Bixler v. Scientology: CSI's Demurrer To Riales

Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/06/2020 06:55 PM Sherri R.
Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Hung,Deputy Clerk
1 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN (State Bar No. 150477)
2 wforman@scheperkim.com
DAVID C. SCHEPER (State Bar No. 120174)
3 dscheper@scheperkim.com
MARGARET E. DAYTON (State Bar No. 274353)
4 pdayton@scheperkim.com
800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor
5 Los Angeles, California 90017-2701
Telephone: (213) 613-4655
6 Facsimile: (213) 613-4656
7 Attorneys for Defendants Church of Scientology

International and Church of Scientology Celebrity
8 Centre International
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
11
12 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE Assigned to Hon. Steven J. Kleifield
13 BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, Dept. 57
14 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS CHURCH OF

SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND
15 v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
CELEBRITY CENTRE
16 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL’S NOTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO
17 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF PLAINTIFF RIALES’ CLAIMS IN
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT;
18 INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1-25, AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF
19 WILLIAM H. FORMAN IN SUPPORT
Defendants. THEREOF
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Filed Concurrently with:
21 Supporting Declaration of William H.
Forman; [Proposed] Order
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Hearing Date: March 18, 2020
23 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 57
24
Trial Date: Not Set
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RESERVATION NO. 897606712223
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DEFENDANTS CSI AND CC’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER

1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 18, 2020, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
3 this matter may be heard, in Department 57 of the above-entitled Court, located at 111 N. Hill
4 Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendants Church of Scientology International (“CSI”)
5 and Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International (“CC”) will, and hereby do, demur to
6 Plaintiff Marie Bobette Riales’ claims in the Complaint in their entirety, including Causes of
7 Action One through Four.
8 As set forth in the concurrently-filed Declaration of William H. Forman, on Thursday,
9 December 12, 2019, counsel for the Parties met and conferred as required by California Code of
10 Civil Procedure Section 430.41(a)(1)-(3) regarding the demurrer. The Parties did not reach an
11 agreement resolving the objections and arguments raised in the demurrer.
12 The demurrer is based on this Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, the attached
13 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the concurrently-filed Declaration of William H. Forman,
14 all pleadings and papers on file in this action, and any further evidence or argument that may be
15 presented at the hearing.
16
17 DATED: January 6, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

DAVID C. SCHEPER
18 WILLIAM H. FORMAN
19 MARGARET E. DAYTON
20
21 By: /s/ William H. Forman

William H. Forman
22
Attorneys for Defendants Church of Scientology
23 International and Church of Scientology Celebrity
Centre International
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1 DEMURRERS
2 Defendants Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) and Church of Scientology
3 Celebrity Centre International (“CC”) demur generally to Plaintiff Marie Bobette Riales’ Claims
4 in the Complaint in their entirety, including Causes of Action One through Four, on the following
5 grounds:
6 Demurrer to First Cause of Action
7 1. The First Cause of Action for Stalking In Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7
8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section
9 430.10(d).
10 2. The First Cause of Action for Stalking In Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7 fails
11 to state a cause of action and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
12 Section 430.10(e).
13 Demurrer to Second Cause of Action
14 3. The Second Cause of Action for Physical Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Cal.
15 Civ. Code § 1708.8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil
16 Procedure Section 430.10(d).
17 4. The Second Cause of Action for Physical Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Cal.
18 Civ. Code § 1708.8 fails to state a cause of action and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to
19 Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).
20 Demurrer to Third Cause of Action
21 5. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of
22 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of
23 Civil Procedure Section 430.10(d).
24 6. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of
25 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 fails to state a cause of action and is therefore subject to demurrer
26 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).
27 Demurrer to Fourth Cause of Action
28 7. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
3
1 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section
2 430.10(d).
3 8. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fails to
4 state a cause of action and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
5 Section 430.10(e).

DAVID C. SCHEPER
8 WILLIAM H. FORMAN
10

William H. Forman
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................8
3
II. Argument ................................................................................................................................8
4
A. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer With Prejudice Because Plaintiff’s
5 Claims Are Misjoined With the Claims of the Four Other Plaintiffs.........................8
6 B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer Because Plaintiff Riales Fails to
Allege Facts Sufficient to State Any Claim Against CSI and CC ...........................11
7
1. All of Plaintiff Riales’ Claims Fail Because She Does Not Allege
8 Facts Demonstrating CSI or CC Engaged In Any Conduct At All ..............11
9 2. Plaintiff Riales’ First Claim Fails Because She Fails to Allege Facts
Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a Claim for Stalking ..................13
10
3. Plaintiff Riales’ Second and Third Claims Fail Because She
11 Premises Them On Conduct That Allegedly Occurred Outside of
California ......................................................................................................14
12
4. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Riales’ Second Claim Fails Because She
13 Does Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a
Claim for Physical Invasion of Privacy........................................................15
14
5. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Riales’ Third Claim Fails Because She
15 Does Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of A
Claim for Constructive Invasion of Privacy .................................................16
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6. Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Claim Fails Because She Does Not Allege
17 the Nature and Extent of the Emotional Distress She Allegedly
Suffered ........................................................................................................17
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III. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................18
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
2
Federal Cases
3
Connor v. Franke,
4
No. 16-cv-3542, 2017 WL 1908154 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) ................................................... 14
5
State Cases
6
Aghaji v. Bank of,
7 Amer., 247 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2016) .......................................................................................... 9
8 Angie M. v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. App. 4th 1217 (1995) ................................................................................................ 17, 18
9
Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co.,
10
164 Cal. App. 3d 602 (1985) ................................................................................................. 17, 18
11
Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspapers, Inc.,
12 175 Cal. App. 2d 650 (1959) ................................................................................................... 9, 10
13 Doe v. City of Los Angeles,

42 Cal. 4th 531 (2007)........................................................................................................... 12, 13
14
Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
15
192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 (2011) .................................................................................................... 12
16
Moe v. Anderson,
17 207 Cal. App. 4th 826 (2012) .............................................................................................. 8, 9, 10
18 Pan Pac. Prop., Inc. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz,

81 Cal. App. 3d 244 (1978) ......................................................................................................... 14
19
Pitman v. City of Oakland,
20 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037 (1988) ............................................................................................... 17, 18
21
Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’,
22 Srvc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2000).............................................................................. 11, 14, 16, 17
23 State Statutes
24 Cal. Civ. Proc. § 378(a)(1) .......................................................................................................... 9, 10
25 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7 .................................................................................................................. 13
26 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a)(3)(A) ................................................................................................... 14
27 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 ............................................................................................................ 14, 15
28
Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) ........................................................................................................ 15, 16
6
1 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) ....................................................................................................... 16, 17
2 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f)(5) ......................................................................................................... 15
3 Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(d) ................................................................................ 8, 10
4 Other Authorities
5
Rutter Practice Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def., B. Elements of Claim, Cal. Prac. Guide
6 Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def. Ch. 2(IX)-B ........................................................................ 16, 17
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1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2
I. Introduction
3
Plaintiff Marie Bobette Riales alleges in the Complaint that certain events have happened
4
in her life: trash stolen, persons loitering in front of her house, computer difficulties, a shattered
5
window. Most people understand these annoyances to be the price of modern, urban life.
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Plaintiff, on the other hand, charges that these commonplace events are part of a vast campaign
7
against her by prominent religious organizations and the ecclesiastical leader of a religion. That
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argument is false and malicious. Other than Plaintiff’s allegations that these events happened to
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her, she alleges no facts that Defendants are the ones responsible. Indeed, the Complaint contains
10
no allegation on personal knowledge that any defendant committed any act that forms the basis of
11
a claim. Instead, Plaintiff alleges “upon information and belief” that all material acts identified in
12
the complaint were performed at the direction of Defendants, without alleging a single fact
13
supporting this “belief.” Such unsupported allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action.
14
Furthermore, even taking on faith Plaintiff’s unsupported argument that unidentified agents of
15
Defendants engaged in the conduct described, her claims still fail as a matter of law, as Plaintiff
16
fails to allege facts supporting the essential elements of each of her asserted claims.
17
But the Complaint’s lack of supporting facts and law is not even its biggest defect. The
18
Complaint improperly joins Plaintiff Riales’ claims with those of four other plaintiffs. Yet, the
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claims are premised on entirely distinct and separate acts—allegedly occurring at different times
20
and in different locations. Because the claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of
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transactions, they cannot be pleaded jointly. Moe v. Anderson, 207 Cal. App. 4th 826, 833 (2012).
22
Thus the Complaint in its current form cannot be cured by amendment and must be dismissed.
23
II. Argument
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A. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer With Prejudice Because Plaintiff’s Claims
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Are Misjoined With the Claims of the Four Other Plaintiffs
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A demurrer must be sustained where “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties.” Cal.
27
Civ. Proc. § 430.10(d). Plaintiffs may be properly joined in one action if their claims “aris[e] out
28
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1 of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
2 law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 378(a)(1)
3 (emphasis added). Separate and distinct acts occurring at separate and distinct times do not “arise
4 out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions,” and therefore joinder is not
5 proper. Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 826 (citing Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspapers, Inc., 175 Cal.
6 App. 2d 650, 653 (1959)); Aghaji v. Bank of Amer., 247 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1120-21 (2016)
7 (finding misjoinder of plaintiffs where each plaintiff’s claims arose from “unique transactions or
8 experiences”). An allegation that defendants “conspired” to commit acts against the plaintiffs is
9 insufficient to demonstrate joinder is proper where the allegations consist of separate acts
10 committed against different plaintiffs at different times and locations. Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d
11 at 654. In Coleman, the court explained that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate “a right to relief
12 arising out the same transaction or series of transactions” where “[t]hree separate and distinct
13 plaintiffs are suing to recover damages for alleged trespasses on separate and distinct premises and
14 for alleged conversions of separate and distinct property.” Id. Similarly, allegations that a
15 defendant has a “pattern and practice” of violating the law and the plaintiffs have suffered because
16 of that pattern and practice does not give rise to joinder. See, e.g., Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 834
17 (affirming sustaining of demurrer without leave to amend where plaintiffs’ claims against the
18 same defendant were based on two separate and distinct alleged sexual assaults because the
19 alleged assaults were not the same transaction or occurrence).
20 The Complaint amounts to a recitation of discrete events that each Plaintiff experienced
21 separately at different times and at different places. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 86, 96, 111 (alleging
22 individuals loitered and/or surveilled outside Plaintiff Bixler’s home), ¶ 89 (alleging Plaintiff
23 Bixler was filmed on a public street), ¶ 92 (alleging Plaintiff Bixler was “harassed and
24 photographed” at a nail salon), ¶ 107 (alleging Plaintiff Bixler was “run off the road by a vehicle
25 that was following her”), ¶ 156 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was followed in a Best Buy store),
26 ¶¶ 158, 165 (alleging individuals loitered and/or surveilled outside Plaintiff Jane Doe #1’s home),
27 ¶ 165 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was watched at a hair salon), ¶ 167 (alleging Plaintiff Jane
28 Doe #1 was “accosted” at an accountant’s parking lot), ¶ 168 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was
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1 “followed into a grocery store”), ¶¶ 191, 193, 198 (alleging individuals loitered and photographed
2 outside Plaintiff Riales’ home), ¶ 194 (alleging Plaintiff Riales was harassed in a restaurant), ¶ 196
3 (alleging Plaintiff Riales was photographed on vacation in Delaware), ¶ 217 (alleging Plaintiff
4 Jane Doe #2 was harassed at a grocery store).
5 The Complaint also alleges the occurrence of numerous bizarre and distinct events—car
6 doors discovered open, theft of trash, theft of items, poisoning of trees, trimming of trees, and
7 malfunction of electronic devices and security systems—which occurred at different locations and
8 different times. Principally, each Plaintiff claims that these events occurred at their separate
9 homes. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 85-88, 94, 100, 109-110, 112 (allegations regarding events occurring at
10 Plaintiff Bixler’s home); id. ¶¶ 160, 161, 162, 170-172 (allegations regarding events occurring at
11 Plaintiff Jane Doe #1’s home); id. ¶¶ 192, 195 (allegations regarding events occurring at Plaintiff
12 Riales’ home).)
13 Each Plaintiff thus pleads separate and particular acts of harassment were directed to each
14 individually, and each bears the burden of proving that these acts happened: Plaintiff Bixler
15 showing that she was “harassed” at a hair salon does not absolve Plaintiff Riales of her burden to
16 show she was taunted at a restaurant. Yet these distinct and separate acts form the basis of
17 Plaintiffs’ jointly-pleaded claims. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 223-224, 226 (all Plaintiffs alleging that all
18 Defendants followed and threatened Plaintiffs), ¶ 236 (same, with respect to trespass allegations),
19 ¶¶ 242-243 (same, with respect to improper use of recording devices), ¶ 248 (same, with respect to
20 allegations of harassment and stalking).) Because Plaintiff Riales’ claims are premised on
21 different acts that occurred at different times and in different locations from the other Plaintiffs’
22 claims, they do not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions. See Moe, 207 Cal.
23 App. 4th at 834; Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654. Therefore, joinder of Plaintiff Riales’ claims
24 with those of the other Plaintiffs is not appropriate, and the demurrer should be sustained without
25 leave to amend. See Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 378(a)(1), 430.10(d); Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 834;
26 Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654. While this is a defect with the claims of all Plaintiffs, CSI and
27 CC have moved to compel arbitration as to the remaining Plaintiffs, and CSI and CC only demur
28 to Plaintiff Riales’ claims at this time.
10
1
2 B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer Because Plaintiff Riales Fails to Allege
3 Facts Sufficient to State Any Claim Against CSI and CC
4 A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint. Rakestraw v.
5 Cal. Physicians’ Srvc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 39, 42-43 (2000). “Because a demurrer tests the legal
6 sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show the complaint alleges facts sufficient to
7 establish every element of each cause of action.” Id. at 43.
8 1. All of Plaintiff Riales’ Claims Fail Because She Does Not Allege Facts
9 Demonstrating CSI or CC Engaged In Any Conduct At All
10 The gravamen of each of Plaintiff Riales’ claims is the alleged acts of harassment and
11 surveillance perpetrated against her individually, specifically:
12  Plaintiff Riales’ First Cause of Action for stalking is based on “Defendants”

13 allegedly following Plaintiffs “online” and in person “thus placing Plaintiffs under
14 surveillance with the intent to alarm, threaten, and harass Plaintiffs.” (Compl. ¶ 224.)
15  Plaintiff Riales’ Second Cause of Action for physical invasion of privacy is based
16 on “Defendants” allegedly “trespass[ing] on [Plaintiffs’] property to take photos, look[ing]
17 in Plaintiffs’ windows, and electronically compromis[ing] their security systems, and/or
18 phones, and/or computers, and/or other digital devices.” (Id. ¶ 236.)
19  Plaintiff Riales’ Third Cause of Action for constructive invasion of privacy is based
20 on “Defendants” allegedly “us[ing] devices to capture image and sound recordings or other
21 physical impressions which, because of such device’s use, allowed Defendants to avoid
22 trespassing on Plaintiffs’ land while still being able to capture such recordings and
23 impressions.” (Id. ¶ 242.)
24  Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional

25 distress is based on “Defendants trespass[ing] on Plaintiffs’ personal property, look[ing] in
26 windows, follow[ing] and stalk[ing], hack[ing] personal online accounts and emails,
27 engag[ing] in surveillance of and interference with Plaintiffs’ daily lives, and/or call[ing],
28 and/or text[ing], and/or otherwise attempt[ing] to communicate repeatedly.” (Id. ¶ 248.)
11
1 Yet, Plaintiff Riales fails to allege any facts supporting the allegation that CSI, CC—or any
2 of the Defendants—committed these acts. Indeed, the Complaint contains no allegation that any
3 Defendant committed any act in furtherance of a claim. Instead, the Complaint alleges as to all
4 material acts identified in the complaint “[u]pon information and belief, all the following-
5 described acts of harassment, surveillance, and/or stalking were carried out by or at the direction
6 of Defendants’ employees, agents, and/or representatives.” (Compl. ¶ 187.) This bare allegation
7 is insufficient.
8 “A plaintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within [her]
9 personal knowledge, if [s]he has information leading [her] to believe that the allegations are
10 true.” Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 1158 (2011) (quoting
11 Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550 (2007)) (emphasis added, internal quotation
12 marks omitted). A pleading made on information and belief is not sufficient if it “merely assert[s]
13 the facts so alleged without alleging such information that ‘leads the plaintiff to believe that the
14 allegations are true.’” Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5.
15 The Complaint alleges that the acts in question were committed by numerous individuals,
16 most of whom are unnamed and completely unidentified. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 190-196, 198.) As
17 to the alleged acts of unnamed and unidentified individuals, there are no facts alleged that support
18 the belief that they were acting at the “direction of Defendants’ employees, agents, and/or
19 representatives.” These are no more than accusations of culpability without a shred of supporting
20 information.
21 Plaintiff Riales identifies only one person by name who supposedly “publicly threaten[ed]
22 Plaintiffs and their families,” Kathy Gold. (Id. ¶ 197.) Yet, the Complaint never specifically
23 alleges Ms. Gold threatened Plaintiff Riales and fails to allege sufficient information that “leads
24 the plaintiff[s] to believe” Ms. Gold was acting at the “direction of Defendants’ employees,
25 agents, and/or representatives.” Instead, the Complaint merely states that Ms. Gold is a
26 Scientologist. (Id.) Plainly, that a person is a member of a religion does not establish that all
27 actions performed by that person were “at the direction” of the religious institution. For instance,
28 if a Catholic is the party at fault in an automobile crash, the injured party cannot allege a claim
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1 against the Catholic Church by stating that the culpable driver is a Catholic.
2 Plaintiff Riales does not allege facts that support her “belief” that the individuals were
3 acting at the direction of CSI, CC—or any other Defendant—when they allegedly performed the
4 acts attributed to them in the Complaint. Because the Complaint merely asserts allegations “on
5 information and belief” without alleging the information that leads the plaintiffs to believe that the
6 allegations are true, it is insufficient. Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5. The
7 Demurrer should be sustained as to all of Plaintiff Riales’ causes of action.1
8 2. Plaintiff Riales’ First Claim Fails Because She Fails to Allege Facts
9 Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a Claim for Stalking
10 To allege a cause of action for stalking under California Civil Code Section 1708.7, a
11 plaintiff must allege facts supporting the following elements:
12 (1) The defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to follow, alarm,
place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff . . .
13
(2) As a result of that pattern of conduct, either of the following occurred:
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(A) The plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety . . .
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(B) The plaintiff suffered substantial emotional distress, and the pattern of conduct
16 would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress;
17 (3) One of the following:
18 (A) The defendant, as part of the pattern of conduct specified in paragraph (1),
made a credible threat with either (i) the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable
19 fear for his or her safety, or the safety of an immediate family member, or (ii)
reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff or that of an immediate family
20 member. In addition the plaintiff must have, on at least one occasion, clearly and
definitively demanded that the defendant cease and abate his or her pattern of
21 conduct and the defendant persisted in his or her pattern of conduct unless exigent
circumstances make the plaintiff’s communication of the demand impracticable or
22 unsafe.
23 (B) The defendant violated a restraining order.
24 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7. Here, Plaintiff Riales fails to allege facts supporting the elements of her
25
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1
Again, this defect exists as to all claims by all Plaintiffs because they make an identical and
27 insufficient allegation “on information and belief,” (Compl. ¶¶ 84, 154, 212), but CSI and CC
28 demur only to Plaintiff Riales because they have moved to compel arbitration against the other
Plaintiffs.
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1 claim for stalking.
2 First, as set forth above, Plaintiff Riales does not allege facts showing that Defendants
3 engaged in any conduct, much less conduct with the intent “to follow, alarm, place under
4 surveillance, or harass the plaintiff” or that Defendants made a “credible threat” to her. Because
5 Plaintiff fails to make these “most basic” allegations, her first cause of action fails. Connor v.
6 Franke, No. 16-cv-3542, 2017 WL 1908154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (granting motion to
7 dismiss stalking claim because “Plaintiff does not even allege that Defendant is the person who
8 broke into her home or followed her”).
9 Furthermore, Plaintiff Riales does not allege that any threat was made to her by anyone.
10 (Compare Compl. ¶ 197 (alleging that “Plaintiffs” but not “Plaintiff Riales” was threatened) with
11 id. ¶ 99 (alleging that “Plaintiff Bixler” was threatened), ¶ 167 (alleging that “Plaintiff Jane Doe
12 #1” was threatened).) For this additional reason, Plaintiff Riales’ first claim for stalking fails.
13 Second, Plaintiff Riales fails to sufficiently allege that “on at least one occasion, [she]
14 clearly and definitively demanded that the defendant cease and abate his or her pattern of conduct
15 and the defendant persisted in his or her pattern of conduct . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a)(3)(A).
16 At paragraph 227, the Complaint alleges “Plaintiffs demanded the Defendants cease their
17 behavior. The Defendants persisted in their pattern of conduct and warned Plaintiffs that further
18 public complaints about them would only increase the severity of their fair gaming campaign.”
19 (Compl. ¶ 227.) This conclusory allegation, jointly-pleaded, does not state when such demand
20 was made, in what form, and to whom. Plaintiff Riales must plead these facts to state a claim.
21 See Pan Pac. Prop., Inc. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. App. 3d 244, 251 (1978) (allegation that
22 appellants “exhausted their administrative remedies” is a “conclusionary statement” that is not
23 admitted on demurrer); see also Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43 (the complaint must allege facts
24 supporting each element of a cause of action).
25 3. Plaintiff Riales’ Second and Third Claims Fail Because She Premises Them
26 On Conduct That Allegedly Occurred Outside of California
27 Plaintiff Riales’ Second and Third Causes of Action are based on Civil Code Section
28 1708.8. Civil Code Section 1708.8 explicitly states that it “applies only to a visual image, sound
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1 recording, or other physical impression that is captured or taken in California in violation of
2 subdivision (a), (b), or (c) after January 1, 2010, and shall not apply to any visual image, sound
3 recording, or other physical impression taken or captured outside of California.” Cal. Civ. Code §
4 1708.8(f)(5) (emphasis added).
5 Plaintiff Riales alleges no events that occurred in California. Plaintiff Riales “lives and
6 works in the State of Indiana.” (Compl. ¶ 5.) She alleges photography and surveillance by
7 individuals “outside her home,” “near her property,” and “throughout her town,” (id. ¶ 198), and
8 while on vacation in Delaware, (id. ¶ 196). She also alleges other events occurring on her
9 property. (Id. ¶ 188 (alleging trash was stolen without alleging location of the trash), ¶ 192
10 (alleging a window to her home was shattered), ¶¶ 191, 193 (alleging individuals standing on her
11 property taking photographs of her home and vehicles). Because all of these events allegedly
12 occurred in Indiana or Delaware, they cannot form the basis of a claim under Section 1708.8, and
13 her Second and Third Claims fail. Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f)(5).
14 4. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Riales’ Second Claim Fails Because She Does
15 Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a Claim for
16 Physical Invasion of Privacy
17 Even if Plaintiff Riales could assert a claim under Section 1708.8(a) for conduct occurring
18 in Indiana and Delaware, her allegations are insufficient to do so. Under Civil Code Section
19 1708.8(a) “[a] person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the person knowingly enters
20 onto the land or into the airspace above the land of another person without permission or
21 otherwise commits a trespass in order to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or
22 other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity and
23 the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.” Cal. Civ. Code §
24 1708.8(a). Accordingly, to allege physical invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section
25 1708.8(a), Plaintiff Riales had to allege facts showing (among other things): (1) CSI and CC
26 physically trespassed and (2) with the intent to record or photograph her engaging in private,
27 personal, or familial activity. Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a). Plaintiff Riales has not alleged facts
28 demonstrating these elements.
15
1 Plaintiff Riales alleges being photographed or surveilled by individuals not on her
2 property. (Compl. ¶¶ 196, 198.) She also alleges instances that may constitute trespass, but
3 without any alleged recording activity. (Id. ¶ 188 (alleging trash was stolen without alleging
4 location of the trash), ¶ 192 (alleging a window to her home was shattered).) Plaintiff Riales also
5 alleges two instances of individuals standing on her property and taking photographs; however, in
6 neither instance does she allege they were taking or attempting to take photographs of “plaintiff
7 engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a). Instead, she
8 alleges these individuals took pictures “of her home” and of her “food truck, car, license plates,
9 and home,” and not of any activity or any person in or around her home. (Compl. ¶¶ 191, 193.)
10 Because Plaintiff Riales has not alleged an instance of trespass on her property with the
11 intent to photograph or record the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity, she
12 fails to state a claim for physical invasion of privacy in violation of Civil Code Section 1708.8(a).
13 See Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43 (plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish every
14 element of each cause of action).
15 5. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Riales’ Third Claim Fails Because She Does
16 Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of A Claim for
17 Constructive Invasion of Privacy
18 Even if Plaintiff Riales could assert a claim under Section 1708.8(b) for conduct occurring
19 in Indiana and Delaware, her allegations are insufficient to do so. Under Civil Code Section
20 1708.8(b) “[a] person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the person attempts to
21 capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound
22 recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, familial
23 activity, through the use of any device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this
24 image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a
25 trespass unless the device was used.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b). This statute is sometimes
26 referred to as “technological trespass” and applies when technology “enabled [a] defendant to
27 secure an image or recording that – but for the device – could not have been achieved without a
28 trespass.” Rutter Practice Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def., B. Elements of Claim, Cal. Prac.
16
1 Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def. Ch. 2(IX)-B (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b)). A treatise
2 further explains that this provision “might apply, for example, if a defendant used a powerful
3 telephoto lens to capture an image from the public street, because otherwise it would be
4 impossible to capture the image without physically trespassing onto plaintiff’s property.” Id.
5 Plaintiff Riales fails to allege facts showing any instance of technological trespass by CSI, CC—or
6 any Defendant.
7 Plaintiff Riales alleges being photographed from a “nearby balcony” while on vacation in
8 Rehoboth Beach, Delaware in July 2018. (Compl. ¶ 196.) Yet, Plaintiff Riales does not allege the
9 device used or that “image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been
10 achieved without a trespass unless the device was used,” as required by Civil Code Section
11 1708.8(b). Because Plaintiff Riales fails to allege facts supporting the elements of a claim for
12 constructive invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section 1708.8(b), the demurrer to her Third
13 Claim should be sustained. See Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43.
14 6. Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Claim Fails Because She Does Not Allege the
15 Nature and Extent of the Emotional Distress She Allegedly Suffered
16 “Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires (1) ‘outrageous’ conduct by the
17 defendant, (2) that the defendant intended to cause (or recklessly disregarded the probability of
18 causing) emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress, and (4) causation.” Angie M. v.
19 Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1225-26 (1995). “[T]he mere allegation that the plaintiffs
20 suffered severe emotional distress, without facts indicating the nature or extent of any mental
21 suffering incurred as a result of defendant’s alleged outrageous conduct, fail[s] to state a cause of
22 action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal. App.
23 3d 1037, 1047 (1988) (citing Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 617 (1985)).
24 Here, the Complaint alleges only “[t]he aforesaid outrageous conduct caused Plaintiffs
25 severe emotional distress, suffering, anguish, anxiety, humiliation, and shame.” (Compl. ¶ 251.)
26 Plaintiff Riales provides no facts “indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering,” and
27 therefore, she has failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
28 The demurrer to Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
17
1 should be sustained. Pitman, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1047 (affirming sustaining demurrer to
2 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because bare allegation that plaintiff “suffered
3 shame, humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of his employment” was insufficient to allege severe
4 emotional distress); Angie M., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1227 (affirming sustaining of demurrer to
5 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where plaintiff failed to allege “specific facts
6 sufficient to show the severity of [plaintiff’s] alleged emotional distress”); Bogard, 164 Cal. App.
7 3d at 617-18 (affirming sustaining of demurrer to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
8 where plaintiffs “failed to set forth any facts which indicate the nature or extent of any mental
9 suffering incurred as a result of [defendant’s] alleged outrageous conduct”).
10 III. Conclusion
11 For the foregoing reasons, CSI and CC respectfully request the Court sustain the demurrer
12 without leave to amend.
13

DAVID C. SCHEPER
15 WILLIAM H. FORMAN
17

William H. Forman
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1 SERVICE LIST
Chrissie Carnell Bixler v. Church of Scientology International
2 LASC Case No. 19STCV29458
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Plaintiffs CHRISSIE
3 Robert W. Thompson CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC BIXLER-
Kristen A. Vierhaus ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE
4 THOMPSON LAW OFFICES BOBETTE RIALES and JANE DOE #2
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
5 Burlingame, CA 94010
Telephone: 650-513-6111
6 Facsimile: 650-513-6071
Emails: bobby@tlopc.com
7 kris@tlopc.com
8 ATTORNEYS NOT ADMITTED TO THE
CALIFORNIA BAR – SERVED VIA MAIL
9 ONLY AS A COURTESY
10 Brian D. Kent
Gaetano D’Andrea
11 M. Stewart Ryan
Helen L. Fitzpatrick
12 Lauren Stram
LAFFEY BUCCI & KENT LLP
13 1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
14 Telephone: 215-399-9255
Facsimile: 215-241-8700
15
Jeffrey P. Fritz
16 SOLOFF & ZERVANOS P C
1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
17 Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: 215-732-2260
18 Facsimile: 215-732-2289
19 Marci Hamilton
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
20 Fox-Fels Building
3814 Walnut Street
21 Philadelphia, PA 19104
Telephone: 215-353-8984
22 Facsimile: 215-493-1094
23 Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid
Lea P. Bucciero
24 PODHURST ORSECK P A
One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300
25 Miami, FL 33131
Telephone: 305-358-2800
26 Facsimile: 301-358-2382
27
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1 SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS
Robert E. Mangels TECHNOLOGY CENTER
2 Matthew D. Hinks
Iman G. Wilson
3 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER
& MITCHELL LLP
4 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
5 Telephone: 310-203-8080
Facsimile: 310-203-0567
6 Emails: rmangels@jmbm.com
mhinks@jmbm.com
7 iwilson@jmbm.com
8
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL Specially-Appearing Attorneys for Defendant
9 Jeffrey K. Riffer DAVID MISCAVIGE
ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN
10 GARTSIDE LLP
10345 West Olympic Boulevard
11 Los Angeles, CA 90064
Telephone: 310-746-4400
12 Facsimile: 310-746-4499
Email: jriffer@elkinskalt.com
13
14 SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Defendant Daniel Masterson
Andrew B. Brettler
15 LAVELY & SINGER PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION
16 2049 Century Park E 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90067
17 Telephone: 310-556-3501
Facsimile: 310-556-3615
18 Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com
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Bixler v. Scientology: CSI's Demurrer To Riales

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Bixler v. Scientology: CSI's Demurrer To Riales

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Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/06/2020 06:55 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Hung,Deputy Clerk

1 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

7 Attorneys for Defendants Church of Scientology

9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

12 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

14 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS CHURCH OF

DEFENDANTS CSI AND CC’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER

7 Action One through Four.

8 As set forth in the concurrently-filed Declaration of William H. Forman, on Thursday,

11 agreement resolving the objections and arguments raised in the demurrer.

13 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the concurrently-filed Declaration of William H. Forman,

15 presented at the hearing.

17 DATED: January 6, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

21 By: /s/ William H. Forman

2 Defendants Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) and Church of Scientology

6 Demurrer to First Cause of Action

13 Demurrer to Second Cause of Action

16 Procedure Section 430.10(d).

19 Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).

20 Demurrer to Third Cause of Action

21 5. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of

23 Civil Procedure Section 430.10(d).

24 6. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of

26 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).

27 Demurrer to Fourth Cause of Action

28 7. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

7 DATED: January 6, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

11 By: /s/ William H. Forman

13 Doe v. City of Los Angeles,

18 Pan Pac. Prop., Inc. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz,

24 Cal. Civ. Proc. § 378(a)(1) .......................................................................................................... 9, 10

25 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7 .................................................................................................................. 13

26 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a)(3)(A) ................................................................................................... 14

27 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 ............................................................................................................ 14, 15

2 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f)(5) ......................................................................................................... 15

3 Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(d) ................................................................................ 8, 10

19 alleged assaults were not the same transaction or occurrence).

4 Jane Doe #2 was harassed at a grocery store).

28 to Plaintiff Riales’ claims at this time.

3 Facts Sufficient to State Any Claim Against CSI and CC

4 A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint. Rakestraw v.

7 establish every element of each cause of action.” Id. at 43.

9 Demonstrating CSI or CC Engaged In Any Conduct At All

11 surveillance perpetrated against her individually, specifically:

12  Plaintiff Riales’ First Cause of Action for stalking is based on “Defendants”

17 in Plaintiffs’ windows, and electronically compromis[ing] their security systems, and/or

18 phones, and/or computers, and/or other digital devices.” (Id. ¶ 236.)

23 impressions.” (Id. ¶ 242.)

24  Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional

28 and/or text[ing], and/or otherwise attempt[ing] to communicate repeatedly.” (Id. ¶ 248.)

7 Demurrer should be sustained as to all of Plaintiff Riales’ causes of action.1

9 Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a Claim for Stalking

11 plaintiff must allege facts supporting the following elements:

17 (3) One of the following:

23 (B) The defendant violated a restraining order.

8 broke into her home or followed her”).

22 appellants “exhausted their administrative remedies” is a “conclusionary statement” that is not

24 supporting each element of a cause of action).

26 On Conduct That Allegedly Occurred Outside of California

4 1708.8(f)(5) (emphasis added).

15 Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a Claim for