Province of North Cotabato v GRP

FACTS: in 2008 the GRP and MILF were scheduled to sign the Moan-AD. The signing of which however
did not materialize upon motion of the petitioners and the SC ordered a TRO on the said signing.

The main body of the Moan-AD is divided into 4 parts, with particular interest to “B” or Territory. Under
this it states that the core of the Bangsamoro homeland would be ARMM along with Lanao Del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and other municipalities in Lanao Del Norte that voted for inclusion in the 2001
plebiscite.

Outside of the core Bangsamoro is said to include other provinces which are grouped into 2 categories A
and B both of which would be subject to a plebiscite to be held on different dates supposedly years
apart. Group A would be subject to a plebiscite not more than 12 months after the signing of the Moan-
AD, while group B or the Special Intervention areas who would hold their plebiscite 25 years after the
signing of the memorandum.

In the case at bar the Province of North Cotabato, Zamboanga Del Norte and other such provinces have
the standing to sue or locus standi since they would suffer as their territiories whether whole or in part,
would be included in the domain of Bangsamoro. They state that they have not yet even voted for their
inclusion to the ARMM even more so Bangasamoro.

ISSUE: W/N MoA-AD WILL PASS?

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. As it is presently worded is unconstitutional. To amended this the

framers of the MoA-AD, created a clause where in the provisions which are unconstitutional will not be
in effect until that framework is amended to make it harmonize with the constitution. Moreover, as the
clause is worded now it is almost certain that amendments to the constitution will be put in place
however neither the GRP peace panel nor the president herself has the power to make such guarantee.

Santiago V Comelec

FACTS: In 1996 Private respondent Delfin filed with Comelec a petition to amended the constitution to
1. Lift the terms of elected officials by people’s initiative. Delfin claimed that he was a founding member
of the Peoples Imitative a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize
people power and that he is exercising the constitutional power of people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the constitution. He is seeking help from the Comelec as required in their resolution
2300, signature stations shall be established all along the country.

His petition was to lift the terms of elected officials. According to Delfin the petition would be first
submitted to the people and after it is signed by 12% it would be formally filed with the Comelec. Upon
petition COMELEC issued an order 1. To cause publication of the petition and setting the case for
hearing.

Petitioner then intervened stating that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be
implemented by law to be passed by congress and as of that moment no law has yet been passed. To
add to the fact that congress had not appropriated funds for the people initiative.
Petitioners stated that in the event that the Comelec grants their petition it would entail expenses of
180 Million Pesos plus additional millions of pesos.

Respondents stated that if their petition is granted, they would not use money of the government. And
that there in fact was a law which included the system of initiative of amendments RA 6735.

DIK then filed a motion for intervention stating that that the petition of Delfin is not an amendment but
in fact it is a revision and that a revision cannot be done by people’s initiative.

ISSUE: W/N the petition of Delfin will push through?

HELD: NO, Sec 2 of Art 17 is a non-self-executing provision of the constitution. The constitution only
recognizes and grants the right to it BUT the people cannot exercise its power if congress does not
provide for its implementation.

RA 6735 intended to cover initiative it did not. While the said RA exerted its utmost diligence in
providing for the initiative and referendum of national and local legislation, it failed to so in terms of
initiative of the Constitution. This brings the SC to the conclusion that RA 6735 is inadequate and
incomplete in the conditions insofar as amendments to the constitution.

SC states that since there is no legislative act enabling the people’s initiative, it does not push through.

Lambino V Comelec

FACTS: In 2006 Petitioners commenced the gathering of signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, as such petitioners filed with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition. They alleged that the petition had the support of over 6 million individuals
consisting of 12% of all registered voters and with each legislative district represented.

The amendments would shift the present BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL system to a UNICAMERAL-

PRESIDENTIAL system. Petitioners prayed that COMELEC submit their proposition in a plebiscite. “Do
you approve of the amendment of articles VI and VII of the 1987 constitution from bicameral to
unicameral?”

COMELEC then denied petition for lack on enabling law.

ISSUE: W/N the petition will push through?

HELD: NO, Lambino group failed miserably to comply with the basic requirements of people’s initiative.
The drafters of the constitution explicitly stated that the draft should be ready and shown to the people
before they sign the proposal before they sign the proposal, they must already have been shown a
draft.

The requisites for people’s initiative 1. The people must author and sign the proposal 2. Proposal must
be embodied in a petition.

There is not a word in the petition of the proposed change to the constitution. Merely a question of “do
you approve of amending”

Add to the fact that Lambino only circulated 100,000 copies of the draft petition and asked his
supporters to copy the petition, he however does not know how many copies of the petition there are.
SC holds that among the 6.3 million signatories only 100,000 people could have received with certainty a
copy of the petition and 1 sheet has 100 spaces for signatures then it would still not amount to 3.6
million signatures.

SC holds that the constitutional provision on amendments and revisions to the constitution only speaks
of amendments when it comes to people initiative. Since only a constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the constitution, while people’s initiative can only propose amendments to such.

To know whether the proposed changes are a revision or an amendment there is the quantitative and
the qualitative test.

The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change
the substantial entirety of the constitution by alteration of numerous provisions.

The qualitative tests ask whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature
of the basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. (change to fundamental framework or
fundamental powers of the branches)

The Lambino petition would pass the quantitative test because it would affect 105 provisions of the
constitution.

It also passes the qualitative test because it would be shift to a unicameral government and from
presidential to parliament.

POLICE POWER

PASE V DRILLON

FACTS: petitioner is a firm engaged in in the recruitment of Filipino workers male and female for
overseas placement. The challenge the constitutional validity of DO 1 or the suspension of Filipino
domestic helpers specifically for discriminating against male or female since it doesn’t apply to all
Filipino workers only those women who are DH. Petitioners state equal protection. SOLGEN invokes
police power.

ISSUE: W/N THIS IS VALID MEASURE OF POLICE POWER?

HELD: YES, since police power 1. Restraints liberty and property and 2. Fosters the common good. Its
scope is ever expanding to meet the exigencies of times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done provided it has enough room for its efficient and flexible response to conditions. The police power
of the state is co-extensive with self-preservation.

For all its awesome power it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise it defeats its
purpose which is public good.

This DO 1 is to protect the Female workers since there has been an ongoing trend of ill-treatment of
Philippine DH marked by cases of physical abuse such as rape and torture.
INCHONG V HERNANDEZ

FACTS: RA 1180 is entitled an act to regulate retail business, in effect it nationalizes retail business. It
prohibits against persons not Philippine citizens and corporations not wholly owned by Filipinos from
engaging directly or indirectly in retail trade. Petitioner also states that it would violate the treaty of
amnesty between China and the Philippines.

Petitioner states that the said act is unconstitutional since it denies aliens the equal protection of the
law. SolGen states that said act is a valid exercise of Police Power which merely exercised in the interest
of national survival.

ISSUE: W/N ACT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER?

HELD: YES, even though petitioner assails that its exercise in this particular instance is a violation of
equal protection and due process of law.

SC states that Police power has been so far reaching in scope that it is almost impossible to limit as it
derives its very existence from the state itself it is co-extensive with state survival and self-protection.

The basic limitation of Police Power is due process and equal protection. The 2 must co-exist. The police
power doctrine is firmly grounded upon public interest and interest a reasonable relation must exist
between purpose and means.

The reason why RA 1180 was passed was that there was a legitimate alien threat upon the retail
business in the Philippines.

The contention of the Petitioner that the act would violate a treaty must fall. A treaty can never restrict
the scope of the Police Power of the State.

LUTZ V ARANETA

FACTS: in 1940 there would be an imminent imposition of export taxes upon Philippine sugar in the US.
The Tydings-McDuffie act and the eventual loss of its preferential position in the US market. In order to
curb this CA 567 was enacted an act to stabilize the sugar industry to prepare for the eventual loss in the
US market. The said act provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a
graduated basis on each picul of sugar. And that all tax collections made under the said act would accrue
to a special fund for the sugar industry only.

Plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Ledesma seeks to recover from IR 14kp paid by
the estate as taxes under the said act alleging that the said act is unconstitutional and void. Since the tax
is being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which he states is not a public
purpose. For which a tax maybe constitutionally levied.

ISSUE: W/N CA 567 is Constitutional?

HELD: YES, since the act is levied for a regulatory purpose to provide stability and rehabilitation for the
sugar industry in other words police power.

SC takes notice that the sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation. It gives thousands
of jobs to laborer’s and it is a great source of state wealth. Its promotion, protection and advancement
are then evident that it redounds to the benefit of the general welfare of the state.
Association of Small Land Owners V DAR

FACTS: In 1987 Cory Aquino issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the benefactors in
PD 27 which provided for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for the distribution among tenant
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits.

Then RA 6657 of the CARP law was passed.

These are consolidated cases since they all have the same legal questions. Petitioners question the PD
27, EO 228 and RA 6657. Further petitioners raise questions on just compensation citing Sec 5 of EO 228
which states that “the land bank of the Philippines shall compensate the land owner in an amount to be
established by the government, which shall be based on the owner’s declaration of current fair market
value as provided, but subject to certain control to be defined and promulgated by DAR…. this
compensation may not be paid fully in money but in several modes that may consist of part cash and
part bond, with interest maturing periodically”.

Petitioners also question the retention limits in the CARP law stating that it is taking without just
compensation.

ISSUE: W/N CARP law is constitutional

HELD: YES, the contention that President Aquino did not have the power to execute EO 228 is untenable
since under the 1987 constitution she still had the power of legislation since the congress had yet to
convene.

With regards to the questions of Eminent Domain V Police Power, generally when the government
controls or takes possession of a land, it is because it is considered noxious and should be destroyed.

However, in this case it would be shown that both states powers are in fact mingling. Eminent Domain is
being used as an instrument for Police Power.

Police power however carries with it the regulation of private property in accordance with the
constitution, however when it deprives someone of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed there is definitely taking under the power of eminent domain which payment of
just compensation is required.

Eminent Domain is an inherent power of the state which enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation. The taking of the land is considered a last
resort if the owner does not wish to sell the property to the state. Eminent domain has 2 requirements
1. Public Use 2. Just Compensation, the public use part of expropriation is already settled no less than
the constitution has called for agrarian reform, which is the reason that private agricultural lands are to
be taken from their owners, subject to the retention limits.

Just Compensation. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
expropriator. In previous jurisprudence, in the Philippines and the USA the classical medium of just
compensation has always been money and no other. This is not an ordinary expropriation case it is Sui
Generis since it encompasses and affects all private lands. Therefore, the court ORDERS THAT PAYMENT
IN BONDS OR IN OTHER MEDIUMS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
Lozano V Martinez

FACTS: BP 22 is known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a person “who makes or draws or
issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of issuance that he does not have the funds
for payment” the penalty inscribed is imprisonment of 30 days to 1 year. The essential element to BP 22,
is knowledge of insufficient funds.

ISSUE: W/N BP 22 is a valid exercise of Police Power?

HELD: YES, the enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that as a matter of policy the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be punished by penal
sanctions. Since the approximate value of bouncing checks was close to 200 Million pesos. Statistics
have also shown that 1/3 of the entire money supply of the country consists of peso demand deposits.
The magnitude of the amount involved justifies a legitimate concern of the state in preserving the
integrity of the banking system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is like pouring garbage into
the bloodstream of the nation’s economy.

The effects of issuing a worthless check transcends private interest and touches the interest of the
community at large.

DECS V SAN DIEGO

FACTS: respondent is a graduate of UE. Petitioner claims he took the NMAT 3 times and failed them all,
when he applied to take it again petitioner rejected his application on the basis that you are not allowed
to take it for the 4th time. For which he went to the RTC to compel his admission to the test. Upon
hearing judge ruled in favor of San Diego stating that the DECS rule denied him his right to pursue
medicine through an arbitrary use of Police Power.

Issue: was the 3 flunks rule a valid exercise of Police Power?

Held: YES, the proper exercise of police power requires 1. Lawful subject 2. Lawful method. In this case
there is a lawful subject since it is the responsibility of the state to ensure that the medical practice is
not infiltrated by incompetence to whom patients trust their lives with.

As for lawful method, the 3-flunk rule is not arbitrary or oppressive, it is there to ensure that those who
will be accepted to medical schools are those who are qualified to be doctors.

The state must protect the medical practice since it directly deals with people’s lives.

YNOT V IAC
FACTS: The president issued EO 626 or prohibiting interprovincial movement of Carabaos and the
slaughtering of Carabaos.

Petitioner had transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat form Masbate to Iloilo in 1984, where they were
confiscated by the police for violation of EO 626. The petitioner then sued for recovery to the RTC of
Iloilo. Upon hearing the case the RTC sustained the confiscation of the Carabaos.

Petitioner then appealed to IAC which held the decision of the RTC hence this petition.
Petitioner states that EO is unconstitutional since it authorizes the outright confiscation of the Carabao
or carabeef, he complains that it is confiscation without right to be heard by an impartial court as stated
under the due process clause in our bill of rights.

ISSUE W/N EO 626 is a valid exercise of Police Power?

HELD: NO, although police power is the most pervasive and least limitable inherit power of the state. EP
626 prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The logic was to conserve the
carabaos for the farmers that need them for their energy needs and that it was the states job to protect
and preserve them since there was an energy crisis and as such there was a need to protect the
carabaos for the farmers energy needs.

SC states although there is lawful subject. The means as to which is unduly oppressive as such there is
no lawful means. There is no correlation between the interprovincial moving of carabaos and the
prevention of the slaughter since the carabaos can be killed anywhere. The connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved is missing.

QUEZON CITY V ERICTA

FACTS: Ordinance 6118 is a city ordinance which states that at least 6% of cemetery shall be set aside for
the burial of paupers and urban poor. Pursuant to such petitioners notified respondent Himlayang
Pilipino to reserve 6% of the lot for the said ordinance.

Respondents reacted by filing a petition seeking to annul the ordinance stating that it is violative of the
constitution, the QC charter and the Local Autonomy Act. RTC ruled in favor of the private respondent.

Hence this petition. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent’s land is a valid exercise of police
power since land is taken for public use as it is for the burial of the paupers. They further argue that the
QC council is authorized under its charter, to exercise local police power.

Respondents state that the taking of their property is obvious because it restricts their enjoyment and
cannot be used for any other purpose. He further states that the general welfare clause is not applicable
for the taking of his property in this case since it refers to “the power to promote public welfare by
restraining ang regulating the use of liberty and property” respondent states that when the state
deprives someone of their property, it is usually for the destruction for noxious purposes and not taken
for public use.

ISSUE: W/N this is a valid exercise of police power?

HELD: NO, the power to regulate does not mean the power to confiscate or to prohibit the ordinance
not only regulates the property but also confiscates such. The respondents were correct in saying that
under police power the property is confiscated for it to be destroyed and not for public use.

SC also states that there is no correlation between setting aside 6% of the total area in all cemeteries for
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety or general welfare. The ordinance is
taking without just compensation. The government is just passing the burden of building and
maintaining cemeteries to the private owners.
WHITE LIGHT V MANILA
FACTS: In 1992 Mayor Lim signed into an ordinance prohibiting short term admissions in hotels, motels,
lodging and pension houses.

Malate Tourist Development Corp then filed a TRO stating that the said ordinance is unconstitutional,
they stated that they were authorized by PD 259 to admit customers for a short time basis. Then white
light filed a motion to intervene on the grounds that the said ordinance directly affected their business
interest. RTC decided that the said ordinance was null and void. Since it strikes the personal liberty of
the individual.

Manila then appealed stating that it was a valid exercise of Police Power. CA reversed the decision of the
RTC and held that the ordinance was constitutional. Stating that police power is only inhibited by 1.
Lawful method 2. Lawful means the lawful object of the ordinance was to curb immoral acts.

ISSUE: W/N ORIDANCE IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER?

HELD: NO, while there is no exact definition of police power, it is purposefully vague to underscore its
comprehensiveness. The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize, if not eliminate the use of
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution and drug use. These goals by themselves fall within
the ambit of police power, however for police power to be valid there must be a reasonable necessity
for the accomplishment of the purpose and it should not be unduly oppressive to a person’s rights, it
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive to
private rights can work. There must be a reasonable relation between the purpose of the measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment. This is where police power fails.

One may curb illicit sex, prostitution and drug use by active police work and stricter penalization of
prostitution and drug use.

The court also mentions that families use these so-called wash rates, when they are waiting for a flight
or when it is brownout.

MIRASOL V DPWH

FACTS: in 2001 petitioners filed a petition for dilatory judgment. They sought the nullity of DPWH order
1 of 1962 and 74 of 1993 for being inconsistent with RA 2000 and for DO 123. Petitioners also prayed for
a TRO to prevent a total ban on motorcycles on costal road. RTC dismissed the petition but declared DO
123 as unconstitutional. Since it only allows motor cycles with latest 400 CC engines to use the tollways,
RTC stated that is it violative of the equal protection clause

ISSUE: W/N DPWH orders are constitutional?

HELD: YES, petitioners assail that the DPWH’s failure to provide scientific and objective data on the
dangers of having motorcycles plying our streets. They state that this is a baseless and unwarranted
exercise of police power.

However, the SC does not find AO’s unreasonable restrictions, it merely outlines several precautionary
measures to which tollway users must adhere these rules were to ensure public safety and the
uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities. None of the guidelines are arbitrary
considering that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and their presence in
such will compromise safety and traffic considerations. AO 1 is also not oppressive since it does not
deprive petitioners of use of the toll way, they are merely being required to adhere to the rules of such
use of the tollway. It does not infringe their right to travel, merely bars motorcycles. They may take a
bus, car or a shuttle.

Petitioners reliance on studies gathered is misplaced police power does not rely on existence of
definitive studies. It just does not have to be oppressive

MANILA MEMORIAL V DSWD

FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of sec 4 or RA 9257 insofar as the claiming of business
establishments of the 20% discount given to seniors as tax deduction. Section 4 of the said law grants
senior citizens 20% off for all seniors on a few commodities, which the establishments may claim the
costs as tax credit. Tax credit refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified
senior citizen by all establishments related to the utilization of transport services, hotels etc., which the
discount shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes
and from their gross sale for value-added tax or other percentage of tax purposes. Establishments which
honor the 20% discount shall keep separate records of sales made to senior citizens. the 20% shall be
deducted from gross income for income tax purposes and from gross sales of the business enterprise
concerned for purposes of the VAT.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the secretary of finance issued RR 4-2006 stating that only
the portion of gross sales exclusively used, consumed or enjoyed by the senior citizen shall be eligible for
deduction.

ISSUE: W/N the 20% discount to seniors may be claimed as tax deduction by private establishments is
unconstitutional?

HELD: NO,

Petitioners do not question the 20% discount to senior citizens, the question the constitutionality of the
tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, stating it contravenes with art III sec 9 of the constitution, in
other words their claiming that tax deduction is not just compensation. Stating Carlos super drug V
DSWD in stating that the tax deduction does not meet the definition of just compensation.

The petitioner’s contention in this case lies in the mandated 20% senior discount is an exercise in POLICE
POWER OR EMINENT DOMAIN, if it is police power just compensation is not warranted. However, if it is
eminent domain, the tax deduction scheme is unconstitutional because it is not peso for peso
reimbursement.

SC believes that this is a valid exercise in police power. Petitioner never did show that tax deduction
scheme works greatly to their disadvantage. Since in Carlos Super Drug, petitioners showed that for
every peso they are discounting .68P while they government only rebates .32p.

This logic is flawed because the law specifically states that the discount shall be deducted from the gross
income, and not per transaction basis. The 20% discount is a valid exercise of police power.
Police Power and Eminent Domain.

Police power is an inherent power of the state which regulates and restrains property and liberty for the
general welfare. Its only limitation is that it should be reasonable and not oppressive. It must have a
lawful subject and a lawful method. The state may interfere with personal liberty, property so as long as
it is for the general welfare and it is not oppressive.

Eminent domain however is an inherent power of the state to take private property for public use. As
long as it.

In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation or the use of the property is
prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases there is no taking, hence just
compensation is not required. It has been observed that, in the exercise of police power none of the
bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for use for the benefit of public good.

The 20% discount is Police power. By simply looking at the 20% discount, the discount is intended to
improve the welfare of seniors, who at their age are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to
illness. As to their nature and effects the 20% discount regulates the ability of private establishments to
price their products and services relative to a certain class of individuals. The 20% is viewed as a price
regulatory method which is police power.

SJS V ATIENZA

FACTS: Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing petroleum products
while Shell and Petron are engaged in in the business of manufacturing, refining and importing,
distributing and marketing petroleum products in the Philippines. DOE is a government agency and is
tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate and supervise activities of the government relative to energy
exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.

SJS in an original petition for mandamus, sought to compel respondent to enforce ordinance 8027 or
reclassifying certain lands from industrial II to Commercial I and directs the owners and operators of
business disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within
6 months from date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses are the Pandacan terminals of
the oil companies.

Instead of closing shop, the City of Manila and the oil companies came to an agreement to scale down
Pandacan Terminals, which was only effective for 6 months but the sanggunian adopted a resolution
authorizing the mayor to issue special business permits to oil companies.

In a SC decision it stated that the City of Manila MUST enforce Ordinance 8027. However, Chevron and
Shell brought to the SC attention of a complaint filed against the city of manila for the annulment of
Ordinance 8027 and a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. RTC granted such on a 2 Million Peso
Bond.

Thereafter the council of Manila enacted ordinance 8119, or the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan,
which aggrieved the oil companies, which they filed a complaint asking for the annulment of ordinance
8119.

ISSUE: W/N Ordinance 8027 is Valid?

HELD: YES, said ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Powers. While police power is vested in the
legislature, police power maybe delegated as stated in section 16 of the LGC. LGU’s execute police
power. As such, the enactment of the said ordinance is the City of Manila’s valid exercise of police
power.

As with the State, local governments maybe considered as having properly exercised their police power
if 1. Interest of the public, generally as distinguished from a particular class requires its exercise 2. The
means employed are reasonably necessary for accomplishment and it is not unduly oppressive. In short
Lawful Subject and Lawful Means.

Said ordinance was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health and
public safety and general welfare, the sanggunian took measures to protect the residence of manila
from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. To reach this goal
they reclassified the area from Industrial to Commercial.

The ordinance was made to safe guard the right to life, security and safety of all inhabitants of manila,
not just a particular class. The depot is a representation of western interest, it is a terrorist target since
this is post 9/11.

MMDA V VIRON
FACTS: in 2003 EO 179 which would decongest traffic by eliminating bus terminals now located along
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to mass transport systems. The
EO also designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the project.

Then Viron transport services engaged in the business of public transport filed a petition for dilatory
relief stated that the EO was tantamount to closing all provincial bus terminals along EDSA. Viron alleged
that MMDA does not have the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus
terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property

RTC decided that the EO was constitutional and that it was issued as a valid exercise of Police Power of
the State. The trial court then reversed its decision stating that the EO was an unreasonable exercise of
police power.

ISSUE: W/N the EO is a valid exercise of Police Power?

HELD: NO, the president has no authority to undertake or cause implementation of the said project.
Petitioners assert that the authority of the president emanates from EO 125 in which president Cory
Aquino issued in the exercise of her then legislative powers. Police power is a power which is historically
held by the legislature, it maybe delegated. As of now the power maybe exercised by administrative
bodies and the President as well as LGU’s. HOWEVER, the designation to the MMDA may not be
sustained, there is no legal basis for such.

As stated in EO 125 it was the DOTC and not MMDA which was established and implemented to a
project to the case at bar and not the MMDA, since the DOTC is the primary implementing
administrative body for a project such as this. by designating the MMDA as the implementing authority,
the president clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law.
The MMDA’s claim that it exercised such as a police power measure must fall. Since 1. Police power was
not delegated to them by legislature and assuming that it did, it still did not pass the lawful subject and
lawful means test. It has a lawful subject but now a lawful means. The SC does not see how the
prohibition against the terminals can be considered as a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion
in the metropolis, since the bus terminals if removed would just congest traffic in the common parking
areas, in case of transference to one site to another.

SC states that there are less intrusive means such as curbing the colorum.

EMINENT DOMAIN

MANILA V CHINESE COMMUNITY

FACTS: in 1916 city of Manila presented a petition in the CFI praying that certain lands be expropriated
for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. Petitioner alleged that they plan to extend Rizal
avenue.

Defendants allege that it is the owner of the lots needed they denied that it was neither necessary or
expedient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes; that the Rizal furnished ample
means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation and if it
was indeed a public necessity other road were available, which would not disturb the rest of the dead.
A large number of Chinese people were laid to rest there, it would require a large sum of money to
transfer the dead to a new cemetery. CFI judge stated that there was no necessity for the expropriation
of the parcel of land in question.

Upon appeal petitioners state that once it has established the fact, under law that it has the authority to
expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it desires and that the only function of the court is to
ascertain the value of the land in question. they state that the Charter of Malia states that “the City may
condemn private land for public use” however the charter does not have any procedure by which the
said authority may be exercised.

ISSUE: W/N MANILA HAS THE POWER OF EXPROPRIATION? And may the courts question eminent
domain?

HELD: NO, the right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, before it can
exercise such power the court must find A. law or exercise exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain B. right or exercise is in accordance with the law. For eminent domain to exists there must be A.
Land must be private B. purpose must be public.

There is a distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise
the right of eminent domain and a decision by a municipality that there exists a necessity for the
exercise of that right in a particular case. 1. Declaration simply that there exists a reason why the right
should be conferred upon municipal corporation 2. The application of the power in a particular case.
Legislative declaration relating to advisability of granting the power cannot be converted into a
declaration that necessity exits for its exercise in a particular case.

the general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in a particular case. The power of legislature to confer, upon municipal corporation and other
entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts. But general authorities of municipalities must not be confused with the right
to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying authority. the
courts have the power to decide whether or not the municipality is exercising the right in a particular
case under the conditions imposed by the general authority.

SC decided against expropriation because records show no proof of the necessity exists for opening the
street through the cemetery especially when adjourning and adjacent lands have been offered free of
charge.

REPUBLIC V PLDT
FACTS: Plaintiff is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and
instrumentalities, one of which was the bureau of Telecommunications. The defendant was PLDT a
public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, to install operate and maintain a telephone
system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmissions of messages
within the Philippines and to other countries.

RCA is an American corporation authorized to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee by
assignment of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of
long-distance wireless messages. In 1933 PLDT and RSA entered into an agreement where telephone
messages from the US received by RSA could automatically be transferred to PLDT. Contracting parties
agreed to divide tolls 75/25 in favor of PLDT and in 1947 it was a 50/50 split. Their contract terminated
in 1956

In 1947 BT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment by renting trucks of PLDT to enable the government offices to call private parties. In their
agreement PLDT prohibits the public use of services furnished by the telephone subscriber for his
private use. BT has extended its services for the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines
owned by, and rented from PLDT.

Plaintiff then entered into an agreement with RSA for a joint overseas telephone service. PLDT then
complained to the BT stating that they were violating their conditions and stated if the violations were
not stopped by midnight PLDT would sever the telephone lines, which it did sever.

At this time BT was maintaining 5,000 lines while 5,000 applications were pending; PLDT has 60,000
lines and 20,000 pending applications. Nether of them had been able to fill the demand for the
telephone service.

BT then proposed to PLDT to enter into a contract with them with the government paying for all calls
passing through their interconnecting facilities from BT to PLDT. They did not agree on the contract
stipulations.
Plaintiff then commenced a suit against the defendant demanding PLDT to enter into a contract with
them for the use of the facilities of the defendant’s telephone system under terms and conditions the
court may see as reasonable.

PLDT denied any obligation of their part to enter into a contract with plaintiff and insisted that they
were justified in disconnecting the trunk line since it was being used to defraud them.

ISSUE: W/N plaintiff can compel PLDT to enter a contract with them?

HELD: NO, the court may not compel them to enter into a contract with each other BUT while the court
may not compel them to enter into a contract, the republic may, in the exercise of eminent domain
require PLDT to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of PLDT as the
needs of the government services may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. Normally
eminent domain results in taking or appropriation of a title to posses and expropriate property by there
is no reason why the said power may not be availed of to impose a burden upon the owner of the
condemned property, without loss of title or possession. In this case private property is subjected to a
burden for public use and benefit. There is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest, provided just compensation.

PEOPLE V FAJARDO
FACTS: In 1950 a city ordinance in Cam Sur states that if any person should construct or repair a building
should obtain a written permit from the mayor also that no one may construct a building which would
destroy the public view of the plaza. The mayor then was respondent

4 years later after the term of respondent, his son in law filed a request for the construction of a
building adjacent to their gas station. The request was denied since it would destroy the public view of
the plaza. They applied again bust was again denied. They still continued with the construction of the
building even without the permit of the Mayor. Respondents stated that they needed to build such since
their house was destroyed by the typhoon and had since been living on leased property.

Respondents were then charged and convicted for violation of such ordinance, upon appeal the CA
upheld the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N the ordinance is valid?

HELD: NO, the ordinance fails to state any policy, or set up a standard or guide to limit the mayor’s
actions. Said ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unlimited power to grant or deny the
construction of buildings.

The contention that that mayor may deny any permit solely on the case the proposed building destroys
the view of the public plaza is unreasonable and oppressive in that it permanently deprives appellants
the right to use their own property; it oversteps the boundaries of police power and amounts to taking
without just compensation. The state may not, under the guise of police power permanently divest the
owners of the beneficial and use of the property practically confiscating them solely to preserve the
aesthetic appearance of the community.

REPUBLIC V CASTELVI
FACTS: Plaintiff filed a complaint for eminent domain against defendant in 1959. In its complaint
republic stated that the fair market value should not be more than 2,000p per hectare on a little over
250,000p and prayed that the court authorize them to take immediate possession of the land. Upon
deposit of just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. The court agreed on said price
of the property.

Respondent meanwhile stated that the fair market value of her property is over 11 million and that the
Airforce despite repeated demands was illegally occupying her land since 1956. Then 3 commissioners
were appointed to asses fair market value, which they came up with was 10p per square meter.

Republic states that taking should be reckoned from 1947 when the contract of lease between
respondent and petitioner was signed and not from the time the complaint for expropriation was filled.

Respondent states that taking has 2 elements: 1. Entrance and occupation by expropriator for more
than a moment 2. Devoted to public use in such a way that it deprives the owner of beneficial use. They
state the 1st requisite is lacking because they have a contract of lease on a year to year basis and 2nd
republic was paying monthly rentals to them.

In 1956 the republic wanted to renew the contract for 1 year but respondent refused and demanded
that the property be vacated within 30 days. The air force stated that it would be impossible for them to
vacate since there were already permanent installations and other facilities erected and established on
the property.

ISSUE: W/N taking starts?

HELD, the requisites for taking are 1. Expropriator must enter a private property (lease agreement of
republic and Castelvi) 2. Entrance must be for more than a moment (the fact that AFP erected
permanent installations means they were not there for just a mere movement) 3. Entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority (Republic entered as a lessee) 4. Property is devoted for a public use
(Airforce base is public) 5. Utilization is in such a way that outs the owner of beneficial enjoyment of the
property (payment of rent)

It is therefore clear that taking could not have taken place in 1947.

In this case the taking was in 1959, when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

AMIGABLE V CUENCA
FACTS: petitioner is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu as evidenced by a TCT, in 1924. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale the government used a portion of the said lot, with an area of 6,167
square meters for Mango and Gordo Avenue.

It appears that since 1921 the avenues were constructed but they were in bad shape and that
construction began in 1925. In 1958 petitioner wrote to the President requesting just compensation for
the lot which had been appropriated to the government, it was disallowed.

Petitioner then filed a complaint against the republic, petitioner sought the recovery of ownership of the
property and compulsory and moral damages.
Respondents stated that the sat could not be sued and that if ever right of action had already
prescribed. RTC decided that petitioners had no course of action because the government cannot be
sued. Hence this appeal

ISSUE: W/N THE GOVERNMENT CAN BE SUED IN THIS CASE?

HELD: yes, when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going to the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may maintain its suit
against the government without violation of government immunity. Government immunity cannot serve
as an entrustment for perpetrating injustice on a citizen. had the government followed procedure
indicated by governing law a complaint would have been filed. However, since the road has already
been built the government must have due compensation in behalf of the petitioner.

PPI V COMELEC
FACTS: PPI is questioning the constitutional validity of Comelec resolution for the so-called “Comelec
space” or that newspapers shall produce a print space of ½ page of Comelec space which is free of
charge for the general public to know the platform of candidates.

In the PPI petition they ask to declare the Comelec resolution unconstitutional on the ground that it
takes private property without just compensation. And at the same time process raw data as to make it
camera ready is tantamount to involuntary servitude.

SOLGEN states that the said resolution does not impose upon its publishers any obligation to provide
free print space and it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanctions for the non-compliance
with the resolution. Even if it were considered as mandatory it would still be a valid exercise of police
power.

ISSUE: W/N Comelec ordinance is constitutional?

HELD: No, just because there is no penal or administrative sanction does not mean that the Comelec’s
intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space. A written communication
officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by the government and
signed by members of the commission is bound to have some coercive effect upon the company
addressed.

To compel print media to donate Comelec space of the dimensions in said resolution amounts to taking
without just compensation. Also, the power of eminent domain has not been given to the Comelec by
the constitution or by legislature.

SUMULONG V GUERRERO

FACTS: in 1977 the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land
covering approximately 25 hectares including the lots of petitioner with an area of 6,667 square meters.
The land sought to be expropriated was valued at 1P per square meter adopting the market value fixed
by the provincial assessor in accordance with the PD.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA
deposited over 150,000p representing the total market value of the subject 25 hectares.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of
possession of property without due process of law, hence this petition questions the said PD petitioners
allege that that PD would allow the taking of property regardless of the size and no matter how small
the area to be expropriated.

ISSUE: W/N PD is a valid exercise of eminent domain?

HELD: Yes, although petitioners contend that social housing is not for public use since it will only benefit
a handful of people. social housing is there so that the low-income families may live there instead of the
slums, meaning that there may be slum clearance which is for the public good.

Public use is a requirement in eminent domain and is flexible and an evolving concept influenced by the
changing conditions.

Public use means – whatever maybe beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies public use.

Petitioners further contend that PD would allow the taking of private property regardless of size. SC
holds that eminent domain is not only for large portions of land but also for small. regardless of the size.

MANOSCA V CA

FACTS: petitioner inherited a parcel of land in Taguig with an area of around 400 square meters, when
land was ascertained by the NHI it was found to be the birthplace of Felix Manalo the founder of the INC
church. PD then was issued to make such land a historical landmark, in 1989 the republic through OSG
filed motion for issuance of an order to immediately posses said property. Motion was opposed by
petitioners. After hearing trial court an order fixing the provisional market price and authorized the
republic to take over the property once the sum as been deposited to the Municipal treasurer or Taguig.

Petitioners move to dismiss complaint based on the fact that the expropriation was not for a public
purpose and incidentally it would constitute an appropriation of public funds for the benefit of INC.

ISSUE: W/N eminent domain is applicable in this case?

HELD: YES, although petitioners argue that expropriation failed to meet the guidelines in Guido case: 1.
Size of land expropriated 2. Number of people benefited 3. Extent of social and economic reform.
However, the enumeration given is restrictive and limited.

Petitioners question why is there a need for the expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo, when
only members of INC would benefit? They fail to realize is that Felix Manalo is a contributor to Philippine
culture and history. Indeed, only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation but it does not
diminish the essence and character of public use.

Public use is that where it confers some benefit to the public and is not confined by actual use of the
public.

EPZA V DULAY
FACTS: in 1979 the President issued proclamation 1811 reserving a certain parcel of land of the public
domain in Cebu covering almost more than 1 million square meters for an Export Processing Zone
Authority. not all of the reserved land was however public, the proclamation included 4 parcels of land
with an area of 22,000 plus square meters owned and registered in the name of private respondent;
petitioner then offered to purchase the said lot from him and they failed to reach an agreement.

Petitioner then filed a complaint for expropriation against private respondent for the establishment
Mactan Exporting Zone. RTC sided with petitioners and stated that they should posses the property after
just compensation in which the courts would have to ascertain.

The 3 commissioners submitted their consolidated report on the amount of 15p per square meter.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that PD 1533 had superseded sections
5 and 8 of rule 67 on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that
compensation must not exceed the maximum set by PD 1533.

ISSUE: W/N PD 1533 has superseded Rule 67 sec 5 and 8?

HELD: NO, PD 1533 states that the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value
declared by the owner of the property or the market value of the assessor, whichever is lower therefore
there is no need to appoint commissioners as stated in the Rules of Court.

The method of ascertaining just compensation is Void because it encroaches judicial prerogative.
Although the courts would technically still have the power to decide just compensation, its task would
simply be to state the lower value from the property owner or the assessor, it would be useless for the
court to appoint commissioners under the Rules of Court. The constitutional guarantee of due process
would still technically be fulfilled however it would be a mere formality as the court will only always
choose the lesser value.

PARANAQUE V V.M REALITY

FACTS: In pursuant to Sanggniang resolution, the city of Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation
against private respondent over 2 parcels of land for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of
the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. RTC
finding it sufficient in form and substance and issued a decision authorizing the petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit of 15% of just compensation.

Respondent then answered stating that complaint for expropriation was filed pursuant to a resolution
and not an ordinance.

ISSUE: W/N eminent domain will push through?

HELD: No, since a resolution is not an ordinance. Although petitioner state that a resolution and an
ordinance are synecious the court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative
branch of government, which may delegate the exercise to LGU’s the FF requisites must occur: 1. There
must be an ordinance enacted by local legislation to exercise eminent domain 2. Eminent domain shall
be used in exercise of public use, purpose welfare or for the benefit of the poor 3. Just compensation 4.
Valid offer has been made to the owner before expropriated.
A resolution is different from an ordinance, since an ordinance is law and a resolution are merely a
declaration of sentiment or opinion. An ordinance has a 3rd reading while a resolution does not. If
legislature intended to allow LGU’s to use the power of expropriation by resolution, then they would
have said so in the LGU Code.

REPUBLIC V LIM

FACTS: IN 1938 republic instituted special action for expropriation with CFI Cebu involving 2 lots for the
purpose of a military reservation for the Philippine Army the lots were in the name of Denzon. After
depositing 9,500p the republic took possession of the said lots thereafter CFI ordered the republic to pay
Denzon 4kP. In 1950 the heirs of Denzon filed with the National Airport Corporation a claim for rentals
for the 2 lots but it denied knowledge of the matter.

For the failure of the republic to pay the lots Denzon’s Successors-in-interest filed with the CFI action for
recovery of possession. In interim the 2 lots were sold to Valdehueza and Panerio, CFI then rendered a
decision favoring them stating that they have retained their right to the property for failure for republic
to pay the 4kP. However, they were forced to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.

The lot was again mortgaged to Lim, who then filed for quieting of title which was approved by the RTC.
Republic appealed to the CA but CA sustained the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N Republic retained ownership of the lost despite failure to pay just compensation?

HELD: according to sec 9 of art III of the constitution “no private land shall be taken for public use
without just compensation” the republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed to pay
respondents PII the just compensation needed. The length of time and manner of which its evaded
payment demonstrates its arbitrary, high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment was
entered in 1948, more than 50 years has passed and the respondents still have not received their just
compensation. The Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair play.

Without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the
expropriator.

While the prevailing doctrine is that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the owner to
recover possession, however in cases where the government fails to pay just compensation within 5
years the owner shall have the right to recover possession.

APO FRUITS V LANDBANK

FACTS: this case was originally held that the just compensation to be paid and fixing the interest due on
the balance of the compensation at 12%. Landbank assails that SC should not have granted the
petitioners motion for reconsideration because the ruling deleting the 12% interest had already been
attained when the entry of judgment was issued. Landbank also argues that the present case does not
involve transcendental importance, as it does not involve life or liberty.

This case involves public interest since it involves the governments agrarian reform law.
ISSUE: W/N LBP is at fault for delay in just compensation?

HELD: although justice Abad insists that landbanks valuation of the petitioner’s properties were in
accord with sec 17 of CARL, he stated when the RTC gave a significantly higher value to the lands in
question landbank acted within its rights when it appealed the valuation. Justice Abad did not show any
evidence that supported his claim. Moreover, the SC already held that the valuation of the RTC was the
correct valuation. Based on the records it shows that the RTC valuation was based on A. Commissioners
reports B. Cuervo appraisers C. Value of permanent improvements.

In determining just compensation the cost of the land, current value of like properties, nature, actual
use and income, tax declarations shall be considered.

Again, Justice Abad states one can only incur interest on just compensation upon default and in the
present case landbank states they did not incur any delay since they were partial payments made.
However, this argument overlooks the definition of just compensation in the sense that FOR
COMPENSATION TO BE JUST IT MUST BE MADE WITHOUT DELAY.

Landbank further states that just compensation in terms of CARL should be determined within the
context of social justice. However, under ART XIII SEC 4, It clearly states that the taking of the land for
the governments use in agrarian reform is conditioned on the payment of just compensation. Nothing
was made to show that taking for agrarian reform purposes should be treated differently from taking as
required in any other case of expropriation