Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.

JD 3-3

Note: (Read b4 u write)

1. Always write my name before the case title (as seen in the heading)
2. Always leave 1 space after the case title and the Facts, Issue, Held
3. Always indent paragraphs.
4. Separate page per case
5. Wag mo masyadong gandahan yung cursive, okay lang na medyo magulo. :D

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS v.

MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ

FACTS:

Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the
project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the
grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to
the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that
usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of
lands by aliens.

ISSUE:

WON the ground for the opposition is correct.

HELD:

No, it is not correct.

The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and
meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not
vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

PHILIP MATTHEWS v. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR

FACTS:

On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a 17-year old Filipina. On
June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a lot in Boracay.
The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds,
constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist
resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the
resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.

However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8,
1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
Thereafter, on July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an
Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of
P12,000.00.

Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without Benjamin’s
consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages
against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Lease Agreement of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the
consent of her British husband is valid.

HELD:

No. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos.

The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to
own lands through another.

Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin,
being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property,
she acquired sole ownership thereto.

This is true even if Benjamin’s claim is sustained, that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By
entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no
reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject
property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.

In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC. vs. THE LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY

FACTS:

Rodis executed a deed of sale over a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, a corporation sole, with Msgr. Thibault, a Canadian Citizen, as the actual
incumbent. When the Roman Catholic Administrator presented the deed of sale for registration at the
Register of Deeds of Davao, the latter required that the corporation sole prepare an affidavit declaring
that 60% of the members were Filipino citizens. In spite of assurance by the corporation sole that the
totality of the Catholic population of Davao
would become the owner of the property, the Register of Deeds still had some doubts as to the registera
bility of thedocument, and referred the matter to the Land Registration Commissioner. The Land
Registration Commissioner found that the corporation sole was not qualified to acquire private lands in
the Philippines because of the requirement that 60% of the corporation was actually owned or
controlled by Filipino citizens; as the present incumbent of the corporation was a Canadian citizen, the
LRC found that the corporation sole was not compliant. Consequently the corporation sole instituted an
action for mandamus with the Supreme Court alleging that the sale in favor is in favor of the Catholic
Church, which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the establishment and maintenance of
places of worship, and prayed that the registration be recognized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc. is entitled to acquire
private properties

HELD:

Yes. In a corporation sole, the bishops or archbishops who sit as the incumbent are merely
administrators of the church properties, and they only hold these in trust for the church. Consequently,
upon the death of the incumbent of the corporation sole, the church properties acquired will pass on to
his successor in office. The Court also finds that here is no provision of law that confers ownership of the
church properties on to the Pope, or even to the corporation sole or heads of the corporation sole who
are mere administrators of said properties; rather, ownership of these properties fall and develop upon
the congregation. While the Catholic congregation does follow the guidance of the Pope, there cannot
be said to be a merger of personalities between the Pope and the Catholic Church, and it cannot be said
that the political and civil rights of the Catholics are affected by their relationship with the Pope; the fact
that the clergy derive their authorities from the Vatican does not mean that the Pope bestows his own
citizenship to each priest. To allow the theory that all of the Churches around the world would follow
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

the citizenship of the Pope would lead to the absurdity that each member of the Catholic Church would
be a citizen of the Vatican or of Italy. As such, it cannot be said that the citizenship of the corporation
sole, as created under Philippine laws, is altered by the citizenship of whoever is the incumbent head.
The Corporation Law recognized that corporation soles as those which are organized and composed of a
single individual for the administration of the properties not used exclusively for religious worship of the
church. The successor in office will become the corporation on ascension to office. Furthermore, the
Corporation Law also recognized that the corporation sole can purchase real property, although there
are restrictions as to the power to sell or mortgage depending on the rules, regulations and discipline of
the church concerned. As such, the Court finds it absurd that the corporation sole can purchase
properties but would not be able to register properties in its name. While the Constitution prohibits
foreigners from taking, acquiring, exploiting or developing the natural resources of the country, the
Court finds that the provisions relating to these are not applicable to corporation
soles because they are merely administrators of the properties titled in their name. Furthermore, the ad
ministration ofthese properties is for the benefit of the members of the congregation, which is
overwhelmingly comprised of Filipinos. As the acquisition of the properties is for the benefit of the
congregation, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao cannot be deprived of the right to
acquire by purchase or donation real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes,
nor of the right to register these properties in its name in the Register of Deeds of Davao.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL v. UNG SIU SI TEMPLE

FACTS:

A Filipino citizen executed a deed of donation in favor of the Ung Siu Si Temple, an unregistered
religious organization that operated through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The Register of
Deeds refused to record the deed of donation executed in due form arguing that the Constitution
provides that acquisition of land is limited to Filipino citizens, or to corporations or associations at least
60% of which is owned by such citizens.

ISSUE:

Whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization

whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.

HELD:

Sec. 5, Art. 13 of the Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The Constitution does not make any
exception in favor of religious associations

The fact that appellant has no capital stock does not exempt it from the Constitutional
inhibition, since its member are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the 60% requirement is to ensure
that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural lands or to exploit natural
resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence
of capital stock, controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

As to the complaint that the disqualification under Art. 13 of the Constitution violated the
freedom of religion, the Court was not convinced that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession or worship.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA

FACTS:

This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to
annul for lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and
building to Estelita Padilla. Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married but have been
separated since February 15, 1981. A Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by
Armando Altares, conveying a parcel of land in favor of Criselda Cheesman. Thomas, although aware of
the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax declarations for the said
property were issued in the name of Criselda Cheesman alone and she assumed exclusive management
and administration of the property. Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledge and
consent of Thomas

Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been
executed without his knowledge and consent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property sold
was paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that Thomas, an American was
disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; that Estelita was a buyer in good
faith

During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took place during the existence of
their marriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974. RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab
initio and ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of the conjugal property. The
judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed by the latter,
grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to
present her case adequately. "After the petition for relief from judgment was given due course,"
according to petitioner, "a new judge presided over the case."

Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of granting Estelita Padilla's petition for
relief, and its resolution of matters not subject of said petition; of declaring valid the sale to Estelita
Padilla despite the lack of consent thereto by him, and the presumption of the conjugal character of the
property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code; of disregarding the judgment of June 24,
1982 which, not having been set aside as against Criselda Cheesman, continued to be binding on her;
and of making findings of fact not supported by evidence. On January 7, 1986, IAC found all of these
contentions without merit. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Criselda can sell the property in question without her husband’s consent

2. Whether or not Thomas, being an American citizen, can question the sale

3. Whether or not Estelita was a buyer of good faith

HELD:
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of
this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him
and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. 31 In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right
over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a
fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or
any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is
not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive
consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive
property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent
buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against
Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter and spirit of the
Constitution itself.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR
DE VEGA

FACTS:

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots, as their residence with a total area of 91.77
sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen. At the time of the purchase, respondent
spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application
for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the RTC of San Pablo City. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. RTC rendered a decision confirming the title of the Spouses. Republic filed an opposition
to the decision of RTC. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

Republic submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject
properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration
thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be
public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the
Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical
sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is
only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land
become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

HELD:

Since the spouses’ predecessor in interest has been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land, such possession ipso jure converts the same to
private property. This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the
mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

In the case at bar, the spouses were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the
process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. But what should not be missed in the disposition of
this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested
parcels of land in their favor. From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other
law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of
private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to
be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of
what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the
public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born

citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land,
it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents
were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could
apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of
title must perforce be approved.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

DIONISIO RELLOSA vs. GAW CHEE HUN

FACTS:

On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together with the
house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila, Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor
remained in possession of the property under a contract of lease entered into on the same date
between the same parties.

Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that the vendee, being a Chinese
citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military Administration in accordance with (seirei)
No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and
that, even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void under article XIII, section 5,
of our Constitution. The vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
seeking the annulment of the sale.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the sale was void because it is against the Constitution

2. Whether the petitioner have the sale declared null and void and recover the property
considering the effect of the law governing rescission of contracts

HELD:

1) Yes, the court held that under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, including residential lands. This matter has been once more submitted to the court for
deliberation, but the ruling was reaffirmed. This ruling fully disposes of the question touching on the
validity of the sale of the property herein involved.

2) No, even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution to set aside the sale in question, they are
now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted
with, because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution.
They cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

GREGORIO LLANTINO and BELINDA LLANTINO assisted by husband Napoleon Barba vs.
CO LIONG CHONG alias JUAN MOLINA

FACTS:

Co Liong Chong entered a contract with Llantino Spouses for a lease of land for a period of 60
years. Note that Co Liong Chong was naturalized as a Filipino citizen (changed name to Juan Molina).
Llantino spouses wanted to recover the property from Co Liong Chong.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lease contract is invalid because at the time of its execution, he was a
Chinese

HELD:

The lease contract is valid. Lease contracts with Aliens allowed since an alien's stay in RP is
temporary, hey may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not prohibited by the
Constitution-the lease contract is valid as long as there are no circumstances attendant to its execution
which are used to circumvent the constitutional prohibition such as an option to buy the contractor a
lease for more than 50 years. An exception to this exception is when the alien subsequently acquires
Philippine Citizenship.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

THE HOLY SEE v. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR. and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises,
Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous
with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots
were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later,
Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to
vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility
of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by
petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana. Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos
for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. The trial court
issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed
off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith
elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on
its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a
private entity.

RULING:

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the
Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international
relations.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be
made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a
donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for
the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of
a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation
and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in
the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to
dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to
use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the
lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in
its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both
Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign
sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse
its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the
Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young,
Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private
Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim,
the latter ceases to be a private cause.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

SALVADOR H. LAUREL v. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS,
as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG

FACTS:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is
located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for
damage done by the latter to the former during the war. Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law,
the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men.
Therefore, it cannot be alienated. Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated.

2. Whether or not Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

HELD:

1) The subject property cannot be alienated. Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of
public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the
respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2) Yes, Philippine Law applies to the case at bar. We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should
apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a
dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land
ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence,
the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule
is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable
of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine
who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public
domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V. CA

FACTS: Marasigan, a lawyer, is a BPI credit card holder. His contractual relations with BPI went on
smoothly until October 1989, when his statement of account amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in
due time. BPI demanded immediate payment, and required him to issue a check in favor of BPI,
otherwise his card will be suspended. Marasigan issued a post-dated check (PDC) in favor of BPI.

BPI, having been informed of the PDC only a week after receipt, already sent a letter to Marasigan,
informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his card. He was also told to refrain from
using his card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding
account within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently cancelled.

On the other hand, confident that he had settled his account with the issuance of the postdated check,
Marasigan invited some guests at Café Adriatico (there is also no showing that he received the letter
from BPI before he went to Café Adriatico). When he presented his credit card to paythe bill, the it was
dishonored and one of his guests paid the bill by using her own credit card.

Marasigan asked BPI to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and to return the said check to him
because according to him, BPI violated their agreement that once Marasigan issues the check to the to
cover his unpaid account, BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card.

Marasigan filed a complaint for damages against BPI before the trial court, and the trial court ruled in
favor of him. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE/S:

1. W/N BPI had the right to suspend the credit card of the Marasigan

2. W/N the trial court and CA erred in holding BPI liable for damages

HELD:

1. YES

2. YES

RATIO:

Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by Marasigan, any card with outstanding
balances after 30 days from original billing shall automatically be suspended. Marasigan admitted that
he did not pay within 30 days for his original billing. BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

Even though there was an arrangement between the parties (that upon issuance of a check, the card
wouldn’t be suspended) the court found that Marasigan was not able to comply with his obligation.

The purpose of the arrangement between the parties was for the immediate payment of Marasigan’s
outstanding account, in order that his credit card would not be suspended. As agreed upon by the
parties, on the following day, private respondent did issue a check. However, the check was postdated
15 December 1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a substitute for money and not money,
the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself operate as payment. This is especially true in the
case of a postdated check.

Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the postdated check was not effective payment. It did
not comply with his obligation under the arrangement with BPI. BPI corporation was therefore justified
in suspending his credit card.

While Marasigan suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In order that a plaintiff may maintain
an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. In the case at bar, it was Marasigan's failure
to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café
Adriatico.

Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some
co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room.
Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and
detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila office. While
working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but
to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced
to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with
males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she was
wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines
later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the case because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed
for other reliefs under the premises.

ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines’ contention is correct.

Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to
dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked the court to make a
determination of Saudia Airlines’s rights hence a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.

Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint of Morada,
she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law.
Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect
whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or where the
defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here because if she’ll file it in
Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law
invoked).

Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign element
involved, is the so called “locus actus” or where an act has been done. In the case at bar, Morada was
already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with
a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she
was defrauded into appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of
defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and
suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be
said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).

Wildvalley v. Shipping Co., Ltd. v. CA, 342 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 119602, October 6, 2000
FACTS:
In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be piloted by
pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas,
a ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez,
a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River.
Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while being piloted by
Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel was owned
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC).
The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make its
delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for
the losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de
Pilotaje andReglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These two laws provide that
the master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez
was proven to be negligent when he failed to check on certain vibrations that the ship was
experiencing while traversing the river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere
photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document to
be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of
his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as
are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law is
deemed to be the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon
cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in
selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited pilot in
Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA

Facts:

The petitioner challenge the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration POEA on the
principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an
overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the
State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine
Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers.

Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA
to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

Issues:

Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power.

Discussions:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:

Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.

Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Rulings:

No. There was no principles violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
“power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
“filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.

SOUTHEAST ASIA SHIPPING CORPORATION v. SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply (Philimare), manning agent in the Philippines of
Navales Shipmanagement and Marine Consulting Pte, Ltd. of Singapore (Navales) which was acting for
and on behalf of Turtle Bay Shipping Pte, Ltd of Singapore (Turtle), hired Nerry Balatogan to work aboard
the vessel Turtle Bay. Navales subsequently appointed Seagull Maritime Corporation(Seagull) as its
manning agent in the Philippines and assumed full responsibility for all seaman deployed by

Philimare. Balatogan met an accident in Egypt and was found to be permanently disabled. He thereafter
filed a claim before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the payment of his
insurance from Philimare and Seagull. The POEA rendered judgment in favor of Balatongan. On appeal,
the NLRC affirmed the decision of the POES. The same decision was upheld by the Supreme Court.

However, before the promulgation of the Supreme Court of the earlier decision, Navales ―on behalf of
Arawa Bay Shipping Corporation Pte Ltd. Of Singapore” and Southeast Asia Shipping
Corporation(Seascorp) enterd into a manning agency agreement wherein Navales appointed Seascorp as
recruiting agent of Filipino seamen. It was stated in the affidavit and special power of attorney that
Seascorp will assume all liabilities that may arise with respect to all seamen recruited and deployed by
Seagull for Navales. On the basis of the agreement, Seagull filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court against Seascorp for the recovery of the amount paid by them to Balatogan. The RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Seagull. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Seascorp is liable to Seagull‘s claim solely on the basis of the agreement executed
by Seascorp and Navales prior to the rendition of judgment by the Supreme Court
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

HELD: As stated earlier, Seagull was the manning agent of Navales which was acting for and behalf of
Tutle Bay Shipping. Upon the other hand, Seascorp was the manning agent of Navales which was acting
for and on behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping.

SEASCORP could only have referred to liabilities that may arise or have arisen with respect to seamen it
recruited and deployed for NAVALES ―acting for and on behalf of ARAWA BAY SHIPPING”.

There is no doubt that the general rule is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous
about the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. That is
the mandate of Article 1370 of the Civil Code.

The Manning Agency Agreement clearly states that Navales, ‖acting for and in behalf of Arawa Bay
Shipping, appointed Seascrp as its recruitment agent for the hiring of Filipino seaman. The same
Manning Agency Agreement states that it shall incorporate the Special Power of Attorney executed by
Navales for the purpose in favor of Seascorp. Reference then to the Special Power of Attorney is likewise
in order. The Special Power of Attorney just as clearly stated that Navales, ―acting for and in behalf of
Arawa Bay Shipping,” named, constituted and appointed Seascorp as its attorney-in-fact. To disregard
the Manning Agency Agreement and the Special Power of Attorney in construing the affidavit as the
appellate court did, thus upholding the literal interpretation of the affidavit against affiant Seascorp,
despite the circumstances under which it was accomplished, which circumstances throw light upon,
explain and restrict the terms of the affidavit, would sacrifice the substantial rights of Seascorp and thus
work injustice, rather than promote justice.

Whether Seascorp‘s employees merely copied the Affidavit from a copy of the POEA, one fact is certain;
Seascorp was mistaken either through ignorance, lack of skill, or negligence. The affidavit does not thus
express the true intention of the parties.

MITSUI VS. CA, 287 SCRA 366

Facts:

Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign corporation represented in the Philippines by its agent,
Magsaysay Agencies. It entered into a contract of carriage through Meister Transport, Inc., an
international freight forwarder, with private respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Corporation
to transport goods of the latter from Manila to Le Havre, France. Petitioner undertook to deliver the
goods to France 28 days from initial loading. On July 24, 1991, petitioner's vessel loaded private
respondent's container van for carriage at the said port of origin.

However, in Kaoshiung, Taiwan the goods were not transshipped immediately, with the result that the
shipment arrived in Le Havre only on November 14, 1991. The consignee allegedly paid only half the
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

value of the said goods on the ground that they did not arrive in France until the "off season" in that
country. The remaining half was allegedly charged to the account of private respondent which in turn
demanded payment from petitioner through its agent.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent's action is for "loss or damage" to goods shipped, within the
meaning of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).

Ruling:

No. The suit is not for "loss or damage" to goods contemplated in §3(6), the question of prescription of
action is governed not by the COGSA but by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code which provides for a prescriptive
period of ten years. As defined in the Civil Code and as applied to Section 3(6), paragraph 4 of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, "loss" contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at all was made
by the shipper of the goods because the same had perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared in
such a way that their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered.

There would be some merit in appellant's insistence that the damages suffered by him as a result of the
delay in the shipment of his cargo are not covered by the prescriptive provision of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act above referred to, if such damages were due, not to the deterioration and decay of the goods
while in transit, but to other causes independent of the condition of the cargo upon arrival, like a drop in
their market value.

Everett Steamship Corporation vs. CA

G.R. No.122494, October 8, 1998

PARTIES:

Everett Steamship Corporation, petitioner

Court of Appeals and Hernandez Trading Co. Inc., respondents

Private respondent imported 3 crates of bus spare parts marked as MARCO C/No. 12, MARCO C/No. 13
and MARCO C/No. 14, from its supplier, Maruman Trading Company, Ltd. (Maruman Trading), a foreign
corporation based in Inazawa, Aichi, Japan. The crates were shipped from Nagoya, Japan to Manila on
board "ADELFAEVERETTE," a vessel owned by petitioner's principal, Everett Orient Lines. Upon arrival at
the port of Manila, it was discovered that the crate marked MARCO C/No. 14 was missing. Private
respondent claim upon petitioner for the value of the lost cargo amounting to One Million Five Hundred
Fifty Two Thousand Five Hundred (Y1, 552,500.00) Yen, the amount shown in an Invoice No. MTM-941,
dated November 14, 1991. However, petitioner offered to pay only One Hundred Thousand
(Y100,000.00) Yen, the maximum amount stipulated under Clause 18 of the covering bill of lading which
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

limits the liability of petitioner. Private respondent rejected the offer and thereafter instituted a suit for
collection. The trial court rendered a decision in favour of the private respondents and this was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Thus, this instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. Is the petitioner liable for the actual value and not the maximum value recoverable under the
bill of lading?

2. Is private respondent, as consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading bound by the
stipulations thereof?

ARGUMENTS:

1. The Petitioner is only liable for the maximum value recoverable under the bill of lading.

Clause 18 of the covering bill of lading:

18. All claims for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the basis of the
shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums, if paid, and in no event shall the carrier
be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss.

The carrier shall not be liable for any loss of or any damage to or in any connection with, goods in an
amount exceeding One Hundred thousand Yen in Japanese Currency (Y100,000.00) or its equivalent in
any other currency per package or customary freight unit (whichever is least) unless the value of the
goods higher than this amount is declared in writing by the shipper before receipt of the goods by the
carrier and inserted in the Bill of Lading and extra freight is paid as required. (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinent provisions that is applicable as to this case:

Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier's liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing
in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.

Art. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances,
and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law, it is required that the stipulation limiting the common
carrier's liability for loss must be "reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely and
fairly agreed upon."

The above stipulations are reasonable and just. In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that its
liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper, Maruman
Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to
blame for not complying with the stipulations.

2. Private Respondents are still bound by the stipulations of the bill of lading

In Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (supra), it was held that even if the consignee
was not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier, the consignee can
still be bound by the contract.

RULING:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

In fine, the liability of petitioner for the loss of the cargo is limited to One Hundred Thousand
(Y100,000.00) Yen, pursuant to Clause 18 of the bill of lading.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married
in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.

San Luis vs San Luis

Facts:

During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luis’s dad) contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the
dissolution of their Felicisimo’s conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26
of the Family Code.

Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate Felicidad’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s estate.

HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
Reyes, Samantha Gaile A.
JD 3-3

country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.

The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo