the result of any will-
ful, deliberate, or mischievous act on the part of an individual at the
facilities surveyed.

Safety and Reliability and Quality Assurance

A detailed managementreview was madeof both the Safety and R&QA


organizations as applicable to the Apollo CSM. Safety Offices at NASA
Headquarters Office of MannedSpaceFlight, MSC,and KSChave safety
responsibilities regarding Apollo which are clearly established and
implemented by both Governmentand support contractor personnel. Safety
audits by NASAHeadquarters teams and participation by MSCand KSCper-
sonnel in panels, boards, and program reviews demonstrates continuing
organizational attention to safety. Safety studies are being madeto
identify hazards associated with the Apollo spacecraft during ground
tests and for each mannedmission. NR-Downeyhas a safety organization

E-II
with specific responsibilities for the Apollo CSM. The NR safety func-
tion is integrated into the Engineering, Manufacturing, and Test Opera-
tions with its objectives to eliminate or control risks to personnel
and equipment throughout the manufacture, checkout, and flight missions
of the Apollo CSM. Even though the NR safety effort, as written in their
Safety Plan, is fragmented over several organizational units, it appar-
ently is working effectively. In all cases, the safety organizations
report to a sufficiently high organizational level to provide them a
desirable independence of safety surveillance.

Failure Reporting

The Panel found that the Apollo Reliability and Quality Assurance
organizations at MSC,KSC, NR, and Beech have an effective independent
failure-reporting and failure-correction and tracking system. Documen-
tation from this system was observed to be both rapid and accurate.
The Reliability Group provides special studies such as Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Suspect Flight Anomalies Report, and con-
figuration change tracking. In the case of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank,
a Single Point Failure Summarywas madein 1968. Amongthe failure modes
considered was fire in the CSMexternal to the oxygen tanks which might
lead to the loss of them. This was considered an acceptable risk be-
cause of control of ignition sources and low probability of occurrence.
Rupture of the oxygen tanks was also considered and accepted due to the
redundance of the oxygen supply and low likelihood of failure occurrence.
For Apollo 13, as for previous missions, a System Safety Assessmentwas
madeon February 19, 1970, as an additional review from previous mis-
sions, and it was concluded that there were no open safety items to
constrain the Apollo 13 flight.

E-12
PART E4

MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

Relating organizational and management structures to an event of


the kind now under consideration is particularly difficult inasmuch as
the time period of importance includes the entire history of the Program,
in this case some 9 years, during which these structures have undergone
many significant changes. With this in mind_ the approach adopted for
this study was (i) to examine and document what exists today, (2) to
trace the history of events that might have had a direct bearing on the
failure, (3) to examine the management inplications of those specific
events, and (4) to try and assess whether those implications are still
pertinent to management as it exists today and whether, therefore, cor-
rective measures of any kind are indicated. To accomplish even this
limited objective has required an early focusing of attention on just
those organizations and functions directly involved, or potentially
involved, in the events under consideration. Thus, following a brief
description of tae overall organizational and management relationships
applicable to the Program as a whole_ this report concentrates on those
organizations responsible for the particular elements of the Apollo
spacecraft in which the failure occurred.

BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE

The Apollo Program has represented the largest single research and
development program ever undertaken by the United States Government; at
its peak (in 1966) it involved about 300_0OO persons. The Government-
industry team responsible for the Program has included 25 prime contrac-
tors and more than 4_000 subcontractors and vendors.

In its simplest terms, the Apollo Program has two major objectives:
(i) to develop a vehicle capable of landing men on the surface of the
Moon and returning them safely to the surface of the Earth, and (2) to
operate that vehicle in an initial series of manned lunar landing missions.
These two objectives have, in a gross sense, dictated the major division
of responsibilities among NASA organizations in the management of the
Apollo Program. With overall responsibility vested in the NASA Head-
quarters organization, responsibility for producing the vehicle was
assigned to two NASA field installations:

i. For the spacecraft, to the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston,


Texas.

2. For the launch vehicle_ to the Marshall Space Flight Center_


Huntsville, Alabama.

E-13
The responsibility for operating the vehicle in the series of
flight missions which constituted the second objective was also assigned
to two field installations:

i. For launching the space vehicle, to the KennedySpace Center,


CapeKennedy, Florida.

2. For all postlaunch operations, to the MannedSpacecraft Center,


Houston, Texas.

These two major objectives also serve to classify the two major
time periods into which the 9-year history of the Programcan be
divided. Thus, the first 7 years, from 1961 to 1968, constituted the
development stage of the Program in which all componentsof the space
vehicle, supporting equipment, and operational facilities were designed,
developed, manufactured and tested; the last 2 years, from 1968 to the
present, have constituted the beginning of the "operations" stage of
the Program, with two successful mannedlunar landing missions already
achieved. The significance of distinguishing between these two periods
of time lies in the inevitable shift of emphasis that accompaniedthe
transition between the two from engineering problems to operational
problems.

NASA- APOLLO
MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATION

Two classical approaches to project managementwere available to


NASAwhen the Apollo Programbegan in 1961. The first approach, often
used by Governmentand the aircraft industry in the early years of air-
craft development, would place in a single organization and under the
total control of the project manager all of the skills and specialities
required to managethe project. Thus, the project organization would
provide for itself all the support necessary in engineering, procurement,
program control, financial management,reliability and quality assurance,
etc., and would operate virtually independently of the institutional or-
ganization of which it was a part. The second approach, which was rapidly
gaining acceptance during the 1940's and 1950's, was the so-called "ma-
trix" concept in which skeletal project managementorganizations were
superimposed on an institutional organization containing elements and
subelements in all of the specialities neededby the projects. Thus
the institutional organization would provide the basic capabilities
required by the projects in engineering, procurement, program control,
etc., and the project managerswould draw upon those as required. The
advantages of this approach for multi-project organizations are apparent.
Costly duplication of support activities is minimized, the overall effi-
ciency of manpowerutilization is maximized, and the quality of support
provided is enhancedby consolidation.

E-14
_SA a]opted the matrix approach to project managementfor the
A_ollo Program. In _SA Headquarters, and in each of the three princi-
_)al NASAfield centers involved, Apollo ProgramOffices were established
from v_ich virtually all of the direction for conduct of the Program
has emanated. At each location, however, these ProgramOffices are
essentially managementorganizations and dependheavily on the line
elements of the host institution's organization for support. Continuity
in lines of authority between the Apollo Program Director in Headquarters
and the Apollo Programorganization in the field has been assured through
the delegation by each Center Director to his Apollo ProgramManagerof
full authority for conduct of that Center's part of the Program. Thus,
for purposes of program direction and authority, there exists throughout
the A_<encya single pyramidal managementstructure cutting across
institutional lines and tying together all elements of the Apollo Program
organization. This relationship is illustrated in figure E4-1.

_he organizations of the principal NASAinstitutions involved in


the Apollo Programare illustrated in figures E4-2 through E4-6, in
which the locations of offices with primary responsibility for Apollo
are indicated by heavy lines.

NASAHeadquarters Organization
The Associate Administrator for MannedSpaceFlight, who heads the
Office of MannedSpaceFlight, is the Administrator's executive agent
for the general managementof all mannedspace flight programs. His
authority flows directly from the Administrator and is broad, covering
all aspects of all mannedspace flight programs. He also exercises
institutional line authority over the three mannedspace flight field
centers which report directly to him.

Office of MannedSpace Flight Organization

Fi_ure E4-2 showsthe organizational structure within the Headquarters


o_fice of MannedSpaceFlight. The Associate Administrator for Manned
S_ace _light has assigned the responsibility for managementof all
aspects of the Apollo Program to the Apollo ProgramDirector, and has
delegated to him full authority to carry out that responsibility. The
Apollo ProgramDirector is the highest Agency official whose responsi-
bility is exclusively for the Apollo Program. There are counterpart
ProgramDirectors for other mannedspace flight programs with similar
responsibilities to their ownprograms, and there are a numberof func-
tional offices which_ consistent with the matrix managementconcept_
provide support to all on-going programs. Shownalso in figure E4-2
are the direct lines of program authority between the Apollo Program
Director and his subordinate program managers in the three field centers.

E-15
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Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)

The organization of the Manned Spacecraft Center is shown in fig-


ure E4-3. The permanent functional organizations are represented by the
five technical directorates (Engineering and Development, Science and
Applications, Medical Research and Operations, Flight Crew Operations,
and Flight Operations) and the institutional Directorates and Staff
Offices (e.g., Administration, Program Control and Contracts, Public
Affairs, Legal, etc.). The program management organizations presently
include the Apollo Spacecraft, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Program Offices,
and the Advanced Missions Program Office, which is responsible for studies
and planning potentially leading to new flight programs.

Responsibility for managing all aspects of the Apollo Program as-


signed to the Center is vested in the Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office (ASPO). Under the matrix-management concept, a rela-
tively small percentage of the Center's staff directly employed in the
Apollo Program reports to him organizationally. Virtually all of the
Apollo tasks done in-house at MSC (component testing, instrumentation
development_ flightcrew training, operations planning, etc.) are per-
formed by the Center's line organizations (the functional Directorates)
under the overall direction and coordination of the ASPO Manager.

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)

This Center is responsible for the development, manufacture, and


testing of the launch vehicles used in the Apollo Program. The organi-
zation of the Center is shown in figure E4-4. As at MSC, this Center
employs the matrix-management concept in which the basic organization,
represented by the Program Development, Science and Engineering, and
Administration and Technical Services Directorates, is functional and
the program-management organization, represented by the Program Manage-
ment Directorate, is made up of program offices for individual launch
vehicles or stages.

Although the Saturn Program Office represents the Apollo Launch


Vehicle Program Office for purposes of full-time management, the Director
of Program Management has been designated the Apollo Launch Vehicle Pro-
gram Manager. He manages and directs all aspects of the Apollo Program
assigned to MSFC, drawing on technical support from the Science and
Engineering Directorates.

Kennedy Space Center (KSC)

The KSC responsibility in the Apollo Program includes the assembly,


checkout, and launch of the space vehicle.

E-18
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The organization of the Center is shown in figure E_-5. Again the
basic organization is functional, consisting of those major operational
activities necessary to the launch of all space vehicles. The program-
management organization is similar to that at MSC and is made up of an
individual program office for each active flight program. Overall re-
sponsibility for managing all aspects of the preparation, checkout, and
launch of the Apollo space vehicles is assigned to the Manager of the
Apollo Program Office (APO). All functional organizations at the Center
participate in those activities under the overall direction of the APO
Manager. Direct responsibility for launch and checkout is delegated to
the Director of Launch Operations.

x CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS

The oxygen tank in which the failure occurred was a component of


the cryogenic gas storage subsystem (CGSS), which serves both the
electrical power system (EPS) and the environmental control system (ECS)
of the spacecraft service module (SM). The contractors and contractual
relationships involved in the manufacture of the tank are illustrated in
figure E4-6. North American Rockwell (formerly North American Aviation),
prime contractor for the command and service modules (CSM), subcontracted
with Beech Aircraft Corporation for manufacture of the CGSS. Beech, in
turn, purchased certain parts for the subsystem from the three vendors
shown: the oxygen pressure vessel (inner tank) from Airite Products
Division of the Electrada Corporation; the oxygen quantity and temperature
sensor probe from Simmonds Precision Products, Inc.; and the fan motors
from Globe Industries, Inc. Pertinent organization charts for North
American Rockwell and Beech Aircraft are shown in figures E4-7 through
E4-11. The organizations of the vendor companies were not considered
pertinent and are not shown.

North American Rockwell (NR)

The Apollo CSM contract is held by the Space Division of North


American Rockwell and the organization of that Division is shown in
figure E4-7. North American Rockwell also applies the matrix-management
concept in their current organization with program offices (Saturn S-If,
Space Station, CSM,' Space Shuttle, etc.) superimposed on a basically
functional organizational structure which includes Manufacturing,
Research, Engineering, and Test; Material; Quality and Reliability
Assurance; and the conventional administrative-support functions. The
Apollo contract is managed for NR by the CSM Program Office headed by
a division vice president. Figure E4-8 shows the organization of that
Office. Within the CSM Program Office the principal suborganization
for program management is Engineering, headed by an Assistant Program
Manager and Chief Program Engineer. On the functional side of the Space
Division, referring again to figure E4-7, line responsibility for

E-21
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performance (as opposed to management) under the Apollo contract falls
under the functional support organization for Research, Engineering, and
Test, also headed by a division vice president. The organization of that
Office is along systems/subsystems lines. At the subsystem level, the
engineer in charge in this organization also acts as the subsystem
manager for the program management organization, in a manner quite
analogous to the technique used by the MSC organization described ear-
lier. The relationship at North American Rockwell is illustrated in
figure E4-9.

North American Launch


Operations Space Division (KSC)

All NR CSM operations at KSC are conducted in accordance with the


provisions of Supplement KSC-I to MSC contract no. NAS9-150 with NR.
The Supplement contains a statement of work prepared by KSC and KSC is
responsible for technical direction to the NR personnel. The NR Apollo
CSM Operations at KSC supports KSC in CSM checkout and launch and is a
part of the NR Launch Operations Space Division under the NR Vice Pres-
ident and General Manager who is located at Cocoa Beach, Florida. He,
in turn, reports to the Space Division President, NR.

Beech Aircraft Corporation

The subcontract from North American Rockwell, for manufacturing of


the cryogenic gas storage subsystem, is held by the Boulder Division of
the Beech Aircraft Corporation. The organization of that Division is
shown in figure E4-10. Beech also uses the matrix-management concept
with management responsibility for the Apollo subsystem contract vested
in the Apollo Program Manager and performance responsibility in the
Manager, Engineering. Figure E4-11 shows the breakdown of management
responsibilities within the office of the Apollo Program Manager.

E-26
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E-30
PART E5

RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATING RELATIONSHIPS

The specific responsibilities assigned to most of the NASA organi-


zational elements involved in management of the Apollo Program are
described in some detail in the series of documents titled NASA-Apollo
Program Management. Where those descriptions are still pertinent, they
are incorporated here by reference or are paraphrased as necessary to
maintain the continuity of this document. The following discussion is,
for the most part, confined to those organizations and responsibilities
that are germane to the present study.

NASA ADMINISTRATOR

The Administrator of NASA reserves to his own office the authority


for establishing and enforcing Agency policy, for establishing overall
program policy and objectives, for approving mission plans and schedules,
for mission funding and major procurement actions, and for insuring ad-
herence to functional management policies. Apollo Program policies,
objectives, and management systems are reviewed and approved by the
Administrator, as are significant schedule and budget decisions. Man-
agement directives relating to the Program are issued within the
Agency-wide NASA Issuance System, with special provisions for specific
instructions and directives to be issued by the Apollo Program Director
to participating program elements in the Manned Space Flight Field
Centers.

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT

As described earlier, the Associate Administrator for Manned Space


Flight, serving as the Administrator's executive agent for the general
management of all manned space flight programs, shares full responsi-
bility with the Administrator for all aspects of these programs. In
this capacity, he is advised by three major policy bodies: the Manned
Space Flight Management Council, the Science and Technology Advisory
Committee, and the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board. The respon-
sibilities of these groups are summarized as follows.

E-31
MannedSpaceFlight ManagementCouncil
The Council consists of the Associate Administrator for Manned
SpaceFlight as Chairman and the Directors of the three MannedSpace
Flight Centers. The Associate Administrator for MannedSpace Flight
establishes program policy guidelines and program plans in consultation
with the Council. For the Apollo Program, the Council reviews policy,
progress, and performance to assure that goals are being met, that
technical problems are being dealt with properly, and that adequate
resources are available for conduct of the planned program. The
Council also acts as the Design Certification Board in examining the
entire Program for proof of development maturity prior to each manned
flight of a new configuration. To insure flightworthiness and manned
flight safety, the Council assesses the design of the space vehicle
launch complex, the Mission Control Center, the MannedSpaceFlight
Network, and the launch instrumentation for mannedApollo missions. A
Mission Design Certification Document, executed by the entire member-
ship of the Council, serves as the approval authority for proceeding
with specific flight missions designated for mannedflight.

Science and Technology Advisory Committee

The Committee is madeup of leading scientists and engineers from


universities, industry, and Government. The Committee functions in an
advisory capacity to the Associate Administrator for MannedSpace Flight
on major technical and scientific questions. They perform independent
evaluations and make recommendationsto the Associate Administrator for
MannedSpace Flight.

MannedSpaceFlight Experiments Board

The Board consists of the Associate Administrator for MannedSpace


Flight as Chairman, the Associate Administrators for Space Science and
Applications and for AdvancedResearch and Technology, and representa-
tives from the Department of Defense and the Air Force. The Board's
responsibility is to advise and recommendto the Associate Administrator
for MannedSpace Flight which experiments should be included in manned
space flight missions.

APOLLO
PROGRAM
DIRECTOR

Full responsibility and authority for managing all aspects of the


Programwithin the constraints of budget, schedule, and performance

E-32
approved by the Administrator are delegated to the Apollo ProgramDirec-
tor by the Associate Administrator for MannedSpace Flight. It is the
Program Director's responsibility to define or approve mission require-
ments, technical requirements, program specifications, and reliability,
quality assurance, and safety standards. His office is organized into
the five functional Directorates shownin figure E5-1. The Apollo
Program Offices in the three MannedSpace Flight Centers have organiza-
tional structures similar to that of the Program Director's, thus
providing parallel responsibilities for managersat the two levels. The
responsibilities of four of the five Directorates in the Apollo Program
Office are described in the following paragraphs.

Test Directorate

The Test Directorate is responsible for planning and coordinating


development of test programs for all phases of design, manufacture, and
checkout of launch vehicles, spacecraft, experiment hardware, and ground
support equipment. The Directorate coordinates requirements for test
facilities, and prepares and justifies budget requests for test programs
and facilities.

Operations Directorate

The Operations Directorate is responsible for operations plans and


schedules; operations documentation; mission test plans; flight plans;
trajectory design and analysis; crew operations and training; premission
operations checkout, mission safety, and hazard probabilities; and
mission operations support.

SystemsEngineering Directorate
The Systems Engineering Directorate is responsible for developing
the Apollo Program Specifications; developing flight mission assign-
ments (including mission objectives and overall flight profiles); re-
viewing program to define technical interfaces; establishing control
weights for vehicle stages and spacecraft modules; and verifying that
system performance requirements are achieved.

Program Control Directorate

The Program Control Directorate is responsible for integrated plan-


ning; preparation of Program DevelopmentPlans; maintaining interrelated
schedules; logistics; specifications; performance analysis and control
system management;configuration management;data managementsystems;

E-33
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preparation of budget and cost information; and operation of the Apollo
Action Center.

Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&QA) Directorate

The R&QA Directorate is responsible for initiating program-wide


R&QA policies and procedures; preparing program development plans for
the Manned Space Flight Centers; developing R&QA training programs;
establishing R&QA reporting requirements; and evaluating the effective-
ness of R&QA programs in the Centers.

Support Contractors

The Apollo Program Director also has the services of three support
contractors available to him:

i. Bellcomm, Inc. (AT&T), which provides systems engineering sup-


port consisting of studies, technical evaluations, analytical investi-
gations, and technical consulting services.

2. The Boeing Company, Space Division, which performs the techni-


cal integration and evaluation function for the Program Director. This
includes analyses and evaluation of program management, interface con-
trol, configuration management, logistics, engineering, manufacturing,
testing, launch operations, and information systems.

3. General Electric Company, Apollo Systems Development, which


provides general engineering support, including data management,
management information systems, and R&QA investigations.

MSC APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE (ASPO)

As in the Headquarters organization, the Apollo Spacecraft Program


Manager at MSC acts for the MSC Center Director as general manager of
all Apollo-related activities at the Center. In that capacity he is
the official technical interface between NASA and the spacecraft con-
tractors. He is responsible for managing the accomplishment of all
Apollo tasks at the Center, even though many of those tasks are per-
formed by Center personnel not organizationally responsible to him.
His functional responsibilities essentially parallel those of the
Apollo Program Director, but are applicable to the spacecraft only
while those of the Program Director encompass all aspects of the Program.
His Program Office organization is also essentially parallel to that of

E-35
the Program Director's, as shown in figure E5-2. He has delegated to
three subordinate Managers (for the CSM,the LM, and Experiments and
GFE) the following responsibilities:

i. Directing the design, development, and fabrication programs


carried out by the contractors.

2. Directing and planning systems engineering and systems inte-


gration functions, including review of engineering design and systems
engineering studies conducted by the contractors.

3. Developing the ground- and flight-test programs to be conducted


at White Sands, MSC,and KSC.

4. Monitoring contractor operations to assure adherence to speci-


fications and to identify and solve problems in the development and
fabrication of systems and subsystems.

5. Chairing the Configuration Control Board (Level 3).

Assistant Program Manager for Flight Safety

There is also within the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office an Assist-


ant Program Manager for Flight Safety, whose responsibility is to assure
that the policies and procedures of MSC's Safety Office are adhered to
in all Apollo Program activities relating to the spacecraft. He is the
Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager's Safety representative to KSC and
the spacecraft contractors. He oversees all program activities from a
flight safety viewpoint and is an advisor to the Program Manager on
the flightworthiness of all systems.

Systems Engineering Division

Referring again to figure E5-2, there are six functional divisions


reporting to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager. Two of these per-
form functions that have a direct bearing on the development and manu-
facture of the cryogenic gas storage subsystem. The Systems Engineering
Division is responsible for the coordination and control of the design
and development of all spacecraft systems. The Division determines the
technical requirements, and develops technical specifications (with the
contractor) for systems and subsystems, and is responsible for assuring
that all program elements (crew, hardware, and software) are successfully
integrated into each system design. This Division plays its major role
during the design and development stage of the spacecraft and its
systems. It is responsible for organizing and conducting all Prelimi-
nary Design Reviews and Critical Design Reviews. It is also responsible

E-36
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E-37
for definition and implementation of the nonmetallic materials program.
Mission definition and planning are also major responsibilities.

CSM Project Engineering Division

This Division, which has counterpart Divisions for the LM and for
Experiments and GFE, plays its major role during manufacture and test
of the spacecraft. From this Division two engineers, designated as
Project Engineers, are assigned to each spacecraft as it begins manu-
facture. The Project Engineers are the Program Manager's representatives
for his particular spacecraft and are responsible for assuring that that
particular spacecraft is ready for launch on schedule, that it has suc-
cessfully passed all tests, inspections, and reviews, and that all asso-
ciated ground support equipment is on schedule. Their responsibility
extends up to launch and resumes after recovery for postflight testing.

Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Offices (RASPO)

There are Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Managers at the North


American Rockwell plant, Downey, California (for the CSM prime contract),
at Bethpage, New York (for the LM prime contract), and at the Kennedy
Space Center (for launch activities). The Managers of the RASPO-Downey
and the RASPO-Bethpage act for the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager in
all spacecraft activities taking place at their locations. Their re-
sponsibilities encompass program control, manufacture, test and checkout,
and configuration management. The Manager at the RASPO-Kennedy repre-
sents the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager in all operations at KSC
which relate to the spacecraft. Specific responsibilities include:

i. Liaison with the KSC Spacecraft Operations Director on all


matters relating to spacecraft preparation and checkout for launch.

2. Submission to KSC of MSC's prelaunch test and checkout require-


ments for the spacecraft.

3. Approval of KSC's Test and Checkout Plans.

4. Approval of w_ivers and deviations to MSC's test and checkout


requirements.

5. Restricted change approval related to GSE and test operations.

E-38
MSC RELIABILITY A_ QUALITY ASSURANCE (R&QA) OFFICE

The R&©_ Office at MSC is an independent functional office reporting


to the Director of the Center and responsive to the ASPO. It has over-
all responsibility for planning, coordinating, and directing all R&QA
activities at the Center. Specific responsibilities include:

i. Establishing reliability, quality, and inspection requirements


and criteria for spacecraft, systems, subsystems, and supporting
equipment.

2. Insuring implementation of R&QA requirements and criteria at


contractor plants and at MSC.

3. Developing MSC engineering design standards and criteria.

L. Establishing certification test criteria and approving certi-


fication test plans and reports.

5. Establishing and enforcing policies governing parts and materials


identification, usage, and qualification information for critical space-
craft hardware.

MSC SAFETY OFFICE

The Safety Office at MSC is also an independent functional office,


reporting to the Center Director. It is responsible for establishing
safety policies, standards, and procedures in the fields of industrial
operations and manned space flight. Specific responsibilities include:

i. Review and evaluation of the safety of operations in all Center


organizations.

2. Advising the Center Director and Center Management on all


matters relating to industrial and flight safety.

3. Reviewing and evaluating the effectiveness of contractor


safety programs against MSC safety standards and criteria.

E-39
MSCENGINEERING
ANDDEVELOPMENT
DIRECTORATE

The Engineering and DevelopmentDirectorate is the principal en-


gineering componentof the Center functional organization. This
Directorate, organized into Divisions by technical discipline, conducts
most of the Center's supporting research and technology, develops con-
cepts for advanced systems, and provides technical support to all on-
going flight programs. This support roughly subdivides into three
major categories:

i. Systems analyses and definition of new techniques applicable


to space flight programs.

2. Subsystemand componenttests.

3. Technical managementof the design, manufacture, and testing


of subsystems by the Program contractors.

This latter function represents a major element of the Apollo


Programmanagementsystem and is described as follows:

The three subordinate Managersin the ASPO(for CSM,LM, and Experi-


ments and GFE) rely heavily on the matrix managementconcept for carry-
ing out their responsibilities. They receive technical support from
subsystem managersappointed from the technical Directorates of the
Center's line organization. There are between 40 and 50 subsystem mana-
gers, most of them located in the Engineering and DevelopmentDirectorate
(fig. E4-4). The SubsystemManager for the cryogenic gas storage sub-
system is organizationally located in the Propulsion and PowerDivision
of that Directorate. These managersremain assigned to their permanent
organizations, but assumeprogram responsibility for the design, develop-
ment, and manufacture of particular subsystems. In this role they report
to the Module Manager (e.g., Managerfor the CSM)in the Program Office.
For all other purposes they report through normal organizational lines.
The subsystemmanager's responsibility for his subsystem is continuous
from preliminary design through operations. He is the Program Office's
technical managerof all work done on the subsystem (although contractor
direction is given through the Project Officer or Contracting Officer)
and is responsible for assuring that the subsystem is built on schedule,
within budget, and to specifications.

E-40
KSCAPOLLO
PROGRAM
MANAGER

The Apollo ProgramManager at KSCrepresents the Center Director


in all matters relating to the launch of an Apollo space vehicle. He
develops all necessary plans for work to be accomplished at KSCfor
the Apollo Program and issues "requirements" to the line organizations
of the Center. The line organizations then assumefull responsibility
for conducting their parts of theProgram, and the role of the Apollo
ProgramManagerbecomesone of monitoring, assessing, and modifying
requirements as necessary. The organization of the KSCApollo Program
Office is shownin figure E5-3.

KSCDIRECTOR
OF LAUNCH
OPERATIONS

This organization has the principal functional responsibility for


conducting the launch of the Apollo space vehicle. The Director of
Launch Operations is responsible for the managementand technical di-
rection of preflight operation and integration, assembly, test, check-
out, and launch of all space vehicles. He initiates, supervises, and
coordinates the preparation of preflight and launch operations test
plans and assures their effective execution. He assists the Apollo
ProgramManagerin negotiating test and operational sequences, methods,
and standards with the two development Centers (MSCand MSFC).

INTER-CENTER
RELATIONSHIPS

Because the day-to-day managementof the Apollo Program, from


design through launch, requires close coordination of activities under-
way at three lield Centers and in NASAHeadquarters, formally docu-
mented Inter-Center Agreements have been drawn to specify how
responsibilities are divided and how the activities at each location
relate to those at the others. Additionally, a series of Inter-Center
Coordination Panels has been established which recommendsolutions to
technical interface problems involving the responsibilities of two or
more Centers. There are eight such panels, covering: Crew Safety,
Electrical, Flight Evaluation, Mechanical, Instrumentation and Commu-
nications, Flight Mechanics, Launch Operations, and Flight Operations.
All panels operate under the cognizance of a Panel Review Board made
up of representatives from the three MannedSpace Flight Centers and
the Headquarters Office of MannedSpaceFlight.

E-41
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E-42
Apollo Program Directive No. 33A, issued in August 1968, defines
in considerable detail the responsibilities of each of the three Centers
in the Apollo Program. It is reproduced on the following pages in its
entirety for reference.

E-43
OFFICEOF.AN_EOSP,_CEF_I_"T M- D MA 1400.O95 "I DAT_
PROGRAI_ DIRECTIVE -- ,n,........ _ .... __AU__ .1568 _

APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTIVE NO. 33A

APOL-I]O PROGRAM DIR_TOR

SUBJECT: Center Responslbilitles in the Apollo Program

OFFICE OF PRIME RESPONSIBILITY: MAP

I. PURPOSE

The :_urpose of this Directive is to assign responsibility


and functions and define Inter-Center relationships for
the conduct of the Apollo Program.

II. SCOPE

ThlS Directive assigns responsibilities and functions to MSF


Centers for accomplishment of the Apollo Program Jn amplifi-
cation of and in consonance with NMI 1142.1 Functions and
Authority - Manned Spacecraft Center, NMI 1142.3 Functions
and Authority - Goorge C. Marshall Space Flight Center, and
NMI 1142.2 Functions and Authority - John F. Kennedy Space
Center.

III. RESPONSIBILITY

A° The Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center Is responsible


for design, development, fabrication, qualification,
acceptance te_t and delivery of Apollo spacecraft; associ-
ated ground support equipment and assigned experiments; for
the planning of all Apollo Missions; for the control of the
flight phase of Apollo Missions including the development of
ground equipment necessary for mission control and not pro-
vided by other centers in the execution of their missions;
for the selection, training and assignment of flight crews;
for the development of software as needed for spacecraft
guidance, checkout, and mission control; for establishing
prelaunch requirements for test, checkout and inspection of
Apollo spacecraft; and for the planning and implementation of
a lunar science program to support the Apollo Program.

Be The Director of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Is


responsible for the design, development, fabrication, quall-
flcatlon, acceptance test and delivery of the Saturn launch
vehicles including engines, associated ground support equip-
ment and assigned experiments;, providing mission planning data
from the standpoint of overall vehicle performance; providing
launch vehicle data and software for launch vehicle guidance
and checkout; for establishing prelaunch requirements for test,
checkout and inspection of Saturn launch vehicles; and ::up-
portlng launch and flight operations as requested by KSC and
_C.
.... i or16 ......

E-44
DATE

OFFICI_ OF _AN'tJED S['AC[ FL IGtCT

PROGRA_,t DIRECTIVE (Prolecf) 5 AUG 196B

C. The Director of the John F. Kennedy Space Center is responsible for


development and operation of launch and industrial facilities and associated
ground support equipment required to support the Apollo Program and the
assembly, test, inspection, checkout and launch of Apollo-Saturn _pace
vehicles at KSC.

D. Center Directors will retain ultimate responsibility for Apollo Program


functions delegated within the Center, and will supervise their perforn_ance.
Significant changes in delegation of functions will be discussed with the
Apollo Program Director prior to i_)le_nentation.

IV. FUNCTIONS

A. Manned Spacecraft Center

The Manned Spacecraft Center is assigned the following functions for


the Apollo Program:

l, Hardware

a. Providing for the detailed specifications, design, manufacture,


checkout, test, reliability and quality, qualification, and
acceptance of MSC d_veloped hardware. This does not include the
test and checkout functions accomplished at the launch site by KSC.

b. Developing and delivering to KSC spacecraft which has been qualified


for flight along with associated software, data and support equ_ment.

c. Providing for the detailed specifications, design, development,


fabrication, qualification, acceptance test and delivery of
experiments flight hardware and associated specialized ground
equipment for those experiments approved by the Manned Space
Flight Experiments Board and assigned by the Apollo Program
Director.

d. Providing logistic support planning and implementation at


factory, test and launch sites for MSC developed hardware_

e. Controlling receipt and stowage of flight crew personal


equipment at KSC _ich is scheduled for flight and providing
to KSC a list of equipment which is considered flight crew
personal equipment.

2, Configuration Control

a. Establishing and controlling configuration of spacecraft


hardware, associated software and support equipment (designed
or provided by MSC) at each stage of preparation or test in the
factory, test or launch site, including approval of changes at
KSC.

.... 2 o_16 .....


NASA FORM 644 tn_v JU_, 6el pn_vlous £DIT_ONS AnE OBSOL-ETE

E-45
I I

PROGRAMDIRECTIVE I_J_-D HA ]Lloo.or_z)


_P,o,,_,_
' ] ,5AUG 1968

b. Providing and .L,_i[tkaining a list of acceptable items and materials


that _pay entt, r the spacecraft for checkout and for flight.

3. Test and Checkout

a. Establishing and maintaining test and checkout requirements and


test and checkout specifications and criteria for factory or test

site acceptance and latmch site preparation of 1_C developed hardware


(including Ground Support Equipment and software).

b.
Providing test and checkout requirements and test and checkout
speciiications ;_nd criteria for launch site preparation of MSC
developed hardware, software and Ground Support Equipment.

c. Reviewing factory, test site and launch site test requirements


and test and checkout plans and procedures as necessary to
assure that adequate testing is beinR accomplished without unnecessary
overlap and duplication between testing conducted at different ]ocations.

d. Providing written approval of KSC test and checkout plans in


consonance with paragraphs IV.A.3b and IV.A.3e.

e° Providing Center approved factory or test site test and checkout


procedures to KSC for use as a baseline in the development of
similar procedures required at the launch site.

f. Reviewing at the option of MSC, the adequacy of KSC test


procedures at the launch site.


Providing requirements and criteria to KSC for assuring flight
readiness of _xperi_::cnts flight hardware, unless KSC and MSC on
the basis of written agreement for a specific experiment make
other arrangements for flight readiness determination.

h, Determining functional performance and flight readiness of


flight hardware closed out at the factory or test site and not
accessible for inspection or not included in test and checkout
requirements for evaluation of functional performance at KSC.

i. Providing such technical assistance or data as may be required

by KSC in preparation of hardware for flight.

j- Assuring that }_SC personnel participating in KSC tests are


responsive to KSC direction during conduct of the tests and
attend pre-test briefings and participate in training exercises
as required by KSC in accordance with responsibilities outlined
herein.

k° Providing an assessment of flight readiness of the spacecraft and


associated software at the Flight Readiness Review in accordance

with Apollo Program Directives.

,,o, 3., 16._,,,


NASal. FORJ4 644 cm(v. JuL ell pR£,wous I:DI"rtONS /,RI[ OBIIOL. E'rI[

E-46
OFFICE OF MANNED _,PACE FLIGIIT
_" D HA i;!00.O95
PROGRAM DIRECTIVE (Proi,ct)

4. Reliability and Quality Assurance

a. Providing quality control requirements and inspection


criteria for MSC developed hardware for use at the

factory, test site and launch site.

b. Conducting audits to evaluate contractor factory and


test site performance in accordance with MSC quality
control requirements and inspection criteria for MSC
developed hardware, and participating at the option of
MSC in audits conducted by KSC at the launch site.

c. Determining corrective action and disposition of MSC


developed hardware which fails, malfunctions or performs
outside the performance limits contained in test and
checkout specifications and criteria during checkout at

KSC. This responsibility does not include routine


trouble-shooting or maintenance of MSC developed ground

support equipment operated by KSC.

5. Systems Engineering

Providing I_C technical representation on design and operations


inter-Center panels or working groups as established by Apollo

Program Directives.

6. Operations

a. Developing flight techniques for mission control and


hardware and software for the Mission Control Center.

b. Developing mission objectives, plans and rules to support

Apollo mission assignments.

c. Conducting flight operations.

d. Obtaining from KSC the operational requirements pertain-


ing to checkout and launch which need to be incorporated
into MSC designed hardware.

e. Planning jointly with the Department of Defense the

provision of recovery support.

f. Providing input to and comment on KSC launch rules.

g. Identifying MSC operational support requirements according


to approved procedures and evaluating support implementation

of said requirements.

NASA FORM 644 i#lv+ Ju_. Ill PNIVlOUI [DITIONI Aml OIIOLITE

E-h7
OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLI_,HT

PROORAM DIRECTIVE (.r',ojectI

7. Flight Crew

a. Providing trained flight crews and personal equipment for manned missions.

b. Directing all astronaut activities except during the time they are
participating in F_C flight hardware tests.

c. Developing and operating flight crew simulators and training equipment at


_C and KSC.

8. Sciei_ee

a. Planning and impleme_tation of a lunar science program to support Apollo,


including site selection, lunar science operations_ thu Lunar Receiving
Laboratory operation and lunar sample analys_s.

9. Ma na _ze me nt

This section contains general management responsibilities for the conduct of


the Apollo program at ._._SCas well as some specific management requirements
which need to be hi_hlighted.

General

a. Assuring that Apollo program requirements for manpower or for


institutional support from other elements of MSC are properly conveyed
to those elements and that Apollo program institutiomal support
requirements arc reflected in Center resource requirements plans,
schedules, and budgets.

b. Assuring that Apollo program requirements for institutional support


are met on an effective and timely basis.

c. Developing and operating Center facilities required for the Apollo


Program.

d. Developing and implementing adequate security procedures.

e. Establishing detailed schedules (Levels 2, 3 and 4) for MSC hardware,


software and associated equipment and operations activities consistent
with the basic schedules (Level I) approved by the Director, Apollo
Program, and the Director, Mission Operations.

f. Providing contract authority for KSC control of spacecraft contractor's


test and checkout activities at KSC through a supplemental contract
under KSC administration.

Medical

_dical support for the Apollo program will be provided in accordance with
NMI 8900.1. In acldition, the following specific requirements will be met

on the Apollo program.

,',,, 5 o_16 ,o_,


HASA FORM 64.4 r_ i _{_; _.,) ;'AEVIOJS LC_,TkO*,5 AmE O0_OLETE

E-48
OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLtGMT
M- D _p,o,_,_ 5 AU_ 1968
PROGRAt4 DIRECTIVE
1
a. Providing for the medical surveillance and support of the astronauts

during all phases of the Apollo Program at any location including


test and checkout operations.

b. Providing for the evaluation of medical data obtained during manned


tests, to insure that the interpretation of such data regarding
the acceptability of equipment performance is properly reflected

in post flight mission reports.

e. Providing for the development and implementation of medical disaster

plans associated with the test of Apollo hardware at FZC.

Safety activities in the Apollo program will be conducted in accordance


with instructions provided by the Apollo Program Director and directives
issued by the Manned Space Flight and NASA Safety Directors. In addition
the following specific requirements will be met on the Apollo program.

a. Providing written approval of KSC criteria for determining hazardous

operations at the launch site.

b. Reviewing and approving any KSC test and checkout procedure in which

the flight crew participates.

NASA FORM 644 (n_v. JUL.. liE*) PREVIOUS EDITIONi ARi[ OBIOL*ETE

E-49
I

1400.0_5 1 DATe
PROGRAM DIRECTIVE
O_FIC| OF MAHNEO SPACE FLIGHT *1 I M- D MA
I (P,oi--,) j 5 AUG 196B
B. GeorBe C. Marshall Space F1i_ht Center

The George C. Marshall Space Flight Center is assigned the following functions for
the Apollo Program.

i. Hardware

a. Providing for the detailed specifications, design, manufacture, checkout,


test, reliability and quality, qualification and acceptance of MSFC
developed hardware. This does not include the test and checkout functions
accomplished at the launch site by KSC.

b. Developing and delivering to KSC launch vehicles which have been qualified
for flight along with associated software, data and support equipment.

c. Providing for the detailed specifications, design, development, fabrication,


qualification, acceptance test and delivery of experiments flight hardware
and associated specialized ground equipment for those experiments approved
by the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board and assigned by the Apollo
Program Director.

d. Providing logistic support planning and implementation at factory, test and


launch sites for MSFC controlled hardware.

2. Configuration Control

a. Establishing and controlling configuration of launch vehicle hardware, asso-


ciated software and support equipment (designed or provided by MSFC) at each
atage of preparation or test in the factory, test or launch site, including
approval of changes-at KSC.

b. Providing criteria to KSC for controlling tools, equipment and materials that
enter and leave the launch vehicle stages and instrument unit during
operations at KSC.
3. Test and Checkout

a. Establishing and maintaining test and checkout requirements and test and
checkout specifications and criteria for factory or test site acceptance and
launch site preparation of MSFC developed hardware (including Ground Support
Equipment and software).
b. Providing test and checkout requirements and test and checkout specifications
and criteria for launch site preparation of MSFCdeveloped hardware, software
and Ground Support Equipment.

c. Reviewing factory, test site and launch site test requirements and test and
checkout plans and procedures as necessary to assure that adequate testing
is being accomplished.
d. Providing written approval of KSC test,and checkout plans in consonance with
paragraphs IV.B.3_ and IV.B.3c.

e. Providing Center approved factory or test site test and checkout procedures
to KSC for use as a baseline in the development of similar procedures
required at the launch site.

,,.,7 o, 16--.--
NASA F01111 $4d Italy. JuL_ ill PnlvlOUll I[on'rloNl| Alql[ OIlIOl.l[;[

E-50
o,,,c,o,..MN,0,,.c,,L,0.,
PROGRAM
M'D
DIRECTIVE I i oo.o9
tP,
o,*_,_ I $ AUG 1968

f. Reviewing at the option of MSFC, the adequacy of KSC test procedures


at the launch site.

g. Providing requirements and criteria to KSC for assuring flight


readiness of experiments flight hardware, unless KSC and MSFC on
the basis of written agreement for a specific experiment make other

arrangements for flight readiness determination.

h. Determining functional performance and flight readiness of flight


hardware closed out at the factory or test site and not accessible

for inspection or not included in test and checkout requirements


for evaluation of functional performance at KSC.

i. Providing such technical assistance or data as may be required by


KSC in preparation of hardware for flight.

j. Assuring that MSFC personnel participating in KSC tests are responsive


to KSC direction during conduct of the tests and attend pre-test
briefings and participate in training exercises as required by KSC
in accordance with responsibilities outlined herein.

k. Providing an assessment of flight readiness of the launch vehicle and


associated software at the Flight Readiness Review in accordance with

Apollo Program Directives.

4. Reliability and quality Assurance

a. Providing quality control requirements and inspection criteria for MSFC

developed hardware for use at the factory, test site and launch site.

b. Conducting audits to evaluate contractor factory and test site performance


in accordance with MSFC quality control requirements and inspection
criteria for MSFC developed hardware, and participating at the option
of MSFC in audits conducted by KSC at the launch site.

e. Determining corrective action and disposition of MSFC developed hardware


which fails, malfunctions, or performs outside the performance limits
contained in test and checkout specifications and criteria during
checkout at KSC. This responsibility does not include routine trouble-

shooting or maintenance of MSFC-developed ground support equipment

operated by KSC.

5. Systems EnKineering

a. Providing MSFC technical representation on design and operations inter-


Center panels or working groups as established by Apollo Program
Directives.

b. Providing the overall integrated space vehicle systems analysis and


criteria for operational requirements and limitations for handling_
checkout, launch and flight as required by MSFC, MSC and KSC.

c. Operating the Manned Space Flight Interface Documentation Repository.

..., 8 0. 16-_..
NASA FORM 144 (nlv, J'JL. IlliJ pllil[¥lOUI I[IDITIONll AFIE OII|OL.II[TI[

E-51
DATE
OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
PROGRAM DIRECTIVE 5 AUG 1968
-D _ 14oo.o-'_,_
fP, oiec_)

6, Operations

a. Developing mission objectives and plans to support Apollo mission

assignments.

b. Providing real time mission support as requested by _C and KSC both on


site and at Huntsville.

c. Providing input to and comment on KSC launch and _SC flight mission rules.

d. Obtaining from KSC the operational requirements pertaining to checkout and


launch which need to be incorporated into MSFC designed hardware.

e. Identifying MSFC operational support requirements according to approved


procedures and evaluating support implementation of said requirements.

7. Fli_ht Crew

Providing instructions and material for training and familiarization of flight


crews with the Saturn vehicle.

8. Science

None

9. Management

This section contains general nmnagement responsibilities for the conduct of

the Apollo program at _FC as well as some specific management requirements

which need to be highlighted.

General

a. Assuring that Apollo program requirements for manpower or for insti-


tutional support from other elements of MSFCare properly conveyed to
those elements and that Apollo program institutional support requirements
are reflected in Center resource requirements plans, schedules, and

budgets.

b. Assuring that Apollo program requirements for institutional support


are met on an effective and timely basis.

c. Developing and operating Center facilities required for the Apollo

Program.

d. Developing and implementing adequate security procedures.

e. Establishing detailed schedules (Levels 2, 3 and 4) for MSFC hardware,


software, and associated equipment consistent with the basic schedules

(Level i) approved by the Apollo Program Director.

f. Providing liquid hydrogen management for MSFC and KSC.

,..=E 9 o,, I6-.Q_,


NASA FORM 644 inFv J,JL (_) PREVIOLJS ED'TIONS A_E OB!_OLET[

E-52
OFFICE

PROGRAI_',
Or

....
&lAMMED SP.ACE

DIRECTIVE
FLIGHT . _,

--
1400.Lr)Qc_

_,o,ec,) - i 0A,E 5 .n_ln 'i"_:_

g* Providing contract authority for KSC control of launch vehicle


contractor's test and checkout activities at _qC through a supplemental
contract under KSC administration.

Medical

Medical support for the Apollo program will be provided in accordance


with NMI 8900.1. In addition, the following specific requirement will
be met on the Apollo program.

a. Providing for the development and implementation of medical disaster


plans associated with the test of Saturn hardware at MSFC.

Safety activities in the Apollo program will be conducted in accordance


with instruction provided by the Apollo Program Director and directives
issued by the Manned Space Flight and NASA Safety Directors. In addition
the following specific requirement will be met on the Apollo program.

a. Providing written approval on KSC criteria for determining hazardous


operations at the launch site.

_o, I0 o_16 .,°_,


NASA FORk 644 IR_v JUL u) PlqlVlOul I[CITIONI IR[ Oi|OL[T[
t

E-53
OFFt¢I[ OP MAMNEOSPACE FLIGHT
PROGRAM DIRECTIVE
_,_,- D .A J4oo, o_,_
m,o,-_ -- J 5 AUG
DAT! "_gBB

C. John F. Kennedy Space Center

The John F. Kennedy Space Ccnter is assigned the followlng functions for the
Apollo Program.

I. Hardware

a. Providing for detailed specifications, design, manufacture, checkout,


test, reliability and quality, quallfication and acceptance of KSC
developed hardware.

b. Developing and delivering qualified ground support equipment associated


with launch facilities and not provided by HSC or MSFC.

c. Developing and operating ground conmunlcatlons, computation, and instru-


mentation systems and equipment for the conduct of launch operations.

d. Taking measures to protect flight hardware and associated Ground


Support Equipment from contamination, corrosion or damage which may
result from environment, housekeeping, procedure or human erro* and
reporting incidents to MSC and MSFC as appropriate.

e. Providing logistics support planning and implementation at the factory


test or at KSC for KSC developed hardware.

2, Confl_uration Control

a. Establishing and controlling configuration of KSC developed launch


facilities and ground support equipment at each stage of preparation
or test at the f_ctory, test site or at KSC.

b. Maintaining configuration control of MSC and MSFC developed hardware and


software after delivery to KSC in accordance with the configuration
requirements established by MSC and MSFC. Assuring that prior approval
is secured from MSC and MSFC before any changes in configuration are
made in spacecraft, launch vehicle, or associated GSE furnished by MSC
or MSFC.

c. Securing, after the flight readiness test, the prior approval of MSC
or MSFC for the replacement of failed parts.

d. Controlling everything that enters and leaves the spacecraft during


checkout at KSC in accordance wlth the MSC llst of acceptable items
and materials that may be taken into the spacecraft for checkout and
for flight.

e. Controlling tools, equipment and materials that enter and leave the launch
vehicle stages and instrument unit _urlng operations at KSC in accordance
with criteria provided by MSFC.

NASA FORM 644 [_l[V JuL e|} llA[VIO_| EOITIC)N| AJI, O|iOl.|T|

E-54
DATE

OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT

.PROGRAM DIRECTIVE I M- D _ 1400,0.95


f P,Olr¢ f )
[ 5 AUG 19¢,_

Logistics Management

a. Provide total logistics support planning and management for all


KSC equlp_:cn_. Plan for the utilization at KSC of equipment pro-
vided by other design cognizant centers, using the Inter-center
coordinated support planning provided by those centers.

Do
Provide logistics products and services to meet the valid intent
of NHB 7500.1 for KSC designed equipment. Utilize logistics
products and services provided by other centers to support equip-
ment under their design cognizance, unless stipulated otherwise
In Inter-center logistics agreements.

c. Receive, store, issue and dispose of spare parts for all Apollo
Program equipment operated at KSC in accordance wlta inter-center
coordinated plans and directions from the design cognizant centers.

d. Provide reports of Zcglstics requirements, status and spares con-


sumption as required.

e. Establish, implement and control a logistics discrepancy reporting


system.

4. Test and Checkout

a. Conducting the assembly, checkout, and launch of flight hardware


for Apollo missions and assembly, checkout and operation of re-
quired ground support equipment.

b. Providing control of all personnel participating in test and


checkout activities, including representatives from MSC and i_FC,
and assuring that personnel attend pre-test briefings and parti-
cipate In training exercises as necessary to assure personnel
safety and proper conduct of the tests.

c. Provldln_ recuirement_ speciflcattona and criteria, and pro-


cedures for test and :[eckout of KSC de_loped suppor_ equipment
whose perforz_nce must be verified for each launch.

d. Providing test _.nd checkout plans _ acccz_snce _Ith !:SC and r_FC
test and c_ecke_-_ re_uLrements plus _ny aSdit!onal KSC test re-
quirements necessa_" to verify launch facility, [____nned Space Flight
Network and launch crew readiness or to saclsfy range _d safety
requirements.

e. Securing MSC and MSFC uritten approval ou te_t and checkout plans
and changes thereto b_fore the plans are _pproved or !zplemented.

f. Developing and providing to MSC or M_FC test and checkout pro-


cedures adapted to the KSC environment using as a baseline the
development center approved factory test and checkout procedures.

,-,,_ 12o, 16 .....


NASA FORM SJ4 ,='-, _.- ,'J =RE_ C__[=,-_O'.SA_EOC_SC_EFE

E-55
DATE

OFFICE OF _ANNEI') SPACE FLIGHT


MA 1400.095
PROGRAM DLRECTIVE fPtc, lrc ft

g. Making final determination that test and checkout procedures


are adequate, safe and in accordance with MSC and MSFC test
and checkout requirements and test and checkout specifications
and criteria.

h, Obtaining approval on deviations and waivers from MSC and MSFC


concerning test and checkout requirements, test and checkout
specifications and criteria and inspection criteria when unable
to meet requirements.

i, Determining ftmctlonal perfon_ance and flight readiness of flight


hard_are and software in accordance with test and checkout re-
quirements and test and checkout specifications and criteria
provided by MSC and MSFC except for that which is closed out at
the factory and not accessible for inspection or not included
in test and checkout requirements for evaluation of functional
performance at KSC.

J° Determining flight readiness of equipment associated with Inflight


experiments in accordance with MSC or MSFC (as appropriate) speci-
fications and criteria unless specifically excluded by written
agreement with MSC or M_FC.

k. Controlling receipt and storage, and assuring flight readiness of


all Government Furnished Equipment, other than flight crew personal
equipment, which is scheduled for flight and which is not processed
to KSC through a contractor responsible to KSC.

i. Providing routine trouble shooting and maintenance for MSC and


MSFC developed equ{pment in accordance with MSC and MSFC require-
ments, specifications and criteria.

m° Providing an assessment of the flight readiness of the launch


complex, flight hardware and software at the Flight Readiness
Review in accordance with Apollo Program Directives.

. Reliability and Quality Assurance

a. Providing quality control requirements and inspection criteria


for KSC developed hardware for use at the factory, test site and
KSC.

b. Conducting audits to evaluate contractor factory and test site


performance in accordance with KSC quality control requirements
and inspection criteria for KSC developed hardware.

c. Determining corrective actidn and disposition of KSC developed


hardware which fails, malfunctions, or performs outside the per-
formance limits contained in test and checkout specifications and
criteria during checkout at KSC.

.... 13 _46 ......

E-56
]i-_T..----
DATE

OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT

" PROGRAM DIRECTIVE M- D _ 14oo.o95_


(Prolect }
5 AUG 1968

d. Generating approval from the appropriate development center (MSC


or MSFC) to disassemble or open any flight hardware closed out
at a factory or test site.

ee
Securing MSC and MSFC written approval of quality control _lans
insofar as development center responsibilities are concerned
before the plans are approved or implemented.

f, Conducting quality control inspections and audits of contractor


activities at KSC and inviting MSC and MSFC participation as
applicable.

g, Obtaining approval from the appropriate development center (MSC


or MSFC) to disassemble or open any flight hardware closed out at
a factor, or test site.

h. Advising MSC or MSFC of any problem arising during prelaunch


preparation concerning flight worthiness of flight hardware.

i. Conducting failure analysis as required by MSC and MSFC.

J . Participating in MSC and MSFC flight hardware acceptance reviews


and providing recommendations to MSC or MSFC and the Apollo
Program Director, concerning the acceptance of the hardware for
shipment to KSC.

6. Systems Engineering

Providing KSC representation on design and operations inter-Center


panels or working groups as established by Apollo Program Directives.

7. Operations

a. 'Identifying KSC operational support requirements according to


approved procedures and evaluating implementation of support
planning.

b, Providing data to MSC and MSFC in accordance with approved Program


Support Requirements Documents.

c. Conducting launch operations.

d. Developing launch plans and rules.

8. Flisht Crew

Coordinating and directing astronaut activities during the time they


are actively participating in KSC tests of flight hardware except that
the flight crew may take any action necessary for their safety.

Science

None

.... 14oq6 .....


NASA FORM 644 {nov JCJL. _13! PREVIOUS [OlTfON$ ARE OBSOLETE

E-57
DA_£

• OFFICE OF MANF_ED SPAC[ [LF61tT _-_

5 AUG 1968
PROGRA/',_ DIRECTIIE ....

i0. Manasemen t

Th_s section contains %_neral management responsibilities for the


conduct of the Apollo program at KSC as well as some specific _anage-
ment requirements wh.lcn need to be highlighted.

General

a. Assur]_L, that ,',r_rile program requirements fqr manpower or


for i>st]tutio:,_] support from other eleme_i'_s of KSC are
propcr'ly conv,,)-_d to those elements and that A:)ollo program
instJt<_ticna± s q_port requirements are reflected in Center
resource re_uire:nents plans, scbedu]es, and 'budcets.

b. Assuring that A!'::>llo program requirements for institutional


support arc mgt o:J an effective and t]me]y _:;asls.

C, Providing contz_ol of all activities of Apollo contractors


at KSC other t!_:n those directly associated with astronaut
training.

d. Developing a.'_d operating Center facilities rcqilred for


the Apollo Proi3ram.

e. Developing and implementing adequate security procedures.

fo
Establis_ing detailed schedules (Levels 2, 3 and 4) for
KSC hardware, software and associated equipment consistent
with the basic schedules (Level l) approved by the Director,
Apollo Program'and the Director, Mission Operations.

Medical

Medical support for the Apollo program will be provided in


accordance with NMI 89OO.1. In addition, the following specific
requirement will be met on the Apollo program.

ao Providing fo;. the development and implementation of _ned_cal


disaster plans associated with the assemtly, checkout and
prelaunch operations of Apollo fl_ght hardware at KSC.

Safety

Safety activities in the Apollo program will be conducted in


accordance with instructions provided by the Apollo Program
Director and directives issued by the Manned Space Flight and
NASA Safety Directors. In additlom the following specific
requirements will be met on the Apollo program.

..... _5o,_6 ......

E-58
f
DATE
OFFICE OF MAHNEO

PROGRAM DIRECTIVE
SPACE FLIGHT
M- D _l'_rolec,)
5 Auc196a

a. Performing as the NASA single point of responsibility


for safety in the Merritt Island and Cape Kennedy area
and for NASA range safety inputs to the Eastern Test
Range.

b. Developing criteria for determining hazardous operations


at the launch site and securing written approval of MSC
and MSFC.

V. PRECEDENCE

This Directive takes precedence over any inter-Center agreements on


Apollo program responsibilities.

VI. CONCURRENCE

This Program Directive has been revlewed and concurred in by the


Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight and the Associate
Administrator for Organization and Management. Any proposed sub-
stantive changes in the responsibilities defined in this document
will be submitted for review and concurrence in the same manner.

.... 16 o_16 ......

E-59
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTINUITY

The Panel considered the question of continuity of experience in


certain key positions at MSC, KSC, E-Downey, and Beech, and found
that it has been good.

At MSC, three different men have held the Subsystem Manager posi-
tion for the cryogenic gas storage subsystem since November 1963. The
first held the position for nearly 3 years during the later design
phases and through most of the oxygen tank development period. The
second Subsystem Manager was in the position from 1966 through 1968 and
was then succeeded by the present incumbent, who had been his assistant.

In the MSC ASPO, there have been five Program Managers, two during
the design and development of the oxygen tank. Additional continuity
in this position was provided from 1961 through 1966, by the fact that
the first Program Manager became the Deputy Program Manager in 1962 and
served in that position, under two successive Program Managers, through
1965. In 1967, when the Program Manager next changed, the position was
taken by the then Deputy Director of the Center, who had been associ-
ated with the Program from that position. The present Program Manager,
who took over last year, had been an astronaut with detailed famili-
arity with the manned space flight program since 1962.

At KSC, the persons with principal responsibility for the test,


checkout, and launch of all Apollo spacecraft are the Director of Launch
Operations and, reporting to him, the Director of Spacecraft Operations.
Continuity in these positions has been good. The present Director of
Launch Operations was the Deputy Director for the prior 2 years, approxi-
mately. Before that he had been the head of the MSC Resident Apollo
Spacecraft Office at KSC. The present incumbent of the Spacecraft
Operations position has occupied that position for 5 years. Prior to
that time he served as the Assistant Manager for Gemini, MSC Florida
Operations.

At North American Rockwell the position with direct responsibility


for overseeing design and manufacture of the cryogenic gas storage
system (CGSS) by the subcontractor, Beech, is the Manager, Fuel Cells
and Cryogenic Systems (fig. E4-10). The present incumbent of that
position has held it since 1962 and has been NR-Subsystem Manager for
the Apollo CGSS over that entire period. The present Apollo Program
Manager at NR succeeded to that position last year when the former
Program Manager was appointed NASA Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight. Prior to his promotion, the present Program Manager had
been the Assistant CSM Program Manager for about 4 years.

E-60
At Beech-Boulder Division, the samemenhave occupied one or
another of the key positions in the CGSScontract to NRover the life
of the contract. There has been turnover in manufacturing personnel
at the technician and trades levels but the principal managersand
supervisors have not changed. It is noteworthy that when membersof
the Apollo 13 Review Board visited Beech for a demonstration of the
assembly of an Apollo oxygen tank, the technician who performed the
assembly demonstration was the samemanwho had assembledApollo 13
tank no. 2 in 1966.

E-61
This page left blank intentionally.

E-62
PART E6

APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

The various organizational relationships and the management philos-


ophy for Apollo are defined in reference i. This document defines the
relationship and functioning of the various organizational elements
which have been described in Parts E4 and E5 of this Appendix. In
addition, there are several other documents which provide implementing
details concerning the management control systems and their intended
operation.

A general understanding of the management systems which are being


used and their relationship to the program progress is helpful in deter-
mining or appreciating the extent of the review which is applied to all
phases of the program throughout design, manufacturing, test, checkout,
and operation.

It is also considered important to recognize that some of the re-


view and control systems are primarily concerned with the entire scope
of a module program and that others concentrate on individual modules
by serial number.

The systems which have been implemented by MSC are generally simi-
lar for both the CSM and the LM. Due to the nature of this review, the
CSM only is considered and all subsequent reference to a vehicle means
the CSM or more particularly the service module.

There are three management systems which directly impact all CSM's
at various points in time:

(a) Design Reviews

(b) Configuration Management

(c) Readiness Reviews

Throughout the entire management process the Reliability and Qual-


ity Assurance system maintains a continuing surveillance of all problems.

DESIGN REVIEWS

The contractor initiates the design phase of the contract based upon
the general specifications and the performance requirements established
by the ASPO. These requirements and broad specifications are developed
by the MSC technical organization and approved by the ASPO prior to the
contractor initiating activity.

E-63
Preliminary Design Review

The general requirement is for a Preliminary Design Review (PDR)


to be conducted on the CSMwhen the design concept has been determined
by the contractor and prior to the start of detail design. The ASPO
SystemsEngineering Division normally organizes and conducts these reviews
which are chaired by the Apollo Spacecraft ProgramManager. Various
subsystemsmay reach a design concept stage earlier than others and a
series of PDR's may be conducted. The result of the PDRis to establish
the design requirements baseline from v_hich engineering control can be
exercised. Upon the completion of the review, the ASP0managerauthor-
izes Part I of the end-item specification to be inserted in the contract,
alon_ with any necessary design modifications.

Critical Design Review

The Critical Design Revie_v(CDR), also organized and conducted by


ASPOSystemsEngineering Division and chaired by the ASPOManager_is
held when the contractor has released or completed between 90 and 95
percent of the engineering. At this point there is sufficient informa-
tion for the ASPOand the appropriate subsystemmanagersto adequately
review the engineering and to determine if the objectives of the design
concept have been achieved. Again, because the engineering for different
subsystems is not all completed at the sametime, a series of CDR'smay
be conducted. At the completion of the CDRa drawing baseline is
established and the strict Configuration Control System is implemented.

CONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT

A primary document, in addition to reference i which defines the


Configuration ManagementControl System, is the "Apollo Spacecraft
ProgramConfiguration ManagementManual," (ref. 2). This document de-
tails the various change control levels, defines the categories of
change, and establishes the membershipof the various boards and
panels which are involved. Figure E6-1 depicts this total relationship
amongthe five change control levels. This document contains the de-
tailed instructions which are necessary to implement the intent of the
"Apollo Configuration ManagementManual" as modified by the MSCSupple-
ment No. i (ref. 3).
As shownby figure E6-1, there are actually five functioning levels
of change control for the CSM. The Configuration Control Board (CCB),
Level II, is responsible for the CSM_LM, and affected subsystems.

The Chairman of the CCBis the Apollo Spacecraft ProgramManager;


and the ASPOManagers for CSM,LM, the Experiments and GFE, the Assis-
tant ProgramManager for Flight Safety, and the MSCDirectors of the

E-64
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E-65
five technical Directorates are principal members. The CCB is respon-
sible for approval or disapproval of changes in the following major
categories:

(a) Changes which affect an interface among two or more Configu-


ration Control Panels (CCP).

(b) Changes which affect spacecraft mass properties.

(c) Change resulting in contract cost increases in excess of


$300,000.

(d) Changes which affect end-item delivery dates.

It should be noted that change control is established for more than


merely hardware or specification baselines. Also included are software
items, such as mission timeline, math models, consumables, and schedules.

Configuration Control Panels (CCP) are established at Level IIl by


the authority of the CCB Chairman and are designated as the approving
authority for all Class I changes not designated for CCB action. Class
I changes are defined in general as those affecting the specification,
performance, cost, quality, safety, or interchangeability. Configura-
tion Control Panels are established for the CSM, LM, and GFE. The CSM
CCP is chaired by the ASPO Manager for CSM. Panel membership is obtained
primarily from the same organizations as indicated for the CCB; however,
the members are Division Chief level or designees rather than Directors.

The Level IV CCP is at the Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office


(RASPO) at Downey. This panel is chaired by the Resident Manager.
Generally, the panel can approve changes which concern test procedures
but not hardware configuration. An exception to this is made during
final checkout of a specific vehicle or during field test or launch
preparation. These are classed as compatibility or make-operable changes,
are restricted to single modules only, and must be reported to the CSM
CCP within 24 hours.

A fifth level of change control exists because all changes whether


Class I or Class II must go through the North American Rockwell (NR) CCB.
This board is chaired by the NR Program Manager. It approves all Class I
changes for submission to the appropriate NASA authority as previously
defined and has the authority to approve Class II changes for implementa-
tion. The definition of Class I and Class II changes is that contained in
ANA Bulletin 445 (ref. 4) which is considered to be a standard reference.
Some subsequent modification of ANA 445 occurred during the course of the
NR contract. However, the effect of these modifications or clarifications

E-66
was to make the procedures and definitions more restrictive. It is
noted that all Class II changes which are approved by the contractor
are submitted to the RASPO for information. This provides an opportunity
for review. Also, the NR control system is such that each Class II item
is picked up and reported to R&QA. Class II changes include those not
defined as Class i.

Although the CCB may be concerned with a change to a specific


vehicle, in most instances the changes involve all of the remaining vehi-
cles to be manufactured or which have not flown. That is, a major part
of the effort of the CCB is devoted to assuring that the overall config-
uration is appropriate and that the procedures are compatible with all
elements of the system. In general, the CCB is concerned about the
configuration of the basic CSM. Readiness Reviews, which are discussed
in the following section, are concerned with the exact configuration of
a specific CSM.

With regard to subcontracts like that for the oxygen tanks, there
is actually an additional level of configuration control by the Beech
Aircraft Corporation. Their Configuration Control Board reviews all
changes, both Class I and Class ii. Class I changes are sent to NR for
processing through the system and Class II changes may be approved by
Beech for implementation. In actual practice there are only a few Class
II changes and all of these are sent to NR for information and recorded
in the system.

READINESS REVIEWS

The Readiness Reviews are conducted for each specific vehicle.


These reviews are concerned with the manufactured subsystems that have
been assigned to a specific CSM.

Customer Acceptance Readiness Reviews

The basic objective of the Customer Acceptance Readiness Review


(CARR) is to evaluate the readiness of the CSM for delivery to KSC for
launch preparation. The CARR Plan for Apollo command and service mod-
ules was revised in January 1969. This plan is referenced in the Apollo
Spacecraft Program Configuration Management Manual (ref. 2) and has gen-
erally been applicable throughout the Apollo Program. The plan defines
the detailed requirements for preparation of documentation, subsystem
reviews, items for review and general procedures. Definition of the
review teams, their composition, function, and tasks are also contained
in the CARR Pls_

E-67
A complete C_RRfor a specific CSMis conducted in three phases:

(a) Phase I - To be conducted by the ASPOimmediately prior to


the initiation of installed subsystem checkout of the assembled CSMto
identify constraints of subsystem tests. This includes firm identifica-
tion of constraints to system tests.

(b) Phase II - This phase was a formal review until changedby


ASPOletter of January 28, 1969, which authorized the RASPO-Downeyto
approve the start of CSMintegrated test by the contractor.

(c) Phase III - Conductedby the Director, MSC_immediately prior


to shipment to identify constraints to acceptance/shipment. It is a
review of additional data from Phase I.

Systems SummaryAcceptance Documents(SSAD)are compiled and used


by Governmentand contractor subsystem review teams in the PhaseI CARR.
There are 44 of these documentsprepared to cover the subsystems con-
tained in the launch escape system_ command module, service module, and
the spacecraft-LM adapter (SLA). Of these, 14 involve the service mod-
ule (SM) and there are separate documents for the environmental control
system and the electrical power system and wiring, which include the
cryogenic oxygen tanks.

SSADbooks becomethe complete and official historical documents


for each specific CSMsubsystem. Included in the books are specific
signed statements from both the responsible contractor engineer and the
NASASubsystemManagercertifying the readiness of the specific subsystem
for the particular phase which is being reviewed.

The Phase !II CARRis concerned only with documentedchanges since


Phase I. This concept provides a meansof concentrating on only those
items which are different from the last review and avoids the effort which
would be necessary to conduct each review from the beginning of the CSM
history.

At the completion of the PhaseIII CARR,the CSMis ready for ship-


ment to the KSC.

Flight Readiness Reviews

A Flight Readiness Review (FRR) for the CSM,LM, and GSEis con-
ducted at MSC. In general, this review is similar to the review described
in the CARRplan. The samesystems are reviewed by similar review teams
and the SSADbooks are continued. However, nowthere are additional
items added due to the inclusion of the ground support equipment and the

E-68
SLA. Primary continuity is obtained by use of the SSADbooks, their
updating during the formal FRRand subsequent special tests.

An FRRData Review is held at KSCto prepare for the formal FRR


Board meeting at MSC. The FRRBoard is chaired by the Director of the
MSCor his deputy and includes key managementpersonnel from NASAHead-
quarters, MSC_and KSC. The review objectives are to determine any
action required to bring the CSM/LM/GSEto a condition of flight readi-
ness.

The final FRRis conducted by the Office of MannedSpaceFlight at


KSCapproximately 5 weeksbefore the scheduled launch. This FRRis
chaired by the NASAHeadquarters Apollo ProgramDirector and includes
review of all elements of the mission.

Launch Minus 2-Day Review

This review is chaired by the Apollo Mission Director with all the
senior mannedspace flight officials in attendance. This review is held
to review all elements of the mission and to assure closeout of all items
since the final FRR.

LAUNCH
CHECKOUT
PROCEDURES

As shownby figure E6-2_ technical control of the hardware remains


with MSCduring the checkout and test operations at KSC. However_the
KSCis specifically responsible for conducting the tests and for develop-
ing appropriate test procedures to fulfill the test requirements estab-
lished by MSC.
A Test Requirements Documentis prepared and approved by MSC(ref. 5).
This document specifically defines the following:
i. Test Constraints - the test sequencing which must be completed
prior to accomplishment of particular test requirements and any specific
test constraints.

2. Primary Mission Test Requirements Matrix - matrices are listed


by system, identifying mandatory test requirements that must be satis-
fied during the course of spacecraft checkout at KSC. Indication is
given of the GSEand facility locations and the desired test guidelines
are referenced.

E-69
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E- 70
3. Retest Requirements - the general requirements for spacecraft
or GSE reverification in the event of test invalidation because of
equipment removal, disconnecting_ repair, etc.

4. Contingency Test Guidelines - requirements.

5. Safety Requirements.

6. Test Guidelines - these specific sheets reflect the desired


test contents, objectives, and test prerequisites.

7. Alternate Mission Test Requirements - matrices are identified


for the mandatory test requirements that must be satisfied if a CSM is
designated to perform an alternate mission.

Upon receipt of the Test and Checkout Requirements Document from


MSC, KSC prepares a Test and Checkout Plan. This plan contains the out-
line for accomplishing the test requirements defined by MSC at the launch
site and additional tests which the KSC considers necessary to verify
launch facility, manned space flight network, and launch crew readiness
or to satisfy range safety requirements. The Test and Checkout Plan
(TCOP) is the master test document and is approved by both KSC and MSC.
Changes to this plan and also changes to the facility are reviewed and
approved by the KSC and MSC.

Based on the TCOP, detailed Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP) are
prepared and approved by KSC. These are the implementing documents which
assure that correct detailed information is available prior to the con-
duct of any test. Changes to these procedures are processed on control-
led change request forms which are signed by the appropriate authority.
The details for preparation, release, and execution of the TCP are con-
tained in Apollo Preflight Operations Procedures No. 0-202 and 0-221.

Test deviations which may be necessary just prior to the start or


during the test are authorized. However, the deviation must be fully
documented. Review in this case takes place after the completion of the
test, but it is still reviewed and the appropriate levels of authority
are provided with the opportunity to modify, change, or to have the tests
rerun.

Approximately 2 weeks prior to the scheduled launch date, two sepa-


rate countdown demonstration tests (CDDT) are conducted. The first of
these, called the "wet" CDDT, involves the booster and tanking of all
cryogenic systems in all modules. This countdown runs to a simulated
lift-off and is then concluded.

E-71
A second, or "dry," CDDTis conducted shortly after the "wet" CDDT.
This CDDTis primarily concerned with the crew functions. The cryogenic
tanks are partially detanked during this CDDT.

The results of the CDDT,"wet" and "dry," are reviewed by the Mis-
sion Director and the decision is madeto initiate the final countdown.
A final review is conducted with all of the senior Manned Space Flight
officials at the Launch Minus 2-day Review. At this point the mission
is firmly committed.

E-72
PART E7

OXYGEN TANK MANAGEMENT REVIEW

GENERAL TANK HISTORY

This part will review the management process described previously


as applied to the design, production, test, and checkout of the cryo-
genic gas storage system oxygen tank.

North American Rockwell (NR) established tentative requirements


for a cryogenic gas storage system and issued a request for proposal
to interested companies in the spring of 1962. In the summer of 1962,
Beech Aircraft Corporation was awarded a letter contract to design,
develop, and qualify the Block I Apollo cryogenic gas storage system.
This contract was awarded after evaluation of the proposals from Beech
and a number of other companies with cryogenic experience. The origi-
nal contract for Block I was scheduled to be completed by January 1964,
and was covered by NAA Specification MC 901-0005 (ref. 6).

A considerable amount of the early effort was expended in develop-


ment of a spherical heater pressurization system which was both heavy
and electrically complicated. In late 1963, a program was established
to design an alternate cryogenic fan motor and heater system which was
developed and approved for production early in 1964.

The primary vendors for Beech on production hardware were Parker


Aircraft for valve modules; Cameron Iron Works for oxygen tank Inconel
forgings; Globe Industries, Inc., for the tank motor fans; Simmonds
Precision Products, Inc., for instrumentation; Airite Division of
Sargent Industries for pressure vessel tank welding; and Metals and
Controls Corporation for the tank heater thermal switches.

In 1964, the state-of-the-art for insulation of supercritical


oxygen tanks was thoroughly investigated and an improved concept using
dexiglass paper and aluminum foil was tested and found satisfactory.
Also, the boilerplate BP-14 tanks were completed and shipped to NR in
1964.

Block II competition was held in early 1965, and Beech was awarded
this contract in October 1965. Beech made delivery of the first Block I
tank in December 1963, and the last one in 1966. There was therefore
some overlap of these contracts.

Preliminary Design Reviews were held in May and July of 1965 by NR


and Beech. A Program Review was held in December 1965 for the MSC

E-73
Apollo Spacecraft Program _Tanager. Because of the tight delivery
schedule, it was decided at the Program Review to assign an NR team to
Beech to assist in assuring meeting tank delivery schedules. The con-
figuration control baseline was established by the Critical Design
Review held in March 1966 attended by NASA, NR, and Beech representa-
tives. The first Block II oxygen tanks were delivered in July 1966.
A First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) was conducted November
16-18, 1966, with NR, Beech and NASA participating. The FACI confirmed
the configuration baseline.

The original specification (ref. 6) from NR to Beech for procure-


ment of the oxygen tank and heater assembly was dated November 1962.
No reference is made in this specification to other than design for
28 V dc. Beech issued a specification in 1963 to Metals and Controls
Corporation for procurement of the thermal switches for the tank heater
assemblies. These thermal switches were to limit the t_k temperatures
and prevent overheating and were built to interrupt the 28 V dc space-
craft current. The heater GSE was subsequently designed and built by
NR with a 65 V dc power supply for use at KSC in initial pressurization
of the oxygen tanks. The 65 V dc current was used in order to pres-
surize the oxygen tank more rapidly than could be done with the 28 V dc
spacecraft power supply. NR issued a revised Block II specification
(MC-901-0685) to Beech in February 1965 which specified that the oxy-
gen tank heater assembly shall use a 65 V dc GSE power supply for
tank pressurization.

Beech issued a specification (14L56) in July 1965 to Metals and


Controls Incorporated for the thermal switches for the Block II tanks.
This revised Beech specification did not call for a change in the ther-
mal switch rating in order to be compatible with the 65 V dc GSE power
supply. (The thermal switch, which remains closed in the cold liquid
oxygen, will carry the 65 V dc current but will not open without dam-
age with 65 V dc applied.)

NR or Beech never subsequently caught this discrepancy in the GSE


and thermal switch incompatibility. The incompatibility had not caused
problems previous to Apollo 13 since the thermal switch had never been
called upon to open with 65 V dc applied. The extended heater o_eration
using 65 V dc GSE power during the March 27 and 25 detanking at KSC
raised the tank temperature to 80 ° F and called for the thermal switches
to open for the first time under these conditions (for which they were
not designed or tested). The switch malfunctioned and during the sub-
sequent operation did not provide the tank overheating protection which
the KSC test personnel assumed existed.

During the development cycle the following technical problems were


encountered.

E-74
Tank Vacuum and Heat Leak Problems

Poor vacuum, difficulty in acquiring good vacuum on initial pump-


down, and degradation of vacuum from outgassing under vibration were
encountered early in the program. These resulted in a high heat leak
and caused excessive rates of flow and pressure rise. Early failures
to attain satisfactory initial vacuum, including two on qualification
tests, were corrected by revisions to test procedures to extend the
heat leak stabilization period and upgrade methods of vacuum acquisi-
tion.

Vacuum pumping equipment was also modified and improved. A speci-


fication change was approved by NR to permit an adequate but more real-
istic value of heat leak.

Design changes were made in order to correct continued difficulty


in securing and retaining good vacuum, and vac-ion pumps were incor-
porated as an integral part of the tank assembly. Use of the vac-ion
pump prevented further gross degradation of vacuum from outgassing.
Part of the heat leak was attributed to variation in density of the
load bearing insulation in the tank annulus. The insulation was re-
designed to reduce the allowable weight and control the overall
density of the insulation.

Heat leak did, however, remain slightly over specification on some


tanks, and these minor deviations were waived.

Fan Motors

The fan motors for the cryogenic oxygen experienced a number of


failures during their production history. A review of these motors was
conducted by Globe Industries, Inc., and Beech Aircraft Corporation.
The report was issued in January 1967.

The complete manufacturing, handling, and usage of the fan motors


at Globe, Beech, and NR was reviewed and the failures that had occurred
were grouped in the following nine failure classes:

i. Contamination failures

2. Bridge ring failures

3. Bearing failures

4. Phase-to-phase shorts

5. Grounds

E-75
6. Leadwire damage

7. Speed
8. Coastdown

9- Miscellaneous

Other failures, including tolerance build-ups, were reported which


could not be classified in the other groups. These are listed under
the miscellaneous classification. The corrective actions taken as a
result of this review significantly reduced the number of failures.
One apparent flight failure in an oxygen tank fan motor occured on
Apollo 6. The failure was analyzed as a single-phase short to ground
in the heater fan motor circuit. Subsequently, the circuit was re-
vised to include individual fuse protection for each motor and single-
phase circuit breakers in each phase.

Vac-ion Pumpand Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Problems

During qualification test there was arcing to the vac-ion pump


harness at a mounting screw. Increased clearance was provided. A
continuity check was added to verify wiring. Dielectric leakage between
the pumpand the tank shell also occurred at the vendor plant. A de-
sign changewas incorporated adding insulation spacers to provide
increased clearances, with satisfactory results.
The use of the vac-ion pumpled to EMI with other systems on the
spacecraft. Corona discharge and arcing of the high voltage lead and
connector occurred. This was identified during altitude chambertest
of spacecraft i01 at KSC. The fix initiated was to modify the shield-
ing of the high-voltage lead and improve the potting in the connector.

The vac-ion pumpis normally not used during flight. It has only
been used during vehicle assembly and checkout to assure that the
proper vacuumis maintained on the oxygen tank annulus. The circuit
breakers for these pumpsare openedprior to flight.

Heater Failures

Electrical shorting in the heater circuit occurred twice. A heater


element caused a short during acceptance test of a Block I tank at the
vendor's plant. A circuit breaker tripped 20 minutes after power was
applied. The short was caused by damageto the insulation of the heater
lead wires. It was apparently scraped during installation of the wires
into the tank or during handling prior to installation. Improved in-
spection and installation procedures and a pin-to-pin insulation

E-76
resistance test were initiated. During qualification testing the heater
lead wire was burned and a circuit breaker was tripped by overload. The
cause was faulty solder Joints madeduring installation. Improved fab-
rication techniques were put in effect, and applied to all Block II
tanks.

During this period of design, development, test, and manufacture,


there had been coordination meetings of Beech personnel with the NRand
NASArepresentatives. By the end of 1966, the tanks had completed the
major cycle of development and qualification and about 30 tanks had been
delivered. In 1967, 17 additional tanks were delivered, three were de-
livered in 1968, and six were delivered in 1969. These deliveries es-
sentially completed the contract except for eight tanks remaining at
Beech. In addition, ll tanks were used during the early development
period for qualification and tests, making 75 tanks in all. Of these
75 tanks, 28 were in Block I and 47 in Block II.

CHRONOLOGY
OFAPOLLO
13 OXYGEN
TANK

The specific tank assembly of interest in this review is oxygen


tank no. 2 of CSM109. This tank is identified as ME282-0046-008
serial number 10224XTA0008. The other tank on the oxygen shelf of
CSM109 was serial number 10024XTA0009.

The end-item acceptance data package (ref. 7) contains the config-


uration and historical data relative to this particular tank. Using
these data and pertinent spacecraft review data, it is possible to trace
this tank through its manufacture, reviews, discrepancies, and tests to
launch as a part of an approved flight system.

The CameronIron Works madea rough forging of top and bottom tank
hemispheres in accordance with Beechspecifications and provided the
required microstructure analysis of Lhe grain size of the Inconel 718
hemisphere and evidence of satisfactory ultrasonic and radiographic
inspection. The forgings were shipped to the Airite Division of
Electrada Corporation, E1 Segundo, California, for machining and
welding. After machining, pressure vessel wall thickness measurements
were madeon the upper and lower hemispheres at about 300 points to
establish that girth and membranemeasurementswere within specified
tolerances. The two hemispheres were then welded together, X-rayed for
weld inspection, and shipped to Beech Aircraft Corporation on June 15,
1966. BeechAircraft installed the probe, quantity and temperature
sensor, furnished by SimmondsPrecision Products, Inc., and cryogenic
fan motors furnished by Globe Industries, Inc. Beechalso installed
the tank insulation and outer Inconel shell.

E-77
During the manufacture and testing of the tank 0008 at Beech, a
number of discrepancies recorded as Material Review Records were reported
and corrected. These discrepancies included:

i. The upper fan motor was noisy and drew excessive current. Cor-
rective action was to remove both fan motors and replace them with new
motors serial numbers 7C30 and 7Chl.

2. The vat-ion pump assembly insulator was found to have two small
cracks along the weld bead. Corrective action was to grind off the pump
assembly and insulation weld, to remove and replace the insulator and
reweld the assembly.

3. During the minimum flow tests, the oxygen flow rate was found
to be 0.81 lb/hr as compared to 0.715 lb/hr specified as maximum in the
NR specification. A waiver was requested for this and three other tanks
that exhibited similar flow rates. Waiver CSM 00hh was approved by
Apollo Project Engineering at NR and by the Acting Manager, Resident
Apollo Program Office (RASPO) in accordance with standard procedures.
The tank was subjected to the specified end-item acceptance check,
including vac-ion functional test, heater pressurization test, electrical
insulation resistance tests, dielectric strength tests, proof and purge
tests, and minimum oxygen flow tests. These tests were all satisfactorily
completed, with the exception of the slightly excessive oxygen flow rate
previously discussed, and are documented in the End-Item Acceptance
Data Package Book (ref. 7).

Handling Incident

The tank was shipped to NR, inspected, and then installed on an


oxygen shelf in June 1968. This shelf was subsequently installed in
CSM 106. The vac-ion pump modification, previously discussed, could
not be performed with the tank-shelf assembly installed in a service
module. For this reason, the oxygen shelf was removed from CSM 106.
During the removal sequence the shelf handling fixture broke and the
shelf was dropped approximately 2 inches. After the modification
and appropriate inspections, the shelf assembly was reassigned to CSM
lO9.

DR's were written to require inspection and test of the shelf


assembly for recertification. These inspections and tests revealed
no major discrepancies. It was reported by NR that an engineering
analysis was performed to determine the forces which might have been
imposed on the tanks due to the "shelf drop." This analysis indicated
that the loads were within the design limits of the tanks and that no
internal damage should have been sustained. This informal report is
not now available from existing files.

E-78
To verify that the internal componentsof the tanks were functional,
a series of tests were conducted. The tanks were given a repeat of the
acceptance and verification tests which are normally conducted by NR
prior to installation of an oxygen shelf in a service module. All of
these tests were passed successfully, with no significant changes from
the previous test results. NRdoes not fill the tanks with liquid oxygen
during their test, assembly, and checkout activities at the plant.
At the completion of the required vac-ion pumpmodifications and
with the successful test results obtained, the shelf assembly condition
was reviewed by NR engineering, R&QA,and the RASPO and installed in
CSM109. All appropriate signatures were obtained on the DR's, copies
of these were provided to the SubsystemManagerat MSC,and copies were
also included in the SubsystemSummaryAcceptance Document(SSAD)book
for spacecraft 109.
At the Phase I CARRfor CSM109, November18-19, 1968, the incident
was again discussed by the CARRsubsystem team with NR engineering and
NASA/RASPO.Documentsand NRtest results were reviewed and the shelf
was accepted. It had passed all required tests, the analysis indicated
that estimated loads had not exceededdesign limits, and the entire
record had been properly reviewed. The incident had been explained in
accordance with all of the managementcontrol systems in effect.

The Phase III CARRon May 26-28, 1969, verified that the shelf was
installed in CSM109 and that test data verified satisfactory oxygen
shelf performance in accordance with the test DRwritten by NR and
NASA/RASPO.
The information concerning the handling incident was included in
the SSADbooks for spacecraft 109. It was not reviewed by the Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) Board. Equipmentwhich has successfully passed
all tests and has been certified as flightworthy does not require
additional reviews unless additional problems are discovered. As no
problems were encountered, the CSM109 FRRon January 15-16, 1970,
considered the oxygen shelf checkout as having been satisfactorily per-
formed and recommendedthe system as flight ready.

Becausethe handling incident had occurred early in the review


cycle for spacecraft 109 and had been closed out, it was not recon-
sidered in any detail during the decision process regarding the
detanking incident. NRpersonnel at Downeywere aware of the handling
incident. However, Beech, KSC, and senior MSCManagementwere unaware
of the incident.

E-79
The R&QA reporting and data retrieval system is designed to enable
records to be readily obtained. However, this is not an automatic
action. It is necessary for the concerned people to initiate the
action; t_at is, request the record search. By virtue of the general
concept that is applied to Apollo, this search of the records is
seldom done. Flight equipment is either flightworthy or not. There
is no gray area allowed between good and bad equipment.

Det anking Incident

After shipment to KSC, build-up checkout activities proceeded


normally until the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) sequence where-
in the tanks were pressurized, checked, serviced with liquid oxygen,
and then detanked. Detanking difficulty developed during sequence 29-
009 of Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP), TCP-K-0007V2, at 10:55 p.m.
on March 23, 1970, when oxygen tank no. 2 did not decrease to about
50 percent quantity as expected.

The problem was first attributed to a faulty filter in the asso-


ciated ground support equipment (GSE) and an Interim Deficiency Report
(IDR 023) was initiated for evaluation of the filter.

Troubleshooting of test sequence 29 was continued by the NR


Systems Engineers, the NASA (KSC) Systems Engineers, and the NR Sys-
tems Specialist with the actions monitored by a KSC reliability
specialist and a KSC safety specialist in accordance with specified
KSC procedures.

A decision was made on March 23, 1970, at 11:37 p.m. that TCP-K-
0007V2 test procedures could be continued. This decision was made by
the NR Systems Engineer, NASA (KSC) Systems Engineer, and the NR Systems
Specialist.

TCP-K-0007V2 was continued through sequence 29-014 by 2:55 a.m. on


March 24, and the IDR 023 was upgraded to a GSE/Discrepancy Report (DR)
for filter evaluation on March 24, 1970.

The TCP-K-0007V2 test sequence 29 was reinitiated on March 27, 1970,


at which time it was known that the suspect GSE filter was not malfunc-
tioning. An Interim Discrepancy Report (IDR 040) was written to inves-
tigate detanking and change detanking procedures to assist in detanking.
After substantial time was spent in the detanking attempt, the IDR 040
was changed to a spacecraft DR 0512.

E-80
A conference including MSC subsystems engineers and KSC Apollo CSM
Manager was held and a Beech engineer was contacted by telephone to
discuss the problem. It was decided that the difficulty was caused by
allowable looseness in a fill line fitting and it was decided to try
detanking using fans and heater on oxygen tank no. 2. This was started
on March 27, 1970, during the second shift.

DR O512 was signed by the NR Systems Engineer, the NASA Systems


Engineer, and the NR Systems Specialist (all of whom are assigned to
KSC), and varied the procedures of the basic TCP. This variation did
not result in satisfactory detanking.

DR 0512 was further amplified on March 28, 1970, at about 4 a.m.,


to provide for a pressure pulsing technique whereby the tank vent was
closed and the tank was pressurized to 300 to 340 psig, allowed to sta-
bilize for 5 minutes, and then vented through the fill line. This pro-
cedure was concurred in at the time by NR Systems Engineer, NASA Systems
Engineer, NR Systems Specialist, and NR Systems Manager, all of whom
are assigned to KSC. This procedure was followed for five pressure cy-
cles and the tank was emptied.

The decision to be made by KSC in consultation with NR and MSC was


whether to leave the oxygen shelf in the spacecraft or to exchange it
for a different one. This was a critical decision because changing a
major unit such as the oxygen shelf at the KSC is not a normal practice.
It can be accomplished, but it must be done manually at some risk of
damage to adjacent components. At the NR factory, there is a specifi-
cally designed item of GSE with which to remove the shelf.

Many telephone calls were made concerning the detank problem, and
several of them were conference hookups so that most of the participants
could hear the entire conversation. The KSC Director of Launch Opera-
tions and the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager led the ensuing
investigation which included key technical experts at Beech, similar
experts at NR_ and the subsystems managers at MSC.

During the weekend beginning March 27, MSC developed a comprehen-


sive checklist of questions which had to be answered prior to making a
decision concerning the oxygen tank:

i. Details and procedures for normal detanking at Beech and KSC.

2. Details of abnormal detanking at KSC on March 27 and 28.

3. Hazards resulting from a possible loose fill tube in the oxygen


tank.

E-81
4. Canthe tank be X-rayed at KSC?

5. Could loose tolerances on the fill tube cause the detanking


problem?
6. Should a blowdown and fill test be madeon the tank?

7. Disassemble both oxygen tanks from Service Module 2TV-I and


examine components.

All of the checklist questions were answeredby test, analysis,


and inspection. The report of the Beech investigation, contained in
reference 8, included the following conclusions:

i. "Based on manufacturing records, the Teflon tube fill line


assembly was installed.

2. Total gap areas in the assembly after cooldown could vary from
0.004 in 2 to 0.09 in 2 from tank to tank.

3. Based on allowable tolerances, gap areas on tanks could approach


the area of 3/8 inch fill line, thus accounting for the inability to de-
tank per methods used at KSC.
4. Normal stresses on the Teflon plug are not sufficient to cause
cracking or breakout of the plug.

5. The assembly, fabricated to print dimensions, cannot comeapart


in the installation.

6. Tank X-rays are not clear enoughto showthe fill assembly.

7. The delta pressure across the coil assembly and disconnect


is very small.
8. Energy level developed by shorting capacitance plates on probe
is too low to cause a problem."
In addition to these conclusions, Beech also provided NRa copy of
their detanking test procedures and the calculations used to reach their
conclusions.

Basedupon the Beech information, the condition of the 2TV-I oxygen


tank fill line determined by direct inspection and the understanding
that the detank procedures at the KSC and at Beech were different, it
was concluded that the tank was flightworthy. The primary participants

E-82
in reaching this conclusion were the NRCSMProgram Manager, the KSC
Director of Launch Operations, and the MSCASPOManager. The fact that
these people did not have complete or correct information to use during
the decision process was not determined until after the accident.

The information which subsequent 9eview determined to be incomplete


or incorrect included the following:

i. Neither the KSCLaunch Operations Director nor the MSCASPO


Managerknew about the tank handling incident which had occurred at
NR-Downey.

2. The last portion of the detanking procedure at Beech is similar


to that used by KSC. No one appeared to be aware of this similarity be-
tween the procedures. At one time during the early portions of the pro-
gram they were, in fact, different.
3. All of the key personnel thought that the oxygen tank on Service
Module 2TV-I had experienced detanking problems similar to those experi-
enced at KSC. As this tank was available, it was disassembled and in-
spected. The examination of the internal tank parts showeda loose-
fitting metal fill tube and it was concluded that this loose fit was
the cause of the detanking problem. Subsequent review has revealed
that the 2TV-I tank probably detanked in a normal manner.
4. The senior managerswere not aware that the tank heaters had
been left on for a period of 8 hours. It appears this information was
provided to NR-Downeyby telephone during a long conversation. However,
it was not considered during the decision process. No one at MSC,KSC,
or NRknew that the tank heater thermostatic switches would not protect
the tank from overheating.
The managementsystem alerted the right people and involved them
in providing technical information to the responsible program managers.
Communicationswere open, unrestricted, and appear to have been nearly
continuous. All of the modified KSCdetank procedures were correctly
documentedand other reports were correctly filled out. The problem
was that inaccurate and misleading information was provided to the
managers.
Any consideration of whether managementdecisions would have been
different if the correct data had been provided is highly speculative.
However, it is likely that requests for additional tests or data may
have been considered during the discussion if the correct information
had been available.

E-83
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E-84
PART E8

OXYGEN TANK MATERIAL SELECTION

The original design of the cryogenic oxygen storage system was


based on state-of-the-art existing in 1962 and subsequent developments
during the course of the contract test and evaluation phase. The tank
contractor, Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, started the design using
materials considered compatible based on existing cryogenic knowledge.
A limited program was followed in qualifying components, such as the
Globe fan motors in the company's test facilities.

The first formal application of Nonmetallic Materials Selection


Guidelines was imposed on NAA by CCA 1361 dated April 17, 1967. This
Change Authorization required that the contractor implement ASPO-RQTD-
D67-5A dated April 17, 1967, and recommend a detailed plan for analysis,
application testing, selection, and approval of nonmetallic materials to
assure that all potentially combustible applications are identified and
controlled. In addition, the contractor was required to recommend any
design and/or material changes necessary to meet these criteria. This
change was effective on Spacecraft 2TV-I, I01, and subsequent.

The cryogenic oxygen gas storage system was categorized as Category


D--Material Applications in High Pressure Oxygen System--for material
selection and control purposes.

Requirements for Category D are as follows: This category shall


include those materials used in greater than 20 psia oxygen systems.
Materials shall have prior use history in oxygen service, with no fire
or explosion experience.

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

Materials for such applications as filters, seals, valve seats, and


pressure bladders shall be covered by these criteria.

Material Property Requirements

Propagation rate.- No test required.

Thermogravimetric analysis and spark ignition test_ reference 9.-


This test is designed to determine the weight loss and outgassed vapor
spark ignition characteristic of materials under test. A material evolv-
ing significant vapors verified by weight loss and having a visible flash
at a temperature less than 400 ° F is unacceptable. A material that shows

E-85
evidence of charring or sustaining combustion at a temperature less than
450 ° F is unacceptable. A material that shows evidence of charring or
sustaining combustion at a temperature less than 450 ° F is unacceptable
for use in crew bay areas.

Odor, carbon monoxide, and organics_ reference 9.- Materials shall


be tested for carbon monoxide and total organics. If the material yields
over 25 micrograms of carbon monoxide per gram of material or over i00
micrograms of total organics per gram, it will be rejected. If it passes
this test, it will be evaluated for objectionable odor by a test panel
of 5 to i0 members. If the odor is objectionable, the material will be
unacceptable.

Friction and impact ignition_ reference 9.- This test is to deter-


mine the sensitivity and compatiability of nonmetallic materials with
pure oxygen for use in the high-pressure oxygen system. Only materials
that have passed other required tests will be subject to this test. The
material will be subjected to three successive tests at 1.5 kilogram
meters impact testing at successively higher gaseous oxygen pressures
until a reaction is observed by discoloration, evidence of combustion,
or.detonation. To be acceptable, the material must not show a reaction
at the maximum use pressure plus 2000 psi.

Friction and impact ignition.- Materials shall not ignite when


tested to the requirements of Appendix D of reference i0.

The presently applicable contractual specification (ref. 9) was


published and placed on contract by CCA 2147 to record the criteria and
requirements actually in force for the Apollo contract. Modifications
to the basic document are made as the knowledge increases, and it was
last revised in November 1969.

The contractor is primarily responsible for the selection of mate-


rials in contractor furnished equipment (CFE) as prescribed by contract.
NASA publishes materials selection requirements and reviews materials
selected by the contractor. A Material Selection Review Board is estab-
lished at the contractor's facility to review material selection and to
approve or reject all deviation requests. The contractor board submits
all decisions to the Material Review Selection Board at MSC for review
and approval. The prime board, MSC, indicates concurrence or noncon-
currence to the contractor board within 5 days of receipt of the lower
board's decisions.

Present requirements for material selection are essentially the


same as those previously cited and are listed in detail in reference i0.

E-86
Materials Listing

A listing of materials was prepared by Beech and furnished to NR.


The listing was checked at NR for completeness and compatibility and
entered into the Characteristics of Materials (COMAT) list and forwarded
to MSC in October 1969. This COMAT package was transmitted to the
MSC/GE Materials Engineering Support Unit where it was reviewed and
signed off as complete and accurate by the Materials Engineering Unit
Manager. All materials are shown to be compatible for the use contem-
plated except Drilube 822 which is an assembly lubricant used in very
small quantities. The MSC COMAT shows this material classed as requir-
ing the submission of a Material Usage Agreement (MUA) for approval.

The Drilube was judged acceptable for the use contemplated in


accordance with the blanket waiver given for outgassing of materials
tested at MSC on the 2TV-I and CSM I01 vehicles.

E-87
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E-88
PART E9

SAFETY AND RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (R&QA)

INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION

General

The Apollo Program has a firmly established safety requirement in


the basic program objective. The original objective of the program was
to land men on the Moon and return them safely to the Earth. The pro-
gram management, design, review, and monitoring procedures described in
previous sections of this Appendix are designed to assure that all
program problems, including safety, are presented to the appropriate
management decision makers at selected program maturity points.

The safety system and organization is designed to provide an inde-


pendent specialized monitoring and evaluation function for the program
line management. The following figures and descriptions of responsi-
bilities outline the safety organization of NASA as it applies to the
Apollo Program, and the contractor-subcontractor organization as it
applies to the Apollo Program generally, and the cryogenic gas storage
system specifically.

NASA Headquarters

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is established to provide a


direct, nonorganizational overview on safety for all programs for the
Administrator (fig. E9-1). The charter for this panel specifies access
to any program information necessary for their safety audit function
and full support of their requirements by the NASA Safety Officer and
other elements of the organization.

The NASA Director of Safety is responsible for exercising functional


management authority and responsibility over all NASA safety activities.
This includes development of policy, procedures to implement policies,
and review and evaluation of conformance to established policy. He is
also charged with supporting Program Directors and Instutional Directors
in discharging their safety responsibilities. His review and concurrence
are required for the safety portion of each Project Plan and Project
Approval Document.

The NASA Director of Safety reports to the Associate Administrator


for Organization and Management.

E-89
E-90
The office of the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
(MSF) (fig. E4-3) has several offices with either a primary or secondary
responsibility for safety.

The Director, Manned Space Flight Safety Office, has a dual organi-
zational responsibility to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight (AA/MSF) for program guidance and policy direction. He also
serves in the office of the NASA Safety Director as Assistant Safety
Director for Manned Space Flight Programs, assisting in the development
of overall NASA-wide safety policy, guidance, and professional safety
standards. In this NASA Assistant Safety Director assignment, he is
under the cognizance of the Office of Organization and Management. In
accomplishing his responsibility as Manned Space Flight Safety Director,
he advises the MSF Program Directors and the AA/MSF on all matters in-
volving manned flight safety and develops and documents appropriate
safety policy for these programs. He audits the program offices and
MSF Field Centers to insure compliance with established policy and de-
velops accident investigation and reporting plans for use in the event
of flight anomalies. He also develops the Manned Space Flight Awareness
Program.

Bellcom, Inc., is under contract to AA/MSF to perform studies,


technical fact finding and evaluation, analytical investigations, and
related professional activities in support of Manned Space Flight Pro-
grams. In support of the Apollo Program, this contract capability is
available under the direction of the Director, Apollo Program, for safety
studies or analyses as required in support of his responsibilities to
systematically identify hazards and risks and take all practical meas-
ures to reduce risks to acceptable levels.

Manned Space Flight Mission Directors are assigned as Deputy Program


Directors for specific missions and are responsible for insuring thorough
inter-Center/OMSF coordination for that mission. The Mission Director
insures that consideration is given to all problems and proposed changes
affecting safety and to advise the Program Director of any disagreement
with proposed actions from the standpoint of assuring quality hardware
and flight safety.

The Director, Mission Operations, is responsible for directing and


evaluating the development of the total operational capability necessary
for the conduct and support of Manned Space Flight missions. These
responsibilities are performed in support of the Manned Space Flight
Program Directors under the cognizance of the Associate Administrator
for Manned Space Flight. In accomplishing this operational responsibil-
ity, the Mission Operations Director works with the MSF Director of
Flight Safety to insure development of operation safety plans.

E-gl
The Director of Reliability and Quality Assurance is responsible to
the Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs to formulate and develop
reliability and quality assurance policies and to prescribe guidance and
procedures to implement approved policies. He is also responsible for
assessing the effectiveness of these programs throughout the Agency and
for keeping the management informed of the status of the program. He
participates in investigations of major accidents and mission failures
whenever reliability and quality assurance could have been a contribut-
ing factor. He also initiates and conducts special studies of problems
affecting the reliability and quality of NASA hardware.

The Director, Manned Spacecraft Center, under the supervision of


the AA/MSF_ manages the development activities of the Apollo Program_
with emphasis on providing spacecraft, trained crews, and space flight
techniques. In carrying out these functions, he procures spacecraft
systems and monitors and directs contractor activities. He also selects
and trains flightcrews_ establishes mission and test requirements, and
plans and executes missions under the direction of the Mission Operations
Director.

The Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), under the super-
vision of the AA/MSF_ develops, operates, and manages the Merritt Island
Launch Area (MILA) and assigned programs at the Eastern Test Range (ETR)
and insures that KSC operations meet the requirements of NASA Safety
Standards.

Manned Spacecraft Center

The Safety Office is the focal point for the development_ implemen-
tation, and maintenance of a safety program at MSC. The office implements
requirements established by NASA Headquarters, maintains a current MSC
Safety Plan and Manual, and participates as an advisor to the Director,
MSC, in major spacecraft reviews. The office assesses the effectiveness
of contractors in their safety functions and assists MSC directorates,
program offices, and contractors in safety matters.

The Safety Office is functionally divided into a number of sub-


divisions to accomplish their assigned duties, as shown in figure E9-2.

The Manned Flight Awareness Office is responsible for developing a


motivational program to instill in each individual associated with
manned space flight a personal awareness of their responsibility for the
lives of the astronauts and mission success of space flight missions.
This responsibility is largely accomplished by development and publica-
tion of motivational literature and by scheduling and coordinating astro-
naut and management official visits to contractor and subcontractor
plants in support of the Manned Flight Awareness Program.

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E-93
The Program ManagementSafety Office develops and applies a system
safety program for flight hardware contracts. System safety guidelines
are identified to MSCprogram offices and directorates and through them
to contractors. The ProgramManagementSafety Office represents the
Manager, Safety Office, on program major milestone reviews and evaluates
contractor and MSCsystem safety requirements for particular programs.
This office also provides for identification and tracking of hazards
throughout the life of a system. In accomplishing this responsibility_
the office assesses mission rules, flight plans, and crew procedures to
identify potential hazards and assure that they are eliminated or con-
trolled. They also evaluate design and procedure changes for safety
implications and monitor space flight missions in real time to appraise
the Manager_Safety Office, of safety-related amonalies. They maintain
close interface with MSCprogram elements to provide inputs for trade-
offs involving safety and performance.

The Test Operations Safety Office is the subdivision of the Safety


Office that establishes a safety program to insure the safe conduct of
hazardous tests involving humansubjects, tests of GFEastronaut equip-
ment, and special tests of spacecraft. The office evaluates test facili-
ties and operations to determine hazardous activities and provides test
officers for activities considered to be of an extremely hazardous
nature. They compile and evaluate reports and findings of Operational
Readiness Inspections (ORl's) and distribute these reports as required.

The System Safety Office develops, implements, and maintains a


system safety program for mannedspacecraft efforts involving prelimi-
nary analysis_ definition, and design phases. The office also provides
system safety support for other elements of the Safety Office. Speci-
fically, this office assists in the preparation of system safety plans
from the initial purchase order or request for proposal through the
procurement stage and then audits the system safety activities of the
contractor or MSCorganizational element throughout the program.

The Industrial Safety Office directs and coordinates comprehensive


industrial, public, and traffic safety programs, including a fire preven-
tion and protection program and an ordnance safety program covering MSC
operations and activities including test facilities; develops and coor-
dinates the MSC/contractor industrial safety program; and evaluates the
effectiveness of all MSC-directed industrial safety activities.

The Reliability and Quality Assurance Office at MSC(fig. E9-3) is


a fundamental element in the safety system. The office is co-located
with the Safety Office and the samemanheads both offices. The R&QA
office develops and implements the reliability and quality assurance
programs for the Center to assure that spacecraft, spacecraft systems_
and supporting systems are designed and built to perform satisfactorily
in the environment for which they are designed. This office also reviews

E-94
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and evaluates R&QA information and activities of contractors and provides
onsite monitoring. The office also provides specialized studies for
safety reviews and provides direct support to program managers for design
reviews, configuration management change control, flight readiness re-
views, and real-time mission support.

The MSC Safety Plan establishes the organized MSC system safety pro-
gram. The plan applies to Center activities and contractors under NASA/
MSC direction. The plan is oriented toward spacecraft systems and crew
safety and does not cover all elements of a total safety program.

The general intention of the safety program is to establish the pri-


mary responsibility for safety of spacecraft and GSE hardware and soft-
ware with the program office/contractor. The responsible directorates
are recognized as having the primary responsibility for the safety of
mission operation and crew procedures. The MSC Safety Office has the
primary responsibility for assessing manned safety of spacecraft flight
and ground testing and acting to insure system safety consideration by
all MSC and program contractor elements.

The MSC offices and directorates with prime system safety responsi-
bilities are shown in figure E9-3 with their functional relationships
with the Safety Office indicated by the dashed lines. Each of these
offices and directorates has established a single point of contact for
all safety matters. This contact interfaces directly with the Safety
Office and has unimpeded access to top management of his directorate or
office on safety matters. The spacecraft hardware and operations safety
responsibilities of each of these offices are as follows:

i. Program offices manage the design, test, and manufacture of


spacecraft systems and related GSE to assure proper contractual safety
requirements. They implement Safety Office policies and procedures and
resolve incompatibilities between mission requirements, mission profiles,
operational constraints, and spacecraft capabilities. They also provide
the basis for certifying design maturity and manned flight safety.

2. Flight Operations Directorate is responsible for:

(a) Trajectory and flight dynamics analysis.

(b) Mission control requirements.

(c) Mission rules and spacecraft systems handbooks.

(d) Ground instrumentation requirements.

(e) Emergency real-time procedures.

E-96
(f) Landing and recovery testing and operations. Coordinating
recovery operations with DOD.

(g) Coordinating safety matters with Air Force Eastern Test


Range.

(h) Providing the basis for certifying design maturity and


manned flight safety.

3. Flight Crew Operations Directorate:

(a) Assures the adequacy of flightcrew selection and training.

(b) Establishes crew procedures and spacecraft operational


constraints.

(c) Conducts mission planning.

(d) Establishes crew station design requirements.

(e) Conducts simulations (nominal operations and abort).

(f) Develops operations handbooks and general flight procedures.

(g) Approves all KSC test and checkout operating procedures


involving flightcrews.

(h) Conducts and supports tests with aircraft where they are
used to develop and evaluate operational capabilities of space-related
hardware and operations.

(i) Provides the basis for certifying design maturity and


manned flight safety.

4. The Engineering and Development Directorate:

(a) Assures the adequacy of design, manufacture, and test of


equipment and the cognizance of this Directorate.

(b) Assures that safety is properly integrated and that system


safety requirements are provided in contractual requirements.

(c) Provides technical support to MSC programs through sub-


system management programs.

E-97
5. The Science and Applications Directorate:

(a) Performs flight experiments and special experimental tasks.


(b) Assures proper integration of system safety policies and
requirements into design and operation of all space science experiments.

(c) Coordinates with Safety Office on safety requirements for


special experiments.
(d) Assures that safety requirements are properly implemented
in the design and operation of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory.

(e) Provides the basis for certifying design maturity and


mannedflight safety.
6. The Reliability and Quality Assurance Office:

(a) Supplies failure modeand effect analysis of spacecraft


systems_ subsystems_GFE_and experiments.
(b) Provides failure trends.

(c) Determines safety categories.

(d) Coordinates with Governmentinspection agencies to insure


that safety-critical items satisfy established requirements.

(e) Approves failure closeout statements.


7. The Medical Research and Operations Directorate:

(a) Provides world-wide medical support for mannedmissions


and provides flight surgeons during missions.

(b) Provides medical coverage for all tests involving human


subjects.
(c) Monitors the physical condition of humanparticipants
with the authority to stop testing if continuation might result in
injury or death to the test subject.

(d) Ascertains by physical examinations the satisfactory phy-


sical condition of the test personnel or flightcrews and certify their
satisfactory physiological condition.

(e) Participates in test planning and approves all physiologi-


cal test standard procedures involving humanparticipants.

E-98
(f) Establishes the physiological limits to which man can be
subjected.

(g) Reviews plans and changes for construction of test facili-


ties involving humans.
(h) Has responsibility for biological safety during Lunar
Receiving Laboratory operations.

The Safety Office also maintains a safety interface between NASA


Headquarters, MSC,other centers, and other Governmentagencies as shown
in figure E9-4. The areas of safety coordination with these organiza-
tions are described as follows. In the event problems arise at these
interfaces, interagency panels will be convened for problem resolution.

MSC/KSC
interface in eight areas that are safety oriented or
related:

1. Test operations at KSC.

2. Flight hardware management.

3. Flightcrew activities at KSC.

4. Configuration control.

5. Quality control and inspection at KSC.

6. Safety at KSC.

7. Experiment management.

8. Launch and flight operations.

Any problems which arise are resolved through the formally orga-
nized intercenter panels.

MSC/DOD Safety Regulations are primarily at the Air Force Eastern


Test Range Facility. DOD provides the following functions:

1. Safety-related base support as required:

(a) Fire protection and control

(b) Explosive ordnance disposal

E-99
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(c) Bioenvironmental engineering

(d) Security

2. Missile ground safety as required.

3. Range safety.

4. Search and sea recovery.

John F. Kennedy Space Center

The Kennedy Space Center takes the test and checkout requirements
and test and checkout specifications and criteria documents prepared by
the development centers and develops plans and procedures for the hand-
ling and launch of spacecraft. To accomplish this responsibility, KSC
prepares and coordinates Test and Checkout Plans and implementing Test
and Checkout Procedures.

The KSC Safety Office.- This office plans and manages an integrated
hazard-assessment and risk-reduction program for all activities at KSC
and for all NASA activities at both Cape Kennedy Air Force Station
(CKAFS), Florida, and Vandenburg Air Force Base (VAFB), California.
This program includes:

1. Handling, storing, and transporting hazardous items such as


missile propellants, ordnance, high-pressure gases, toxic fluids, and
radioactive devices.

2. Insuring safety requirements are included in all contracts


initiated or administered by KSC and that contractor performance is
periodically evaluated.

3. Performing engineering system safety studies to assure inclu-


sion of safety requirements in engineering design of space vehicle test
and checkout (launch complex and ground support equipment/facilities and
operations).

4. Insuring that safety controls and required support are in effect


during performance of all operations.

5. Approving siting, construction, and modification plans for safety


aspects.

The office conducts safety surveillance while selected operations


are actually in progress, with authority to halt activities under speci-
fied circumstances.

E-IOI
Prior to publication of a test and checkout procedure (TCP) for
(a) operational checkout of flight hardware, (b) functional verification
and operational control of GSE, and (c) operational instructions to ser-
vice, handle, and transport end-item flight hardware during prelaunch
and launch operations, the KSCSafety Office reviews and approves these
procedures to assure that operations are compatible with KSCsafety
criteria and use appropriate safety personnel, techniques, and equipment.

Prior to publication of a technical procedure involving hazardous


operations to (a) authorize work, (b) provide engineering instructions,
and (c) establish methods of work control, the KSCSafety Office re-
views and approves the procedure to assure that operations are compat-
ible with KSC safety criteria and use appropriate safety personnel,
techniques, and equipment.

During selected operations that involve hazardous sequences, the


Safety Office has representatives on site. In the case of major inte-
grated tests, i.e., CDDT, the number of representatives can be as high
as 12_ with three people on station in the Launch Control Center firing
room and the remainder at various positions on the launch pad. The
safety representative insures that safety requirements are implemented,
approves or disapproves on-the-spot changes to Category I procedures
made either by Procedure Change Request (PCR) or Deviation Sheets and
assists the test supervisor in obtaining resolution on matters that
have safety overtones.

North American Rockwell Corporation - Space Division

The NR System Safety Plan for the Apollo CSM program is the imple-
menting document for the program required by MSC specification under the
basic CSM contract.

The objective of the system is the elimination or control of risks


to personnel and equipment throughout the manufacture, checkout, and
flight missions of the Apollo CaM. To achieve this objective the CSM
system safety program has an organization as shown in figure E9-5. The
CSM System Safety Office reports directly to the CSM General Manager
and is headed by the Assistant to the General Manager for CSM System
Safety. The Assistant to the General Manager for CSM System Safety acts
for the General Manager in the conduct of activities relating to all
facets of safety for the CSM programs, and is a permanent member of the
Space Division Safety Committee. He directs and monitors program activ-
ities necessary to assure an effective system safety program. He is
responsible for preparation and compatibility of the CS_4 system safety
programs at all sites with the exception of Launch Operations at KSC.

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Specific responsibilities of the NR CSM Safety Office include:

i. Develop and direct the system safety program for the CSM
programs.

2. Participate in Customer Acceptance Readiness Reviews (CARR's)


and Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR's) and assess problems submitted for
flightcrew safety impact.

3. Supervise the three CSM functional departments relative to


system safety and interface with other agencies and divisions of NR
concerning CSM safety.

4. Participate as a member of the NR Change Control Board (CCB)


to review proposed changes and assure changes do not jeopardize ground
and flightcrew safety.

5. Maintain status report system on all safety problems and design


changes affecting safety.

The Engineering Division System Safety Office:

i. Reviews and evaluates safety effect of all Engineering Design


Change (EDC) packages.

2. Reviews and assesses engineering analyses such as FMEA's, SPF's_


and similar documents for identified hazards which jeopardize crew
safety. Evaluate their corrective action and disposition.

3. Participates in postflight evaluations when requested by MSC


for evaluation of crew safety problems.

The Manufacturing Division System Safety Office:

i. Provides safety checklists to aid manufacturing personnel in


preparing documents and conducting safety surveys.

2. Assures that CSM manufacturing test, handling, and transport


procedures and work documents contain appropriate system safety
provisions.

3. Assures that operations defined as safety-critical are ade-


quately planned and monitored.

E-I04
The Test Operations System Safety Office is responsible for protec-
tion of the operational integrity of the C_{ during checkout at Downey
and testing at field sites. This office:

i. Generates system safety checklists for preparing Test Operations


and conducting safety surveys.

2. Reviews all test, checkout, and operations procedures for ade-


quate system safety requirements.

3. Reviews all safety-critical operations to assure adequacy of


test set-up_ documentation, and personnel qualification. Assures that
adequate emergencyplans and procedures are established and in use for
these safety-critical operations.
4. Coordinates crew safety provisions and requirements and, when
appropriate, recommendscorrective action for identified hazards
associated with crew procedures.
The Safety Plan appears to be operating satisfactorily according
to the most recent MSCaudit. The multiple safety offices and fragmen-
ted responsibilities warrant a critical review aimed at evaluating the
expected effectiveness of a more centrally managedprogram.

The Reliability and Quality Assurance function, as shownin figure


E9-5, has a functional responsibility to the corporate quality office
and a program managementresponsibility to the CSMProgramManager.
They are responsible for monitoring the manufacturing orders for proper
R&QAcallouts, verification inspection callouts, planned inspection
callouts_ and proper implementation of R&QArequirements in the planning
operation. They also compile the SystemSummaryAcceptance Documents
(SSAD's) for CustomerAcceptance Readiness Reviews (CARR's) and Flight
Readiness Reviews (ERR's). They conduct quality inspections on manufac-
turing processes and testing operations and participate in design re-
views. They also verify material usage and make and dispose of failed
hardware.

The reliability function monitors design specifications and pre-


pares failure effects and criticality analyses. They develop and super-
vise maintainability analyses_ perform failure reporting analyses and
recommend corrective action, support end-item reviews_ perform problem
investigations, and support the problem items.

Beech Aircraft Corporation

The overall organization of the Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder


Division, is shown in figure E4-11, and a functional breakdown of the

E-X05
office of the Apollo Program is shown in figure E4-12. The Beech Quality
Control Plan establishes the detailed methods and procedures for accom-
plishing the positive quality control required by NASA of its contrac-
tors and subcontractors in the Apollo Program. The Beech plan does
comply with the NASA requirements of NPC-200-2_ "Quality Program Pro-
visions for Space Systems Contractors" (ref. ii), and is applicable to
the material, parts_ components, subassemblies, installations, and sys-
tem and subsystems purchased, tested, and manufactured for the Apollo
supercritical gas storage system.

The system operates to assure maintenance of the basic approved


configuration baseline by reviewing and documenting materials, processes,
vendor-provided equipment, testing procedures, and manufacturing opera-
tions.

The Beech Reliability Program Plan provides for management and opera-
tion of the reliability system. It provides for the monitoring and
reporting of all tests, and maintenance of a complete record of action
on discrepancies and failures; and participates in corrective action and
research required for Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) analyses,
logic diagrams, math models, and reliability predictions and apportion-
ments. Documentation of these efforts are furnished to the NR and NASA
to fulfill contract requirements. The Beech Aircraft reliability and
quality assurance organization and operation appear to be adequate and
in compliance with contract and NPC-200-2 requirements. Manufacturing
procedures and process control were surveyed and found in good condition
and documentation such as the FMEA's was examined and found to be
satisfactory.

SAFETY AND R&QA AUDITS

Regular audits of the Safety and R&Q_ functional areas are made of
the field centers by NASA Headquarters teams. The Centers, in turn,
make similar audits of their prime contractors. These contractors con-
duct audits and survey visits with their subcontractors and suppliers.
In addition, the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has reviewed cer-
tain aspects of the manned space flight safety program. These reports
are included in the Apollo 13 Review Board files.

Consideration of these audits and reviews by the Management Panel


showed no significant items relative to the Apollo 13 accident. The
general functioning of the overall Safety and P_QA programs was found
to be consistent with good practices.

E-I06
MSCSAFETY/R&QA
PARTICIPATION

The MSCSafety Office is responsible for implementing safety poli-


cies and assuring safety in design, development, and operation of space-
craft. The R&QAfunction is responsible for assuring that spacecraft
and supporting systems are designed and built to perform in the environ-
ment for which they are built. The two functions, Safety/R&QA, are
mutually dependent, have many commoninformation and data requirements,
and have manyreview and monitoring functions that support them both.

Safety/R&QAare closely involved in the entire design, development,


test, and flight phase of all spacecraft components, systems, and sub-
systems. This includes participation in formal reviews such as the
Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR), Critical Design Reviews (CDR), First
Article Configuration Inspection (FACI), and CustomerAcceptance Readi-
ness Reviews (CARR)conducted by the Program Office. Safety/R&QAalso
participates in Design Certification Reviews (DCR)and Flight Readiness
Reviews (FRR).

These offices implement general policy and establish specific pro-


grams for contractors. They then monitor these programs throughout the
contract period to assure safety and quality of performance by the
contractor.

This review considered someof the activities of these two offices


from the CARRthrough the post-touchdown phase of the commandand ser-
vice module of Apollo 13.

CARR'sare held in two phases at present: PhaseI prior to the


initiation of subsystem testing and Phase III prior to shipping the
assembled vehicle. MSC R&QA reviewed documentation for Phase III CARR
for CSM 109 with the following specific results.

Phase III CARR for CSM 109

1. No hardware will exceed its allowable operational storage limits


during KSC operation and flight.

2. No known parts problems exist that will constrain shipment of


CSM 109.

3. There are 854 Certification Test Requirements (CTR's) for equip-


ment applicable to CSM 109. Testing is incomplete for six and certifi-
cation will not be complete at time of delivery. This status is sig-
nificantly better than previous CSM's, however, and shows an improving
trend.

E-I07
4. An improving trend in spacecraft quality was shownby a review
of NR-Downeydiscrepancy reports on CSM109.

5. Verification of nonmetallic materials has been accomplished and


establishes that all exposed nonmetallic materials have been identified
and approved or deviations written and accepted.

6. All known single-point failures applicable to CSM109 have been


reviewed and are acceptable.

A comparison of data shownin the R&QAreview for CSM109 and pre-


vious CaMspacecraft showsthat CSM109 has shownsubstantial improve-
ment in most R&QAand safety categories and no decrement in safety in
any area.

FRRR&QASummary

The next formal review was the Apollo 13 Flight Readiness Review
(F_).

i. All limited-life items adequate to support flight.


2. No known electrical, electronic, or electromechanical problems
exist that would constrain launch.

3. No Certification Test Requirements constrain flight, since all


have been approved except one which will be certified by analysis prior
to flight.

4. All known single-point failures have been reviewed and are


considered acceptable.

5. The overall quality of CSM109 showsa favorable trend relative


to previous spacecraft.

The Flight Safety assessmentat the FRRwas:

6. The system safety assessment of planned mission flight activi-


ties and spacecraft functions disclosed no safety concerns that would
constrain the Apollo 13 flight scheduled for launch on April ii, 1970.
7. Four changes from previous missions have been madewhich
reduced flight risks.

8. The risks unique to Apollo 13 involve: (a) programming S-IVB


stage for lunar impact during translunar coast; (b) performing lunar
descent orbit insertion with CSM/LMdocked; (c) operating power drill on

E-I08
lunar surface; and (d) performing PLSScommunication degradation test
during lunar surface EVA. These risks are not of constraining magnitude.

Weekly Safety/R&QAReport

In addition to the formal CARR,FRR, and other reviews, information


is furnished to the Apollo Program Office and the Director, MSC,on a
weekly basis of the activity of Safety and R&QArelative to particular
spacecraft through the Weekly Activity Reports. Abbreviated mention of
someitems from this Weekly Report from January 1970 to April lO, 1970,
concerning the Apollo 13 and CSM109 follows.

January 8-15_ 1970.- Thirteen open certification items for Apollo 13


were reported. Pacing items are four lunar camera items scheduled to be
closed in February.

January 15-22_ 1_70.- CSM 109 FRR data review generated lO R&QA
Review Item Dispositions (RID's). CSM 109 FRR subsystem working session
was conducted at KSC on January 15-16. FRR RID's were generated and
submitted for preboard action on January 25. Readiness statements were
prepared for CSM 109.

January 22-28_ 1970.- An assessment of CSM 104 through 109 failures


at KSC was conducted. Detailed assessment will be made to determine
reasons failures were not discovered at NR before shipment.

Safety Office briefed Astronaut Conrad on proposed procedure change


for Mode 4 abort. Conrad will review with other astronauts, including
Apollo 13 Commander.

January 30-Februar_ 4_ 1970.- Ground support equipment (GSE) at


KSC supporting CSM 109 is defective and may provide a countdown demon-
stration and countdown constraint unless the situation is remedied. NR
is studying the problem. The Apollo 13 Safety Assessment Study of Mis-
sion Phases from translunar injection through CSM descent orbit injec-
tion has been completed and will be distributed by February 4, 1970.
The biweekly meeting of MSC Safety/Boeing System Safety on Apollo mission
concerns was held January 30. Seventeen Apollo 13 safety concerns were
reviewed. Eight of the seventeen were closed.

February 12-18 a 1970.- R&QA and Apollo Test Division met to discuss
anomaly reporting effort. The discussion disclosed no duplication of
effort and agreement was reached that the Apollo Mission Anomaly Test
would be the guide for anomaly investigations. As of this date, only
one GSE problem is open. It is expected to be resolved by the CDDT.

E-IO9
February 19-26 t 1970.- The Safety Offices Assessment Report for
Apollo 13 has been prepared. There are no constraining items in the
report.

February 26-March 5_ 1970.- The Apollo 13 R&QA Flight Readiness


Assessment Report was completed February 26, 1970. R&_A agrees with the
data and conclusions drawn. Of the five items listed as requiring veri-
fication, only one (referring to LM-7 rate gyro) is still active and
should be resolved March 6. The Safety Office Assessment Report was
presented at MSC's FRR on February 26, 1970. No constraining items
exist. Two items are to be presented involving crew procedures.

March 20-26_ 1970.- An R&QA review will be held during the after-
noon and evening before the Apollo 13 launch to reaffirm launch, and
results will be discussed with the CSMManager. The mission plan and
information notebook for the Apollo 13 mission is being prepared for
Safety and R&QA mission support. The Safety Office provided the Deputy
Manager with a written assessment of an R&QA single-point OPS/PLSS
leakage failure. The Crew Systems Division is aware of the problem and
is developing a work-around procedure.

April 3-9_ 1970.- Open problems with potential Apollo 13 effectiv-


ity continue to be worked. Last planned status report to ASPO is sched-
uled for April iO, 1970. It is anticipated that all open problems will
be closed or explained by that time.

April i0-16_ 1970.- Final Apollo 13 Single Failure Point Summary


was made during this time and approved by subsystem manager. All re-
ported problems effective against Apollo 13 were closed or explained
prior to launch. Also, all ALERTS for Apollo 15 were closed prior to
launch. R&QA and Safety activities have been mainly to support changes
in the mission brought about by loss of the oxygen supply.

Apollo 13 Mission Real-Time Activities

The Safety/R&QA functions support the premission and mission activ-


ities of Apollo flights in real time. The purpose of this support is
twofold. First, the Safety/R&QA personnel, both in-house and contract,
provide a contact for the mission group to call on for specialized sup-
port at any time during the mission from launch minus 9 days through
splashdown. There are also specialized R&QA/Safety personnel available
at the contractor's plants, NR and Grumman, for consultation as required.
Secondly, the Safety/R&QA people are monitoring mission activities to
make independent safety assessments and evaluations for future crew safety
and mission readiness purposes. For this purpose, the monitoring team
maintains a log of problems and occurrences that is used to prepare a

E-IIO
support anomaly list that is later resolved with the Project Test
Division in the preparation of the Mission Anomaly list. The Safety/
R&QAsupport operation for the Apollo 13 mission included the following
activities:

Prelaunch. -

Daily problem closeout meeting: Meetings were held daily to review


the status of hardware problems, certification tests, limited-life
items, and other pertinent reliability concerns to assure that all
potential problems had been properly evaluated and resolved. Head-
quarters R&QA was also represented at these meetings.

R&QA/Safety status meeting: A meeting of R&QA and Safety per-


sonnel was held on Friday evening, April lO, 1970, to review the
status of all known and potential problems on Apollo 13. The meeting
was chaired by the Manager, Safety and R&QA Offices. Following the
meeting, the CSM Project Manager was informed of the results of the
meeting. Headquarters R&QA was represented at the meeting.

Daily launch readiness problem report: This was initiated


February 9, 1970, and the final report was issued on the morning
of April ll, 1970, indicating no open problems against Apollo 13
hardware.

Daily bulletins: Apollo 13 bulletins were issued daily by the


Control Center to keep personnel informed as to the status of Apollo
13 as it neared launch.

Countdown monitoring: Monitoring activities at MSC were initiated


at T - 2 days and continued through the mission. Headquarters personnel
maintained 24-hour monitoring of countdown activities at KSC up until
launch.

Quality data review: MSC quality personnel at KSC reviewed IDR's


DR's, etc., at KSC as the problems occurred to assure immediate evalua-
tion of these problems.

Problem review and evaluation: Safety/R&QA participated in review


and evaluation of hardware problems to determine potential mission im-
pact. These included the lunar module cryogenic helium tank pressure
rise problem and the oxygen tank umbilical quick-disconnect leakage
occurrence.

Launch to accident. -

Monitoring activities: Real-time monitoring of Apollo 13 was


maintained at MSC and in the GE Mission Evaluation Room offsite. A

E-111
control center was also mannedby contractor personnel on a 24-hour
basis to provide a central focal point for all Safety/R&QAmissions
activities.

Daily bulletins: Bulletins reporting the mission status were


issued daily.

Flight anomalies: As suspect flight anomalies occurred, they


were posted in the Control Center. R&QApersonnel were requested to
review and evaluate these occurrences as soon as feasible after the
events were reported.
Requests for support: Requests for R&QAsupport for Test Division
or other NASAgroups were received and were worked as required. Three
such requests were received prior to the accident. These requests were
for failure histories, failure modeevaluations, etc., on the cryogenic
helium tank pressure rise problem, the ECSsuit pressure transducer,
and on the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gaging probe problem.
Postaccident.-

Safety/R&QA activities immediately following the Apollo 13 accident


concentrated on compilation of subsystem data to determine the factors
involved in the safe return of the crew--including single failure
points. It included:

Safe-return factors: Each spacecraft subsystem was reviewed to


identify those areas and concerns affecting the safe return of the
crew in the emergency Apollo 13 configuration. A "Safe Return Factors"
book was compiled and made available for reference in the Planning
Room (GE).

Quality data: The quality control data on the CSM 109 oxygen
tank no. 2 was compiled and a search of these records for any question-
able items was initiated.

Historical data: The historical data, including failures, on


similar oxygen tanks were searched for evidence of significant problem
areas, as was the test and checkout history of the CSM 109 cryogenic
and EPS systems.

Flight data review Safety/R&QA: Personnel participated in the


review of flight data as a part of a team.

Configuration review: A review of the equipment and its relative


location in bay 4 of the SM was made.

E-II2
Single failure points: A study was prepared listing all
Criticality I SFP's in both the CSMand the LM based upon the emer-
gency configuration of Apollo 13.
Unexplained anomalies: A review was madeof each of the explained
anomalies approved for Apollo 13 to determine any potential connection
with the Apollo 13 accident.

Daily review meeting: An R&QA/SafetyReview meeting was held


daily at 4 p.m.c.s.t, on April 14-17, 1970, to review the status and
progress of the activities listed in the preceding paragraphs. The
Manager, Safety and R&QA,strongly emphasizedduring these meetings
the need to concentrate on thos@activities affecting the safe return
_f the astronauts. The activities designed to determine the cause of
the accident were pursued only when they did not interfere with this
primary concern.

CONCLUSION

The MSCSafety/R&QAplans and procedures appear to be adequate and


complete for their assigned responsibilities. Their maintenance of
equipment and system records, identification of suspect and failure
areas, and followup corrective actions through the Governmentand
contractor organization are adequate. Monitoring of contractors is
presently accomplished with onsite personnel and visits rather than
by formal audits. This appears adequate at present but should be
supplementedby formal audit visits whenever possible.
The preflight System Safety Assessments made for each flight of
the Apollo Program are thorough and timely and the flight monitoring
support of Safety/R&QA is good. The postflight anomaly identification
and tracking system is good.

The Safety/R&QA area appears to be generally adequate with


proper procedures_ good organization, and well-motivated personnel.

E-II3
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E-II4
PART EIO

SECURITY

Security surveys were conducted at Beech Aircraft Corporation,


Boulder Division, and North American Rockwell Corporation, Downey,
California, during the time period of April 27, 1970, through May 5,
1970.

The purpose of these investigations was to evaluate the adequacy


of the security programs at each location during the time periods that
the Apollo oxygen tanks were in custody at the respective industrial
plants. An extension of the accident investigation involved recon-
structing the security systems and procedures applicable to the oxygen
tanks from the time of shipment from NR to KSC and through launch of
Apollo 13 on April ll, 1970. To fulfill the stated purpose of this
inquiry involved evaluation of security programs at Beech, NR, and KSC
from April 1,. 1966, through April ll, 1970.

The security programs at each contractor location were found to be


satisfactory and adequate to provide for the physical protection of the
oxygen tanks. The security procedures provided at KSC were found excel-
lent and assured the integrity of all Apollo 13 hardware from initial
receipt on June 26, 1969, through launch on April ll, 1970.

Federal and local agencies acquainted with the security programs


at NR and Beech were contacted and gave favorable evaluations of each
contractor's performance during the pertinent time period.

Industrial security files were reviewed for incidents involving


the oxygen tanks at Beech and spacecraft 106 and 109 at NR. The results
at Beech were negative, and the incidents located at NR have been re-
ported for technical evaluation in the preliminary report submitted
May 8, 1970, to the Review Board Chairman and Manager, Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office.

The determination reached as the result of this survey is that no


evidence was discovered that the failure of the Apollo 13 oxygen tanks
was the result of any willful,_deliberate, or malicious act on the part
of an individual at the contractor facilities surveyed or at KSC. Phys-
ical security measures were sufficiently designed, implemented, and
monitored so as to preclude unauthorized access to the hardware associ-
ated with this investigation.

E-II5
REFERENCES

i. Anon.: MSC/ApolIo Program Management. MSCM 8020, Manned Spacecraft


Center, Nov. 27, 1967.

2. Anon.: Apollo Spacecraft Program Configuration Management Manual.


SB07-C-001, Manned Spacecraft Center, Dec. 15, 1967.

. Anon.: Apollo Configuration Management Manual. NPC 500-1, MSC


Supplement No. i, Revision B, April 26, 1965.

. Anon.: Engineering Changes to Weapons, Systems, Equipment, and


Facilities. Air Force-Navy Aeronautical Bulletin No. 445,
July 12, 1963.

o Anon.: Test and Checkout Requirements Document for KSC CSM 108
and Subsequent Vehicles. Manned Spacecraft Center, July 28, 1969.

° Anon.: Storage Subsystem--Cryogenic. Specification No. MC 901-


0005, North American Aviation, Inc., March 16, 1966.

° Anon.: End-Item Acceptance Data Package Book. CM-A-0499B,


Beech Aircraft Corp.

, Anon.: Apollo 13 CGSS Oxygen Tank Fluid Detank Analysis. Beech


Memorandum Report 15230, Beech Aircraft Corp., April 2, 1970.

. Anon.: Apollo Spacecraft Nonmetallic Materials Requirements.


MSC-PA-D-67-13, Addendum No. l, Manned Spacecraft Center,
Nov. 7, 1969.

lO. Anon. : Procedures and Requirements for the Evaluation of Space-


craft Nonmetallic Materials. MSC-A-D-66-3, Revision A, Manned
Spacecraft Center, June 5, 1967.

ll. Anon.: Quality Program Provision for Space Systems Contractors.


NPC 200-2, NASA Headquarters, April 1962.

NASA _ MSC-- Coral., Houston, Texas

E-II6
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REPORT OF
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

APPENDIX F - SPECIAL TESTS AND ANALYSES

APPENDIX G- BOARD ADMINISTRATIVE


PROCEDURES
APPENDIX H- BOARD RELEASES AND PRESS
STATEMENTS

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i (_X OR AD NUMBER} (CATEGORY}

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION


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CONTENTS

Part Page

APPENDIX F - SPECIAL TESTS AND ANALYSES

FI INTRODUCTION .................... F-I

F2 SUMMARY OF TESTS AND ANALYSES ........... F-3

DETANKING AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER ........ F-3

QUANTITY GAGE DROPOUT .............. F-3

IGNITION AND COMBUSTION PROPAGATION ....... F-3

TANK FAILURE ................... F-4

PANEL LOSS .................... F-4

F3 SELECTED TESTS AND ANALYSES ............ F-5

F3.1 THERMAL SWITCH TESTS ............... F-7

Objective ................... F-7

Approach and Results .............. F-7

Conclusions .................. F-7

F3.2 TEFLON INSULATION DAMAGE DUE TO OVERHEATING F-9

Objective ................... F-9

Approach and Results .............. F-9

Conclusions .................. F-9

F3.3 THERMODYNAMICS AND COMBUSTION ANALYSIS


OF OXYGEN TANK PROCESSES ............ F-12

Energy Required to Account for Measured


Pressure Rise ................ F-12

Energy Available in the Potentially


Combustible Materials in the Tank ......

Potential Ignition Energy ...........

iii
Page

TEFLON INSULATION IGNITION ENERGY TEST ...... F-19

Objective ................... F-19

Approach .................... F-19

Results .................... F-21

Conclusion ................... F-21

F3.5 IGNITION AND PROPAGATION THROUGH QUANTITY


PROBE SLEEVE AND CONDUIT ............ F-23

Objective ................... F-23

Experimental .................. F-23

Results .................... F-26

Conclusions .................. F-27

F3.6 ZERO-g TEFLON FLAME PROPAGATION TESTS ...... F-_2

Objective ................... F-42

Apparatus ................... F-42

Approach .................... F-b2

Results .................... F-43

Conclusions .................. F-43

F3.7 FULL-SCALE SIMULATED OXYGEN TANK FIRE ...... F-48

Objectives ................... F-b8

Apparatus ................... F-b8

Results .................... F-48

Conclusions .................. F-49

iv
Part
Page

F3.8 ANALYSIS OF FLOW FROM RUPTURED OXYGEN TANK .... F-55

Objective ................... F-55

Assumptions .................. F-55

Method ..................... F-55

Results .................... F-56

Discussion and Conclusions ........... F-61

F3.9 MYLAR-INSULATION COMBUSTION TEST ......... F-63

Objective ................... F-63

Apparatus ................... F-63

Approach .................... F-63

Results .................... F-63

Conclusion ................... F-6_

F3. i0 PANEL SEPARATION TESTS .............. F-70

Objectives ................... F-70

Approach .................... F-70

Apparatus ................... F-71

Results and Discussion ............. F-7h

Conclusions .................. F-82

F4 MASTER LIST OF TESTS AND ANALYSES ......... F-83

F5 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS - APOLLO 13 ACCIDENT ...... F-J07

REFERENCES ..................... F-i_2

v
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vi
PART FI

INTRODUCTION

An integral part of the Apollo 13 Review Board's effort included


an extensive test and analysis program to evaluate in detail postulated
modes of failure. The majority of these tests and analyses were con-
ducted at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) and five other NASA cen-
ters--Langley Research Center (LRC), Ames Research Center (ARC), Lewis
Research Center (LeRC)_ Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and Kennedy
Space Center (KSC). Some tests at White Sands Test Facility (WSTF),
North American Rockwell, Beech Aircraft, Parker Aircraft, and Boeing
were also conducted. The results of this intensive test and analysis
program formed, to a large extent, the basis for the development of many
of the Board's findings, determinations, and recommendations.

During the review, the requests for tests and analyses were chan-
neled through the MSC Apollo Program Office, which maintained a master
file. The selection of individual tests and analyses was made after a
preliminary study by Review Board specialists. In each case the request
was approved by the Board Chairman or a specially designated Board moni-
tor. In many instances the preparation and execution of tests were
observed by Apollo 13 Review Board representatives.

Nearly a hundred separate tests and analyses have been conducted.


The level of effort expended on this test and analysis program included
a total of several hundred people over a period of about 6 weeks.

The first portion of this Appendix is a summary of those tests and


analyses which most precisely support the sequence of events during this
accident. This is followed by a more detailed description of these tests
and analyses. This Appendix concludes with a test and analyses master
list and a fault tree analysis.

It should be noted that an attempt has been made to include all


tests that have been carried out in support of this review in the master
list. As a result, the list includes a number of early tests which were
exploratory, and in some cases inconclusive, and may not appear to lend
substantive information. For each effort_ there is summary information
which includes identification, a statement of the objective, and a brief
statement of results. More complete data on studies and tests can be
found in the official files of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

F-I
This page left blank intentionally.

F-2
PART F2

SU}@4ARY OF TESTS AI,_ ANALYSES

To assist the reader, a summary of the most significant tests and


analyses is included in this part. The summary consists of a series of
concise statements which are based on the results from one or more test
or analysis. The summaries are presented in chronological order of the
events as they occurred in the spacecraft.

DETA_TKING AT KENq_-EDY SPACE CENTER

A test simulating the conditions of the special detanking opera-


tions during the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) revealed that the
thermal switches were overloaded and failed in the "closed" position.
The failure of the thermostats caused very high temperatures (700 ° to
i000 ° F) inside the heater tubes. Damage to the wire insultation re-
sulted from this overheating. Subsequent tests showed that under the
conditions existing in the tank, the wire insulation would seriously
degrade at temperatures between 700 ° F and i000 ° F, thus exposing bare
wire.

QUANTITY GAGE DROPOUT

Tests to determine the signal characteristics of the quantity


probe under various fault conditions showed that a short between the
concentric tubes would cause an off-scale high readins which would then
_<o to zero when the short is removed, remain there for about 1/2 second,
and then retur_ to the correct indication in about 1-1/2 seconds. These
are the characteristics that were observed in flight. It is not estab-
lished that the failure of the quantitH gage was related to the combus-
tion that occurred in the oxygen tank no. 2.

IGNITION AND COMBUSTION PROPAGATION

The enersy required to achieve the pressure rise from 887 psia to
]OO$ p_la observed in oxygen tank no. 2 (iO to 130 Btu) can be supplied
by the comb_stion of the Teflon wire insulation in the tank and conduit
(260 Btu). Tests have also indicated that other Teflon elements and
certain aluminum components inside the tank may also be ignited and
thus contribute to the available energy.

F-3
Experiments show that tile Teflon insulation on the actual wires
in oxygen tank no. 2 can be ignited by an energy pulse which is less
than the energy estimated to be available from the observed flight
data.

Test of fuses in the motor power leads showed that sufficient


energy to ignite Teflon insulation could be drawn through the fuses
before they would blow.

The flame propagation rate experiments in supercritical oxygen


indicate a rather slow burning rate along Teflon wire insulation (about
0.25 in/sec dovmward in one-g). Propagation rates as low as 0.12 in/sec
were measured under zero-g conditions. These measurements are consist-
ent with the slow rate of pressure rise observed in the spacecraft.

Under one-g conditions, Teflon wire insulation flames will propa-


date along the wire through apertures fitted with Teflon grommets.

TANK FAILURE

Several combustion tests confirmed that burning of Teflon and pos-


sibly aluminum could reach high enough temperatures to cause either the
tank or the conduits into the tank to fail. Oxygen pressure was very
likely lost due to the failure of the conduit.

A test in one-g in which the actual bundled Teflon insulated wire


was ignited within the conduit leading from an oxygen tank and filled
with supercritical oxygen resulted in bursting the heat-weakened con-
duit wall.

A test which contained an upper portion of the quantity probe and


conduit showed that ignition of the motor lead bundle in supercritical
oxygen results in flame propagation through the quantity probe insula-
tor and into the conduit. Posttest examination showed an approximately
2-inch diameter hole had been burned out of a 3/8-inch thick stainless
steel simulated tank closure plate.

PANEL LOSS

Tests with I/2-scale honeycomb panel models in vacuum produced


complete panel separation with a rapid band loaded pressure pulse in the
oxygen tank shelf space. Peak pressures in the simulated tunnel volume
w_th scaled venting were considerably lower (about 1/5) than that of the
ox_y_en tank shelf space. These tests are consistent with the informa-
tion obtained from the photographs of the service module taken by the
Apollo 13 crew.

F-4
PART F3

SELECTED TESTS AND ANALYSES


This page left blank intentionally.

_-6
PART F3.1

THEP_AL SWITCH TESTS

Objective

Determine the behavior of the thermostatic switches in the oxygen


tank no. 2 under the conditions experienced during the abnormal detank-
ing experienced at KSC. During the KSC tests, heater currents of
6.5 amperes at 65 V dc were used.

Approach and Results

Subsequent to discovering that the heater thermostatic switches


most likely fused in the closed position during the KSC detanking pro-
cedures, tests were conducted to determine the power handling capabili-
ties of these switches.

Batteries were used as a power source to test the switches. They


were initially supplied with 31 V dc at currents up to 3.5 amperes. No
contact degradation was observed under these conditions. _en the volt-
age was raised to 65 V dc, some increase in contact resistance (up to
about 3 ohms from a few milliohms) was noted at 1.25 amperes, although
the switch continued to operate. The current was then increased to
1.5 amperes at 65 V dc; and when the switch attempted to open, it fused
closed. The body of the switch was removed and the condition of the
contact can be seen in figure F3.1-1.

Conclusions

Thermostatic switches similar to those in oxygen tank no. 2 will


fuse closed when they attempt to open with a 65 V dc potential and
currents in excess of 1.5 ampere.

F-7
I
CO

Figure F3.1-1.- Fused thermal switch control.


PARTF3.2

TEFLONINSULATION
DAMAGE
DUETO OVERHEATING

Objective

These tests were conducted to determine the damagethat could have


been done to the Teflon wire insulation during the abnormal detanking
operation at Cape Kennedy.

Approach and Results


The likelihood that the equipment inside the oxygen tank was
subjected to high temperatures for several hours prompted tests to
reveal any changes in the thermochemistry of the remaining material.
Four samples were treated in a heated oxygen flow system. The flow rate
was 259 cc/sec. These samples were comparedwith an unbaked control
sample. A typical sample of wire is shown in figure F3.2-I. The mass-
loss results are given in table F3.2-I.
The relative values of heats of reaction in subsequent DTAtests
in oxygen showthat the degraded material is slightly more energetic
per unit mass than the virgin material when oxidized.

Conclusions

The tests reveal that severe damagecould have resulted to the


wire insulation during the abnormal detanking procedure. In several
places along the leads, bare wire was exposed which could have led to
the short circuits that initiated the accident.

F-9
!

Figure F3.2-I.- Damaged Teflon insulation.


TABLE F3.2-I.- INSULATION DEGRADATION TESTS

Baking
Sample
Temperature, °F Time, hr Weight loss, percent
insulation

i 77 0

2 572 2.75 +0.15

3 752 1.0 -o.o8

4 86o 0.5 -34.

5 932 0.5 -i02.

F-II
PARTF3.3

THERMODYNAMICS
ANDCOMBUSTION
ANALYSISOF OXYGEN
TANKPROCESSES

Since there is strong evidence that the failure centered around an


abnormal energy addition to oxygen tank no. 2, it seemsappropriate to
include a special discussion of the analysis of the thermodynamicsand
combustion processes that mayhave occurred in this tank° Consideration
is given here to (1) the energy required to account for the measured
pressure rise, (2) the energy available in potentially combustible mate-
rials in the tank, and (3) potential ignition energy.

Energy Required to Account for MeasuredPressure Rise


The measuredabnormal pressure rise in oxygen tank no. 2 is pre-
sented in figure B5-3 of Appendix B. Calculations can be madefor two
limiting thermodynamicprocesses to account for this pressure rise. One
process assumesthat the pressure rise results from an isentropic com-
pression of the supercritical oxygen by an expanding 'bubble" of com-
bustion products. This corresponds to the minimumamountof energy re-
quired to achieve the measuredpressure rise. Another limiting process
assumesthat the energy addition is accompaniedby complete mixing which
results in homogeneousfluid properties.
Figure F3.3-1 is a pressure-enthalpy diagram for oxygen whereon
point '_" is the thermodynamicstate just prior to the abnormal energy
addition, approximately -190° F and 887 psia° The path of the isentropic
compression (minimumenergy) from this state to the maximumpressure
measured of 1008 psia is represented by line AB. Thermodynamicproper-
ties of oxygen presented by Weber (ref. l) and Steward (ref. 2) were used
to computethe increase in the internal energy of the oxygen. This in-
ternal energy increase of the oxygen (242 lbm) amountsto about lO Btu.
The temperature increase associated with this process is about 1.8 ° F.
Figure F3.3-1 also showsthe constant density path along line AC
from 887 psia to 1008 psia. This process could be achieved by complete
mixing of the tank contents. The internal energy increase for this
case (maximumenergy) is about 130 Btu. The temperature increase for
this process is 2.6 ° F. It should be noted that this energy addition is
to the _ in the tank. It does not include energy that might be
added to other tank componentssuch as metal parts.
The measured temperature rise of 38° F (indicated by figure B5-5 in
Appendix B) during the pressure rise to 1008 psia cannot be explained by

F-12
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F-13
either of the above-mentioned thermodynamic processes because they give
a rise of only 1.8 ° and 2.6 ° F. As figure B5-3 shows, the measured tem-
perature rise lagged the pressure rise. Both this lag and the magnitude
of the temperature rise can be explained by the passage of a combustion
front near the temperature sensor.

Energy Available in the Potentially Combustible Materials in the Tank

Many materials can of course react with oxygen if an ignition


source is provided. Here only Teflon is considered in any detail while
aluminum is mentioned briefly.

Teflon (polytetrafluoroethylene) can react with oxygen to form


largely a mixture of carbonyl-fluoride, carbon tetrafluoride, carbon
dioxide, and other species in small quantity, such as fluorine, depend-
ing on the stoichometry and flame temperature. The overall chemical
reactions which produce these combustion products include:

_( C2F4) n + 02 _ 2 COF 2 ; _c = -1910 Btu/ib m Teflon

i (C24)n+ O2 - C02+ ; = -2130 Btu/ib m Teflon

where the heat of combustion for these reactions is also given. For the
purpose of this discussion, the heat of combustion of Teflon is taken to
be -2000 Btu/lb m Teflon. The internal energy of combustion f_Ec is
about 99 percent of fkHc. The amount of Teflon wire insulation in the
system is about 0.13 lbm, so that the energy available from combustion
of Teflon wire insulation alone is about 260 Btu. This amount of energy
is therefore more than sufficient to account for the measured pressure
rise from 887 to 1008 psia.

If aluminum combustion occurs, or other tank components, the quantity


of energy available is many times greater than the energy released by
Teflon combustion. Experiments show that once ignited, aluminum burns
readily with supercritical oxygen.

Potential Ignition Energy

Several experiments have shown that Teflon insulated wire can be ig-
nited under the conditions that existed in the tank. A series of tests

F-14
has shownthat the energy required to ignite Teflon in supercritical
oxygen is 8 joules or less. It was also determined that ignition v_as
geometry dependant and in one favorable configuration combustion was the
fault initiated with an estimated energy as low as 0.45 joule. In any
case, the value of 8 joules is less than energy deduced from the telem-
etry data, as will be shownbelow.
The fan motors were turned on just before the event occurred. There
are clear indications of short circuiting in the fan motor circuitry
immediately prior to the observed pressure rise. For the moment, we will
consider ignition mechanismsby electrical arcing originating in the fan
circuits as being the most probable cause of the fire.
An analysis has been madeof the telemetry data that permits an es-
timate of the total energy that could have been dissipated in a postu-
lated short circuit which ignited the Teflon. A summaryof the analysis
is presented here.
The following telemetry data were used in the analysis:

i. SCSthrust vector control commands. Onehundred samples per


second at lO-millisecond intervals. This channel provides, in effect,
a time differentiated and filtered indication of phase C of ac bus no. 2
voltage.

2. Bus no. 2 ac phase A voltage. Ten samples per second at


lOO-millisecond intervals.

3. Fuel cell no. 3 dc voltage at i0 samples per second.

4. Total fuel cell current at i0 samples per second.

The ll5-volt fan motor circuit is shown in figure D3-5 of Appendix


D. The power for the motor comesfrom an inverter producing three-
phase, 400-cycle, ll5-volt power. The motors are operated in parallel,
each phase to each motor being separately fused with a 1-ampere fuse
(there are a total of six fuses in the circuit). The important portions
of the telemetry traces are shown in figure F3.3-2. The sequenceof
events postulated is as follows:
i. Fan turnon occurs at 55:53:20 g.e.t, and the phase A voltage
drops from 116.3 to 115.7 volts. This is normal. The telemetry granu-
larity is ±0.3 volt.
2. At 55:53:23, an ac voltage drop from 115.7 to 114.5 volts is
observed, coincident with a fuel cell current increase of ii amperes.
This is the first short circuit that occurred after fan turnon. Since
the ac voltage rose from 115.7 to 116.0 volts (as indicated by "toggling"

F-15
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105
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72

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68
o_
o. "------- IMU heater on

u_2

°1
-@ 66
L__ J
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64 _--0 2 tank 2 fans on

I
2 tank 1 fans on

62
I
55:53:18 :20 :22 :24 :26 :28 :34 :36 :38 :40 55:53:42

Ground elapsed time, hr : rain : sec

Figure F3.3-2.- Telemetry data for ac bus 2 voltage phase A and total CM current.
between 115.'7 and 116.3 volts) after the event, it is probable that the
short circuit involved phase A of the motor drive circuit, and all power
may have been lost to one of the two fan motors at this time. This hy-
pothesis is further supported by the coincident decrease in fuel cell
current of 0.7 ampere_ approximately half of the 1.5 amperes drawn by
both motors.

3. At 55:53:38 another short circuit occurred, causing an ac volt-


age rise to 117.5 volts followed by a drop to 105 volts. The voltage
rise indicates a short circuit in phase B or C as the regulator tries to
bring up the voltage in a nonshorted phase. The 4-ampere dc current
spike that occurs concurrently with this ac voltage rise and fall was
probably much greater at some time between telemetry samples. The re-
sultant decrease in phase A voltage may indicate an open circuit in one
of the other phases of the second motor, causing phase A to draw more
than normal current. The pressure in the tank starts to rise at 55:53:36
so that this short probably occurred after some combustion had commenced.

4. A final short circuit occurs at 55:53:41 as indicated by the


22.9-ampere spike on the dc current telemetry. No voltage drop is ob-
served on the ac bus_ probably because the short was of such short dura-
tion that it was not picked up by the telemetry samples. All the re-
maining fuses are blown (or the leads open-circuited) by this short
circuit since the ac bus voltage and dc current return to the levels
observed prior to initial energizing of the fans in oxygen tank no. 2.

%_e approximate total energy in the short circuit (arcing) can be


estimated from the telemetry data. The voltage spikes indicate that the
shorts were less than i00 milliseconds (the telemetry sampling interval)
in duration. The fact that all the voltage and current "glitches" con-
sisted of essentially one data point (sometimes none) means that the time
of the short was very likely 50 milliseconds or less. An independent
piece of evidence that bears on the time interval during which the short
circuit condition exists comes from the signal on the SCS telemetry. A
signal appeared on the SCS telemetry line each time a short circuit
occurred on ac bus no. 2. These signals have a data rate i0 times larger
Dhan the signals from the ac and dc busses. The initial excursion of
each of these SCS signals was 20 to 40 milliseconds long, and was then
followed by one or two swings which are due to the SCS circuit filter
characteristics. Thus, 30 milliseconds will be taken as an approximate
value for the duration of the short circuits.

The current drawn during the short circuit can be estimated from the
properties of the fuses used to protect the motor fan circuits. From
April 18 to April 20, tests were conducted by MSC personnel to measure
failure currents and failure times of the fuses using the same type in-
verter and fuses that were in the spacecraft. The following are the
results of these measurements for a single-phase short circuit (data

F-17
taken from a preliminary report of table III of the MSCApollo 13 In-
vestigation Team):

Fault
Volts, ac Amperes, ac Duration_
milliseconds energy,
joules

107 _.0 120 _9


i05 4.0 31 13
102 5.0 20 i0
95 7.O lO 7
75 9.O 8 5

From these results, the most probable range of ac current in the short
circuit that occurred is 3 to 5 amperes. The total energy in the short
circuit is therefore between i0 and 16 joules, since it is considered
unlikely that the fault persisted for more than 50 milliseconds. Thus,
a most probable energy of i_ joules and a most probable ac current of
4 amperes is reasonable for those faults which blew fuses.

These values are applicable to single-phase faults to ground. For


two-phase faults, the current in each phase remains the same, while the
available ignition energy doubles to 26 joules.

F-18
PART F3.4

TEFLON INSULATION IGNITION E_RGY TEST

Objective

To determine the energy required to ignite the Teflon insulation


by 115 volt, 60 cycle sparks on flight-qualified wire which had been
subjected to the type of heating which could have occurred during the
KSC detanking procedure. The spark-generating circuit was fused so
that it could deliver no more energy than could have been delivered by
the fan motor circuit.

Approach

Sample sections of Teflon-insulated conductors obtained from Beech


Aircraft Corporation through MSC were baked in oxygen for 5 hours at
572 ° F, held overnight at room temperature in oxygen, and baked further
for 2 hours at 842 ° F. The Teflon lost its pliability, cracked, and
flaked off as shown in figure F3.4-I.

The test specimen consisted of four strands of degraded-insulation


wires, as shown schematically below.

_ Shorting so,few,, approx. 2 ohm resistance


Ground _ _j_ ground to hot
leg _ _ _-_J_-J_-_'-'---_
_--_-"__

IlHot II j_ __Z w -__--Z__Copper clip


legs I _ Copper clip to restrain / _-__._ to. restrain
L. - wires i wire
L.. Unglozed alumina Insulotors

An adjustable short was provided by a number 80 screw driven be-


tween the strands of the "ground" wire and then adjusted so that a low-
resistance short was established to one of the "hot" legs near some re-
maining Teflon. A replica of the test harness, made of virgin wire, is
also shown in figure F3.4-I. The shorting screw and the standoff loop,
installed to hold the screwhead away from the test-chamber walls, are
seen in this photograph. The low resistance short was installed in
series with a 1-ampere slow-blow fuse. In an independent test series,
the current-carrying ability of this fuse was determined by inserting
(in series) dummy resistors of various values to replace the shorted

F-19
I
I"o
0

Figure F3.4-I.- Heat degraded wire and test harness replica.


test harness, and a O.l-ohm resistor across which the voltage drop was
measured. Repeated tests showed about 3.5 to 7.5 joules were required
to destroy the fuse. Depending on the resistance of the remaining cir-
cuit, 10 to 90 percent of the line voltage might appear across the arc.
The fault energy of the ignition tests, where the arc resistance is less
than 2 ohms, is in the same range (i.e., from 3.5 to 7.5 joules).

The specimen was immersed in liquid oxygen (as before) inside the
stainless steel tubing test rig shown in figure F3.4-2. The initial
pressure was 920 psi.

Results

The test assembly withstood three firing pulses, 115 volts, 60 cy-
cles, before igniting on the fourth. The 1-ampere fuse was blown each
time. The short resistance was measured after each trial and was found
to reduce progressively from about 5 ohms to 2 ohms, at which level
ignition occurred on the next try. Approximately 1/2 second later the
pressure gage showed the start of a 7-1/2 second pressure rise from 920
to 1300 psi. A thermocouple placed about 1 to 2 inches from the ignition
point showed a small rise about 1 second after ignition and a large rise
about 1/2 second later as the flame swept by. Much of the main conduc-
tor wire was consumed; all of the small thermocouple wire was gone.
Virtually all of the Teflon was burned--Teflon residue was found only in
the upper fitting where the electrical leads are brought into the test
chamber. All but one of the alumina insulators vanished.

Conclusion

From the fuse energy tests and these ignition tests, it is clear
that from 5.5 to 7.5 Joules are adequate to initiate combustion of heat-
degraded Teflon insulation. This is essentially the same as is required
for unheated wire.

F-21
Figure F3.4-2.- Stainless steel test rig.

F-22
PARTF3.5
IGNITIONANDPROPAGATION
THROUGH
QUANTITYPROBE
SLEEVEANDCONDUIT*

Objective

The purpose of this test was to determine if burning wire insula-


tion would propagate through the upper quantity probe insulator. Another
objective was to determine the failure modeof the conduit which results
from the combustion of the polytetrafluoroethylene insulation.

Experimental
The chamberused for this test consisted of a schedule 80 weld-neck
tee equipped with three flanges to provide a viewport, electrical and
hard line feedthroughs, and conduit to quantity probe interface. The
chamber, which is shown in figure F3.5-I, had a volume of approximately
one-third cubic foot. A pressure relief valve was provided to maintain
chamberpressure at 1050 psia during test; and, in addition, the chamber
contained a rupture disc to prevent chamber failure. Supercritical con-
ditions inside the chamberwere obtained by filling with gaseous oxygen
to a pressure of 940 psia and cooling externally with liquid nitrogen,
using insulating foam covered with thermal blankets. Five thermocouple
penetrations were provided through the chamberwall. Chamberpressure
was monitored by a pressure transducer. Color motion pictures were
taken through the chamberviewport at a speed of 2h frames a second. An
additional cameraprovided external color motion pictures of the conduit-
chamber interface.

The test item consisted of an upper portion of the quantity probe


interfaced with a conduit assembly shown in figure F3.5-2. The quantity
probe used was Block I hardware which had been sectioned for demonstra-
tion purposes. An additional hole was drilled in the probe insulator to
modify it to Block II and wire was routed through it and the conduit
assembly to represent the Apollo 13 configuration. Stainless steel sec-
tions were welded onto the probe to close the demonstration ports. Wiring
with insulation was allowed to extend beyond the Teflon insulator approx-
imately 4 inches. This wiring was also routed through the conduit and
connected to the feedthrough pins through which power, 115 volts at 400
cycles, was supplied to both fan motor bundles by a system which had been

*Extracted from "Fuel Quantity Probe Sleeve and Conduit Assembly


Flammability Report," prepared by the MannedSpacecraft Center for the
Apollo 13 Review Board under TPS 13-T-06, June 5, 1970.

F-23
I
ovie camera

Thermocouple 13- -!_ Pressure

Thermocouple 4 .... "1 relief valve


I
!
Thermocouple 5
i' I
__+28 Vdc
I
I
02 fill

Thermocouple 6 --
02 vent

k., Nichrome ignitor

Motor power cable

Probe assembly

F
Thermocouple 11 m_@ . ,

Thermocouple 13

Thermocouple 14

Note: Not to scale

Figure F3.5-I,- Quantity probe and conduit assembly apparatus.

F-24
Probe assembly
1.50

// , ._oo+_:°°o_ : 7.00±.010

!
[,o
k_n
4/////7 , ///'_---_ i. 75

Conduit assembly

= 1.7

Figure F3.5-2.- Upper quantity probe - conduit interface.


fused using 1-amp fuses. One of the fan motor bundles was allowed to
extend beyond the other wiring inside the test chamberand a nichrome
ignitor was installed on it.

The probe conduit interface consisted of a stainless steel 2-inch


pipe plug machined to the dimensions shownin figure F3.5-2. The inter-
face was mounted on the bottom flange of the chamberso that flame propa-
gation would be downward.

Three the_Locouples were located in the region of the quantity probe


as shown in figure F3.5-I. Two thermocouples were installed to measure
internal chamberwall temperatures. Three thermocouples were installed
on the external surface of the conduit as shown in figure F3.5-I.

After filling the chamberto 925 psia with gaseous oxygen, the
chamberwas cooled until thermo_ouple 3 shown on figure F3.5-I indicated
-138° F. Twenty-eight volts dc was applied at 5 ampsto the ignitor for
approximately 3 seconds. The current was increased to I0 ampsfor
2 seconds at which time fusion of the ignitor occurred.

Results

Pressure history of the chamberis shown in figure F3.5-3. The


first relief valve opening occurred at approximately 28 seconds. It
subsequently reopened 15 times before failure occurred. Fusion of the
ignitor is shown on the graph to indicate ignition of the insulation.

Temperature histories of both internal and external portions of


the test apparatus are shownin figures F3.5-4 and F3.5-5. Thermocouple
placements in each of these areas are included in the legend figures of
each of these graphs. It should be noted that two types of thermo-
couples were used, one with good sensitivity at low temperatures, copper-
constantan, and one with good sensitivity at high temperatures, chromel-
alumel. These two types are also indicated in figures F3.5-h and F3.5-5.

The propagation observed in the color motion picture coverage inter-


nally proceeded from the ignition site (fig. F3.5-6) vertically downward.
Figure F3.5-7 showsburning of the insulation on the fan motor wire bun-
dle Just before reaching the other wire bundles. Figure F3.5-8 shows
the burning of several of the wire bundles. Figure F3.5-9 shows the burn-
ing of the wire bundles Just prior to reaching the Teflon insulator, and
figure F3.5-I0 showsthe more subdued fire after the propagation had pro-
gressed further into the upper probe region. Figure F3.5-II showsthe
dense smokeafter propagation of the burning into the insulator.

Figure F3.5-12 shows the conduit and chamberinterface burnthrough


scenes taken from the external movie coverage. The time for this sequence
(24 frames) is i second. The small _ount of external burning resulted

F-26
from ignition of the Mylar film used to insulate the test chamber.
Visual observation of the failure of the conduit through a test
cell window revealed that a flame front resulted as far away as 3 or
feet from the chamber.

After the test, the section of conduit was found approximately


8 feet from the chamber. Several pieces of the Teflon insulator, two
pieces of the conduit swedgelock nut, and one piece of conduit tubing
were gathered from a.20-foot radius around the test area (fig. F3.5-13).
The only item remaining in the test chamberwas a portion of the Inconel
section of the capacitance probe (fig. F3.5-14). The stainless steel
portion was completely gone and a portion of the Inconel was burned. No
remains of the aluminumportion of the probe could be found. The conduit-
chamber interface was torched out to a maximumdiameter of 1-7/8 inches
(see figs. F3.5-15 and F3.5-16).

Conclusions

It is quite evident from the results of this test that the insula-
tion burning on the electrical conductors did propagate through the probe
insulator even in downwardburning and proceeded into the conduit. It
is difficult to determine if the insulator was ignited and what time
was required for the burning to propagate through the insulator. How-
ever, failure of the conduit occurred in approximately i0 seconds after
burning had proceeded to the insulator-wire bundle interface. After the
initial failure of the conduit, the contents of the tank (1/3 cubic foot)
were vented in approximately 0.5 second with a major portion of the burn-
ing of metal occurring in 0.25 second. Venting of larger amountsof
oxygen would not necessarily take longer since continued oxygen flow
should produce considerably larger "torched out" sections. In order to
produce the heat necessary for the effects observed here, metal burning
must have occurred.

F-27
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+_

I
0

I
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ID
|
I J I | i I
0
N?
0 0 0 0 0 0
.r-I

r-'l ,"1

F-2_
./----TC 6 (chamber wall)

3OOO
[] Thermocouple 3 (copper constanstan)
A Thermocouple 4 (chromel alumel)
2500 0 Thermocouple 5 (chromel alumel) A E_
7
7
• Thern_ocouple 6 (copper constanstan)
I
2000
o Z
_3
I
FO
8 1500

i000

500

i A

i I l I I I I

0 lO 22 24 26 28 .30 52

T illle, SOC

Figure F3.5-h.- Temperature history of quantity probe and chamber wall.


{ZD

TC 13

TC 14----.__
T

2500

2O00
Z
'-d • Thermocouple ii (chromel alumel)
I LI_ • Thermocouple 13 (chromel alumel)
LLI o 1500
o 0 Thermocouple 14 (chromel alumel)

$ I000

B--

5OO
7
Z
A

I l I I I I I .

0 10 22 24 26 28 30 32

Figure F3.5-5.- Temperature history of co:_duit.


!

Figure F3.5-6.- Internal chamber view shortly after ignition.


!

Figure F3.5-7.- Burning along fan motor wire bundle.


!

Figure F3.5-8.- Burning of adjacent wire bundles.


!

Figure F3.5-9.- Burning bundles prior to reaching probe insulator.


!

Figure F3.5-I0.- Burning progressed into insulator.


!

O_

Figure F3.5-11.- Dense smoke after propagation of burning into insulator.


Figure F3.5-12.- External views of chamber-conduit
interface at time of failure.

F-37
Figure F3.5-13.- Parts of probe insulator and tubing collected
from area around test chamber.

F-38
Figure F3.5-14.- Portion of probe which remained in the test chamber.

F-39
Figure F3.5-15.- External view of chamber flange on which
conduit-quantity probe interface was mounted (after test).

F-40
Figure F3.5-16.- View of chamber flange internal surface after test.

F-41
PART F3.6

ZERO-g TEFLON FLAME PROPAGATION TESTS

Objective

The objective of these tests was to measure the flame propagation


rate along Teflon-insulated wire bundles in oxygen at 900 psia and -180 o F
in a zero-g environment. A second objective was to determine whether
flames travelling along the fan motor lead wires would pass through the
aperture in the motor case. Measurements are to be used to interpret
the pressure and temperature history observed in the oxygen tank during
the accident.

Apparatus

Tests were conducted at the Lewis Research Center's 5-Second Zero


Gravity Facility. An experimental apparatus was designed and constructed
which permitted the tests to be conducted in an oxygen environment of
920 psia ± 20 psi and -180 ° F ± lO °. The apparatus was installed on a
standard drop test vehicle capable of providing the necessary supporting
functions. An overall view of the drop vehicle is presented in fig-
ure F3.6-1 and a detailed photograph of the experimental apparatus is
shown in figure F3.6-2. The basic components of the experimental appara-
tus are the combustion chamber with a sapphire window to permit high-
speed photography, and an expansion tank as a safety feature in the event
an excessive pressure rise were to occur. The apparatus was equipped
with a fill and vent system, pressure relief system, and liquid nitrogen
cooling coils. The test specimen was installed in the combustion chamber
in a horizontal position as is shown in figure F3.6-3. This figure is
typical of all installations. Ignition was caused by heating a 26-gage
nichrome wire which was wrapped around the specimen. Chamber pressure
and temperature were monitored throughout the test. High-speed photo-
graphic data (h00 frames per second) were obtained using a register
pin Milliken camera.

Approach

A total of eight tests were conducted on three test specimens. Each


specimen was run in a one-g and a zero-g environment, and a one-g and
zero-g test was repeated on two specimens to examine repeatability of the
data. The three specimens were the following:

Type i - Fan motor conductor bundle - four wires and white sleeving

F-42
Type 2 - Fan motor conductor bundle - four wires and clear shrink
sleeving

Type 3 - AluminumTeflon feed-through assembly - four wires and no


sleeving

The aluminumplate thickness for the Type 3 tests equaled that of


the fan motor case. This specimen was used to determine whether a flame
burning along the lead wires would continue through the aperture in a
simulated motor case, and whether the aluminumwould ignite.

Results

The zero-g linear propagation rate for fan motor wires in white
pigmented Teflon sleeving (Type l) was measuredas 0.12 in/sec, and for
the samewires in clear Teflon sleeving (Type 2), the rates in two sep-
arate tests were O.16 and 0.32 in/sec. The corresponding flame propaga-
tion rate at one-g for both types of wire bundles was 0.55 in/sec meas-
ured in three tests. These results are listed in table F3.6-I. The
flame in both zero-g and one-g tests pulsed as it spread along the wire
bundles with the flame markedly more vigorous in the one-g cases. In
all cases the Teflon was completely burned with little visible residue.
The flame propagation tests through an aluminumplate (Type 3)
showedthat the flame did not appear to have propagated through the Tef-
lon grommetedaperture under zero-g conditions, but did pass through at
one-g. Unfortunately, the pictures of the flames under zero-g were not
clear enough to be certain that the flame failed to propagate through
the aperture. Because the zero-g period lasts for less than 5 seconds
following ignition, it is possible that flame propagation through the
aperture would have been observed if more time at zero-g were available.
These results are also listed in table F3.6-I.

Conclusions

The flame propagation rate along Teflon insulation in zero-g is


reduced by about a factor of two from that observed in one-g. The
propagation rate along the fan motor lead bundle in zero-g is in the
range of 0.12 to 0.52 in/sec. These flame propagation rates are of a
magnitude which is consistent with the time required to account for the
duration of the pressure rise in the spacecraft oxygen tank.

F-h3
Figure F3.6-I.- 5-second drop vehicle.

F-44
!

Figure F3.6-2.- Experimental combustion apparatus.


!
g

Figure F3.6-3.- Typical test specimen installation in combustion chamber.


TABLE F3.6-I.- SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Average flame Comments


Run no. Test specimen Gravity level
spread rate, in/set

A-I-I Type i One 0.55 The specimens burned vigor-


A-I-2 Type 2 One O.55 ously. The flame progressed
A-l-6 Type i One O.55 along the specimens in a
pulsating fashion.

A-I-3 Type 2 Zero O.16 The specimens burned in zero-g


_J
! A-I-5 Type i Zero 0.12 but not as vigorously as in
A-I-7 Type 2 Zero 0.52 normal gravity. _le flame
pulsated along the specimens
in a similar way as in normal
gravity but at a slower over-
all rate.

A-I-8 Type 3 One The flame propagated through


the aluminum holder but did
not ignite it.

A-I-4 Type 3 Zero The flame could not be clearly


defined on the film. The
aluminum holder did not ignite.
PART F3.7

FULL-SCALE Si_._7LATED OXYGEN TAI,IK FiPJ_

Objectives

The purpose of this test was to simulate as closely as possible, in


a one-g environment, the processes that occurred during the failure of
oxygen tank no. 2 of Apollo 13. The data to be obtained include the
pressure and temperature history which results from the combustion of
Teflon wire insulation beginning at one of three likely ignition loca-
tions, as well as observing the manner in which the tank or conduit fails
and vents its contents.

Apparatus

A Block I oxygen tank was modified to Block II configuration. The


vacuum dome was removed and the tank was mounted in a vacuum sphere with
the appropriate size and length of tubing connected. The heaters were
disconnected and three hot-wire ignitors were installed. One ignitor was
located on the bottom fan motor leads, one on the top fan motor leads,
and another on the wire loop between the quantity probe and the heater-
fan support. The connecting tubing, filter, pressure transducer and
switch, relief valve, and regulator were flight-qualified hardware. The
tank was mounted so that the long axis of the quantity probe was hori-
zontal. Figure F3.7-I shows the tank mounted in the chamber. Two tele-
vision cameras and four motion picture cameras were mounted in the vacuum
chamber. One camera operates at 64 frames/sec, two at 250 frames/sec,
and another at 400 frames/sec. The two 250 frames/sec cameras were
operated in sequence.

Re sult s

The nichrome wire ignitor on the bottom fan motor leads was ignited.
The tank pressure rose from an initial value of 915 psia to 990 psia in
48 seconds after ignition. The temperature measured by the flight-type
resistance thermometer, mounted on quantity gage, rose 3 ° F from an
initial value of -202 ° to -199 ° F in this 48-second period. The tank
pressure reached approximately 1200 psia at 56 seconds after ignition and
apparently the flight pressure relief valve which was set to open at
1005 psia could not vent rapidly enough to check the tank pressure rise.
Two GSE pressure relief valves, set at higher pressures, apparently
helped to limit the tank pressure to 1200 psia. The tank temperature
rose abruptly after 48 seconds, following ignition, from -199 ° to -170 ° F
in 3 seconds. After this time the temperature read off-scale above

F-48
2000 ° F. Failure of the temperature measuring wiring is indicated by
the erratic readings that followed. These data are shown in figure
F3.7-2. The pressure data shown beyond 56 seconds represent the vent-
ing of the tank contents. These pressure and temperature histories are
qualitatively similar to the measured flight data but occur more rapidly
than observed in flight.

The conduit failed close to where it attaches to the tank closure


plate about 57 seconds after ignition (fig. F3.7-3). The two 250-frame/
sec cameras and the 6h-frame/sec camera failed to operate during this
test. However, the 400-frame/sec camera suggests that the first mater-
ial to issue from the ruptured conduit was accompanied by bright flame.
The tank pressure declined from 1175 psia to 725 psia in 1 second fol-
lowing conduit rupture. High oxygen flow rates were observed from the
conduit breach for about 15 seconds. A posttest examination of the rup-
tured conduit showed that the expulsion of the tank contents was limited
by the 1/2-inch-diameter aperture in the tank closure plate. An exami-
nation of the internal components of the tank showed complete combustion
of the Teflon insulation on the motor lead wires as well as almost com-
plete combustion of the glass-filled Teflon sleeve. This is shown in
figure F3.7-h.

Conclusions

The qualitative features of the pressure and temperature rises in


oxygen tank no. 2 have been simulated by initiating Teflon wire insula-
tion combustion on the lower fan motor lead wire bundle. The time from
ignition of the total combustion process in the simulated tank fire is
about three-fourths to one-half the time realized in the spacecraft
accident. The conduit housing the electrical leads failed near the
weld and resulted in a limiting exit area from the tank of about
1/2 inch diameter. The venting history is characteristic of the expul-
sion of liquid for the first l-l/2 seconds. This was followed by a
two-phase flow process.

F-49
Figure F3.7-I.- Posttest oxygen tank setup.

F-50
1200

ii00

- i000
Jl i C
-165
Ogu C
g Q
rGSE tank pressure gage 0

-175 - _J 900

! u. Flight type pressure gage


k_n o

_2
-185 800 [)
E
I.- (
¢
-195 700

O0 o
O0 0
--Flight 0type 0
teiperature 0gage 0 0 0
-205 - 600
i0 20 30 40 50 60

Time after ignition, sec

Figure F3.7-2.- Measured pressure and temperature time histories


(preliminary data as of June 4, 1970).
!

(a) Wide-angle view.


Figure F3.7-3.- View of failed conduit.
(b) Closeup view.
Figure F3.7-3.- Concluded.

F-53
i_.
C_

_-j

o
ce
c+
®
c_
c_-

i._°
!
ce
CD

c+

©
(I)

c+
PART F3.8

ANALYSIS OF FLOW FROM RUPTURED OXYGEN TANK

Objective

The objective of this analysis was to compute the real gas discharge
rate from the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 and provide the subsequent pres-
sure history of various service module volumes.

Assumptions

i. Oxygen remains in equilibrium at all times. The oxygen prop-


erties were obtained from the tabulations and plots of references 2 and
3.

2. All orifice coefficients were taken to be unity and the orifices


assumed to be choked.

3. All volumes and areas are invariant with time.

4. The effective volume of the oxygen tank is 4.7 ft 3 and is not


changed by combustion processes.

5. All processes are isentropic both inside the oxygen tank and
also between the oxygen tank and its discharge orifice.

6. Oxygen thermodynamic properties (p, p, h) are uniform through-


out any given individual volume at any time.

7. The processes in volumes external to the oxygen tank are adia-


batic. The total enthalpy in these volumes is equal to the average en-
thalpy of all prior discharged oxygen. Each volume acts as a plenum
chamber for its respective vent orifice.

8. The initial tank conditions at t _ 0 are _ = 900 psi;


P = 47.4 ib/ft3; T = -190 ° F.

Method

Computations were based on several manually generated cross plots


of the thermodynamic properties, correlations of intermediate computed
results; and analytical and numerical integrations involving these

F-55
correlations. Choked orifice states were obtained by maximizing pu
for a given entropy•

Results

Figure F3.8-I shows the mass flow rate per unit of effective orifice
area plotted as a function of time. The two time scales shown are appli-
cable to effective orifice diameters of 0.5 inch and 2.0 inches.

Figure F3.8-2 plots the total mass discharged from the oxygen tank
against the same two time scales.

Figures F3.8-3 and F3.8-4 are plots of pressure time histories for
various combinations of secondary volumes and orifices. The time scale
in this case is only applicable to the 2-inch diameter exit orifice in
the oxygen tank. The combinations of V and A* shown in figure F3.8-3
were chosen to roughly simulate the components of the SM as follows:

i. V = 25 ft 3 A* = 2.08 ft 2 (300 in 2) Simulates net volume


of the oxygen shelf in bay 4 with effective venting of 300 in 2.

2. V = 67 ft 3, A* = 2.08 ft 2 (300 in 2). Simulates the bay 4


2
oxygen shelf and fuel cell shelf combined volume with venting of 300 in .

3. V = 67 ft 3 A* = 1.39 ft 2 (200 in 2) Same as case 2 but

reduced venting area to rest of service module.

4. V = i00 ft 3 A* = 43 ft 2 (62-1/2 in 2) Simulates entire

bay 4 with small venting.

5- V = 200 ft 3, A* = .L3 ft 2 (62-1/2 in 2). Simulates combined

bay 4 and tunnel volumes with venting past rocket nozzle only.

Also plotted are reference curves for each of the above volumes
without any venting (A* = 0).

Case i has a very rapid initial pressure rise with time due to the
small volume (25 ft 3) of the oxygen shelf. However, the mass efflux from
this volume also increases rapidly with time so that it equals the influx
at t = 0.18 second and the pressure peaks at approximately 8.8 psia.

*If the tank were initially at p _ i000 psi and the same entropy,
then with a 2-inch diameter orifice the pressure would drop to 900 psi
in 0.004 second with the discharge of i ib oxygen.
m

F-56
1.6XlO4
1.6xlO 4

1.4 1.4
tn
I

%
_. 1.2
1.2

*c_. 1.0
(u
co
, 1.0

0.8
E

% 0.8 i J i
0.6
0 .04 .08 .12

Time for 2 in. hole, sec


0.6

0 4 8 12 16 20

Time for 1/2 in. hole, sec

0.4

0.2

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

Time scale for 2 in. hole, sec

I I I I I I 1 1 I I I I I
0 2 4 6 8 i0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Time scale for 1/2 in. hole, sec

Figure F3.8-I.- Mass flow per unit area against time


for 2 inch and 0.5 inch orifices.

F-57
140

120

lO0

./
c
c_ 20

80
o

04
0

"6 o i0
t_

60

! I

•04 .08 1.2


40
Time for2 in. hole,sec

L ! A I I

0 5 i0 15 20

2O Time for1/2 in. hole,sec

0
0 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4

Time scale for 2 in. hole, sec


! I I I

0 10 20 30

Time scale for 1/2 in. hole, sec

Figure F3.8-2.- Mass of oxygen expelled from tank against time.

F-58
I I
2 in. dia A; ft 2
44 /
/"
40 , IL_p _...,,---f /K_v=67
36 A'=O
/
l/- v=2s
A*=O / /
32

f
/ //
k__ V = i00
A" = 0
•_ 28

v=25 /
/ //
J
'8
1.. 24
1./"1
-A" = 2.08/I /. ,--- v = 100
I
13_
20
',_n

16
/ / f " / _"" _ V "- '200
A" =0
_2 .. =-_-_- - _
8 -- -_- ::'_-- " -_ -V=200

41']xt V=67 1
_--V= 67
A ° = 1.39
A" = .43

/ A" = 2.08
o I I
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
Time, sec

Figure F3.8-3.- Pressure rise against time.


12
/v = 25 / v = loo i_ .43loo
/
A*=O V=67 A*=O I
/ V=67
A*= 1.39

V=25 / V,- 200


0

.-_--..._.°_7_/_
.43
=
U3
ffl

I
O'x
o I" I /j /,rs_¢ /_
2 in. dia A*[t 2

i/-

0
0 0.i 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6

Time, sec

Figure F3.8-h.- Pressure rise against time (expanded scale).


The pressure of case 2, with V = 67 ft 3, rises less rapidly and
consequently peaks at a later time (t = 0.32 sec) and a lower peak
pressure (p _ 7.2 psi).

When the vent area for V = 67 ft 3 is decreased from 300 in 2 to


200 in 2 (case 3), the pressure rises more rapidly, peaks at a longer
time (t _ 0.45 sec), and has a higher peak pressure (p _ 9.8 psia).

The large volume solutions with minimum vent areas (cases 4 and 5)
have higher peak pressures (p _ 18 and 12 psia) occurring at much larger
times (t = i.i and 1.5 sec).

Discussion and Conclusions

These "quasi-steady" two-volume, two-orifice, adiabatic calcula-


tions do not predict pressures in excess of 20 psia for a 2-inch diameter
effective orifice in the oxygen tank. In fact, if the two larger volume
simulations (cases 4 and 5) are excluded due to unrealistically low vent-
ing areas and/or the long time rise, then the maximum predicted pressure
is below i0 psia. The smaller volumes representative of the oxygen shelf,
or the oxygen shelf plus fuel cell shelf (which is fairly well inter-
vented to the oxygen shelf) have shorter rise times which are more rep-
resentative of the implied "time to panel failure" of Apollo 13. The
effective venting area of these volumes is also more realistic.

On the basis of these approximate calculations, the following


alternative possibilities might be considered:

i. The panel failure pressure is below i0 psi. Other experiments


show this low failure pressure level to be unlikely.

2. The dynamic unsteady pressures exceed the computed quasi-steady


pressures. A non-uniform pressure distribution with internal moving
pressure waves is considered very probable with their importance being
larger for the smaller times and volumes.

3. The oxygen tank orifice had an effective diameter greater than


2 inches. During the discharge of the first 9 pounds of oxygen, the
orifice was choked with nearly saturated liquid oxygen and the coeffi-
cient was probably nearer 0.6 than i. Thus an effective 2-inch diameter
would require an even larger physical hole during this time.

F-61
4. The processes in the oxygen tank were not isentropic in a
fixed volume. Either continued combustion inside the oxygen tank or
the presence of a bubble of combustion products at the time of initial
gas release could prevent the computed rapid decrease in mass flow with
time (fig. F5.8-I) and therby increase the pressure rise rate and the
peak pressure.

5. The processes in the external volume (V) are not adiabatic.


Combustion of the Mylar insulation has been estimated to produce large
pressures (several atmospheres) if the combustion process is rapid
enough.

6. The oxygen processes are not in equilibrium. The possibility


of super-satruation of the oxygen discharged into the bay and subse-
quent flashing to vapor might produce a strong pressure pulse.

F-62
PART F3.9

MYLAR-INSULATION COMBUSTION TEST

Objective

The purpose of this test was to determine the ignition properties


and measure the rate of combustion of Mylar insulation in an initially
evacuated simulated oxygen shelf space. The conditions of this test
are achieved by ejection of oxygen from a iO00 psia/-19 O° F oxygen sup-
ply with ignition by pyrofuses placed on the Mylar blanket at several
locations.

Apparatus

The basic dimensions and arrangement of the apparatus are shown in


figure F3.9-I. An end view of the apparatus is shown in figure F3.9-2.
Mylar blank material is placed on the bottom shelf. Oxygen is supplied
through a regulator into a simulated tank dome volume. The dome contains
a 2-inch diameter rupture disc which is designed to open at 80 psi.
Pressures are measured during the course of combustion process. High-
speed motion pictures are obtained through window ports in the chamber.
The chamber volume and vent area simulate the oxygen tank shelf space.

Approach

Oxygen is supplied from a cryogenic source which is initially at


i000 psia/-190 ° F. Oxygen flows for a controlled time into the dome
volume. The 2-inch disc ruptures at 80 psi. This exposes the initially
evacuated chamber and its contents to a mixture of liquid and gaseous
oxygen. A series of pyrofuses are then ignited in sequence. The data
include high-speed motion pictures and pressure-time histories.

Results

A test in which oxygen was allowed to flow for 3 seconds from an


initially i000 psia/-19 O° F source resulted in complete combustion of a

14.5 ft 2 Mylar blanket sample. Five pyrofuses located at various loca-


tions on the Mylar blanket were sequentially activated at times ranging
between 0.3 and 1.4 seconds after the disc ruptured. Examination of the
chamber after this run showed that all of the Mylar blanket was consumed.
The pressure rise rate with the addition of oxygen but before ignition
was approximately 6 psi/sec. Ignition occurs when the pressure rises to

F-63
about i0 psi with subsequent combustion which causes a sharp increase in
the pressure rise rate. The rate of pressure rise during the combustion
process reaches approximately 42 psi/sec. The initial pressure rise rate
of 6 psi/sec also corresponds to a measuredrise rate obtained in an
earlier test in which combustion did not occur. The pressure data are
shown in figure F3.9-3. 'lhe conditions in the chamberbefore the test
are shown in figure F3.9-4. Figure F3.9-5 showsthe chamber just after
the test.

Conclusion

The Mylar insulation blanket burns completely when ignited locally


and exposed simultaneously to oxygen from a i000 psi/-190 ° F source.
The pressure rise rate increases from 6 psi/sec without combustion to
about 42 psi/sec with the combustion of Mylar. A substantial increase
in the pressure rise rate in the oxygen tank shelf space due to Mylar
combustion might therefore be expected. From tests conducted elsewhere,
it is further concluded that an ignition source is required to achieve
Mylar/oxygen combustion.

_-64
77snLI
1 inch tube 0 2 supply , Iowout disc
_/_ 20 ft

g orifice

---t--
19.5 in. dia vent
Pome
300 in. 2

I
ox _-To
29in.
I.D. vacuum
pump

42 in.

Floor

2 in. dia rupture disc, Ignitors


80 psi

Figure F3.9-I.- Assembly of test fixture.


0 2 supply

Mylar
',amera
port

Floor

Figure F3.9-2.- Section through test fixture.

F-66
7O
[]
nO

6O

Run 5, mylar combustion

5O

.5

4O

3O
I e- E

-q __ Ln
@J _- "o
= 13/ _ k..-. Run 3, no combustion
2O
_3_._.¢_=_. _ = /;' -o .................
0 _ _ uq

>= 14-C...2-= _o., _. -6 --_


10

N, o

I I I
0
0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7

Time, sec

Figure F3.9-3.- Measured pressure histories for runs with and without Mylar combustion
(initial oxygen tank temperature for Run 3 was -186 ° F and for Run 5 was -192 ° F).
!

O_
co

Figure F3.9-4.- View of chamber conditions before test.


!

_O

Figure F3.9-5.- View of chamber conditions after test.


PART F3. i0

PA}_L SEPARATION TESTS

Objectives

The objective of these tests was to demonstrate complete separation


of the SM bay 4 cover panel in a manner that could be correlated with
flight conditions. The panel failure mechanism and the pressure distri-
bution that resulted in separation were also to be determined.

Approach

An experimental and analytical program utilizing one-half scale dynamic


models of the SM bay 4 cover panel was conducted. Panels were attached
through replica-scaled joints to a test fixture that simulated pertinent SM
geometry and volume. Venting was provided between compartments and to
space. A high-pressure gas system was used to rapidly build up pressure
behind the cover panel as the input force leading to failure.

Size of the dynamic models (one-half scale) was determined primarily


by material availability. The use of full-scale materials and fabrication
techniques in the model was dictated by the need to duplicate a failure
mechanism. Therefore, similarity laws for the response of structures led
to scale factors of one-half for model time and one-eighth (one-half cubed)
for model mass. From these scale factors for the fundamental units, some
of the derived model to full-scale ratios are as follows:

Displacement = 1/2 Force = 1/4


Velocity = i Pressure = 1
Acceleration = 2 Stress = 1
Area = i/4 Energy = 1/8
Volume = 1/8 Momentum = 1/8

A step-by-step approach to testing led to rapid learning as new factors


were introduced. Initial tests were conducted on isotropic panels that
scaled only membrane properties while more completely scaled sandwich
panels were being fabricated. Testing started in atmosphere while prepara-
tions for vacuum testing were underway. In a similar manner, first tests
concentrated on determining the pressure input required for separation and
deferred the simulation of internal flow required to produce these distri-
butions to later tests.

Analysis of the one-half scale bay 4 cover panel models used two com-
puter programs. Initial dynamic response calculations using a nonlinear
elastic finite difference program indicated that panel response was

F-70
essentially static for the class of pressure loadings expected in the
tests. Subsequent calculations used static loadings with a nonlinear
elastic finite element representation and the NASTRAN computer program.

Apparatus

Models.- Figure F3.10-1 shows the full-scale and model panel cross
sections.

7].78-T6
7075-T6
0.010 in. 0.030 in. 0.006 in. 0.016 in.
7075-T6
, _ _ 7075-T6
0.032 in.
I, ,I,li,'_\ 0.060 _n. '11_ 1¢1_'_10.032 in.

I=_lll
ill/. !
,I,,1',1
t l,
!,!..
!!!, ,I 71 i' _;11I 1
ill,ll'; L_-_
11 0.012 in. 0.006 in.
0.020 in. 0.010 in. 0.016 in.
2024-T3 7075-T6
2024-T81 7178-T6 2024-T3
Alclad
1/8 in. × 0.008 in. core
3/16 in. X 0.0015 in. core

(b) DM model. (c) HS model.


(a) Full scale.

Figure F3.10-1.- Panel designs.

The full-scale panel is a honeycomb sandwich structure with a z-bar edge


closeout attached to the SM by i/4-inch bolts around the edges and to each
of the bay 4 shelves. The first one-half scale panel models, designated
DM and shown in figure F3.10-l(b), scaled membrane properties of the
full-scale sandwich panel inner and outer face sheets with a single iso-
tropic panel having the correct nominal ultimate tensile strength. The
z-bar was simulated by a flat bar that represented the shear area of the
outer z-bar flange. Fastener sizes, bolt patterns, and bonding material
were duplicated from full scale.

One-half size honeycomb sandwich panels, designated HS and shown in


figure F3.10-1(c), scaled both bending stiffness and membrane stiffness.
Although core density of the sandwich models is slightly high, the dimen-
sions, materials, bonding, and z-bar closeout are scaled. Some alloy
substitutions were made but nominal strength requirements were met.

F-ZI
Test fixture.- The test fixture shown schematicaliy in figure F_.IO-2
and in the photographs of figure F3.10-3 is a one-half size boilerplate
mockup of the SM bay 4 and central tunnel. Vent areas connect the bay 4
shelf spaces to the central tunnel and to each other. The tunnel also has

Volume Description
1 Pressurization tank
2 Fuel cell space
3 02 Tank space
4 Upper H2 tank space
5 Lower H2 tank space
6 Tunnel
7 Other SM free volume

Figure F3.i0-2.- Schematic of test fixture.

vents to space and to a large tank simulating the remaining free volume
of the SM. Vent areas were adjusted in initial tests to obtain desired
pressure distributions but were scaled from the best available data for
final testing. The fixture also holds the pressurization system and in-
strumentation. True free volume was approached by adding several wooden
mockups of equipment.

Pressurization system.- The pressurization system can also be seen in


the photographs of figure F_.IO-3. A 3000-psi accumulator is discharged
on command through an orifice by mechanically rupturing a diaphragm. The
gas expands into the oxygen shelf space of bay 4 through a perforated
diffuser. In order to obtain uniform pressure over the entire panel for
some tests, the diffuser was lowered so that it discharged into both the
oxygen and hydrogen shelf spaces. For these particular tests, extra vent
area was provided between all shelves to insure uniform pressure throughout
bay 4. For most tests, a shield was placed between the diffuser and panel
to minimize direct impingement.

Other.- Instrumentation consisted of strain gages, fast response


pressure sensors, and high-speed motion picture cameras. Atmospheric
tests were conducted in the Rocket Test Cell and vacuum tests at imm Hg
pressure in the 60-Foot Vacuum Sphere at Langley Research Center.

F-72
(b) Fixture with pamel In$1alled.
(a) _al vieW.

Shelf

H2 Shelf

(cI Internal view.

Figure F3.10-3.- One-half size boilerplate mockup


of the SM bay _ and central tunnel.

F-73
Results and Discussion

Presentation of results.- The test program is summarized in


table F3.10-I. Typical failures and pressure-time histories are illus-
trated in figure F3.10-4. Figure F3.10-5 is a sequence of prints from
high-speed movie cameras that demonstrate separation of the sandwich
panel models. Results of NASTRAN calculations on the one-half scale
models are presented in figures F3.10-6 and F3.10-7.

Demonstration of panel separation.- Panel separation has been demon-


strated with both membrane and sandwich panels. Two sandwich panels
separated completely from the test fixture during vacuum tests. Two
membrane panels, although less representative of flight conditions, also
separated completely in vacuum tests. However, similar tests with mem-
brane panels in atmosphere left portions of panels attached to the test
fixture as illustrated in figures F3.10-h(b) and (c). Complete separa-
tion in atmosphere could not be achieved due to mass and drag of the
air.

Pressure distributions.- Complete membrane panel separation was


achieved only with nearly uniform pressure distribution over the entire
bay h panel cover, shown in figure F3.10-h(d). When Just the oxygen
shelf space experienced high pressures, membrane panel separation was
localized to the area of the panel over the oxygen shelf space as shown
in figure F3.10-2(a). This type of local failure occurred in both at-
mosphere and vacuum. When scaled internal venting was introduced,
model DM-10 lost a slightly larger portion of panel due to high pressure
experienced by both the oxygen shelf and fuel cell shelf spaces while
the rest of bay 4 was at low pressure.

F-%
Diffuser-.. " i_
-F v L_

Panel fragments- __._


G_

riLL_
<3

I
-.l
',51

0 40 0 4O
0 40
Time, msec Time, msec
Time, msec
b. Membrane panel DM-3, c. Membrane panel DM-4, atmosphere,
a. Membrane panel DM-2,
atmosphere, uniform load uniform load, no direct impingement
-i.mosphere, band load

Figure F3.10-4.- Failure modes and pressure-time histories.


=

l L 03
om
U3

i , , i i , , i i i i i , i i i i I | I

. , I , • . , 1 L I . , , i i 1
0 40 0 100 200 0 40
Time, msec Time, msec Time, msec
d. Membrane panel DM-6, vacuum, e. Sandwich panel HS-2, f. Sandwich panel HS-3,
uniform load, no direct impingement vacuum, no direct impingement vacuum, no direct impingement

Figure F3.10-4.- Concluded.


t= 0.012 [= 0.015
t=O t = 0.003 t= 0.005 t= 0.0065 t= 0.0105
(c) Sandwich panel HS-2.

_j
!

t= 0.0045 t= 0.0065 t= 0.0115 t= 0.014 t = O. 0245


t=O t = 0.003
(b) Sandwich panel HS-3.

t= 0.0025 t= 0.0035 t= 0.007 t= 0.009 t= 0.013 t= 0.015


t=O
(a) Membrane panel D[V1-6.

Figure F_.IO-5.- Sequemtial failure of two sandwich and one membrane


panel (t = time from first observed failure).
_OO

8OO

6OO

4OO

2OO

Pe_k Pressure (psU

Figure F3.10-6.- Maximum edge load on half-scale honeycomb panel


as predicted by NASTRAN.

TYPICAL INITIAL FAILURE FOR


[SOTROP]C PANELS

1470 Ib/in

Asst/m_
870 Ib/in 02 Shelf Initial Failur _ _ Sl111f
33 psi , 3psl
/ ..........

Final (_ser_
• Failure
(I$o(r®ic Penel)

A_ A'-_

155'0 lb/in
14.5 psi _ Psi

0.) Shelf Assumed 0 Z Shelf


IITO Ib/in
;R) psi Intt_ll Failure Z9 psi

M. 5 psi

,g_je "e*"
H

Figure F3.10-7.- Distribution of edge loads on half-scale


Apollo 13 honeycomb panel as predicted by NASTRAN.

F-78
TABLE
F3.10-1.- PANEL
SEPARATION
TESTSUMMARY

Volume Pressure*
Internal Failure
Model first Diffuser Peak, Rise time,
vents
pre s suri zed character
Load psi I sec

Atmosphere tests

DM-l-1 Not scaled Oxygen shelf Open Band 24-30 0.020 None

DM-1-2 Not scaled Oxygen shelf Open Band 30-58 0.005 Oxygen shelf area

DM-2 Not scaled Oxygen shelf Open Band 34-52 0.006 Oxygen shelf area

DM-3 Not scaled Bay 4 Open Uniform 15-35 0.015 Nearly total (folded back)

DM-4 Not scaled Bay 4 Shielded Uniform 20-26 0.016 Nearly total (left edges)

Vacuum tests

_J Shielded Uniform 14-20 None


I DM-5-1 Not scaled Bay 4
kO Shielded Uniform 20-28 0.016 Total
DM-5-2 Not scaled Bay 4

DM-6 Not scaled Bay 4 Shielded Uniform 19-27 0.018 Total

DM-7 Not scaled Oxygen shelf Open Band 25-40 0.005 Oxygen shelf area

DM-8 Not scaled Oxygen shelf Shielded Band 20-37 0.012 Oxygen shelf area

DM-9 Not scaled Oxygen shelf Shielded Band 18-23 0.040 None

DM-IO Scaled Oxygen shelf Shielded - 21-39 0.070 Upper 2/3 of panel

HS-1 Scaled Oxygen shelf Shielded None

HS-2 Scaled Oxygen shelf Shielded - 23-32 0.190 Total

HS-3 Scaled Oxygen shelf Shielded - 30-67 0.020 Total

HS-4 Scaled Oxygen shelf Shielded - 3o-44 o.o2o None

*Range of peak pressures in the oxygen shelf space is indicated. Time from pressure release to peak
pressure is rise time.
Complete separation of sandwich panels has been obtained with both
uniform and nonuniform pressure distributions. Figure F3.10-8 shows the
type of pressure time histories experienced by various sections of the
panels. The pressure predictions are based on the internal flow model

Pressure

/ .-.-.- _. ; _ _ _ :-_-Fuel cell shelf space

r .-'" .-" _-RestofBay4

-.02 -.20
Time, sec

Figure F3.10-8.- Pressure build-up in bay 4.

of the Apollo 13 SM shown in figure F3.10-2 and have been verified in


these experiments. Peak pressure levels were varied from test to test
but the curve shape was always similar. One sandwich panel separated
after about 0.02 second during the initial pressure rise in the oxygen
shelf space, while overall panel loading was highly nonuniform as shown
in figure F3.10-4(b). The other sandwich panel did not separate until
about 0.19 second after all bay 4 compartments had time to fill with gas
and arrive at a much more uniform loading, as shown in figure F3.10-4(e).

The effect of pressure distribution on peak pressures required for


failure is shown by the NASTRAN calculation in figure F3.10-6. Included
for reference is the linear membrane result, N = pR. The load required
for edge failure was determined from tensile tests on specimens of the
DM model joints. The peak uniform pressure at failure initiation is only
75 percent of peak pressure at the failure load with just the oxygen
shelf space pressurized.

Failure mechanism.- The failure mechanism for complete separation of


a membrane panel is demonstrated by the photographic sequence in
figure F3.10-5(a). Pailure is probably initiated by a localized high
pressure near the edge of the oxygen shelf space. A crack formed where
a shelf bolt head pulled through and rapidly propagated through the
panel. Expansion of the pressurizing gas through the openings accelerated

F-80
panel fragments to very high velocities. Inertia loads from the high
acceleration completed the separation. Membranepanels were observed to
separate in three pieces--one large and two small fragments.
The failure of a sandwich panel under uniform loading in vacuumis
shown in the picture sequenceof figure F3.10-5(c). F_ilure started at
the edge of the oxygen shelf space by pull-through of the edge bolts
through the upper sandwich face sheet. Very rapid tearout along three
edges followed, primarily by tension in the face sheets and tearing of
the core material from the z-bar at the edge. The panel then rotated
like a door and separated from the test fixture in one piece.
Nonuniform loading of a sandwich panel led to the failure shown in
figure F3.10-5(b). Initial failure was at the panel edge near the fuel
cell shelf. Tearout along one edge and the top rapidly followed, similar
to the previous failure. However, the edge tear stopped before reaching
the bottom and becamea diagonal rip that left the lower third of the
panel attached to the fixture. The upper two-thirds of the panel then
rotated door-like and separated. Finally, a vertical tear propagated
through the center of the remaining fragment_ the bottom tore out_ and
rapid rotation separated the remnants in two pieces.
Figure F3.10-7 relates NASTRAN calculations to the observed failures.
Predicted edge load direction and magnitude are illustrated for two
pressure distributions. In figure F3.10-7, parts A-I and B-I, panel edges
are assumedfixed, while in figure F3.10-7, parts A-2 and B-2, the panel
edge joint along the oxygen shelf space is assumedto have failed. Also
shown in figure F3.10-7, parts A-2 and B-2, are typical observed failure
patterns for these types of loadings on membranepanels. An enlargement
of the dotted section of figure F3.10-7, part A-2, is shown in part C of
the figure to indicate the type of edge failure observed. Arrows indicate
the direction of force required to cause the pullout failures. The NASTRAN
edge force patterns are consistent with these failures. In addition,
figure F3.10-7, parts A-2 and B-2, indicates that tears into the membrane
panels tend to remain normal to the direction of the edge forces.
Correlation with flight.- Tests with sandwich panels more closely
similate flight conditions than tests with membrane panels due to initial
failure characteristics and post-failure separation behavior. The separa-
tion behavior of sandwich model HS-3, figures F3.10-4(f) and F3.10-5(b),
is also believed to be more representative of flight than the separation
behavior of model HS-2, figures F3.10-4(e) and F3.10-5(c), for two
reasons. First, although model HS-2 was tested with scaled internal
venting between the compartments of bay 4 and the SM tunnel, the rest of
the SM free volume had been closed. In the HS-3 model test, this vent
area had been opened to a realistic value of 60 square inches. Second,
the slow pressure buildup before separation of model HS-2 allowed SM
tunnel pressure to rise well above the lO-psi limitation required to

F-81
prevent CM-SMseparation. Pressurization leading to model HS-3 separation
was so rapid (20 milliseconds) that SM tunnel pressure remained below the
lO-psi limit. The time to failure would scale up to 40 milliseconds for
the flight configuration.

Tests with models HS-3 and HS-4 have bracketed the most likely separa-
tion conditions. For both tests, internal venting was scaled and diffuser
configuration and accumulator pressure were identical. Model HS-3 sep-
arated due to an initial air flow of 190 ib/sec through an orifice of
2.85 square inches. Separation was not achieved on model HS-4 when initial
air flow was 135 ib/sec through a 2.0-square inch orifice, even though peak
pressures of over 95 psi occurred in the oxygen shelf space after 20 milli-
seconds.

As a part of this study, an analysis has also been carried out at the
Langley Research Center to estimate the distribution and time history of
pressures within the Apollo 13 service module. Based on these calculations
and the experimental results on panel separation, it appears that ad-
ditional combustion outside the oxygen tank or rapid flashing of ejected
liquid oxygen may have occurred to produce panel separation. A report of
this analysis can be found in the official file of the Review Board.

Conclusions

Complete separation of one-half scale honeycomb sandwich models of


the bay 4 cover panel in vacuum has been demonstrated. Separation was
achieved by rapid air pressurization of the oxygen shelf space. Internal
volumes and vent areas of the SM were scaled. Separations were obtained
with both uniform and nonuniform pressure distributions. The separation
resulting from a nonuniform loading that peaks 20 milliseconds after start
of pressurization (40 milliseconds full scale) correlates best with hypo-
theses and data from flight. This particular panel separated in three
pieces after an initial tear along the sides that allowed it to open like
a door. Inertial loads are a major factor in obtaining complete separa-
tion after initial failure.

F-82
PART F4

MASTER LIST OF TESTS AND ANALYSES

This part presents a listing of tests and analyses grouped according


to the following event categories:

Shelf Drop

Detanking

Quantity Gage Dropout

Short Generation

Ignition

Propagation of Combustion

Pressure Rise

Temperature Rise

Pressure Drop

Final Instrument Loss

Telemetry Loss

Tank Failure

Oxygen Tank No. 1 Pressure Loss

Panel Loss

Side Effects

Mi sce llane ous

F-83
MAS'-ER LIST OF TESTS AND ANALYSES

[By Event ]

Number (T/A)
Location Title _jective - Description Status - Results - R_marks
Monitors

"SHELF DROP"

13-T-55(T) Determine energy required to produce a dent


Tank Impact Test C - May 26, 1970. A load of 7g was re-
MSC
in tank dome and determine the approximate quired to produce a dent in the tank shelf
P. Glynn input g level to tank.
R, Lindley

I}-T-60 Quantity Gage Rivet Apply incrementally increasing force to the C - April 27, 1970. Shortly after a load
MSC Test
load rivet supporting the quantity probe of 105 ib was applied, a decrease to 90 ib
P. Glynn concentric tubes until the rivet fails.
was noted, indicating a failure. When the
S. Himmel
X-ray the rivet during significant failure load was increased to 120 ib, the rivet
! stages to show the failure mechanism.
failed by bending and subsequently pulling
OO
4¢- through the probe tubing.

A-92(T) Shock Load Failure Determine by test the shock load at which C - May 8, 1970. The four machine screws
LRC Test of Fan Motor the four 4-40 x 1/4-inch steel fan mounting started yielding between 2OOOg and 2500g
R. Herr Mounting Screws screws fail.
with complete failure in tension between
R. Lindley
4OOOg and 420Og with an attached 0.875-ib
mass.

DETANKING

15-T-O7RS(T)
Apollo 15 Oxygen De- Determine the effects on the tank wiring ECD - June 18, 1970. Test in progress.
Beech A/C tanking Simulation and components of the detanking sequence
S. Owens
with the Inconel sleeve and Teflon block
K. Heimburg displaced in the top probe assembly,

LEGEND: (T) - Test (A) - ,_Jalyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Date TBD - To Be Determined

NASA--MSC

MSC Form }45 (OT)


MASTER LIST OF TESTS AND ANALYSES

[By Event ]

Number (T/A)
Location Title Objective - Description Status - Results - Remarks
Monitors

DETANKING

15-T-OSRI (T) Bench Test of Oxygen Determine whether the electrical loads and C - May 15, 1970. Maximum temperature of
MSC Tank Conduit pressure cycling during KSC detanking the conduit (at the midpoint) reached
C. Propp raised the wire temperature in the conduit 325 ° F. Pressure cycling of the tank did
K. He imburg to damaging levels. not raise the temperature significantly.
Inspection showed no degradation. Test re-
sults will be confirmed by TPS 15-T-O7R3(T_

13-T-19(T) Ground Support Identify contaminants (oil and glass beads) C - April 20, 1970. This test showed that
NR Equipment Filter found in GSE filter pads during Apollo 13 the filter assembly did not contribute to
J. Jones Analysis
I oxygen tanking at KSC and determine if the the system malfunction. Oxygen-compatible
CO K. Heimburg filter material could be responsible for lubricant was found on filter.
k]l the failure to detank.

13-T-20(T) Heater Cycle Test Determine if the oxygen tank heater cycled C - May i, 1970. Test results indicate
KSC at KSC
during the 7-hour period of prelaunch de- that heater cycling would cause voltage
H. Lamberth
tanking at KSC. drop on other channels. The prelaunch
K. Heimburg records during detanking show that the
heaters did not cycle but remained con-
tinuously "on."

I_-T-_3(T) Heater Assembly Determine if the heater temperatures could C - May 26, 1970. Tests indicate heater
MSC Temperature Profile have been high enough during the KSC de- surface could reach i000 ° F. Wire conduit
C. Propp tanking to degrade the fan motor lead wire could reach 750 ° F. Teflon insulation was
K. He imburg insulation. Tests are to be carried out
damaged. A second detanking test resulted
using nitrogen. in thermal switch failure in the closed
position with 65 V dc applied.

LEGEND: (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Date TBD - To Be Determined

NASA--MSC

Mac For_ 343 (OT)


K&S[ER LI3T OF TESIt; A_ ANALYSES

[_y Event ]

Num,,er
(T/A)
Location Title Objective - Description Status - Results - Remarks
Monitors

DETANKING

19-T-80 Thermostatic Switch Determine the voltage and current levels at C - June 5, 1970. Tie thermostatic
MSC Failure Tests which the thermostatic switches weld shut
switches fail to open where currents ex-
C. Propp
in the closed position when they attempt to
H. Mark ceeding 1.5 amps at 65 V dc are passed
open in response to temperatures exceeding through them. The heater current used in
80 c F.
the special detanking procedure at KSC was
7 amps at 65 V dc, well in excess of the
measured failure current.

A-15(T) Blowdow-n Character-


Determine the Oleeddown time from 250 psig C - May 15, 1970. The test proved that
! KSC istics of Oxygen using GSE at KSC with the proper configura-
CO T. Sasseen Tanks both tanks did depressurize in practically
O_ tion for one tank and the fill tube com- identical times considering the difference
E. Baehr
pletely disconnected for the other tank.
in vent lines and back pressure. The test
refuted the earlier assumption of a time
difference between the different tank con-
figurations. The significance is that
blowdown data are not sensitive enough to
determine the fill tube configuration.

QUANTITY GAGE DROPOUT

13-T-30(T) Quantity Gage and Determine the signal conditioner response


MSC C - May 22, 1970. The quantity gage signal
Signal Conditioner under extreme transient conditions of am-
R. Robinson Test conditioner deviated less than 0.85 percent
bient temperature, determine quar_tity gage under extreme temperature excursions, the
R. Wells
failure indications, and define transient
response of the gage so various electrical
and stead_'-state energy levels supplied to
faults was catalogued, and an analysis of
every possible fault condition.
the energy level of faults was made. The
significance of this test is that it per-
mits interpretation of abnormal quantity
gage readings at the time of the accident
and eliminates the gage as a probable
source of ignition.

LEGE_YJ: (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Date TBD - To Be Determined

MSC Form }49 (OT) NASA--MSC


MASTER
LISTOFTES!'S
AND AiiALYSES
[By Event ]

Number (T/A) Status - Results - Remarks


Location Title Objective - l_scription
Monitors

SHORT GENERATION

13-T-II(T) Fan Motor Inductive Determine the amount of stored energy re- C - May 7, 1970. The test showed a power
MSC Voltage Discharge leased from the fan motor when one power release of 0.02 joule. Transient peak
R. Robinson and Electrical lead is opened. voltage of 1800 volts and current of
R. Wells Energy Release 0.7 amp were measured. These data estab-
lish the energy potential from an open cir-
cuit failure of a fan motor.

13-T-22(T) Inverter Operational Determine the operating characteristics of C - April 20, 1970. Generally, faults in-
MSC Characteristics the spacecraft ac inverter when operated troduced on a particular phase gave a volt-
_J
I G. Johnson with three-phase, phase-to-phase, and age reduction on that phase and a voltage
on R. Wells phase-to-neutral step loads and short cir- rise on the other phases. Clearing the
cuits. faults gave the opposite response. This
information assists in interpretation of
flight data.

15-T-23(T) AC Transient Voltage To determine whether bus 2 transients are C - April 22, 1970. This series of tests
MSC Signal Duplication capable of producing the type of response applied transients to the ac bus that

J. Hanaway seen in the SCS auto TVC gimhal command dipped the bus voltage to 105, 95, 85, and

R. Wells servo signals just prior to the oxygen tank 80 volts for durations of 50, i00, and
failure. 150 milliseconds. The transient that
dipped the voltage to 85 volts for
150 milliseconds, caused a transient of
0.16 degree per second in the SCS signals,
which matched the largest transient ob-
served in the flight data. The signifi-
cance of this is that it allows more pre-
cise timing of the duration, and estimation
of the magnitude, of possible causes of
ignition.

ECD - Estimated Comp]-tion Dmte TBD - To B_ Determined


LEGEnd): (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - Completed

NASA--MSC

MSC Form 34_5 (OT)


9_kSTER LI:',; OF TF, S FS AWD AN;_LYSF, L;

_By Event

Numi,er (T/A)
Lo _'at ion Title
Objective - Dt,scripti,:m Status - Results - Remarks
Monitors

IGNITION

i3-T-Oi(T) Ignition of Fan


Determine if overloaded fan motor winding
MSC C - April 24, 1970. Windings were not
Motor Winding by will cause ignition and combustion of the
L. Leger Electrical Overload fused by 400 Hz-5 amps; 8 amps dc fused
insulation in supercritical oxygen. winding wire. Ignition did not occur. Re-
I. Pinkel
Initial conditions were i15 volts, 1-amp
sults were the same in nitrogen and oxygen
fuse, current initially 1 amp and increased
at 900 psia, -180 ° F. NR test shows same
in 0.5-amp increments. result.

15-T-19(T) Spark Ignition


Determine if an electrical spark generated
MSC C - May 50, 1970. A single Teflon in-
Energy Threshold for by tank wiring can ignite selected non-
! C. Propp Various Tank Ma- sulated wire may be ignited with energies
metallic tank materials.
CO I. Pinkel terials as low as 0.45 joule with a spark/arc.
Oo

13-T-15 (T) Spark Source Ig-


Determine if Teflon can be ignited with
ARC nition in Super- C - April 50, 1970. Three tests in oxygen
115 V ac spark under various conditions in
L. Stollar of 50 psig, 500 psig, and 940 psig at am-
critical Oxygen oxygen atmospheres.
H. Mark bient temperature showed insulation ignited
and burned in all cases. In oxygen at
940 psig and -190 ° F the Teflon insulation

ignited and burned with a 138-psig pressure


rise and no noticeable temperature rise.

ig-T-2i(T) One-Amp Fuse Test Determine the time/current characteristics


MSC C - April 20, 1970. .,-he fuses blow at the
to blow the 1-amp fuses in the tank fan
G. Johnson circuit. following currents and times: 4 amp -
I. Pinkel 0.05 second, $ amps - 0.025 second. These
values give approximately 16 joules.

I_-T-24(T) Tank Materials Ig- Exploratory test with electrical overloads


MSC nition Test C - May _O. 1970. Drilube 822 and all of
and nichrome heaters to de,ermine the ig-
C. Propp the different types of tank wiring ignited.
nition and combustion possibilities of tank
I. Pinkel Nickel wire was only partially consumed in
materials in low and high pressure gaseous
LOX and solder could not be ignited. The
oxygen and ambient pressure liquid oxygen.
power levels required to get ignition were
far in excess of the amount available in
the tank.

LEGEND: (T) - Text (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estlm_ted Comlle;,ion Date TBD - To Be Determined

MSC Form 54} (OT) NASA--MSC


MASTER LIST OF TESTS AND ANALYSES

[By Event ]

Numbe_(T/A)
Location Title Objective - Description Status - R_-sulbs - R_:marks

Monitors

IGNITION

13-T-25(T) Locked-Rotor Motor Determine motor behavior in a locked con- C - April 19, 1970. [wo motors were tes%ei
MSC Fan Test dition and check possibility of ignition in LOX and powered for 2.5 and !.O hours,
P. MeLaughlin and propagation. respectively. Tmere was no indication of
malfunction such as heating, arcing, or
sparking. Posttest measurements showed no
degradation of motor wire insulation.

19-T-28(T) Liquid Oxygen Impact Obtain the impact sensitivity data on Ag- C - May 22, 1970. Teflon insulated wire
MSFC Test of Tank Com- plated Cu wire (two sizes), nickel wire, showed no reaction, Drilube 822 had one

I R. Johnson ponents 822 Drilube, and Pb-Sn solder. reaction of 20 tests, 60-40 solder ignited
OO I. Pinkel in 7 out of 20 tests. _ese results in-
dicate that in one-g, Teflon and Drilube
are acceptable in LOX from an impact sen-
sitivity standpoint and tha_ 60-40 solder
is not acceptable.

13-T-33(T) Spark/Electric Arc Determine the spark/electric are ignition C - April 19, 1970. _ere was no ignition
NR Ignition Test characteristics of Teflon and other non- of the Teflon in the LOX at i atmosphere.
B. Williams metallic materials in a LOX/GOX environment This test was super_eled Ly later tests,
I. Pinkel by simulating specific component failures
which could serve as possible ignition
sources.

13-T-34(T) Closed Chamber Spark Determine the possibility of igniting Tef- C - April 20, 1970. inis was an early tes_
NR Ignition Test lon on a motor lead wire when the Teflon is designed for a quick appraisal and the d_-
B. Williams penetrated by a grounded knife edge in sired test conditions were not realized.
I. Pinkel pressurized L0X while the motor is running.

(A) - Analyses C - Compf_te:l ECD - _]3tilrlatt-i ]_m_ b "i,)n D'¢2e. TBD - 'I', B.: D_termined
Li,',O_',r3L):
(T) - Test

NASA -- MSC

MSC Form 543 (OT)


_ItgS'fER L[GT OF TESI'S AI_I] ANALYSES

[By Ew<t ]

Number (T/A)
Location Title Objective - D_scripti_n Status - Results - Remarks
Monitors

IGNITION

13-T-35(T) One-Amp Fuse Test Determine the time/current characteristics C - April 19, 1970. Fuses blow at the
NR
of the 1-amp fuses in the tank fan circuit following times and currents: 0.010 seconc
G. Johnson
using a spacecraft regulator and inverter. -7.3 amps, 0.012 second - 5,O amps,
I. Pinkel
0.100 second - 3.1 amps, and 1.00 second -
_,o amps.

13-T-_6(T) Hot Wire Test oi" Determine if Teflon materials in the tank C - April 20, 1970. This test shows that
N'R Nonmetallic Tank will ignite with ohmic heating at simulated Teflon sleeving in supercritical oxygen car
R. Johnson Materials tank environment.
_J he ignited by the burn-through of a ni-
I I. Pinkel
chrome wire with 7 to 18 joules.

13-T-41(T) Failed Wire Over- Determine if a failure or defect in a wire C - June i, 1970. No ignition was obtained
MSC load Ignition could produce an overload condition with where fan motor wire was reduced to one
R. Bricker
eventual ignition of wire insulation. strand with electric current ranging up to
I. Pinkel
5 amperes. Current-time duration was fixed
by quick-blow 1-amp fuse used in fan motor
circuit. In a separate test, a 3-amp
current was held for 1 minute without
ignition.

13-T-42(T) Ignition Capability Determine if the quantity gage signal con- C - May 18, 1970. Test with signal con-
MSC of Quantity Gage ditioners can supply sufficient energy _o ditioner showed that it is incapable of
C, Propp Signal Conditioners cause ignition in supercritical oxygen. generating enough electrical energy to
I. Pinkel
cause ignition of Teflon.

13-T-44(T) High Pressure LOX Determine if a freshly scored or abraded


ECD - TBD. Tests to start June 5, 1970.
WSTF Sensitivity of surface of tank metal would provide an en- Metallic materials will be IIOOAI,
A. Bond Metallics with Sur- vironment suitable for _nitiation of fire 2024T-SAI, and 300_AI. Tests will be ex-
I. Pinkel face Oxide Penetra-
under typical LOX tank operating con- tended to include Alcoa AMS-_412 brazing
tions ditions. flux.

LEGEI_]: (T) - T_st (A) - Analyses C - Complt-tcd ECD - Estimated Com_let, i,0n Date TBD - % B,_. Determined

MSC Form }45 (OT) _ASA--_SC


p-," S _r., ]

L,_.at.i_n li'Se Obje_tive - Ik. st'ritt]_n 2T tt,u; - R. s,2ts - R_::::_r<s


M_ni tort;

IGNITION

13-'r-62('r) Ignition Test of Determine the ignition potentiality cf Tef- C - May 4, 1970. N_is test s:_ows that Tef-
ARC Teflon Submerged i_ lon submerged in LOX from an electrical lon can be ignited _y a low energy elec-
T. Canning LOX short. trical spark (5 f 3 joules) and gi.'es sus-
H. Mark
tained temperatures great enough melt
through the tes_ fixture. ;:eramic feed-
throughs and cause pressure increases.

13-T-68(T) Flow Reactor Test Determine the effect of flowing oxygen ,over C - May 4, 1970. The initial stage of deg-
ARC
a heated polymer. radation follows a first-order process.
! J. Parker
'The t{mlerature at which spontaneous
,,O H. Mark
igni_i:m occurs is 500 ° C.

15-T-69(7) Arc Test of Tank Determine ignition energy required !"rim a C - May 4, 1970. All materials zould be
ARC b_teria!s Submerged shorL circuit to cause ignition in atmos- igniteu but burning was very marginal.
J. Parker in LOX at One Atmos- pheric oxygen. Ignition energy under these conditions was
H. Mark phere not determined.

i_-T-70(T) Ignition Test on Determine the ignition energy require_ from C - May 4, 1970. lhe test indicated that
ARC Tank Materials in a short circuit to cause ignition in hi<h- spark energies of 2.5 Joules would ignite
g. Parker High-Pressure LOX pressure LOX. _eflon and initiate a metal-Teflon re-
H. Mark action.

PROPAGATION OF COMBUSTION

13-T-O4_(T) Sample Analysis of Determine the contaminates Fresent _n the 3 - _y 50, 1970. Tests shewed trace con-
mVMSC/XX Residual Oxygen in residual oxygen in 5he surge tank as an aid ruminate level had not changed rrom that
E. Tucker S/C 109 Surge Tank in identifying the possible source of ;_om- or <ri_ihal tank fill.
I. Pinkel gustion.

-S:'H'[ii: (i) - lest (A) - Aaal.Tses <, -:3om[J_te i E,;D - ,_]stimatel ] mll,/:t- _ ,c. ['90- L _ >-:t<;!'m[net

NASA -- MSC

t,t;:"
_ r_:"<; (r,.)
MA.STI_]R LIST Of' TESTS AND ANALYSES

[By Event ]

Number (T/'A)
Location Title Objective - Description Status - Results - Remarks
Monitors

PROPAGATION OF COMBUSTION

15-T-O6(T) Ignition of Oxygen Determine if burning Teflon can ignite C - May 27, 1970. Iron, Inconel, and alum-
MSC Tank Metals by metals at cryogenic conditions and attempt inum were ignited by burning Teflon in a
R. Bricker Burning Teflon to ignite quantity probe aluminum tube by series of tests. A separate test showed
I. Pinkel
igniting the probe wires.
that a flame propagating along Teflon in-
sulation will enter the quantity probe in-
sulator. Posttest examination showed that
about a 2-inch diameter hole had burned
through the 3/8-inch thick stainless steel
_J tank closure plate.
!
I}-T-12(T) Propagation Rates Determine the flame propagation rate of C - May 15, 1970. Flame propagation rate
MSC of Ignited Teflon
various forms of Teflon used in the oxygen for Teflon insulation in 900 psia/-180 ° F
R. Bricker Wire Insulation and tank.
I. Pinkel oxygen was 0.2 to 0.4 in/see downward. In
Glass-Filled Teflon
900 psia/75 ° F oxygen, Teflon gives 0.4 to
0.9 in/sec downward and 2 to lO in/sec up-
ward, and glass-filled Teflon gives 0.09 to
0.17 in/sec downward.

13-T-18(T) Inspection and Con- Determine the contaminates present and


NR ECD - TBD. Work in progress. Laboratory
tamination Analysis damage incurred in components of the oxygen
E. Tucker analysis of contaminants in oxygen system
of CM Cxygen System system as an _id in identifying the source
I. Pinkel components is to begin June 18, 1970.
Components - S/C and extent of the anomaly.
I09

1}-T-48(T) Comparison of Un- Determine the electrical conductivity and


MSC C - May 15, 1970. This test was done under
colored and Color-
the flame propagation of colored, un- TPS 13-T-12. The fingerprint portion will
A. Bond Filled Teflon Flame colored, and fingerprint-contaminated be done at a later date.
I. Pinkel Propagation Rates Teflon.

LEGEnd): (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Date TBD -To Be Determined

MSC Form 345 (OT) NASA--Mse


_t%SPER
LISTOFPESTS
AIRANALYSES
[By Event ]

Number (T/A)
Location Title Objective - Description Status - Results - Remarks
Monitors

PROPAGATION OF COMBUSTION

13-T-49(T) Teflon Flame Propa- Determine the propagation rates for fan ECD - June 17, 1970. Zero-g flame propaga-
LeRC gation in Zero-g motor and temperature sensor wire bundle at tion rate over fan motor wire bundles in
A. Bond zero-g for comparison with data from tests clear Teflon sleeving is 0.12 in/sec and i_
I. Pinkel performed at one-g. white pigmented sleeving 0.15 to 0.}2 in/
sec. Measurement of zero-g flame propaga-
tion rate along wire in oxygen tank conduit
to start June i0.

15-T-56(T) Teflon Spark Determine the ignition energy of a variety ECD - August i, 1970.
_J MSC of Teflon materials not associated with
I Ignition
<O R. Bricker Apollo 15.
t_ I. Pinkel

13-T-57(T) Teflon Propagation Determine the bounds of Teflon propagation ECD - August 30, 1970. Tests to start end
MSC Rates rates in supercritical oxygen. of June. Tests will establish flame propa-
R. Bricker gation rates for Teflon insulation formula-
I. Pinkel tions which differ from present Apollo in-
sulations; to provide possible candidate
insulations of reduced fire hazard.

13-T-58(T) Ignition and Flame To determine whether lead wire flame will C - May 22, 1970. Flame propagates into
MSC Propagation Tests propagate into fan motor and ignite the in- fan motor house without ignition of any
C. Propp of Fan Motor Lead- terior when immersed in oxygen at 900 psi metals or stator windings.
I. Pinkel Wire System and -180 ° F.

13-T-59(T) Oxygen Tank Combus- Determine the pressure time history curve C - June 4, 1970. Ignition point was
MSC tion Propagation of an oxygen tank if the lower motor lead located at lower fan motor. Flame propa-
C. Propp Test wires are i_nited between the entrance to gated along wire insulation to tank conduit
B. Brown the motor and the exit from the heater approximately 1-1/2 as fast as observed _n
assembly. Apollo 13 flight oxygen tank. Tank failure
occurred in conduit close to tank closure
plate.

........ _). (T) _'_st (A)- _,_lj_es C - CLmpl_-ted ECD - Estimate! Compietiun Date TPD - To Be Desermined

NASA--MSC

MSC Form ,j4_" (oT)


bt4:;ir]R LIS'I Of' [IES'S A]2D ANALYf, Eg

<-', E ":_.t 7

f, ati_ ]i_! ,- O =e_tiv __ - [A-s:ri_ti h Status - Results - Remarks


N_ ,n i : <:r s

PROPAGATION OF COMBUSTION

13-T-63 (T) Products cf Com_ US- Determine the principal products of 'omous- ? - May 4. 1970. N_e pri:_:isal product of
ARC rich t,f Teflon in _ion of F_flon in oxygen. cc'mbusti_ was COF,_ with aL _:iergy release
J. Parker LOX :_ 121 k:a!/mole.
il. Mark

frcpagaticn Rate <r Determine the propagation rate ol comt_:s- C - June 2, 1970. rest gi.es downwar]
LRC 7_f'icn C_mtt_sticn tion along a wire in s_percritical oxygen. propagation rate of 0.25 in/sec for a
J. Hallisay in 2upercritieal single black wire.
W. Ericksen Oxygen

!
kO 13-T-67(T) DYA on Motor Cem- Perform. a differential thermal analysis on C - May 4. 1970. _lis test shows that
ARC ponents aluminum and leflon in air. a_proximacely 79_ keal/mole of heat are re-
J. Parker
leased when Teflon, alumih,_m, and oxygen
H. Mark react.

.a-O6(A) Computer Preiiction Compute tLe flame temperature and major C - May 19, 1970. The maximum flame tem-
LRC cf Products from ;omEus<ion products for a range of oxygen/ peratare is 4360 ° F anti the major products
G. _alberg Oxvgen/leflon Com- ieflon ratios and assumed heat losses.
of combustion are COF2, CF 4, and CO 2. F 2
W. Erickson bustion
mole fraction is 0.i0 at highest tempera-
t ilTF-.

See Pressure Rise.

S<e ignit ic<.

LECENI): (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estimatei ,Jompietic,n Date T_D - To Be Determined

NASA--M$C

MS;; F_rrn 545 (0_')


MASTER 1I£'.. OF TESTS A]_ AliALYSES

[By Event ]

::._,: <..r (r/.,°,)


Status - Results - Remarks
L.J "kLion Title Objective - Description
_,]_ni " urs

PRESSURE RISE

Determine the propagation rate of combus- C - May 17, 1970. Ignition started in con-
I}-T-17Ri(T) Oxygen Tank Wiring
tion and the pressure increase in the tank duit behind electrical connector. Conduit
MSC Conduit Propagation
Rate and Pressure conduit filled with supercritical oxygen ruptured approximately 2 to 3 seconds after
C, Propp
W. Eriekson Buildup when the wiring is ignited at the elec- ignition.
trical connector end of the conduit.

i}-T-26(T) Flowmeter Test Determine the effects of oxygen pressure C - April 27, 1970. During the ambient

MSC and temperature variations on flowraeter temperature test a step pressure increase

output to analyze why the flowmeter be- would result in a spike in the flowmeter
P. McLaughlsm
_J F. Smith havior led the remaining instrumentation in output but the flowrate indication would
I not show any other change. At low tempera-
the timeline prior to failure.
kO
k_ tures an increase or decrease in pressure
would give an indicated corresponding
change in flow. At constant pressure a
temperature change would give an indicated
flow change. All of these effects were
known and the data do not have to be

corrected for any unexpected behavior of


the flowmeter.

I}-T-46(T) Filter Clogging by Determine if the oxygen tank filter can be ECD - TBD. This test has not yet been con-

ARC ducted.
COF 2 clogged by COF 2 snow.
A. Bond
F. Smith

B-62(T) Simulated Tank Fire Investigate pressure-temperature profiles This test was conducted under TPS 13-T-59.

MSC and propagation patterns within a zlosel/


C. Propp simulated oxygen tank with various ignition

E. Cortright points.

ECD - Estima ,÷-i Comli' < l)n Dat_ T_D - 'r<)B_ D_t,ermineJ
LEGEI_D: ('f) - Ses (A) - Amalyses C - Completed

NASA -- MSC

MSC Form 54_ (0i)


MASTER iI31 OF TESIS AlJD Ai;ALYSES

[By _]ve_t ]

Number (T/A)
Location Title Objective - Des::ripti)n Status - Results - Remarks
Monitors

PRESSURE RISE

A-87(A) Energy Required to Determine the energy required to explain C - May 19, 1970. The minimum energy re-
MSC/LRC Account for Ob- the observed pressure rise in oxygen tank quired (isentropie) is about iO Btu and the
R. Ried/ served Pressure no. 2. An isentropic compression of the maximum (constant density) is about
G. Walberg Rise oxygen is considered as well as a _onstant i}0 BtLl.
W. Erickson density process with heat addition.

15-T-37(T) See Final Instrument Loss.

TEMPERATURE RISE
!

13-T-38(T) See Final Instrument Loss.

B-62(T) See Pressure Rise.

PRESSURE DROP

13-T-02(T) Relief Valve Blow- Determine the differential pressure between C - April 27, 1970. The maximum pressure
MSC down Investigation a simulated oxygen tank and the flight difference between the tank and the flight
C. Propp pressure transducer as a function of a mass transducer was 9 psig at a flow rate of
V. Johnson flew through the relief valve. Also deter-
182 ib/hr. B_e pressure stimulus of 75 psi
mine the response of the flight transducer was transmitt_/ t_. the fli_h5 transducer in
to a step pressure stimulus. 24 milliseconds and reached iOO percent of
the step pressure in 57 milliseconds. This
test shows that the flight transducer will
follow the system pressure under high flow
rates and step pressure increases and will
not introduce significant errors in the _]_
data.

LEGEND: (T) - Test (A) - A_mlyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Date TBD - To Re De%ermined

NASA--MSC

MSC Form 545 (OT)


MASTER LIS'! OF TESTS AI'fD ANALYSES

[By Event ]

Numt)e r (T/A)

Lo_atiun Title Obj_ctiv_ - Lk.scription Status - Results - Remarks


Monitors

PRESSURE DROP

13-T-16(T) Relief Valve Flow Determine the flow rate of the relief valve C - May 15, 1970. The flow rate at these
Parker A/C Tests at temperatures from 360 ° R to i060 _ R.
W. Chandler temperatures ranged from approximately
0.016 to 0.034 ib-m/see. This is greater
V. Johnson
than is required to produce the observed
pressure drop.

13-T-27(T) Oxygen Relief Valve Determine the pressure drop between the C - April 21, 1970. The maximum recorded
MSC System Simulation
filter and the relief valve, and the flight pressure drop between the simulated tank
P. Crabb at 80 ° F
pressure transducer response to a step and pressure transducer was 18 psi. A
I N. Armstrong pressure increase. 500-psi step increase in the "tank" was
<O
measured by the pressure transducer with a
delay of about lO0 milliseconds. This test

indicates that under conditions of warm gas


and an open filter, the pressure transducer
will follow actual tank pressure with
reasonable accuracies in magnitude and
time.

iS-T-31(T) Relief Valve Flow


Determine flow rate through a fully open C - April 21, 1970. The crack pressure of
Parker A/C Rate relief valve.
L. Johnson the valve was 1OO5 psig and it was fully
open at i010 psig. The maximum flow rate
S. Himmel
of GO)( was 34.5 ib/hr and 108 ib/hr for
LOX.

A-24(A) Oxygen Tank Filter


Determine flow rates and pressure drops C - May 14, 1970. The analysis showed that
MSC
through lines and filter to account for
if the filter had been clogged, the rate of
W. Chandler
those pressure measurements noted during
F. Smith pressure drop would have been much greater
the flight. Consider the case of a com-
than that observed in the data. Analysis
pletely clogged filter.
shows that the pressure relief valve can
reduce the oxygen tank pressure at the rate
shown in the telemetry data.

LEGEnd): (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Date TBD - To Be Determined

MSC Form 343 (OT) NASA--MSC


MASTER LIST OF TESTS AND ANALYSES

[By Event ]

[_umbe r (T/'A)
Location Title Objective - Description Status - Results - Remarks
Monitors

PRESSURE DROP

A-55(A) Premature Relief To determine if a premature relief valve C - May 14, 1970. This analysis showed
MSC Valve Opening opening would account for the 15 seconds of' that the relief valve flow would have
W. Rice constant tank pressure after the initial caused a pressure drop, not a plateau.
N. Armstrong pressure rise, assuming several gas tem-
peratures.

13-T-71(T) See Tank Failure.

FINAL INSTRUMENT LOSS


!
<O
OO 15-T-37 Pressure Transducer Determine the pressure transducer output C - April 21, 1970. The pressure trans-
Beech A/C Test characteristics at extremely low tempera- ducer gives erratic readings below -250 ° F.
R. Urbach tures.
Temperatures in the oxygen tank were always
R. Wells
above -190 ° F.

13-T-38(T) Temperature Sensor Determine the temperature sensor response C - April 18, 1970. This test gave sensor
Beech A/C Response time in a rapidly changing temperature en- response rates of 5° to 12 ° F per second
W. Rice vironment.
over a range of +60 ° to -317 ° F.

A-3 (A) Time Tabulation of ?o determine times and causes for caution C - May 14, 1970. These data were usei by
MSC Alarms and warning alarms during the mission. Panel i in their analyses of mission
G. Johnson events.
J. Williams

LEGEm): (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Date TBD - To Be Determined

NASA--MSC

MSc Porm _45 (OT)


I9\LTER LIST OF' T'<S]13 Ai_D Ai_AIYSES

[Bj E.,_r._ ]

_er (C/A)
Title Objective - Description Status - Results - Remarks
Location
Monitors

TELEMETRY LOSS

A-2(A) High Gain Antenna To explain the difficulties associated with C - May 14, 1970. This was not a specific

MSC Signal Loss acquiring high-gain antenna operation at antenna problem which could be isolated to

M. Kingsley 55 hours 5 minutes into the mission. this mission. Previous missions have en-
J. Williams countered similar problems. This dif-
ficulty is not considered significant to
the Apollo 13 incident.

TANK FAILURE

_J
i Fracture Mechanics C - June 3, 1970. Test results show that a
13-T-29(T) Determine the fracture toughness and LOX
Boeing Data for EB Welded threshold of electron beam welded Inconel through fracture greater than 3 inches long
S. Glorioso Inconel 718 in LOX 718 tank materials. would be required to cause rupture of the
B. Brown pressure vessel.

13-T-40(T) Torch Test of In- Determine the burn-through tolerance of In- C - May 18, 1970. The significant result
MSC conel 718 conel 718, by prestressing the specimen to of this test is that fairly large holes
S. Glorioso tank operating pressure and burning through must be burned through Inconel 718 to cause
B. Brown the specimen with an oxyacetylene torch. catastrophic failure.

I_-T-61(T) Crack Growth of Weld specimens (0.125 inch thick) con- ECD - July 15, 1970.
MSC Cracked Inconel EB taining cracks will be tested in liquid
S. Glorioso Welds nitrogen and subjected to a mean stress
B. Brown corresponding to a relief valve pressure in
the supercritieal oxygen tank with a super-
imposed cyclic stress equal to that caused
by heater operation.

1}-T-71(T) Supercritical Determine the transient thermodynamic pro- ECD - June 16, 1970. Apparatus being
LeRC Oxygen Blowdown cess involved in sudden venting of super- assembled for this test.
W. Chandler Test critical oxygen t_ a hard vacuum.
S. Himme i

LEGE_[): (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - C,_T_:_:icted ECD - Estimatel 3c:ml]etion i):_e TPD - T; Be Determined

NASA--MSC

MSC Form _ (OT)


IL." '_.,'_; LIST OF TESPS AND Ali.'i':_£S

[By Event ]

,:::_:, (:'i)
Lz:'ation
i. ":" tors Title Objective - Description Status - Results - Remarks

TANK FAILURE

.... So(A) Stress Analysis of


MSP To determine whether failures of the oxyger
Oxygen Tank Neck C - May 19, 1970. The analysis was per-
tank neck area might be initiated by the
P. Glynn Areas formed using three assumptions on thermal
combined effects of pressure and thermal
:',. Brow_] inputs. In all cases analysis showe2 that
stresses.
the =onduit would fail rather tna_ the
vessel.

A-_/(A) Complete Tank Stres_


To provide information on the complete de-
t.ISC Analysis C - May i], 1970. Received two cu_rsory
sign stress analysis and on the assumption
P. _lynn stress analysis reports. Factors of safet_
_J of membrane stress made in the fracture
! _. Brown acceptable for all conditions analyzed.
mechanics analysis with particular emphasis
O on low discontinuity areas.
O
A-40(T) Fracture Test on
Carry out fracture mechanics tests and
Poeing Co. C - June 3, 1970. Test shows that the
Oxygen Tank
analysis of the oxygen tank.
P. Glynn failure mode of the tank would have
B. Brown probably been leaking and no5 a rupture.

Tensile Test at Low


Determine the tensile strength of Inconel
MSC/Boeing and Elevated Tem- C - May 20, 1970. All information fur-
718 and EB weld in the temperature range
P. Glynn peratures nished on typical ultimate and yield
from -320 ° to +18OO ° F.
[:. _row_ strength lata showed adequate safety mar-
gins for Fressures reached in tank.

.':-_(_) Fracture Mechanics


To assess the adequacy of ;revious fracture
:gU'Boeing Review of All Apoll( ECD - June 19, 1970. .4_alys s ls trderway.
analyses and to identify areas where ad-
J. ]2tanchJk Pressure Vessels ditienal data are needed.
>. Brown

_._"3E2;1}: (T) - Test


(A) - A_Jalyses C - C:mI:lete! ECD - Estimatei Comiieti,m I):.T,: FT:D - F_ D-" P' :,<i
MASTER LIST OF ir],]?S AND ANALYSES

[By Event ]

Number (T/A)
Location Title Objective - ik,scription Status - ResulLs - R_marks.
Monitors

OXYGEN TANK NO. 1 PRESSURE LOSS

13-T-59(T) Oxygen Tank Blow- Determine the rate of pressure decay from C - April 20, 1970. Vent through delivery
Beech A/C down oxygen tank XTA 00041 through simulated line (O.1870D x O.OI5W) reached 550 psia in
W. Rice delivery and vent line fracture starting at 25 seconds and 160 psia in 600 seconds.
H. Mark 78 percent density level, and 900 psig and Vent through vent line (0.5750D x O.OI5W)
ending at ambient pressure. reached 415 psia in 5 seconds and ambient
in 560 seconds.

A-56(A) Hardware Damage - Determine what hardware damage would be re- C - May 18, 1970. The analysis shows that
MSC Tank i quired to explain the loss of pressure from a hole from 0.076 inch to 0.108 inch in
_J W. Chandler
I oxygen tank no. i. diameter would be required to explain the
g. Baehr
pressure loss in tank no. 1.
O

PANEL LOSS

15-T-50(T) Oxygen Impingement Determine if Mylar insulation can be ig- C - June 5, 1970. The lowest pressure at
MSC Test on Mylar In- nited by a jet of hot oxygen. which the Mylar will burn in a static
R. Bricker sulation oxygen atmosphere with flame ignition is
W. Eriekson 0.5 psia. Impingement of i000 ° F and
1200 ° F oxygen at 80 psia did not ignite
the Mylar blanket. (A test is being pre-
pared to attempt to ignite Mylar in the
configuration of the oxygen tank area.)

13-T-54(T) Fuel Cell Radiator Determine thermal response of temperature C - May 20, 1970. Results indicate that
NR Inlet Temperature sensor installed on EPS water-glycol line. under no-flow conditions 5he flight pro-
D. Arabian Response Test files could not be reproduced. Initial re-
S. Himmel
sponse of the temperature sensor occurred
in 0.25 second after heat application.

LEGEI_I): (T) - Test (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Date TPD - 2c Be Determined

NASA--MSC

M_'7 Form 545 (OT)


MASTER LIST OF TESTS AND ANALYSES

[By Event ]

141m_er (_ A)
Lo,::ati_ri li!l¢ Objective - Descriptic, n Status - R._sults - R_r'a.,'ks
Moni" <rs

PANEL LOSS

1}-T-65(T) One-Half Scale Panel Determine the pressure impulse necessary to C - June 2, 1970. Complete separation of
LRC Separation 'Pest cause complete panel separation and deter-
/
i/2-scale honey_.cmt panel models in vacuum
£. .Morgan mine the mode of failure. A i/2-scale was demonstratei f_r a rapi_ _,'_:_ loaded
_' mF [_=kso:
mode! of SM _ay 4 is use/ with stru_turally pr, zslre pulse a!i] Yet _liif_r_h _ressure.
scaled best _anels. T_sts are -o _e run in _eparatiLn for non mifrrm !oafling o:;eurred
va:!uum witti appropriate .ent areas. Pan_l wl triin atout 20 mi!lis_- nds. leak
isaiing is simulated by a ru}il pressure press_r_s that occur in tne ox2"gen sheif
pulse. space are near 50 psia, 25 psia in fuel
_J cell shelf, and somewha_ less than i0 psia
! in tunnel volume.
O
?O I3-T-66(T) Hot Oxygen Impinge- Determine if the Mylar insulation blanket C - May 18, 1970. Mylar blanket can be
LRC ment on Mylar Ig- will oe ignited by a jet of hot oxygen an_ ignited by a hot oxygen (15OO _ F) jet at
M. Ellis nition Test estimate the rate of combustion. pressures above iO psia. Combustion of a
W. Erickson
1-foot square sample requires about 15 sec-
onds. More rapid combustion occurs witi_
70 ° F at iO psia oxygen when Mylar is ig-
nited with Pyrofuse.

l_-T=75(r) Heats of Csm:kustion De%ermine the heats of somcustinn cf Tef- ? - Hay 27, 1970. H_ats of combustion
MSFC of Teflon. _ylar lon. Mylar, aluminized N_vlar. arid alumi- _ere: T_i'!on - 22C< <t],/!t. M¥1ar -
J. Nunellej and Kapton nized Kapt::n. _;, ,_ ['_lh, Kapton - l O.i'OO ftu/ib.
W. Ericks_n

l_-?-T<i(r) _it'esh<ll Oxygen Dezermine the threshold ox[,gen pressure for S - !day 2;, 1])7©. i6xiti_n tnrssncld
MSFC Pr_ss_r_ ibr _[,_lar flume propagation nr P_'iur _n_i Eagles
_xygen _r_ssure ran6ed from O.7 to [,5 _si
C. Key & Ka}ton Flam_ films.
f_r _oth aluminized _'iar and Kupton under
W. Erickson Propagation
_-utis cnn_itions.

NASA--MSC
_.L_JIER LiS'i Oi' rESiS Ai._D ANALYSES

P>, Event ]

:iu_,oer (L'A)
i,c tr]ti: ! i i _i,_ Obje_-tive - Des N'ipt. __,;, Status - R _sults - Remarks
Honl i <Jrs

P?d:EL LOSS

A-6_(A) CM-_,! Heat Shield Determine if there is any reasona_ie p_s- C - May 22, 1970. Visu_l inspection of the
MSC and Attach F_ttings sibJlizy of estimating rhe pressur_ i_ads bolt assembly between ti__ CM-SM interface
P. Olynn Analysis applied t_ the bay 4 panel Ly reviewing the revealed no _hread damage. It is im-
V. Johnson design of _he CM heat shield structure aud prcoable that the bulkhead experienced any
_he C%I-SM attach fitt.[ngs. s_rueturally significant pressures during
%he event.

A-6_(A) Panel Trajectory To determine if the bay _ panel is in lunar C - May 15, 1970. Analysis revealed that
MSC or earth orbit: if so_ -o investigate the the mos_ protahle tra ect,_ry l_d to an im-
! M. Wind!__ r possibility of getting photo@raphs of thu pact of tue pa_i _n tke H:;on.
k-J W. Hedri _k
O panel on some future manned space fligh<..
Co
A-88(A) Prediction of Com- Compute the flame temperature and major C - May 25, 1970. Flame temperature is
LRC b,_stion Pro_u_rts combustion products for an o×ygen/My!ar r_- 47p0 _ and 5400 _ F for stoishiometric com-
5. Walberg from Ox_y_en/Myiar action over a range of oxygen/}_lar ratios. bustion at 1.5 and 60 psia. For oxygen/
/J, Erickson Oxi4ation Mylar molar ratios of iO, the flame tem-
perature is 2350 ° and 2400 ° F at 1.5 and
60 psia. Combustion products are CO o and

Ho0 below 3_00 _ F ani include UO an_ 0 at

the blather temperaL_res.

A-9}@) Calculated Pressure Calsulaze _he press_re rise in the oxygen C - June 8, 1970. A maximum pressure rise
LRC Rise in Bay _ Due tank shelf which could result from various ::r at:cut 9 psia is achieve[ in the oxygen
R. Trimpi t< Com%ustisn modes of r,
ank rupture. Consider tasks with sLelf space for no combustion based on
W. Erickson and without combustion. initial tank e_nditions -f 900 psia/-190 ° F
ana a 2-inch diameter oriri:_, ibis pres-
sure s_urs at 180 milliseconds after rup-
tare. An estimate with combustion Of*
0.2 i% of _]ar indicates a press;re rise
m
of about 55 }sia.

LE]END: (i) - i'_s_ (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estima_)e] 3omI, ietfon i,_te TPD - To Be D,,termined

HSC F;rm _4_ (OT)


MASTEi LIST Of' TESI<_ AND AI{fdJYSES

L_-.v Ev,::it ]

Locati_ !_ Ti,le
Objective - _,s2ri_t] Status - Results - Remarks
Monit, r_

PA}_L LOSS

A-94(T) Mylar Combustion Observe the nature of the comoustio._ oi'


LRC C - June 6, 1970. Mylar ins_lation flanker
T_sts with Super- Mylar insulation blanket with sulercriti:_al
i',1. Ellis "ri*i-al Oxygen in burns completely when igh[te i be p,vrofuse
oxygen in a simulate_ suL'_Y spa _ ._-,]im>.,
W. Er_ 'kz ,<im_lated Shelf anl exposed to oxygen _xh_nstir,_ Fr-m
Measure tL_ resulting pressure rise for
Spau_ ::nmsber at. 900 psia/-/[}o F. i)ur_< _in oz'
various rr_o<tes of ignition u_]q simulateJ
CO_O_sti:7:_] pFocess is a[clt o to _ SccoHis.
tank ru_ turn.
The pressure rise rate witn <_m[..;tion in
these tests is about '[ times that _easured
with no combustion,
!
A-95(A) Analysis of Tempera- Use the flight measured temperature-time
0 LRC C - June 9, 1970. Examination of the tem-
ture by Sensors Out-
4¢- histories for sensors outside shelf space
R. Trimpi side Shelf Space perature-time histories suggests heat
to estimate the temperature of the gas
W. Erickson addition outside of oxygen tank.
which flows from shelf space.

SIDE EFFECTS

13-T-32(T) Fuel Cell Valve


Determine the effect of a high g load on
NR Mod_le - Reactan_ C - April 20, 1970. _is test showed that
the fuel sell reactant shutoff valves.
R. Johnson Valve Shock Test the reactant valves shut under l_wer shock
R. Wells loads than the RCS va].'es. Sin,_e a _orti<,n
of the RCS valves clo_-i a_ "!m _ime of the

[ncldenL. the rea:._tant ",_ives pro: abij_


closed due to *he sho<k l,>a_[::g.
I_-T-26(!)
S_e Pressdre Rise,

LEC'<:_I): (:) - Test (A) - Aaalyses C - C<,mlicted ECD - Estimated Completion Date T_D - Tc B_ Determined

I_[S() F::rm Jq'; (OT) NASA--MSC


MA:r[<R ilZT Of' TE.NS AND ANA3_YSES

[B:/ Ew-r!t ]

:;,;rater (I,;:)
Lo'ati<h Titi_ OLj_:_tive - D_scrilti_n Stat_s - I_Js_its - R{-m;_'_s
_._oni<ors

MISCELLANEOUS

I_-T-43(T) Development of Develop new operating procedures for groun= ECD - _D. Test has not yet been con-
MSC Service Procedure operations tc prevent stratification in rht Ju¢ted.

C. Propp for Apollo 14 oxjgen tanks.


S. Himmel

I}-T-51(T) LOX Tank Fan Motor lffentil_ nonmetallic motor parts and pro- C - May 12, 1970. The motor _arts were
KR Examination vide information on their usage. Identify identified for the use of Panel i. Drilube
d. Diaz surfaces containing Drilube 822 and look 822 was used on threaded areas or the motor

_J F. Smith for signs of corrosion. housing and mounting hardware. The motor
! showed evidence of corrosion at areas of
k-J contact of dissimilar metals.
O

l_-T-52(T) N204 and A-50 Re- Determine the reactivity of' Teflon in N204 ECD - Jun_- 12, 1970. 1_e overload test has
WSTF been completed and the arcing test is bein@
activity with ief- and A-50 when arcing or short _ir-uiting
M. Steinthal prepared. The overloau test shows a maxi-
ion Insulated Wire occurs.
I. Pinkel mum temperature rise of 2 F and maximum
pressure rise of 2 psi. ihere have been nc
reactions with _ir_er N O_ or A-50.
- 2. 4

13-T-VS(T) Reactivity of Hydrogen materials will be ig_:ttel in ECD - June _0, 1970. _te test has not ye!
MSC _vdrogen Tank Ma- gaseous hydrogen at various temperatures. been conauct, e i.

C. Propp terials Ignition will be by a nit,rome wire ele_-


H. Mark tri_ally heated until failure occurs.

13-T-73(T) Spark Ignition Determine spark ignition threshold anti com- ECD - June 19, 1970. The test has not yet
MSC Threshold and Prop- bustion propagation rates for hjdrogen tank been conduut¢ff.
C. Propp agation Rates for material in gaseous and s_percri_i:al hy-
H. Mark Hydrogen Tank Ma- drogen at various temperatures.
terial in Gaseous

Hydrogen

f _ TBD - T< B_ D_termfned


Ln..... ,ni_ i) . _Tj - (A) - Analyses C - Completed ECD - Estimated Completion Dat<

NASA--MSC

MSC Form 34_ (OT)


i%AS!Ek LIST OF 'r'E'S2IS AL_) AHfk[IYS_[;

LP.y Event ]

:Ium:,_,. 0 "z)
L, cat.ioh ]i!i,: Objective - l>:_s:ripticn St}ttN:; - Resllt2 - Remarks
M,?_]it Jr;:

MISCELLAI_ous

I;rni tiorl oF Details ffepenff on results cf i5-[-72 ani EJD - J &y i, ]J (. Fhe test has t::_t yet
MSC S]pe . [fic C, nf'i_art_- _J. Sill mo<:kup h.'¢_rogen tank !Gr:ii_KurR- [(:'en o.qdu:_e i.
{2 Propp [::n." in Hydrog:_
H. Hark

I _ /'i :t ]_!uminum
l.,_ePmi:: wh_ther 27 is pcssi:.R o [_x'.'e ,; - "laj =p. 1_ ,:. t ;<F_ :i xhi iowdmr,'_
,:G{C I6:!_<:]:n in inert i,:f'lon ctni :_imminum i:: an i:]er< atmosFm,:r< &l_mi._lam mixtuc_ -<uld be male <) :)urn.
E, din£1 :' A t_n : i phe re
lligh ignition _nergies (grealer than
H. Mark
_J iO joules) were necessary and it was ruund
I
that the aluminum had to be finely diviJed

g before it would burn.

- • - _' ..FI,;: _ed ECD - Estimat-I Ccmtie< ].)ri 2_'xt_ I_BD - ?< Be Determined

MSC F:rm 5,4} (OT) NASA--NSC


PART F5

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS - APOLLO 13 ACCIDENT*

INTRODUCTION

This report contains a fault tree analysis of the applicable por-


tions of the electrical power and cryogenic system, s involved in the
Apollo 13 incident. It was prepared by the Boeing Company under the
direction of MSC and at the request of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this analysis is to identify potential causes that


could lead to the loss of the SM main bus power, to show their logical
associations, and to categorize them as being true or false for the
Apollo 13 incident based upon available data, analyses, and tests. The
prime emphasis is to identify the initiating cause, and secondarily,
the sequence of events leading to the loss of SM main bus power.

SCOPE

This fault tree identified the applicable ECS/cryogenic system


hardware and potential causes, down to the component or groups of com-
ponents level. The logical association of the potential causes is shown
graphically and is developed tracing the system functions backwards.
Each potential cause is categorized as being true or false where flight
data, ground tests, technical analyses, and/or engineering judgment pro-
vide sufficient rationale. The main thread to determine the initiating
cause is identified in the fault tree. The tree does not include unre-
lated or secondary effects of the failure (i.e., quantity gage malfunc-
tion, panel blow-off, fire in the service module).

Pages F-lOS through F-l14 provide information on symbo!ogy, termi-


nology, abbreviations, references, and schematics for reference during
review of the fault tree. Page F-ill identifies what pages of the fault
tree are associated with the various segments of the system. Page F-l15
pictorially depicts the required layout of the pages of the fault tree
to provide an overview of the complete system.

*Extracted from "Fault Tree Analysis - Apollo 13 Incident_" dated


June 5, 1970, under Contract NAS 9-10364 - Task Item 9.0, for MSC
Apollo 13 Review Board, Action Item 35.

F-10?
DESCRIPTION OF FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:

BEGINNING FROM THE DEFINED UNDESIRED EVENT, "FUEL CELL POWER


NOT AVAILABLE ON SM BUSES", THE CAUSATIVE FACTORS HAVE BEEN
SHOWNBY MEANS OF LOGIC DIAGRAMMING. GIVEN THAT A SPECIFIED
EVENT CAN OCCUR, ALL POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THAT EVENT ARE ARRAYED
UNDER IT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS LISTING INCLUDES ALL
POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH THE EVENT CAN OCCUR. NEXT, THE RELATION-
SHIP OF THESE CAUSATIVE FACTORS TO ONE ANOTHER AND TO THE
ULTIMATE EVENT IS EVALUATED AND A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER
THE DEFINED CAUSES ARE MUTUALLY INDEPENDENT, OR ARE REQUIRED TO
COEXIST, IS MADE. THE SYMBOLOGYEMPLOYED TO ILLUSTRATE THE
THOUGHT PROCESS IS AS FOLLOWS:

FAILURE/CAUSE STATEMENT - FAILURES ARE

L__] SHOWNWITHIN THE LOGIC BLOCKS - TRUE AND


FALSE STATEMENTS AND RATIONALE ARE
ADJACENT TO THE APPLICABLE BLOCKS.

"OR" GATE - THOSE CAUSES WHICH ARE CAPABLE,


INDEPENDENTLY, OF BRINGING ABOUT THE
UNDESIRED EVENT ARE ARRAYED HORIZONTALLY
BELOW THE "OR" SYMBOLS.

"AND" GATE - THOSE CAUSES WHICH MUST


COEXIST ARE ARRAYED HORIZONTALLY BELOW
THE "AND" SYMBOLS.

"INHIBIT" GATE - THOSE FACTORS WHICH

PROBABILITY, AND WHICH


INTRODUCE ELEMENTS ARE REQUIRED TO
OF CONDITIONAL
COEXIST WITH OTHER CAUSES, ARE DEFINED
AS "INHIBIT" FUNCTIONS.

"HOUSE"
ARE - THOSE
NORMALLY CAUSATIVE
EXPECTED FACTORS
TO EXIST, ORWHICH
TO
OCCUR, ARE SHOWNAS "HOUSES"

"DIAMOND" - TERMINATED FOR THIS SUB-BRANCH;


FURTHER DEVELOPMENT NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS
ANALYSIS.

"CUT CORNER" - INDICATES THIS IS A KEY OR

WAS PERFORMEDIN GREATER DEPTH SINCE


___ _ NODAL BLOCK. ANALYSIS OF THESE BLOCKS
THEY "CONTROL" SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF
THE FAULT TREE.

F-zo8
TRUTH STATEMENT CATEGORIZATION:

EACH FAILURE STATEMENT IS REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS


TRUE OR FALSE. THE TYPE DATA USED TO SUPPORT A STATEMENT BEING
TRUE OR FALSE IS IDENTIFIED. IN ADDITION, THE SUPPORTING DATA
SOURCES ARE REFERENCED.

CODE KEY

CATEGORY DATA TYPE

F = FALSE FD = PER FLIGHT DATA

T = TRUE A = PER ANALYSIS

GD = PER GROUND DATA

EJ = PER ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT

TE = PER TEST

SL = SUBORDINATE LOGIC
(SUPPORTED BY SUB-TIER
LOGIC.)

EXAMPLE: F - FD = FALSE PER FLIGHT DATA

REFERENCES:

I. MSC APOLLO INVESTIGATION TEAM PANEL I, PRELIMINARY REPORT,


DATED APRIL 1970

2. APOLLO 13 UNPUBLISHED FLIGHT DATA, AVAILABLE AT NASA/MSC


BUILDING 45, 3RD FLOOR, DATA ROOM

3. NASA/MSC TPS 13-T-58, IGNITION OF DESTRATIFICATION MOTOR TEST

4. MSC APOLLO INVESTIGATION TEAM PANEL I, APOLLO 13 CRYOGENIC


OXYGEN TANK 2 ANOMALY REPORT (INTERIM DRAFT), DATED MAY 22, 1970

5. NASA/MSC TPS 13-T-53, HEATER ASSEMBLY TEMPERATURE PROFILE

6. NASA/MSC TPS 13-T-59, OXYGEN TANK IGNITION SIMULATION

F-I09
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AL. ALUMINUM

ASSY ASSEMBLY

CAP CAPABILITY

CRYO CRYOGENIC

CU COPPER

ECS - ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

ELEC - ELECTRICAL

EOI - EARTH ORBIT INSERTION

EPS - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM

FAB - FABRICATION
FC - FUEL CELL

FIG. - FIGURE

GEN - GENERATE OR GENERATED

- HYDROGEN
H2
- WATER
H20

MECH - MECHANICAL

MSC - MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

NASA - NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION


NEG. - NEGATIVE

NO. - NUMBER

OXYGEN
O2

OS-X OXYGEN SUPPLY CONNECTION I, 2 OR 3


PARA. PARAGRAPH

PRELIM. - PRELIMINARY
PRESS - PRESSURE OR PRESSURIZED

QTY - QUANTITY
REF, - REFERENCE

RF - RADIO FREQUENCY

s/c - SPACECRAFT

SM - SERVICE MODULE

STRUCT - STRUCTURE OR STRUCTURAL

SYS - SYSTEM

TEMP - TEMPERATURE

F-IIO
SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC OF EPS

OXYGEN
AND CRYOGENIC OXYGEN SYSTEM

cT_] OXYGEN

PURGE
"] H 1,_
I T°ll LIN(

I ECSII rill
N

B
U
i jTIII,
.....
S

I
A 4------- PAGE I -_- PA_ 2,-. ! ;-- _ 6 THRI t8 _ PAGE,5_'_
I
OXYGEN
I /
I RELIEF
• I
OS -_ I lINE
I

t--J I
M!

A t_AG[ I _ PAGE I! i _--; _I I LSTORAG(


N I
VALVE
TO
MODULE
ECS
_, i OS-1 l
L
tiN[
II I FUEL CELL VALVE MODULE
rILL

i
OXYGEN
?-go,
co?
,
TANK l]
[_ O_ YCI_I 9,_PLY CONN[C T ION [_ CHECK VAEV1E Q PR[SSUR[TRANSDUC[R

Q OXYGEN FLOWM{'/ER _ FILTER


PRESSUR[ SWITCH

[_ QUICK OISCONN(CT
I

OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 IP/JI


CRYOGENIC P/J 1_L SIGNAL
FAN MOTOR

(_A...
MTR
SW
_

AUTO i---oTo--..1NEUTRAL--
X

S
TEMP.
SENSOR 1i CONDITIONER

_0-5 VDC
TEMP.
+ TLM
TYP. _.- L
_---R
(TYPICAL) _ W
AC2
_-.-M 52.8W
(TOTAL) I>
MTR _ E
_N o_HEATER
_.._ _._ QUANTI T__---_-: Q] 0-5 VDC
DENSITY TLM
METER
PROBE--_
28 VDC ON t +

I
I-.-' ,---;Zlm.
l-J

R2

DC RETURN J

155 WATTS
VAC-ION PUMP

_> I15 VAC, 400 CPS 28 VDC


I VAC -ION]
PUMP ]MA
_R]/-- CONVERTER MAIN B
FROM INVERTER 2
(CONNECTED TO MAIN B) p50 MA
LIMIT

OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC

vi
INCONEL
CONDUIT

QUANTITY PROBE LEADS


TEMPERATURE SENSOR LEADS
HEATER AND
FAN HARNESS (4)
LEADS INCONEL
HOUSING
MOTOR AL

GLASS-FILLED TEFLON
FAN AL

TEMPERATURE SENSOR
HEATER THERMO

! TUBE
F_ HEATER .032
LJJ TUBE STAINLESS

TO LOWER WIRE LENGTH


MOTOR UNCERTAIN

UPPER HEATER AND PROBE ASSEMBLY

vii
_-HEATER
ASSEMBLY
STAINLFSS
CONDUIT

CAPACITANCE_

GAGING PROBE
TFE GROMMET---,J I ""

FAN MOTOR
LEAD

;i.
TINNED COPPER CLIP
INPELLER
_J
!

_p-

0 0 0

TANK
DETAIL OF HEATER
ASSEMBLY

LOWERHEATER AND PROBE ASSEMBLY


viii
FAULT TREESHEETLAYOUT
1
19
2

5 [ 6 4
,3-L2o
t
7 2()A
12
g 10 11
I 8
]-,
I--'
",0-I
21
15 16[
13 14 I
18
17
24
23
25

TO ASSEMBLEFAULTTREE, LAYOUT PAGES IN THEPOSITIONS SHOWNABOVE


ix
BUSESAND FUELCELLS
PAGE1

,,u°,.e,,.,L,,.s
I'+--I
lune 5,Ig7O
AVAILA|LE

o,,.,,,s,, ,-o_,, ,o
lit.I'VE S
T40

C UR RE N'T PLOTS

_11111111111111111111111111111111 IIIIIIIIIIIII III

FUEL CELLS FAIL


FC CURRENi PI !_T'_ TO GENFJ_AIE
BUS VOtTAGI +1,,1_ P
LOAD PROf IL_ F _rO OWER t_rO
g[f lflG 16 WITHCOMMANOS
, OUS VOLTAGE PLOTS CURRENT PL01"5
ENRU ?_? RFF IFIG I_ THRU ._2 PRESENT I-j RET. IFIG 3

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIilllo o----,,-, o,-°,,,, ++-° +,+---- ,--t

FAILS TO G_NERATE FALLS TO GENERAT1E FALLS TO C-.I[NERAllE

illlllltl MAIN THREAD REQUIRED PO_R PO_R PO_R WHEN

T.FO WHEN COt/_ 0 T_FD C(_NOE D T4_O


WHENCOEM4ANOED 1"4 I_.LFIG. 211 f'5 REF. LFIG_ I_ I_.|PIG]0

i ...... CONTRIBUTORYBRANCHES

I--' CELL NO. 1 _HE P_ H

I
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII1_1 _ +,,,,,,,,,,,,,,++,,,,,,,,,,++,,,,,

TO G[NERATE

F_ _tlE TO CAUSES T'fO

rC PARA_RS [X[_.RNA[ TO $S. &FLOI#/ PLOTS


qEF I _UEL CIELLS r_L CELL I"tl F_] FIG 5. 9. _. & ZE

IIl|llll|llll iiillllllllllllllllll|lllUllllllll_-r

i+++1++
.....
Dr' IVI"RE O TO
F
Ll_
. _
.Etl
0 P_TSS &
r _'
t_'LOTS
g[_ I rig _
F 4_

T[MP
0
PLOTS
F-A
_C PARAME'ITRS

++.+,+r +,,+,
Ilrllnllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll_

_O_L O2
F'fO NOT UELIVERED T"FD

R_? | F'_.(_ P1.Q_ TO FUEL CELL NO. _ I_.'ES S & FL (TF_ PI. OTS
H _[SS I'1) _ I FIG S &

sff PAGE
Z PAGEI
BUSESAND FUELCELLS
FROM PAGE I

I
FUELCELLNO. 2 INTERCONNECTSYSTEM
NOe_L NOT I PAGE 2
0EL IVERE 0(0_O T-FD

FUEL CELL MO, Z 1-13 I _. RE$S


1 FIG. t. 5t,_6
FLOW PLOTS

_111111111111111111 t

NO O_LIVERY
_F'FO
I_IOW _OTS

REF. 1FtG._ Peo


REF. ]PLOTS
FLOW FIG 26 l TO F[OWMFTER 2-] I FLOT¢
T_FO
REF. [ PLOTS
FIG.Z6 _F_FD FLOW
REF. ] PLOTS
FIG._

1111 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIll nlll I iIiIiiIitlllllnllllllllllllllllllllllllll ii1_

RET. 1 FIG. 5&26 REF. 1FtG S & L_ REF. 1FIG._ Z_ REF. I FeG 5
I

i-J
I-J

F'FO F_O TO P,_.ANIFO( 0


PRESS & PRESS 6 PRESS &

FLOW PLOTS FLOW PLOTS FLOW PLOTS


RE_. 1 FIG 5 i 26 REF. |FIG 5& _ ,_£T. l FIG.5 £ _

TANK NO
FA ILS TO

OT_ IVFR O_
TANKFAILUR_
T_ OELIVER0 2
TO LIN[S
GoESTRUE
AT _PLETION

O3

LOSSOF FLUID
PRE$$Li_ DUETO
STRUCTURAL
FAILUI_

0 2 TANK NO. 2
PAGE 3
=1
I lilllll IIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIII IIIIIII II IIII I I I I lUll IIIII
IIIIII II II III III IIII IIIII II IIIIIII I IIIIInlll II IIIIIIIIIIIIii IIIIIIIII IIIIII III Ill I Ill Ill|Ill IIIIIIIIII1|1111111nllllllllllllllllll i iii1_ iii II iiiiiiiiiiiii/I

FRO_ PA_E 3

0 2 TANK 2 STRUCTURAL FAILURES

P_SSU_ _ 10
STRUCTURAL FAILURE

LOSS C_ D_ I

I
TO EAILURO_

{)f ANCILLARY

LINES 4-t

SEE PAGE

I-'
',,C)
STRUCTURAL
CAUSED
FA ILUg_
BY EXTERNAL

EL[CTRICALr_MEANS
CAUSED

CHEMICAL
BY EXTERNAL

MEANS
CAUSED

..........
LI
............
_ViECHANICAL
CAUSED
_Y EXTERNAE

_ANS 4 /
BY STRUCTUR_

{){GRADATION
OXYGEN

VACUUM
REACTION

CAVI
rN
TANK DAMAGED

ENCLOSE{)

ATMOSPHERE

_OVER "PRESSURE}
8Y

CAUSE
CU_E_ PtOTS RE_ 4
_E; i _rG [B SEE PAC,{ SEE PAC,{ 9 SEE PAGE SEE PAGE II
THR_ 22

OVER PRESSURE OVERPRESS URE

I NOT RELIEVED i IS GENERATED


TANK
4-If

SE PAGE II

PAGE4
___________________________________________________________________|________________________________________________________________________________

FROM p/_G_ 4 ANCILLARY LINE FAILURE

FAILURE OF

[ LOSS Or _ OUE i'0 I PAGE5


ANCILLARy LINES 44

C)

ANCILLARYLINE FAILURE
PAGE 5
_i____________i___ii_jI_jjj_

J from PaGe 4 0 2 TANK NO. 2 DESIGN LIMITS

FAILUREDUE TO FAILURE
J TO
TANKSTRUCTURAL
MEEt"D_SIGN LIMITS J r A PAGE 6
: REFI APPENOIX 8

I TANK STRUCTURAL
MAT(RIALS ANDPRO- i
FAILURE DUETO POOR FA fAILURE DUETOD(SIGN
I_FICIENCY
WORKMANSHIP 6"2 J TANK STRUCTURAL
_SIGN LtMITS
CESSESFAIL 6-1 i F-A
TO MEE_
6-3,

Q
!

ro

02 TANK NO. 2 DESIGN LIMITS


PAGE 6
CO_PONE_:GE %TANK NO. _'

I
_AffR FALLS BLOCKED FEED
TO GENERATE LINES INTERELAL
P_SSUR_
$t_ _ATERS F'-A TO O_ TANK
LAST REATTR CYCLE

I
FROM RAGE I fROM PAGE 4 STRUCTURALCORROSION
PAGE 8

CAUSED BY [×ffRt_AL

I CHEMICAL R_;TI(_I ]
GNEMICALMEANS 4_ F_SL

EREE CORROSIVE

REACTION CONTAMINANT

IS _NtTiArED WITHIN SM CAUSE 02


r_ TANK STRUCTURAl _ A
8_2

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll

INITIATED BY REACTION INITIATED


SPONTANEOUS INDIRECTLY BY REACTION INJTIATED

COMBUSTI MECHANICAL ENERGY INDIRECTL v BY

I
_,g_,c,F_ 85 _LECtRrCAL
E_RCy8 7 r-a
F_ LIAKS

Fx.)
_o
•COSMIC
• NUCLEAR
II SEE PAGE 13 SEE PAGE 14

MATERIALS

EXPOSED
i INCOMPATt BI_ I
DURI_ FLIGHT 8_2

PROT[CTIV_ A[. OXIDE


COATING REMOVED BY
• FAN RUBBING
• SUBSI ITUTION Of • ARCING
• IMPACT
TITANIUM PARTS
• CORROS ION
MICRO ORGANISMS
• OTHER

STRUCTURAL CORROS ION

PAGE 8
I FROM pAGE 4 EXTERNAL MECHANICAL
PAGE 9

CAUSED gY _XTERHAL

I STRUCTURAL fAILURE i
MECHANICAL M[ANS4 -7 F-SL

| li

i
CAUSED

MECHANICAL
PRIO_
BY

SOURCE
TO fLIGHT F -A
REF I APP_NOIX a
I
CAUSED
_CHANICAL
STRUCTURAL
SOURCE
BY

FA ILUR[
DURING
FLIG_.
Z_ r St

iiiii

INDUCED BY SXOCK F A
_F_I
FROM EXTERNAL CAUSE TABll X
9"6

I
C LOSEOUT PNOI OS (_

F_A
F_ ALL PmESS,
SELS INTACt lifts x VIII & I_(
TABL_ Viii R1EF,I |AmLE Xl

EXTERNAL MECHANICAL
PAGE9
I FROM pAr._ 4
INTERNALTANK STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION

i-I
PAGE_

CAUSED BY
$TRUCTURAt

D£GRADATIO_ A-I E-SL

l I

CAUSED BY
CAU$[D |Y
M[CHANICAL
CORROSION F'(J
I TA_FAILU_ OFFSET TANK FAILURE r
DAMAGE 10-2 F-'IL
RA_ TO HIGH

INSUFFICIENT F_
EMERGY P_ t gig. _4

I AVAILABLE

I--' SEE mI.QCK

r_ 13-1 FOR $1MILAII

I-I
CAUSED

EF_CTS

SHORTS
BY DIRECT

(TiE ELECTRICAt

IO-6 F-SL

PLOTS IMOICAI_
EFFECTS OF SHORT IN
HEALER OFF
FAN CII_UIT
_r. _ FIG. -TE

F'[J Kl-ffi F-SL 18 lhru 20 INSUrhClENT

I_-II ENERGY E E5 MILLIJOULFS


( I TABLE rV PABA+ ),1,3

INTERNAL TANK STRUCTURAL DEGRAbATION


PAGElO
I FRUM PAGE 4
02 TANK NO. 2 VACUUM JACKETCAVITY
PAGE
II
TANK DA_0 DQ[ TO

_YGEN REACTION tN

OCCURS KI_[NG0(Y_N
C(YA|USTION Of FLAM
ANO SUSCEPTIBLE MAT[-
MABL£ A_TERIAL IN
RIALS WlTHINTH(
CATALYTIC REACTION I TANK DAMAGE 0_J( TO J
VACUUM CAVITY 114 VACUUM CAVII_ II ?

I I I

I
IN VACUUM CAVITY

fi 3
I MAI_R

1
VACUUM
IAL WITHIN

CAV ITY IT "6


I
H

SEF PAGF Io
S[[ PAGE I_

m m

02 TANK NO. 2 VACUUM JACKETCAVITY


PAGELL
I
EROFt_ PAGE 4

OVERPR[SSURE TANKOVER PRESSURE


tS GENERATED F-A
PRESS DJ_TA PAGE ]2
4_lZ _F.4

I
(OV_R PRESSURE1

BY INCR[ASE IN
f NT[RNAL
DAMAGE CAUSED
PRESS OATA
_MI_'RATUR[
REF. 4

F_J
RCE

INTERNAL TEMffRATUR(
It_IEAS[ CAUSED BY
ilY CONVERSION OF I NSLILAT Iq

VACUUM BEI"WEEN INNER RADIATION O_ I

ANO OUteR TANK WALLS OU_R TANK WALL |


I LEAK CAUSED LOSS OF J RESULTS
DIRECT IN HEAT
SOLAR |i F_EJ
12-T
LEAK 1_-8| INSUFFICIENT
HEAT LEAK

VACUUM CAVITY F-(J


0 2 IS PRESENT tN INSUFFIC tENT
]Z-Q HEAT LEAK
RE_, FI_ l0

SFF PAC[ 16

TANK OVER PRESSURE


PAGE ).2
IIIIIII III I|lllllllll|llllllilllllllllllllllUllUllllllll_ll_:_ _II_!iGI_EII_,SII _ll_i_ Ili_lllO_flil_lillll Ilililliiill

SEE PAGE 17
I

co

_ STALtS

MECHANICAL ENERGY
CREATES HEAT IN 02TANK 2
PAGE 13
ELECTRICAL ENERGY CREATES HEAT IN 02TANK NO. ?

__|__|__|______________________u__________||||_|_________||_|_|||__________________________||_______________|_||__||||||||||n_________
I PAGE[4

FROM PAGE I

I REACTION INITIATED I

iIIIIIIIIIIIlUIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

I CON_RED TO HEAT
F-' DESIGN OUIE TO CONTINUOUS F-A
CONVERteD TO H[AT GII_CI.I[S
F'T.J OUAL hOlED DUE TO P(_A_R CI RCUIT COINC_O(NT WITH
4 INSUFFIC lENT ENERGY OPERATION INSU_ ICIENT TIME AN(]MALY FANS ON
14 5
",E) AILA ICLE R[F. 1 FIG 10 14-6 Rff[F. 1 FIG,4
• RF ENERGY
• TR] IIOELECTRIC
CHAeG[

r-A F_
r_ _ ON CURRENT PLOTS
OL"TZMtNLr_s Ff_A_RS OFF

ELECTRICAL ENERGY CREATES HEAT IN 02 TANK NO. 2


PAGE[4
I
FRCN PAG_10 |

BY OIRECT t:_CTS FANSMOTOR


SHORT-TORCH
EFFECT
OF _T iN FAN
PAr..,[ 15
CIRCUIT
F-St

I
F-'
0

I
RESULTI_ IN
TORCH EFFECT

SEEPAGEHi

BETWEEN P_$ES, PHAS( (,


1AND
SHORT CIRCUITOCCUR_
NEUTRAL,Off PHASES
AND STRUCTURE CREATIN[" FANSMOTOR SHORT-TORCHEFFECT
AN IGNITfOt_ PAGE |5

SEEAA PAGE 24
02 IN VACUUM CAVITY
PAGE16

flCII P/C_I[S II & IZ

¥ACUIIM CAVITY
02 IS PRESE_ IN !
II _). II-_. IZ q

$(_[ LIFTOFF

PRESENT 1
16 I
I
CAUSATIV[ I_'CELOPM[NT
L.O WO_0 SE SIMILAR tO THAT
_PEr 0LOC_S 4-1.4_8l I,d-IO

02 IN VACUUM CAVITY
PAGE16
I FROM PAC_ 13

IMPACT WITHIN 02 TANK CREATES HEAT


ICNA/IICAL EIC/IG V
PAGE ).7
COIO_RllED TO HEAT
FIIOM I_ACT

13"3

II

CYCLE
kIDM I N_J.

LOO%[ FO_[ IGN


OBJECT WITHIN
LAST H[AI_ll _N WITHIN TANK 17 *T FAN _
TANK STRIKES
IO(O[ COMPONENT J

I--'

i"O

LOOSE C(_PONENT J EXISTS WITHIN TANK

EXISTS WITHIN TANK |


i J LOD_ EOREIGN OBJECT J
[7 IOJ IT-It

• RIVETS

• TiMNEO_CU CLIP

• SAF'_TY WIRE

• LOOSE SOLDER
• OTHER

OBJECT INTRODUCED

INTO TANK I)URING

FAB,RICATION OR fiST

• BUNA N "O" RING

• HYOROCARBON_

• SUBST ITUTIOI_I OF TITANI UA_ pARTS

• OTHER

IMPACT WITHIN 02 TANK CREATES HEAT


PAGE 17
FAN CIRCUIT - TORCH EFFECT
PAGE

FROM PAGE 15

FAN MOTOR HARNESS

CAUS ING lANK WALL c. A


OR TUBING TO t,e.EL/ INSUFFIC lENT

ENERGY

I
Q !
SHORT OCCURS IN FREE |
LEADS

PROBE

CLAMPS
BE']'_V[EN THE

ASSY

ON THE
AND THE

HEATER
I
I
%HO_T

WITHIN
CCCURS

CONDUIT
OR CONN[CIOR
IN LEAD

| AND FAN ASSY 18- I 18 ?

!
I--'

SEE AA PAGE 24

FAN CIRCUIT - TORCH EFFECT


PAGE[8
I; _:UEL CELL NO. l&3 POWER GENERATION
PAGE 19

TAILS TO GENERA_

ID(_ II WUEN T _0

uuog meeeeeoet ooel_o _llee

FUEL C_LL FALLS

@ I':1
TO GEUERAIT

r k DUE TO CAUSES T';O


FC p_rA_aETII/S EXI_R_L TO O ? _SS & F LOW _' LOTS
_[E q _L_L C_LLS FUEL CELL NO _ '_-_ F L IG,_

*,***o,oo.o.....e.e*._o*ooo,oooo..

DEL VERED TO
RJ(L CELL O? PRESS & F-fD r k

I
t-' J LOW PLOE_ _lU_ TIMe PLO_S rC PARAM[ffRS

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Ic)) R_FI FIC_ 9 ?_ ?8 I_rl_lG4 REF IrLIELCELLS

E"

_z _ESS o2NOTDELIVERED

,_qQ FLOIrl I_LOT5 mET


_.E
TOFUEL CELL NO. I
L
T_O
PRESS & _0_ PLO?_

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,_IMILkR if'y

rL_ _LO1S _ ,
StA_VATI_ ST_4TI_
SIMILARITY _ I_LARITy _[r [ _C 2 FL_ PLOT

R[F I_IG _ _[ l F_G _ _lt CELLS REr L_IG._

PAGE 19
0 2 STORAGE SYSTEM NO. !
PAGE20

I
FJ

O2STORAGE SYSTEM No.!

PAGE ZO
OzSTORAGE SYSTEM No. ]
& TANK NO. |

PAGE ZOA

I FROM PAGE ZO

!
AND FALLS TO CLOSE

J I_L IEF VALVE OPENS I

• $_X;K

• owReeEssu_

• c CkNT_I_TI(3td

I--'
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& PRESS FROM 0 2 TANK

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O2STORAGE SYSTEM No. !


& TANK NO. 1
PAGE 2'OA
02 TANK NO Z PRESSURERELIEF
PAGE 21

FROM PAG_E 4

TO RELIEVE AT NtGH
ENOUGH RATE
VALVE SYSTEM UNAgL[

0 2 TANK NO. 2 PRESSURE RELIEF

PAGE 21
ELECTRICALENERGYCONVERSIONTO HEAT
PAGE
ELECIR ICN. [HERG Y

C OI_RIIE D TO HEA| T'FD

TO P_R CIRCUIT GLITCHES COIk_I_NT


M4OtMLY

REF I. FIG. 4.

F-J
_0
CO

FAULT OCCURS IN
FAULT ([CURS FAULT OCCURS FAULT OCCURS FAULT OCCURS FAULT OCCURS
HEATER CONDUIT
AT CONKE CTO_ IN CONDUIT IN FREE LEADS IN PROBE HEA0 IN FANS
AREA

SHORT

CIRCUIT

OCCURS

• PI_ES[ TO pHASE
• PFL_$[ TO NEUTRAl

• PHASE TO GROUN0

• P'HAS[ TO GROUND
THROUGH ADJACENT
CIRCUITRY

SEE AA

PAGE 24

ELECTR ICAL ENERGY CONVERSION TO HEAT

PAGE
I FR(_M PAGE Z2 I FRCI_ P/_[ 2_
_HGRT CIRCUIT REACTIONS
PAGE_

JFAULTO_C_SA'/
FAULT OCCURS IN /

CONNECTOR _ FREE LEADS _

,
{ ,

• TEFLON
Z3-1
Il • PHASE TO PHASE
Z3-ZJ
i FUEL IS
AVAILABLE

IN

• _FLON
FREE LEADS

73-3
J

• PHASE TO PHASE
CIRCUIT

OCCURS
SHORT
23-4

• SILWR • PHASE TO NEUTRAL • GLASS FILLED TEFLON • PHASE TO NEUTRAL


• COPPER • PHASE TO GROUND • CONTAMIHATION • PHASE TO STRUCTURE _GRO_JNDt
• SOLDER • PHASE TO GROUNO
• PHASE TO QUANTITY PRO_E
• CONIAMINATJON THROUGH ADJACENT CIRCUITRY OUTER TU_

• PHASE TO GROUND TNR OUCH HEATER


SEE AA ON PAG_ 24
• PHASE TO NEAI[R GROUND

I
I--' SEE AA ON PAG_ Z4

SHORT CIRCUIT REACTIONS


PAGE 23
SHORTCIRCUIT REACTIONS
PAGE 24

FAULT OCCURS FAULT OCCURS


FAULT OCCURS
IN PROBE HEAD IN NEATER CONDUIT
I N FANS
AREA

SHORT CIRCUIT
AVAILABLE
IN CONDUIT AREA OCCURS
IN PflOgE
I fUEL IS FUEL IS AVAILAIIL£
HEAD N-t
24-5 N_

• TEFLON • PHASE TO PHASE T_FLON • PHASE TO PHASE • ff.FLON INSULATION ---_ • PHASE TO PHASE
• COeP£R • PHASE TO NEUTRAL
ALLg_IINIII_ FAN HOUSING • PHASE TO NEUTRAL • TEFLON G R Of#_/_'TS ._ • PHASE TO NEUTRAL
• ALI_MINU_ • PNASE TO GROUNO • CONTAMI NATION
RULON "A" BEARINGS • PHASE TO GROUND " • PHASE TO GROUND
• SILVER • PHASE TO GROUND THROUGH
"i_I_ON IMPREGHAI[D THROUGH ADJACENT STRUCTURE
• GLASS FIL_O _ELON ADJACENT FI6(R GLASS SEE AA BELOW =

!
• COWTkMINATION CIRCUITRY •

SOLDER
BRASS
SEE AA BELOW -=
SEE AA _LOW
• TINI_O COPF'ER CLIP

• CONTAMINATION
o
_____|_______________________________________|____________________________________|_____|______-

AS A RESULT [_

INSULATI_

BREAKDOWN Z4-7

SHORT C IRC U ITREACT IONS


PAGE 24
FROM PAGE Z4

INSULATION CHEMICAL DEGRADATION


PAGE 25
O_GRADATIOF¢
I CHEMICAL ]

_nlll|llll|llll|lllllll|ll|lllllll

CHEMICAl
BR[AKDOWN
CAUSED BY HEAT

I SL

ABNORMAL

THERMAL
[NVL RONMENT
ENVIRON_NT DI_ TO THERMAL
FANS. TEMP SENSOR. [NVIRON/_ DD[ TO HEATERS

,-q OTY SENSOR¸ OR D_SIGN [RROR r_J


I _Ir_¥ AT,sr.cTOrY
F-J

THERMOSTAT
ANOMALY
MONITORING

OF THERMOSTAT

_lTOR REAl T_[

INSULATION
CHEMICAL DEGRADATION
PAGE 25
REFERENCES

i.
Weber, Laurence A.: Thermodynamic and Related Properties of Oxygen
from the Triple Point to 300 ° K at Pressures to 330 Atmospheres.
Supplement A (British Units), NBS Report 9710A, August 29, 1968.

o
Stewart, Richard B.: The Thermodynamic Properties of Oxygen. PH.D.
Thesis, Dept. of Mechanical Engineering, University of lowa,
June 1966.

,
Weber, Laurence A.: P-V-T, Thermodynamic and Related Properties
of Oxygen from the Triple Point to 300 K at Pressures to 33 MN/m 2.
Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards - A.
Physics and Chemistry, Vol. 74A, No. i, January-February 1970,
PP. 93-129.

F-142
0

c3

c3

z
m
-o
-=I I=19
Z
0
X
<
m Q
"0

0
C_
m
o
c
m
INDEX OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Number Title Date

i° Authority to Act for the Chairman of the April 24, 1970


Apollo 13 Review Board

2° Official File of the Apollo 13 Review Board April 24, 1970

3. Response to Offers of Assistance or Recom- April 24, 1970


mendation

. Apollo 13 Review Organization and Structure April 24, 1970

5. Overview Responsibilities Assigned to April 24, 1970


Apollo 13 Review Board Members

° Designation of Apollo 13 Review Board Panel April 24, 1970


Chairmen and General Responsibilities

° Use of Consultants, Advisors, and other April 24, 1970


Special Assistants to the Apollo 13 Review
Board

° Requisition and Control of Data and Equip- April 24, 1970


ment Related to the Apollo 13 Review Board
Activities

° General Assignments to Apollo 13 Review April 24, 1970


Board Supporting Offices

i0. Apollo 13 Review Board Sessions April 24, 1970

ii. Work Orders April 27, 1970

12. Interrelationship of Activities of the April 27, 1970


Apollo 13 Review Board with Those of the
MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team

13. Records of the Proceedings of the Executive May i, 1970


and General Sessions of the Board

14. Coordination and Control of Test Support for May 6, 1970


Apollo 13 Review Board

lSi Custody of and access to Apollo I_ May 22, 1970


Review Board Materials

iii
This page left blank intentionally.

iv
April 24, 1970

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE NO.I

TITLE: Authority to act for the Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review


Board.

POLl CY : i. The Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board will desig-


nate a member of the Board to act for him during his absence
from MSC.

2. The authority delegated to the Acting Chairman is full


and complete and includes all the authorities vested in the
Chairman by virtue of the NASA Administrator's letter of
April 17, 1970.

PROCEDURES : Delegation of authority to act for the Chairman in his


absence from _C will be prepared by the Secretariat.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-I
April 24, 1970

APOLLO13 REVIEWBOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. 2

TITLE: Official File of the Apollo 13 Review Board.


SCOPE: This procedure covers the accumulation and preservation
of all documents required for the official Apollo 13
Review Board file including documentsacquired and main-
tained by Panels and supporting offices.
POLICY: The documentation of actions taken by the Board and Panels
is required by the Board's Charter. The orderly organiza-
tion of the documentation is essential for the preparation
of the Board's Report to the Administrator.
PROCEDURES:i. All documents received by the Board or emanating from
the Chairman or Membersof the Board will be maintained by
the Secretariat.

2. All documents received by Panels or Sub-Panels will be


maintained by these organizations until incorporation into
the Board's files at the time Panel Reports are accepted
by the Board.

3. Support offices of the Board will maintain all documents


pertinent to their areas of responsibility.
4. Documentsintended for incorporation in the Panel and
Board's Reports will be identified as such by Panel Chairmen
and the Board, as appropriate.

5. Documentsreferenced in the Panel and Board's Reports


will be identified as such, and classified in a manner that
will permit quick retrieval.
DEFINITION: i. "Documents" meansany form of communication (written,
recorded, or photographic).

Edgar M. Cortright

G-2
April 24, 1970

APOLLO
13 REVIEWBOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. 3

TITLE: Responseto Offers of Assistance or Recommendation

POLICY: Offers of assistance or recommendationaddressed to the


Apollo 13 Review Board (Chairman, individual members,or
any Board participant) will be answeredby a memberof the
Apollo 13 Review Board or by individuals designated by the
Chairman of the Board.

PROCEDURE: i. All messages (letters, telegrams, or other written


communications) addressed to the Apollo 13 Review Board
or to any of its participants which are identified as
suggestions or offers of help or assistance will be for-
warded to the Public Affairs Office of the Apollo 13 Review
Board.

2. The Public Affairs Office will arrange for the prepara-


tion of replies to all such messages.

3. Copies of all incoming and outgoing correspondence or


offers of assistance will be maintained for the Board by
the Public Affairs Office.
4. The Head of the Apollo 13 Review Board Public Affairs
Office is authorized to acknowledgeall messagesof assist-
ance covered by this Procedure, and to reply to messagesin
the nameof the Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-3
April 24, 1970

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE NO. 4

TITLE: Apollo 13 Review Board Organization and Structure.

SCOPE: This document establishes the basic organization and respon-


sibilities of the Apollo 13 Review Board. This procedure is
an implementation of the Administrator's memorandum of
April 21, 1970.

POLICY : I. The Apollo 13 Review Board was established by the


Administrator, NASA, on April 17, 1970, pursuant to NASA
Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966. The
following responsibilities and duties were assigned to the
Board:

a. Review the circumstances surrounding the accident


to the spacecraft which occurred during the flight of
Apollo 13, and the subsequent flight and ground actions
taken to recovery, in order to establish the probable
cause or causes of the accident and assess the effec-
tiveness of the recovery actions.

b. Review all factors relating to the accident and


recovery actions the Board determines to be signifi-
cant and relevant, including studies, findings, recom-
mendations, and other actions that have been or may be
undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and
contractors involved.

c. Direct such further specific investigations as may


by necessary.

d. Report as soon as possible its findings relating


to the cause or causes of the accident, and the effec-
tiveness of the flight and ground recovery actions.

e. Develop recommendations for corrective or other


actions, based upon its findings and determinations
or conclusions derived therefrom.
f. Documentits findings, determinations, and recom-
mendations, and submit a final report.

2. The membershipof the Apollo 13 Review Board has been


established by the Administrator in letters to individual
Board members, as follows :
Date of
Memb e rs Appointment

a. Mr. Edgar M. Cortright April 17, 1970


Director, Langley Research
Center, Chairman of the
Apollo 13 Review Board

b. Mr. Robert F. Allnutt April 21, 1970


Assistant to the Administrator,
NASA Headquarters, Member

c. Mr. Neil A. Armstrong April 21, 1970


Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft
Center, Member

d. Dr. John F. Clark April 21, 1970


Director, Goddard Space Flight
Center, Member

e. Brig. Gen. Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. April 21, 1970


Office of Deputy Chief of Staff,
Research and Space Headquarters,
USAF

f. Mr. Vincent L. Johnson April 21, 1970


Deputy Associate Administrator
(Engineering), Office of Space
Sciences and Applications, NASA
Headquarters, Member

g. Mr. Milton Klein April 21, 1970


Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear
Propulsion Office, Member

h. Dr. Hans M. Mark April 21, 1970


Director, Ames Research Center_
Member
3. Technical support to the Board:
Mr. Charles W. Mathews April 21, 1970
Deputy Associate Administrator,
Office of MannedSpace Flight,
NASAHeadquarters

4. Counsel to the Board has been appointed by the Adminis-


trator :

Mr. George T. Malley April 21, 1970


Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center
5. Observers to the Apollo 13 Review Board have been
appointed by the Administrator, NASA,as follows:

Date of
Members Appointment

a. Mr. William A. Anders April 21, 1970


Executive Secretary, National
Aeronautics and Space Council

b. Dr. Charles D. Harrington April 21, 1970


Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel

c. Mr. I. Irving Pinkel April 21, 1970


Director, Aerospace Safety
Research and Data Institute

d. Mr. James E. Wilson April 22, 1970


Technical Consultant to the
Committee on Science and Astronautics
U.S. House of Representatives

6. Heads of Apollo 13 Review Board Supporting Offices have


been appointed by the Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
These officials are:

a. Secretariat - Mr. Ernest P. Swieda, KSC

b. Public Affairs - Mr. Brian Duff, MSC

c. Legislative Affairs - Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoff,


NASA Headquarters

d. Report Editorial Group - Mr. R. G. Romatowski, LRC

c-6
PROCEDURES : i. The following organization of the Apollo Review Board
is established:

a. Panels

(i) Mission Events


(2) Manufacturing and Test
(3) Design
(4) Project Management

b. Board Offices

(i) Public Affairs


(2) Report Editorial Office
(3) Legislative Affairs
(4) Secretariat

2. In addition to the Board organization established by


the Chairman, the Administrator, NASA, has established a
number of observers to the Board. Each observer shall
have a direct access to the Board Chairman.

3. Sub-panel structure and assignment of responsibilities


will be authorized by the Chairman.

4. Changes to the basic organization of the Apollo 13


Review Board may only be authorized by the Chairman. All
such changes will be officially implemented in documenta-
tion prepared by the Secretariat.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-7
April 24, 1970

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE NO. 5

TITLE :
Overview responsibilities assigned to Apollo 13 Review
Board Members.

SCOPE:
This document establishes overview responsibilities
assigned to members of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

POLl CY :
Assignment of overall responsibilities to members of the
Apollo 13 Review Board will be made by the Chairman.
Specific assignments may be made in memorandum form
signed by the Chairman. Any specific assignments will
be made part of the official records of the Apollo 13
Review Board.

PROCEDURES :
i. Overview assignments to members of the Apollo 13
Review Board are established as follows:

Member of the Board Overview Assi6nmen t

Neil Armstrong, MSC Mission Events

Dr. John Clark, GSFC Manufacturing and Test

V. L. Johnson, OSSA Design

M. Klein, SNPO ProJect Management

Brig. Gen. Hedrick, USAF Apollo 13 Panel Integration

Dr. Hans Mark, ARC Special Studies and Coordina-


tion of Expert Advice and
Assistance

R. F. Allnutt, NASA Hqs Report Editing and Board


Do cument at i on

Edgar M. Cortright

G-8
April 24, 1970

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE NO. 6

TITLE: Designation of Apollo 13 Review Board Panel Chairmen and


general responsibilities.

S COPE : This document establishes the general assignments made to


the Chairmen of Apollo 13 Review Board Panels.

POLICY: The assignment of tasks and responsibilities to Panel


Chairmen will be made by the Chairman of the Apollo 13
Review Board. Each Panel Chairman will draw upon the
data, analyses, and technical expertise of the staff at
MSC and the Apollo contractors. In addition, sufficient
independent checks and analyses will be made to constitute
a clear and sufficient validation of key findings.

PROCEDURES: i. The following Panel Chairmen are designated:

Pane i Ch airman

a. Mission Events F. B. Smith, NASA Hqs.

b. Manufacturing and Test H. M. Schurmeier, JPL

c. Design S. Himmel, LeRC

d. Project Management E. Kilgore, LRC

2. Panel Chairmen are the Board's principal reviewing


agents for specified areas of the Apollo 13 Mission.
General responsibilities of Panel Chairmen include:

a. Maintaining a day-by-day record of activities


including such information as:

(I) Meetings
(2) Subject matter
(3) Attendance
(4) Minutes (when appropriate)

b. Collecting and retaining for the Board all records,


tapes, photographs, studies and other documents which

G-9
may be needed to substantiate Board findings and deter-
minations within a Panel area of inquiry.

c. Preparation of preliminary findings and determina-


tions for evaluation and assessment by the Board.

3. General area assignments for each Panel Chairman are


appended to this procedure. These may not be changed with-
out the approval of the Apollo 13 Review Board Chairman.

4. Each Panel Chairman will coordinate his reviews, anal-


yses, and findings with the other Panels as appropriate.

5. Each Panel Chairman will work under the overall guidance


and direction of a Board Member designated by the Board
Chairman. (See Procedure No. 5)

6. Each Panel Chairman is responsible for designating an


alternate in case of temporary absence. This alternate
must be approved by the Board Member assigned to overview
Panel activities.

7. Each Panel Chairman is responsible for recommending


membership on the panel. Such memberships must be approved
by the Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

8. Specific Task Assignments made to Panel Chairmen by the


Board Chairman will be cataloged and maintained by the
Secret ari at.

9. Panel reports of findings, determinations, and recom-


mendations (together with complete supporting documentation)
will be required of all Panels. Any minority positions
relative to Panel Reports will be brought to the attention
of the Board.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-IO
General Assignment for Mission Events Panel

It shall be the task of the Mission Events Panel to provide a


detailed and accurate chronology of all pertinent events and actions
leading to, during, and subsequent to the Apollo 13 incident. This
information, in narrative and graphical time-history form, will provide
the Apollo 13 Review Board an official events record on which their anal-
yses and conclusions may be based. This record will be published in a
form suitable for inclusion in the Review Board's official report.

The Panel will report all significant events derived from telemetry
records, air-to-ground communications transcripts, crew and control center
observations, and appropriate documentssuch as the flight plan, mission
technique description, Apollo Operations Handbook, and crew checklists.
Correlation between various events and other observations related to the
failure will be noted. Wheretelemetry data are referenced, the Panel
will commentas appropriate on their significance, reliability, accuracy,
and on spacecraft conditions which might have generated the data.
The chronology will consist of three major sections: Preincident
Events; Incident Events; and Postincident Events. The decision-making
process leading to the safe recovery, referencing the relevant contin-
gency plans and available alternates, will be included.
Preincident Events. This section will chronicle the progress of
the flight from the countdown to the time of the incident. All action
and data relevant to the subsequent incident will be included.

Incident Events. This section will cover that period of time


beginning at 55 hours and 52 minutes after lift-off and continuing so
long as abnormal system behavior is relevant to the failure.

Postincident Events. This section will document the events and


activities subsequent to the incident and continuing to mission termina-
tion (Splash). Emphasis will be placed on the rationale used on mission
completion strategy.

O-ll
General Assignment for Manufacturing and Test Panel

Review the manufacturing and testing, including the associated


reliability and quality assurance activities, of the flight hardware
componentsinvolved in the flight failure as determined from the review
of the flight data and the analysis of the design. The purpose of this
review is to ascertain the adequacyof the manufacturing procedures,
including any modification, and the preflight test and checkout program
and any possible correlation of these activities with the inflight
events.

The Panel shall consist of three activities:

i. Fabrication and Acceptance Testin5

This will consist of reviewing the fabrication, assembly, and


acceptance testing steps actually used during the manufacturing of the
specific flight hardware elements involved. Fabrication, assembly, and
acceptance testing procedures and records will be reviewed, as well as
observation of actual operations when appropriate.

2. Subsystem and System Testin6

This will consist of reviewing all the flight qualification


testing from the completion of the component level acceptance testing
up through the countdown to lift-off for the specific hardware involved.
Test procedures and results will be reviewed, as well as observing
specific tests where appropriate. Results of tests on other serial no.
units will also be reviewed when appropriate.

3. Reliability and _uality Assurance

This will be an overview of both the manufacturing and testing,


covering such things as parts and material qualification and control,
assembly and testing procedures, and inspection and problem/failure
reporting and closeout.

G-12
Genera] Assignment for Design Panel

The Design Panel shall examine the design of the oxygen and asso-
ciated systems to the extent necessary to support the theory of failure.
After such review the Panel shall indicate a course of corrective action
which shall include requirements for further investigations and/or
redesign. In addition, the panel shall establish requirements for review
of other Apollo spacecraft systems of similar design.
The Panel shall consist of four subdivisions:

i. Des i_n Evaluation

This activity shall review the requirements and specifications


governing the design of the systems, subsystems, and components_ their
derivation, changes thereto and the reasons therefor, and the design of
the system in response to the requirements, including such elements as
design approach, material selection, and stress analysis; and development
and qualification test programs and results. This activity shall also
review and evaluate proposed design modifications, including changes in
operating procedures required by such modifications.

2. Failure Modes and Mechanisms

This activity shall review the design of the systems to ascer-


tain the possible sources of failure and the manner in which failure may
occur. In this process, they shall attempt to correlate such modes with
the evidence from flight and ground test data. This shall include con-
siderations such as energy sources, materials compatibility, nature of
pressure vessel failure, effects of environment and service, the service
history of any suspect systems and components, and any degradation that
may have occurred.

3. Electrical

This activity shall review the design of all electrical compo-


nents associated with the theory of failure to ascertain their adequacy.
This activity shall also review and evaluate proposed design modifica-
tions, including changes in operating procedures required by such modifi-
cations.

4. Related Systems

This activity shall review the design of all systems similar


to that involved in the Apollo 13 incident with the view to establish-
ing any commonality of design that may indicate a need for redesign.
They shall also consider the possibility of design modifications to
permit damage containment in the event of a failure.

G-13
General Assignment for Project ManagementPanel

The Project ManagementPanel will undertake the following tasks:

i. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management


structure employed in Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13
incident. This review will encompassthe organization, the responsibi-
lities of the organizational elements, and the adequacyof the staffing.
2. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management
systems employed on Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13
incident. This task will include the managementsystems employed to
control the appropriate design, manufacturing, and test operations; the
processes used to assure adequate communications between organizational
elements; the processes used to control hardware and functional inter-
faces; the safety processes involved; and protective security.
3. Review the project managementlessons learned from the
Apollo 13 mission from the standpoint of their applicability to subse-
quent Apollo missions.
Tasks (i) and (2), above, should encompassboth the general review
of the processes used in Apollo 13, and specific applicability to the
possible cause or causes of the mission incident as identified by the
Board.

G-14
April 24, 1970

APOLLO
13 REVIEW
BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. 7
TITLE: Use of Consultants, Advisors, a_d other special assistants
to the Apollo 13 Review Board.

POLICY: This procedure provides for the utilization of consultants


and advisors to the Apollo 13 Review Board.

PROCEDURES:
i. All official advisors and consultants to the Apollo 13
Review Board will be appointed by the Chairmanof the
Board.
2. Advisors and consultants will be given task assign-
ments whenever practicable so as to focus their efforts
on behalf of the Board.
3. Whenever appropriate, experts and consultants utilized
by the Board will submit their advice or opinions in writ-
ing and these documentswill becomepart of the Board's
official file.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-15
April 24, 1970

APOLLO
13 REVIEW
BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. 8
TITLE: Requisition and Control of Data and Equipment Related to
the Apollo 13 Review Board Activities.
POLlCY: The Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board has been
authorized by the Administrator to impose controls on
the use of Apollo data and/or equipment when such con-
straints are deemednecessary for the conduct of the
Board review. Such acquisition and control may only be
authorized by a Memberof the Board acting for the
Chairman. Wheneverthe sequestration of data or equip-
ment may delay or hinder program needs, the control will
be for a minimumof time adequate for the needs of the
Board.
PROCEDURES:
i. Data and/or equipment required by a Panel or the Board
will be identified in a Data Control Request approved by
the Chairmanor Memberof the Apollo 13 Review Board.

2. The Data Control Request will be submitted to the


program organization through the MSCApollo Office. The
MSFTechnical Representative to the Apollo 13 Review Board
will transmit all such requests on behalf of the Board.
3. Each Data Control Request will be logged by the
Secretariat and closed out at the earliest appropriate
time. All such requests, MBFacknowledgements,and subse-
quent closeouts will be part of the official files of the
Board.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-16
April 24, 1970

APOLLO
13 REVIEW
BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. 9

TITLE: General Assignments to Apollo 13 Review Board Supporting


Offices.

PROCEDURES
: i. The Heads of Apollo 13 Review Board supporting offices
were established in Administrative Procedure No. 4, dated
April 24, 1970.
2. General assignments of responsibility to the Heads of
these offices are attached to this document. Changesmay
be madeonly with the approval of the Apollo 13 Review
Board Chairman.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-17
April 24, 1970

ATTACHMENT
A_SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat of the Apollo 13 Review Board will:

i. Provide for complete administrative support to the Board,


including clerical assistance, office space, supplies, equipment, trans-
portation, travel, housing arrangements, and other _ogistic and adminis-
trative support.

2. Maintain all official files, minutes, and other Board documenta-


tion and correspondence.

3. Coordinate Board Schedules amdplaas so as to maximize the most


efficient utilization of time and effort.

4. Act as the liaison point with M_Cand other Center officials on


all administrative matters.

C-18
April 2L, 1970

ATTACHMENT
B -- REPORT
EDITORIALOFFICE

The Head of the Report Editorial Office will:


i. Recommend to the Board the form and content of the Board's
Report to the Administrator.
2. Organize the report, supervise its preparation, and provide
for the complete review of all preliminary and final drafts.

3. Insure that Counsel to the Board is consulted on all report


material with respect to legal sufficiency and substance.

C-19
April 2L, 1970

ATTACHMENT
C -- PUBLICAFFAIRS

The Head of the Apollo 13 Public Affairs Office will:

i. Provide all public affairs support to the Chairman and Members


of the Board including preparation, review, and distribution of press
releases, statements, and other information releases.

2. Maintain a complete file of all Apollo 13 related press releases


and statements madeby officials of NASAand supporting agencies which
bear on the events and incidents in flight.

3. Maintain biographies, photographs, and other records with


respect to Board officials.

4. Provide all liaison with Public Affairs officials in NASA


Headquarters, other Centers, and outside agencies.

5. Maintain a complete inventory of letters received from the


public which are addressed to the Board Chairmanor any Members,includ-
ing copies of all replies.

6. Report to the Board on a regular basis in order to summarize


all significant PAOactivities.

G-20
April 24, 1970

ATTACHMENT D -- LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

The Head of the Apollo 13 Legislative Affairs Office will:

i. Provide the Board with complete congressional support, includ-


ing arranging visits, recommending replies to inquiries, and monitoring
a complete record of all congressional activities related to the Board's
Charter and responsibilities.

2. Make periodic reports to the Board on the status of congressional


activity directly affecting the Board's operations.

G-21
April 24, 1970

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE NO. i0

TITLE: Apollo 13 Review Board Sessions

i. The Apollo 13 Review Board meeting schedules are


established, as follows:

a. General Sessions. These will be daily sessions


held each evening at a time prescribed by the Chairman
of the Apollo 13 Review Board. The purpose of these
sessions will be to review the progress of Panel efforts
and to establish priorities for further reviews. All
participants in the Apollo 13 Review Board organization
should attend. Agendas for these meetings will be
prepared by the Secretariat after consultation with the
Board and the Panel chairmen.

b. Executive Sessions. These will be held at the call


of the Chairman (generally each morning). The purpose
of these sessions will be to discuss among the Board
itself progress and plans for Panel and Support Office
activities. Attendance at Executive Sessions will be
limited to Members of the Apollo 13 Review Board, and
Counsel to the Board, as well as such other members of
the Board's organization as are invited by the Chairman.
Each Executive Session will be recorded and transcribed.

c. Action items assigned by the Chairman in either the


General Session or in Executive Session will be recorded
by the Secretariat, and made part of the official files
of the Board.

Edgar M. Cortright

0-22
April 27, 1970

APOLLO
13 REVIEW
BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. ll

TITLE: Work Orders

SCOPE: This procedure covers the origination and documentation of


Work Orders to the MSCApollo 13 Investigation Team, here-
inafter "Team," and other organizations.

POLICY
: All work by other sources connected with the Board's or
Panel's investigation will be documentedand preserved
for the Board's official files.

PROCEDURE:i. The Panel Chairman, with the concurrence of the cogni-


zant Board member,will originate a Work Order, if the
course of the Panel's investigation requires support from
outside sources.
2. The Work Order (memorandum
form) will include:
A Statement of Work (detailed step-by-step procedures
or work items, when appropriate)
Identification of Board, Panel, or other personnel
who may visit the work site at the time the work is
being performed
Procurement requirements, if known

The kind of data, reports, drawings, and other infor-


mation required
Period of Performance
Other items essential for a complete understanding of
the Work Order
3. The Work Order will be assigned a numberby t_le
secretariat and transmitted to the Team.

G-23
4. If the Work Order duplicates, in whole or in part,
prior work done for the Team, the TeamLeader will advise
the Panel Chairman to that effect.

5. If the Work Order initiates work not previously per-


formed, in whole or in part, by the Team, the TeamLeader
will advise the Panel Chairman of the need for amending
the Statement of Work to include such work items that are
needed by the Team.

6. Whencoordination between the Teamaad the Board has


been effected, the Teamwill prepare a Test Preparation
Sheet in accordance with its procedures and advise the
cognizant Panel Chairman of actions taken, together with
periodic reports, when feasible.

7. Whenthe work has been performed the TeamLeader will


advise the cognizant Panel Chairman and transmit work
products, if any, to the Chairman.

8. The Board Secretariat will document close-out actions


or final disposition of all Work Order requests.

Edgar M. Cortri6ht

C-24
April 27, 1970

APOLLO13 REVIEWBOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. 12

TITLE: Interrelationship of activities of the Apollo 13 Review


Board with those of the MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team.

SCOPE: This procedure covers the methodology in conducting a


concurrent investigation of the Apollo 13 mission failure.

POLICY: The investigation and review by the Board and the investi-
gation by the Team shall be in accordance with NMI 8621.1,
April 14, 1966; and as implemented by the Administrator's
memorandum of April 20, 1970 to the Associate Administrator
for Manned Space Flight. Further, the Board will conduct
its own independent review and conduct such further specific
investigations as empowered by the Administrator's memor-
andum of April 17, 1970: Establishment of Apollo 13 Review
Board.

PROCEDURE: i. Liaison between the Board and the Team is the responsi-
bility of Mr. C. W. Mathews, who provides OMBF technical
support to the Board pursuant to the Administrator's memor-
andum of April 21, 1970.

2. The Board and the Team will establish a working


relationship between the Panels of the Board and Team
Groups in areas of investigation of mutual interest.
Information and data will be freely exchanged between
the Panels and the Team Groups.

This information and data, together with informa-


tion and data obtained independently by the Board Panels,
will be s_alyzed and, when approved by the Board, will
be included in interim reports and the final report to
the Administrator.

3. All documents published by the Team shall be furnished


the Board for its official files.

G-25
h. Requests for personnel details of Team members to the
Board will be approved by the Chairman and implemented by
the OMSF Technical Support representative.

Edgar M. Cortright

0-26
May i, 1970

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE NO. 13

Records of the proceedings of the Executive and General


TITLE:
Sessions of the Board.

This procedure covers the methods and responsibilities


S COPE :
related to recording the proceedings of the Board during
its review and investigation activities.

The proceedings of all the General Sessions of the Board


POLICY :
shall be mechanically recorded and placed in transcript
form for inclusion in the files of the Board. The
Secretariat is responsible for transcribing and initial
editing of the record for content and accuracy. Counsel
shall be responsible for final review of the transcript.
The proceedings of Executive Sessions of the Board shall
be mechanically recorded but no transcripts shall be pre-

pared.

i. The Secretariat shall record all Executive and General


PROCEDURES:
Sessions of the Board.

2. The Secretariat shall transcribe the recordings of


General Sessions. The Secretariat shall maintain a log
and suspense for each transcription during the review
process. The rough transcripts shall be edited by the
Secretariat for content and accuracy.

3. To the extent feasible, the transcript shall be retyped


after the editing and then Counsel shall perform the final
review of the transcripts.

4. Following the review, the transcripts of the General


Sessions shall be typed in final form and filed by the
Secretariat. The tapes for both General and Special
Sessions shall be included in the files of the Board by
the Secretariat.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-27
May 6, 1970

APOLLO13 REVIEWBOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. 12

TITLE:
Coordination
Review Board. and Control of Test Support for Apollo 13
POLlCY:
Test support for the Apollo 13 Review Board is to be
coordinated within the Board and controlled throughout
the tenure of the Board by use of Test Preparation Sheet
(TPS).
REFERENCE:
i. Administrative Procedure No. ii, dated April 27, 1970.
2. Memorandum from Donald D. Arabian to Apollo 13 Investi-
gation Team, subject: TPSprocedures and requirements
dated May 5, 1970.
PROCEDURES:
i. Wheneverany Member,Panel Chairman, or Panel partici-
pant requires a test activity by _C or one of its con-
tractors to support the Board's review of Apollo 13 events,
a request should be madein writing using the procedures
set forth in the referenced Administrative Procedure.

2. Each such request will be reviewed by a designated


Board Memberand M&TPanel Chairmanbefore it is submitted
to the MSCTeamLeader (Simpkinson) for implementation.

3. The designated Board Memberand the M&TPanel Chairman


will be responsible for maintaining a Master List of
Support
events. Tests on which tests will be related to incident

4. After coordination within the Board, the support test


request (work order) will be submitted to the MSCTeamand
logged as an official TPSby the Team.

5. Support tests to be carried out by other than MBCor


its contractors will also be sent to the M&TPanel Chairman
for review and will also be coordinated and logged in as a
TPSby the MBCTeam. In this case, the intent is to use

C-28
the Project's TPSnumbering, control, and filing procedures
as a central data system for the Review Board and the MSC
Investigation Team.
6. The above procedure should be applied to any support
test activity initiated by an official memberof the Board
organization from its inception on April 21, 1970.

Edgar M. Cortright

G-29
May 22, 1970

APOLLO
13 REVIEWBOARD

ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
NO. 15

TITLE: Custody of and access to Apollo 13 Review Board Materials


SCOPE: This procedure covers the custody of and access to Apollo
13 Review Board materials upon the completion of the
Board's activities at the MannedSpacecraft Center (MSC).
POLICY: The files and other material used in preparing the Apollo
13 Review Board Report shall be stored in the custody of
the Langley Research Center. The files and report mater-
ials of the Panels shall be madepart of the Review Board
files. The files, documentation, and other data of the
MSCInvestigating Teamwill not be controlled by the
Apollo 13 Review Board. Custody and disposition of the
materials preserved by the MSCTeamshall be left to MSC
Center management. Apollo 13 hardware and original data
received from the spacecraft during flight shall be con-
trolled and stored in accordance with the usual MSF
procedures.
PROCEDURE:Reports, files_ tapes, and working materials determined
by the Chairman to be included in the final repository
shall be in the final custody of the Director, Langley
Research Center. Access thereto shall be determined by
him or by the Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center.

Adequate secure storage and warehousing will be provided


by the Langley Research Center.

Edgar M. Cortright

NASA -- MSC

G-30
t_
0

ITI
I"'
rTI

m
Z Z
m

"v X

-,4

m
Z
CONTENT S

Page
Se c t i on

H-I
News Release No. AI_-IO, April 17, 1970 ..........

News Release No. AI_-IO, April 18_ 1970 .......... H-3

H-4
Apollo 19 Investio_ation Board Report He. i_ April 21, 1970 •

H-IO
Apollo 19 Investigation Board Report No. i, April 24, 1970 •

Apollo i_ Press Conference with Dr. George Low,


H-19
May 1, 1970 ........................

H-3Z
Apollo 1_ Review Board Conference, June 2, 1970 .......

Ho45
Status Reports of the Apollo 19 Review Board .........

H-_6
Status Report No. i ..... ° ..... ° .......

Status Report No. 2

H-48
Status Report No. .......... ° ° ° ° .....

H-50
Status Report No. 4 .................. • °

U-5l
Status Report No. 5 • ° ................ ° °

Status Report No. 6 ......... ° ..... ° ° • ° °


H-52

H-5_
Status Report No. 7 .°°°° .... °°°°°.°.°°°

H-54
Status Report He. 8 °•°.°°°° .... °°•°.°.

H-55
Status Report No. 9 ..°°°° ........ ° .....

H-56
Status Report No. iO ....................

H-57
Status Report ]&:. ii ....................

H-58
Status Report No. 12 ....................

H-59
S<a_us Report No. 19 ....................

H-60
Status Report No. 14 ...................

H-61
Status Report No. 15 ....................

iii
This page left blank intentionally.

iv
APOLLO
NEWSCENTER
HOUSTON,
TEXAS

NEWSRELEASE NO. AI3-10


APRIL 17, 1970
SUBJECT:APOLLO 13 REVIEWBOARD

The National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration today established


an Apollo 13 Review Board to investigate the circumstances and causes of
the accident aboard the spacecraft Odyssey and the subsequent flight and
ground actions taken to recover.
This action was taken by NASA'sAdministrator, Dr. ThomasO. Paine,
and Deputy Administrator, Dr. GeorgeM. Low, immediately following the
successful recovery of the astronauts today "because of the serious
nature of the accident to the Apollo 13 spacecraft which jeopardized
humanlife and caused failure of the Apollo 13 lunar mission."

Mr. Edgar Cortright, Director of NASA'sLangley Research Center in


Hampton,Virginia, was appointed Chairman of the Review Board. Mr. Cort-
right served for manyyears as NASA'sDeputy Associate Administrator for
SpaceScience and Applications, and in 1967-68 was Deputy Associate
Administrator for MannedSpace Flight.
The other membersof the Board will be senior individuals from
NASAand other government agencies with special competence in flight
safety matters, the Apollo systems, or the various technical disciplines
related to the investigation, but not having direct responsibilities
relating to Apollo 13. Top consultants from government, industry, and
the academic communitywill also be available to the Board as required.
NASA'sAerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a statutory panel responsible
to the Administrator, will review both the procedures and findings of
the Review Board and make an independent report to the Administrator.

The Apollo 13 Review Board will establish its ownprocedures as


provided by standing NASAinstructions for the investigation of mission
failures. The timing of its report will be determined after the Board
has met and madean assessmentof the length of investigation required.
The Board will makeperiodic progress reports directly to the Administra-
tor and Deputy Administrator. Timely progress reports will also be made
to Congress and the public.
NASA'sOffice of MannedSpace Flight will make available to the
Review Board all pertinent records and data and will provide technical
support to the Board as requested. The Office of MannedSpace Flight,

H-I
as a part of its regular responsibilities, will develop parallel recom-
mendations on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14
mission.

Decisions on the Apollo 14 mission will depend on the findings and


recommendations of the Apollo 13 Review Board, the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, and the Office of Manned Space Flight.

II-2
APOLLO
NEWSCENTER
HOUSTON,
TEXAS

NEWSRELEASE NO. AI3-10


APRIL18, 1970
SUBJECT:UP-DATETO STATUS
OF APOLLO
13 REVIEWBOARD

The Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board, Mr. Edgar Cortright,


Director of NASA'sLangley Research Center, expects to discuss with
Dr. Paine and Dr. Lowon Mondaythe appointment of additional membersof
the Board established to review the accident to the Apollo 13 spacecraft.
The Board will meet as soon as possible m very soon, Mr. Cortright
said --to set up its procedures and begin its investigations.

H-3
APOLLO 13 INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT NO. i
APRIL 21, 1970

DUFF :
Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a briefing by Mr. Edgar M.
Cortright, the chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board. Mr.
Cortright.

CORTRIGHT:
I thought that it would be beneficial if we got together for
a few minutes today to give you some idea of how this Review
Board will be conducted, and to announce the members of the
Board. The membership has just been selected by Dr. Paine.
Basically, as you know, from the material you've received
already, and to paraphrase my detailed instructions, the
function of the Board is to perform an independent assessment
of what happened, why it happened, and what to do about it.
To do this, we have selected a group of senior officials from
both within the agency and without the agency. These gentle-
men will meet here with me during the next few weeks in
intensive sessions, which will probably run days, nights, and
weekends, without letup, in order to get an early determina-
tion. The group will be supported by an additional group of
experts, and we will select these gentlemen within the next
2 or 3 days. In addition, we'll draw on the work that the
project is now carrying out under the direction of the pro-
ject manager to determine on their own what happened. Now,
the members of the Board are as follows: Mr. Robert Allnutt,
who is assistant to the administrator in NASA Headquarters;
Mr. Nell Armstrong, astronaut, from the Manned Spacecraft
Center; Dr. John Clark, Director of the Goddard Space Flight
Center; Brigadier General Walter Hedrick, Jr., Director of
Space, Deputy Chief of Staff for R&D office, Headquarters,
USAF, Washington; Mr. Vince Johnson, Deputy Associate
Administrator for Engineering, in the Office of Space Science
and Applications, NASA Headquarters; Mr. Milton Klein, Manager
of the AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office; and Dr.
Hans Mark, Director of the Ames Research Center.

QUERY: How do you spell that last?

CORTRIGHT:
Mark. M-a-r-k. In addition, the counsel, legal counsel,
for the Board, will be Mr. George Malley, who is Chief Coun-
sel for the Langley Research Center. Mr. Charles Mathews,
Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Manned Space Flight,
will be named to work with the Board to help provide the
technical support we'll need to get our job don_. In addi-
tion, there will be three officially named observers to the

H-4
Board. Mr. William Anders, former astronaut, now Executive
Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council; Dr.
Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Ad-
visory Panel, and also President and General Manager of
Douglas United Nuclear Incorporated; and Mr. Irving Pinkel,
Director, Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute,
Lewis Research Center. We'll be assisted in our relation-
ships with the press by Mr. Brian Duff of the Manned Space-
craft Center. And we'll be assisted in our relationships
with the Congress, during the course of this investigation,
by Mr. Gerald Mossinghoff, Office of Legislative Affairs,
NASA Headquarters. It will be our policy during the course
of this investigation to keep you informed of what we're
doing, and how we're going about our business, insofar as
that is practical. One thing l'd like to avoid, however, is
speculation. I must avoid that with this type of a Board.
So, if sometimes I appear to be not as communicative as you
would like, it will only be because l'm not in a position to
say something with authority and certainty, at that time;
but otherwise we'll do all we can to keep the members of the
press fully informed of what we're doing. And, I think that
is about all I really planned to say. I make myself avail-
able for questions within the ground rules that I just speci-
fied, that l'd like to avoid speculation, and further, since
the Board has not held its first meeting, I can't very well
represent the Board at this point.

DUFF : l'd just say one thing, before we have questions. The biog-
raphies of all the members and the documents relating to
what Mr. Cortright has just said will be available after
this conference is over. Now we'll take questions.

QUERY: Can I add one point, Brian? I think I forgot to mention


that the first meeting of the Board will take place at
8:00 p.m. this evening.

DUFF: All right Bob, we'll start across the front row.

QUERY: I realize it's impossible for you to say precisely how long
the Board will take to reach the determination, but do you
have any estimate at this time? In other words, would it
be a matter of perhaps 3 or 4 weeks or do you think it would
last through the summer?

CORTRIGHT: It's my hope that we can reach adequate and effective deter-
mination within 3 or 4 weeks. As a matter of fact, that is
the number I had in my mind. But we'll have to take as much
time as required to do it properly. It could run longer.

H-5
SPEAKER Bob.

QUERY : What procedure will you follow for calling perhaps contractor
experts and so on? Can you - you said you would talk about
them a little bit.

CORTRIGHT: Yes, we identified the need for speciality information that's


best developed by a contractor. We'll call on that con-
tractor to provide us information and/or to appear before
the Board to testify on this information.

QUERY: Do you have any names or companies already formulated?

CORTRIGHT: No.

QUERY: What is going to be the possibility, Ed, on making your


releases? Are you going to do it on a regular basis like
once or twice a week, or just whenever you have something
to say? How are you going to arrange this?

CORTRIGHT: The releases of the Board will be made only with my approval
and through the office of the Public Affairs here at Houston.
Now there may, of course, be releases by Dr. Paine or Mr. Low
based on information that I can provide them on regular
meetings. We'll probably meet once a week. And I would
envision the use of bulletins for the press. How much in-
formation they would contain would be dependent on how much
progress we will make. But at least it would keep you
informed on where we are and what activites are facing the
Board that week.

QUERY: Do you intend to break the Board down into teams similar to
what was done for the 204 Review Board?

CORTRIGHT: That's my current plan. But until the Board meets with me
and expresses their individual opinions _ud negotiate a
little bit, I won't know for certain.

DUFF: Here.

QUERY: Ed, when will you have all the telemetry data reduced, do
you think, with the Board then in a position to move at full
burner?

CORTRIGHT: Well, the telemetry data are being reduced at the moment by
a pretty sizable team of engineers, both here and in the
contractor's plant. I don't have specifics on that yet,
Jules, but I have the impression that they expect some

II-6
milestones to be reached before the end of the week, in terms
of telemetry data reduction. Of course, that's sort of
first time through, perhaps, and we'd have to iterate that
to get the last little bit out of it.
Wasconsideration given to appointing Lt. Gen. SamPhillips
QUERY:
to the Board?

SPEAKER
: l'm not certain. Dr. Paine selected the Board. I know
General Phillips is extremely busy with his present assign-
ment and it probably would be an impossibility.

DUFF: Right here, Mary Bubb.

QUERY: Whenyou finally do pinpoint the cause, sir, how long do


you think it will take you to decide whether you have to go
into redesign or somemodifications? I would presume anY-
way that you would makerecommendationsalong these lines.

SPEAKER: Well, of course that depends on what the problem is. Gen-
erally speaking, you work on potential fixes at the same
time you're homing in on the probable cause, so that there
need not necessarily be a long period of time between the
two, the determination of the problem and what to do about
it. On the other hand, there could be under certain circum-
stances, and my position at the momentis that I can't - I
have a totally open mind. l'm trying not to prejudge any-
thing. As the facts unfold, then we'll start forming
opinions.

DUFF: Ed.

QUERY: Two questions: I assumethat the bulk of the investigation


will be conducted here at MSC. Is that correct?

CORTRIGHT:That is correct.
And what will the relationship be between your Board's
QUERY: investigation and the investigations already underway by
individual contractor teams and by the initial review board
that was set up right after the accident? And what is the
status of that board, by the way?

CORTRIGHT:Well, l'd rather not commenton the status of the Manned


Spacecraft Center Board. That's Dr. Gi]ruth's board, but
I can tell you a little bit about how we plan to work to-
gether. In the first place, mos_I_{ [" the detailed technical
work will have to be done by the menwho know that area the
best, and these are the engineers and scientists of the
Manned Spacecraft Center and the prime and supporting con-
tractors. We will follow their work and audit their work
and make the best possible use of their work that we can.
At the same time, we'll maintain sufficient independence
so that it will constitute a true independent check on what's
done here and an independent assessment of what corrective
measures should be taken. Does that answer your question?
QUERY:
Mr. Cortright, in your experience have you ever conducted
a similar investigation having to do with unmanned space-
craft, trying to find out what happened?

CORTRIGHT:
I have not chaired a board of this type, but l've been in-
volved in a number of investigations of various unmanned
spacecraft projects, such as Ranger, Surveyor, and Centaur.
QUERY:
What was your rate of success in these investigations?

CORTRIGHT:
Well, all of the projects that I mentioned succeeded to
a rather high degree. The extent to which the review
board helped that process is something we'll probably never
know.

DUFF : Here in the front row.

QUERY:
Will your reports - your periodic reports to Dr. Paine be
released to the press?

CORTRIGHT: Probably not.

QUERy:
Will we know that there are these reports and will we even
know the gist of them, if you're making progress or stymied,
or what?

CORTRIGHT:
Well, as I mentioned earlier, we will try to keep the press
informed as to what's going on with the Board, but we'll
stop short of speculating or prematurely judging the results.
That, of course, is quite a constraint in terms of making
public what our current opinions are as to what happened,
and I think we'll be fairly limited on what we can say until
this Job is done. Now, my reports to Dr. Paine will be in-
formal progress reports and will contain just the sort of
material that it would be improper to release in totality
because it's somewhat speculative in nature. I don't think
you'd really want that any more than I would.

H-8
QUERY : Ed, i'm not quite clear on this point. You may have made
it clear and I may have slipped in a cog. Does - is cor-
rective work, such as deemed necessary by various groups
here at MSC or the Cape, or wherever else it might be, is
corrective work suspended or held in abeyance while the
Board meets? For example, if it were found that the liquid
oxygen tank, for example, was suffering from stress corrosion
or metal fatigue and blew at too low a pressure, and Beech
or North American or somebody wanted to go ahead developing
new tanks, would that effort go ahead in tandem with the
Board's investigation or be held up for the Board's findings?

CORTRI GHT : l'm not positive, but I believe the procedure that would be
followed would be that a major corrective work which might
impact the existing system and result in changes to hardware
that's currently assembled would be held in abeyance until
the Board's report was in. On the other hand, it is not
unreasonable that certain things could go forward in parallel
for possible incorporation later in order to save time now.

QUERY : Dr. Cortright, does your franchise possibly extend to the


early shutdown of the second stage engine, and second
question, is it likely that you would make any recommen-
dations on the deployment of rescue ships in the Atlantic
or even possibly the Indian Ocean?

CORTRIGHT: The instruction does not require us to examine the early


shutdown on the second stage engine except insofar as the
peak g loads might have influenced the anomaly we're
looking into. I don't anticipate that we will be con-
sidering deployment or any other aspects of rescue ships.

QUERY : Along the same line, it is in your charter to examine the


adequacy of the measures taken in Mission Control to see
whether there are some improvements that could be made
in those or whether that response could be improved in
any way. That is still your understanding?

CORTRIGHT: Yes, sir. That is in the charter, the instructions.

DUFF: Thank you very much.

H-9
APOLLO 13 INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT NO. i
APRIL 22, 1970

CORTRIGHT: I indicated the other day when we talked that I'd keep you
abreast of what we're doing and although I think what I
have to say is less than you want to hear, it's a progress
report at least. I thought l'd start out by telling you
how we've organized to do the job. There was a little indi-
cation of that the other day, but this is the structure of
the Review Board. This is the Board itself, and I went
through those names the other day. Now, in addition, we
have four major panels. One is on Mission Events, and this
panel is chaired by Frank Smith from NASA Headquarters. In
addition, we have asked that Neil Armstrong from the Board
have a secondary function of following in depth the activi-
ties of this particular panel. The panel will have three
members: John Williams from Kennedy Space Center, who will
handle preincident events as to the events up to the time
of the incident; Tom Ballard, from Langley Research Center,
will handle the events of the incident in detail --the short
period of time in which the apparent explosion took place;
and the postincident events will be handled by Pete Frank,
and he is from Houston Manned Spacecraft Center. The second
panel is Manufacturing arid Test. Schurmeier from the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory will handle that, and Jack Clark,
the Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center, will be the
member of the Board who stays with that panel's activity
when he is not meeting with the Board. That panel will also
have three members: Ed Baehr from the Lewis Research Center,
who will review the fabrication and acceptance testing of the
hardware that flew; Karl Heimberg from the Marshall Space
Flight Center, who will review the subsystem and system test-
ing of the qualification-type testing_ and Brooks Morris from
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, who will look into the reli-
ability and quality assurance aspects of the hardware. The
third panel, on Design, will be headed by Mr. Himmel from the
Lewis Research Center, and Mr. Johnson of the Board will
honcho that activity with him. Now the one member, Dr. Lucas
from Marshall, who has been identified to work on failure
modes and mechanisms, will also be a design evaluation man
and a man to look into related systems, so that if there is a

lesson in h<_re to be learned which can be interpreted and ap-


plied to other systems it will be his responsibility to
understand that. The last panel is on Project Management.
Ed Kilgore from Langley Research Center is the Chairman there,
and Milt Klein from the Board will work with him. There are
three men who will help, a Mr. Ginter from NASA Headquarters,

H-IO
Mr. Mead from the Ames Research Center, and Mr. Whitten on
safety from the Langley Research Center. That group will,
in general, look into the management aspects of the procure-
ment of this hardware and its preparation for flight to see
if there were any breakdowns in the system we've been using
which may have been contributory, Now, although I haven't
shown you this chart before, there are some staff boxes that
we don't have to spend any real time on. The first one I
mentioned the other day -- that's a very important box actu-
ally. Mr. Mathews is heading up the OMSF Technical Support.
That is, he's insuring that the Board gets everything it
needs down here. And he's also working on how to interface
with the investigation that's going on by the project, and
just how do our members of the panel work with their counter-
parts in the Manned Spacecraft Center and the contractors
who are really looking at the same questions. We have a
council secretary to handle our records and papers, a Report
Editorial Group, I think I mentioned that the other day, to
lay out the manner in which we'll report this to Dr. Paine,
Public Affairs, and Legislative Affairs, Mr. Mossinghoff.
We've had one addition to the observers, Mr. Wilson from
the House Committee on Aeronautics and Space, Congressman
Miller's Committee.

Now, that is the essence of what I wanted to tell you today.


CORTRIGHT :
We're getting into the problem in some depth. We've been
going through that period when everyone who starts to look
at the data immediately invents his own explanation and has
to discard it the _next day. So, it's sort of a "getting
humble" period, and I think we're almost through that, and
we're starting to get our hands really dirty and understand
what went on. l'm not prepared to issue any statement on
that subject today, but I would ask you whether or not
or I might point out, rather, that there was a statement
issued in Washington's part of the committee --the testi-
mony of Mr. Petrone before the Congress today, which gave
the timeline of significant events or the major events
leading up to the incident. Have you all had a chance to
get that yet?

SPEAKER: I believe so - -

Well, it may be more current. I'ii be glad to quickly read


CORTRI GHT :
it for you if you'd like. The first event at -- this is
eastern standard time 10:06, oxygen fans were turned on. At
10:06 and 22 seconds, it was a high current spike in fuel
cell number 3. At 10:06 and 36 seconds, there was an oxygen
tank number 2 pressure rise. At 38 seconds, there

H-ll
was an ll.3-volt transient on ac bus number 2, at 41 seconds,
a high current spike on fuel cell number 3, and at 58 sec-
onds, an oxygen tank number 2 temperature rise. At 10:07
and h5 seconds, oxygen tank number 2 maximumrecorded pres-
sure, and at 10:07, 53 seconds, there were measurable mo-
tions of the spacecraft. At 10:07 and 56 seconds, the oxygen
tank number 2 pressure went to zero, and shortly thereafter
Lovell stated that he had a problem. Additionally,
Mr. Petrone madethe following statements: "That the
event was not a meteorite. The probability was calculated
to be too low, for one thing." And also, "The telemetry is
good enough and the number of events have enough information
in them that it would appear not to be that rare coincidence
of a meeting with a meteorite." He goes on to say, "From
preliminary examination, it does appear that the observed
rapid rise in the oxygen tank number 2 pressure would require
an amount of heat much greater than that produced from cur-
rent flow for the tank fans, heaters, and instrumentation
operation. In other words, the electrical system could not
alone pump enough heat into that --energy into that tank
to raise the temperature of the oxygen as -- and the pres-
sure of the oxygen, rather, as much as was observed. This
does not rule out electrical power as a source of initia-
tion for some other energy source as yet undetermined.
Analysis and tests are being made to determine what such
an energy source could be and how it could have been
initiated." That's all I have to say.

QUERY:
l'd like to ask you a question about what Dr. Paine said
this morning. He referred to it as a relatively simple
component in the number 2 oxygen tank, and he seemed to
think the problem could be taken care of right away. Could
you comment
nent? on that? What is this relatively simple compo-

CORTRIGHT:
Well, here's what he said: "The oxygen thermos flask
believed to be involved is a relatively simple component,
and corrective action should not prove to be a major task."
I think he was referring to the entire tank and its con-
tained equipment as being simple. And I think what he
I'll speculate here _ that he means it's simple compared
with the rest of the system, and even if they had to do
major things to that tank, that it probably could be done
in time not to impact the schedule. But, I don't think
he was precluding the possibility of some fairly major
changes in that tank. But, the tank itself, you know, is
a reasonable-sized device to have to cope with.

H-12
QUERY
: Then you see possibly somemajor changesthat will have to
be done in the tank for Apollo 14.

CORTRIGHT
: I wouldn't rule that out.

QUERY
: Cortright, have you seen any indication at all which would
give you a clue or a vague hint as to what possibly could
have gone wrong? Anything at all to lead you into a gen-
eral direction?

CORTRIGHT: Well, the obvious. If you're looking for energy in a tank


like this, you have to say, "Well, what energy is there to
start with?" And, you do have kinetic energy, you have
moving parts, namely, the fan and the motor that drives it.
And, you have electrical energy. You do know that there
were glitches in the electrical system which would lead
you to think there might be someelectrical problem in the
tank. And, it's not very mysterious, really. You can get
short circuits with electrical equipment, and they usually
are accompaniedby glitches. So, that's certainly one
possibility that would have to be considered.

QUERY: You didn't mention fires. Wasthere any danger of fires?

CORTRIGHT: Again, the major energy source, potentially in the tank,


would be combustion, and if combustion took place, it's
not certain exactly what it would be like with super-
critical oxygen at those pressures and temperatures and
the small amountof combustible material in there. We
don't quite knowwhat it would be like if it happened, but
it could happen conceivably, and that could have been
the energy source.

QUERY
: Mr. Cortright, is there anything that you have eliminated
as m besides the meteorite -- as not being the cause?

CORTRIGHT: Now, we're not really going at it that way, yet. Nowthe
Board has started by concentrating on that area that the
experts here had determined as the probable source of trou-
ble. And, we've spent most of our time trying to get to
understand everything about that oxygen tank; how it inter-
faces with the rest of the equipment in the system; what
energy sources are there in that tank and how might they be
triggered; what type of chemical reactions could take place
in the tank; would they look like combustion or not, and
how might they be initiated? So, we are not really yet
concentrating on ruling things out. We're trying to rule
things in right now.

H-13
QUERY
: Mr. Cortright, do I interpret that to meanthat Mr. Petrone's
statement today was his own; it was not based on anything
the Board of Review had said? It was based on the MSC
investigation? And, let me ask you further to follow Paul
Recer's question, have you ruled out a meteorite?
CORTRIGHT: Wehaven't considered it abort yet, but l'm inclined to
say "Yes." The odds would be extremely small that it could
be that. As far as Petrone's statements are concerned, l'd
say they are his own, and the way we're handling this sort
of thing, statements of fact, insofar as they can be deter-
mined to be fact, are madeby the Project. And, we draw on
those samefacts to help us in our investigation. So, in
other words, if you have detailed questions about how vague
were the current spikes and exactly when they occurred, the
Project is releasing all that information as fast as it can
pin it down. And, the interpretive part of it, apparently,
they are releasing someof that too. l'm trying not to do
too muchof that now.

QUERY
: Have you ordered any tests such as the effect of the elec-
trical arc within this tank or someto that effect? Any
tests using- -
CORTRIGHT: Tests are already under way by the Houston team. They are
trying to determine in what way an electrical problem might
have been a source of ignition, for example.
QUERY: To follow that question, have you ordered or requested that
Houston investigators or any others go further in their
investigations in any direction than they have been going
and are you generally satisfied with those investigations?
CORTRIGHT: Well, l've been generally satisfied. Wehave madea sugges-
tion or two which would constitute slight expansions to what
was already being done, but generally, we've been satisfied.
QUERY
: You listed somepossible or potential causes that are being
investigated. I wonder if you could run through a complete,
you know, i, 2, 3, of the possibilities that will comeinto
consideration without weighing them in any relative value.
CORTRIGHT: l'd rather you get that from the Project.
QUERY: You plan to meet as -- in panels and perhaps one or two
executive sessions a day.
: Wedo that.
CORTRIGHT Generally speaking, we meet with Jim McDivitt
and his people at 8 o'clock in the morning, to start the
day off. And we get a summaryof what they accomplished
the day before. Then we have special technical briefings
as we need them in the morning and otherwise operate as
panels and subpanels during the balance of the day. We
also monitor the technical meeting that takes place every
evening at 6 o'clock, Mr. Arabian's meeting.

DUFF
: It would makemy life a little easier if you'd say what you
plan to do over the weekend. If you don't, I don't have to.

CORTRIGHT
: Well, if you know, I wish you'd tell me. Wewill work over
the weekend, but at the moment, most of our days aren't
planned very far in advance. We're still playing it by
ear as we go along.

QUERY
: Sir, l've been told that there's a report at CapeKennedy
that one source of the problem is thought to have been a
motor driving fan which failed. That it's the motor driving
the fan that failed. Is this true, or do you know?

CORTRIGHT: Well, that --the fan motor sad the fan does constitute the
kinetic energy you have and also constitutes a major elec-
trical element, one which does use a fair amount of current.
Yes, that's under close examination.

QUERY
: Did it fail?

CORTRIGHT
: No. I didn't say that. l'm sorry. I guess I misunder-
stood your question. It could have failed. It could have
been the source of the problem. It's one of the potential
sources .

Do I understand correctly that there's no doubt whatsoever


QUERY
:
that the problem occurred within the tank?

C0RTRIGHT
: No. It's highly likely. According to the project here, the
project office, that the problem occurred within the tank.
And frankly, the evidence we've seen so far, also points
in that direction. We haven't come up with anything dif-
ferent.

Will telemetry tell you whether this far m_tor failed?


QUERY
:
CORTRIGHT
: Telemetry may. There was a loss of some telemetry, as I
guess you know, something like 1-I/2 seconds, and it may
be possible to get a little more data out of that lost telem-
etry, which would help determine that problem.

H-15
QUERY
: And do you still think that you can conclude this in 3
or 4 weeks?

CORTRIGHT
: I think it's possible. It looks tight.
QUERY
: Well, in order to do that, wouldn't you have to knowwhere
you're going?
CORTRIGHT: Yes. And that's why I said we haven't yet. Of course,
we've only been here a couple of days -- a few days, but
we haven't yet seen any anomalies in the mission that point
elsewhere. Everything points to this tank. So we're con-
centrating on understanding every possible failure mechanism
of the tank.
QUERY
: Are you as optimistic as Mr. Paine was this morning? He
seemedto be rather optimistic that everything would be
cinched up pretty fast and Apollo would be back on schedule
very soon. Are you that optimistic?
CORTRIGHT: I think it should be possible to fix this tank up. Yes.
But I --you know, when I look at a tank like that, I think,
well, there's a good Job here to be done, probably, and
it will take someeffort. But it's not as big an effort
as these people have handled manytimes before.
QUERY
: Talking about something as basic as a fan motor, all the
other tanks have fan motors, don't they? Or are there - -
CORTRIGHT: There are other fans and other systems I believe_ yes,
that will have to be looked at.
QUERY
: Doesyour data indicate there was a fire on board definitely
and if so, what size fire?
CORTRIGHT
: No. That conclusion has not been reached. All it indicates
is that there was somesource of energy in the tank large
enough to raise the pressure above that possible with just
plain electrical omni heating.
QUERY: Would you, in reference to that, that list you have there,
indicate the 1-1/2 second data dropout?
CORTRIGHT: Well, the dropout occurred just at the time of the incident.
In other words, when the apparent bang took place that's
when they lost the data.

H-16
QUERY
: How's that indicated on that list?

CORTRIGHT
: I guess it isn't.

QUERY
: Do you have a time for it?
CORTRIGHT
: You can get that from the Project Office.

QUERY
: Combustion in a tank would infer the presence of a contami-
nant, would it not?
CORTRIGHT: Not necessarily. Combustion can be different things, of
course. Oxidation -- rusting is combustion, you know, in
a sense. So what we want to understand is if there was
combustion, what was it that was oxidizing and how was it
going about. It wouldn't have to be a contaminant. There
are other things in the tank that could react with oxygen
and metals and insulation, both.

QUERY
: Dr. Cortright, when you say within the tank, you meaninside
the sphere now. You're not talking about equipment associated
with the tank or near it. You were talking inside the sphere
of the tank.

CORTRIGHT
: That's correct.

QUERY
: I understand there's paper matting insulation between the
two walls. Is this being left out as the possible source
of combustion?

CORTRIGHT: Yes. I don't know whether it's paper or not. There's


superinsulation in there. At the moment, the Board is
concentrating and looking at the inside of the inner sphere,
both the insulation on the wires and the possibility of
contaminants and someof the metals themselves.

QUERY
: You also plan to look between the two walls?

: We'll have to look at all that.


CORTRIGHT

QUERY
: --metal could react with the oxygen could you characterize
that? The nature of the reaction that the metal prepared
you're not speaking about combustion in there are you?

CORTRIGHT: Yes. Aluminum can burn, and liquid oxygen under the right
conditions.

QUERY
: Blaze sort of thing?

H-17
CORTRIGHT: I don't know too much about that yet. l'd just as soon not
try to answer that question. As you know, aluminum can
burn in air.

QUERY
: Is the Project Office or industry, or anyone else simulating
any failure modesand if so, what are they?
CORTRIGHT
: The Project Office and North American are both attempting
to generate failure modeswhich could explain all the anom-
alies in the telemetry. And I refer you to the Project
Office for the details of that.

QUERY: In reference to the picture that was released, could you


tell very much from that picture what had happened?
CORTRIGHT: Not at first glance. But there are image enhancement
experts working on the pictures now to try and get more out
of them. In other words, it was difficult to tell much
about the number 2 oxygen tank.
QUERY
: Is there anything you detected in the photos that would
indicate a fire? Any charring or that sort of thing?
CORTRIGHT
: No, not to me but there was somestaining as you recall
that was announcedby the astronauts themselves. A brown
stain on the outside and I don't know what that means.
That's being looked at.
QUERY
: Would liquid oxygen itself leave a brown stain?
CORTRIGHT
: I haven't any idea.
DUFF
: Thar_kyou very much.

H-18
APOLLO
13 PRESSCONFERENCE
WITHDR. GEORGE
LOW
MAYi, 1970

DUFF: Press conference this afternoon with Mr. George Low,


Deputy Administrator of NASA.

LOW
: Goodafternoon. I have just spent the day since early this
morning receiving my first status report from the Apollo 13
Review Board. I received briefings this morning from
Mr. Cortright, who is Chairman of the Board, several members
of his panels, and also from Mr. Scott Simpkinson and
Col. McDivitt and Don Arabian who are conducting the Apollo
Program Office investigation here at the MannedSpacecraft
Center. There is a major effort on the way, as all of you
know, to determine the cause and the possible fixes for the
Apollo 13 accident, i don't have an exact number, but i
would estimate that between two and three hundred people are
working on the problems associated with this event. Wedo
have excellent telemetry data, and a great deal of informa-
tion from the spacecraft about the sequence of events that
occurred on April 13, about 55 hours into the flight of
Apollo 13. And as we said before, the major source of
information is the telemetry data. Wealso have photographs
of the service module taken after the service module was
jettisoned just before reentry. And as of today at least,
the information given by these photographs is still incon-
clusive. Specifically, there is still no firm decision
based on the photographs as to whether the oxygen tank
number 2 was still in the service module at the time it was
jettisoned or not. Review work is on the way in enhancing
the photographs, getting the maximumpossible information
out of them, but it is certainly not clear that we will ever
get that answer from the photos themselves. In addition to
the telemetry and the photograph, there's also on the way
now a very significant effort of tests and analyses. And
it will take a combination of all of the data from telem-
etry, from all of the testing of all of the analytical work,
and perhaps information from photographs to dete_rminethe
most probable cause or causes for the event that took place
on April 13. But from what l've heard today, and from what
l've been told previously, l'm fairly confident, quite con-
fident that we will be able to bound the problem, that we
will be able to determine its limits, and that we will find
corrective action that will encompassall possibilities.
Both the Board and the project people told me today that
the most probable sequence of events on Apollo 13 was as

}_-19
follows. First, a short circuit occurred in oxygen tank
number 2. This short circuit most probably caused combus-
tion within the tank. This in turn caused the pressure and
a temperature within the tank to increase. The tank then
ruptured. This rupture of the tank caused the pressure in
the compartment in which the tank is located to increase
which then caused the panel, the big covering panel in the
service module, to blow off. And if at any one fact then
that I had not known before today is that the blowoff of
the panel most probably was when the panel flew off and
then hit the high gain antenna which temporarily knocked
it out for a matter of a second or two and this led to the
loss of data for that very short period of time just about
the time that the panel did fly off. We also discussed
today the preflight events that might be of importance in
connection with the Apollo 13 accident. These included the
facts that the motors, the fan motors, the fans inside of
the tank were changed early in the manufacture at the ven-
dor's plant; later on the tank, itself, was removed and
reinstalled; moved from one spacecraft and installed in
spacecraft 109 and during the removal from spacecraft, I
believe it was 106, it was jarred or dropped an inch or two,
and this may or may not have had an influence on the well-
being of the tank. Finally, during the loading and unloading
of the tank during the countdown demonstration tests at the
Cape, there was an anomaly which made it very difficult to
get the oxygen out of the tank. This was several weeks
before the flight and a new procedure, not previously tried,
was used in this detanking. These three factors are also
being looked at by the Board and by the Review Team to see
whether there's any possible connection between those and
the accident, itself. The Board, today, estimated that they
will make their final report to Dr. Paine and myself about
the first of June. This is a very brief summary of our
discussions today. I also spent time this afternoon then
with Dale Myers and Rocco Petrone and Jim McDivitt and
discussed possible alternatives of design changes that
might be made to the spacecraft without in any way prejudging
what the conclusions of the report would be. But no deci-
sions in any such changes have been made at this time.
Be glad to answer any questions you might have.

DUFF : We'll start with Art Hill and then go back.

QUERY : George, how certain can you be that a short circuit was
responsible for initiating this series of events?

H-20
LOW : As I said, Art, the conclusion by the Board and the Review
Team ws,s that this was the most probable initiative of the
events. I don't think that anybody, as of today _ can be
positive that this was the- that this will be the final
answer, but, as you know, there were a number of electrical
glitches, high currents, low voltages, just preceding the
rest of the events and the investigation today was focusing
in that direction.

DUFF : Ed DeLong.

QUERY : In what component would you estimate that that short cir-
cuit happened and when you say combustion in the tank, does
anyone yet have any idea of what combustion in a high pres-
sure L0X tank is?

LOW: First question, what component --what component did it


happen on. Short circuit could only be in the wiring
leading to the fans, to the temperature sensor, to the
quantity gage or to the heaters. Now the preliminary con-
clusions today are that the heaters were not powered at
the time, so they're eliminated. And the current to the
quantity sensor and to the temperature fills were so low
that they are unlikely components. So the most likely
source would be the current to the fans.

QUERY : Before you go further, you say wiring leading to the fans.
Would that include wiring in the fan motors themselves?

LOW: It could certainly include that, yes.

QUERY: What component reacted or where was --where did the com-
bustion take place?

LOW: Again, the people have looked at what might burn in this
oxygen environment, and it would have to be the insulation
on the wiring or the wires themselves or some of the
aluminum components.

DUFF : Paul, you had one.

QUERY : Have you all simulated this failure with the tank rupturing,
and if so, does it cause shrapnel that would damage other
components in the same bay?

H-21
LOW: The complete simulation --there has been no complete sim-
ulation of the tank rupturing or of the entire events in
the full-scale tank, and it is certainly not clear today
whether the tank would rupture or whether it would spring
a leak or whether it would open a small hole only. I was
told today that all possible tests are still being examined
and that no firm test plan has yet been developed. Again
this will depend in part on the analyses and part in the
small scale tests and part of it is also the -- of looking
at the data before the people here will come up with a plan
for an overall test program.

QUERY
: Dr. Low, you indicated that during the countdown demonstra-
tion tests at the Cape that there was what you said was an
anomaly which caused difficulty in detanking the 02 tanks.
The other two factors were physical factors like a fan
changed or dropped. This is a procedural change. Would
you explain how that could possibly by a contributory
factor to the series of events?

LOW: Only in that it may --well, first of all it may have --


going back to this prelaunch event now, the -- at the time
that it was difficult to detank the oxygen, an analysis was
made and it was concluded that there could have been a
buildup of tolerances between various types in the stand-
pipe and the vent line that could have led to this diffi-
culty in detanking. In looking back over the records,
one can then ask the question could the detanking diffi-
culties be an indicator of something else being wrong
inside that tank, and we don't know today that it was.
Also, could the specific procedures in the detanking have
caused something else to be damaged? For example, during
the detanking the gaseous oxygen was pumped into the tank
and released again, and the heaters were turned off and on.
These procedures are now being examined in detail by the
Review Teams and by the Board to see if amy of it could
have had an effect on the tank itself.

QUERY : George, at what point in the history of the tanks were the
fans changed and why were they changed and was it both fans
we're talking about or just one or what?

LOW : At what point in history were they changed? Before the tank
was delivered to North American, I believe, so while they
were still at Beech. They were changed, I believe, because
there was a reading of voltage or current or something that
was not completely within specifications, so they were
removed and a new set of fans was installed.

H-22
QUERY
: So the fans that were in the tank that the explosion occurred
in were new fans?

LOW
: As far as I know, that's right. They are not the original
fans that were removed at the vendors.

QUERY
: The old fans weren't fixed and then put back in, or amy-
thing like that?

LOW
: I don't believe they were.

QUERY Sixty-six are we not - -

LOW
: I don't knowthe date, but I would imagine it was at least
that early.

DUFF: Wecould help perhaps afterward by going back and finding


someof these. Do you have a question?

QUE
RY Two or three here. One, do you have any idea what combus-
tion would be -- I mean, would it be flame, what would the
physical process of combustion be under those high pressure
or low temperature liquid oxygen conditions? Two, yesterday
we received from, ! gather Jim McDivitt's group, although
it cameout through the Public Affairs Office and was not
tagged specifically as to who it came out through, very firm
assurances that, although the shelf had been dropped an inch,
this did not contribute to the problem and you seemless
certain of that. Could you explain that a little bit, and
has there been any speculation at all about what might cause
a short circuit and what do you meanwhen you say short
circuit; do you meantwo wires crossing, do you meansome-
thing stalling the motor and overheating it, what's included
the re ?

LOW
: To the first question, do you rememberit? Okay, what is
combustion like in that environment, its supercritical
oxygen at minus 150 degrees and 900 pounds pressure. I
really don't know. Wehad an interesting discussion about
this at lunch time, whether -- I asked whether we had ever
seen or been able to take pictures of something reacting
violently in that environment. And I was told no, we had
not yet, at least the people here had not seen this, and
we are going to look at the possibility of putting a window
or a port into a test model so that one can take films of
this. So combustion really meansa violent reaction,
release of energy of so manyBtu's which are needed then to
increase the pressure and the temperature. I don't think

H-23
anybody today can really answer that question in any more
detail. The second question concerned the -- I try to point
out here the three things that we discussed that were
anomalous in the preflight situation. The fan change and
the removal of the oxygen shelf, and the 2-inch drop that
was involved there, and third, the detanking. And I brought
these out only because they are unknownstoday; I mentioned
also that at the time that the shelf was removed and was
dropped a couple of inches there was a normal discrepancy
procedure followed; in other words, it was examined and was
looked at, it was analyzed and the conclusion reached at that
time was that certainly the tank was all right to reinstall,
where it would not have been done. What the people are now
beginning to do is take a look at this again, to reanalyze
what might have happened at that time, to see whether higher
loads could have been imposed on it than was known at that
time, to see whether anything else could have happenedthat
was overlooked at that time. And I mention it only in that
light. And if- do I have them all?
QUERY
: What do you meanby a short circuit?
LOW
: A short circuit meansan abnormal flow of current which
could be caused by insulation missing off the wire, or the
wire touching the ground or it could be almost anything.
Does that include the fan motor stalling?

My recollection from previous knowledge I have had is that


the fan motor even in the complete stalled condition will
not generate enoughheat to cause any kind of a problem.
DUFF: Wewill get Jim because we haven't gotten to him yet, then
we are going to Washington for a few questions, then we
will comeback.
QUERY
: Will any or all of the fixes that you have discussed delay
the launch of IL?
LOW
: I don't know. I think the important thing here is to fix
what went wrong. I should have mentioned, of course, that
everybody here is also looking at all the manyother possi-
bilities in manyother areas where similar or related events
might occur. So we are going to take whatever time is nec-
essary to make right what went wrong, and until I get the
complete Board report, and this may not even be on June ist,
this was the estimate today, if they need more time, they

}{-24
will get more time to do their job, and until the job is
done both by the people here at MSC and by the Board, we
won't really know whether or not we will delay Apollo 14.

DUFF : We are ready for questions from Washington now.

SPEAKER : Okay, please wait for the mike now. Don.

QUERY : George, could you tell us when and where the tank jarring
occurred?

LOW : Where and when the tank jarring occurred; it occurred at


the North American Rockwell Factory in Downey. And it
therefore occurred before the spacecraft was delivered.
We will have to get to the exact date; I don't have it.
I am told November 68.

QUERY : George, could you tell us --you were speaking of separating


the oxygen tanks takes some equipment change to do that.
Are you also thinking -- i to 3 months in this whole thing?

LOW : I missed the middle part of the question. Could you repeat
it please?

LOW : Could you repeat the question, please. I did not get it.

Qk1_RY : George, are you thinking of separating the oxygen tanks


some physical way, not putting them into a different bay,
but maybe armor plating them? Are you also thinking of
removing the fans and the heaters and any other source of
electricity, and if you are thinking of this, wouldn't this
mean a delay of anywhere from I to 3 months in Apollo lh?

LOW : First question concerned the separation of armor plating


of the tanks. This is being looked at also, but it is as of
today not proposed as a solution. The removal of fans,
specifically the removal of fans, and the changing of the
wiring to the heaters instead of removing them or even the
possibility of removing them is being examined by Jim
McDivitt and his people. Again, no decision has been
reached. As far as time is concerned, I cannot give you
an answer. I know that there was a time when we launched
Apollo flights on 2-month centers and made some very major
dramatic changes in those fairly short periods of time. As
I said before, we will take whatever time is necessary to
fix it.

}[-25
DUFF : All right. I am told that October is the correct date.

QUERY : Dr. Low, while you were talking about the change and relo-
cating them and so on, you discussed something in general
about what design modifications you talked to Jim McDivitt

and also what area is it you're looking into where you


could through a single event lose your safety redundance
other than the

LOW: I can answer the first question. The design changes today
are the only design changes. They have not yet moved out
on any hardware changes. The design changes that are being
looked at include the removal of the fans, the changing of
the heater wiring, or the heater location so that all of the
wiring into the heaters can be enclosed in a metal sheath
going to the outside of the tank. The relocation of the

quantity probe or the redesign of the quantity probe to


remove the aluminum in it, and at the same time make it
possible to assemble the heater and probe device without
needing flexible wiring leading to them. And the removal
of all nonmetallic materials from inside the tank, and the
removal of aluminum and anything else that may react with
oxygen. Now, again let me emphasize that these are changes
that were being discussed and not yet being perused at
North American. At the same time as looking at these and
other changes and until all these get together, no decision
has been made on any changes.

QUERY : - - some of the possible errors where you could lose your
re dundan ce.

LOW: This we did not discuss today.

QUERY: Did you say McDivitt has some people looking into those
other possible areas?

LOW: Yes.

QUERY - - yesterday that after they're manufactured the oxygen


tanks were rejected two times before hastily being accepted
on the third inspection as the deadline approached. Would
you comment on that?

LOW:
This is the first time that I've heard this. We'll certainly
look into it and get you an answer. I have no information
on this.

H-26
QUERY : Well, l'm kind of confused on this fan. When you changed
out these fans, did you put back new ones of the same model
or were they different models, different in design than
the fans that had flown on all the previous Apollos?

LOW: The fans in Apollo 13, to the best of n_y knowledge, were
the same fans that we had flown in previous Apollos. The
fans that were removed from the tank back at the vendor's
plant apparently did not quite meet specifications when
they were tested in the tank. They were rejected, removed,
and other fans of the same kind were reinstalled.

QUERY : Okay. Did this happen in any previous Apollo flights, that
you had to remove the fans?

LOW: If it did, it was not discussed today.

QUERY: Dr. Low, again along with Paul's question, could you com-
pare these anomalies with anomalies of similar nature of
other Apollo flights? Have you had things of this nature
happen on other flights that you might be able to compare
with the anomalies on 13?

LOW : It's hard to form a comparison. We had, of course, some


anomalies in every Apollo flight. None of them was as
critical, none of them could potentially lead to as cata-
strophic a result as the anomalies on Apollo 13 could have
led to. Going back in history, of course, we had Apollo 6
where we lost 3 engines on the Saturn V launch vehicle on
the way out and had a very --had the POGO problem on the
first stage and also had a very major damage to the service
module LM adapter. Apollo 7, I don't remember the list.
We did lose, during the flight of Apollo 7, momentarily all
ac power as you'll recall. Apollo 8, we had very few,
although the list of details was quite long still.
Apollo 9, you're making me go back in memory here, but we
had some kinds of problems in every flight, up to and
including the computer alarms on Apollo Ii and the lightning
strike on Apollo 12, but none of them, as I mentioned
before, were potentially as catastrophic as these might have
been on Apollo 13.

QUERY : Well, I was basically thinking that --not of the overall


flight but on the LOX tank itself. If you could compare
all of the Apollo L0X tank situations, what would 13 look
like? Would it look like really a bad tank and if you'd
have compared them all would you have gone with it?

H-27
LOW
: I can't answer that question. It is not at all unusual
to have countdownproblems or countdowndemonstration
problems and --because this is why you conduct a count-
down demonstration in the countdown. I rememberin
Apollo 9 we had a very significant problem the entire night
before launch on the supercritical helium tank where we
did not know whether we had a blockage in the tank or not,
and we decided at that time that we were satisfied that
we understood the problem as we did on Apollo 13 on the
oxygen tank, and went ahead with the launch. That's a
related problem in that they were both cryogenics that we
had a problem with and only in that sense. I don't think
you should consider any single countdown problem or a
single countdowndemonstration problem or a single check-
out problem at the Cape to be unusual. We've changed
engines, we've changed fuel cells, we've done all of
these things and that's why you conduct tests at the Cape.
It's only today in retrospect, now that we've had the
accident, we're looking at the procedures again, that
we're looking particularly at the procedures in connection
with that tank to see whether that could have had an effect
on what happenedlater in the flight.
QUERY
: If you're moving the fans from the tank, what mechanism
would be used to stir that oxygen? The second thing, what
is your opinion now of the possibility of flying another
Apollo flight this year?
LOW: The first question is a technical one and even that does
not have a complete answer, Jim. Based on information by
Jim McDivitt and his people to date, it is possible that
we can conduct the flight without stirring the cryogenics
with the fan. This is based on looking at all the informa-
tion from all of the Apollo flights to date and looking at
the times and the fairly long times that we've gone on some
of these flights without turning on the fans, it appears to
be possible to eliminate the fans entirely without replacing
them with anything else. This is not yet a firm conclusion.
What is the probability of an Apollo 14 flight this year?
I can't give you an answer.
QUERY
: You talked about the possible design changes in the hard-
ware. Howabout design changes in the flight, itself, the
trajectory and the use of this hardware. Specifically,
there has been a suggestion that you might possibly carry
the ascent stage back as a possible lifeboat. Is there
any consideration being given to design changes in this
area?

H-28
LOW: That was not discussed today and has not been discussed with
me at all, so I really can't answer that. I don't know
whether or not it is being considered and if it is being
considered, whether it has a positive outlook or not.

QUERY
: Dr. Low, based on the thinking of your investigative Board
that it can have a final report ready for you and Dr. Paine
by June ist. Does this meanthat you have arrested a prime
suspect and now you're just going to give the guilty party
a fair trial the rest of the month, or have you got some
other --

LOW
: That's a good way of putting it. No, I told you all that
I know. However, the people here are quite confident, that
given another week or two of proceeding with the analysis,
of doing someof the tests that are underway, that they
will have enough information to bound the problem to decide
on the design fixes. Now, it maybe, as I said before, that
they will not be finished by the first of June or it may be
that they will give a report on the first of June and we'll
ask them to reconvene in July or August or someother time
to again look at what has been going on within the Program,
and to make sure that all the loose ends, if any, will
clean up.
QUERY
: Amongthe possibilities of solving this problem, have you
considered any that are not directly related to the struc-
ture itself, such as carrying another set of bottles or
dividing them into two small bottles, or carrying a reserve
supply somewhereelse so that a flight would not be impeded?
LOW
: Yes. I listed, a momentago, those avenues that the project
people here are looking at most seriously, today. They,
then, have a whole list of other things that they are also
looking at which include, perhaps all of them that -- all
of the ones that you have mentioned.
LOW
: Have it one at a time, Ed.

QUERY
: Okay. You reminded me when you mentioned the POG0problem
and the engine failure that we did have an engine-out on
this flight and that I have heard someproject people say
that if there is a delay in 14 that the fixes for that
engine-out maybe more responsible for it than any modes
to the spacecraft. What is the status of that engine
situation and how accurate is that assessmentof the possi-
bility of delay?

}_-29
LOW : Ed, I know that people at Marshall are working very hard
on that. I have not been briefed on it, and I have not
reviewed it, and I honestly don't know.

DUFF : Thank you all very much.

H-30
APOLLO
13 REVIEWBOARD CONFERENCE
JUNE2, 1970

CORTRIGHT: Goodafternoon. The purpose of this particular conference


is to bring you up to date on where the Apollo 13 Review
Board stands, tell you a little bit about why we've de-
layed our report and a little bit about what our prospects
are of making the current date. Now, in particular, I
want to tell you something about the tests that are going
on. I will refer to a few notes here in which I hope I
didn't leave anything out. First of all, let me say that
the general status of the review is that it's nearing com-
pletion, l'm generally satisfied with the results that
have been turned up in the investigation to date. I think
the understanding of the accident is good. We've delayed
the report, as I mentioned in a bulletin which cameout
within the last few days, because there are critical tests
being carried out which will help pin down someof the de-
tails of what took place. The Board has not been satisfied
until recently that these details were pinned down. There
are still a few key points to clear up.

Now, the tests that are being carried out are being carried
out all over the country. For example, here at Manned
Spacecraft Center, there are a number going on. They are
also being conducted at AmesResearch Center, Langley Re-
search Center, Marshall SpaceFlight Center, KennedySpace
Center, and at North American Rockwell, Beech, Boeing, and
a few other places. One of the key tests is -- one series
of tests relates to this special detanking procedure, which
you heard about before, and the checkout proceedings at
the Capeprior to launch. Nowthe tests so far have found
the faulty thermal switches, or the failed thermal switches,
which were mentioned the other day. They've also demon-
strated that if these thermal switches had failed as we
now are relatively certain was the case, that the tempers-
tures that would have been reached in the heater tube
assembly could have exceeded i000 ° F in somespots, although
not everywhere. There were tests conducted here at the
MannedSpacecraft Center that showedthat when the heater
assembly, the heater tube assembly, reached temperatures
like that it baked the Teflon-coated wires and destroyed
the insulation. And a little bit later I'll showyou some
samples of this insulation and what happens to it when it's
baked in an oxygen environment. Nowthe clincher is going
to be conducted at Beech Aircraft Corporation this week
wherein an actual flight tank will be cycled back through

H-31
the sameseries of detanking operations that took place
on the oxygen tank no. 2 from Apollo 13. These tests
began yesterday with a normal detanking and will proceed
now into the special detanking. Following the tests, the
tank will be disassembled and the wiring damageexamined.

Another series of tests that are appearing important are


being carried out at the MannedSpacecraft Center, the
AmesResearch Center, and the Lewis Research Center relate
to the ignition and combustion processes in the tank. Now
the first tests on ignition of Teflon by means of an elec-
tric arc were run at the Ames Research Center; they demon-
strated very low ignition energies. In fact, the initial
test indicated less than I Joule of energy and the short
circuits that were measured in flight showed energies of
at least 20 times that --I0 to 20 times that. Subse-
quently, the values required to start an insulation fire
in the tank fluctuated a little bit, but generally seem
to show I joule or less minimum energy, if the fire or
ignition were by means of an electric arc. Just plain
heating takes a lot more energy, but an electric arc con-
centrates the heat. The most recent test at Ames has
shown that if the wire is baked in an oxygen environment
and damaged, it still ignites and burns much as if it were
in its original condition. Now, the test at the Lewis
Research Center was designed to check these phenomena in a
zero-g environment. Now, the way this is done is that
there's a facility at Lewis which consists of a tank which
is dropped from a 500-foot tower. Actually, it's dumped
into a 500-foot hole and I think you can get 5 seconds of
zero-g flight that way, and if you toss it up from the
bottom and let it get almost to the top and come back down
again you can get i0 seconds. Basically what they've
shown in the combustion rate or propagation rate tests is
that in one-g the rate of propagation of combustion along
a Teflon-insulated wire depends on whether it's traveling
up, down, or sideways because of the convective currents.
The direction which most nearly simulates zero-g is down,
and that is about twice the rate that really takes place
in zero-g. These are Just rough numbers, but they are
generally right and all of this information has been de-
termined since the beginning of this test program.

As far as the tank rupture is concerned, there has been a


lot of question about just how much of a rupture it was, and
the guesses have ranged all the way from a small half-inch
hole, which might have occurred if a conduit burned out at
the top of the tank, to total rupture. Now, here's why
that's important. We feel that we'd like to know how much

H-32
the tank ruptured so that we can understand what caused
this rupture. Wecan readily conceive of a burnthrough
at the top of the tank because there are manywires that
cometogether at the top of the tank and run out through
this small conduit. This makes sense to us. Tests were
just run here the other day that showedthat not only
might that small conduit burn through, but as much as a
2-inch hole in this particular case could burn through
very rapidly.
Now, this ties into another series of tests, and that is
how the panel cameoff the service module. The pulse re-
quired to take that panel off has been under study at the
Langley Research Center with a very large crew of people
working on this problem. The service module bay 4 has
been mockedup in about one-half scale, and so far I think
a series of about 15 tests has been run to attempt to pop
the panel off in a realistic way, and this has all been
scaled dynamically and structurally so that it does simu-
late the actual conditions. The first thing that was
found out was that if you pulse a very rapid pulse in a
local area, which simulated a very rapid, rather large
rupture of the tank, it tore a hole in the panel. But if
the pulse were just a little bit slower and gave sufficient
time for the gas to spread throughout the whole bay and
pressurized that panel fairly uniformly, it cameoff
completely, and it cameoff at about the pressure it was
designed for, which was between 20 and 25 psi. Now, there
was someproblem with these tests in the sense that the
slow pulse which took the panel off pressurized someof
the rest of the service module more than we think happened,
because under one condition the pressure could have sepa-
rated the command module. The commandmodule was designed
in such a way that if it had been pressurized at its heat
shield area to i0 psi about, it would have comeoff. So
we have been looking for a pulse that would take this panel
off more abruptly and get it all off and this was achieved
yesterday morning where we were running our second honey-
combreinforced panel. Prior to this test, the panels
were single sheets simulating the tensile strength and the
membraneproperties of the actual panel. Someof the stiff-
ness properties were injected the other day whenwe got
our first scale honeycombpanels. They have now comeoff
in total, not in one piece, but they've all comeoff with a
sharp local pulse of the type we think occurred.

Werve also been running extensive theoretical calculations


at Langley to try to relate the shape of the pressure wave

H-33
and the total energy in it to what you might expect from
various size ruptures in the tank. We're getting close to
a match but we don't quite have it yet. Now if we've got
a 2-inch hole in the tank, and we're not sure we did get
it, just one test sample showed a hole about that size,
that would about give the right size pulse. If it was
something less, we might need an augmented pulse. There's
one way you can get an extra kick into that pulse, and
that is by burning of the Mylar insulation was right over
the top of the tank. There's a test being run at Langley
today to try to demonstrate that if the tank had burst,
flooded the Mylar insulation with liquid oxygen, or a
spray of liquid and gaseous oxygen, and had ignition
sources present (which would almost certainly have been
there with a burnthrough at the top of the tank) it would
in fact, ignite and supplement the pressure pulse from
the cold gas alone. Now this isn't quite pinned down yet.
Obviously, l'm giving you some information in advance of
conclusive results but l'm doing this so you'll understand
what we're about. I guess the last thing I would say then
is that the tests are all coming to a focus here this week.
It's going to be very difficult to get the report in by
next Monday. The Administrator is not putting me or the
Board under pressure to get that report in but rather is
urging us to take the time required to do a good job and
we're going to do that. So that if additional time is
required, we'll take it. I won't know for a few days yet.
That's what I thought I would tell you, except to answer
the questions.

QUERY : Would you just summarize for us the probable sequence of


events that happened on Apollo 13 based on all the know-
ledge to date?

CORTRIGHT: Where do you waist me to start?

QUERY: When the problems developed, what had happened that lead
up to this problem on Apollo 13 ... based on the
investigation?

CORTRIGHT: Well, I'Ii tell you part of it but I don't want to attempt
to give you the whole sequence because there's some steps
in it that we're still debating. In fact, I have to leave
here before too long to go back and participate in a
meeting with officials from the prime and subcontractor
who built this tank to discuss some of the events that
preceded the accident. But in a gross sense, it was be-
lieved to be something like this. The switches which
failed at the Cape, we think, were not rated to the voltage
levels to which they were subjected at the Cape. Normally

H-34
they would not have been opened under these voltages at
the Cape, but they did so in the special detanking. This
higher voltage failed the switches in a manner in which
they could no longer function as protective thermostats.
This in turn resulted in the heaters operating for a
long period of time without interruption. The heater tube
assembly reached temperatures which we suspect, locally,
may have been as high as i000 ° F. We have demonstrated
that this seriously damages Teflon insulation. In flight,
when the fan motor wires were energized for a normal stir
of the oxygen, they short circuited at a point where the
insulation had been damaged by this heater cycle. The
short circuit was of such a nature that it created an
electric arc which, in turn, ignited the Teflon insulation.
The Teflon insulation burned towards the top of the tank.
When it reached the top of the tank it ignited additional
Teflon insulation around other wires which come together
there, creating a local furnace which burned through the
top of the tank in some manner. The high-pressure oxygen
rushed out into bay 4, pressurized it with a sharp quick
pulse, separated the panel, damaged the oxygen tank no. i
system, resulted in the total loss of oxygen and power
ultimately.

QUERY: What evidence is there that this happened before launch?


The switches were damaged before launch?

CORTRIGHT: The tests the other day showed- indicated that the
switches can weld closed when they attempt to interrupt
a current of the strength which was used at the Cape dur-
ing a detanking procedure. Now the details of that, with
regard to the actual rating of the switch, how it came to
have that rating, l'm not prepared to discuss that today.

QUERY: How many times were the fans used before the explosion and
why?

CORTRIGHT: I don't have that count, but they were used.

QUERY: More than once?

CORTRIGHT: Yes.

QUERY: Who authorized this special procedure for detanking?

CORTRIGHT: This was authorized through normal procedures at the


Kennedy Space Center with checks with responsible
indivi duals.

QUERY: Had they ever been used before?

H-35
CORTRIGHT: No.

QUERY: Do you know why they had trouble with these tanks?

CORTRIGHT:
We suspect a loose portion of a filter assembly in the tank
but l'd rather defer discussion of this aspect of it. I
think I will defer at about this point because there are
elements of it that are not yet clearly established and
they will be in the final report to the Administrator which
I'll make next week.

QUERY:
Why was the failure of switches not discovered early in
launch ?

CORTRIGHT: The ground support equipment which monitored the tank did
not readily or visibly display the heater operation and
the operation of those two switches.

QUERY : And was no special step made to check those switches due
to the fact that they had been taken above their rated
voit age s ?

CORTRIGHT:
No. I defer that question for the next time we get together.

QUERY: Well, what kind of voltage did your tests show? What volt-
age did the switches draw?

CORTRIGHT: 65 volts dc.

QUERY:
When you said there was nothing on the ground support equip-
ment, what do you mean, there was no indicator or gage or
something, or what?

CORTRIGHT: l'm not sure I understand your question.

QUERY: You said there was nothing on the ground support equipment
that would indicate the heater operation and the operation
of the two switches?

CORTRIGHT:
The voltage of the equipment is recorded but as far as I
know, and this is one of the things we're checking into,
there is no convenient way that would illustrate the
cycling of those switches to the observer.

QUERY:
Do you have a detanking procedure which was not normal,
which had been described to us since is very strenuous,
hard on the equipment, etc.?

H-36
CORTRIGHT: There were tests run in support of that operation to deter-
mine whether or not it was a safe procedure to follow.
There was no mechanism hypothesized that could damage the
tanks.

QUERY: No special tests were run after the procedure was completed
to back check the two switches?

CORTRIGHT: I feel it's very important to be accurate in regards to


this switch malfunction because it probably was the final
thing that occurred during ground tests which caused the
accident. I think it'd be seriously wrong on my part to
speculate in any way.

QUERY: Cortright, you say that welding occurred at 65 volts dc?

CORTRIGHT: l'm not exactly sure of the exact number so l'd rather not
answer that.

QUERY: Dr. Paine testified on May 19 before the Senate Appropria-


tions Committee that modifications are being made. Is that
true?

QUERY: What does that mean?

CORTRIGHT: It means that work is going ahead as planned.

QUERY: But no nominal gain made, is that right?

CORTRIGHT: The fix has not yet been authorized.

QUERY: As I understand it, this heater switch business is some-


thing that you became fairly sure of last week, is that
correct?

CORTRIGHT: Yes o

QUERY: That would have been after Dr. Paine said that modifications
are being made, it raises a question of will this necessi-
tate further modifications?

CORTRIGHT: This switch, I believe, had already been taken out for sub-
sequent flights prior to the accident, and the discovery
of the switch problem merely helps us be certain we knew
what happened. It doesn't change the approach to the fix.

QUERY: What about pinning the fault of the explosion on the de-
tanking operation? Does this mean that whereas the detanking

H-37
in the past has been sort of thought to have been a one-of-
a-kind failure and there may be some modifications coming
out of it now? Further modifications?

CORTRIGHT: I don't believe that the normal detanking procedure will be


changed as a result of what we learned. Certainly the spe-
cial KSC detanking procedure will not be followed again.

QUERY: This sounds like not an equipment failure, but human failure
in not using the equipment properly, is that right or not?

CORTRIGHT: There appears to have been a mismatch between the ground


support equipment and the switches which were used on the
spacecraft, and what we're trying to pin down now is how
that occurred.

QUERY: You're saying that the people conducting the test felt that
these switches could handle the current used in the test.
Did they use too much current?

CORTRIGHT: It was too much for switches that were on board.

QUERY: Are you saying in essence that you think it means they
know what kind of switches were on board?

CORTRIGHT: Yes. They didn't know that the switches would not handle
that current.

QUERY: Had there been a change in switch specs somewhere along


the line?

CORTR!GHT: I understand why you want the answers to all these ques-
tions, but I am not prepared to give much more than this
today because I don't have all the answers yet. As I say,
we're meeting at 3 o'clock, to attempt to pin some of these
things down. If I attempt to answer any more questions
about these events, I'ii be changing the answers tomorrow...

QUERY: ... switches to be set, was this known?

CORTRIGHT: It was known to some.

QUERY: To the people operating the ground support equipment?

CORTR!GHT: No, I said that they -

QUERY: The people operating the ground support equipment.

H-38
CORTRIGHT: No, I said that they felt the switches were rated
at the level to which they were using them.

QUERY : Has NASA called for or requested a change in switch speci-


fications anywhere along the way here?

QUERY: What are the switches rated at? What were the switches
that were in there rated at? We've got 65 ...

CORTRIGHT: We're double checking that, and we'll tell you when we
know.

QUERY: You said that this thermostat switch had been taken off
in future flights?

CORTRIGHT: I think so.

QUERY: Do you know why?

CORTRIGHT: Pardon?

QUERY: Do you know why that it was taken off?

CORTRIGHT: l'm not positive that I have all the information on it,
but normally those switches are never used. They would
normally be used in very unusual condition where the
oxygen in the tank got down to a few percent of maximum
during flight, and the tanks aren't used that way. But
they were used that way during this detanking procedure.

QUERY: The switch removal then is not one of the steps that you
ordered as part of the fire proofing procedure?

CORTRIGHT: No, sir.

QUERY: These switches, are they inside the tank, outside, or where?

CORTRIGHT: They are inside the tank, mounted on the inside of a heater
tube, near the top.

QUERY: Then Apollo 13 would have been the last flight to the best
of your knowledge at this point in time that would have
had those switches in it?

C ORTRI GHT : l'm going to ask Brian Duff to check that for me. l'm
not certain. That's my recollection.

QUERY: We've got one question from Washington. Wait a second.

H-39
QUERY: ... and the mismatching of switches in GSE, etc., are you
coming to the conclusion that perhaps there has been
over a period of time ... a letdown in quality control
and attention to detail that's got to be shaped up?

CORTRIGHT: We're not going to come to that conclusion today. We're


trying to reach conclusions so that we can make recommenda-
tions to the Administrator next week. I guess that will
have to be nTy answer for today. Let me say one other
thing in answer to that question. I have not detected any
letdown in quality assurance as set up for this program and
as carried out. In fact, we have found that the quality
assurance program is about the most rigorous we've ever
seen and that it's carried out to the letter. That does
not mean that the best systems can't let things slip
through occasionally.

QUERY: You said that the ground support people didn't know that
that switch couldn't take that current but that some
people did know it. Were these some people that were at
the Cape that were involved in the procedures?

CORTRIGHT: We're trying to determine today and this week who did and
who didn't know and what information was exchanged among
them.

QUERY: You certainly have given an overall impressiom at least


that there was either a substandard switch involved or
that some documentation along the way didn't get passed
along, or that something in this area probably occurred.
Is that what you're looking at, at least is that possibility
you' re looking at?

CORTRIGHT: I think it's clear that a mistake was made. That's what
we're looking for.

QUERY: Does it look more like a hardware mistake or a documenta-


tion mistake?

CORTRIGHT: l'm not certain just what aspects have been ... most
significant.

QUERY: Then why ...

CORTRIGHT:
l'd rather not get into a discussion of this today, if you
don't mind.

H-40
QUERY
: Dr. Cortright, how did you cometo suspect the switches?
Wasit because the detanking procedure was a deviation
from the normal way of doing things, that an investigation
of this type you would normally look into a thing like that?
CORTRIGHT
: That's the first part of it. It was ar_abnormal thing.
The tank failure was abnormal. You try to put two and two
together. Wedid recognize immediately that if those
switches had not operated that the heaters could have gotten
quite hot, so we undertook with the MannedSpacecraft Center
to conduct tests to determine how hot the heaters might
have gotten. In the process of conducting those tests, the
switches actually failed in the manner I described. It
wasn't actually during the test of the switches themselves
but they did weld themselves shut and therefore pinned
down a key step in the whole process.

QUERY
: Well, do you feel that the sequencewas a failure? When
the switches failed at CapeKennedy and generated possibly
i000 degrees of temperature, this in effect did somebaking
of the insulation. Subsequently, use of the fans and the
heaters continued to bake and on April 13 the insulation
just gave way and arced. Is that what happened? After a
continual exposure to this high heat?
CORTRIGHT: Weexpect that the insulation was in bad shape at launch
and just why it took as manyhours as it did to strike an
arc we don't know, but there are mechanismsthat you can
speculate on. For example, there are wires that are re-
latively free. They are loops in the tank, and these loops
no doubt do somemoving around each time the fans comeon
and stir the fluid. They conceivably get movedback to a
point where they had once been in contact with the heater
and were damaged,and if at the time they movedback they
were bare, partly bare because of the damage, it would
strike an arc. That's one way it could happen. Wemay
never know.

QUERY: Do you have a certain amount of sloshing in those tanks by


just attitude changes? Do they slosh ... ?
CORTRIGHT: Well, sloshing is not the right description, but a gentle
reactive motion.

QUERY: The loops --the wires could movew!thin the tank in this
kind of motion?

H-41
CORTRIGHT: Yes, but when the short circuits took place was immediately
following turnon of the fans.

QUERY: Whenwas it first discovered that more voltage was applied


to the switches than should have been?
CORTRIGHT: Last Wednesday. Wereported it to you last Thursday.

QUERY: Wasthat just a studying of documentation of test at the


Cape? Is that right?
CORTRIGHT: That was by having the switches fail during the ground
tests and attempting to understand why they failed.
QUERY: Howdid you becomepositive that the switches were failed
at the time of launch? Is this hypothesis based on these
tests or was there somedocumentation that you could go
back to for the GSEto determine this?
CORTRIGHT: The records l've seen to date indicate that the rating of
the switches was lower than the voltage supplied to them
and that this makes it seemrational that since they failed
in ground tests at the voltage used at the Cape, that they
in turn had failed at the Cape. Now, someof the tests
that are being run this week, and l'd like to makea strong
point of this, are to validate in fact that these switches
would normally fail at the applied voltages and that it
wasn't simply an odd occurrence here in a test at MSC.

QUERY
: That's the purpose of the voltage test for the flight
model?

CORTRIGHT: Actually -- excuse me, I want to answer that question.


That isn't one of the main purposes of that test and I
don't know what configuration those switches are in in
that tank; they may, in fact, be wired closed. But
there will be more switches tested here to get a little
bit of statistical sample as to whether they would
always weld closed.

QUERY: Would you run through in a very brief capsule summary,


the tests that were conducted, in the sequence in which
they were conducted and the place they were conducted
leading up to this day and this week, this month? MSC
switch failure found and pick up from there.

H-42
CORTRIGHT: I guess I won't try to do that because I don't have all
those dates and sequencesthat sharply in my mind. The
key test was here at MSC last Wednesday in which the
switches failed.

QUERY: Is there any sensor ...

C0RTRIGHT: No. The thermal switch itself is set to open at 80 ° F


plus or minus i0 °.

QUERY: Yeah ... thermal switches, is there any idea ... it's
two dimensional.

CORTRIGHT: l'm not prepared to discuss the details of that. Now I


can guarantee you that there will be thought given to need
for such a measurement. I'm not sure if it's needed.

QUERY
: Plus or minus 80 degrees - plus or minus how much you can
handle ...

QUERY: How did you decide that the insulation was in bad shape
or not? I would ...

CORTRIGHT: Just happened to have. (Laughter.)

CORTRIGHT: I intended to bring along and show the original condition


so you could imagine that. This is a piece of wire that
was baked for i hour at 752 ° F; the insulation is cracked
and opened up at various positions on the wire. That
represents i degree of insulation damage. Subsequent
movement of shaking and thermal stresses might have caused
pieces to flake off. Now at a little bit higher tempera-
ture, 860 ° F, you can see the insulation is largely gone.
That was after 1/2 hour. Now we know that we were quite
sure that some portions of the heater tube reached i000 °,
probably most of it didn't but it could have been local
damage perhaps as bad as this.

QUERY: You'd call that thing cooked, wouldn't you?

QUERY: Several hours, at the Cape at i000 ° and this burned off
in a half hour; how did he even get airborne? •

CORTRIGHT: That's good question and I Just don't know the answer
to that question. We only have a few measurements in our
tests so far that give temperatures on that heater. One
of them went as high as I mentioned (1GO0 ° F) and it was

H-43
very close to the actual heater element. The temperature
dropped off fairly rapidly away from that element, l've
been led to believe. And therefore, the wires may not
have approached these temperatures on most of their length.
All we have established really is that the potential was
there to destroy the insulation on the wires at least
locally.
QUERY: Howclose is this fan wire adjacent ...
CORTRIGHT: The lower fan motor wires run through the heaters through
a small conduit.

QUERY: What's the material of this conduit?


CORTRIGHT: Inconel. I think l'm going to have to limit you to about
one more question. Then I have to get back to the meeting.
_]ERY: Canyou even ball-park roughly how this 65 degree -- did
you say the voltage it was supposed to be in the switches
was two times as high, three times as high, four times as
high?
CORTRIGHT: No. l'd rather not. I have an approximate number, but
we're checking that today.
QUERY: Could you even just give us a rough thing like it was
quite a bit higher?
CORTRIGHT: Waslarger.

QUERY: Wasit quite a bit larger?


CORTRIGHT: It was large enough, I think, to weld them.
QUERY: Whatwas the material that ... checked?
CORTRIGHT: • . . (Laughter.)

H-44
STATUS REPORTS OF THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

H-45
STATUS REPORTS OF THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

Status Report No. i


April 21, 1970

The first meeting of the Apollo 13 Review Board was convened by


Chairman Edgar M. Cortright at 8 p.m., c.s.t., April 21, at the Manned
Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. The Board adjourned at i0 p.m.
Present for the first meeting, in addition to the Chairman, were Board
Members Neil Armstrong, John F. Clark, Milton Klein, W. R. Hedrick, and
Charles W. Mathews. Cortright said the other Members of the Board,
which was appointed by NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine yesterday,
intended to join the Board in Houston today. The Members unable to
attend last night's preliminary meeting were Dr. H. M. Mark, Robert F.
Allnutt, and Vincent L. Johnson.

The Board immediately set itself a work routine which will begin
with a 7 a.m. breakfast and end at 9 p.m.

In addition to its own planning meetings and fact-finding sessions,


Chairman Cortright allocated an important part of each day to coordinate
reviews with the Manned Spacecraft Center's Apollo 13 Investigation Team.
Cortright said the Board intended to rely heavily on the data-gathering
and analytical capabilities of the Apollo Program Office Team, while at
the same time insuring that the Review Board had within its own organi-
zation the competence and depth to make a completely independent assess-
ment of any findings or recommendations of the MSC team or any other
source.

In this regard, Cortright said the Review Board will wait until
later this week when it has had a chance to hear a detailed briefing
from the Apollo Program Office Team before it makes final decisions about
recruiting additional support or advisory assista#ice. He said it was too
early to know just where and what additional strength will be needed.

H-46
Status Report No. 2
April 22, 1970

The Apo_lo 13 Review Board held its first full day of meetings at
the MannedSpacecraft Center today. The Board began the day by famil-
iarizing itself with the status of the investigation of the accident
currently underway by the engineers of the MannedSpacecraft Center and
its contractors.
Following this the Board took its first detailed look at the suspect
area of the liquid oxygen tanks in the service module. E. M. Cortright,
Board Chairman, stated that this review included a study of the telemetry
records and the anomalies which preceded the destructive event. A de-
tailed discussion of possible causes of failure followed, and the Board
membershad the opportunity to carefully examine specimens of the type
that failed.

H-47
Status Report No. 3
April 23, 1970

The Apollo 13 Review Board settled into a routine today, which


Board Chairman Edgar M. Cortright expected would carry it at least
through next week without a break.

The entire membershipof the Board sat in as observers for an early-


morning status briefing by Apollo Spacecraft Program engineers on the
progress of all investigations and testing currently underway at NASA
installations or contractor plants.

Immediately afterward, Cortright called the Board and its supporting


experts into session to makethe assignments of responsibility as the
Board began to tackle in earnest its Job of determining what happened
to cripple the Apollo 13 service module, why it happened, and to recom-
mendcorrective action.

Board MemberNeil Armstrong, astronaut, was asked to oversee the


area of Mission Events. Mr. Frank Smith, Assistant Administrator,
University Affairs, NASAHeadquarters, was namedchairman of a panel of
supporting experts. Board MemberJohn Clark, Director of the NASAGoddard
SpaceFlight Center, was given responsibility for the area of manufac-
turing and test, and Mr. C. B. Schurmeier of the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory was namedchairman of the supporting panel. Board MemberVincent L.
Johnson, NASAHeadquarters, was given responsibility for the area of
design, and Mr. S. C. Himmel, Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles,
Lewis Research Center, will chair the supporting panel. A study of
project managementaspects pertinent to the Apollo 13 incident will be
under the direction of Board MemberMilton Klein, Managerof the
AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, and his supporting panel will
be headedby Mr. Edward Kilgore of the NASALangley Research Center.
Cortright requested the responsible Board Membersand their panel leaders
to determine quickly what kind of additional help they will need to
carry out their assignments and to submit their recommendationsfor his
approval.

Another of the Board Members,Brigadier General Walter R. Hedrick,


Jr., USAF,was given a special assignment to facilitate integration of
the various panels' activities.

Dr. HansMark, a Me_er of the Review Board and Director of the NASA
AmesResearch Center, was given responsibility for special testing and
analyses and for identifying consultants if needed.

H-48
Mr. Charles Mathews, NASAHeadquarters, was asked to supervise
liaison between the work of the Review Board and the investigations
being carried on by the Apollo Program Office.

Board MemberRobert Allnutt, a special assistant to the NASA


Administrator, was put in charge of documenting the Board's plans and
procedures, and planning the form of the Board's official report.

A fourth official observer was added to the Board today at the


direction of NASAAdministrator ThomasO. Paine. He is James E. Wilson,
technical consultant to the House Committeeon Science and Astronautics.
Cortright said Wilson, like the other official observers, will sit in
on all Board activities.

H-49
Status Report No. 4
April 24, 1970

Membersof the Apollo 13 Review Board and a number of the Board's


supporting experts will makea 1-day field trip to the North American
Rockwell plant at Downey, California_ tomorrow.

Board Chairman Edgar Cortright said the purpose of the trip will
be to inspect available hardware with particular emphasis on the equip-
ment in bay 4 of the service module; to inspect and review any tests
which are being conducted as a result of the Apollo 13 flight; and to
give the Board Membersa complete history of the oxygen system which
flew on the Apollo 13 spacecraft. North American Rockwell is the prime
contractor for both the Apollo commandand service modules.

Review Board Members,in addition to the Chairman, who will make


the trip are: Dr. John Clark, Dr. HansMark, Mr. Vincent Johnson,
Brigadier General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (USAF)_Mr. Milton Klein,
and Mr. Neil Armstrong.

Panel Chairmenmaking the trip will include: Mr. H. M. Schurmeier,


Mr. Frank Smith, and Mr. S. C. Himmel. Mr. Charles Mathews, who is
responsible for liaison between the Review Board and the Apollo Program,
will makethe trip, as will a number of other supporting specialists and
staff members.

The Board plans to leave Houston via Air Force jet at 8 a.m. Sunday
morning and return to Houston late the sameday. The panel will be at
the North American Rockwell plant approximately 7 hours.

H-5o
Status Report No. 5
April 27, 1970

Apollo 13 Review Board panel chairman Harris M. Schurmeier will


accompany Apollo project engineers to the plant of the Beech Aircraft
Corporation in Boulder, Colorado, on Tuesday to witness the assembly of
an Apollo service module oxygen tank.

Beech builds the tank as a subcontractor to North American Rockwell.


Schurmeier said the primary purpose of his visit to Beech will be to
follow in detail the normal assembly procedures practiced during the
insertion of components inside the service module tank. Several Review
Board specialists and Apollo project engineers will make the trip also.
Schurmeier, of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, is chairman of a panel of
specialists which is assisting the Review Board in the area of manufac-
turing and test procedures.

Other Board and panel members broke up into working groups today
to continue their review of the available data concerning the destructive
incident which made it necessary to abort Apollo 13's mission to the Moon.

H-51
Status Report No. 6
April 28, 1970

The Apollo 13 Review Board examined carefully processed photographs


of the damagedservice module today but found the pictures inconclusive.

"It is our opinion that the photographs, at their present stage of


processing and analysis, do not establish the condition of the number
two oxygen tank or even its presence," said Board ChairmanEdgar M.
Cortright.

The photographs were taken by the Apollo 13 astronauts after their


commandmodule had separated from the service module just before reentry.
The pictures, from 70-millimeter still photographs and frames of
16-millimeter motion picture footage, show the interior of the service
module's bay 4 which contained fuel cells and oxygen and hydrogen tanks.
The Board had hoped that the photographs would help establish the condi-
tion of the number 2 oxygen tank, prime suspect in the Apollo 13 equip-
ment failure. Efforts to bring out further detail in the photography
with sophisticated enhancementtechniques continues here at the Manned
Spacecraft Center and elsewhere around the country. However, the pro-
ducts of this work will not be available to the Board until sometime
next week. Membersof the Board and Apollo Program engineers have said
from the beginning that the most valuable clues to what happenedin the
service module will comefrom the telemetered data received from the
spacecraft, rather than from photography.

Chairman Cortright said that the Board and the MSCteam investi-
gating the accident will makeinterim progress reports to NASADeputy
Administrator George Low on Friday morning at the MannedSpacecraft
Center. In the meantime, study of data by the various investigative
panels continues.

H-52
Status Report No. 7
April 29, 1970

The Management Panel of the Apollo 13 Review Board scheduled inspec-


tion trips to the North American Rockwell plant at Downey, California,
today and to the Beech Aircraft Corp. plant at Boulder, Colorado, tomor-
row.

Panel Chairman Edward Kilgore, of the NASA Langley Research Center,


heads the Board's team of specialists. The Panel is charged with a
study of project management aspects pertinent to the Apollo 13 failure.

H-53
Status Report No. 8
April 29, 1970

Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory


Panel, a statuatory body created by Congress after the Apollo i fire,
arrived today for 2 days of briefing by the Apollo 13 Review Board
and Apollo Program engineers.

Dr. Harrington was accompanied by Mr. Carl Praktish, the Panel's


executive secretary, and Mr. R_nerson Harris, the Panel's deputy executive
secretary. Dr. Harrington in an official observer of the Review Board.
In addition, the Safety Panel has been asked by NASA Administrator
Thomas O. Paine to review the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13
Board, and the Board is required to keep the Safety Panel informed of
its work and progress.

Tonight (Wednesday) several members of the Review Board will experi-


ence, with fellow Board Member Neil Armstrong as a guide, what it was
like in the Apollo 13 command module at the moment when the crisis was
discovered. Armstrong said the command module training simulator at the
Manned Spacecraft Center will be used to try to give the Board Members
and some of the panelists a better appreciation of the failure from the
crewmen's point of view.

"The Board Members will see what indications of the incident were
available in the spacecraft and, particularly, how the positions of the
various crew members would affect their ability to interpret what was
taking place," Armstrong said.

"It is just one more way to reconstruct the _ncident," he added.

H- 54
Status Report No. 9
April 30, 1970

Members of the Apollo 13 Review Board and its Panels spent most of
today summarizing findings to date for an interim review of progress for
NASA Deputy Administrator George Low. Low will get a 3-hour combined
briefing from the Board and project officers.
Status Report No. i0
May 5, i970

The Apollo 13 Review Board and the MSCApollo 13 Investigation Team


will brief the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel all day tomorrow.

Dr. Charles Harrington, Chairman of the Panel, and seven panel and
staff memberswill be given a complete review of the Apollo 13 failure
and the progress of the investigations so far, and will meet with indi-
vidual membersof the Board. The Harrington Panel also will inspect the
service module oxygen tank and associated equipment and will participate
in a simulator demonstration. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is a
statuatory body created by Congress after the Apollo 1 fire. NASAAdmin-
istrator Thomas0. Paine has asked the Safety Panel to review all findings
and procedures of the Review Board.

Membersof the Board's Project ManagementPanel were at the Kennedy


SpaceCenter in Florida this week as part of a continuing study of all
aspects of government and contractor managementpertinent to the Apollo 13
failure. The Board worked through the past weekendand on Mondaytaking
progress reports from its four Panels - Mission Events, Design, Manufac-
turing and Test, and Project Management. The Board has been conferring,
too, with the Apollo ProgramTeamto determine the scope and variety of
tests to be conducted at NASAinstallations or at contractor plants to
further pinpoint the cause of the Apollo 13 failure and, eventually, to
validate proposed design changes.

Robert Wells, an electrical engineer from the NASALangley Research


Center, Joined the Design Panel this week.

_-56
Status Report No. ii
May 7, 1970

The Apollo 13 Review Board will take its first break this weekend
since it went to work on April 21. Chairman Edgar M. Cortright said he
would adjourn the Board on Friday and not reconvene until Tuesday, May 12.
Most of the Board and Panel Members are from out of town and have not
had a chance to get home since the Board was convened.

After the Board reconvenes next Tuesday, Cortright plans to


stay in session until the end of the month in an effort to deliver
a finished report on the Apollo 13 failure to NASA Administrator Thomas
O. Paine by June i. The day-to-day work of the Board and its Panels
continues to be a detailed review of all available information on the
Apollo 13 accident, testing of principal hypotheses, and preliminary
work on individual segments of the report.

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Status Report No. 12
May 13, 1970

Apollo 13 Review Board Chairman Edgar Cortright will be in


Los Angeles tomorrow on business for the Langley Research Center,
where he is Director. Board memberVincent L. Johnson, Deputy Associate
Administrator for Engineering in NASA'sOffice of Space Science and
Applications, is acting chairman in Cortright's absence.
In the meantime, our Board Membersand Panel Chairmenworked to
have a final report ready for NASAAdministrator Thomas0. Paine by
June i. Today was spent interviewing persons with special knowledge
of the Apollo 13 mission or Apollo spacecraft systems and in refining
draft sections of the Board's report.

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Status Report No. 13
May 25, 1970

The Apollo 13 Review Board expects to make its final report on


June 8 instead of June i, Chairman Edgar M. Cortright said today.

The 1-week delay in the previously announced schedule is to allow


time for completion of special tests currently under way at NASA Centers
and contractor plants_ Cortright said. The Chairman said he informed
NASA Administrator Thomas 0. Paine of the need for the delay this
morning.

Cortright said that in view of the new schedule, the Board will
recess Wednesday evening and reconvene the following Monday morning.
He said he plans to deliver the final report to Paine and Deputy Admin-
istrator George Low in Washington on Monday_ June 8.

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Status Report No. 14
May 27, 1970

A special detanking procedure which was applied to the no. 2 oxygen


tank of the Apollo 13 service module before launch "probably resulted
in major damage to the wiring insulation in the tank," the Chairman of
the Apollo 13 Review Board said today.

Chairman Edgar M. Cortright said the probability that significant


damage occurred to the insulation during the detanking procedures
developed during tests conducted at the Manned Spacecraft Center in
Houston, Texas, over the last few days.

The detanking, a partial draining of the oxygen in the tank,


occurred during preflight preparations on the pad at the Kennedy Space
Center before the launch of Apollo 13.

Tests will continue over the next few days in an effort to substan-
tiate the findings so far, Cortright said, and the Review Board will
hear the results of this work when it reconvenes at the Manned Spacecraft
Center on Monday, June i.

In discussing the detanking tests, Cortright said it now appears


that two thermal switches, designed to protect the heaters in the tank
from overheating, may have failed. In such an event, other tests have
shown that the heater tube in the tank could have reached temperatures
of about i000 ° F and that such temperatures would seriously damage the
insulation around the heater wires, he said.

Cortright said such insulation damage could have resulted in the


arcing short circuits which are believed to have initiated the combus-
tion of insulation inside the tank during the flight. The burning, in
turn, raised the pressure of the supercritical oxygen and caused the
tank to rupture.

Another area of testing which the Board will hear about on Monday
seeks to determine the manner in which the tank finally failed and what
mechanism was needed to cause the outer panel of the service module to
blow off.

Cortright said the Board continues to expect to deliver its final


report to NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine and Deputy Administrator
George M. Low on Monday, June 8, 1970.

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Status Report No. 15
June 5, 1970

Apollo 13 Review Board ChairmanEdgar M. Cortright said today that


he plans to send the final draft of the Board's report to the printer
about the middle of next week and deliver the full report to Dr. Thomas
O. Paine, _SA Administrator, in Washington on Monday,June 15, 1970.

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NASA -- MSC

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