Strategic Analysis

ISSN: 0970-0161 (Print) 1754-0054 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20

US–India Relations: The Shadowboxing Era

Shubhrajeet Konwer

To cite this article: Shubhrajeet Konwer (2019): US–India Relations: The Shadowboxing Era,
Strategic Analysis, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2020.1699994

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1699994

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Strategic Analysis, 2020
https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1699994

US–India Relations: The Shadowboxing Era

Shubhrajeet Konwer

Abstract: As the US presidential elections are just a few months away, the eco-
nomic and strategic differences between India and the United States have come to the
forefront. Trump–Modi partnership which started with ‘hugplomacy, is now trans-
formed to that of ‘shadowboxing’. In this era, legacy as well as personal ties between
the two leaders will matter little because national interests will be pursued relent-
lessly. India’s quest for autonomy in foreign policy and its ability to manage the
contradictions with the United States will dictate the future course of relations
between the two countries.

Introduction
n 2005, the US President George W. Bush while hosting the state dinner honour-
I ing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India remarked, ‘India and the United
States are separated by half a globe. Yet, today our two nations are closer than ever
before.’1 Indeed, times have changed, and so has this relationship. The coldness in
this relationship can be perceived by the decision of US President Donald Trump to
not attend India’s Republic Day celebrations as the chief guest because of ‘domestic
concerns’. The White House has clarified that the inability of President Trump to
attend the Republic Day celebrations is because of ‘scheduling constraints’ and
preparations for ‘State of the Union Address’. While the two countries do share a
‘natural affinity’, a certain degree of coldness has crept into this ‘special relation-
ship’. It may not be seen as a ‘snub’, but certain issues have led to this impasse—
firstly, India kept buying oil from Iran despite US government sanctions; secondly,
despite the prevalence of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA), India signed the S-400 missile defence system agreement with Russia in
2018. Therefore, the ‘special relationship’ seems to have floundered because of
differences in the way the two countries perceive ‘national interests’.
The ‘strategic autonomy’ pursued by the Modi-led administration,2 has led to a
flaking of relations between the two largest democracies of the world. The Trump
administration wants to ‘Make America Great Again’ whereas Modi-India wants
greater autonomy in issues of foreign policy. Despite the threat of sanctions, India
continues to flex its autonomy muscle when it comes to its relations with Iran and
defence ties with Russia. Divided into six sections, this article traces the trajectory of
India–US relations and highlights the challenges and agendas that will shape the
future course of relations between the two countries. Indeed the ‘shadowboxing era’
has started between the US and India, and uncomfortable issues will have to be

Shubhrajeet Konwer is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, at Gauhati

University, Guwahati.

© 2019 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

2 Shubhrajeet Konwer

addressed without hurting long-term strategic interests. The management of diver-

gence and the ability to find the common ground of cooperation will dictate the
course of India–US relations.

The lost decades: US Presidential visits and trajectory of US–India relations

Presidential visits to India to some extent reveal the state of relations between the
two countries. While Indian prime ministers have been visiting the US since the
Nehru years, it is the reverse which has gained pre-eminence, primarily because of
the asymmetrical nature of US–India relations. Clearly, the official PM/head of
government level visits are severely lopsided in favour of India. In contrast, very
few US Presidents have visited India. Perhaps this reflects the fact that India has put
the US on a higher pedestal, in terms of ‘high politics’.
The US–India relations were marked by suspicion during the 1950s. The US
cultivation of Pakistan as an ally and partner in the regional collective security
framework arrangements would severely strain India–US relations.3 As the Cold
War loomed over South Asia, ‘Pakistan gained new strategic and political signifi-
cance for the West as a bulwark against Communist expansion.’4 Dwight D
Eisenhower became the first US president to visit India in 1959, towards the fag
end of his tenure, but nothing substantial was achieved to allay the Chinese threat to
India. However, the logistics provided by the US and the World Bank led by Eugene
Black did help finalize the Indus Water Agreement between India and Pakistan,
which provided for sharing of waters of six rivers.
The latter half of the 1960s witnessed growing tensions between India and
Pakistan. As Hayes notes,

In the eyes of Nixon and Kissinger, India posed a two-fold threat: First, India indirectly
threatened containment: Indian support for an independent Bangladesh would result in a
state vulnerable to communist “infiltration.” Secondly, Nixon saw the ultimate Indian aim as
the destruction of Pakistan, an ally to the United States and a component of containment
policy.5

Richard Nixon made a short visit to India in 1969 but nothing substantial or credible
was achieved. Rather, it led to further deterioration of relations because the ‘warmth’
was clearly missing. The Carter administration was deeply concerned about India’s
nuclear programme. India had refused to sign the NPT (1968) and also refused the
IAEA inspectors' access to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) facility. Still
disturbed by the 1974 nuclear tests, Jimmy Carter visited India in 1978 when Morarji
Desai was Prime Minister, and sent a ‘cold and blunt message’6 regarding India’s
nuclear programme, on his return to the US. But India was at the heart of South Asia
and too large to be ignored. President Carter always insisted that his paramount
consideration was to bring India back into the international community of nations
friendly to the United States.7 When Morarji Desai visited the US in 1978, the joint
communiqué reflected that the US administration and India were keen on achieving
‘world peace’ which could ‘only be assured through effective measures to halt the
arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, including the prevention of the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination.’ Furthermore, President
Carter pledged to make every effort consistent with American law to maintain fuel
supplies for Tarapur and continue nuclear cooperation with India.8
 Strategic Analysis 3

Through the initial three decades of the post-independence era, India was not
given its due attention by the US presidents because of India’s non-aligned policy
that was ‘imbued with Gandhian-Nehruvian moralism’.9 The policy adopted by India
was ‘not merely an idealistic dream of neutrality, but was rather based on a realistic
assessment of India’s geopolitical situation’.10 However, from the US perspective,
the main problem with Indian policy was that after the early 1970s, ‘non-alignment,’
did not translate into genuine neutrality but rather a tilt into the Soviet Union’s
ambit.11 Likewise, during the heyday of the Cold War, anti-Americanism was the
hallmark of Indian foreign policy.12 Essentially, the Cold War decades were an era of
lost opportunities.

The era of partnerships

From 1990 to 2010, frequent changes of government meant that the value orientation
of the Indian governments swayed between liberal internationalism and Hindu
nationalism.13 These two decades saw India–US relations swing from one extreme
to the other, from sanctions to that of being ‘natural allies’. The end of the Cold War
opened up new avenues of cooperation between India and the US, and so did the
camaraderie between the people at the top. The Clinton–Vajpayee partnership and
the Bush–Singh era witnessed the consolidation of the relationship between the two
largest democracies. The Soviet nuclear tests of 1988 did create a blip in India–US
relations as they broke the early momentum of the bilateral relationship.14 This
coupled with economic sanctions gave the impression that India–US relations had
derailed. However, after the initial scepticism, 'the US perceived India’s nuclear
development as a capacity enhancement that would create a new balance in Asian
geopolitics’.15 The subsequent India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement marked the
beginning of the end of nuclear apartheid and played an important role in ‘facilitat-
ing the Indo-US rapprochement’16 process. It was furthermore viewed as a ‘vehicle’
by which the Indian people were reassured that the United States was a true ‘friend
and ally’ that was responsive to aspirations of the country.17 Since 2004, Washington
and New Delhi have begun a ‘strategic partnership’ based on numerous shared
values, for improved economic and trade relations.18 Under Manmohan Singh,
Indian foreign policy practice indicated a preference for ‘strategic autonomy’19;
but a certain degree of lethargy crept into this relationship, and by 2013, the
relationship between the two countries had nose-dived to a new low.20
The advent of the Modi regime in India has led commentators to argue that India–US
relations have undergone a ‘qualitative change in the relationship’21 and that a ‘funda-
mental transformation’22 has taken place. A ‘global strategic partnership’ between India
and the US-based on democratic values and a convergence of interests on ‘bilateral,
regional and global issues’ has been envisaged. Guided by the mottos: Chalein Saath
Saath (We Go Forward Together); and Sanjha Prayas, Sab ka Vikas (Shared Effort,
Progress for All) adopted during the first two summits between Prime Minister Modi
and President Obama in September 2014 and January 2015, respectively. India and the
US have sought to ‘reinvigorate bilateral ties and enhance cooperation’.23 The summit
level joint statement issued in June 2016 described India-US relations as ‘Enduring
Global Partners in the Twenty-first Century’.24 India–US defence deals seem to be the
thrust areas of this relationship. The ideological baggage worked as a ‘hand-brake’ on
India–US relations during the Congress regime, but it was dismantled by the Modi
4 Shubhrajeet Konwer

government and defence agreements such as the LSA—along with BECA (Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) and CISMOA (Communications and
Information Security Memorandum of Agreement) gave a boost to this partnership.25
Relations between the two largest democracies have been strengthened in spite of
differences. The frequency of head of state-/government-level talks in the last two
decades reveals that both countries are trying to forge a ‘common path in spite of
strategic constraints’.

Trump-Modi era: autonomy, foreign policy and contestation

In the context of India–US relations, Guillem Monsonis argues that ‘India’s twin
objectives are: to accumulate power, in the broader sense of the term, while retaining
enough strategic space to manoeuvre.’26 But relations are based on a commonality of
means and goals. Strategic commentators are of the view that the United States is
seeking to use India as a counterweight to China;27 Ashley Tellis argues that the US
administration needs a friendly India to not only counter China, but also to assist the
United States in ‘managing proliferation, enhancing security in the region, and help
spread democracy in the developing world.’28 Effectively, both countries have
incompatible visions and goals. Paranjpe sums it up as: ‘The US is a global power
with global concerns, while India still remains a regional player.’29 However, the
ability of India to assert its autonomy in foreign policy is a concern for the US
administration. The US may be an ‘ageing superpower’, but it continues to have
enough strength and capabilities to shake off multiple strategic challenges. The
necessity of an à la carte relationship is noted by many Indian authors and deci-
sion-makers, who prefer an ‘issue-based’ partnership which should be based on ‘not
permanent but temporary identity of interests’.30 Relations between India and the
United States have become ‘shaky’ over the past few months. Issues ranging from
trade and tariffs, oil imports from Iran, defence procurements from Russia as well as
burden-sharing in the war-torn state of Afghanistan have put relations between the
two countries on slippery ground.
The first area of contestation is the trade deficit and high tariffs on products traded
between the two countries. The Trump ‘presidency based itself on protectionism,
alliance scepticism and an emphatic personal leadership in a comparatively calmer
geopolitical situation, in which India was seen both as an oasis of economic growth
and stability.’31 However, things have become more competitive between the two
nations. The emergence of ultranationalist forces in the two countries has ensured that
political rhetoric as well as social cleavages have become sharper. The Indian economy
is the third largest in the world in terms of PPP after China and the US, and the fifth
largest in terms of nominal GDP.32 According to the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, ‘US goods and services trade with India totalled an estimated $126.2
billion in 2017. Exports were $49.4 billion; imports were $76.7 billion. The US goods
and services trade deficit with India was $27.3 billion in 2017.’33 Donald Trump called
India a ‘tariff king’ as American products were subject to high tariffs in India.34 The
bilateral trade imbalance between the two countries is a major concern for the Trump
administration which has criticized India for a range of ‘unfair’ trading practices.35
The Trump–Modi relationship will be competitive to say the least. The Trump
campaign which sought to ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) aimed to bring
jobs back to Americans and was ‘about (re)gaining control of US relations that
 Strategic Analysis 5

would primarily favour and further its interests’.36 Essentially the Trump adminis-
tration stressed on ‘Rejecting Globalism, Promoting Americanism’.37 Likewise, the
‘Indian foreign policy under Modi is witnessing a proactive turn infused by a strong
leadership’.38 The Modi government’s Make in India (MII) programme strives to
‘facilitate investment, foster innovation, enhance skill development, and protect
intellectual property and build best in class manufacturing infrastructure in the
country.’39 Effectively, both the governments’ are trying to usher in an assertive
foreign policy wherein economic nationalism and national interest will be para-
mount. The question is whether MAGA and MII can complement each other in
the long run.
The second area of concern is the issue of oil imports by India from Iran. India is the
second-largest purchaser of Iranian oil and has imported about 22 million tons from Iran in
the 2017–2018 period.40 While it has caused friction between India and US, India has
continued to import oil from Iran and the US has agreed to grant it a waiver from sanction;
it essentially implies a tussle between India’s quest for autonomy and America’s agenda of
cornering Iran. India is trying to reassure the US that the oil money from India will not be
used by Iran for and terror-related activities.41 While South Korea, Japan as well as India
are major importers of oil from Iran, the imposition of sanctions on only a particular
country, namely India would definitely show the US in poor light. The US realizes that
India is too big an economy to be ignored and both countries realize that stable India–US
relations are a strategic requirement which neither can afford to ignore. Iran is an integral
part of India’s extended neighbourhood policy as it provides it ‘access to Central Asia and
Afghanistan without having to traverse China or Pakistan.’42 The Chabahar port is of
prime importance for the Modi government because it not only lowers transportation costs
and provides access to Central Asia, but importantly it helps monitor Pakistan’s activities
in the region. Delhi–Tehran relations are based on a delicate balance. While India is
energy-dependent on Iran, it still voted in against Iran in the IAEA.43 At a broader level,
the US views Iran as a rogue state which has relentlessly pursued its nuclear programme
and is a major threat to the US interests in the Middle East. Iran has been resilient and has
‘survived the past two decades under economic sanctions of all sorts and isolation of
different degrees by the United States and Europe.’44 Iran has undertaken measures to
ensure that the US faces strategic challenges while trying to impose its policies in the
Middle East as well as maintain its autonomy. Edward Chang argues ‘rogue states often
align themselves with the great power rivals of the superpower and those aligned with it.’45
Iran has countered the US threats by not only strengthening its nuclear programme but also
cementing its ties with Russia and China who are challenging the dominant position of the
US in world politics. On the other hand, India is also acutely aware that the troika of Iran–
China and Pakistan is a challenge which needs to be countered. The US administration is
deeply aware of the dilemma the Indian government faces in dealing with Tehran and the
Indian administration is likewise aware that the US needs more ‘burden-sharing partners’
in a complex world.
Thirdly, the issue of greater burden sharing in Afghanistan has become a thorn in
the relations between India and the US. Stability and peace in Afghanistan are
imperative for the Indian government. India’s growing involvement in Afghanistan
will never be acceptable for Pakistan, because ‘Afghanistan provided the crucial
“strategic depth” and having faced “strategic reversal” with the ouster of the Taliban
is anxious to reclaim lost grounds by providing sanctuaries to the remnant Taliban.’46
The Taliban and its roots and support system in Pakistan have been a threat for India.
6 Shubhrajeet Konwer

Peace in Kashmir is closely linked with the ability of the Indian forces to keep
enemy forces at bay and root out cross border support for terrorists in Kashmir. As
Yadav and Barwa point out, ‘An autonomous Afghanistan is India’s best route to
maximizing its relational control over Pakistan’,47 but it is also linked with the
nature of burden-sharing it has with the US. According to reports, ‘Since leading the
multi-nation invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the US has lost more than 2,400
soldiers and spent more than $900 billion in its longest war.’48 In Afghanistan,
post-conflict state-building efforts by the US have proved to be a herculean chal-
lenge. The US has 16,000 troops in Afghanistan and along with other international
donors it has committed to provide $15.2 billion in civilian assistance through
2020.49 India too has made its presence felt in Afghanistan, albeit in a limited
manner. Economic investment and trade seem to have just picked up. Sahida
Mohammad Abdali in a USAID-FICCI event highlighted: ‘The bilateral trade
between India and Afghanistan is US $ 900 million and with opening of air corridor
our target to take it to US $ 2 billion by 2020.’50 But importantly, India continues to
invest in Afghanistan through other means. Since 2001, India’s development efforts
in Afghanistan have been in the form of ‘humanitarian assistance, major infrastruc-
ture projects, small and community-development projects and education and capacity
development.’51 As the US plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan and Syria,
it wants its allies to play an important role, and more specifically, hopes that India
could send troops to this war-torn region. However, the Indian government has
categorically ruled out putting ‘boots’ on the ground in Afghanistan.52 India’s
experience of sending troops to foreign lands has not been a happy one and there
is a growing fear that it may be targeted by the Pakistan proxies. India is more
comfortable with providing reconstruction and humanitarian aid. But the bigger fear
amongst the strategic community in India is that the withdrawal of the US troops
from Afghanistan may strengthen the hands of the Taliban and lead to the resurgence
of Pakistan’s influence in this region. If US forces do withdraw from this troubled
region, it will have major security implications for the region of South Asia.
Fourth is the issue of defence cooperation and arms procurement from Russia.
India and Russia, defence ties continue to remain strong. The India–Russia Joint
Statement of 2018 points out that ‘Military and Military-Technical cooperation
between the two countries is an important pillar of their strategic partnership’ and
both states are committed to the continuation of the Tri-Services Exercises-
INDRA.53 On the other hand, US–Russia relations have soured considerably.
Russia’s involvements in Syria, Ukraine, the Moscow–Tehran ties and its meddling
in the US elections haves considerably strained the relationship. However, both
countries have managed to ‘bandage’ this estranged relationship. L. Yang rightly
sums up that, ‘Russia and America have differences in principle in terms of interests
and positions, but both exercise self-restraint to limit their contradictions within a
certain scope, thus leading to such a situation where struggle and cooperation
alternatively gain the upper hand.’54 The dilemmas of American foreign policy are
well exposed when it comes to its dealings with countries like India and Russia.
Both the countries have successfully inked the purchase of Russian S-400 Triumf
missile systems despite the US threat of sanctions.55 The Countering America’s
Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) 2018, which ‘mandates the imposi-
tion of economic sanctions on countries importing Russian military hardware’, is
unlikely to be imposed on India in the immediate future given the strategic
 Strategic Analysis 7

partnership between India and the US. An assertive Russia and a geo-strategically
important democratic country like India will test the elasticity of American national
interest.
According to A. Lukin, ‘In a multipolar world, the influence of the West will
diminish, while that of other centres of power (China, India, Brazil) will grow as
they seek to build zones of influence around their borders’.56 But considerable
contradictions continue between these ancillary powers. A disturbed neighbourhood
has led India to steadily scale up its defence procurements. Between 2012 and 2016,
India was the world’s largest importer of major arms accounting for 13 per cent of
the global total sales.57 The China–Pakistan nexus and threats originating from
Afghanistan have driven India’s security concerns. In an insecure world order,
India still views the Pakistan-backed Taliban as the principal threat to peace and
stability in Afghanistan,58 while the growing closeness of Russia and Pakistan as
well as Russia–China relations have left India feeling rather vulnerable. In spite of a
rich legacy, India–Russia relations have changed in the post-Cold War era, wherein
each country puts its own national interest above bilateral interests.

Strategic limitations and national interests

The US appears to be rather handicapped when it comes to imposing sanctions on
strategic partners like India. As Mir Sadat points out, ‘A rising, prosperous and more
engaged India helps create a favourable balance of power in Asia that supports long-
term US strategic interests.’59 According to a report of the Council for Foreign
Relations:

For the United States, India’s location alone makes it a more consequential partner than
other nations more distant from these US zones of concern. Unlike many US treaty allies,
India does not need to be convinced that a distant problem requires the projection of US
power to be successfully managed. Many of America’s global challenges are India’s regional
challenges, and therefore India is uniquely positioned to exert influence and offer resources
to help deal with them.60

India and the US have been strengthening their strategic partnership. The Joint
Statement following the inaugural India–U.S 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogue in 2018
stated that the ministers

welcomed the signing of a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement

(COMCASA) that will facilitate access to advanced defence systems and enable India to
optimally utilize its existing US-origin platforms. The Ministers also announced their
readiness to begin negotiations on an Industrial Security Annex (ISA) that would support
closer defence industry cooperation and collaboration.61

Essentially, India–US defence relations are moving in the right direction but con-
siderable challenges still remain. Ironing out these differences in an era charged with
ultra-nationalism will not be easy. In stark contrast to the Bush or the Obama era,
when the Indian government was seldom criticized openly, Donald Trump has made
remarks which have ruffled a few feathers in North Block.
While economic relations and tariff barriers do hurt US–India relations in the true
sense, in a electorally competitive atmosphere, it is the emotive as well as
‘machismo issues’ which matter, especially for India. Issues such as continuing oil
8 Shubhrajeet Konwer

imports from Iran and defence ties which further consolidates PM Modi’s ‘56 inch
chest’ image amongst the electorate. The Republic Day invitation fiasco reveals that
it was not just an overt expression of the US displeasure regarding the ‘autonomy’ of
Indian foreign policy, but it also underlines the deep malaise in the India–US
relationship. The BJP-led NDA government wanted President Trump to be the
chief guest on India’s Republic Day because of the ‘political image’ of Trump, as
a ‘tough-man’ with a no–nonsense attitude towards illegal migrants and terrorism.
The BJP-led NDA government’s position on illegal migrants and terrorism is a near
mirror image of that of the Trump administration. Again, the ‘library’ jibe by Donald
Trump also has not gone down too well with the Indian government.62 At a time
when the Indian government is trying to help in the reconstruction of war-torn
Afghanistan, such remarks have only created a more discomfort between the two
largest democracies.

Agenda for the second term

The Modi–Trump partnership will be judged not by their public postures and camar-
aderie, but by their ability to deal with hard politics. Tariff wars, the adoption of new
technologies like 5G, the growing US pressure on Tehran and India’s ability to
perform a ‘balancing act’ will all shape the future course of relations between the
two countries. The issues of nationalism and counterterrorism played a key role in the
election of Narendra Modi as prime minister for a second term. The Indian voter is
rather emotive and seldom swayed by macro-economic issues. The Modi regime has
now set a target of growing India into a $5 trillion economy by 2024–2025, and ‘invest
heavily in infrastructure, digital economy, job creation’.63 But the next couple of years
are also crucial for the Trump administration. In Europe, countries like Italy, Germany
and France have seen the rise of right-wing populism. Across the Atlantic, President
Donald Trump also realizes that his legacy can only get cemented in American
folklore, if he is elected US President for the second term. Therefore, he too has
made nationalism and ‘America First’ the hallmarks of his 2020 election agenda. The
‘America first policy’ which is broadly based on ‘two simple rules: buy American and
hire American’64 has led to tariff wars. It started with hiked tariffs on the import of
steel and aluminium from the European Union and other countries including India.
Again, the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) programme, which incidentally ‘is
the largest and oldest US trade preference programme and is designed to promote
economic development by allowing duty-free entry for thousands of products from
designated beneficiary countries’, stands terminated for India.65 In retaliation, India
too has hiked tariffs on 28 items imported from the US, including almonds, lentils and
apples. Though India has reduced the customs duty on the iconic Harley Davidson
motorcycles, Donald Trump has argued vigorously for protecting US manufacturing
industries and the interests of workers. He has supported the United States Reciprocal
Trade Act that ‘would give him authority to levy tariffs equal to those of a foreign
country on a particular product if that country’s tariffs are determined to be signifi-
cantly lower than those charged by the United States.’66 For Trump, trade is going to
be a key issue area as he starts his re-election campaign. While the US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo sought to play down the trade tensions with India by promising a
renewed focus on negotiating better ties, Donald Trump lashed out saying that ‘India’s
tariffs on US.products were “unacceptable” and they must be withdrawn.’67 The
 Strategic Analysis 9

diplomatic skills and political acumen of Prime Minister Narendra Modi will indeed be
tested over the next two years. Trump did highlight the friendship between the two
democracies, especially the need for continued military cooperation at Osaka.68 But
there are fundamental differences in the US and India perception of what constitutes
national interest, especially during the election season. The US administration will
only harp on the need to ‘Make America Great Again’ which will involve drastic
economic steps, including increasing tariffs on imports from countries like India.
US–Iran relations have worsened in the last two years. The Tehran revolutionary
regime’s nuclear ambitions, its aggression in the region and support for terrorism
have been major concerns for the Trump administration.69 The growing maritime
tensions between US and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, which is considered to be the
most important oil shipping route of the world, has increased the growing security
gulf between the two countries.70 While Iran has tried to control this vital narrow sea
strait, President Donald Trump has threatened to block Iranian oil exports through
this waterway.71 The US is increasingly concerned that Iran could harm its allies and
hurt its strategic interests in the Gulf region. From an Indian perspective, Iran can be
considered as ‘extended neighbour’,72 but such relations seldom matter when it
comes to securing national interests. Meanwhile, to comply with US sanctions,
India has stopped all oil imports from Iran. Indeed, India is walking the tightrope.
The equation between India and US is also on a different wavelength especially
when it comes to adopting 5G technology. The Trump administration is not comfor-
table with Chinese companies, more specifically Huawei, which ‘has long been
accused of rampant theft of intellectual property (IP), selling US tech to enemy
states like Iran and North Korea and being a Trojan horse for the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP).’73 Essentially it has been linked with espionage and seen
as a threat to national security.74 India, on the other hand, is one of the key players
that will shape the path, scope and magnitude of 5G technology. Adoption of 5G
technology in sectors such as agriculture, education, health, tourism and defence will
greatly benefit the Indian economy. Data consumption amongst the youth of India
continues to grow, and this makes India an ideal market for 5G technologies. The
Indian administration is also aware of the need for ‘data localization’ and protection
of privacy. Given the strategic and geopolitical challenges, India is well aware that
data, especially those related to national security, can be shared between Chinese
companies and Beijing.75 India will have to adopt new technologies like 5G soon,
but it has to be done under conditions of transparency and greater goodwill rather
than under pressure from external powers.
In spite of US pressure, India–Russia ties seem more stable. The International
North–South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) is one of the key initiatives pursued by
India, which will greatly enhance trade connectivity and transport between India and
Eurasia. But more concrete steps will have to be taken. The bonhomie between the
leaders of Russia–India–China (RIC) was visible during the G20 summit. The division
between the Euro-Atlantic Community is apparent and Russia has sought to exploit the
West’s openness and vulnerabilities.76 For the US, China is a ‘revisionist power’ that is
challenging the contemporary order. Therefore, the Trump administration is leaving no
stone unturned to ensure that the rise of China is countered from all quarters. As noted by
Lu, ‘In the current atmosphere of US domestic politics, pursuing a hardline policy
toward China is expected to boost the popularity of the ruling party.’77 In the grand
scheme of things, the Indian authorities realize that while the US may be the ‘elephant’
10 Shubhrajeet Konwer

in the room, the benefits of the strategic alliance between the two largest democracies far
outweigh the tariff inconveniences.
In a post-Article 370 India, where there is heightened tension between India and
Pakistan, and China continues to make ambiguous statements on Kashmir, Prime
Minister Modi’s visit to the US in September 2019 has indeed been significant.
Compared to other Indian leaders, PM Modi’s popularity amongst the Indian
American community is unparalleled. His war cry ‘Abki baar, Trump Sarkar’, has
given a major fillip to Trump’s quest for a second term as US president. President
Trump can breathe a little easy because there is a substantial Indian American
population in the United States. It is estimated that there are over 40 lakh Indians
in the United States, and of the 50 states in the US, there are 16 where the percentage
of Indian-Americans is more than one per cent.78 ‘Howdy, Modi’ event in Texas has
revealed that the Indian American community can change the trajectory of this
relationship, apart from playing a crucial role in determining the fate of US
Presidential election—and President Trump is well aware of this. In spite of the
electoral underpinnings, President Trump knows too well that while the Indian
American community may play an important role in the electoral process, his
election as President of USA for the second term will be decided by the American
voters on the basis of ‘promises’ he made four years ago i.e. ‘America First’ and
‘Make America Great Again’. US–India relations will barely figure in the political
debates leading up to the Presidential elections. For the American voter, it is issues
such as the domestic economy, immigration and the health-care system that will
matter.79 Reports suggest that ‘about seven-in-ten say it is more important for
President Donald Trump to focus on domestic policy right now’.80 Bargaining
with the Trump administration has proved to be a difficult task for the Indian
leadership. In spite of the strained relations, Prime Minister Modi realizes that
strategic relations will have to be strengthened. His visit to the US provided an
opportunity for PM Modi to discuss issues of trade deficit with the US but resulted in
only a ‘limited’ trade deal. The fine print of this limited trade deal is still unclear.
The US administration is keen to withdraw its forces from the Middle East and
Afghanistan, but sharing the burden of war, especially in Afghanistan, will never be
well received by the Indian public. India’s reluctance to be involved in the Afghan
quagmire exposes the differences of national interests between both countries.

Conclusion
Hillary Clinton in her article ‘America’s Pacific Century’ in Foreign Policy (October
11 2011) argued that ‘United States is making a strategic bet on India’s future—that
India’s greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security, that opening
India’s markets to the world will pave the way to greater regional and global
prosperity.’ Furthermore, she rightly pointed out that ‘there are still obstacles to
overcome and questions to answer on both sides’.81 Perhaps, this rightly sums up the
complexity of the India–US relationship. This complexity stems from the fact that
rising powers will want to assert their autonomy when it comes to protecting their
own national interests. A need-based India–US partnership will mean that the US
will continue to be non-committal about India’s needs. Trump’s protean commitment
to international institutions and his purported stand on economic nationalism has not
helped the US make new partners or cement ties with traditional allies. As
 Strategic Analysis 11

Dombroski and Reich have pointed out, ‘Trump has not universally attempted to
apply an isolationist, “America first”, grand strategy through a process of disen-
gagement. Nor, conversely, has he taken universal steps to restore American primacy
globally.’82 This may show that the Trump administration lacks a ‘grand strategy’ for
the twenty-first century or it may also suggest the prevalence of ‘coexisting strate-
gies that are flexible and adaptive.’83 Either way, it is not helping the Trump
administration win new friends. President Trump is ‘ready, willing, and able’ to
mediate between India and Pakistan, but this has not gone down too well with the
Indian government or the public. It is definitely an uncomfortable proposition, and it
does not help address India’s ‘Kashmir challenge’. While the Indian government is
fully aware that tackling Pakistan will not be an easy task, the balancing act of the
US does not help this strategic partnership.
While there has been an erosion of the ‘absolute dominance’ of the US in
international relations,84 other powers are still grappling to gain a firm foothold in
a fluid world order. But, there has never been any doubt that India needs the US
more than vice-versa. The asymmetrical power balance in favour of the US will be
hard to be ignored by any great or global power. A cosy partnership does not work in
a realist world. Personal relationships and hard political realities are very different.
Close personal relationship need not mean compromising national autonomy and
interests. Divergence of interests cannot be overcome by personal interests. If there
is a convergence of interests, then personal relations will only make the deal sweeter.
‘Hugplomacy’ may have worked, but hard political realties have hurt India–US
relations as well as the Trump–Modi partnership. While dealing with the US, India
too cannot take its geo-strategic and growing economic stature for granted. The US
carries considerable weight in all global institutions; the two nations need to work
out their differences, earnestly. If India continues to challenge the rules of the game
set by the US, it must be prepared for only conditional support from the US to its
areas of concern, especially those emanating from its neighbourhood.
Indeed, the era of shadowboxing has started wherein both the countries want to
avoid any direct hostile engagement. India–US relations have become complexly
engaged and derailment of the same is simply not possible. However, the growing
divergence of opinions between the two nations on key issues has to be addressed
rather quickly by the respective states. Firstly, incompatibility of strategic interests is
here to stay and will test the boundaries of the India–US relationship. Secondly,
while personal ties between President Trump and Prime Modi seem to have gathered
momentum, this can also be attributed to the forthcoming 2020 US presidential
elections, where Indian Americans will play a vital role. For both the leaders, the
challenge will be to convert close personal ties into ‘strategic gains’ for their
countries. Thirdly, the exercise of ‘strategic autonomy’ especially by India has led
to a chill in relations. According to Ashley J. Tellis, ‘India’s willingness to demon-
strate solidarity with the US on critical issues remained unclear’;85 this has created
an environment where Donald Trump will remain noncommittal or will take ambiva-
lent positions on issues that concern India’s national interests. India is keen to see
itself as an equal in this relationship, but the strategic environment in South Asia has
ensured that when it comes to dealing with India, the US will bargain from a position
of strength. These are troubled times when every country will bargain hard and
historical baggage will be seldom matter while being involved in realist games. It
may be too premature to argue that India and the US are ‘natural allies’,86 at best,
12 Shubhrajeet Konwer

India and the US may be partners, based on opportunism rather than any long-term
principles.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes
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