A bout the Authors
A Short Introduction to
JAMES RACHELS (194]-2003) was University Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He wrote The End of rife:
Euthanasia and Aloralily (1986), Createdfrom A njlllals: TIU' Moml Impli-
cations ofDarwinism (1990), Can Ethirs Prrmidl! illl5wn:s? (1997), Pmblfms
from PhilosoPhJ (2005), The Hements ofi'V1oml Philoso/}h),. and The Legacy
ofS'ormtes (forthcoming).
SrL'ART R~CHELS is Associate Professor of Philosoph v at the Universit\
of Alabama. A former United States Chess Champion and a Life Master
at bridge, he wrote the fifth edition of TIll' Elnlll'nts of AToral PhiloslI/llz,·
(2006; previous editions were by James Rachels). His scholarl" articles
have appeared ill 11 umenms journals.
\i
CHAPTER 1
Moral Philosophy
James Rachels
,\n ancient legend tells the story of Gyges. a poor shephcnl who found a
magic ring in a fissure opened 1)\ an earthquake. The ring wonld make
its wearer im·isible. so he could go allywhere and do 3mthing unde-
tected. Gyges II'as an Ilnscrnpulous fellow, aHo he quickly realized that
the ring cOlllo be pllt to good ach'antagc, \'\'e arf' told that hf' IIsed its
power to gaill entrY to the royal palace where he seduced the queen,
mllHlered the king, and seized the throne. (It is 110t explained 11()\\' in-
visibility helped him to St"CitIC(" the qlleen-bllt let that pass.) In no time
at all, hf' went from being a poor shepherd to being king of all the land.
This story is recollnted in Book II of Plato's RI'/JllIi!ir. Likf' all of
Plato's works, the RejJllblic is written in the form of a dialogue between
Socrates and his companions. Glaucon, who is having an argument
with Socrates, lIses the storv of Gvges's ring to make a point.
Glaucon asks liS to imagine that there are two such rings, olle
given to a illan of virtuf' and the other giYf'l1 to a rogne. How might
we expect them to beha\e? The rogue, of coursf', will do anything
necessary to increase his own wealth and power. Since the cloak of
invisibility ,viII protect hill! from discm·el'V. he can do anything he
pleases without fear ofheing caught. Therefore, he will recognize no
mOI'al constraints 011 his conduct, and tht"rl' will he no end to the
mischief he will do.
But how will the so-called ,"irtuous mall behave? Glaucon sug-
gests that he will do no bf'lter than the rogue:
':\0 Olle, it is cOllll1lonh' beJiner!, would ha\'e sitch iron slrength of
mind as to stand t~lsl in doing right OJ' keep his hands oIl' Olher
l1len's goods, when he COl lid go 10 the market-place and Ip<lrlessly
help hil1lselflO amthing he w(lllled. enter houses and sleep with any

2 nl~,RIGIITTI"J\(;TO[)O
\\'0111an he chost', st't prisont'rs Irt't' ,\I1d killlllen at his pleasure, and
in a word go aboUl among Illen \\'itb tile powers ola god. lie \\'Hlld
heha\'t' IlO ht't1t'r than tl1t' otl1t'r: both would take the sallle course,
Moreovcr, Glallcon asks. wIn shOllldn't Ilt'? Once he is fret'd froll1 the
fear of reprisal, why shouldn't a person simply do what he pleases, or
what he thinks is best for himself:- Why should he care at all about
"moralitv"?
The RF/mblir, written OHT 2~)OO years ago, was Olle of the first
great works of IllOl'al philosophy ill Western history. Since theil,
philosoplwrs havt" formulated theories to explain what Illoralitv is,
why it is important, and why it has the pendiar hold on liS that it dot'S,
What, if anything,justifies us in belie\'ill~ that we mOrrill)' ought to art ill
one way rather than another?
Relativism
Perhaps the oldest philosophical theof\ abollt moralin' is that right
and \\Tong arc relatiyt" to the customs of olle's societY-Oil this vie\\'.
thnc is nothing behilld the demands of llIorality except social con-
vention. Herodotlls, the first of the great Creek historians, lived at
ahout the timc of Sucrates. His Histm), is full of WOlldcrhd anecdotes
thai illustrate his belief that "right" ,Ind "wrong" arc little mol'(:' than
n<llllt'S for social rOl1\entiolls, Of the Massa~etae, a tribe in Central
Asia, he writes:
The follo\\'ing arc some of their Clistollls-Each lllall has htlt Ollt'
wife. H't all the \Iives al'e held ill common. , , Hlllll,lll lift' dol'S
not come 10 its natural dose with these people: bill \\hell a lllan
gn)\I's \er\ old. all his kinsl()lk collect together and oJ'll'l him up
in sacrifice; om-rin),!; al the sallle time sonw rattle also, .\fter the
sacrilke thc\ hoil the flesh and fcaq on it: and those \\'ho thus
end their da\'s arc l-ecKollcd the happiest. lIa man dies ol'diseas(O
they do not eat him. but hun him in the ground. bcwailing his
ill-fortlllle th,ll he did not come to he sacrificed. The\' sO\\ 110
grain, but live on their herds, and on fish. of which there is great
plellll in the A"axes, '\lilk is \I'hat thel chielh dlink. The onll
god they worship is the sun, and to hill! the" offer the horse in
sacrific(>; llnder tlw notion of giving the swiftest of the g'ods the
swiftest of all lllona] creatllres.
Herodotus did not think the Massagetae were to be cl'iticized fIll' sllch
practices, Their customs were llcither better nor worst' than those or
other peoples; they were merelv different. Tile Grecks, who considered
,\ SIIORT I:\TR()()lCTI(l:\ TO \1(HL\1 PHilOSOPHY :s
thelllseh'e~ 1ll0lT "ciYilizer\," l1)a\' han' th()I!~llt that their cllstoms were
slllwrior, but, HtT()(\OtllS says, that is ollh' because everyone helit"vcs
the ClIStOIllS of his ()\\'!1 society to he the hest. The "tmth" depends 011
olle's point or view-that is, Oil the society in which olle happens to
have heen raised.
Relati\'ists thillk that Herodotus was ohviously on to something
and that those \\\10 believe in "objcctin'" rig-ht and wron~ are m('rd~'
!lain'. Critics, hO\\'CHT, object to the theon' on a ntllnheY' of ~rollnd~.
First, it is cxcecdin~h c()nscITati\'(~, ill that tht" theory endor~t"s wha1-
('Yer llIoral views happen 10 be CUITt'llt ill a socit"t\, C;msider our o\\'n
socicty. I\bm' people helicyc that ollr society's 111O;'al cock is mistaken.
at least on somc points-for exal1lple, thl'~ may disagn,'c with the dom-
inant social \icw regarding capilal punishment, or homosexualit\, or
the treatmcnt of Ilonhuman animals. Milst we conciu<it" that these
would-be reformcrs an:' "T(mg. merely because thcy oppose the ma-
jority yic\\'? 'Win' Hlllst the majority always he righ t?
But there is a d(,eper problem \\'itb Relativism, l'11lphasi/ed by
Socrates. SOllle soci~d custOIllS art', indeed, llIcrely arbitran'. and wllt:';1
t~ICSt' CUstOlllS arc ~It issllc it i~ frllitless to insi~t that one s()~iety's prac-
tices are hetter th~lIl 'lIIother's. Flillcran' practices arc a good example.
I he Greeks burned their dead, "hilt· the Callalians atc their <lelt!. but
lleither pr<lrtic(' is hellcr thall the otheL Ho\\'ner. it do('s not follow
i'rolll this that 1111 ~ocial practiccs arc arbilran in the same \\'<1\, Some
an', ~lIld some arc lIOt. The Creeks alld the Callatialls \\'('l'(' f'I.;.{' to ac-
ccpt wltalner Ii.lI1crar\ praoiccs the\' liked bt'c<llls(' no ohjcctin' rea-
son could he gin'n win- one practice \\',IS s\lperior to tilt' other. In the
case or other practices. howen']', there Illa\' ht" good reaSOllS wl1\' sOl11e
are superior. It is l10t hard, II)]' example, 'to t'~plain wll\' hOllestv and
respect for h 1Il1l<ln lire art" socially desi rabie, and sill! ilarl~' it is not hard
to explaill wll\ slmery and racislIl' are undesirable. BeC<ll;SC we can SlIp-
pon ()llrjlld~lIlents about these Illatters with ratiollal arglllllents, we
do not ha\'t" to regard thosejlldglllt'nts as '"Illerely" the expression of
ollr particnlar societ\·\ moral code.
Divine Commands
A second ,1Ilcicllt idea, also Etllliliar to Socrales, was that moral living
consIsts in olwdience to divine ('ollllllands. II this were true, then we
could easily answer the challeng-e of (;vg-cs's ring-even irwc had the
power orill\'isibilit\', we would still be suhject to di\in(' retriblltion, so
ultimately we could lIot "get ,I\\'a\ with" doing whatevcr we wanted.
4 n IF RJ(;HT TJ lINC TO no
BUI Socrates did not believe that rig-lit living could consist
merely in trying to please the gods. In the Elilhyphm. another of
Plato's dialogues, Socrates is shown considering at some length
whether "right" can be the same as "what the g-ods command." Now
we ma) notice. to begin with, that there are considerable practical
ditliculties with this as a general theory of ethics. I low, luI' example,
are we suppo,>ed to know what the gods command? There are, or
COHrse, those who claim to have spoken with God about the matter
and who therefore claim to be in a position to pass on his instruc-
tions to the rest of us. But people who claim to speak for God are not
the most trustworthy folks-hearing voices can be a sign of schizo-
phrenia or a megalomania just as casily as an instance or dhine com-
lIlunication. Others, more modestl\', rely on scriptllre or church
tradition for guidance. But those sources are notoriou,>ly ambiguolls-
they gh'e vague and often cOIItI'aoi('(ory instrllctions-so, when peo-
ple consult these authorities. they typically rely on whatever elements
of scripture or church tradition support the moral dews they are al-
read, inclined to agree with. :\10reoW'r, because scripture and church
tradition han> becn handed down from earlier times. they provide
littk dirc('\ help in addressing distinctin'lv contemporary problems:
the problem of elwirol1l11ental prcscn<ltion. for example. or tIle
problem of lIm\ lIlllch or our resources should be allocated to AIDS
research as opposed 10 other worth, endeavors.
Still. it may be thought that God's commands provide the ulti-
matc Illltlwrit)· for ethics, and that is t.he issue Socrates addressed,
Socrates acceptcd that the gods exist and that thcy may issue instruc-
tions. But he showed that this cannot be the ultimate basis of ethics.
He points Ollt that we hm'e to distinguish two possibilities: Either the
gods have some reason for the instructions they issue, or they do not.
If tltey do not, then their commands are merely arbitrary-the gods
are like petty tyrants who demand that we act in this way and that, even
though there is 110 good reason for it. Bllt this is an impiolls view that
religious people will not want to accept. On the other hand, if we~ay
that the gods do have good reasons for their instructions, then we have
admitted that there is a standanl of rightness inoepcndcllt of their
cOlllmands-namely. the standard to which the gods themselyes refer
in deciding what to require of liS.
It follows, then, that evcn if one accepts a religi011s picture of
the world, the righmess or wrongness of actions cannot be under-
stood merely ill terms of their conformity to divine prescriptions. We
llIay always ask why the gods cOlllmand what they do, and the answer
A SHORT INTRODCCTION TO MORi\L PHILOSOPHY 5
to thai question will reveal why right actions are right and why wrong
actions are wrong.
Aristotle
Although Relativism and the Divine Command Theon' have always
had supporters, they have never been popular among serious students
of moral philosophy. The first extended, systematic treatise on moral
philosophy, produced two generations after Socrates, was Aristotle's
lVi(OIfl(lchmll Elhi(~ (ca, 3~~O B.C.), and Aristotle wasted no timt' 011 such
notions. Instead. Aristotle oHerccl a detailed account of the ,irtues-the
qualities of character that people need to do well in lite. The yinues in·
clude courage, prudence, generosity, honesty, and many more; Aristotle
sought to explain what each one is and why it is importallt. His answer to
the question of Gygcs's ring was that \irtlle is necessary fC)t' human beings
to achieve happiness; therefore, the man ohlrtue is ultimately better off
b(,((lIlsf' he is \lrtuous.
ArislOt.ie's view of the virtuous lile was connected with his overall
way or ullderstanding the world and our place in it. Aristotle's con-
ception of what the world is like was enormously influential; it domi-
nated WesterJI thinking for over 1700 years. A central feature or this
conception was that f'(1('t)'lhiIlK in Ii(llllll' ('xi.l/sjfJr (I jmrjJos('. "Nature,"
Aristotle said, "belong-s to the class or causcs which act for the sake or
something. "
It seems Ob'1011S that artil~lCts such as knives and chariots have pur-
poses. because we have their purposes ill mind when we make them. But
what about natural objects that we do not make? Do they have purposes
too: Aristotle thought so. One of his examples was that we have teeth so
that we can chew. Such biological examples are quite persuasive; the
parts of our bodies do seem, intuitively, to have particular purposes-
eyes are for seeing, the heart is for pumping blood, and so on. But Aris-
totle's thesis was not limited to organic beings. According to him,
rorrything in nature has a purpose. He also thought, to take a different
sort of example, that rain Jails so that plants can grow. As odd as it may
S(>('ll1 to a modern reader, l\Jistot1e \vas perfectly serious about this. He
considered other alternatives, such as that the rain falls "of necessity" and
that this helps the plants only "bv coincidence, and rejected them, His
considered \iew was that plants and animals are what they are, and that
the rain falls as it does, "hecause it is better so."
The world, therefore, is all orderly. rational system, with each
thing having its own proper place and serving its own special purpose.
() 1m: RICII 1'[ 11I:-.J(; TO DO
There is a neat hierarch\': The rain ('xists ['ortbe sake oitl1e plants, the
plants exist li)l' the sakc of the animals, and the animals exist-of
coursc-Ior the sakc of pcople, whose \lcll-being i" the point of the
wllolc ,1IT<lllgClllCIIL In the Politics he \1 rOlt':
I\\' Jc IIIlISI 1)('li('\'(', tirst (h~ll plant:., e:...ist for the ,<Ike of anima\:",
second Ih;ll ;tll other animals exisl [i)!' the sakI' of 111,111, tame <l1Ii-
Ill,tls lil!' the ll'(' he ell! llIake of (helll as \\'('11 as for the food the\'
prmitle: and as li)l "ild animals, 1110.',1 though not all of these can
he lIscd fill food or ,II (' lise/it! in other "',l\S: clothing and ins(l'Il-
mell h (';111 h(' made Olll of I hCIll, If thell we arc righl in belining-
Ihal natun' makes nothing withollt '01111' (,Ild ill vicw, nothing III
no plllpOSC, it lIIust be that n<lllllC ha, made al1thing-s ,pcdlically
for the ,ake 0/ Ill,lIL
It W,IS a stllllningly anthropocelltric view, Aristotle may be f()rgiYen,
110\\1'\'('1', \\'hCI1 we considcr thm \'irtllal'" C\TIY important thinker in
0111' histon has entertained sOllle such thoug-hl. Humans are a I'e-
IllarbblY \<lin spccies,
Natural Law
'I'll(' Christi,lIl think(']'s who CIIlIC later found ,\ristotk's vicw of the
I\,orld 1(1)(' (ollgellial. T1t{'lc II,IS (lIlh Olll' thing Illissillg: The additioll
()f(~()d W,IS required to 1l1'1J..e Ihe picttlre complete, (Ari~totl(' had de-
lIied Iltal (~od lIas a Jl('('('ssarY part or tht' picture, For him, the worlcl-
liCI\ I\C h,IH' oUllined \\as not religious: it was simply a description or
how things arc,) Titus, the Christian thinkers said that the rain falls to
hdp the planls becallse Ihal is whatlhl' ClI'flior ill lellded, and the animals
,llT for lllllll<tn ll'll' because Iltal h: what God Jiuuit Ihl'lll fOJ: Valucs and
pllrposes were, there/()re, conceived to be a fundamental part the
lIalllre 0/ thillgs, benlllSl' the world was believcd to have heen created
according- to a divl11(' plan,
This \ie\\' or the world had a number or consequences for ethics.
011 the l110st gellerall(,\,el, it affirnwd the supreme \'alue ortmman life,
and il explained whv humans arc entitled to do whatever they please
with the rest oinaillre, The basic moral alTangemcllt-human beings,
whose lin's ,In.> sacred, dOlllinating a world made j()1' their benelit-
was ellshrined as the ?\atural Order of Thillg-S,
,\t a lllore detailed len:\, a corollmv of this outlook was that the
"I<IIIS ofnatll!'e" speed':-' how things o/lghlto bl', as well as describing how
things {In', In turn, knowing' how thing-s ought to he enables us to eval-
llate states of aflilirs as objcctin'h' g'Ood or had, Things are as they
,\ SHORT [:\TROJ)lfCIIOr-.; TO i\J(lR.\L PIIILOSOl'HY 7
ought to be wlwn they are serdng their natural pllrp0'ieS; \dH'l1 tht'y
do not 01' cannot sern~ thost' purposes, things ha\'t' gOlW wrong, Thus,
tcelh that ha\'e dccan:d alld cannot be used ror chewing are deft-ctive;
and drought, which deprin.>s plants of the rain t he\' need, is a lIatural,
objectin' niL
There an~ also implications fc)l' humau action: On Ihis dcw, Illoral
mles are olle type ofl;\\\' of nature, The key idea htTt' is Ihal ~Ollle f(ll'IllS
of human behayior are "natural" whik others are not; and "ullll,llural"
acts art' said to be wrong, Beneficence, tor example, is 1I(l(lJral (or lIS
lWC<lnse God has made us as social (l't',\lllres, \\'e \\anl and llced the
friendship of other people, and wc ha\t' natural affections for thcm;
hCllce. beh;l\ing brutishly toward them is unnaturaL Or to lake a clif-
f~rent sort or t'x<lmple, the purpose of the sex OlWlllS is procreatioll,
Thus, <lilY lise or them f()r other purpost's is "col1tran' to nature"
which is \\'11\ Ihe Christiall c1mrch has traditiollalh regarded allY form
or sexual acti\'it" thai does not result in procreation. snch as l1la~tllrba­
tion, ga: sex, or the use of cOlltraceptiYes, as impel'lllissible,
This combination of ideas, tog-etltn with others like them,
rormed Ihe core of an outlook known as 11~ltllral-law t'lhics. The Thc-
on of :'\alllral Law was deH'lopl'd most fttlh 1)\ Saillt Tholll<lS .\qllill<lS
(I ~~;)-l :!7-t.), who lin'ci at a lime \\'hen Ill(' Aristoleliall world\iew \Ias
11l1cl1,llknged, Aquinas was the fOH'llIO:,t thinker among traditional
Catholic thcolog-ians. Todal' n<ltllral-bw tileory still has aelhert'llls illsid(.>
tilt' (:atholie (:llllrch, bill few olltsicit'. The reasoll is that tlw Arislotciidll
\\orl(l\iew, on which llatural-Ll\\' ethics depended, bas bccII n"placcd
lw the outlook 01 mode]'Jl science.
Galileo, Ncwton. Darwin, ,Illd otlwrs den-loped wms of under-
standing natural phenomena that malk 110 llse of (,yaillatin' notions,
or In their wm' of thinking, the raill has no purpose, It cloes nol bll ill or-
der to hdp the plants grow, Plants tvpicalJ\' tlle alllollnt of water
the\' need h('cause each spccies has e\'(Jlved, by nalllr,d sele( tion, ill
the cIlYironme!1t in \\'hich that amollnt of water is cH'<lilable. l\atllral
selection prodllces an orderly arrangement thai ajJjJ('(IJ:\ to haye been
designed, but that is only an illusion, To explain natnre there is no
need to aSSllme teleological principles, neither Aristotle's "final
GlIlses" nor thc Christians' God, This changed olltlook \Vas 1)\ far the
l1loSI insidious f(.'ature of the new science: it is lit lit' woncler that the
church's first respollse was to condelllll it.
Model'll science trallsformed people's \'ic\\' of whal tllc world is
like, But part or lilt' tr~\Ilsf()l'Jnation, inseparable /i'om Ihe rest, was an
altcred yie\\' of tht' nature of ethics, Right anel \\Tong could no longer
10 THE RH;fIT THI~(; TO DO
rules requiring truthflllness and promise keeping are needed filr peo-
ple to flourish ill a social setting. Even if there are liO IJloral j~lCts. the
reasoning that leads to such conclusions is perfectl\" objecti\"t'.
Third, the Social Contract TI1t'ory explains why we should mr!'
ahout ethics-it ollt'rs at least a partial response to the problem of
Gyges's ring. If there is no God to punish lIS, 1\lw should wt' hother
to do what is "right," especially when it is not to Ollr advantage? The
answer is that it is to our ad\"antage to live in a soriet\' where people
behan' morally-thus, it is rational for us to accept moral rt'stric-
tions on our conduct as part of a bargaill we make with other people.
'We bendit directly from the ethical conduct of others, and our OWII
cOl1lplianct' with the moral rules is the price we pay to secure their
compliance,
Fourth, the Social COlHraCl. approach gives us a sensiblt' and ma-
tllre \\',1\' of determining what our ethical dllties really are, \Ylwll
"morality" is mentioned, the first thing that pops into many people's
minds is an attempt to restrict t\leir sex lives. It is unfortunate that the
word II/oral.l has come to han" sllch a cOl1notation. The whole pnrpose
of ha\'ing a s\'stern of morality, according to Social Contract Them\', is
to make it possible for people to li\'t' their individual lin's in a setting
or social coopt'ration-its purpose is not to tell people what killds or
lin's they should liyt' (except inso/ilr as it is necessary to restrict con-
d lIct in the ill lerests of main tain ing social coopna tion), Therefore, <In
ethic hased on the Social COil tract would han' little interest in what
people do in their bedroollls.
Finally, we may note again that Social Contract Theory assumes
rdatiyely little about human natltre. It trt'ats human beings as sell~
interested creatllres and does not assume that they are naturally al-
truistic. even to the slightest degree. One of the theory's charms is that
it can reach the conclusion that we ought. oftt'n, to beluw!'altruistically,
without assuming that we arenatural\y altruistic We want to Ii\'e as wt'll
as possihle, and moral obligations are created as we band together
with otht'r people to form the cooperativt' societies that are necessary
for us to achieve this /illldanwntalIv self~interested goal.
Altruism and Self-Interest
Arc people essentially sel/~interested? Although the Social Contract
Theory continues to attract supporters, nOi many philosophers anc!
psychologists today iYOldd accept Hobbes's egoistic view of human
nature, It seems c\'ident that humans have at least sOllie altruistic
A SHORT I:-.lTROnUTIO,\ TO \(ORAL PilI10SOl'llY II
feelings, if onl\' for their family and friends. We have e\oIH'd as so-
cial C1'e,ltllres jllst a" surely as we havc evolved as (Teatllres with
legs-thus, caring for Ollr kin and members of onr local group is as
natural for liS as walking.
If humans do hme some degree of natural altruism, does this
have any significance /()r morals? Hume thought so, Humc agreed
with Hobbes that our moral opinions are expression~ of Ollr fecl-
ings. Tn I 7:~9, when he invited his readers to consider ',\dllflll rnur-
der" and see if they cOlild filld that "matter offan" called "vice:' Hllme
concluded:
You can lwver End it, till \'Inl tllrn your reJ1exion into \our ()\Ill
breast, and find a senlinwlll of disapprolxllioll, which aris('s in
:Oll, towards litis 'K1io11. Here is a ll1~Hter of fac\: hut 'tis the ob-
ject of feeling ... It lies in IOllr;,df, not in the object. So thatllhcll
)'ou pronoullce ,lilY ,Inion or character to he I'icio\ls, I'OU mcan
llothing. but that from the cunstillltion of\ouJ' Hatun' \011 ha\'e a
It>eling or sClllimclll of blallle from the contemplation of it.
And what. exactl\', is "lhe constitution of Ollr nature"? Of course, it is
part of Ollr Ilature to care about ollrsehes and ollr own welt~lrt'. Bllt
Humt' added tltat Wt' also han' "wcia/ sentilllents" that C011-
!lect liS \I'itll other people and make llS cOllcerlled about their \\'eIEu'e.
That is why, HUllle ;;,lid, \\e llle<lSllre right alld \\TO!l1-S hv "the true ill-
terests of maIlkind":
In all detertllillatiom of llloralitl, thi" circul1l"t,1l1((' of pllhlic Itlil-
ill' is e\er principalh' in I'iell': and II'hcrel'(') displllCS arise. either
ill philm,oph\' or C0111mon life, concerning the bounds of dutv,
the ljucstioll canllOt, bl ,1111 means. be decided \I'ilh greater cer-
tainty lhall In ascertaining. 011 ,lIlI side, the true intel'est, of
mankind.
This \'iew came to be known as Utilitarianism, III modern moral phi-
losoplw, it is the chief" alternatin' to the I'henry of the Social Contract.
Utilitarianism
Ctilitarians hold that tlwrt' is olle principle that SHillS llP all ollr
moral duties. The ul timate moral principle is that we should llitlW)'S du
1lIIWI!'vN will jm)(/u({' Ihl' gr{'{/i(,11 jJossihlf /)(I{allc!' oj IwjJjJi II e,l,1 OVI'/' IW/W/J-
pi rtf/ISjiJr (,Vt'l)'OW' wIlli will be afli'tln! hJ 0111 (Ic1iol1. This "principle of util-
ity" is decepti\"t'ly simple. It is actuallv a combination or three ideas:
First. ill determining what to do, we should be guided by the expected
l:Z THLRI(;HTTIIl:-.lCTODO
consequences of our actions-we should do whateycr will have the
best consequences. Second, in determining which consequences are
best, we should giye the greatest possible weight to the happiness or
unhappiness that h'ould be caused-we should do whateyer will cause
the most happiness or the least unhappiness. And finally, the princi-
ple of utility assumes that each individual's happiness is equally as im-
portant as anyone else's.
Although HUl11e expressed the basic idea of Ctilitarianisl11, two
other philosophers elaborated it in greater detail.Jeremy Bentham, an
Englishman who lived in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, was the
leader of a group of philosophical radicals who aimed to reform the
laws of Britain along utilitarian lines. They were remarkably successful
in alh'ancing such causes as prison reform and restrictions on the usc
of child labor. John Stuart l\lill, the son of one of Bentham's original
followers. gave the theon' its most popular ami influential defense in
his book l'tiiilariulI;slII, published in 1861.
The utilitarian movement attracted critics from the outset. It
was an easy target because it ignored conn:ntional religious notions.
The point or morality, ,lccording to the Ctilitarians, had nothing to
do with obeying God or gaining credit in Heayen. Rather, the point
wasjust to make life in this world as comfortable and happy as possi-
ble. So some critics condemned Utilitarianism as a godless doctrine.
To this Mill replied:
[T Ihe qlle~li()n depcnds upon what idea we haYe forllled of tlw
moral character of the Deit\·. If it be a true belief that God de-
sires, ahme all things, the happiness of his creallll'es. and that
this was his purpose in their creation. milit\ is not only not a
godless doctrine, hut more profollndly religious than allY other.
Ctilitarianisl1l was also an easy target because it was (and still is)
a Sllb1",,:~i'1!I' theory, in that it turned mallY traditional moral ideas up-
side clown. Bentham argued, for example, that the purpose of the
criminal justice system cannot be understood in the traditional way as
"paying back" miscreams for their \dcked deeds-that only piles mis-
ery upon misery. Instead, the social response to crime should be three-
fold: to identi{'· and deal with the causes of criminal behavior; where
possible, to reform individual lawbreakers and make them into pro-
ductive citizens; and to "punish" people only insofar as it is necessary
to deter others from committing similar crimes. (Today, of course,
these are (;mliliar ideas, but only because the U tilitarialls' victory was
so sweeping.) Or, to take a different example, by insisting that every-
one's happine~s is equallv important, the lJ tilitarians offended variolls
A SHORT INTRODL'CTIO:-.J TO '-IORAI PflTlOSOI'IIY I~
elitist notions of group superioritv. According to the Utilitarian stan-
dard, neither race, sex, 1101' social class makes a difference to one's
moral status. Mill himself wrote a book on The Subjertion O/WOflll'll that
became a classic of the 19th-century sutTragist movement.
finally, Utilitarianism was controversial because it had no use for
"absolute" moral rules. The Utilitarians regarded the traditional
rules-against killing, lyillg, breaking one's promises, and so on-as
"rules of thumb," useful because following them will generally be for
the best. But they are not ahsolute-wheneyer breaking such a rule
will have better results for e\'eryone concemed, the rule should be
broken. The rule against killing, for example, might be suspended ill
the case of \'Oluntary euthanasia for someone dying of a painful illness.
Moremer, the Utilitarians regarded some traditional rules as dubious,
even as rules of 111ll1llh. For example, Christian moralists had tradi-
tionallv said that masturhation is evil because it violates the Natllral
Law; but from the point of view of the Principle of Utility, it appears to
be harmless. A more serious matter is the traditional religious con-
demnation of homosexllalit\', which has resulted in misery for count-
less people. UtilitarianisllI implies that if an acthity makes people
happy, without anyone heing harmed, it cannot he wrong.
But it is one thillg to describe a I110r'1l riew; it is another thing to
justil\ it. Utilitarianism says that our moral duty is to "promote the
general happiness." \\'Il\' should we do that? How call the challenge of
Gvges's ring be answered? As Mill puts it:
I kel that I am bOllnonot 10 rob or llIurder, betray or deceive: bllt
wIn am I hound to prOlllote the genet-al happiness~ If my O\\ll hap-
piness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?
Aside from the "external sanctions" of law and public opinion, Mill
thinks there is only one possible reason for accepting this or allY
other moral standard. The "internal sanction" of morality I11USt al-
ways be "a feeling in our minds," regardless of what sort of ethic this
feeling endorses:
The ultimate sanction. therefore, of all rnoralitv (external motin's
apart) being a sllhjeni\'e feeling in our own minds, I see nothing
embarrassing to those whose standard is utility ill the question.
'What is the sanction of that particular standard? 'We lila\, 'lllswer. the
same :JS all other moral standmds-the conscientious feelings
of mankind. t:ndouhtedlv this sanction has no binding eftiGtc)
on those who do nOl possess the j('elings it appeals 10; hut neither
will these persons be more obedient to ,Ill\' other moral Ininciple
thall the utilitarian Olle,
 --
14 nn: RI(;IHTHI~(,T() 1)0
The kind of morality we accept ,,-ill, therefore, depend on the nature
of Olll- fcclings: If human beings haw~ "social feelings," then ,\Iill Sil\'S
that utilitarian morality will be the natural standard 1'01' them:
The firm fllllndalioll [of lllilitarian moralitl' I is that of the social
feelings of mankind-Iht' desire to he in l!l1itl· with OHr kllow
(Teat lilTS, which is already a powerful principle in hllman na-
tlIn', and happih one of Ihme which tend to become ~tronger,
eyell without l'xpre,s inculcation. ti-Olll the inJlIH'lIccS of ad-
y,lIKing ciyilizatioll,
Impartiality
l'lilitarianism, as we hm'e seen, has implications that are at odds with
traditional morality, Much the same could be said about the Social
COlltrau Theon', Tn most of the practical matters that han' been
l1Ientioned-punishment, racial discrilllination, women's righls, eu-
thanasia, homosexuality-the two theories haye similar implications.
But Ihere i, one matter un which they differ dralllaticalh', l'tilitarians
belie\!:' Ihat we han' a ,'cry extcnsi\,e moral duty to help other people.
Social COl !lract theorists den, this.
Suppose, for example, vou arc thinking of spending $1000 fur a
lICW ]iying room carp,\. Should you do this? \\'l1at ane the alt"rnati,c . . ~
0ue alternati\"e is to gin' the lI10lle,' to an agenc\' ~llch as the l'nilcd
l\;atiolls Children \ F lind, Each vear between 10 and 20 millioll third·
world children die or easily preventable diseases, because there i~n't
enough money to provide the Yitamin-A capsules, autibiotic~, and oral
rehydration treatments they need, By giving the money to CNICEF,
and making do a while longer with your old carpel, you could prm·ide
much-nceded medical care for dozens of childrclI. From the point
of view of utility-seeking the best O\'crall outcome for everyolle
concerned-there is no doubt you should giye the l110ney to UNICEF,
Obvioush, the medicine will help the kids a lot more than the ncw rug
will help you.
But frOlll the point of view of thc Social Contract, things look
H'!Y diffi:'renL If 11100-alit)' rt'sts on an agreement between people-
remember, an agreement they cnter into to jJlvlUn/e tlwi!' OWI1 illh'If'.I/S-
what would the agreement say about helping other people? Certaiuh-,
we ,\'Ould want the contract to impose a duty not to harm other peopk,
evctl strangers, Each of liS would obviously benefit from that. Alld it
might be in our best interests to accept a mutual obliEiation to pro\'idv
aid to others whcn it is cas\' and cOll\'enient to do so. But would rational
.\ SlioRT I~TRODl(TIO:\ TO \1()~~[ PHILOSOPlIY I:)
people accept a general duly to prlwide virtually unlimited aid to
strangers, eyen al great cost Lo themselves? From the standpoinL of seH~
interest, that sounds crazy, Jan ;\Jar\'(~snn, a contract theorist who teaches
philosophy al the Uniyersity of v\'aterloo ill Canada, writes in his hook
Aloml Mal/en (1993):
[I\f]orals. if the\' arc to]w ratiollal, Illllst <Il1Hllllll to clgrennents
alllong r;eople-pcople of all killds, each pursllillg his or her
OWll illlcresls, which are \'arioW', and do not necessarily include
Il1II<'h concern for others and their interests. But people have
minds. alId apply inform<1tion gleaned from obsening tite world
arounfi thellI to tlI<' task of pnmlOting their interest'>, amllhe\'
hal"(' a broad repcrtoire of powers including SOIllC Ihal LllI
Illake thel1l exceedilIgh dangerolls. as well as others th,It can
make Ihem vcr\, helpful. This gh'es us ITa,OI1 to agree wilh each
other that w(' will refrain from harming- otilers in the pursuil of
our inlert'sts, to respcct each other's property ,md grant extcl1-
sin' civil rights, hut llot nC'cessarih' [0 go \"ten' far OIlt. of oIlr wa,-
to hc ,en' helpful to thosc wc don't kn(m- and lllaY llot partinl'
larl\' care for. ...
It is reasonable, then. to arrive at a generalullcier:'>landing
that we shall I", reach to help whell help is urgent and whell giv.
ing it is not yen Ol1CrfHl, to llS. But a gcnel-al II)HicrstdlHling that
we shall help en')'YOllC as if thel \\ere ollr spollses or dt'arest
friends is quite another mailer.
(1 nlike many philosophers who pref(>r to keep things abstract, ;\Jatyeson
is good about spelling out the i1l1plications of his view ill a ,\a\ thatlea"cs
no room [(n- misunderstandillg:
'What about parting with the llle,ll1S for making your sweet lillie
daughter\ birthday party a memorable one, ill order to keep a
do/cn sLrangen, ali'T on the other side olthe world? Is this some·
thing YOU are lllorall" required to do' Illdeed HOt. She mal' \\('11
111(111;"1 to mIl more thall they, This illustrates agaill the fan that
pcople do not "COUll I equally" for 1110St of lIS. :\onnal people care
more abollt somc people Llm11 others, and build their ,erl' lh'es
aronnd Lhose carillgs.
\Vhich "iew is correct? Do we have a moral duty to prO\"ide ex-
tensive aid to sl rangers, or not? Both views appeal ultimately to our
emotions, A striking feature of ~aryesol1's contractariall argument is
its appeal to the fact that we (mY' mun' for some people than others.
This is certainly true: As he says, we care more for onr own children
than for "strangers on the other side of the world," Bur does this really
\() THFRICHTTHIV;rODO
mean that I may choose some trivial benefit for I11V children over the
n:ry lives or the strangers:- Suppose there are two buttons on mv desk
at this moment, and bv pressing button A, I can provide my SO;1 \\ith
a nice part\'; bv pressing B, I can saY(' the lives of a dozen strangers. Is
it really all right for me to press A,just because T "care more" for my
SOli: Mill agrees that the issue must be decided on the basis of feel-
illgs (lIO\\, else cOllld it be?), but for him it is not these small-scale per-
sonal feelings that han' the final say. Instead, it is one's "conscientiolls
feelings"-thc feelings that preyail after eyenThing has been thought
through-that finally determine onc's obligations. ~lill assumes that
wc canllot when we are thollghtful and rellective, approve of oltr-
seh'cs pushing blltton A.
HoweHT, some contemporalJ' Utilitarians ha,'e argued that
the matter need not be left to the "icissitlldt's of individual feeling.
1t may be tnw, tilt'" say, tha t we all care more for ourselvt's, ollr I~un­
ily. and our friends than we care for strangers. But we have rational
capacities as well as feelings, and if we think objt'ctin'lv about the
matter, wt' will realize that other people are no different. Others,
even strangers, also care about themselves, their families, and their
friends, ill tlte sallle wa\, that we do, Their net'ds and intert'sts are
comparable to our OWl\. III lact, t/tnl' is notliing of t!1 is ,!!;I'llI'm! ,101'1 thill
III(/Ii!',\ (lilYOIII' di/ji'II'1itjro III IIIIYlHlI' d\'l~al1d if we arc in all re]c,'ant re-
spe('\s similar to one another, then there is no justification for any-
one taking his or her 011'11 interests to be more important. Pet~r
Singer. a utilitarian philosopher at Princeton Cniversit\', writes in
his book limo A,II' WI" to Lil l f? (1995): . Slated in this way, Kant's principle sumlTlari/es a procedure (or decid-
Reason makes il possible for liS to see ollrseh'es in this wm' , , , I am
able 10 see that r am just one being alJlong others. with interests
ami desires like others. I ha\'e a personal perspectin: Oil the
world, from whirh my interests are at the front and centre of the
stage, the interests of my family and friends are dose behind, and
the interests of strangers are pu;,hecito the back and sicks. But
reaSOll enables me to see that mhers han' similarh subjective per-
spetti\'es, and that from "the point of \'jew of the universe" my
perspecrive is no more pri\'ileged than theirs. Thus my abilitv to
reason shows llle the possibilitv of detaching myself f'n;m my (')wn
perspective, and shows me what the Ilni\'erse might look like if I
had no personal perspective.
So, from an o~jective viewpoint, each or IlS must acknowledge
that our OWI1 perspecti,'e-our own particular set of needs, interests,
likes, and dislikes-is onl" one among many and has no special status.
,\ SIlORT INTRODUTIO,\ TO '.IORAL 1'1 IILOSOI'HY 17
Kant
The idea ofimpartialil\ is also central to tllt' tllird major alternalive ill
modem llloral philosoph)', the systcm or t'thical ideas de\'ised b\' the
l!;reat German philosopher Immanuel Kant (I iYi-lHO-l). Lik~' the
Social Contract theorists and the Utilitarians, Kant sought to explain
ethics without appealing to di,'illt' comrnalld~ or "lllorall:ICts. Kant's
soll1tioll was to sec morality as a prodllct of "pure reaso11." Jllst as we
lllllst do some things bec<lllse of our dC,lirf'l-for exalllple, bccause J
desire to attend a concert, I must reserve a ticket-the mor:11 law is
binding 011 us because of our 11'(/,1'011,
Like the Ctilitarians, Kant belicvcd that Illorality can be slIlllnlcd
up ill Ollt' ultimate principle. Ihml which all our duties anel obligatiolls
are derin'd. But his yersion of the "'ultimate moral principle" was yen
different fmm the Principle or Ltility, because Kallt did not empha-
siLc the outcomes of actions. \Vhat \\,<15 imponant for II im was "doing
one's duty," and he held that a persoll's duty is not delermined b,
calculating conseqllences.
Kallt called hb ultima1e moral principle the "Catcgoricallmpera-
lin'." BUl he gan.' this principle two n'" dilkrcnt f(mllulations. Tile first
version of the Categorical Illlperatl\r. as cxpres~ed ill his 1I11/(/rllllt'lItll!
PriJilijifes o/Ihe ;\[l'IlIjilr)'sin ofA/llml\ (17H:l) goes like this:
.\n onl\' according \0 lilal llla:-;im b\' which \011 call ~\I tile 'i~1I11l'
lime \\'illlhat il should becol11e a ullin'l'sallaw.
ing whether an act i~ moral'" permissible. 'When vou are cOlltel1lpbtillg
a particular actioll, VOlt art' to ask whal rule VOIl \\'()tlid be follm\'ing if
you were to do it. (This will be tile "maxim" or t he act.) Then YOli are
to ask whether vou \\ould be willing for lhat rule to be follO\\'ed b\
everyone all the time. (That would make it a "UlliHTs,tllaw" in the rei-
evant [I so, tilt' rule may he followed, and the act i, permissi-
hie. H()\\'evcr, if "ou would Tlot be willing ror e\,ervol1e to lolk)\\ the
rule, thell YOli mav not follow it, and the act is morally impermissible.
This explains why tIlt' \-tora] Law is binding 011 liS simply bv
virtne of our rationality, The first requirement of rationality is thai we
he consistent, and it would not be consistent to an Oil a maxim tllat wt'
could lIot want others to adopt as well. Kant belicvcd. ill additi011, tilat
consistellcy re'luires llS 10 intt'rprct lIloral ruil's as h~l\ing no t'xceptiolls.
For this reason, he endorst'd a whole range of absolute prohibiliollS,
covering everythiIlg h'olll lying to suicide.
 II IF RI(.I IT Tf(I\;C TO DO ,\ SIIOR (I\;TROIHClIO\; 10 ~IOR.\1. 1'111« )SOI'IIY 1\)

HO\I'CHT, K,lIlt ,dso g-alT ~1I1otlH'r l()J'lllldatioll oj the (:atcgorical waJlt to discO\'cr tht' trlIth, 110\1' <111 idea strikes lIS is lIot" r('liahl(~ gIIide,
Illlpn<llill', Later ill tht· samc book, lit' said that tht' ultimate Illoral t(») OIlI "illllIiliollS" 1ll,1~ be lllist,lkclI,
pI'illCiplc mal be understood as S,l\illg: HappilY. tllt're is all altclIlati\ c, ,\11 ide,l is JlO bt'1tcr thall the
SO:lct thaI 1'011 Ireal hillnanill. Idlt'lll('r in \nUl own persotl or III
,lrglllllcllts th,tt SIlPPOrl it. So, to cI,lIl1,lte a philosophical ide,\, we ilIaI'
I h,ll or ,Illoll ]('1', ,tlll;!IS as all ('nd alld neler as I\leans (Jllk t'xallline the re,lsoning behind it. The great philosophers kllt'\1 this
ItTI well: The\ did Hot simph ,lllllOllllCC their pililo,ophical opillions:
"'hat dol'S it lllcan to s,n lklt persolls ,1I't' to be treated as "ends" instead, thel preo-.cllted ,llglllllt'llts ill SlIPpoi't oflhciryie\\'s, The lead-
,llld 1lC\'cr as "lllC,IIlS";- Kant gin's tllis ('xa III pie: Snppose \'()[l ueed ing idea, hOIl1 the tilllC ofSocr;lks to tlte present. has becn that truth is
11l()!](,\', ,lIld so lOll \\'allt a "10,111," bllt \'()]l kno\\' \t)!! could !lot Icp;n disco\Trcd bl considering the reasons I'DI' and against the lariulls al-
it. III ~kspcr;Hioll, lOll considn making a false prolllise (10 repal) ill terndTiyt's-tite "correct" tht'on is tht' Ol1e that has thc bc"! arglllllclliS
ordel to trick a fricnd illto g'iling l'OIl the III OlW\,. ]\};I\ YOU do this: Oil its side, Thlls, philosophical thinking consist>., to <I large extt'lll. in
Pnltaps lOll need the 1ll01H'\ J()I a gooc\ pllrpost'-'o good, in faci. formulating ,Illd ,lssessillg ;lrgllL1lellls. This is not the "hole of philos-
th,lt lOll mighl cO!l\'illce \ol!l'sdf tIll' lie \\onld be justilied, :\('\cr- Oph', bill it is a big parr of it. II is 111t;tt lIIakt's philo..,opln a Lltion;ti {'n-
thckss, illoll lied to IOllr friend, lOll \\Ollld llwrel\ be manipulating 'teq)ris(', rathel thall ,llI emptl cXt'ITi"e ill Theorl mongcrillg.
him ,md using !tilll "<l~ a means,"
Oil tlw other ham!. \lhat would it be likt' to treat 10111 friend
"a-; all clld"~ Suppose lOll told the truTh-tll"t lOll need Ihe lllOllel
lor a ('('nail! purpose bllt could not rt'p,l\' it. Then nHlr Iriend conld
lllak(' lip hi, 01\11 llIind ahout \11l('thcI to kt IOI! han' it. He cOl!ld ('X-
eleis(' hi, OWIl p(lII'crs or r("IS(lIL c()l!sldrillg' his O\\'ll 1',!Illes and
wishes, and make a rrc(', ;]lItOll()1lI0U, ch()ice. 111](' did decide to
gill' till' 1ll0lH'1 1'01' this pllrpose, he \\'oltld he choosillg to make 111<11
pllrpc ,t' his ()\Ill. TIlliS, I()ll II'Oldd 1101 11]('1'('11 1)(' IlSillg hilll ~IS a
n](',lIlS 10 ;lchieyillg \0111' g()al. This is whal Kalil !lIeant \I'hell h(' said
that "r;lliolul heillg;;, , ' oughl always he ('stc('!ll('d also ,10-. ('lids, thaI
is, as beillg.s who IlIIlSI hc capable 01 containing ill tlH'lll,cl\TS tlle
l'nd of till' \'('1'\ S;JIll(' <]ctio!l.-'

Conclusion
Ollr purp()',(' here is !lot to reach am linn C()lldllSion abollt I\hich or
these approaches, if am, is correct, But we 111<1\ (,lid I"illt an obsl'na-
liOll abollt hOl\' lhat project Illigltt be lInch-rlakel)'
Philosophical ideas arc 01lell \'tTl ,1\Jstract, and it is dirficlIlt to
sce what ,ot't of ('yidl'Ill'(' (,()[Illts fot' or ,lgaillsl titelll. It is casl' enough
to apprcciate, intllitin'\I', the idea, lwhind each 01 these theorit's, hilt
hOI\' do In- delt~rll1ilH' which, if ;111\, is correct? It is a dalllltillg ques-
tion, Faced "'illt thi" problem, people are t(>lllplcd to accept or reject
philosophical i(\(',IS Oil the basis of their intllitin' appeal-if all idea
sounds good, (Jill' mal' embrace it: 01 if it rubs Olll' the wrollg wal', it
lIla\ be disclrdcd. Bill tltis is h;mlh ,I sati,ractol\ wa\' to proceed if we