CIVPRO CASE DOCTRINES – RULE 3
Intellectual property of robcsj
1. Banda vs. Ermita
Class suit
2. Navarro vs. Escobido
Thus, contrary to Navarro's
contention, Karen Go is the
real party-in-interest, and it
is legally incorrect to say
that her Complaint does
not state a cause of action
because her name did not
appear in the Lease
Agreement that her
husband signed in behalf
of Kargo Enterprises.
Since Glenn Go is not
strictly an indispensable
party in the action to
recover possession of the
leased vehicles, he only
needs to be impleaded as
a pro-forma party to the
suit,
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No.
378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia,
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities
Only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case. DIEAHc
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance,9 to which
the previously mentioned Af􏰀davit of Desistance10 was attached,
was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers
Association (NAPOWA).
leading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions
and views among the members of the class sought to be
represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit.
There is here an apparent con􏰀ict between petitioners' interests
and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it
cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of
the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a
class suit.
Petition is hereby DISMISSED
Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the
seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro's possession.
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE entered into
by and between KARGO ENTERPRISES, then represented by its
Manager, the aforementioned GLENN O. GO
Checks dishonored
RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff
seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession of
Karen Go.
Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two
complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a
party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not
state a cause of action.
In response to M/R, acting on the presumption that Glenn Go's
leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen

Even assuming that Glenn
Go is an indispensable
party to the action, we
have held in a number of
cases 26 that the
misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a
complaint is not a ground
for dismissal of action.
Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action
against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should
have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on
Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules). 12 Thus, the lower
court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn
Go as co-plaintiff.
RTC denied Navarro’s M/R
Navarro’s contention: a complaint which failed to state a cause of
action could not be converted into one with a cause of action by
mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 15
Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, 16 Kargo
Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the
party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in
this case.
Thus, contrary to Navarro's contention, Karen Go is the real party-
in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does
not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the
Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises.
Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of
whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is conjugal or
paraphernal property, we hold that it is conjugal property. Under
this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against
Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased
vehicles which they co-own.
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an
indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the
leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma
party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which
states:
Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be
sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the

3. Bacalso vs. Padigos
Abence of indispensable
party
The absence then of an
indispensable party
renders all subsequent
actions of a court null and
void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the
absent party but even as to
those present.
action, we have held in a number of cases 26 that the misjoinder or
non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground
for dismissal of action.
Maximo Padigos (Maximo), Flaviano Mabuyo (Flaviano),
Gaudencio Padigos (Gaudencio), Domingo Padigos (Domingo),
and Victoria P. Abarquez (Victoria), who are among the herein
respondents gainst Rosendo Bacalso (Rosendo) and Rodrigo
Bacalso (Rodrigo) who are among the herein petitioners, for
quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of
possession, and damages.
In their Answer 6 to the complaint, petitioners Rosendo and
Rodrigo claimed that their father Alipio, Sr. purchased via deeds of
sale the shares in the lot of Fortunata, Simplicio, Wenceslao,
Geronimo, and Felix from their respective heirs, and that Alipio, Sr.
acquired the shares of the other co-owners of the lot by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription through continuous, open,
peaceful, and adverse possession thereof in the concept of an
owner since 1949.
Gaudencio, Maximo, Flaviano, Domingo, and Victoria, with leave of
court, 9 filed an Amended Complaint 10 impleading as additional
defendants Alipio, Sr.'s other heirs,
Gaudencio et al. 􏰀led a Second Amended Complaint13 with leave
of court,14 impleading as additional plaintiffs the other heirs of
registered co-owner Maximiano,
In their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, 17 petitioners
contended that the Second Amended Complaint should be
dismissed in view of the failure to implead other heirs of the other
registered owners of the lot who are indispensable parties. 18
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, CA affirmed.
Respondents admit that Teodulfo Padigos (Teodulfo), an heir of
Simplicio, was not impleaded.32 They contend, however, that the
omission did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because
Article 487 of the Civil Code states that "[a]ny of the co- owners
may bring an action in ejectment
Respondents' contention does not lie. The action is for quieting of
title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession
and ownership, and damages
The absence then of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of a court null and void for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent party but even as to those present.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents are guilty of laches — the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has

4. Tallorin vs. Heirs of
Tarona
Court's annulment of a tax
declaration in the names of
three persons, two of
whom had not been
impleaded in the case, for
the reason that the
document was illegally
issued to them. ICHcT
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder
of indispensable parties. —
Parties in interest without
whom no final
determination can be had
of an action shall be joined
either as plaintiffs and
defendants. 16
Here, the RTC and the CA
annulled Tax Declaration
6164 that belonged not
only to defendant Tallorin
but also to Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez
and Dolores Valdez, which
two persons had no
opportunity to be heard as
they were never
impleaded. The RTC and
the CA had no authority to
annul that tax declaration
without seeing to it that all
three persons were
impleaded in the case.
There is a need, therefore,
to remand the case to the
RTC with an order to
implead Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez
and Dolores Valdez as
defendants so they may, if
either abandoned it or declined to assert it. 65 While, by express
provision of law, no title to registered land in derogation of that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner
may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches. 66
Respondents Carlos, Rogelio, and Lourdes Tarona (the Taronas)
􏰀led an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga,
Bataan, 1 against petitioner Anicia Valdez-Tallorin (Tallorin) for the
cancellation of her and two other women's tax declaration over a
parcel of land.
The Taronas alleged in their complaint that, unknown to them, in
1981, the Assessor's Office of Morong in Bataan cancelled Tax
Declaration 463 in the name of their father, Juanito Tarona
(Juanito), covering 6,186 square meters of land in Morong, Bataan.
The cancellation was said to be based on an unsigned though
notarized affidavit that Juanito allegedly executed in favor of
petitioner Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita Pastelero
Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, who were not impleaded in
the action.
Tallorin filed a belated answer, alleging among others that she held
a copy of the supposedly missing af􏰀davit of Juanito who was
merely an agricultural tenant of the land covered by Tax
Declaration 463
RTC rendered judgment, a) annulling the tax declaration, CA
affirmed
Whether or not the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Taronas'
complaint for not impleading Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez
and Dolores Valdez in whose names, like their co-owner Tallorin,
the annulled tax declaration had been issued;
Here, the RTC and the CA annulled Tax Declaration 6164 that
belonged not only to defendant Tallorin but also to Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, which two persons
had no opportunity to be heard as they were never impleaded. The
RTC and the CA had no authority to annul that tax declaration
without seeing to it that all three persons were impleaded in the
case.
But the Taronas' action cannot be dismissed outright. the non-
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal.
There is a need, therefore, to remand the case to the RTC with an
order to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores
Valdez as defendants so they may, if they so desire, be heard.
they so desire, be heard.
5. Spouses Crisologo vs
JEWM Agro-Industrial
Corporation
whether the CA correctly
ruled that RTC-Br. 14
acted without grave abuse
of discretion in failing to
recognize Spouses
Crisologo as indispensable
parties in the case for
cancellation of lien
In an action for the
cancellation of
memorandum annotated at
the back of a certificate of
title, the persons
considered as
indispensable include
those whose liens appear
as annotations pursuant to
Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529,
As indispensable parties,
Spouses Crisologo should
have been joined as
defendants in the case
pursuant to Section 7, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory
joinder of indispensable
parties. — Parties in
interest without whom no
􏰀nal determination can be
had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. 17
Be it noted that the effect
of their non-participation as
indispensable parties is to
preclude the judgment,
This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum
of money 􏰀led against So Keng Kok, the owner of various
properties including two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
292597 and 292600 (subject properties), which were attached by
various creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result,
the levies were annotated on the back of the said titles.
Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation(JEWM) was the
successor-in- interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another
collection case before RTC, Branch 8, Davao City TC-Br. 8
rendered its decision based on a compromise agreement, dated
October 15, 1998, between the parties wherein the defendants in
said case were directed to transfer the subject properties in favor of
Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to
one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM
A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate
collection case led before RTC-Br. 15 against Robert Lim So and
So Keng Koc (defendants). he Branch Sheriff issued a notice of
sale scheduling an auction on August 26, 2010. The notice of sale
included, among others, the subject properties covered by TCT
Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the name of JEWM.
JEWM prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the
notice of sale. JEWM prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject
properties covered in the writ of execution issued pursuant to the
ruling of RTC-Br. 15
Spouses Crisologo 􏰀led an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial
of the application for writ or preliminary injunction filed by JEWM
and asking for their recognition as parties. No motion to intervene
was, however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was
unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does
named in the complaint.
RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses Crisologo's Omnibus Motion and
granted JEWM's application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari all of
which denied their motion to be recognized as parties. They also
prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. AacCIT
Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM
filed a motion on December 6, 2010 before RTC-Br. 14 asking for
orders and the proceedings
from attaining 􏰀nality. Time
and again, the Court has
ruled that the absence of
an indispensable party
renders all subsequent
actions of the court null
and void for want of
authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but
even to those present.
Consequently, the
proceedings before RTC-
Br. 14 were null and void
including the assailed
orders, which may be
"ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its
head." 29
6. Macawadib vs. PNP
Directorate for Personnel
Indispensable party
it is the integrity and
correctness of the public
records in the custody of
the PNP, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM)
and Civil Service
Commission (CSC) which
are involved and which
would be affected by any
decision rendered in the
petition for correction 􏰀led
by herein petitioner. The
aforementioned
the resolution of the case on the merits.
On January 10, 2011, RTC-Br. 14 ruled in favor of JEWM,
Whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without
grave abuse of discretion in failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo
as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien
The Court agrees with Spouses Crisologo.
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the
back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as
indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations
pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529,
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo's liens were
indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676.
Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be
bene􏰀ted or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of
annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as
indispensable as JEWM itself in the 􏰀nal disposition of the case for
cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. HCSEcI
As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been
joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable
parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and the proceedings
from attaining 􏰀nality. Time and again, the Court has ruled that the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even to those present. Consequently, the
proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void including the
assailed orders, which may be "ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head." 29
Petitioner was a police of􏰀cer with the rank of Police Senior
Superintendent.
Chief of Directorial Staff of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
issued General Order No. 1168, enumerating the names of
commissioned of􏰀cers who were subject to compulsory retirement
Petitioner filed an application for late registration of his birth with
the Municipal Civil Registrar's Office of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In
the said application, petitioner swore under oath that he was born
on January 11, 1956. The application was, subsequently,
approved.
petitioner filed with the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8, a Petition for
Correction of Entry in the Public Service Records Regarding the
Birth Date.
government agencies are,
thus, required to be made
parties to the proceeding.
As the above-mentioned
agencies were not
impleaded in this case
much less given notice of
the proceedings, the
decision of the trial court
granting petitioner's prayer
for the correction of entries
in his service records, is
void. As mentioned above,
the absence of an
indispensable party
renders all subsequent
actions of the court null
and void for want of
authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
7. Republic vs. Uy
the present petition on the
sole ground that the
petition is dismissible for
failure to implead
indispensable parties.
respondent should have
impleaded and noti􏰀ed not
only the Local Civil
Registrar but also her
parents and siblings as the
persons who have interest
and are affected by the
changes or corrections
respondent wanted to
RTC rendered judgment n favor of petitioner
Herein respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA, seeking to nullify the
above-mentioned Decision of the RTC on the ground that the trial
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, "an unimpleaded
indispensable party." 7
CA promulgated its assailed Decision assailed Decision dated
December 4, 2001 of the respondent court in Spl. Proc. No. 782-01
is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Also, so as to prevent further
damage upon the PNP, let a permanent injunction issue in the
meantime, barring the private respondent Dimapinto Babai
Macawadib from continuing and prolonging his tenure with the PNP
beyond the mandatory retirement age of fifty- six (56) years.
Whether respondent is indispensable party
it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the
custody of the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which are involved and which
would be affected by any decision rendered in the petition for
correction 􏰀led by herein petitioner. The aforementioned
government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the
proceeding.
The Court, likewise, agrees with the observation of the OSG that, if
petitioner was indeed born in 1956, he would have been merely 14
years old in 1970 when he was appointed as Chief of Police of
Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. This would not have been legally tenable,
considering that Section 9 of RA 4864, otherwise known as the
Police Act of 1966, provides, among others, that a person shall not
be appointed to a local police agency if he is less than twenty-three
years of age. Moreover, realistically speaking, it would be dif􏰀cult
to believe that a 14-year old minor would serve as a police of􏰀cer,
much less a chief of police.
Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certicate
of Live Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar
of Gingoog City
Certi􏰀cate of Live Birth 7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy"
when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as
"Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records,
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine
Certi􏰀cate, 8 and passport 9 bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay."
Respondent allegedly 􏰀led earlier a petition for correction of entries
with the Of􏰀ce of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect
the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted. 12 However, the National Statistics Of􏰀ce (NSO) records
did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, The RTC concluded
make.
The fact that the notice of
hearing was published in a
newspaper of general
circulation and notice
thereof was served upon
the State will not change
the nature of the
proceedings taken.
8. Resident Marine
Mammals vs. Reyes
Service Contract No. 46
that respondent's petition would neither prejudice the government
nor any third party.
CA af􏰀rmed in toto the RTC Order The CA held that respondent's
failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by
serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG
and the City Prosecutor's Of􏰀ce.
he changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch
on respondent's 􏰀liation and citizenship. In changing her surname
from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which
is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status
from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from
Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in
this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City
who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This,
notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the
correction sought by respondent, which decision was af􏰀rmed in
toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
respondent should have impleaded and noti􏰀ed not only the Local
Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who
have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections
respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or 􏰀liation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court is mandated
A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different
potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition
and another given to other persons who are not named in the
petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties.
Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration,
development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon
Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of
(SC-46), which allowed the
exploration,
Public respondents argue
that the Resident Marine
Mammals have Section 1.
Who may be parties;
plaintiff and defendant. —
Only natural or juridical
persons, or entities
authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action. The
term "plaintiff" may refer to
the claiming party, the
counter-claimant, the
cross-claimant, or the third
(fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff.
The term "defendant" may
refer to the original
defending party, the
defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-
defendant, or the third
(fourth, etc.)-party
defendant.
In light of the foregoing, the
need to give the Resident
Marine Mammals legal
standing has been
eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental
laws. It is worth noting here
that the Stewards are
joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in
representation of the
named cetacean species.
The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having
shown in their petition that
there may be possible
violations of laws
concerning the habitat of
the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the
legal standing to 􏰀le this
petition.
Negros and Cebu. 2
One petition seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-
46 and to have it nulli􏰀ed for willful and gross violation of the 1987
Constitution and certain international and municipal laws
One petition seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance
Certi􏰀cate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), R
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the
"Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the
waters in and around the Tañon Strait
They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza
Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as
friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly
empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned
marine species.
Supply Oil􏰀eld Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine
agent of JAPEX. 􏰀led a Motion to Strike 17 its name as a
respondent on the ground that it is not the Philippine agent of
JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the branch of􏰀ce
application of JAPEX, 18 wherein the latter's resident agent was
clearly identi􏰀ed. SOS claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics
contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities in the
Philippines.
petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also asked
the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a co-respondent or as a
substitute for its parent company, JAPEX.
public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have
no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical
persons, viz.:
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. — Only
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming
party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth,
etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original
defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-
defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise
challenge their claim of legal standing on the ground that they are
representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
Moreover, the public respondents argue that the Stewards are not
the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to
be bene􏰀ted or injured by the decision in this case. 46
Section 10, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-
plaintiff. — If the consent of
any party who should be
joined as plaintiff can not
be obtained, he may be
made a defendant and the
reason therefor shall be
stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule,
when the consent of a
party who should be joined
as a plaintiff cannot be
obtained, he or she may be
made a party defendant to
the case. Th
ublic respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards' petition was not brought in the name of a
real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.
whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given
legal standing in actions before courts of law
However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases
has been given a more liberalized approach
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, 51 which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit
any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations
of our environmental laws:
Although this petition was 􏰀led in 2007, years before the effectivity
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been
consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively
applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in
rules of procedure."
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards,
Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there
may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the
legal standing to 􏰀le this petition.
Petitioners Stewards inG.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling
co- petitioner former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an
unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express declaration and
undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect
Your Petitioners' habitat, among others.
She is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to
lack of material time in seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof
and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by
reason of her of􏰀cial relations with public respondents under the
alter ego principle in political law.
This is incorrect.
 Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. — If the consent of any party who

should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made
a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the
complaint.

Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should
be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made
a party defendant to the case. Th

Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for

including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not
suf􏰀cient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading
the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she
made in the performance of the functions of her of􏰀ce, is contrary
to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all
of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention." 59

Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be

impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is
stricken off the title of this case.