HARAKAH AL-YAQIN - the MOST ACTIVE and DANGEROUS

TERRORIST THREAT in ARAKAN

by Rick Heizman

• Origins of Harakah al-Yaqin - the Movement of Certainty

• Leader and Spokesman Ata Ullah
• October 2016 - Organized and Coordinated Attacks by
‘Rohingya’ Muslims
• Thousands of Frantic Buddhists Rescued by Boats and
Helicopters
• Fatwas Give Islamic Legitimacy to Attack and Kill Buddhists
• Violence Escalates in November
• Ata Ullah Rants and Demands
• Planning, Training, and Operational Strategy for the Attacks
• Clandestine Training
• Assassinating Their Own People
• Much Larger Attack Plans Were Thwarted
• Local Support, Youth Are Emboldened
• Communications via Viber and WhatsApp
• International Links
• International (Re)Actions, International (Mis)Understandings

Origins of Harakah al-Yaqin - the Movement of Certainty

A new violent militant group known by its Arabic name ‘Harakah al-Yaqin’ (translated as: the
Faith Movement, or the the Movement of Certainty) is a
dangerous ‘Rohingya’ nationalistic Islamic terrorist group which
carried out a series of surprise deadly attacks in October and
November 2016. Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY), is also known as
‘Aqa Mul Mujahadeen’ (translated from Arabic as, ‘Those who
stand as Mujahideen (Muslim warriors)’. Recently, on March
29, 2017, the group released a press statement using the new
name of ‘Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’ (ARSA), perhaps a
savvy move to have an English name, and therefore minimize
the Arab and Islamist connection, and to use the term ‘Arakan’
to strengthen the propaganda that the Bengali ‘Rohingya’
Muslims are indigenous to the land of Arakan.
Leader and Spokesman Ata Ullah
Guided by a committee of Bengali ‘Ryohinga’ Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Harakah al-Yaqin is
led on the ground, in part, by Ata Ullah (also known as Hafiz Tohar, Havistoohar, Abu Amor
Jununi, and Ameer Abu Amor), a Bengali Muslim, self identified as ‘Rohingya’, born in
Karachi, Pakistan. His father, a Muslim from northern Rakhine State, had migrated to
Pakistan, and after Ata Ullah was born the family then moved to Saudi Arabia, where he grew
up in Mecca, receiving a madrassa (Islamic religious school) education. This is consistent
with the fact that on videos he shows fluent command of both the Bengali dialect spoken in
northern Rakhine State and the Arabic of the Saudi peninsula.
Ata Ullah and around twenty other Rohingya from Saudi
Arabia, all with international training and experience in
warfare technique and weaponry, are leading the training
of recruits, and the actual attacks. Ullah has stated that
he received training in modern guerrilla warfare in
Pakistan, and further weaponry and explosives training in
Libya. Ullah appears in a series of videos, released
online by Harakah al-Yaqi, where he bellows his fanatic
calls for jihad, and his supremacist demands.
October 2016 Attacks
In the early hours of October 9, 2016, Ullah led about 400 insurgents to the border area of
Bangladesh and Myanmar where, in three groups, they launched simultaneous surprise
attacks on three Burmese Border Guard Police (BGP) bases in Maungdaw and Rathedaung
townships, near the border with Bangladesh.
One of the targets was a BGP headquarters, a
major installation in Kyee Kan Pyin (just north
of Maungdaw town) that was overrun in a
carefully planned multi-phase attack, and from
where many weapons were looted. In another
indication of the preparation level, the group
planted an improvised explosive device (IED)
and set an ambush on the approach road to the
headquarters, delaying reinforcements and damaging vehicles. The two other targets were a
BGP sector headquarters at Nga Khu Ya in north Maungdaw and a BGP outpost at Koe Dan
Kauk in Rathedaung, just south of Maungdaw township.
Ata Ullah had instructed that after attacking the bases, the attackers should murder the
members of the police, take their weapons and equipment, and use those weapons in
further attacks on nearby army and police bases.
The Muslims killed 9 officers, and carried away many weapons and large quantities of
ammunition. Over the next few days 5 more soldiers were killed in further attacks, ambushes,
and firefights.
On the afternoon of October 10, heavily-armed ‘Rohingya’ Jihadis ambushed an army
column on the road between Kyee-gan-byin and Kyane-gyaung and killing five soldiers.
On October 10 and 11, Burmese army units entered Myo-thu-gyee, Yay-dwin-Byin, and U-
Chint Bengali ‘Rohingya’ Muslim villages in northern Maungdaw area and cleared the
Bengali militants who were armed with some of the stolen guns, as well as guns smuggled
in from Bangladesh. Several stolen weapons and quantities of ammunition were recovered.
On October 13, another operation was made in the Bengali village of War-bate. One stolen
gun and more than a thousand rounds of ammo were recovered from the village ruins after
the Muslim terrorists set the village on fire and fled towards the nearby border with
Bangladesh.
Similar operations were made against several Bengali villages suspected of hiding local
villagers who had taken part in the October 9 attacks, and harboring jihadis who had snuck
in from Bangladesh. According to unofficial sources altogether 40 Muslim terrorists were
killed and more than 200 were captured and now being detained and interrogated in Sittwe
Prison.
A captured Bengali ‘Rohingya’ named Mamud Eslam said, while being
interrogated, “When we arrived at the mosque the Imam persuaded us to join
the militant group. We were told that we must conduct violent attacks in
collaboration with the men from Bangladesh.”
Another detainee, Saw Du Aarr Mane said, “Our group was
armed with Clubs, machetes, and slingshots. There was a
plan to loot guns (in the surprise attacks on the BGP bases)
and then attack the Burmese army and police forces when
they arrived.”
Another Bengali being interrogated told what he witnessed, “On October
13, we Muslims set fire to villages. I saw about 100 houses burning.” Ei Ar
Har admitted.
Disturbingly, IEDs were used with great effect in most of the attacks. The attacks marked a
major escalation of violence in Rakhine and reflected an unprecedented level of planning and
execution.
Thousands of Frantic Buddhists Rescued by Boats and Helicopters
Riverboats are the main transportation
routes in much of Arakan, and
frightened and desperate Buddhists
near the rivers flocked to the docks in
order to escape to safety.
The October 10, 7:30 AM Express ferry
boat leaving Buthidaung for Sittwe was
so overcrowded with Buddhists
seeking safety from the Muslims that
the security forces had to remove
many people tickets from the Shwe-
pyi-dan ferryboat.
“Today the passengers traveling on the ferry to
Sittwe was more than double the usual number.
Most are school teachers and government
employees from Maungdaw and Buthidaung
fleeing the Rohingya terrorists. Police had to
force people without tickets to disembark and
finally the ferry boat left at 9:15 nearly 2 hours
later than the scheduled departure,” said a local
resident.
There were nearly 2,000 Rakhine and Burmese Buddhist teachers staffing 183 government
schools in Maungdaw and 217 schools in Buthidaung townships. Most Buddhists living in
northern Maungdaw were trapped behind ‘Rohingya’ terrorists and their only hope was to
wait (in great fear) as the Burmese army slowly advanced out from the town of Maungdaw to
clear the rugged area of ‘Rohingya’ terrorists, or to be rescued by helicopters.
On October 13, the Burmese Army sent at least ten
helicopter gunships into troubled areas north of Maungdaw
and airlifted out nearly 2,000 Buddhists, mostly females,
back to Maungdaw town and then to their hometowns in
other parts of Rakhine State. They were mainly teachers,
doctors, nurses, and government staff serving in the
schools, clinics, and government offices located in Bengali
Muslim villages. Three helicopter gunships in several trips
managed to airlift 90 teachers who were trapped inside
Taungbyo-letwel Muslim village, with only a small BGP
patrol for protection. Other Buddhists took refuge in nearby
Rakhine Buddhist villages, which were most often
surrounded by a overwhelmingly larger population of
Bengali ‘Rohingya’ Muslim villages.
"We used to live together with (Muslims) like
family," said Moe Moe, a 62-year-old Rakhine
Buddhist, as she stirred curry inside her tiny
kitchen in the village of Warpaik, just next to the
BGP headquarters in Kyee Kan Pyin, which
suffered the deadly attack 4 days previous. “They
used to come to my shop. They used to work
inside the (border post)," she an AFP reporter. She
remarks about the Oct 9 attack that her village
seemed to be under attack as well because it was
so close, and she and others fled in panic. ”About 40 of us (Buddhists) ran up a nearby hill
with the children. We got hurt because we slipped and fell down as we ran," she said,
showing injuries to her foot. “They (the Bengali ‘Rohingya’ Muslims) were shooting with
guns. They only ran away when soldiers arrived. If soldiers hadn't come, we would have all
been killed."
Attackers returned three days later to Warpaik,
setting fire to more than two dozen bamboo houses.
The destroyed homes still smoldered as Moe Moe
stirred her curry and spoke about the horror.
Moe Moe was shown the Harakh al-Yaqin videos
circulating on social media of armed ‘Rohingya’ men
calling for Muslims worldwide to rise up in jihad. She
recognized three of the militants on the video as
three of the Muslim attackers who terrorized, killed,
and burned the BGP headquarters and her village.
She knew them by name and said they, and others,
had frequented her food stall, and eaten her curry.
Now, under the threat of more attacks, food and supplies scarce, and business dismal, Moe
Moe is considering leaving the village where she has lived for 24 years. "I'm still very scared.
My relatives have asked me to move back (south). I am thinking I will."
Fatwas give Islamic Legitimacy to Attack and Kill Buddhists
In a clever move to rally the local ‘Rohingya’ Bengalis, and especially the greater Muslim
world, Atta Ullah sought religious legitimacy for the attacks. Harakah al-Yaqin prompted senior
‘Rohingya’ Bengali clerics and foreign clerics to rule that, given the (perceived) persecution
Muslims face in Rakhine State, the campaign to fight the security forces is legal by Islamic
Law, and therefore anyone opposing it is blasphemous by the tenets of Islam. Fatwas (Islamic
religious rulings) to this effect were obtained shortly after the October 9 attacks against the
BGP, in many countries with significant ‘Rohingya’ Bengali diaspora, including Saudi Arabia,
Dubai, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. This significantly influenced many Muslim religious
leaders in northern Rakhine State to endorse HaY. The group also has a senior Islamic
scholar with it in Maungdaw (the largest town in northern Rakhine State, where the Muslims
have slaughtered and driven out almost the entire Buddhist population), a ‘Rohingya’ Bengali
from Saudi Arabia, known as Mufti Ziabur Rahman, who brings religious legitimacy to
operations and has authority to issue fatwas.
(Note that they live in, and are supported and funded by a country in which there is not, and
will never allow, even one Buddhist temple, nor even allow a person to have even the
smallest Buddhist statue)
Violence Escalates in November
A further serious escalation on November 12 made it clear that the October attacks on
security forces were not one time events, and that HaY was still operational despite a month
of intensive military operations against them.
At 6:45 am, an army column clashed with some 60 members of the armed HaY group in a
valley near Pwint Hpyu Chaung village; one soldier died and several were wounded; six
attackers were reportedly killed. There were several other skirmishes as the attackers
retreated to Gwa Son village. When troops approached the village, the HaY militants shot at
them.
Several hundred villagers, armed with whatever they had at
hand (knives and farming implements), spontaneously
supported the attackers. A Burmese lieutenant-colonel was
shot dead, and the troops retreated, calling in air support from
two attack helicopters with mounted machine guns.
The same day, there were at least two IED attacks on
government forces in the area. A BGP convoy was struck as it
crossed a bridge, then came under attack by armed
combatants; the authorities report the attackers were repelled
and that there were no casualties. In the second incident, an
army column was struck by an IED, reportedly damaging a vehicle but without casualties. The
authorities have reported several other IED incidents and said that explosives/IEDs were also
used tactically in the initial attack on the BGP headquarters.
Ata Ullah Rants and Demands
Starting a few days after the October 9 attacks Atta Ullah appeared in a series of provocative
online videos, speaking in Bengali, claiming responsibility for the attacks, and appealing, with
frenzy, for all to join him in glorious jihad to liberate Arakan (of course that means to eliminate
the infidels and create a Sharia Law abiding Islamic State.)
From his many rants:
“My Rohingya brothers, I am requesting you, if you want to save
Islam, if you want to save the land of Arakan living inside Arakan, if
you want to save the honor of the mothers and sisters of Arakan, if
you want to save all the masjid (mosques) and madrassas (Islamic
schools) of Arakan from destruction, then, my special request to
you, Please listen to me with attention. Please, join us. Please take
part in this great Jihad with us.”
“To my young Rohingya brothers who are listening to us from
Arakan and outside Arakan, I benignly request all of you - Please
do not sit in the four walls of your house. Please get up and join us.
If you want to see Arakan free, if you want to save the oppressed
Rohingya, if you want to save Islam, please join us. Please, do not
fear death. Death is inevitable. If Allah doesn’t want your death you will not die.”
“I repeat, you will never die if Allah doesn’t want you to die. No one has the power to take your
life except Allah. So, please join us. I am asking the Islamic scholar society who are reluctant
to follow the fatwa of Jihad. My brothers who are experts in Hadith, (accounts of the prophet
Muhammad’s life) please join us.If you act upon Jihad fatwa, Jihad will be established in
Arakan. I urge you to join us. And please start giving the fatwa of Jihad. Please don’t hide
yourselves, please, join us. Please join us to establish Jihad in the land of Arakan.”

“I am speaking to all Rohingya brothers and Muslim Ummah around the world. Please
prepare for Jihad and come here. The fighting can start now, today.”

“If we don’t get our rights, if 1 million, 1.5 million, if all Rohingya need to die, we will die.”
Planning, Training, and Operational Strategy for the Attacks
Interviews of HaY members and the local
population, as well as interrogations of captured
HaY members, by the International Crisis
Group, Reuters, and other well-informed
sources including regional diplomats and
security analysts, have revealed a fairly
detailed picture of the planning and operational
strategy behind the attacks.
HaY’s formation and planning for operations
were initiated in the wake of the 2012 violence. Active recruitment of local leaders began in
2013, then the training of hundreds of recruited villagers. Training was in small batches to
avoid attention, a village at a time, so members would not know the identities of other
trainees, and was primarily conducted in the hills and forests of the Mayu mountain range
along the border of Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships (the only part of Arakan that is now
mostly Muslim), as well as in the compounds of some large houses in villages. It included
weapons use, guerrilla tactics, and - as gleaned from captured HaY members and trainees - a
particular focus on explosives and IEDs. The training took 2 years or more to complete, and
was taught by ‘Rohingya’ Bengalis with combat experience abroad, as well as Pakistanis,
Bengalis, and Afghanis with extensive combat experience, fighting with Taliban, al-Queda,
and other major Islamic terrorist groups.
Since October 9, several hundred young Rohingya men from Bangladesh have joined the
fight. However, the main fighting force is made up of Muslim villagers in northern Rakhine
State who have been given basic training and organized into village-level cells to limit risks of
compromise. These are mostly led by young Islamic clerics (known as ‘Mullahs’ or ‘Maulvis')
or scholars (‘Hafiz’) from those villages.
Clandestine Training
In the village of U Shey Kya, close to Maungdaw, northern
Rakhine State, adult men were approached in early 2016
and asked to join the group, three residents told Reuters.
Some agreed and took part in the training. One man said,
“Some villagers were recruited first, then these agents
persuaded other people one by one. They would go to a
grocery store or in the tea shop, they would talk to people.”
Mohammed Shah, 26, from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son
village, told how he came across 30 people training in a
forest clearing near his village with wooden dummy
weapons. “I support them. We have been persecuted for
decades and they are working to bring us justice.”
Police Captain Yan Naing Latt, the lead interrogator of suspects at the jail in Sittwe, the state
capital, told Reuters that Harakah al-Yaqin’s goal was to seize control of the northern part of
Arakan to create a State for Muslims only, detached from Burma, and following Sharia Law.
“There were six cells in total,” said Captain Yan Naing Latt, but only three were able to
successfully launch attacks in October. He continued, “Leaders like Mohammed Noor were
sent with some weapons to each village, and he recruited and trained locals there. They
trained karate and practiced firing guns. Some of the attackers came from refugee camps in
Bangladesh and brought with them weapons that had been stolen there,” he remarked.
Villagers who have seen the Harakah al-Yaqin videos say Ata Ullah was one of those who led
recruitment and training. “He used to come to the village very often…he told the villagers that
he will fight for our rights,” said a school teacher from the village of Kyar Gaung Taung. Four
other residents said some of the trainers did not speak the local Bengali language but
conversed in Urdu, the language of Pakistan, or other languages they did not know.
“About 20 people in our village attended the training. We attended it it in an area of the
western Mayu Mountains.” Jarburaman, a captured Bengali said during interrogation.
“They are moving from one place to the next and organizing short 5-10 day long training
sessions in different villages,” according to an intelligence officer’s investigation and
interrogation of captured Hay fighters.
Assassinating Their Own People
Harakah al-Yaqin has assassinated informers, or suspected
informers, among the Muslim villages of north and south Maungdaw
and threatened, intimidated, or killed others to ensure its own
survival. Those who refuse to support their brutal methods, or dare
report on their activities to government forces, are often found with
their throats slashed as a warning to any who would dare question
the righteousness of their campaign, according to an International
Crisis Group report. HaY has drawn up a hit list of those whom it
cannot find or reach. The group also paid significant hush money to
keep potential informers - that they couldn’t kill - quiet. From August
2016, the killing of informers increased because of a bold and secret
plan being made.
A captured Bengali ‘Rohingya’ named Jarburaman told interrogators, “I was forced to attend
the terrorist training. They threatened to shoot me or cut my throat if I did not attend it.”
Another captured Bengali, Mamud Eslam, said, “When we arrived at the mosque the Imam
persuaded us to join the militant group. We were told that we must conduct violent attacks in
collaboration with the men from Bangladesh. The Imam also said that one person from every
house must join in this action. Those who don’t join will be killed with their throat cut.”
Even after the October 9 attacks, there were more assassinations - a Muslim man who used
to work as a BGP cook was abducted by fellow villagers in Laungdon village and found in a
paddy field on October 31 with his throat cut. On November 3, in U Shey Kya village, a former
village administrator was similarly found dead, with his throat cut, as was a village leader in
south Maungdaw on November 17. These killings were done in the same gruesome way,
presumably to inspire fear. Three more ‘Rohingya’ Muslims, who had worked closely with the
local administration, were found dead on Jan 21, 2017, believed to have been murdered by
‘Rohingya’ insurgents in reprisal attack.
Much Larger Attack Plans Were Thwarted
Two Saudi Arabia-based senior leaders of Harakah al-Yaqin spent the month of August, 2016,
in northern Rakhine State, selecting targets for a much larger coordinated attack and
determining how and when the attacks would take place. Once they left, the intention was to
obtain weapons and ammunition for the hundreds of trainees. Plans were also made to
deploy at least four experienced doctors with medicines and supplies and to train locals as
medics to assist them. From late August, 2016, there was an increase in the killing of known
informers within the Rohingya community, in an attempt to keep the plans secret.
The claimed objective of the upcoming operation was to take complete control of Maungdaw
township, cut off communications with Buthidaung to the
east and establish military posts on the ridges of the
Mayu range between Maungdaw and Buthidaung,
creating a defendable liberated area. After this, the intent
was to attack the northern part of Buthidaung – a very
ambitious plan that would give complete control of the
Bangladesh border – as well as parts of Rathedaung.
In early September, 2016, after the two senior leaders
left, two informers in U Shey Kya village-tract, close to Nga Khu Ya where one of the 9
October attacks occurred, revealed the identities of eight local HaY members to the BGP,
which arrested them on September 12. They were interrogated and finally divulged shocking
and frightening information about the secret plan. HaY managed to bribe their members out of
jail, learned who the informers were, and on September 30 killed the two informants. The
Burmese and Rakhine authorities subsequently began large payments to informers in north
Maungdaw to draw up lists of villagers in their area involved with terrorist and separatist
groups, which prompted many to flee into Bangaldesh.
Additionally, local people say, an IED that accidentally exploded in Ngar Sar Kyu village-tract
around October 7while it was being prepared drew the attention of the security forces.
According to members of the group, HaY saw that the net was closing and decided that
though its preparations were not yet complete for the larger attack plan, it had to make an
emergency plan and launch a smaller operation on October 9 - ahead of schedule.
Though done hastily, the attacks showed some sophistication, including diversionary tactics;
blocking reinforcements with a complex attack (IEDs plus armed assault) on a convoy some
distance away; and felling of trees across roads to halt military vehicles. It is unclear where
the explosives came from, but a foreign expert described the IEDs as crude but not
completely amateurish.
The group was able to organize widely, pay numerous potential informers in northern Rakhine
State prior to the attacks to keep them quiet and large bribes to the security forces to free
detained militants. Now that it has established its legitimacy and capability with attacks, it is
likely to be able to get funding much more easily, from the Rohingya diaspora and major
private donors in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East - all of whom like to see their money result
in quick and powerful events. HaY may also attract much larger terrorist groups to come and
join their warfront.
Local Support, Youth Are Emboldened
It would not have been
possible for HaY to establish
itself and make detailed
preparations without the buy-in
of some local people,
particularly religious leaders
and local communities in
northern Rakhine State.
HaY leaders also seem to have
been effective in this regard.
The local commanders, about
twenty ‘Rohingya’ Bengalis from
Saudi Arabia, including Ata Ullah, all had good, secure lives in Saudi Arabia - the dream of
many Rohingya - but were seen to have sacrificed comfort and prosperity to live beside
impoverished villagers, without wearing shoes or good clothes and eating the same meagre
food. These observations convinced many locals that the group was sincere and committed.
Young men are especially emboldened now to join. Following the success of the attacks,
some youths take the view that the group has achieved what their fathers and grandfathers
could not.
Communications via Viber and WhatsApp
Much of HaY’s communications and planning is over encrypted messaging applications such
as WhatsApp and Viber, as well as WeChat (which does not have end-to-end encryption).
Use of these has become widespread across Myanmar over the last few years, as mobile
voice and data connectivity have been rolled out along with $20 smartphones (people close to
the border have had access to these opportunities for much longer, by connecting to
Bangladeshi networks). Myanmar is one of the only countries where Viber is the dominant
messaging app: the company claims 25 million unique users as of October 2016, out of a
51.5 million population. Such tools have significantly lowered communication and organization
barriers for communities in northern Rakhine State.
The preferred messaging app among Rohingya is WhatsApp. This is probably due to its much
greater popularity internationally and the fact that Rohingya use these apps to keep in touch
with family overseas and the diaspora more generally. International Crisis Group identified
more than 50 WhatsApp groups in use in northern Rakhine State, each with as many as 250
members, and including diaspora Rohingya around the world. These are mainly used for
social interaction and information sharing, not nefarious purposes. Some individuals are
members of ten to twenty WhatsApp groups and can also easily share information from group
chats with their individual contacts. In the wake of the October 9 attacks, these have been
used to quickly disseminate information about security threats and other urgent issues. They
are likely also an important source of HaY operational intelligence. Since the Rohingya dialect
of Bengali does not have a written form, much of the communication over these applications
uses audio files or voice messages.
Links with International Jihadist Groups
Ata Ullah, the other commanders, and the Pakistani and Afghan fighters with Ullah are well-
trained and experienced in guerrilla warfare; their tactics and operational success appear to
confirm this, particularly their use of asymmetric methods and weapons such as IEDs, albeit
crude ones. Such training and experience imply at least some links with international
extremist groups. HaY recruits confirm that they have been instructed in Rakhine State or
Bangladesh by ‘Rohingya’ Bengalis, Bangladesh Bengalis, Pakistani, and Afghani trainers,
and that their leaders seem well connected with those countries, and the various militant
groups in those countries, and more.
Additionally, the Rohingya cause has been used propagandistically by international jihadist
groups for several years. Examples include threats against Myanmar by Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (2012); calls by an Indonesian extremist leader for Muslims to wage jihad in
Myanmar (2013); threats by the IS leader to take revenge on Myanmar and several other
countries for abuses against their Muslims; promises to rescue Muslims in Myanmar and
elsewhere from ‘injustice and oppression’ in the formation announcement of ‘al-Qaeda in the
Indian Subcontinent’; frequent citations in speeches as recently as 2015 by Hafiz Muhammad
Saeed, head of Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba militants, to the ‘atrocities on Rohingya Muslims’
and calls for revenge; offers of resources and training
facilities by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in June 2015 to
help Myanmar Muslims ‘take up the sword’; and a call in
the April 2016 issue of IS’s Dabiq magazine by
Bangladeshi militant Abu Ibrahim to help oppressed
Muslims in Myanmar in every possible way, but stating
that it was not a current operational focus.
There appear to be some other forms of cooperation or assistance, including training and
funding, as well, potentially, as provision of weapons and explosives, which HaY currently
seeks in Bangladesh. According to security analysts, small arms and military-grade
explosives are available there, and procuring them should not be too difficult if the group has
connections with regional arms traffickers or Bangladeshi or regional militant entities.
It is also possible that the spotlight on the Rohingya’s plight might prompt foreign groups
unconnected with HaY to conduct a terrorist attack; there has been a foiled attempt to bomb
Myanmar’s Jakarta embassy, and the individual who carried out the recent attack at Ohio
State University in the U.S. claimed to have been inspired, in large part, by his perceived
oppression of the ‘Rohingya’ Muslims.
On the western border in particular, arms, narcotics and human smuggling networks are
intertwined and could be used by insurgent and jihadist groups to transport weapons, materiel
and personnel.
All indications are that HaY is preparing further attacks on security forces and retains the
capability to do so, or more likely, is increasing the capability to do so. And, the involvement of
foreign militants has the potential to radicalize and enflame the conflict, and to create a war
with which not only Arakan’s Buddhists are threatened with extinction, but Myanmar itself, and
the other Buddhist populations in Asia.
International (Re)Actions, International (Mis)Understandings
The current security operation has strained relations with nearby countries that have large
Muslim populations and with which there are practical needs for close ties - Bangladesh,
Malaysia, and Indonesia - all of which have seen huge rabble-rousing demonstrations, heated
political talk, and gross demonization of Buddhists and Buddhism. Their Muslim majorities are
subject to completely false and manipulative media, and the entrenched Islamic supremacist
view, where Muslims are never at fault, and always are, or should be, above all non-Muslims
in all matters.
The anger against Myanmar in much of the Muslim world is
real, though the reasons for the anger are not real. Among
the Western countries there is anxiety and concern, but
without proper understanding of the history of the region, and
without understanding the core Islamic tenet to conquer and
eliminate all others, and to have no concern about doing
that.
Looking at the larger picture, of which these incidences
described here are just several events, people are, or should
be, disillusioned and aghast at the genocidal elimination of the
indigenous Buddhists in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in
Bangladesh, countless terrorist attacks by Islamists against
Buddhists in Southern Thailand, the destruction of historic and
holy Buddhist relics in Afghanistan and the Maldives by
intolerant Islamic militants, the bloody and sensational attacks
in China by Islamic Uighurs from Xinjiang, the anti-Buddhist
hatred spewed by Indonesian and Malaysian mobs, the
demonization and vitrification of Buddhist people and the
Buddhist faith by the very malicious and manipulative Muslim
media, and more.
Simply put:
the regional and historical realities are being neglected
by a simplified Western bias, coupled with an Islamic media bias.

Hoping for peace and harmony, in diversity, with metta

(loving kindness)
By Rick Heizman, April 20, 2017, San Francisco