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PORCADILLA, MARK ANTHONY

Special Proceedings (7:30-9:00 PM/Wed.)


Atty. Brenda Tanggarorang

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF CASES

1.G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988


TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA, executrix-
appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES
VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.

FACTS: Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura while
Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are also the brother and mother
of Maria Ventura. On the other hand, appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's
legitimate children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano but the paternity of appellees was
denied by the deceased in his will.
On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not
include the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was
named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate.
In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954. Gregorio Ventura died on
September 26,1955. On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her
appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. On October 17, 1955,
Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was issued in her
favor.
On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of Gregorio Ventura.On
June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive.
Said account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz on
July 25, 1960 and by Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura on August 5,1963. Both oppositions
assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate and the expenses which
allegedly are not administration expenses.
But on January 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion for the approval of the accounts of
administration without the opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria
Ventura and Exequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity of Mercedes Ventura and
Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before the Supreme Court and that should they be
adjudged the adulterous children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose
the approval of the counts of administration.
However,it was found that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by the Court of
First Instance in Civil Cases No. 1064 and 1476, as the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, hence,
they have reason to protect their interest.
On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds
of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the
matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the
estate, rendered the questioned decision removing her as executrix and in her place Mercedes Ventura
and Gregoria Ventura are appointed joint a admintratrices of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.
RULING: Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous
appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now necessitate the
appointment of another administrator,under the following provision:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;"
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the
next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has
been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's
property. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant,
is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for
preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to
be preferred."
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are
the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the
nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana
Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.
PRINCIPLE: In the absence of persons named as executor in the will, or if such person named therein
is incompetent or fails to execute a bond as required by law, preferential right is given to the persons
enumerated under Section 6 (a) , Rule 78 of the Rules of Court to be appointed as the executor or
administrator. The preterition of a compulsory heir in the will necessarily calls for the nullification of
the will. In such case, the person named as executor therein may not be respected and may be validly
replaced in favor of persons preferred under Section 6 (a) , Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
2. G.R. No. L-41508 June 27, 1988
CANDELARIO VILLAMOR, PILAR DE LA SERNA, BARTOLOME VILLAMOR, RAFAELA
RETUYA, SOFRONIO VILLAMOR, PILAR SEMBLANTE, ELEUTERIO VILLAMOR,
CARIDAD GORECHO, MARCOS OR and GUADALUPE CEDEÑO petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DANIELA CENIZA UROT, in her capacity as administratrix
of the estate of Fr. Nicanor Cortes, under Sp. Proc. No. 3062-R, respondents.
FACTS: Spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castañeda had eight (8) children, namely: Rufino, Barbara,
Florencio, Casimira, Brigida, Braulia, Margarita and Eugenia. Of the eight children, six died single and
without issue. Barbara Cortes begot a son by the name of Eustaquio Cortes. Rufino Cortes, who died on
June 12, 1909 left two alleged legitimate children, Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor.
The last to die of the Cortes children was Eugenia Cortes. She died on January 8, 1931.
Eustaquio Cortes, son of Barbara, married one Sixta Ceniza. Born to them were five children, namely:
Dionisio, Bartolome, Nicanor, Agapita and Amancia, all surnamed Cortes. All five remained unmarried
and died without will nor forced heirs. Dionisio, Amancia and Agapita predeceased their father
Eustaquio. Eustaquio died on October 20, 1932, survived by his spouse and two sons, Bartolome and
Nicanor. Bartolome who was a Catholic priest, died on November 14, 1937. Nicanor Cortes, also
known as Father Gabriel Maria Cortes, died as a monk of the Carthusian Order in Barcelona, Spain on
August 28, 1969. He was the last of the direct descendants of the Barbara Cortes line.
On the other hand, Paula Villamor, alleged daughter of Rufino Cortes, died single on January 29, 1967
and without issue. Ireneo Villamor married one Bersabela Perez. Said marriage was blessed with five
children, namely: Candelario, Bartolome, Sofronio, Eleuterio and Marcos, all surnamed Villamor, the
petitioners, herein. Ireneo Villamor died on April 21, 1966.
It appears that shortly after the death of Bartolome Cortes, Special Proceedings No. 227 was instituted
for the settlement of his estate. Fr. Diosdado Camomot, a close friend of Bartolome, was named
administrator.
Sometime between 1937 and 1938, Special Proceedings No. 262-C, which relates to the intestate
estates of Eugenia, Casimira, Florencio, Braulia, Margarita and Barbara, all surnamed Cortes was filed.
This proceeding evidently did not include a brother, Rufino Cortes. Atty. Primitive Sato was appointed
administrator.
On September 27, 1938, Paula Cortes Villamor and Ireneo Cortes Villamor, claiming to be the
legitimate children of Rufino Cortes, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Rufino
Cortes, under Special Proceedings No. 343-C, to protect their rights and counteract the effects of
Special Proceedings No. 262-C. Appointed administrator in this proceeding was one Moises Mendoza,
who thereafter submitted an inventory of the properties allegedly belonging to the estate of Rufino
Cortes. The properties enumerated in the inventory were the very same properties subject of Special
Proceedings Nos. 227 and 262-C.
A scramble over the control and possession of the, properties ensued between the heirs of Barbara
Cortes, represented by Sixta Ceniza with the help of Fr. Camomot, and the Rufino Cortes line
represented by Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor. On May 20, 1946, Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor
and Father Camomot filed a joint motion in Special Proceedings No. 262-C and Special Proceedings
No. 343-C, wherein they manifested that "the heirs have arrived at an agreement to settle the matter
amicably between themselves by partitioning the estate among them" Thus, after six months of
negotiation, or on December 7, 1946, a Project of Partition was executed by them. In said Project of
Partition, seven parcels of land were apportioned and delivered to Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor.
On April 14, 1948, Judge S. C. Moscoso approved the project of partition, and on September 30, 1948,
the administrators delivered the seven parcels of land to Ireneo and Paula Villamor. Special
Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 were ordered closed and terminated by Judge Florentino Saguin on
November 25, 1953. Entry of judgment was made on March 18, 1954.
After Ireneo's death, his children, now petitioners, executed an extra-judicial partition, dividing the
remaining 6 parcels of land among themselves.
Meanwhile, upon the death of Sixta Ceniza on July 28, 1948, one Cristina Ceniza, sister of respondent
Daniela Ceniza Urot instituted Special Proceedings No. 364-R for the administration of the estate of
Sixta Ceniza. One Escolastico Ceniza, brother of respondent, was appointed special administrator. The
latter's appointment, however, was revoked on February 20, 1954 upon petition of Fr. Nicanor Cortes
through his counsel, Atty. Fermin Yap on January 14, 1954, and in his stead, Victorio Perez was
appointed the special administrator. In this proceedings, the nephews and nieces of Sixta Ceniza,
including herein respondent, prayed that they be declared the sole and only forced heirs of Sixta
Ceniza, although at the time, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, the only surviving child of Sixta Ceniza, was still
alive.
On October 21, 1954, Fr. Cortes executed a power of attorney before the Vice-Consul of the Republic
of the Philippines in Madrid, Spain, constituting and appointing Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-
in-fact and giving him the power to appear for me and in my behalf in Special Proceedings No. 364-R
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, with authority to designate and employ the services of an
attorney or attorneys for the protection of my rights.
On January 13, 1955, Victorio Perez submitted an inventory which specifically Identified the properties
which came from the Project of Partition and the corresponding number of such property or parcel of
land in said Project of Partition.
On August 18, 1955, the court, through Judge Clementino Diez, denied the motion of the nephews and
nieces of Sixta Ceniza to be declared her heirs and declared Fr. Nicanor Cortes as the only and
universal heir of Sixta Ceniza.
On May 16, 1962, Fr. Nicanor Cortes executed a Deed of Conveyance in favor of several persons
wherein he conveyed ten parcels of land which included those received by his mother under the Project
of Partition.
On August 28, 1969, Fr. Nicanor Cortes died in Barcelona, Spain. Special Proceedings No. 3062-R of
the Court of First instituted for the settlement Instance of Cebu was thereafter in of his estate.
Appointed administratrix was respondent Daniela Ceniza Urot who, on June 4, 1970 filed Civil Case
No. 11726 against petitioners, successors-in-interest of Ireneo Villamor of the seven parcels of land and
Paula Villamor, for recovery received in the Project of Partition, accounting and receivership. The
complaint heavily invoked the existence of fraud in the procurement of the Project of Partition and the
failure to notify Fr. Nicanor Cortes of the proceedings thereof, thereby depriving him of personal
knowledge, which necessarily calls for the annulment of the Project Partition and deprivation of right
over the subject properties.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found for the private respondent. Hence, the petition for
certiorari questioning the affirmation of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a collusion between the administrators in the case, who are
considered strangers to the decedents.
RULING: The Court found and gave credence to the pieces of evidence that no fraud was committed
nor collusion of the administrators. The Court do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the
lower court and concurred in by the Court of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question, the
administrators appointed were complete strangers to the decedents. There is nothing repulsive in this
nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors and administrators. It provides that in case
the persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve,
administration may be granted to such other person as the court may appoint.
What is intriguing is the fact that although Fr. Nicanor Cortes had a number of surviving first cousins,
he chose and preferred a stranger, Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-in-fact to take charge of his
and his Nanay's affairs. And even more intriguing is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of his mother, he took steps to have the appointment of Escolastico Ceniza, brother of
private respondent, who was appointed as Special Administrator, revoked and in which he succeeded.
PRINCIPLE: A stranger to the decedent may be appointed as administrator to the settlement of his
estate, subject to the discretion of the court, in case the persons who have the preferential right to be
appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve.
COMPARATIVE: In G.R. No. L-26306, the nullification of the will due to the preterition of a
compulsory heir also results to the nullity of the person named as executor therein in favor of the
persons preferred under Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. While, in G.R. No. L-41508,
appointment of strangers to the decedent may be allowed provided that the the persons who have the
preferential right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve.

3. G.R. No. 160671 April 30, 2008


LUIS L. CO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, Makati City, ELIZABETH RACHEL CO, ASTRID MELODY CO-LIM,
GENEVIEVE CO-CHUN, CAROL CO, KEVIN CO, EDWARD CO and the ESTATE OF LIM
SEE TE, respondents.

FACTS: On March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) OF Makati City, appointed petitioner and
Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of the estate of the petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun.
However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioner’s appointment as special co-
administrator. Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin, for brevity), for
appointment as co-administrator of the estate. On August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin as special
co-administrator.
Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs, issued its January
22, 2002 Order7 revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin. The trial court reasoned that
Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his
capacity, ability or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the
filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided
the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and
confidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disqualication against Alvin is applicable.
RULING: Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by
the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove
special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it.
This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principles.
Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no
longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid
effect thereto. The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and
control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to
its smooth administration and earliest settlement.
In this case, we find that the trial court’s judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal as special co-
administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. The appellate court correctly
observed that: In ruling to revoke the appointment of Alvin Milton Co, the lower court took into
consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator which demands a high degree
of trust and confidence in the person to be appointed. The court a quo observed that, burdened with the
criminal charges of falsification of commercial documents leveled against him (sic), and the
corresponding profound duty to defend himself in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co’s ability and
qualification to act as special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and the
recall of his appointment is only proper under the attendant circumstances.
PRINCIPLE: The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding
the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long
as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it.

4. G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008


VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY
EDUARDO NIERRAS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and
HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.
FACTS: Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private
respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed
an Opposition to the Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a
special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be
resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of
the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the
country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or
competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto
administratrix of his estate since his death.
On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives
to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix. More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the
RTC, acting on the private respondents’ Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave
Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been
made.
Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order appointing Romualdo
as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate.
Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin
of the deceased. The Motion was denied by the respondent Judge.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifiying
Vilma to be executor.
RULING: This Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment
of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge
Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered
petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her
appointment for the reason that she fails to comply with the urgent directive by Atty. Nuevo. This Court
is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs be that heir is
(sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the
requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer the estate of
Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.
PRINCIPLE: The order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the
afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The preference under
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and is not appealable.The discretionary power of the court in the
appointment of executor, if fault is attendant, at best, would constitute a mere error of judgment and
would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other
hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
5. G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO
PIJUAN, special administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.
FACTS: In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz — hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea — and Carlos
Gurrea were married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came,
with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had
two (2) children. Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos Gurrea
refused to admit her to his residence in said municipality. Hence, she stayed with their son, Teodoro, in
Bacolod City.
Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament,
in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son,
Teodoro. Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon
his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the
probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged
illegitimate daughter of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether Marcelo Pijuan qualifies as special executor.
RULING: It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea that the lower court erred in denying her petition for
appointment as administratrix, for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the language of this provision, said preference
exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case
at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still
pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names
Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more,
he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his
appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties
thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the
Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix,
not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of
the probate court,5 and is not appealable.
PRINCIPLE : The preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court exists "if no
executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate. Where an alleged will named a person as executor, pending
probate, shall be respected until disprove that the decedent died intestate.

6. G.R. No. 14904 September 19, 1921


FRANCISCO D. LUNSOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
SINFOROSO ORTEGA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS :On June 3, 1915, Rufina Medel, widow, resident of the municipality of San Pablo,
Province of Laguna, in a public document executed and acknowledged on the same day before
Felix Esconde, notary public for and in said municipality, sold to Francisco Lunsod, husband of
Gabina Peyamonte, for the sum of P2,000 and with the right to repurchase for two years.

On September 19, 1916, Francisco Lunsod filed in the justice of the peace court of San Pablo a
complaint against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, the case being docketed there as civil case
No. 861. In said complaint the description of the parcels in question was given and the plaintiff alleged
that he was the owner of the three parcels of land mentioned in the aforementioned document and that
on or about June 4, 1916, he was illegally, and by means of strategy and stealth, turned out of the
possession thereof by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have been collecting the fruits,
thereby injuring him in the sum of P150.

In answer to said complaint, the defendant alleged, as a special defense, that he was in possession of
said parcels because he was, together with his sister Francisca Ortega, a pro indiviso owner thereof,
and that his possession was not obtained illegally, nor by the means mentioned in the complaint. The
defendant, therefore, prayed that he be absolved from the complaint and the injunction denied.

To this answer the plaintiff filed a reply, denying generally and specifically all the facts alleged therein,
and further stating that said three parcels were his exclusive property, having acquired them by
purchase from Rufina Medel, deceased, the sole and absolute owner thereof.

The defendants having answered the complaint, judgment was rendered on October 26, 1916, by the
justice of the peace court in favor of the plaintiff, sentencing Sinforoso Ortega to restore the possession
of the property in question to the plaintiff and to pay the sum of P150, as damages sustained by the
latter, with the costs. The case was dismissed as to the defendant Cariaga. From this judgment an
appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance by the defendant Ortega.

After the institution of intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rufina
Medel, to wit, on November 6, 1916, which was one and one-half month after the filing by Francisco
Lunsod of the complaint for unlawful detainer and six days after the inventory of the properties left by
said deceased had been made and submitted, the administrator of the estate, Cipriano Medel, and his
sister Jacoba presented in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna an application, which was later
amended, for the registration in their name, in accordance with the Land Registration Act, of said three
parcels with the improvements thereon, described in the plans attached thereto. In said application it
was alleged that they acquired the absolute title thereof through inheritance from their deceased sister
Rufina Medel, and that said parcels were occupied since the year 1915 by Francisco Lunsod to whom
they had been sold with the right to repurchase by their sister Rufina. The applicants finally invoked
the benefits of chapter 6 of Act No. 926, on the ground that they had been in continuous, open and
peaceful possession of the land for more than 21 years including that of their predecessors in interest.

Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega challenged the application by claiming that claimed that they
were the absolute owners and were in possession thereof, having acquired them by inheritance from
their deceased father Mariano Ortega and their deceased niece Anacleta Ortega.

The three civil suits respectively mentioned, to wit, case No. 2322, for unlawful entry and detainer,
case No. 2286, for the recovery of title, and exclusion of the land from the inventory of the intestate
estate of the deceased Rufina Medel and the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the
defendants, and finally case No. 219, that is to say, the proceedings instituted by Cipriano Medel and
his sister Jacoba Medel for the registration of said three parcels, were jointly tried, by common consent
of the parties; and it was agreed between the parties that the evidence introduced in case No. 2286,
should be considered as evidence in the other two cases.

After said trial the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered judgment as follows: In case No. 219,
which is the land registration case, it was declared that Cipriano and Jacoba Medel had no right to a
decree of registration and the application was therefore dismissed, with costs. In the other two civil
cases, Nos. 2286 and 2322, it was held that the three parcels of land in question belonged to Sinforoso
Ortega and Francisca Ortega, and it was therefore ordered that the defeated party should pay the costs
and that said three parcels should be excluded from the inventory submitted by Cipriano Medel,
administrator of the estate of the deceased Rufina Medel in civil case No. 2218, the intestate
proceeding. To this judgment the plaintiff Francisco Lunsod and the administrator of the intestate
estate, Cipriano Medel, and his sister Jacoba Medel excepted, and filed a motion for new trial, which
was denied with their exception, and took an appeal by the proper bill of exceptions, which was
transmitted to this court.

ISSUE: Whether or not reserva troncal exist and what are the rights of the parties therein.

RULING: The trial court did not err in finding that the weight of the evidence markedly preponderates
in favor of the theory that the lands in question passed, through inheritance, upon the death of Mariano
Ortega, father of Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega, to the last named person who, with his
wife Rufina Medel, took possession thereof, and that, therefore said couple having had a daughter
named Anacleta Ortega, who inherited said three parcels upon the death of her father; upon the death
of said daughter on June 17, 1903, said three parcels of land passed by inheritance to her mother
Rufina Medel. To this it must also be added that it is likewise proven that Rufina Medel continued in
possession of said parcels jointly with the brother and sister of her deceased husband, who are uncle
and aunt, respectively, of her deceased daughter Anacleta, and who are the appellees Sinforoso Ortega
and Francisca Ortega, and that she was in such joint possession on June 3, 1915, when she sold said
parcels with pacto de retro to Francisco Lunsod who, notwithstanding said sale, was not in possession
thereof in June, 1916, the date when, according to him he was turned out of said possession by
Sinforoso Ortega, by reason of which facts we cannot hold that the acts indicative of that possession
and testified to by Lunsod himself and his witnesses and the witnesses of the other plaintiffs and
appellees were duly proven.

Now, according to article 811 of the Civil Code an ascendant who inherits from a descendant any
property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law in favor of the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.
In the case at bar, Rufina Medel inherited by operation of law from her daughter Anacleta Ortega, who
died at the age of six years, the three parcels of land in question situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina in
the municipality of San Pablo Province of Laguna, which parcels had been acquired by said Anacleta
Ortega gratuitously, that is to say, also by inheritance from an ascendant, who was her father Estanislao
Ortega, and said three parcels having come from Mariano Ortega, father of the deceased Estanislao
Ortega and the appellees Sinforoso and Francisco Ortega, who are therefore relatives within the third
degree of the child Anacleta Ortega, daughter of Estanislao Ortega, then according to the provisions of
said article 811, these pieces of land constitute reservable property in favor of said Sinforoso and
Francisca Ortega, uncle and aunt of the descendant's predecessor in interest with respect to the
property.

The court highlighed the rights of the reservor as well as the ascendants of the prepositus by citing
numerous decisions, to wit:

The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal, and recovery. This
absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that
absolute ownership would arise.

"The ascendant acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exist at
the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendant from whom they inherit in the
line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the
death of the ascendant. If they do not exist, the ascendant can freely dispose thereof. If this is true,
since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the
ascendant may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has
and nothing more because no one can give that does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an
expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their
heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve
the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved
and they will acquire it and all the rest that has the same character in complete ownership, in fee
simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary."
(Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservables, 304, 305.)

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at
all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of his to alienation, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and
have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even
though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved
has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is in no way, either actually, constructively, or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can
transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die
before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in
the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that is to say, a
second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future
legacy.

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act to disposal inter vivos of the
person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is
burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know
that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an
act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the
descendant from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this
alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some
special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December
30, 1897.)

The three parcels referred to not being, therefore property of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
Estanislao Ortega and Rufina Medel, but the separate and exclusive property of the former, since he
acquired them gratuitously from his father Mariano Ortega, the title thereof passing afterwards to their
daughter Anacleta Ortega, and, upon the latter's death, to Rufina Medel by inheritance from Anacleta,
with the character of reservable property in favor of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, who acquired the
absolute title thereto by virtue of said character, the exclusion, ordered by the court, of said property
from the inventory presented by the administrator Cipriano Medel in the intestate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Rufina Medel, case No. 2218, was proper.

PRINCIPLE: It is established doctrine that the mere fact that one of the parties is the executor or
administrator of the estate of the deceased person does not confer upon the probate court, in which the
proceedings for the distribution and settlement of said estate are pending, exclusive jurisdiction to
decide all questions that may arise between said executor or administrator and third persons as to the
title to a specific property.

7. G.R. No. L-46847 June 29, 1940


Testamentaria de la finada Arcadia Santos (alias Leocadia).
MAXIMINA MARCELINO, solicitante y apelada,
vs.
ROSARIO ANTONIO Y OTROS, solicitantes y apelantes.
FACTS: After the will of the late Arcadia (Leocadia) Santos was legalized by the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, his heirs Felisa Antonio and others presented, on July 19, 1938, two motions:
One, asking for inventory and rendering of acccounts of all properties which comes to the possession
and knowledge of the executor. Second, it was requested that the deceased's will be declared void in
respect of any legacy or interest given in said last will to Calixta Peralta, daughter of Casimiro Peralta,
one of the witnesses to the will.
The court, holding the opposition of Maximina Marcelino and Calixta Peralta, dismissed the motions
by order of January 31, 1939, on the grounds that they raised questions to be addressed in separate
ordinary action. The movers appealed against that order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the participation and distribution of
the inheritance among the interested parties after all the debts of a testamentary or intestamentary have
been paid.
RULING : The Court is of the opinion that the lower Court incurred in the errors indicated in the
pleading of the appellant motives, since once a testament is legalized, it is the duty of the executor or
administrator, unless it is legatee, to present to the Court, within the next 3 months His appointment, an
inventory of all assets, rights and credits that have come into his hands.
As for the other motion, in which the will is declared void in relation to the legacy made in favor of
Calixta Peralta, and as to the memorandum of the movers with respect to the exclusion of certain
properties of the inventory of the testamentary, the Order can not be upheld either. After all the debts of
a testamentary or intestamentary have been paid, the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the
participation and distribution of the inheritance among the interested parties. In the exercise of that
jurisdiction, the court may or may not respect the distribution made in the will, according to whether or
not this distribution is in accordance with the provisions of the law. The power, therefore, to determine
the legality or illegality of the testamentary dispositions, is inherent to the jurisdiction of the court
when proceeding to a fair and legal distribution of the inheritance. On the other hand, to declare that an
independent and separate action is necessary for that purpose, is to go against the general tendency of
jurisprudence to avoid multiplicity of lawsuits, and is, moreover, costly, dilatory and impractical.
PRINCIPLE: After all the debts of a testamentary or intestamentary have been paid, the court has
jurisdiction to proceed with the participation and distribution of the inheritance among the interested
parties. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the court may or may not respect the distribution made in the
will, according to whether or not this distribution is in accordance with the provisions of the law. The
power, therefore, to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary dispositions, is inherent to
the jurisdiction of the court when proceeding to a fair and legal distribution of the inheritance.

8. G.R. No. 18140 September 1, 1922


MARIA BABAO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIA G. VILLAVICENCIO, administratrix-appellant.

FACTS: In the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ignacio Trillanes, Maria Babao,
the herein appellee, petitioned the court that an additional inventory be made of certain properties of
the deceased and an allowance be made to her minor children for their support, pending the distribution
of the estate. These minors are children of Jose Trillanes, son of the deceased Ignacio Trillanes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to the provisional support granted by Section 684 of the Code of Civil
Procedure extends to the grandchildren of the deceased.
RULING: The reference made in the aforesaid section to "allowances as are provided by the law in
force in the Philippine Islands on and immediately prior to the thirteenth day of August, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight," does not, in the opinion of the court, have the effect of extending the right to
this provisional support to persons other than the children of the deceased. Such reference is made only
with regard to the extent of the allowances to be made during the pendency of the proceeding for the
settlement of the estate, but cannot have the effect of extending the allowances to persons who are in
entitled to support under the Civil Code come under this section would justify the inclusion in this
phrase "widow and minor children of a deceased" even of the brothers of the deceased, who are also
entitled to support under Article 143 of the Civil Code.
PRINCIPLE: The reference made in Section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure to "allowances as are
provided by the law in force in the Philippine Islands on and immediately prior to the thirteenth day of
August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight," does not, in the opinion of the court, have the effect of
extending the right to this provisional support to persons other than the children of the deceased, in this
case, to the granchildren.

9. G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987


PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE SANTERO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR, RODRIGO,
ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and REYNALDO EVARISTO, in his
capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of PABLO SANTERO, respondents.

FACTS: Acting on the Motion For Allowance dated June 30, 1982 filed by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
and Miguel, all surnamed Santero, thru their guardian, Anselma Diaz, the Opposition thereto dated July
8, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Reply to Opposition dated July 12, 1982 filed by movant Anselma
Diaz and the Rejoinder dated July 26, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Court was constrained to
examine the Motion For Allowance filed by the herein movant last year wherein the ground cited was
for support which included educational expenses, clothing and medical necessities, which was granted
and said minors were given an allowance prayed for in their motion.
In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant Anselma Diaz only followed the precedent
of the Court which granted a similar motion last year to be spent for the school expenses of her wards.
In their opposition the oppositors contend that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer
schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They likewise
allege that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance because
whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for the benefit
of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from which said administrator derives the
only income of the intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the allowance to the respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel-
P2,000.00 each despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the
exception of Miguel.
RULING: The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment
and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While
the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased,
the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the
private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the
provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right
to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by
Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect
to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers
of the children here).
PRINCIPLE: While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
distinction. Hence, the fact that the children are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no
moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
A mere procedural rule does not prevail over a substantive law.

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