Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
INTRODUCTION
A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and
the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.
A corporation, being a creature of law, "owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent
on its will," it is "a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state
acting according to law." A corporation will have no rights and privileges of a higher priority
than that of its creator and cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state
organs. (Tanyag v. Benguet Corporation)
Stock
Non-Stock
Definition
One where no part of its income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or officers.
(§87)
Purpose
May be formed or organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, fraternal,
literary, scientific, social, civic service, or similar purposes like trade, industry, agricultural and
like chambers, or any combination thereof. (§88)
Distribution of Profits
Whatever incidental profit made is not distributed among its members but is used for furtherance
of its purpose. AOI or by-laws may provide for the distribution of its assets among its members
upon its dissolution. Before then, no profit may be made by members.
Composition
Stockholders
Members
Each stockholder votes according to the proportion of his shares in the corporation. No shares
may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and issued as "preferred" or "redeemable"
shares, and as otherwise provided by the Code. (Sec. 6)
Each member, regardless of class, is entitled to one (1) vote UNLESS such right to vote has been
limited, broadened, or denied in the AOI or by-laws. (Sec. 89)
Voting by proxy
May be authorized by the by-laws, with the approval of and under the conditions prescribed by the
SEC. (Sec. 89)
Not possible.
Governing Board
Board of Trustees, which may consist of more than 15 trustees unless otherwise provided by the
AOI or by-laws. (Sec, 92)
Directors / trustees shall hold office for 1 year and until their successors are elected and qualified
(Sec. 23).
Board classified in such a way that the term of office of 1/3 of their number shall expire every year.
Subsequent elections of trustees comprising 1/3 of the board shall be held annually, and trustees so
elected shall have a term of 3 years. (Sec. 92)
Election of officers
Officers are elected by the Board of Directors (Sec. 25), except in close corporations where the
stockholders themselves may elect the officers. (Sec. 97)
Officers may directly elected by the members UNLESS the AOI or by-laws provide
otherwise. (Sec. 92)
Place of meetings
Any place within the Philippines, if provided for by the by-laws (Sec. 93)
Generally, the meetings must be held at the principal office of the corporation, if practicable. If
not, then anyplace in the city or municipality where the principal office of the corporation is
located. (Sec. 51)
Transferable.
Generally non-transferable since membership and all rights arising therefrom are
personal. However, the AOI or by-laws can provide otherwise. (Sec. 90)
FACTS: Club Filipino owns and operates a club house, a sports complex, and a bar restaurant,
which is incident to the operation of the club and its gold course. The club is operated mainly
with funds derived from membership fees and dues. The BIR seeks to tax the said restaurant as a
business.
HELD: The Club was organized to develop and cultivate sports of all class and denomination for
the healthful recreation and entertainment of its stockholders and members. There was in fact, no
cash dividend distribution to its stockholders and whatever was derived on retail from its bar and
restaurants used were to defray its overhead expenses and to improve its golf course.
In the case at bar, nowhere in the AOI or by-laws of Club Filipino could be found an authority for
the distribution of its dividends or surplus profits.
INCORPORATORS
REQUIREMENTS
COMMENTS
Definition
Characteristic
· natural persons
Number
· does not prevent the “one-man (person) corporation” wherein the other incorporators
may have only nominal ownership of only one share of stock; not necessarily illegal
Age
· of legal age
Residence
STEPS
COMMENTS
Promoter
· brings together persons who become interested in the enterprise
· aids in procuring subscriptions and sets in motion the machinery which leads to the
formation of the corporation itself
· formulates the necessary initial business and financial plans and, if necessary, buys the
rights and property which the business may need, with the understanding that the corporation
when formed, shall take over the same.
Process:
a) SEC shall examine them in order to determine whether they are in conformity w/ law.
b) If not, the SEC must give the incorporators a reasonable time w/in w/c to correct or
modify the objectionable portions.
d) required percentage of ownership has not been complied with (Sec. 17)
a) SEC is satisfied that all legal requirements have been complied with; and
· It is only upon such issuance that the corporation acquires juridical personality.
(See Sec. 19. Commencement of corporate existence)
· Should it be subsequently found that the incorporators were guilty of fraud in procuring the
certificate of incorporation, the same may be revoked by the SEC, after proper notice & hearing.
CONTENTS OF AOI
COMMENTS
Corporate Name
· Essential to its existence since it is through it that the corporation can sue and be sued and
perform all legal acts
· A corporate name shall be disallowed by the SEC if the proposed name is either:
The policy underlying the prohibition against the registration of a corporate name which is
“identical or deceptively or confusingly similar” to that of any existing corporation or which is
“patently deceptive or patently confusing” or “contrary to existing laws is:
1. the avoidance of fraud upon the public which would have occasion to deal with the entity
concerned;
2. the prevention of evasion of legal obligations and duties, and
3. the reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations.
Purpose Clause
· A corporation can only have one (1) primary purpose. However, it can have several
secondary purposes.
· A corporation has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law & by its articles
of incorporation, those which may be incidental to such conferred powers , those reasonably
necessary to accomplish its purposes & those which may be incident to its existence.
· Corporation may not be formed for the purpose of practicing a profession like law,
medicine or accountancy
Principal Office
Term of Existence
Capital Stock
Other matters
A ‘de facto’ corporation is a defectively organized corporation, which has all the powers and
liabilities of a‘de jure’corporation and, except as to the State, has a juridical personality distinct
and separate from its shareholders, provided that the following requisites are concurrently present:
(1) That there is an apparently valid statute under which the corporation with its purposes may
be formed;
(2) That there has been colorable compliance with the legal requirements in good faith; and,
(3) That there has been use of corporate powers, i.e., the transaction of business in some way as
if it were a corporation.
Can a corporation transact business as a ‘de facto’ corporation while application is still pending
with SEC?
No. In the case of Hall v. Piccio (86 Phil. 603; 1950), where the supposed corporation transacted
business as a corporation pending action by the SEC on its articles of incorporation, the Court held
that there was no ‘de facto’ corporation on the ground that the corporation cannot claim to be in
‘good faith’ to be a corporation when it has not yet obtained its certificate of incorporation.
WON a corporation organized under a statute subsequently declared void acquires status as ‘de
facto’ corporation.
No. A corporation organized under a statute subsequently declared invalid cannot acquire the
status of a ‘de facto’ corporation unless there is some other statute under which the supposed
corporation may be validly organized. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that the municipality
was organized before the statute had been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a ‘de facto’
corporation since there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.
The constitutive documents of the proposed corporation were deposited with the Register of
Deeds but not on file in said office. One of the requirements for valid incorporation is the filing of
constitutive documents in the Register of Deeds.
Was there ‘colorable’ compliance enough to give the supposed corporation at least the status of
a ‘de facto’ corporation?
No. The filing of the constitutive documents in the Register of Deeds is a condition precedent to
the right to act as a corporate body. As long as an act, required as a condition precedent, remains
undone, no immunity from individual liability is secured.
Was there ‘colorable’ compliance enough to give the supposed corporation at least the status of
a ‘de facto’ corporation?
No. Neither the hope, the belief, nor the statement by parties that they are incorporated, nor the
signing of the articles of incorporation which are not filed, where filing is requisite to create the
corporation, nor the use of the pretended franchise of the nonexistent corporation, will constitute
such a corporation de facto as will exempt those who actively and knowingly use s name to incur
legal obligations from their individual liability to pay them. There could be no incorporation or
color of it under the law until the articles were filed (requisites for valid incorporation).
In the case of Hall v. Piccio, where the supposed corporation transacted business as a corporation
pending action by the SEC on its articles of incorporation, the Court held that there was no ‘de
facto’ corporation on the ground that the corporation cannot claim to be in ‘good faith’ to be
a corporation when it has not yet obtained its certificate of incorporation.
NOTE: The validity of incorporation cannot be inquired into collaterally in any private suit
to which such corporation may be a party. Such inquiry must be through a quo warranto
proceeding made by the Solicitor General. (Sec. 20)
CORPORATION BY ESTOPPEL
(Sec. 21)
The ‘de facto’ doctrine differs from the estoppel doctrine in that where all the requisites of a
‘ de facto ’ corporation are present, then the defectively organized corporation will have the
status of a ‘de jure’ corporation in all cases brought by and against it, except only as to the State
in a direct proceeding. On the other hand, if any of the requisites are absent, then the estoppel
doctrine can apply only if under the circumstances of the particular case then before the court,
either the defendant association is estopped from defending on the ground of lack of capacity to be
sued, or the defendant third party had dealt with the plaintiff as a corporation and is deemed to
have admitted its existence.
(De facto – has status of ‘de jure’ corpo, except separate personality against State, provided
all requisites are present)
(2) against third party? Third party cannot deny existence of corporation if it
dealt with it as such.
Company was sued on a promissory note. Its defense was that at the time of its issuance, it was
defectively organized and therefore could not be sued as such.
The Corporation cannot repudiate the transaction or evade responsibility when sued thereon by
setting up its own mistake affecting the original organization.
Corporation sued a partnership on a promissory note. The latter as defense alleged that the
plaintiff was not a corporation.
One who enters into a contract with a party described therein as a corporation is precluded, in an
action brought thereon by such party under the same designation, from denying its corporate
existence.
The corporation sued another corporation a promissory note. The defense was that the plaintiff
was not able to prove the corporate existence of both parties.
The defendant is estopped from denying its own corporate existence. It is also estopped from
denying the other’s corporate existence. The general rule is that in the absence of fraud, a person
who has contracted or otherwise dealt with an association is such a way as to recognize and in
effect admit its legal existence as a corporate body is thereby estopped from denying its corporate
existence.
IBM, having dealt with the defectively organized company as if it were properly organized and
having relied on its credit instead of Cranson ’ s, is estopped from asserting that it was not
incorporated. It cannot sue Cranson personally.
Salvatierra leased his land to the corporation. He filed a suit for accounting, rescission and
damages against the corporation and its president for his share of the produce. Judgment against
both was obtained. President complains for being held personally liable.
He is liable. An agent who acts for a non-existent principal is himself the principal. In acting on
behalf of a corporation which he knew to be unregistered, he assumed the risk arising from the
transaction.
Mariano Albert entered into a contract with University Publishing Co., Inc. through Jose
M. Aruego, its President, whereby University would pay plaintiff for the exclusive right to publish
his revised Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code. The contract stipulated that failure to pay
one installment would render the rest of the payments due. When University failed to pay the
second installment, Albert sued for collection and won. However, upon execution, it was found
that University was not registered with the SEC. Albert petitioned for a writ of execution against
Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant. University opposed, on the ground that Aruego was not a
party to the case.
The Supreme Court found that Aruego represented a non-existent entity and induced not
only Albert but the court to believe in such representation. Aruego, acting as representative of
such non-existent principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon, and thus assumed such
privileges and obligations and became personally liable for the contract entered into or for other
acts performed as such agent.
The Supreme Court likewise held that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel cannot be
set up against Albert since it was Aruego who had induced him to act upon his (Aruego's) willful
representation that University had been duly organized and was existing under the law.
(a) No later than one (1) month after receipt from SEC of
official notice of issuance of Cert. of incorporation.
When effective: Only upon the SEC’s issuance of a certification that the by-laws
are not inconsistent with the Corporation Code.
Contents of By-laws - Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, this Code, other
special laws, and the articles of incorporation, a private corporation may provide in its by-laws
for:
1) the time, place and manner of calling and conducting regular or special meetings of the
directors or trustees;
2) the time and manner of calling and conducting regular and special meetings of the
stockholders or members;
3) the required quorum in meetings of stockholders or members and the manner of voting
herein;
4) the form for proxies of stockholders and members and the manner of voting them;
6) the time for holding the annual election of directors or trustees and the mode or manner of
giving notice thereof;
7) the manner of election or appointment and the term of office of all officers other than
directors or trustees;
10) such other matters as may be necessary for the proper or convenient transaction of its
corporate business and affairs.
As a general rule, the by-laws of a corporation are valid if they are reasonable and calculated to
carry into effect the objective of the corporation and are not contradictory to the general policy of
the laws of the land. Under a statute authorizing by-laws for the transfer of stock, a corp. can do
no more than prescribe a general mode of transfer on the corp. books and cannot justify
an restriction upon the right of sale.
Is a provision in the by-laws allowing the BOD, by vote of absolute majority, to cancel shares
valid?
No. It is a patent nullity, being in direct conflict with Sec. 187 of the Corp. Law which prohibits
forced surrender of unmatured stocks except in case of dissolution.
Yes. Since the Corporation Law does not prescribe the rate of compensation, the power to fix
compensation lies with the corporation.
Is a provision requiring persons elected to the Board of Directors to own at least P 5,000 shares
valid?
Yes. The Corporation Law gives the corporation the power to provide qualifications of its
directors.
CITIBANK, N.A. v. CHUA (220 SCRA 75)
· Where the SEC grants a license to a foreign corporation, it is deemed to have approved its
foreign-enacted by-laws. Sec. 46 of the Corporation Code which states that by-laws are not valid
without SEC approval applies only to domestic corporations.
ISSUE: Whether the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one (1) month from the
date
of its incorporation, as mandated by Art. 46 of the Corporation Code, results in the corporation's
automatic dissolution.
RULING: No. Failure to file by-laws does not result in the automatic dissolution of the
corporation. It only constitutes a ground for such dissolution. (Cf. Chung Ka Bio v. IAC, 163
SCRA 534) Incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and
remedy the same.
Since corporate property is owned by the corporation as a juridical person, the stockholders have
no claim on it as owners, but have merely an expectancy or inchoate right to the same should any
of it remain upon the dissolution of the corporation after all corporate creditors have been
paid. Conversely, a corporation has no interest in the individual property of its stockholders,
unless transferred to the corporation. Remember that the liability of the stockholders is limited to
the amount of shares.
SAN JUAN STRUCTURAL & STEEL FABRICATORS v. CA (296 SCRA 631)
In this case, the sale of a piece of land belonging to Motorich Corporation by the corporation
treasurer (Gruenberg) was held to be invalid in the absence of evidence that said corporate
treasurer was authorized to enter into the contract of sale, or that the said contract was ratified by
Motorich. Even though Gruenberg and her husband owned 99.866% of Motorich, her act could
not bind the corporation since she was not the sole controlling stockholder.
Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and
distinct from its members. While shares of stock constitute personal property, they do not
represent property of the corporation. A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the
corporation's property or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according
to law and equity, but its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation. Nor
is he entitled to the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets.
The act of liquidation made by the stockholders of the corp of the latter’s assets is not and cannot
be considered a partition of community property, but rather a transfer or conveyance of the title of
its assets to the individual stockholders. Since the purpose of the liquidation, as well as the
distribution of the assets, is to transfer their title from the corporation to the stockholders in
proportion to their shareholdings, that transfer cannot be effected without the corresponding deed
of conveyance from the corporation to the stockholders. It is, therefore, fair and logical to
consider the certificate of liquidation as one in the nature of a transfer or conveyance.
The petitioners were not involved in the initial stages of the organization of the airline. They
were merely among the financiers whose interest was to be invited and who were in fact
persuaded, on the strength of the project study, to invest in the proposed airline.
There was no showing that the Airline was a fictitious corp and did not have a separate juridical
personality to justify making the petitioners, as principal stockholders thereof, responsible for its
obligations. As a bona fide corp, the Airline should alone be liable for its corporate acts as duly
authorized by its officers and directors. Granting that the petitioners benefited from the services
rendered, such is no justification to hold them personally liable therefor. Otherwise, all the other
stockholders of the corporation, including those who came in late, and regardless of the amount of
their shareholdings, would be equally and personally liable also with the petitioner for the claims
of the private respondent.
The case of the reliance on a default provision of the contract granting automatic extra-judicial
rescission.
The court found no badges of fraud on the part of the president of the corporation. The BOD had
literally and mistakenly relied on the default provision of the contract. As president and
controlling stockholder of the corp, no sufficient proof exists on record that he used the corp to
defraud private respondent. He cannot, therefore, be made personally liable because he appears to
be the controlling stockholder. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation
of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for
disregarding the separate corporate personality.
The case of the assignment by Senator Magsaysay of a certain portion of his shareholdings in
SUBIC granting his sisters the right to intervene in a case filed by the widow against SUBIC.
The words "an interest in the subject," to allow petitioners to intervene, mean a direct interest in
the cause of action as pleaded, and which would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a
fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.
Here, the interest, of petitioners, if it exists at all, is indirect, contingent, remote, conjectural,
consequential and collateral. At the very least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer
expectancy of a right in the management of the corporation and to share in the profits thereof and
in the properties and assets thereof on dissolution, after payment of the corporate debts and
obligations.
While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the property of the corp, it
does not vest the owner thereof with any legal right or title to any of the property, his interest in
the corporate property being equitable and beneficial in nature. Shareholders are in no legal sense
the owners of corporate property, which is owned by the corp as a distinct legal person.
A: That a corporation has a personality distinct from its stockholders, and is not affected by the
personal rights, obligations and transactions of the latter.
A: The veil of corporate fiction may be pierced when it is used as a shield to further an end
subversive of justice, or for purposes that could not have been intended by law that created it or to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime or to perpetuate fraud or
confuse legitimate issues or to circumvent the law or perpetuate deception or as an alter ego,
adjunct or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders.
(1) Stockholders would be personally liable for the acts and contracts of the corporation whose
existence at least for the purpose of the particular situation involved is ignored.
(2) Court is not denying corporate existence for all purposes but merely refuses to allow the
corporation to use the corporate privilege for the particular purpose involved.
STATE V. STANDARD OIL (49 Ohio, St., 137, N.E. 279, 15; 1892)
Where the corporation was formed by and consisted of the members of a partnership whose
business and property was conveyed to the corporation for the purpose of continuing its business,
such corporation is presumed to have assumed partnership debts.
shows that other shareholders may be considered dummies of Castro. Hence, corporate veil may
be pierced.
Tan BBC (T) supplies paper to Graphics Publishing Inc (G) but the latter fails to pay. G's printing
machine levied upon to satisfy claim but PADCO, another corpo intercedes, saying it is the owner
of the machine, having leased such to G.
Printing machine was allowed by the Court to satisfy G's liability. Both G and PADCO's corporate
entities pierced because they have: the same board of directors, PADCO owns 50% of G, PADCO
never engaged in the business of printing. Obviously, the board is using PADCO to shield G from
fulfilling liability to T.
Associated Financing Corp. (AFC), through its pres. F. Sycip (who together with wife, own 76%
of AFC) contracts with NAMARCO for an exchange of sugar (raw v. refined). N delivers, AFC
doesn't since it did not have sugar to supply in the first place. N sues to recover sum of money plus
damages.
Sycip held jointly and severally liable with AFC. AFC's corporate veil was pierced because it
was used as Sycip's alter ego, corpo used merely as an instrumentality, agency or conduit of
another to evade liability.
JACINTO V. CA (198 SCRA 211)
Jacinto, president/GM and owner of 52% of corpo, owes MetroBank sum of money, signs trust
receipts therefor. Jacinto absconds. Jacinto ordered to jointly and severally pay MetroBank. Corpo
veil pierced because it was used as a shield to perpetuate fraud and/or confuse legitimate issues.
There was no clear cut delimitation between the personality of Jacinto and the corporation.
Both predecessor and successor were owned and controlled by petitioner and there was no break
in the succession and continuity of the same business. All the assets of the dissolved Plant were
turned over to the emerging corporation. The veil of corporate fiction must be pierced as it was
deliberately and maliciously designed to evade its financial obligation to its employees.
Rule: The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity applies when corporate fiction is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or when it is made as a
shield to confuse the legitimate issues or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business
conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so
conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation.
Case at bar: Union sought to pierce corporate veil alleging that the creation of Acrylic is a devise
to evade the application of the CBA Indophil had with them (or it sought to include the other
union in its bargaining leverage).
SC: Legal corporate entity is disregarded only if it is sought to hold the officers and stockholders
directly liable for a corporate debt or obligation. Union does not seek to impose such claim against
Acrylic. Mere fact that businesses were related, that some of the employees of Indophil are the
same persons manning and providing for auxiliary services to the other company, and that
physical plants, officers and facilities are situated in the same compound - not sufficient to apply
doctrine.
Libra/Dolphin Garments was but an alter ego of Lawman Industrial, therefore, the former must
bear the consequences of the latter's unfair acts. It cannot deny reinstatement of petitioners simply
because of cessation of Lawman's operations, since it was in fact an illegal lock-out, the company
having maintained a run-away shop and transferred its machines and assets there.
Here, the veil of corporate fiction was pierced in order to safeguard the right to self-organization
and certain vested rights which had accrued in favor of the union. Second corporation sought the
protective shield of corporate fiction to achieve an illegal purpose.
A corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock
of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate
personality.
Where there is nothing on record to indicate the President and majority stockholder of a
corporation had acted in bad faith or with malice in carrying out the retrenchment program of the
company, he cannot be held solidarily and personally liable with the corporation.
Jose M. Villarama, operator of a bus company, Villa Rey Transit, which was authorized to
operate 32 units from Pangasinan to Manila and vice-versa, sold 2 CPCs to Pantranco. One of the
conditions included in the contract of sale was that the seller (Villarama) "shall not, for a period of
10 years from the date of the sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the
buyer (Pantranco)."
Barely 3 months after the sale, a corporation called Villa Rey Transit, Inc. was organized,
with the wife of Jose M. Villarama as one of the incorporators and who was subsequently elected
as treasurer of the Corporation. Barely a month after its registration with the SEC, the
corporation bought 5 CPCs and 49 buses from one Valentin Fernando, and applied with the Public
Service Commission (PSC) for approval of the sale. Before the PSC could take final action on the
said application, however, 2 of the 5 CPCs were levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution issued
by the CFI in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, judgment creditor, against Valentin Fernando, judgment
debtor. During the public sale conducted, Ferrer was the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale
was issued in his name. Shortly thereafter, he sold the said CPCs to Pantranco, and they jointly
submitted their contract of sale to the PSC for approval.
The PSC issued an order that pending resolution of the applications, Pantranco shall have
the authority to provisionally operate the service under the 2 CPCS that were the subject of the
contract between Ferrer and Pantranco. Villa Rey Transit took issue with this, and filed a
complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale of the CPCs and prayed that all the orders of the PSC
relative to the dispute over the CPCs in question be annulled. Pantranco filed a third-party
complaint against Jose M. Villarama, alleging that Villarama and Villa Rey Transit are one and the
same, and that Villarama and/or the Corporation is qualified from operating the CPCs by virtue of
the agreement entered into between Villarama and Pantranco.
Given the evidence, the Court found that the finances of Villa-Rey, Inc. were managed as
if they were the private funds of Villarama and in such a way and extent that Villarama appeared
to be the actual owner of the business without regard to the rights of the stockholders. Villarama
even admitted that he mingled the corporate funds with his own money. These circumstances
negate Villarama's claim that he was only a part-time General Manager, and show beyond doubt
that the corporation is his alter ego. Thus, the restrictive clause with Pantranco applies. A seller
may not make use of a corporate entity as a means of evading the obligation of his
covenant. Where the Corporation is substantially the alter ego of one of the parties to the
covenant or the restrictive agreement, it can be enjoined from competing with the covenantee.
Close Corporations
The Cease plantation was solely composed of the assets and properties of the defunct Tiaong
plantation whose license to operate already expired. The legal fiction of separate corporate
personality was attempted to be used to delay and deprive the respondents of their succession
rights to the estate of their deceased father.
While originally, there were other incorporators of Tiaong, it has developed into a closed family
corporation (Cease). The head of the corporation, Cease, used the Tiaong plantation as his
instrumentality. It was his business conduit and an extension of his personality. There is not even a
showing that his children were subscribers or purchasers of the stocks they own.
The Delpher Trades Corp. is a business conduit of the Pachecos. What they really did was to
invest their properties and change the nature of their ownership from unincorporated to
incorporated form by organizing Delpher and placing the control of their properties under the
corporation. This saved them inheritance taxes.
This is the reverse of Cease; however, it does not modify the other cases. It stands on its own
because of the facts.
Parent-Subsidiary Relationship
Q: What is the general rule governing parent-subsidiary relationship?
A: The mere fact that a corporation owns all or substantially all of the stocks of another
corporation is not alone sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity.
(1) if the subsidiary was formed for the payment of evading the payment of higher taxes
(2) where it was controlled by the parent that its separate identity was hardly discernible
(3) parent corporations may be held responsible for the contracts as well as the torts of the
subsidiary
Q: What are the criteria by which the subsidiary can be considered a mere
instrumentality of the parent company?
1. the parent corp. owns all or most of the capital stock of the subsidiary.
2. the parent and subsidiary have common directors and officers
3. the parent finances the subsidiary
4. the parent subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its
incorporation
5. the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital
6. the parent pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of the subsidiary
7. the subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corp. or no assets except
those conveyed to or by the parent corp.
8. in the papers of the parent corp. or in the statements of its officers, the subsidiary is
described as a department or division of the parent corp. or its business or financial responsibility
is referred as the parent’s own
9. the parent uses the property of the subsidiary as its own
10. the directors or the executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the
subsidiary but take their orders from the parent corp. in the latter’s interest
11. the formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed
(Garrett vs. Southern Railway)
(Note: Sir Jack said that we must not stop after we ’ ve gone through the 11 points in order to
determine whether or not there is a subsidiary or instrumentality. We must go further and
consider other circumstances which may help determine clearly the true nature of the relationship.
--- Em)
GARRETT VS. SOUTHERN RAILWAY (173 F. Supp. 915, E.D. Tenn. 1959)
The general rule is that stock ownership alone by one corporation of the stock of another
does not thereby render the dominant corporation liable for the torts of the subsidiary, unless the
separate corporate existence of the subsidiary is a mere sham, or unless the control of the
subsidiary is such that it is but an instrumentality or adjunct of the dominant corporation.
In the case, it was found that there were two distinct operations. There was no evidence that
Southern dictated the management of Lenoir. In fact, evidence shows that Marius, the manager of
the subsidiary, was in full control of the operation. He established prices, handled negotiations in
CBAs, etc. Lenoir paid local taxes, had local counsel and maintain a Workmen’s Compensation
Fund. There was also no evidence that Lenoir was run solely for the benefit of Southern. In fact,
a substantial part of its requirements in the field of operation of Lenoir was bought
elsewhere. Lenoir sold substantial quantities to other companies. Policy decisions remained in
the hands of Marius. Hence, the complaint against Southern Railway was dismissed.
This case involved a complaint for the recovery of merchant sales tax paid by Koppel
(Philippines), Inc. under protest to the Collector of Internal Revenue. Although the Court of First
Instance did not deny legal personality to Koppel (Philippines), Inc. for any and all purposes, it
dismissed the complaint saying that in the transactions involved in the case, the public interest and
convenience would be defeated and would amount to a perpetration of tax evasion unless resort
was had to the doctrine of "disregard of the corporate fiction."
The facts show that 99.5% of the shares of stocks of K-Phil were owned by K-USA. K-Phil.
acted as a representative of K-USA and not as an agent. K-Phil. also bore alone its own
incidental expenses (e.g. Cable expenses) and also those of its “principal”. Moreover, K-Phil’
s share in the profits was left in the hands of K-USA. Clearly, K-Phil was a mere branch or
dummy of K-USA, and was therefore liable for merchant sales tax. To allow otherwise would be
to sanction a circumvention of our tax laws and permit a tax evasion of no mean proportion and
the consequent commission of a grave injustice to the Government. Moreover, it would allow the
taxpayer to do by indirection what the tax laws prohibit to be done directly.
To allow the taxpayer to deny tax liability on the ground that the sales were made through another
and distinct corporation when it is proved that the latter is virtually owned by the former or that
they were practically one and the same is to sanction the circumvention of tax laws.
Southern Motors was actually owned and controlled by Yutivo as to make it a mere subsidiary or
branch of the latter created for the purpose of selling vehicles at retail. Yutivo financed
principally, if not wholly, the business of Southern Motors and actually exceeded the credit of the
latter . At all times, Yutivo, through the officers and directors common to it and the Southern
Motors exercised full control over the cash funds, policies, expenditures and obligations of the
latter. Hence, Southern Motors, being a mere instrumentality or adjunct of Yutivo, the CTA
correctly disregarded the technical defense of separate corporate identity in order to arrive at the
true tax liability of Yutivo.
The La Campana Gaugau Packing and La Campana Coffee Factory were operating under one
single business although with 2 trade names. It is a settled doctrine that the fiction of law of
having the corporate identity separate and distinct from the identity of the persons running
it cannot be invoked to further the end subversive of the purpose for which it was created. In
the case at bar, the attempt to make the two businesses appear as one is but a device to defeat the
ends of the law governing capital and labor relations and should not be permitted to prevail.
While a corporation could not have been a party to a promoter's contract since it did yet exist at
the time the contract was entered into and thus could not possibly have had an agent who could
legally bind it, the corporation may make the contracts its own and become bound thereon if, after
incorporation, it:
McARTHUR V. TIMES PRINTING CO. (48 Minn. 319, 51 N.W. 216; 1892)
The right of agents to adopt an agreement originally made by promoters depends upon the
purposes of the corporation and the nature of the agreement. The agreement must be one which
the corporation itself could make and one which the usual agents of the company have express or
implied authority to enter into.
Whatever may be the proper legal theory by which a corporation may be bound by the contract
(ratification, adoption, novation, a continuing offer to be accepted or rejected by the corporation),
it is necessary in all cases that the corporation should have full knowledge of the facts, or at least
should be put upon such notice as would lead, upon reasonable inquiry, to the knowledge of the
facts.
A promoter could not have acted as agent for a corporation that had no legal existence. A
corporation, until organized, has no life therefore no faculties. The corporation had no juridical
personality to enter into a contract.
Should the other contracting party fail to perform its part of the bargain, the corporation
which has adopted or ratified the contract may either sue for:
BUILDERS DUNTILE CO. v. DUNN (229 Ky. 569, 17 S.W. 2d 715; 1929)
When the corporation was formed, the incorporators took upon themselves the whole thing, and
ratified all that had been done on its behalf. Though there was no formal assignment of the
contract to the corporation, the acts of the incorporators were an adoption of the
contract. Therefore the corporation has the right to sue for damages for the breach of contract.
The incorporation of (Morong) and its acceptance of the franchise as shown by this action in
prosecuting the application filed with the Commission for approval of said franchise, not only
perfected a contract between the municipality and Morong but also cured the deficiency pointed
out by the petition. The fact that Morong did not have a corporate existence on the day the
franchise was granted does not render the franchise invalid, as Morong later obtained its certificate
of incorporation and accepted the franchise.
WELLS VS. FAY & EGAN CO. (143 Ga. 732, 85 S.E. 873; 1915)
Individual promoters cannot escape liability where they buy machinery, receive them in their
possession and authorize one member to issue a note, in contemplation of organizing a corporation
which was not formed. (see Campos' notes p. 258-259). The agent is personally liable for contracts
if there is no principal. The making of partial payments by the corporation, when later formed,
does not release the promoters here from liability because the corporation acted as a mere stranger
paying the debt of another, the acceptance of which by the creditor does not release the debtors
from liability over the balance. Hence, there is no adoption or ratification.
HOW & ASSOCIATES INC. VS. BOSS (222 F. Supp. 936; 1963)
The rule is that if the contract is partly to be performed before incorporation, the promoters solely
are liable. Even if the promoter signed "on behalf of corporation to be formed, who will be
obligor," there was here an intention of the parties to have a present obligor, because three-fourths
of the payment are to be made at the time the drawings or plans in the architectural contract are
completed, with or without incorporation. A purported adoption by the corporation of the contract
must be expressed in a novation or agreement to that effect. The promoter is liable unless the
contract is to be construed to mean: 1) that the creditor agreed to look solely to the new
corporation for payment; or 2) that the promoter did not have any duty toward the creditor to form
the corporation and give the corporation the opportunity to assume and pay the liability.
QUAKER HILL VS. PARR (148 Colo. 45, 364 P. 2d 1056; 1961)
The promoters here are not liable because the contract imposed no obligation on them to form a
corporation and they were not named there as obligors/promissors. The creditor-plaintiff was
aware of the inexistence of the corporation but insisted on naming it as obligor because the
planting season was fast approaching and he needed to dispose of the seedlings. There was no
intent here by plaintiff-creditor to look to the promoters for the performance of the obligation.
This is an exception to the general rule that promoters are personally liable on their contracts,
though made on behalf of a corporation to be formed.
OLD DOMINION VS. BIGELOW (203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193; 1909)
A promoter, notwithstanding his fiduciary duties to the corporation, may still sell properties to it,
but he must pursue one of four courses to make the contract binding. These are: 1) provide an
independent board of officers in no respect directly or indirectly under his control, and make full
disclosure to the corporation through them; 2) make full disclosure of all material facts to each
original subscriber of shares in the corporation; 3) procure a ratification of the contract after
disclosing its circumstances by vote of the stockholders of the completely established corporation;
or 4) be himself the real subscriber of all the shares of the capital stock contemplated as a part of
the promotion scheme. The promoter is liable, even if owning all the stock of the corporation at
the time of the transaction, if further original subscription to capital stock contemplated as an
essential part of the scheme of promotion came in after such transaction.
CORPORATE POWERS
· Of succession by its corporate name for the period of time stated in the articles of
incorporation and the certificate of incorporation;
· To amend its articles of incorporation in accordance with the provisions of this Code;
· To adopt by-laws not contrary to law, morals, or public policy, and to amend or repeal the
same in accordance with this Code;
· In case of stock corporations, to issue of sell stocks to subscribers and to sell treasury
stocks in accordance with the provisions of this Code; and to admit members to the corporation if
it be a non-stock corporation;
· To purchase, receive, take, grant, hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise
deal with such real and personal property, including securities and bonds of other corporations, as
the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require,
subject to the limitations prescribed by law and the Constitution;
(NOTE: There are two (2) general restrictions on the power of the corp. to acquire and hold
properties:
· To make reasonable donations, including those for the public welfare of for hospital,
charitable, cultural, scientific, civic, or similar purposes:
· To establish pension, retirement and other plans for the benefit of its directors, trustees,
officers and employees; and
· To exercise such other powers as may be essential or necessary to carry out its purpose or
purposes as stated in its articles of incorporation.
O A sale is deemed to substantially cover all the corporate property and assets if such sale
renders the corporation incapable of continuing the business or accomplishing the purpose for
which it was incorporated.
Implied Powers
Under Sec. 36, a corporation is given such powers as are essential or necessary to carry out its
purpose or purposes as stated in the articles of incorporation. This phrase gives rise to such a wide
range of implied powers, that it would not be at all difficult to defend a corporate act versus an
allegation that it is ultra vires.
A corporation is presumed to act within its powers and when a contract is not its face necessarily
beyond its authority; it will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed valid.
Ultra vires acts are those acts beyond the scope of the powers of the corporation, as defined by its
charter or laws of state of incorporation. The term has a broad application and includes not only
acts prohibited by the charter, but acts which are in excess of powers granted and not prohibited,
and generally applied either when a corporation has no power whatever to do an act, or when the
corporation has the power but exercises it irregularly.
· Parties to the ultra vires contract will be left as they are, if the contract has been fully
executed on both sides. Neither party can ask for specific performance, if the contract is
executory on both sides. The contract, provided that it is not illegal, will be enforced, where one
party has performed his part, and the other has not with the latter having benefited from the
former’s performance.
· Any stockholder may bring an individual or derivative suit to enjoin a threatened ultra
vires act or contract. If the act or contract has already been performed, a derivative suit for
damages against the directors maybe filed, but their liability will depend on whether they acted in
good faith and with reasonable diligence in entering into the contracts. When the suit against the
injured party who had no knowledge that the corporation was engaging in an act not included
expressly or impliedly in its purposes clause.
· Ultra vires acts may become binding by the ratification of all the stockholders, unless third
parties are prejudiced thereby, or unless the acts are illegal.
Resolution adopted by the company to open a post office branch at the mining camp and to
assume sole and direct responsibility for any dishonest, careless or negligent act of its appointed
postmaster is NOT ULTRA VIRES because the act covers a subject which concerns the benefit,
convenience, and welfare of the company’s employees and their families.
While as a rule an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is
created as defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon
it by law, there are however certain corporate acts that may be performed outside of the scope of
the powers expressly conferred if they are necessary to promote the interest or welfare of the
corporation.
The BOD of the Phil Trust Co. adopted a resolution which authorized its president to purchase at
par and in the name of the corp. bonds of MSC. These bonds were later resold and guaranteed by
PTC to third persons. PTC paid plaintiff the corresponding interest payments until July 1, 1928
when it alleged that it is not bound to pay such interest or to redeem the obligation because the
guarantee given for the bonds was illegal and void.
Held: The act of guaranty by PTC was well within its corporate powers. Furthermore, having
received money or property by virtue of the contract which is not illegal, it is estopped from
denying liability. Even if the then prevailing law (Corp. Law) prohibited PTC from guaranteeing
bonds with a total value in excess of its capital, with all the MSC properties transferred to PTC
based on the deed of trust, sufficient assets were made available to secure the payment of the
corresponding liabilities brought about by the bonds.
(This case is an example of how the implied powers concept may be used to justify certain acts of
a corporation.)
A quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Gov't against El Hogar, a building and loan ass'n to
deprive it of its corp. franchise.
1. El Hogar held title to real property for a period in excess of 5 years in good faith, hence this
cause will not prosper.
2. El Hogar owned a lot and bldg. at a business district in Manila allegedly in excess of its
reasonable requirements, held valid bec, it was found to be necessary and legally acquired and
developed.
3. El Hogar leased some office space in its bldg.; it administered and managed properties
belonging to delinquent SHs; and managed properties of its SHs even if such were not mortgaged
to them.
Held: first two valid, but the third is ultra vires bec. the administration of property in that manner
is more befitting of the business of a real estate agent or trust company and not of a building and
loan ass'n.
Held: Court cannot dwell on the issue since the promoter is not a party in the proceeding and it is
the corp. or its SHs who may bring a complaint on such.
5. Issuance of special shares did not affect El Hogar's character as a building and loan ass'n nor
make its loans usurious.
6. Corporate policy of using a depreciation rate of 10 % per annum is not excessive, bec. accdg. to
the SC, the by-laws expressly authorizes the BOD to determine each year the amount to be written
down upon the expenses of installation and the property of the corp.
7. The Corp. Law does not expressly grant the power of maintaining reserve funds but such power
is implied. All business enterprises encounter periods of gains and losses, and its officers would
usually provide for the creation of a reserve to act as a buffer for such circumstances.
8. That loans issued to member borrowers are being used for purposes other than the bldg. of
homes not invalid bec. there is no statute which expressly declares that loans may be made by
these ass'ns solely for the purpose of bldg. homes.
9. Sec. 173 of the Corp. Law provides that "any person" may become a SH on a bldg. and loan
ass'n. The word "person" is used on a broad sense including not only natural persons but also
artificial persons.
Two railroad corporations contend that they transcended their own powers and violated their own
organic laws. Hence, they should not be held liable for the injury of the plaintiff who was a
passenger in one of their trains.
Held: The contract between the two corporations was an ultra vires act. However, it is not one
tainted with illegality, therefore, the accompanying rights and obligations based on the contract of
carriage between them and the plaintiff cannot be avoided by raising such a defense.
This case involved the issue of whether or not the defendant corporation performed an ultra vires
act by donating the life insurance proceeds to the minor children of Pirovano, the deceased
president of the defendant company under whose management the company grew and progressed
to become a multi-million peso corporation.
Held: NO.
“(1) to invest and deal with moneys of the company not immediately required, in such manner as
from time to time may be determined; and
(2) to aid in any other manner any person, association or corporation of which any obligation or in
which any interest is held by this corporation or in the affairs of prosperity of which this
corporation has a lawful interest.”
From this, it is obvious that the corporation properly exercised within its chartered powers the act
of availing of insurance proceeds to the heirs of the insured and deceased officer.
A contract between Benguet and Balatoc provided that Benguet will bring in capital, eqpt. and
technical expertise in exchange for capital shares in Balatoc. Harden was a SH of Balatoc and he
contends that this contract violated the Corp.Law which restricts the acquisition of interest by a
mining corp. in another mining corp.
Held: Harden has no standing bec. if any violation has been committed, the same can be enforced
only in a criminal prosecution by an action of quo warranto which may be maintained only by the
Attorney-General.
Board of directors or trustees- responsible for corporate policies and the general management of
the business and affairs of the corporation.
Stockholders or members- have residual power over fundamental corporate changes like
amendments of articles of incorporation.
Who Exercises Corporate Powers
The BOD is responsible for corporate policies and the general management of the business affairs
of the corporation. (See Citibank v Chua)
(b) Requirements
(iii) Nationality
The formula for determining the number of shares needed to elect a given number of directors is
as follows:
X = Y x N1 +1
N+1
By a vote of the SHs holding or representing at least 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock, or by
a vote of at least 2/3 of the members entitled to vote, provided that such removal takes place at
either a regular meeting of the corporation or at a special meeting called for the purpose. In both
cases, there must be previous notice to the SHs / members of the intention to propose such
removal at the meeting.
Removal may be with or without cause. However, removal without cause may not be used to
deprive minority SHs or members of the right of representation to which they may be entitled
under Sec. 24 of the Code.
Note: Directors or trustees so elected to fill vacancies shall be elected only for the
unexpired
term of their predecessors in office.
If not provided in by-laws: Directors shall not receive any compensation other than
reasonable per diems, as directors. However, compensation other than per diems may be granted
to directors by a majority vote of the SHs at a regular or special stockholders' meeting.
Note: In no case shall the total yearly compensation of directors, as such directors, exceed 10%
of the net income before income tax of the corporation during the preceding year.
(h) Liability (See subsequent discussion under Duties of Directors and Controlling
Stockholders.)
(i) In general (Sec. 31)
In this case, the board of directors, before the financial inability of the corporation to proceed with
the project was revealed, had already recognized the contracts as being in existence and had
proceed with the necessary steps to utilize the films. The subsequent action by the stockholders in
not ratifying the contract must be ignored. The functions of the stockholders are limited of nature.
The theory of a corporation is that the stockholders may have all the profits but shall return over
the complete management of the enterprise to their representatives and agents, called directors.
Accordingly, there is little for the stockholders to do beyond electing directors, making by-laws,
and exercising certain other special powers defined by law. In conformity with this idea, it is
settled that contracts between a corporation and a third person must be made by directors and not
stockholders.
In this case, the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines terminated the ad interim
appointment of Dr. Blanco as Dean of the College of Education by not acting on the matter. In the
transcript of the meeting which was latter agreed to be deleted, it was found out that the BOR,
consisting of 12 members, voted 5 in favor of Dr. Blanco's appointment 3 voted against, and 4
abstained.
The core of the issue is WON the 4 abstentions will be counted in favor of Dr. Blanco's
appointment or against it. The SC held that such abstentions be counted as negative vote
considering that those who abstained, 3 of which members of the Screening Committee, intended
to reject Dr. Blanco's appointment.
The SC held that the validity of the meeting was not affected by the failure to give notice as
required by the by-laws, provided that the parties were personally present. Since all the parties
were present at the meeting of December 8, and understood that the meeting was to be a directors'
meeting, then the action taken is final and may not be voided by any informality in connection
with its being called.
The action was brought by the mortgagor (Tapnio) against PNB for damages in connection with
the failure of the latter's board of directors to act expeditiously on the proposed lease of the
former's sugar quota to one Tuazon.
The Supreme Court held that while the PNB has the ultimate authority to approve or disapprove
the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to PNB, the latter certainly cannot escape
liability for observing, for the protection of the interest of the private respondents, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving or
disapproving the lease of the said sugar quota.
Any 2 or more positions may be held concurrently by the same person, except that no one shall act
as (a) president and secretary, or (b) president and treasurer at the same time.
The doctrine of apparent authority provides that a corporation will be liable to innocent third
persons for the acts of its agent where the representation was made by the agent in the course of
business and acting within his/her general scope of authority even though, in the particular case,
the agent is secretly abusing his authority and attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon his/her
principal or some other person for his/her own ultimate benefit.
The authority of a corporate officer in dealing with third persons may be actual or apparent. The
doctrine of "apparent authority," with special reference to banks, was laid out in Prudential Bank v.
CA (223 SCRA 350) where it was held that:
A bank is liable for the wrongful acts of its officers done in the interest of the bank or in the course
of dealings of the officers in their representative capacity but not for acts outside the scope of their
authority. A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence will not be
permitted to profit by the frauds they may thus be enabled to perpetrate in the apparent scope of
their employment; nor will it be permitted to shrink from its responsibility for such frauds, even
though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom.
Accordingly, a bank is liable to innocent third persons where the representation is made in the
course of its business by its agent acting within the general scope of his authority even though, in
the particular case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and attempting to perpetrate a fraud
upon his principal or some other person for his own ultimate benefit. Application of these
principles is especially necessary because banks have a fiduciary relationship with the public and
their stability depends on the confidence of the people in their honesty and efficiency. Such faith
will be eroded where banks do not exercise strict care in the selection and supervision of its
employees, resulting in prejudice to their depositors.
YU CHUCK V. KONG LI PO (46 Phil. 608; 1924)
The power to bind a corporation by contract lies with its board of directors or trustees. Such power
may be expressly or impliedly be delegated to other officers and agents of the corporation. It is
also well settled that except where the authority of employing servants or agents is expressly
vested in the board, officers or agents who have general control and management of the
corporation's business, or at least a specific part thereof, may bind the corporation by the
employment of such agents and employees as are usual and necessary in the conduct of such
business. Those contracts of employment should be reasonable. Case at bar: contract of
employment in the printing business was too long and onerous to the business (3-year employment;
shall receive salary even if corp. is insolvent).
THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V. HEIRS OF MAXIMO KALAW (20 SCRA 987; 1967)
Kalaw was a corporate officer entrusted with general management and control of NACOCO. He
had implied authority to make any contract or do any act which is necessary for the conduct of the
business. He may, without authority from the board, perform acts of ordinary nature for as long
as these redound to the interest of the corporation. Particularly, he contracted forward sales with
business entities. Long before some of these contracts were disputed, he contracted by himself
alone, without board approval. All of the members of the board knew about this practice and
have entrusted fully such decisions with Kalaw. He was never questioned nor reprimanded nor
prevented from this practice. In fact, the board itself, through its acts and by acquiescence, have
laid aside the by-law requirement of prior board approval. Thus, it cannot now declare that these
contracts (failures) are not binding on NACOCO.
A chattel mortgage, although not approved by the board of directors as stipulated in the by-laws,
shall still be valid and binding when the corporation, through the board, tacitly approved and
ratified it. The following acts of the board constitute implied ratification:
1. Erquiaga is one of the largest stockholder, and was the all-in-one officer (he was the
President, GM, Attorney, Auditor, etc.)
2. Two other directors approved his actions and expressed satisfaction with the advantages
obtained by him in securing the chattel mortgage.
3. The corporation took advantage of the benefits of the chattel mortgage. There were even
partial payments made with the knowledge of the three directors.
Board Committees
The By-laws of the corporation may create an executive committee, composed of not less than 3
members of the Board, to be appointed by the Board. The executive committee may act, by
majority vote of all its members, on such specific matters within the competence of the board, as
may be delegated to it in either (1) the By-laws, or (2) on a majority vote of the board.
(1) approval of any action for which shareholders' approval is also required;
(2) the filling of vacancies in the board (refer to Sec. 29);
(3) the amendment or repeal of by-laws or the adoption of new by-laws;
(4) the amendment or repeal of any resolution of the board which by its
express terms is not so amendable or repealable; and
(5) a distribution of cash dividends to the shareholders.
HAYES V. CANADA, ATLANTIC AND PLANT S.S CO., LTD. (181 F. 289; 1910)
No, because the Executive Commmittee usurped the powers vested in the board and the
stockholders. If their actions was valid, it would put the corp. in a situation wherein only two
men, acting in their own pecuniary interests, would have absorbed the powers of the entire
corporation. "Full powers" should be interpreted only in the ordinary conduct of business and not
total abdication of board and stockholders' powers to the ExeCom. "FULL POWERS" does not
mean unlimited or absolute power.
Stockholders or Members
In the following basic changes in the corporation, although action is usually initiated by
the board of directors or trustees, their decision is not final, and approval of the stockholders or
members would be necessary:
In all of these cases, even non-voting stocks, or non-voting members, as the case may be, will be
entitled to vote. (Sec. 6)
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ELECTION COMMITTEE OF SMB VS. TAN (105 Phil. 426;
1959)
Meeting was invalid for lack of notice. By-laws provide for a 5-day notice before meeting. March
26 posting not enough for March 28 election.
However, the proceedings can be nullified if the walkout was for a reasonable and justifiable
cause. In this case, F. Logan Johnston, who owned and/or represented more than 50% of the
corporation's outstanding shares, was prohibited from voting the shares of the Silos family (which
he had validly purchased) and of the minor children of Albert S. Johnston (of whom he was
guardian) on the ground that such shares must first be registered in the names of the wards,
thereby prompting the walkout. The Court of Appeals held that the walkout was neither
unreasonable nor unjustifiable. It noted however that there was no formal declaration of a
quorum before the withdrawal from the meeting by F. Logan Johnston.
Upon good cause, such as a Chairman of the Board failing to call a meeting, either by his absence
or neglect, the Court may grant a stockholder the authority to call such a meeting.
DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE BUREAU VS. CLORIBEL (26 SCRA 225; 1968)
The Corporation Law says that every director must own at least one (1) share of the capital stock
of the corporation.
· Section 21 of the Corporation Law provides that a corporation may prescribe in its by-laws
the qualifications, duties, and compensation of its directors.
· A stockholder has no vested right to be elected director for he impliedly contracts that the
will of the majority shall govern.
· Amended by-laws are valid for the corporation has its inherent right to protect itself.
Under the Law, directors can only be removed from office by a vote of the stockholders
representing 2/3 of subscribed capital stock, while vacancies can be filled by a mere majority.
Court may appoint a receiver when corporate remedy is unavailable when board of directors
perform acts harmful to the corporation.
Generally, stockholders cannot sue on behalf of the corporation. The exception is when the
defendants are in complete control of the corporation.
The stockholders have an implied power to remove a director for cause. Even when there is
cumulative voting, stockholders can still remove directors for cause.
DELA RAMA V. MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO, INC. (27 SCRA 247; 1969)
A corporation may use its funds to invest in another corporation without the approval of the
stockholders if done in pursuance of a corporate purpose. However, if it is purely for investment,
the vote of the stockholders is necessary.
VOTING
- Pledgors or mortgagors have the right to attend and vote at stockholders' meetings.
- Treasury shares have no voting right for as long as such shares remain in the Treasury.
- Proxies must be in writing, signed by the stockholder/member, filed before the scheduled
meeting with the corporate secretary.
- Unless otherwise provided in the proxy, it shall be valid only for the meeting for which it is
intended. No proxy shall be valid and effective for a period longer than five (5) years at any one
time.
- Voting trusts may be voted by proxy unless the agreement provides otherwise. (Sec. 59)
- It must be noted however that directors or trustees cannot vote by proxy at board
meetings. (Sec. 25)
- Note that in Sec. 89, non-stock corporations are permitted to waive the right to use proxies via
their AOI or by-laws.
- Voting trusts must be in writing, notarized, specifying the terms and conditions thereof, certified
copy filed with SEC. Failure to comply with this requirement renders the agreement ineffective
and unenforceable.
- As a general rule, voting trusts are valid for a period not exceeding 5 years at any one time, and
automatically expire at the end of the agreed period unless expressly renewed.
However, in the case of a voting trust specifically required as a condition in a loan agreement, said
voting trust may exceed 5 years but shall automatically expire upon payment of the loan.
- Voting trusts may be voted by proxy unless the agreement provides otherwise. (Sec. 59)
Pooling agreement
- Pooling agreements refer to agreements between 2 or more SHs to vote their shares the same
way. They are different from voting trust agreements in that they do not involve a transfer of
stocks but are merely private agreements between 2 or more SHs to vote in the same way.
- Sec. 100, par. 2 of the Corporation Code provides for pooling and voting agreements in close
corporations. Although there is no equivalent provision for widely-held corporations, Justice and
Prof. Campos are of the opinion that SHs of widely-held corporations should not be precluded
from entering into voting agreements if these are otherwise valid and are not intended to commit
any wrong or fraud on the other SHs that are not parties to the agreement.
ITF shares
- Any one of the joint owners can vote said shares or appoint a proxy thereof.
Sec 58. Proxies. – Stockholders and members may vote in person or by proxy in all meetings
of stockholders or members. Proxies shall be in writing, signed by the stockholder or member and
filed before the scheduled meeting with the corporate secretary. Unless otherwise provided in the
proxy, it shall be valid only for the meeting for which it is intended. No proxy shall be valid and
effective for a period longer than five (5) years at any one time.
Character: agency relationship; revocable at will (by express revocation, by attending the meeting)
and by death, except when coupled with interest or is a security.
Even if stocks are sold, the stockholder of record remains the owner of the stocks and has the
voting right until the by-law requiring recording of transfer in the transfer book is complied with.
Thus, a proxy given by the stockholder of record even if he has already sold the share/s of stock
remains effective.
STATE EX REL EVERETT TRUST V PACIFIC WAXED PAPER, (159 A.L.R. 297; 1945)
The general rule is that a proxy is revocable even though by its express terms it is irrevocable. The
exceptions are: (a) when authority is coupled with interest; (b) where authority is given as part of a
security and is necessary to effectuate such a security. It is coupled with interest when there is
interest in the share themselves (such as a right of first refusal in case of sale) and the rights
inherent in the shares (such as voting rights; capacity to obtain majority).
Where a stockholder’s meeting was validly convened, the proxies must be deemed present even if
the proxies were not presented, provided: (a) their existence is established; (b) the agents were so
designated to attend and act in SH’s behalf; (c) the agents were present in the meeting.
Q: Is it valid for the corporation to pay the expenses for proxy solicitation?
A: In the case of Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp. (128 N.E. 2d 291; 1955), it
was held that in a contest over policy (as opposed to a purely personal power contest), corporate
directors have the right to make reasonable and proper expenditures, subject to the scrutiny of the
courts when duly challenged, from the corporate treasury for the purpose of persuading the SHs of
the correctness of their position and soliciting their support for policies which the directors believe,
in all good faith, are in the best interests of the corporation. The SHs, moreover, have the right to
reimburse successful contestants for the reasonable and bona fide expenses incurred by them in
any such policy contest, subject to like court scrutiny.
However, where it is established that such monies have been spent for personal power,
individual gain or private advantage, and not in the belief that such expenditures are in the best
interest of the stockholders and the corporation, or where the fairness and reasonableness of the
amounts allegedly expended are duly and successfully challenged, the courts will not hesitate to
disallow them.
In a contest over policy, as compared to a purely personal power contest, corporate directors have
the right to make reasonable and proper expenditures. Reason: in these days of giant corporations
with vast numbers of SH ’ s, if directors are not allowed to authorize reasonable expenses in
soliciting proxies, corporate business may be hampered by difficulty in procuring quorum; or
corporations may be at the mercy of persons seeking to wrest control for their purposes if the
directors may not freely answer their challenge. But corp expense may be disallowed by courts
where money was shown to have been spent for personal power, individual gain or private
advantage, or where fairness and reasonableness of amount spent has been successfully
challenged.
Voting Trust
A Voting Trust Agreement (VTA) is an agreement whereby the real ownership of the shares is
separated from the voting rights, the usual aim being to insure the retention of incumbent directors
and remove from the stockholders the power to change the management for the duration of the
trust.
Advantages
· Accumulates power. Small shareholders are given the chance to have a representation in
the BOD or at least a spokesperson during stockholders’ meetings.
· Continuity of management.
· More effective than proxies because it is irrevocable.
· Ensures that the required number of stockholders is met thereby facilitating smooth
corporate operations.
Disadvantages
Rights given up by the shareholder in a VTA in exchange for the fiduciary obligation of the
trustee:
· Voting rights
· Proprietary rights/naked title/legal ownership
· Incidental rights such as to attend meetings, to be elected, to receive dividends)
(1) A VTA is prepared in writing, notarized, and filed with the corporation and SEC.
(2) The certificates of stock covered by the VTA are cancelled and new ones (voting trust
certificates) are issued in the name of the trustee/s stating that they are issued pursuant to the VTA.
(4) The trustee/s execute and deliver to transferors the voting trust certificates. (Note that
these certificates shall be transferable in the same manner and with the same effect as certificates
of stock.)
(5) At the end of the period of the VTA (or the full payment of the loan to which the VTA is
made a condition, as the case may be), in the absence of any express renewal, the voting trust
certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the trustee/s shall be deemed
cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of the transferors.
This case illustrates how VTA can give rise to effective control and how it can be abused. Original
stockholders can set aside the VTA when their rights are trampled upon by the trustee.
· Want of consideration
· Voting power not coupled with interest
· Fraud
· Illegal or improper purpose
A VTA transfers only voting or other rights pertaining to the shares subject of the agreement, or
control over the stock. Stockholders of a corp. that lost all its assets through foreclosures cannot
go after those properties. PNB-NIDC acquired those properties not as trustees but as
creditors.
Advantages:
Disadvantages:
What rights does a shareholder give up/ retain with a pooling agreement?
Shareholders retain their right to vote because the parties are not constituted as agents. However,
the will of the parties may not be carried out due to non-compliance with the pooling agreement.
Generally, agreements and combinations to vote stock or control corporate fiction & policy are
valid if they seek without fraud to accomplish only what parties might do as stockholders and do
not attempt it by illegal proxies, trusts or other means in contravention of statutes or law.
Stockholders ’ control agreements are valid where it is for the benefit of corporation where it
works no fraud upon creditors or other stockholders and where it violates no statute or recognized
public policy.
MCQUADE v. STONEHAM (189 N.E. 234; 1934)
If the enforcement of a particular contract damages nobody-not even the public, there is no reason
for holding it illegal. Test is WON it causes damage to the corporation and stockholders.
Methods of Voting
1. Straight voting: If A has 100 shares and there are 5 directors to be elected, he shall
multiply 100 by five (equals 500) and distribute equally among the five candidates without
preference
2. Cumulative voting: If A has 100 shares and there are 5 directors to be elected, he shall
(one candidate) multiply 100 by five (equals 500) and he can vote the 500 for only one
candidate.
3. Cumulative voting: If A has 100 shares, there are 5 directors to be elected, and he only
(multiple candidates) wants to vote for two nominees, he can divide 500 votes between the
two, giving each one 250 votes.
X= # of shares required
Y= # of outstanding votes
Z= # of directors to be elected
X= _ Y__ +1
Z+1
2. Baker & Cary’s formula (minimum no. of votes needed to elect multiple directors)
X= # of shares required
Y= # of shares represented at meeting
D= # of directors the minority wants to elect
D’= total # of directors to be elected
X= Y x D + 1
D' + 1
NOTES
· Levels playing field or at least ensures that the minority can elect at least one
representative to the board of directors (BOD)
· Cannot of itself give the minority control of corporate affairs, but may affect and limit the
extent of the majority’s control
· By-laws cannot provide against cumulative voting since this right is mandated by law in
Section 24.
Type of shares
2. Preferred: share has preference over dividends and distribution of assets upon
liquidation;
right to vote may be restricted (Sec. 6)
NOTES
· Even though the right to vote of preferred and redeemable shares may be restricted, owners
of these shares can still vote on certain matter provided for in Sec. 6.
· SEC requires that where no dividends are declared for three consecutive years, in spite of
available profits, preferred stocks will be given the right to vote until dividends are declared.
· Provision granting right to vote to preferred stock previously prohibited from voting,
constitutes diminution of the voting power of common stock.
· Provision in the articles of incorporation granting holders of preferred stock right to vote in
case of default in payment of dividends after July 1, 1951 was construed as denial by necessary
implication of the right to vote even prior to July 1, 1951.
· Most common restriction: granting first option to the other stockholders and/or the
corporation to acquire the shares of a stockholder who wishes to sell them.
· This gives to the corporation and/or to its current management the power to prevent the
transfer of shares to persons who they may see as having interests adverse to theirs.
· As long as the qualifications imposed are reasonable and not meant to unjustly or unfairly
deprive the minority of their rightful representation in the BOD, such provisions are within the
power of the majority to provide in the by-laws.
· According to Gokongwei vs. SEC, aside from prescribing qualifications, by-laws can also
provide for the disqualification of anyone in direct competition with the corporation.
Founder’s shares
· If founder’s shares enjoy the right to vote, this privilege is limited to 5 years upon SEC’
s approval, so as to prevent the perpetual disqualification of other stockholders.
· Contract to manage the day-to-day affairs of the corporation in accordance with the
policies laid down by the board of the managed corporation.
· BOD can and usually delegate many of its functions but it can ’ t abdicate its
responsibility to act as a governing body by giving absolute power to officers or others, by way
of a management contract or otherwise. It must retain its control over such officers so that it may
recall the delegation of power whenever the interests of the corporation are seriously prejudiced
thereby.
SHERMAN & ELLIS VS. INDIANA MUTUAL CASUALTY (41 F. 2d 588; 1930)
Although corporations may, for a limited period, delegate to a stranger certain duties usually
performed by the officers, there are duties, the performance of which may not be indefinitely
delegated to outsiders.
UNUSUAL VOTING AND QUORUM REQUIREMENTS (Sec. 25, 97 [for close corporations])
· In exchange for the numerical majority in the BOD, minority can ask for a stronger veto
power in major corporate decisions.
· A requirement that there shall be no election of directors at all unless every single vote be
cast for the same nominees, is in direct opposition to the statutory rule that the receipt of plurality
of the votes entitles a nominee to election. (See Sec. 24)
· Requiring unanimity before the BOD can take action on any corporate matter makes it
impossible for the directors to act on any matter at all. In all acts done by the corporation, the
major number must bind the lesser, or else differences could never be determined nor settled.
· The State has decreed that every stock corporation must have a representative government,
with voting conducted conformably to the statutes, and the power of decision lodged in certain
fractions, always more than half, of the stock. This whole concept is destroyed when the
stockholders, by agreement, by-law or certificates of corporation provides for unanimous action,
giving the minority an absolute, permanent and all-inclusive power of veto.
· The requirement of unanimous vote to amend by-laws is valid. Once proper by-laws have
been adopted, the matter of amending them is no concern of the State.
Device
Favorable To:
Limitations
Cumulative voting
Classification of shares
MINORITY: so long as they hold more common stock as opposed to the majority who holds
more preferred stock
Preferred and redeemable stock can still vote on certain matters as provided in Sec. 6 or as may be
provided by the corp.
MAJORITY: they can choose whether to keep or release shares and they can prevent opposition
from acquiring shares
See Sec. 98
MAJORITY: they’re the ones who can prescribe the qualifications in the by-laws
Qualifications must be reasonable and do not deprive minority of representation on the board
Management contracts
MAJORITY: allows them to delegate certain functions and duties without losing control over the
corporation
MEETINGS
SPECIAL: At any time upon call of the president or as provided in the by-
laws.
NOTICE: Must be sent at least 1 day prior to the scheduled meeting, unless otherwise
provided by the by-laws.
WHERE: Anywhere in or outside the Philippines, unless the by-laws provide otherwise.
Exceptions:
REGULAR: Held annually on a date fixed in the by-laws. If no date is fixed, on any date in
April of every year as determined by the Board of Directors or trustees.
Notice: Written, and sent to all stockholders or members of record at least 2 weeks prior to the
meeting, unless a different period is required by the by-laws.
Notice: Written, and sent to all stockholders or members of record at least 1 week prior to the
meeting, unless otherwise provided in the by-laws.
WHERE: In the city of municipality where the principal office of the corporation is located,
and if practicable in the principal office of the corporation. Metro Manila is considered a city or
municipality. (Sec. 51)
WHO PRESIDES: The president, unless the by-laws provide otherwise. (Sec. 54)
Generally, the proceedings had and/or any business transacted shall be void. However, the
proceedings and/or transacted business may still be deemed valid if:
(1) Such proceedings or business are within the powers or authority of the corporation; and
(2) All the stockholders or members of the corporation were present or duly represented at the
meeting. (Sec. 51)
(1) Diligence
(2) Loyalty
(3) Obedience
Obedience - directors must act only within corporate powers and are liable for damages if they
acted beyond their powers unless in good faith. Assuming that they acted within their powers,
liability may still arise if they have not observed due diligence or have been disloyal to the
corporation.
(1) willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation; or
(2) are guilty of gross negligence of bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation; or
(3) acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or
trustees.
In such cases, the directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting
therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty,
any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has been reposed in him in
confidence, as to which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be
liable as a trustee for the corporation and must account for the profits which would otherwise have
accrued to the corporation. (Sec. 31)
In addition to this general liability, the Corporation Code provides for specific rules to
govern the following situations:
As a general rule, directors and trustees of the corporation cannot be held liable for mistakes or
errors in the exercise of their business judgment, provided they have acted in good faith and with
due care and prudence. Contracts intra vires entered into by the board of directors are binding
upon the corporation, and the courts will not interfere unless such contracts are so unconscionable
and oppressive as to amount to a wanton destruction of the rights of the minority.
However, if due to the fault or negligence of the directors the assets of the corporation are
wasted or lost, each of them may be held responsible for any amount of loss which may have been
proximately caused by his wrongful acts or omissions. Where there exists gross negligence or
fraud in the management of the corporation, the directors, besides being liable for damages, may
be removed by the stockholders in accordance with Sec. 28 of the Code. (Campos & Campos)
GENERAL RULE: Contracts intra vires entered into by BoD are binding upon
the corporation and courts will not interfere.
Directors are expected to manage the corporation with reasonable diligence, care and
prudence, i.e. the degree of care and diligence which men prompted by self-interest generally
exercise in their own affairs. Thus, they can be held liable not only for willful dishonesty but also
for negligence.
Although they are not expected to interfere with the day-to-day administrative details of the
business of the corporation, they should keep themselves sufficiently informed about the general
condition of the business.
If in the course of management, the directors arrive at a decision for which there is a reasonable
basis and they acted in good faith, as a result of their independent judgment, and uninfluenced by
any consideration other than what they honestly believe to be for the best interest of the railroad, it
is not the function of the court to say that it would have acted differently and to charge the
directors for any loss or expenditures incurred.
In the present case, the bond issue was adequately deliberated and planned, properly
negotiated and executed; there was no lack of good faith; no motivation of personal gain or profit;
there was no lack of diligence, skill or care in selling the issue at the price approved by the
Commission and which resulted in a saving of approximately $9M to the corporation.
The Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. adopted a resolution which granted to its sugar planters an
increase in their share in the net profits in the event that the sugar centrals of Negros Occidental
should have a total annual production exceeding one-third of the production of all sugar central
mills in the province. Later, the company amended its existing milling contract with its sugar
planters, incorporating such resolution. The company, upon demand, refused to comply with the
contract, stating that the stipulations in the resolution were made without consideration and that
such resolution was, therefore, null and void ab initio, being in effect a donation that was ultra
vires and beyond the powers of the corporate directors to adopt. This is an action by the sugar
planters to enforce the contract.
The terms embodied in the resolution were supported by the same cause and consideration
underlying the main amended milling contract; i.e., the premises and obligations undertaken
thereunder by the planters, and particularly, the extension of its operative period for an additional
15 years over and beyond the thirty years stipulated in the contract.
As the resolution in question was passed in good faith by the board of directors, it is valid
and binding, and whether or not it will cause losses or decrease the profits of the central, the court
has no authority to review them. They hold such office charged with the duty to act for the
corporation according to their best judgment, and in so doing, they cannot be controlled in the
reasonable exercise and performance of such duty. It is a well-known rule of law that questions
of policy or of management are left solely to the honest decision of officers and directors of a
corporation, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment of the board of directors;
the board is the business manager of the corporation, and so long as it acts in good faith, its orders
are not reviewable by the courts.
FACTS: Alleghany Corp. bought terminals in Kansas City and St. Joseph. It needed to
raise money to pay the balance of the purchase price but could not directly borrow money due to a
borrowing limitation in its charter. Thus, it sold Missouri Pacific bonds to J.P. Morgan and Co.
worth $IOM. J.P. Morgan, in turn, sold $3M worth of the bonds to Guaranty Trust
Company. Under the contract, the seller was given an option to repurchase at same price within
six months.
HELD: Option given to seller is invalid. It is against public policy for a bank to sell
securities and buy them back at the same price; similarly, it is against public policy for the bank to
buy securities and give the seller the option to buy them back at the same price because the bank
incurs the entire risk of loss with no possibility of gain other than the interest derived from the
securities during the period that the bank holds them. Here, if the market price of the securities
rise, the holder of the repurchase option would exercise it to recover the securities at a lower price
at which he sold them. If the market price falls, the seller holding the option would not exercise it
and the bank would sustain the loss.
Directors are not in a position of trustees of an express trust who, regardless of good faith,
are personally liable. In this case, the directors are liable for the transaction because the entire
arrangement was improvident, risky, unusual and unnecessary so as to be contrary to fundamental
conceptions of prudent banking practice. Yet, the advice of counsel was not sought. Absent a
showing of exercise of good faith, the directors are thus liable.
FACTS: Frederick Southack and Alwyn Ball loaned Avram $20T evidenced by a
promissory note executed by Avram and endorsed by Lacey. The loan was not authorized by any
meeting of the board of directors and was not for the benefit of the corporation. The note was
dishonored but defendant-directors did not protest the note for non-payment; thus, Lacey, the
indorser who was financially capable of meeting the obligation, was subsequently discharged.
HELD: Directors are charged not with misfeasance, but with non-feasance, not only with
doing wrongful acts and committing waste, but with acquiescing and confirming the wrong doing
of others, and with doing nothing to retrieve the waste. Directors have the duty to attempt to
prevent wrongdoing by their co-directors, and if wrong is committed, to rectify it. If the
defendant knew that an unauthorized loan was made and did not take steps to salvage the loan, he
is chargeable with negligence and is accountable for his conduct.
It has been alleged that the payment of cash dividends to the stockholders was wrongfully
done and in bad faith, and to the injury and fraud of the creditors of the corporation. The
directors are sought to be made personally liable in their capacity as directors.
HELD: Creditors of a corporation have the right to assume that so long as there are
outstanding debts and liabilities, the BOD will not use the assets of the corporation to buy its own
stock, and will not declare dividends to stockholders when the corporation is insolvent.
In this case, it was found that the corporation did not have an actual bona fide surplus
from which dividends could be paid. Moreover, the Court noted that the Board of Directors
purchased the stock from the corporation and declared the dividends on the stock at the same
Board meeting, and that the directors were permitted to resign so that they could sell their stock to
the corporation. Given all of this, it was apparent that the directors did not act in good faith or
were grossly ignorant of their duties. Either way, they are liable for their actions which affected
the financial condition of the corporation and prejudiced creditors.
A complaint was filed against a corporate director for failing to give adequate attention (he relied
solely on the President’s updates on the status of the corp) to the affairs of a corporation which
suffered depletion of funds.
The director was not liable. The court said that despite being guilty of misprision in his office, still
the plaintiff must clearly show that the performance of the director’s duties would have avoided
the losses. When a business fails from general mismanagement, business incapacity, or bad
judgment, it is difficult to conjecture that a single director could turn the company around, or how
much dollars he could have saved had he acted properly.
Cushing, a director and in charge of leasing a roller skating rink of the corp, leased the same to
himself. Minority stockholders filed suit against Bowen, the corporation's President, to recover for
company losses arising out of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
Bowen was held to be not liable because: (1) Cushing's acts were not actually dishonest or
fraudulent; (2) Cushing performed personal work such as keeping the facility in repair which
redounded to the benefit of the company and even increased its income; (3) Bowen did not profit
personally through Cushing's lease; and (4) the issue of the possible illegality of the lease was put
before the Board of Directors, but the Board did not act on it but instead moved on to the next
item on the agenda. Absent any bad faith on Bowen's part, and a showing that it was a reasonable
exercise of judgment to take no action on the lease agreement at the time it was entered into,
Bowen was not liable.
Lowell Hoit filed action against directors of a cooperative grain company for an alleged willful
conversion by the manager of grain stored in the company facility. The court said that the directors
were not personally liable. There was no evidence that the directors had knowledge of the
transaction between the manager and Lowell Hoit.
The court will treat directors with leniency with respect to a single act of fraud on the part of a
subordinate officer/agent. But directors could be held liable if the act of fraud was habitual and
openly committed as to have been easily detected upon proper supervision. To hold directors liable,
he must have participated in the fraudulent act; or have been guilty of lack of ordinary and
reasonable supervision; or guilty of lack of ordinary care in the selection of the officer/agent.
Coleman, an employee of the bank, was able to divert bank finances for his benefit, resulting in
huge losses to the bank. The receiver sued the president and the other directors for the loss.
The court said that the directors were not answerable as they relied in good faith on the cashier’s
statement of assets and liabilities found correct by the government examiner, and were also
encouraged by the attitude of the president that all was well (the president had a sizable deposit in
the bank). But the president is liable. He was at the bank daily; had direct control of records; and
had knowledge of incidents that ordinarily would have induced scrutiny.
A self-dealing director is one who enters into a contract with the corporation of which he is a
director.
Voidable at the option of the corporation, whether or not it suffered damages. It is possible
that the self-dealing director may have the greatest interest in its welfare and may be willing to
deal with it upon reasonable terms.
However, such contract may be upheld by the corporation if all of the following
conditions are present:
(1) The presence of the self-dealing director or trustee in the board meeting for which the
contract was approved was not necessary to constitute a quorum for such meeting;
(2) The vote of such self-dealing director or trustee was not necessary for the
approval of the contract;
(4) In the case of an officer, the contract has been previously authorized by the
Board of Directors.
In the event that either of or both conditions (1) and (2) are absent (i.e., the presence of the
director/trustee was necessary for a quorum and/or his vote was necessary for the approval of the
contract), the contract may be ratified by a 2/3 vote of the OCS or all of the members, in a meeting
called for the purpose. Full disclosure of the adverse interest of the directors or trustees involved
must be made at such meeting.
DOCTRINE: A director of a corporation holds a position of trust and as such, he owes a duty
of loyalty to his corporation. In case his interests conflict with those of the corporation, he cannot
sacrifice the latter to his own advantage and benefit. As corporate managers, directors are
committed to seek the maximum amount of profits for the corporation. This trust relationship "is
not a matter of statutory or technical law. It springs from the fact that directors have the control
and guidance of corporate affairs and property and hence of the property interests of the
stockholders." (Prime White Cement Corp. v. IAC, 220 SCRA 103; 1993)
The articles of inc. of respondent included a provision that relieves any director of all
responsibility for which he may otherwise be liable by reason of any contract entered into with the
corp., whether it be for his benefit or for the benefit of any other person, firm, association or
partnership in which he may be interested, except in case of fraud.
SC: This is in direct contravention of the Corp Law, of the traditional fiduciary relationship
between directors and the SH. The implication is that they can do anything short of fraud, even to
their benefit, and with immunity.
Note: This case was decided in 1966 under the Corporation Law, which had no
provisions on self-dealing directors.
MEAD V. MCCULLOUGH (21 Phil. 95; 1911)
Issue: validity of sale of corp. property and assets to the directors who approved the same.
Gen Rule: When purely private corporations remain solvent, its directors are agents or
trustees for the SH.
Exception: when the corp. becomes insolvent, its directors are trustees of all the creditors, whether
they are members of the corp. or not, and must manage its property and assets with strict regard to
their interest; and if they are themselves creditors while the insolvent corp is under their
management, they will not be permitted to secure to themselves by purchasing the corp property
or otherwise any personal advantage over the other creditors.
Exception to Exception: A director or officer may in good faith and or an adequate consideration
purchase from a majority of the directors or SH the property even of an insolvent corp, and a sale
thus made to him is valid and binding upon the minority.
In the case at bar, the sale was held to be valid and binding. Company was losing. 4 directors
present during meeting all voted for the sale. They likewise constitute majority of SH. Contract
was found to be fair and reasonable.
Prime White Cement Corp. (through the President and Chairman of the Board) and Alejandro Te,
a director and auditor of the corporation, entered into a dealership agreement whereby Te was
obligated to act as the corporation's exclusive dealer and/or distributor of its cement products in
the entire Mindanao area for 5 years. Among the conditions in the dealership agreement were that
the corporation would sell to and supply Te with 20,000 bags of white cement per month, and that
Te would purchase the cement from the corporation at a price of P 9.70 per bag.
Relying on the conditions contained in the dealership agreement, Te entered into written
agreements with several hardware stores which would enable him to sell his allocation of 20,000
bags per month. However, the Board of Directors subsequently imposed new conditions,
including the condition that only 8,000 bags of cement would be delivered per month. Te made
several demands on the corporation to comply with the dealership agreement. However, when the
corporation refused to comply with the same, Te was constrained to cancel his agreements with
the hardware stores. Notwithstanding the dealership agreement with Te, the corporation entered
into an exclusive dealership agreement with a certain Napoleon Co for marketing of corporation's
products in Mindanao. The lower court held that Prime White was liable to Te for actual and
moral damages for having been in breach of the agreement which had been validly entered into.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the dealership agreement is not valid and enforceable, for
not having been fair and reasonable: the agreement protected Te from any market increases in the
price of cement, to the prejudice of the corporation. The dealership agreement was an attempt on
the part of Te to enrich himself at the expense of the corporation. Absent any showing that the
stockholders had ratified the dealership agreement or that they were fully aware of its provisions,
the contract was not valid and Te could not be allowed to reap the fruits of his disloyalty.
USE OF INSIDE INFORMATION: Do directors and officers of a company owe any duty at all
to stockholders in relation to transactions whereby the officers and directors buy for themselves
shares of stock from the stockholders?
In the case of Gokongwei v. SEC (89 SCRA 336; 1979), the Supreme Court, quoting from
the US case of Pepper v. Litton (308 U.S. 295-313; 1939) stated that a director cannot, "by the
intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient precept against serving two masters … He
cannot utilize his inside information and his strategic position for his own preferment. He cannot
violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly through the corporation what he could not do
directly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the
stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how
meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the
equitable limitation that it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage
of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis."
If a director acquires for himself, by virtue of his office, a business opportunity which should
belong to the corporation, thereby obtaining profits to the prejudice of the corporation, he must
account to the corporation for all such profits by refunding the same. However, if his act was
ratified by 2/3 stockholders' vote, he need not refund said profits. This provision applies even
though the director may have risked his own funds in the venture.
In this case, it was held that the general allegations in the complaint of conspiracy of the directors
to obtain corporate opportunity were deficient. The complaint should state specific transactions.
Directorship in 2 competing corporations does not in and of itself constitute a wrong. It is only
when a business opportunity arises which places the director in a position of serving two masters,
and when, dominated by one, he neglects his duty to the other, that a wrong has been done.
Fiduciary duty applies even if the corporation is unable to enter into transactions itself.
In this case, it was held that the common stock purchased by the defendants wasn’t a business
opportunity for the corporation. Having fulfilled their duty to the corporation in accordance with
their best judgment, the defendant directors were not precluded from a transaction for their own
account and risk.
Interlocking directors
An interlocking director is one who occupies a position in 2 companies dealing with each
other.
Except in cases of fraud, and provided the contract is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances, a contract between 2 or more corporations having interlocking directors shall not
be invalidated on that ground alone. This practice is tolerated by the Courts because such an
arrangement oftentimes presents definite advantages to the corporations involved.
However, if the interest of the interlocking director in one corporation is substantial (i.e.,
stockholdings exceed20% of the OCS) and his interest in the other corporation or corporations is
merely nominal, he shall be subject to the conditions stated in Sec. 32, i.e., for the contract not to
be voidable, the following conditions must be present:
(1) The presence of the self-dealing director or trustee in the board meeting for which the
contract was approved was not necessary to constitute a quorum for such meeting;
(2) The vote of such self-dealing director or trustee was not necessary for the approval of the
contract;
(3) The contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances;
(4) In the case of an officer, the contract has been previously authorized by the Board of
Directors.
In the event that either of or both conditions (1) and (2) are absent (i.e., the presence of the
director/trustee was necessary for a quorum and/or his vote was necessary for the approval of the
contract), the contract may be ratified by a 2/3 vote of the OCS or all of the members, in a meeting
called for the purpose. Full disclosure of the adverse interest of the directors or trustees involved
must be made at such meeting.
Note: The Investment House Law prohibits a director or officer of an investment house to be
concurrently a director or officer of a bank, except as otherwise authorized by the Monetary
Board. In no event can a person be authorized to be concurrently an officer of an investment
house and of a bank except where the majority or all of the equity of the former is owned by the
bank. (P.D. 129, Sec. 6, as amended)
The Insurance Code likewise prohibits a person from being a director and/or officer of an
insurance company and an adjustment company. (Sec. 187)
GLOBE WOOLEN CO. V. UTICA GAS & ELECTRIC (121 N.E. 378; 1918)
Maynard, president and chief stockholder of Globe but nominal SH in Utica Gas, obtained a cheap,
10-year contract for Utica to supply power. Maynard did not vote during the meeting for the
approval of the contract.
Can Globe seek to enforce contract? The Supreme Court held that Globe could not enforce the
contract and that said contract was voidable at the election of Utica. It was found that based on
the facts of the case, the contract was clearly one-sided. Maynard, although he did not vote,
exerted a dominating influence to obtain the contract from beginning to end.
The director-trustee has a constant duty not to seek harsh advantage in violation of his trust.
shall be solidarily liable with the stockholders concerned to the corporation and its creditors for
the difference between the fair value received at the time of the issuance of the stock and the par
or issued value of the same.
GENERAL RULE: Directors as such are not entitled to compensation for performing
services ordinarily attached to their office.
WHO FIXES THE COMPENSATION? The stockholders only (majority of the OCS)
MAXIMUM AMOUNT ALLOWED BY LAW: Total yearly income of the directors shall
not exceed 10% of the net income before income tax of the corporation during the preceding
year (Sec. 30)
GOV'T OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EL HOGAR FILIPINO (50 Phil. 399; 1927)
The compensation provided in sec. 92 of the by-laws of El Hogar Filipino which stipulated that
5% of the net profit shown by the annual balance sheet shall be distributed to the directors in
proportion to the attendance at board meetings is valid. The Corporation Law does not prescribe
the rate of compensation for the directors of a corporation. The power to fix it , if any is left to the
corporation to be determined in its by-laws. In the case at bar, the provision in question even
resulted in extraordinarily good attendance.
This action was brought by the directors of defendant corporation to recover 1% from each of the
plaintiffs of the profits of the corporation for 1929 pursuant to a by-law provision which grants the
directors the right to receive a life gratuity or pension in such amount for the corporation.
The SC held that the by-law provision is not valid. Such provision is ultra vires for a mutual loan
and building association to make. It is not merely a provision for the compensation of directors.
The authority conferred upon corporations refers only to providing compensation for the future
services of directors, officers, and employees after the adoption of the by-law in relation thereto.
The by-law can't be held to authorize the giving of continuous compensation to particular directors
after their employment has terminated for past services rendered gratuitously by them to the
corporation.
CENTRAL COOPERATIVE EXCHANGE INC VS. TIBE (33 SCRA 596; 1970)
The questioned resolutions which appropriated the funds of the corporation for different expenses
of the directors are contrary to the by-laws of the corporation; thus they are not within the board's
power to enact. Sec. 8 of the by-laws explicitly reserved to the stockholders the power to
determine the compensation of members of the board and they did restrict such compensation to
actual transportation expenses plus an additional P30 per diems and actual expenses while waiting.
Hence, all other expenses are excluded. Even without the express reservation,
directors presumptively serve without pay and in the absence of any agreement in relation thereto,
no claim can be asserted therefore.
A retirement plan which provides a very large pension to an officer who has served to within one
year of the retirement age without any expectation of receiving a pension would seem analogous
to a gift or bonus. The size of such bonus may raise a justifiable inquiry as to whether it amounts
to wasting of the corporate property. The disparity also between the president's pension plan and
that of even the nearest of the other officers and employees may also be inquired upon by the
courts.
This is an appeal filed to enjoin the California Eastern Airways from putting into effect a stock
option plan and a profit-sharing plan. The SC held that the stock option plan was deficient as it
was not reasonably created to insure that the corporation would receive contemplated benefits. A
validity of a stock option plan depends upon the existence of consideration and the inclusion of
circumstances which may insure that the consideration would pass to the corporation. The options
provided may be exercised in toto immediately upon their issuance within a 6 month period after
the termination of employment. In short, such plan did not insure that any optionee would remain
with the corporation.
With regard to the profit-sharing plan, it was held valid because it was reasonable and was
ratified by the stockholders pending the action.
Close Corporations
Sec. 97 provides that the AOI of a close corp. may specify that it shall be managed by the
stockholders rather than the BoD. So long as this provision continues in effect:
· Generally, stockholders deemed to be directors for purposes of this Code, unless the
context clearly requires otherwise;
· Stockholders shall be subject to all liabilities of directors. The AOI may likewise provide
that all officers or employees or that specified officers or employees shall be elected or appointed
by the stockholders instead of by the BoD.
Further, Sec. 100 provides that for stockholders managing corp. affairs:
· They shall be personally liable for corporate torts (unlike ordinary directors liable only
upon finding of negligence)
· If however there is reasonable adequate liability insurance, injured party has no right of
action v. stockholders-managers
A SH/director is still entitled to vote in a stockholder’s meeting even if his interest is adverse to a
corporation. But a stockholder able to control a corp. is still subject to the duty of good faith to the
corp. and the minority.
Persons with management control of corporation hold it in behalf of SHs and can not regard such
as their own personal property to dispose at their whim.
· Transfer of managerial control through BoD resignation & seriatim election of successors
if concomitant with the sale and actual transfer of majority interest or that which constitutes
voting control;
· Disposal by controlling SH of his stock at any time & at such price he chooses
· Selling corp. office or management control by itself, that is NOT accompanied by stocks or
stocks are insufficient to carry voting control;
· Transferring office to persons who are known or should be known as intending to raid the
corporate treasury or otherwise improperly benefit themselves at the expense of the
corp. (Insuranshares Corp. V. Northern Fiscal);
The corp. is suing its former directors to recover damages as a result of the sale of its control to a
group (corporate raiders) who proceeded to rob it of most of its assets mainly marketable
securities.
Are previous directors who sold corp. control liable? Yes, they are under duty not to sell to raiders.
Owners of corp. control are liable if under the circumstances, the proposed transfer are such as to
awaken a suspicion or put a prudent man on his guard. As in this case, control was bought for so
much aside from being warned of selling to parties they knew little about, and also from fair
notice that such outsiders indeed intended to raid the corp.
Duty to Creditors
General rule: Corporate creditors can run after the corp. itself only, and not the directors for
mismanagement of a solvent corp.
If corp. becomes insolvent, directors are deemed trustees of the creditors and should therefore
manage its assets with due consideration to the creditor’s interest.
If directors are also creditors themselves, they are prohibited from gaining undue advantage over
other creditors.
Personal Liability of Directors
In what instances does personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer validly attach
together with corporate liability?
II. Consents to the issuance of watered stocks, or who, having knowledge thereof, does
not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;
III. Agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation;
IV. Is made, by a specific provision of law, to personally answer for his corporate action.
In labor cases, particularly, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the
corporation for the termination of employment of corporate employees done with malice or in bad
faith.
In the instant case, there was a showing of bad faith: the Board Resolution retrenching the
respondents on the feigned ground of serious business losses had no basis apart from an unsigned
and unaudited Profit and Loss Statement which had no evidentiary value whatsoever.
A stock and transfer book is a record of all stocks in the names of the stockholders
alphabetically arranged. It likewise contains the following information:
· Installments paid and unpaid on all stock for which subscription has been made, and the
date of any installment;
· A statement of every alienation, sale or transfer of stock made, the date thereof, and by
whom and to whom made;
The stock and transfer book shall be kept in the principal office of the corporation or in the office
of its stock transfer agent, and shall be open for inspection by any director or stockholder of the
corporation at reasonable hours on business days.
A stock transfer agent is one who is engaged principally in the business of registering
transfers of stocks in behalf of a stock corporation. He or she must be licensed by the
SEC; however, a stock corporation is not precluded from performing or making transfer of its
own stocks, in which case all the rules and regulations imposed on stock transfer agents, except
the payment of a license fee, shall be applicable.
In the absence of any provision to the contrary, the corporate secretary is the custodian of
corporate records. Corollarily, he keeps the stock and transfer book and makes the proper and
necessary entries. (Torres, et al. vs. CA, 278 SCRA 793; 1997)
This includes book of inventories and balances, journal, ledger, book for copies of letters and
telegrams, financial statements, income tax returns, vouchers, receipts, contracts, papers pertaining
to such contracts, voting trust agreements (sec. 59)
2. By-laws
These are expressly required to be open to inspection by SH/members during office hours (Sec.
46). Note: There is no similar provision as to AOI, but these are filed with the SEC anyway.
This is to inform stockholders of Board policies. Such right arises only upon approval of the
minutes, however.
These are records of all stocks in the names of the stockholders alphabetically arranged. contain
all names of the stockholders of record. Useful for proxy solicitation for elections. SEC has
however ruled that a SH cannot demand that he be furnished such a list but he is free to examine
corp. books.
6. Most recent financial statement
Sec. 75 of the Code provides that within 10 days from the corporation's receipt of a written request
from any stockholder or member, the corporation must furnish the requesting party with a copy of
its most recent financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last
taxable year and a profit or loss statement for said taxable year.
Note: Under the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, records of bank deposits of the corporation are
NOT open to inspection, EXCEPT under the following circumstances:
1. The exercise of this right is subject to reasonable limitations similar to a citizen’s exercise
of the right to information. Otherwise, the corp. might be impaired, its efficiency in operations
hindered, to the prejudice of SHs.
2. Such limitations to be valid must be reasonable and not inconsistent with law ( Sec. 36[5]
and 46).
3. A corp. may regulate time and manner of inspection but provisions in its by-law which
gives directors absolute discretion to allow or disallow inspection are prohibited.
6. Place of inspection: Principal office of the corp. SH cannot demand that such records be
taken out of the principal office.
7. As to purpose:
· PRESUMPTION: that SH’s purpose is proper. Corp. cannot refuse on the mere belief
that his motive is improper (sec 74).
· BURDEN OF PROOF: lies with corp. which should show that purpose was illegal.
· To be legitimate, the purpose for inspection must be GERMANE to the INTEREST of the
stockholder as such, and it is not contrary to the interests of the corporation.
· Belief in good faith that a corp. is being mismanaged may be given due course even if later,
this is proven unfounded.
Every director, trustee, stockholder, member may exercise right personally or through an agent
who can better understand and interpret records (impartial source, expert accountant, lawyer).
NOTE: Writ shall not issue where it is shown that the petitioner ’ s purpose
is improper and inimical to the interests of the corporation.
(2) Injunction
(3) Action for damages against the officer or agent refusing inspection. Also, penal
sanctions such as fines and / or imprisonment (Sec. 74; Sec. 144)
(1) The person demanding has improperly used any information secured through any prior
examination; or
(2) Was not acting in good faith; or
(3) The demand was not for a legitimate purpose.
BOD/Officers may deny inspection when sought at unusual hours or under improper conditions.
But they cannot deprive the stockholders of the right altogether. In CAB, by-law provided that
the inspection be made available only for a few days in a year, chosen by the directors. This is
void.
There was nothing improper in the secretary’s refusal since the minutes of these prior meetings
have to be verified, confirmed and signed by the directors then present. Hence, Veraguth has to
wait until after the next meeting.
The law takes from the SH the burden of showing impropriety of purpose and places upon the
corporation the burden of showing impropriety of purpose and motive.
Considering that the foreign subsidiary is wholly owned by SMC and therefore under its control, it
would be more in accord with equity, good faith and fair dealing to construe the statutory right of
Gokongwei as petitioner as SH to inspect the books and records of such wholly subsidiary which
are in SMC’s possession and control.
DERIVATIVE SUITS
Suits of stockholders/ members based on wrongful or fraudulent acts of directors or other persons:
a. Individual suits - wrong done to stockholder personally and not to other stockholders
(ex. When right of inspection is denied to a stockholder)
· But since the directors who are charged with mismanagement are also the ones who will
decide WON the corp. will sue, the corp. may be left without redress; thus, the stockholder is
given the right to sue on behalf of the corporation.
· Suing stockholder is merely the nominal party and the corp. is actually the party in interest.
· A SH can only bring suit for an act that took place when he was a stockholder; not
before. (Bitong v. CA, 292 SCRA 503)
1) Stockholder/ member must have exhausted all remedies within the corp.
3) Any benefit recovered by the stockholder as a result of bringing derivative suit must be
accounted for to the corp. who is the real party in interest.
4) If suit is successful, plaintiff entitled to reimbursement from corp. for reasonable expenses
including attorneys' fees.
The injury complained of is against the corporation and thus the action properly belongs to the
corporation rather than the stockholders. It is a derivative suit brought by the stockholder as a
nominal party plaintiff for the benefit of the corporation, which is the real party in interest. In this
case, plaintiffs brought the suit not for the benefit of the corporation's interest, but for their
own. Plaintiffs here asked that the defendant make good the losses occasioned by his
mismanagement and to pay them the value of their respective participation in the corporate assets
on the basis of their respective holdings. Petition dismissed for venue improperly laid.
Should the corporation be made a party? The English practice is to make the corp. a party
plaintiff while the US practice is to make it a party defendant. What is important though is that
the corporation should be made a party in order to make the court's ruling binding upon it and thus
bar any future re-litigation of the issues. Misjoinder of parties is not a ground to dismiss the
action.
The importation of textiles instead of raw materials, as well as the failure of the board of directors
to take actions against those directly responsible for the misuse of the dollar allocations constitute
fraud, or consent thereto on the part of the directors. Therefore, a breach of trust was committed
which justified the suit by a minority stockholder of the corporation.
The claim that plaintiff Justiniani did not take steps to remedy the illegal importation for a period
of two years is also without merit. During that period of time plaintiff had the right to assume
and expect that the directors would remedy the anomalous situation of the corporation brought
about by their wrong-doing. Only after such period of time had elapsed could plaintiff conclude
that the directors were remiss in their duty to protect the corporation property and business.
· The power to sue and be sued in any court by a corporation even as a stockholder is lodged
in the Board of Directors that exercises its corporate powers and not in the president or officer
thereof.
à It was JAKA's Board of Directors, not Senator Enrile, which had the power to grant Bitong
authority to institute a derivative suit for and in its behalf.
· The basis of a stockholder's suit is always one in equity. However, it cannot prosper
without first complying with the legal requisites for its institution. The most important of these is
the bona fide ownership by a stockholder of a stock in his own right at the time of the transaction
complained of which invests him with standing to institute a derivative action for the benefit of the
corporation.
FINANCING THE CORPORATION
Sources of Financing
Capital Structure
This refers to the aggregate of the securities -- instruments which represent relatively long-term
investment -- issued by the corporation. There are basically 2 kinds of securities: shares of
stock and debt securities.
CAPITAL STOCK
CAPITAL
DEFINITION
the amount fixed, usually by the corporate charter, to be subscribed and paid in or secured to be
paid in by the SHS of a corporation, and upon which the corporation is to conduct its operation
actual property of the corporation, including cash, real, and personal property. Includes all
corporate assets, less any loss which may have been incurred in the business.
CONSTANCY
COMMON
PREFERRED
PAR
NO PAR*
TREASURY
REDEEMABLE
FOUNDER’S
DEFINITION
Stock which entitles the owner of such stocks to an equal pro rata division of profits
Stock which entitles the holder to some preference either in the dividends or distribution of assets
upon liquidation, or in both
Shares that have been issued and fully paid but subsequently reacquired by the issuing corporation
by lawful means.
Shares issued by the corporation that may be taken up by the corporation upon expiration of a
fixed period.
à regardless of the existence of unrestricted retained earnings
Special shares whose exclusive rights and privileges are determined by the AOI.
VALUE
Fixed in the AOI, and indicated in the stock certificate. May be sold at a value higher, but not
lower, than that fixed in the AOI.
Value not fixed in the AOI, and therefore not indicated in the stock certificate. Price may be set
by BOD, SH’s or fixed in the AOI eventually.
VOTING RIGHTS
No voting rights for as long as such stock remains in the treasury (Sec. 57)
NOTE: Only preferred and redeemable shares may be deprived of the right to vote. (Sec. 6,
Corporation Code)
EXCEPTION: As otherwise provided in the Corporation Code.
* No-par value shares may not be issued by the following entities: banks, trust companies,
insurance companies, public utilities, building & loan association (Sec. 6)
Nature of Subscription Contract
It is any contract for the acquisition of unissued stock in an existing corporation or a corporation
still to be formed. This is notwithstanding the fact that the parties refer to it as a purchase or
some other contract. (Sec. 60)
· Subscriptions constitute a fund to which the creditors have a right to look for satisfaction
of their claims.
· The assignee in insolvency can maintain an action upon any unpaid stock subscription in
order to realize assets for the payment of its debts.
· A subscription contract subsists as a liability from the time that the subscription is made
until such time that the subscription is fully paid.
A share of stock or the certificate thereof is not an indebtedness to the owner nor evidence of
indebtedness and therefore, it is not a credit. Stockholders as such are not creditors of the
corporation.
The capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund to be used more particularly for the security of the
creditors of the corporation who presumably deal with it on the credit of its capital.
Pre-incorporation subscription
RULE: When a group of persons sign a subscription contract, they are deemed not only to make
a continuing offer to the corporation, but also to have contracted with each other as well. Thus,
no one may revoke the contract even prior to incorporation without the consent of all the
others.
2) After the AOI have been submitted to the SEC (Sec. 61)
UTAH HOTEL CO V. MADSEN (43 Utah 285, 134 Pac. 557; 1913)
Sec 332 in express terms confers powers upon the stockholders “to regulate the mode of making
subscriptions to its capital stock and calling in the same by-laws or by express contract.”
Since it may be done by express contract, this shows that it was intended that a contract to that
effect may be entered into even before the corporation is organized, and the contract agreement is
enforced if the corporation is in fact organized.
One who has paid his subscription to the capital stock of the corporation may compel the issuance
of proper certificates therefor.
Post-incorporation subscription
NOTE: Under the Corporation Code, there is no longer any distinction between a
subscription and a purchase. Thus, a subscriber is liable to pay for the shares even
if the corporation has become insolvent.
To protect existing stockholder equity. If the right is not recognized, the SH’s interest in the
corporation will be diluted by the subsequent issuance of shares.
Under the prevailing view in common law, the preemptive right is limited to shares issued in
pursuance of an increase in the authorized capital stock and does not apply to additional issues of
originally authorized shares which form part of the existing capital stock.
This common law principle which was generally understood to be applicable in this jurisdiction
has now to give way to the express provisions of the Corporation Code on the matter.
LIMITATIONS: The pre-emptive right does not extend to: (Sec. 39)
2) Issuance of shares in exchange for property needed for corporate purposes, including cases
wherein an absorbing corporation issues new stocks to the SH ’ s in pursuance to the merger
agreement (Sec. 39)
Why? (a) Because it is beneficial for the corporation to save its cash;
(b) A swap is more expedient than determining the monetary
equivalent of the property.
Note: In Nos. (2) and (3), such acts require approval of 2/3 of the OCS or
2/3 of total members.
In Close Corporations
In close corporations, the preemptive rights extends to ALL stock to be issued, including
re-issuance of treasury shares, EXCEPT if provided otherwise by the AOI. (Sec. 102). Note that
the limitations in Sec. 39 do not apply.
The waiver of the preemptive right must appear in the Articles of Incorporation or an amendment
thereto in order to be binding on ALL stockholders, particularly future stockholders. (Sec. 39)
If it appears merely in a waiver agreement and NOT in the AOI, and was unanimously agreed to
by all existing stockholders:
· The existing stockholders cannot later complain since they are all bound to their
private agreement.
Any stockholder who has not exercised his preemptive right within a reasonable time will be
deemed to have waived it.
The issue of shares may still be objectionable if the Directors have acted in breach of trust and
their primary purpose is to perpetuate or shift control of the corporation, or to “freeze out” the
minority interest.
The directors were under the legal obligation to give the SH-plaintiff an opportunity to purchase at
the price fixed before they could sell his property to a third party. By selling to strangers without
first offering to sell to him, the defendant wrongfully deprived him of his property and is liable for
such damages as he actually sustained.
Independently of the charters, the SHs of a corporation have a preferential right to purchase new
issues of shares, to the proportional extent of their respective interests in the capital stock then
outstanding, when the privilege can be exercised consistently with the object which the disposition
of the additional stock is legally designed to accomplish. In the present case, every SH of the
bank, for each of the shares, was to receive 1 1/2 shares of the stock co. (share in exchange for
property). It would not be feasible to consummate a transfer based upon such consideration if the
preemptive right were to be held enforceable with respect to every new issue of stock regardless of
the object of the disposition.
Preemptive right is not to be denied when the property is to be taken as consideration for the stock
except in those peculiar circumstances when the corporation has great need for the particular
property, and the issuance of stock is the only practical and feasible method by which the corp.
can acquire it for the best interest of the SHs. Ground: practical necessity. [cf. Sec. 39]
If the issue of shares is reasonably necessary to raise money to be issued in the business of the
corporation rather than the expansion of such business beyond original limits, the original SHs
have no right to count on obtaining and keeping their proportional part of original stock.
But even if preemptive right does not exist, the issue of shares may still be objectionable if the
directors have acted in breach of trust and their primary purpose is to perpetuate or shift control of
the corporation, or to ‘freeze out’ minority interest.
Debt Securities
Borrowings
à not secured by any collateral; THEREFORE, are not bonded indebtedness in the true sense,
and stockholder approval is NOT required (although it would generally be a good idea to obtain it)
NOTE: Under the SEC rules, stock option must first be approved by the SEC.
Also, if the stock option is granted to non-stockholders, or to directors, officers, or managing
groups, there must first be SH approval of 2/3 of the OCS before the matter is submitted to the
SEC for approval.
Of course it goes without saying that the corporation must set aside enough of the junior
securities in case the holders of the option decide to exercise such option.
MERRITT-CHAPMAN & SCOTT CORP. VS. NEW YORK TRUST CO. (184 F. 2d 954; 1950)
If the corporation is allowed to declare stock dividends without taking account of the warrant
holders (who have not yet exercised their warrant), the percentage of interest in the common stock
capital of the corporation which the warrant holders would acquire, should they choose to do so,
could be substantially reduced/diluted. Thus, the corporation is wrong in contending that a warrant
holder must first exercise his warrant before they may be issued stock dividend.
Hybrid securities
Because preferred shares and bonds are created by contract, it is possible to create stock which
approximates the characteristics of debt securities. Hybrid securities, as the name implies,
therefore combine the features of preferred shares and bonds.
Determining the true nature of the security is crucial for tax purposes. The American courts use
the following criteria:
(1) Is the corporation liable to pay back the investor at a fixed maturity date?
(2) Is interest payable unconditionally at definite intervals, or is it dependent on earnings?
(3) Does the security rank at least equally with the claims of other creditors, or is it subordinate
to them?
BONDS
STOCK
WHAT IS PAID?
Interest
Dividends
TO WHOM PAID?
Creditor-investor
Stockholder
WHEN PAID?
NATURE
Expense
Not an expense
TAXABILITY
CANNOT be deducted
MATURITY DATE?
Yes
No
RANK ON DISSOLUTION
JOHN KELLY VS. CIR TALBOT MILLS VS. CIR (326 U.S. 521; 1946)
In the Kelly case, the annual payments made were interest on indebtedness (therefore, a bond is
held) because there were sales of the debentures as well as exchanges of preferred stock for
debentures, a promise to pay a certain annual amount if earned, a priority for the debentures over
common stock and a definite maturity date in the reasonable future.
In the Talbot Mills case, the annual payments made were dividends and not interest (therefore,
shares are held), because of the presence of fluctuating annual payments with a 2% minimum, and
the limitation of the issue of notes to stockholders in exchange only for stock. Besides, it is the
Tax Court which has final determination of all tax issues which are not clearly delineated by law.
The payments made, regardless of what they are called, are in fact dividends (on stocks) because
of the absence of a maturity date and the right to enforce payment of the principal sum by legal
action, among other factors.
The following criteria should be used in determining whether a payment is for interest or
dividends:
(1) maturity date and the right to enforce collection;
(2) treatment by the parties;
(3) rank on dissolution;
(4) uniform rate of interest payable or income payable only out of profits;
(5) participation in management and the right to vote.
It must be noted that these criteria are not of equal importance and cannot be relied upon
individually. E.g. treatment accorded the issuance by the parties cannot be sufficient as this would
allow taxpayers to avoid taxes by merely naming payments as interest.
(1) debtor-corporation
(2) creditor-bondholder
(3) trustee: representative of all the bondholders
The rights of bondholders are to be determined by their contract and courts will not make or
remake a contract merely because one of the parties may become dissatisfied with its
provisions. If the contract is legal, the courts will interpret and enforce it.
In the deed of trust and bonds in this case, there are provisions empowering bondholders of 2/3 of
the principal amount or more, by agreement with the company, to modify and extend the date of
payment of the bonds provided such extension affected all bonds alike. When this was done, the
bondholders only followed such provisions in good faith. The company benefited because of such
move, and the bondholders were not necessarily prejudiced, as defendants Joneses in this case
were themselves owners of 72% of the bond issue.
· cash;
· property actually received by the corporation: must be necessary or convenient for its use
and lawful purposes;
· labor performed for or services actually rendered to the corporation
(NOTE: Future services are NOT acceptable!);
· previously incurred indebtedness by the corporation;
· amounts transferred from unrestricted retained earnings to stated capital;
· outstanding shares exchange for stocks in the event of reclassification or conversion
· future services
· promissory notes
· value less than the stated par value
(2) By the BOD pursuant to authority conferred upon it by the AOI or the by-laws; or
(3) In the absence of the foregoing, by the SHs representing at least a majority of the
outstanding capital stock at a meeting duly called for the purpose (Sec. 62)
IF THE CONSIDERATION FOR SHARES IS OTHER THAN CASH, HOW IS THE VALUE
THEREOF DETERMINED?
Watered Stocks
WHAT IS WATERED STOCK?
NOTE: No-par shares CAN be watered stock: when they are issued for less
than their issued value as fixed by the corp. in accordance with law.
(1) Gratuitously, under an agreement that nothing shall be paid to the corporation;
(2) Upon payment of less than its par value in money or for cost at a discount;
(3) Upon payment with property, labor or services, whose value is less than the par value
of the shares; and
(4) In the guise of stock dividends representing surplus profits or an increase in the value of
property, when there are no sufficient profits or sufficient increases in value to justify it.
Directors and officers who consented to the issuance of watered stocks are solidarily liable
with the holder of such stocks to the corp. and its creditors for the difference between the fair
value received at the time of the issuance and the par or issued value of the share.
The liability will be to all creditors, whether they became such prior or subsequent to the
issuance of the watered stock. Reliance by the creditors on the alleged valuation of corporate
capital is immaterial and fraud is not made an element of liability.
PRIVATE TRIPLEX SHOE V. RICE & HUTCHINSTC \L 1 "TRIPLEX SHOE V. RICE &
HUTCHINS" (72 A.L.R. 932; 1930)
In this case, the stocks issued to the Dillman faction were no par value shares, the
consideration for which were never fixed as required by law. Hence, their issuance was void.
Moreover, the stocks were issued to the Dillmans for services rendered and to be rendered. Future
services are not lawful consideration for the issuance of stock.
PRIVATE MCCARTY V. LANGDEAUTC \L 1 "MCCARTY V. LANGDEAU" (337 S.W. 2d
407; 1960)
McCarty agreed to purchase shares of a corp. with a downpayment of only $20, with the
balance due to be evidenced by a note. McCarty failed to pay a big portion of the balance. The
Court affirmed the judgement against McCarty for the balance due on the contract.
McCarty contends that the contract is void. But the law only prohibits the issuance of
stock. If it is understood that the stock will not be issued to the subscriber until the note is paid, the
contract is valid and not illegal.
If a security such as a note, which is not a valid consideration, is accepted, the law does
not say that such note, or the stock issued for it, shall be void. What is void by express provision
of law is the fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness. The law was designed for the protection
of the corporation and its creditors. It emphasizes the stockholder’s obligations to make full and
lawful payment in accord with its mandate, rather than furnish him with a defense when he has
failed in that obligation. Its purpose is to give integrity to the corporation’s capital. None of these
objects would be promoted by declaring a note given by a subscriber for stock uncollectible in the
hands of a bona fide stockholder.
This case involves an action to collect unpaid balances on par value of shares. It was held
that innocent transferees of watered stock cannot be held to answer for the deficiency of the stocks
even at the suit of the creditor of the company. The creditor’s remedy is against the original owner
of the watered stock.
A subscriber to shares who pays only part of what he agreed to pay is liable to creditors
for the balance.
Holders of watered stock are generally held liable to the corporation’s creditors for the
difference between the par value of the stock and the amount paid in.
Under the misrepresentation theory, the creditors who rely on the misrepresentation of the
corporation’s capital stock are entitled to recover the “water” from holders of the watered stock.
Reliance of creditors on the misrepresentation is material. However, under the statutory
obligation theory, reliance of creditors on the capital stock of the corporation is irrelevant. (It
must be noted that here in the Philippines, it is the statutory obligation theory which is prevailing.)
Issuance of Certificate
Certificate of stock
(1) The certificates must be signed by the President / Vice-President, countersigned by the
secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation.
à There is no issuance of a stock certificate where it is never detached from the stock books
although blanks therein are properly filled up if the person whose name is inserted therein has no
control over the books of the company. (Bitong v. CA, 292 SCRA 503)
(3) Par value of par value shares / Full subscription of no par value shares must be fully paid.
(4) Surrender of the original certificate if the person requesting the issuance of a certificate is a
transferee from a SH.
Stock issued without authority and in violation of law is void and confers no rights on the
person to whom it is issued and subjects him to no liabilities. Where there is an inherent lack of
power in the corporation to issue the stock, neither the corporation nor the person to whom the
stock is issued is estopped to question its validity since an estoppel cannot operate to create stock
which under the law cannot have existence.
Unpaid Subscriptions
· Unpaid subscriptions are not due and payable until a call is made by the corporation for
payment. (Sec. 67)
· Interest on all unpaid subscriptions shall be at the rate of interest fixed in the by-laws. If
there is none, it shall be the legal rate. (Sec. 66)
(1) Call for payment as necessary, i.e. the BOD declares the unpaid subscriptions due and
payable (Sec. 67);
Poizat subscribed to 20 shares but only paid for 5. Board made a call for payment through a
resolution. Poizat refused to pay. Corporation became insolvent. Assignee in insolvency sued
Poizat whose defense was that the call was invalid for lack of publication.
It was held that the Board call became immaterial in insolvency which automatically causes all
unpaid subscriptions to become due and demandable.
Company’s president subscribed to shares and paid partially. The Board made a call for payment
through a resolution. However, the president refused to pay, prompting the corporation to sue.
The defense was that the call was invalid for lack of publication.
It was held that the call was void for lack of publication required by law. Such publication is a
condition precedent for the filing of the action. The ruling in Poizat does not apply since the
company here is solvent.
Da Silva subscribed to 650 shares and paid for 200. The company notified him that his shares
will be declared delinquent and sold in a public auction if he does not pay the balance. Da Silva
did not pay. The company advertised a notice of delinquency sale. Da Silva sought an injunction
because the by-laws allegedly provide that unpaid subscriptions will be paid from the dividends
allotted to stockholders.
The Court held that by-laws provide that unpaid subscriptions may be paid from such
dividends. Company has other remedies provided for by law such as a delinquency sale or
specific performance.
NATIONAL EXCHANGE VS DEXTER (51 Phil. 601; 1928)
Dexter subscribed to 300 shares. The subscription contract provided that the shares will be paid
solely from the dividends. Company became insolvent. Assignee in insolvency sued Dexter for
the balance. Dexter's defense was that under the contract, payment would come from the
dividends. Without dividends, he cannot be obligated to pay.
The Court held that the subscription contract was void since it works a fraud on creditors who rely
on the theoretical capital of the company (subscribed shares). Under the contract, this theoretical
value will never be realized since if there are no dividends, stockholders will not be compelled to
pay the balance of their subscriptions.
Lumanlan had unpaid subscriptions. Company ’ s receiver sued him for the balance and
won. While the case was on appeal, the company and Lumanlan entered into a compromise
whereby Lumanlan would directly pay a creditor of the company. In exchange, the company
would forego whatever balance remained on the unpaid subscription. Lumanlan agreed since he
would be paying less than his unpaid subscription. Afterwards, the corporation still sued him for
the balance because the company still had unpaid creditors. Lumanlan ’ s defense was the
compromise agreement.
The Court held that the agreement cannot prejudice creditors. The subscriptions constitute a fund
to which they have a right to look to for satisfaction of their claims. Therefore, the corporation
has a right to collect all unpaid stock subscriptions and any other amounts which may be due it,
notwithstanding the compromise agreement.
Holders of subscribed shares not fully paid which are not delinquent shall have all the rights of a
stockholder. (Sec. 72)
Chua Soco bought 500 shares of China Banking Corp. at par value of P100.00, paying the sum of
P25,000.00, 50% of the subscription price. Chua mortgaged the said shares in favor of plaintiff
Fua Cun to secure a promissory note for the sum of P25,000.00. In the meantime, Chua Soco's
interest in the 500 shares were attached and levied upon to satisfy his debt with China Banking
Corp. Fua Cun brought an action to have himself declared to hold priority over the claim of
China Bank, to have the receipt for the shares delivered to him, and to be awarded damages for
wrongful attachment, on the ground that he was owner of 250 shares by virtue of Chua Soco's
payment of half of the subscription price.
The Court held that payment of half the subscription price does not make the holder of stock the
owner of half the subscribed shares. Plaintiff's rights consist in an equity in 500 shares and upon
payment of the unpaid portion of the subscription price he becomes entitled to the issuance of
certificate for the said 500 shares in his favor.
Baltazar, et al. subscribed to a certain number of shares of Lingayen Gulf Electric Power. They
had made only partial payment of the subscription but the corporation issued them certificates
corresponding to shares covered by the partial payments. Corporation wanted to deny voting rights
to all subscribed shares until total subscription is paid.
The Court held that shares of stock covered by fully paid capital stock shares certificates are
entitled to vote. Corporation may choose to apply payments to subscription either as: (a) full
payment for corresponding number of stock the par value of which is covered by such payment; or
(b) as payment pro-rata to each subscribed share. The corporation chose the first option, and,
having done so, it cannot unilaterally nullify the certificates issued.
Note: The Camposes are of the opinion that § 64 of Corporation Code makes
the Lingayen Gulf inapplicable at present.
NAVA V. PEERS MARKETING (74 SCRA 65; 1976)
Teofilo Co subscribed to 80 shares of Peers Marketing Corp. at P100.00 a share for a total of
P8,000.00. He, however, paid only P2,000.00 corresponding to 20 shares or 25% of total
subscription. Nava bought 20 shares from Co and sought its transfer in the books of the
corporation. The corporation refused to transfer said shares in its books.
It was held that the transfer is effective only between Co and Nava and does not affect the
corporation. The Fua Cun ruling applies. Lingayen Gulf does not apply because, unlike in
Lingayen Gulf, no certificate of stock was issued to Co.
Effect of delinquency
Stock that remains unpaid 30 days after the date specified in the subscription contract or the date
stated in the call made by the Board.
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF DELINQUENCY?
1. The holder thereof loses all his rights as a stockholder except only the rights to dividends;
2. Dividends will not be paid to the stockholder but will be applied to the unpaid balance of
his subscription plus costs and expenses. Also, stock dividends will be withheld until full
payment is made.
3. Such stockholder cannot vote at the election of directors or at any meeting on any matter
proper for stockholder action.
WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR THE CONDUCT OF A DELINQUENCY SALE? (Sec. 68)
The BOD issues a resolution ordering the sale of delinquent stock, specifically stating the amount
due on each subscription plus all accrued interest, and the date, time and place of the sale.
Note: The sale shall not be less than 30 days nor more than 60 days from the date the stocks
become delinquent.
Notice of the date of delinquency sale and a copy of the resolution is sent to every delinquent
stockholder either personally or by registered mail. The notice is likewise published once a week
for 2 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province or city where the
principal office of the corporation is located.
If the delinquent stockholder fails to pay the corporation on or before the date specified for the
delinquency sale, the delinquent stock is sold at public auction to such bidder who shall offer to
pay the full amount of the balance on the subscription together with accrued interest, costs of
advertisement and expenses of sale, for the smallest number of shares or fraction of a share.
(4) Transfer and issuance of certificate of stock
The stock so purchased is transferred to such purchaser in the books of the corporation and a
certificate of stock covering such shares is issued.
If there is no bidder at the public auction who offers to pay the full amount of the balance on the
subscription and its attendant costs, the corporation may bid for the shares, and the total amount
due shall be credited as paid in full in the books of the corporation. Title to all the shares of stock
covered by the subscription shall be vested in the corporation as treasury shares and may be
disposed of by said corporation in accordance with the Code.
Note that this is subject to the restrictions imposed by the Code on corporations as regards the
acquisition of their own shares. (See the discussion under Dividends and Purchase by
Corporation of its Own Shares.)
Yes. This is done by filing a complaint within 6 months from the date of sale, and paying or
tendering to the party holding the stock the sum for which said stock was sold, with interest at the
legal rate from the date of sale. No action to recover delinquent stock sold can be sustained upon
the ground of irregularity or defect in the notice of sale, or in the sale itself of the delinquent stock
unless these requirements are complied with.
(1) File an affidavit in triplicate with the corporation. The affidavit must state the following:
(a) Circumstances as to how the certificates were SLD;
(b) Number of shares represented; and
(c) Serial number of the certificate
(d) Name of issuing corporation
(2) The corporation will publish notice after the affidavit and other information and evidence
have been verified with the books of the corporation, (Note however that this is not
mandatory. The corporation has the discretion to decide whether to publish or not.)
NOTE: One-year period will not be required if the applicant files a bond good for
1 year.
However, if a contest has been presented to the corporation, or if an action is pending court
regarding the ownership of the SLD certificate, the issuance of the new certificate shall be
suspended until the final decision by the court.
NOTE: Should corporation issue new certificates without the conditions being fulfilled and a
third party proves that he is the rightful owner of the shares, the corporation may be held liable to
the latter EVEN IF it acted in good faith.
NOTE: Even if the above procedure was followed, if there was fraud, bad faith, or negligence on
the part of the corporation and its officers, the corporation may be held liable.
TRANSFER OF SHARES
By delivery of the certificate/s indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person
legally authorized to make the transfer. (Sec. 63)
(1) Delivery;
(2) Indorsement by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other persons legally authorized to
make the transfer
(3) Recording of the transfer in the books of the corporation (so as to make the transfer valid as
against third parties)
à Until registration is accomplished, the transfer, though valid between the parties, cannot be
effective as against the corporation. Thus, the unrecorded transferee cannot enjoy the status of a
SH: he cannot vote nor be voted for, and he will not be entitled to dividends.
RURAL BANK OF SALINAS, INC. V. CA (210 SCRA 510)
A corporation, either by its board, its by-laws or the act of its officers, cannot create
restrictions in stock transfers.
A by-law which prohibits a transfer of stock without the consent or approval of all the SHs
or of the President or Board of Directors is illegal as constituting undue limitation on the right of
ownership and in restraint of trade (citing Fleisher v. Botica Nolasco Co., Inc., 47 Phil. 583)
While Sec. 47 (9) of the Corporation Code grants to stock corporations the authority to
determine in the by-laws the "manner of issuing certificates" of shares of stock, however, the
power to regulate is not the power to prohibit, or to impose unreasonable restrictions of the right
of SHs to transfer their shares. To uphold the cancellation of a stock certification as null and void
for lack of delivery of the cancelled "mother" certificate whose endorsement was deliberately
withheld by petitioner, is to prescribe certain restrictions on the transfer of stock in violation of the
Corporation Code as the only law governing transfer of stocks.
Toribia Uson filed a civil action for debt against Vicente Dioisomito. Upon institution of said
action, an attachment was duly issued and D's property was levied upon, including 75 shares of
the North Electric Co., which stood in his name on the books of the company when the attachment
was levied on 18 January 1932. The sheriff sold said shares at a public auction with Uson being
the highest bidder. Jollye claims to be the owner of said certificate of sock issued to him by the
co. on 13 February 1933.
There is no dispute that Diosomito was the original owner of said shares, which he sold to
Barcelon. However, Barcelon did not present these certificates to the corporation for registration
until 19 months after the delivery thereof by Barcelon, and 9 months after the attachment and levy
on said shares. The transfer to Jollye was made 5 months after the issuance of a certificate of
stock in Barcelon's name.
Is a bona fide transfer of the shares of corp., not registered or noted on the books of the corp.,
valid as against a subsequent lawful attachment of said shares, regardless of whether the attaching
creditor had actual notice of said transfer or not.
NO, it is not valid. The transfer of the 75 shares in the North Electric Co., Inc made by the
defendant Diosomito as to the defendant Barcelon was not valid as to the plaintiff. Toribia Uson,
on 18 Jan. 1932, the date on which she obtained her attachment lien on said shares of stock which
still stood in the name of Diosomito on the books of the corp. Sec. 35 says that No transfer,
however, is valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is entered and noted upon the
books of the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the
transfer, the number of the certificate, and the number of shares transferred.
All transfers of shares not so entered are invalid as to attaching or execution creditors of the
assignors, as well as to the corporation and to subsequent purchasers in good faith, and indeed, as
to all persons interested, except the parties to such transfers.
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be
transferable in the books of the corporation. (Sec. 63)
The proper remedy is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the corporation to record the
transfer or issue a new certificate in favor of the transferee, as the case may be. The writ will be
granted provided it is shown that he transferee has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
and that there are no unpaid claims against the stocks whose transfer is sought to be recorded. It
must be noted that unless the latter fact is alleged, mandamus will be denied due to failure to state
a cause of action. (Campos & Campos)
It is the corporate secretary's duty and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks and if
said corporate officer refuses to comply, the transferor SH may rightfully bring suit to compel
performance.
Note: In this case, Judge Torres had no right to enter the assignments (conveyances) of
his shares himself in the corporation's stock and transfer book since he was not corporate
secretary.
Isamu Akasako, a Japanese national who was allegedly the real owner of the shares of stock in the
name of one Aquilino Rivera, a registered SH of Fujuyama Hotel and Restaurant, Inc., sold 2550
shares of the same to Milagros Tsuchiya along with the assurance that Tsuchiya would be made
President of the corporation after the purchase. Rivera assured her that he would sign the stock
certificates because Akasako was the real owner. However, after the sale was consummated and
the consideration paid, Rivera refused to make the indorsement unless he is also paid.
Tsuchiya, et al. attempted several times to have the shares registered but were refused compliance
by the corp. They filed a special action for mandamus and damages.
The Supreme Court held that mandamus was improper in this case since the shares of
stock were not even indorsed by the registered owner who was specifically resisting the
registration thereof in the books of the corporation. The rights of the parties would have to be
threshed out in an ordinary action.
Exception: In close corporations, restrictions may be placed on the transfer of shares. Such
restrictions must appear in the AOI and in the by-laws, as well as in the certificate of
stock. Otherwise, the restriction shall not be binding on any purchaser thereof in good faith.
The restrictions imposed shall be no more onerous than granting the existing
stockholders or the corporation the option to purchase the shares of the transferring stockholder
with such reasonable terms, conditions or period stated therein. If this option is not exercised
upon the expiration of the period, the transferring stockholder may sell his shares to any third
person. (Sec. 98)
The corporation may, at its option, refuse to register the transfer of stock in the name of
the transferee. (Sec. 99.4) However, this shall not be applicable if the transfer, though otherwise
contrary to subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Sec. 99, has been consented to by all the stockholders of
the close corporation, or if the close corporation has amended its AOI in accordance with Title XII
of the Code.
For his part, the transferee may rescind the transfer or recover from the transferor under
any applicable warranty, whether express or implied.
UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFERS
A possessor, even without authority, may transfer good title to a bona fide purchaser if:
This proceeds from the theory of quasi-negotiability which provides that in endorsing a certificate
in blank, the real owner clothes the possessor with apparent authority, thus, estopping him later
from asserting his rights over the shares of stock against a bona fide purchaser.
Forged Transfers
A corporation does not incur any misrepresentation in the issuance of a certificate made pursuant
to a forged transfer. It can always recall from the person the certificate issued, for cancellation.
In case where the certificate so issued comes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value
from the original purchaser, the corporation is estopped from denying its liability. It must
recognize both the original and the new certificate. But if recognition results to an over-issuance
of shares, only the original certificate may be recognized, without prejudice to the right of the
bona fide purchaser to sue the corporation for damages.
SANTAMARIA VS. HONGKONG (89 Phil. 780; 1951)
Santamaria secured her order for a number of shares with Campos Co. with her stock certificate
representing her shares with Batangas Minerals. The said certificate was originally issued in the
name of her broker and endorsed in blank by the latter. As Campos failed to make good on the
order, Santamaria demanded the return of the certificate. However, she was informed that
Hongkong Bank had acquired possession of it inasmuch as it was covered by the pledge made by
Campos with the bank. Thereafter, she instituted an action against Hongkong Bank for the
recovery of the certificate. Trial court decided in her favor. The bank appealed.
Issues: 1) WON Santamaria was chargeable with negligence which gave rise to the case
2) WON the Bank was obligated to inquire into the ownership of the certificate
(1) The facts of the case justify the conclusion that she was negligent. She delivered the certificate,
which was endorsed in blank, to Campos without having taken any precaution. She did not ask the
Batangas Minerals to cancel it and instead, issue another in her name. In failing to do so, she
clothed Campos with apparent title to the shares represented by the certificate. By her misplaced
confidence in Campos, she made possible the wrong done. She was therefore estopped from
asserting title thereto for it is well-settled that “where one of the innocent parties must suffer by
reason of a wrongful or unauthorized act, the loss must fall on the one who first trusted the
wrongdoer.”
(2) The subject certificate is what is known as a street certificate. Upon its face, the holder is
entitled to demand its transfer into his name from the issuing corporation. The bank is not
obligated to look beyond the certificate to ascertain the ownership of the stock. A certificate of
stock, endorsed in blank, is deemed quasi-negotiable, and as such, the transferee thereof is
justified in believing that it belongs to the transferor.
De los Santos filed a claim with the Alien Property Custodian for a number of shares of the
Lepanto corporation. He contended that said shares were bought from one Campos and Hess, both
of them dead. The Philippine Alien Property Administrator rejected the claim. He instituted the
present action to establish title to the aforementioned shares of stock.
The US Attorney General, the successor of the Alien Property Administrator, opposed the action
on the ground that the said shares of stock were bought by one Madrigal, in trust for the true
owner, Matsui, and then delivered to the latter indorsed in blank.
It is the rule that if the owner of the certificate has endorsed it in blank, and is stolen, no title is
acquired by an innocent purchaser of value. This is so because even though a stock certificate is
regarded as quasi-negotiable, in the sense that it may be transferred by endorsement, coupled with
delivery, the holder thereof takes it without prejudice to such rights or defenses as the registered
owner or credit may have under the law, except in so far as such rights or defenses are subject to
the limitations imposed by the principles governing estoppel.
Collateral Transfers
Shares of stock are personal property. Thus, they can either be pledged or mortgaged. However,
such pledge or mortgage cannot have any legal effect if it is registered only in the corporate books.
Where a certificate is delivered to the creditor as a security, the contract is considered a pledge,
and the Civil Code will apply.
If the certificate of stock is not delivered to the creditor, it must be registered in the registry of
deeds of the province where the principal office of the corporation is located, and in case where
the domicile of the stockholder is in a different province, then registration must also be made
there.
In a situation where, the chattel mortgage having been registered, the stock certificate was not
delivered to the creditor but transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value, it is the rule that the
bona fide purchaser for value is bound by the registration in the chattel mortgage registry. It is said
that such a rule tends to impair the commercial value of stock certificates.
To guarantee payment of a debt, Co mortgaged his shares of Samahang Magsasaka stock to Chiu.
The said mortgage was duly registered in the City of Manila. Chiu later assigned his rights in the
mortgage to Guan who soon foreclosed the same after Co failed to pay. Guan won in the public
bidding. He requested the corporation that new certificates be issued in his name. The corporation
refused because apparently prior to Guan ’ s demand, several attachments against the shares
covered by the certificates had been recorded in its books.
Did the chattel mortgage in the registry of deeds of Manila gave constructive notice to the
attaching creditors?
The Chattel Mortgage Law provides two ways of executing a valid chattel mortgage: 1) the
possession of mortgaged property is delivered and retained by the mortgagee; and, 2) without
delivery, the mortgage is recorded in the register of deeds. But if chattel mortgage of shares may
be made validly, the next question then becomes: where should such mortgage be properly
registered?
It is the general rule that the situs of shares is the domicile of the owner. It is also generally held
that for the purpose of execution, attachment, and garnishment, it is the domicile of the
corporation that is decisive. Going by these principles, it is deemed reasonable that chattel
mortgage of shares be registered both at the owner ’ s domicile and in the province where the
corporation has its principal office. It should be understood that the property mortgaged is not the
certificate but the participation and share of the owner in the assets of the corporation.
It is recognized that this method of hypothecating shares of stock in a chattel mortgage is rather
tedious and cumbersome. But the remedy lies in the legislature.
Note: The provision of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508) providing for delivery of
mortgaged property to the mortgagee as a mode of constituting a chattel mortgage is no longer
valid in view of the Civil Code provision defining such as a pledge.
NON-TRANSFERABILITY
IN NON-STOCK CORPORATIONS
Although shares of stock are as a rule freely transferable, membership in a non-stock corporation
is personal and non-transferable, unless the articles of incorporation or by-laws provide otherwise.
The court may not strip him of his membership without cause. (Sec. 90)
Form of Dividends
2. Property
· scrip - certificate issued to SHs instead of cash dividends which entitles them to a certain
amount in the future
3. Stock dividends
· Stock dividends are distribution to the SHs of the company’s own stock.
· Stock dividends cannot be declared without first increasing the capital stock unless
unissued shares are available.
· New shares are issued to the SHs in proportion to their interest.
· No new income unless sold for cash.
· Civil fruits belong to the usufructuary and not to the naked owner.
· Can only be issued to SHs.
· Whenever fractional shares result, corp may pay in cash or issue fractional share warrants.
Cash Dividend
Stock Dividend
Board of Directors
Shall be applied to the unpaid balance on the subscription plus costs and expenses.
Shall be withheld from the delinquent stockholder until his unpaid subscription is fully paid.
Stock dividends are issued only to SHs This is so because only stockholders are entitled to
dividends. A stock dividend really adds nothing to the interest of each stockholder; the
proportional interest of each stockholder remains the same. If a stockholder is deprived of his
stock dividends - and this happens if the shares of stock forming part of the stock dividends are
issued to a non-stockholder - then the proportion of the stockholder's interest changes
radically. Stock dividends are civil fruits of the original investment, and to the owners of the
shares belong the civil fruits.
Dividends can be sourced only out of the unrestricted retained earnings of the corporation.
Unrestricted retained earnings is defined as "the undistributed earnings of the corporation which
have not been allocated for any managerial, contractual or legal purposes and which are free for
distribution to the stockholders as dividends." (SEC Rules Governing Redeemable and Treasury
Shares, 1982)
Retained earnings has been defined as "net accumulated earnings of the corporation out of
transactions with individuals or firms outside the corporation." (Simmons, Smith, Kimmel,
Intermediate Accounting, 1977, ed. P. 635) The term implies the limitation that no corporation
can declare dividends unless its legal or stated capital is maintained. It does not include:
· premium on par stock i.e. difference between par value and selling price of stock by corp
since this is regarded as paid-in capital; but SEC allowed declaration of stock dividends out of
such premiums
· transactions involving treasury stocks which are considered expansions and contractions of
paid-in capital;
If subscribed shares have not been fully paid, the unpaid portion of subscribed capital stock is an
asset, and as long as the net capital asset (after payment of liabilities) including this unpaid portion
is at least equal to the total par value of the subscribed shares, any excess would be surplus or
earnings from which dividends may be declared. However, if a deficit exists, subsequent profits
must first be applied to cover the deficit.
· SEC-imposed restrictions pursuant to law, like those imposed on banks and insurance
companies;
· Restriction on the retained earnings equivalent to the cost of treasury shares held by the
corporation, which is lifted only after such shares are reissued or retired (Sec. 195, PD 612)
Dividends can only be declared only from the surplus, i.e. the excess in the value of the assets
over the liabilities and the issued capital stock. To do otherwise would be illegal The object of
the prohibition is to protect the creditors in view of the limited liability of the SHs and also to
protect the SHs by preserving the capital so that the purposes of the corp. may be performed.
Surplus must be bona fide i.e. founded upon actual earnings or profits and not to be dependent for
its existence upon a theoretical estimate of an appreciation in the value of the company’s assets.
The prohibition does not apply, however, to stock dividends because creditors and SHs will not be
affected by their declaration since they do not decrease the company’s assets.
Dividends on non-cumulative preferred stock are payable only out of net profits and for the years
in which said net profits are actually earned.
The right to dividends is conditional upon: (1) accrual of net profits, and (2) retention in the
business.
If the annual net earnings of a corp. are justifiably applied to legitimate corp. purposes, such as
payment of debts, reduction of deficits and restoration of impaired capital, the right of
non-cumulative preferred stockholders to the payments of dividends is lost. If they are applied
against prior losses and thereby completely absorbed, there are no net profits from which
dividends may be lawfully paid.
However, such discretion cannot be abused and the BOD cannot accumulate surplus profits
unreasonably on the excuse that it is needed for expansion or reserves.
2. BOD should declare dividends when surplus profits of the corporation exceed 100% of the
corporation's paid-in capital stock.
Exceptions:
(a) When justified by definite corporate expansion projects or programs approved by the
Board;
(b) When creditors prohibit dividend declaration without their consent as a condition for the loan,
and such consent has not yet been secured;
4. The corporation may be subjected to additional tax when it fails to declare dividends,
thereby unreasonably accumulating profits. (See Sec. 25, NIRC)
5. The dividends received are based on stock held whether or not paid. However, if the
stocks are delinquent, the amount will first be applied to the payment of the delinquency plus costs
and expenses; stock dividends will not be given to a delinquent SH.
The mere fact that a large corporate surplus exists is not enough to warrant equitable intervention;
the test is good faith and reasonableness of the policy of retaining the profits. However, where
dividends are withheld for an unlawful purpose – to deprive a SH of his right to a just
proportion of the corporation's profit, the court may compel the corporation to declare dividends.
This case involves an action against the Ford Motor Company to compel declaration of
dividends. At the time this complaint was made, Ford had concluded its most prosperous year of
business, and the demand for its cars at the price of the previous year continued. While it had
been the practice, under similar circumstances, to declare larger dividends, the corporation refused
to declare any special dividends. The Board justified its refusal to declare larger dividends on the
expansion plans of the company by erecting a smelting plant, but maintaining the selling price of
its cars (instead of reducing it as had been the practice in previous years). The plaintiffs contend
that such a proposal would be tantamount to the business being conducted as a semi-eleemosynary
(or charitable) institution instead of a business institution.
The court pointed out that a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of SHs. The discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself – reduction of profits or to devote
profits to another purpose. While the Court noted the capable management of the affairs of the
corporation and therefore was not convinced that the motives of the directors were prejudicial to
the company's interests, it likewise noted that the annual dividends paid were very small in
relation to the profits that the company had been making. It therefore affirmed the amount fixed
by the lower court to be distributed to the stockholders.
Note: Prof. Jacinto is of the opinion that what happened in this case is
possible under the present Code, even without changing the AOI.
Preference as to Dividends
In the AOI and the certificate of stock of Stock A, it was stated that the holders of said stocks are
entitled to receive to receive preferential dividends of 5% per fiscal year, non-cumulative, before
dividends are paid to other stocks. From 1915 to 1926, no dividends were declared. The net
earnings were instead used for the improvements and additions to property and equipment. Due
to this, the corporation became prosperous and proposed to pay dividends to A & B common
stock. Plaintiffs filed this case in order to collect the dividends for fiscal years 1915-1926 before
the other classes of stock are paid.
No, they were not. By the plain meaning of the words in the AOI and the certificates of stock, the
holders are not entitled to dividends unless directors declare so. It is likewise generally
understood that in cases where the company's net earnings are applied for improvements and no
dividend is declared, the claim for such year is gone in case of non-cumulative stock, and cannot
be later asserted.
BURK V. OTTAWA GAS & ELECTRIC CO. (123 Pac. 875; 1912)
An action was brought by the preferred SHs of Ottawa against the directors of Ottawa to (1)
require the directors to account for all the property and assets of the corporation, (2) declare such
dividends from the net profits of the business of such co. as should have been declared since 1 Jan.
1906, and (3) restrain the officers and directors during the pendency of the action from paying out
any of the money or disposing of the assets of the company except such amounts as should be
necessary to pay the actual necessary current expenses of conducting the business of the
corporation.
The BOD maintained that the corporation's funds were exhausted by expenditures for the
extension of the co’s plant, hence it was unable to declare dividends. Expenditures were said to
be necessary and for the betterment of the plant.
Were the corp funds were wrongfully diverted, and were preferred SHs entitled to dividends?
The case was remanded to the trial court, with instructions to make further findings to protect the
preferred SHs in their rights.
The fair interpretation of the contract between Ottawa and its SHS is that if in any year net profits
are earned, a dividend is to be declared. To hold otherwise, meaning if the BOD had absolute
discretion when to declare dividends and when not to, when the corporation has funds for such
dividends, would result in temptation to unfair dealing, giving one party the option to pay the
other or not. In the case at bar, the accumulated profits would be lost forever since the dividends
were non-cumulative.
Preferred SHs, however, are not generally creditors until dividends are declared. In the case at
bar, if dividends should have been declared to such SHs, they are considered creditors from that
time.
As soon as the BoD has declared dividends. From this time, it becomes a debt owed by the
corporation, and therefore can no longer be revoked (McLaran v. Crescent Planning).
EXCEPTION: If the declaration has not yet been announced or communicated to the
stockholders.
NOTE: When no dividends are declared for 3 consecutive years, preferred SHs are given the
right to vote for directors until dividends are declared.
NOTE: The extent of the SH’s share in the dividends will depend on the capital contribution;
NOT the number of shares he has.
CPM Corp., having a surplus of $29,000, declared a 6% cash dividend payable in four
installments. The first installment was paid by the Board after which an error was discovered in
the computation of the assets: from the initial recognized surplus of $29,000 to $6,000. Mainly
for this reason, the Board adopted a resolution rescinding the dividends payable on the three other
installments despite the solvency of the corp and the existence of ample funds to pay said
dividends. The original P was Humber, a SH, and was substituted by McLaran, the administrator
of his estate when he died. The defendant corp maintained that there was no valid declaration of
dividends because the corporation failed to set aside funds to pay for the same.
A cash dividend, properly declared, cannot be revoked by the subsequent action of the corp. for by
its declaration, the corp had become the debtor of the SH and it goes without saying that the
debtor cannot revoke, recall or rescind the debt or otherwise absolve itself from its payment by a
unilateral action or without the consent of the creditor. Thus, the rescission by the BOD of the
subsequent installments was of no force.
Dividends are defined as portions of profits/surplus funds of the corp. which have been actually
set apart by a valid board resolution or by the SH at a corp. mtg. for distribution among SH
according to their respective interests. The mere declaration of the dividend, without more, by
competent authority under proper circumstances, creates a debt against the corporation in favor of
the stockholders the same as any other general creditor of the corporation. By the mere
declaration, the dividend becomes immediately fixed and absolute in the stockholder and from
henceforth the right of each individual stockholder is changed by the act of declaration from that
of partner and part owner of the corporate property to a status absolutely, adverse to every other
stockholder and to the corporation itself, insofar as his pro rata proportion of the dividend is
concerned.
(1) If the directors acted wilfully, or with negligence or in bad faith, they will be liable to the
corporation. If the corporation has become insolvent, they are liable to the corporation's creditors
for the amount of dividends based out of capital. (Based on Sec. 31)
(2) If the directors cannot be held liable because they acted with due diligence and in good faith,
in the absence of an express provision of law, an innocent stockholder is not liable to return the
dividends received by him out of capital, unless the corporation was insolvent at the time of
payment. (Majority view; Campos)
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR ACQUISITION BY THE CORPORATION OF ITS OWN
SHARES? (Sec. 41)
FOR WHAT PURPOSES CAN A CORPORATION ACQUIRE ITS OWN SHARES? (Sec. 41)
The appraisal right refers to the right of a stockholder who dissented and voted against a
proposed fundamental corporate action to get out of the corporation by demanding payment of the
fair value of his shares.
(1) In case any amendment to the AOI has the effect of changing or restricting the rights of any
SH or class of shares, or of authorizing preferences in any respect superior to those of outstanding
shares of any class, or of extending or shortening the term of corporate existence (Sec. 81);
(2) In case of sale, lease, exchange, transfer, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of all or
substantially all of the corporate property and assets as provided in this Code (Sec. 81; Sec. 40);
(4) In case the corporation invests its funds in any other corporation or business or for any
purpose other than the primary purpose for which it was organized (Sec. 42)
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE APPRAISAL RIGHT? (Sec. 82)
All rights accruing to the shares, including voting and dividend rights, are suspended in
accordance with the Corporation Code, except for the right of the SH to receive payment of the
fair value thereof.
However, if said dissenting SH is not paid the value of his shares within 30 days after the
award, his voting and dividend rights shall immediately be restored.
If the certificates are consequently cancelled, the rights of the transferor as a dissenting
SH cease and the transferee has all the rights of a regular stockholder. All dividend contributions
which would have accrued on the shares will be paid to the transferee. (Sec. 86)
AMENDMENTS OF CHARTER
The charter of a private corporation consists of its articles of incorporation as well as the
Corporation Code and such other law under which it is organized.
Amendment by Legislature
Subject to the limitation that no accrued rights or liabilities be impaired, the legislature has the
power to make changes in existing corporations through an amendment to the Corporation Code.
Amendment by Stockholders
One of the powers expressly granted by law to all corporations is the power to amend its articles
of incorporation. This, in effect, is a grant of power to owners of 2/3 of the outstanding stocks to
change the basic agreement between the corporation and its stockholders, making such change
binding on all the stockholders, subject only to the right of appraisal, if proper.
(1) The appraisal right must be recognized in case the amendment has the effect of
changing rights of any stockholder or class of shares, or of authorizing preferences in any respect
superior to those of outstanding shares of any class, or extending or shortening the term of
corporate existence.
(2) Extension of corporate term cannot exceed 50 yrs. in any one instance
(3) A copy of the amended articles should be filed with the SEC, and with the proper
governmental agencies, as appropriate (e.g., in the case of banks, public utilities, etc.)
(4) Original and amended articles should contain all matters required by law to be set
out in said articles.
The same grounds as for the disapproval of the original articles (Sec. 17):
· Required percentage of ownership of capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Phils. has
not been complied with as required by the Constitution or existing laws;
The law expressly allows amendments which would change or restrict existing rights of
stockholders or any class of shares. (Sec. 81)
MARCUS V. RH MACY (74 N.E. 2d 228; 1947)
The Board of Directors gave notice to SH that among the matters to be acted upon in its annual
meeting would be a proposal to amend certificate of incorporation to add to the rights of preferred
stockholders, voting rights equal to those of common stockholders. Marcus, objected and
demanded payment for the common stock owned by her.
The Court held that Marcus may invoke her appraisal right. The aggregate number of shares
having voting rights equal to those of common shares was substantially increased and thereby the
voting power of each common share outstanding prior to the meeting was altered or limited by the
resulting pro rata diminution of its potential worth as a factor in the management of the corporate
affairs. Considering that she held diminished voting power; that she notified the corpo of her
objection; that her shares were voted against the amendment—these were sufficient to qualify her
to invoke her statutory appraisal right.
Effectivity of amendment
Amendments take effect only from the approval by the SEC. However, such approval or rejection
must be made within six months of filing of amendment; otherwise it shall take effect even w/o
such approval (as of the date of filing), unless cause of delay is attributable to the
corporation. (Sec. 16)
Special amendments
After the authorized capital stock has been fully subscribed and the corporation needs to increase
its capital, it will have to amend its articles to increase its capital stock. A corporation does not
have the implied power to increase capital stock; such a power can only be granted by law.
The power to increase or decrease capital stock must be exercised in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 38 of the Code.
Reduction of capital stock is not allowed if it will prejudice the rights of corporate creditors.
A corporation has no power to release an original subscriber to its capital stock from the obligation
of paying for his shares, without valuable consideration for such release; and as against creditors a
reduction of the capital stock can take place only in the manner and under the conditions
prescribed by the statute or charter or the articles of incorporation.
The Code allows a corporation not only to extend but also to shorten its term of existence. As in
the case of increase/decrease of capital stock, change must be approved at a members ’
/stockholders’ meeting by 2/3 of the members/outstanding capital stock.
(1) All issued stock of all classes should be held by not more than 20;
(2) All issued stock shall be subject to one or more specified restrictions on transfer permitted by
law;
(3) Corporation should not be listed in the stock exchange or make any public offering of its
stock.
If any of these are deleted, then the corporation will cease to be a close corporation and will lose
the special privileges of such corporations. Thereafter, it will be governed by the general
provisions of the Code. Since such amendment involves a change in the nature of the corporation,
even non-voting stocks are given a voice in the decision. A stockholders’ meeting is required
and a 2/3 vote must approve the amendment, unless otherwise provided by the articles of
incorporation.
DISSOLUTION
Modes of Dissolution
This is effected by majority vote of the BOD and a 2/3 vote of the OCS or members. (Note the
special notice requirements.) The copy of the resolution authorizing the dissolution shall be
certified by a majority of the BOD and countersigned by the secretary of the corporation. THE
SEC shall thereupon issue the certificate of dissolution.
A petition for dissolution must be filed with the SEC after having been signed by a majority of the
BOD, verified by the president or secretary or one of the directors, and resolved upon by the
affirmative vote of 2/3 of the OCS or members. The petition must set forth all claims and
demands against the corporation, and the fact that the dissolution was approved by the SHs with
the requisite 2/3 vote.
If the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the SEC shall fix a date on or before which
objections thereto may be filed by any person.
Date: not less than 30 days nor more than 60 days after the
entry of the order
Before the date fixed by the SEC, the SEC order shall be published and posted accordingly.
Newspaper: Once a week for 3 weeks in a newspaper of general circulation published in the
municipality or city where the corporation's principal office is situated, or there be no such
newspaper, in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
Posting: For 3 consecutive weeks in 3 public places in the city or municipality where the
corporation's principal office is situated
Upon 5 days notice, given after the date on which the right to file objections to the order has
expired, the SEC shall proceed to hear the petition and try any issue made by the objections filed.
If no objection is sufficient, and the material allegations are true, the SEC shall render
judgment dissolving the corporation and directing such disposition of its assets as justice requires.
A corporation may be dissolved by the SEC upon filing of a verified complaint and after proper
notice and hearing on grounds provided by existing laws, rules and regulations.
(b) Quo Warranto proceedings (See Sec. 5b, PD 902-A and Rule 66, Rules of
Court. Previously, the SEC had exclusive jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving
corporation. Under the Securities Regulation Code or RA 8799, however, the jurisdiction of the
SEC over all cases enumerated under Sec. 5 of PD 902-A have been transferred to the Regional
Trial Courts.
The grounds for involuntary dissolution of a corporation under quo warranto proceedings are:
(1) When the corporation has offended against a provision of an act for its creation or renewal;
(3) When it has committed or omitted an act which amounts to a surrender of its corporate
rights, privileges or franchises;
(4) When it misused a right, privilege or franchise conferred upon it by law, or when it has
exercised a right, privilege or franchise in contravention of law
(PNB v. CFI, 209 SCRA 294; 1992)
In close corporations, any stockholder may, by written petition to the SEC, compel the dissolution
of such corporation when:
· Illegal;
· Fraudulent;
· Dishonest;
· Oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the corporation
or any other SH;
Effects of Dissolution
· Corporate existence continues for 3 years following dissolution for the ff. purposes only:
NOTE that the subsequent dissolution of a corporation may not remove or impair any right or
remedy in favor of or against, nor any liability incurred by, any corporation, its stockholders,
members, directors, trustees or officers. (Sec. 145)
Plaintiff National Abaca Corporation filed a complaint against Pore for the recovery of a sum
of money advanced to her for the purchase of hemp. She moved to dismiss the complaint by
citing the fact that National Abaca had been abolished by EO 372 dated Nov. 24, 1950. Plaintiff
objected to such by saying that it shall nevertheless be continued as a corporate body for a period
of 3 years from the effective date of said order for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
by or against it and to enable the Board of Liquidators to close its affairs.
Can an action commenced within 3 years after the abolition of plaintiff corporation be continued
by the same after the expiration of said period?
The Corp. Law allows a corporation to continue as a body for 3 years after the time when it would
have been dissolved for the purposes of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it. But at
any time during the 3 years, the corporation should convey all its property to trustees so that the
latter may be the ones to continue on with such prosecution, with no time limit on its
hands. Since the case against Pore was strong, the corp.'s amended complaint was admitted and
the case was remanded to the lower court.
The termination of the life of a juridical entity does not by itself cause the extinction or
diminution of the right and liabilities of such entity nor those of its owners and creditors. If the
3-year extended life has expired without a trustee or receiver having been expressly designated by
the corporation itself within that period, the board of directors or trustees itself may be permitted
to so continue as "trustees" by legal implication to complete the corporate liquidation. In the
absence of a board of directors or trustees, those having any pecuniary interest in the assets,
including not only the shareholders but likewise the creditors of the corporation, acting for and in
its behalf, might make proper representations with the SEC, which has primary and sufficiently
broad jurisdiction in matters of this nature, for working out a final settlement of the corporate
concerns.
Executory contracts
The prevailing view is that executory contracts are not extinguished by dissolution. Sec. 145 of
the Code states that "No right or remedy in favor of or against any corporation….nor any liability
incurred……shall be removed or impaired either by the subsequent dissolution of said corp. or by
any subsequent amendment or repeal of this Code or of any part thereof."
Liquidation
Liquidation, or winding up, refers to the collection of all assets of the corporation, payment
of all its creditors, and the distribution of the remaining assets, if any, among the stockholders
thereof in accordance with their contracts, or if there be no special contract, on the basis of their
respective interests.
Although there is no express provision authorizing this method, neither is there any provision in
the Code prohibiting it.
2. Conveyance of all corporate assets to trustees who will take charge of liquidation.
If this method is used, the 3-year limitation will not apply provided the designation of the trustees
is made within said period. There is no time limit within which the trustee must finish liquidation,
and he may sue and be sued as such even beyond the 3-year period unless the trusteeship is limited
in its duration by the deed of trust. (See Nat'l Abaca Corp. v. Pore, supra)
3. Liquidation is conducted by the receiver who may be appointed by the SEC upon its
decreeing the dissolution of the corp.
As with the previous method, the three-year rule shall not apply. However, the mere appointment
of a receiver, without anything more, does not result in the dissolution of the corporation nor bar it
from the exercise of its corporation rights.
FOR HOW LONG MAY THE LIQUIDATION OF A CORPORATION BE UNDERTAKEN?
Generally, a corporation may be continued as a body corporate for the purpose of liquidation
for 3 years after the time when it would have so dissolved. (Sec. 122) However, it was held in
the case of Clemente v. CA (supra) that if the 3-year period has expired without a trustee or
receiver having been expressly designated by the corporation itself within that period, the BOD
itself may be permitted to so continue as "trustees" by legal implication to complete the corporate
liquidation.
(2) Conveyance of all corporate property to trustees for the benefit of SHs, members,
creditors, and other persons in interest;
GENERAL RULE: No corporation shall distribute any of its assets or property except upon
lawful dissolution and after payment of all its debts and liabilities. (Sec. 122)
Any asset distributable to any creditor or stockholder or member who is unknown or cannot
be found shall be escheated to the city or municipality where such assets are located. (Sec. 122)
The appointment of a receiver by the court to wind up the affairs of the corporation upon
petition of voluntary dissolution does not empower the court to hear and pass on the claims of the
creditors of the corporation at first hand. In such cases, the receiver does not act as a receiver of
an insolvent corporation. Since "liquidation" as applied to the settlement of the affairs of a
corporation consists of adjusting the debts and claims, that is, of collecting all that is due the
corporation, the settlement and adjustment of claims against it and the payment of its just debts, all
claims must be presented for allowance to the receiver or trustees or other proper persons during
the winding-up proceedings within the 3 years provided by the Corporation Law as the term for
the corporate existence of the corporation, and if a claim is disputed so that the receiver cannot
safely allow the same, it should be transferred to the proper court for trial and allowance, and the
amount so allowed then presented to the receiver or trustee for payment. The rulings of the
receiver on the validity of claims submitted are subject to review by the court appointing such
receiver though no appeal is taken to the latter ruling, and during the winding-up proceedings after
dissolution, no creditor will be permitted by legal process or otherwise to acquire priority, or to
enforce his claim against the property held for distribution as against the rights of other creditors.
Defendant corp. was a timber license holder with concessions in Camarines Norte. Investigations
led to the discovery that certain taxes were due on it. BIR assessed Marsman 3 times for unpaid
taxes. Atty. Moya, in behalf of the corp., received the first 2 assessments. He requested for
reinvestigations. As a result, corp. failed to pay within the prescribed period. Numerous BIR
warnings were given. After 3 years of futile notifications, BIR sued the corp.
Although Marsman was extrajudicially dissolved, with the 3-year rule, nothing however bars an
action for recovery of corporate debts against the liquidators. In fact, the 1st assessment was
given before dissolution, while the 2nd and 3rd assessments were given just 6 months after
dissolution (within the 3-year rule). Such facts definitely established that the Government was a
creditor of the corp. for whom the liquidator was supposed to hold assets of the corp.
TAN TIONG BIO V. CIR (G.R. No. L-15778; April 23, 1962)
The creditor of a dissolved corp. may follow its assets, as in the nature of a trust fund, once they
pass into the hands of the stockholders. The dissolution of a corp. does not extinguish the debts
due or owing to it.
An indebtedness of a corp. to the government for income and excess profit taxes is not
extinguished by the dissolution of the corp. The hands of government cannot, of course, collect
taxes from a defunct corporation, it loses thereby none of its rights to assess taxes which had been
due from the corporation, and to collect them from persons, who by reason of transactions with the
corporation hold property against which the tax can be enforced and that the legal death of the
corporation no more prevents such action than would the physical death of an individual prevent
the government from assessing taxes against him and collecting them from his administrator, who
holds the property which the decedent had formerly possessed. Thus, petitioners can be held
personally liable for the corporation's taxes, being successors-in-interest of the defunct
corporation.
(1) All liabilities and obligations of the corporation shall be paid, satisfied, and discharged,
or adequate provision shall be made therefor.
(2) Assets held by the corporation upon a condition requiring return, transfer or conveyance,
and which condition occurs by reason of the dissolution, shall be returned, transferred or conveyed
in accordance with such requirements.
(3) Assets received and held by the corporation subject to limitations permitting their use
only for charitable, religious, benevolent, education or similar purposes, but not subject to
condition (2) above, shall be transferred or conveyed to one or more corporations, societies or
organization engaged in activities in the Philippines substantially similar to those of the dissolving
corp. according to a plan of distribution adopted pursuant to Sec. 95 of the Code.
(4) Assets other than those mentioned in preceding paragraphs shall be distributed in
accordance with the AOI or by-laws.
(5) In any other case, assets may be distributed to such persons, societies, organizations or
corporations, whether or not organized for profit, as may be specified in a plan of distribution
adopted pursuant to Sec. 95.
* The plan of distribution of assets may be adopted by a majority vote of the Board of trustees
and approval of 2/3 of the members having voting rights present or represented by proxy at the
meeting during which said plan is adopted.
It must be noted that the plan of distribution of assets must not be inconsistent with the provisions
of Title XI of the Code.
CORPORATE COMBINATIONS
(1) Merger (A + B = A)
(2) Consolidation (A + B = C)
(3) Sale of substantially all corporate assets and purchase thereof by another corporation;
(4) Acquisition of all / substantially all of the stock of one corporation from its SHs in exchange
for the stock of the acquiring corporation
Merger or Consolidation
(1) Board of Directors of the constituent corporations must prepare and approve a plan of
merger or consolidation.
(2) The separate existence of the constituent corporations shall cease, except that of the
surviving or consolidated corporation.
(3) The surviving or consolidated corporation shall possess all rights, privileges, immunities
and powers and shall be subject to all the duties and liabilities of a corporation organized under
the Corporation Code.
(4) The surviving or consolidated corporation shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the
rights, privileges, immunities and franchises of each of the constituent corporations;
(5) All property (real or personal) and all receivables due on whatever account (including
subscriptions to shares and other choses in action), and all and every other interest of, or belong to,
or due to each constituent corporation, shall be deemed transferred and vested in such surviving or
consolidated corporation without further act or deed.
(6) The surviving or consolidated corporation shall be responsible and liable for all the
liabilities and obligations of each of the constituent corporations in the same manner as if such
surviving or consolidated corporation had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations; and any
pending claim, action or proceeding brought by or against any of such constituent corporations
may be prosecuted by or against the surviving or consolidated corporation. (Note: The merger
or consolidation does not impair the rights of creditors or liens upon the property of any such
constituent corporations.)
Consolidation becomes effective not upon mere agreement of the members but only upon
issuance of the certificate of consolidation by the SEC. There can be no intra-corporate nor
partnership relation between 2 jeepney drivers' and operators' associations whose plans to
consolidate into a single common association is still a proposal.
If the absorbed corporation in such a merger / consolidation happens to be the foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines, it shall file a petition for withdrawal of its license in accordance
with Sec. 136.
If by the sale the corporation would be rendered incapable of continuing the business or
accomplishing the purpose for which it was incorporated. (Sec. 40)
(1) Majority vote of BOD + 2/3 vote of OCS or members at a meeting duly called for the
purpose;
Note, however, that after such approval by the SHs, the BOD may nevertheless, in its
discretion, abandon such sale or other disposition without further action or approval by the
SHs. This, of course, is subject to the rights of third parties under any contract relating thereto.
(1) If the disposition is necessary in the usual and regular course of business; or
(2) If the proceeds of the disposition be appropriated for the conduct of its remaining business
(Sec. 40)
Exchange of stocks
In this method, all or substantially all the stockholders of the "acquired" corporation are made
stockholders of the acquiring corporation. With the exchange, the acquired corporation becomes
a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. Although this method does not combine the 2
businesses under a single corporation as in merger and sale of assets, from the point of view of the
acquiring (parent) corporation, there is hardly any difference between owing the acquired
corporation's business directly and operating it through a controlled subsidiary. In fact, the parent
corporation would have the power to buy all the subsidiary's assets and dissolve it, achieving the
same result as in the other methods of combination. (Campos & Campos)
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
A corporation formed and organized under laws other than those of the Philippines,
regardless of the citizenship of the incorporators and stockholders. Such corporation must have
been organized and must operate in a country which allows Filipino citizens and corporations to
do business there.
In times of war: For purposes of security of the state, the citizenship of the controlling
stockholders determines the corporation’s nationality.
Where a domestic corporation which has both Philippine and foreign stockholders is an investor in
another domestic corporation which has also both Philippine and foreign stockholders, the
so-called "grandfather rule" is used to determine whether or not the latter corporation is qualified
to engage in a partially nationalized business, i.e. by determining the extent of Philippine equity
therein.
Under present SEC rules, if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the first corporation is at least
60%, then said corporation will be considered as a Philippine national and all of its investment in
the second corporation would be treated as Filipino equity. On the other hand, if the Philippine
equity in the first corporation is less than 60%, then only the number of shares corresponding to
such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality. (See SEC Rule promulgated on 28
Feb. 1967, cited in Opinion # 18, Series of 1989, Department of Justice, dated 19 January 1989.)
The BOI certificate is issued upon a finding of the Board of Investments that the business
operations of the foreign corp. will contribute to the sound and balanced development of the
national economy on a self-sustaining basis. (See Omnibus Investments Code, Sec. 48-49)
NOTE: Applications, if not acted upon within 10 days from official acceptance thereof, shall be
considered automatically approved! (Art. 53, Omnibus Investments Code)
· Application under oath setting forth the information specified in Sec. 125;
· Duly executed certificate under oath by authorized official/s of the jurisdiction of the
company's incorporation, attesting to the fact that the laws of the country of the applicant allow
Filipino citizens and corporations to do business therein, and that the applicant is an existing
corporation in good standing;
· Statement under oath of the president or any other person authorized by the corporation
showing that the applicant is solvent and in good financial condition, and setting forth the assets
and liabilities of the corporation within 1 year immediately prior to the application.
(3) Certificate from appropriate government agency
NOTE: Certain sectors such as banking, insurance, etc. require prior approval
from the government agencies concerned. (Sec. 17)
Within 60 days after the issuance of the license, the licensee shall deposit with the SEC securities
with an actual market value of at least P 100,000.00. These securities are for the benefit of
present and future creditors, and shall consist of any of the following:
Once the licensee ceases to do business in the Philippines, these deposited securities shall be
returned, upon the licensee's application and proof to the satisfaction of the SEC that the licensee
has no liability to Philippine residents or the Philippine government.
Note: Foreign banking and insurance corporations are the exceptions to this requirement.
The designation of a resident agent is a condition precedent to the issuance of the license
to transact business in the Philippines.
PURPOSE: To be served any summons and other legal processes which may be served in all
actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation. Service upon such resident shall be
admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized officers of the foreign corporation
at its home office.
Foreign corporations lawfully doing business in the Philippines are bound by all laws,
rules and regulations applicable to domestic corporations of the same class.
(1) The corporation will not be permitted to maintain agency in the Philippines;
(3) The corporation will not be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action before Philippine
courts or administrative agencies; it can be SUED.
Isolated transactions
Marshall Wells, a corporation organized under the State of Oregon, sued a domestic corp. for the
unpaid balance on a bill of goods. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did
not show that plaintiff had complied with the law regarding corp. desiring to do business in the
Phil., nor that the plaintiff was authorized to do business in the Phil.
The Supreme Court, in ruling for Marshall Wells, stated that the object of the statute was to
subject the foreign corp. doing business in the Phil. to the jurisdiction of its courts. The object of
the statute was not to prevent it from performing single acts but to prevent it from acquiring a
domicile for the purpose without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the
local courts. The implication of the law is that it was never the purpose of the Legislature to
exclude a foreign corp. which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Phil., from
securing redress in Phil. Courts, and thus, in effect to permit persons to avoid their contract made
with such foreign corporation.
ATLANTIC MUTUAL V. CEBU STEVEDORING (G.R. No. 18961; Aug. 31, 1966)
A foreign corp. engaged in business in the Phil. can maintain suit in this jurisdiction if it is duly
licensed. If a foreign corp. is not engaged in business in the Phil., it can maintain such suit if the
transaction sued upon is singular and isolated, in which no license is required. In either case, the
fact of compliance with the requirement of license, or the fact that the suing corp. is exempt
therefrom, as the case may be, cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the party suing is a
foreign corp. The qualifying circumstance, being an essential part of the element of the plaintiff’s
capacity to sue, must be affirmatively pleaded. In short, facts showing foreign corporation ’ s
capacity to sue should be pleaded.
Curing of defect
A contract entered into by a foreign insurance corp. not licensed to do business in the Phil. is not
necessarily void and the lack of capacity to sue at the time of execution of the contract is cured by
its subsequent registration.
Domestic corporation General Garments registered “Puritan” trademark for its men’s wear. US
corporation Puritan Sportswear petitioned the Phil. Patent Office for cancellation of said
trademark, alleging its ownership and prior use in the Phil.
The Supreme Court held that a foreign corp. which does not do business in the Phil. and is
unlicensed but is widely known in the Phil. through the use of its products here has legal right to
maintain an action to protect its reputation, corporate name and goodwill. The right to use the
corporate name is a property right which the corp. may assert and protect in any of the courts of
the world.
A foreign corporation not doing business in the Phil. needs no license to sue in the Phil. for
trademark violations.
Where a violation of our unfair trade laws which provide a penal sanction is alleged, lack of
capacity to sue of injured foreign corp. becomes immaterial (because a criminal offence is
essentially an act against the State).
NOTE: Sec. 160 of R.A. 8293 (Intellectual Property Code) provides that any foreign national
or juridical person who meets the requirements of Sec. 3 of the Act (i.e., is a national or is
domiciled in a country party to any convention, treaty or agreement relating to intellectual
property rights or the repression of unfair competition, to which the Philippines is also a party, or
extends reciprocal rights to Philippine nationals by law) and does not engage in business in the
Philippines may bring a civil or administrative action for opposition, cancellation, infringement,
unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it is
licensed to do business in the Philippines under existing laws.
· Mere investment as a shareholder and the exercise of the rights as such investor;
The true test as to whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines seems to be
whether the foreign corp. is continuing the body or substance of the business for which it was
organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. The term
implies a continuity of dealings and arrangements and contemplates performance of acts/works or
the exercise of the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of the purpose
and object of its organization.
The Court of Industrial Relations ordered Facilities Management Corporation (FMC) to pay Dela
Osa his overtime compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift premiums. FMC filed a petition
for review on certiorari on the issue of whether the CIR can validly affirm a judgment against
persons domiciled outside and not doing business in the Phil. and over whom it did not acquire
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner may be considered as doing business in the Philippines
within the scope of Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 14. Service upon private foreign corp. - If the defendant is a foreign corp., or a non-resident
joint stock corporation or association, doing business in the Phil., service may be made on its
resident agent, on the government official designated by law to the effect, or to an y of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.
FMC had appointed Jaime Catuira as its agent with authority to execute Employment Contracts
and receive, on behalf of the corp., legal services from, and be bound by processes of the Phil.
Courts, for as long as he remains an employee of FMS. If a foreign corp. not engaged in business
in the Phil., through an Agent, is not barred from seeking redress from courts in the Phil., that
same corp. cannot claim exemption done against a person or persons in the Phil..
NOTE: Under Sec. 12, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the term "doing business"
has been replaced with the phrase "has transacted business," thereby allowing suits based on
isolated transactions.
The spouses refused to pay and moved to dismiss the case alleging that plaintiff had no legal
capacity to sue because (1) MLF is doing business in the country without a license; and (2) the
transactions were made with Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner and Smith and not with plaintiff MLF.
Issue: Can MLF sue in Philippine courts to establish and enforce its rights against spouses in
light of the undeniable fact that it had transacted business without a license?
Legal capacity to sue may be understood in two senses: (1) That the plaintiff is prohibited or
otherwise incapacitated by law to institute suit in the Phil. Courts, or (2) although not otherwise
incapacitated in the sense just stated, that it is not a real party in interest.
The Court finds that the Laras were transacting with MLF fully aware of its lack of license to do
business in the Phils., and in relation to those transactions had made payments and the spouses are
estopped to impugn MLF's capacity to sue them. The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge
the personality of a corp after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with
it. The principle is applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later
taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has
received the benefits of the contract.
PACIFIC VEGETABLE OIL V. SINGSON (G.R. No. 7917; April 29, 1955)
This is an action instituted by the plaintiff, a foreign corporation, against the defendant to recover
a sum of money for damages suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the failure of the
defendant to deliver copra which he sold and bound himself to deliver to the plaintiff. Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff failed to obtain a license to transact
business in the Phil and, consequently, it had no personality to file an action.
Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the copra in question was actually sold by the defendant
to the plaintiff in the US, the agreed price to be covered by an irrevocable letter of credit to be
opened at the Bank of California, and delivery to be made at the port of destination. It follows
that the appellant corporation has not transacted business in the Phil in contemplation of Sec. 68
and 69 which require any foreign corporation to obtain a license before it could transact business,
or before it could have personality to file a suit in the Phil.. It was never the purpose of the
Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order of business
from the Phil., from securing redress in the Phil. Courts, and thus, in effect, to permit persons to
avoid their contracts made with such foreign corp.. The lower court erred in holding that the
appellant corporation has no personality to maintain the present action.
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO. VS. PACIFIC STAR LINE (80 SCRA 635; 1977)
Aetna as subrogee of I. Shalom sued Pacific Star Line (PSL), the common carrier for the loss of
Linen & Cotton piece goods due to pilferage and damage amounting to US$2,300.00. PSL
contends that Aetna has no license to transact insurance business in the Philippines as gathered
from the Insurance Commission and SEC . It also argues that since said company has filed 13
other civil suits, they should be considered as doing business here and not merely having entered
into an isolated transaction.
Based on rulings in Mentholatum and Eastboard Navigation, the Supreme Court held that Aetna is
not transacting business in the Philippines for which it needs to have a license. The contract was
entered into in New York and payment was made to the consignee in the New York branch.
Moreover, Aetna was not engaged in the business of insurance in the Philippines but was merely
collecting a claim assigned to it by consignee. Because it was not doing business in the
Philippines, it was not subject to Sec. 68-69 of the Corporation Law and therefore was not barred
from filing the instant case although it had not secured a license to transact insurance business in
the Philippines.
Topweld entered into 2 separate contracts with foreign entities: a license and technical assistance
agreement with IRTI, and a distributor agreement with ECED, SA. When Topweld found out that
the foreign corporations were looking into replacing Topweld as licensee and distributor, the latter
went to court to ask for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the foreign corporations from
negotiating with 3rd parties as violative of RA 5445 (4).
Although IRTI and ECED were doing business in the Philippines, since they had not secured a
license from BOI, the foreign corporations were not bound by the requirement on termination and
Topweld could not invoke the same against the former. Moreover, it was incumbent upon Topweld
to know whether or not IRTI and ECED were properly authorized to engage in such
agreements. The Supreme Court held that both parties were guilty of violating RA 5445. Being in
pari delicto, Topweld was not entitled to the relief prayed for.
The SC held that the transactions entered into by Stokely with Antam et al (3 transactions, either
as buyer or seller) were not a series of commercial dealings which signify an intent on the part of
the respondent to do business in Philippines but constitute an isolated transaction. The records
show that the 2nd and 3rd transactions were entered into because Antam wanted to recover the
loss it sustained from the failure of the petitioners to deliver the crude oil under the first
transaction and in order to give the latter a chance to make good on their obligation. There was
only one agreement between the parties, and that was the delivery of the 500 tons of crude coconut
oil.
As a rule, jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is acquired by the courts through service of
summons on its resident agent.
If there is no assigned resident agent, the government official designated by law can receive
the summons on their behalf and transmit the same to them by registered mail within 10
days. This will complete the service of the summons. Summons can also be served on any of the
corporation's officers or agents within the Philippines. (See Sec. 128; Rule 14, Sec. 12, Rules of
Court. Note that while Sec. 128 presupposes that the foreign corporation has a license, Rule 14
does not make such an assumption.)
Note that if there is a designated agent, summons served upon the government official is not
deemed a valid process.
v Johnlo Trading case holds that the service on the attorney of an FC who was also charged
with the duty of settling claims against it is valid since no other agent was duly appointed.
v Service on Officers or Agents of an foreign corporation’s domestic subsidiary will only vest
jurisdiction if there is sufficient ground to disregard the separate personalities.
General Corporation and Mayon investment sued Union Insurance and Firemen’s Fund Insurance
(FFI) for the payment of 12 marine insurance policies. The summons was served on Union which
was then acting as FFI’s settling agent in the country. At that time, it was not yet registered and
authorized to transact business in the Philippines.
Issue: Did the trial court acquire valid jurisdiction over FFI?
Yes. The service of summons for FFI on its settling agent was legal and gave the court
jurisdiction upon FFI. Section 14, Rule 7 of ROC embraces Union in the phrase, “ or agents
within the Philippines”. The law does not make distinctions as to corporations with or without
authority to do business in the Philippines. The test is whether a foreign corporation was actually
doing business here. Otherwise, a foreign corporation doing business illegally because of its
refusal or neglect to obtain the corresponding authority to do business may successfully though
unfairly plead such neglect or illegal act so as to avoid service and thereby impugn the jurisdiction
of the courts.
(1) All claims which have accrued in the Philippines have been paid, compromised and settled;
(2) All taxes, imposts, assessments, and penalties, if any, lawfully due to the Philippine
Government or any of its agencies or political subdivisions have been paid; and
(3) The petition for withdrawal of license has been published once a week for 3 consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
(1) Failure to file its annual report or pay any fees as required by the Corporation Code;
(2) Failure to appoint and maintain a resident agent in the Philippines as required;
(3) Failure, after change of resident agent or of his address, to submit to the SEC a statement
of such change;
(4) Failure to submit to the SEC an authenticated copy of any amendment to its AOI or
by-laws or of any articles of merger or consolidation within the time prescribed by the Code;
(5) A misrepresentation of any material matter in any application, report, affidavit or other
document submitted by such corporation pursuant to Title XV;
(6) Failure to pay any and all taxes, imposts, assessments or penalties, if any, lawfully due to
the Philippine government or any of its agencies or political subdivisions;
(7) Transacting business in the Philippines outside of the purpose/s for which such
corporation is authorized under its license;
(8) Transacting business in the Philippine as agent of or acting for and in behalf of any
foreign corporation or entity not duly licensed to do business in the Philippines; or
(9) Any other ground as would render it unfit to transact business in the Philippines.
Educational corporations
(Sec. 106-108)
· At least 60% of the authorized capital stock of educational corporations must be owned by
Filipino citizens, and Congress may require increased Filipino equity participation therein. (With
the exception of educational institutions established by religious groups and mission boards,
which are not subject to this equity requirement.) However, control and administration of
educational institutions must be vested exclusively in citizens of the Philippines. (Art. XIV, Sec.
4 (2), 1987 Constitution) This means that no alien may be elected as a member of the BOD nor
appointed as Principal or officer thereof.
· Once a school, college or university has been granted government recognition by the
DECS, it must incorporate within 90 days from the date of such recognition, unless it is expressly
exempt by DECS for special reasons. (Act 2706, Sec. 5) In addition, it must file a copy of its
AOI and by-laws with the DECS. Without the favorable recommendation of the DECS Secretary,
the SEC will not accept or approve such articles. (Sec. 107, Corporation Code)
Religious corporations
(Sec. 109-116)
Religious corporations are governed by Title XIII, Chapter II of the Corporation Code and
by the general provisions of the Code on non-stock corporations insofar as they may be
applicable. (Sec. 109)
In case of death, resignation, transfer or removal of the person in office, his successor
replaces him and continues the corporation sole. The property is not owned but is merely
administered by the corporation sole, and ownership pertains to the church or congregation he
represents. On the other hand, he is the person authorized by law as the administrator thereof and
the court may take judicial notice of such fact and of the fact that the parish priests have no control
over such property.
In determining whether the constitutional provision requiring 60% Filipino capital for
corporation ownership of private agricultural lands, the Supreme Court has held that it is the
nationality of the constituents of the diocese, and not the nationality of the actual incumbent of the
office, which must be taken into consideration. Thus, where at least 60% of the constituents are
Filipinos, land may be registered in the name of the corporation sole, although the holder of the
office is an alien. This ruling is based on the fact that the corporation sole is not the owner but
merely the administrator of the property, and that he holds it in trust for the faithful of the diocese
concerned. (See Gana v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 43 O.G. No. 8, 3225; 1947)
In contrast to a corporation sole, religious societies are composed of more than one
person. The requirements for incorporation of such societies are set forth in Sec. 116 of the Code.
Close Corporations
(Sec. 96-105)
A close corporation, within the meaning of the Corporation Code, is one whose articles of
incorporation provide that:
(1) All the corporation's issued stock of all classes, exclusive of treasury shares, shall be held of
record by not more than a specified number of persons not exceeding 20;
(2) All the issued stock of all classes shall be subject to one or more specified restrictions on
transfer permitted by Title XII of the Code; and
(3) The corporation shall not list in any stock exchange or make any public offering of any of
its stock of any class.
Notes:
· A narrow distribution of ownership does not, by itself, make a close corporation. (San
Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators v. CA, 296 SCRA 631)
· A corporation shall not be deemed a close corporation when at least 2/3 of its voting stock
or voting rights is owned or controlled by another corporation which is not a close corporation.
YES, provided that said corporation owns less than 2/3 of voting stock or voting rights.
· Mining
· Oil
· Stock Exchange
· Bank
· Insurance
· Public Utilities
· Educational Institutions
· Corporations declared vested with public interest
Close Corporation
"Regular" Corporation
No. of stockholders
Management
Meetings
Pre-emptive right
Buy-back of shares
Resolution of deadlocks
SEC has the power to arbitrate disputes in case of deadlocks, upon written petition by any
stockholder. (Sec. 104) This includes the power to appoint a provisional director, as well as to
dissolve the corporation.
Dissolution
May be petitioned by any stockholder whenever any of the acts of the directors or officers or those
in control of the corporation is illegal, fraudulent, dishonest, oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to
the corporation or any stockholder, or whenever corporate assets are being misapplied or
wasted. (Sec. 105)
Generally requires a 2/3 vote of the stockholders and a majority vote of the BOD.
(Note however that in case of involuntary dissolution under Sec. 121, a corporation may be
dissolved by the SEC upon filing of a verified complaint and after proper notice and hearing.)
A provisional director is an impartial person who is neither a stockholder nor a creditor of the
corporation or of any subsidiary or affiliate of the corporation, and whose qualifications, if any,
may be determined by the SEC. He is not a receiver of the corporation and does not have the title
and powers of a custodian or receiver. However, he has all the rights and powers of a
duly-elected director of the corporation, including the right to notice of and to vote at meetings of
directors, until such time as he shall be removed by order of the SEC or by all the
stockholders. (Sec. 104)
Withdrawal Right
Appraisal Right
Close corporation
"Regular" corporation
When availed of
· The SEC has the power to issue rules and regulations reasonably necessary to enable it to
perform its duties under the Code, particularly in the prevention of fraud and abuses on the part of
the controlling stockholders, members, directors, trustees or officers. (Sec. 143)
· Whenever the SEC conducts any examination of the operations, books and records of any
corporation, the results thereof must be kept strictly confidential, unless the law requires them to
be made public or where they are necessary evidence before any court. (Sec. 142)
· All domestic and foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines must submit an
annual report to the SEC of its operations, with a financial statement of its assets and liabilities
and such other requirements as the SEC may impose. (Sec. 141)
· No right or remedy in favor of or against, nor any liability incurred by, any corporation, its
stockholders, members, directors, trustees or officers, may be removed or impaired by the
subsequent dissolution of said corporation or by any subsequent amendment or repeal of the
Code. (Sec. 145)
· Violations of the Corporation Code not otherwise specifically penalized therein are
punishable by a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 but not more than P 10,000.00 or by imprisonment
for not less than 30 days but not more than 5 years, or both, in the discretion of the court. If the
violation is committed by a corporation, the same may be dissolved in appropriate proceedings
before the SEC. (Sec. 144)