St. Martin Funeral Homes v.

NLRC
G.R. No. G.R. No. 130866| |16 Sep 1998

Overview:
Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of Petitioner on
February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and
petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was
dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other
hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed,
the owner of petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of Amelita
passed away, so the latter took over the management of the business.
Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife
were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed
a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The labor arbiter
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case.

Facts:
 Bienvenido Aricayos alleged that he started working as operations manager in St. Martin
Funeral Home on 6 Feb 1995.
 There was no contract of employment nor was his name included in the in the
semimonthly payroll.
 [1996] He was dismissed from employment for misappropriating ₱38K which was intended
for payment of VAT to the BIR.
 St. Martin claims that Aricayos is not an employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed,
owner of St. Martin.
 Aricayos was allegedly voluntarily helping, as an indication of gratitude, because Amelita’s
mother gave him financial assistance when he was still working overseas.
 When Amelita’s mother passed away, Amelita took over the management of the business. She
then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees,
although the records purported to show that the same were already paid.
 Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his
wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof.
 Aricayas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

LA: No employer-employee relationship. Hence, no jurisdiction over the case.

NLRC: set aside the LA’s decision. Remanded to LA. Petitioner filed MR, denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the CA may exercise judicial review over decisions rendered NLRC.
Ruling: YES.

In San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor , it was held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no
right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part
of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and
unjust adjudications.

In this case, the petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or
certiorari should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle
of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

Additional Notes:
[1972] The NLRC was first established in the Department of Labor by Pres. Decree No. 21. Decisions
of the NLRC were expressly appealable to the Secretary of Labor → President.

[1974] Pres. Decree No. 442 was enacted. LABOR CODE, art. 302 later 223. It granted the aggrieved
party of the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor. Pres. Decree
No. 1391, however abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since been provided for.

As stated above, in San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor, the court ruled that there is an
underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; and that the purpose of judicial
review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights
of the parties.
Remedy of the aggrieved party:
1. Timely file a motion for reconsideration (precondition for subsequent remedy)
2. Seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
a. Even if the 10 day period for finality of the NLRC decision has lapsed the Supreme
Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari if filed within the 60
day reglementary period under Rule 65.

Furthermore, in BP Blg. 129, sec. 9, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7902: Cases under the
LABOR CODE are now part of the exclusionary clause. This would mean that appeals from the
NLRC cannot be brought before the CA, but to the Supreme Court.

This is illogical and impracticable since there are no cases in the LABOR CODE wherein the
decisions, resolutions, order or awards are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
or of any other court for that matter.

1. There was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. The purpose of Batas
Blg. 129 is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review
of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. The court held, therefore, that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil
action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of the decisions of the
NLRC.

2. Appeal on certiorari (RULES OF COURT, Rule 45): SC only. Special civil action of Certiorari
(RULES OF COURT, Rule 65): SC and CA, concurrently.

3. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the SC
are interpreted and declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All such
petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
hierarchy of courts. Now, Labor Code, art. 229, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715 (1989) and
renumbered in 2015.