1.

GO v CA

Facts:

Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete
City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00. Three
times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to
their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because
the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private
respondents' return. When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out
that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered. Furious at the loss of
the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding, private respondents filed on September
23, 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court,
7th Judicial District, Branch 33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, to
wit: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby granted:1. Ordering the rescission of the agreement entered into between
plaintiff Hermogenes Ong and defendant Nancy Go; 2. Declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, on September
14, 1993, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend
that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence they presented to prove that they acted only
as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and, as such, should not have been held liable. In addition, they aver that there
is no evidence to show that the erasure of the tape was done in bad faith so as to justify the award of damages.

Issue: Whether or not there is damage

Ruling: Yes. In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages."

In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, the former
undertook to cover the latter's wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For whatever reason,
petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening
their obligation to said private respondents and are thus liable for damages.
The grant of actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P450.00 is justified, as reimbursement of the
downpayment paid by private respondents to petitioners. 6

Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because this case is not
among those enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. However, it is also accepted in this jurisdiction that
liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations, that is, the act which
violates the contract may also constitute a quasi-delict. 7 Consequently, moral damages are recoverable for the
breach of contract
which was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. 8

Petitioners' act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage of private respondents' wedding was
precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo.

Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the case at bar, the award of
exemplary damages by the trial court is justified 10 to serve as a warning to all entities engaged in the same
business to observe due diligence in the conduct of their affairs.

2. EMMANUEL HERBOSA v CA

FACTS: It appears from the evidence adduced that the petitioner spouses contracted the services of Professional
Video Equipment (PVE) for the betamax coverage of their then forthcoming wedding celebration scheduled in
the morning of October 11, 1980. Pursuant to the contract PVE undertook to record on betamax format the
wedding celebration of the petitioners starting with the pre-departure activities of the bride at her residence,
followed by the wedding ceremony and the reception which had an approximate playback time of 60 to 90
minutes.

Ben Zarate, studio manager of PVE, informed the petitioners that the videotape coverage of their wedding
celebration was damaged due to mechanical defect in their equipment. On October 19, 1980 PVE general
manager, Eric Sycip, confirmed the damage and proposed to do a video tape production of their wedding
celebration through photographs or a video coverage of any event of similar significance. In addition, Eric Sycip
sent a check representing the amount of the downpayment which the petitioners did not accept. Deeply
aggrieved, the petitioners rejected both of the proposed alternatives since, according to them, a video tape
production through photographs was not going to compensate for the betamax or film coverage of their actual
wedding celebration and that there could be no event of similar significance insofar as petitioners are
concerned.

PVE disclaimed any liability for the damaged videotape by invoking force majeure or fortuitous event and
asserted that a defective transistor caused the breakdown in its video tape recorder. However, said respondent
failed to substantiate its bare allegation.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are entitled to award of moral damages arising from breach of contract
RULING: YES. Ordinarily, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because such
an action is not among those expressly mentioned in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code. However, moral
damages are recoverable for breach of contract where the breach was wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad
faith, oppressive or abusive. The wanton and reckless failure and neglect to timely check and remedy the video
tape recorder by the PVE crew who are all employees of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. indicates a malicious
breach of contract and gross negligence on the part of said respondent in the discharge of its contractual
obligations. Consequently, the petitioners who suffered mental anguish and tortured feelings thereby, are
entitled to an award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages.

The misfortune that befell the then newly-wed couple, petitioners herein, could have been avoided by a timely
exercise of minimum prudence by the crew of PVE to check any possible mechanical defect in the video tape
recorder. The defect could have been detected earlier and remedial measures could have been made to ensure
full video tape coverage of the petitioners' wedding celebration.

3. Air France vs Carrascoso

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March
30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers
got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the
white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the
white man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.

Issue: W/N the award of damages was proper

Ruling: Yes.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 43
And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier —
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages
— in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised —
as it was here — should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The
task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the
same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57

3. Air France vs Carrascoso

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March
30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers
got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the
white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the
white man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.

Issue: W/N the award of damages was proper

Ruling: Yes.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 43
And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier —
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages
— in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised —
as it was here — should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The
task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the
same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57

4. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. CA and Lydia Geronimo [GR. 110295, Oct. 18, 1993]

FACTS: Geronimo is the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale of
soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the
public. Some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her
contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles. As a consequence of the discovery of the
foreign substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted, which eventually led to her
closing shop and becoming jobless. She demanded damages against petitioner, which it rebutted. Trial court
dismissed the case in favor of petitioner, ruling that the complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-
delict. Therefore, she should have filed her complaint within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold, since
what was involved was a breach of implied warranty of the seller.
CA ruled in favor of Geronimo, stating that the latter’s complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach
of warranty as respondent contends, the applicable prescriptive period is four years.

ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars the applicability of the law on quasi-delict.

HELD: Yes (general rule); however, the acts which breaks the contract may be a quasi-delict. Meaning, liability
for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations, as held in Air France v. Carrascoso.
The CA did not err in holding that the private respondent’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict.

5. Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972
FACTS:
Spouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta, with their daughter, boarded a Pan American plane
from Honolulu to Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. While on the stopover, Mr. Zulueta found the
need to relieve himself and after finding the terminal’s comfort rooms full, he walked down the beach to do his
business. Meanwhile, the flight was called and Mr. Zulueta’s absence was noticed. Heading towards the ram,
plaintiff remarked, “You people almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective announcing system and
I was not paged.”Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane, however, the airport manager stopped plaintiff
and asked him to surrender his baggage for inspection. Refusing to comply with the order, plaintiff was not
allowed to board the plane. His wife and daughter were able to proceed but were instructed to leave their
baggage behind. By virtue of this, Zulueta instituted an action for damages.

ISSUE: WON he is entitled to damages not on the basis of the breach of contract but because of the social
humiliation he suffered?

HELD:
Yes. YES, the plaintiff is entitled to damages. Firstly, plaintiff’s testimony about what he did upon
reaching the beach is uncontradicted. Furthermore, there is absolutely no direct evidence about said alleged
quarrel. If such was true, surely, plaintiff would not have walked back from the beach to the terminal before the
plane had resumed its flight to Manila, thereby exposing his presence to the full view of those who were looking
for him. Anent the request of the common carrier to inspect the bags of plaintiff, it appears that Captain Zentner
received information that one of the passengers expressed a fear of a bomb on board the plane. As a result, he
asked for the plaintiff’s bags to verify the bomb. Nevertheless, this claim is unfounded. The Captain failed to
explain why he seemingly assumed that the alleged apprehension of his information was justified. Plaintiff
himself intimated to them that he was well known to the US State Department and that the Captain was not
even aware of the informant’s name or any circumstances which may substantiate the latter’s fear of a certain
bomb.

The records amply establish plaintiffs' right to recover both moral and exemplary damages. Indeed,
the rude and rough reception plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met
him at the ramp ("what in the hell do you think you are? Get on that plane"); the menacing attitude of Zentner
or Sitton and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags ("open your bag," and
when told that a fourth bag was missing, "I don't give a damn"); the abusive language and highly scornful
reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one of PANAM's employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta and Miss
Zulueta remarked, "will you pull these three monkeys out of here?"); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares
and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by men in uniform as if they
were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with Sitton; the airline officials' refusal to allow plaintiff to board
the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision
to leave him in Wake; Mrs. Zulueta's having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was hospitalized as
a result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of
PANAM's employees; Miss Zulueta's having suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment for the
treatment received by her parents at the airport 6 — all these justify an award for moral damages resulting
from mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation thereby suffered
by plaintiffs.

On account of the peculiar situation of the parties the law implies a promise and imposes upon the
carrier the corresponding duty of protection and courteous treatment. Therefore, the carrier is under the
absolute duty of protecting his passengers from assault or insult by himself or his servants. A contract to
transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation tended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of
the carrier's employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are titled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the
part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. A carrier of
passengers is as much bound to protect them from humiliation and insult as from physical injury.
6. Cabardo vs CA
Facts:
Jose Peralta, driver of the Consolidated Industrial Gases Incorporated (CIGI). While driving the company’s
truck-tanker on the southbound lane of the SLEX, he met an accident. Peralta claimed that the truck-tanker
reached Laguna, a Volkswagen car suddenly took the inner lane occupied by his truck, as a result of which he
was forced to swerve to the left and roll over and fell on its right side. With him at the time of the accident was
petitioner Fidel Cabardo who was his helper and pump operator.
Moments later, PR Juanito Rodil came along in a Toyota Corolla car. There was a heavy rain which
affected visibility along the highway. Rodil claimed that upon seeing the disabled vehicle, he immediately
stepped on his brakes, causing his car to swerve to the left and slide sideways towards the truck-tanker. With
PR was his wife Leveminda. PR and his wife were injured. The truck-tanker driver, Jose Peralta, was unhurt but
his helper, petitioner Cabardo, suffered a fractured left leg. Pet and Rodil spouses were taken to the hospital.
Petitioner and Peralta filed reckless imprudence resulting in SPInjuries against PR. Rodils, on the other
hand, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner and peralta. PR denied having caused petitioners injury.
He alleged that the same was sustained when the truck-tanker, driven by Jose Peralta, fell on its side.
Issue: W/N Rodil is guilty of negligence
Ruling:
Yes. Indeed, it is more probable that petitioners injuries were caused by private respondents car hitting
him. First, as the Court of Appeals itself found, petitioner was taken to a hospital in Bian, Laguna together with
the Rodils. Had he been injured earlier when the truck-tanker turned turtle, he would, in all probability, have
been taken for treatment much earlier. The plaintiff, as passenger of the truck-tanker was seated at the right
side of the driver. The driver did not sustain any injury. On the other hand, the plaintiff sustained and was
treated of the following injuries.
Fracture, closed, complete, lateral tebial condyle, knee.

7. Valenzuela v CA

FACTS: June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta Avenue towards the direction of
Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2
feet away, place her emergency lights and sought help. She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon. While she
was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi
Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and she slammed across his windshield and fell to the ground.
She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was replaced with an
artificial one. Her expenses totaled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (artificial leg)]

RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual
damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks
after the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from
August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty
salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs.

CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's employer

Li’s defense: 55 kph - self serving and uncorroborated

ISSUES:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3.W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO. If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided
hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance. It was not
even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car
since there is plenty of space for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards
Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao

2. NO. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
Emergency rule - an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in
search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. She
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if
needed. she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car

3. YES. Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant (must be
in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for
his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability
imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Situation is of a different character,
involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives. Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because
he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate’s
place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related
function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies.Alexander Commercial, Inc.
has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family
in entrusting its company car to Li.

4. YES. As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion that the
amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury
-. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi
Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident. The damage done to her would not only be permanent and
lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would
normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding
adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.

8. PNCC v. CA
FACTS: PASUDECO is a company that transports sugarcane. Due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, they had to
take a different route, which is via NLEX. PNCC is tasked to maintain the safety of motorists in the NLEX. During
patrol, PNCC saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle of the road. PNCC asked PASUDECO to remove such, yet
there were scattered flattened sugarcanes that remained. A certain Arnaiz, who was driving in NLEX, ran over
the flattened sugarcanes and thus the vehicle turned turtle. He thereby sued.
ISSUE: Is PNCC liable?
HELD: Yes. The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist. In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even
as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the
flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would
endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning.
9. PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION VS. VIVIAN TAN LEE

February 16, 2010

FACTS: The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The bus was owned
by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila. On March 15, 2005,
respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint against petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident
that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death
of respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries. On June 18, 1992, respondent
filed an Amended Complaint in her own behalf and in behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages against
petitioner. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary
damages, funeral and interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycles
repair, attorneys fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.

Petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident was the recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila.

The trial court adjudged Avila of simple negligence and ordered Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito
Avila to pay Vivian Tan jointly and solidarily the sum of P745,575.00 representing loss of earnings and actual
damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. It found that before the collision, the motorcycle was on the left
side of the road, just as the passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle was in a running position
moving toward the right side of the highway. The trial court agreed with the bus driver that the motorcycle was
moving ahead of the bus from the left side of the road toward the right side of the road, but disagreed that the
motorcycle crossed the path of the bus while the bus was running on the right side of the road. The trial court
held that if the bus were on the right side of the highway, and Margarito Avila turned his bus to the right in an
attempt to avoid hitting the motorcyle, then the bus would not have hit the passenger jeep, which was then
parked on the left side of the road. The fact that the bus also hit the passenger jeep showed that the bus must
have been running from the right lane to the left lane of the highway, which caused the collision with the
motorcycle and the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road. The trial court stated that since Avila saw
the motorcycle before the collision, he should have stepped on the brakes and slowed down, but he just
maintained his speed and veered to the left. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification in the award of damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioners driver, and whether negligence on his part
was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to
respondent/ whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and

HELD:

1) Yes. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to
respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior
on the road. Indeed, petitioners tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It
also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents. A review of the records
showed that it was petitioners witness, Efren Delantar Ong, who was about 15 meters away from the bus when
he saw the vehicular accident. Nevertheless, this fact does not affect the finding of the trial court that petitioners
bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed by the appellate court. Foreseeability is
the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way
that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were
unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on
the right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the
collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the
motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent
in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 17, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 70860 is hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito
Avila are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally respondent Vivian Lee Tan: (a) civil indemnity in the amount
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the amount of One Hundred Twenty-Seven
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and Eighty-Five Centavos ( P127,192.85); (c) moral damages in the
amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00); (d) indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and (e) temperate damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00).

10. WILLIAM ADDENBROOK v. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a conviction by the Court of First
Instance of Manila for homicide through reckless imprudence upon the petitioner William Addenbrook y Barker.

The appellate court’s decision depicts the facts as follows:

". . . about 3:15 in the afternoon of 9 January 1960, the front bumper of the Stanvac Service Truck, being driven
then by accused William Addenbrook, came into contact with the body of a pedestrian Wenceslao Risaldo, with
the result that the latter fell and was taken to the Philippine General Hospital by accused and his helper but was
dead on arrival, it having been found that he had received abrasions on the left forehead, and contusions with
lacerations on the face, left arm, right thigh, knee joints and right buttocks and waist and fracture of the skull,
so that the Fiscal filed the present criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence against accused resulting
in his conviction. . . .”

Upon impact of the van against the victim, the latter fell and rolled to a distance of fifteen (15) paces, as shown
by two (2) sets of bloodstains observed by patrolman Emilio Guzman in his ocular investigation immediately
after the occurrence of the incident. From these facts, the appellate court found it difficult to believe that the
van was traveling at a slow and reasonable speed. Considering further that as postulated by the accused himself,
his view of the street was partly blocked by a parked car in front of house No. 1010, Marquez de Comillas, from
behind which the deceased tried to cross the street; and with the added fact that the appellant did not blow his
horn despite the visual obstruction by the parked car, the Court of Appeals concluded that he failed to observe
that reasonable care required of a driver of a motor vehicle.
Appellant insists that such conclusion is error. The Court of Appeals gave no credence to the claim that the
deceased suddenly darted from behind the parked car. Neither did the trial court do so, considering the lack of
corroboration of petitioner’s version, and the circumstance that the victim, being a grown-up man, and not a
child would not have ignored the noise of the oncoming vehicle, there being no reason shown for his
disregarding the obvious danger.

ISSUE:

W/N the driver is liable.

RULING:

YES.

At any rate, that the accident could not be avoided because the victim was so close to the truck when he, as
alleged by appellant, suddenly darted across the street, does not exculpate the accused, since the latter was
driving at excessive speed."The fact that a pedestrian came into the path of the car suddenly and so close that
the driver could not stop and avoid striking him will not excuse the driver, where the car was being driven at an
unreasonable rate of speed under the circumstances."

While the general rule is that a driver is not held accountable just because he failed to take the wisest choice in
a sudden emergency, the rule does not apply where the emergency is of the driver’s own creation or devising.

23. TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO.

FACTS:

Plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age visited Murphy an employee of
defendant to wit he is not around.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across
the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces.

After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went
to the home of the boy Manuel
The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light
socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a
hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled
with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to
the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across
the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces.

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by
his father, his nearest relative. The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street
railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he
received the injuries complained of,15 years of age. On the 30th of September, 1905 David together with his
companion Manuel Claparols went to the company’s premises and found some twenty or thirty brass
fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They tried to break the cap with a stone and hammer but failed, so
they opened one of the caps with a knife and finding that it was filed with a yellowish substance they lighted it
with a match and explosion followed causing them more or less injuries and to the removal of the right eye of
David. So, this action arises and the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

David Taylor = eye, Manuel burned hand and other injuries, Jessie on slight cut to the neck after explosion.

The Lower Court held that the claim of the plaintiff shows sufficient evidence to establish the contrary, and
justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were its property
thus, the company is liable for damages under Art. 1089, 1902, 1903 and 1908 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to damages

HELD: NO. In the case at bar, we are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents
of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not
have been incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff’s own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
.We think it is quite clear that the immediate cause of the explosion ,the accident which resulted in plaintiff’s
injury ,was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having “ contributed to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover”. Twenty days after the date of this
decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below, without costs to either party in
this instance, and 10 days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where
judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed
without day. SO ORDERED. Judgment reversed.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day
as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that
he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt
that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he
was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as
described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by
the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his
endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion
might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when
he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.

12. Federico Ylarde V. Edgardo Aquino

Facts: Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan while
Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. The school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old
school shop destroyed in World War II. Aquino decided to help clear the area. So after the classes, he gathered
18 of his male pupils, aged 10-11, and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in making a hole
where the stone can be buried. The following day he called 4 of the 18 students, including Novelito Ylarde to
complete the excavation. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and
his four pupils got out of the hole. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil while he went to see another
teacher for the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope. Before leaving, he told the children
“not to touch the stone”. After he left, 3 of the children playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning
at all, the remaining one jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall which led to his death 3 days after. The parents
of Ylarde filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.
Issue: Can Aquino and Soriano be held liable for damages?

Held: Aquino is liable, Soriano is not.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should
be answerable for torts committed by their students while in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable. It was held in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals that:

Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This
is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of
their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and
students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."

Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, we rule that private respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be
held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades.
Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any
instruction regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180
of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and
his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.

It is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to
eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous
task;
 (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the
huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may
go to the perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone
was at the brink of falling;
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and
(5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a
direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children
to play around. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private
respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation
created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

13. Abiad v Albayda GR No 172200, July 6, 2010

Facts:
Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, located at Villamor Air
Base (VAB), Pasay City. Redentor Completo (Completo), now represented by his heirs, was the taxi driver of a
Toyota Corolla, bearing Plate No. PYD-128, owned and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad (Abiad).
On August 27, 1997, while Albayda was on his way to the office to report for duty, riding a bicycle along
11th Street, the taxi driven by Completo bumped and sideswiped him, causing serious physical injuries. Albayda
was brought to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB. However, he was immediately
transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC), because there was a fracture in his
left knee and there was no orthopedic doctor available at PAFGH. From August 27, 1997 until February 11, 1998,
he was confined therein. He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from February 23, 1998 until March 22, 1998.
Albayda alleged that the pain he suffered required him to undergo medical physiotherapy for a number
of years. He further stated that aggravating the physical sufferings, mental anguish, frights, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation resulting from his injuries, his
wife abandoned him in May 1998, and left their children in his custody.
Abiad testified that, aside from being a soldier, he was also a franchise holder of taxicabs and passenger
jeepneys. When Completo applied as a driver of the taxicab, Abiad required the former to show his bio-data,
NBI clearance, and driver’s license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since the time he was
employed in February 1997. Abiad averred that Completo was a good driver and a good man. Being the operator
of taxicab, Abiad would wake up early and personally check all the taxicabs.
Issue:
Whether Abiad was able to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, Completo in order to escape liability under Article 2180
Ruling:
No. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees, but the employers’ responsibility shall cease upon proof that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. If
the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other
words, the burden of proof is on the employer.
The trial court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with Albayda
at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of Completo, as driver, and
his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. The civil
liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing to his own
negligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil liability of the employer attaches even if the
employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of employees,
employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required under the law. Abiad’s
evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of
Abiad was insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and
supervision of his driver.
14. Mckee vs IAC
Facts: It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between Angeles
City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor
children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well as Kim’s babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando,
Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a Ford Escort. Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by
Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in the opposite direction, from
Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it was
carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.

As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right
side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether to
cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang
was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on, applied his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However,
he failed to get back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck. The collision occurred on the bridge.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose
lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting
in the back of the Escort, received physical injuries from the collision. An information was filed against Ruben
Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage
to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The
conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the
denial by the SC of his Petition for Review.

Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by
Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The
respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included. The
cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually consolidated. The trial court dismissed
the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it was Galang’s
inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of
an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car
invaded the lane of the truck and the collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption
that Koh was negligent.

Issue: W/N Jose Koh’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

Ruling: No. On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it
is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would
mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly
where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to
the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into
the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting
them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles
(48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30
kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's
subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision
which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance
is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat
the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the
last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence
in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As
employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and
primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence
of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

15. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ
and COMPANY, CPA’s

Facts: Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation while private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company,
CPA’s (“L.C. Diaz”), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting and which opened a
savings account with Solidbank. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya , filled up a savings cash deposit
slip and a savings checks deposit slip. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit
the money with Solidbank and give him the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to
Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning
to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to
make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre
returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook.
Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya. The following day,, L.C. Diaz through its
Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz, called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until
L.C. Diaz could open a new account followed by a formal written request later that day. It was also on the same
day that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before of P300,000 from its savings
account. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and
Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received
the P300,000.

L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but to no avail. Hence, L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint
for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court. After trial, the trial court
rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint. Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court.

Issue: WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.

Ruling: Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual. Under Article 1172
of the Civil Code provides that “responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is demandable.” For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual,
the bank is liable to its depositor. L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the
impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of
the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to
another person. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not
have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbank’s negligence in not
returning the passbook to Calapre.

Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to
the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings
account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner.

16. Bataclan vs Medina – Proximate Cause

Facts: At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina and driven by
its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to Pasay City, one of the front
tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan,
Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. No
evidence to show that the freed passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or
extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle.

After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Juan
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought
the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in
the total amount of P87,150.

After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants
appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to SC.

Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that burned the bus,
including the 4 passengers left inside.

Ruling: Yes. The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle turned not
only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.

The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available.

In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its
conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at
least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus.

The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina Transportation failed to carry
Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant, through his
agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding and that the
driver failed to changed the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina.

The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had
he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his
speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
17. Far Eastern Shipping v CA

Facts: M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots’ Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing,
boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the
vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and
its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International
Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark,
one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet
from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on
the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After
Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then
on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the
anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern” code. Before the right anchor and additional
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused
by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;

(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the
master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

Ruling: 1. No. Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes
the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring,
towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty
to insist on having effective control of the vessel or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign
law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who
retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite
common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted
requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under
local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to
pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon
assuming such office as a compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of
care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation
in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the
master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care but must have and exercise the ordinary
skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under
extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to
measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties.
As the pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.

2. Yes. The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the
allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt.
Kabankov’s testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship,
leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky
maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by
admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable
therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that
his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even
though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the
master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release
the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with
respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted
by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the
owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a
vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason
of her negligent management or navigation.

18. Rodriguez v. Manila Railroad, November 19, 1921, G.R. No. L-15688
Facts:
The defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in the municipality of Albay; that
on January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the
smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four
plaintiffs respectively, and the same were entirely consumed. All of these houses were of light construction with
the exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered
with nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was blowing
at the time. It does not appear either in the complaint or in the agreed statement whose house caught fire first,
though it is stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first communicated to the house of Remigio
Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the others.
It is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of said
fire, in the following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper supervision over the employees in
charge of the locomotive; secondly, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated
without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks; thirdly, in using in its locomotive
upon this occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior quality which, upon combustion, produces sparks in
great quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio Rodrigueza stood partly within
the limits of the land owned by the defendant company, though exactly how far away from the company's track
does not appear. It further appears that, after the railroad track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to
get his house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position. Rodrigueza did not comply
with this suggestion, though he promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did. Instead, he
changed the materials of the main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon
this fact it is contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio
Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad Company, and that for this reason the
company is not liable. This position is in our opinion untenable for the reasons which we shall proceed to state.
Issue:
WON the recovery of damages in favor of the plaintiffs must be upheld.
Ruling:
Yes. In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was
the negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was
partly on the property of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives
was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be
imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was
not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and therefore
with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly
there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near Remigio Rodrigueza's house, had
requested or directed him to remove it, did not convert his occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him any
additional responsibility over and above what the law itself imposes in such situation. In this connection it must
be remembered that the company could at any time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.
19. Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
The M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC for brevity's sake), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA for brevity's sake) to
conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of
the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel
and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International
Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.

When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier,
Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor,
with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the
vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between
Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured
Gavino that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that
the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too, (Exhibit "7-Far Eastern Shipping). Kavankov
filed his sea protest (Exhibit "1-Vessel"). Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot (Exhibit "1-Pilot") who
referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority (Exhibit 2-Pilot"). Abellana likewise submitted his report of
the incident.
PPA argued that there is concurrent negligence on part of Capt. Gavino, the harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor
Kabankov, * shipmaster of MV Pavlodar and such was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision
between the vessel and the pier .
Respondent Court ruled that the owner of the vessel is likewise liable liable likewise if the damage is caused by
the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage.
Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under compulsory pilotage at the time of the incident, it
was the compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was in command and had complete control in the navigation
and docking of the vessel. It is the pilot who supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of a ship and his orders must be obeyed in all respects connected with her navigation.
Consequently, he was solely responsible for the damage caused upon the pier apron, and not the owners of
the vessel. It claims that the master of the boat did not commit any act of negligence when he failed to
countermand or overrule the orders of the pilot because he did not see any justifiable reason to do so. In
other words, the master cannot be faulted for relying absolutely on the competence of the compulsory pilot.
If the master does not observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master
is justified in relying on the pilot.
Issue: Whether or not Kavankov as master of the vessel is liable for concurrent negligence with the
compulsory pilot Gavino
Ruling:
Yes. In line with such established doctrines, Chapter II of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 prescribes
the rules for compulsory pilotage in the covered pilotage districts, among which is the Manila Pilotage Distric.,
Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the Manila International Port.
Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards
of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to
navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that
of the master. A pilot 57 should have a thorough knowledge of general and local regulations and physical
conditions affecting the vessel in his charge and the waters for which he is licensed, such as a particular harbor
or river.
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to permit him to navigate
it, if the master observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the dury of the master
to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying
upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master,
exercising that reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or should have
observed, that the pilot was so navigating the vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and
there was in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to
save the ship from danger, the master should have acted accordingly. 83 The master of a vessel must exercise
a degree of vigilance commensurate with the circumstances.
In smuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of the trial court, especially
as this is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. But even beyond that, our own evaluation is that Capt. Kabankov's
shared liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to act when the perilous situation should have spurred
him into quick and decisive action as master of the ship. In the face of imminent or actual danger, he did not
have to wait for the happenstance to occur before countermanding or overruling the pilot. By his own
admission, Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavino's decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he
decided not to countermand any of the latter's orders. Inasmuch as both lower courts found Capt. Gavino
negligent, by expressing full agreement therewith Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.
20. G.R. Nos. L-21477-81 FRANCISCA VILUAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PATRICIO HUFANA
and GREGORIO HUFANA, respondents.
Main point:
In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and
of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally
liable for damages.
Facts: It appears that, as the bus owned by petitioner Viluan and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino neared the
gate of the Gabaldon school building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by Patricio
Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the
speed of his bus and raced with the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a
post, crashed against a tree and then burst into flames.
The heirs of those who perished sued petitioner Viluan and the latter's driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, for
damages for breach of contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured, also sued petitioner and the
driver for damages.
In their answer, petitioner Viluan and her driver Aquino blamed respondent Gregorio Hufana for the
accident. With leave of court, they filed third party complaints against Gregorio Hufana and the latter's
employer, Patricio Hufana.
After trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the
two buses and held both, together with their respective employers, jointly and severally liable for damages.
Both petitioner Viluan and her driver Aquino and the respondents herein appealed to the Court of
Appeals. While affirming the finding that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of
both the Viluan and the Hufana buses, the Court of Appeals differed with the trial court in the assessment of
liabilities of the parties. In its view only petitioner Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for breach of contract
of carriage. The driver, Aquino, cannot be made jointly and severally liable with petitioner because he is merely
the latter's employee and is in no way a party to the contract of carriage.

Issue: Should Petitioner Viluan—operator of the bus that caught fire—be held to be the only one liable for the
death and injuries suffered by passengers of his bus? Answer: No.

Held: As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177 that in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some
members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.
Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that petitioner as
well as respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana are jointly and severally liable for the damages
awarded by the trial court. The disallowance of moral damages in the amount of P1,000.00 is correct and should
be affirmed. No costs.
21. CONSTANCIA G. TAMAYO, JOCELYN G. TAMAYO, and ARAMIS G. TAMAYO, collectively known as HEIRS
OF CIRILO TAMAYO vs. ROSALIA ABAD SERA, ROAN ABAD SERA, and JANETE ABAD SERA, respondent

FACTS: Antonieto Senora, 43 years old and police chief inspector of the PNP was riding along Sucat in his
motorcycle, when he was bumped by a tricycle from behind. This led to the motorcycle being pushed under an
oncoming Isuzu Elf Van driven by Polloso which immediately resulted to the death of Senora. Cirilo, the owner
of the sole proprietorship which employed Polloso put up the defense of using the diligence of a good father of
a family when employing his employees. When a case was filed in the RTC, it ruled in favour of Senora, which it
ordered to pay the latter the amounts ofP105,100.00 for actual damages,P50,000.00 for loss of
life,P1,152,360.00 for loss of earnings andP30,000.00 for attorney’s fees. It reasoned that even without the
simple negligence of the tricycle, Polloso could have avoided the accident by slowing down or stopping.

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, but it adjusted the value to P1.8 Million. Petitioner then appeals
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cirilo is liable.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that findings of fact of trial courts are entitled to great
weight and should not be disturbed, except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better
position to examine the demeanor of witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze and
weigh evidence all over again. The factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are final and
conclusive. There is no reason to disturb the factual findings of the lower courts.

The RTC correctly disregarded the testimonies of Cirilos wife and his employee, leaving no other evidence to
support the claim that he had exercised the degree of diligence required in hiring and supervising his employees.
The CA also correctly applied the formula in computing the damages awarded, which is:

Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary living expenses)
Petition DENIED. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
22. Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo
St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground
storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to
and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs of Ong, sued
respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in charge of its
operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents,
and that there was due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents can be held liable.
Held: Yes. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur applies in this case. It literally means “the thing or transaction speaks
for itself.” For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a) the
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by
an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline
station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how
the fire started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is
a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The negligence of the
employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen.
Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages.

23.1 Picart vs. Smith.

Facts: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the
railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed
until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being
frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing car.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of negligence

Held: Yes, but although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the defendant was
nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid the
accident af ter he realized the situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that
opportunity; while the plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position of greater safety.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty
on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision,
is the constitutive f act in negligence. Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds
that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party.
23.2 Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in connection with its
business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds
amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to RMC’s account with PBC. However, it turned out that
Yabut deposited the amounts in her husband’s account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of
accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.
Issue:What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not checking his monthly statements or the bank’s
negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?
Held: The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and
presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-
imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.
The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the
proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the latter’s entrusting cash to a dishonest employee.
Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds, she would not have been able to deposit those
funds in her husband’s current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts wherein she
had deposited them, had it not been for the bank teller’s aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with
the consequences thereof. It means that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had
the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by exercise of due diligence.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant,
or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Negligence is the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The seventy-eight (78)-yearold, yet still
relevant, case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considera-tions of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, reiterated in
the case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, defines proximate cause as “that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. x x x.” In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent
scheme with impunity. Furthermore, under the doctrine of “last clear chance” (also referred to, at times as “supervening
negligence” or as “dis-covered peril”), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when
it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated
differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had
the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private
respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity
to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller,
had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure. In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father
of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed,
private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company
would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would
definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little
vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the
damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code.

60-40 ratio

24. Pilipinas Bank vs. CA

Facts:
As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to
Winner Industrial Corporation for P20,927.00 and Vicente Tui, for P11,419.50, with due dates on October 10
and 12, 1979, respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested PCIB Money Shop's manager
Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his savings account therein and have it deposited
with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then Filman Bank), Biñan Branch. Roberto Santos was requested
to make the deposit.
In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller the current account number of
Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was "815" and so
this was the same current account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name FLORENCIO
REYES.
Nothing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then Current Account
Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account number. He,
thus, posted the deposted in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip
was REYES.

On October 11, 1979, the October 10, check in favor of Winner Industrial Corporation was presented for
payment. Since the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was
dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing.
The October 12, 1979 check was redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that the
check was drawn against insufficient fund.
Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his
account.
Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador
was immediately transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did not
effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00. The transfer having been effected, the bank then honored the
October 12, 1979, check (Exh. "C").
On the basis of these facts, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay to the private respondent: (1) P200,000.00
as compensatory damages; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and (4) the
costs of suit
Issue: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable for damages for failing to verify the respondent’s account?
Ruling:
Yes. For Article 21793 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our
corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from
which it ought to have been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury
complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence." In the
case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously
posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name.
As held by the trial court:
Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care
required in the performance of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in the
account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger without,
however, going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have
continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear
certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality of the person
notable of which is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by
the plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes
indicated a balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks.

25. GIAN PEOPLES LIMBER AND HARDWARE VS IAC

FACTS:

Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it was going towards the direction of Davao City. At
about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul
Zacarias y Infants, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City, had just crossed said bridge. At about 59
yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo
died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left
side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep was extensively damaged. After the impact,
the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the
truck stopped on its wheels on the road.

Both drivers, had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both
vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The private respondents have
admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to
deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the
jeep was still thirty meters away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the jeep driver was liable?

RULING: YES

From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has
appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from
the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time
to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize
that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him
a clear path.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability today. Since
said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an
inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports the latter's additional defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there is such
evidence in the record which has not been controverted.

26. Allied Banking Corporation vs BPI, GR No. 188363, February 27, 2013
FACTS: On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to “Mateo Mgt. Group
International” (MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted at petitioner Allied Banking Corporation Kawit
Branch. The post-dated check was drawn against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) with respondent Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to respondent
through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC). The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner
credited the account of MMGI with P1,000,000.00.
On October 22, 2002, MMGI’s account was closed and all the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later,
Silva discovered the debit of P1,000,000.00 from his account. In response to Silva’s complaint, respondent
credited his account with the aforesaid sum. On March 21, 2003, respondent returned a photocopy of the check
to petitioner for the reason: “Postdated.” Petitioner, however, refused to accept and sent back to respondent
a photocopy of the check. Thereafter, the check, or more accurately, the Charge Slip, was tossed several times
from petitioner to respondent, and back to petitioner, until on May 6, 2003, respondent requested the PCHC to
take custody of the check. Acting on the request, PCHC directed the respondent to deliver the original check.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration Committee, asserting that respondent should solely bear the
entire face value of the check due to its negligence in failing to return the check to petitioner within the 24-hour
reglementary period as provided in Section 20.1 of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations 2000. Petitioner
prayed that respondent be ordered to reimburse the sum of P500,000.00 with 12% interest per annum, and to
pay attorney’s fees and other arbitration expenses. In its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent charged
petitioner with gross negligence for accepting the post-dated check contending that petitioner’s admitted
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the loss. The Arbitration Committee rendered its Decision in
favor of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable?
RULING: Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the defendant and
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon that assumption. Stated
differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused
by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s
failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the
proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury. In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the
proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of respondent who
cleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own verification
procedure. As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary care in
the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date written on the face of
the check “Oct. 9, 2003”. Respondent could have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus
dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to the payee’s account. Thus,
notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the petitioner in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it
can seek reimbursement from respondent the amount credited to the payee’s account covering the check.
27. Tamagro v. CA, 209 SCRA 519
Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. The natural parents of Tamargo filed a complaint for damages against the
natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was
granted in November 1982 that is after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Adelberto’s parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses
Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority
had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses
Tamargo’s petition.
Issue:
WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with
the biological parents.
Ruling:
No. Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental
authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting
incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted
child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet
begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the
natural parents of Adelberto.

28. CUADRA v MONFORT

FACTS: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other
classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic
headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she
had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise
moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain,
she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen
and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in
the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite
the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.

In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort,
Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as
moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

ISSUE: W/N Monfort’s Father should be held liable

RULING: NO. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence
accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the
act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable
under Article 2180. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in
connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or
outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and
when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a
consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented
the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school,
where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care
and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent
prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special
reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait
in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.

29. Exconde vs Capuno

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro
Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante
Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante
Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control,
supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it
only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of
law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Bilintawak
Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in
honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with
other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while
the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers,
Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a
parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon
instruction of his teacher.

Issue: W/N Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting
from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
Ruling: Yes.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with
his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the
victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the
civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from
liability.

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Here
Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity,
he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in
connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident
occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor,
could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institute of arts and
trades as provided by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their
means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation". The only
way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage. This defendants failed to prove.
30. Ciriaco L. Mercado v. CA and Manuel Quisimbing, Jr., et al. [108 Phil. 414, May 30, 1960]

FACTS: Augusto Mercado is the 9-year-old son of petitioner. Augusto had a fight with his classmate, herein
private respondent. He repeatedly punched his Manuel and cut his cheek with a razor. Manuel was not
hospitalized, but his treatment cost P50. Petitioner, as the father of Augusto , was held liable for his son’s
actions. Counsel for petitioner claimed that the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead,
since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess
time). Petitioner hinged his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which states that: “Lastly,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”

ISSUE: WON it is the teachers who must be liable for the damage caused by Augusto Mercado.

HELD: No. The clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass
from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a
situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back
to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article
2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school
must, therefore, be held to be without merit.
31. CRESENCIO and AMELIA YAP LIBI vs IAC G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992
FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu
City. Petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents. Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann
broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell
wanted to reconcile but Julie Ann never budge and gave in; thus, he resorted to threats. On January 14, 1979,
Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the
crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of
the same city.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her
death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide.
On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the
imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized
by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused
Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification. As a result
of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. This was granted later on appeal.

ISSUE: WON Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners
liable for vicarious liability?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence
they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on
record either. Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a
gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a
key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful
night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts
that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the
fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box
was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to
a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as
parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so
that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and
that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged
in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation
given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding
upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their
legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children
9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard
to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under
21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said
Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified. In the case at bar, whether the death
of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent
court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom.
32.PALISOC v. BRILLANTES G.R. No. L-29025 [October 4, 1971]
FACTS:
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics students at the
Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation transpired
between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen years old while
Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador looking at them. The situation
prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio
on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused the latter to
stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter died, the cause of death being “shock due to traumatic
fracture of the ribs”. The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the
head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes
who is a member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor of MTI.
The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause “so
long as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where the pupil
lives and boards with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents., and such control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the father and mother to
the teachers. This legal conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn based its decision
in Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in this case, as defendant Virgilio
did not live with the defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the defendant?
RULING:
The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly
and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the
MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded as party
defendant.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their custody” means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that
for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school.
The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are deemed to have been
set aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and
students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent to their
pupils and students and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” In
this case, The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of
the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed to
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they cannot likewise
avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court was modified, while claim for
compensatory damages was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary
damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part of the said defendants.

33. Amadora v CA

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim’s
parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors,
high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints
against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI
Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a
school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already
ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the
necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe
other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement
for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding
classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium
to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the
other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them
was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the
students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had
earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action
or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was
shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the
head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the
facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his
death. Petition was denied.

34. PSBA v. CA
Facts: Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable for the death of Carlitos
Bautista, a third year commerce student who was stabbed while on the premises of PSBA by elements from
outside the school. Private respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging the school and its
officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during, and after the attack on the
victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.
Ruling: NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools
and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures.
This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.

35. Ylarde vs. Aquino

July 29, 1988

FACTS: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in
Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During that time, the school had several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to
help clear the area so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete
block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of
the 18 students including the Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the children to level
the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope. It
was alleged that before leaving, he told the children “not to touch the stone”. After he left, the children playfully
jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned
to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The
parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.

HELD: No for Soriano. As held in Amadora vs CA, “it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school
who should be answerable for torts committed by their students”. Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher
in charge of such student, this is the general rule. However, in case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature,
in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable
for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any instruction regarding the
digging.

Yes for Aquino. A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his students should make sure that the children are
protected from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk and should not be
placed under the category of Work Education such as school gardening, planting trees etc. Aquino acted with
fault and gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his
students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete
block adjacent to the excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the
petitioners.
36. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA

FACTS:

Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His parents,
respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son
to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go
back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to
the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died.
Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers
liable but dismissed complaint against the school.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

RULING:

NO.

Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused
damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar,
the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely
private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity.
Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding
of the same.

No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who
joined the picnic
37. School of the Holy Spirit of Q.C. vs. Taguiam,
Facts:
Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon
City. On March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letter to the grade school principal requesting permission to hold a
year-end celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to use the
swimming pool. In this connection, respondent distributed the parent's/guardian's permit forms to the pupils. Corazon P.
Taguiam admitted that Chiara Mae Federico's permit form was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae
was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit. Before the activity started, she warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper
area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where
they were going. Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When she returned, the maintenance
man was already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. The child was still alive when respondent
rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. Corazon P. Taguiam was dismissed
for gross negligence resulting to loss of confidence.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to
terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
Respondent had been grossly negligent. First , it is undisputed that Chiara Mae's permit form was unsigned. Yet,
respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it by
personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. The purpose of a permit form is precisely to
ensure that the parents have allowed their child to join the school activity involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore this
by resorting to assumptions. Respondent admitted that she was around when Chiara Mae and her mother arrived. She
could have requested the mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to obtain her
conformity. Second, it was respondent's responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by
the school. Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first
aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with
the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them. Notably,
respondent's negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however, the
cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.
This is not the first time that the SC have departed from the requirements laid down by the law that neglect of duties must
be both gross and habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, we ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL) cannot be legally
compelled to continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his
duties although it was his first offense. In that case, we noted that a mere delay on PAL's flight schedule due to aircraft
damage entails problems like hotel accommodations for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility of law suits, and
payment of special landing fees not to mention the soaring costs of replacing aircraft parts. In another case, Fuentes v.
National Labor Relations Commission, we held that it would be unfair to compel Philippine Banking Corporation to
continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we observed that although the teller's infraction was not habitual, a
substantial amount of money was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior to its loss and the amount
reflected thereon is already considered as current liabilities in the bank's balance sheet. Indeed, the sufficiency of the
evidence as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In this
case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child. As a result of gross negligence in the present case, petitioners
lost its trust and confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must be based
on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly
and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently. Otherwise stated, it must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims,
caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be genuine
and not simulated; nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge
for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because
of its subjective nature. There must, therefore, be an actual breach of duty committed by the employee which must be
established by substantial evidence. All told, there being a clear showing that respondent was culpable for gross
negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence, her dismissal was valid and legal.
38. Republic vs. Sandoval
Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a
marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result,
then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an
investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of
Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in
the incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held:

1. NO. The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The
recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does
not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation
of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for
a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of
the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

2. NO. The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible
for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a
settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority,
hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

39. Filamer Christian Institute vs IAC GR No. 75112, August 17, 1992
Facts:
Potenciano Kapunan Sr., an 82 yr old retired schoolteacher was struck by the Pinoy Jeep owned by
petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Daniel Funtecha, as Kapunan Sr. was walking along Roxas
Ave., Roxas City, at 6:30pm on October 20, 1977. The Supreme Court previously absolved Filamer in its 1990
decision, based on the IRR of the Labor Code, particularly Sec. 14, Rule X Book 3, which states that there is no
employer-employee relationship between the school and a mere working scholar. This petition is a motion for
reconsideration of the 1990 decision.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner
Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for
only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take
over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant to note that the place
where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the
house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
 According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to
swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against
the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano
Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.) At the time of the
incident the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Filamer should be held vicariously liable for the acts of Daniel Funtecha
Ruling:
Yes. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic
of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. The clause
"within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer,
includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle
derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by
answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged
employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the
patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
is misplaced.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would
prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or
prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school
vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees
against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by
which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for
acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary.
However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to
the heirs of the plaintiff.
40. NPC vs CA

Facts: On July 22, 1979, a convoy of 4 dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi
city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks with plate no RFT-9-6-673
driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted
in the death of 3 persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other
passengers.

The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against National Power Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO
Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then CFI of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its
answer to the complaint it contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the
Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of
supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and
countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO. The trial court ruled against PHESCO,
but on appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s judgement, finding that: A "labor only" contractor is considered
merely as an agent of the employer. A finding that a contractor is a "labor only" contractor is equivalent to a
finding that there is an employer-employee relationship between the owner of the project and the employees
of the "labor only" contractor. So, even if Phesco hired driver Gavino Ilumba, as Phesco is admittedly a "labor
only" contractor of Napocor the statute itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the
employer (Napocor) and the employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor (Phesco). Consequently, we
hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gavino Ilumba, as there was no employment relationship between
Phesco and driver Gavino Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to hold the employer liable for torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task, there must exist an employer-employee
relationship.

Issue: W/N NPC should be liable.

Ruling: Yes. There is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in “labor-only” contracting vis-à-vis NPC and as such,
it is considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship
between the principal employer and the employees of the “labor-only” contractor is created. Accordingly, the
principal employer is responsible to the employees of the “labor-only” contractor as if such employees had been
directly employed by the principal employer. Since PHESCO is only a “laboronly” contractor, the workers it
supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees of NPC. After all,
it is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters into an agreement with a job contractor,
either for the performance of a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes responsibility over the
employees of the latter.

However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a “labor-only” contract exists between it and PHESCO, its
liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts of the employee of the “labor-
only” contractor. Stated otherwise, its liability shall only be limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasi-
delicts. x x x The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that the action was premised on the recovery of
damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor
Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case. x x x Given the above considerations, it is apparent that
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the “labor-only” contractor. This is
consistent with the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a “labor-only” contractor is equivalent to a finding
that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the “labor-only”
contractor, including the latter’s workers.

41. Equitable Leasing Corp. vs. Suyom

Facts: On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna
Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor was
charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical
injuries. Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the registered owner of the
tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against
Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for
damages. The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no
longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee,
not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi delict for the negligent acts.

Ruling: Yes. The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the
parties to enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered in the
name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.

Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of Sale over the tractor was
executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered
with the LTO. Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered
owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made
of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned. Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability
for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver. Petitioner held liable for the deaths
and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident
on July 17, 1994; Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator
insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; In contemplation of law, the owner I operator of record
is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent

42. CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO and CA – Master Servant Rule

Facts: At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a loading and unloading zone, waiting for a jeepney when one came along to stop. As he stepped
down from the curb to board the jeepney and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole. The
fall caused Teotico’s head to hit the rim and break his eyeglasses and the broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid.
Respondent was then brought to PGH to be treated of his injuries. Respondent suffered contusions in various parts of his
body and allergic eruptions caused by the anti-tetanus injections administered to him required further medical treatment
and payment of these charges.

Thereafter he sued for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the
city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruled
that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground
that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in
enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that
the accident happened in national highway.

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages
suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Yes. Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and municipalities
. . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason” — specifically — “of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.” In other
words, Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets,” in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that “the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned” who “have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law.” Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos
Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary
for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
“control or supervision” over said street or road.
43. Dulay v CA
Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at
the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard
on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow
of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for
damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co.,
Inc., and/or Superguard Security Corp. the alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Defendant BENIGNO
TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the
time of the incident complained of, was under their control and supervision. The incident resulting in the death
of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S
wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision
and control of its employee to avoid the injury. Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages. private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay
was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
RTC issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as
defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute
a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or
that the same was done in the performance of his duties.

Issue: W/N dismissal proper for failure to allege negligence since quasi delicts are limited to acts of negligence

Ruling: No. Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for
damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they
are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been
established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to
make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on
the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting
occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's
employer and responsible for his acts. In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to
support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the
facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits
of the case

44. Capili v. Cardaña, G.R. No. 157906, November 2, 2006

Facts:
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary
School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous
death. Thus, her parents filed a case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against
petitioner.
The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay,
Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the
petitioner the tree that stood near the principal’s office. The Cardañas averred that petitioner’s gross negligence
and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Petitioner, school principal, denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the
tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses
who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on December
15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.
Issue:
WON the petitioner is negligent and therefore liable to pay damages under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger
that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school
grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state
of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of
her position.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred.
The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the
school’s premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for
application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
1.Rogelio Ramos vs.CA

Facts:
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985, a 47-year old Because the discomforts
somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an
operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder She underwent a series of examinations which included
blood and which indicated she was fit for surgery.
Through the intercession of a mutual friend, Dr. Buenviaje, she and her husband Rogelio met for the first time
Dr. Orlino Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, on June 10, 1985. They agreed that their date at the
operating table at the DLSMC (another defendant), would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided
that she should undergo a "cholecystectomy" operation after examining the documents. Rogelio E. Ramos,
however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio that he
will get a good anesthesiologist.
At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the operating room with the patient, heard somebody say
that "Dr. Hosaka is already here." She then saw people inside the operating room "moving, doing this and that,
[and] preparing the patient for the operation". As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez
intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata
ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan". Because of the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention
on what Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of
the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone
to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist . After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this
anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed
in a trendelenburg position — a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her
feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain. Immediately thereafter,
she went out of the operating room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos "that something wrong was . . . happening".
Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient.

Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient. The
doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm.
About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ramos was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka. The latter informed the former that
something went wrong during the intubation.
During the whole period of her confinement, she incurred hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25 which is the
subject of a promissory note and affidavit of undertaking executed by Rogelio E. Ramos in favor of DLSMC. Since
that fateful afternoon of June 17, 1985, she has been in a comatose condition. She cannot do anything. She
cannot move any part of her body. She cannot see or hear. She is living on mechanical means. She suffered brain
damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes

Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of medical negligence?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court in this case applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. before resort to the doctrine may be allowed,
the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; 2. It is
caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility
of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of instrumentality" which caused the damage.
Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit
of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and
must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund
of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. 30 Where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,
an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred.
We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the
care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. There was negligence in
the the pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia which is universally
observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to
respondent Dra. Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda's case prior to
the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she never saw the patient at the bedside. She herself
admitted that she had seen petitioner only in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the
cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take advantage of this important opportunity. As such, her attempt
to exculpate herself must fail.

2. Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital G.R No. 130547 (October 3, 2000)
Facts: Petitioner, Leah Alesna Reyes, is the wife of the deceased patient, Jorge Reyes. Five days before the
latter’s death, Jorge has been suffering from recurring fever with chills. The doctors confirmed through the
Widal test that Jorge has typhoid fever. However, he did not respond to the treatment and died. The cause of
his death was “Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.” Consequently, petitioner
filed the instant case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which dismissed the case and
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death was due to the wrongful
administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence,
they would not have recommended and rushed the performance of the Widal Test, hastily concluded that Jorge
was suffering from typhoid fever, and administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on
the patient’s compatibility with said drug.

Issue: Whether or not Sisters of Mercy Hospital is liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.

Ruling: No. Sisters of Mercy Hospital is not liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.
There is no showing that the attending physician in this case deviated from the usual course of treatment
with respect to typhoid fever. Jorge was given antibiotic choloromycetin and some dose of triglobe after
compatibility test was made by the doctor and found that no adverse reactions manifested which would
necessitate replacement of the medicines. Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the
average merit among all known practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to the least
experienced, but the reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good physicians. Here, the doctors did not
depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as they in fact observed the due care
required under the circumstances.

In Medical Negligence cases, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that the usual procedure in treating
the illness is not followed by the doctor. Failure to prove this, the doctor is not liable. Physicians are not insurers
of the success of every procedure undertaken and if the procedure was shown to be properly done but did not
work, they cannot be faulted for such result.

3. Dr. Noel Casumpang vs. Nelson Cortejo

DOCTRINE GENERAL RULE: hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors
EXCEPTION: Doctrine of apparent authority - if the physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible
agent of the hospital
FACTS: Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought his 11-year old son Edmer to the ER of San Juan de Dios Hospital because
of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain and fever. Dr. Ramoncito Livelo diagnosed Edmer with
bronchopneumonia and gave him antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his plegm. By virtue of
her Fortune Care card, Mrs. Cortejo was then assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang, a pediatrician accredited with
Fortune Care. Dr. Casumpang confirmed the initial diagnosis of Bronchopneumonia.
Next day, Edmer vomited phlegm with blood streak. Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda, a resident physician at SJDH came
to examine the blood specimen, however, Mrs. Cortejo washed it away. So she just conducted physical check-
up and found out that Edmer’s symptoms are not typical of dengue fever. In the afternoon. Edmer vomited
blood again. Dr. Miranda then examined the blood specimen. Suspecting she could be afflicted with dengue,
she inserted a plastic tume in his nose, drained liquid from his stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and
gave an instruction not to pull out the tube, or give the patient any oral medication. Blood tests showed that
Edmer was suffering from Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever. Dr. Casumpang then recommended transfer of Edmer to
the ICU to which Mrs. Cortejo consented.However, the ICU was full to Dr. Casumpang suggested transfer hire a
private nurse. Mrs. Cortejo insisted, however, to transfer his son to Makati Medical Center. After the respondent
had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time, checked Edmer's condition, found that his blood
pressure was stable, and noted that he was comfortable.
By midnight, Edmer was transferred to MakatiMed via private ambulance. Upon examination of patient’s clinical
history and lab exam results, attending physician diagnosed Edmer with Dengue Fever Stage IV that was already
in its irreversible stage. Edmer died at 4am with his death certificate indicating “ Hypovolemic
Shock/hemorrhagic shock; Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV ” as cause of death. Cortejo filed an action for
damages against SJDH, Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda before RTC Makati alleging that Edmer’s death was
caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of the doctors. RTC ruled that doctors were negligent and also
held SJDH solidarily liable for damages, finding that Dr. Casumpang as consultant is an ostensible agent of SJDH
while Dr. Miranda as resident physician is an employee of SJDH as their qualifications, fitness, and competence
are scrutinized and determined by screening committee of hospital before engaging their services. CA affirmed
RTC ruling en toto finding that SJDH and its attending physicians failed to exercise the minimum medical care,
attention, and treatment expected of an ordinary doctor under like circumstances. CA ruled that the hospital's
liability is based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The CA opined that the control which the hospital exercises
over its consultants, the hospital's power to hire and terminate their services, all fulfill the employer-employee
relationship requirement under Article 2180. It also found that SJDH failed to show that it exercised diligence of
a good father of a family in hiring and supervision of its physician.
ISSUE : W/N doctors had committed inexcusable lack of precaution in diagnosing and in treating the patient.
RULING: YES.
Medical malpractice suit –is an action available to victims to redress a wrong committed by medical
professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient. - Plaintiff must prove that the doctor either
failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor would
not have done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient. - The patient's heir/s bears the burden
of proving his/her cause of action. Elements: (1) duty; - Dr. Casumpang: physician-patient relationship arose
when parents of Edmer sought his medical services - Dr. Miranda: PPR arose when she assumed obligation to
provide resident supervision over Edmer To determine the standard of care, expert testimony is crucial in
determining first, the standard medical examinations, tests, and procedures that the attending physicians
should have undertaken in the diagnosis and treatment of dengue fever; and second, the dengue fever signs
and symptoms that the attending physicians should have noticed and considered. According to the expert
testimony of Dr. Jaudian on which the RTC and CA relied: - Edmer's rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain,
fever, and the presence of blood in his saliva are classic symptoms of dengue fever. - The standard of care is to
administer oxygen inhalation, analgesic, and fluid infusion or dextrose. If the patient had twice vomited fresh
blood, the doctor should order blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes Dr. Casumpang,
as Edmer's attending physician, did not act according to these standards and, hence, was guilty of breach of
duty. (2) breach; - Dr. Casumpang's first and second visits to Edmer: he already had knowledge of Edmer's
laboratory test result (CBC), medical history, and symptoms (i.e., fever, rashes, rapid breathing, chest and
stomach pain, throat irritation, difficulty in breathing, and traces of blood in the sputum). However, these
information did not lead Dr. Casumpang to the possibility that Edmer could be suffering from either dengue
fever, or dengue hemorrhagic fever, as he clung to his diagnosis of broncho pneumonia. In other words, it was
lost on Dr. Casumpang that the characteristic symptoms of dengue. Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated some
and not all of the symptoms presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his
findings. In sum, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when reasonable
prudence would have shown that indications of dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes
negligence. Dr. Miranda, a junior resident, was not independently negligent. Although she had greater patient
exposure, and was subject to the same standard of care applicable to attending physicians, we believe that a
finding of negligence should also depend on several competing factors, among them, her authority to make her
own diagnosis, the degree of supervision of the attending physician over her, and the shared responsibility
between her and the attending physicians. (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.
ISSUE: W/N hospital is solidarity liable with the doctors.
RULING: YES, but not on the basis of Art 2180 as respondents posits but on the basis of doctrine of apparent
authority or agency by estoppel. There is no employer-employee relationship because no evidence showing that
SJDH exercised any degree of control over the means, methods of procedure and manner by which the doctors
conducted and performed their medical profession. Petitioning Doctors are mere independent contractors.
GENERAL RULE: hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors
EXCEPTION: Doctrine of apparent authority - if the physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible
agent of the hospital A hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician (or an
independent contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two factors: 1) the
hospital's manifestations ; and whether the hospital acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. Such
representation may be express or implied. –
In this case, the court considered the act of the hospital of holding itself out as provider of complete medical
care, and considered the hospital to have impliedly created the appearance of authority 2) the patient's
reliance - whether the plaintiff acted in reliance on the conduct of the hospital or its agent , consistent with
ordinary care and prudence; or, whether the plaintiff is seeking care from the hospital itself or whether the
plaintiff is looking to the hospital merely as a place for his/her personal physician to provide medical care. -
Thus, this requirement is deemed satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that he/she relied upon the hospital to
provide care and treatment, rather than upon a specific physician. - SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr.
Casumpang with apparent authority leading the respondent to believe that he is an employee or agent of the
hospital. Respondent did not know that Dr. Casmpang was an independent contractor. Mrs. Cortejo accepted
Dr. Casumpang's services on the reasonable belief that such were being provided by SJDH or its employees,
agents, or servants. By referring Dr. Casumpang to care and treat for Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out Dr.
Casumpang, not only as an accredited member of Fortune Care, but also as a member of its medical staff. SJDH
cannot now disclaim liability since there is no showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the respondent knew, or should have
known, that Dr. Casumpang is only an independent contractor of the hospital. In this case, estoppel has already
set in.
ISSUE: W/N there is a causal connection between the petitioners' negligent act/omission and the patient's
resulting death.
RULING: YES due to Dr. Casumpang's failure to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue, the latter was not
immediately given the proper treatment. In fact, even after Dr. Casumpang had discovered Edmer's real illness,
he still failed to promptly perform the standard medical procedure RULING WHEREFORE, premises considered,
this Court PARTLY GRANTS the consolidated petitions. The Court finds Dr. Noel Casumpang and San Juan de
Dios Hospital solidarity liable for negligent medical practice. We SET ASIDE the finding of liability as to Dr. Ruby
Sanga-Miranda.

4. Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, 31 January 2007.
FACTS: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and
bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering
from “cancer of the sigmoid.” Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed
an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her
left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s
husband to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. Thereafter, Dr. Ampil took over,
completed the operation and closed the incision. However, based on the record of the hospital, the attending
nurses indicated nota bene that 2 sponges were missing. The same was reported to Dr. Ampil but were not
found after “diligent search”. After couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region.
She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence
of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes
which were not removed during the operation. Natividad went to US for 4 months but she was only declared
free of cancer. In Natividad’s return, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon
being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish. But instead the
pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment in other hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon
Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina — a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive
organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Natividad underwent another surgical operation to
remedy the damage. Civil and administrative complaints, for damages and gross negligence respectively, were
filed against PSI owner of Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.
ISSUE(S): Are the following liable?
(1) Professional Services Inc., based on(a) “employer-employee relationship”;(b) “doctrine of apparent
authority”;(c) “corporate negligence”;
(2) Dr. Ampil, (a) for medical negligence;(b) under the “captain of the ship doctrine”;
(3) Dr.Fuentes, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor;
HELD:(1) YES.[P]rivate hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’
staff. While ‘consultants’ are not, technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of ans employer-employee relationship, with the
exception of the payment of wages. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of
allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an E-E relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians.
(b) YES.Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the “holding out” theory, or doctrine of
ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. We concur with the CA’s
conclusion that it “is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded
in the public directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.” As expected,
these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were
being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants. (c) YES. Hospital’s corporate negligence
extends to permitting a physician known to be incompetent to practice at the hospital. xxx [A] patient who
enters a hospital does so with the reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. In the present case,
it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of
providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to
perform such duty.(2) YES. This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Dr,
Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty such gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision.
When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate
cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by
the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from
Natividad’s vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. (b) YES.Under the
“Captain of the Ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all
personnel connected with the operation. he was the “Captain of the Ship.” That he discharged such role is
evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work
of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’ permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure
of the incision. To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two
pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.(3) NO. We
find the element of “control and management of the thing which caused the injury” to be wanting. Hence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the
operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr.
Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the
surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything
to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad.
5. Rosit vs. Davao Doctors Hospital
Facts: On January 15, 1999, Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident. The X-ray taken the next day at the Davao
Doctors Hospital showed that he fractured his jaw. Rosit was then referred to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in
mandibular injuries,4 who, on January 19, 1999, operated on Rosit. During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a
metal plate fastened to the jaw with metal screws to immobilize the mandible. As the operation required the
smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo cut the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that
there were smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so inform Rosit supposing that the latter
would not be able to afford the same. After the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth
and was in pain. X-rays done on Rosit 2 days after the operation showed that the fracture in his jaw was aligned
but the screws used on him touched his molar. Given the X-ray results, Dr. Gestuvo referred Rosit to a dentist,
Dr. Pangan, who opined that another operation is necessary and that it is to be performed in Cebu. Alleging that
the dentist told him that the operation conducted on his mandible was improperly done, Rosit went back to Dr.
Gestuvo to demand a loan to defray the cost of the additional operation as well as the expenses of the trip to
Cebu. Dr. Gestuvo gave Rosit P4,500. Rosit went, still suffering from pain and could hardly open his mouth.In
Cebu, Dr. Pangan replaced the ones installed with smaller titanium plate and screws, as well as extracting Rosit’s
molar and some bone fragments. Rosit was then able to open and close his mouth normally. On his return to
Davao, Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse him for the cost of the operation and the expenses he
incurred in Cebu amounting to P140,000, as well as for the P50,000 that Rosit would have to spend for the
removal of the plate and screws that Dr. Pangan installed. Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Gestuvo is liable for medical negligence
Ruling: Yes. In Flores v. Pineda, the Court explained the concept of a medical negligence case and the elements
required for its prosecution: A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a patient. There are four elements involved
in a medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation. Duty refers to the
standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on one’s conduct. The standard in turn refers to the amount of
competence associated with the proper discharge ofthe profession. A physician is expected to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use under the same circumstances.
Breach of duty occurs when the physician fails to comply with these professional standards. If injury results to
the patient as a result of this breach, the physician is answerable for negligence. To establish medical negligence,
this Court has held that an expert testimony is generally required to define the standard of behavior by which
the court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient.
This is so considering that the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of a patient is usually a matter
of expert opinion. We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the
requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be availed of if the following essential
requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged;
and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships came From a purely
ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose
what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of
treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of
undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his
judgment by reasonably balancing theprobable risks against the probable benefits. There are four essential
elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: “(1) the
physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks;
(3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.” The
gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to “point to significant undisclosed information
relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.” Moreover, even if such affidavit
is considered as admissible and the testimony of an expert witness, the Court is not bound by such testimony.
The opinion of an expert should be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances of the
case. The problem of the evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Thus, the belief of Dr. Pangan whether
Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of negligence or not will not bind the Court. The Court must weigh and examine such
testimony and decide for itself the merits thereof. The trial court properly awarded Rosit actual damages after
he was able to prove the actual expenses that he incurred due to the negligence of Dr. Gestuvo.
6. MANILA DOCTORS HOSPITAL vs SO UN CHUA AND VICKY TY
G.R. no. 150355
FACTS: This case originated from an action for damages filed with the RTC by respondents So Un Chua and Vicky
Ty against petitioner Manila Doctors Hospital.2 The complaint is premised on the alleged unwarranted actuations
of the petitioner towards its patient, respondent So Un Chua (Chua), who was confined for hypertension,
diabetes, and related illnesses. that respondent Ty represented that she will settle the bills as soon as the funds
become available; that respondent Ty pleaded to the management that in view of the physical condition of her
mother, respondent Chua, the correspondences relating to the settlement of the unpaid hospital bills should be
relayed to the former; that these pleas were unheeded by the petitioner; that petitioner threatened to implement
unpleasant measures unless respondent Ty undertakes her mother's obligation as well as the obligation of her
sister, Judith Chua, to pay the hospitalization expenses; that petitioner made good its threat and employed
unethical, unpleasant and unlawful methods which allegedly worsened the condition of respondent Chua,
particularly, by (i) cutting off the telephone line in her room and removing the air-conditioning unit, television
set, and refrigerator, (ii) refusing to render medical attendance and to change the hospital gown and bed sheets,
and (iii) barring the private nurses or midwives from assisting the patient. Respondents thus prayed for the award
of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. although respondent Ty paid up to P435,000.00,
more or less, she reneged on her commitment to pay the balance in violation of the Contract for Admission and
Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment dated October 30, 1990 which she voluntarily executed; that she
signed a Promissory Note on June 5, 1992 for the unpaid balance of P1,075,592.95 and issued postdated checks
to cover the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to damages under TORTS.
HELD: NO. Though human experience would show that the deactivation of the air-conditioner may cause a
temperature differential that may trigger some physical discomfort, or that the removal of entertain ment
facilities such as the television set, or the disconnection of communication devices such as the telephone, may
cause some exasperation on the part of the one who benefits from these, nevertheless, all things considered,
and given the degree of diligence the petitioner duly exerted, not every suppression of the things that one has
grown accustomed to enjoy amounts to an actionable wrong, nor does every physical or emotional discomfort
amount to the kind of anguish that warrants the award of moral damages under the general principles of tort.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff
suffered some pain and suffering.

7. MERCURY DRUG VS DE LEON

FACTS:
Respondent Raul T. De Leon was a judge who noticed that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty
reading. On the same evening, he met a friend for dinner who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla, and
had just arrived from abroad.
De Leon consulted Dr. Milla about his irritated left eye. The latter prescribed the drugs "Cortisporin Opthalmic"
and "Ceftin" to relieve his eye problems. Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon went to the a
branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to
petitioner a pharmacist assistant. Subsequently, bought the medicine handed over by Petitioner.

At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. Instead of relieving his
irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed his eye with water, but the pain did not
subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine, "Cortisporin Otic Solution."

De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he confronted
Petitioner why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and instead
brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription.

Mercury Drug denied that it was negligent and therefore liable for damages. It pointed out that the proximate
cause of De Leon’s unfortunate experience was his own negligence. He should have first read and checked to
see if he had the right eye solution before he used any on his eye. Furthermore, what was written on the piece
of paper presented was "Cortisporin Solution." and what was given only available "Cortisporin Solution" in the
market. Moreover, even the piece of paper De Leon presented upon buying the medicine cannot be considered
as proper prescription. It lacked the required information concerning the attending doctor’s name and license
number.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable?
RULING: YES
Mercury Drug and Petitioner can not exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field
of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. Likewise,
numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and human
health. The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high
degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest
practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the
reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing
from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.

One holding himself out as competent to handle drugs, having rightful access to them, and relied upon by those
dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for by the peculiarly dangerous nature
of the business, cannot be heard to say that his mistake by which he furnishes a customer the most deadly of
drugs for those comparatively harmless, is not in itself gross negligence. In our own jurisdiction.

This Court reminded druggists to exercise the highest degree of care known to practical men. In cases where an
injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has
been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of one’s employees. This
presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption.

As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to
him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not
stand at arm’s length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent
death or injury to any person who relies on one’s absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The Court emphasized:
x x x The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser anything. It would be idle
mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently,
it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.

Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer or to enrich the claimant at the
expense of defendant. There is no hard and fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount
of moral damages since each case must be governed by its peculiar circumstances. However, the award of
damages must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.

8. Mercury Drug Corporation vs Baking, GR No. 156037, May 28, 2007

FACTS: Respondent Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG,
blood and hematology examinations, and urinalysis, Dy. Sy found that respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride
were above normal levels. Dy. Sy prescribed two medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood sugar and
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent bought the prescribed medicines at petitioner Mercury Drug Store. However, the saleslady
misread the prescription for Diamicron for Domicrum, a potent sleeping tablet. Respondent then took the
medicines for three consecutive days unaware of the mistake of the saleslady. On the third day, he figured in a
vehicular accident where his car collided with another car driven by Jose Peralta. It turned out that respondent
fell asleep while driving without idea regarding the accident. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have caused
the accident, he returned to Dr. Sy and the latter was shocked because of the wrong medicine. Respondent
thereafter filed with RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff which
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was negligent and if so, was it the proximate cause of the accident?
RULING: Yes. The Court cited Article 2176 of the New Civil Code which provides that “Whenever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault of negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict.
The Court also enumerated the three elements of quasi-delict, to wit:
1. Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
2. Fault or negligence of the defendant;
3. Connection of the cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.
The Court stressed that there is no dispute that respondent suffered damages. It is generally recognized
that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into
jeopardy if the drugstore employee will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence.
In this case, the petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent. The Court ruled that the proximate cause
of the accident was the petitioner’s employee’s negligence. The vehicular accident could have not occurred had
the employee been careful to his job.