PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

LEGAL INTERPRETIVISM
GROUP 4 - GOZON - GUAN - IBAY - JOCSON - KHO
Legal Interpretivism
Defined

Explains how institutional practice – the legally

significant action and practices of political
institutions – modifies legal rights and
obligations.
Ex. Labor – illegal dismissal give rise to action
thru the arbiter or NLRC.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Legal Interpretivism
Non - Positivist Claim

Combines what is known by law and how

morality would affect a situation and alter it
through metaphysics and theism.
Ex. Law – an enactment is on an institutional
action which charges right and obligation
which may not be the direct intent of the law
nonetheless shall be impacted by it

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

 The Orthodox View

The law is how the institution

communicates its logic through the
production of legal texts.
2 KINDS OF INTERPRETIVISM
What difference does morality make?

Hybrid Pure (Non-hybrid)

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

HYBRID
The institutional input to the interpretive
process.
Built around consistency and integrity
which are basically the foundation of the
law

PURE (NON-HYBRID)
Does not just focus on rights and
obligations.
Deals with moral principles and how they
determine the practice
 Rationale

The philosophy of
Interpretivism is relevant to the
study of law as it is necessary to
learn how the laws can be
applied in a given set of facts.
Dworkin 1986, 2011
 Rationale

Moral explanations, norms and

institutional principles are
considered in dissecting a legal
provision.
Dworkin 1986, 2011
NOT ABLE PHILO SOPHERS
Legal Interpretivism

Ronald D'workin John Hart Ely Cass Sunstein

Judicial Activist Judicial Middle Ground Judicial Minimalist

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Ronald D'workin
Judicial Activist

December 11, 1931 – February 14, 2013

AmericaN philosopher, jurist and scholar of United
States constitutional law
A professor at Yale (1962–75), Oxford (1969–98), New
York Univ. (1975–2013), and University College London
(1998–2013)
Notable Ideas: Law as integrity, fit and justification in
law, right answer thesis, legal interpretivism, rights as
trumps
Award: Holberg International Memorial Prize

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Ronald D'workin
Judicial Activist

Believed in the strong approach to Interpretation,

where judges are vital and in the best position to
interpret because they are protected from political
influence and strong-arming
Decisions interpreted through principles that have
always existed will remain timeless unlike sets of norms
that depend on the opinion and acceptance of society.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Cass Sunstein
Judicial Minimalist

September 1954 (age 64 years),

American legal scholar, particularly in the fields
of constitutional law, administrative law,
environmental law, and law and behavioral
economics,
Currently the Robert Walmsley University
Professor at Harvard. From 2009 to 2012, he
was Administrator of the White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Cass Sunstein
Judicial Minimalist

Subscribes to decision-making brought about by

analogical reasoning and practice, and lessens the
dependence on theory building and interpretation
utilizing principles.
Reliance on tradition, something that he finds
dangerous, should be minimized - because there will
be a need to determine if such tradition obscures or
clarifies

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

John Hart Ely
Judicial Middle Ground

December 3, 1938 – October 25, 2003

Taught law at Harvard and Yale and had been
dean of the Stanford Law School,
Notable Work: ''Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review''

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

John Hart Ely
Judicial Middle Ground

A critic of judicial review and the encompassing role of

judges, as he wanted judges confined to handling cases
for discrete or insular minorities or making decision that
merely affect the few.
Interpretation solely belongs to the Legislature, and
decision-making for important issues be left to elected
officials, thus the interpretive process will remain
virtually free from precedent, both from usage and its
value.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Legal
Interpretivism
Cases

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
GR NO. 154380, October 5,
2005, Article 26; Divorce
Herein the petition for review, the Solicitor
General assailing the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur and
its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared
that respondent Cipriano Orbecido III (Orbecido)
is capacitated to remarry.
CASE 1
FACTS:
Respondent Orbecido was married with Lady Myros
Villanueva (Villanueva) at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981.
They were blessed with son and daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, respondent’s wife left for United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and
married a certain Innocent Stanley
..
 FACTS:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code. No opposition was filed, thus finding
GR NO. 154380, October 5, merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
2005, Article 26; Divorce Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of
certiorari on the Decision of the RTC

CASE 1
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005,

Article 26; Divorce
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not respondent

Orbecido can remarry
under paragraph 2 Article
26 of the Family Code.
CASE 1
 RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that taking into consideration the

legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article
26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III obtains a divorce decree.  The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005, a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
Article 26; Divorce marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding

Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry
under Philippine law. However, since Orbecido was not
CASE 1 able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still
barred from remarrying.
Case 1
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

In this case the Supreme Court decided to interpret the

law to be just and fair not only for the parties involved
but to future cases as it will form part of the law of the
land. The case doctrine relied on the legislative intent in
order to arrive in a justifiable conclusion. A law can be
applied with reason but allegations must be proved by
substantial evidence to considered as a fact. The legal
interpretation was in favor of Orbecido but he still lost
the case by failure to prove a material fact that his
spouse indeed obtained a divorce abroad.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4


MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS.
GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156; February 3, 1997
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked
by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC)
which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they
ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the
protective mantle of the Constitution.
CASE 2
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC).
 
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS.
 FACTS:

MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a

subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17
October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC
MANILA PRINCE came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
HOTEL VS. GSIS
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
G.R. NO. 122156; been identified with the Filipino nation and has
February 3, 1997 practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
 
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
CASE 2 requires implementing legislation(s).
 MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156;

February 3, 1997

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Article XII Sec. 10 of

the Constitution is self-executing
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel
forms part of the national patrimony
CASE 2

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005,
Article 26; Divorce
1. Whether or not Article XII Sec.
10 of the Constitution is self-
executing
CASE 2
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision that is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
 
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005,
Article 26; Divorce
2. Whether or not the Manila
Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony
CASE 2
RULING:
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to
be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the
Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities
during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth.
Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine
Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors
who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005,
Article 26; Divorce
2. Whether or not the Manila
Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony
CASE 2
RULING:
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel
has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony.
Case 2
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

According to Dworkin, interpretative concepts are a

special kind of concept whose correct application
depends not on fixed criteria but rather on the
normative or evaluative facts that best justify the total
set of practices in which that concept is used. In manila
prince hotel case the Filipino First Policy is interpreted
to be as a self-executing provison in order to preserve
our national heritage. This ruling was made in order to
prevent aliens from owning any of our preserved
heritages by invoking the presumption that all
Constitutional provisions are self-executory since it is
the supreme law of land.
 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4
Case 2
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

The legal interpretation by the Supreme Court was for

the greater interest of the country to protect its rights
over the Manila Hotel which is considered as a national
heritage due to the events that took place on such
grounds. There may be a legitimate argument that the
decision may be biased and will turn off foreigners from
investing in our country but the Highest Tribunal of the
land is free to interpret the laws which they believe is
just and for the greater benefit of all. 

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO
G.R NO. 221029 APRIL 24, 2018
FACTS:
The instant case is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside
the ruling of the Court of Appeals dated
September 18, 2014 and a resolution dated
October 12, 2014. The ruling in question
granted the cancellation of marriage entry
in the civil registry of San Juan, Manila as
petitioned by herein respondent, Marelyn
Tanedo Manalo.
CASE 3
The latter filed such petition subsequent to a divorce
decree rendered by a Japanese court.
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo is a Filipino citizen who was
married to a Japanese national, named Yoshino Minoro.
She later on filed for divorce in Japan which was
granted after due proceedings. Thereafter, she
proceeded to have their marriage entry cancelled in the
civil registry of San Juan, Manila, filing the appropriate
petition in the Dagupan- Regional Trial Court.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit.
Citing Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides for the
Nationality principle, the trial court ruled  that unless
Filipino citizens are naturalized as citizens of another
country, Philippine laws shall govern over issues
involving Filipinos' family rights and duties together with
the determination of their condition and legal capacity
to enter into contracts and civil relations including
marriage.
 FACTS:

Upon appeal the Court of Appeals, however, reversed

the lower court's decision and ruled in favor of Manalo. It
held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES for divorce against her Japanese husband because the
VS MARELYN TANEDO decree they obtained makes the latter no longer
MANALO married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary ruling
G.R NO. 221029 APRIL 24, 2018 that the meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative
intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of
injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to
her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo
who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
CASE 3
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO

G.R NO. 221029 APRIL 24, 2018

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not a Filipino citizen, who

initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
thereafter obtained a divorce decree,
capacitated to remarry pursuant to Article
26 (2) of the Family Code.

CASE 3
 RULING:

Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
VS MARELYN TANEDO capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear
MANALO and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The strict
G.R NO. 221029 APRIL 24, 2018 reading of the law does not demand that the foreigner
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding.
The provision does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse or the foreigner spouse is the petitioner in the
foreign divorce proceeding.

CASE 3

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO
G.R NO. 221029 APRIL 24, 2018
CASE 3
RULING:
The very purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it is
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. It
exacts a remedy to the anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
is already free to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. Whether or not the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding, the validly obtained foreign
divorce decree effectively dissolving the marriage bond
and thereby capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will lead to the same outcome, the Filipino
spouse will be without a husband or a wife. Therefore,
the subject provision should not make a distinction.
 RULING:

In both situations, it is extended as a means to

recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES law.
VS MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO There is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and
G.R NO. 221029 APRIL 24, 2018 a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the
instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are
alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are
still married to their foreigner spouses who are no
CASE 3
longer their wives/husbands.
 RULING:

Hence, to make a distinction between them are based

merely on superficial difference of whether they
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair.
VS MARELYN TANEDO
Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and
MANALO
unjustly discriminate against the other.
G.R NO. 221029 APRIL 24, 2018
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce
proceeding abroad and validly obtained such, resulting
to his or her alien spouse capacity to remarry, is likewise
capacitated to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code.

CASE 3
Case 3
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

The Court in the case at bar decided based on the

intent of the lawmakers when they formulated the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
wit:
       “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.”

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Case 3
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it

only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not mandate that the
foreigner spouse must be the one who initiated the
proceeding. As provided by the plain meaning rule, the
Court cannot stray from the words of the statute when
it is clear and unambiguous. Respecting its co-equal
branch which is the legislature, the Court cannot
amend the statute.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Case 3
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

The issue: whether or not the Filipino spouse who

initiated the divorce proceeding may enforce a valid
foreign divorce as contemplated in Art. 26 of the Family
Code, is not a novel one to the Court as the same has
already recognized a foreign divorce decree initiated by
the Filipino spouse in the case of Dacasin v. Dacasin
and also in a much older case, decided even prior the
effectivity of the Family Code, Van Dorn v. Ronillo.
However, in Republic v. Orbecido, the Court
pronounced the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4
Case 3
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW - GROUP 4

Case 3
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

The Court has abandoned such requirements in the

instant case as it is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker, which in this case as time and again stated
by the Court, the purpose of this provision is to avoid
the absurd situation that the Filipino spouse remains
married to the already unmarried alien spouse. Without
a doubt, the law should never be interpreted in such a
way to perpetrate injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in
fact, for we presume the good motives of the
lawmaking body, is to render justice.
Case 3
In Relation to Legal Interpretivism

In the interpretation of the provision, for the sake of

argument, assuming that the law intended that divorce
proceedings must be initiated by the foreigner spouse,
the Court cited the Equal Protection clause and
concluded that there is no actual and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated the foreign
divorce and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her foreigner spouse.
Therefore, it is only fair to consider both divorce decrees
valid as they are both Filipinos endowed with the same
rights and obligations surrounded with the same
circumstances with regard to marrying an alien spouse.
To make a distinction between them based merely on
the superficial difference of who initiated the divorce
proceedings is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
against the other.