LANDMARK CASE

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133036. January 22, 2003]

JOY LEE RECUERDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Before us for review is the July 16, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 20577 affirming that
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City which in turn affirmed that of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67 convicting Joy Lee Recuerdo (petitioner) for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on 5 counts.

From the evidence of the prosecution, the following facts are established:

Sometime in the first week of December 1993, Yolanda Floro (Yolanda) who is engaged in jewelry business
sold a 3-karat loose diamond stone valued at P420,000.00 to petitioner who gave a downpayment of
P40,000.00. In settlement of the balance of the purchase price, petitioner issued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which
in the amount of P40,000.00, and 1 in the amount of P20,000.00, all drawn against her account at the Prudential
Bank.

When Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to her depository bank, Liberty Savings and Loan Association, only
3, those dated December 25, 1993, January 25, 1994, and February 25, 1994, were cleared. The remaining 5
were dishonored due to the closure of petitioner’s account.

Yolanda thus went to petitioner’s dental clinic and advised her to change the dishonored checks to cash.
Petitioner promised alright but she welshed on it.

A demand letter was thereupon sent to petitioner for her to settle her obligation but she failed to heed the same,
hence, the filing of 5 informations against her for violation of B. P. 22 at the Makati MeTC, the accusatory
portion of the first of which reads:

That sometime in the first week of December, 1993, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make out, drawn (sic) and issue to YOLANDA G. FLORO to apply on account or
for value the check described below:

Check No. - 008789

Drawn Against - Prudential Bank

In the Amount of - P40,000.00

Postdated/dated - July 25, 1994

Payable to - Cash
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said account did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment,
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.”

Except for the check numbers and dates of maturity, the four other informations are similarly worded.

After trial, Branch 67 of the Makati MeTC convicted petitioner in a Joint Decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on five (5) counts and therefore sentences the accused to suffer an imprisonment of
30 days for each count and to restitute the amount of P 200,000.00 to Miss Yolanda G. Floro, which is the total
amount of the five (5) checks, and to pay her also the amount of P20,000.00 as damages to compensate the
payment of attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.

As stated early on, the RTC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the MeTC. And the Court of Appeals affirmed
that of the RTC.

In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioner proffers as follows:

“1. Petitioner was convicted by an invalid law which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for being an unconstitutional
law.

2. Petitioner was denied her constitutional right to due process for failure of the courts a quo to uphold her
presumption of innocence and for convicting her even if the prosecution evidence does not prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

3. The findings of fact of the courts a quo, primarily the Court of Appeals, are based on surmises, conjectures
and speculations.

4. The Court of Appeals was biased against petitioner when it denied the petition moto propio (sic) without the
comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.”

Petitioner contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentment of dishonored checks as they impose a
penalty for each, only creditors/payees are unduly favored by the law; that the law “is in essence a resurrected
form of 19th century ‘imprisonment for debt’” since the drawer is coerced to pay his debt on threat of
imprisonment even if his failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or from any criminal intent to cause
damage; and that the law is a bill of attainder as it does not leave much room for judicial determination, the
guilt of the accused having already been decided by the legislature.

These matters subject of petitioner’s contention have long been settled in the landmark case of Lozano v.
Martinez where this Court upheld the constitutionality of B. P. 22:

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because
of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. (Emphasis supplied)

The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial and the essence of
which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt, fails. For under B. P. 22, every
element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof.

Reinforcing her thesis, petitioner cites the speech made by now Vice-President Teofisto Guingona delivered
before the Philippine Bar Association wherein he stressed the need to review the law since it has not prevented
the proliferation of bouncing checks.

As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, however, while due deference is given to the opinion of the Vice-
President, the same should properly be addressed to the legislature which is in a better position to review the
effectiveness and usefulness of the law. As held in the case of Lozano, it is not for the Court to question the
wisdom or policy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between the means and the end.

Petitioner further claims that the dishonored checks were not issued for deposit and encashment, nor was there
consideration therefor, in support of which she cites her alleged agreement with Yolanda – that she could have
the stone appraised to determine the purchase price, and since she found out that it is only worth P160,000.00,
there was no longer any need to fund the remaining checks which should be returned to her. Yolanda, however,
so petitioner adds, could no longer be reached. Petitioner thus concludes that she had already paid in full the
purchase price of the stone, she having paid P40,000.00 cash plus the P120,000.00 proceeds of the three cleared
checks.

Petitioner’s submission does not lie. Such alleged agreement does not inspire belief. The terms and conditions
surrounding the issuance of the checks are irrelevant.

“A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any
other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that “any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be
punished by imprisonment.” (Emphasis supplied.)

“BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its
primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual
substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the
legislative enactment can be made.” (Emphasis supplied)

Additionally, petitioner argues that as no bank representative testified as to “whether the questioned checks
were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds (sic),” such element was not clearly and convincingly proven,
hence, the trial court failed to uphold her right to presumption of innocence when she was convicted based on
the sole testimony of Yolanda.

Whether the checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, or “Account Closed” as alleged in the
informations and testified on by Yolanda, petitioner’s argument is untenable.

“It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee bank’s representative as a
witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may
present, as it did in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense
charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she deposited the checks to her account in a
bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation ‘drawn against
insufficient funds’ stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the
dishonored checks duly given to the complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the
checks or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.” (Emphasis supplied)

Yolanda’s testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depository bank they were dishonored due to
“Account Closed” thus sufficed. In fact, even petitioner’s counsel during trial admitted the dishonor, and on
that ground.

Finally, petitioner imputes bias on the part of the appellate court when it decided her petition for review without
the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.

The rendition of the decision by the appellate court without the comment of the People-Appellee is not by itself
proof of bias. In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General gave its comment on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision.

In fine, the affirmance of petitioner’s conviction is in order.

Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not be imposed on those found guilty of
violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 issued on February 14, 2001 vests in the courts the
discretion to determine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, whether the
imposition of fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise contrary to the
imperatives of justice.

In the case at bar, this Court notes that no proof, nay allegation, was proffered that petitioner was not a first time
offender. Considering this and the correctness of the case, it would best serve the interests of justice if
petitioner is just fined to enable her to continue her dental practice so as not to deprive her of her income, thus
insuring the early settlement of the civil aspect of the case, not to mention the FINE.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO
guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

In lieu of imprisonment, accused-herein petitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO, is ordered to pay a FINE equivalent
to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the five cases at bar. And she is also ordered to pay
private complainant, Yolanda Floro, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos representing
the total amount of the dishonored checks.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Court of Appeals Rollo, [hereinafter CA Rollo] pp. 32 - 34.

Id. at pp. 35, 38.

Id. at p. 40.

From the CA Rollo, it is gathered that the letter of demand was marked as Exhibit “F.”
CA Rollo, pp. 40-42.

CA Rollo, pp. 24-28.

Penned by Judge Leticia Querubin Ulibarri.

Rollo, p. 53.

Penned by Judge Erna Falloran Aliposa.

Penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. (now Supreme Court Justice).

Rollo, pp. 12-13.

Rollo, p. 17.

Id. at p. 18.

Id. at pp. 17-18.

146 SCRA 323 (1986).

Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986).

People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972).

Rollo, p. 19.

Id. at p. 138.

Supra.

CA Rollo, p. 66.

Id. at p. 69.

Id. at p. 72.

Id. at p. 73.

Id. at p. 74.

Rollo, p. 24.

Lim v. People, 340 SCRA 497 (2000).

Dico, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 637 (1999).

Meriz v. People, G. R. No. 134498, November 13, 2001.

Rollo, p. 21.
CA Rollo, p. 35.

Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744 (1998).

CA Rollo, p. 35.

Id. at p. 38.

So v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 138869, August 29, 2002.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148326. November 15, 2001]

PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS,
respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner, seeks the nullification of two Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was issued by its Second Division on
April 30, 2001, disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of the
Province of Davao del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; and
the second is the en banc Resolution dated May 10, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.

Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the
First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for
Congressman on February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.

On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Commission On Elections
(COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate
of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of
P100,000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth
Division), in its Decision dated April 23, 1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 09017, affirmed the RTC Decision.
Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 106709. However, in its Resolution of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third
Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory. Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is “Eligible for
the office I seek to be elected” – which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said
certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and
executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence.
Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his
disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC,
Manila, for resolution.

On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas’ petition, issued the challenged
Resolution in SPA 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as “a candidate for and from holding any elective
public office” and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation
of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of
People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.

Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution dated
May 10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.

The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.

The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the
COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

“Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

“The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.”
(Emphasis ours)

As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary
as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

In In re Vinzon, the term “moral turpitude” is considered as encompassing “everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, or good morals.”

We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that “not every criminal act involves moral
turpitude,” and that “as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.” We
further pronounced therein that:

“…in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted that it
cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral
turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final
analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.” (Emphasis ours)

We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question
of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did
in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a special law.

Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:

“That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value
Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to
Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.”
(Emphasis ours)

He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 which provides:

“SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.” (Emphasis ours).

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda we held that a
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and “certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person….” The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of
Lozano vs. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, “transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public” since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers “can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.” Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer
who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a
manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.

Petitioner contends that this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda, insofar as it states that
conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer.

This argument is erroneous.

In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuanda’s conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and, in
addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was denied by this Court on the ground that
the said offense involves moral turpitude. There we said in part:

“We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, under both of which she was bound to ‘obey the
laws of the land.’ Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. x x x.” (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor
did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not so
when committed by a non-member.

We cannot go along with petitioner’s contention that this Court’s ruling in Tuanda has been abandoned or
modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs.
Court of Appeals. In these two latter cases, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 was deleted by this Court. Only a fine was imposed. Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the
prison sentence, the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement. This is
what we said in Rosa Lim:

“In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. Blg.
22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable
human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due
regard to the protection of the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We
imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners
brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was committed, ‘otherwise, they
would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term.’ We
do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.”

In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed
Resolutions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Carpio, J., no part.

Rollo, p. 46.

Ibid., p. 45.

Docketed as SPA (PES) No. A-01 – 002; Rollo, pp. 37-44.

Ibid., pp. 47-53.

Ibid., pp. 54-62.

Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., p. 64.

Ibid., pp. 76-90.

Ibid., p. 81.

Ibid., pp. 29-34.

181 SCRA 692 (1990).

Rollo, p. 35.

Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections, 258 SCRA 483, 487 (1996), citing Zari vs. Flores, 94 SCRA 317, 323
(1979); Tak Ng vs. Republic of the Phil., 106 Phil. 727 (1959); Court Administrator vs. San Andres, 197 SCRA
704 (1991); International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, 221 SCRA 760 (1993).

19 SCRA 815 (1967).

Supra, Note No. 13.

Citing International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, ibid., at p. 767, and In re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, 66
SCRA 245 (1975).

Supra.

Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).

Evangeline Danao vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 122353, June 6, 2001, citing
People vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305 (1989).

Supra, Note No. 11.

Ibid..

146 SCRA 323 (1986).

Ibid., at p. 340.

Supra.

Supra, p. 697.

G.R. No. 130038, Sept. 18, 2000.

298 SCRA 656 (Nov. 16, 1998).