Lowel entries

9. LABO VS COMELEC

This is the second time1 that this Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship of Ramon
Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his candidacy for mayor of
Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing his certificate of candidacy on March
23, 1992.

Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on other hand, also filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same office on March 25, 1992.

Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner Ortega filed on
March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that
he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.

Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the Comelec on March 27, 1992 to
petitioner Labo followed by a telegram dated April 1, 1992, requiring him to file his Answer
within three (3) non-extendible days but the latter failed to respond.

On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to file his
Answer.

On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the Election Registrar of
Baguio City to personally deliver the summons. On May 4, 1992, the disqualification case
was set for reception of evidence. At the said hearing, Ortega presented the decision of this
Court in Labo v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen
of the Philippines. Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present
any evidence. It was only on May 5, 1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming
Filipino citizenship.

RULING

Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification
for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines."
The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage — the very essence which strikes at the
very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested office, he being an alien
and not a Filipino citizen.

The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.

10. LABO VS COMELEC

The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on

January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on
January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on
February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone
was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid.

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The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the
ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing
fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record
that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on
March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the
Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.

The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo
warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at
the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is
regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public
office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important
consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is
the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is
the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that
more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly
address it now in this same action.

The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses
Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine
of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it
was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been
invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment.
Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this
case.

The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding
that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen
of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process,
simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for
such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to
fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument
cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance
to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the
petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of
the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of
Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his
adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected
Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign
country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he
claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the
Philippines.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should
not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and
thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the
second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could
not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and

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the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of
the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the
belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election
cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office
itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were
not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the
election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not
now qualified to serve as such.

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that
as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously
not the choice of the people of Baguio city.

11. JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu),

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the
January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short),
as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial
Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on
the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of
America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued
by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying
that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at
Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised
under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
— A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of
any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on
the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines

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 shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten
days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19,
1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent
on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-
day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition
was filed out of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a
petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably
premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu
only on March 3, 1988.

However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship

and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is
enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu,
is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that
private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under
C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three
mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States
of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent
"must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization
Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States
does not concern Us here.

12. MANUEL DE LARA

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Petitioner seeks to become a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner is a citizen of the Chinese Nationalist Republic and was born on December 23,
1928 in Labo, Camarines Norte. He has resided continuously in Labo since his birth up to
the present time. He finished his elementary education at the Labo Elementary School, and
his secondary education at the Camarines Norte Institute. He is a graduate of the College of
Architecture of the Mapua Institute of Technology. He speaks and writes well English and
speaks and writes fairly well Tagalog, as evidenced by the writings he made in open court.
He is still single and is at present employed with the Hi-Q Commercial, a firm dealing in
chemicals, established at Jose Abad Santos St., Manila, from which he derives an average
annual income of P4,800.00, excluding bonus.

Petitioner believes in the principles underlying our Constitution and has conducted himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during his residence in Labo in his relation with our
government, as well as with the community in which he lives. He has mingled socially with
the Filipinos and has evinced a desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and
idiosyncracies of the Filipino people. He is not opposed to organized government nor is he
affiliated with any association which upholds and teaches doctrines opposed to organized
government.

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He is not a polygamist, nor a believer in polygamy. He has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any incurable or contagious disease. He
has none of the disqualifications provided for by law.

After hearing, the court a quo granted his petition for naturalization. It was declared that,
two years after the decision shall have become final, petitioner shall appear before the court
for further proceedings, in accordance with law.

The government appealed from the decision on the ground that petitioner has failed to
establish sufficiently his claim that he was born in Labo, Camarines Norte, and that his two
character witnesses lack the qualifications necessary to establish some of the important
averments of his petition.

It was claimed that petitioner was born in Labo, Camarines Norte, on December 25, 1928,
and that he has received his primary and secondary education at the Labo Elementary
School and Camarines Norte Institute, for which reason he has not filed the declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen, as required by law. But the evidence presented to
support such claim is far from convincing, for it only finds support in the testimony of
petitioner. While it may be conceded that petitioner's birth certificate could not be obtained
due to the destruction of the records of the local civil registrar of Labo during the last world
war, the claim of petitioner could have been corroborated by his mother or father who
apparently are still living, as there is nothing in the record to show that they are dead. The
claim could have also been corroborated by his baptismal certificate wherein generally the
place and date of birth of the neophyte are recorded. But no such thing was done despite
his claim that he was baptized in the Roman Catholic church of Labo.

It is true that petitioner submitted as part of his evidence his alien certificate of registration
and his immigrant certificate of residence, but such documents do not furnish proof of his
date of birth because they merely serve to prove that he is an alien duly registered in the
Bureau of Immigration. Moreover, their contents are generally not admissible because the
public officer or employee who wrote the date therein contained has merely received them
and he has no personal knowledge of them. The government's objection on this point is
well-taken.

A circumstance that cannot be overlooked is that while petitioner has been a resident of
Labo, Camarines Norte since his birth on December 25, 1928, he has not however
continuously resided therein but a good portion of his time was spent in Manila where he
studied at the Mapua Institute of Technology and graduated with the Degree of Bachelor of
Science in Architecture, yet his two character witnesses Manuel Raneses and Antonio
Luzarraga only claim to be both residents of Labo, Camarines Norte and as such cannot
qualify to attest to his good conduct and irreproachable character during the time of his
residence in the Philippines. Our law requires that petitioner should conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines, which must be established by qualified witnesses, and as we already said, the
aforesaid witnesses do not have the requisite qualification.

13. CIRILO R. VALLES

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ,

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia
and came to settle in the Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate
Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board

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Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was
elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo,
Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor
her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had
renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the
petition, ratiocinating thus:

"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that
respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late
father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle
of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private
respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for
alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said
declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for
elective office.

As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by
the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not
automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to
petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply
with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election
of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship
since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged
renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless
person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner
concluded.

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 4 and 19875 Constitutions. Thus, the
herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a
Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a
Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this
contention, petitioner cited private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988,
and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. 10The
filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.11 This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto.
Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy
in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

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Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February
11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by
Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly
appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective,
petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation
holds no water.

14. EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA

14. A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of
all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.

On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition 3 before the Provincial
Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on
the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public
office. In his Answer,4 petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same
time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.5 He returned to the Philippines and
resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for
Barangay Chairman.

After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner. 6

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
(Emphasis added)

Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly
provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath."

Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC
observation on this point:

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship
Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a
public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual
citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented
that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such
proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an
officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and
unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the
instant case, respondent Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by
the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that
he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that
he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified
from running for an elective position in the Philippines.11 (Emphasis added)

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the
functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy.

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Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified
candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.12

In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as

candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CATHERINE’S CASES

13. A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA December 19, 2001

In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Demetrio G. Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen:
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, respondent.

and

14. A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA March 27, 2001

IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED
DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, respondent.

FACTS:

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 11 April 2001 respondent asserts that he did not
intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, nor is there any showing beyond
reasonable doubt that he did. Respondent also maintains that "[i]f at all any penalty should
be visited upon (him) for what he did . . . a reprimand may perhaps be considered
'appropriate.' " In his Manifestation and Motion for Oral Argument dated 13 September
2001, respondent maintains that "if he were only allowed by this Court to orally argue his
case and expound his arguments personally, he believes that he can convince this Court of
the justness of his cause." Finally, in his Letter of 8 October 2001, respondent says that if
indeed he committed the acts of interference of which he was found guilty, he respectfully
and humbly submits that the penalty imposed on him is too harsh.

As found by the Court-appointed investigator, the Honorable Mme. Justice Carolina C.

Griño-Aquino, on 18 July 2000, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, the
pairing Judge for Branch 53 (then left vacant by the demise of its incumbent Judge) was
heard and thereafter submitted for resolution. Later, just before lunch time, upon his arrival
in his office, SP Pablo C. Formaran III, the public prosecutor handling the case, was
informed by his secretary that a call from the Office of Justice Demetria was received and
that respondent Justice wanted to speak with him. Since SP Formaran III was still out, a
return call was requested. When the return call was made, the voice of the same woman
who earlier called answered that respondent Justice was already out for lunch. She then
said that she would just call again.
At around 1:30 to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent Justice, in the
company of Go Teng Kok and Atty Reinerio Paas went to the office of SP Formaran III
asking the latter to withdraw the Motion for Inhibition he had earlier filed against Judge
Muro. Go Teng Kok pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion while respondent
Justice counseled SP Formaran III that the basis for the motion for inhibition, i.e., the
unsigned letter of "concerned court employees," was "not strong." Respondent Justice also
advised Go Teng Kok to calm down or "keep his cool" as the latter was already becoming
too emotional. Respondent also asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go
Teng Kok. Just to put an end to the conversation, SP Formaran III, after politely declining
the request, answered that he would bring the matter to CSP Jovencito R. Zuño. "Iyon

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pala," respondent Justice replied, then stood up, bade SP Formaran III good bye, and left
with Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok.
Upon returning to his office in the Court of Appeals, respondent Justice called up CSP Zuño
and requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion for Inhibition so that
Judge Muro could issue an order in the case of Yu Yuk Lai. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State
Prosecutor Formaran na iwidraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa
na ng Order si Judge Muro," to which CSP Zuño replied, "Tingnan ko po kung ano ang
magagawa ko."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Justice Demetrio G. Demetria is GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct

HELD:

YES, the evidence is clear, if not overwhelming and damning.

Respondent Justice has no reason to extend counseling to SP Formaran III. As a member

then of the Judiciary, respondent should not act as lawyer for an accused. Neither should he
teach the prosecutor what to do. He should refrain from getting himself involved in the
prosecution of any case which may later be appealed to his court.
Respondent denies ever making a call to CSP Zuño. This is very difficult to accept since
there is sufficient reason to believe that he indeed made the call, which he could have very
well done so. If respondent could personally go to the Department of Justice and argue for
an accused before a prosecutor whom he claims he did not even know, what more a simple
telephone call to a former subordinate. This is truly a common experience of man which can
be very probable under the circumstances and may be received as credible evidence. But
this Court is not pinning respondent down for the phone call alone. The series of events that
transpired and the circumstances simply lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to his guilt.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times
must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion.39 His must be free of
even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties,
but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up to this
expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his
high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention
of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and
interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness tha a seat in the Judiciary.40 High
ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of
the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved. 41 There
is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of
judicial conduct and integrity.

15. A.M. No. P-00-7-323-RTJ October 17, 2001

RE: RELEASE BY JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, RTC, BRANCH 54 MANILA, OF AN
ACCUSED IN A NON-BAILABLE OFFENSE.

FACTS:

On July 161 2000, Yu Yuk Lai, one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 99-169862, was re-
arrested by the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) while playing
baccarat without jail guards at the Holiday Inn Pavilion Casino. At that time, she was
supposed to be detained at the Manila City Jail since her petition for bail was previously
denied by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. Forthwith, a news article was published in the

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Philippine Star4 entitled "BJMP told to explain drug queen's case." It reported that Yu Yuk
Lai "had obtained an order signed by Judge Manuel T. Muro (Regional Trial Court, Branch
54, Manila) allowing her hospital confinement for medical and humanitarian reasons."
Acting on the news report, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in Memoranda dated July 20,
2000, July 25, 2000 and July 26, 2000, directed Judge Manuel T. Muro, respondent, to
comment on the article and to submit to this Court pertinent documents showing that the
order was regularly issued.
After respondent judge had complied with the Memoranda, the Court en banc, in a
Resolution6 dated August 8, 2000, designated Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the
Court of Appeals to conduct an investigation and to submit to this Court her report and
recommendation. In the same Resolution, this Court suspended respondent judge from
office until further orders.
It appears from the investigation that on May 3, 2000, Atty. Rodolfo G. Tablante, Yu Yuk
Lai's counsel, filed a "Motion to Order the Confinement of Accused in a Hospital, "

On May 3, 2000, Judge Angel V. Colet, then presiding judge of the Manila Regional Trial
Court, Branch 53, to where Criminal Case No. 99-169862 was re-raffled,8 directed State
Prosecutor Pablito C. Formaran III and the Chief of the Manila City Jail Medical Clinic to
comment on Yu Yuk Lai's motion .
In a letter dated May 8, 2000, Doctor Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief, Health Services of the
Manila City Jail, did not oppose the motion. Instead, he requested that the accused be
brought to the Philippine General Hospital for confinement for a maximum period of seven
(7) days. Prosecutor Formaran, on the other hand, manifested that if the doctor of the
Manila City Jail Infirmary concurred in the recommendation of the physician of Yu Yuk Lai,
then for humanitarian reasons, he would interpose no objection to her hospital confinement
for a reasonable period set by the court. Meanwhile, Judge Colet died. The case was
assigned to his pairing judge, respondent herein.
On May 19, 2000, Yu Yuk Lai filed an urgent motion for extension of her medical
confinement for a period of two (2) months. She claimed that the results of her ECG, PAPS
smear, pelvic ultrasound, KUB, T3, T4 and other blood chemistry were not yet completed;
and that according to her attending physician at the Manila Doctors Hospital, Dr. Peregrino
C. Lao, he needed a period of two (2) months to complete the laboratory examination and
treatment. She submitted a copy of the Progress Report Medical Evaluation signed by Dr.
Lao.

On May 29, 2000, Yu Yuk Lai's counsel filed a Manifestations attaching thereto a copy of the
Clinical Abstract Report of Dr. Lao and a Certification of Dr. Felix Salgado, a specialist from
the Philippine General Hospital, stating that "further work-ups and diagnostic test are
recommended [for Yu Yuk Lai] to rule out possibility of other underlying organic cause.
The hearing of the motion and opposition was inserted in the court's calendar on May 26,
2000. However, for some reasons, the incidents were not heard. Respondent judge simply
issued an order submitting them for resolution and granted Yu Yuk Lai's motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro is liable for gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct

HELD:

YES. In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that Judge Muro's acts were so
serious and indefensible in character as to call for the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service.

It is thus clear that Judge Muro "delegated" to the doctors the determination of the length of
Yu Yuk Lai's confinement in the hospital. His first consideration should have been the gravity
of the charge against Yu Yuk Lai which is non-bailable. He created an easy vehicle for Yu
Yuk Lai to attain temporary relief from detention. Had he conducted a simple inquiry on the
actual medical condition of Yu Yuk Lai, he could have discovered easily that the same was
not life threatening or serious in nature which would require confinement in a hospital.

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Besides, mere reading of the Motions and the Medical Reports/Certifications would invite
suspicion considering the complaints and the recommended treatment. A simple
investigation would reveal that Yu Yuk Lai was allowed by the doctors to go out on pass on
several accessions. This only shows that she was not suffering from any ailment needing
hospitalization or that her medical condition was not that serious as the doctors wanted it to
appear.

It has been said that when the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to know or
observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. However, applying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor, the case presented herein was not mere ignorance of the law but amounts to grave
abuse of authority, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to proper administration of
justice.

Undoubtedly, respondent judge has impaired the image of the judiciary to which he owes
the duty of loyalty and obligation to keep it at all times above suspicion and worthy of the
people's trust.
Judicial office demands the best possible men and women in the service. This Court will not
hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards effective and
efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.

16. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013

(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3;
JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES,
Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu ·City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6,
Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III,
RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch
4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN
MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City. Respondents.
*
PERLAS-BERNABE

FACTS:

On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City
and headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the
MTCC in Cebu City. A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a
couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the
guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that
he would be recognized by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4
who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that only the female
lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process. Inside Branch 4,
a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer
asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage
could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day
the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process
for a fee of three thousand pesos (₱3,000) only.
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the
judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S.
Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
to submit their respective comments.7 The Court also suspended the judges pending
resolution of the cases against them.

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On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepaño submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 2007 and Supplemental Report. Six
hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit
team. The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages
were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches
indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates
in the courts’ custody. There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from
the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages
solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of Barili,
Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of
almost two (2) hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers
away from Cebu City.

ISSUE:

Whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and
in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.

HELD:

YES. This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy
burden and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public. In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we
said that: Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of
official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages.
The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice
of the parties and the proper administration of justice.

The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and
Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they
solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly
the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence.

17. A.C. No. 9920

[Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant
vs.
FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Respondent

FACTS:

1
Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Tormis), together with other judges and
employees of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for turning the
solemnization of marriages into a business. Tormis was dismissed from the service for the
second time, and this Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment
proceedings against her.
The Office of the Court Administrator found that the respondent judges in that case
connived with the court personnel, who acted as "fixers" in solemnizing marriages. The
judges heedlessly kept solemnizing marriages despite irregularities in the requirements
provided under the law.

On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution requiring all the judges
involved, including Tormis, to comment on the Supplemental Report. The Resolution also
directed the Process Servicing Unit to furnish all the judges with a copy of the
Report. Further, all the court personnel involved were asked to show cause why they should
not be disciplined for their misconduct.
In her comment, Tormis denied the charges against her. She claimed that the action of the
Office of the Court Administrator was an "entrapment." According to her, there was nothing
wrong with solemnizing marriages on the same date the marriage license was issued. In
view of the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of

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regularity.37 Tormis asserted that she should not be blamed for assuming that the affidavits
were true since judges are not handwriting experts.
Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was hearsay. She averred that when
Baguio-Manera and her husband was asked about the affidavit, they confirmed the
truthfulness of their statements, particularly that they had been living together for five (5)
years.40 Lastly, Tormis blamed the filing clerks for the irregularities in the number of
marriages solemnized in her sala.

ISSUE:
Whether the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in the solemnization of
marriages, where she was found guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross
ignorance of the law, constitute gross misconduct warranting her disbarment

HELD:

YES. Respondent's conduct has fallen short of the strict standards required by the legal
profession. Hence, her repeated failure to live up to the values expected of her as an officer
of the court renders her unfit to be a member of the bar.

19. G.R. No. L-25895 July 23, 1971

FELIZARDO S. PACETE, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Petitioner in his own behalf.

FACTS:

Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the
Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.

He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his
appointment, was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission
on Appointments at its next session in 1965.

On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his
petition, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as
municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment had been by-passed.

Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the
reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had received.

Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then
Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice
of such body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the
confirmation of the appointment in question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through
the Judicial Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as
municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the
Department of Justice was likewise named respondent as he had, as a consequence,
withheld petitioner's salaries.

ISSUE:

Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become final and executory upon the
adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21,
1965;

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Whether the petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed; and

Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed
for by petitioner.

The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato
is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement
as to costs.

Ratio: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did
suffice to set it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by
petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover
tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive
weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect
of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely
worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the
constitutional prescription.

In view of confirmation

In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his

confirmation became final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular
session of the Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965.

In view of construction

As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted
Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution
of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member
presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members
present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and
submitted anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment
may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion."

1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the motion for
reconsideration of Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the
confirmation of petitioner's appointment and that, accordingly, it should be considered non-
existent. His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the
members present in favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the
appointment — and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation — and to require a resubmission of
the appointment for confirmation."

2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress."

That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a

collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-
man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.

Lowel&Cath | Midterm | Poli | 14

3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. Thus even
legislative acts and executive orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly,
there is nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially so,
when as in this case, a construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an
individual to a public office. The task becomes unavoidable when claims arising from the
express language of the Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. So it is in this case. It
is a truism that under the circumstances, what cannot be ignored is the primacy of what the
fundamental law ordains.

As due process is impressed with both substantive and procedural significance, the scope of
judicial inquiry is thus not unduly limited.

20. G.R. No. 183171 August 14, 2008

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

FACTS:

On May 4, 2005, respondent Commission on Appointments (Commission) issued a

Certification of Consent3 and confirmed the appointment of former Vice President Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the People’s Republic of
China with concurrent jurisdiction over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
Mongolia. Petitioner Tatad challenged the consent before the RTC in Quezon City via a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity.

Petitioner prayed that the Commision’s consent be declared as void from the beginning on
the ground that the appointment of former Vice President Guingona to the position was
contrary to law and public policy because he was already beyond seventy (70) years old at
that time.

After respondent Commission filed its Answer,4 petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.5 Respondent opposed the motion and contended that the complaint should be
dismissed considering that the issue had been mooted after Ambassador Guingona tendered
his resignation from the position.6

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commision’s consent is void from the beginning on the ground that the
appointment of former Vice President Guingona to the position was contrary to law and
public policy because he was already beyond seventy (70) years old at that time.

HELD:

On this basis, both the RTC and the CA ruled that the issue had become moot.

We agree with both the trial and appellate courts. The resignation of former Vice President
Guingona as Ambassador rendered the issues raised in this petition moot. It has become a
non-issue such that a resolution either way would be of no practical effect. In essence, there
is no more illegal appointment to speak of because the appointee ceased to occupy the
subject position.

An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy.
In such a case, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. We have consistently held that

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courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief will be
granted.

Petitioner insists that despite the resignation of former Vice President Guingona from the
position, a resolution of the issues presented is imperative so that the public may know
whether respondent Commission violated the law and public policy.
Petitioner is mistaken. Because the present case lacks an actual controversy, any resolution
of the issues presented would not result in an adjudication of the rights of the parties, but
would take the nature merely of an advisory opinion. As this Court held in Ticzon v. Video
Post Manila, Inc.,14 courts are called upon to resolve actual cases and controversies, not to
render advisory opinions.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.

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