Cases for Persons and Family Relations

3 – Republic of the Phils [Represented DOE vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G. R. No. 173918, 08 Apr 2008

11 – PNB vs. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 139479, 27 Dec 2002

19 – Bellis vs. Bellis 20 SCRA 358

27 – People vs. Casipit, 51 SCAD 482, 232 SCRA 638 (31 May 1994)

35 – George Manantan vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 107125, 29 Jan 2001

43 – Valerio e. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, 14 January 2015 [not the 19 Sep 2011 decision]

1
3 – Republic of the Phils [Represented DOE vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation

G. R. No. 173918, 08 Apr 2008

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 173918 April 8, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), petitioner,

vs.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 4
August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.1 The appellate court reversed the
Decision2 dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that
Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85 dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure to
comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987,3 which requires the publication
and filing in the Office of the National Administration Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances. Thus,
surcharges provided under the aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon respondent Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.

Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the
business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities.4

The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office
of the President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate,
supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to energy
exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.

On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956
for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or
increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.5

Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to
reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to
fluctuation in foreign exchange rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products at
reasonable prices.6

Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the Energy
Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the prevailing
prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost, increasing or
decreasing this price component as necessary to maintain the balance between revenues and claims on the
OPSF.7

2
On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the
sources and utilization of the OPSF in order to maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at
reasonable levels.8

On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that
respondent’s contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to
March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by
respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was
imposed upon respondent. The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended
by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94,9 which provides that:

2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall
be made not later than 20th of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign exchange
payment for the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the case of locally
produced crude. Payment after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent
(15%) of the amount, if paid within thirty (30) days from the due date plus two percent (2%) per month if
paid after thirty days.10 (Emphasis supplied.)

On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11 to respondent advising the latter of its additional
underpayment to the OPSF of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the period
April 1991 to October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed thereon.

In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the
transactions in question were based on a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and
MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985.12

On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment,
totaling P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges.13

In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF a
total amount of P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for the
period December 1989 to October 1991.

In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges due.
Otherwise, the DOE warned that it would proceed against the respondent’s Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit
to recover its unpaid surcharges.

On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the
President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996.
While it admitted that the implementation of MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its publication and filing
with the ONAR, it noted that respondent failed to adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such
requirements. The aforementioned Decision reads:16

Given the foregoing, the DOE’s implementation of MOF Circular 1-85 by imposing surcharges on
Pilipinas Shell is only proper. Like this Office, the DOE is bound to presume the validity of that
administrative regulation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Department of Energy, contained in its letters
dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the
President, which was denied on 28 November 2003.17

3
Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9 February
200418and 11 February 200419 issued by ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF Circular No. 1-85
respectively, have not been filed before said office.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and
ruled that MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with
ONAR. It decreed that even if the said circular was issued by then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo de Roda,
Jr. long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules
already in force on the date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed within three
months from the date of effectivity of said Code, otherwise such rules cannot thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons.20According to the dispositive of the appellate court’s Decision:21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2003 and the
Resolution dated November 28, 2003 of the Office of the President, are hereby REVERSED.

ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of surcharges upon petitioner is hereby declared without legal basis.

On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following
issues were raised:22

THE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN
AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT,
MOF CIRCULAR NO. 1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT
OF A LAW REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL REGISTER

II

ASSUMING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF MOF NO. 1-85 IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT WAIVED
ITS OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OF NON-REGISTRATION WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT
REQUIRED BY PETITIONER.

This petition is without merit.

As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera23 enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all
statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding
force and effect, to wit:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
(Emphasis provided.)

Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII thereof
specifically providing that:

4
 Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of
this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection. (Emphasis provided.)

Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances
which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No.
1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987 – filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center – for
rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These
requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers
and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern
and, therefore, require strict compliance.

In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 200425 and 9 February 200426 issued by ONAR prove
that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said
office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondent’s allegation that neither of the aforementioned
circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure to
comply with the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-
85, as amended, ineffective.

In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board,27 this Court
emphasized that both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce
existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it specified several
instances wherein this Court declared administrative issuances, which failed to observe the proper
requirements, to have no force and effect:

Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the GRAM Implementing Rules was published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both
the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly provide that they "shall take effect immediately."
These clauses made no mention of their publication in either the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR), the said implementing rules and regulations were not likewise filed
with the said office in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court has previously declared as having no
force and effect the following administrative issuances: (1) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint
Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the
accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering
the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national
government; (3) Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; (4) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for
importation from the People’s Republic of China; (5) Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued
by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and
fringe benefits to government officials and employees; and (6) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2
Series of 1983 which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private
employment agencies or authority holders.

5
 In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as
they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. On the other hand,
in Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of
the National Telecommunications Commission had not become effective despite the fact that it was
filed with the National Administrative Register because the same had not been published at the time.
The Court emphasized therein that "publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect."

Petitioner’s argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended,
when it paid in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious. MOF Circular
No. 1-85, as amended imposes surcharges, while respondents’ underpayment is based on MOF Circular No.
11-85 dated 12 April 1985.

Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer
necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously
flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled
by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned. Hence,
also in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, this Court
pronounced:

In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance with the
publication requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that parties,
particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public consultation
on the ERC’s proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the said public consultation
and even submitted their comments thereon.

However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their
respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing
Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must
be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of
publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether
even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their
comments.28 (Emphasis provided.)

Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, gains its vitality from the subsequent
enactment of Executive Order No. 137, which reiterates the power of then Minister of Finance to promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to implement the executive order. Such contention is irrelevant in the
present case since the power of the Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is not under
dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-
compliance with the requisite publication and filing with the ONAR. And while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process requirements of publication and filing cannot
be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85,
as amended from the aforementioned requirements.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August 2006
of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Acting Chairperson, Carpio-Morales*, Tinga*, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

6
* Assigned as Special Member.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao

and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring. Rollo, pp. 55 -74.

2 Id. at 301-303.

3 Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that:

Filing.— (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to
public inspection.

4 Rollo, p. 63.

5 Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956 states that:

SECTION 8. There is hereby created a Special Account in the General Fund to be designated
as Oil Price Stabilization Fund for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought
about by exchange rate adjustments and/or an increase in world market prices of crude oil and
imported petroleum products.

The Fund may be sourced from any of the following:

(a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad-valorem tax or customs duty imposed on
petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the
Board of Energy;

(b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations under Presidential Decree No. 1931, as may be determined
by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;

(c) Any additional tax to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of
the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy
requiring payment by persons or companies engaged in the business of importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products.

The Fund created herein shall be used to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases on
crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or
increase in world market prices of crude oil.

The Fund shall be administered by the Ministry of Energy.

6 Rollo, p. 301.
7 Id. at 56-57.
8 Section 1 of Executive Order No. 137 provides that:

SECTION 1. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956 is hereby amended to read as follows:

7
 "SECTION 8. There is hereby created a Trust Account in the books of accounts of the Ministry
of Energy to be designated as Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) for the purpose of minimizing
frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or changes in world
market prices on crude oil and imported petroleum products. The Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) may be sourced from any of the following:

a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on
petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the
Board of Energy;

b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Board of Energy;

c) Any Additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the

resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of
Energy requiring payment by persons or companies engaged in the business of
importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;

d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil
companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso
costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of
Energy.

The Fund herein created shall be used for the following:

1. To reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported
petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase in
world market prices of crude oil;

2. To reimburse the oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a

result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products. The magnitude
of the underrecovery, if any, shall be determined by the Ministry of Finance.
‘Cost underrecovery’ shall include the following:

i. Reduction in oil company take as directed by the Board of Energy

without the corresponding reduction in the landed cost of oil inventories
in the possession of the oil companies at the time of the price change;
ii. Reduction in internal ad valorem taxes as a result of foregoing
government mandated price reductions;
iii. Other factors as may be determined by the Ministry of Finance to
result in cost underrecovery.

The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) shall be administered by the Ministry of Energy."

9 Rollo, p. 77.
10 Id. at 76.
11 Id. at 78.

12 Ministry of Finance (MOF) Order No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 provides for payment of foreign

exchange risk charge "based on the actual peso value of the foreign exchange payment for the
shipment" and Ministry of Energy (MOE) Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985 prescribing
supplemental rule and regulations to MOF Order No. 11-85 which provides, among others, that the risk

8
charge "shall cover all crude oil and imported finished petroluem fuel credits outstanding xxx." Id. at 79-
80.
13 Id. at 302. 18 Id. at 231.

14 Id. at 81-82. 19 Id. at 230.

15 Id. at 98. 20 Id. at 72-73.

16 Id. at 303. 21 Id. at 73-74.

17 Id. at 304. 22 Id. at 349.

23 Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29

December 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 453-454.

24 Id. 26 Id. at 231.

25 Rollo, p. 230.

27 National Association of Electricity Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 163935,

Consumers for Reforms v. Energy 2 February 2006, 481 SCRA 480, 519-521.
28 Id. at 521.

9
11 – PNB vs. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc., et al.
G.R. No. 139479, 27 Dec 2002

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 139479 December 27, 2002

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS, INC., FILM ADVERTISING MEDIA EXHIBITIONS, INC. (FAME),
LUIS NEPOMUCENO, AMPARO NEPOMUCENO, and JESUS NEPOMUCENO, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
475001affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 155) in Civil Case No. 28809
which set aside the foreclosure proceedings and auction sale of respondent’s properties and ordered petitioner
to pay attorney’s fees.

The relevant facts of the case are undisputed.

On November 28, 1973, petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted respondents a 4 Million Pesos
(P4,000,000.00) credit line to finance the filming of the movie "Pacific Connection."2 The loan was secured by
mortgages on respondents’ real and personal properties, to wit: (1) a 7,623 square meters parcel of land
located in Malugay Street, Makati (referred to as the Malugay property); (2) a 3,000 square meters parcel of
land located in North Forbes Park, Makati (referred to as the Forbes property);3 and (3) several motion picture
equipments.4 The credit line was later increased to 6 Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) on January 14, 1974,5 and
finally to 7.5 Million Pesos (P7,500,000.00) on September 8, 1974.6

Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties with the
Sheriff’s Office of Pasig, Rizal. Initially scheduled on August 12, 1976, the auction sale was re-scheduled
several times without need of republication of the notice of sale, as stipulated in the Agreement to Postpone
Sale,7 until finally, the auction sale proceeded on December 20, 1976, with petitioner as the highest bidder in
the amount of P10,432,776.97.8

Aggrieved, respondents filed Civil Case No. 28809 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 155), an
action for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages with injunction.9 Respondents contended that the
foreclosure sale is null and void because: (1) the obligation is yet to mature as there were negotiations for an
additional loan amount of P5,000,000.00; (2) lack of publication; (3) the purchase price was grossly inadequate
and unconscionable; and (4) the foreclosure proceedings were initiated by petitioner in bad faith.10

In its Decision dated September 16, 1992, the court a quo ordered the annulment and setting aside of the
foreclosure proceedings and auction sale held on December 20, 1976 on the ground that there was lack of
publication of the notice of sale.11 The court a quo also ordered petitioner to pay P100,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.12

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

10
During completion stage of the appeal, the appellate court issued a Resolution on January 31, 1996 dismissing
petitioner’s appeal with regard to the Forbes Park property as the same was already the subject of a Deed of
Reconveyance executed by petitioner in favor of respondents on November 22, 1994, as well as a
Compromise Agreement dated September 13, 1994 between the same parties.13 Said Resolution having
become final and executory on February 26, 1996, entry of judgment was made on March 27, 1996.14 Hence,
resolution of the appeal in the Court of Appeals pertained only to the Malugay property.

On December 11, 1998, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision, which affirmed in toto the decision
of the court a quo.15

Hence, herein petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner maintains that:

"I

"THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PNB’S FORECLOSURE SALE OF RESPONDENTS’

PROPERTIES NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF REPUBLICATION DESPITE THE PARTIES AGREEMENT
TO WAIVE THE REPUBLICATION AND RESPOSTING OF SHERIFF’S SALE

"II

"THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE RESPONDENTS IN ESTOPPEL TO ASSAIL
THE VALIDITY OF THE FORECLOSURE SALE AFTER THEY INDUCED PNB TO EXECUTE THE
AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE SALE WAIVING THE REPUBLICATION AND REPOSTING OF THE
SHERIFF’S NOTICE OF SALE

"III

"THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT THIRD PERSONS
IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW"16

The focal issue in this case is whether the parties to the mortgage can validly waive the posting and publication
requirements mandated by Act No. 3135.

We answer in the negative.

Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages on real property is specific with
regard to the posting and publication requirements of the notice of sale, to wit:

"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public
places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four
hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city."

On this score, it is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting of notices of sale in three
public places; and, (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation.17 Failure to publish the
notice of sale constitutes a jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale.18

Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can be dispensed with since the
parties agreed in writing that the auction sale may proceed without need of re-publication and re-posting of the
notice of sale.19

11
We are not convinced. Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication
requirements of Act No. 3135.

In People v. Donato,20 the Court expounded on what rights and privileges may be waived, viz.:

"x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver'
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his
property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene
public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or role made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it
can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the
community at large x x x.

"Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may
be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if
it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be
waived.

"While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution
may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived,
and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver."21

While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that such waiver
is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.22

The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the mortgagor as to
inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and
terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property.23 Clearly, the
statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the
public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
even necessary, unless stipulated.24 As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver
thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.

Moreover, statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly
complied with and slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at the very least
voidable.25

"Where required by the statute or by the terms of the foreclosure decree, public notice of the place and time of
the mortgage foreclosure sale must be given, a statute requiring it being held applicable to subsequent sales as
well as to the first "advertised sale of the property. It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage
foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the
sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice insufficient and vitiate the
sale."26

Thus, in the recent case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Aguirre,27 the foreclosure sale held more
than two (2) months after the published date of sale was considered void for lack of republication.28 Similarly, in
the instant case, the lack of republication of the notice of the December 20, 1976 foreclosure sale renders it
void.

12
The right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor’s failure to pay his obligation must be
exercised according to its clear mandate, and every requirement of the law must be complied with, lest the
valid exercise of the right would end.29 The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others.30

We also cannot accept petitioner’s argument that respondents should be held in estoppel for inducing the
former to re-schedule the sale without need of republication and reposting of the notice of sale.

Records show that respondents, indeed, requested for the postponement of the foreclosure sale.31 That,
however, is all that respondents sought. Nowhere in the records was it shown that respondents purposely
sought re-scheduling of the sale without need of republication and reposting of the notice of sale. To request
postponement of the sale is one thing; to request it without need of compliance with the statutory requirements
is another. Respondents, therefore, did not commit any act that would have estopped them from questioning
the validity of the foreclosure sale for non-compliance with Act No. 3135.

In addition, the "Agreement to Postpone Sale" signed by respondents was obviously prepared solely by
petitioner.32A scrutiny of the agreement discloses that it is in a ready-made form and the only participation of
respondents is to affix or "adhere" their signature thereto. It therefore partakes of the nature of a contract of
adhesion, i.e., one in which one of the contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of contract which the
other party may accept or reject, but cannot modify.33 One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while
the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto, giving no room for negotiation, and
depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.34 As such, their terms are construed strictly
against the party who drafted it.35

Finally, while we rule that the appellate court did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the court a
quo, we find the award of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees to be excessive. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows
the award of such fees when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect its just and valid claim. In view of petitioner's foreclosure of the property without complying with the
statutory requirements,36the award of attorney's fees of P25,000.00 is just, fair, and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47500 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification that the award of attorney’s fees is reduced to P25,000.00.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Entitled: "Nepomuceno Productions, Inc., et al. vs. Philippine National Bank," Rollo, p. 40.
2 Original Records, pp. 734-736.
3 Id., pp. 728-732.

4 Id., pp. 739-747.

5 Id., pp. 748-753.

6 Ibid.

7 CA rollo, pp. 372-375.

8 Id., p. 376.

9 Original Records, pp. 1-8.

10 Id., pp. 4-5.

11 Id., p. 887.
12 Id., p. 888.

13 CA rollo, p. 117.

13
14 Id., p. 150.
15 Id., p. 291.
16 Id., pp. 24-25.

17 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wong, G.R. No. 120859, June 26, 2001; Valmonte v. Court

of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, 289 [1999]; Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, 265 SCRA 71, 81 [1996].
18 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 144877, September 7, 2001.

19 Rollo, p,. 27.

20 198 SCRA 130, 154 [1991].

21 Ibid., citing 92 C.J.S., 1066-1068

22 Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 642, 656 [1997].

23 Olizon v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148, 156 [1994].

24 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wong, supra.; Philippine National Bank v. Rabat, 344

SCRA 706, 716 [2000] ; Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 614, 620 [1997]; Fortune Motors
(Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, supra.
25 Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 16, 23 (1988).

26 Ibid.

27 G.R. No. 144877. September 7, 2001.

28 Citing Masantol Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 752 (1991).
29 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wong, supra.

30 Ibid.

31 TSN of April 18, 1988, pp. 20-21.

32 Ca rollo, pp. 372-275.

33 Polotan, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 247, 255 [1998].

34 Ibid.

35 BPI Express Card Corp. v. Olalia, G.R. No. 131086, December 14, 2001.

36 CA rollo, p. 322.

14
19 – Bellis vs. Bellis

20 SCRA 358 (G.R. No. L-23678)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy
Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in
the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c)
after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äw phï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00
each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
15
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's
Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction
of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or
a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the
registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30,
1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this
Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
16
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate
and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositors-
appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after
paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to
allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the motion.

2 San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

3 Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

17
27 – People vs. Casipit

51 SCAD 482, 232 SCRA 638 (31 May 1994)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 8829 May 31, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FOUND GUILTY OF RAPE and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the offended party
P30,000.00 for moral damages, 1 the accused GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM appeals to us insisting on his
innocence.

The victim, Myra Reynaldo, was then 14 years old and a sixth grader, while appellant was 22. They were
neighbors in Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan.

On 19 September 1986, before going to Manila for a medical checkup, the father of Myra entrusted her to the
parents of Guillermo. On the same day, Guillermo invited Myra to go to the town proper of Alaminos to buy rice
and bananas. When they reached the poblacion, he told her that they should buy in Dagupan instead because
the prices were cheaper. She agreed. Upon arriving in the poblacion, Guillermo invited Myra to watch a Movie.
They watched the movie until six o'clock in the evening, after which, they took a ride for Alaminos arriving there
at eight o'clock. They took their dinner in Alaminos before proceeding home to Barangay Victoria. On their way
home it rained hard that they had to take shelter in a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang. Inside the hut,
Myra sat on the floor while Guillermo laid down. After a few minutes, he told her to lie down with him and rest.
Then he went near her. He removed her panties, poked a knife at her neck and warned her not to shout. She
resisted appellant, kicked him twice, but was helpless to subdue him as he tied her hands behind her nape.
Moreover, he opened her legs, went on top of her, and the inevitable had to come. He mounted an assault on
her chastity until he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She could not stop him as he was big and
strong. After the sexual encounter, she felt pain and could not
sleep. 2

After waking up the following morning, they proceeded home. On their way, he told her to proceed ahead.
When she reached home, she was observed to be walking abnormally (bull-legged) by Rogelio Casipit, her
cousin-in-law. When her aunt, Nenita Rabadon, learned about it, she called for her and asked her what
happened. She then narrated everything to her. Her aunt took her to the house of their barangay captain,
Bruno Carambas, and reported the incident to him. The barangay official then called for Guillermo but he
denied having raped Myra.
18
While inside the house of the barangay captain, the victim was examined by her sister-in-law Susan Cabigas
and Elsa Carambas, wife of the barangay captain, who both found the victim's private part reddish and her
panties stained with blood. 3

The following afternoon, Myra, accompanied by an uncle, went to the police station of Alaminos to report the
rape and then to the Western Pangasinan General Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Fideliz Ochave.
The medical findings of Dr. Ochave showed no external sign of physical injuries but noted the presence of first
degree fresh healing laceration at the perineum and of
the hymen at six o'clock position. The laboratory result was negative for spermatozoa. 4 On 26 September
1986, Myra gave her statement to the police and later filed a criminal complaint against Guillermo. 5

The version of Guillermo, on the other hand, is that long before the incident, he and Myra were sweethearts.
On 19 September 1986, they agreed to watch the movie "Cabarlo" so they went to Dagupan City. They entered
the moviehouse at noon and left at six o'clock in the evening. While watching the show, he placed his arm on
the shoulder of Myra and she did not object. He kissed her several times; she kissed him as many times. They
talked about their love for each other. After the movie, they went home. However, when they reached
Alaminos, it rained hard so they sought shelter in a hut. They removed their wet clothes. He embraced her and
she liked it. Then he lowered her panties and she did not resist. He laid her down on the floor and she
consented. He joined her on the floor. He placed himself on top of her and sexual intercourse followed as a
matter of course. They stayed inside the hut the whole night. They went home together the following morning.
After the love tryst, he went to look for a job in San Juan, Metro Manila. He was arrested in July 1987. He
contended that the victim was probably induced by her aunt Nenita Rabadon to file the case. 6

After the trial, the court a quo sustained the prosecution and found appellant guilty of raping Myra by means of
force and intimidation.

Appellant now assails the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while
disregarding his and worse, for finding him guilty instead. He maintains that the victim's story contained many
flaws: firstly, even as she had testified that she struggled with him and kicked him twice, the doctor who
examined her found no external physical injuries on her body; secondly, the fact that the victim agreed to have
a movie date with him shows that she liked him and was attracted to him; and, thirdly, the victim did not leave
the hut but slept with him until morning, which is an unnatural behavior of one who had been raped.

We cannot sustain the accused; hence, we affirm his conviction. We cannot argue against the trial court for
giving full faith and credit to the testimony of Myra that appellant poked a knife at her neck and sexually abused
her despite her resistance as he was stronger and bigger than she who was only 14 years old. Considering the
physical condition of the victim and the place where the crime was perpetrated, which was in an isolated hut in
an open field, it was not difficult for the accused to subdue the victim and coerce her into submission.

These factual findings of the trial court appear to be borne by the records, and we cannot have any justification
to hold otherwise. When the question of credence arises between the conflicting versions of the prosecution
and the defense on the commission of rape, the answer of the trial court is generally viewed as correct, hence
entitled to the highest respect, because it is more competent to so conclude having closely observed the
witnesses when they testified, their deportment, and the peculiar manner in which they gave their testimonies
and other evidence in court. 7

The argument that the absence of external injuries on the body of the victim belies her claim that she struggled
with appellant to prevent him from raping her is devoid of merit. The absence of external signs or physical
injuries does not negate the commission of rape. Proof of injuries is not necessary because this is not an
essential element of the crime. 8 This does not mean however that no force or intimidation was used on the
victim to consummate the act. The force or intimidation required in rape is relative. It is viewed in the light of the
victim's perception and not by any hard and fast rule. It need not be overpowering or irresistible but necessary
only to achieve its purpose. Aside from applying force, the appellant used intimidation by threatening the victim
with a knife.

19
The fact that Myra went with appellant to a movie is no indication that she already agreed to have sex with him.
Her actuation is understandable as she is a close relative of appellant, according to his grandfather. 9 Hence, it
is not improbable that the victim placed her trust on appellant by letting him accompany her to the movie. It
should be emphasized that she was then only fourteen years old, an innocent barrio lass. Records are bereft of
evidence that she was a woman of ill-repute, or of a flirtatious nature to incite or provoke appellant to have sex
with her.

The principal defense of appellant that he and Myra were sweethearts cannot be given weight. For, if that was
true, she would not have immediately disclosed to her family and to the authorities the sexual assault done to
her. 10 After all, nobody else but the two of them knew what happened between them in the loneliness of an
isolated hut in an open field. The fact that Myra lost no time in immediately reporting the violation of her honor
and submitting herself to medical examination bolsters her credibility and reflects the truthfulness and
spontaneity of her account of the incident. If she had voluntarily consented to the sexual act with appellant, her
most natural reaction would have been to conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her honor and
reputation as well as to her family. Her unwavering and firm denunciation of appellant negates consent. 11

Worth noting is the marked receptively of our courts to lend credence to the testimonies of victims who are of
tender years regarding their versions of what transpired since the State, as parens patriae, is under obligation
to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect
themselves. 12

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM guilty of
rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity in favor
of MYRA REYNALDO is increased to P50,000.00.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Cruz and Kapunan, JJ., are on leave.

# Footnotes

1 Decision penned by Judge Antonio M. Belen, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Br. 38.
2 TSN, 1 December 1987, pp. 6-10.
3 TSN, 15 February 1988, pp. 1-10.
4 Records, p. 1.
5 Ibid.
6 TSN, 22 April 1988, pp. 1-14.
7 People v. Carson, G.R. No. 93732, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 266.
8 People v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, 27 January 1989, 169 SCRA 530.
9 Rollo, p. 62.
10 People v. Sarol, G.R. No. 75506, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 286.
11 People v. De Dios, G.R. No. 58174, 6 July 1990, 187 SCRA 228.
12 People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 86162, 17 September 1993.

20
35 – George Manantan vs. CA, et al.

G.R. No. 107125, 29 Jan 2001

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case
No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence
without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066,
the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents
Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben
Nicolas.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan with
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver
and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and
operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and
ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and
operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon,
thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a
passenger of said automobile.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:

[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio… decided to catch shrimps at the
irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow the Ford
Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the
Ford Fiera but…said that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the
deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before
21
 they proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one
(more) case of beer. At about 12:00 o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock
that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to
the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case
of beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go
bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the
same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was
no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40
minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night
Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and
proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldo…and then they decided to go home. Again the
accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and
Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused
was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles Cudamon, the
car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway
because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on.
The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from the steering
wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other
at the center of the road.

xxx

As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the highway
immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the
road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its
right lane five meters away from the point of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by
Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal
Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his
belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was pulled
out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from
the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died
that night (Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.2

The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the prosecution,
except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the
accident, the defense claimed that:

…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the road at
about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a
passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very
fast suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its
top at the right edge of the road while the jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown by a
picture taken after the incident (Exhibit "1") and a sketch (Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his
rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the driver's side. As a result of the collision, the accused and
Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where
they were all brought for treatment.3

In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No.
066 in petitioner's favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of
the crime charged and hereby acquits him.

SO ORDERED.4
22
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court's
judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision
appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.

On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby held
civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the
vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for
the death of Ruben Nicolas,

SO ORDERED.5

In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in
a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of
beer…between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m."6 It found that petitioner's act of driving while intoxicated was a clear
violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)7 and pursuant to Article
2185 of the Civil Code,8 a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner's act of violating
the Traffic Code is negligence in itself "because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to
be prevented by the regulation."9

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the
motion.

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our consideration:

FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME
OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER
INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND THEREFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.

SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND
INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION
OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA,
BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE
REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION
AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO
INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.

THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA
NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED
WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL
CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING
THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.

In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence?

(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?

23
 (3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-
G.R. CV No. 19240?

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial
court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He
argues that the trial court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal,
and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court
not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."

Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to
review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages. 1âw phi1.nêt

Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act."10 When a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter
cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.11 This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to
exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the
first.12 In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066
and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note,
however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal
offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being
imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the
judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been
placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.13 There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delictcomplained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.14 The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.15 This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code,16 where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case.
However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any
fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission.17 The reason for this rule is
that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence,
notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied,
was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.

On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally
negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he
argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal
bars any civil action.

24
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal
did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence,
they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code
to come into play.

Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate
court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by
his discharge. We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was
really negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused
presented itself before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record…the Court's mind
cannot rest on a verdict of conviction."18 The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated
on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.

On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since
private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case
was impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the
amount of the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.19 He avers that
since Manchester held that "The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed
docket fees," the appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less
award indemnity and damages.

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note
that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while
the Manchesterrequirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela
did not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the
civil damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and
demanding payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the
Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no
violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.

At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was
governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.20 As correctly pointed out by private respondents,
under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111,
Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now
required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information,
the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.

The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private
respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature
of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.

Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed
by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to
be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged
in the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.21 Recall
25
that the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that
the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first
lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal
action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find
no basis for petitioner's allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate
court acquired no jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24,
1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. 1âw phi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes:

1 Records, p. 1.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 53-55.
3 Id. at 56-57.
4 Records, p. 429.
5 CA Rollo, p. 60.
6 Id. at 57.
7 SEC. 53. Driving while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug. – No person shall drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or narcotic
drug.
8 Civil Code, ART. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
9 Supra note 6, at 58.
10 Const., Art. III, Sec. 21.
11 Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, 768 (1950).
12 People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 171 (1985).
13 Almeida, et al. V. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 (1907). See also Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, 40 Phil. 1056 (1910), 218 US 476, 54 l. Ed. 1116
(1910); Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314 (1923), Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327 (1924). Article 29 of the Civil Code serves only to limit and qualify the
application of the Almeida doctrine.
14 Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 2. Institution of Separate civil action. –
xxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (stress supplied)
15 Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202, 214 (1996), citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984).
16 Civil Code, ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted (stress supplied). Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case, the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
17 Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, supra note 13, at 1061.
18 Supra note 4.
19 The subject of which reads: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE
PLEADINGS, BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER IN ORDER TO BE ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR FILING. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SO SPECIFIED
IN THE COMPLAINT SHALL BE THE BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF THE FILING FEES.
20 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately.

21 People v. Escano, Jr., 193 SCRA 662, 665 (1991).

26
43 – Valerio e. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez

G.R. No. 166357, 14 January 2015 [not the 19 Sep 2011 decision]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision for
lack of legal and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of
respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations
of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and
neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts,
were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a
result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations
that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with
the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this,
saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link
this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency
of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not

27
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove
her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men,
but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity
per seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive
of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality
of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent
was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once
did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took
care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made
real efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact
that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing
to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as
bases for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision
and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what
constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of
three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically
incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as
to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was
about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has
usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the
members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they
decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some

28
resiliency in its application."4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the
Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the
applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired
that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive
effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family
Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not
be taken and construed independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage." Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as
the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

29
 (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence
— whatis decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family
Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to
adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead,
every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours"
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every
30
"trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on
the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological
incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where
the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the
appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the
findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the
Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the
fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution 14 only
relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because
such a marriage has no legal existence.15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the
sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the
more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position and role
of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina
Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
petitioner’s version of the events.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a
merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code.
We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the
case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity
of the petitioner’s factual premises.17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her
interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be
unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her
expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another
expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that
the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases
for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider
as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."18

31
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine
the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of
personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did
not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no
requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician,
because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological
incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The
expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as
evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by
Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been
based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion should be
considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare
the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and
dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondent’s
psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways. Although
she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but she
may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to
maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and
demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And
yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her.
Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on
most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting his love,
constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became
relationship-dependent.25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on
the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and
compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are several scores
wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and
compulsion.
32
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be
considered as acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect
that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder.
Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or
less, could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is
self-centered or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her fatherdied
in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly
assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and
her siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and
responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And
there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame
her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own
mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate
a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of
care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you
have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both
Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could
not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live
with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still insearch
of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this
need for attention, this need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a
mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and
consider the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila
Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding
Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity
could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by current trends in
33
psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the
concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility
with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as
you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of
respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated is not
true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested
running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was
dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in an
unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own
beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to
this lifestyle that she had embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the relationship
of the respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher
children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating with
friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody takes for
granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated to
the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.

Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

34
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of
Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so
concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism afflicting
respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?

A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious obligations
which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own
lifestyle. Very serious.

Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at the
time or marriage or even thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the
marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you
show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her
and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the top
priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting
such fundamental obligations.

Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you
mentioned?

A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background situation.
Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in
her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her position
in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her
accepting the pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top priority.31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded
respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties’
psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees
of the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court
an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could
not justly disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr.
Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32

35
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at
the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new
grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The
ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the
spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole
of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning
of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as
meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than
just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of
the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital obligations are
the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality
where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx
36
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack
of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the
marriage was entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in
Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and
another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without
too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the
"most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far
fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be

37
bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders
of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and
incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of
nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that
she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played
four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always withthe permission
of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that
theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any
proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode
to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully
appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully
appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very
tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would
erode their moral fiber.

38
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her
family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio
Teodoro Kalaw37– the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father
that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity or practice
which your mother engaged in, before the separation?

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get there by
lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She
brought you?

WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very
grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan
both explained that the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood
experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article
209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of such
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated
children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) x x x x

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 (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect
that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume
the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by
the respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered
from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:

ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper of
the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they were
together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But
as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship work, she
was denying even those kinds of problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude
that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really thinking
of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that time he
was not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so,
Sir.
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Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his
younger years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to
you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to
you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and
given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during
the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?

A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological
capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to
Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature
and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to
answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent,
as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the
matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological
incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological
incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already
accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law,
was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the
lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their
void marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more damage. This was the very same
injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the
law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties
has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

41
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. It is not, in effect,
1âw phi 1

directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain
illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because
he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from
her and towhich he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit
that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an
opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological
incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the
beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not
preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects
of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself
adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at
present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a
petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in
fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage
is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the
Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should
be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is
a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

42
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN**

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
** Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 2, Internal Rules.
1
657 SCRA 822.
2
Id. at 836-839.
3
Rollo, pp. 689-704.
4
See Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 31.
5
See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108.
6
Supra note 4.
7
Id. at 34.
8
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
9
Id. at 209-213.
10
Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 8, at 214.
11
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76; Republic v.
Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735.
12
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 158, 170.
13
Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.
14
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
15
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461 ("[B]lind adherence by
the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological
incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage is doomed from its inception should not be
forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.").
16
Collado v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72780, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 206, 212;
People v. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 369, 382-383.
17
Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 379.
18
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193, 228.
43
19
G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 757.
20
Id. at 764.
21
Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume V (1999), pp. 804-805.
22
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, supra, note 15, at 487.
23
Carcereny, et al., Annulment in the Philippines: Clinical and Legal Issues (2010), p. 16.
24
Records Volume II, pp. 87-105.
25
Id. at 100, 103.
26
A psychological test used to find personality disorders based on the respondent’s answers to 175
true/false questions (Ng, et al., Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity [2006], p. 109).
27
TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13.
28
TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 8-10.
29
Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 569, 585.
30
Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, at 370.
31
TSN dated June 17, 1998, pp. 24-28.
32
Supra note 18.
33
Id. at 229-232.
34
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 8.
35
Supra note 18, at 220-228.
36
Decision, pp. 837-838.
37
Records, pp. 354-391.
38
Id. at 363.
39
Paragraph 3 (Records, Vol. I, p. 20) of which runs:
3. She specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Petition
alleging that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations to the marriage and that such incapacity manifested itself only after the marriage,
the truth of the matter being that it is the petitioner who is psychologically incapacitated.
40
TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 10-12.
41
Supra note 4, at 38.

44