Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
00
\ e -
MORTIMER J. ADLBR, Editor in Chief
VOLUME II
VOLUME
.........
I
PREFACE
....
EXPLANATION OF REFERENCE STYLE
ANGEL to LOVE ....
xi
xxxiii
.1-1081
Chapters 1-50:
\
VOLUME II
Chapters 51-102.:
I.
MAN to WORLD .....
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ADDITIONAL READINGS
ix
1-1140
Appendix .
1143
parts:
I. General Typographical Style
II. Style of Bible References
III. Punctuation, Symbols, Abbreviations
IV. Table of Authors, Titles, and Author's Divisions Cited
(2)
Name:
Author's
The author's name immediately follows the volume number, except in
the case of the American State Papers and the Federalist, which are in-
cluded in Volume 43. Authors' names are usually given in shortened form.
ix
xii THE GREAT IDEAS
sometimes places continuous reading matter in the a and c sections of the
upper half of the page, or in the b and d sections of the lower half of the
page. This occurs when a work or an author's division begins in the lower,
or ends in the upper, half of the two-column page. Where continuous read-
ing matter thus appears in discontinuous page sections, it is indicated by
a,c or b,d. For example:
means that the work cited begins in the lower half of page 64 and ends in
the upper half of page 77.
Footnotes or notes are sometimes specifically cited by themselves in the
references, in which case the page sections given correspond to their loca-
tion on the pages referred to. When a footnote or a note is not specifically
cited, the page sections given mark the beginning and the end of the text
referred to. The reader is expected to consult the footnotes or notes indi-
cated in the body of that text.
Chaucer's works (in Volume 22) are printed in two columns; the inside
column of each page contains the Middle English text, the outside column
a Modern English version. Since both columns contain equivalent pas-
sages, the references to this volume employ page sections (a and b) which
divide each page only into an upper and a lower half.
verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by
a (/?), follows. For example:
the passages from Plutarch are only a part of Lycurgus, and the passage
from Swift is only a few pages from Part II of Gulliver's Travels.
When the title of a work, or an author's division of a work, is not
separated by a comma from the page sections which follow, the reference
is to the whole work or to the whole of the indicated author's division.
Hippolytus Hecuba
Alcestis Heracles Mad
Heracleidae The Phoenician Maidens
The Suppliants Orestes
Lysis Gorgias
Laches The Republic
Protagoras Timaeus
Euthydemus Critias
Cratylus Parmenides
Phaedrus Theaetetus
Ion Sophist
Symposium Statesman
Meno Philebus
Euthyphro Laws
Apology The Seventh Letter except Republic
Crito and Laws, BOOK
REFERENCE STYLE xvn
Categories
CHAPTER, Line
Interpretation
On Interpretation
Prior Analytics
Topics
Metaphysics
Soul On the Soul
Sense and the Sensible On Sense and the Sensible
9 ARISTOTLE
History of Animals
BOOK, CHAPTER, Line
Parts of Animals On the Parts of Animals
Motion of Animals On the Motion of Animals
CHAPTER, Line
Gait of Animals On the Gait of Animals
Generation of Animals On the Generation of Animals
Ethics Nicomachean Ethics BOOK, CHAPTER, Line
Politics
The Oath
Ancient Medicine On Ancient Medicine
Fractures On Fractures
paragraph
Articulations On the Articulations
Instruments of Reduction
XX THE GREAT IDEAS
17 PLOTINUS (205-270)
first-Sixth Ennead The Six Enneads TRACTATE, CHAPTER
27 SHAKESPEARE, WILLIAM
Twelfth Night Twelfth Night; Antony and Cleopatra
or, What You Will Coriolanus
Hamlet Hamlet, Prince ofDenmar\ Timon of Athens
The Merry Wives of Windsor Pericles Pericles, Prince of Tyre
Troilus and Cressida Cymbclinc
All's Well That Ends Well The Winter's Tale
Measure for Measure The Tempest
Othello Othello, the Moor of Venice Henry VIII The Famous History
King Lear of the Life of King Henry
Macbeth the Eighth PROLOGUE, ACT, SCENE, EPILOGUE, Line
Triangle
41 GIBBON, EDWARD
Decline and Fall The Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire (continued), Chapters 41-71
REFERENCE STYLE xxv
to the
Metaphysic of Morals
The Science of Right
Liberty On Liberty
Representative Government
Utilitarianism
Relation to Sex
Capital
INTRODUCTION
or not the proper study of can perform. The methods by which this analy-
WHETHER
mankind man, it is the only study in
is developed are, for the most part, the same
sis is
which the knower and the known are one, in methods which the Greek philosophers use in
which the object of the science is the nature of physics. "The study of the soul," Aristotle
the scientist. If we consider every effort men writes, "falls within the science of Nature." The
have made in response to the ancient injunction definitions of the psychologist, like those of the
"know thyself," then psychology has perhaps a physicist, give "a certain mode of movement
longer tradition than any other science. But by a of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a
conception of science, more is required
stricter body) by this or that cause and for this or that
than individual insight or self-consciousness. end." In the case of the human soul, however,
Definitions, principles, analyses applicable to all the psychologist can employ a method not ap-
men must be established, and it has been plicable to other things. The human intellect is
questioned whether the method of introspec- able to examine itself. Mind can thus know
tion suffices for this purpose. What methods things about mind which are not otherwise ob-
should be used by the psychologist depends in servable.
part upon the precise object and scope of his The subject matter of psychology narrows
inquiry. According as different subject matters somewhat when, at a later moment in the tradi-
and different methods define psychology, there tion, the study of mind tends to replace the
seem to be several disciplines bearing that study of man. This narrowing takes place grad-
name, each with its own tradition in western ually.Though Descartes identifies soul with
thought. mind or intellect, he treats of the passions and
In one conception, psychology begins with the will as well as thought and knowledge. Dif-
the dialogues of Plato and with Aristotle's trea- fering from Descartes with regard to body and
tise On the Soul. As Aristotle's title indicates, soul, Hobbes and Spinoza also give as much at-
^nd as the Greek roots of the word "psychol- tention to the emotions as to ideas and reason-
ogy" connote, the soul rather than man is the ing.But with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume there
object of the science. Anthropology, Kant later isan increasing tendency to analyze the con-
suggests, would be a more appropriate name for tents of consciousness and the acts of the under-
the science of man. The Greek inquiry into the standing, treated exclusively as a faculty of
soul extends, beyond man, to all living things. thinking or knowing. Where in the earlier tra-
It is because "the soul is in some sense the prin- dition the observation of human behavior and
ciple of animal life," Aristotle writes, that "the the behavior of other animals appears to be use-
knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes ful in psychology, here the main source of
greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, psychological knowledge seems to be intro-
above all, to our understanding of Nature." spection.
Nevertheless, psychology for the Greeks The Principles ofPsychology by James and the
isj
principally concerned with the study of m writings of Freud represent a return to the
The analysis of the parts or faculties of the hu- broader conception of the science. According
man soul is an analysis of the properties of hu- to James, "it is better ... to let the science be
man nature the powers which man has and the asvague as its subject ... if by so doing we can
characteristically human acts or functions he throw any light on the main business in hand.'*
1
THE GREAT IDEAS
If psychology "takes into account the fact that Kant's critique of rational psychology thus ap-
minds inhabit environments which act on them pears to be based on the same principles which
and on which they in turn react" and "takes underlie his critique of metaphysical assertions
mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, concerning God's existence and the freedom of
it is
immensely more fertile than the old-fash- the will.
ioned 'rational psychology,' which treated the Those principles are in turn based on an elab-
soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto it- orate theory of the human faculties, such as
self,and assumed to consider only its nature sense, understanding, and reason, and the role
and properties. I shall therefore feel free," James they play in the constitution of experience and
goes on to say, "to make any sallies into zoology knowledge. But Kant does not regard his own
or into pure nerve-physiology which may seem theory of the faculties as psychology. Writers
instructive for our purposes." like Locke and Hume, on the other hand, seem to
Though in the hands of James and Freud the make their psychology certainly in its princi-
scope of psychology extends no further than pal concern with how the content of the mind
the range of topics Aquinas covers in his trea- is
acquired and formed the basis for apprais-
tise on man and his treatise on human acts and ing the validity of all other knowledge. They
passions, their return to the study of man as a do not question the validity of psychology it-
whole accompanied by an interest in or in-
is self.
They seem to assume that self-knowledge
vention of new methods, experimental and clin- has unique advantages over all other inquiries.
ical. "As a science," Freud writes, "psycho-
analysis is characterized by the methods with THESE ISSUES of the scope and validity of psy-
which it works, not by the subject matter with chology are in one sense more relevant to the
which it deals." Those who distinguish between chapters on KNOWLEDGE, MIND, and SOUL than
science and philosophy in terms of empirical to this one. Their relevance here is limited by
research date the beginning of psychology from their connection with the main issues about the
the inception of these new methods. They re- nature of man. Not merely
the tradition of psy-
gard most psychological writings earlier than chology, but the whole tradition of western
James and Freud as works of speculation or phi- thought seems to divide on the question of
losophy. man's essence.
Controversy over the validity of conclusions The question can be put in a number of ways.
in psychology sometimes turns on the conflict- Is man a rational animal, and does that defini-
ing claims of rival methods to be the only way tion imply that only man has reason ? Does it
of arriving at the truth; and sometimes, as with imply that man has free will, and that only man
Kant, the issue of method seems to be subor- has free will? Like the question about the dis-
dinate to the issue of subject matter. Kant ad- tinction between living and non-living things
mits the possibility of an empirical psychology or the similar question about the difference be-
which would confine inquiries to the phe-
its tween plants and animals, this question can also
nomenal processes of thought and feeling, be- be asked in terms of the contrast between dif-
cause with respect to such an object "we could ference in kind and difference in degree. Does
call in aid observations on the play of our man differ essentially or in kind from other ani-
thoughts," and thence derive "natural laws of mals, or do all animals possess the same funda-
the thinking self." But, he goes on to say, "it mental properties ? Does man differ from the
could never be available for discovering those others only in the degree to which he possesses
properties which do not belong to possible expe- some of these shared qualities ?
rience." Some, like Darwin, think that "the differ-
What Kant calls "rationalpsychology" aims ence in mind between man and the higher ani-
at what is for him impossible, namely, knowl- mals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and
edge of the reality or substance of the soul it- not of kind. We
have seen," he writes, "that
self. It is impossible, he says, to make "any dog- the senses and intuitions, the various emotions
matical affirmation concerning an object of ex- and faculties, such as love, memory, attention,
perience beyond the boundaries of experience." curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man
CHAPTER 51: MAN
boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even admire a grand natural scene," as an indication
sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the that the ape totally lacked human reason or
lower animals. They are also capable of some intellect, however acute his animal intelligence.
inherited improvement, as we see in the domes- But the writers who agree that man is radically
tic dog compared with the wolf or jackal. If it differentfrom the brutes do not all agree in the
could be proved that certain high mental pow- account they give of human reason; nor do they
ers, such as the formation of general concepts, all affirm free will as the natural accompaniment
guage." Such a view clearly nation, but, he says, "brutes abstract not.
takes the position . . .
that man varies from other animals in the same The power of abstracting is not at all in them."
way that one species of animal varies from an- This power of having"general ideas is that which
other. puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and
Those who take the opposite position do not brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties
always agree on the precise nature of the differ- of brutes do by no means attain to." But Locke
ence in kind. For the most part, they attribute denies that man has free will in the sense of a
rationality to man alone and use the word free choice among alternatives. Rousseau, on
"brute" to signify that other animals totally
all the other hand, declares that "every animal has
lack reason, no matter how acute their intelli- ideas . . and it is only in degree that man dif-
.
gence or the apparent sagacity of their instinc- fers, in this respect, from the brute. ... It is
With sanctity of reason, might erect ness of this liberty that the spirituality of his
His stature, and upright with front serene soul is displayed."
Govern the rest, self-knowing, and from thence
James agrees with Locke that "it is probable
Magnanimous to correspond with heaven.
that brutes neither attend to abstract charac-
Those who find a difference in kind between ters nor have associations by similarity," but it
man and other animals also tend to think that is the latter fact which James himself makes the
human society and human language are essen- principal distinction between man and brute.
tially different
from the beehive or the ant "We may," he asserts, "consider it
proven that
mound, from bird jungle cries, or parrot-
calls, the most elementary single difference between
ing, because they are the work or expression of the human mind and that of brutes lies in this
reason. Unlike Darwin, some of them find in deficiency on the brute's part to associate ideas
human speech not the cause of man's apparent by similarity." James enumerates "other clas-
difference in kind from other animals, but the sical differentiae of man besides that of
being the
consequence of his real difference in kind his only reasoning animal." Man has been called,
distinctive rationality. The fact that man does he says, "the laughing animal" and "the talking
certain things that no other animal does at all animal," but these distinctive traits, like hu-
means to them that man possesses certain pow- man reasoning, James regards as "consequences
ers which no other animal shares to any degree, of his unrivalled powers ... to associate ideas
even the slightest. They would therefore inter- by similarity."
pret Darwin's admission that an anthropoid ape Reason and speech are for James the effects,
could not fashion "a stone into a tool" or "fol- where for Adam Smith they are the cause, of
low a train of metaphysical reasoning, or solve a man's peculiarly human attributes. "The pro-
mathematical problem, or reflect on God, or pensity to truck, barter, and exchange one
THE GREAT IDEAS
thing for another," Smith writes, is "common velopments signify the possession by man of
to all men, and to be found in no other race of powers which set him apart as
special different
animals." This seems to him to be a "necessary in fynd. While admitting extraordinary differ-
consequence of the faculties of reason and ences between the behavior or accomplishments
speech" which are peculiar to man. Hobbes, as of men and other animals, this view does not re-
we shall see presently, takes still another posi- ject the possibility that such accomplishments
tion, since he explains man's reasoning power in may represent merely wide differences in de-
terms of his faculty of speech, a faculty which is gree of power, which give the appearance of
possessed by no other animal. differences in kind.
they agree even with writers like Plato, Aris- purely spiritual being, who merely inhabits or
totle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, uses a physical body, no theory of human na-
Kant, and Hegel who hold, as they most defi- ture doubts that man, as a living organism, pos-
nitely do not, that man has a special faculty of sesses in common with plants and animals cer-
mind, reason, or intellect. The
contradictory tain bodily powers or functions. The vegetative
position is, therefore, not to be found in the functions which Galen calls "the natural facul- ,
denial of some particular theory of reason, but ties" are indispensable to human as to all other
rather in the denial that any faculty or attri- forms of corporeal life. Similarly, the powers of
bute which man possesses warrants our calling sensitivity and appetite or desire are obviously
him "rational" and other animals "brute." present inman as in other animals. To the ob-
server,who sees only the externals of human
THE ISSUE is sharply drawn between these con- and animal behavior, men and the higher ani-
tradictory positions. Yet it is avoided by those mals appear to react to the physical stimulation
who go no further than to see in human civiliza- of their sense organs with a similar repertoire of
tion certain distinctive features, such as the arts bodily movements, which vary only as their
and sciences, or law, government, and religion. and their organs of locomo-
skeletal structure
Mill, for example, discussing the sentiment of tion differ. They also manifest outward signs of
justice, finds
its root in the natural impulse "to inner emotional disturbance sufficiently similar
resent, and to repel or retaliate, any harm done to warrant treating emotions like fear and rage
or attempted against ourselves, or against those as common to men and other animals.
with whom we sympathise common to all
. . . On all this there seems to be little dispute in
animal nature." Man differs from other ani- the tradition of the great books. But difficult
mals, he writes, "first, in being capable of questions arise when the inner significance of
sympathising, not solely with their offspring, these external movements is considered. Both
or, like some of the more noble animals, with men and animals have the familiar sense organs
some superior animal who is kind to them, but and such powers as touch, taste, smell, hearing,
with all human and even with all sentient be- and vision. But do sensations give rise to knowl-
thought is attributed to man, for animal and a triple parting of the ways. After sniffing along
human sense perception, imagination, or even the first and second paths and discovering no
emotion may be incommensurable if a special trace of the scent, the hound, without a mo-
factor of understanding or reason enters into all ment's hesitation or sniffing, takes up the pur-
human experience and is
totally absent from suit along the third trail. This, Montaigne sug-
that of animals. gests, is a kind of syllogizing; as if the dog rea-
In the ancient and mediaeval periods, the sen- soned thus with himself: "1 have followed my
sitive faculty, including the interior sensitive master by foot to this place; he must, of neces-
powers of memory and imagination, is generally sity, be gone by one of these three ways; he is
distinguished from another faculty, variously not gone this way nor that; he must then in-
called "intellect," "reason," or "mind." Writers be gone this other."
fallibly
like Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Lucretius, Au- It is noteworthy that Aquinas tells
exactly
gustine, and Aquinas have different conceptions the same story in order to make the point that
of intellect or mind, in itself and in its relation such appearances of reasoning in animals can be
to sense and imagination, but they do not ques- explained as instinctively determined conduct.
tion its existence as a separate faculty. The range "In the works of irrational animals," he writes,
of the sensitive powers does not extend to ideas "we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far
or intelligible objects, nor is sensitive memory as they have a natural inclination to set about
or imagination for them the same as rational their actions in amost orderly manner through
thought. being ordained by the supreme art. For which
Not only does it seem unquestionable in the reason, too, certain animals are called prudent
ancient and mediaeval tradition that man has or sagacious; and not because they reason or
these two distinct faculties of knowledge, but it exercise any choice about things." That such
is
generally assumed that other animals have to behavior is not the work of reason, he claims,
a greater or less degree, the power of the senses "is clear from the fact that all that share in one
alone. Only men can understand as well as per- nature invariably act in the same way."
ceive; only men can know the universal as well Unlike Montaigne, Machiavelli seems to im-
as the particular; only men can think about ob- ply that men and brutes are alike not in having
which are neither reason, but in lacking it. The
jects sensible nor, strictly, passions control
imaginable objects such as atoms and God, the behavior. Intelligence exhibits itself largely as
infinite and the eternal, or the intellect itself. craft orcunning in gaining ends set by the pas-
The affirmation of an essential difference be- sions. Man is no less the brute in essence be-
tween reason and sense seems to be inseparable cause in the jungle of society he often succeeds
from the affirmation of an essential difference by cunning rather than by force. He may have
between men and brutes. more cunning than the fox, but without armor
he also has strength than the lion. The
less
DOUBTS OR DENIALS with regard to both affir- prince, Machiavelli remarks, "being compelled
mations achieve considerable prevalence in knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose
modern times. But though the two affirmations the lion and the fox, because the lion cannot
appear inseparable, they are not always denied defend himself against snares and the fox can-
together. Montaigne, for example, does not so not defend himself against wolves."
much doubt that men have reason as he does For the most part, however, the modern dis-
that other animals lack it. He considers the mat- sent from the ancient and mediaeval view takes
ter in the light of external evidences, in terms the form of denying that reason and sense are
of the comparable performances of men and distinct powers. In its most characteristic ex-
animals. The light of reason seems to shine in pression, this denial is
accompanied by a denial
both. of abstract ideas as in the writings of Hobbes,
He repeats many stories from Plutarch and Berkeley, and Hume. Their position, discussed
Pliny which supposedly reveal the comparable more fully in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND
mentality of animals and men. One is the story PARTICULAR, is that men only" give the appear-
THE GREAT IDEAS
ance of having abstract or general ideas because But if custom and instinct underlie the ap-
they employ common names which have gen- pearance of reasoning in both men and animals,
eral significance. it may be asked, says Hume, "how it happens
Language, according to Hobbes, is the root that men so much surpass animals in reasoning,
of all other differences between man and brute. and one man so much surpasses another?" His
Sense and imagination are "common to man and answer seems to be entirely in terms of degree
beast." Reasoning, or the "train of thoughts," of the same factors. The same sort of difference
can take place in any animal which has memory which obtains between a superior and an infe-
and imagination. But that type of understand- rior intelligence among men obtains between
ment that "by the help of speech and method, bles on the characteristics of human mentality is
the same faculties" which belong to both men offered by him same point. But
in proof of the
and beasts "may be improved to such a height to those who think that man alone has an intel-
as to distinguish men from all other living crea- lect or a rational faculty, over and above all his
tures," would seem to imply that Hobbes re- sensitive powers, such evidence remains incon-
gards man as superior to other animals only in clusive. As in the case of the dog, whose behav-
degree. Yet, on the other hand, he enumerates ior Aquinas and Montaigne interpret different-
a variety of institutions peculiar to human life, ly, the same observed facts seem to be capable
such as religion, law, and science, which imply a of quite opposite explanation by those who hold
difference in kind. opposite theories of human and animal intelli-
Like Hobbes, Berkeley thinks that men use gence.
general names butdo not have general or ab-
But he seems much less willing than
stract ideas. Is THERE INTERNAL evidence, obtained from
Hobbes to assert man's clear superiority, even man's introspective experience of his own
on the basis of man's attainments through the thought, which can resolve the controversy ? As
power of speech. If the fact that "brutes ab- Descartes sees it, the interpretation of such
Locke, "be made
stract not," he says in reply to evidence also seems to depend on the prior
the distinguishing property of that sort of ani- assumption one makes about the sameness or
mals, I fear a great many of those that pass for difference of men and btutes.
men must be reckoned into their number." "Wecannot help at every moment experi-
Hume goes further than either Berkeley or encing within us that we think," he writes; "nor
Hobbes. Agreeing with them that man has no can anyone infer from the fact that it has been
faculty above sense and imagination, and hence shown that the animate brutes can discharge all
no faculty which animals do not also possess, he these operations entirely without thought, thdt
alone explicitly draws the conclusion which that he therefore does not think; unless it be that
implies. having previously persuaded himself that his
"Animals as well as men," he writes, "learn actions are entirely like those of the brutes, just
many things from experience and infer that the because he has ascribed thought to them, he
same events will always follow from the same were to adhere so pertinaciously to these very
1
causes." Such inferences, in animals or men, are words, 'men and brutes operate in the same way,
not "founded on any process of argument or that when it was shown to him that the brutes
reasoning." They are the result of the operation did not think, he preferred to divest himself of
of custom and instinct. "Were this doubtful that thought of his of which he could not fail
with regard to men, it seems to admit of no to have an inner consciousness, rather than to
question with regard to the brute creation; and alter his opinion that he acted in the same way
the conclusion being once firmly established in as the brutes."
the one, we have a strong presumption, from all On the other hand, Descartes continues, those
the rules of analogy, that it ought to be univer- who hold "that thoughtis not to be
distinguished
sally admitted, without any exception or re- from bodily motion, will with much better rea-
serve." son conclude that it is the same thing in us and
CHAPTER 51: MAN
in them, since they notice in them all corporeal man than hand and foot and eyes are parts of
movements as in us; they will add that a differ- the whole living creature."
ence merely ofgreater and less makes no difference So far as his having this special faculty is con-
to the essence, and will infer that, though per- cerned, man is set apart. But for Lucretius noth-
chance they think that there is less reason in the ing exists except atoms and void. Consequently,
beasts than in us, our minds are of exactly the "the nature of the mind and soul is bodily,"
same species." consisting of "seeds exceedingly round and ex-
ceedingly minute, in order to be stirred and set
THE ISSUE concerning the senses and the rea- in motion by a small moving power." In his
longs primarily to the chapter on SOUL, and cartes conceives man as a union of two sub-
also to the chapter on MIND. But like the issue stances. "I possess a body," he writes, "with
about sense and bearing on the
intellect, its which I am
very intimately conjoined, yet be-
problem of man's nature deserves brief com- cause, on the one side, I have a clear and dis-
ment here. tinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a
The question is not whether man has a soul, thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the
but whether only man has a soul; a rational other,I possess a distinct idea of
body as it is
soul; a soul which is, in whole or in part, imma- only an extended and unthinking thing, it is
terial; a soulcapable of separate existence from certain that this I (that is to say, my soul
by
the body; an immortal soul. If soul is conceived which I am what I am), is entirely and abso-
as the principle of life in all living organisms lutely distinct from my body and can exist
docs not distinguish man from plants or ani- hunger, thirst, etc." lead Descartes to add: "I
mals. If, furthermore, the rational soul is am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a
distinguished from the sensitive and vegeta- vessel, but ... I am very closely united to it,
tive soul in the same way that men are distin- and so to speak so intermingled with it that I
guished from brute animals and plants, namely, seem to compose with it one whole."
by reference to certain powers, such as intel- Only man has a dual nature, thus compound-
lect and will, then the statement that men ed. Other living things, Descartes seems to hold,
alone have rational souls would seem to add are merely bodies, having the structure and op-
nothing to the statement that men alone are eration of complex machines. If, like the "auto-
rational. mata or moving machines made by the in- . . .
cal things,even further than the special power ing that they were not of the same nature as
of reason separates him from the brutes. The those animals."
ing principle of life, [and] is no less part of the this one factor which makesjt impossible for a
8 THE GREAT IDEAS
machine to imitate human speech and action. thermore, of all the parts or powers of the soul,
It is this one factor which also requires man's thinking seems to Aristotle to afford "the most
soul, unlike that of the brute, to be an incor- probable exception" to the rule that "all the
affections of soul involve
poreal substance. body."
Unlike sensations and passions,acts of thought Apart from thinking, "there seems to be no
and will, according to Descartes, cannot be func- case," he says, "in which the soul can act or be
tions of bodily organs. "Even though I were to acted upon without involving body." Whereas
grant," he says, "that thought existed" in dogs the sensitive powers are seated in bodily organs
and apes, "it would in nowise follow that the and cannot act except as bodily functions, the
human mind was not to be distinguished from intellectis immaterial. It has no
bodily organ
the body, but on the contrary rather that in which comparable to the eye as the organ of
is
other animals also there was a mind distinct vision and the brain as the organ of memory and
from their body." When Descartes affirms man's imagination. The act of understanding is not a
affirming that of all things man alone is "formed single substance, composite of correlative prin-
of body and soul" not a corporeal soul, but a ciples of being matter and form, or body and
spiritual substance. The angels, in contrast, are soul. But man differs from all other physical
simply spirits. substances which are similarly composite in that
The remark of Plotinus, that
"humanity is he has a faculty and mode of activity separate
poised mid way bet ween the gods and the beasts," from matter. In the later development of this
applies with somewhat altered significance to the theory by Aquinas, the immateriality of the in-
Cartesian view. But there are other concep- tellect becomes the basis for arguing that the
human constitution which, though
tions of the rational soul of man can exist apart from matter
they preserve the sense of man's dual nature, when the composite human substance is dis-
in the order of nature by conferring on him immortality of the soul. We are not here con-
alone participation in the divine mind. "The cerned, however, with the various arguments
human mind," he writes, "is a part of the infi- and their merits, but only with the fact that
nite intellect of God." The human body, on certain conceptions of man's constitution at-
the other hand, is "a mode which expresses in a tribute to man something more than the power
certain and determinate manner the essence of of rationality, namely, the distinction of having
God in so far as He is considered as the thing ex- a spiritual and immortal life.
theory, the soul is not a substance in its own immortal soul, man
belongs to eternity as well
right, but the substantial form of an organic as to time. Henot merely a transient charac-
is
body. This is true of all kinds of souls whether ter in the universe. His stature and his dignity
of plants, animals, or men. But when Aristotle are not the same when man regards himself as
enumerates the various powers which living completely dissolvable into dust.
things possess such as "the nutritive, the ap- The question of man's past or origin is, per-
petitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the haps, even more bearing on man's
critical in its
power of thinking" he assigns to man alone, present status. Ancient poetry and history con-
or "possibly another order like man or superior tain many myths of man's kinship with the
to him, the power of thinking, i.e., mind." Fur- gods. The heroes trace their lineage back to the
CHAPTER 51: MAN
gods. Through them or through the progenitors firstquestion, the evidence favored the affirma-
of the race, man conceives himself as of divine tion of a difference in kind, that would not en-
descent or, at least, as having more affinity with tail the denial of biological evolution, though it
the immortal gods than with all other earth- would necessarily challenge the Darwinian the-
bound things. ory of how such evolution took place. One al-
In the Descent of Man, Darwin paints a dif- ternative to the Darwinian hypothesis is the
ferent picture of human origin. Two proposi- theory of emergent evolution, according to
tions determine its
general outlines. The first, which lower forms of life may give rise to new
already stated, is that man belongs to the ani- organic forms which are not only higher but
mal kingdom without any differentiation ex- are distinct in kind.
cept in degree. Not only in anatomy, physiol- Whether or not Christian theology and some
ogy, and embryology are there marks of man's theory of biological evolution can be reconciled,
affinity with the mammals; man's behavior and there seems to be an inescapable contradiction
mentality also show, according to Darwin, that between Darwin's view of man's origin and the
man possesses no attribute so peculiarly human Judaeo-Christian conception of man as a special
that some trace of it cannot be found in the creation, special above all in the sense that "God
new species of plants or animals have originated his intellectual nature." In all creatures "there
by descent with variation from a common an- is some kind of likeness to God," but it is
only
cestor. This theory of the origin of species is dis- in man that that likeness is an image. Man's
cussed in the chapter on EVOLUTION. Its special finitude, imperfection,and corporeal existence
application to the human species involves the make the image a remote resemblance; yet, ac-
notion of a common ancestor for both man cording to the theologians, it is precisely that
and the anthropoid apes, and the disappearance likeness which separates man from all other
not only of the ancestral form, but of the inter- earthly creatures and places him in the com-
mediate varieties the so-called "missing links" pany of the angels.
in the chain of variation. But man is no more an angel than he is a
These two propositions are logically interde- brute. He is separated from the one by his body
pendent. If the proposition is false that man as from the other by his reason. Nor docs he in
from other animals only in degree, the
differs the present life have the spiritual existence of a
proposition cannot be true that man originated disembodied and immortal soul. To these three
along with the anthropoid apes by descent from negatives in the definition of man not an an-
a common ancestor. Conversely, if the Darwin- gel, not a brute, not a soulthe Christian theo-
ian theory of man's origin is true, it cannot be logian adds a fourth, drawn from man's past.
true that men and brutes differ in kind. But Man is of the race begotten by Adam, but he
though the truth of each of these two proposi- does not have the attributes which Adam pos-
tions implies the truth of the other, the prob- sessed before the fall.
lem of the difference between man and other The dogma of man's fall from grace is dis-
animals has a certain logical priority over cussed in the chapter on SIN. Here we are con-
the problem of man's origin, simply because cerned only with its implications for the under-
more evidence is available to solve it. That ques- standing of man's present nature, as not only
tion calls for an examination of man as he is to- being deprived of the extraordinary gifts of
day in comparison with other extant species; life and knowledge which Adam lost through
whereas the other question necessarily requires disobedience, but as also being wounded in
the collection and interpretation of historical perpetuity by Adam's sin. Weakness, ignorance,
evidence, which may have some bearing on hy- malice, and concupiscence, Aquinas declares,
pothetical missing links. "are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of
It should be added that if, in regard to the human nature as a result of 'our first parent's
10 THE GREAT IDEAS
sin."Man in the world is not only disinherited seems to have significance for the theory of hu-
from Adam's gifts, but with the loss of grace, he man society and the history of civilization. That
also suffers, according to Aquinas, a diminution is the division of men into groups, sometimes
in "his natural inclination to virtue." by reference to physical and mental traits which
separate one race from another whether these
THERE ARE OTHER divisions in the realm of man, traits are supposed to be determined biologi-
but none so radical as that between Eden and cally as inheritable racial characteristics or are
the world thereafter. As retold by Plato, the attributed to environmental influences; some-
ancient myths of a golden age when men li ved times by reference to the customs and ideals of
under the immediate benevolence of the gods a culture. Both sets of criteria appear to be used
also imply a condition of mankind quite differ- in the traditional discussion of the opposition
ent from the observable reality, but they do between Greek and barbarian, Jew and gentile,
not imply a decline in human nature itself with European and Asiatic.
society considers only the external circum- their being asked. The answer may be that man
stances of human life and does not divide man is the measure of all things; that he is sufficient
according to two conditions of his soul. Other unto himself or at least sufficient for the station
dichotomies such as that between prehistoric he occupies and the part he plays in the struc-
and historic man, or between primitive and ture of the universe. The answer may be that
civilized man are even less radical, for they man is not a god overlooking the rest of nature,
deal even more in gradations or degrees of the or even at home environment of time
in the
same external conditions. and space, but rather that he is a finite and de-
These considerations lead us to another phase pendent creature aware of his insufficiency, a
of man's thinking about man. Where the pre- lonely wanderer seeking something greater than
vious problem was how man differs from every- himself and this whole world. Whatever answer
born, and to what extent are they the result of Man, is "a
writes Pascal, nothing in compari-
individual acquirement in the course of life? son with the Infinite, an All in comparison with
The range of human differences, whether in- the Nothing, a mean between nothing and ev-
nate or acquired, may itself become the basis erything. Since he is infinitely removed from
for a division of men into the normal and the comprehending the extremes, the end of things
abnormal, a division which separates the feeble- and their beginning are hopelessly hidden from
minded and the insane from the competent and him in an impenetrable equally in-
secret; he is
sane. From a moral and political point of view, capable of seeing the Nothing from which he
this is perhaps the most fundamental of all clas- was made, and the Infinite in which he is
sifications. It must be admitted, however, that swallowed up.
problem of the difference be-
traditionally the "Man," Pascal goes on, "must not think that
tween men and women and the problem of the he is on a level either with the brutes or with
difference between the ages of man from the the angels, nor must he be ignorant of both
extreme of infancy to the extreme of senility but he must know both." In
sides of his nature;
seem to have exercised more influence on the recognizing both lies his wretchedness and gran-
determination of political status and moral re- deur. "Man knows that he is wretched. He is
One other differentiation of man from man really greater because he knows it."
CHAPTER 51: MAN 11
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Definitions of man: conceptions of the properties and qualities of human nature 13
ic. The conception of man as an animal, differing only in degree of intelligence and
of other qualities possessed by other animals
2b. The sciences of human nature: anthropology and psychology; rational and
empirical psychology; experimental and clinical psychology
(4) The place of psychology in the order of sciences: the study of man as pre-
30. Man as a unity or conjunction of matter and spirit, body and soul, extension
and thought
3#. Comparisons of man with God or the gods, or with angels or spiritual substances 20
4. The analysis of human nature into its faculties, powers, or functions: the id, ego, and
super-ego in the structure of the psyche
40. Man's vegetative powers: comparison with similar functions in plants and
animals 21
4#. Man's sensitive and appetitive powers: comparison with similar functions in
other animals
5. The order and harmony of man's powers and functions: contradictions in human
nature; the higher and lower nature of man
50. Cooperation or conflict among man's powers 24
jc. Cultural differences among men: Greek and barbarian, Jew and gentile, European
and Asiatic 30
ga. The mylh of a golden age: the age of Kronos and the age of Zeus
gb. The Christian doctrine of Eden and of the history of man in the world 32
(1) The condition of man in Eden: the preternatural powers of Adam
(2) The condition of man in the world: fallen man; corrupted or wounded
human nature
(3) The Christian view of the stages of human life in the world: law and grace 33
gc. Secular conceptions of the stages of human life: man in a state of nature and in
society; prehistoric and historic man; primitive and civilized man
i CM?. The fmiteness and insufficiency of man: his sense of being dependent and
ordered to something beyond himself
ice. Man's comparison of himself with other creatures and with the universe as a
whole 36
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
:
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-H9b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
:
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
33] 217d-218a; [687*4-10] 218c-d / Generation in, PROP 57 414d-415b; PART iv, PROP 35,
of Animals, BK n, CH 6 [744*27-31] 285c / SCHOL 433d-434a; PROP 37, SCHOL 1-2 434d-
b
Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [io97 2 3-1098*7] 343a-b; 436a passim
en 13 [1102*27-1103*3] 347d-348c; BK in, en 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vii [449-549] 227a-
2 [nu b 6 12] 357b-c; BK vn, CH i [1145*15 33] 229a; BK vm [369-451] 240a-242a; BK ix
a b
395a-b; CH 3 [ii47 25- 5l 397c-d; BK ix, CH [549-566] 259b; BK xn [63-110] 320b-321b
423d-424a; BK x, CH 7 [1177^6- 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 140 199a-b; 339-348 233a-
ft
9 [i i70 i6 -i 8]
b
ii78' 8] 432c;
l
CH 8 [i i78 23-27] 433c / Politics, 234a; 418 243a
b
BK i, CH 2 [1253*1-39] 446b-d; CH 5 [i254 i5- 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en vi, SECT 56-63
25] 448b; BK vn, CH 13 [1332*39^7] 537a-b; 36d-38c; CH xiv, SECT 163-164 63a-c / Human
b
CH 15 [i334 i2-28] 539c-d Understanding, BK n, en xi, SLCT JQ--II 145d-
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; 146a; en xxvn, SUCT 8 221a-222a; SECT 12
en 6 110c-112b; CH 9 114c-116b; CH 16 121d- 223a-b; BK in, CH vi, SECT 26-27 274d-276a;
122d; en 28, 134a-d; BK n, CH 8, 146a-147a; CH x, SECT 17 295d 296b; CH xi, SECT 20
BK in, CH 7, 183c-184a; BK iv, CH i 213a- 304c-d
223d; CH 5, 228c-229b; CH 7, 233a-b 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld-2b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 16 259a; 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338c; 357c-358b
BK in, SECT 1 6 262d-263a,c; BK v, SECT 16 / Social Contract, BK i, 393b-c
271c-d; BK vi, SLCT 23 276b; BK vm, SECT 7 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 6d-7b; 8a-b
286a; SECT 41 288d; BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c / Fund. Prin.
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b esp en 10, Metaphysic of Morals, 264d-265a; 279b,d;
5a / Third Ennead, TR in, CH 4 94c-95c / Sixth 281c-282c / Practical Reason, 291a-293b; 316c-
Ennead, TR vii, CH 4-6 323c-325a 31 7a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xin, par 12 378b-c / Science of Right, 400b,d-402a esp
113b-d; par 35-37 120b-121a / City of God, 401b-402a; 420d-421a /Judgement, 584d-585c
BK v, CH n 216c-d; BK vii, CH 23, 256b-c; BK 43 MILL: Liberty, 294a-297b
vm, CH 6, 269a; BK xi, CH 26-28 336d-338d / 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 21
Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 8 626c-627a; CH 17a-c; PART i, par 47 24a-b; PART n, par 132
22 629b-630a 46b-47a; par 139 48d-49b; ADDITIONS, 4
19 AQUINAS: Summa
PART i, Q 3, ATheologica, 116a-d; 10 117d-118a; 22 120c-d; 28 121b; 62
i, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 18, A 2, REP i 105c-106b; 126a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c;
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 10, ANS 117d-118b; 168b-d; 178a-b; 186a; PART i, 257d-258a;
Q 23, A i, ANS and REP 2-3 132c-133b; Q 30, PART in, 304d-305a
A 2, REP 3 168a-169b; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b- 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287b-c; 319b-d;
309a; Q 72, A i, REP 1,3-4 368b-369d; QQ 75- 331b-332a
16 THE GREAT IDEAS \b to \c
7 PLATO: Charmides, 7b-c; 8b-d / Phaedrus, 2b. The sciences of human nature: anthropol-
322b-323b; 388c-389c; 48Sc-486a; 520b 522a 54 FRLUD: Unconscious, 431b-d / General Intro-
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 332b duction, 451a-453a esp 451b-452a / Group
30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 54b-c; 88c- Psychology, 664a 665a / New Introductory
89b Lectures, 864a-868d esp 868b-c; 873c-d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51c-52a /
Meditations, n 77d-81d / Objections and Re- 2^(1) The subject matter and scope of the
science of man
207b; 224b,d; 276b-c
plies,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 19-23 382b- 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH i 631a-632d
383c 19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q 87
Theologica,
33 PASCAL: PensSes, 396-399 240b 464d-468d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-SOb;
SECT 1-8 121a-123a esp SECT 7-8 122c-123a; 54b-c
CH ix, SECT 1-2 138b-c; CH xix 175b-176b; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT
CH xxi, SECT 30 185a-c; CH xxm, SECT 15 1-4 93a-94b
208c-d; SECT 32-33 212c-213a; CH xxvn, 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i 451a-
SECT 9 222a-b; BK iv, CH ix, SECT 2-3 349a-c 455b
35 HUME: Human Understanding SECT i, DIV 8, 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-331d
454a-b; SECT vn, DIV 51-53 472b-474b 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 294a-b / Intro.
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349b-c Metaphysic of Morals, 388b-c / Judgement,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 32a-c; 55a-56c; 99a-101b; 599d-600d esp 600d
121a-123b / Practical Reason, 292d [fn i]; 53IAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 3b-4a; 120a-
307d-310c / Judgement, 599d-600d 121a; 129b; 236a; 825a [fn i]
43 MILL: Liberty, 303b-c 54 FREUD: Unconscious, 428a-429c esp 429b /
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 5 General Introduction, 452a-454b; 467b-d;
13a-c; par 7 14a-c; PART i, par 35 21a-b; 550a-b; 606a / Group Psychology, 664a-665b
ADDITIONS, 5 116d-117a; 22 120c-d; 25 121a / / New Introductory Lectures*, 866a-b
18 THE GREAT IDEAS 2b(2) to 3a
(2b. The sciences of human
nature: anthropology 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 271a-b; 296d /
and psychology; rational and empirical Circulation of the Blood, 321d-322a; 322c-d /
psychology; experimental and clinical psy- On Animal Generation, 431d-432a
chology.) 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 48d-50b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 60b-c; PART
23(2) The methods and validity of psychology vi, 61c / Meditations, vi, 99d / Objections and
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH i 631a-632d; BK 11, Replies, 207d-208a; 209c
CH 4 [415*14-22] 645b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 14 380c; PROP
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [1102*5-25] 16-17 380d-381d; PROP 26, DEMONST 384a-b;
347b-c PART v, PREF 451a-452c; PROP 39 462a-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 87 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338a
464d-468d 42 KANT: Judgement, 538d-539a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvm 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 689c-
[49-60] 80b-c 690a
23 HOBBKS: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d; PART n, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-4a; 7a; 9a-56a esp 9a-b,
163a 52a-53b; 66b-71a passim; 690b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-50b; 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a /
54b-c Unconscious, 429a-b; 431c-d / General Intro-
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 145 duction, 451d-452a; 605b-606b / Inhibitions,
441d-442a; SECT 148 442b-d Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721a / New Intro-
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 8 ductory Lectures, 872c-d
454a-c; SECT ix, DIV 82 487b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 55a-56c; 121a-123b; 2b(4) The place of psychology in the order of
sciences: the study of man as prerequisite
126c d / Practical Reason, 292d [fa i]; 294a-b;
for other studies
307d-310c I Judgement, 599d-600d
43 FLDERALIST: NUMBER 79, 234b-c 7 PLATO: Charmides, 7b-c; 8b-d / Phaedrus,
52 DOSTOLVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xn, 116c-d / Phaedo, 240d-242b / Republic, BK n,
386c-387d 316a-b; BK iv, 350a-b / Philebus, 629b-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 17b-18b; 56a~66a passim; 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK vi, CH i [1026*
121a-129b esp 126a-129b; 146a; 165a; 235b- 5-6] 548a
236a esp 236b [fn i]; 259a-b; 822b; 825a [fn i] 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [1102*5-25]
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 347b-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [1356*21-29] 595d
Analysis, 13c-14a / Unconscious, 429b-c; 434c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d
/ General Introduction, 451d-452a; 548a-550c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 69d-70c; 259a-260b;
esp 550a-b; 606a-b / Beyond the Pleasure 308c-d
Principle, 639a-b; 661c-662b / Ego and Id, 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 443b
706d-707a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51c~52a /
Meditations, n 77d-81d / Objections and Re-
2b(3) The relation of psychology to physiol- 207b
plies,
ogy: the study of organic factors in 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 66 180b; 144-146 200b
human behavior 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-242b / Timaeus, 474b- 93a-95d
475d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 7-8
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [246b20- 453c-454c
248*8] 330a-d / Soul, BK i, en i [40^2^19] 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-330b
632a-d; BK n, CH i 642a-643a; CH 9 [42^22- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c esp Ib-d / Practi-
b
26] 653b; BK in, CH 4 [429*28- 4] 661c-d; CH 9 cal Reason, 307d-310c; 331a-332d I Judgement,
b
[432 26-433*i] 665c / Sleep 696a-701d esp 511a-512a; 599d-600d
CM i 696a-697c / Dreams 702a-706d passim, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 4 12d-
esp CH 2 703a-704d 13a; par 19 16d-17a
9 ARISTOTLE: Pans of Animals, BK n, CH 4 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 868b d;
b
175b-176a; CH 7 [653 i~7] 178d-179a; BK in, 874a-c; 883c-d
CH 6 [669*18-20] 197c; BK iv, CH 10 [686b22-
b 3. The constitution of man
29] 218b-c / Motion ofAnimals, CH 7 [70i i3]-
CH 8 [702*22] 237a~c; CH n
239a~d
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 155d-160d esp 3<*. Man as a unity or conjunction of matter
159a-c and spirit, body and soul, extension and
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of'Things, BK HI [94-829]
thought
31b-40c OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:7
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologiea, PART i, Q 75, A APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:14-15; 15:11
3, REP 3 380c-381b; A 4 381b-382a; Q 76, A 5 (D) OT, Boo^of Wisdom, 9:14-15; 15:11
394c-396a; Q 84, AA 7^8 449b-451b; Q 85, A 7 NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 7:14-23; 8:4-13 /
459c-460b; PART i-n, Q 41, A i, ANS 798b-d / Corinthians, 15:36-49
3* /o 30(2) CHAPTER 51: MAN 19
7 PLATO: Cratyluf, 93b-d / Phaedrus, 124b-d / 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229b 230a; 270b;
Phaedo, 231b-234c / Republic, BK in, 338a- 277a-b
339a / Timaeus, 453b-c / Laws, BK v, 686d- 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 198a-c
687c 42 KANT: Judgement, 557c-558b
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BKVII, CH 10 [i(>35 b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 47-48
13-32] 559a-b; BK vm, CH 3 [1043*29^4! 24a-c; ADDITIONS, 2 115d
567d; CH 6 569d-570d; BK XH, CH 10 [1075** 53 JAMES: Psychology, la-4a esp 2b-3a, 4a; 84a-
34-37] 606d / Soul, BK i,
CH i Uo3 2-b i9]
ft
93b esp 88a-90b; 116a-119b; 130a; 139a-140a;
b b
632a-d; CH 5 [4io io-i6] 640c; U" 5-i8] 208a-b; 221a-226a esp 221a-222b, 225b-226a
641 c-d; BK ii, CH 1-2 642a-644c 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 5 [i254a33~b7]
448a
Man as a pure spirit: a soul or mind
using a body
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [94-176]
31b-32b; [370-395] 34d-35a 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93b-d / Phaedrus, 124b-126c
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; / Meno, 179d-180b / Phaedo, 231b-234c;
BK iv, CH ii, 240d-241b 250a-d / Timaeus, 452d-454a
12 AURELIUS Meditations, BK iv, SECT 21 265b-c;
: 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK iv, CH 11, 240d-
BK vn, SECT 55 283b-c; BK ix, SECT 8 292b; 241a
BK xii, SECT 30 310a-b 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [724-751] 230b-231a
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 29a-b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b esp CH
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b / Second 5-7 2d-4a / Second Ennead, TR i, CH 5, 37c
Ennead, TR i, CH 5, 37c / Fourth Ennead, TR / Third Ennead, TR iv, CH 2 97d-98a / Fourth
HI, CH 19-23 151d-154b esp CH 20 152b 153a; Ennead, TR vn, CH i 191c-d / Sixth Ennead,
TR vii, CH i 191c-d; CH 8, 197c-198b / Sixth TR vn, CH 4-6 323c 325a
Ennead, TR vn, CH 4-6 323c-325a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xm, en 16 367a-
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH n, 216c; d; CH 19 369c-370c
BK ix, CH 8-17 289d-295c passim; BK x, CH 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 29,
29 316d-318b; BK xm, CH 16 367a-d; CH 19 A i, REP 5 162a-163b; Q 75, A 4 381b-382a; Q
369c-370c; BK xiv, CH 2-3 377a-378d; CH 5 76, A i, ANS 38Sd-388c; A 4, ANS 393a-394c;
379c-380b A 7, ANS 396d-397d; Q 118, A 3, ANS 603b-604b
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A i,
: 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
REP 2 34d-35c; A 2, REP 2 35c-36b; QQ 75^76 Q 79, A i, ANS and REP 4 951b-953b
378a-399b; Q 118, A 2, ANS and REP 2 601c- 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51c-52a;
603b; A 3, ANS 603b-604b; Q 119, A i, ANS PART v, 60b-c / Meditations, n 77d-81d; vi,
604c-607b; PART I-H, Q 4, A 5, REP 2 632c- 98c-d / Objections and Replies, 119d-120a;
634b; Q 17, A 4, ANS and REP 3 688d-689c DEF vi-vn 130c-d; DEF x 130d; PROP iv 133c;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 2, 135d-136b; 152d; 155c-156a; 207d-208a
A i, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c; A 5 715a~716b; 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 2 396c-398b;
Q 17, A 2, REP 4 808d-809d; PART HI SUPPL, PART v, PREF 451a-452c
Q 79, A I-Q 80, A 2 951b-958b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv xxvii, SECT 6-8 220c-222a esp SKCT 8, 221d-
[34-78] 91d-92a 222a; SECT 21 225d-226a; SECT 28-29 228a-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 311a-b; 432 b-d; 538a- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b;
543a,c SECT 89 430b-c; SECT 135-142 440a-441c;
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-49c SECT 148 442b-d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 5ld-52a; 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 186a-b
PART v, 60b-c / Meditations, 11 77d-81d; vi, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 35
98c-99a; 99d-100a / Objections and Replies, 21a-b; par 47 24a-b; ADDITIONS, 5 116d-117a;
119d-120a; DBF vi-vn 130c-d; DBF x 130d; 22 120c-d; 25 121a; 28 121b / Philosophy of
PROP iv 133c; 135d-136b; 152b,d-156a; History, PART in, 310d
170b c; 207d 208a; 209c; 224d 225d; 231a- 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 28a; 380b-381a
232d; 248 b; 276b-c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 295b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART u, PROP 10-13 376c- 53 IAMES: Psychology, 220b-226a
378c; PART HI, PROP 2 396c-398b; PART v,
PREF 451a-452c Man's spirituality as limited to his im-
material powers or functions, such as
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 512 262a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH HI,
reason and will
SECT 4, 113b; BK n, CH xxvii, SECT 6-8 220c- 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 4 [408^8-29] 638c;
CH b b
222a esp SECT 8, 221d-222a; SECT 15 224b-c; 5 [4ii i3-i8] 641c-d; BK n, CH 2 [4i3 24-
SECT 21 225d-226a; SECT 27-29 227d-228c; 29] 643d-644a; BK in, CH 4-5 661b-662d
BK iv, CH in, SECT 6 313c-315b passim 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vii, DIV REP 2 31d-32c; Q 29, A i, REP 5 162a-163b; Q
52 472c-473c 75, A 2 379c-380c; AA 5-6 382a-384c; Q 76
20 THE GREAT IDEAS Ibto 4
119a; BK iv [358-393] 160a-161a; BK v [388-
(da. Man as a unity or conjunction of matter and BK vi
450] 183b-185a; [469-505] 185b-186a;
spirit, body and soul, extension and thought. [320-353] 203a-204a; BK x [888-908] 293b-
3a(2) Man's spirituality as limited to his 294a
immaterial powers or functions, such as 33 PASCAI- Pcnsees, 140 199a b; 418 243a
reason and will.) 35 LOCKE- Human Understanding, BK n, CH x,
385c-399b passim; Q 77, A 5 403d-404c; Q 78, SECI 9 143a-c; CH xxm, SECT i \ 207d-208b,
A i, ANS 407b-409a; Q 79 413d-427a; Q 80, A 2 BK iv, CH in, SECT 17 317c; si-cr 2^ 320a c
428a-d; QQ 82-83 431d-440b; Q 84, A i, ANS 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECI 81
and REP i 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 428c-d
6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 85, A i, ANS 451c-453c; 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 394a
Q 86, A i, REP 3 461c-462a; Q 87, A i, REP 3 42 KANT Pure Reason, 33a-d / Practical Reason,
465a-466c; Q 91, A i, ANS and REP i 484a- 350c-351b
485b; Q 96, A 2 511b-d; Q 98, A i, ANS 516d- 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [482-517] 14a-b; [602-
517c; Q 118, A 2, ANS 601c-603b 736] 16b-19b passim; PART n [8094-8097]
197a
3. Comparisons of man with God or the gods, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 295b-c
or with angels or spiritual substances 53 JAMES: Psychology, 745a
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1.26-27; 5:1-2; 9:6 /
3c*. Man as an organization of matter or as a
Job, 4:16-21 / Psalms, S.^-(D) Psalms, 8:6
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom ofSolomon, 2:23 (D) OT, collocation of atoms
Q 96, A 2 511b-d; QQ 106-107 545c-552b pas- 559d; 575b 578a, 578d-582c; 599d-600d
sim; Q 108, Ai, ANS 552c-553c; A 8 561a-562a; 46 HFCLL Philosophy ofllntory, PART i, 255d
Q 112, \ REP 4 571d-573a, Q 117, A 2, REP 3
i, 51 TOLSIOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689c-
597c 598c; A 3, ANS 598c-599b; Q 118, A 3, 690a
ANS 603b-604b; PART MI, Q 4, A 5, RLP 6 53 JAMKS: Psychology, 95a-119b
632c634b 54 FRKUD: New Introductory Lectures, 829a b
20 AQUINAS' Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
A 6 lla 12a, PART in, Q 6, A 3, REP 2 742a- 4. The analysis of human nature into its facul-
601c-603b; Q 119 604c-608d; PART i-n, Q 17, A 3 8b-9a; P\RT in, Q 2, A 2, RH> 2 711d-712d;
A 8 692a-c Q 18, A 2, ANS Slid 812b; PARI in ST PPL, Q 79,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, A 2, RLP 3 953b-955c
A 3, RKP i 8b-9a; PART in SUPPL, Q 80, A \, 21 DANIE. Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv
ANS and RFP 4-5 959c-963a [34-84] 91d-92b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv 22 CH \UCER: Knight's Tale [1^03-1333] 181b-
[34-8 4 ]91d-92b 182a / Manciple's Tale [17,104-144!
490a-b
24 RABLLAIS: Gargantua and Pantagrucl, BK in, 23 HOBBFS. Leviathan, PARI i, 49a 54c; 61a-c;
143a-144c 64a-c, PMII n, 139a; 141a-b; P\RI iv, 267b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 427d-428b 24 R \BLLAIS. Gargantua and Pantagrnd, BK in,
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 27, 192b-d
158ab 25 MONIAIGNL: Essays, 285c-292d; 424d-425c
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 207a; 27 SHAKLSPLARE. King l^ear, ACT iv, sc vi
244b-c [109-191] 274c-275b
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 256a-257c 28 H \RVEY. On Animal Generation, 347c-d
54 FREUD: Sexual Enlightenment of Children, 121 d 30 BACON: Novum Orgunum, BK n, APII 27,
APH 40, 173c-d
157b-c;
4b. Man's sensitive and appetitive powers: 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19a 20d / Discowse,
comparison with similar functions in PART v, 59a-b / Objection* and Replies, 156a d
other animals 31 SPINOZA' Ethics, PART in, PROP 57, SCHOL
7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 319c-320c; BK iv, 415b
351b-353d / Timaeus, 466a-467d / Theaetetus, 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vm [369-451]
534d-535b / Philebus, 620b-622b / Laws, BK 240a-242a
vn, 715b-c; BK xn, 796a-b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 77-81
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, en 5 [41 1^7-3 1] 641d; 42b-43a / Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix,
BK n, en 2 [4H n2o-b i3] 643b-d; BK n, CH SECT 11-15 140b-141a; CH x 141b-143d pas-
5-BK in, CH 3 647b-661b / Sense and the Sensi- sim, esp SECT 10 143c-d; CH xi, SECT 4-7 144d-
ble 673a-689a,c 145b
22 THE GREAT IDEAS
2 [ii39b i4] 387b-388b; BK vn,
The analysis of human nature into itsfaculties, CH b
3 [ii47 2-5] 397d; BK ix, CH 9 [1170*16-
(4.
powers, orfunctions: the id, ego, and super- 18] 423d-424a; BK x, CH 7-8 431d-434a pas-
ego in the structure of the psyche. 4b. Man's b
sim, esp CH 7 [ii77 26-i 178*8] 432c, CH 8
sensitiveand appetitive powers: comparison b
[ii78 23-3i] 433c / Politics, BK i, en 2 [1253*
with similarfunctions in other animals.) B b
7-18] 446b-c; BK vn, CH 13 [i332 39~ io]
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix 487b- 537a-b; CH 15 [1334^-28] 539b-d / Rhetoric,
488c BK i, CH i [i355 b i-3] 594d
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 147b-148b 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12, 173a-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 331a-b; 337d-338d; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 6 110c-112b;
348d~349c CH BK n, CH 8, 146a-b; CH n
28, 134a-c;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164b-c / Intio. Mctaphysic 150a-151b; BK in,CH 7, 183c-184a; BK iv,
of Morals, 386b-d / Judgement, 479a-d CH 6-7, 231d-233b; CH 7, 234d-235a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 121 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 16 262d-
136c-d 263a,c; BK v, SECT 16 271c-d; BK vi, SECT 23
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 134b-135a; 244a- 276b; BK vni, SECT 7 286a; SECT 41 288d;
245b; 286b-288a; 289b-291a BK ix, SECT 8-9 292b-d; BK xi, SECT i
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 261c-262a; 287d- 302a-b
291c; 294c; 301c-302b; 304a-313a; 568d-571b 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR iv, CH 2 97d-98a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 689c- / Fifth Ennead, TR i, CH 10, 213d-214a
690a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH n 216c-d;
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in, BK vn, CH 23, 256b-c; BK XH, en 23, 357d
54a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 8 626c-627a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 49a-50a; 198b-199b; 702a- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i,
b; 704a-706b; 712b-737a REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; Q 59,
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c-
Analysis, 20a-d / Narcissism, 400c-401d / 396a; Q 78, A i, ANS 407b-409a; A 4, ANS and
Instincts 412a-421a,c esp 413a-415b / General REP 4-6 411d-413d; Q 79 413d-427a; o 80, A 2
Introduction, 569c-585a esp 574a-d, 579b- 428a-d; Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; QQ 82-89 431d-
581c, 584b c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle 480c; Q 96, A 2 511b-d; Q 118, A 2, ANS 601c-
639a-663d esp 640b-c, 647a-648a, 651d- 603b; PART i-n, Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2
654c, 659d-66tc / Ego and Id, 708c-712a esp 673c-674c; Q 15, A 2 682a-c; Q 17, A 2 687d-
708d-709b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anx- 688b
iety, 720b-721a; 737b-738a; 752a / Civiliza- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
tion and Its Discontents, 782a-d [fni]; 784d- A 3, REP 2 8b-9a; AA 4-5 9a-10d
785a / New Introductory lectures, 840a-853b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvm
esp 843d 844c, 846a-850a, 850d-851d [19-75] 80a-c; xxv [34-84] 91d-92b
23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 52b; 53a-b; 54a;
4c. Man's rational powers: the problem of simi-
57d; 59b; 63a; PART n, lOOa-c
lar powers in other animals
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 119b-d; 184a-c
7 PLATO: Laches, 35b-c / Republic, BK in, 338a- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc iv [32-39]
339a; BK iv, 352b-353d / Timaeus, 452c-454a 59a
/ Thcaetettis, 535b-536a / Laws, BK n, 653a-c; 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 427d-428a
BK vii, 723c-d 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 35,
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK v, en 3 [i}2 a i7-22] 163d-164a
183a / Metaphysics, BK i, en i [98ob 25-27J 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19a-20d / Discourse,
499b; BK ix, CH 2 571c-572a; en 5 573a-c; PART i, 41b,d; PART iv, 51d-52a; PART v,
en 7 [1049*5-12] 574c-d / Soul, BK n, CH 3 56a-b; 59c-60b / Meditations, 71b-d; 11 77d-
b
[4i4 i7-2o] 644d; [415*7-12] 645b; BK HI, en 81d / Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 209b-c;
3-8 659c-664d; CH 10 [433*8-13] 665d / Mem- 226a-d
ory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453*5-14] 695b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, AXIOM 2 373d; PART
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i in, PROP 57, SCHOL 415b
b b
[488 2o--27] 9d; BK iv, CH 9 [536 i-8] 63a-b; 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vn [499-528]
BK vin, CH i [588*1 8- b 4] 114b,d / Parts ofAni- 228a-b; BK vin [369-451] 240a-242a; BK ix
mals, BK i, CH i [64^5-10] 164b-c; BK ii, CH 16 [549-566] 259b
h b
[659 28]-cn 17 [66o 3] 186d-187c; BK in, CH 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 339-349 233a-234a; 365 236a
6 [669*18-20] 197c; CH 10 [673*4-10] 201d- / Vacuum, 357a-358a
202a; BK iv, CH 10 [686*25-687^5] 217d-219a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT i
b
/ Generationof Animals, BK v, CH 7 [786 i5- 93a-b; BK i, CH i, SECT i 95b,d-96a; CH in,
22] 328c-d BK i, CH 7 [io97 b 23-io98 a
/ Ethics, SECT 12 115b-116a; SECT 17 117a-c; SECT 23
b
20] 343a-c; CH 13 [no2 i3-i 103*3] 348a-c; 119b-120a; SECT 25 120c-d; BK n, CH vi
BK in, CH 2 [ini b 6-9] 357b; BK vi, CH i 131b-c; en xi 143d-147b esp SECT 8-n 145b-
CHAPTER 51: MAN 23
146a; CH
xxi, SECT 5-6 179c-180a; SECT 15-16 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH i,
181c-182a; CH xxvn, SECT 12 223a-b; BK iv, SECT i 95b,d-96a; CH in, SECT 12 115b-116a;
CH xiv, SECT 3-4 364d-365a; CH xvn, SECT SECT 17 117a-c; SECT 23 119b-120a; SECT 25
1-3 371c-372b 120c-d; BK n, CH xxi, SECT 6 179d-180a;
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV SECT 15-20 181c-183a
62 478b-c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 8,
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld-2b 454b-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338c; 349b-c / 42 KANT: Judgement, 461a-475d esp 466a-c, 474b-
Social Contract, BK i, 393 b-c 475d
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 6d-8b 53 JAMES: Psychology, la-2a; 17b-18b
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 150c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c; 199c-200c / 5. The order and harmony of man's powers
Fund. Prin. Mctaphysic of Morals, 264d-265a; and functions: contradictions in human
nature; the higher and lower nature of
271c-d; 279b; 281c-282c; 284d-285a / Practi-
cal Reason, 303b-d; 316c-317a / Pref. Meta-
man
physical Elements of Ethics, 372a-b / Judge- APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:15 (D) OT,
ment, 465c-467a csp 466a-c; 474b-475d; Boo\ of Wisdom, 9:15
479a-d; 522b; 568c-575b esp 568c-d, 570c- NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 5-8 csp 7:15-25 /
571c, 572b-575b; 584d-585c; 587d-588a; Galatians, 4-5 /James, 4:1-3
602b,d [In i] 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 231b-234c / Republic, BK iv,
43 MILL: Liberty, 294a-297b 350a-355a; BK ix, 421a-427b; BK x, 431b-434a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 4-5 / Timacus, 466a-c / Laws, BK v, 686d-687c
116a-117a; 121 136c-d / Philosophy of History, 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 7 |iog7 b 22-
INTRO, 156c; 168b d; 186a; PART i, 257d- 1098*17] 343a-c; BK vn, CH 6 [1150*1-5] 400c
258a; PART in, 304d-305b 12 EPIC FETUS: Discourses, BK in, en 24 203c-
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 278a-b; 287a-b; 210a; BK iv, CH n 240d-242d
292a-294c; 296c-300a esp 297d-298a, 299b; 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT i 253a;
312a-313a; 319c; 331b-332a; 591d-592a BK in, SECT 6 261a~c; BK iv, SECT 27 266a;
50 MARX: Capital, 8Sa-d SECT 39 267a; BK v, SECT 26 272c; BK vn,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689c- SECT 13 280c; BK ix, SECT i 291a-c; SECT 7-8
690a 292b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 85a b; 184a-187b csp 186a- 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR iv, CH 2 97d 98a
187a; 664a-693b esp 664a-b, 677a-686b, 691a; / fourth Ennead, TR iv, cti 18 166d-167b /
873a Sixth Ennead, TR iv, CH 15, 304c-d
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 363b-364b; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vm, par 10-11,
367b-c; 377c-379c csp 379a-b; 384c-385c / 55d; par 19-24 58b 60a; BK xin, par 12
Unconscious, 429c-d / General Introduction, 113b-d / City of God, BK xi, CH 26-28 336d-
532a 338d; BK xm, CH 3 361a-c; CH 15 366c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77,
4</. The general theory of faculties: the critique AA 4-7 403a-406b; Q 95, A 2 507c 508a;
of faculty psychology PART i -ii, Q 13, A i, ANS 672d-673c; Q 16, A i
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK u, CH 2-3 643a-645b; 684b-d; Q 17, A 4 688d-689c
CH 5 [417*21-418*6] 647d-648d; BK in, CH 9 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 82,
:
12 AURLLIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT i 259b,d 6a. The cause and range of human inequalities:
BK vn [323-405] 245a-247b differences in ability, inclination, tem-
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, perament, habit
A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 33:10-15; 38:24-34
591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; o 10, (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 33:10-15; 38:25-39
A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 24, A 2 727d- NLW TESTAMENT: Romans, 12:3-8 / / Corin-
728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP i 742a-d; Q 31, thians,12/II Timothy, 2:20-21
A 7 757c-758b; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d 4 HOMLR: Iliad, BK xni [723-734] 95d 96a /
23 HOBBLS: Leviathan, PART i, 66d-67b; 68b-d; Odyssey, BK vin [165-185] 223d-224a; BK xiv
69b-c [199-232] 262b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: lOb-llb; 25c-
Essays, 5a-6c; 5 SOPHOCLES. Ajax [1226-1263] 153c-154a
26d; 36c-41a; 166a-167a; 235b c; 274d-276a; 5 EURIPIDES: Rhesus [105-108] 204a / Electra
316b-c [358-400] 330b-d / Heracles Mad [632 636]
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard HI 105a-148a,c 370c / Iphigenia at Aulis [558-572] 429d-
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc v 59c-62a; 430a
ACT [236-255] 70b c / Othello, ACT iv,
v, sc ii 5 ARISTOPHANES: Progs [1482-1499] 581d-582a
sc 229d-230b / King Lear, ACT iv,
i
[1-59] 6 TIIUCYDIDLS: Pcloponncsian War, BK i, 370a-c;
sc iv [1-19] 272b-c; sc vn [16-82] 276d-277c 383d-384a; BK in, 425b-c
/ Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b-307a; sc in [37- 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 70c / Gorgias, 274a-275c
56] 308a-b / Republic, BK n, 316c-320c; BK in, 329c-
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c-d 330a; 339b-341a; BK v, 357b 360d; BK vi,
29 CLRV ANTES: Don Quixote esp PART i, la-3b, 373c-375b; 383c-d; BK vni, 404a-405c; BK ix,
PART ii, 205a-209d 421a-c / Theaetetus, 540c-541a / Statesman,
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 155d- 605d 608a / Laws, BK vi, 699d-700b; 704a-c
156a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d esp 810c
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 60 37d- 8 ARISTOFLE: Categories, CH 8 [8 h 25-9R i3] 13d-
b
38a / Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, ft
14a; [9 9~io io] 14c-15a / Posterior Analytics,
SECT 12-13 146a-c; BK iv, CH iv, SECT 13-16 BK i, CH 34 122c / Memory and Reminiscence,
b
326d-328d esp SECT 13 326d-327a CH i
[449 3~9] 690a; [450*25^12] 691a-c
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 109c 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vn, CH i
b a
621d; BK ii, CH 2 [I378 28-i379 3] 623d- 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en vi, SECT 54 36c
624a; CH 5 [n82 b i9-22] 628d; CH 16-17 638b- / Human BK 11, CH x, SECT 8
Understanding,
n
639a; BK in, CH 7 [i4o8 27~33] 659b-c 142d-143a; CH
SECT 2 144a-c; BK HI, CH
xi,
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 3-7 vi, SECT 26-27 274d-276a
9c-12a; par 10 13b-14a; par 12-24 14b-19a,c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV
/ Epidemics, BK in, SECT in, par 14 59b / 66 480b-c; SECT ix, DIV 84, 488b,d [fn i]
Sacred Disease, 155d-156a 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 191b-192b; 269b-
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [231-322] 273a
33a-34b 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 274a-b
12 EPICTLTUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 2-3 106d- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 2b-d
108c; CH 5, HOb; BK 11, CH 15, 156a-b; BK in, passim; BK vm, 52a; BK xiv, 102b,d~104a;
CH 182a-b; CH 24, 203c-206a
6, BK xv, llla-b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, DK xi [243-295] 334b-336a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality 323a 366d esp 329a-
14 PLUTARCH: Pompey, 512c-d 334a,c, 347a-b, 348b,d-363a,c / Social Con-
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR HI, CH 1-3 lOa- tract, BK i, 387b,d-390d esp 388b-c; 394d;
lla / Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 17, 166d / BK in, 411c 412c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 51d; BK iv, 345b-c; BK in, CH 12 [1119*34^19] 366a,c;
184b; BK vi, 263b-264b; BK vn, 287a-b; BK BK vi, CH 8 [ii42 n i2-i9] 391b; BK x, CLI ^
n
xi, 488b-c; BK xn, 543b-544a; BK xv, 639a-b; [i i74 i-4] 428b / Politics, BK i, CH 1 3 [i 259^9-
EPILOGUE i, 659b; 660d-661b I26o a 33] 454b 455a; BK vii, en 14 [i3$2 h }6-
b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 691b-692a; 720a; 887b 41] 537c-d; BK vni, CH 7 [i342 i8~33] 548c /
b
[fn 3 ] Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 [i36i 6-i5] 602a-b; BK ii,
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 405b-406a / Ego and Id, en 12-14 636a-638a
705a-706a; 707d / Civilization and Its Dis- 10 HIPPOCRATES: Injuries of the Head, par 18
contents, 785a [fn i] / New Introductory 69a b / Aphotisms, SECT i, par 13-14 131d;
Lectures, 853b-864a esp 854a-855a, 862a- SECT n, par 39 133c; par 53 133d; SLCT in,
863c par 3 134a; par 18 134d; par 24-^1 135a-b;
SLCT vi, par 6 140c; par 29-30 141a; par 57
6c. The ages of man: infancy, youth, maturity, 141d; SECT vn, par 82 144a / Sacred Disease,
senescence 157b-158b
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 17:15-19; 18:9-15; 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [445-
21 1-8; 27:1 / Deuteronomy, 34:7 / / Kings,
:
458] 35d-36a; BK iv [1037-1057] 57d; BK v
1:1-4 (D) III Kings, 1:1-4 / /^ 3 2: ^ 9 / [222-234] 64a
Proverbs, 20:29 / Isaiah, 65:20 (D) Isaias, 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vin [152-174] 263a-b;
65:20 [510-520] 272b-273a
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 14:17-18 (D) OT, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 7-13 2c-
Ecclesiasticus, 14:18-19 4c; par 30-31 8b-9a / City of God, BK xxi,
NEW TESTAMENT: John, 21:18 / / Corinthians, CH 16 573b-574a
13:11 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77,
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xxm
[448-499] 165d-166b; A 8, REP 3 406b-407a; Q 96, A 3, ANS 512a-c;
[566-649] 167a-168a; [785-792] 169c; BK xxiv PART i-n, g 34, A i, REP 2 768c-769d; Q 40,
171a-179d esp [349-551] 175a-177a A 5, REP 2 795d-796c; A 6 796c-797a
5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [71-82] 52d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [1211-1248] 94, A I, REP tO CONTRARY 221a-d; PART III
125b-c / Antigone [631-767] 136c-137d / SUPPL, Q 70, A i, REP 7 893d-895d
Philoctetes [96-99] 183a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [85-
5 EURIPIDES: Alcestis [629-705] 242c-243a 105] 77d
5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians [676-718] 463a-c 22 CHAUCER Reeve's Prologue [3862-3896] 224a-b
:
(7. Group variations in human type: racial differ- d; 366a-c; 370a-c; BK n, 395d-397d; BK
ences. lb. The influence of environmental
vm, 589d-590a
factors on human characteristics: climate 7 PLATO: Crutyhis, 106b-c / Republic, BK iv,
and geography as determinants of racial or 350c-d; BK v, 357d-358a; 367b-368c / States-
national a ifferences.)
man, 582d-583b / Laws, BK i, 645b 647c
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 203a-204a; 224a-b; 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 2 [i252 b 5-9]
295b-296b 445d; CH 6 [1255*28-37] 448d-449a; BK in, CH
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xiv 102b,d- b
14 [1285*17 29] 483b-c; BK vn, CH 7 [i327 i9~
108d; BK xv, llla-b; BK xvi, 116a-120a; BK 38] 531d-532a
xvii, 122a-124d passim; BK xvui, 125a-129c; 10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 16
BK xxi, 153a-154a; BK xxin, 190c-d 15d-16a; par 23 18a-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349a / Social Contract, 14 PLUTARCH: Thcmistocles, 99b-c / Marcellus,
BK in, 415b-4l7c 254c-256b / Flamininus, 303a-310d
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 291a-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK n, 23d 24a / Histories,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 45d; 87d-88a; BK v, 295d-296a
397c-398a; 409d-412c esp 410a-411a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK i, CH 1-17 129d-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 220b-223c passim, 140b; BK iv, en 34 206d-207a,c; BK xvi, CH
1 6 433c-434a; CH 18 434c; CH 21-28 435a-
esp 221b-c; 338b-c; 341b 342c; 778a [n ij
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER n, 55d-56b 440b; CH 32, 442b-c; BK xix, en 22
46 HI,GI:L: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 346 525b-c
lllb / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 190b- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 98,
201a,c; PART i, 235c-d; 236d-237a; 251d- AA 4-5 242b-244b; QQ 102-105 270b 321a
252d; PART n, 259d-260a passim
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 267a-c; 268b-269a; 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK n, STANZA
343c-344a; 356b-358d; 584a-b 3-7 22a-b / Tale of Man of Law [4631-4644]
238a / Prioress's Tale [13,418-620] 392a-
lc. Cultural differences among men: Greek and 395b
barbarian, Jew and gentile, European 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 267c-d
and Asiatic 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 44b-48a; 91d-98b esp
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 12:1-4; 15; 17:1-18:19; 93b-94a
26:1-6; 27:46; 35:9-13 / Exodus, 34:1-17 / 26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT i, sc
Leviticus, 26 / Deutewnomy, 7:1-8; 10:15; in 409c 411b; ACT n, sc in 414a-b; ACT in,
14:1-2; 26:17-19; 28:1-10,58-65 /Judges, 14- sc i 418d-420a; sc in 423b-d; ACT iv, sc i
16 / Ruth I I Kings, 8:38-43,51-53; n:i- [386-400] 429c-d
10 (D) /// Kings i 8:38 -43,51-53 ; 11:1-10 / 31 DESCARTLS: Discourse, PART 11, 46b-c
/ Chronicles, 17:21-24 (D) I Paralipomenon, 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 266c-269b
17:21-24 / Esther (D) Esther, 1:1-10:3 / 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xiv
Ezetyel, 37:21-22 (D) Ezechiel, 37:21-22 / 102b,d-108d; BK xv, HOa-d; BK xvi, 116a-
Daniel, 1:1-8 120a; BK xix 135a-146a,c passim; BK xxi,
APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther (D) OT, Esther, 153a-c
10:4-16:24 / II Maccabees, 6:1-11; 11:22-26 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 352b / Social Contract,
(D) OT, // Machabces, 6:1-11; 11:22-26 BK n, 402d-403a
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 10:5-6 / Acts, 15:1- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 99c; 179d-183a;
29 esp 15:9, 15:17; 16:16-24 / Romans, 2:9- 207b-208d; 260d-261a; 402a; 409d-410a
29; 3:29-30; 4:11-12; 10:12 / / Corinthians, 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 32d-34c; 35b-36c;
1:22-24; 12:13 / Galatians, 3:26-29; 4:21-31 222d-226a passim, esp 224b; 300a-c; 336c-
/ Ephesians, 2:11-22 / Colossians, 3:9-11 339b passim; 341b-343a; 508d-509d
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK iv [422-445] 28a-b 42 KANT: Judgement, 504a-b
5 EURIPIDFS: Medea 212a-224a,c / Andromache 43 MILL: liberty, 300d-302c; 307d-308c
315a-326a,c esp [147-244] 316c-317b, [445- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 351
453] 319a-b, [590-601] 320b / Hecuba [1196- 112a-b / Philosophy of History 153a-369a,c
1201] 363a / Iphigenia Among the Tauri passim, esp INTRO, 161a-c, 174b-d, 176b, 177b-
411a-424d / Iphigenia at Aulis [1395-1401] 178a, 182d-183a, 183d-188b, 192a-194a, 196d-
437d 199d, PARF i, 211a-221a, 222a 233a, 235c-d,
6 HERODOTUS: History la-314a,c passim, esp BK 245d-247b, 250a-c, PART n, 276d-277a, 277d-
i, 12d-13b, 35b-c, BK n, 57d-58a, 61d, 69b-d, 278a, 279c-d, PART in, 289b-d, 312c-313a,
BK HI, 97d-98a, BK iv, 137a-138c, 140d-141a, PART iv, 352a 353a
BK v, 163d-164a, BK vn, 216b-d, 232d- 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic1(, 17a-19a; 36b-46a;
233d, 253b-254a, BK vm, 264c, 287c-d, BK 60b 65a; 350b-354b
ix, 291c-292a, 298a-302c, 305d-306a, 308d- 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 323a-b; 571b-
310c 577d esp 573b-c, 575d, 577b-c; 584a-b
CHAPTER 51: MAN 31
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 140d-141b; 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 56a-b / Medi-
^
BK iv, 171b; BK vni, 309b-c; BK ix, 358b-365c tations, in, 87d-88d
96. The Christian doctrine of Eden and of the APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:13-16; 2:1-
history of man in the world i2,23-24~(D) OT, BooJ^of Wisdom, 1:13-16;
2:1-12,23-25
9(1) The condition of man in Eden: the pre- NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 15:10-20 / Marl^,
ternatural powers of Adam / John, / Romans, 3:9-23;
7:14-23 8:3-8
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis^ 1:26-30; 2:7-25 5:12-21; 7:14-24; 8:20-23; 9:29 / / Corinthi-
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:13-16; 2:23- ans, 3:1-4; 15:21-22 / Galatians, 3:22; 4:1-3;
24 (D) OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, i
:i3~i6; 2 123- 5:19-21 / Ephesians, 2:1-5 / I John, 2:15-17
25 / Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-15 (D) OT, Beck- 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xii, CH 22 357c;
siasticus, 17:1-13 BK xm, CH 3 361a-c; CH 10 364a-c; CH 13-14
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 12 329b-c; 366a-c; CH 23 372a-373c; BK xiv, CH i 376b,d-
BK xii, CH 21 357a-b; BK xm, CH i 360a-b; 377a; CH 3 378a-d; CH 12 387a-b; CH 15-26
CH 13-14 366a-c; CH 23 372a-373c; BK xiv, 388d-396c; BK xxi, CH 12 571a-c; CH 15 572c-
CH 10-13 385b-388c; CH 15-17 388d-391a; 573b; BK xxii, CH 22-23 606d-609a
CH 21-24 392b-395b; CH 26-27 395d-397a; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 17,
BK xxii, en 30, 617c-618a A 9, REP 3 692d-693d
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76,
: 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I-H, QQ 81-
:
1466] 232d-236d / Alcestis [962-996] 245c / 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 59d-60c; BK vi,
Suppliants 258a-269a,c esp [195-245] 260a-c, 91b-d; BK xvi, 179d; 183d / Histories, BK i,
[734-749] 264d / Trojan
Women
270a-281a,c 189d-190a; BK n, 235a-c
csp [895-990] 277c-278b, [1277-1283] 280d 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 9, 71a
/ Ion 282a-297d esp [237-451] 284a-286c / / Third Ennead, TR n, CH 8-9 86c-88a
Helen 298a-314a,c esp [711-721] 304d-305a / 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions la-125a,c passim /
Andromache [1070-1288] 324b-326a,c / Electra City of God 129a-618d / Christian Doctrine,
327a-339a,c esp [1233-1359] 338b-339a,c / BK i 624a*636a,c; BK n, CH 7 638d-639c
Bacchantes 340a-352a,c / Heracles Mad [1301- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8,
1356] 376b-d / Orestes 394a-410d esp [316- A 3, ANS and REP 4 36b-37c; Q 17, A i, ANS
347] 397a-b, [1625-1693] 410b-d / Iphigenia lOOd-lOld; Q 22, A 2, REP 4-5 128d-130d; QQ
Among the Tanri 411a-424d esp [378-391] 23-24 132b-143c; Q 83, A i, REP 2-4 436d-
414b, [57 -575] 416a, [903-911] 419a, [1435- 438a; Q 103, A 5, REP 3 531b-532b; A 8, REP
1499] 424a-d / Iphigenia at Aulis [1034-1035] 1-2 533d-534b; Q 116 592d-595c; PART i-n,
434c; [1279-1335] 436d-437a QQ 1-48 609a-826a,c
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [356-411] 492b-493c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, QQ
/ Birds [1189-1266] 557c-558b; [1494-1765] 49-114 la-378a,c
5GOc-563d / Plutus 629a-642d esp [76-146] 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy esp PARADISE, i [94-
630a-d 142] 107b-d, vn [19-120] 115b-116b, xix [40-
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 7b-10a esp 9d- 66] 135c-d
lOa; 12d-13b; 20b-22a;39a-d;40d-41a; BK in, 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK i, STANZA
98b-c; 99a; BK iv, 124d-125a; 159d; BK vn, 30-35 5a-b; BK in, STANZA 89 66a; BK iv,
217c; 224d-225a; 250b; BK vm, 262b-c; 279d- STANZA 136-155 106a-108b; BK v, STANZA
280a; BK ix, 309d 259-267 154a-155a / Knight's Tale [1251-
6 TuucYDiDES-.Peloponnesian War, BKV,506b-c 1274] 180b-181a; [1303-1333] 181b-182a /
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 94a; 106b / Phaedrus, 125b- Tale of Man of Law 236b-255b esp [4869-
126c / Ion, 144b-145c / Euthyphro 191a-199a,c 4931] 242b-243b, [5240-5253] 249b / Friar's
/ Apology, 206b-d / Phaedo, 222b-d / Repub- Tale [7056-7085] 281a-b / Franklin's Tale
lic, BK ii, 314c-d; 320c-324c / Timaeus, 447a- [11,177-206] 353b-354a / Prioress's Tale 391a-
477a,c passim / Critias 478a-485d / Theaetetus, 395b / Tale ofMelibeus, par 17 407b-408a /
530b-531a/ Laws, BK i, 650a-b; BK 11, 653b-c; Monffs Prologue 432a-434a / Mon%s Tale
BK iv, 682d-683d; BK v, 686d-689c passim; 434a-448b / Nun's Priest's Tale [15,236-256]
BK vn, 721a-c; BK x 757d-771b 456b-457a / Second Nun's Tale 463b-471b /
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH n [105*2-6] 148c Parson's Tale 495a-550a esp par i 495a-b,
b
/ Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [982 28-983*5] par 12, 503b-504a, par 52-56, 526a-528a, par
501a-b 103 549b-550a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH i [1145*15-33] 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xxv, 35a-b
b
395a-b; BK vin, CH 7 [ii58 29-i 159*1^] 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 54b-c; 78d-83a;
410d-411a / Rhetoric, BK n, CH 5 [i383 a33~b8] PART n, 113b-c; 159d-164a,c; PART iv, 254b;
a b
629c-d; CH 17 [i39i 3o- 3] 638d 260b-c; 272b-c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [581-660] 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv,
22b-23b; [1090-1104] 29a; BK HI [978-1023] 265a-d
42d-43b; BK v [146-234] 63a-64a; [1161-1240] 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 98b-99a; 208a-294b esp
76b-77b; BK vi [43-79] 80d-81b 209a-212d, 233a-234a, 246a-258b
100 to CHAPTER 51: MAN 35
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT v, sc 11 [23-40] 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 302b-303d
346c-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 50b-c; BK v,
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc n [129-134] 196a-198b; 216d-218b; BK ix, 357d-358b;
32 d; ACT in, sc HI [36-96] 53d-54b / King BK xiv, 608a-b; BK xv, 631a-c; EPILOGUE 11,
Lear, ACT iv, sc i [30-37] 269d; sc n [46-81] 675a-676b; 680b-c; 684b-d
271a-b; sc vi [34-80] 273d-274b / Antony 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in,
and Cleopatra, ACT n, sc i [1-8] 317d / Pericles, 54a-b; 64c-67a; BK v, 121d-137c passim; BK
ACT in, sc i [1-26] 433c-434a / Cymbeline, vi 146b,d-170d; BK vii, 177b-180a; 185a-c;
ACT v, sc iv [1-151] 481a-482c; sc v [425-485] BK xi, 313c-314d; 337a-346a passim
488bd 53 JAMES: Psychology, 203a-204b
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 267b-c; 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 246c-247d /
408c General Introduction, 582a-b / Civilization
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a and Its Discontents, 771a-b; 793c
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv 51b-54b pas-
sim / Meditations, m81d*89a passim; iv 89a- 10. Man as the measure of all things
93a / Objections and Replies, 122a-b; 123c-d; 7 PLATO:' Cratylus, 85a-86d / Theaetetus, 517b-
142b-c; 213b-214d; 226d-227a; 229c-d 532a esp 517b-c, 522b, 525a-526c, 531b-c;
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 25, COROL 534b / Laws, BK iv, 683a
365b; PROP 29, SCHOL 366b-c; APPENDIX 8 ARISTOTLE Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 5-6 528c-
:
BK CH b
369b-372d; PART n, PROP 5 374c-d; PROP 10 531c; x, i
[io53*3i- 3] 580a; CH 6
b
376c-377a; PART iv, PREF, 423a-b [1057*7-11] 584b; BK xi, CH 6 [io62 i2-
b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [80-134] 137a- io63 i4] 590d-592a
138a; BK iv [411-439] 161b-162a; BK v [224- 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 50a
245] 180a-b; [506-543] 186a-187a; BK x [610- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 279d-
640] 287b-288b / Samson Agonistes [373-419] 280b
347b-348b; [667-709] 354a-355a / Areopagit-
ica, 394b-395b
lOc. Man as an integral part of the universe:
his station in the cosmos
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b / Pensees,
389 239b; 425-555 243b-270a 7 PLATO: Laws, BK x, 767c-768c
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH n, SECT 6 26b-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 2 106d-108b;
/ Human Understanding, BK n, CH VH, SECT CH 12 118d-120b; CH 14 120d-121c; BK n,
5-6 132c-d CH 8 146a-147c; BK in, CH 13 188b-189c; CH
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 155-156 24 203c-210a; BK iv, CH i 213a-223d
444b-d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d;
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV SECT 4 257b; SECT 9 257d; SECT 16 259a; BK
78-81 485c-487a; SECT xi, DIV 106-109 499b- iv, SECT 14 264d; SECT 23 265c; SECT 48
501a 267d-268a; BK v, SECT 3-4 269a; SECT 8
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, la-2b; 269d-270b; BK vi, SECT 40-46 277d-278d;
BK xn, 85d-86a BK vii, SECT 9-10 280b-c; SECT 13 280c; BK
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 366b-d / Social Con- vin, SECT 27 287c; SECT 34 288a-b; BK ix,
tract, BK iv, 435a-439c SECT i 291a c; SECT 9 292b d; BK x, SECT 6-7
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 292d-296c; 409b 297a-c; BK xn, SECT 30 310a-b
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 258a; 259b-260a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 14
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 89b-d
278b-279d / Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 25, COROL
325a-328b; 334a-335c; 345c-d / Intro. Meta- 365b; PROP 29, SCHOL 366b-c; PROP 31 366d-
physic of Morals, 383b,d-384a,c / Judgement, 367a; PART n, PROP i-io 373d-377a; PROP n,
502d-503a; 594d [fn i] COROL 377b-c; PART in, 395a-d; PART iv,
43 MILL: Liberty, 296b-d PROP 2-6 425a~426a; APPENDIX, vi-vni
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 392d-393a; 394a-c; 481d- 447c-d; xxvi 449c; xxxn 450c-d; PART v,
482d PROP 40, SCHOL 462d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-
10</. The finiteness and insufficiency of man:
160b; 169d; PART i, 224a-225a; 236a-c; 245d-
his sense of being dependent and or-
246c; PART n, 263d-265c; 266d; 268b-271c;
dered to something beyond himself
280b-281b; PART in, 291b-292b; 303c-307b;
308a-b; PART iv, 322a-c; 339b-d; 349c- OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-30; 3:16-24 /
350c Numbers, 23:19 / Deuteronomy, 8:3 / Job,
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-517] lla-14b; 4:17-21; 9; 12-14; 25 / Psalms, 8; 39:4;
[1810-1815] 43a; PART 11 [8582-8590] 209a 103:14-16; 119-120; 139:1-16; 144:3-4 (D)
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 28a-36b; 84b-85a; Psalms, 8; 38:5; 102:14-16; 118-119; 138:1-16;
123a-b; 306b-307a; 318b; 380a-381a; 396b- 143:3-4 / Proverbs, 16:33; 20:2 4 /
397a 17:5-8 (D) Jeremias, 17:5-8
36 THE GREAT IDEAS Wdto 10<?
(D) OT, Bool( of Wisdom, 9:14-17; 16:26 / Agonistes 339a-378a esp [164-175] 343a-b,
Ecclesiasticus, 18:7-11; 33:10-15 (D) OT, [373-419] 347b-348b, [667-704] 354a-355a
Ecclesiasticus, 18:6-10; 33:10-15 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 205 21 la; 208
NEW TESTAMENT: Luty, 4:4 / Romans, 14:7-9 / 211b; 227 213a; 233 213b-216a / Geometrical
7 Corinthians, 2-3 / James, 4:13-16 / I Peter, Demonstration, 439b
1:24 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH n,
3 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b SECT 3 128b-c; CH vn, SECT 5-6 132c-d; CH
5 EURIPIDES: Alcestis [962 996] 245c / Sup- xv, SECT 12 165b-c; CH xxni, SECT 12-13
pliants [195-245] 260a-c; [734-749]
264d / 207a-208b; BK iv, CH xiv, SECT 1-2 364b-c
Heracles Mad [1301-1356] 376b-d 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, la-2b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 7b-8a; 20b-21a; 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 366b-d
46c-d; BK n, 65b; BK in, 98b c; 99a; 103d- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 270,
104b; BK iv, 153b-d; BK VH, 252b-c; BK ix, 85c; par 340 HOb-c / Philosophy of History,
291bc INTRO, 162a-170b; 196d-198b; PART n, 266d;
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 246c / Laws, BK i, 650a-b; 280b-281b; PART in, 304c-306c
BK vn, 721a-c; BK x, 767c-768c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE 7a-9b; PART i
8 ARISTOILP: Metaphysics, BK XIT, CH 10 [1075* [652-655] 17b; [997-1010] 25b
i2-24]605d606a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 50b-c; BK v,
12 RpicThrus: Discourses, BK iv, en 7 232c- 196a-198b; BK vi, 243d-250a; 262c; BK VIIT,
235a 303a-305b; BK xiv, 605b-d; BK xv, 631a-c;
12 AURLLIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 3 257a-b; EPILOGUE i, 646d-647b; 650b-d; 659c-d;
SECT 17 259b-d; BK HI, SECT 10 261d-262a; 671c-672a; EPILOGUE n, 692c-694d
BK iv, SECT 33-36 266c-d; BK v, SECT 10
We. Man's comparison of himself with other
270c-d; SECT 33 273b-c; BK vn, SECT 44-50
creatures and with the universe as a
282b-283a; BK xii, SECT 32 310c
14 PLUTARCH: Aemilius Paulus, 225b-c; 229a-c
whole
/ Sulla, 370c-371b / Demetrius, 739c-740d; 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 447b-455c esp 452c-453c;
744b-c 466a-b / Philcbus, 618c-619c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 49c; BK iv, 68d-69b; 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 7 [ii4i a 2o-b2]
BK vi, 91b-d / Histories, BK i, 194a-c; BK n, 390a-b / Politics, BK i, CH 8 [1256! 5-22] 450c
232d-233a; BK iv, 281a-b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi
[647-652]
17 PLO-IINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 9, 87d 89a
18 AUGUSTINL: Confessions, BK i, par 1-2 la-c; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 5, 143d-
BK iv, par 15-19 23a-24b; BK v, par 1-2 27a-c; 144a; BK in, CH 13, 189a
BK vii, par 16-17 48c-49a; BK ix, par 23 -26 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 4 264a
68a-d; BK x, par 7-8 73a-c; par 33-40 79d- 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 915b-916a
81c; BK xii, par 10 lOlc; BK XHI, par 9 112c-d 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 7 69c-70a
/ City xii, CH
of God, BK i 342b,d-343c; BK 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 17,
xix, CH 4-10 511a-516d / Christian Doctrine, A 8, REP 2 692a-c
BK i, CH 38 635c-d 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK i, STANZA
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica* Q 12, PART i, 31-35 5a-b; BK v, STANZA 263 154b / Tale of
A i, ANS 50c-51c; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 60, Man of Law 236b-2S5b esp [4610-4623] 237b,
A 5, ANS 313b-314c; PART i-n, Q 2, A 3 617b- [4701-4729] 239a-b
618a; A 8 621c-622b; Q 3, AA 6-8 627b-629c; 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
Q 5, A 3 638b 639a; A 5 640b-641a 135b-139b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vn [61-96] 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 213d-215a; 259a-d
lOb-c; PURGATORY, HI [16-45] 56a-b; x [121- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT 11, sc 11 [303-331]
129] 68c-d; xi [1-30] 68d-69a; xvi [52-105] 43d; ACT in, sc i [122-132] 48b; sc iv [53-63]
77b-d; PARADISE, vn 115a-116c 55a-b; ACT iv, sc in [17-33] 58a-b / King
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 163d-164a Lear, ACT in, sc n 262d-263d; sc iv 264a-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 6d-10a passim; 149b-d; 266b esp [105-114] 265b / Macbeth, ACT v,
208a-294b esp 213a-215b, 231d-234a, 251c- sc v [16-28] 308d-309a / Antony and Cleo-
252b, 269d-270a, 294a-b; 503b-d; 514d-515a; patra, ACT v, sc ii [76-100] 347a-b / Pericles,
520b-d; 528c-529b ACT i, sc i [41-55] 422b; ACT n, sc i [i-ii]
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, HI 81d 89a passim 427b / Tempest, ACT iv, sc i [148-158] 543b
/ Objections and Replies, 122a-b; 214a-d 29 CERVANTES Don Quixote, PART n, 237c; 427a
:
CHAPTER 51: MAN 37
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 50c-51d REP 1-2 487d-488c; Q 93 492a-501c; Q 106,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 13, SCHOL A i, REP 3 545d-546d; PART I-H, PROLOGUE
378a-c 609a,c
32 MILTON: Sonnets, vn 63b / Paradise Lost, BK 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-ii, Q 55,
iv [411-735] 161b-168b esp [411-491] 161b- A 2, REP 3 27a-d; Q no, A 4, ANS 350d-351d
163a, [721-735] 168a-b; BK VHI [249-559] 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, v [19-24]
237b-244a / Samson Agonistes [164-175] 112b; vn [64-84] 115d-116a
343a-b; [667-704] 354a-355a 22 CHAUCER: Iroilus andCressida, BK v, STANZA
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 347-348 233b- 263 154b
234a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 41 b-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, in, 88c-d / Objec-
xxm, SECT 12-13 207a-208b; BK in, CH vi, tions and Replies, 214a-d
SECT 12 271d-272b esp 272b; BK iv, CH xvi, 32 MILTON: Paradise Ijost, BK iv [285-294] 158b;
SECT 12, 370c-371a [356-365] 160a-b; BK vn [519-528] 228b; BK
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i 3a-42a; PART n 45a- xi [466-522] 309b 310b / Areopagitica, 384a
87b; PART iv, 172b-173a 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 430-431, 246b-247b; 434-
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 383a-384a; 394a 435, 249b-251a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349b-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 168b-d;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 175b [fn i] / Fund. Prin. PART in, 304d-305b; 310d
Metaphysic of Morals, 271d-273b esp 271d- 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [486-517] 14a-b; [614-
272c; 274a-277b / Practical Reason, 327d- 685] 17a-18a
328b; 348a-b; 360d-361d / Pref. Metaphysical 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 790d
Elements of Ethics, 373d / Judgement, 583b-c;
lib. The fatherhood of God and the brother-
584d-587a; 591b-592d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 168b*d
hood of man
47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE [280-292] 8a; OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:1-15 / Leviticus,
PART i [652-655] 17b; PART ii [11,404-419] 19:11,13-18,33-34 / Deuteronomy, 10:17-19 /
277b Psalms, 82:6; 103:13 (D) Psalms, 81:6;
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{ esp 84b-85a, 123a-b, ~
102:13 / Isaiah, 2:1-4; 45 :II I 3I 63:15-16
168a-b, 171b, 204a, 209b, 236a-239a, 313b- (D) Isaias, 2:1-4; 45:11-13; 63:15-16 / Micah,
314a, 318a, 319a-b, 341b-343a, 347b, 353b- 4:1-5 (D) Micheas, 4:1-5 / Malachi, 2:10
354b, 360b-361a, 363a-364a, 370b-371b, (D) Malachias, 2:10
381a, 409b-410b APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 13:15-17; 25:1 (D)
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 156d; 162b- OT, Ecclesiasticus, 13:19-21; 25:1-2
164a,c; BK v, 217b-218b NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:38-48; 12:46-50;
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 19:19; 22:39; 23:8-9; 25:34-40 / Mar\, 12:31-
117c-127b passim 33 / Luke, 10:27 /John, 1:12; 8:41-42; 13:34-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 655a-659a esp 655b-657b 35; 15:12-17 / Acts, 17:22-34 esp 17:24-26 /
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 562c-563a / New Romans, 3:29; 8:14-19; 12; 13:8-10; 14:10-13
Introductory Lectures, 874a / // Corinthians, 6:17-18 / Galatians, 3:26-28;
5:13-14 / Ephesians, 2:13-22; 3:6,14-15; 4:1-
11. The theological conception of man
6,25; 5:1-2 / Colossians, 3:9-14 / / Thessa-
lonians, 4:9-10 / / Peter, 1:22; 2:17 / I John,
1 la. Man as made in the image of God 2:9-11; 3:1-2,10-18; 4:7-11,20-21; 5:1-2
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-27; 5:1; 9:6 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 9 114c-116b;
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:23 (D) CH 13 120b-c; BK in, CH ii 187a-b; CH 22,
OT, Boo\ of Wisdom, 2:23 / Ecclesiasticus, 199b-d; CH 24, 203c-204c; 207a-b
17:1-3 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-3 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK HI, SECT 4 260b-
NEW TESTAMENT: / Corinthians, 11:7; 15:49 / 261a; SECT n
262a-b; SECT 13 262c; BK vi,
// Corinthians, 3:18 / Colossians, 3:8-10 / SECT 42 278a-b; BK ix, SECT i 291a-c
James, 3:9 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XH, CH 2i-*2
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vi, par 4 36a-b; CH 27, 359d / Christian Doctrine, BK i,
357a-c;
BK xin, par 12 113b-d; par 32 119a-b / City CH 22 629b-630a; CH 30 632c-633b
of God, BK xi, CH 26-28 336d-338d; BK XH, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART n-n, QQ
CH 23 357d-358a; CH 27, 359c-d / Christian 25-27 501 a- 52 7a; Q 29, A
3, ANS 531d-532c;
BK i, CH 22 629b-630a
Doctrine, A 4, ANS 532c-533a; Q 44, AA 2-3 593d-595b;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 3, A A 7 597b-598a; Q 184, A 2, REP 3 629d-630d
i, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 14, A 2, REP 3 76d-77d;
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 31 517b-518b
Q 32, A i, REP 2 175d-178a; Q 35, A 2, REP 3 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 31d-32a
189d-190d; Q 59, A i, CONTRARY 306c-307b; 44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 392b-c
Q 72, A i, REP 3 368b-369d; Q 77, A 2, REP i 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in,
401 b-d; Q 88, A 3, REP 3 472c-473a; Q 91,
A 4, 308a-b; 310d-311a
38 THE GREAT IDEAS Ik/012
33 PASCAL: Pens&s, 512 262a; 553 268a-270a;
(11. The theological conception of man. lib. The
763-765 322a; 785 325b; 862 342b-343a
fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 308a-b
man.) 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 134a-161a,c esp
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 84b-85a 134a-138a; 230d-231a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196a-198b; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 306b
213a-218b; BK xi, 525c-526b 307b; 308a-b
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
117c-137c passim; BK vi 146b,d-170d pas- 127a-137c
sim
53 JAMES: Psychology, 887a-b
12. Man as an object of laughter and ridicule:
54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 674c-d comedy and satire
14:61-62; 15:15-39 / Lu{e, 1-2 esp 1:26 38, 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 237b-c / Phtlebiis, 629a-630c
2:8-12; 5:18-26; 7:33-34; 11:27-28; 22:67 70; 12 Luciiii'iius: Nature of Things, BK in [978
125a; [5457-5470] 134b-135a; [6956-6966] 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 149b-d; 381 b-c; 528c-
170b 529b
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II 320a-351d
13. The grandeur and misery of man 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet 29a-72a,c / Troilusand
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-30; 3:17-19; 11:1- Cressida 103a-141a,c / King Lear 244a-283a,c
9/77 Samuel, 14:14 (D) II Kings, 14:14 / / Timon of Athens 393a-420d / Henry VIII,
7 Chronicles, 29:15 (D) 7 Paralipomenon, ACT in, sc n [350-372] 572c-d
29:15 / Job esp 3:1-26, 5:7, 7:1-21, 14:1-12, 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49b
15:14-16, 21:23-26, 25:4-6, 29:1-30:31 / 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK n [496-505] 122a;
Psalms, 8:4-8; 39:4-6,11; 49:12-14; 51:2-5; BK xi [466-529] 309b-310b / Samson Agonistes
89:47-48; 103:13-16; 144:3-4 (D) Psalms, [164-175] 343a-b; [667-709] 354a-355a
8:5-9; 38:5-7,11-12; 48:13-15; 50:4-7; 88:48- 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 103 192b-
49; 102:13-16; 143:3-4 / Ecclesiastes passim / 193a; 125-183 195b-204b; 195 209b-210b; 199
Isaiah, 40:6-8 (D) Isaias, 40:6-8 210b; 351 234a; 366 236a; 386 239a; 397-424
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:1-3,13-16; 240b-243b; 430-431 245a-247b; 434-435,
10:1-2 (D) OT, BooJ( of Wisdom, 9:1-3,13- 249a-251a; 443 251b; 510-511 261b; 513-517
16; 1 0:1-2 / Ecclesiasticus, 8:7; 10:9-11; 14:17- 262a-263b; 524-555 264a-270a; 693, 301b
19; 17:1-4,30-32; 40:1-11 (D) OT, Ecclesi- 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 383a-384a; 394a
asticus, 8:8; 10:9-13; 14:18-20; 17:1-4,29-31; 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338c; 363a-366d
40:1-11 / Social Contract, BK i, 393 b-c
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 7:21-25 / Hebrews, 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 633d-634a,c
2:6-8 /James, 4:14 / 1 Peter, 1:24 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 300a-d; 321b-329a
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK vi [144-151] 41c; BK xvn esp 327d-328d; 345a-347a; 360d-361d /
[420-455] 126b-d Judgement, 584d-586a; 587a-588a; 591b-592d
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c- 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 58b-c; 94d-95d; 102a-b;
45a 102d-103a; 312b; 362c-363a; 401a-b; 540b-
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King
[1186-1195] 542a
HOb-c; [1524-1530] 113c / Oedipus at Colo- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 39
mis [1211-1248] 125b-c / Antigone [332-375] 21d; PART in, par 358 113c; ADDITIONS, 22
134a-b / Trachimae [94-140] 171a-b 120c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [195-245] 260a-c; [734- 170b; PART n, 280b-281b; PART in, 285a-b;
749] 264d 304c-306c; 310d
5 ARISTOPHANES: Kirds [685-692] 551b-c 47 GOLTHE: Faust esp DEDICATION ^J-PRELUDE
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 2b; 7b-8a; 20b- [78] la-3a, PROLOGUE [280 -292] 8a, [300-329]
21a; BK v, 160c-d; BK vn, 224d-225a; 252b-c; 8b-9a, PARTI [354-517] lla-14b, [606-807] 16b '
BK ix, 291b-c 21a, [1064-1117] 26b-28a, [1178-1237] 29b-
7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 322a-b / Timaeus, 30b, [1544-1571] 37b-38a, 11583-1706] 38b-
476a-b / Laws, BK vi, 704b 41a, [1765-1815] 42a-43a, [1851-1867] 44a-b,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61] [3217-3250] 79a-b, [MB 1 -^^^] 84a-b, [4405-
15a-d; BK in [31-93] 30b-31b; [1053-1075] 4612] 110a-114b, PART n [8094-8131] 197a-
43c-d 198a, [9695-9944] 235a-241b, [11,219-272]
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK en 3-4 108b- i, 273a-274a, [11,384-419] 277a-b, [11,573-603]
HOa; CH 24 129a-d; CH 28 133b-134d; BK n, 281b-282a, [11,934-12,111] 290b-294b
en 16 156b-158d; BK in, CH 22 195a-201a; 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 54b-55a; 59a-60b;
CH 24 203c-210a 84b-85a; 88b-91a; 107a-b; 313a-314a; 318a;
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR in, CH 3 93d-94c 343a; 403a-b; 418a-4l9a
/ Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 8 145d-146d 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 597a,c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK ix, CH 14-15 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace esp BK vi, 235a-
293a-294a; BK XH, CH i, 343a-c; BK xm, en 238c, 243d-250a, 262c-263a, BK vn, 294b4
10 364a-c; BK xix, CH 4-10 511a-516d; CH 20 BK vin, 303a-305b, 311a-313a, BK ix, 355c-
523d-524a; CH 27 529a-d; BK xxi, CH 15 358b, BK x, 430a-b, 439b-440a, BK xi,
572c-573b; BK xxn, CH 22-24 606d-612a 514c-d, BK xiv, 605b-d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxvi [49-142] 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in,
38c-39c 54a-b; BK v, 127b-137c
22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [1303-1333] 181b- 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 246c-248c /
182a / M
on1(s Prologue 432a-434a esp [13,971- Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 654a-c / Civiliza-
996] 433b-434a / Monffs Tale 434a-448b esp
tionand Its Discontents 767a-802a,c esp 771c-
[13,997-14,004] 434a, [14,679-684] 446b-447a 776b, 778d-779a, 799a-802a,c / New Introduc-
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 76c-d; 79c-d tory Lectures, 853a-b
40 THE GREAT IDEAS
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the difference between men and other animals, see ANIMAL ic-ic(2);
KNOWLEDGE yd; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION i, 6b; MIND 33-3^ SENSE 2c; WILL 6c.
Matters relevant to the science of psychology and its relation to other sciences, see KNOWL-
EDGE 5e; MIND 6; SOUL 53-5 b.
The issues concerning matter and spirit in the constitution of man, see ELEMENT 5f; MATTER
2d, 33, 4c~4d; MIND 2a-2e; ONE AND MANY 3^4); SOUL 3a~3d;and for comparisons of
human with angelic nature, see ANGEL 4; SOUL 4d(2).
Discussions bearing on the analysis of human faculties or powers, see ANIMAL ic(i)-ic(2),
8d; DESIRE 30-3^2); EMOTION i, ic; HABIT 3; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION i-ia, ic,
5; MIND ia-ig(3); SENSE la-id; SOUL 2c(i)-2c(3), 43; WILL 3a, pa.
The problem of harmony and conflict in human nature and the discussion of human ab-
normality, see EMOTION 33, 3c; MEDICINE 6a-6c(2); MIND 8-8c; ONE AND MANY 3^5);
OPPOSITION 4-46; WILL 90.
Another consideration of the cycle of human life, see LIFE AND DEATH 6b-6c; and for the
consideration of human immaturity, or childhood, see FAMILY 6c, 6e; MIND 4b.
The relation of men and women in the domestic community, and for the place of women in
the state, see FAMILY 5a~5c.
Matters relevant to the problem of individual and racial differences, see ANIMAL 10; EVOLU-
TION ib; MIND 43.
The concerning the ultimate origin of man, see EVOLUTION ya-yb.
issue
Other statements of the myth of a golden age, see LABOR la; PROGRESS ic; TIME 8b; and for
the distinction between prehistoric and historic man, or for the progress of historic man,
see ART 12; EVOLUTION yc; TIME 8a.
The distinction between man of nature and in a state of civil society, see LAW 4b;
in a state
LIBERTY ib; NATURE 2b; STATE 3c; and for the consideration of man as a social animal, see
FAMILY i; STATE 3b(i).
Other discussions of the condition of Adam before and after original sin, and of the condition
of the human race as a result of Adam's sin, sec GOD pc; JUSTICE ib; SIN 3~3c; VIRTUE AND
VICE 8b; WiLLye(i); and for theological doctrines concerning man's life on earth and
hisimmortal destiny, see HISTORY 53; IMMORTALITY 5d~5g; PUNISHMENT 5d; SIN 6c-6e.
The teaching of Christian theology concerning Christ, see GOD 90-9^3) ONE AND MANY 6c. ;
Matters relevant to man's understanding of himself, his place in the world, and his relation
to God or the gods, see DESIRE yb; GOD 3-3^ WORLD 2.
The tragedy or comedy of humsn life, see HAPPINESS 4b; POETRY 4b.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
HOBBES. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic D. STEWART, Elements of the Philosophy of the
The Whole Art of Rhetoric. BK n, CH 14-
. Human Mind, PART in, CH 2
'9 .
Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of
KANT. Anthropologie Man
J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK vi, CH 3-4 GOGOL. The Overcoat
FREUD. An Outline of Psychoanalysis KIERKEGAARD. Either/Or
.
Concluding Unscientific Postscript
II.
. The Sickness Unto Death
THEOPHRASTUS. The Characters SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL i,
CICERO. De Finibus (On the Supreme Good), iv-v BK IVJ VOL III, SUP, CH 31-32
HORACE. Satires . On Human Nature
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Logicians, BK i COMTE. System of Positive Polity, VOL iv, Theory of
(Concerning Man) the Future of Man, CH i, 3-4
BOETHIUS. Contra Eutychen (A Treatise
Against LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK iv, CH 4-5; BK vi, CH 2, 4-5
Eutyches and Ncstorius) RENOUVIER. Essais de critique generale, n, PART i
MARVELL. Dialogue Between the Soul and the FRAZLR. The Golden Bough, PART i; PART vi,
INTRODUCTION
TT is
necessary for us to observe the difference the precision of its concepts, the rigor of its
J. between problems in mathematics and the demonstrations, the certitude of its truth.
problem of the truth about mathematics. In Even its detractors like Swift or Berkeley
the case of any science in physics, logic, or concede the exactitude and brilliance of math-
metaphysics, as well as mathematics it is one ematics while questioning its utility; or they
thing to examine the discourses or treatises of admit its intellectual austerity while challeng-
the scientists on the special subject matter of ing some application of its method. Its "clear-
their field, and quite another to examine dis- ness and certainty of demonstration," Berkeley
cussions of the science itself, its scope, branches, writes, "is hardly anywhere else to be found."
and unity, its objects, its methods and its rela- This general agreement about the quality oi
tion toother disciplines. The chapter on mathematical thought may explain why in all
QUANTITY deals with the subject matter of epochs mathematics has been looked upon as
arithmetic, geometry, and other branches of the type of certain and exact knowledge. Some-
mathematics; here we are primarily concerned times it is taken as more than a model for other
with the nature of mathematical science itself. sciences; it is
regarded as the method of pure
Sometimes reflections on the nature of a sci- science itself or as the universal science. Some-
ence are expressed by experts in its subject mat- times itsexcellences are thought to be qualified
ter who comment on the scientific enterprise in by the limited or special character of its objects;
which they are engaged in prefaces or inter- or it is contrasted with other
disciplines which,
spersed remarks. Sometimes such reflections are employing different methods, deal with more
the commentary on a particular science by fundamental matters no less scientifically. But
those who may claim to speak with competence always the conclusions of mathematics serve to
on the processes of the human mind, the nature exemplify rational truth; always the method of
of knowledge or of science in general, but who mathematics represents the spirit of dispas-
claim no special competence in the particular sionate thought; always mathematical knowl-
science under consideration. This is usually the edge symbolizes the power of the human mind
commentary of philosophers who may assert to rise above sensible particulars and contin-
their right to make all knowledge, as well as all gent events to universal and necessary rela-
tween discourse in and about the science could inquiry," writes Alexander Hamilton, "are so
hardly escape notice. Even if no preliminary entirely abstracted from those pursuits which
rule of caution were laid down, we should be stir and put in motion the unruly passions of the
struck by the contrast between the agreement human heart, that mankind, without difficulty,
mathematicians have been able to reach in the adopt not only the more simple theorems of
solution of their problems and the disagreement the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes
of the commentators on basic questions about which, however they may appear susceptible of
mathematics. To this there may be one signif- demonstration, are at variance with the natural
icant exception. Mathematics is honored for conceptions which the mind, without the aid
42
CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 43
of philosophy, would be led to entertain upon Ophelia. This simile is singularly exact. For
the subject. . But in the sciences of morals
. .
Ophelia quite essential to the play, she is
is
1
and politics, men are found far less tractable.' very charming and a little mad. Let us grant
This, Hamilton points out, is not due merely that the pursuit of mathematics is a divine mad-
to the passionate interest in their problems. ness of the human spirit, a refuge from the
"It cannot be pretended," he says, "that the goading urgency of contingent happenings."
principles of moral and political knowledge For Kant the madness lies not in the pursuit
have, in general, the same degree of certainty of mathematics itself, but in the delusion of
with those of mathematics." the philosopher that he can proceed in the
same way. "The science of mathematics," Kant
ADMIRATION FOR MATHEMATICS often extends writes, "presents the most brilliant example of
beyond enthusiasm for its exemplary virtues how pure reason may successfully enlarge its
or delight in its intellectual beauty to the rec- domain without the aid of experience. Such
ognition of its influence on the whole history examples are always contagious, particularly
of thought. Yet here differences of opinion be- when the faculty is the same, which naturally
gin to appear. flatters itself that it will meet with the same
In the ancient world Plato and Aristotle success in other cases which it has had in one."
grievously misled if he tries to follow the meth- The point is not that mathematics obtains its
od of mathematics in his own inquiries. White- objects from reason rather than experience,
head charges Aristotle with having deposed but rather that it obtains them from reason by
mathematics from its high role "as a formative construction; as, for example, Euclid begins by
and others in the iyth century, mathematics Hence, Kant maintains, "we must not try in
recovered the importance it had for Plato. philosophy to imitate mathematics by begin-
Attempting to qualify his own enthusiasm, ning with definitions, except it be by the way of
Whitehead admits that he would not "go so far experiment In philosophy, in fact, the defi-
as to say that to construct a history of thought nition in complete clearness ought to con-
its
without a profound study of the mathematical clude rather than begin our work"; whereas in
ideas of successive epochs is like omitting Ham- mathematics we cannot begin until we have
letfrom the play which is named after him. constructed the objects corresponding to our
That would be claiming too much. But it is definitions. "It follows from all this," Kant con-
certainly analogous to cutting out the part of cludes, "that it is not in accordance with the
44 THE GREAT IDEAS
very nature of philosophy to boast of its dog- things, and geometry with figures, not with
matical character, particularly in the field of physical shapes, areas, or volumes, so Plato
pure reason, and to deck itself with the titles points out that music and astronomy belong to
and ribands of mathematics." the mathematical sciences when they deal not
with audible harmonies but with their numeri-
DIFFERENCES OF opinion about mathematics cal ratios, not with visible celestial motions but
represent, for the most part, philosophical con- with their geometrical configurations.
troversy concerning the nature of science or the Provoked by Glaucon's interest in the use-
objects of its knowledge. Mathematicians who fulness of the mathematical arts, Socrates ex-
engage in such controversy assume the role of cludes their utility as being of no interest to the
philosophers in doing so, for mathematics itself philosopher. He recommends arithmetic and its
is not concerned with
questions of this sort. But sister disciplines only so far as these sciences en-
there are some questions about mathematics tirely ignore the world of sensible things. The
which seem to call for a close study of the sci- reason why the philosopher "who has to rise out
ence itself and even for proficiency in its sub- of the sea of change and lay hold of true being
ject matter and operations. They are questions . must be an arithmetician," he explains, is
. .
about the scope of mathematics and about the that arithmetic can have "a very great and ele-
divisions of the science, in relation to one an- vating effect," when it compels "the soul to
other and to its
unity. On these issues, mathe- reason about abstract number" and rebels
maticians disagree not only with philosophers, "against the introduction of visible or tangible
but among themselves and in their capacity as objects into the argument." In the same way,
mathematicians. only when it concerns itself with "knowledge of
These issues usually involve different inter- the eternal," not with measuring earthly dis-
pretations of the history of mathematics. The tances, will geometry "draw the soul towards
problem is not one of the origin of mathematics. truth, and create the spirit of philosophy." The
The
ancient opinion, found in Herodotus, astronomer, like the geometer, "should employ
Plato, and Aristotle, that the mathematical problems, and let the heavens alone, if he
arts, especially geometry, were first developed would approach the subject in the right way";
by the Egyptians, is of interest because of the and, like the astronomer, the student of harmony
questions it raises about the circumstances of willwork in vain, if he compares "the sounds
the origin of mathematics. Herodotus seems to and consonances which are heard only" and so
suggest that geometry arose as an aid in the fails to "reach the natural harmonies of num-
practice of surveying land. "From this prac- ber."
tice," he says, "geometry first came to be known About the non-empirical or non-experimen-
in Egypt, whence it passed into Greece." Aris- tal character of mathematics there has been little
totle, on the other hand, separating from the is seldom suggested that the growth
dispute. It
useful arts those which "do not aim at utility," of mathematical knowledge depends upon im-
thinks the latter arose "first in the places where provement in methods of observation. But on
men first began to have leisure. That is why the the relation of mathematics to physics, which
mathematical arts were founded in Egypt, for raises the whole problem of pure and applied
there the priestly caste was allowed to be at mathematics, or of mathematical and experi-
leisure." mental physics, there has been much contro-
The Greek development of mathematics very versy, especially in modern times.
between the pure sciences of
early distinguishes Bacon, for example, adopts the ancient divi-
arithmetic and geometry and their useful ap- sion of mathematics into pure and mixed, the
plications in the arts of measurement. The former "wholly abstracted from matter and
Greeks conceived mathematics as essentially physical axioms." Though he regards mathe-
speculative rather than practical or productive. matics as a useful instrument in physics "the
upon its essentially experimental character. with the manual arts of measurement which are
Physics has been corrupted, he says, by logic imperfect and inexact; and it is therefore wrong
and by mathematics when these seek to domi- to distinguish geometry from mechanics as that
nate instead of to serve "It
a strange fatal-
it. is which is
perfectly accurate from that which is
ity that mathematics and logic, which ought to less so. "But since the manual arts are chiefly
be but handmaids to physics, should boast their employed in themoving of bodies, it happens
certainty before it, and even exercise dominion that geometry is commonly referred to their
against it." magnitude, and mechanics to their motion."
The certainty and clarity which Hume is Newton himself does not abide by this dis-
willing to attribute to mathematics cannot, in tinction. His aim is to subject all the phenome-
his opinion, be extended to mathematical na of nature "to the laws of mathematics" and
physics. "The most perfect philosophy of the to cultivate mathematics as far as it relates to
natural kind," he thinks, "only staves off our natural philosophy. "I offer this work as the
. Nor is mathematical principles of philosophy, for the
ignorance a little longer. .
geometry,
.
when taken into the assistance of natural philos- whole burden of philosophy consists in this
ophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead from the phenomena of motions to investigate
us into the knowledge of ultimate causes, by all the forces of nature and from these forces to
that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so demonstrate the other phenomena." He regrets
Every part of mixed mathe- that he has not been able to deduce all the phe-
justly celebrated.
matics," Hume continues, "proceeds upon the nomena of nature "by the same kind of
assumption that certain laws are established by reasoning from mechanical principles."
nature in her operations; and abstract reason- Fourier goes even further. "Mathematical
ings are employed, either to assist experience analysis," he says, is "as extensive as nature it-
in the discovery of these laws, or to determine self." Mathematical analysis has "necessary re-
their influence in particular instances, where it lations with sensible phenomena." In laying
depends upon any precise degree of distance or hold "of the laws of these phenomena," mathe-
the formulation and the discovery of the laws plan of the universe, and to make still more
of nature. evident that unchangeable order which presides
A differentview seems to be taken by the over all natural causes." This much had been
great mathematicians and physicists of the ijth said or implied by Descartes and Newton. But
century. Galileo, Descartes, and Newton tend in addition to all this,Fourier, from his own
to make mathematical analysis an integral part experience in developing a mathematical the-
of physics. As the structure of the world is ory of heat, comes to the conclusion that "pro-
mathematical, so, too7 must the science of found study of nature is the most fertile source
nature be mathematical. Geometry, says of mathematical discoveries." Mathematics it-
Descartes, is "tlie science which furnishes a self benefits from its alliance with physics; it in-
general knowledge of the measurement of all creases in analytical power and in the generality
bodies." If we retain the ancient distinction of its formulations as physical inquiries extend
between geometry and mechanics, it can only the range of phenomena to be analyzed and for-
be in terms of the assumption, "confirmed by mulated.
the usage" of these names, that "geometry is
precise and exact, while mechanics is not." THE RELATIONS OF mathematics to physics are
In the preface to his Mathematical Principles considered in the chapters on ASTRONOMY, ME-
of Natural Philosophy, Newton also says that CHANICS, and PHYSICS. Mathematical physics
"geometry is founded in mechanical practice, must be examined in the light of the opinion
and is
nothing but that part of universal me- that mathematics and physics are separate sci-
chanics which accurately proposes and demon- ences, distinct in object and method. Further-
strates the art of measuring." What is called more, whereas some of the major contributions
"rational mechanics" must not be confused to mathematics appear in the* great books of
46 THE GREAT IDEAS
physics or natural philosophy (e.g., Archimedes, Descartes does not regard his success as con-
Kepler, Newton, Fourier), even more funda- sisting in the advance of mathematical truth
mental formulations of the science occur in great through discoveries based upon principles or
books devoted exclusively to mathematics: conclusions already established. Nor would he
Euclid's Elements (on geometry), Apollonius' even be satisfied to say that his use of algebra in
treatise On Conic Sections, Nicomachus' Intro- developing analytical geometry created a new
duction to Arithmetic, Descartes' Geometry, and branch of mathematics. Rather, in his own
Pascal's mathematical papers. Others belonging view, it tended to unify all existing branches
to this latter group are listed in the Additional and to form a single universal method of analy-
Readings. The great modern advances in math- sis. In effect, it revolutionized the whole char-
ematics are exemplified by the works of Gauss, acter of mathematics and laid the foundation
Lobachevski, Hamilton, Riemann, Boole, De- for the characteristically modern development
dekind, Peano, Frege, Cantor, Hilbert. of that science since his day. "To speak freely,"
It would be both natural and reasonable to he writes, "I am convinced that it is a more pow-
inquire about the relation between the great erful instrument of knowledge than any other
works of mathematics included in this set and that has been bequeathed to us by human agen-
the equally great treatises or monographs, listed cy, as being the source of all others."
in the Additional Readings, which represent for One need not quite agree with Bertrand Rus-
the most part the contributions of the igth cen- sell that pure mathematics was not discovered
tury. But since the major question which im- until the iplh century, in order to perceive
mediately confronts us in such an inquiry con- that the discoveries made in that century carry
cerns the relation of modern to ancient math- out the spirit of the Cartesian revolution. If
ematics, we can examine the problem in terms one understands the difference between the
of the works included in this set, for they repre- universal mathematics of Descartes and the
sent both the continuity and the discontinuity separate sciences of arithmetic and geometry as
in the tradition of mathematical science. developed by the ancients; if one understands
Galileo and Newton
are disciples of Euclid the difference between the theory of equations
and Archimedes; Fourier is a disciple of Newton in Descartes and the theory of proportions in
and Descartes. But Descartes the great in-
is Euclid; one understands how algebraic sym-
if
novator. He seems to be quite self-conscious of bolism, replacing numbers by letters, frees both
his radical departure from the ancients and arithmetic and geometry from definite quanti-
from the state of mathematics as he found it in ties, then the profound discontinuity between
his own
day. Yet the truth and power of his modern and ancient mathematics begins to be
mathematical discoveries seem so evident to discernible.
him that he cannot doubt the ancients must There are other differences contributing to
have had some inkling of it. that discontinuity, such as the modern treat-
"I am quite ready to believe," he writes, ment of the infinite, the invention of the cal-
"that the greater minds of former ages had culus,and the theory of functions. But what is
some knowledge of it, nature even conducting of prime importance for the purpose of under-
them to it. We have sufficient evidence that the standing the nature of mathematics, its ob-
ancient Geometricians made use of a certain jects, and its methods, is the perception of the
analysis which they extended to the resolution discontinuity in any one or another of its mani-
of all problems, though they grudged the secret festations. Here is a fundamental disagreement
to posterity. At the present day also there about the nature of mathematics which is not
flourishes a certain kind of Arithmetic, called an issue between philosophers disputing the
Algebra, which designs to effect, when dealing definition of the science, but rather an issue
with numbers, what the ancients achieved in made by work of mathematicians in
the actual
the matter of figures. These two methods," he ancient and modern times.
claims, "are nothing else than the spontaneous In his Battle of the Booty ancient and
fruit sprung from the inborn principles of the modern Swift sees only the great poets and
discipline here in question," philosophers of the two epochs set against one
CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 47
another. The battle between the ancient and tions of numbers into superabundant, deficient,
the modern books of mathematics might be as and perfect; and of the parts of numbers in rela-
dramatically represented. In such affairs there tion to the numbers of which they are parts.
is a natural tendency to prejudge the issue in Finally, numbers are considered in terms of
favor of themodern contender. That prejudice their geometrical properties, to be observed
has reason on its side in certain fields of knowl- when their units are disposed discretely in spa-
edge where the perfection of new instruments tial and in one, two, or three dimen-
patterns,
and the discovery of new facts work to the ad- sions. There are linear, plane, and solid num-
vantage of the latecomer. But it is questionable bers, and among plane numbers, for example,
whether in this dispute over the nature of there are triangular, square, pentagonal, hexag-
mathematics the same advantage prevails. onal numbers, and so on.
When the issue is fairly explored by an exam- The arithmetic operations of addition, sub-
ination of the differences between the great traction, multiplication, and division are per-
masterpieces of ancient and modern mathemat- formed in the production of numbers or in the
ics, it may be found impossible to say that truth resolution of numbers into their parts. But
lies more on one on the other, or that
side than though any two numbers can be added to-
one conception of mathematics is more fruitful gether or multiplied, the inverse operations
than another, because the two versions of the cannot always be performed. A greater number
science may seem to be incommensurable in cannot be subtracted from a less, for subtraction
their aims, methods, and standards of accom- consists in taking a part from the whole, and
plishment. leaving a positive remainder. Since division is
the decomposition of a number into its parts, a
ONE EXAMPLE WILL illustrate this incommen- number cannot be divided by one greater than
surability. The ancient notion of number, as itself, for the greater cannot be a part of the
even though we can deal with the number itself bers and fractions can have no place. Nico-
apart from any set of numbered things. It is al- machus will not carry out arithmetical opera-
ways a positive and integral quantity which, tions in all possible directions without regard
excepting unity itself, "the natural starting to the result obtained. He refuses to perform
point of all numbers," contains a multitude of these operations when the results which would
discrete units. be obtained do not have for him the requisite
Numbers are classified according to the way mathematical reality. He does not find it re-
in which they are constituted of parts and ac- pugnant to reason that subtraction and divi-
cording to the constitution of these parts. The and multiplication, are not
sion, unlike addition
primary division of numbers is into even and possible for any two numbers; as, for exam-
odd. "The even is that which can be divided from a smaller number,
ple, subtracting a larger
into two equal parts without a unit intervening or using a divisor which does not go into the
in the middle; and the odd is that which cannot dividend evenly, and so leaves a fractional re-
be divided into two equal parts because of the mainder. On the contrary, Nicomachus finds it
operations as the extraction of the square of pos- merically. Arithmetic and geometry are not
itive integers which are not perfect squares, even coordinate, much less co-extensive sci-
would never appear in Nicomachus' set of num- ences. Arithmetic is the simpler, the more ele-
bers; nor would the imaginary number, which mentary science, and is
presupposed by geom-
is the result of applying the same operation to etry.
negative quantities. Other examples arising from the innovations
When the arithmetical operations are per- of Descartes might be employed to show the
formed algebraically, with unknowns as well as chasm between the arithmetic and geometry of
definite quantities, the solution of equations the ancients, and modern mathematics such as
employment of terms which Nico-
requires the the treatment of infinite magnitudes and num-
machus would not admit to be numbers nega- bers, the theory of functions, and the method of
tives, fractions (both rational and irrational), the calculus. But the multiplication of examples
imaginaries, and complex numbers, which are does not seem necessary to suggest that there
partly real and partly imaginary. Descartes may be no answer to the question, Is Descartes
finds nothing repugnant in these novel quanti- right, and Nicomachus and Euclid wrong? or to
ties. On
the contrary, he would find it repug- the question, Are the modern innovations im-
nant not to be able to perform the basic arith- provements or corruptions of the mathematical
metical operations without restriction. Algebra arts and sciences ?
would be impossible, and with it the general These questions are not
like questions con-
method of analysis that proceeds in terms of the cerning the truth or falsity of a proposition in
purely formal structure of equations from mathematics or the validity of a proof. A given
which all definite quantities have been exclud- theorem in Euclid must, in the light of his defi-
ed. It would also be impossible to do what Des- nitions, axioms, and postulates, be either true
cartes thinks essential to the unity of mathe- or false; and accordingly Euclid's demonstra-
matics, namely, to represent geometrical opera- tions or constructions are either cogent or falla-
tions algebraically and to perform most alge- cious. The same rules apply to Descartes. But
braic operations geometrically. whether Euclid's or Descartes' conception of
Geometrical loci cannot be expressed by alge- the whole mathematical enterprise is right
braic formulae or equations, unless there are as seems to present a choice between disparate
many numbers as there are points on a line. The worlds, a choice to be made by reference to
number series for Nicomachus, without frac- principlesand purposes which are themselves
tions and irrationals, is neither dense nor con- not mathematical.
tinuous. There are fewer numbers than there Modern mathematics may be much more
are points on a line. And without the use of useful in its
physical applications, especially in
zero, negativenumbers, and fractions none the analysis and calculation of variable notions
of which would be regarded as numbers by or quantities. It may have a special elegance
Nicomachus it would be impossible for Des- and simplicity, as well as greater unity and even
cartes to construct a set of coordinates for the systematic rigor. But it may also purchase these
geometrical representation of equations, where- qualities at the expense of the kind of intelli-
by all the points in a plane have their unique gibility which seems to characterize ancient
numerical equivalents. mathematics as a result of the insistence that
The Cartesian synthesis of algebra and geom- its objects have an immediately recognizable
etry, which in his view vastly increases the reality. Ancient mathematics never occasioned
power of each, violates the ancient distinction such an extreme remark as that made by Ber-
between continuous and discontinuous quanti- trand Russell about modern mathematics
tiesmagnitudes (like lines and planes) and that it is "the science in which we never
knoWj
multitudes (or numbers). Euclid, for example, what we are talking about, nor whether what
treats the irrational or the incommensurable we are saying is true.'*
CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 49
THE QUESTION OF the reality of the objects of strates the construction of an equilateral tri-
mathematics is in part aproblem for the math- angle, he has proved the geometrical existence
ematician and in part a question for the philos- of that figure, or, in other words, its reality in
opher. The problem for the mathematician the space of his postulates.
seems to be one of establishing the existence of A number of questions can be asked about
the objects he defines. This can be illustrated this and many other similar demonstrations.
by reference to Euclid 's Elements. The postulates being assumptions, their truth
The basic principles, as Euclid expounds the can be questioned and an effort made to prove
science, seem to be threefold: definitions, postu- or disprove them. This type of questioning led
lates, and axioms or common notions. The to the development of the non-Euclidean
axioms are called "common notions" because geometries. After centuries of trying unsuc-
they are truths common to other branches of cessfully to prove Euclid's postulate about par-
mathematics as well as to geometry. The com- allel lines, geometers like Lobachevski and Rie-
mon notions are called "axioms" because their mann postulated other conditions concerning
truth is
supposed to be self-evident. In contrast, parallels, with consequences for the properties
the postulates are peculiar to geometry, for they of other geometrical figures.
are written as rules of construction. They de- The interior angles of a Euclidean triangle,
mand that certain operations be assumed possi- for example, equal the sum of two right angles;
ble, such as the drawing of a straight line or a in certain non-Euclidean triangles, they add up
circle, or the transposition of a figure from one to more or less than two rights. One
interpreta-
portion of space to another without alteration tion of this situation is that the truth of con-
of its form or quantity. clusions in geometry is entirely dependent on
Euclid's definitions include the definition of arbitrary assumptions. Another is that the sev-
a straight line and a circle. His first two postu- eral variants of the parallel postulate indicate
lates, therefore, seem to ask us to assume that the selection of different spaces in which to
space is such that these defined geometrical construct figures; and under each set of spatial
objects exist in it as they are defined; or, in conditions postulated, there is only one body of
other words, that objects corresponding to the geometrical truths concerning the properties
definitions have geometrical reality. But there of the figures therein constructed.
are many definitions of a triangle, of an equi- Another type of question concerns the logi-
lateral triangle, of a parallelogram for which cal, as opposed to the geometrical, conditions
Euclid states no postulate demanding that we of geometrical proof. In his essay On Geometri-
assume the geometrical reality of the object cal Demonstration, Pascal declares the geometric
defined. Hence before he undertakes to demon- method to be the most perfect available to
strate the properties of these figures, he finds it men, "consists not in defining or in prov-
for it
necessary to prove that they can be constructed. ing everything, nor in defining or proving
Until they are constructed, and the construc- nothing, but in maintaining itself in the mid-
tion demonstrated, the definitions state only dleground of not defining things which are
possibilities to which no geometrical realities clear to all men and in defining all others; and
are tyown to correspond in the space deter- not proving everything known to men, but in
mined by Euclid's postulates. proving all the other things." This method, it
In his first constructions, Euclid can employ seems, is not restricted to the subject matter of
only the definition of the figure itself, his axi- geometry; to Descartes and Spinoza, at least, it
oms, and those postulates which permit him to seems to be the method for demonstrating any
use certain mechanical devices the straight theoretical truth. Descartes presents "argu-
edge and the compass, which are the mechani- ments demonstrating the existence of God and
cal equivalents of his postulates that a straight the distinction between soul and body, drawn
line can be drawn between any two points and up in geometrical fashion"; and as its title page
a circle described with any radius from any indicates, the whole of Spinoza's Ethics is set
point upon a plane. When, for example, in the forth "in geometrical order."
first
proposition of Book I, Euclid thus demon- It may be questioned whether the postulates
50 THE GREAT IDEAS
which Descartes adds to his definitions and As indicated in the chapters on BEING, FORM,
axioms, or those which Spinoza introduces be- and IDEA, Plato and Aristotle seem to answer
ginning with Proposition 13 of Book II, func- these questions differently. But there are fur-
tion as postulates do in geometry, i.e., as rules ther differences among those who regard math-
of construction; it may similarly be questioned ematical objects as having being only in the
whether Spinoza is
following the geometrical mind.
method in Book I where he proceeds without Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, and James, for
consistency and the adequacy of the primitive particulars of sense and imagination. "The
"
propositions the definitions, axioms, postu- mathematical, such as numbers and figures,
lateslaid down as the foundation for all that Aquinas writes, "do not subsist as separate
is to be demonstrated. The investigation of this beings." Apart from numbered things and
problem calls for an examination of the whole physical configurations, numbers and figures
process of proof, from which has developed the "have a separate existence only in the reason,
modern theory of mathematical logic that chal- in so far as they are abstracted from motion and
lenges the universality and adequacy of the matter.'* Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, on the
traditional logic of Aristotle, and asserts that other hand, deny abstract ideas or universal
mathematics and logic are continuous with one concepts. "Let any man try to conceive a tri-
'another essentially the same discipline. angle in general," Hume declares, "which is
neither isosceles nor scalenum, nor has any par-
THE ISSUES RAISED by mathematical logic or ticular length or proportion of sides; and he
the logic of mathematics are considered in the will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scho-
chapters on HYPOTHESIS, LOGIC, and REASON- lastic notions with regard to abstraction and
question about their reality or mode of exist- tional rather than empirical; or, in the lan-
ence which cannot be answered by the mathe- guage of Kant and James, a priori rather than a
matical proof of a construction. posteriori. But the meaning of this agreement
When, for example, Euclid constructs an is not the same for those who think that truth
not be the one imperfectly drawn upon paper. other sciences and those who think that mathe-
The postulated permission to use a ruler and matical truths stand alone precisely because they
compass does not remove the imperfection of are not about matters of fact or real existence.
these mechanical instruments or the inaccuracy Plato, for whom all science is
knowledge of
in their physical use. The trianglewhose prop- purely intelligible objects, regards the mathe-
erties the geometer tries to demonstrate must matical sciences as inferior to dialectic in the
be perfect, as no actually drawn figure can be. knowledge of such objects "because they start
The philosophical question, therefore, concerns from hypotheses and do not ascend to princi-
the reality or existence of this ideal, perfect ples." The students of such sciences, Plato
figure.The same question can be asked about writes, "assume the odd and the even and the
pure numbers numbers apart from all num- figures and three kinds of angles and the like
bered things. in their several branches of science; these are
Are the objects of mathematics purely in- their hypotheses, which they and everybody
telligible beings existing apart from the sensible are supposed to know, and therefore they do
world of material things ? Or are they ideal enti- not deign to give any account of them either
ties not in the sense of existing outside the to themselves or others; but they begin with
mind, but in the sense of being ideas in the them, and go on until they arrive at last, and
mind itself rather than perceptible particulars? in a consistent manner, at their conclusion."
CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 51
For Aristotle, what differentiates mathe- i.e.,the a priori knowledge of space and time.
matics from physics and metaphysics is the Thanks to the progress of Symbolic Logic . . .
special character of its objects. Physics and this part of the Kantian philosophy," Russell
metaphysics both deal with substances as they holds, "is now capable of a final and irrevocable
exist outside the mind, whereas the objects of refutation." Leibnitz, before Kant, had advo-
mathematics are abstractions. Though figures cated "the general doctrine that all mathemat-
and numbers "are inseparable in fact" from ics is a deductionfrom logical principles," but,
material substances, they are "separable from according to Russell, he had failed to substanti-
any particular kind of body by an effort of ab- ate this insight, partly because of his "belief in
straction." This does not deny, for example, the logical necessity of Euclidean geometry."
that physical things have perceptible figures. The same belief is, in Russell's opinion, the
It merely insists that the geometer does not cause of Kant's error. "The actual propositions
treat figures as sensible, but as intelligible, that of Euclid ... do not follow from the principles
is, as abstracted from matter. Nevertheless, the of logic alone; and the perception of this fact,"
truths of mathematics, no less than those of he thinks, "led Kant to his innovations in the
physics and metaphysics, apply to reality. All theory of knowledge. But since the growth of
three sciences arc further alike in demonstrat- non-Euclidean geometry, it has appeared that
ing their conclusions rationally rather than by pure mathematics has no concern with the
experiment. All three employ induction to ob- question whether the axioms and propositions
tain their principles, though metaphysics alone of Euclid hold of actual space or not."
attains to the first principles of all science. "by the help of ten prin-
Russell asserts that
For Kant, "mathematical cognition is cogni- ciples of deduction and ten other premises of a
tion by means of the construction of concep- general logical nature (e.g., 'implication is a
tions." To
explain this he cites the example of relation'), all mathematics can be strictly and
the construction of a triangle. "I construct a formally deduced." He regards "the fact that
triangle, by the presentation of the object all Mathematics is
Symbolic Logic" as "one of
which corresponds to this conception, either the greatest discoveries of our age; and when
by mere imagination (in pure intuition) or this fact has been established, the remainder of
upon paper (in empirical intuition); in both the principles of Mathematics consists in the
cases completely a priori without borrowing analysis of
Symbolic Logic itself." Though this
the type of that figure from any experience. . . . view of mathematics may not be worked out
We keep our eye merely on the act of the con- in detail except in such treatises as Russell's
struction of the conception, and pay no atten- Principles of Mathematics and in the Principia
tion to the various modes of determining it, for Mathematlca^ on which he collaborated with
example, its size, the length of its sides, the size Whitehead, the conception of mathematics as a
of its angles." The a priori character of such in- purely formal science, analogous to (if not
tuitions, on which rests the a priori character of identical with) logic, does have some anticipa-
mathematical truths, does not mean that math- tions in the great books. For James, as for
ematics has no relevance to experience. Arith- Locke and Hume, mathematics is strictly a
metic and geometry are like physics, according science of the relations between ideas, not of
to Kant; they are sciences of experience or real existences. "As regards mathematical judg-
nature but like pure (as opposed to empirical) ments," James writes, "they are all 'rational
physics, they are a priori sciences. Since Kant propositions' ... for they express results of com-
holds that experience itself is constituted by a parison and nothing more. The mathematical
prioriforms of perception, he can ascribe the and equalities ex-
sciences deal with similarities
validity which mathematics has for all possible clusively,and not with coexistences and se-
experience to the "a priori intuition of the quences." Both James and Locke, however,
pure forms of phenomena space and time." differ from Hume in thinking that there are
Bertrand Russell rejects this "Kantian view sciences other than those of number and quan-
which [asserts] that mathematical reasoning is tity which can demonstrate their conclusions
not strictly formal, but always uses intuitions, with certitude.
52 THE GREAT IDEAS
The foregoing discussion indicates some of ern philosophers, especially Berkeley, Hume,
the differences among philosophers concerning and Kant, raise against the notion of infinite
the objects of mathematics, the conditions of quantities seem to favor the ancient rather than
its truth, and its relation to other sciences, the modern tenor of mathematical thought.
These disagreements do not seem to take the Though the reasons they give do not derive
form of an opposition between ancient and from the same principles as those to which Plato
modern thought, like that between ancient and Aristotle appeal, they, like the ancients,
and modern mathematicians concerning the appear to insist upon a certain type of intel-
nature of their science. The two oppositions do ligibility in the objects of mathematics, which
not run parallel to one another. seems to have been sacrificed in the mathe-
On the contrary, the objections which mod- matical development initiated by Descartes.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The science of mathematics: its branches or divisions; the origin and development of
mathematics 53
la. The distinction of mathematics from physics and metaphysics: its relation to logic
ib. The service of mathematics to dialectic and philosophy: its place in liberal
education
54
ic. The certainty and exactitude of mathematical knowledge: the a priori founda-
tions of arithmetic and geometry
id. The ideal of a universal ma thesis: the unification of arithmetic and geometry
55
2b. The being of mathematical objects: their real, ideal, or mental existence 56
2C. Kinds of quantity: continuous and discrete quantities; the problem of the
irrational
3#. The role of construction: its bearing on proof, mathematical existence, and the
4.
Mathematical techniques
40*.
The method of exhaustion: the theory of limits and the calculus
5.
The applications of mathematics to physical phenomena: the utility of mathematics
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
Spheres BK i 510a-b
la * ^
_, .
e distinction of mathematics from phys-
17 PLOTIN'US: Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH n, 250c-d icsand metaphysics: its relation to logic
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 38 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 75b / Republic, BK vi,
654b-c 386d-388a; BK vn, 391b-398c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 35, 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 12
A 8, ANS 779c-780c [77^7-34] 107a; [78*10-13] 107b-c / Physics,
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d; PART iv, BK n, CH 2 [193*22-194*11] 270a-c; CH 9
268c-d; 269b [200*15-29] 277c-d / Heavens, BK i, CH 10
b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 46a-c [279 32-28o*n] 371b-c / ^Metaphysics, BK i,
54 THE GREAT IDEAS \bto\c
603d; BK xiv, CH 3 622d-623d; CH 5-6 624d-
(1. The science of mathematics: its branches or 626d / Soul, BK i, CH 4 [408^3-409*9] 638d
divisions; the origin and development of 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 8 [1142*12-19]
mathematics, la. The distinction of mathe- 391b
matics from physics and metaphysics: its
11 NICOMACIIUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a-813d
relation to logic.) 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5b-6a
b
CH 8 [989^9-990*8] 508a; CH 9 [992 29~ 9] ft
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
510c-d; BK n, CH 3 [995*15-20] 513d; BK in, Spheres, BK i, 510a-b
en 2 [996*21-36] 514d-515a; BK iv, CH i 522a; 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 863b-872b passim
BK vi, CH i 547b,d-548c; BK xi, CH i [io59b i5- 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH 3 lOd-lla
b
21 587c-d; CH 3 [io6i 29- i2] 589c-d; CH 4
tt
]
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 30 26b-c
589d-590a; CH 7 592b-593a; BK xn, CH 8 / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 16, 644d-645d;
b b
[io73 i~7] 603d / Sow/, BK i, CH i [403 io-i6] CH 38-39 654b-655b
632d 23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 56b-57a; 59b-c;
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 8 [1142*12-19] PART n, 164c; PART iv, 268c-d; 269b
391b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a 27d; BK iv, 278b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, o i, A i, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 70a-d
REP 2 3b 4a; Q 7, A 3, ANS 32c-33c; Q 44, A i, 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY,
REP 3 238b-239a; o 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c 190b-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART n-n, Q 9, 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a-b;
A 2, REP 3 424b-425a; PART in, 0.7, A 12, REP 46a-c
i 754c-755c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, n 2a-3b; iv 5a-7d; xiv,
23HoBBLs: Leviathan, PART 56b-57a; 58a-c;
i, 29a-b / Discourse, PART i, 43b-c; PART n,
59b-c; 72a d; PART iv, 267a-b; 268c-269a 46c-48b / Geometry, BK i, 297a-b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 31 SPINO/A: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 370b-c
190b-c 33 PASCAL: Pensecs, 1-2 171a 172b / Gcomcttical
30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 46a-b Demonstration, 442a-446b
31 DESCARTLS: Rules, n, 2d-3b; iv 5a-7d; vm, 34 NEWTON: Principles, lb-2a
12b 13a; xiv, 31c 32a / Discourse, PART n, 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 97a-b
46c-47a / Meditations, 70b-c; i, 76b-c / Ob- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 46a-c; 211c-218d
jections and Replies, 128d-129a; 169c-170a esp 215a-c / Judgement, 551a-552c
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 445a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 47b-48d
34 NEWTON: Principles, la 2a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a 883a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in,
SECT 29 322c-323a; CH xn, SECT 7 13 360b-
f. The and exactitude of mathemati-
certainty
362d passim cal knowledge: the a priori foundations
of arithmetic and geometry
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV
48 470d-471c 7 PLATO: Philebus, 633b-634b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b- 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, en 27
337a 119b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [982*25-28]
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-9a; 15c-16c; 17d-19a; 500c; BK n, CH 3 513c-d; BK xin, CH 3 609a-
211c-218d csp 215d-217a; 243c-248d passim, 610a
BK b
csp 248c / Practical Reason,
244d-245a, 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, i, CH 3 [io94 i2-28]
295b-d; 311d-313d / Pref. Metaphysical Ele- 339d-340a
ments of Ethics, 376c-d 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a 814b
6-9 325a-326b; CH xn, SECT 1-8 358c-360c BK VII, DEFINITIONS, 1-2 127a; BK XI, DEFINI-
passim, esp SECT 7 360b-c; en xm, SECT 3 TIONS, i 301a
364a 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811d-812b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 118 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-b
436b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 38
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 654b-c
20 458a-b; SECT vn, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7,
xn, DIV 131 508d-509a A 3, ANS 32c-33c; A 4, ANS 33d-34c; Q 30, A i,
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 118b-119a REP 4 167a-168a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-8d; 15c-16c; 31b-d; 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 72a-d
35b-36a; 46a-b; 68a-69c; 86b-c; HOa; 211c- 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 46a-c
218d / Practical Reason, 295b-d; 312c-d; 31 DESCARTES: Rules, n, 3a-b; iv, 7a-b; vi 8a-
330d-331a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of lOa; xiv, 30d-33b / Discourse, PART n, 47b-d;
Ethics, 376c-d / Science of Right, 399a-b / PART iv, 52d-53a / Meditations, i, 76b-c /
Judgement, 551a-552a Objections and Replies, 217b-d / Geometry,
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBLR 31, 103c-104a; NUMBER BK n, 304a 306a; 316a-b
85, 257d-258d
34 NEWTON: Principles, la b
43 MILL: Liberty, 283d-284b / Utilitarianism, 35 LOCKL: Human Understanding, BK n, en xn,
445b-c SECT 3-5 147d-148b
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of'Chemistry, PREF, la; 2b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 118-132
45 Fou RI E R Theory of Heat, 1 73a- b
: 436b-439c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 175a-176a; 874a-878a; 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV
879b-882a 131 508d-509a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 46a-c; 62a d; 68a-69c;
Id. The ideal of a universal ma the sis: the unifi-
2llc213a
cation of arithmetic and geometry 53 JAMES: Psychology, 874a-878a esp 874a
7 PLATO: Meno, 180d-182c / Theaetetus, 515a-c
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [4 2o-5*i \\ 9a-c
2a. The apprehension of mathematical objects:
Posterior BK CH 103c-d / Meta-
by intuition, abstraction, imagination,
/ Analytics, i, 7
construction; the forms of time and space
physics, BK n,3 513c-d; BK vi, CH i
CH
ft
[io26 i8--27] 548b; BK xi, en 7 [io64 b 6-9] 7 PLATO: Meno, 180b-183c / Republic, BK vi,
592d-593a; UK xm, CH 2 [1077*9-10] 608b; 387b-d; BK vn, 393a-394a / Theaetetus,
CH 3 [i<>77 b i7-23] 609a 535b-c
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK n 30a-40b; BK v 81a- 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 18
98b; BK vn, DEFINITIONS, 16-19 127b lllb-c / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 9 [ic>5i 2$-tt
15] 514c; CH 5 520c-521b passim; BK vn, CH 2 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16a-c; 17d-18d; 24d-25b;
b a b
[io28 i8-28] 551a-b; BK xi, CH 3 [io6i 29- 4] 31b d; 35b~36a; 46a-c; 55c-56a; 62a d; 68a-
589c 69c; 86b-c; 87b-c; HOa; 211c-212a / Practical
56 THE GREAT IDEAS 2b to 2c
53 IAMES: Psychology, 302a-304b; 549a-552a esp 458a-b; SECT xn, DIV 122 505c-d; DIV 124-125
552b [fn ij; 869a-870a; 874b-878a passim 506a-507a esp DIV 125, 507b [fn i]
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16a-c; 24a-33d esp 31d-
2b. The being of mathematical objects: their 32c;35b-36a; 46a-c; 62a-d;87b-c; 91c-d;94b-
real, ideal, or mental existence 95a; 211c-213a esp 211c-212a / Practical Reason,
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228b-230c; 242c-243c / Re- 295b-d; 312c-d / Judgement, 551a-553c
public, BK vi, 387b c; BK vn, 391b-398c /
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 183a b
Theaetetus, 535b-c; 541b-d / Sophist, 562c / 53 JAMLS: Psychology, 874a-878a esp 875a-876b;
Phtlebus, 636b-c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b 880b881a
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, 01141 [49 32-
b 2c. Kinds of quantity: continuous and discrete
37] 68c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, en 10 J76 39-
CH ciu8 [81*40- quantities; the problem of the irrational
77*3] 105d; 13 [79*6-10] 108c;
b
vi, CH 6 [i43 n -33]
b BK 7 PLATO: Meno, 180d-181c / Republic, BK vin,
lllb-c
5) / Topics,
197b-c / Physics, BK u, en 2 [i93b 23-i94*n] 403a-d / Parmenides, 499d-500c / Theaetetus,
270a-c; BK in, CH 5 [204*8-34] 282a-b; BK iv, 515a-c
CH i
b
[2o8 i9-24] 287b-c; en
b
[2i9 5-8] 299b; u 8 ARISTOTLE: CH 5 [3 b 32~4*9] 8a-b;
Categories,
b
CH 14 [223*21-29] 303a / Heavens, BK in, CH 6 [4 CH 8 [io b 26 -11*14] 15d -
23-5*i4] 9a-c;
CH i
[299*1-300*19] 390b-391c; CH 7 [306*1- 16b / Physics, BK iv, CH 4 [2ii*29-b 4] 290c;
b
2] 397b-d /'Metaphysics, BK i, CH 5 (985 b 22- CH 5 [2i2 b 3~6] 291d; BK v, CH 3 [227*10-34]
b
986*21] 503d-504b; CH 6 [987 io-34] 505c- 307d-308b; BK vi, CH 1-2 312b,d-315d /
cn8 b b
506a; [989 29-99o*32] 508a c; CH 9 [9$i Heavens, BK i, cn i [268*6-11] 359a; BK in,
b
9~992
b
i8] 509d-511a; BK in, CH i [995 i3- CH i [299a i-3oo i9] 390b-391c; CH 7 [306*26-
tt
b b
18] 514a; [996*13-15] 514c; CH 2 [996*22-36] 2] 397c-d; CH 8 [3o6 i7-26] 398a / Generation
S14d-515a; [997^2-998*19] 516b-d; CH 5 and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 [3i5 b 25~3i7*i7]
b b
411b 413a; BK 11, CH 10 [337^2-34] 439b-c
[iooi 26]-cii 6 [ioo2 25] 520c-521c; BK vn,
CH 2 [io28b i8-28] 551a-b; en 10 [io35 b / Metaphysics, BK i, en 2 [983*11-20] 501b-c;
32-1036*12] 559b-c; CH
b
[io36 32-i 037*4] u BK n, en 2 [994^3-26] 513a; BK in, CH 4
b
560b-c; BK xi, CH i [io59 2-i3] 587b-c; CH 2 [100^7-25] 520b-c; BK v, CH 6 [1015^5-1016*
b b b
[io6o 36- i9] 588c-d; CH 3 [io6i*29- 4] 589c; 17] 536b-c; [ioi6 6~32] 537a-b; CH 13 [1020*
ft
b
Novum Otganum, BK i, APH 59 112b-c 29^4] 589c; cn 4 [io6i i7-25] 589d-590a; CH
31 DESCARTES: Rules la-40a,c csp n 2a-3b, iv,
b
7 [io63 36-io64 9] 592b; BK xni, CH 2 [io77b
ft
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 370b-c 11 EUCLID: Elements la-396b esp BK i, DEFINI-
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 1-3 171a-172b / Geometrical TIONS-COMMON NOTIONS la~2a
Demonstration, 430a-434a; 442a-446b / Arith- 11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, DEFI-
metical Triangle, 451b-452a; 458b-459b; 464a- NITIONS-ASSUMPTIONS 404a-b / Spirals, 484b
466a / Quadrature ofthe Parabola, 527a-b / Method,
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK 11, LEMMA 2 and 569b-570a; PROP i 571a-572b csp 572b
SCHOL 168a-170a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica PART i, Q 85, t
280*12] 371 b-c / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 9 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK vm, CH 14 [i63 b2}-28]
[1051*22-34] 577b-c 222b
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, POSTULATES, 1-3 2a; 11 EUCLID: Elements, BK vii-ix 127a-190b
PROP i 2b-3a 11 ARCHIMEDES: Measurement of a Circle, PROP
23 HOKBES: leviathan, PART iv, 267a~b 3 448b-451b / Conoids and Spheroids, LEM-
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv-xvin 28a-39d / MA 455b-456a; LEMMA to PROP 2 456b-457b
Geometry, BK n, 304a-306a; 316a-b; BK in, / Spirals, PROP 10-11 488a-489b / Sand-
331b-332b Reckoner 520a-526b
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 373a b 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 814b-821d
34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 990a b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 31b-d; 68a-69c; 86b-c; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56a; 58a-b
91c-d; 94b-95a; 211c-215a; 217c-d / Science 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY,
of Right, 399a-b / Judgement, 551a-553c 193bc
53 JAMES: Psychology, 673b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xvi 33d-35c; xvm 36b-
39d / Discourse, PART 11, 46d; 47b-d /
3c. Analysis and synthesis: function and vari-
Geometry, BK i, 295a-296a
able 33 PASCAL: Arithmetical Triangle 447a-473b esp
b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 3 [ni2 2o-24] 451b-452a, 458b-459b, 464a-466a / Corre-
358d spondence with Fermat 474a-487a passim
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK n, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH
PROP i 434b-435b; PROP 3-7 437a-443b / xvn, SECT ii 378b
Method, 569b-570a; PROP i, 572b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK ii, PROP 44-47 710b- 19 410c; SECT 121-122 436d-437c
CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 59
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18d; 68a-69c; 212d- 47b-d / Geometry 295a-353b esp BK in, 33 2 b-
213a; 217c-d 341b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 874b-876b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xiv, 590a-c
4b. The operations of geometry 4d. The method of exhaustion: the theory of
7 PLATO: Meno, 180b 183c / Republic, BK vi, limits and the calculus
4c. The use of proportions and equations 5. The applications of mathematics to physical
phenomena: the utility of mathematics
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, en 17
b
[99*8-10] 135a / Topics, BK vin, CH 3 [i58 29- 7 PLATO: Republic, BK vn, 391b-398c; BK vin,
351 215c 403b-d; BK ix, 424d-425b / Timaeus, 448b-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 6 [1106*26-36] 450a; 453b-454a / Statesman, 585a-b / Phile-
351d-352a; BK v, CH 3 [n3i a3O-b i5] 378d- bus, 633c-d / Laws, BK v, 691d-692a; 695c-
379b 697a; BK vn, 728b-730d
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK v-vi 81a-126a esp BK v, 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 9
DEFINITIONS, 5 81a, 7 81a-b, BK vi, PROP 23 [76-3-25] 104b-d; CH 13 [78^1-79*16] 108b-c;
117a-b; BK vn, DEFINITIONS, 20 127b; PROP CH 27 [87*32-33] 119b / Physics, BK n, CH 2
11-14 134b-136a; PROP 17-22 137a-140a; [194*7-11] 270b-c; BK vn, CH 5 333a-d /
PROP 33 145a-146a; BK vin, PROP 1-13 150a- Heavens, BK ii, CH 14 [297*4-7] 388c/ Meteor-
161b; PROP 18-27 163b-170a; BK ix, PROP 8-13 ology, BK in, CH 3 477a-478a; CH 5 480a-
b
174a-180a; PROP 15-19 181a-183b; PROP 35-36 481c/ Metaphysics, BKIII, CH2 [997 i2-998 a i9]
188b-190b; BK x, PROP 5-9 195a-198b; PROP 516b-d
ii 199b; PROP 14 201a-202a; BK xi, PROP 25 9 ARISTOTLE: Gait of Animals, CH 9 247a-248a
320b-321b; PROP 32-34 327b-332b; PROP 37 / Politics, BK v, CH 12 [1316*1-17] 518d-519a
335b-336a; BK xu 338a-368b 11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes 502a<
11 ARCHIMEDES: Conoids and Spheroids, PROP 4 519b / Floating Bodies 538a-560b
459b-460b 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812d-813a
11 APOLLONIUS: Conies 603a-804b passim 14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252a-255a
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I-H, 821d-831d; 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
BK n, 841c-848d Spheres, BK i, 510b
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1012b- 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 964b-965a
1014b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 3-6 27c-
31 DESCARTES: Rules, vi 8a-10a; xiv, 28b-29a; 28c / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 29 650d-
xvm-xxi 36b-40a,c / Discourse, PART ii, 651c
60 THE GREAT IDEAS 5a to 5b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A
(5. The applications of mathematics to physical
5, REP 2 17c-18b; Q 10, A 6, ANS and REP 4 45c-
phenomena: the utility of mathematics.) 46d; Q 66, A 4, REP 3 348d-349d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 35, 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK iv, 85c-89c; BK v,
A 8, ANS 779c-780c 92a-95a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART n -n, Q 9, 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
A 2, REP 3 424b-425a 136d-137c; 148d-149c; 164a-166c; THIRD DAY,
23 HOBDES: Leviathan, PART i, 73b; PART iv, 207d-208c
267a-b; 268c-d 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 286c-288c
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv, 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 44-48
278b 175d-188b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131d- 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv, 31b-33b / Geometry,
132a; SECOND DAY-FOURTH DAY 178a-260a,c BK i, 296a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 46b-c 33 PASCAL: Great Experiment 382a-389b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 7a-b; xiv, 31b-d / 34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b; LAWS or MOTION,
Discourse, PART i, 43b-c / Objections and Re- SCHOL, 20a-22a; BK n, GENERAL SCHOL 211b-
plies, 169c-170a / Geometry, BK n, 322b-331a 219a; PROP 40, SCHOL 239a-246b
34 NhwroN: Principles, ,la-2a; DEF vui 7b-8a; 34 HUYCJLNS: Light, CH i, 554b-557b
COROL n 15a-16b; BK i, PROP 69, SCHOL, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xvi,
131a; BK in 269a-372a SECT 8 167c
34 HUYGENS: Light 551a-619b 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 14b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 120 42 KANT: Judgement, 497a-498d esp 498b-d
436d; SECT i }i 439b c 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 14a-c; 33b-36a; 41a-44d; PART in, 87d-90a;
27 460c-d 91a-95a; 96b 103b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 78b; PART in, 94b- 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 184b-185b; 249a-
103a 251b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 661c-662c 50 MARX: Capital, 20b
42 KAN r: Pure Reason, 68a-69c / Practical Reason,
300d [fn i]; 330d-331a / Judgement, 551a-552a 5b. Mathematical physics: the mathematical
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-173b; I75b; structure of nature
177a-251b esp 183a-184a 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 448b-4SOa; 453b-454a;
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 831b-c 458a-460b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d; BK 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 9
xiv, 589c-590c; 609b; EPILOGUE n, 694d-695c 104b-d; CH 13 [78^1-79*16] 108b-c / Physics,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 348a-359a; 882a-884b BK ii, CH 2 [194*7-11] 270b-c / Heavens, BK
in, CH i [299*1-300*19] 390b-391c / Meta-
5a. The art of measurement BK CH 9 -b
SlOc-d; BK n,
physics, i, [992*29 9]
b
5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [992-1020] 555a-b CH 513d; BK in, CH 2 [997 i2-
3 [995*15-17]
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 70b-c; BK CH b
iv, 998*19] 516b-d; BK xn, 8 [io73 i-i7]
139b-c 603d-604a; BK xin, CH 3 609a-610a
7 PLATO: Republic, BK x, 431b-d / Statesman, 11 NIOOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812b-d; 813d-
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The relation of mathematics to other arts and sciences, /^ASTRONOMY 2c; MECHANICS 3;
METAPHYSICS 3b; PHILOSOPHY ib; PHYSICS ib, 3; SCIENCE 5c.
The quality of necessity in mathematical truth, and for the theory of the a priori foundations
of arithmetic and geometry in the transcendental forms of space and time, see NECESSITY
AND CONTINGENCY 4d; SENSE ic; SPACE 43; TIME 6c.
The controversy over the character and existence of the objects of mathematics, see BEING
?d(3); QUANTITY i; SPACE 5.
The discussion of the mental processes by which mathematical objects are apprehended, see
IDEA la, 2f-2g;KNOWLEDGE 63(3), 6c(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION la, 6c(2)-6d;
SENSE 53; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2b.
The consideration of the specific objects of mathematical inquiry, such as numbers and
figures, ratios and proportions, continuous and discontinuous quantities, finite and infinite
quantities, see INFINITY 3a~3c;QUANTITY ib~4c, 7; RELATION id, 53(3); SPACE 3a~3C.
The method or logic, see DEFINITION 6a; HYPOTHESIS 3;
general theory of mathematical
JUDGMENT 8b-8c; LOGIC 43; REASONING 6b; TRUTH 4c; and for the particular techniques
of arithmetic, geometry, algebra, and calculus, see MECHANICS 3b-3d; QUANTITY ib,
6b; RELATION 53(3); SPACE 3d.
Other discussions of applied mathematics or mathematical physics, and of the role of meas-
urement, see ASTRONOMY 2c; MECHANICS 3; PHYSICS 3, 4d; QUANTITY 3d(i), 6-6a, 6c;
SCIENCE 5c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
SCHOPI NMAUhR. The World as Will and Idea, VOL 11, Science and Method, BK i, en 2-3; BK n, en }
.
RICMVNN. Vbcr die Ilypothcsen wclchc do Geometric N. R. (^\\ii'Bi L. What Is Scicmt'V* en 6-7
i
INTRODUCTION
we came out of the church," says who assert its existence postulate it as a sub-
A^TER
Roswcll in his Life ofJohnson, "we stood stratum or support for the sensible qualities
talking foi some time together of Bishop Berke- they perceive.
ley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non- Thequestion, therefore, is whether such a
existence of matter, and that everything in the substratum is a
necessary or an unnecessary hy-
universe is merely ideal. 1 obseived that though pothesis. Berkeley does not deny the existence
we are satisfied his doctrine is not tiue, it is im- of beings which cannot be directly sensed. He
possible to refute never forget the
it. I shall affirms the existence of the human spirit or
alacrity with which Johnson answeicd, striking mind, of minds other than his o\\n, and the
his foot with mighty fotte against a large stone, spiritual being of God. These must be inferred
till he rebounded from it, T lefule it thus.'" to exist in order to explain the phenomena of
But Berkeley's argument anticipated Dr. our sensible experience and the experience of
Johnson's style of refutation. "I do not argue," our own activities in thinking, imagining, will-
he says, "against the existence of any one thing ing. If, in addition, the existence of matter or a
that we can apprehend either by sense or reflex- material substance were necessary to explain
ion. That the things 1 see with my eyes and the phenomena, Berkeley would not object to
touch with my hands do exist, icallv exist, I affirming its existence by inference, even if it
make not the least question. The only thing could in no way be directly perceived.
whose existenc e I deny is that \\h\chphtlosophers His argument therefore involves, first, a
call Matter 01 corporeal substance. And in do- denial of Locke's distinction between primary
ing this there is no damage clone to the rest of and secondary qualities. Supposing it to be gen-
mankind, who, 1dare say, will never miss it/' erally agreed that colors, sounds, odors have no
The rest of mankind does need to be in- actual existence except in the perceiving mind,
structed, however, that when they use the he denies that perceptible figure, size, or mo-
word "matter," they speak of nothing. They tion can exist otherwise. "It ha\mg been shown
may from careless habit suppose they arc refer- th.it noneen of these can possibly exist other-
e\
ring to the most obvious something there is in wise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives
the world the solid, massy, concrete stulf of them, it follows that we have no longer any
which tangible, visible, movable, and moving reason to suppose the being of Matter."
things aic made. Of them, Berkeley would ask Matter is not needed as a substratum or sup-
how they know such stuff exists. It is not itself port for the qualities we peiceive. This is the
perceptible. second mam point in Berkeley's argument.
Weperceive a variety of qualities colors, "Though we give the materialists their external
shapes, temperatures, textures, sizes, or exten- bodies, they by their own confession are never
sionsbut these, Berkeley argues, have their the nearer k'.owmg how our ideas are produced ;
being in being perceived. Even if certain of these since they own themselves unable to compre-
sensible qualities, sometimes called "primary," hend in what manner body can act upon spirit,
such as figuie, or weight, arc supposed to
size, or how it is should imprint any idea
possible it
belong to bodies when they are not actually in the mind. Hence it is evident that the pro-
being sensed, they are not matter, but only Us duction of ideas or sensations in our minds can
properties. Matter itself is not sensible. Those be no reason why we should suppose Matter or
63
64 THE GREAT IDEAS
corporeal substances, since that is acknowl- the existence of spiritual substances, they may,
edged to remain equally inexplicable with or of course, define the nature of these immaterial
without this supposition." things differently, and differently interpret
their relation to the realm of matter. But, as
BERKELEY'S ARGUMENTS against matter, which theories of matter, their principal difference
occupy the greater part of his Principles of Hu- way in which they conceive the
consists in the
man Knowledge, may not have the same force being of bodies, material substances, or the
when they are applied against different theories bodily mode of substance.
of matter. Berkeley seems to regard his attack In the conceptions of Descartes and Locke,
on materialism as the refutation of an error at for example, it is matter which gives actuality
the root of skepticism, atheism, and irreligion. to sensible bodies. We
have "no other idea or
He also thinks materialism creates difficulties notion of matter," Locke writes, "but some-
for the sciences. But are all affirmations of mat- thing wherein those many sensible qualities,
ter to be lumped together as materialism in the which affect our sense, do subsist." The entire
same sense! Are Aristotle, Plotinus, Descartes, substance of sensible bodies consists of matter.
Spinoza, and Locke materialists in the same All their properties derive from the essence or
sense as Lucretius, Hobbes, and perhaps Marx? nature of matter. But in the conceptions of
Does it make no difference whether bodies are Aristotle and Plotinus, bodies would not exist at
said to be the only real existences, or whether, they were composed only of matter, for
all if
in addition to bodies, immaterial substances or matter is no more than a capacity for being, not
spiritual beings are also said to exist ?
something which by itself actually is. Sensible
Does it make no difference how matter is bodies derive their being and all their attributes
conceived whether as a self-subsistent sub- from the forms which matter assumes when its
stance in its own right, capable of existing apart potentialities are actualized. Matter totally de-
from any qualities except extension and motion void of form isnot the nothing Berkeley calls it,
which belong to its very essence, or merely as but it is so near to nothing that Plotinus says it
one factor in the constitution of bodies, the is "more
plausibly called a non- being ... a bare
factor of potentiality which, as will be presently aspiration towards substantial existence."
explained, has no existence apart from the These theories of matter or corporeal being
forms which actualize it? Are skepticism, athe- seem to be as contrary to one another as to-
ism, andirreligion to be associated with all gether they are contrary to Berkeley's doctrine.
affirmations of matter, in view of the fact that Yet each of the two middle positions leans
theologians like Augustine and Aquinas seem to toward one of the opposite extremes.
think that a sound view of matter supports the The conception of matter seems to be very
truths of religion against the errors of the much the same in the complete materialism of
materialists? Lucretius and Hobbes and in the view of Des-
There seem to be, in short, three distinct cartes, Spinoza, and Locke. In the former, only
positions to which Berkeley's blanket denial of bodies exist. In the latter, bodies do not com-
matter stands opposed. The diametrically op- prise the whole of existence, but matter is the
posite view seems to be the blanket denial of whole substance of bodies. The separation of
anything except bodies, or of anything which body and mind, or matter and spirit, into dis-
cannot be reduced to a property or function of tinct substances, or modes of substance, leaves
matter. The atomism of Lucretius, discussed matter the same kind of stuff that it is in a
in the chapter on ELEMENT, may be taken as world which admits of no other reality. Atom-
representative of this view, though Engels ism, furthermore, may be common to both
would insist that materialism can be dialectical theories, at least to the extent that it is held
rather than atomistic or mechanical. that the complex bodies we perceive are com-
Between the two extremes, there appear to posed of minute and insensible particles. Un-
be two middle positions which are alike insofar Locke may not insist upon the
like Lucretius,
as both affirm the immaterial as well as the absolute indivisibility of the particles, or upon
material. Although they are alike in asserting the eternity of the uncreated atoms of matter;
CHAPTER 53: MATTER 65
but he, like Hobbes and Newton, carries the ally agreed upon. Two bodies or two distinct
division of the familiar bodies of sense-expe- quantities of matter cannot occupy the same
rience down to parts which cannot be perceived place at the same time. A
body may not be im-
and yet have, in a way, a more ultimate reality penetrable in the sense of being indivisible, but
as units of matter than the complex bodies they so long as it remains the whole that it is, it offers
constitute. resistance to other bodies tending to move into
"Had we senses
acute enough to discern the the place it
occupies.
minute particles of bodies, and the real con- There is another connection between matter
stitution on which their sensible qualities de- and quantity. To those who ask what makes two
pend," Locke writes, "I doubt not but that otherwise identical things two in number or
would produce quite different ideas in us; and what is involved in the merely numerical dif-
that which is now the yellow color of gold, ference of things alike in every other respect
would then disappear, and instead of it we the usual answer is in terms of matter. Matter is
should see an admirable texture of parts, of a traditionally spoken of as "the principle of in-
certain size and figure." dividuation." Aquinas, for example, holds that
At the other extreme, Berkeley's complete angels, unlike physical substances, cannot differ
denial of matter has less in common with the from one another as do numerically distinct in-
view of Aristotle, Plotinus, Augusline, and Aqui- dividuals. Because they are immaterial,
they
nas than the theoiy of Descartes, Spinoza, and can differ only as do species or kinds. "Such
Locke has with the materialism of Lucretius things as agree in species," he writes, "but differ
and Hobbes. They would appear to be close in number, agree in form, but are distinguished
enough, for one seems to hold that matter is materially. If, therefore, the angels be not com-
almost non-being and the other that matter is posed of matter and form, it follows that it is
simply nothing at all. But where Berkeley de- impossible for two angels to be of one species;
nies any role to matter, Aristotle and those who just as it would be impossible for there to be
take his view affirm matter to be an indispen- several whitenesses apart, or several humanities,
sable factor in the constitution of physical since whitenesses are not several, except in so
things. They do not question the reality of bod- far as they are in several substances."
iesor their existence apart from mind. On both The way in which matter is related to in-
of these points they are as opposed to Berke- dividual differences can be exemplified in works
Berkeley rather than toward the other extreme may differ in no other discernible respect than
in one respect. Where Berkeley denies the that they are two of the same kind. Their
existence of matter, they deny its substantiality. ttvoness seems to be somehow related to the fact
Where Berkeley no being, they
says matter has
that each consists of a distinct quantity of mat-
it has the lowest grade of being on the ter. But it may be asked how two units of mat-
say
very verge of not being! ter have the distinction of being two while they
differ in no other respect. One answer to this
IN SPITE OF ALL the differences noted, the idea difficult question is that their distinction con-
of matter has a certain constant meaning sists in their
occupying different places. In the
Platonic theory of the origin of many particu-
throughout the tradition of the great books.
It is generally associated with the idea of lars all
participating in the same form, diversity
of place seems to play the role which matter
quantity, and especially the basic magnitudes,
such as time, space, and mass. Sometimes it is plays for Aristotle and Aquinas.
said that the essence of matter itself is exten- Plato's doctrine of the receptacle, which is
sion; sometimes that bodies not matter itself discussed in the chapter on FORM, is sometimes
have the property of tridimensionality. But interpreted by conceiving the receptacle as
which is or has matter in it
in either case that space, and sometimes by conceiving it as mat-
necessarily occupies space.
ter. The receptacle, it is said in the Timaeus, is
The manner of that occupation is also gener- that which, "while receiving all
things, never
66 THE GREAT IDEAS
departs at all from her own nature and never It is
supposed that some of the qualities which
in any way, or at any time, assumes a form like we sense in bodies are actually in them whether
that of any of the things which enter into her." we sense them or not such properties as size,
This, according to Plotinus, means that "its one figure, weight, motion. Other sensible qualities,
form is an invincible formlessness.'* such as colors, odors, temperatures, or sounds,
But Plotinus, who combines Plato's doctrine are supposed to be effects produced by the mo-
of the receptacle and the forms with Aristotle's tions of material particles acting on the sensitive
theory of potentiality and actuality, holds that apparatus of animals. This distinction between
it is matter, not space, which is "the receptacle what Locke calls "primary and secondary quali-
and nurse of all generation." He says that ties" found also in Lucretius and Descartes-
is more
"recipient and nurse" is a better description fully considered in the chapters on
of matter than the term "mother," for that QUALITY and SENSE, but here it calls attention
term "is used by those who think of a mother as to the problem of how matter, devoid of certain
matter to the offspring, as a container only, sensible qualities, causes these qualities to arise.
giving nothing to them." In his own view, mat- For Lucretius the peculiar difficulty of the
ter is more than space or mere receptivity. He is problem seems to lie in the fact that the sensi-
not female to full effect, female in receptivity functions of matter in motion. How, then, does
solutely intangible or imponderable, but that, moving particles on the bodily sense-organs,
because of the limitation in our senses, it is im- they do not belong to the world of matter at all,
perceptible to us. On this interpretation it but to the realm of spirit. How, then, do the
would then seem possible to say that all bodily motions of matter cause effects which exist
existence is sensible existence. only in the immaterial domain of mind ?
But if we ask about the sensibility of matter These questions indicate some of the prob-
itself,rather than of bodies large or small, lems of matter as an object, condition, or cause
questions arise which are more difficult to of knowledge. They also show how the nature
solve. On one theory of matter, matter devoid of the problem varies with different concep-
of form is as insensible as it is unintelligible,
yet tions of matter, both in itself and in its relation
forms which are not material, that is, not in to mind. There are still other problems which
matter, are also insensible but not unintelligi- confront those theories of mind which separate
ble. On the contrary, they are regarded as more reason or intellect from the sensitive faculty.
perfectly intelligible than embodied forms. In such theories the consideration of mat-
How, then, does matter which is itself insensi- mind goes beyond the question
ter's relation to
ble cause the forms which it assumes to become of the origin of sensations. It takes sensations
sensible when they are materialized ? and images as somehow the functions of living
The theory of matter which does not regard matter the acts of the various sense-organs
it as a co-principle with form seems to be con- and the brain. But sensations and images, be-
fronted with a different problem of sensibility. cause they are acts of corporeal organs, have the
CHAPTER 53: MATTER 67
same limitation which belongs to everything the atoms, as in Lucretius and Newton; or, as in
material. As matter is said to cause the individ- Spinoza, may be established by the uncreated
it
uality or numerical diversity of bodies, so is it and eternal nature of God. "By body," Spinoza
said to make sensations and images "particular writes, "I understand a mode which expresses in
intentions of the mind" capable of
that is, a certain and determinate manner the essence of
representing only particular objects, not gener- God in so far as He is considered as the thing
al kinds or classes. Hence such theories face the extended."
problem of the relation of sensations and images In the modern development of the science of
to the "universal intentions of the mind," its mechanics the law of the conservation of mat-
general concepts or abstract ideas. ter seems to be another expression of the same
insight. "We may lay it down as an incontest-
ONE MORE TRADITIONAL meaning of matter re- able axiom," Lavoisier writes, "that in all the
mains to be mentioned. The sciences of physics operations of art and nature, nothing is created;
or mechanics are concerned with change or mo- an equal quantity of matter exists both before
tion. They are not concerned with mutability and after the experiment." What appears to be
in general, but with the kind of mutability that the destruction of a body is merely the trans-
is manifested by material things. Material formation of its matter into another physical
things are never conceived as unmovable or un- condition, without loss of mass unless there is an
chapter on CHANGE) that matter and form are herent in the material world, the mutability of
together principles of change in changing sub- bodies, as well as the immutability of matter,
stances,it is neither matter nor form but the seems to be differently conceived according to
substance composite of matter and form which different conceptions of matter. The difference
changes. Those who think that the motions of between the physics of Aristotle and the phys-
the physical world are without beginning and icsof Descartes can be expressed in terms of
end, attribute a similar eternity to matter and contrary definitions of motion, or divergent
conceive it as imperishable. Thetheologians notions of causality, but neither of these differ-
who think that God can annihilate whatever ences is
fully intelligible apart from the vari-
He creates, do not hold that mattcris indestruct- ance of these theories from one another on the
ible,but they nevertheless attribute everlast- nature of matter.
ing endurance to matter in God's plan. Aquinas, When matter is an actual substance, whose es-
for example, in his treatise on the end of the sence is extension and whose chief
property is
world, describes the final conflagration which local motion, the principles of physics are me-
will purge the material universe but leave its chanical. The laws of mechanics, with time,
matter in existence under the forms of the ele- space,and mass as their fundamental variables,
ments and the heavenly bodies. "The world seem to have a universality adequate for de-
will be renewed," he writes, "in such a way as scribing all natural phenomena. All changes in
to throw off all corruption and remain forever material things are either the local motions of
at rest." Hence nothing can be "the subject of bodies or the result of the local motions of their
that renewal, unless it be a subject of incorrup- parts.Motions are determined in their magni-
tion," such as "the heavenly bodies, the ele- tude and direction by the impressed force which
ments, and man." one body exerts upon another and the resistance
On other theories of matter the fact that mo- of that other. Motion is itself completely ac-
tion is
regarded as an property of bod-
intrinsic tual, as matter is; and the only type of cause to
ies seems to be similarly consistent with the which physics need appeal is the efficient cause,
notion that matter itself is immutable or inde- that is, the push or pull of one body upon
structible. This indestructibility may be con- another.
ceived in terms of the absolute indivisibility of Physicists who share this Conception of mat-
68 THE GREAT IDEAS
ter may not agree, as Descartes and Newton do respects in which the substance is actually de-
not, in their mechanical formulations. They terminate), and lacks certain forms which it can
may or may not be atomists. They may, like assume (the respects in which the substance is
Lucretius, think that local motion is an abso- both indeterminate and potential).
lutely intrinsic property of the eternal parti- As the chapter on ART indicates, Aristotle
cles; or, like Descartes and Newton, they may frequently uses artistic production to afford a
think that God first imparted motion to matter simple illustration of his theory of matter and
at the world's creation. They may hold that all form as principles of change. When a man sets
subsequent motions issue therefrom in a con- out to make a bed, he chooses material, such as
tinuous chain of cause and effect. But when wood, which can be shaped in a certain way.
matter is the only factor in the constitution of The same wood could have been made into a
bodies, and one body differs from another only chair or a table.With respect to these various
in its quantitative determinations, the conse- possible determinations in structure, the wood
quence for physical theory seems to be one or is itself indeterminate and determinable.
another sort of mechanical formulation. Before the artist has worked on
it produc-
When matter is
nothing more than a body's tively, the wood is both privation
in a state of
potentiality for change, and when neither what and potentiality with regard to the form of a
the body is nor how it changes can be explained bed, a chair, or a table. The transformation
seems to be constructed in other than mechani- ing certain potentialities in the material for
cal terms. Itsconcepts and principles resemble forms or determinations which the material at
those of biology. It finds natural tendencies or the moment lacks. When the bed is made, the
desires, and ends or final causes, in the motion wood or matter which is now actually in the
of inert as well as animate bodies. form of a bed may still have the potentiality
Central to Aristotle's physics are his theory for being remade into a chair or table.
of the four causes, discussed in the chapter on The wood, of course, remains actually wood
CAUSE, and theory of the four types of
his throughout these artificial changes, as it does
change, discussed in the chapter on CHANGE. not when it suffers the natural change of com-
But even more fundamental is his definition of bustion. This indicates that though the wood
motion as the actualization of that which is
may be called matter or material by the artist,
according to Aristotle, you remove its capacity or bronze, as the material principle. But in the
for physical change. Remove form, and you re- analysis of substantial change, when matter it-
move its existence, for nothing can exist with- selfchanges from being one kind of matter to
out being actual or determinate in certain re- being another in the coming to be or perishing
spects. When a thing changes physically, it of composite substances, the material principle
loses certain determinate characteristics and must be pure matter matter totally devoid of
goes on to say, "is the matter in each." The matter in a condition of absolute indeterminacy
matter of an existing substance is thus con- and pure potentiality.
ceived as that which has certain forms (the Referring to this ultimate substratum as "the
CHAPTER 53: MATTER 69
underlying nature," Aristotle says that it "is an mon, and signate or individual; common, such
object of scientific knowledge by analogy. For and bones; and individual, as this flesh
as flesh
as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the and these bones." When the intellect forms
bed, so is the matter and the formless before re- concepts of different kinds of physical sub-
ceiving form to anything which has form, and stances,it abstracts "from the individual sensi-
so also is the underlying nature to substance, ble matter, but not from the common sensible
i.e., the actually existing." matter." In defining the nature of man, for
example, we abstract, Aquinas says, from "this
ARISTOTLE'S DEFINITION of matter as "the pri- fleshand these bones, which do not belong to
mary substratum of each thing, from which it the species as such, but to the individual"; but
comes to be without qualification, and which we do not abstract from the fact that man, con-
persists in the result" not only signifies an ob- sisting of body and soul, is a thing of flesh and
logically (i.e., by comparisson with substantially To say man consists of body and soul is
that
formed matter like wood and bronze), but also to indicate thatcommon matter enters into the
indicates that matter, by definition, must be in definition of man as a physical substance. Bur in
itself both unintelligible and non-existent. distinction from definitions of this type, which
What Aristotle calls "the primary substratum" are proper to physics, mathematical and meta-
is later called by Plotinus "primal matter," by physical definitions carry the abstraction from
Augustine "formless matter," and by Aquinas matter still further. In mathematics, Aquinas
"prime matter." Since they all agree that that declares, the intellect abstracts "not only from
which is without form lacks all determination individual sensible matter, but also from com-
and actuality, they deny that it can have exist- mon sensible matter." In conceiving numbers
ence by itself or be an object of knowledge, and figures, the intellect does not, however, ab-
either by sense or reason. stract from matter entirely, but only from in-
Augustine and Aquinas go further. They dividual intelligible matter. The common intel-
deny even to God's omnipotence the power of ligible matter which is represented by "sub-
creating matter without form. They speak of stance as subject to quantity" underlies all
matter not as created, but as concretized, that is, mathematical notions. "But some things,"
united at the very instant of its creation with Aquinas maintains, "can be abstracted even
the forms it must assume in order to exist. God from common intelligible matter, such as being,
"made formless matter of absolutely nothing, unity, potency, act and the like, all of which can
and the form of the world from this formless exist without matter." Such abstraction char-
matter," Augustine writes. Yet He "created acterizes the concepts of metaphysics. Aquinas
both simultaneously, so that form came upon thus differentiates the three speculative sci-
matter with no space of time intervening." ences of physics, mathematics, and metaphys-
ics in terms of three grades of abstraction, each
IN THE TRADITION of Aristotle's physics and distinguished by the type of matter from which
metaphysics, especially as developed by Aqui- the concepts of the science are abstracted.
nas, matter and form become basic analytic With one exception physical matter is not
terms, often having a significance remote from said to be of different kinds when it exists under
their original meaning in the analysis of change. different forms. The one exception for both
The conception of prime (or formless) matter Aristotle and Aquinas is the matter of terres-
as the substratum of substantial change leads to trial and celestial bodies.
the designation of the formed matter underly- Basing his inference on the observations avail-
ing accidental change as "second matter." This, able to him, Aristotle holds that the heavenly
in turn, is called "signate matter" when, con- bodies are eternal "not subject to increase or
sidered as the matter of an individual substance, diminution, but unaging and unalterable and
it isviewed as having the limiting determina- unmodified." Immutable in every other way,
tions of individuality. they are, however, subject to local motion.
"Matter is twofold," Aquinas writes, "com- Since they are eternal, both their matter and
70 THE GREAT IDEAS
their motion must be different from that of difference between celestial and terrestrial mat-
perishable terrestrial bodies. "All things that tcr or motion, and as the chapter on ASTRON-
change have matter," Aristotle writes, "but OMY shows, by so doing he not only gives im-
matter of different of eternal things those
sorts; petus to the Copernican system, but also paves
which are not generable but are movable in the way for Newton to frame laws of motion
space have matternot matter for generation, applicable to matter everywhere in the uni-
howevcr, but for motion from one place to verse. Because their matter is the same, it is
another." That motion from place to place is, Kepler insists, to explain the motion of
possible,
unlike terrestrial motion, circular; it has the the heavenly bodies by the same principles
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PACE
1. The conception of matter change and
as a principle of as one constituent of the being
of changing things: the receptacle or substratum 71
\a. Matter and the analysis of change: prime and secondary matter; privation and
form; participation and the receptacle
ib. Matter in relation to the kinds of change: substantial and accidental change;
terrestrial and celestial motion 72
ir. Matter and the distinction between individual and universal: signate and com-
mon matter; sensible and intelligible matter
$d. The relation of God to matter: the creation of matter and its motions
4.
Matter as an object or condition of knowledge
4^. The role of matter in the concepts and definitions of the several sciences: the
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and
page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265 28 }] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume m the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 J AM LS Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of paee 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepagc. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, en,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-28^] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) 11 Etdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intcimit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the PAplanaiion of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
. . .
_ and REP 2 20d-21b; Q 7, A i, ANS 31a-d; A 2,
1. The conception of matter as a principle of ANS and Rpp 31d 32c Q
,
.
A 2 REp
change and as one constituent of the 7 6d-77d; Q 15, A 3, RLP 3 93b-94a; Q 18, A 4,
being of changing things: the receptacle RFP 2 _3 107 d-108c; Q 47, A r, ANS 256a-257b;
or substratum o 86> A 3 463b-d; PART i-n, Q 10, A i, REP 2
7 PLATO: Ttrnaeus, 455c-458b 662d 663d
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, en 4-9 262a 268d; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
BK m, CH7 [207b }5-2o84] 286c / Metaphysics, 52, A i, ANS 15d-18a; PART in, Q 2, A i, ANS
b b
BK i, en 6 [987 i9]-cn 7 [988 5J 505d-506c; and REP 2 710a-711c
b b
CH 8 [988 22-989 24] 506d-508a; BK n, en 3 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, 25b
[995*15-17] 513d; BK v, en 2 [1013*24-27] 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH x,
533b; CH 4 534d-535c; BK VH, CH 3 551b- SECT 15 295a c
552a; CH 7-17 555a-566a,c esp CH 7-9 555a- 35 BERKELEY I Juman Knowledge, SECT ii415a-b
:
558a, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK vin 566a-570d; 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-76c esp 74b-76c;
a
BK xii, CH 10 [io75 25-33] 606a / Soul, BK 186b-d / Judgement, 565b-d; 566d-567a
in, CH
5 [430*10-14] 662c
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK
la Matter and the analysis of change: prime
-
VH, SECT 23 281b;
BK xn, SECT 30 310a-b and secondary matter; privation and
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK 5b form participation and the receptacle
5
i,
(1. The conception of matter as a principle of \b. Matter in relation to the kinds of change:
change and as one constituent of the being substantial and accidental change; ter-
of changing things: the receptacle or sub- restrial and celestial motion
stratum, la. Matter and the analysis of BK b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, i HI, CH
[2oo 26-
change: prime and secondary matter; priva- 2oi a i4] 278b-c; b
CH
3 [202 22 -29] 280c; BK iv,
tion andform; participation and the recep- CH 9 296b-297c esp [2i7*2o-b26] 297a-c; BK
tacle) v, CH 1-2 304a-307b / Heavens, BK i, CH 2-5
iv, OF i 5 403d-404d / Generation and Corrup- 359d-364a; CH 9-12 369a-375d; BK n, CH 4
b b a
tion 409a~441a,c esp BK i, CH 3 413c-416c / [287 i5-2i] 379b; BK iv, CH 3 [3io 22-3ii i2]
b
Meteorology\ BK
IV,CH 12 [389 22-39o*7] 493d- 402b c; en 4 [3i2 3-22J 403c-d / Generation
ft
b
494a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [g87 30-988*8! and Corruption 409a-441a,c esp BK i, CH 4
R b
506a; BK n, CH 2 f994 [320*2-6] 41 7a / Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 7-9
ft
b a
CH
17 24) 536c-d; BK vi, 0112 [io26 27-io27 i5] 5 [1044^9] 569a-c; BK ix, en 7 [1049*19-
b b
CH b
549a-b; en 3 [io27 i5-i7J 549d; UK vir, CH i] 574d-575a; 8 [io5o 2o-28] 576c-d;
b b
7-9 555a-558a; BK vin, CH i [1042*24 b 7J -
BK xi, CH ii [io67 i]-cn 12 [ro68 25] 596a-
566b d; CH 46 568d-570d; BK ix, CH 7 574c- 597d; BK xii, CH 25 598c-601a csp CH 2 [io69b
b
575a; BK xi, en 9[io65 2o-$<5]594a-b; BK XH, 24-27] 599a / Soiil, BK i, CH 3
CH 2 5 598c-601a; CH 10 (1075*25 ''24] 606a-c
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 20 16 PIOLIIMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a; 8b; lOb-llb;
b
[72</io|-cn 22 ]73o 33] 269b-271a BK xui, 429a-b
12AuRi'.iius: Meditations, BK vir, SECT 23 16 CopbRNicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly
281b Spheres, BK i, 517b-518a; 519b-520a
16 KLPLKR: Harmonies of the World, 1078a-b 16 KKPLKR: Epitome, BK iv, 888b-890b; 894a;
17 PLOIINUS: Second Ennead, TR in, en 18- 929b-930b
TR v, CH 5 49c-60c / Third Ennead, TR vi, 17 PLOIINUS: Second Enncad, TR i, CH 1-4 35a-
CH 7 ig llOd 119a / Sixth Ennead, TR in, 37b; TR iv, CH 6 51d-52a; TR v, CH 6 103b-
CH 2 8 281c-285d; TR v, on 8 307d 308c 104a / Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 8-19 lllc-
18 A IK; us TIN Confessions, UK xn, par 36
i-.: 119a
99d lOOc; par 8 lOla b; par 14-16 102b-103a; 19 AQUINAS: Sunima Theologica, PART i, g 7, A
par 24 26 104c-105b; par 28 31 105c 107a; 2, ANS and REP ^ 31d-32c; g 45, A 2, REP 2
par 38 40 108d llOa; BK xiu, par 48 124a 242d-244a; g 46, A i, REP 1,3,5 6 250a-252d;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, P\RI* i, Q 3, A 48, A 3, ANS 261b-262a; g 55, A 2, ANS
2, ANS 15c-lti,-i; A 8, ANS 19d-20c; g 4, A i, 289d 290d; g 66, A i, ANS 343d-345c; A 2
ANS and RLP 2 20d-21b; g 5, A }, UUP 3 345d-347b; g 84, A 3, REP i 443d-444d
25a-d; g 7, A 2, REP 3 31d 32c; Q 9, A i, ANS 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, g 49,
38c 39c; Q 29, A 2, REP 3-5 163b-164b; Q 45, A 4, ANS 5a-6a
A 2, REP 2 242d-2<r4a; A 8 249b 250a; g 46, 28 GILBERI: Loadstone, BK vi, HOb-c
A i, RKP 6 21>0a-252d; Q 47, A i, ANS 256a-
lr. Matter and the distinction between individ-
257b; g 48, A 3, ANS 261b~262a; g 66, A i
343d-345c; Q 77, A i, RKP 2 399c 401b; Q
ual and universal: signate and common
matter; sensible and intelligible matter
84, A }, RKP 2 443d-444d; g 86, A ^ 463b d;
Q 92, A 2, REP 2 489d 490c; A 3, RLP i 490c- 8 AKISTOILL: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [987** 19-
n a b
491 b; A 4, ANS and REP i 491 b-d; g 103, A i, 988 i6] 505d-506b; BK in, en 3 [998 2o- i3]
REP 2 528b-529a; g 104, A i, ANS and RKP 1-2 517a-b; CH 4 [999*24-1000*4] 518a-d; CH 6
534c-536c; g no 564c-568b; g 117, A 3 598c- [1003*5 -16] 521d*522a,c; BK vn, CH 10-11
b
599b; PART i-n, g 22, A i, RLP i 720d- 558a*561a; CH 15 [io39 27~3i] 563d; BK vni,
721c CH 6 [1045*33-36] 570a-b; BK x, CH i [1052*
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, g 60, 28-37] 578<^ BK XII CH 4-5 599d-601a; BK
A i 49d-50c; g 85, A 6 182d-184a; PART ii-n, xiu, CH 10 618c-619a,c / Soul, BK n, CH i
Q 24, A ii, ANS 498b-499c; PART in SUPPL, [412*6-8] 642a
Q 92, A i, REP 12 1025c-1032b 12 AURFLIUS: Meditations, BK xii, SECT 30
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [121- 310ab
148] 116b-c; xiu [52-87] 126a-b 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 2-5
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, 25b 50b-51d / Sixth Ennead, TR in, CH 3 282a~c
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 407c-409b; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A
412a-415b; 494a-496d csp 494b, 495c 496a 2, RLP 3 15c-16a; A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 4, A i,
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH x, REP 3 20d 21b; Q 7, A i, ANS 31a d; g 14,
SECT 15 295a-c A n, ANS 84c-85c; g 15, A 3, REP 4 93b~94a;
35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge, s ECT 1 1 415a-b
:
Q 29, A i 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 74b-76c; lOOd-lOlb A 3, REP 4 164c-165c; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-
Itolb CHAPTER 53: MATTER 73
258c; Q 50, A 4, ANS 273b-274b; Q 56, A i, 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY
REP 2 292a-d; o 65, A 3, ANS 341c-342b; Q 178a-196d passim
75, A 4, ANS 381b 382a; A 5, ANS 382a-383b; 30 H\CON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 8 140b;
A 7, ANS 384d~385c; Q 76, \ 2 388c 391a; Q 85, APH 2s 155a-d; APH 40 170c-173d; APH 48
A i, REP 2 451c-453c; Q 115, A i, ANS and RLP 179d 188b
1-3 585d-587c; o 119, A i, ANS 604c 607b 31 Di-scARThs: Meditations, n, 78c-d; 80b d /
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, P\RI in, Q 2, Objections and Replies, DEF vn I30c-d; 154a;
A 2, ANS 711d-712d; A 3, REP 3 713a-714c 231a232a
31 SPINOZ\: Ethics, PART i, PROP 14, COROL 2-
2. The conception of matter as extension, as a
PROP 15 360a 361d; PROP 25, COROL 365b;
bodily substance, or as a mode of sub- P\RT n, ni:i- i 373a; PROP 2 374a
stance: atoms and compound bodies
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF i 5a; DEF in 5b;
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12 172d- BK n, PROP 40, SCHOL, 246a b; BK in, RUI i
5] 606a-d
PART HI, 172b 10 GALLN: Natural Faculties, BK i, en 12 172d-
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 40 173c
170c-173d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i
[146-634]
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, n, 78c-d; 80b-d / 2d-8d
Objections and Replies, DEF vn 130c-d; 228c- 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK ix, SECT 39 295a;
229b; 229d-230c; 231a b BK x, SECT 6 297a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, en i 50a-b;
VHI, SECT 7-26 134b-138b passim; CH xxm CH 7, 52c / Third Ennead, TR i, CH 3 79b-c /
204a-214b passim, esp SECT 1-6 204a-205c, Fourth Ennead, TR vn, CH 2-4 192a-193c /
SECT 15 208c-d Sixth Ennead, TR i, en 25-30 265b-268c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 7-21 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 19-21,
414b-417a; SECT 37 419d; SECT 49 422b; 32c 33b; par 25 34b-c; BK vn, par 1-2 43b-
SECT 73 427b-c; SECT 76-78 427d-428b; 44a; par 7 45a-d
SECT 91 430d-431a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 47,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 50, A i, ANS 269b-
122-123 505c-506a esp DIV 123 506a 270a; Q 75, A i, ANS 378b-379c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; lOOc-d 23 HOBBLS: Leviathan, PART in, 172b; PART iv,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 185a; 331 a; 503a 269b-272b
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 8
2d. The diremption of body and mind, or mat- 140b
ter and spirit 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH x,
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b csp CH SECT 8-17 351a-353c passim
3-7 ld-4a / Sixth Ennead, TR iv, CH i 297b-d; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b-98a; 106a; 671b
CH 4-6 299a-300b [fn i); 882a-884b
3b to 4* CHAPTER 53: MATTER 75
413a 431d passim; SECT 133 439c 440a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 157b
123 506a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 85d-91d csp 88b-c 4. Matter as an object or condition of knowl-
44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 134c-d edge
5d. The relation of God to matter: the creation 4a. The knowability of matter: by sense, by
of matter and its motions reason
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228d 229c / Republic, BK ix,
APOC RYPH A Wisdom of Solomon,
:
11:17 (D) 423c-424a / Timaeus, 456a-458a
OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 11:18 SARisTon.t: Physics, BK i, CH 7 [191*8-11]
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 448b-449a; 450b-451b; 266d / Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 15 [io39b 2o-
CH 7 b
563c-564a; BK ix,
ft
458a-b; 466a-b I04o 8] [i049*i9- i]
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 6 574d-575a / Soul, BK in, CH 4 (429b io-4^o n9J
b
[107^19-32] 601c; CH 10 [io75 i6-24] 606c 661d-662c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-158] 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [265-328]
2d 3a; BK v [146-194] 63a-c 4b 5a; BK n [80-141] 16a-d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 7 45a- 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vin, CH 9 31c-
d; BK xi, par 7 90d-91a; BK xn, par 3-9 32a / Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 10 53b-d; CH
99d-101c; par 102b-103a; par 24-
15-16 12 54c-55b
26 104c-105b; par 28-31 105c-107a; par 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xu, par 3-6
38-40 108d-110a; BK xnr, par 45 123a; par 99d-100c
48 124a / City of God, BK xi, CH 23 334c- 19 AQUINAS:Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3,
335c A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 14, A u 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3,
19 AQUINAS: Summa
Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A 4, REP 3-4 93b 94a; Q 50, A i, ANS 269b*270a;
ANS and REP 37c-38c; Q 15, A 3, REP 3-4
i Q 57, A i 295a-d; Q 66, A i, REP i 343d-345c;
93b-94a; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 44, A 2 QQ 84-86 440b-464d; Q 87, A i, ANS 465a-
239b-240a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2 242d-244a; A 466c
8 249b-250a; Q 46, A i esp REP 1,3,5-6 250a- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
252d; Q 47, A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 65, A 3 Q 92, A i, ANS and REP 12 1025c-1032b
341c-342b; Q 66 343d-349d; o 75, A 5, REP 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 66
1,4 382a 383b; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d 444 d; 114d-115c
76 THE GREAT IDEAS
(4. Matter as an object or condition of knowledge. 4c. The material conditions of sensation, im-
4a. The knotvability of matter: by sense, agination, and memory
by reason.) 7 PLATO: Meno, 177b-c
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i-n 75a-81d passim; 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH i [403*5-20]
vi 96 b 103d passim / Objections and Replies, 632a b; BK n, CH 12 [424*25-b i9] 656a-d; BK
b
229d*230c in, CH 3 [429*4-7] 661b; CH 4 [429*29 4]
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 15, SCHOL 360b- 661c-d / Sleep, CH i [454*1-12] 696b-c
361d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [398-477!
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding BK n, en vm, 20a-21a; [730-864] 24b-26a; BK iv [26-268]
SECT 7 26 134b-138b passim; CH xxni, SECT 44b-47d; [324-336] 48c; [522-817] 51a-54d
5 205a-b; SECT 15-17 208c-209a; SECT 22-32 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75,
209d 212d; BK iv, CH HI, SECT 6 313c 315b; AANS 379c-380c; A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c-
2,
SECT 9-17 315c-317c passim; SECT 23-27 381b; Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A 3,
320a 322a passim; CH vi, SECT 14 335d- ANS 410a-411d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c;
336b A 6, ANS 447c-449b; A 7, ANS 449b-450b;
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 16-24 A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-
416a-417d; SECT 54 423b 464d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XH, DIV 23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-51b; 62b;
123 506a PART HI, 172b-d; PART iv, 258b-c; 261a;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 186b-d 262a-b
46 H EG EL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 52 31 DhscARTLs: Rules, xn 18b 25b passim /
25a-c Meditations, vi 96b-103d passim
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 231a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 17-18 380d-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 140b-145a; 502a 503b pas- 382b
sim 34 NhwroN: Optics, BK HI, 518b-519b; 522a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i,
4&. The role of matter in the concepts and defi-
SECT 23 127b; CH vm, SECT 4 133d; CH x,
nitions of the several sciences: the grades SECT 5 142a-b; SECT 10 143c-d; CH xxix,
of abstraction in physics, mathematics, SLOT 3 234b c; CH xxxm, SECI 6 249a-b
and metaphysics 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18 20
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 455c-458b 416b-417a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 102
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH 2 270a-271a; 432d-433a
cii 275b 278a,c / Meteorology, BK iv,
7 9 35 HUML: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV
en 12493d-494d / Metaphysics, BK n, CH 3 123 506a
[995*15 20) 513d; BK in, CH ^ [998*20- 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
b
i4J 517a-b; BK vi, en i [io25 28 1026*6]
l)
14a
547d-548a; BK vn, en 10-11 558a-561a; en 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 85d-87a / Descent
h
15 [
20 -1040*8) 563c-564a; CH 175663-
10 $o. of Man, 568d-569a
566a,c; BK vm, CH 2 3 566d 568d; CH 6 53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 13a-19b esp 15b-
569d-570d; UK x, CH 8-9 585b-586c; BK xi, 17b, 19a-b; 26b-42a; 49b-50a; 98b-106b
b
CH 7 [1064*19-281 592c; BK xn, CH 9 [io74 passim; 348a-359a esp 348a, 358a-b; 367a-
b
37-1075*2] 605c; BK XIH, CH 2 [io77 nj- 373a esp 368b-369a, 370a b; 427b-433a esp
cu 3 11078*31] 609a-d / Soul, BK i, CH i 428b"430a; 453a; 455b-457a; 459a-479a pas-
-b b
[40 j*i 5 i 9] 632b-d; BK in, CH 7 [4$i i3-i9] sim, esp 460a-464a, 469a; 497a-501b; 520a-
664b 521a; 758a-759a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351c-352d
[641*14-31] 163d-164a esp 352a-b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
16 PTOLLMY: Almagest, BK i, 5b 646b-648a esp 646c-d, 647d-648a
19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q i, A i,
Theologica,
KBP 2 3b 4a; Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 18, A 4, 4d. The material conditions of thought: the
REP 3 107d-108c; Q 29, A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; relation of matter to the existence and
93b esp 84a-85a, 88a-90b, 91a-93a; 116a-119b 442a; A 6, ANS 447c 449b
csp 119b; 151a-153a; 291a-295b; 367a-373a 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 355b-d;
esp 368a-369a, 370b 371a; 455b 456a; 690a-b; 495c-496d
758a-759a; 827b 835a; 856b 858a 35 BERKELLY: Human Knowledge, SECT 21
54 FRLUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of 417a; SECT 35 419c; SI:CT 50 422c; SUCT 85 88
Dreams, 154d-155a; 367b c; 382a-c; 384c- 429c 430b; SECT 92 96 431a-d; SECI 102
385a / Unconscious, 431c-d / Beyond the 432d-433a; SECT 133 439c-440a; SECT 141
Pleasure Principle, 646b-649c 441a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 126c-d / Judgement,
5. Matter in relation to good and evil
558b-559d; 579d-580a; 582b-c
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-226c; 231c-234c / 7Y- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 140b;
maeus, 452d-453b; 474b-d / Statesman, 587a- 143a-c; BK x, 449b-c; BK xi, 469a-472b;
589c BK xin, 570d; BK xiv, 589c-590c; 609b;
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 9 [i 91^5-1 92*24] EPILOGUE n, 678a-b; 689c 690a; 694d-696d
267d-268c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [988*7-16] 53 JAMES: Psychologv, 5a; 8b 9a; 84a-119b;
506a-b 291a-295b; 655b-656a; 745a-b; 823a-825a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 9 114c-116b 54 FREUD: New Introductory lectures, 882b 884c
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other considerations of matter as a principle of change, see ART 2b; BEING 7b(5); CHANGE
2a; FORM id(i)-id(2); and for the theory of celestial and terrestrial matter as distinct in
kind, see ASTRONOMY 8a; BEING 7b(3); CHANGE 7c(4); WORLD 6a.
The conception of matter as potentiality in relation to form as actuality, and for the theory of
physical substances as composite of matter and form, see BEING 7b(2), 7c(3); FORM 2c(i)-
2c(3); INFINITY 4c; MAN
33; MIND 2b; ONE AND MANY 3b(4); SOUL 3c.
Considerations relevant to the doctrine that matter is the source of numerical diversity or the
principle of individuality in material things, see SAME AND OTHER. la; UNIVERSAL AND
PARTICULAR 3.
78 THE GREAT IDEAS
For: The conception of matter or extension as a substance, or as a mode of substance, see BEING
7b(4); FORM 2d; MAN 33; MIND 2d; SOUL 3c.
Atomism as a theory of matter and as a materialistic philosophy of nature, see ELEMENT 53-
5h; MIND 2e; and for discussions bearing on materialism as a philosophy of nature, society,
and history, see ELEMENT 5; HISTORY 43(2); MAN 3c; WILL 5c.
Matter mind, or body in relation to soul, see MAN 3a; MIND 2a-2e; SOUL 3c,
in relation to
3e; and for the discussion of immaterial substances, spirits, or beings which exist apart
from matter, see ANGEL 2, 3b; BEING 7X2); ETERNITY 43; FoRM2a,2d; GoD4c; MAN 33(1);
MIND 2a; SOUL 3a~3c.
The theological problems of matter, its creation and conservation, see GOD 73; WORLD 46-
4 e( ')- .
The physical properties of matter or bodies and the laws of their motion, see ASTRONOMY
8c(}); MECHANICS 53-5^2), 6a-6e; QUANTITY 5d~5c; SPACE la-id; and for the prob-
43,
lem of the infinity of matter or of an infinite body, see INFINITY 43-4^
Matter as an object of knowledge, see KNOWLEDGE 53(2).
Matter in relation to sensation and to sensible qualities, see ELEMENT 50; MECHANICS 4b;
QUALITY i; SENSE 3^3).
Matter in relation to thought, abstract ideas, or definitions, see DEFINITION 6a; FORM 3c;
IDEA 2g; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(i); MIND 13(2); SENSE 53; UNIVERSAL AND
PARTICULAR 40.
ADDITIONAL HEADINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals, These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
ENGELS. Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outline ofClas- Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Neces-
steal German Philosophy sity
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL
**
in, SUP, CH 24
EPICURUS. Letter to Herodotus BUCHNKR. Force and Matter
ERIGENA. De Divisione Naturae HELMIIOLTZ. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects,
JUDAH HA-LEVI. Kitab al Khazari vn
CRESCAS. Or Adonai, PROPOSITIONS 10-12, 16, 19- LANGE. The History of Materialism
24 B. STEWART. The Conservation of Energy
CHAPTER 53: MATTER 79
MAXWELL. Matter and Motion The Nature of Existence, CH 34
r.
INTRODUCTION
taken as the name for just One way, then, of understanding the impor-
MECHANICS,
one of the physical sciences, would tance of mechanics is in terms of that story.
merit no place on a small list of basic, focal Other chapters, such as ASTRONOMY, CHANGE,
terms. But the word "mechanics" means more ELEMENT, MATTER, PHYSICS, SPACE, and TIME
than that. In the tradition of western thought and perhaps also CAUSE and HYPOTHESIS
a whole philosophy of nature, and it
it signifies tell part of that story, especially the part which
connotes a set of fundamental principles under turns on the differences between Aristotle s
which, it has been thought, all the physical physics (which is neither experimental nor
sciences can be unified. mathematical) and modern physics (which is
The principles of mechanics have been ap- both). This chapter focuses on issues which fall
plied not only in statics and dynamics, which largely within modern physics issues belong-
are concerned with the action and reaction of ing to that part of the story which, in the great
bodies at rest or in motion, but also in acoustics books, begins with Galileo, Huygcns, and New-
and optics and the sciences of heat, magnetism, ton and runs to Fourier and Faraday. The story
and electricity. They have been extended to itself does not end there, but the point to which
astronomical phenomena to constitute what is Faraday carries it suggests the sequel in Clerk
called "celestial mechanics." They have been Maxwell and Einstein, just as Galileo's point of
thought to govern the action or motion of in- departure reflects antecedents in Aristotle. The
visible particles or waves as well as the familiar great books state the issues sufficiently well,
Jx)dies of ordinary experience. In the range and though they do not tell the whole story. That
variety of the phenomena it covers, mechanics can be fully documented only by a host of sup-
-would seem to be co-extensive with physics. plementary scientific classics in various fields,
Such at appears to be its scope at one stage
least such as the works listed in the Additional
in the development of natural science. Readings.
We shall presently consider the dissatisfac-
tion with the mechanical point of view which IN MODERN TIMES it is accepted that physics
causes scientists in our own day to hail the should be both experimental and mathematical.
replacement of "classical mechanics" by the No one questions the ideal of unifying the
"new physics" as a great advance in science. physical sciences and finding the unity in na-
The intellectual significance of this change can ture's laws. But the question is whether that
be compared with that earlier revolution in the unification can be achieved under the aegis of
1
7th century when the new natural science mechanics; and the issue is whether physics
founded on the achievements of Galileo, Huy- should gather its experimental findings to-
gens, and Newton replaced the physics of Aris- gether under purely mathematical formula-
totle which had long reigned as the traditional tions or should also try to give those mathe-
philosophy of nature. What Einstein calls "the matical formulae a mechanical interpretation.
rise and decline of the mechanical point of The issue involves more than a question of
view" thus seems to provide an apt title for the scientific method. It concerns the ultimate aim
story of three stages in the history of science, in of natural science and the kind of concepts it
only one of which does the whole of physics should employ to fulfill this aim. Should the
ing for explanation, it appears to be broader mechanical theory. Both are fundamental no-
than the question whether physics should or tions and both are philosophical in the sense
should not be mechanical. Even granted that that they do not seem to result from the find-
explanation is desirable, does it necessarily fol- ings of experimental research. The first point is
low that physical explanation must employ the an exclusive emphasis upon efficient causes,
principles and concepts of mechanics? Aris- which means the exclusion of other types of
totle's physics, itcan be argued, provides a causes, especially final and formal causes, from
negative answer. His various physical treatises mechanical explanation. As the chapter on
represent a natural science which tries to ex- CAUSE indicates, efficient causality consists in
plain the phenomena without doing so me- one thing acting on another. But not every sort
chanically, just as it tries to describe the phe- of action by which one thing affects another is
nomena without doing so mathematically. mechanical. According to the doctrine, an ef-
That the connection of these two features of ficient cause is mechanical
only if it consists in
Aristotle's physics is not accidental seems to be a moving body acting on another by impact, or
indicated by the conjunction of their opposites if it consists in a force exerted
by one body to
in modern physics. When in the i7th century cause motion in another or to change its quan-
the physicist describes natural
phenomena in tity or direction. The notion of a force which
mathematical terms, he explains them if he does not work through the impact of one mov-
tries to explain them at all in mechanical ing thing upon another raises the problem of
terms. "The laws of Mechanics," writes Des- action-at-a-distance to which we shall return
cartes, "are the laws of Nature." Huygens subsequently.
opens his Treatiseon Light by referring to op- f
The second fundamental point is an exclu-
tics as the kind of science "in which Geometry (siveemphasis upon quantities. Mechanical ex-
is
applied to matter"; but he at once expresses planation makes no references to qualities or
the desire to advance this branch of mathe- other attributes of things. Paradoxically this
matical physics by investigating "the origin point is sometimes expressed in terms of a dis-
and the causes" of the truths already known, in tinction between primary and secondary qual-
order to provide "better and more satisfactory ities; on QUANTITY and
but, as the chapters
explanations." Such explanations, he thinks, QUALITY point out, the primary qualities are
will be found only if we conceive "the causes alljquantities. According to Locke, they are
of all natural effects in terms of mechanical "solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and
motions." He declares it hisopinion that "we number"; according to Newton, "the universal
must necessarily do this, or else renounce all qualities of all bodies whatsoever" are "exten-
hopes of ever comprehending anything in sion, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and
Physics." inertia." Others, like Galileo and Descartes,
Galileo and Newton, as will be noted, do not give still different enumerations, but the point
unqualifiedly share Huygens' view that it is remains that the only attributes of bodies which
proper for the mathematical physicist to in- have mechanical significance are measurable
quire about causes. But they would agree that quantities. Such secondary qualities, for exam-
if any explanation is to be given for laws of na- ple, as colors and tones belong to the physical
ture expressed in mathematical form, one or world (as it is mechanically conceived) only by
another type of mechanical hypothesis would reduction to the local motion of particles or
be required to state the causes. Postponing for waves having certain velocities, lengths, or
the moment the consideration of whether the other quantitative attributes.
82 THE GREAT IDEAS
We need not be concerned here with what assigned for the continuing uniform motion of
sort of reality assigned to secondary qualities,
is a body along a straight line but only for a
or how their presence in experience is ac- change in its direction or velocity.
counted for. These problems are discussed in What is new in modern times is not the phil-
other chapters, such as QUALITY and SENSE. osophical doctrine of mechanism, but the in-
However they are solved, the philosophy of troduction of mechanical explanation into ex-
mechanism excludes from the physical world perimental and mathematical physics, and the
whatever does not consist in, or cannot be re- controversy about whether it belongs there or
duced to, quantities of matter (or mass), mo- can be defended as useful. The so-called rise
tion, or force, and such related quantities as and decline of the mechanical view in modern
those of time and space (or distance). physics connected with experimental discov-
is
The two points of mechanical theory are ob- eries and mathematical formulations. It is not an
viously connected, for the kind of cause which alternation between success and failure on the
mechanical explanation employs to the exclu- level of philosophical argument concerning
sion of all others consists in a quantity of mo- the ultimate truth of mechanical conceptions.
tion or of force. Just as obviously, mechanical When these conceptions arc rejected, it is not
explanation, dealing only in quantities and in for the sake of returning to opposite notions in
causes which are quantitatively measurable, is physical theory, such as those of Aristotle, but
precisely the type of explanation which would rather because, as Einstein says, "science did
seem to be appropriate if one felt called upon not succeed in carrying out the mechanical
to give an interpretation of the mathematical program convincingly, and today no physicist
relationships which the mathematical physicist believes in the possibility of its fulfillment.*'
formulates as laws of nature. These mathemat- There is a touch of prophecy in the conversa-
ical laws are after all statements of the relations tion Swift imagines taking place between Aris-
among physical quantities which have been totleand the physicists of the iyth century.
subjected to experimental determination or According to Swift, when Aristotle was con-
measurement. fronted with Descartes and Gassendi, he "freely
fundamental points of mechanism the doc- the vortices of Descartes, were equally exploded.
trine of primary and secondary qualities and He predicted the same fate to attraction, where-
the doctrine that all effects in nature are pro- of the present learned are such zealous as-
duced by moving causes.
efficient serters. He said that new systems of nature
The controversy over mechanism is also an- were but new fashions, which would vary in
cient. Aristotle denies both points of doctrine every age; and even those who pretend to dem-
in his criticism of the Greek atomists, Democri- onstrate them from mathematical principles,
tusand Leucippus; and in the exposition of his would but a short period of time, and
flourish
own physical theories he states an opposite be out of vogue when that was determined."
view. To qualities and qualitative change he
assigns physical reality. He explains change in BOTH GALILEO and Descartes re-state the phil-
terms of four types of causes, not one. He does osophical doctrine which first appears in an-
not exclude the mechanical type of cause in cient atomism, but both re-state it in a way
his explanation of local motion. On the con- that suggests its utility for an experimental
upon by a moving cause throughout the period concern with the nature and causes of heat. He
of its motion, seems to be more mechanical wishes to explain, he writes in // Saggiatorc,
than the modern theory that no cause need be why he thinks that "motion is the cause of
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 83
heat." To do this he finds it necessary to ques- The force of gravity, according to Newton, is
tion a prevalent notion "which is
very remote apower of attraction which one body exercises
from the truth"- the belief that "there is a on another without the first being in motion or
true accident, affection, or quality, really in- coming into contact with the second. Newton
herent in the substance by which we feel our- acknowledges the problem of action-at-a-dis-
selves heated." He denies the physical reality tance which his theory raises. For the most part
of heat as an inherent quality of bodies on the he lets it stand as a problem which does not af-
same ground that he denies the physical reality fect the mathematical results of his work. But
of other qualities. "I do not believe," he de- in the Queries he attaches to his Optics he sug-
clares, "that there exists anything in external gests, by way of solution, the hypothesis of an
bodies for exciting tastes, smells, and sounds, ether as the continuous medium through which
but size, shape, quantity, and motion, swift or gravitational force is exerted. In the opinion of
slow; and if ears, tongues, and noses were re- later physicists, Newton's hypothesis is no less
moved, I am of the opinion that shape, quan- mechanical than Descartes'. Nor does there
tity, and motion would remain, but there seem to be any philosophical grounds for pre-
would be an end of smells, tastes, and sounds, ferring one hypothesis to the other.
which, apart from the living creature, I regard But Newton's quarrel with Descartes is not
as mere words." on a philosophical issue. It turns on which me-
Descartes' statement of the doctrine is bold- chanical conception, if any at all is to be of-
er, perhaps, in its suggestion of a mechanical fered, fits best with the mathematical laws of
program for physical research. "Colors, odors, terrestrial and celestial motion which Newton
and the rest of such things," he writes,
savors, had succeeded in formulating as universal laws
are "merely sensations existing in thought." my of nature. Those mathematical laws, moreover,
They differ from the real properties of bodies had the merit of fitting the observed phenom-
just as much as "pain differs from the shape and ena and so, of realizing the scientific ideal of
motion of the instrument which inflicts it." accurate description stated in the most gen-
The true physical properties, such as "gravity, eralized form. Newton's triumph over Des-
hardness, the power of heating, of attracting cartes, then, is a triumph in mathematical and
and purging" consist, in Descartes' opinion, experimental physics, not a triumph in philos-
"solely in motion or its absence, and in the con- ophy.
figuration and situation of [bodily] parts." Pope's couplet
As a philosophical doctrine, the mechanical Nature and Nature's Laws lay hid in Night,
view is not necessarily tied to atomism. Des- God said, Let Newton be, and all was light
cartes opposes atomism as plainly as does Aris- records that triumph, and celebrates the illu-
totle.Furthermore, Newton, who is an atomist, mination of nature by the mechanical as well
disagrees with both Descartes anH the^Greek as the mathematical principles of Newton's
atomists on one fundamental point in mechan- physics. Newton's picture of the world domi-
ical theory. The ancient atomists make the ac- nates the mind of a century and controls its
tual motion of one particle in collision with science.Locke speaks of "the incomparable
another the indispensable cause of a change of Mr. Newton" and of "his never enough to be
motion in the latter. Descartes likewise requires admired book"; Hume refers to him as the
one motion to be the cause of another and ex- philosopher who, "from the happiest reasoning
plains gravity in terms of actual bodily motions. . determined the laws and forces, by which
. .
Newton rejects Descartes' mechanical hypoth- the revolutions of the planets are governed and
esis of material vortices as the cause of gravita- directed"; and even Berkeley, who challenges
tion. He seems to have mind, and to put
this in his theories of space, time, and attraction, re-
Descartes in the same class with Aristotle, when grets that he must take issue with "the author-
he says that "hypotheses, whether metaphysi- ity of so great a man," a man "whom all the
cal or physical, whether of occult qualities or world admires" as the author of "a treatise on
mechanical, have no place in experimental Mechanics, demonstrated and applied to
philosophy." nature."
84 THE GREAT IDEAS
NEWTON'S ACHIEVEMENT is to have accom- this philosophy strives after," he continues,
plished an extraordinary synthesis of all that "is a mathematical world-formula, by which,
was good in previous scientific work, and a if all the collocations and motions at a
given
sweeping criticism of all that was considered moment were known, it would be possible to
stultifying. That so many and such varied reckon those of any wished-for future moment,
phenomena should be organized mathemati- by simply considering the necessary geometri-
cally by a theory as simple as Newton's, is alto- cal,arithmetical, and logical implications."
gether impressive. Equally astonishing is the Laplace had in fact pictured a lightning cal-
predictive power of Newton's laws and the ex- culator who, given the to taTcbnfigu ration of
planatory power of his mechanics, not to men- the world at one instant, would be able to bring
tion the technological fruits of the latter in the whole future "present to his eyes." And
mechanical engineering and the invention of James quotes Helmholtz to the effect that the
machinery of all sorts. Whatever difficulties are whole problem of physical science is "to refer
implicit in the Newtonian mechanics sub- natural phenomena back to unchangeable at-
sequently to become, with new discoveries, tractive and repulsive forces whose intensity
more and more perplexing the scope and depends wholly upon distance. The solubility
grandeur of Newton's book gives mechanics a of this problem is the condition of the com-
commanding position with respect to the fu- plete comprchcnsibility of nature."
ture of science for at least two centuries. In commenting on this, James admits that
In the century between the publication of "the world grows more orderly and rational
Newton's Mathematical Principles and the pub- to the mind, which passes from one feature of
lication in 1787 of Lagrangc's Mecanique analy- it by deductive necessity, as soon as
to another
tique, "the notion of the mechanical explanation it as made up of so few and so sim-
conceives it
of all the processes of nature," writes White- ple phenomena as bodies with no properties
head, "finally hardened in to a dogma of science." but number and movement to and fro." But
In the next century, the mechanical dogma he also insists that it is "a world with a very
spreads from physics and chemistry through- minimum of rational stuff. The sentimental
out the whole domain of natural scienceinto facts and relations," he complains, "are butch-
biology and psychology and even beyond ered at a blow. But the
rationality yielded is so
that, into economics and sociology. Books bear superbly complete inform that to many minds
such titles as The Mechanistic Conception of this atones for the loss, and reconciles the think-
Life, The Mechanism of Human Behavior, So- er to the notion of a purposeless universe, in
cial Statics, Social Dynamics. At the end of the which all the things and qualities men love . . .
i
pth century, James notes the conquests which are but illusions of our fancy attached to acci-
are being made on all sides by the mechanical dental clouds of dust which will be dissipated
idea. "Once the possibility of some kind of by the eternal cosmic weather as careless as they
mechanical interpretation is established," he were formed."
writes, "Mechanical Science, in her present
mood, will not hesitate to set her brand of WITH THE 20TH CENTURY a change occurs. The
ownership upon the matter." dogma of mechanism may continue to spread
James himself testifies to the persuasiveness in other sciences and gain even wider accept-
and success of the mechanical dogma, though ance as a popular philosophical creed, but
not without some resentment. "The modern within the domain of the physical sciences, cer-
etc., begins by saying that the only facts are col- Einstein, for example, quotes the passage
locations and motions of primordial solids, and from Helmholtz that James had cited, in which
the only laws the changes in motion which Helmholtz goes on to say that the vocation of
changes in collocation bring. The ideal which physics "will be ended as soon as the reduction
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 85
of natural phenomena to simple forces is com- material, but we turn to the mathematician to
plete." This "mechanical view, most clearly build it out of his material."
formulated by Helmholtz," Einstein concedes, We may turn to the mathematician's con-
"played an important role in its time"; but, he struction of the world in his terms; but in the
adds, it "appears dull and naive to a twentieth tradition of western thought, mathematically
introducing so many of them all quite inde- then, be the substitution of the mathematical
pendent of each other, was enough to shatter for the mechanical account of why and how.
the belief in the mechanical point of view. . . . The from mechanics to mathematics is
shift
In the attempt to understand the phenomena rather a shift from explanation as the scientific
of nature from the mechanical point of view," ideal to the statement of laws which, while hav-
he continues, "throughout the whole develop- ing maximum generality, remain purely de-
ment of science up to the twentieth century, scriptive. What Eddington means by building
it was necessary to introduce artificial sub- the world out of the material of mathematics
stances like electric and magnetic fluids, light seems to be the same as what Galileo means,
corpuscles, or ether." According to Einstein, four centuries earlier, when he says that the
"attempts to construct an ether in some simple book of nature "is written in mathematical
way" have been "fruitless"; but what is more language." The materials are such symbols
important in his opinion, such failures "indi- as "triangles, circles, and other geometrical
cate that the fault lies in the fundamental as- figures." Without the help of these, Galileo
sumption that it is possible to explain all events writes to Kepler, nature "is impossible to com-
in nature from a mechanical point of view." prehend."
Does this mean
that the contemporary physi- But does the mathematical comprehension of
cist has found another and better way of ex- nature mean a causal explanation of it ? More
plaining nature ? Is there a non-mechanical way explicitly than Eddington, Galileo insists that
of explaining the phenomena, which fits the explanation at least in the sense of stating the
mathematical laws of experimental physics; or causes is not the business of the mathematical
does discarding mechanics mean relinquishing physicist. In a passage which cannot be read too
all efforts to explain nature ? often or examined too closely, he names three
Eddington suggests an answer. "One of the opinions which the philosophers have expressed
greatest changes in physics between the nine- about "the cause of the acceleration of natural
teenth century and the present day," he writes, motion." Some, he says, "explain it by attrac-
"has been the change in our ideal of scientific tion to the center, others to repulsion between
explanation. It was the boast of the Victorian the very small parts of the body, while still
he would not claim to understand
scientist that others attribute it to a certain stress in the sur-
a thing until he could make a model of it; and rounding medium which closes in behind the
by a model he meant something constructed of falling body and drives it from one of its posi-
levers,geared wheels, squirts, and other appli- tions to another. Now
of these fantasies,"
all
ances familiar to the engineer. Nature in build- he continues, "and others too, ought to be ex-
ing the universe was supposed to be dependent amined, but it is not really worthwhile."
on just the same kind of resources as any human They ought to be examined by philosophers,
mechanic. The man who could make gravi-
. . .
perhaps, but debating them is not worthwhile
tation out of cogwheels would have been a hero in "those sciences where mathematical demon-
in the Victorian age." Today, however, Ed- strations are applied to natural
phenomena."
dington continues, "we do not encourage the Perfectly defining the program of mathematical
engineer to build the world for us out of his physics, Galileo sets himself a limited task:
86 THE GREAT IDEAS
"merely to investigate and to demonstrate tion of its author to limit himself to the pro-
some of the properties of accelerated motion gram of mathematical physics on which both he
(whatever the cause of this acceleration may and Galileo seem to agree. He will not try to
be)." It should be noted that of the three opin- define "the species or physical qualities of
ions about causes which Galileo mentions, the forces"; he will only investigate "the quantities
first, which anticipates Newtonian attraction, and mathematical proportions of them." In
isno less summarily dismissed than the third, the General Scholium with which the Mathe-
which summarizes the Aristotelian theory. matical Principles concludes, Newton disavows
"What I call Attraction," Newton later once more any knowledge of the cause of grav-
writes, "may be performed by impulse or by ity. "To us it is enough," he says, "that gravity
some other means unknown to me. I use that does really exist, and acts according to the
word here to signify only in general any force laws which we have explained, and abundantly
by which bodies tend towards one another, serves to account for all the motions of the
whatsoever be the cause." It is well known, he and of our sea." Admitting that
celestial bodies,
asserts in the same passage of the Optics, "that he has "not been able to discover the causes . . .
bodies act one upon another by the attractions of gravity from phenomena," Newton flatly
of gravity, magnetism, and electricity"; but, reiterates his policy: "I frame no hypotheses."
he goes on, "how these attractions may be per-
formed I do not here consider." IN VIEW OF THIS policy, how does the name of
Newton's attitude toward causes and expla- Newton come to be associated with the tri-
nation would seem to be identical with Gal- umph of the mechanical point of view in phys-
ileo's. Galileo calls opinions about causes "fan- ics? Why do contemporary scientists like Ein-
tasies" and dismisses them; Newton calls them stein identify Newtonian physics with classical
resolutely. "Hypotheses are not to be regarded Newton or Galileo, refrains from guessing at or
in experimental philosophy," he declares in one asserting causes, how can he be charged with
place; and in another, having just referred to having indulged in the impurity of a mechani-
predecessors who feigned hypotheses "for ex- cal explanation of the phenomena, and with
plaining all things mechanically," he says that, having foisted a mechanical conception of the
on the contrary, "the main business of natural universe upon mankind ?
philosophy is to argue from phenomena with- The answer to these questions, so far as New-
out feigning hypotheses." ton is concerned, may be partly found in his
The task of the physicist who is both experi- own writings. He did not, it seems, entirely
mental and mathematical in his method, New- disavow an inquiry into the cause of attractive
ton plainly states, is "to derive two or three force, as in itself either misguided or irrelevant
general principles of motion from phenomena, to science. "We
must learn from the phenom-
and afterwards to tell us how the properties ena of nature," he tells us, "what bodies attract
and actions of all corporeal things follow from one another, and what are the laws and proper-
those manifest principles. [This] would be a ties of the attraction, before we enquire the
very great step in philosophy, though the cause by which the attraction is
performed."
causes of those principles were not yet dis- This statement postpones, but does not ex-
covered. And therefore," he says of his own clude, an inquiry into causes. In another state-
work, "I scruple not to propose the principles ment, Newton even gives us a reason for the
of motion above mentioned, they being of very postponement. "In mathematics," he says, "we
general extent, and leave their causes to be are to investigate the quantities of force with
found out." their proportions consequent upon any condi-
The two
or three principles of motion men- tions supposed; then, when we enter upon
tioned in this passage from the Optics are the physics, we compare those proportions with
foundation of Newton's other great work, the the phenomena of nature, that we may know
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. the several kinds of attractive bodies. And this
Its title indicates the clearly conceived inten- preparation being made, we argue more safely
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 87
concerning the physical species, causes, and physics written for the layman, it is necessary
proportions of the forces." to mark the influence of mechanical concep-
These remarks of Newton do not give the tions upon scientific discovery and thought, in
whole answer. For the other and perhaps more order to understand the difference between the
important part of it, we must go to the actual unifying mathematical laws of the i7th and the
development of physical science in the iyth 20th centuries. As we retrace the steps we see
century. The in this development
steps how fertile is the interplay between mathe-
against the equally mechanical but different treats of the local motions of inert or inanimate
time and time again, the pivot for new discov- demonstration" established the science in all its
eries. The causes arc not found, but new hy- essentials; "since
upon a single proposition in
potheses are made, and these, when employed, hisbook on Equilibrium depends not only the
'lead to wider, more general results in the form law of the lever but also those of most other
of more inclusive, unifying laws. We see this mechanical devices." Pascal may later enlarge
happen not only in the study of gravitation and statics,by showing in his treatise On the Equi-
light, but also in the investigation of heat and librium of Liquids that "a vessel full of water is
electricity. The concern of Faraday, for ex- a new principle of Mechanics, a new machine
ample, to explain electrical attraction and re- which will multiply force to any degree we
pulsion in terms of the action of contiguous choose"; in other works Pascal extends these
particles, and to establish the existence of phys- conceptions further, as in his treatment of the
ical lines of force, leads to Maxwell's theory of pressure of air. But at the time of Galileo, it
the electro-magnetic field; and his field equa- could be said that although Archimedes had
tions,combined with Faraday's speculations offered an exemplary model of mathematical
concerning the relation between electrical physics, no progress was made until the work of
and gravitational attraction, lead to the at- Galileo's immediate predecessors.
tempt, on the part of contemporary physics, Not without assistance from certain prede-
to construct a unified field theory covering all cessors like Stevin, Galileo founds the science
Physics may return in the 20th century to the start made by Archimedes, no earlier ap-
the purely mathematical character it had at the plication of his principles and method had been
beginning of its modern development. But as made. The answer may be found in the physics
may be seen in any introduction to recent of Aristotle. His theory of the four elements
88 THE GREAT IDEAS
carried with it a doctrine of natural motions to of his experiments on inclined planes, Galileo
different natural places, drawn from the ob- expresses an insight which Newton later formu-^
servation of fire rising, stones dropping, air lates as the first law of motion, sometimes called
bubbling up through water. Such a doctrine the "law of inertia." It declares that "every
would prevent the search for laws of motion body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform
applicable to all bodies; and the general char- motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to
acter of Aristotle's physics, treating qualities change that state by forces impressed upon it."
as well as quantities, seems to have discouraged Though Newton describes his method as one of
the application of mathematics even to the "making experiments and observations, and in
of the earth led him, he told Hobbes, to the or in motion continues forever in its present
careful Study of movements on the earth. His state" that is, unless it is acted on by some
aim is simply to describe with precision the mo- new force.
tions to be found in a child's play stones The condition introduced by "unless** raises
dropped and stones thrown, the one the natural Poincare"s question: "Have there ever been ex-
motion of free fall, the other the violent motion perimcnts on bodies acted on by no forces?"
of a projectile. It is clear to observation that the If not,and if they are impossible, then James
motion of a freely falling body is accelerated. may be right in saying that "the elementary
But though, as a mathematical physicist, Gal- laws of mechanics" are "never matters of ex-
ileo refrains from asking why this is so, he is not perience at all, but have to be disengaged from
satisfied to know simply that it is so. He wants under experience by a process of elimination,
to know the properties of such acceleration. that is, by ignoring conditions which are always
What is the relation of the rate of increase in present." Because "the idealized experiment
velocity to the durations and distances of the [which it calls for] can never be performed,"
fall f How much increase in velocity is acquired the law of inertia, according to Einstein, can
and how fast? What is the body's velocity at be derived "only by speculative thinking con-
any given point in the fall? Similarly, when sistent with observation."
Galileo turns to projectiles, he wants to know, In any case, the first law of motion initiates a
not merely that their trajectory is consistently new departure in So far as local motion
physics.
curvilinear, but precisely what curve the path is concerned, Aristotle and his followers look for
of the projectile describes. the cause which keeps a moving body in motion
Galileo succeeds in answering all these ques- or a stationary body at rest. According to Gal-
tions without being perturbed by any of the ileo and Newton, uniform motion continues
philosophical perplexities connected with space naturally without cause. Only a change in the
and time; nor does he allow questions about the velocity or direction of that motion requires a
forces involved in these motions to distract him cause, such as a force impressed upon it.
from hispurpose to "demonstrate everything How radical this innovation is may be judged
by mathematical methods." With mathemati- from its consequences in celestial mechanics,
cal demonstration he combines observation and which in turn lead to a completely unified
experiment and uses the latter to determine dynamics for both celestial and terrestrial mo-
which mathematical conclusions can be ap- tions. These advances are the work of Newton's
plied to nature which principles can be em- mathematical genius, but the ground for them
pirically verified as well as mathematically de- had been laid by the investigations of Galileo.
duced. Galileo had resolved the curvilinear motion of
a projectile into the imparted rectilinear mo-
ONE OF GALILEO'S principles, however, seems tion and the deflecting pull of gravity. This
to outrun ordinary experience and to defy ex- composition of forces sometimes called the
perimental verification. In the interpretation "parallelogram law" explains why the path of
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 89
the projectile is a parabola. The path of the appears to be at first? Its mathematical mean-
planets in their orbits, Kepler had previously ing is
plain enough, and its
application to
shown, is another conical curve an ellipse. measured phenomena reveals its descriptive
But Kepler, lacking the first law of motion, scope. When we ask, however, about its physi-
could theorize physically about the cause of the cal significance, we raise difficult questions con-
planetary orbits only by looking for a force, cerning the nature of this attractive force and
projected outward from the sun, which would how it operates. To call it the "force of gravity"
sweep around to keep the planets moving in and to point out that this is a familiar force
their paths. On the other hand, a follower of which everyone experiences in his own person
Galileo, asWhitehcad points out, would seek hardly answers the question.
"for normal forces to deflect the direction of
motion along the curved orbit." He would look GALILEO WOULD NOT have tried to answer it.
for a force pulling the planet off its own rec- In his Dialogues Concerning the Two Great Sys-
tilinear course inward toward the sun. tems of the World, one of the characters, Sim-
That is
precisely what Newton did. When plicio, refers to that manifest cause which
the problem, which others had been able to "everyone knows gravity." To this Salviati
is
formulate, was put to Newton, he simply went replies: "You should say that everyone knows
to his study for the solution. He had solved that it is I do not
called gravity. question you about
problem some years before. He had found the the name," he continues, "but about the es-
law of the force which, attracting the planets sence of the thing"; and that, he concludes, is
to the sun, would produce their elliptical paths precisely what cannot be defined.
and the other proportionalities stated in Kep- A physicist like Huygens, who expects the
ler's purely descriptive laws. explanation of natural effects to be expressed in
With that single discovery, Galileo's terres- the familiar mechanical terms of bodily impact,
trial dynamics becomes a celestial one, too; and has other objections. "I am not at all pleased,"
the traditional separation of the heavens from he writes to Leibnitz about Newton, "with any
the earth overcome. Newton goes even fur-
is theories which he builds on his principle of at-
ther. He guesses, and then shows by arithmetic, traction, which seems to me absurd." What
that the force deflecting the planets around the shocks Huygens is a scandal that Newton him-
sun and the moon around the earth, is the same self cannot avoid facing. It is the scandal of ac-
force which makes apples fall and stones heavy tion-at-a-distance of the force of gravity be-
in the hand. He generalizes this insight in his ing propagated instantaneously across great dis-
famous inverse-square law: "Every particle of tances and producing effects at some remote
matter attracts every other particle of matter place but no effects along the way. Newton rec-
with a force proportional to the mass of each ognizes the strangeness of such a force. In a
and to the inverse square of the distance be- letter to Bentley, he echoes Huygens' protest
Accordingly, the world can be pictured as inherent and essential to matter," he says, "so
one in which material particles each have posi- that one body may act on another at a distance
tion in absolute space and a determinate veloc- through a vacuum, without the mediation of
ity. The
velocity of each particle causes the anything else, by and through which their ac-
change of its position, and changes in velocity tion and force may be conveyed from one to
are caused by forces, the amounts of which another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I
are determined by positions. From his laws of believe no man who has in philosophical mat-
motion and this simple law of force Newton is ters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever
able,by mathematical deduction, to account fall into it."
for the perturbations of the moon, the oblate- The absurdity of action-at-a-distance seems
ness of the earth, the precession of the equi- to be recognized by common sense and philoso-
noxes, the solar and lunar tides, and the paths phy alike. "No action of an
agent," Aquinas
of the comets. remarks, "however powerful it may be, acts at
But is Newton's law of force as simple as it a distance except through a medium"; and
90 THE GREAT IDEAS
Kant, who regards Newtonian physics as the do this, he left the explanation of the cause of
model of a rational science of nature, speaks of gravity as a problem for succeeding ages. . . .
"a force of attraction without contact" as a The progress made towards the solution of the
"chimerical fancy" which "we have no right to problem since the time of Newton," Maxwell
assume." How can Newton avoid this absurdity adds, "has been almost imperceptible."
without violating his rule of method in mathe-
matical physicsnot to frame hypotheses? THE PROBLEM OF the mechanical properties of
Newton's dilemma can perhaps be stated in an ethereal medium occurs in another form in
the following alternatives: either the inverse- the field of optics. Here complicated by the
it is
square law of gravitational attraction is to be rivalry between two theories of light New-
treated as a purely mathematical, and hence a ton's corpuscular theory and Huygens' undu-
purely descriptive, proposition of great sim- latory or wave theory. Each involves a mechan-
plicity and generality; or it must be given phys- ical hypothesis one concerning the motion of
ical meaning by a causal explanation of how particles emitted from the light source, and one
gravitational force operates. On the first al- concerning the wave-like propagation of the
ternative, Newton can avoid framing hypoth- light impulse through a medium. Both theories
eses,but the physical meaning of the' concepts involve the motion of particles. In their ex-
he employs to state the mathematical law is planation of the oar which appears bent in the
then left dark. On the second alternative, he water, both appeal to the action of the particles
can solve the mechanical problem created by in the refracting medium on the light corpus-
such words in his law as "attracts" and "force," cles or the light waves.
but only by going beyond mathematical phys- Both theories, furthermore, are expressed by
icsinto the realm of mechanical hypotheses. their authors in a mathematical form which
Newton seems to take the first alternative in permits the deduction of quantitative facts
his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philos- of the angles of incidence and
like the equality
ophy, and the second in his Optics. There he of reflexion, the bending of the light ray in re-
proposes the hypothesis of an ethereal medium fraction according to the law of sines, and the
to explain the attractive force of gravity. "Is recently discovered fact of the finite velocity
not this medium," he asks, "much rarer within of light. Huygens' book gives prominence to
the dense bodies of the sun, stars, planets, and the explanation of the strange phenomena of
comets, than in the empty celestial spaces be- double refraction found in "a certain kind of
tween them ? And in passing from them to great crystal brought from Iceland" Iceland spar.
distances, not grow denser and denser
doth it But both theories seem to be equally compe-
perpetually, and thereby cause the gravity of tent in dealing with the established facts of
those great bodies towards one another, and of reflexion and refraction, and the new facts
towards the bodies; every body en-
their parts about dispersion.
deavoring to go from the denser parts of the For a century at least, their rivalry resembles
medium towards the rare? And though this
. . . that between the Ptolemaic and Copernican
increase of densitymay at great distances be theories at a time when they seemed equally
exceeding slow, yet if the elastic force of this tenable so far as accounting for the phenomena
medium be exceeding great, it may suffice to was concerned. Later, new discoveries, such as
impel bodies from the denser parts of the me- those by Young and Fresnel, tend to favor the
dium towards the rarer, with all that power wave theory of light; but the rivalry continues
ivhich we call
gravity." right down to the present day. It remains un-
The hypothesis fits the law of gravitation if, resolved, at least to an extent which prompts
is Maxwell points out, "the diminution of pres- Eddington, in reviewing contemporary con-
sure [in the ether] is inversely as the distance troversy about the nature of light and electric-
from the dense body." Newton recognized, ac- ity, to suggest the invention of the word "wav-
cording to Maxwell, that it then becomes nec- icle" to signify the complementary use of both
essary "to account for of pres-
this inequality particles and waves in the modern theory of
sure in this medium; and as he was not able to radiation.
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 91
Unlike the rivalry between the Ptolemaic HUYGENS' WAVE THEORY requires what any-
and Copernican systems, which seemed for a body would have to call an hypothesis and re-
while to be entirely a matter of different mathe- quires it from the very start. "It is inconceiv-
matical descriptions of the same phenomena, able," he writes, "to doubt that light consists
the conflict between these two theories of light in the motion of some sort of matter." He im-
involves from the very beginning an issue be- mediately rejects the notion that light rays con-
tween diverse mechanical hypotheses to explain sist inthe "transport of matter coming to us
the phenomena. That issue is argued not only from the [luminous] object, in the way in which
with respect to the adequacy of either theory to a shot or an arrow traverse the air" if for no
explain such phenomena as the rectilinear prop- other reason, because "the rays traverse one
agation of light and its different behavior in another without hindrance." The similarity
different mediums; but it is also debated in between the phenomena of light and the phe-
terms of the underlying mechanical concep- nomena of sound suggests to him the "way that
tions.As gravitational force acting at a distance light spreads," and causes him to extend the
raisesa mechanical problem which Newton's mechanics of sound conceived as a wave mo-
ether is not finally able to solve, so Huygens' tion to light.
ether as the medium through which light is "We know that by means of air, which is an
propagated in waves raises mechanical prob- invisible and impalpable body," Huygens ar-
lems which, if insoluble (as they seem to be), gues, "sound spreads around the spot where
contribute even more heavily to the general it has been produced, by a movement which is
begins his with a reiteration of his disavowal of on the matter which is between the two. ... If,
writes, "is not to explain the properties of light it will movement, impressed on
follow that this
by hypotheses, but to propose and prove them the intervening matter, is successive; and con-
and, in addition, the assumption that, although Huygens is aware, however, that the analogy
all light particles have the same velocity when between and sound is far from
light perfect.
they travel together making white light, sepa- "If one examines," he says, "what this matter
rate particles for different colors are differently may be in which the movement coming from
refrangible, that is, differently susceptible to the luminous body is propagated, one will see
the action of the particles in the refracting me- that it is not the same that serves for the
prop-
dium of the glass. agation of sound. This may be proved,"
. . .
Perhaps only in Newton's somewhat arti- he goes on, "by shutting up a sounding body
ficially restricted sense of the word "hypoth- in a glass vessel from which the air is with-
esis"could these assumptions escape that de- drawn." An
alarm clock beating its bell in a
nomination. In any case, the existence of Huy- jar without air makes no sound, but a jar with-
gens' rival theory prevented his escaping a out air is no less transparent than one with air.
controversy about hypotheses. In the Queries Since when "the air is removed from the vessel
attached to his Optics, he engages in that con- the light does not cease td traverse it as before,"
troversy with an acumen which shows another and since waves have to be waves of something,
rkf lit e mnine onrl H74* roe f\r <air l-hir
92 THE GREAT IDEAS
must be waves of a substance, says Huygens, puscular theory, but only by the wave theory
"which I call ethereal matter." (thus shifting the scales decisively in favor of
This ether, a transparent medium permeat- the latter), it was also found that the wave
ing the whole universe, proves to be what Ein- theory could explain polarization only on the
stein calls the enfant terrible in the family of hy- assumption that the motion of the ether par-
pothetical physical substances. Postulated by ticles which produce the light waves is not
Huygens in order to explain light mechanically, longitudinal, but transverse, that is, in a direc-
it in turn calls for a mechanical account of its tion perpendicular to the waves produced by
own extraordinary properties. Huygens does the vibration of the particles.
not avoid this new problem, but neither does As Fresnel pointed out at the time, "the
he undertake to solve completely. it
supposition that the vibrations were transverse
Suppose "one takes a number of spheres of was contrary to the received ideas on the nature
equal size, made of some very hard substance, of the vibration of clastic fluids." They had all
and arranges them in a straight line, so that involved, as in the case of air as the medium for
they touch one another." Then, says Huygens, sound, a longitudinal transmission. The charac-
"one finds, on striking with a similar sphere ter of the ether is changed by the requirement
against the first of these spheres, that the mo- that its particles vibrate transversely. It ceases
tion passes as in an instant to the last of them, to be an air-like ether and must be imagined as
which separates itself from the row, without a jelly-like ether.
one's being able to perceive that the others The task which Huygens had postponed
have been stirred." This type of motion in the that of giving a mechanical explanation of the
ether would account for "the extreme velocity ether he had posited in order to state the me-
of light" and yet "this progression of motion chanics of light becomes in consequence far
is not instantaneous," as the motion of light more not impossible. In their efforts
difficult, if
ues, "there is nothing to hinder us from esti- and unnatural assumptions," that they finally
mating the particles of the ether to be of a sub- decided to abandon the whole program of me-
stance as nearly approaching to perfect hard- chanical explanation.
ness and possessing a springiness as prompt as
we choose." Beyond this Huygens does not go. OF NEWTON'S TWO objections to the wave
"It not necessary to examine here," he says,
is
theory of light, the second by itself seems to
"the causes of this hardness, or of that springi- create an insuperable difficulty for Huygens'
ness. Though we shall
. . .
ignore the true cause ether, even before the realization that it must
of springiness we still see that there are many be a jelly-like medium.
bodies which possess this property; and thus Newton's first objection is that any wave
there is nothing strange in supposing that it theory is inconsistent with the fact of the rec-
exists also in little invisible bodies like the par- tilinear propagation of light. "If light consisted
ticles of the ether." in pression or motion, propagated either in an
But difficulties which Huygens did not fore- instant or in time, it would bend into the shad-
seemake his ether more than a strange supposi- ow; for," he points out, "pression or motion
tionalmost a mechanical impossibility. Huy- cannot be propagated in a fluid in right lines,
gens had thought that light waves are trans- beyond an obstacle which stops part of the
mitted in the ether in the way that soundwaves motion, but will bend and spread every way
are in the air, that longitudinally, the direc-
is, into the quiescent medium which lies beyond
tion in which the individual particles vibrate the obstacle. . The waves, pulses or vibra-
. .
being the same as the direction of the wave mo- tions of the air, wherein sound consists, bend
tion itself. But when, in the i9th century, it manifestly, even though not so much as the
was found that the phenomena of the polariza- waves of water."
tion of light could not be explained by the cor- This objection loses its force when, in the
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 93
1
9th century, light's bending is experimentally This objection of Newton's, pointing to an
discovered. But Newton's other objection gains inconsistency between the kind of ether re-
force when, two centuries after he made it, a quired by the wave theory of light and the un-
jelly-like density imposed upon the ether by
is retarded motion of the heavenly bodies, ap-
the experimental facts of polarization. This pears not to have been answered, but only
second objection does not point to the inade- waived, at the time of the wave theory's as-
quacy of the wave theory with respect to the cendancy. The famous Michelson-Morley ex-
phenomena which must be described, but rath- periment on ether drift later re-opens Newton's
er calls attention to its
inconsistency with ce- penetrating query about the ether. But this
lestial mechanics. occurs at a time when physicists are prepared to
Light travels through inter-stellar space. But give up not only the ether, but also with it the
so also do the planets. Newton's astronomy ac- mechanical explanations of gravity and light
counts for the motion of the planets with great which it had
brought into conflict with one
precision, only on the supposition of no resistance another.
he writes, "it is necessary to empty the heavens course, it has a career in other fields of physical
of all matter, except perhaps such an ex-. . .
inquiry. The phenomena of heat, magnetism,
ceedingly rare ethereal medium as we de- and electricity are explored and explained un-
scribed above." Here he refers to the ether he der its inspiration. The history of these sub-
himself had posited as a possible cause of gravi- jects is marked by a very rash of hypotheses.
tational attraction. Its resistance, he thinks, Each time mechanical explanation is attempted
is "so small as to be inconsiderable." The for a new domain of phenomena, new sub-
perform their motions more freely in this The postulated entities calorific, magneti-
ethereal medium than in any fluid, which fills cal, and electric fluids- are unobservable and
all space adequately without leaving any without weight. In Newton's terms, they are
pores." Such "a dense fluid . . . serves only to "occult"; though, it must be added, they are
disturb and retard the motions of those great no more occult than the ether Newton himself
bodies, and make the frame of nature languish." postulated to explain gravity or the ether Huy-
Since "hinders the operations of nature," and
it
gens postulated to explain light. In fact, each
since "there is no evidence for its existence," of these new substances seems to resemble the
Newton concludes that "it ought to be rejected." aeriform or fluid ether, just as each is con-
The next conclusion follows immediately. ceived, as the gravitational or optical ether was
"If it be rejected, the hypotheses that light earlier conceived, in the context of the issue of
consists in pression or motion, propagated action-at-a-distance as opposed to action-by-
through such a medium, are rejected with it." contact. They would seem to be unavoidable
Newton would seem entitled to draw these con- in a mechanical account of the radiations of
clusions because, no matter how slight the den- heat, magnetism, and electricity.
sity of ethereal matter, the use of the ether in The phenomena of heat, Lavoisier writes, arc
the wave theory of light involves some interac- "difficult to comprehend . . . without admit-
tion between the particles of ether and the par- ting them as the effects of a real and material
ticles of matter. Unless such interaction takes substance, or very subtle fluid Where-
place, no explanation can be given of the fore," he continues, "we have distinguished
change in the velocity of light when it enters the cause of heat, or that exquisitely elastic
amedium like glass or water. Since in Newton's fluid which produces it, by the term of caloric."
universe there is no difference between terres- Lavoisier declares himself "unable to determine
trial and celestial matter, Newton cannot ac- whether light be a modification of caloric, or
cept an ether which interacts with the matter if caloric be, on the contrary, a modification of
of glass or water, but does not interact with the light." But in terms of observed effects he does
matter of the planets. attribute ether-like properties to caloric. "This
94 THE GREAT IDEAS
subtle matter," he says, "penetrates through the physical questions to problems of pure anal-
the pores of all known substances"; for "there ysis" and "to express the most general condi-
are no vessels through which it cannot escape." tions of the propagation of heat in differential
The theory of caloric serves its purpose be- equations." He expresses his indebtedness to
fore it gives way to the theory of heat as molec- Descartes for "the analytical equations" which
ular motion, a conception which can be inte- that mathematician "was the first to introduce
grated with the molecular, or kinetic, theory of into the study of curves and surfaces," but
gases. "The development of the kinetic theory "which arc not restricted to the properties of
of matter," writes Einstein, "is one of the figures, and those properties which are the ob-
greatest achievements directly influenced by ject of rational mechanics." These equations,
the mechanical view." It is all the more strik- he insists, "extend to all general phenomena,"
ing, therefore, that in the opening pages of and "from this point of view, mathematical
Fourier's Analytical Theory of Heat wherein analysis is as extensive as nature itself."
he reviews the triumphs of explanation This strongly worded statement aflirms the
achieved by Newton and his successors mathematical character of nature as the sup-
Fourier should so flatly assert: "But whatever port and justification fora purely mathematical
may be the range of mechanical theories, they physics. If Fourier's remarks about causes and
do not apply to the effects of heat. These make hypotheses arc reminiscent of Newton in his
up a special order of phenomena which cannot mathematical mood, how much more is Fou-
be explained by the principles of motion and rier's faith in pure mathematical analysis rem-
theory of heat, but the possibility of a purely ment of the incompetence and irrelevance of
mathematical treatment of the phenomena. mechanics to the subject he is investigating.
"We are not obliged to suppose [caloric] to be His trust in mathematical analysis, which is
a real substance," he writes; it is sufficient able by itself to yield and organize physical
"that be considered as the repulsive cause,
it discoveries, not only revives the spirit of Gal-
whatever that may be, which separates the ileo, but also seems to have inspired Clerk
particles of matter from each other, so that we Maxwell to turn from a mechanical to a mathe-
are still at liberty to investigate its effects in an matical theory of electricity.
abstract and mathematical manner." Certain of Fourier's mathematical achieve-
The second of these two things is
precisely ments, such as his theory of dimensions, prove
what Fourier proposes to undertake, but he useful to Maxwell. More important, perhaps,
disavows any interest in the first, namely, the is the fact that Maxwell's predictions about the
pendent of all hypothesis." Fourier's aim, BETWEEN FOURIER and Maxwell comes Fara-
therefore, with respect to "the very extensive day.One of the greatest experimenters in the
class of phenomena, not produced by mechani- whole tradition of science, Faraday discovers
but resulting simply from the pres-
cal forces, the phenomena whose mathematical structure
ence and accumulation of heat," is "to reduce Maxwell later develops. He prepares the way
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 95
for Maxwell's application to electricity and rivative from some other primary force. But it
magnetism of the method Fourier had prac- would suggest questions to be asked by experi-
ticed. His speculations concerning the relation ment.
of electrical and gravitational force point ahead, Gilbert compares magnetism and electricity
but he is not able to convert one into the other.
beyond Maxwell, to the possibility of a field
theory which might unify all physical phenom- Oersted, before Faraday, is the first to establish
ena under a single set of mathematical laws. one aspect of their convertibility. He shows
Faraday sees no incompatibility between ex- that an electric current has a magnetic effect.
perimentation and speculation. On the con- Faraday succeeds in showing the reverse that
trary he says that "as an experimentalist I feel a magnetic current has electrical power. He
bound to let experiment guide me into any expresses his fascination with such reversibili-
train of thought which it
may justify; being ties in his remarks on the electrical torpedo
satisfied that experiment, like analysis, must fish. "Seebeck," he writes, "taught us how to
lead to strict truth, if rightly interpreted; and commute heat into electricity; and Peltier has
believing also that it is in its nature far more more lately given us the strict converse of this,
suggestive of new trains of thought and new and shown us how to convert electricity into
conditions of natural power." Faraday's faith heat. . . . Oersted showed how we were to con-
seems to have been amply justified. His experi- vert electric into magnetic forces, and I had
ments not only discovered a stunning number the delight of adding the other member of the
of new facts, but the speculations to which they full relation, by reacting back again and con-
led transformed the whole mode of thinking verting magnetic into electric forces. So per-
about electricity and magnetism, and, to some haps in these organs, where nature has pro-
extent, the whole of physics. vided the apparatus by means of which the
The Elizabethan Gilbert, with his bold and fish can exert and convert nervous into electric
brilliantly handled thesis that the earth is a force, we may be able, possessing in that point of
magnet, had made magnetism appear some- view a power far beyond that of the fish itself,
thing more than a random phenomenon occa- to reconvert the electric into the nervous force."
sionally met with in nature. But not until Faraday demonstrates still another such re-
Faraday's discovery of diamagnetism, an- versibility in nature. The nature of his discov-
nounced in a memoir On the Magnetic Condition ery is indicated by the titles of the papers in
of All M after > would anyone have dared to say which he announces it: On the Magnetization
that "all matter appears to be subject to the of Light and the Illumination of Magnetic Lines
magnetic force as universally as it is to the of Force and The Action of Electric Currents on
gravitating, the electric and the chemical or Light. These papers, in his opinion, "established
cohesive forces." Of electricity, he can only for the first time, a true, direct relation and
predict, as the result of his protracted experi- dependence between light and the magnetic
mental investigations, that "it is probable that and electric forces"; and he concludes them
every effect depending upon the powers of in- with an explicit statement of the central theme
organic matter will ultimately be found
. . . of all his researches and speculations.
subordinate to it." "Thus a great addition is made," he writes,
These remarks indicate
controlling the "to the facts and considerations which tend to
theme of Faraday's researches, namely, the prove that all natural forces are tied together
convertibility and unity of natural forces. It and have one common origin. It is no doubt
seems to have been suggested to him by the difficult in the present stateof our knowledge
discovery that both electrical and magnetic to express our expectation in exact terms; and,
forces obey the same simple inverse-square law though I have said that another of the powers
as the force of gravitational attraction. The of nature in these
experiments, directly
is,
fact that certain forces obey the same law or related to the rest, ought, perhaps, rather to
I
that their action can be described by the same say that another form of the great power is
equations, would not of itself reveal whether distinctly and directly related to the other
one of these forces is primary or all are de- forms."
96 THE GREAT IDEAS
ONE FORM OF the "great power" remained to of gravitation, no effect sustaining the idea of
be connected with such "other forms" as those an independent or physical line of force is
of light, heat, electricity, and magnetism. That presented to us; as far as we at present know,
was the power of gravitational force. Faraday the line of gravitation is merely an ideal line
comes to this last stage of his speculations con- representing the direction in which the power
cerning the unity of nature's powers in terms is exerted." But encouraged, perhaps, by New-
of his conception of "lines of force" and of what ton's repeated references to "the attractions of
later came to be called "the field of force." gravity, magnetism, and electricity," and by
The of electricity and mag-
earliest theories Newton's letter to Bentley which he interprets
netism, in an orthodox atomistic vein, had con- as showing Newton to be "an unhesitating be-
ceived them as exerting an influence by means liever in physical lines of gravitating force,"
of the effluvia which they emitted. Newton, for Faraday goes to work experimentally.
example, speculates on "how the effluvia of a The report of these researches On the Possible
magnet can be so rare and subtle, as to pass Relation of Gravity to Electricity opens with the
through a plate of glass without any resistance re-statement of Faraday's central theme. "The
or diminution of their force, and yet so potent long and constant persuasion that all the forces
as to turn a magnetic needle beyond the glass." of nature are mutually dependent, having one
When electrical conduction is later discovered, origin, or rather being different manifestations
effluvia arc replaced by fluids, on the analogy of of one fundamental power, has made me often
caloric as the fluid conductor of heat. But when think of establishing, by experiment, a connex-
Faraday finds that he can induce from one cur- ion between gravity and electricity, and so
rent to another, he becomes interested in the introducing the former into the group, the
dielectric, non-conducting medium around the chain of which, including also magnetism,
circuits. He is
strongly averse to any theory chemical force and heat, binds so many and
which involves action-at-a-distance, and so he such varied exhibitions of force together by
argues that induction takes place by the action common relations." His experiments, he tells
of contiguous particles. To support that argu- us, unfortunately "produced only negative
ment he shows experimentally that electrical results," but that docs not shake his "strong
induction can "turn a corner." feeling of the existence of a relation between
From study of all the phenomena of mag-
his gravity and electricity."
netism, Faraday forms the conception of "lines
of force" and concludes that there is "a center THOUGH FARADAY FAILS to prove "that such
of power surrounded by lines offeree which are a relation exists," he does bequeath, as a legacy
physical lines essential both to the existence of to 20th century physics, the problem of a field
force within the magnet and to its conveyance theory which would embrace both gravita-
to, and exertion upon, magnetic bodies at a tionaland electrical force. But whereas Faraday
distance." He says of this "idea of lines of conceives the problem mechanically in terms
force" that "all the points which are experi- of the physical reality, as well as unity, of all
mentally established with regard to [magnetic] lines of force, in which contiguous particles
action, />., all that is not hypothetical, appear acton one another, those who inherit the prob-
to be well and truly represented by it"; and lem from him cease to concern themselves with
he adds: "Whatever idea we employ to repre- the physical existence of "lines of force" and
sent the power ought ultimately to include their mechanical basis in the action and reac-
electric forces, for the two are so related that tion of bodies. Influenced by the amazing gen-
one expression ought to serve for both." erality implicit in Maxwell's field equations,
Subsequently Faraday satisfies himself as to they proceed to search for a purely mathe-
the physical reality of electrical lines of force matical statement of nature's structure.
in addition to the magnetic lines. The com- In the judgment of the 20th century physi-
pulsion of his interest in the unity of nature then cist mathematics may at last succeed in doing
drives him to speculate about gravitational precisely what mechanics, from Newton to
force. He begins by admitting that, "in the case Faraday, kept promising but forever failing to
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 97
do. If the unity of nature can be expressed in each of them has diffused through the whole";
a single set of laws, they will be, according to so that "besides the geometrisation of mechan-
Einstein, laws of a type radically different from ics, there has been a mechanisation of geom-
the laws of mechanics. Taking the form of etry."
Maxwell's equations, a form which appears "in According to this view, it is not mechanics,
all other equations of modern physics," they but classical mechanics, which the new physics
will be, he writes, "laws representing the has abandoned. The character of the mechanics
structure of the field." seems to have altered with the character of the
In saying that "Maxwell's equations are mathematical formulations. Field theory, deal-
structure laws" and that they provide "a new ing with contiguous areas and successive events,
pattern for the laws of nature," Einstein means avoids the problem of action-at-a-distance and
to emphasize their non-mechanical character. also apparently that problem's classical solution
"In Maxwell's theory," he writes, "there arc no in terms of the action of contiguous particles.
material actors." Whereas "Newton's gravita- But another sort of mechanics may be implicit
tional laws connect the motion of a body here in the field equations which connect events in
and now with the action of a body at the same one area with events in the immediate vicinity.
time in the far distance," Maxwell's equations had been available to him,
If those equations
"connect events which happen now and here Newton might have expressed his theory of a
with events which will happen a little later in
variably dense ether analogous to the modern
the immediate vicinity." Like the equations conception of a variably filled or variably
which describe "the changes of the electro- curved space in terms of structure laws de-
magnetic field, our new gravitational laws are," scribing the gravitational field.
according to Einstein, "also structure laws de-
scribing the changes of the gravitational field." WE ARE LEFT with a number of questions. Is the
The heart of the difference between a "struc- story of mechanics the story of its rise and de-
ture law" and a mechanical law seems to be con- cline or the story of its changing role now
tained in Einstein's statement that "all space dominant, now subordinate; now more mani-
isthe scene of these laws and not, as for me- fest, now more concealed at all stages in the
chanical laws, only points in which matter or development of a physics which is committed
changes are present." This contrast between to being both mathematical and experimental?
matter and space brings to mind the difference Do the status and character of mechanical con-
between physics and geometry. Yet Einstein's ceptions change with changes in the form of the
repeated reference to "changes" in these space- mathematical laws which describe the phenom-
structures also reminds us that the electrical ena ? Can physics be totally devoid of mechan-
and gravitational fields are not purely geomet- ical insight and yet perform experiments which
rical, but physical as well. somehow require the scientist to act on bodies
The structure laws of the new physics may and to make them act on one another? Could
be geometrical in form, but if they are to have a pure mathematical physics have yielded pro-
any physical meaning, can they entirely avoid ductive applications in mechanical engineering
some coloring by the mechanical conceptions without the intermediation of mechanical no-
which have been traditionally associated with and effect ?
tions of cause
the consideration of matter and motion? At Whichever way these questions are answered,
least one contemporary physicist appears to we face alternatives that seem to be equally
think that mechanics survives to bury its un- unsatisfactory. Either experimental physics is
dertakers. After describing the development in purely mathematical and proclaims its disin-
which geometry progressively "swallowed up terest in as well as its ignorance of causes; or
the whole of mechanics," Eddington observes physics cannot be experimental and mathe-
that "mechanics in becoming geometry re- matical without also being mechanical, and
mains none the less mechanics. The partition without being involved in a search for causes
l
its mo-
cist's practical mastery of matter and ways remain "ignorant of the several powers,
tions, which he naively supposes to depend efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the
upon a scientific knowledge of the causes, while effects, which we daily see, are produced." If
all the time the scientists protest that the causes scientific knowledge is
knowledge of causes,
remain unknown to an experimental and then "how far soever human industry may ad-
mathematical physics. Mechanical explana- vance useful and experimental philosophy in
tions may be offered from time to time, but the physical things, scientifical will still be out of
various "forces" they appeal to can be under- our reach."
stood only from their effects, and are nothing When we try to observe efficient causes at
more than verbal shorthand for the formulae work, what do we see ? Hume answers that we
or equations which express the mathematical only see one thing happening after another.
laws. Yet they remain cause-names, and seem "The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended
to stimulate advances in science both experi- with motion in the second. This is the whole
mental and mathematical almost as a conse- that appears to the outward senses." Nor can
quence of the exasperating elusiveness of these we form any "inward impression" of what takes
hidden causes. place at the moment of impact. "We are ig-
Certain philosophers hold a view which sug- norant," he writes, "of the manner in which
the word "hidden." Causes exist and we can always remain so, for "their force or energy is
controlthem to build machines and explode entirely incomprehensible."
bombs, but we cannot with our senses catch As the chapter on CAUSE indicates, Aristotle
them in the very act of causing, or perceive the holds an opposite view of the matter. What
inwardness of their operation. If the fact that takes place in efficient causation may be im-
they are thus unobservable means that they perceptible, but it is not incomprehensible. All
are occult, then
all causes are occult not least causes may be occult so far as the senses are
of all the mechanical type of cause which con- concerned, but they are not obscure to the in-
sists in the impact of one body upon another. tellect. But Aristotle would also insist that the
In the century in which physicists tried to action of efficient causes cannot be understood
avoid the scandal of forces acting at a distance if they are totally isolated from other causes-
by postulating mechanical mediums through material, formal, final. A purely mechanical
which one body acted directly on another, physics, in his opinion, defeats itself by its basic
philosophers like Locke and Hume express their philosophical tenets, which exclude all
proper-
doubts that such causal action is
any less oc- ties that are not quantitative and all causes ex-
cult than Newton had said Aristotle's causes cept the efficient. Only a different metaphysics
conceivable, as how our minds move or stop our deal with causes and explain the phenomena;
bodies by thought. The increase of motion
. . . but such an Aristotelian physics, from the mod-
by impulse, which is observed or believed some- ern point of view, stands condemned on other
times to happen, is
yet harder to understand. grounds. It is not experimental. It is not pro-
We have by daily experience, clear evidence of ductive of useful applications. It is not mathe-
motion produced both by impulse and by matical; nor is it
capable of comprehending all
thought; but the manner how, hardly comes the phenomena of nature under a few simple,
within our comprehension; we are equally at a universal laws,
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 99
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The foundations of mechanics 101
ib. The laws of motion: inertia; the measure offeree; action and reaction
4. The place, scope, and ideal of the science of mechanics: its relation to the
philosophy of
nature and other sciences
40. Terrestrial and celestial mechanics: the mechanics of finite bodies and of parti-
cles or atoms
4#. The explanation of qualities and qualitative change in terms of quantity and
motion
5.
The basic phenomena and problems of mechanics: statics and dynamics
105
5^. The equilibrium and motion of fluids: buoyancy, the weight and pressure of air,
the effects of a vacuum
$e. Rectilinear
motion 106
6b. Weight and specific gravity: the relation of mass and weight
(1) The relation of mass and force: the law of universal gravitation
yc.
The theory of heat
(1) The description and explanation of the phenomena of heat: the hypothesis
of caloric
(2) The measurement and the mathematical analysis of the quantities of heat
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK u [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
:
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
:
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF i 5a; DEF 5b; BK m The laws o f motion: inertia; the measure
of force; action and reaction
i, PROP 73, SCHOL 133b-134a; BK n, GENERAL
SCHOL, 218a-219a; PROP 40, SCHOL, 246a-b; 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vm, CH 10 [266*27-
BK HI, RULE HI 270b-271a; PROP 6, COROL 267*21] 354b-d / Heavens, BK in, CH 2
b
HI-IV 281b; PROP 7 281b 282b / Optics, BK [30i*2i- 3i] 392c-393b
102 THE GREAT IDEAS \c to la
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, 448b-451b / Conoids and Spheroids, PROP 3-6
SECT 1-4 178b-179c; BK iv, CH in, SECT 25-26 458b-460b / Equilibrium of Planes, BK i,
321a-c PROP 6-7 503b-504b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 50-53 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 18b-20b
422c-423a passim; SECT 60-66 424b-426a; 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
SECT 102-109 432d-434b 197b-200a; 205b 206c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv, 31b-33b / Geometry,
24-27 459b-460d esp DIV 26 460b-c; SECT vn, BK i, 295a-296b
DIV 55, 474c-d; DIV 56-57 475a-d esp DIV 57, 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LLMMA i 25a
475d [fn 2]; SECT vm, DIV 64, 478d 42 K\NT: Judgement, 551a-552a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 118b-119a 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 183a-b
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 687d;
695b-c 3^. The geometry of conies: the motion of
53 JAMES: Psychology, 885b-886a planets and projectiles
11 ARCHIMEDES:Quadrature of the Parabola
3. The use of mathematics in mechanics: the 527a-537b
dependence of progress in mechanics on 11 APOLLONIUS: Conies 603a-804b
mathematical discovery 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 975a-979b
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 9 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY
b
104b-d; CH 13 [78 3 1-79*1 6] 108b-c / Physics, 191c-195c; FOURTH DAY 238a-260a,c passim,
BK ii, CH 2 [194*7-11] 270b-c; BK vn, CH 5 esp 238b-240a
104 THE GREAT IDEAS 3c to 4<r
3<r. Algebra and analytic geometry: the sym- 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 888b-905a passim;
bolic formulation of mechanical prob-
919b; 929a-933a; 935b; 940b-941a; 959a-
lems 960a
31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 5c-d; xiv, 30d-33b; 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY,
xvi 33d-35c; xvm 36b-39d / Geometry 295a- 245b-d
353b esp BK i-n, 298b-314b, BK n, 322b- 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK H, APH 5 138b-
331a 139a; APH 35 162a-164a; APH 36, 165c-166c;
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA 19 57b- APH 46, 178c; APH 48, 186c-d
58b 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK HI, RULES 270a-271b;
34 HUYGENS: Light^ CH vi, 610a-b PROP 7 281b-282b / Optics, BK in, 539a-
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREP, la 542b
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a-173b; 177a- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xm, 563a-b;
251b EPILOGUE ii, 694d-696d
3</. Calculus: the measurement of irregular 4b. The explanation of qualities and qualitative
areas and variable motions change in terms of quantity and motion
11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes, BK i, 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 4 [985b 3~i9]
PROP 7 504b / Quadrature of the Parabola 503c-d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442*30-
b
527a-537b 24] 680a-c
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 973a-975a; 979b- 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2, 167b-
983b 168b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK ii
[398-521]
193b-194d; THIRD DAY, 205b-d; 224b-c 20a-21c;[677-687] 23c-d; [730-1022] 24b-
33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 395a-b / 28a; BK iv [522-721] 51a-53d
Geometrical Demonstration, 434b-435b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49b-d; PART in,
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA i-n and 172b
SCHOL 25a*32a esp LEMMA n, SCHOL, 31a-b; 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 231a-b
BK ii, LEMMA 2 and SCHOL 168a-170a 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK i, 431a-455a esp 450a-
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172b; 177a; 181a-b; 453a
183a-b; 221a-248b 34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553b-554a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK ii, CH vm,
EPILOGUE ii, 695b-c SECT 4 133d; SECT 7-26 134b-138b; CH xxi,
SECT 3 178d; SECT 75 200b-d; CH xxm, SECT
4. The place, scope, and ideal of the science of
8-9 206a-c; SECT n 206d-207a; SECT 37 213d-
mechanics: its relation to the philosophy
214b; CH xxxi, SECT 2 239b-d esp 239d;
of nature and other sciences BK III, CH IV, SECT 10 261b-dj BK IV, CH II,
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d SECT 11-13 311c-312b; CH in, SECT 6, 314b;
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a-b; 33d- SECT 12-14 316a-d; SECT 28 322a-c
34b / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 74 118b; 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25 417d-
BK n, APH 9 140b-c / New Atlantis, 210d- 418a; SECT 102 432d-433a
214d 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169b; 182a-b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 7a; v, 8a / Discourse,
PART v, 54d-56a; 59a 4c. The mechanistic account of the phenomena
34 NEWTON: Principles, lb-2a; BK i, PROP 69, of life
SCHOL 130b-131a / Optics, BK in, 541b-542a 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-242b / Sophist, 567a-
34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553b-554a 568a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 9, 8 ARISTOTLE: Sense and the Sensible, CH 4
454c-d a-c
5to5d CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 105
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
[640**
163a-164a / Motion of Animals, 5b. The equilibrium and motion of fluids:
5-641*19]
CH b
7 [70i i-3<>] 236d-237b; CH 8 [702*22]-
buoyancy, the weight and pressure of
cn 10 [703b i] 237c-239a / Gait of Animals air, the effects of a vacuum
5. The basic phenomena and problems of me- 5d. Motion, void, and medium: resistance and
chanics: statics and dynamics friction
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 162c- PROP 30-31 and SCHOL 76a-81a; PROP 40-42
163a; THIRD DAY, 197b-200a 88b-92b; PROP 46-47 and SCHOL 101a-102a;
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF m-iv 5b-6a; LAW i PROP 51-56 105b Ilia; BK n, PROP 4 161b-
14a; COROL iv-v 18a-19a; BK H, PROP i, 165a; PROP 10 and SCHOL 173b-183a; LEMMA
COROL 159a; PROP 2 159b 160a; PROP 5-6 3-PROP 1 8 189b-194b; PROP 24-GENERAL
165a-167a; PROP 11-12 183a-184b SCHOL 203a-219a; BK in, PROP 1-5 and SCHOL
276a-279a; PROP 13 286a-b; PROP 20 291 b-
5e(2) Accelerated motion: free fall
294b; LEMMA 4-PROP 42 333a-368b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH 8 [215*24- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xiv,
216*21] 295a-d / Heavens, BK in, CH 2 [301** SECT 21 159a-d
16-31] 393a-b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT in,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [225-242] 434d
17d-18a
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, lOb-llb 5/(2) Perturbation of motion: the two and
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115, three body problems
A i, REP 3 585d-587c 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 920b 921b; 922b-
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 157b- 926a; 957b-959a
171 b; THIRD DAY, 200a-237a,c 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 54c-d; 55c-56b
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 36, 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 43-45 92b-
166b-c; APH 48, 181d lOla; lllb; PROP 57-69 and SCHOL lllb-131a;
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF iv 6a; LAW n 14a~b; BK in, PROP 5, COROL HI 279a; PROP 12-14
COROL vi 19b; BK i, PROP 32-39 81a-88a; BK and SCHOL 285a-287b; PROP 21-39 294b-333a
n, PROP 3-4 160b-165a; PROP 8-10 170a-179a; 45 FARADAY Researches in Electricity, 817a-b
:
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vu, CH 5 333a-d; 40b esp 30a-32c; 42b-43c; 45d-47b; 51a-c;
BK viu, CH 10 [266*25-267*20] 353c-354d / 54d-55c; BK v, 102d-104b; BK vi, 112d
Heavens, BK in, CH 2 [30^2-32] 392d-393b 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 202 d
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 3 234a-c 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 37 168d-
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 938b-939a; BK v, 169c; APH 45 176a-177c; APH 48, 183a-c; 186a
969a-971b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, ix, 15c / Discourse, PART
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 105, v, 55c
A 4, REP i 541c-542a; PART i-n, Q 23, A 4 34 NEWTON: Principles, DBF V-VIH 6a-8a; BK i,
726a-727a PROP 69, SCHOL 130b-131a; BK in, GENERAL
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 84, SCHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK in, 507a-516b;
A 3, REP 2 985d 989b 520a-522a esp 521a-b; 531b-542a passim
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 26d-40b passim 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV
31 DESCARTES: Rules, ix, 15c / Objections and 57, 475d [fn 2]
Replies, 231c-232a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 227b
1U8 UKbAl
544a passim, esp BK i, 379a, BK n, 492a-495b
(6d. force: its kinds and its effects. 6d(2) Action- BK in, 525b-531b
at-a-distance: the field and medium of 34 HUYGENS: Light 551a-619b passim, csp CH i
force) 553a-563b
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 9b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH iv,
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 441a-442b; SECT 10 261b-d; BK iv, CH n, SECT 11-13 311c-
451a-454a; 463d-465d; 513d-514c; 521a-524a; 312b
528c-532a; 604b-c; 631b-c; 648b-d; 685d- 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
686c; 816b,d-819a,c; 819a-d; 824a-b; 832a c; lOb-c
840c-842c; 855a,c 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 595a-
607a,c; 817b-c
6i/(3) The parallelogram law: the composition 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c
of forces and the composition of veloci-
ties 7a(l) The laws of reflection and refraction
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 969a 970a 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 454c-455a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 8 ARISTOTLE: Meteorology, BK in, CH 2-6 476b-
224d-225c; FOURTH DAY, 240a-d; 243d-249b 482d / Soul, BK n, CH 8 [419^8-33] 651a
passim 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [269-323]
34 NLWTON: Principles, COROL I-H 15a-16b 47d-48b; [436-442] 49d-50a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 691b 692a; 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
:
7 a (4) The medium of light: the ether 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK 11, CH 7 [418*27-419*24) 9a-16d
b a
649b-650b; BK in, CH 12 [434 22-435 n] 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat 169a-251b passim
667c-668a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 3 676a- 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 812b-c;
B
678b; CH 6 [446"20-447 i2] 684c-685c 813b-815b; 857a 858d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [449-508] 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xin, 587b-c;
67a-c EPILOGUE n, 687d
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 857a-b; 901a-b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcohgica, PART i, Q 14, A 7c(2) The measurement and the mathemati-
6, ANS 80a-81c
cal analysis of the quantities of heat
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 48, 33 PASCAL: Great Experiment, 388a
186a 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
*
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 366a-367a 14a-c; 33b-36a; PART HI, 99d-103b
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL, 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 184b 185b
372a / Optics, BK in, 520a-522b; 525b-529a
34 HUYGENS Light) CH i, 553b-560b esp 557b-
:
Id. Magnetism: the great magnet of the earth
560b 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 14, 177a-
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 595b [fn 2] 178c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [906-
Ib. Sound: the mechanical explanation of
1089] 92b-94c
acoustic phenomena 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, 23b-25d; BK vi
7 PLATO: Meno> 177b-c / Timaeus, 471 b 106a-121a,c
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK n, CH 8 650c-652c 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 36,
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK v, CH 7 166c-167a; APH 45, 176b-c; APH 48, 183b-c
328c-330b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 100a-102a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [524- 45 FARADAY: Researches th Electricity, 286a-294a;
614] 5la-52b 697b-757d
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR v, CH 5 186b d
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 7</(l) Magnetic phenomena: coition, verticity,
CROSS-REFERENCES
QUANTITY la.
Mechanism as a philosophy of nature, man, and history, see ANIMAL ic; ELEMENT 5e~5g;
HISTORY 43(2); MAN 30; MIND 2e; WILL 50; WORLD ib.
Other discussions of motion and its laws, see ASTRONOMY 8c-8c(3); CHANGE 7~7d; MATTER
2b; and for the related consideration of the void and action-at-a-distance, see ASTRONOMY
3b; ELEMENT SPACE 2b(2)-2c.
5c;
Another discussion of mass and weight, see QUANTITY 5d; for another discussion of velocity,
and momentum, see QUANTITY 5c; for another discussion offeree, see QUAN-
acceleration,
TITY 5e; and for another discussion of the composition of forces, see OPPOSITION 3d.
CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS Hi
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
usage of the English word "physic" as the name share acommon training in the relevant sciences
for the art, practice, and profession of what is and arts, but who also have adopted a code of
now generally called "medicine" suggests what practice and obligated themselves to perform a
the word's Greek root signifies, namely, that service to their fellow men.
the physician, no less than the physicist, is a The Hippocratic Oath, sworn to in the name
student of nature. of "Apollo the physician and Aesculapius, and
There is one other historic use of "medicine" Health . and all the gods and goddesses," is
. .
which indicates its scope and connections in the the first explicit formulation of a professional
western tradition. When mediaeval institutions ideal. In the collection of writings attributed to
firstshaped the university, the basic divisions Hippocrates, The Law explicitly indicates as
of learning then embodied in its structure re- The Oath implies that there arc intellectual as
flected different uses of learning as well as dif- well as moral conditions to be fulfilled by those
ferences in subject matter. The three faculties who would dedicate themselves to the service
of medicine, law, and theology not only disci- of health. Only those who have satisfied all req-
knowledge, but also trained them for distinct gent application have acquired a true knowl-
applications of knowledge to practice. edge of it shall be "esteemed physicians not
The faculty of medicine represented all the only in name but in reality."
natural sciences, especially those which have The same high conception of medicine ap-
come to be called "biological sciences," just as pears in the Bible. We
read in Ecclesiasticus:
the faculty of law or jurisprudence represented "Honor the physician for the need thou hast
all the moral sciences and their later offshoots, of him: for the most High hath created him.
now called "social sciences." The doctor of For all healing is from God, and he shall receive
medicine was concerned with knowledge bear- gifts of the king. The skill of the physician shall
lift up his head, and in the sight of great men
ing on the relation of man to nature, as the
doctor of laws was concerned with knowledge he shall be praised. The most High hath created
bearing on the relation of man to man, and the medicines out of the earth, and a wise man will
doctor of theology with knowledge bearing on not abhor them. The virtue of these things
. . .
the relation of man to God. is come knowledge of men, and the most
to the
It is a curious accident that the word "doc- High hath given knowledge to men, that he
tor," which in origin signified the competence may be honored in his wonders. By these he
to teach others who might practice in each of shall cure and shall allay their pains, and of
these great fields of learning, has come in popu- these the apothecary shall make sweet confec-
lar usage to designate, not the teacher, but the tions, and shall make up ointments of health,
113
114 THE GREAT IDEAS
and of his works there shall be no end. For the Such commentary as this bears more on the
peace of God is over all the face of the earth." history of medicine than on the abiding prob-
lems of its science or art, which, from Hip-
FIVE OF THE authors of the great books Hip- pocrates to Freud, have been more generally
pocrates, Galen, Gilbert, Harvey, and Freud agreed upon than the theories proposed for
belonged to the profession of medicine. They their solution. Of similar historical significance
were major figures in its history. Practitioners are the passages in the great works of history
of its arts, they were also contributors to the which describe the phenomena of disease as
sciences concerned with health and disease. they appeared to contemporary observers, the
Three others combined medicine with other plagues which ravaged Athens, Rome, and
pursuits. Copernicus studied medicine at Padua London, or the maladies which afflicted emi-
and devoted considerable time to its practice; nent individuals. Poetry, as well as history and
Locke was Lord Shaftesbury's personal physi- biography, contributes to this record. The
cian; James took a medical degree at Harvard novels of Tolstoy and Fielding, the plays of
after years spent in the biological sciences. Still Shakespeare, the tales of Cervantes and Chau-
another, Rabelais, not only studied and prac- cer, theGreek tragedies, and the Homeric epics
ticed medicine, but also edited the Aphorisms furnish evidence of both the constant and the
of Hippocrates and Galen's little treatise on the changing elements in the conception of disease,
medical His knowledge of medicine and his
art. the vocation of medicine, and the social accept-
observation of its contemporary practices can ance of the physician.
be readily discerned in his comic exaggerations The history of medicine is an epitome of the
of anatomical and physiological detail, and of history of the natural sciences. The researches
regimens of diet or exercise. of the Hippocratic school inititate specific
The discussion of medicine in the great books methods of empirical investigation, such as the
is not limited to its professors or practitioners. systematic collection and comparison of obser-
Montaigne has many doubts about medical vations and the painstaking record of individ-
diagnosis and the possibility of charting the ual case histories. The fundamental concepts of
causes of disease or the remedies which cure. medical theory reflect the philosophy of nature
The patient's ignorance permits the physician and of man. Conflicting notions of the causes of
to claim credit for his successes and to blame disease focus major issues in biology, such as the
fortune for his failures. controversy in which Galen engages with As-
Montaigne, characteristically, delights in ob- clepiades and Erasistratus in the defense of
serving that the doctors disagree. He offers, as what he supposes to be Hippocrates' and Aris-
"one example of the ancient controversy in totle's organic view of nature against mech-
ger,he adds, "in our mistaking the height of also affords Bacon and Descartes the prime
the sun, or the fraction of some astronomical example of a useful application of the knowl-
computation; but here where our whole being edge gained by the new methods they propose.
is concerned, 'tis not wisdom to abandon our- More than engineering or the invention of
selves to the mercy of the agitation of so many mechanical utilities, medicine represents for
contrary winds." them knowledge in the service of mankind.
CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 115
That science shall bear fruit in technology "is truth without the aid of teachers. Animals and
not merely to be desired," writes Descartes, men can preserve and regain their health with-
"with a view to the invention of an infinity of out the care of physicians. But without shoe-
arts and crafts . . . but principally because it makers or house builders, shoes and houses
brings about the preservation of health, which would not be produced.
is without doubt the chief blessing and the The art of medicine does notproduce health
foundation of all other blessings in this life . . . in the sense inwhich the shoemaker produces a
It is true that the medicine which is now in shoe, or the sculptor a statue. These other arts
Jenner, Bichat, Virchow, Claude Bernard, and physician's art when he uses the metaphor of
Koch, seems to substantiate Descartes' proph- midwifery to characterize his own method of
ecy. But it also seems to be true that the teaching. As it is the mother who labors and
major problems of medical practice are not gives birth, so it is the student who is primarily
greatly altered or diminished by the tremen- active in the process of learning. The teacher,
dous increase in our knowledge of the causes of like the midwife, merely assists in a natural
specific diseases and our vast store of well process which might be more painful, and might
tested remedies. possibly fail, without such help. "The teacher,"
What sort of art medicine is; to what extent writes Aquinas, "only brings exterior help as
the physician should let nature run its course; does the physician who heals; just as the interior
with what restraint or prudence the physician nature is the
principal cause of the healing, so
should apply general rules to particular cases; the interior light of the intellect is the principal
whether health is better served by the general cause of knowledge.
practitioner treating the whole man or by a "Health," he continues, "is caused in a sick
specialist treating a special organ; how the re- man, sometimes by an exterior principle, name-
lation of the physician to his patient is itself a ly, by the medical art; sometimes by an interior
therapeutic factor and underlies the effective- principle, as when a man is healed by the force
ness of his skill in all other respects; to what of nature. . . .
Just as nature heals a man by al-
extent mind and body interact both in the ori- teration, digestion, rejection of the matter that
gin and in the cure of disease these are the caused the sickness, so does art. . . . The exte-
problems of medicine concerning which Hip- rior principle, art, acts not as a primary agent,
pocrates and Galen can converse with Osier and but as helping the primary agent, which is the
Freud almost as contemporaries. and by furnishing it with in-
interior principle,
struments and assistance, of which the interior
THE DISTINCTION made in the chapter on ART principle makes use in producing the effect.
between the simply productive and the coop- Thus the physician strengthens nature, and em-
erative arts associates medicine with agriculture ploys food and medicine, of which nature makes
and teaching, and separates these arts, which use for the intended end."
merely help a natural result to come about, The subordination of the medical art to na-
from the arts which produce an effect that ture seems to be the keystone of the whole
would never occur without the work of the structure of Hippocratic medicine. It is im-
Plants grow and reproduce without the
artist, plied in the emphasis which Hippocrates places
help of farmers. The mind can discover some on the control of the patient's regimen, espe-
116 THE GREAT IDEAS
cially the elements of his diet, the exercise of gets out of order, it needs a mechanic and me-
his body, and the general circumstances of his chanical remedies to fix it. On the contrary, it
life. Even in the treatment of acute diseases, seems to him, the living body is an organic
Hippocrates looks to the regimen first, pre- unity, not an aggregation of atoms, or a system
scribing changes or special articles of diet. of interlocking parts.
Medicines or drugs perform an auxiliary "Nature is not posterior to the corpuscles,
function. Surgery is always a last resort, to be but a long way prior to them," Galen writes.
used primarily in the treatment of injuries, and "Therefore it is nature which puts together the
not to be employed in diseases which will yield bodies both of plants and animals; and this she
to a course of regimen and medication. There does by virtue of certain faculties which she
is an element of violence in surgery which puts possesses these being, on the one hand, attrac-
it last among the means of an art which should tive and assimilative of what is appropriate,
work by cooperating with nature rather than and, on the other, expulsive of what is foreign.
by operating on it. And among medicines, Further, she skillfully moulds everything dur-
those are preferable which, like ptisan, a special ing the stage of genesis; and she also provides
preparation of barley water, derive their effi- for the creatures after birth, employing here
regimen is not only the primary factor in ther- its faculties or powers for the
performance of
apy, but also the original principle of medicine. natural functions and the production of natural
In the treatise On Ancient Medicine, he points effects.Galen's polemic against the mechanists
out that "the art of medicine would not have thus leads him to reverse the usual statement.
been invented at first, nor would it have been Where Hippocrates looks upon nature as the
made the subject of investigation (for there model for art to follow, Galen calls Nature the
would have been no need for it), if when men artist, in order to set his view in sharp contrast
arc indisposed, the same food and other articles to all mechanical conceptions. "Instead of ad-
of regimen which they eat and drink when in miring Nature's artistic skill," he declares,
good health were proper for them, and if no "they even go so far as to scoff and maintain
other were preferable to these. The diet. . . that .
things have been made by Nature for
. .
and food which people in health now use would no purpose!" Nature, Galen holds, produces
not have been discovered, provided it suited effects according to its powers and in con-
man to eat and drink in like manner as the ox, formity to its needs. It seems to work with in-
the horse, and all other animals What other telligence and for an end, not blindly and by
object, then, has he in view who is called a chance. The true art of medicine, therefore,
physician, and is admitted to be a practitioner borrows its method from "Nature's art."
of the art, who found out the regimen and diet The conception of nature as an artist may be
befitting the sick, than he who originally found taken metaphorically or literally, but the in-
out and prepared for all mankind that kind of sight controlling the practice of medicine re-
food which we all now use, in place of the for- mains the same. The physician is a servant, not
mer savage and brutish mode of living?" a master, of nature. Aristotle's doctrine of final
causes, summarized in the maxim Galen so often
THE SAME CONCEPTION of medicine's relation to repeats that "nothing is done by Nature in
nature seems to be fundamental in Galen's vain" furnishes a principle for physiological
thought. He attributes to Hippocrates his own research, as well as the rules of medical art.
reformulation of the insight that the art of Whether because of faulty observation on his
healing consists in imitating the health-giving part, or because of a failure to apply his own
and healing powers of nature itself. The medi- principle, Galen leaves to Harvey one of the
cal doctrines which he criticizes were based on great discoveries which can be credited to close
the atomism of Epicurus. They regarded the attention to final causes. Always observant of
body as a complex piece of machinery. When it the relation between structure and function,
CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 117
always questioning the purpose which bodily their special causes, their symptoms, and the
organs serve, Harvey establishes the fact that typical course each seems to take. Such knowl-
the blood circulates, and finds therein the reason edge underlies the doctor's diagnosis of the pa-
for the structure of the heart, its motions, and tient's malady. That in turn determines his
its relation to the lungs. prognosis of the stages through which the illness
It may also be possible for a principle to be will run, from its onset through various crises or
carried to excess. Montaigne, for example, ex- turning points to its sequelae or consequences.
presses his distrust of medical theory and the Upon the accuracy of his diagnosis and the cer-
physician's remedies by an unqualified trust in tainty of his prognosis may depend the effec-
nature's own resourcefulness. Drugs, especially tiveness of any remedy the physician prescribes
help and without art, and contrary to its rules. which can be gained only from actual practice.
Let us a permit Nature to take her own
little Without prudence born of experience, general
way; she better understands her own affairs rules can be misapplied, for no general rule, in
than we.*' The Hippocratic doctrine seems to medicine as in law, fits all cases alike. The most
occupy a middle ground between this view of famous of Hippocratic aphorisms conveys a
nature as an unerring artist and the opposite sense of the hazards of medical practice: "Life
extreme which permits all sorts of tampering is short, and Art long; the crisis fleeting; ex-
and tinkering with the machinery of the body. periment perilous, and decision difficult. The
physician must not only be prepared to do what
THE ART OF MEDICINE "consists in three things," is right himself, but also to make the
patient,
writes Hippocrates: "the disease, the patient, the attendants, and the externals cooperate."
and the physician. The physician is the servant To persuade the patient to cooperate is the
of the art, and the patient must combat the firstmaxim governing the physician's relation
disease along with the physician." With regard to his patient. Plato contrasts the right and
to diseases, the physician must "have two spe- wrong relation between doctor and patient by
cial objects in view ... to do good, and to do comparing the practice of the physicians who
no harm." treated slaves and those who treated free men.
This celebrated summary indicates the two "The slave-doctor," he says, "prescribes what
kinds of knowledge which the physician should mere experience suggests, as if he had exact
possess. He should know about disease in gen- knowledge, and when he has given his orders,
eral, so that he can classify diseases according to like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance
118 THE GREAT IDEAS
to some other servant who is ill. . . . But the other "each physician treats a single disorder, and no
doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practices more: thus the country swarms with medical
upon freemen; and he carries his enquiries far practitioners, some undertaking to cure diseases
back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; of the eye, others of the hand, others again of
he enters into discourse with the patient and the teeth, others of the intestines, and some
with his friends, and is at once getting informa- those which are not local." The fact that the
tion from the sick man, and also instructing him next paragraph begins a discussion of funerals
as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for can hardly be taken as revealing the attitude of
him until he has first convinced him; at last, Herodotus toward specialization, though his
when he has brought the patient more and comment on the Egyptian practice does imply
more under his persuasive influences and set a contrast to Greek medicine.
him on the road to health, he attempts to ef- One sentence in the Hippocratic Oath "I
fect a cure." will not cut persons laboring under the stone,
In the treatment of mental diseases, as Freud but will leave this to be done by men who are
points out, the proper development and man- practitioners of this work" indicates some di-
agement of the relationship between patient vision of labor in the organization of Greek
and physician is itself a major factor in psycho- medicine. But apart from the special tasks and
therapy. "It presupposes a profound interest for skillsof surgery, the Hippocratic conception of
psychological incidents, as well as a personal the physician's work favors the practice of gen-
sympathy for the patient," he writes. "It re- eral medicine rather than specialization. The
quires the full consent and the attention of the man, not the disease, is to be treated, and to
patients, but above all, their confidence, for the treat him well the physician must examine the
analysis regulaily leads to the inmost and most man as a whole, not merely the organ or bodily
secretly guarded psychic processes." Since fears, part in which the disorder seems to be located.
anxieties, or other temperamental dispositions The Hippocratic formula for getting a case his-
on the part of the patient may affect the course tory calls for an inquiry into the background of
of an organic ailment, the patient's confidence the individual's life, his antecedents, his occu-
in the physician and, even more generally, his pation, his temperament, "the patient's habits,
emotional response to the physician's character regimen, and pursuits; his conversation, man-
play an important role in the successful treat- ners, taciturnity, thoughts, sleep, or absence of
ment of bodily ills as well as of mental or func- sleep, and sometimes his dreams, what they are
tional disorders. and when they occur; his picking and scratch-
Hippocrates recommends that the physician ing; his tears." From these as well as from the
cultivate prognosis, not only for the guidance symptoms, says Hippocrates, "we must form
of his own actions, but also for the sake of the our judgment."
patient. "By foreseeing and foretelling, in the The defense of general practice against spe-
readily believed to be acquainted with the cir- of the whole man is, to Galen, one of the de-
cumstances of the sick; so that men will have plorable consequences in medical practice of
confidence to entrust themselves to such a phy- atomism or mechanism in medical theory.
sician." This issue argued again and again in the
is
Herodotus reports a high degree of medical distinct trades, to clothe us, and are so much the
specialization in Egypt. "Medicine is practised better fitted, seeing that each of them meddles
among them on a plan of separation," he writes; only with his own business, and has less to
CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 119
trouble his head with than the tailor who un- calelements are in a proper proportion or bal-
dertakes them all; and as in matter of diet, ance,and in which the various parts or powers
great persons, for their better convenience, function harmoniously with one another. As
have cooks for the different offices ... so also health is
harmony or good order in the body, so
as to the cure of our maladies." With Freud disease consists in imbalance and disharmony
and the development of a greater awareness of an excess or defect with consequent dispropor-
the psychological origin of many bodily dis- tion of the elements, or the disorder of con-
orders, a new factor enters into the argument. flicting bodily processes.
It tends to favor the general practitioner who, In the Timaeus, Plato first states this
theory
from his acquaintance with the patient as a per- in terms of the four physical elements. "There
son, may be better able than the specialist to are four natures out of which the body is com-
detect hidden psychological causes. pacted, earth and fire and water and air, and
the unnatural excess or defect of these, or the
THE CONCEPTION of disease is usually deter- change of any of them from its own natural
mined by the conception of health. The ab- place into another . . .
produces disorders and
normality is judged and measured as a devia- diseases." He then considers the diseases which
tion from the norm. Hippocrates uses the out- result from excess or defect of one or another
ward appearance of man in a healthy condition of the four humours blood, phlegm, black and
as the standard for discerning the visible signs yellow bile.
of illness. The
physician, he says, "should ob- The humoural hypothesis, which Hippoc-
serve . . . the countenance of the patient,
first rates and Galen share with Plato and Aristotle,
if it be like those of persons in health, and more undergoes many transformations in the history
so, if like itself, for this is the best of all; where- of medicine. The four elements or humours are
as the most opposite to it is the worst." He replaced by other physiological factors, such as
should also take note when he finds the patient the hormones or internal secretions, or the ele-
reclining in a posture which resembles the nor- ments of modern biochemistry. But constant
mal disposition of the healthy body. "To find throughout these changing formulations is the
the whole body lying in a relaxed state" is a conception of health as an equilibrium, and of
more favorable sign than to find him "upon his disease as its loss through disorder and dispro-
back, with the hands, neck, and the legs ex- portion.
tended." This broad conception of health and disease
Thehistory of medicine, especially on the seems to apply to mental as well as bodily ills.
side of its science and theory, if not so much There is not only a basic continuity between
with regard to its art and practice, can be told Plato's and Freud's discussion of the bodily ori-
in terms of refinements in the classification of gin of mental disorders and the psychic origin
diseases and progressive discovery of their spe- of physical ailments; but the Freudian emphasis
cific causes, both internal and external, predis- upon conflict and disintegration in the neurotic
posing and exciting. But the analysis of diseases character milder forms of the schizophrenia
according to their aetiology and by reference or "split personality" which characterizes in-
to the typical picture of the disease process sanityalso appeals to harmony as the princi-
leaves unanswered the general question about ple of health. The language of modern psychi-
the nature of disease as a loss of health. atry which refers to "the integrated personal-
Apart from its causes and its
symptoms, its ity" or "the well-balanced and adjusted indi-
modes and its patterns, what is disease ? This is vidual" defines the norm or the ideal of mental
the question of major speculative interest in the health.
tradition of the great books. The answers given The various kinds and degrees of mental dis-
have a certain uniformity in spite of the vary- order, especially those which seem to be en-
ing terms in which they are expressed. tirely functional rather than organic, represent
The humoural hypothesis of ancient medical abnormalities which, though they differ in
theory, for example, conceives health as that symptom, and tendepcy, have in com-
cause,
condition of the body in which the physiologi- mon some excess or defect in the psychic struc-
120 THE GREAT IDEAS
ture or some unresolved conflict in the nature addition to insisting that the patient shall help
of man. Freud's psychoanalytic method in the to cure himself, it is directed toward the reso-
treatment of mental ills places psychotherapy lution of conflict, restoring the harmony which
in the main tradition of medical practice; for in ishealth.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The profession of medicine, its aims and obligations: the relation of physician to pa-
tient; the place of the physician in society 121
20. The scientificfoundations of the art of medicine: the contrast between the
empiric and the artist in medicine
2b. The relation of art to nature in healing: imitation and cooperation
2C. The comparison of medicine with other arts and professions 123
3#. General and specialized practice: treating the whole man or the isolated part
124
4.
The concept of health: normal balance or harmony 126
5</.
The causes of disease: internal and external factors
7. The historical record on disease and its treatment: epidemics, plagues, pestilences
131
CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 121
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halvesof the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a*119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) arc sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or vrrses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "csp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the works or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
CH 15 [1286*10-15] 484b; CH 16
(1. The profession of medicine, its aims and obli- b
485d-486a; BK vn, CH 13 [i33i 3o-38] 536c
gations: the relation of physician to patient; b
/ Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [i355 26~32] 595b;
the place of the physician in society.)
[1356^8-32] 596b-c
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-268d 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 la-
29 CERVANTES Don Quixote, PART u, 345a-346b
: 3b; par 12-15 4b-5d; par 20-24 7b-9a,c /
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 50c-53d Airs, Waters, Places, par 1-2 9a-c / Prognostics,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 117, par 9 3b-d / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 3
A i, ANS and REP i 595d-597c 27a-c / The Law, par 1-3 144a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51, 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK XH [391-397] 364b
A i, ANS 12b-13c 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34b / Pericles, 129b-d /
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, Demetrius, 726a-d
207c-d 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH n 250c-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 52c-d; 368d-369a; 369c- 251a
370a; 528c-529b 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 30
27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT iv, sc iv [1-15] 651c-d
272b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 117,
28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 305a-d / A i, ANS and REP i 595d-597c; PART i-n, Q 14,
On Animal Generation, 438c A 4, ANS 679b-d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 53b-d / 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n,
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 1-9 107a-d 76b-c; BK HI, 186a-c
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61b-c; 66d- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 450d-451a
67a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 5b-6a; 50c-
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 195b 51d; 52d-53b; 77d-78d
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 34b; 86b-c 33 PASCAL: PensSes, 33 176b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336b-337a 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-373b; 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 86a-c; 90b
BK x, 449b-c 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 44c
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 448d
Analysis, 2a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 108a-b
Anxiety, 746b-c
3. The practice of medicine
2c. The comparison of medicine with other
arts and professions 3*. The application of rules of art to partic-
7 PLATO: Charmides, 6d-7b / ular cases in medical practice
Lysis, 17c-18a /
Phaedrus, 136b-137c / Gorgias, 260a-262a; 7 PLATO: Statesman, 599a-b; 600b-d / Laws,
268d-270b; 282c-d; 289c-d / Republic, BK i, BK iv, 684c-685a
298a~299a; BK in, 337b-338a; BK v, 36 Id- 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [981*5-24]
362a / Theaetetus, 515d-517b; 525d / Sophist, 499b-c
556d-558d / Statesman, 599a-602c / Philebus, 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
633b-c / Laws, BK iv, 684c-685a / Seventh b
[639 i6-2i] 161d-162a / Ethics, BK n, CH 2
b
Letter, 803c-804b [1104*1-9] 349b-c; BK in, CH 3 [ni2*3o- 2o]
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH 3 144a-b; BK v, b
358b-c; BK vi, CH i [ii38 25-34J 387b; CH 7
b b
CH 7 [136^33-137*7] 189a; BK vi, CH 5 [142^0- [ii4i i4-2i] 390c-d; BK x, CH 9 [n8o 7~23]
a b
143*9] 196b-c / Physics, BK i, CH 8 [i9i 33- 9] 435b-c / Politics, BK in, CH 15 [1286*10-15]
b b
267b; BK n, en i [i92 23~32] 268d-269a; 484b; BK vn, CH 13 [i33i 30-38] 536c /
b b
[i93 i3-i9] 269d-270a; CH 8 [ Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [i356 28-32] 596b-c
/ Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 7 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 12 4b-c;
555b-d par 20-21 7b-8a / Airs, Waters, Places, par 2
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BKi, CH i 9b-c / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 18 34d-
15-24] 161d-162a / Ethics, BK
CH i [1094*6-
i, 35b / Epidemics, BK i, SECT in, par i 49c-d;
9] 339a; CH 6 [1096*29-33] 341c; CH 7 [1097* BK in, SECT in, par 16 59b-c / Articulations,
15-23] 342c; CH 13 [1102*15-26] 347c; BK n, par 10 94d-95a; par 71, 117c / Aphorisms,
CH 2 [1104*1-9] 349b-c; BK HI, CH 3 [1112*30- SECT i, par 9 131c
b
i9] 358b-c; BK v, CH n [ii38*29- 4] 386d-
b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 17, 159a-b
b
387a; BK vi, CH i [ii38 25-34] 387b; CH 7 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 52a-53c
[1141*20-34] 390a-b; CH 12 [1143^1- 1144*5] 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a
393b-c passim; CH 13 [n 45*6-12] 394d; BK x, 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 372b-373a
CH 9 [Ii8ob 7-ii8i b7] 435b-436a / Politics, 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 70c-71b
BK i, CH 9 [i257b25-3o] 451d; [1258*10-14] 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 60b-c
452b; CH 10 [1258*23-33] 452b-c; BK n, CH 8 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-373b
b b
[i268 33-37] 464d; BK in, CH 6 [i278 36- 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 32a-c / General Introduction,
b
1279*2] 476b; CH n [I28i 40-i282*6] 479d; 607a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 871 d
124 THE GREAT IDEAS
(3. The practice of medicine.) 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 370c-d; 372b-373b;
531d-532b
36. General and specialized practice: treating 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49b-50b;
the whole man or the isolated part 52a; 52c d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 65c 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a; 114b;
7 PLATO: Charmides,~2&3b / Phaedrus, 136b-c PART iv, 156b-157a
/ Gorgias, 282c-d / Timaeus, 474d-475d / 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 33c-34a; 70c-71b;
Laws, BK x, 767d 14Sb-146a; 157a-158a; 373c-d
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 20 7b-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 38c-d; BK vni,
/ Epidemics, BK i, SECT HI, par i 49c-d / 307a-c; BK ix, 372a-373b; BK xi, 524c-525a
Injuries of the Head, par 20 69d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 373c-d 340c
44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 350c-d 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 250c Analysis, lb-2b / Hysteria, 31b-d; 38d-40a;
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-373b 50b-c; 54b-56c; 60b-62c csp 60b-d; 87a-90d
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi, esp 87a-d / Psycho -Analytical Therapy, 124b /
340c-d "Wild" Psycho- Analysis,' 128a-l29d esp 129c-d
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 62b-c / General Introduction, / Interpretation of Dreams, 151a-c / General
451b-452a; 620b-c / New Introductory Lec- Introduction, 550d-557a esp 556a-b; 593b-c;
tures, 871d-872a 605b-607b passim, esp 606c-607b / New
Introductory lectures, 872d-873a
3r. Diagnosis and prognosis: the interpreta-
tion of symptoms; case histories 3^. The factors in prevention and therapy
OLD TLSTAMENT: Leviticus, 13-14
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 44d-45a 3</( 1) Control of regimen: climate, diet, exer-
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK 11, 399c- cise, occupation, daily routine
400c OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 16:24; 17:22
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 59b-c / Laws, BK iv, 684c- APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 30:25; 31:19-22;
685a 37:29-31 (D) OT, Ecclcsiasticus, 30:27;
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 27 31:22-27137:32-34
[70*3-39] 92a-c passim / Prophesying, CH i 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 64c-d
a b
[463 3- io] 707b-708a 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 50d / Symposium, 155c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 / Gorgias, 261a d; 289c-d / Republic, UK HI,
b
[537 i4~2o] 64b; BK vn, CH 12 [588*10-12] 334b-337a; BK w, 345b-c / Timaeus, 474d-
b b
114c; BK vin, CH 18 [6oi 6-8] 127c; CH 21 [6o3 475d / Laws, BK n, 656b-c / Seventh Letter,
a b
20-24] 129c; CH 23 [6o4 i2]-CH 24 [6o4 2o] 803c-804b
b
13Qa-c / Rhetoric, BKI, CH2 [i357 i4~2i]597b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK n, CH 12 [292*14-
b
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 10-11 i8] 383d-384b
13b-14b / Prognostics 19a-26a,c csp par i 9 ARisroTLb: History of Animals, BK vn, CH 12
19a-b, par 15 22d~23a, par 25 26a,c / Regimen 114c; BK vin, CH 21 [6o3 b 25-34J 129d / Ethics,
in Acute Diseases, APPENDIX, par 9-14 38b 40d BK ii,CH 2 [1104*10-26] 349c-d; BK vi, CH 7
b
/ Epidemics, i, SECT 11, par 5 46c-d; SECT
BK [ii4i i4-2i] 390c-d / Politics, BK vn, CH n
16 [i335 b i2-i9] 540c;
a
HI, par I-CASE xiv 49c-53d; BK in, SECT i-n [i33 34-4 I ] 535a; CH
53d-56d; SECT in, par i6-cASE xvi 59b-63d CH 17 [1336*4-39] 541a-c; BK vni, CH 4 [i338 b
/ Injuries of the Head, par 5 65a; par 8 65c; 39-1339*10] 544b-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 6
par 10-12 65d-67a; par 19 69b-c / Fractures, [1362*29-33] 603a; CH 7 [1364*3-5] 605b
par 5 76d-77a / Articulations, par 10 94d-95a; 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 3-11 Id-
par 26 99a-b; par 30 99c-100b; par 51 109a-b; 4b; par 13-16 4c-6b; par 20 7b-d / Airs,
par 54 Ilia; par 57 llld-112b; par 58, 112d; Waters, Places, par i 9a-b; par 3-7 9c-12a;
par 59 113b / Instruments of Reduction, par par 9-10 12d-14a; par 12 14b-d; par 15 15b-c;
4-24 122d-126c passim / Aphorisms, SECT i, par 19-21 16c-17b / Regimen in Acute Diseases
par 2 131a; par 12 131d; SECT 11 132b-134a 26a-44a,c esp par 9 29d-30c, APPENDIX,
passim; SECT iv, par I7-SECT v, par 15 135d- par 1 8 41a-d / Epidemics, BK i, SECT i, par i
138b; SECT v, par 30-SECT vn, par 86 138d- 44a-b; SECT n, par i 45a-c; par 7-8 47a-c;
144a,c passim BK in, SECT in, par 1-2 56d-57a; par 15 59b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [1138- / Surgery, par 20 73d / Fractures, par 7 77c-
1214] 95b-96b 78a; par 9 78c-d; par 36 88d-89a / Articula-
19 AQUINAS Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 13,
:
tions, par 9 94b-c; par 50, 108b-d; par 55
A 5, ANS 66b-67d; A 6, ANS 67d-68c; Q 57, A 3, llla-c; par 58 112b-113a; par 81 120d /
ANS 297b-298a; A 4, ANS 298a~299a Aphorisms, SECT i, par 3-11 131a-c; par 13-19
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 131d-132a; SECT n, par 4 132b; par 16-17,22
197a 132d; par 36 133b; par 38,45 133c; par 49-50
3d(2) to 3d(3) CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 125
133d; SECT in, par 1-19 134a-d; SECT v, par 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 13, 176a-
16-29 138b-d; SECT vn, par 56 143a; par 66 177a; CH 14, 179a-b; BK n, CH 9, 195d-196a;
143c / Ulcers, par i, 145a / Sacred Disease, BK in, CH 13, 209c
160b-d 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [411-444] 166b-167a /
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK 11, CH 8 191b- Tale ofMelibeus, par 10, 403a
195c 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34b-d; 40c-42a / Cae- 26d; BK n, 92b-c; 96a-d; 124d-125d; BK in,
sar, 583d-584b 140 b; 173d 174a; 189a c; 196d; 225a; 226d;
22 CHAUCER: Nun's Priest's Tale [14,827-852] BK iv, 246d-247a; 310d-311c
450a-b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 90d-91b; 365b-379c pas-
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, sim, esp 369c-370a
26d-29d; 48d-49a; BK n, 68a-69a,c; BK in, 27 SHAKESPEARE: All's Well That Ends Well,
134d-135a; 152a-153b; 188d-191c ACT i, sc in [227-262] 147d-148b; ACT n, sc i
par 26-39 43a-44a,c / Fractures, par 27, 85b-c; 151a-b / Hemorrhoids, par 2-6 152b,d-154a
par 29 85d-86a / Articulations, par 36 101 d; 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 14,
par 63 114d-115b / Aphorisms, SECT n, par 22 627d-628a
132d/ Ulcers, par 1 145a-c; par 4-13 146b-149b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n,
/ Fistulae, par 2-12 150b-152d / Hemorrhoids, 119b-c; BK in, 196c
par 2-3 152b,d-153b; par 6-7 153d-154a,c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 330b-d; 373a-b
126 THE GREAT IDEAS
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK HI,
(3< The factors in prevention and therapy. 137d-139b; BK iv, 234a-235a; 239d-240a
3</(3) Surgery.) 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 233c-236a; 368d; 369d-
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 289d-290a / 370a
On Animal Generation, 376d-377a; 438b-c 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 296d-297a /
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 52b-c / New On Animal Generation, 493a-b
Atlantis, 211d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 50c-51d;
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 113b; PART iv, 72b
148b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [524-543]
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 70c-71b; 162a-c 310b-311a / Areopagitica, 407b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336d-337a 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 155b-156a; 170b-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 464a-465c 171b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 844a 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 412a-417a
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 81b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336b~d / Political
Economy, 368d-369a
4. The concept of health: normal balance or 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 293d-294b
harmony 42 KANT: Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics,
7 PLATO: Charmides, 2d-3b / Symposium, 155d- 368d-369a /judgement, 509c-d
157a / Meno, 175b / Gorgias, 282c-283a / 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 449b-c
Republic, BK HI, 334b-337a; BK iv, 355b-d; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 799a-b
BK ix, 422c-d; 427a / Timaeus, 472a-c; 474d- 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 635b-c
475d / Philebus, 616d-617a / Laws, BK v,
690a-c 5. The theory of disease
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [8 b 25-9a28] 13d-
14b / Topics, BK HI, en i [n6b i7-22] 163a-b 5a. The nature of disease
a b
/ Physics, BK VH, CH 3 [246 io- i9] 329c-330a 6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War, BK n,
:
b
/ Metaphysics, BK v, CH 20 [io22 io-i3] 544a 400b-c
b
/ Soul, BK i, CH 4 (407 3 1-408*2] 637c; BK n, 7 PLATO: Lysis, 21d / Republic, BK iv, 354d-
CH 2 [414*4-14] 644a-b / Sense and the Sensible, 355c; BK vin, 409a; BK x, 435a-d / Timaeus,
CH 5 [445*16-31] 683a-b 472a-474d
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK HI, CH 19 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [246*10-
b a b b
[52o i9-52i i4] 45c-46a; BK vn, CH i [58i i9] 329c-330a
25-582*4] 107b-c / Parts of Animals, BK i, 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK v, CH 4
CH i [640*4-7] 162d; BK n, CH 5 [65i a37- b i8] b
[784*3 i- 34] 326b-d / Ethics, BK n, CH 2
b
176c; en 7 177c-179a; BK iv, CH 2 [677*5- i] [1104*10-19] 349c; BK v, CH i
[1129*12-25]
206d-207b / Ethics, BK n, CH 2 [1104*10-26] 376b-c
349c-d; BK v, CH i [1129*12-25] 376b-c; CH n 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 14 5a-c;
[1138*28-32] 386d; BK vi, CH 12 [i 143^1- par 1 6 5d-6b; par 19 6d-7b / Fractures, par 31,
1144*5] 393 b-c passim / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 87a / Sacred Disease, 159b
b
[i 3 6i 3 -26] 602a-b; CH 7 li&fu-^ft] 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK n, CH 8, 193d;
605b 194c-d; CH 9, 195c-196a; BK in, CH 12 208b-
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 13-19 209b esp 208d
4c-7b / Regimen Acute Diseases, par
in 9, 17PLOTiNus: Second Ennead, TR ix, en 14
29d / Sacred Disease, 156b-c 74b-d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK n, CH 8, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 71,
194c-d; CH 9, 195c-196a A i, REP 3 105d-106c; Q 72, A 5, ANS 115a-
12 LUCRETIUS : Nature of Things, BK in [558- 116b; Q 73, A 2, ANS 120d-121c; A 3, ANS
565] 37b 121c-122b; Q 77, A 3, ANS 147c-148b; Q 82,
BK v, SECT 8 269d-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, A i, ANS and REP i 168a-d; A 4, REP 2 170b-
270b 171a; Q 88, A i, ANS 193a-194b; PART in
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 13 519a- SUPPL, Q 8 1, A 4, REP 4 966d-967d
520a; BK xxn, CH 24, 610c-611a / Christian 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 528c-529b
Doctrine, BK i, CH 16 628c-d 28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 305a-d
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49,
: 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [477-543]
A 2 2b-4a; A 3, REP 3 4b-5a; A 4, ANS 5a-6a; 309b~311a
Q 50, A i, ANS and REP 2-3 6a-7b; A 3, REP 2 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 155b-157a
8b-9a; Q 51, A i, ANS 12b-13c; Q 52, A i, 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 293d-294b
ANS and REP 3 15d-18a; A 2, ANS 18a-19a; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-b
Q 54, A i, ANS 22d-23d; Q 73, A 2, ANS 120d- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 799a-807b csp 799a-800a,
121c; A 3, ANS 121c-122b; Q 82, A i, ANS and 806a-b; 815a
REP i 168a-d 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 403a-b
5b to 5d CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 127
APOCRYPHA: // Maccabees, 3:27-29; 9 (D) OT,
5b. The classification of diseases II Machabees, 3:27-29; 9
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 472a-474d NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 9:32-33; 17:14-18
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK iv, CH 3 [i23b 34~37] / / Corinthians, 1 1
125-30
172c 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i [33-100] 3b-4b
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [1-215] 99a-
b
18-27 127b-131b / Ethics, BK vn, CH 8 [ii5o lOla
29 -35] 401c-d 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 32c-d; 38a-b;
10 HIPPOCRATES Airs, Waters, Places, par 3-6
: BK n, 64c-d; BK iv, 135c-d; 157a
9c-lla / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 1-2, 7 PLATO: Symposium, 155d-157a / Republic,
26c-d / Epidemics, BK i, SECT in, par 2 49d- BK 11, 318c-319a; BK HI, 334b-335d; BK iv,
50a / Injuries of the Head, par 4-8 64d-65c / 345b-c; BK vm, 412d; BK x, 434d-435c /
Fractures, par 31, 87a / Articulations, par 51 Timaeus, 472a-474d; 476b-d
109a-b; par 61 113d-114a / Aphorisms, SECT 8 ARISTOTLE: Meteorology, BK iv, CH 7 [384 tt
SECT in, par 2-3 49d-50b / Injuries of the SECT 56d-57a; par 15 59b / Surg-
in, par 1-2
Head, par 19 69b-c / Fractures, par 31 86d- ery, par 20 73d / Articulations, par 12 96a-b;
87d / Articulations, par 69 116b-117a / Aphor- par 58, 113a / Aphorisms, SECT n, par 51 133d;
isms, SECT i, par 7-12 131b-d; SECT n, par 13 SECT in, par 1-19 134a-d; SECT v, par 16-24
132c; par 23-32 132d~133b; SECT in, par 28 138b-c / Fistulae, par i 150a / Hemorrhoids,
135a b; SECT iv, par 22-82 136a-137d esp par i 152b / Sacred Disease 154a-160d esp
par 30 136b, par 36 136b-c, par 64 137b 155d-156a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 14, 177c 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH u, 172b-c;
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [487- BK n, CH 8-9 191b-199a,c esp CH 8, 194c-d,
505] 36b-c; BK vi [1138-1214] 95b-96b CH 9, 195c-196a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 51d-52a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [769-
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 86a-c 829] 90c-91b; [1090-1137] 94d-95b
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 350b-354a 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 14 74b-d
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 256c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, o 81,
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 402d-403a / General In- A i, ANS 163a-164d; Q 82, A 2, ANS 168d-
troduction, 618c 169c; A 4, REP 2 170b-171a; Q 83, A 4, ANS
173c-174b; Q 85, AA 5-6 181d-184a
5</. The causes of disease: internal and external 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [411-444] 166b-167a
factors 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, 148d; 151b-c;
OLD TESTAMENT: Leviticus, 26:16 / Numbers, 152b
12:10-15; 16:46-50 / Deuteronomy, 28:21- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
22,27-28,35,58-62 / // Kings, 5:27-(D) IV 53a-c
Kings, 5:27 / / Chronicles, 21:14-15 (D) 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 367b-368a; 371c-d
Paralipomenon, 21:14-15 / // Chronicles,
I 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 296a-d / Cir-
26:18-21 (D) // Paralipomenon, 26:18-21 / culation of the Blood, 305a-d; 316c-d; 321d-
Job, 2:7 / Psalms, 107:17-20 (D) Psalms, 322a / On Animal Generation, 386d-387a;
106:17-20 407a; 423 b; 433a-c; 455d-456a; 493a-b
128 THE GREAT IDEAS 5d(l) to 5<?
152] 56a-b / Othello, ACT in, sc in [321-333] ductory lectures, 81 2a; 830d-832a
225c-d
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a
6b. The classification of mental diseases
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 215b-216a; 380a 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 368d-369b / 9 ARisTorLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 5 399a-d passim
Social Contract, BK HI, 419c-d 10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159b-c
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 293d-294b 23 HOBBLS: Leviathan, PART i, 67b; 68c-d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 38, 122b-123c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 241b
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 60b-61c; 87a-d / Narcissism,
6. Mental disease or disorder: its causes and 403b-d / General Introduction, 451d; 568c;
cure 605b-606d esp 606c-d; 620c-d
6a. The distinction between sanity and in- 6c. The process and causes of mental disorder
sanity: theconcept of mental health and NEW TESTAMENT: Marl^ 9:17-29 (D) Mar\,
the nature of madness
9:16-28
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d 5 AESCHYLUS: Choephoroe [1021-1076] 80a-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247b i- 5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [1-332] 143a-146a
B b
248*9] 330b-d / Dreams, CH 2 [46o 32- i8] 5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes 340a-352a,c esp [847-
704b-c 1326] 347b-351b / Heracles Mad [815-1145]
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 5 399a-d passim 371d-374d esp [822-873] 372a-c / Orestes [i-
10 HIPPOCRATES Sacred Disease, 159a-b
:
426] 394a-398b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK 11, CH 15 155c- 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK 11, 86b; BK in,
156b 95d-98a; BK 199c-201c esp 201b-c
vi,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d
A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [9b 34-io a6] 15a
a b
591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 10, / Dreams, CH 2 [46o 32- i8] 704b-c
A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 24, A 2, 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 5 399a-d passim
ANS 727d-728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP i 10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease 154a-160d esp
742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d; Q 48, 155d-156a, 159a-b
AA 3-4 824c-826a,c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [487-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 74, 505] 36b-c
A 5, REP i 131d-132b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115,
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 66d-67b; 68b-69c A 5, REP i 590d-591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7,
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, REP 3 650a-d; Q 10, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-
201b-d 665c; Q 24, A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q 28, A 3,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 166a-167a; 235b-c ANS and REP i 742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 72b 786d; Q 48, AA 3-4 824c-826a,c
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 155d- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 67b; 68b-71b
156a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 235b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 44, SCHOL 26 SHAKESPEARE: Midsummer-Night's Dream, ACT
437d-438a v, sc i [1-27] 370d-371a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc 11 [171-
SECT 13 146b-c; CH xxxm, SECT 3-4 248c-d 221] 42b-d; ACT in, sc iv {102-144] 55d-56a;
130 THE GREAT IDEAS 6c(i) to 6d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [459-
(6. Mental disease or disorder: its causes and
4751 36a
cure. 6c. The process and causes of mental 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84,
disorder.) A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d-
ACT iv, sc v [1-75] 59c-60b; [154-200] 61b-d; 591c
ACT v, scii
[237-254] 70b-c / King Lear, ACT 23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 68c
n, sc iv [274-289] 261c-d; ACT in, sc iv 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT 11, sc iv [106-
264a-266b; ACT iv, sc iv [1-19] 272b-c; sc ii3]259cf (
Analysis, lb-19a esp 4a-5a, 6a-b, 8a, 14b, 18b- Unconscious, 434c-436b / General Introduction,
19a / Hysteria, 25a-106c passim, esp 25a-27a, 546b-623b esp 550d-569c, 577a-591a, 599d-
35b-c, 37d-38a, 53b-c, 81c-87a, 93d-96a, 97b- 600d, 604c-605b, 611a-615a, 620b-623b /
106c; 110d-118a,c / Narcissism, 402d-404d / Group Psychology, 690c-691c / Ego and Id,
Unconscious, 440a-443d esp 440a-b / General 699a-c; 704d; 712c-714a / Inhibitions, Symp-
Introduction, 451d-452a; 546b~623b esp 567d- toms, and Anxiety, 720a-752c esp 720a-723d,
569c, 585b-591a, 593b-596b, 599d-600d, 728b-731d, 746c-747b
602d 607b, 611a-615a, 616b-c Beyond the
/
Pleasure 641a-c; 648d-650a esp 6d. The treatment of functional disorders:
Principle,
649c /Group Psychology, 690d-691c; 695b-
psychotherapy as a branch of medicine
696a,c / Ego and Id, 712c-715c; 716d-717a,c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [31-93]
/ Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a- 30b-31b esp [87-93] 31b; [510-522] 36c-d;
752c esp 720a-723d, 744b-747b / Civilization BK vi [1-42] 80a-c
and Its Discontents, 774c-d; 798c-799a / 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 38
New Introductory Lectures, 830d 832a; 866b- 786d-789d
867a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
188d-191c
6c(l) Somatic origins of mental disease 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 37c-39a; 401b-406a
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 96c 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT iv, sc iv
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d [1-19] 272b-c / Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b-
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247^3- 307a esp [79-83] 307a; sc in [37-54] 308a-b
248*6] 330c-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 77d-78d
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 7 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 127a-b; 284c-d; 297d-
b BK vn, CH 3
[653 i-7] 178d-179a / Ethics, 298a; 354c-355a
[H47'i4-i 7 ]397b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 357b-358b
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 155d-160d esp 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xv, 614a-d;
159a-b 616a-618b esp 616b, 617a-b, 618b
CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 131
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Discussions bearing on learned professions or professional education, see EDUCATION 53, 6;
LAW 9; RHETORIC 6.
The general theory of art which underlies the consideration of medicine as an art, see ART
3, pa; EXPERIENCE 33; KNOWLEDGE 8a.
The theory of signs involved m the interpretation of symptoms, sec LANGUAGE 10; SIGN AND
SYMBOL 46; and for other matters relevant to medical diagnosis and prognosis, see HY-
POTHESIS 4b, 4d.
Another discussion of health and disease, see LIFE AND DEATH 53, 5c; and for the special
problems of mental disease and the methods of psychopathology, see EMOTION 3a, 3c~3d;
MAN 5b; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 2e(3)-2e(4), 5c; MIND 2c(i), 8a-8c; WILL pb.
Discussions relevant to the comparison of mental health or sanity with happiness, see
HAPPINESS 23; JUSTICE ib.
132 THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography ot Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
/CONCERNING memory and imagination, blind man who lived entirely in a world of
V^/ the tradition of western thought seems to grays would not be able to imagine a golden
be involved in less dispute than it is on other as- mountain or a purple cow, though he might be
pects of human and animal life. There are, as able to imagine things as unreal as these.
we shall see, points of difficulty and debatable Because of their dependence on sense-per-
theories. But
these arise only within the frame- ception,memory and imagination are usually
work of certain fundamental insights which regarded as belonging to the same general fac-
are widely, ifnot universally, shared. Here at ulty as the external senses. Not all writers,
least we can begin without having to deal with however, conceive of a generic power of sense,
verbal ambiguities. Unlike many of the words which they then divide into the exterior senses
which are the traditional bearers of the great such as sight, hearing, and touch, and the in-
ideas, "memory" and "imagination" have a terior senses such as memory and imagination.
constant core of meaning in almost everyone's Some, like Hobbes, treat imagination as "noth-
discourse. ing but decaying sense," and use the word
It is understood that memory and imagina- "memory" to "expiess the decay, and signify
tion depend upon sense-perception or upon that the sense is fading, old, and past."
previous experience. Except for illusions of The image, whether it is a memory-image or
imagine things we have never perceived and not differ from the original sense-impression,
may never be able to. That is the respect in which ideas or concepts do
Yet even when imagination outruns percep- differ from sense-impressions at least accord-
tion, it draws upon experience for the materials ing to those who hold that ideas or concepts
it uses in its constructions. It is
possible to have a certain universality and abstractness
imagine a golden mountain or a purple cow, which is not found in sensations and sensory
though no such object has ever presented itself images. Those who, like Berkeley and Hume,
to perception. But, as Hume suggests, the call sensations or images "ideas" deny the ex-
possibility ofcombining a familiar color and a istence of abstract ideas or universal notions
familiar shape depends upon the availability of precisely because they, too, agree that sense-
the separate images to be combined. impressions or sensory images are always par-
"When we think of a golden mountain," ticular in their content and meaning.
Hume writes, "we onlytwo consistent
join
ideas, gold and mountain^ with which we were THE FUNDAMENTAL controversy about what an
formerly acquainted ... All this creative power idea is and the verbal confusion occasioned by
of the mind amounts to no more than the fac- the ambiguity of the word (which appears in
ulty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, the chapter on IDEA) do not seem to affect the
or diminishing the materials afforded us by the understanding of the nature, of images or their
senses and experience." A congenitally color- role in the activities of memory and imagina-
133
134 THE GREAT IDEAS
tion. As William James points out, in discussing do, elicits opposite answers from those who
the "blended" or "generic" image which is affirm that man alone has reason and those who
somehow associated with abstract or universal deny that man has powers of knowing or think-
meaning, "a blurred thing is
just as particular ing not possessed by other animals to some
as a sharp thing, and the generic character of degree.
either sharp image or blurred image depends Nevertheless, if man alone is considered, the
on its being felt with its representativefunction" nature of memory and imagination is clear.
He speaks of this function as "the mysterious The object remembered or imagined need not
plus, the understood meaning," but he denies be physically present to the senses like the ob-
the possibility of universal or abstract images, ject perceived. The object imagined need not
whatever may be the truth about ideas which be located in the past like the object remem-
are not images at all. Certainly those who bered; nor, for that matter, need it have any
deny the presence of anything abstract or uni- definite location in time and space. It need
versal in the understanding do so on the ground have no actual existence. It may be a mere
that the content of the mind is basically sen- possibility, unlike the object which cannot be
sory, whether the mind is perceiving or remem- known without being known to exist. As the
bering, imagining or thinking. object of memory is an event which no longer
The controversy about the nature of the exists, so the object of imagination may be
mind does not seem to affect the conception of something which has never existed and never
memory or imagination. As neither is confused will.
with sense-perception, so neither is confused Thus memory and imagination greatly en-
with rational thought. This remains the case large the world of human experience. Without
whether the theory of mind looks upon the them, man would live in a confined and narrow
intellect as a faculty separate from the sensitive present, lacking past and future, restricted to
faculty (including memory and imagination), what happens to be actual out of the almost
or conceives the understanding as a single fac- infinite possibilities of being. Without memory
ulty which is active in judgment and reason- and imagination, man could be neither a poet
ing as well as in perceiving, remembering, and nor an historian; and unless he had an angelic
haps, such issues can be ignored here. Sensation did not extend the reach of his senses.
is attributed to both animals and men to all
organisms which give evidence of having sense- THE PSYCHOLOGICAL analysis of memory usually
it into a number of
organs or some sort of sensitive apparatus. divides separate acts or
Whether all animals, even those which have phases. Recollection presupposes the retention
the most rudimentary scnsorium, also have of the material to be recalled. The ingenious
memory and imagination may be disputed; but experiments of Ebbinghaus that James reports
no one doubts that the higher animals, with using the memorization of nonsense syllables
central nervous systems and brain structures to isolate the factors influencing memory
resembling those of men, can remember and seem to show that retention is affected by the
imagination require bodily organs, though the the time of learning and the time of revival.
assignment of these two function* to the brain The amount of forgetting seems to be a func-
is more tion of two separate factors: the force with
as their organic seat uniformly a tenet
of modern than of ancient physiology, and can which the material to be recalled is originally
be more clearly expounded as the result of mod- committed to memory, and the lapse of time.
ern researches in neurology. But the question That retention is not the same as recall may
whether the memory or imagination of men be seen from Ebbinghaus' experimental dis-
and other animals differs more than their bodies covery of the fact that forgetting is never com-
CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 135
ptete. Material
which lies below the threshold the disagreeable" to such everyday occurrences
of recall is nevertheless retained, and manifests as the forgetting of familiar names as well as
itspresence by its effect on attempts to relearn to the repression of memories connected with
the material which appears to have been for- the emotional traumas of early life.
Nothing can be utterly forgotten if, as tion, but also from recognition. The illusion
Augustine suggests, what seems to be forgotten known as dtjh vu consists in the experience of
remains in the memory. He considers the effort intense familiarity with a place or scene that, so
men make remember a forgotten name.
to far asone can recall, has never been witnessed
"Where docs that name come back from," he before. In contrast, normal recognition depends
asks, "except from the memory? For even upon previous acquaintance with the object
when it is through being reminded of some- being cognized again, />., re-cognized. The fact,
thing else that we recognize someone's name, it noted by many observers, that recognition may
by memory that we do it, for we do not
is still or may not be accompanied by recollection of
hold as some new thing learned, but by mem-
it the previous circumstances, indicates the sep-
ory we are sure that this is what the name was. aration of recall and recognition as acts of
But, were the name utterly blotted out of memory. Whereas recollection is
remembering
mind," Augustine argues, "we should not re- through the recall of images, recognition con-
member it even if we were reminded. For if we sists in remembering at the very moment
had utterly forgotten it, we should not even be of perceiving. Both, however, depend upon
able to think of looking for it." what seems to be memory's fundamental act
Freud considers forgetting from another retention.
volving efforts in reminiscence. The things lems which have been the subject of inquiry
which we have put out of mind, he claims, are throughout the whole tradition. The first con-
"hindered from becoming conscious, and forced cerns what is
usually called "the association of
to remain in the unconscious by some sort of ideas." From Aristotle through Hobbes and
force." He calls this "repression." Freud ob- Hume to James and Freud, there have been
served that it occurred when" a wish had been various formulations of the laws of association
aroused, which was in sharp opposition to the and various interpretations of what such laws
other desires of the individual, and was not signify about the mind. Ebbinghaus, for ex-
capable of being reconciled with the ethical, ample, used nonsense syllables in order to meas-
aesthetic,and personal pretensions of the pa- ure the effect upon retention of the associations
tient's personality. The end of this inner
. . . formed by repetition of a series of sounds. All
struggle was the repression of the idea which meaning had been removed in order to avoid
presented itself to consciousness as the bearer of the influence upon recollection of associations
this irreconcilable wish. This was repressed resulting from meaningful connections of the
from consciousness and forgotten." sort which exists among ordinary words. The
On this view things which have been put repetition of nonsense syllables in pairs or series
out of mind because we find them unpleasant illustrates association by contiguity or succes-
to contemplate, things which are repressed in sion. According to most writers, the elements
order to avoid conflict, are not forgotten when of experience become associated through other
they cannot be consciously remembered. Nor modes of relation also, such as their similarity
ire they below the threshold of recall in the or contrast with one another in any significant
sense that our retention of them has been so respect.
weakened by time that no effort at recollection It is not the association itself which is re-
can revive them. On the contrary, they may be membered. Rather through the association
it is
capable of quite vivid revival when the emo- of one part of experience with another that
tional obstacles to recollection are removed. memory seems to work, one particular tending
Freud applies his theory of the "obliviscence of to recall others with which it has been asso-
136 THE GREAT IDEAS
ciatcd in one or more ways. Recollection seems liam James seems to think can be solved only
to occur through activating connections which in terms of the retentive power of nervous
have been formed and retained. The modern tissue what he calls "physiological retentive-
differentiation of controlled and free association ness" though in the view of others the prob-
indicates two ways in which this can happen- lem becomes no easier (and may even be more
either by a purposeful pursuit of the past or by complicated) when it is transferred from mind
the apparently chance recall of one thing by to matter. On either view, there seems to be
another. The ancients make a parallel distinc- no question that changes in the brain are some-
tion between reminiscence and reverie. The how causally connected with the activity of
former is a process in which recollection resem- memory and imagination, especially retention
bles reasoning in step by step
proceeding and Aquinas, for example, observes that
recall.
through a series of related terms; the latter is the imagination and memory may be "hin-
more like daydreaming or spontaneous fantasy. dered by a lesion of the corporeal organ ... or
The second problem can be stated, perhaps, by lethargy," an observation many times
as the mystery of retention itself. In describing extended by more recent investigations of
the capacity of the memory to hold the innu- the brain pathology underlying amnesia and
merable things which are not now in mind but aphasia.
can be recalled, the ancients speak of memory
as "the storehouse of images." Every variety JAMES' TREATMENT of retention as somehow
of thing which can be perceived can be "stored based on pathways traced in the brain, with
up in the memory," says Augustine, and "called recall the result of a retracing of these paths,
away marvellously as if in cabinets, and as mar- to identify habit and memory. Ice skating
vellously brought forth again when we re- aftermany years of absence from the sport is
member." as much remembering how to ice skate as recit-
The marvel of memory deepens into a mys- ing a poem committed to memory in youth is
tery when we ask what the metaphor of the the exercise of an old habit.
storehouse literally means. Where actually are Not all conceptions of habit and memory
the images when they are not actually in mind ? permit this fusion of the two or even their
If an is by its nature an act of conscious-
image affinity as related aspects of the same phenom-
ness,whereby we apprehend objects not im- enon. Aquinas, for example, restricts memory
mediately present to our senses, how do images to an act of knowledge. The performance popu-
exist outside of consciousness during intervals larly called "reciting from memory" would not
when they do not function in remembering, be for him an act of memory, though it might
imagining, or other acts of knowing? Their involve memory if the recitation were accom-
return to consciousness seems to imply that panied by knowledge of the time or place and
they have been retained, but where and how occasion when the poem was first learned. Such
is the problem not solved by the metaphor of knowledge would be a memory, but the recita-
things stored in a capacious barn.
away tion itself would not be, any more than ice
The
physical storehouse docs not require any skating is. These performances represent the
fundamental transformation in the being of the exercise of habits of skill or art.
things it holds between periods when they are In view of this, Aquinas raises the question
actually in use. The memory does. This prob- whether the act of knowledge, of the sort in-
lem of the nature and causes of retention Wil- volved in reconsidering a geometric proof
CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 137
learned at some earlier moment and now re- geometrical problem and merely by question-
called to mind, is an act of memory. The knowl- ing him, without ever giving him a single an-
edge of the proof which is retained by the in- swer, getting the slave boy to find the right
tellect during periods when it is not actually solution for himself. Meno assures Socrates that
exercised, he would call an intellectual habit or the slave boy had never been taught geometry.
habit of knowledge. But should the recollec- Since the boy was not told the answer, he must
tion of this retained knowledge, or the activa- have always known it, and needed only some re-
tion of this intellectual habit, also be called an minding to remember what he knew. Socrates
act of memory ? Aquinas answers No, on the suggests the explanation that the boy's soul
ground that no reference to the past need be always possessed this knowledge, bringing it
problem, that is another matter. Even so, pothesis. "The soul, being immortal, and having
Aquinas claims that "if in the notion of mem- been born again many times, and having
ory we include its object as something past, seen all things that exist . has knowledge of
. .
then the memory is not in the intellectual, but them all; and it is no wonder that it should be
only in the sensitive part." The intellect is said able to call to remembrance all that it ever
to remember only in the sense of recalling a knew about and about everything; for
virtue,
truth retained by habit, and "not in the sense as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all
that it understands the past as something here things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or
and now." as men say learning, out of a single recollection
Memory is another way in
considered in still all the rest, if u man is strenuous and does not
relation to speculative truths about scientific faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but rec-
or philosophical matters. The question is one ollection."
of the origin of such knowledge. In the usual Though he differs from Plato in his
concep-
conception of memory as knowledge of past and the origin of the knowledge
tion of the soul
particulars, one traditional view, found in Aris- which it innately possesses, Augustine seems to
totle, holds that "out of sense-perception comes hold a similar view. As he examines his own
to be what we call memory, and out of fre- memory, it
appears to contain much that has
quently repeated memories of the same thing not been implanted there by sense-experience.
develops experience" the generalized experi- Certain things, referred to by words he under-
ence which gives rise to induction and the stands, he says, "I never reached with any
apprehension of the universal. But in the tradi- sense of body, nor ever discerned them
my
tion of the great books we also find a more radi- otherwise than in my mind; yet in my memory
cal and, perhaps, less familiar conception of have I laid up not their images, but themselves.
memory as the chief source of knowledge. How they entered into me, let them say if they
This is Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, in can; for have gone over all the avenues of my
I
which all learning is a kind of remembering of flesh, but cannot find by which they entered."
knowledge already present in the soul. All If the seeds of learning are in the soul at its
teaching takes the form of helping the learner creation, memory can draw from these "sem-
to recollect things he may not be aware he inal reasons" the full fruit of knowledge.
knows, by reminding him through a process of
questioning which awakens the knowledge al- THE DOCTRINE OF reminiscence changes the
sory images and universal ideas or abstract con- obvious. For imagining lies within our own
cepts. Those who, like Hobbes, Berkeley, or power whenever we wish (e.g., we can call up
Hume, deny universals or abstractions as any a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the
part of the mind's content, see no special prob- use of mental images), but in forming opinions
lem in the origin of that part of the mind's con- we are not free; we cannot escape the alterna-
tent which is not received as sense-impressions. tives of falsehood or truth."
The original impressions are somehow external- The point is not that images cannot be false.
ly caused, and all the rest of the mind's con- They frequently are, as (according to Aristotle)
tentits images and memories and all con- sensations never are. But the falsity of our imag-
structions of the sortLocke calls "complex inations involves a judgment that things really
ideas" then arise by natural derivation from are as we imagine them to be. If imagination is
the original sense-impressions. not accompanied by judgment, the question of
But those who, on the contrary, maintain truth or falsity does not arise, for in pure imag-
that ideas or concepts are not images of any sort, ination we are not concerned with the way
cannot avoid the problem of how the mind things actually exist, but with the possible, />.,
comes by its ideas. One solution of this problem the imaginary rather than the real. "Everyone
attributes existence to ideas as intelligible ob- knows the difference," says James, "between
jects, and attributes to the mind the power to imagining a thing and believing in its existence."
apprehend them by direct intuition, just as the Conceiving imagination as an activity de-
senses directly apprehend sensible objects. But pending upon the prior activity of the senses,
if ideas, whether or not they exist outside the Aristotle holds that imagination is "incapable
mind, cannot be apprehended intuitively, then of existing apart from sensation." In this he
what is the origin of the ideas whereby the mind docs not differ from other psychologists. But
understands intelligible objects? he also holds that rational thought, which for
To this question, the doctrine of reminis- him is quite distinct from imagination, cannot
cence is one answer. Another answer is the doc- exist apart from imagination. "To the thinking
trine of abstraction, as formulated by Aristotle soul images serve as if they were the contents of
and Aquinas. Locke and James also seem to perception. . . That is the why the soul never
.
the discussion of memory, so the doctrine of onlywhen it acquires new knowledge, but also
abstraction which posits an active intellect is when it uses knowledge already acquired, there
relevant to the discussion of imagination. is need for the act of imagination. . . It must of
CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 139
necessity turn to the phantasms in order to per- Dreaming seems to be the striking case of
ceive the universal nature existing in the indi- imagination divorced from reason's judgment
vidual." The
cooperation of the imagination or control. It has long been suspected that ani-
is shown, furthermore, by the
with the intellect mals also dream, but the question whether they
fact that "when the act of imagination is hin- can distinguish their dreams from their waking
dered by a lesion of the corporeal organ ... we perceptions may prove forever unanswerable.
see that a man is hindered from understanding Philosophers and psychologists have, however,
actually even those things of which he had a asked themselves whether there is any way of
ages." When we consider numbers, for example, know that the thoughts that come in dreams
"it is not their images which are in [our] mem- are more false than those that we have when we
ory, but themselves." The question of image- are awake, seeing that often enough the former
less thought of thinking abstractly without are not less lively and vivid than the latter?" It
the use of images seems to be peculiarly insist- seems to him that "there are no certain indica-
ent in sciences like mathematics, metaphysics, tions by which we may clearly distinguish wake-
and theology, in which the conceivable may fulness from sleep." Even as he writes these
not be imaginable. The objects peculiar to words, he can almost persuade himself that he
these sciences seem to require the scientist to is
dreaming. Yet he does find one probable sign
do without imagery, or, as Aquinas says, "to whereby to tell dreaming from waking. "Our
rise above his imagination." memory," he observes, "can never connect our
This may be true even in physics. Atoms, dreams with one another, or with the whole
according to Lucretius, are conceivable, but course of our lives, as it unites events which
they are no more imaginable than they are per- happen to us while we are awake."
ceptible. If we need images to think of them, Aquinas finds other evidences of the differ-
picturing the atom as the smallest particle im- dream at all, for his imagination is inactive as
aginable only more so! To the objection that well as his senses and his mind. But
as sleep
there must be imageless thought if we can think passes gradually into waking, his faculties begin
of incorporeal beings, of which there can be no to act again, not merely the imagination, but
images or phantasms, Aquinas replies that we the reason also, so that "a man may judge that
do so "by comparison with sensible bodies of what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were,
which there are phantasms." between things and their images. Nevertheless,
the common sense remains partly suspended,
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY that the operations of and therefore, althoughit discriminates some
thinking are always dependent on (though not images from reality, yet it is
always deceived in
reducible to) acts of imagination, does not im- some particular. Even while a man is asleep, his
ply that imagination is always accompanied by sense and imagination may be to some extent
abstract or rational thought. Normally, human free, and similarly the judgment of his intellect
thinking and knowing is a work which com- may be unfettered, though not entirely. Con-
bines both sense and intellect, both reason and sequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when
imagination, but sometimes even in man imag- he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in
ination may be active without judgment or rea- some respect."
soning. Brute animals, according to Aristotle,
ire largely guided by their imaginations "be- APART FROM QUESTIONS of truth and falsity, or
cause of the non-existence in them of mind." reality and illusion, the nature and causes of
But when imagination takes the place of dreaming are perennial themes in the tradition
thought in men, it is "because of the temporary of western thought. As different suppositions
eclipse of their minds by passion or disease or are made concerning the cause of dreams, so dif-
spiredby the gods or is a divine visitation, it writers like their ancient forebears appeal thus
becomes a medium of divination or prophecy to sensation and memory as the natural causes
a way of foretelling the future, or of knowing of the origin and content of dreams. But, ex-
what the gods intend in general, or for the cept for daydreams or waking fantasy, they do
guidance of some particular man. In the great not observe that dreaming may be even more
books of ancient poetry and history, and in the profoundly a product of desire. If Freud's ex-
Old Testament as well, dreams, like oracles, are traordinary insight on this point
supported is
interpreted as supernatural portents, and figure by all the evidences he assembles in his
great
as one of the major sources of prophecy. Aris- work, the Interpretation of Dreams then the ,
totle discounts both the fulfillment of dreams lateness of this discovery may be thought even
and their non-fulfillment, "for coincidences do more extraordinary than the theory itself.
not occur according to any universal or general The theory not simply that the content of
is
law." Regarding prophetic dreams as mere co- dreams is determined by desires. When Oedi-
incidences, he does not find it
surprising that pus Jocasta of his fear that in taking her to
tells
"many dreams have no fulfillment." From wife he has unwittingly married his mother,
the fact that "certain of the lower animals she tells him to fear not, for "many men ere
also dream," he thinks "it may be concluded now have so fared in dreams also." If that is so,
that dreams are not sent by God, nor are they then such dreams do not call for the interpreta-
designed for the purpose of revealing the tion which Freud gives. If there arc men who
future." suffer from what Freud calls "the Oedipus com-
Instead, Aristotle proposes natural causes for plex," involving repressed incestuous desires,
the origin of dreams. Slight stimulations of the then the expression of those desires in dreaming
sense-organs awaken the dream process and de- will not take the form of imagining them to be
termine its content. "Dreamers fancy that they actually fulfilled.
are affected by thunder and lightning, when in On the contrary, Freud's theory of dream
fact there are only faint ringings in their cars symbolism holds that "the dream as remem-
... or that they are walking through fire and bered is not the real thing at all, but a distorted
feeling intense heat, when there is only a slight substitute." Beneath what he calls "the mani-
warmth affecting certain parts of the body." fest dream-content" the actual moving im-
Lucretius similarly explains dreams by natural ages which occupy the dreaming consciousness-
causes, but attributes their content to events lie "the latent dream- thoughts" which are dis-
which have dominated the thought of waking torted in the actual dream. This distortion "is
life. due to the activities of censorship, directed
"On
whatever things we have before spent against the unacceptable unconscious wish-
much time," he writes, "so that the mind was impulses . . .
invariably of an objectionable
more strained in the task than is its wont, in our nature, offensive from the ethical, aesthetic, or
sleepwe seem mostly to traffic in the same social point of view, things about which we do
things; lawyers think that they plead their cases not dare to think at all,or think of only with
and confront law with law, generals that they abhorrence." The repressed desires or wishes,
fight and engage in battles, sailors that they the loves or fears, which the dreamer refuses to
pass a life of conflict waged with winds." This acknowledge consciously must, therefore, ap-
is true even of animals.
"Strong horses, when pear in dreams in a disguised form. The imagery
their limbs are lain to rest," Lucretius contin- of dreams seems to Freud to be a kind of lan-
ues,"yet sweat in their sleep, and pant forever, guage in which the repressed materials of thought
and strain every nerve as though for victory. and feeling employ a special symbolism to ex-
, . . And hunters' dogs often in their soft sleep press what the moral censor will not permit us
legs, and all at once give
yet suddenly toss their to express in the ordinary language of our con-
tongue, and again and again sniff the air with scious thought or social conversation,
their nostrils, as if they had found and were As ordinary language contains symbols con-
following the tracks of wild beasts." ventionally agreed upon, so Freud finds that
CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 141
the recurrence again and again of certain images more, which Freud mentions in his enumera-
in the dreams of neurotic patients, and of nor- tion, comprises the sexual organs and acts. In
mal persons as them the character of
well, gives contrast to the others, these, he says, "are
all
is/* according to Freud, "not great." They dreams are sexual symbols."
are, he says, "the human body as a whole, par- Freud points out why it would be a mistake
ents, children, brothers and sisters, birth, to treat dream symbols like the words of an
death, nakedness and one thing more. The ordinary language. "Their object is not to tell
only typical, that is to say, regularly occurring, anyone anything; they are not a means of
representation of the human form as a whole is communication; on the contrary, it is impor-
that of a house. . . . When the walls are quite tant to them not to be understood.'* Wresting
smooth, the house means a man; when there their secret from such symbols is a remark-
are ledges and balconies which can be caught able achievement. Aristotle's remark, which
hold of, a woman. Parents appear in dreams as Freud quotes, that "the most skilful intcr-
emperor and empress, fyng and queen, or other preter of dreams is he who has the faculty of
exalted personages Children and brothers
. . .
observing resemblances," seems to be borne
are less tenderly treated, being symbolized by out in the Freudian method of discovering the
little animals or vermin. Birth is almost invar- latent content of the dream symbolism. But
iably represented by some reference to water. Freud's therapeutic use of what can thus be
. .For dying we have setting out upon a
. discovered makes the psychoanalytic method
journey or travelling by train. Clothes and urn- a thing totally unanticipated by any of his
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The faculties of memory and imagination in brutes and men 143
\a. The relation of memory and
imagination to sense: the a priori grounds of possible
experience in the synthesis of intuition, reproduction, and recognition
\b. The physiology of memory and imagination: their bodily organs 144
ic. The distinction and connection of memory and imagination: their interdepend-
ence
id. The influence of memory and imagination on the emotions and will: voluntary
movement
2c. The association of ideas: controlled and free association; reminiscence and
reverie
causes
30. Reminiscence as the process of all learning: innate ideas or seminal reasons
3^. Sensitive and intellectual memory: knowledge of the past and the habit of
knowledge
experience 1
48
3^. Memory as the muse of poetry and history: the dependence of history on the
memory of men
40. Memory in the life of the individual: personal identity and continuity
4#. Memory in the life of the group or race: instinct, legend, and tradition
5.
The activity of imagination, fancy, or fantasy: the nature and variety of images 149
50. The distinction between reproductive and creative imagination: the representa-
tive image and the imaginative construct
5& The image distinguished from the idea or concept: the concrete and particular
as contrasted with the abstract and universal 150
y. The pathology of imagination: hallucinations, persistent imagery
ja. The use of imagination in the production and appreciation of works of art
7& The fantastic and the realistic in poetry: the probable and the possible in poetry
and history 153
8tf. Dreams as divinely inspired: their prophetic portent; divination through the
medium of dreams
$b. The role of sensation and memory in the dreams of sleep 154
8r . The expression of desire in daydreaming or fantasy
8d. The symbolism of dreams 155
(1) The manifest and latent content of dreams: the dream-work
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-285] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAXIES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends m the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, m 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164,
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, en,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-28}] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references arc to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Doiuy versions differ in title of books or in the numbciing of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
r: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:^6.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" sigmiies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance m the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
ory and imagination to sense: the a priori SECT 5 142a-b; SECT 10 143c-d; CH xxvn,
grounds of possible experience in the syn- SECT 27 227d-228a; CH xxix, SECT 3 234b-c;
thesis of intuition, reproduction, and recog- CH xxxin, SECT 6 249a-b
nition.) 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-17 53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 13a-b; 15a-17b;
74b-75d; par 25 77c-d 32a-37b passim, esp 33a, 36b; 70a-71a; 367a-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 373a; 423a-424a; 427b-434b; 497a-501b
A ANS and REP 4 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, REP
4, 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-d;
3 430c-431d; Q 84, A 7, REP 2 449b-450b; Q 375b-376a passim; 378a-b / Unconscious,
in, A 3, ANS and REP 1-2 570b-571b 431c-d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 646b-
23 HOBBF.S: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-50d; 52b-c; 647c
54b-c; PART iv, 258b-c; 262a-b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-335a \c. The distinction and connection of memory
and imagination: their interdependence
esp 334c-d
31 DESCARTLS: Rules, XH, 19a 20d / Medita- 7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 523d-524a
tions, vi, 97a / Objections and Replies, DEF n 8 ARISJOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH i
130a-b 690a-692b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 17-18 380d- 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [7oi b
382b; PROP 48, SCHOL 391b-c; PART in, 13] CH 8 (702*21] 237a-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH n
POSTULATE 2 396a; PART v, PROP 21 458a ft
[i37o 28-33]613c-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, en i, 17 PLOIINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR HI, CH 28-31
SECT 15 98d-99a; en in, SECT 21 118b-119a; 156d-158c
BK n, CH i, SECT 17 125c-d; en n, SECT 2-3 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-18
128a-c; CH x, SECT 1-7 141b-142d csp SECT 74b-76a; par 23 77a-b
2 141b-c, SECT 7 142c-d; en xu, SECT 8 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78,
148c-d; CH xxxin, SECT 36-37 213c-214b; A 4, ANS and RLP 3 411d-413d; Q 93, A 6,
BK iv, en xi, SECT 4-8 355b-356d; SECT n REP 4 496b-498a
357b-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 28-33 A 3, REP 3 8b-9a
418b-419a; SECT 36 419c-d; SKCT 41 420c 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 50a-c; PART iv,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n 455b- 258b-c
457b; SECT vn, DIV 49 471c-d; DIV 61 477c- 31 DLSCARTES: Rules, vn, lOb-c; xu, 19a-20d
478a 31 SIMNOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 18, SCHOL
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 48d 55a esp 48d 49a, 382a b; PART iv, PROP 34, SCHOL 433a-b
54b-55a; 61a-64a; 85d-89c passim; 115b-c / 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, en x,
Practical Reason, 319c-320b /Judgement, 552c- SECT 2 141b-c; SECT 7-8 142c-143a
553c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i, 413a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b; 13a; 324a; 391a; 422a- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV
424a; 453a~456a; 480a b; 483b-484a; 497a- 39 466c-467a
501b esp 499a-501a 42 KAN Pure Reason, 194d-195a
i :
Ib. The physiology of memory and imagina- Id. The influence of memory and imagination
tion: their bodilyorgans on the emotions and will: voluntary
8 ARISTOTLE Memory and Reminiscence, CH i
:
movement
b b
(449 24-29) 690b-c; [45o*26- i2] 691a~c; CH 2 4 HOMER: BK xxiv [480-516] 176b-d /
Iliad,
b
[453"i5- n] 695 b-d / Dreams, CH 2-3 703a- Odyssey, BK iv [183-189] 201a; BK xv [389-
706d 402] 270a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 3 [427 b 2i-24]
A 4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 84, A 6, REP 2 447c- 660a
449b; A 7, ANS 449a-450b; A 8, REP 2 450b- 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 6 [700**
451b a
I5]-CH 8 [702 22] 235d-237c; CH n 239a-d
n b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50a-51b passim; / Rhetoric, BK i, CH tt
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK ix [82-104] 230a 2e(5) Organic lesions: amnesia and the apha-
7 PLATO: Ph'aedrus, 138c-141a,c / Philebus, sias
621a-b 8 ARISTOTLE :
Memory and Reminiscence, CH i
experience 662d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK 11, CH 12 [1389*20-
b a
[99 34-ioo 9] 136b-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 24] 636c; CH 13 [1390^-10] 637b-c
b
i
ft
9 8o 28 98i i3]499a-500a
[
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [670-
28 GILBERT: loadstone, PREF la-2d 678] 38d; [830-869] 40c-41a
28HARVKY: Motion of the Heart, 273d / On 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [441-493] 115a-116b; BK
Animal Generation, 332a~335c esp 334c-d ii [1-12] 124a; BK vi
[703-751] 229b-231a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59a-b / 17PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 25-31
Novum Organum, PREF 105a-106d; UK 1 107a- 154d-158c passim; TR iv, CH 1-17 159a-166d
136a,c esp APII 11-26 107d-108d, APH 97-98 passim
126c 127b, APH 105 128b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xi, par 17-38
31 DESCARTES: Rules, in, 4c-d; vn 10b-12a pas- 93b-98c esp par 36-38 97d-98c
sim; vin, 14b; xvi 33d-35c / Discourse, PART 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
n, 47c-d Q 87, A i 997b-998c; o 98, A 7 1076d-1077b
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 355a-358b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxxi-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 385a-b; 677b-678a xxxiii 100d-105d passim
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 15a-16c; 236b-237a;
5d. Memory as the muse of poetry and history: 316a-317a; 465c-466c
the dependence of history on the mem- 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, vi, 103a-d
ory of men 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [484-493] 14d-15a / xxvn, SECT 9-26 222a-227d passim, esp SECT
Odyssey, BK i 183a; BK vin [62-82]
[i-io] 20 225c-d
222d-223a; [469-520] 226d-227b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 544c-545d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, la,c; BK in, 114a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [779-784] 20b
6 TnucYDiDts: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 353d- 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 19a-20a
354c; BK v, 489a-b; 500d-501a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 297a-c
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 443d-444c / Critias, 479a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 394d
13 VIRUIL: Aeneid, BK vn [641-646] 254a 52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov, EPILOGUE,
:
12; 24:17-22; 32:7 /Joshua, 1:12-13; 3:14- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVH
4:9 (D) Josue, 1:12-13; 3:14-4:9 / Esther, [1-45] 78c-79a
9:25-32 / Psalms, 102:12; 135:13 (Z>) Psalms, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-52b; 61a-b;
101:13; J
34 :I 3 / Ecclesiastes, 1:11; 2:16; 9:5 / PART HI, 172b-d; PART iv, 258b-d; 261a;
Isaiah, 44:21; 46:9 (D) Isaias, 44:21; 46:97 262a-c
Malachi, 4:4 (D) Malachias, 4:4 25 MONTAIGNE Essays, 14c-15a
:
APOCRYPHA: / Maccabees, 14:16-49 (D) OT, 26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT i, sc
/ Machabees, 14:16-49 iv [96-103] 291c / Richard II, ACT v, sc v [i-
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 26:6-13 / Marl^ 41] 349d-350a / Midsummer-Night's Dream.
14:3-9 / Lu1$, 22:19-20 / / Corinthians, ACT v, sc i [1-22] 370d-371a
11:23-25 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 66c-67b
7 PLATO: Laws, BK vn, 716a-b; 717d-718c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19d-20a / Meditations,
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [441-493] 115a-116b; BK n, 79a-c; vi, 96b-97a; 98d-99a
in [84-191] 149b-152a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 17, SCHOL
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, 60d-61a 381b-d; PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b; PART v,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 97, PROP 34, DEMONST 460c-d
A 2 236d-237b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [95-113] 177b
26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT iv, sc in [40- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH n,
67] 556a-b / Julius Caesar, ACT in, sc 11 [79- SECT 2 128a-b; CH xi, SECT 6 145a; CH XH,
82] S84c SECT I-CH xm, SECT i 147b-149a; CH xin,
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 46b-c SECT 4-6 149b-d; SECT 27 154c-d; CH xiv,
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 626 286b SECT 24-31 160b 162a passim; on xv, SECT
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART rv, 169a 2-3 162c-d; CH xvi, SECT 1-2 165c-d; SECT 5
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88b-d; 97c-98c; 166b-c; en xvn, SECT 3-7 168b-169c; CH
398b; 413b-d; 544c-545c; 627b-d xxii, SECT 2 201a-b; CH xxni, SECT 3? -37
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 527d-528a,c 212d-214b passim; BK in, CH xi, SECT 15
43 MILL: Representative Government, 424c-425b 303b-c; BK iv, CH iv, SECT 5 324d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
356 113a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 10 406d-407b; SECT i, 413a; SECT 5 414a-b
153b-c; 181a-182a; 186d-190b; PART i, 227b-c; 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV n,
230c-231b; 239c-241a; PART n, 259b-c; 261b; 455b-c; DIV 13 455d-456b; SECT v, DIV 39,
263d-266a 466c-d
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 318a-c; 570b-571b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 173b-174a / Judgement,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 647b-c 493c-d; 528c-529c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 717a-719a esp 718b-719a; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a c;
722b-725a esp 724b-725a; 731b; 851b; 853a- 155b; PART i, 219d-221a; 254b-d
858a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 292a-b
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 105d-106b;
Analysis, 4a-b / Instincts, 413c / Unconscious, BK vn, 294b-29Sa; 297a-298a; BK vin,
439d / General Introduction, 509a-513d pas- 318b-c; BK xi, 523d-524c; BK xn, 542d-
sim, esp 512b-513b; 526c-d; 591d-592b; 543a; 544a-b; BK xiv, 601c-602d; 605c-d
599a-b; 608c-d; 613a / Group Psychology, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 480a-501b
686c-689b esp 688d-689a, 689b [fn ij; 692a- 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 483b; 597b-
693a / Ego and Id, 706c-708b esp 707b, 708b 599d esp 599b-d / New Introductory Lectures,
/ War and Death, 763b-c; 764d-765a / Civili- 877d
zation and Its Discontents, 795b-796c; 800a-b
New 5a. The distinction between reproductive and
/ Introductory Lectures, 834b-d
creative imagination: the representative
5. The activity of imagination, fancy, or fan- image and the imaginative construct
tasy: the nature and variety of images 7 PLATO: 577c
Sophist,
7 PLATO: Sophist, 577a-b / Philebus, 623d-624c 12 LUCRETIUS : Nature of Things, BK iv [722-
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK HI, CH 3 659c~661b; 748] 53d-54a
CH n [433b 3 2 -434a 9l 666d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 14 74d-75a
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH n [i37oB28-b29] 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12,
613c-614b A 9, REP 2 58b-59a; Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d;
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vin [18-25] 259b Q 84, A 6, REP 2 447c-449a
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 31 158b-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50 d; PART iv,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 13-14 74c- 262a-c
75a 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 60 112c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A 113a
9, REP 2 58b-59a; Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 54a-b /
Q 84, A 6, ANS and REP 1-2 447c-449a Meditations, i, 76a b; nn 82d-83b
150 THE GREAT IDEAS 5b to 5c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
The activity of imagination, fancyt orfantasy:
(5. 6-19 405d-410c passim, esp SECT 12-16 408a-
the nature and variety of images. 5a. The
409d; SECT 25-27 417d-418b esp SECT 27
distinction between reproductive and crea-
418a-b; SECT 89 430b-c; SECT 135-142 440a-
tive imagination: the representative image 441c esp SECT 140 440d-441a, SECT 142 441b-c
and the imaginative construct?) 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341c-342a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 49, SCHOL, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15d-16c; 23a-24a; 34a-c;
392c-d; 393c-d 115b-c /Judgement, 542b-543c; 570c-572b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [95-113] 177b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 155b;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxn, PART i, 219d 220a; 230c-231b; 254b-d
SECT 2 201a-b; CH xxx 238a-239b passim 53 JAMES: Psychology, 305a-311a esp 307b-308b,
35 BERKELEY: Human
Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 311b-312b [fn i]; 480b-484a
10, 406d-407a; SECTi, 413a 54 FREUD: Unconscious, 442b-443d
35 HUME: Hitman Understanding, SECT n, DIV
5c. The pathology of imagination: hallucina-
13 455d-456b; SECT v, DIV 39-40 466c-467c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 89b-c; 173b-174a; 211c- tions, persistentimagery
212a / Judgement, 493c-495a,c; 528c-529b 7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 520c-522b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 480a-b 8 ARISTOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 270c-271a [453*15-31] 695b-d / Dreams, CH 2 [460*31-
b
27J 704b-d
5b. The image distinguished from the idea or 14 PLUTARCH: Marcus Brutus, 816d-817c
concept: the concrete and particular as 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17,
contrasted with the abstract and uni- A 2, REP 2 102a-d; Q 51, A 2, ANS 276b-277a;
versal
Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 84, A 6, REP i 447c-449a;
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 108c-lllc; 113c-114a,c / A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q in, A 3, ANS and
Phacdrus, 126b-c / Republic, BK in, 333c-d / REP 4 570b-571b
Thcaetetus, 534d-536a / Seventh Letter, 809c- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 53,
810d A 3, ANS 21d-22d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 18 22 CHAUCER: Miller's Tale [3611-3617] 219b
lllb-c; CH BK n, CH 19 [100*15-
31 120a-c; 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 50d; 51b-52b;
b BK i, CH i [980*28-
5J 136d / Metaphysics, 80a; PART in, 172c-d; 174b; PART iv, 258b d;
b
98i i3] 499a-500a; CH 9 [990^-15] 508d; 261a
BK in, CH 4 [999 a 24-b 5J 518a-b / Soul, BK n, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 36c-41b; 237a-b; 405d-
CH 5 [4i7 b i7~28] 648b-c; BK in, CH 8 [432*9- 406a
14] 664c-d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT n, sc i [33-61]
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 3 [ii47b 3-6] 290d-291a; ACT in, sc iv [38-121] 298a-299a
397d 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote esp PART i, ld-2b,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 16-19 4b-c, 18d-22a, 44b-46b, 50b-52d, 134b-136a,
75b-76b; par 23 77a-b PART ii, 285a-288c
19 AQUINAS: Stimma Theologica, PART i, Q 55, A 31 DLSCARTES: Rules, xn, 22c-23a / Meditations,
2, Rjip 2 289d-290d; Q 75, A 2, REP 3 379c- i, 75c-77c / Objections and Replies, 209c
380c; A 3, RKP 2 380c-381b; Q 81, A 3, ANS 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 44, SCHOL
430c-431d; Q 84, A i, ANS and REP i 440d- 437d-438a
442a; A ANS and REP i 442b-443c; AA 6-7
2, 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [95-128] 177b-
447c-450b; Q 85, AA 1-2 451c-455b; Q 86, A i, 178a / Samson Agonistes [599-605] 352b
ANS 461c-462a; PART i-n, Q 17, A 7, ANS 690d- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV
692a; Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3 748b-749a n,455b-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 598a~b
Q 70, A 2, REP 3 896a-897d 44 Bos w ELL :/o toon, 13c-d; 114b-115a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 262a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 196d-
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 53b / Medi- 197c
tations, n, 79a-c; 80a-81d; in, 82d-83b; vi, 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [4405-4612] 110a-114b
96b-97a; 98d-99a / Objections and Replies, 48 MELVILLE: MobyDic^, 148b-150a; 232b-235a
DEF n 130a-b; 136d-137a; 137d; 138d; 211d- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 109d-110a;
212a; 218c-d BK vn, 293c-294a; BK xi, 524c-527a; BK xv,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 44 389b 390a; 616a617a
PROP 48, SCHOL 391b-c; PROP 49, SCHOL, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov^ BK xi,
391d-392c; PART v, PROP 34, DEMONST 460c-d 337a-348d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 274a; 490a-493a; 506a-
SECT 8-9 145b-c; CH xxxii, SECT 8-9 244d- 507a esp 507b-508b [fn i]; 515a-520a; 527a-
24Sa; BK in, CH vi, SECT 32-33 277c-278c; 538b esp 527a-533a; 662a-663a [fn i]; 747b
BK iv, CH VH, SECT 9, 339a-b [fn 3]; 842b-844a
6 to 6c(\) CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 151
6-19 405d-410c passim, csp SECT 12-16 408a- CH vi, SECT 9 270d-271a; BK iv, CH vn, SECT
409d; SECT 97-100 431d-432c 9 338d-339b; CH xvi, SECT 12 370b-371a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
122 505c-d; DIV 124-125 506a-507a csp DIV 6-19 405d-410c; SECT 27 418a-b; SECT 135-
125, 507b [fn i] 142 440a-441c passim
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d-342a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341c-342b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 254b-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-b; 15c-16c; 17d<19a;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 305a-308a; 330a-331b 19d-20c; 85d-93c; 211c-212a; 217d-218a;
227a-230c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
6c(2) The schema of the imagination as me- 264d / Science of Right, 399a / Judgement,
diating between concepts of the under- 497a-502d; 506a-511a esp 506d, 509d-510a;
standing and the sensory manifold of 578a-b; 603b-d
intuition: the transcendental unity of 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, lOc
apperception 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 257c-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 48d-55a, 258a
61a-64a, 66d-93c; 193a-195a / Practical 53 JAMES: Psychology, 158a-161a esp 158b-159a;
Reason, 319c-320b / Judgement, 542b-543c 301a-302a; 549a-550b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 232b 235a passim 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 661d-
662b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 769b-
6d. The limits of imagination: imageless 770b esp 770a
thought; the necessity of going beyond
imagination in the speculative sciences 7. Imagination and the fine arts
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [265-328] 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 67b-c; PART iv,
4b-5a; [599-612] 8b-c; BK n [80-141] 16a-d; 262c
[308-332] 19a-b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Midsummer-Night's Dream,
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK n, CH 2 323a-c ACT v, sc i [1-27] 370d-371a / Henry V, PRO-
/ Chtistian Doctrine, BK i, CH 7 626b-c LOGUE 532b,d; ACT in, PROLOGUE 543c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 9 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 285a-288c
8d-9c; Q 12, A 3 52c 53b; Q 75, A i, ANS and 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 38c-
REP 1-2 378b-379c; A 2, CONTRARY 379c- 39a
380c; A 3, ANS 380c-381b; Q 84, A i, ANS and 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i, 76a-b
REP 2 440d-442a; A 2, REP i 442b-443c; A 6 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 198a-b
447c-449a; A
7, REP 3 449b-450b; Q 85, A i, 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 280a; 296b,d-298a
ANS and REP 2 451c-453c; QQ 87-89 464d- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 173b-174a / Judgement,
480c; Q 93, A 6, REP 4 496b-498a; PART i-n, 473a-c; 482b-483d; 491a-c; 493c-495a,c;
Q 17, A 7, REP 3 690d-692a 498b-502d; 506a-511a esp 506d, 509d 510a;
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52c; 54b-c; 523c-524a; 525c-532a esp 528c-530c
78d-79a; 80a-b; PART n, 162b-d; PART iv, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-c;
262a-b PART i, 254b-d; PART n, 263d-265c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55b d / 47 GOETHE Faust, DEDICATION la-b
:
STANZA 183 144a; STANZA 245 152a / Nun's 23; 27:19 / Acts, 2:17-18; 18:9-10
1
Priest s Tale [14,889-15,162] 451a-455b 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i
[59-67] 3d; BK n [1-75]
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50d-51d; PART iv, lOa-d / Odyssey, BK xix [509-581] 294c-
258b-c 295a,c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 290b-c; 533d-534a 5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [176-230] 17a-d / Prome-
26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT i, sc iv theus Bound [442-506] 44c-45a esp [484-486]
Bd. The symbolism of dreams 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 86a; BK vi,
249a-250a; BK xi, 481a-482b; BK xn, 561c-d;
8</(l) The
manifest and latent content of BK xiv, 608a-b; EPILOGUE i, 672b; 673d-
dreams: the dream-work
674a,c
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK xix [509-581] 294c* 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
295a,c Analysis, llc-12c / Interpretation of Dreams,
5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [176-230] 17a-d / 178a-205c csp 189b-190a, 194b-d, 204c-d;
Choephoroe [523-552] 75b-c 252c-340a esp 252c-253a, 332a-333b, 336d-
5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [42- 340a; 356d-373a passim / General Introduc-
66] 411c-d tion, 489c-504d csp 489c-494d; 513d-526c esp
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 25b-c; 28c-29a; 513d-519d; 532d-544d passim, esp 536c-539a,
47a-c; BK 11, 78d 541b-542b / New Introductory Lectures, 809b-
7 PLATO: Crito, 213b-d / Phaedo, 221d-222a 810b; 812d-814d; 816b-818b
8 ARISTOTLE: Prophesying, CH 2 [464b 7~i8]
709c 8d(2) The recurrent use of specific symbols in
14 PLUTARCH: Pyrrhus, 329c-d / Cimon, 398d- dreams: the dream-language
399b / Eumenes, 473a-b / Alexander, 548d- 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
549a / Demosthenes, 702c-703b / Demetrius, Analysis, 12c-d / Psycho- Analytic Therapy,
727b-d 123d-124a / Interpretation of Dreams, 173a-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, ix [i- 174d; 178b-179c; 230b-231c; 265a-272c;
69] 6Sd-66c; xix [1-69] 81c-82a; XXVH [91- 277b-298a esp 278d-285c / General Introduc-
108] 95c tion, 504d-513d; 516a-518c; 523a-526c / New
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA Introductory Lectures, 813d; 815a-817a
52-55 127a-b; STANZA 177-185 143b-144b;
8e. Dream-analysis as uncovering the re-
STANZA 207-217 147a-148b; STANZA 245 152a
26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT i, sc n pressed unconscious
[17-55] 36c-37a / Richard III, ACT i, sc iv 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
114d-117c / Romeo and Juliet, ACT i, sc iv Analysis, lla-13a / Interpretation of Dreams,
[49-103] 291a-c / Julius Caesar, ACT H, sc n 178a-205c esp 178a-179c, 204c-d; 282d-283a;
[75-90] 578d-579a 285c; 294d-295a; 319d-320c; 340a-387a,c
27 SHAKESPEARE: Cymbeline, ACT v, sc v [426- esp 345c-350a, 356d-358c, 365a, 383d-384a,
465] 488b-d 386b-387a / General Introduction, 483d-494d
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [28-128] 176a- esp 486b-c, 488b-c, 489c-490a; 501c<504d
178a esp 504b-d; 519d-524a passim; 531d-532c;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 263d- 538d-539b; 585a; 635a / New Introductory
265c Lectures, 808d-813b esp 811a-812b, 812d
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The discussion of memory and imagination in relation to the faculties of sense and under-
standing, desire and will, see DESIRE 53; IDEA ic, 2e-2f; SENSE 3b(2), jdfa).
The controversy over the distinction between image and idea, see IDEA 2f-2g; MIND ia(i);
SENSE UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4d.
id, 53;
Other discussions of the association of ideas, and of reverie or daydreaming, see DESIRE 53;
IDEA 56; RELATION 4f.
The consideration of memory as knowledge of the past, see KNOWLEDGE 6b(2); TIME 6e;
TRUTH 33(2); and for the distinction between memory and intellectual habit, see HABIT i,
5d; MIND 4c.
The doctrine of reminiscence which identifies learning with remembering, or for the doctrine
of innate ideas, see IDEA 2b; KNOWLEDGE 6c(3); MIND 4d(2).
The role of memory in science, history, and poetry, see EXPERIENCE 2a-2b; HISTORY i;
INDUCTION 2; POETRY 2.
The problem of personal identity, see SAME AND OTHER ib; SOUL id.
The theory of racial memory in relation to instinct and tradition, see HABIT 36; LANGUAGE
3c; POETRY 3.
156 THE GREAT IDEAS
For; The function of imagination in thinking and knowing, see MIND ia(2); REASONING ic;
and for the doctrine that universal concepts are abstracted from sensory images, see IDEA
EMOTION 3a~3b; MAN 50; MIND 8b; SENSE 4d(2); TRUTH 33(2).
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great floods of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
HuMfc. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK i, PART i, II, CH 5-8; PART IV, CH 6; VOL II, PART IX,
SLOT Hi; PART III, SECT V~VII CH 3
FREUD. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, CH EMERSON. Natural History of Intellect
1-7 HLRING. Memory
. Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious TAINE. On Intelligence
. Leonardo da Vinci TYNDALL. Scientific Use of the Imagination
LEWIS CARROLL. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
II.
Through the Looting-Glass and What Alice
.
tionary Plains
T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers ofMan, in HODGSON. The Metaphysic of Experience, VOL i, en 2
BLAKE. Songs of Innocence (3-4. 6), 3 (3-4), 7 (5), 8 (4); VOL m, CH i (2 (c)),
Songs of Experience
. 2 3
> (5). 4 (3)> 5
COLERIDGE. Diographia Literaria, CH 13 STOUT. Analytic Psychology, CH 1 1
biguities. In the tradition of western thought, sist of valid synthetic judgments a priori. Kant,
the name of science has never been denied to therefore, does not exclude metaphysics from
mathematics, no matter how its
subject matter the ranks of science because he thinks that
has been defined or what conception of science "metaphysic, according to its proper aim, con-
has prevailed. But controversies about meta- merely of synthetic propositions a priori."
sists
physics often begin, in modern times at least, Not the method of metaphysics, nor the form
by questioning our right to use the word "sci- of propositions, but the character of its ob-
its
ence" when we speak of metaphysical inquiry jects seems to be the cause of its frustration,
or speculation. The challenge usually
implies reducing it to what Kant calls an "illusory dia-
that metaphysics cannot be regarded as a body lectic" rather than a valid science.
of valid knowledge because the peculiar objects might be supposed that those who take the
It
it has chosen to investigate are not susceptible opposite view that metaphysics is a science,
to scientific inquiry. even, perhaps, the highest of the sciences
experimentation were the sine qua non of
If would agree in defining its objects or the scope
scientific knowledge, it would follow, of course, of its inquiry. This docs not seem to be the case,
that a discipline which could not perform ex- any more than it seems to be true that all those
periments or even less rigorous types of empiri- who criticize metaphysics conceive its subject
cal research could not be called a science. But matter in the same way.
by that standard mathematics would also be Following what he takes to be the traditional
ruled out. It does not seem to be the case, how- conception of metaphysics in the mediaeval
ever, that mathematics and metaphysics stand schools, which appears to him to be continued
or fall together. in the writings of Descartes, Leibnitz, and
Hume, for example, admits the one and ex- Wolff, Kant says that "metaphysic has for the
cludes the other. If we are persuaded of his proper object of its inquiries only three grand
principles concerning science, what havoc, he ideas: God, Freedom, and Immortality." This
says, must we make when we run over our li- also seems to be at least part of what Hume has
braries. "If we take in our hand any volume; of in mind when he refers to "school metaphysics"
divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let and associates it with "divinity," by which he
us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning con- means theology, natural or sacred. Yet we find
cerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain William James saying that "Hume is at bottom
any experimental reasoning concerning matter of as much of a metaphysician as Thomas Aqui-
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the nas," because he is
engaged in speculations con-
flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry cerning the relation or lack of relation, the iden-
and illusion." tity or lack of identity, in the discrete elements
Nor does Kant make experimentation or em- of immediate experience. Here the question
pirical research indispensable to valid and cer- seems to be not about God, freedom, and im-
tain knowledge. On the contrary, pure, as op- mortality, but about the existence of enduring
158
CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS 159
substances underlying all perceptible qualities, all things." There are other theoretical sciences,
or about a fixed order of reality behind the se- such as physics and mathematics, which investi-
quence of phenomena in experience. According gate causes or deal with principles, but they do
to James, "the whole question of interaction not reach to the highest causes or first prin-
and influence between things is a metaphysical ciples,nor do they take all things in their
question, and cannot be discussed at all by most universal aspect as the object of their
those who are unwilling to go into matters inquiry.
thoroughly." Though "physics also is a kind of Wisdom,"
In the Preface to his Principles of Psychology\ says Aristotle, "it is not the first kind"; and
James declares his plan to limit his own in- elsewhere he says that "both physics and mathe-
quiries to what can be known by the empirical matics must be classed as parts of Wisdom."
methods of the natural sciences. Psychology Physics deals only with material things in mo-
like physics must assume certain data. The dis- tion; and "the mathematician investigates ab-
cussion of these assumptions, he says, "is called stractions" objects which, except as abstract-
metaphysics and falls outside the province of ed, cannot exist apart from matter and motion,
this book The data assumed by
psychol- "If there something which is eternal and im-
is
ogy, just like those assumed by physics and the movable and separated from matter, clearly the
other natural sciences, must sometime be over- knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science
hauled. The effort to overhaul them clearly and not, however, to physics nor to mathematics,
thoroughly is metaphysics; but metaphysics but to a science prior to both." It is that science
can only perform her task well when distinctly which is the
highest part of wisdom.
conscious of its great extent." The implication Aristotle gives two names to the supreme
seems to be not that metaphysics is impossible form of human wisdom or the highest of the
but rather that metaphysics, as James conceives theoretical sciences. He denominates it both
it, does not yet exist in any mature or satisfac- from the position it occupies in relation to all
tory development. "Only a metaphysics alive other disciplines and also in terms of the kind
to the weight of her task," he writes, can hope of substance which it alone investigates. If there
to be successful. "That will perhaps be centu- is "no substance other than those which are
ries hence." formed by nature, natural science (i.e., physics)
will be the first science, but if there is an im-
WE CANNOT FULLY explore the issue concerning movable substance, the science of this must be
the objects of metaphysics without observing prior and must be first philosophy." But this
that other names are used in the tradition of highest science also deserves to be called "the-
the great books to designate the discipline which, ology" as well as "first philosophy." There are,
rightly or wrongly, claims to be the highest Aristotle says, "three theoretical philosophies,
human science. The Greeks initiated the con- mathematics, physics, and what we may call
ception of a discipline which should be preemi- theology, since it is obvious that if the divine
nent because it deals with first principles and is present anywhere, it is present in things of
highest causes. It not only searches for wisdom this sort," />., the eternal, immutable, imma-
about the ultimate realities; it also lays the terial.
book to have this word in its title, never uses principles and for theknowledge of the most
the word to refer to the science which he is try- intelligible realities. As appears in the chapter
ing to define and establish. In the opening chap- on DIALECTIC, Aristotle contrasts the dialecti-
ters, he speaks of it under the name of wisdom, cian and the philosopher as respectively con-
for "all men suppose what is called Wisdom to cerned with opinion and knowledge, but Plato
deal with the first causes and the principles of regards the dialectician as preeminently the
160 THE GREAT IDEAS
philosopher. Not only does dialectic belong to helps to characterize the nature of metaphysics
the realm of knowledge rather than opinion, as a science.
but in the realm of knowledge, mathematics The word -"metaphysics" comes into use as a
occupies the lower, dialectic the upper part. result of the title supposedly given by the Alex-
The mathematical sciences build upon hypoth- andrian librarians to the work in which Aristotle
eses which they do not and cannot establish. treats the problems of the first philosophy. The
Dialectic uses hypotheses only "as steps and word is short for "the books which come after
points of departure into a world which is above the books on physics." Plotinus uses the word
hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond and connects it with the Platonic meaning of
them to the first principle of the whole; and . . . "dialectic. "In the training of the metaphysi-
by successive steps she descends again without cian he says, dialectic is the ultimate study.
the aid of any sensible object from ideas, Dialectic, according to Plotinus, "is the meth-
through ideas, and in ideas she ends." od, or discipline, that brings with it the power
Despite all the relevant differences between of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature
Plato and Aristotle concerning being and be- and relation of things what each is, how it dif-
coming, reason and sense, the intelligible and fers from others, what common quality all have,
the sensible,it seems
possible to compare the to what kind each belongs and in what rank
knowledge which Plato calls "dialectic" with each stands in its kind and whether its being is
what Aristotle calls "first philosophy" or "the- real-being, and how many beings there are, and
ology." how many non-beings to be distinguished from
Both, for example, proceed from first princi- beings." But we must not think of dialectic,
plesand establish the foundations of the infe- Plotinus declares, "as the mere tool of the meta-
rior sciences. On its downward path, dialectic, physician." It goes beyond metaphysics as vision
according to Plato, brings the light of reason to or contemplative wisdom goes beyond discur-
bear on the understanding of the hypotheses sive reasoning and demonstration. "It leaves to
which are the principles of mathematics. Though another science all that coil of premises and
Aristotle thinks that mathematics rests on ax- conclusions called the art of reasoning."
ioms or self-evident truths, he also says that "it
must be the business of first philosophy to ex- THE QUESTION which Plotinus raiseswhether
amine the principles of mathematics" because there is a higher science or form of knowledge
the mathematician only uses them in a special than metaphysics naturally considered by
is
application without investigating their general the great Christian theologians. In part their
truth. Furthermore, the question concerning answer resembles that of Plotinus; in part it
' *
how the objects of mathematics exist is a ques- differs. Where Plotinus speaks of dialectic as the
tion for the first philosopher, not the mathema- most precious part of philosophy" because it
tician. transcends reasoning and argument and reaches
In the Sophist, Plato, to illustrate the differ- the sort of immediate apprehension of reality
ence between the sophist and the dialectician which cannot be expressed in words, theologians
or philosopher, develops an analysis of such recognize the supremacy of mystical knowl-
terms as being and non-being, true and false, edge a foretaste in this life of what the vision
same and other, one and many, rest and motion. of God will be like in the life to come. But, un-
These, it seems, are the fundamental concepts like Plotinus, they do not think such knowl-
in the philosopher's knowledge of the ultimate edge, here or hereafter, is natural wisdom. Rath-
reality. But these are also the fundamental con- er it is supernatural knowledge, the divine gift
ters on THEOLOGY and WISDOM. Another subor- cis Bacon divides the sciences "into
theology
dination of metaphysics, considered there also, and philosophy," he adds that "in the former
must be mentioned here as well. That is the we do not include natural theology." Natural
subordination of metaphysics to theology. Both theology is the divine part of philosophy, yet
Himself, in that part of philosophy called theol- inquiry concerning the existence and nature of
ogy, or the divine science, by Aristotle." To immaterial and imperishable substances, his
this he replies by giving two reasons for sacred definition of the object of metaphysics would
theology. seem to justify the title of theology.
It is necessary, he says, "for the salvation of Descartes, who also separates metaphysics
man that certain truths which exceed human from physics by reference to the immateriality
made known to him by divine
reason should be and materiality of the substances which are their
Even as regards those truths about
revelation. objects, even more explicitly seems to give the
God which human reason could have discov- whole of metaphysics a theological character.
ered, it was
necessary that man should be taught In the Preface to his Meditations on the First
by a divine revelation; because the truth about Philosophy, he says that he is concerned to treat
God such as reason could discover, would only of "God and the human soul"; for, as he ex-
be known by a few, and that after a long time, plains to the professors of Sacred Theology of
and with the admixture of many errors." Fur- the Sorbonne, "I have always considered that
thermore, he continues, there is no reason "why the two questions respecting God and the soul
those things which may be learnt from philo- were the chief of those that ought to be dem-
sophical science, so far as they can be known by onstrated by philosophical rather than theo-
natural reason, may not also be taught us by logical argument."
another science so far as they fall within reve- Though he adds the freedom of the human
lation. Hence the theology included in sacred will to the existence of God and the immortal-
doctrine differs in kind from that theology ity of the soul, Kant's definition of the objects
which is a part of philosophy." of metaphysical speculation similarly makes
These two kinds of theology are traditionally metaphysics an inquiry into things which lie
distinguished as natural and sacred. When Fran- outside the realm of physics and associates it
162 THE GREAT IDEAS
with the traditional subject matter of theology, ence to investigate; for to physics one would
at least in the sense that here reason tries to assign the study of things not qua being, but
prove propositions which are the main tenets of rather qua sharing in movement"; and math-
religious faith. In his Preface to the first edition ematics is concerned with the attributes of
of the Critique ofPure Reason, Kant remarks that things insofar as they are "quantitative and
when reason "finds itself compelled to have re- continuous." These sciences "mark off some
course to principles which transcend the region particular kind of being, some genus, and in-
of experience," it "falls into confusion and con- quire into this, but not being simply, nor qua
tradictions. . . . The arena of these endless con- being. . . .
Similarly, these sciences omit the
tests is called Metaphysic." question whether the genus with which they
deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs
IF NOTHING IMMATERIAL exists, if there are no to the same kind of thinking to show what it is
beings apart from the changing things of sense- and that it is."
experience, or if, although such things exist, Only the first philosophy "does not inquire
they cannot be known by reason proceeding in about particular subjects in so far as each has
the manner of speculative science, does it follow some attribute or other, but speculates about
that metaphysics must also be denied existence, being, in so far as each particular thing is." Its
at least as a speculative science? The answer subject matter, then, includes all existing
seems to be clear. If the declared objects of a things as existing, and involves not only the
science do not exist, or if those objects are un- question how anything which exists exists (i.e.,
knowable by the methods which that science the properties of being), but also the question
proposes to follow, then it seems difficult to de- whether certain things, whose existence can be
fend claims to be a valid science against those
its questioned, do in fact exist. Whatever truths
who challenge them. The controversy over the hold good for all things qua being such as the
validity of metaphysics would thus appear to principle that the same thing cannot both be
turn on the truth or falsity of the two "ifs" and not be in the same respect at the same time
istence. Aristotle's definition of the subject phy explains, as its restriction to natural the-
matter of the first philosophy seems to contain ology could not explain, why the central books
an alternative conception of metaphysics, one in Aristotle's Metaphysics treat of sensible, phys-
which may be quite consistent with the con- ical substances; their nature as substances; the
ception of it as
theology, but which, however, distinctionbetween substance and accident,
gives it problems to solve in the realm of physi- form and matter, potentiality and actuality, as
cal things. principles of the composite nature of changing
"There is a science," Aristotle writes, "which substances; and the properties of such ex-
investigates being as being and the attributes istences in virtue of their having being, e.g.,
which belong to being in virtue of its own na- their unity and divisibility, their sameness and
ture." This definition of the first
philosophy otherness.
seems to differentiate it from mathematics and Aristotle does not inquire whether such sub-
physics as sharply as the other definition in stances exist. He seems to take their existence
terms of immaterial and imperishable sub- as unquestionable, for he frequently refers to
stances. The other sciences, according to Aris- physical things as "the readily recognized sub-
totle, do not treat of "being qua being uni- stances." But in addition to the question "how
versally." The properties of anything which is sensible substances exist," there are such ques-
"in so far as it has being, and the contraries in tions as "whether there are or are not any be-
it qua being, it is the business of no other sci- sides sensible substances. . . and whether there
CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS 163
is a substance capable of separate existence, and idea. ... As we have divided natural phi-
apart from sensible substances, and if so why losophy into the investigation of causes and the
and how." These latter questions lead to the production of effects, and referred the investi-
concluding books of the Metaphysics which in- gation of causes to theory, which we again di-
quire into the existence of the non-sensible, the vide into physical and metaphysical, it is nec-
immaterial, the immutable. If Aristotle's the- essary that the real difference of these two be
ology begins here, then theology is only a part drawn from the nature of the causes they in-
the crowning part, perhaps of a larger science quire into." Physics, according to Bacon, in-
whose object is not a special realm of being, but quires into efficient and material causes; meta-
all of being. physics, into formal and final causes; and as
Hobbes and Bacon go further than Aristotle mechanics the practical application of physi-
is
in the direction of opposing the identification cal theory, so what Bacon calls "magic" is the
of metaphysics with theology. Where Aristotle practical doctrine that corresponds to the meta-
seems to admit theological subject matter as a physical theory of forms.
part of the first
philosophy, they exclude it
ploys it only as a term of derogation to refer to ever named, does not seem to be uniformly ac-
scholastic doctrines which he repudiates. His companied by agreement or disagreement con-
own classification makes philosophia prima that cerning the status and development of the dis-
branch of natural philosophy which is prior to cipline in question.
the mathematical and mechanical sciences. The There seems to be some similarity, for ex-
latter deal with determinate quantity and mo- ample, between Plato's dialectic as an inquiry
tion. The antecedent science deals with "quan- into forms and Bacon's notion of metaphysics
tity and motion indeterminate" These "being as concerned with formal causes a similarity
the principles or first foundation of philos- which Bacon himself observes. But where Plato
ophy," the science which deals with them "is seems to think that dialectic exists, to be taught
called Philosophia Prima" and learned, Bacon's judgment is that this part
Bacon distinguishes between first philosophy of metaphysics, if not the part dealing with
and metaphysics and between metaphysics and final causes, has not yet been developed because
natural theology. First philosophy, he says, is the right method has not been employed.
"the common parent of sciences." It is con- Again, Aristotle's conception of metaphysics
cerned with "axioms, not peculiar to any sci- as concerned with the primary axioms, the
ence, but common to a number of them" and universal principles applicable to all existence,
also with "the adventitious or transcendental and the transcendental properties of being,
condition of things, such as little, much, like, seems to bear some resemblance to Bacon's
different, possible, impossible, entity, nonen- primary philosophy. But Bacon writes as if
tity, etc." Natural theology,
which is the divine Metaphysics^.^ not been written, or
Aristotle's
"God, unity, goodness, angels, and spirits," is might have supposed it had, in establishing the
separate from the rest of natural philosophy. science which Bacon finds for the most part in
"But to assign the proper office of metaphys- a defective or undeveloped condition.
ics, from primary phi-
as contra-distinguished If we turn to natural theology, either as a
losophy and natural theology," Bacon writes, part of metaphysics (with Aristotle), or as
"we must note that as physics regards the separate from metaphysics (with Bacon), or
things which are wholly immersed in matter as identical with metaphysics (with Descartes),
and movable, so metaphysics regards what is we find the same situation. Aside from some
more abstracted and fixed; that physics sup- verbal and some real differences concerning the
poses only existence, motion, and natural ne- objects of the inquiry, Aristotle, Bacon, and
cessity, whilst metaphysics supposes also mind Descartes think that the existence of beings
164 THE GREAT IDEAS
apart from the sensible world of matter and cal problems from the realm of questions worth
change can be demonstrated and that some- thinking about, Kant does not reject the
thing can be known of their nature whether problems but rather offers alternative methods
they are called immaterial substances, spirits, of stating and solving them. He hopes thereby
and intelligences, or God, angels, and souls. to accomplish a reformation rather than an ab-
With some alterations in language and olition of metaphysical inquiry.
thought, Plato and Plotinus, Augustine and The existence of God, freedom, and im-
Aquinas, Spinoza and Locke can be added to mortality must be affirmed, Kant thinks, in
thiscompany. They are theologians in that sense the order of practical, not speculative reason.
of "theology" which implies a rational knowl- They are indispensable "conditions of the nec-
edgewithout religious faith, and either by in- essary object of our will .... that is to say, con-
tuition or demonstration of beings which re- ditions of the practical use of pure reason."
physics" is derogatory, and though the pur- gives his fundamental treatises in morals and
pose of his Essay Concerning Human Understand- ethics a metaphysical character, but sees the
tion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover out according to the critique of pure reason."
in things without cohesion and separa-
us, the Kant's transcendental philosophy, and es-
tion of solid parts, which is the extension and pecially what he calls "the architectonic of
motion of bodies," Locke writes, "we have as pure reason," is in a sense that
metaphysic al-
much reason to be satisfied with our notion of ready begun. In subject matter, if not in its
deny metaphysics (so far as it is identified with reason," he says in his original preface to the
what is traditionally natural theology) the Critique, "I hope to be able to publish under
status of a valid theoretical science. For them the title of Metaphysic of Nature" And in the
it is incapable of taking its
place beside physics last pages of the Critique, wherein he criticizes
and mathematics. Hume, in addition, denies all speculative efforts in the sphere of natural
validity to metaphysical speculation concern- theology, Kant reaffirms "the speculative and
ing causes and substances in the natural order. the practical use of pure reason" to constitute
Unlike Hume, who simply removes metaphysi- "a Metaphysic of Nature and a Metaphysic of
CHAPTBR 57: METAPHYSICS 165
Ethics." The former, he says, is "what is com- theory of the criteria of valid knowledge)
monly called Metaphysic in the more limited could determine in advance of any examina-
sense." Both together "form properly that de- tion of metaphysical discussion whether the
partment of knowledge which may be termed, matters to be discussed fall within the range of
in the truest sense of the word, philosophy, questions concerning which the human mind
The path which it pursues is that of science, has the power to find and validate answers,
which, when it has once been discovered, is But if this supposition is untenable in itself; or
never lost, and never misleads." untenable because psychology and epis-
if it is
ity of metaphysics without engaging in, or at GOD, ANGEL, IDEA, SOUL, IMMORTALITY,
least facing, issues which are themselves meta- WILL (which are relevant particularly to the
suppose that psychology (as an analysis of the chapters as BEING, CAUSE, FORM, MATTER,
powers of the mind) or epistemology (as a ONE AND MANY, RELATION, SAME AND OTHER.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1.
Conceptions of the highest human science: dialectic, first philosophy, metaphysics,
natural theology, transcendental philosophy 166
2. The analysis of the highest human science: the character of dialectical, metaphysical,
or transcendental knowledge 167
20. The distinctive objects or problems of the supreme science
2b. The nature of the concepts, abstractions, or principles of the highest science
2c. The method of metaphysics: the distinction between empitical and transcen-
dental methods
as a propaedeutic to meta-
4#. Reconstructions of metaphysics: critical philosophy
physics
166 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK 11 [265-283! 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a 119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SF.CT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Refcicncc Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
2. The analysis of the highest human science: 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 269 b- 2 72 b
the character of dialectical, metaphysi- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43a-46a esp
cal, or transcendental knowledge 44c-45a; 60b-c
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv 51b-54b pas-
2a. The distinctive objects or problems of the sim / Objections and Replies, 128d-129a
supreme science 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL 2-
7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-13d / Republic, BK v, PROP 41 388a-c; PROP 47 390c-391a; PART v,
368c-373c; BK vi-vn, 383d-398c esp BK vn, PROP 25-26 458d-459a; PROP 28 459b
396d-398c / Timaeus, 476a-b / Sophist, 564d- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
574c / Philebus, 633a-635a esp 634b-635a 6 405d-406a; SECT 17 409d-410a
/ Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 342b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 9 [i92 a33~b2] 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 6c-d; 215d-216d; 245c-
b
268c-d; BK n, CH 2 [i94 9-i5] 271a; en 7 249c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
[198*22-31] 275b-c / Heavens, BK in, CH r 253b-c; 264d; 270c-d / Practical Reason, 330d-
b
[298 i3~24] 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK i-iv 331a; 351b-352c / Pref. Metaphysical Elements
499a-532d; BK vi, CH I-BK vn, CH i 547b,d- of Ethics, 365a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals,
551a; BK xi, CH 1-8 587a-593d; BK xn, 388a-c / Judgement, 467d-468b
CH b
CH i 598a-c / Soul, BK i, i
[4<>3 io-i7] 53 JAMES: Psychology, 884b-886a
632d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK CH 7 390a-d 2c. The method of metaphysics: the distinction
vi,
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a-813a between empirical and transcendental
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, PREF, 5a-b
methods
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH 4-6 lla- 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 134a-c; 139d-140b / Re-
12b public, BK vi-vn, 383d-398c esp BK vn, 396d-
19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q 5, A 2,
Theologica, 398c / Parmenides 486a-511d esp 491a-d /
ANS 24b-25a; Q A 2, REP 4 47d-48d
11, Sophist 551a-579d esp 552b-c, 553d-554a,
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 269b-272b 561b, 570c-571d / Statesman 580a-608d esp
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 42c-46a; 580d, 582d-583c, 586c-589c, 591a-d, 594d-
60b-c / Novum Organum, BK n, APH 9 140b-c 596a / Philebus, 610d-613a / Seventh Letter,
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, 69a-71a,c; i-n 75a- 809c-810d
81d 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK n, CH 3 513c-d;
BK iv, CH 2 [1004*25-31] 523b-c; CH 4 [ioo5 b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL 2
388a-b; PROP 47 390c-391a; PART v, PROP 25- 35-1006*28] 525a-c^cii 7 [1012*18-24] 532a-b;
33 458d-460c CH 8 [ioi2 b 5-8] 532c; BK vi, CH i [io25 b i-i8]
a b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XH, DIV 547b,d; BK ix, CH 6 [io 4 8 25- (;] 573c-574a;
BK CH b
132 509a-d xi,
ft
171a esp 169c-170a, 170c-171a; 177b-192d 513c-516a; BK iv, CH 1-3 522a-525a; BK vi,
csp 177b-179c; 200c-209d; 218d-223d; 234c- CH i 547b,d-548c; BK xi, CH i 587a-588a; CH
b
240b esp 239a-c; 241d-242c; 246a-250a,c 3 [io6i*29]-cH 4 [io6i 34] 589c-590a; CH 7
a b
/ Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 592b-593a; BK xn, CH i [io69 3<>- 2] 598b-c;
263d-264d; 277d-287d csp 277d-279d, 283d- CH 8 [io73 b i~7] 603d / Soul, BK i, CH i [403 b
285a / Practical Reason, 291a-293c esp 292a- 10-17] 632d
293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 307d-314d; 331a- 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812b-813d
337a,c; 340a-342d; 344a-349b esp 344a-c, 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a
348b-349b; 351b-352c; 353a-354d / Intro. 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in 10a-12b
Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-388d esp 386d- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 8,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Statements in other contexts concerning the highest human science, see DIALECTIC 2a, 4;
PHILOSOPHY 2b; SCIENCE 13(2); THEOLOGY 33; WISDOM la.
Discussions relevant to the objects, problems, and concepts of metaphysics or the highest
human science, see BEING 2, 3, 4-43, 7a~7b, 7c, 70!, 76, 8a-8b; CAUSE 53, 5tl; GOD 2b-2c,
6b; GOOD AND EVIL la-ib; IDEA if; IMMORTALITY 2; KNOWLEDGE 6a(i), 63(4); LIBERTY
43; MIND lof; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY i, 2a-2b; ONE AND MANY i-ib; RELATION 3;
SAME AND OTHER i, 2c, 2e; SOUL 4b; TRUTH ib-ic.
Considerations relevant to the nature of metaphysical concepts or abstractions, see BEING i ;
DEFINITION 6a; IDEA id, 2g, 4^4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6d; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d.
The method or character of metaphysical thought, see KNOWLEDGE 6c(4) LOGIC 4d; PHILOS- ;
physics as the first philosophy, see DIALECTIC 2c, 3C, 6; KNOWLEDGE 5d~5e; 2b(4); MAN
PHILOSOPHY 3d, 6b; SOUL 53; THEOLOGY 5.
Considerations relevant to a metaphysic of morals, and for the solution therein of the prob-
lems of God, freedom, and immortality, see GOD 2d; IMMORTALITY 33; NECESSITY AND
CONTINGENCY 4b; PHILOSOPHY 23; WILL
170 THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below arc works not included in Great Boofy ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
MALEBRANCHE. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Re- GILSON. The Unity of Philosophical Experience, CH
12
ligion
LEIBNITZ. Philosophical Wor^s, CH 1 1 (On the Reform B. RUSSELL. Mysticism and Logic, CH 5
. An
of Metaphysics and on the Notion of Substance) Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, CH 25
Chapter $S:
INTRODUCTION
TN the tradition of the great books, the word what is here discussed and the matters con-
JL "mind** is frequently than "rea-
used less on SOUL, SENSE, MEM-
sidered in the chapters
son," "intellect," "understanding," or "soul." ORY AND IMAGINATION, remain the same as they
There are still other words, like "intelligence," would be if "reason" or "intellect" were used in
"consciousness," and even "spirit" or "psyche," place of "mind." Different formulations of
which often carry some part of the connotation these relationships are not affected by the
of the word "mind. "Certain authors use "mind" words used, but by different theories of what
as a synonym for one or another of these words, the mind is, however it is named.
and give it the meaning which other writers ex- Beforewe consider the diverse conceptions
derstanding." Some discuss mind without ref- der the seven main divisions of the first section
erence to soul, some identify mind with soul or in the Outline of Topics, it
may be useful to
spirit, and some conceive
mind as only a part of examine the elements of meaning more or less
soul or spirit. common to the connotation of all the words
For the purpose of assembling in a single which "mind" here represents. Even here we
chapter references to all discussions which fall must avoid begging the question whether mind
within the area of meaning common to all these is a peculiarly human possession. Other animals
terms, was necessary to adopt some single
it may have minds. Mind may be, as it is on one
covering word. Our choice of "mind" is partly theory, a universal property of matter. Ac-
the result of its present currency, partly the cording to another theory, there may be super-
result of the fact that it is somewhat more neu- human minds or intelligences, or a single abso-
tral than the others and therefore less prejudi- lute mind, a transcendent intelligence.
cial to the conflicting theories which are juxta- What, then, does the universe contain be-
posed in this chapter. cause there is mind in it, which would be lack-
Words like "reason" or "intellect" usually ing if everything else could remain the same
imply a sharper distinction between the func- with mind removed ? The facts we are compelled
tions or faculties of sensation and thought than to mention in answering this question should
does the word "mind." Imagination and mem- give us some indication of the elements of
ory, for example, are attributed to the un- meaning common to "mind" and all its syno-
derstanding in the writings of Locke and nyms.
Hume, whereas, in the analytical vocabulary of
Aristotle and Aquinas, imagination and mem- FIRST is THE FACT of thought or thinking. It
ory belong to sense, not to reason or intellect. there were no evidence of thought in the world,
Similarly, words like "soul" or "spirit" usually mind would have little or no meaning. The
connote a substantial as well as an immaterial recognition of this fact throughout the tradi-
mode of being, whereas "mind" can have the tion accounts for the development of diverse
meaning of a faculty or a power to be found in theories of mind. None of the great writers
171
172 THE GREAT IDEAS
Itmay be supposed that such words as fine the nature of thinkingand to develop theo-
"thought" or "thinking" cannot, because of ries of mind. This fact about thought its re-
their own ambiguity, help us to define the flexivity also seems to be a common element
sphere of mind. But whatever the relation of in all the meanings of "mind." It is sometimes
thinking to sensing, thinking seems to involve referred to as "the reflexivity of the intellect"
more for almost all observers than a mere re- or as "the reflexive power of the understand-
ception of impressions from without. This seems ing" or as "the ability of the understanding to
to be the opinion of those who make thinking a reflect upon its own acts" or as "self-conscious-
consequence of sensing, as well as of those who ness." Whatever the phrasing, a world without
regard thought as independent of sense. For self-consciousness or self-knowledge would be a
both, thinking goes beyond sensing, either as world in which the traditional conception of
an elaboration of the materials of sense or as mind would probably not have arisen.
knowledge or knowing. This may be ques- insensitive things are expressions of desire. But
tioned on the ground that if there were sensa- it is not in that sense of desire that the fact of
tion without any form of thought, judgment, purpose or intention is here taken as evidence
or reasoning, there would be at least a rudi- of mind.
mentary form of knowledge some degree of It is rather on the level of the behavior of
consciousness or awareness by one thing of living things that purpose seems to require a
another. Granting the point of this objection, factor over and above the senses, limited as
it nevertheless seems to be true that the dis- they are to present appearances. It cannot be
tinction between truth and falsity, and the found in the passions which have the same limi-
difference between knowledge, error, and ig- tation as the senses, for unless they are checked
norance, or knowledge, belief, and opinion, do they tend toward immediate emotional dis-
not apply to sensations in the total absence of charge. That factor, called for by the direction
thought. The chapter on KNOWLEDGE reports of conduct to future ends, is cither an element
formulations of these distinctions or differences. common to all meanings of "mind" or is at least
Any understanding of knowledge which in- an element associated with mind.
volves them seems to imply mind for the same It is sometimes called the faculty of will
reason that it
implies thought. rational desire or the intellectual appetite.
There is a further implication of mind in the Sometimes it is treated as the act of willing
fact of self-knowledge. Sensing may be aware- which, along with thinking, is one of the two
ness of an object and to this extent it
may be a major activities of mind or understanding; and
kind of knowing, but it has never been ob- sometimes purposiveness is
regarded as the very
served that the senses can sense or be aware of essense of mentality. Considerations relevant
themselves. Take, for example, definitions of to this aspect of mind are discussed in the chap-
of sensation and the objects of
sense, or theories ter on WILL,
sense. Such definitions and theories must be
regarded as works of reflective thought; they THESE THREE OR FOUR FACTS thought, knowl-
are not products of sensation. edge or self-knowledge, and purpose seem to
Thought seems to be not only reflective, but be common to all theories of mind. More than
reflexive, that is, able to consider itself, to de- that, they seem to be facts which require the
CHAPTER 58: MIND 173
development of the conception. They are, for thinkerswho have dwelt at length on the sub-
the most part, not questioned in the tradition From another point of view, there may be
ject.
of the great books; but they are not always fewer than seven, for when the lines are drawn
seen in the same light. They are not always re- according to certain basic differences, several
lated in the same way to one another and to of these theories appear to be variants of a
other relevant considerations. From such dif- single doctrine.
ferences in interpretation and analysis arise the
various conflicting conceptions of the human "THAT IN THE SOUL which is called mind,"
mind. Aristotle writes, "that whereby the soul
is
The conflict of theories concerning what the thinks and judges." For him, as for Plato, the
human mind is, what structure it has, what human intellect or reason is a part or power of
it or what whole it belongs to, the soul of man, distinct from other parts or
parts belong to
does not comprise the entire range of contro- such as the senses and the imagination,
faculties,
versy on the subject. Yet enough is common to desire and the passions. Though the human soul
all theories of mind to permit certain other is
distinguished from the souls of other living
questions to be formulated. things by virtue of its having this part or pow-
How does the human mind operate? How er, and is therefore called by Aristotle a "ra-
does it do whatever is its work, and with what tional soul," these writers do not identify mind
intrinsic excellences or defects? What is the and soul. As soul is the principle of life and all
relation of mind to matter, to bodily organs, vital activities, so mind is the subordinate
prin-
to material conditions? Is mind a common ciple of knowledge and the activities of think-
might be called mind in animals distinctly dif- Within the general framework of this theory,
ferent from the human mind ? Are there minds many differences exist between Plato and Aris-
or a mind in existence apart from man and the totle and between them and others who share
whole world of corporeal life ? their views. These differences arise not only with
Such questions constitute the major topics respect to the soul of which the intellect is a
of this chapter. Other topics which appear here, part, but also with respect to the power or ac-
such as the moral and political aspects of mind, tivity of the intellect itself. For example, the
are reserved for discussion in the many other distinction which Aristotle between
initiates,
chapters devoted to the great ideas of moral mind as an active and as a passive power, is
and political thought. Still others, like the more explicitly formulated
by Aquinas in his
problem of insanity the loss or derangement theory of the active intellect and the intellect
of mind obviously relevant here even
are as potential.
though the more general consideration of psy- The human intellect, Aquinas writes, "is in
The intelligibility of the positions taken in as the Philosopher says. This is made clear from
the dispute of the issues which are here our ma- first we are only in potentiality
the fact that at
jor concerndepends to some degree on the di- towards understanding, and afterwards we are
vergent conceptions of the human mind from made to understand actually. And so it is evi-
which they stem. It seems necessary, therefore, dent that with us to understand is in a way to be
to examine the seven notions of mind which passive'' But the forms of things, or what
appear in the great books. This will at least pro- Aquinas calls their "intelligible species," are
vide the general context for the reader's further not actually intelligible as they exist in ma-
explorations, even if it is not possible to trace terial things. He therefore argues that in addi-
the implications each of these notions may have tion to the "power receptive of such species,
for the great controversial issues. which is by reason
called the possible intellect
Seven is, of course, a fiction of analysis. There of its being in potentiality to such species,"
are, from one point of view, more perhaps as there must also be another intellectual power,
many as there are, among the great authors, which he calls the active of "agent" intellect.
174 THE GREAT IDEAS
Nothing, he says, can be "reduced from po- Aquinas assigns to the active and the possible
tentiality to act except by something in act" intellect respectively, conception, judgment,
or already actual. "We must therefore assign and reasoning do not, in his opinion, require
on the part of the intellect some power to make distinct powers. Nor do the two kinds of
*
things actually intelligible, by the abstraction thought or reasoning which Aquinas calls 'spec-
of the species from material conditions. Such is ulative" and "practical." The speculative and
the necessity for positing an agent intellect." practical intellects, he maintains, "are not dis-
The more which Aqui-
explicit formulation tinct powers," for they differ only in their ends.
nas gives of the distinction between the active The speculative intellect "directs what it ap-
and the possible intellects as distinct powers has prehends, not to operation, but to the sole con-
further consequences for the analysis of three sideration of truth"; the practical intellect
states of the passive or possible intellect dis- "directs what it apprehends to operation" or
tinguished by Aristotle. The intellectual power action. But to the nature of intellect as a power
which is
receptive of the intelligible species may of apprehension, "it is accidental whether it be
either be in complete potentiality to them, as it directed to operation or not."
is when it has not yet come to understand cer-
tain things. Or it may be described as in ha- NOT ALL THE foregoing distinctions are made,
bitual possession of the intelligible species when or made in the same way, by Plato, Aristotle
certain things, but is not now actually engaged Aquinas, who standtogether in regarding mind
in understanding them. In the third place, the as only a part of the human soul. Lucretius be-
potential intellect may also be actual or in act longs with them on this point, though he differs
whenever it is actually exercising its habit of radically from them on the issue of mind and
understanding or is for the first time
actually matter. Mind, for him, is only "the directing
other distinctions are made in the sphere of only the thinking or deciding part of the soul.
mental activity, but none is
thought to require But Plato, Aristotle, and their followers make
a division of the mind into two distinct powers, a distinction in kind between sensations or
or even to require the discrimination of several images and universal ideas or abstract concepts.
states of the same power. Just as Plato regards Sense and intellect are for them distinct facul-
the intuition or direct apprehension of intelligi- ties of knowing and have distinct objects of
ble objects as an activity of the same intelli- knowledge. For Lucretius, on the other hand,
gence which is able to reason discursively about thinking is merely a reworking of the images
the ideas can contemplate, so Aristotle and
it received by the senses. In this one respect at
Aquinas assign three different activities to the least,Lucretius is more closely associated with
intellectual power which apprehends intelli- the theory of mind to be found in Hobbes,
gible objects, not by intuition, but only as the Locke, and Hume.
result of the abstraction of forms from matter In the consideration of mind, agreement on
to which the mind can act independently of the former agree, is totally different from ex-
sense and imagination. Augustine seems to share tension, the common term for describing the
Plato's doctrine of reminiscence as an account latter." Descartes denies that brutes possess
of how the senses recall actively to mind ideas thought, but "even though I were to grant,"
it hasalways somehow possessed. Aquinas he says, "that thought existed in them, it would
in nowise follow that the human mind was not
adopts Aristotle's doctrine of abstraction as the
quite contrary account of the role the senses to be distinguished from the body, but on the
play in providing the materials on which the contrary that in other animals also there was a
mind works to obtain ideas. But Augustine and mind distinct from their body."
Aquinas come together on another point in The two components of human nature are,
which they depart alike from Aristotle and according to Descartes, each of them substances
Plato. They distinguish with precision between a res cogitans or a thinking substance and a res
the intellect and will as separate faculties of extensa or an extended substance. Descartes uses
the soul, whereas Plato and Aristotle treat the phrases "rational soul" and "mind" inter-
thinking and willing (or knowing and loving) changeably. Reason or intellect the capacity
as merely diverse aspects of mental life. to think is not a
power of the soul. Nor is
thinking an act which the soul sometimes per-
THE SAME SITUATION prevails with respect to forms, sometimes does not. It is the very es-
the other theories of mind which we must now sence of the soul itself, even as extension is the
consider in their own terms. Descartes, for ex- essence of body. Just as bodies cannot exist
ample, resembles Plato and Augustine on the without actually having three dimensions, so
point on which we have seen that they together the mind cannot exist without thinking.
differ from Aristotle and Aquinas, namely, the Though it is literally translated into English
relation of mind or reason to the senses or imag- by "I think, therefore I am," Descartes' cogito,
ination. Yet he is also closer to Aristotle and ergo sum can be rendered by "Thinking is;
Plato in a respect in which they together differ therefore, the mind is," or by the strictly
from Augustine and Aquinas, namely, in re- equivalent statement, "The mind exists;
garding thinking and willing as acts of the mind therefore, there is thinking." It is precisely this
rather than as belonging to completely sepa- equation of the mind's existence with the
rate faculties. activity of thought which Locke challenges.
These agreements and differences occur in "We know certainly, by experience," he writes,
the context of a basic opposition between Des- "that we sometimes think, and thence draw
cartes and all the other writers so far men- this infallible consequence, that there is some-
tioned. Unlike all of them, he identifies the thing in us that has the power to think; but
human mind with the rational soul of man. In whether that substance perpetually thinks or
the dual nature of man, he says, "there are cer- not, we can be no farther assured than ex-
tain activities, which we call corporeal, e.g., perience informs us I grant that the soul in
magnitude, figure, motion, and all those that a waking man is never without thought, be-
cannot be thought of apart from extension in cause it is the condition of being awake: but
space; and the substance in which they exist is whether sleeping, without dreaming, be not an
called body Further, there are other activi- affection of the whole man, mind as well as
ties, which we call thinking activities, e.g., un- body, may be worth a waking man's considera-
derstanding, willing, imagining, feeling, etc., tion. . . . Methinks every drowsy nod shakes
which agree in falling under the description of their doctrine, who teach that the soul is
thing or the mind, or any other name we care, that Locke and Descartes agree in their con-
provided only we do not confound it with cor- ception of man as a union of two distinct sub-
poreal substance, since thinking activities have stancesthe union of a material substance or
no affinity with corporeal activities, and body with a spiritual substance, a mind or soul.
thought, which is the common nature in which It is not surprising, however, that Berkeley
176 THE GREAT IDEAS
should hold the Cartesian view against Locke. that taken by Locke. Spinoza agrees that the
Considering the flow of time in terms of the mind a thinking thing. He agrees that man
is
succession of ideas, Berkeley affirms it to be "a consists of an individual body united with an
plain consequence that the soul always thinks.'* individual mind. But he differs from Descartes
To try to "abstract the existence of a. spirit from on the meaning of substance. By its very na-
its cogitation" is, he adds modestly, "no easy ture, substance is infinite; and because it is in-
task." He might have said it is impossible, for finite, there can be only one substance, which
since he holds that bodies do not exist and that is God. Finite individual things, whether bod-
man consists of mind or spirit alone, he need ies or minds, do not exist as substances, but as
not hesitate to assert that the mind cannot modes of the divine attributes.
cease to think witJiout ceasing to be. Neither "The human mind is a part of the infinite
he nor Descartes is, in James' opinion, "free to intellect of God, and therefore," Spinoza de-
take the appearances for what they seem to be, clares, "when we say that the human mind per-
and to admit that the mind, as well as the body, ceives this or that thing, we say nothing less
may go to sleep." than that God has this or that idea." He in-
Despite these differences, Descartes, Locke, cludes love and desire, as well as perception and
and Berkeley seem to agree on the range of ac- imagination, among the affections of the mind,
tivities within the sphere of mind. The mind is even calling them "modes of thought." He
a thinking substance for Descartes, yet it also do not exist apart
adds, however, that these
senses and imagines, suffers passions, and exer- from the idea of the thing loved or desired,
cises acts of will. What
Descartes says in terms "though the idea may exist although no other
of acts, Locke says in terms of powers. Mind mode of thinking exist."
Berkeley also includes the whole range of psy- Hegel's view of the human mind as a phase
chological phenomenasensation, imagination, or dialectical moment of the Absolute Mind or
memory, the passions, reasoning, and choice. Spirit seems comparable to Spinoza's concep-
Hume takes a similar view, though in his tion of the human mind as a part of God's in-
case one basic qualification must be added. He finite intellect. The Hegelian theory of mind,
does not conceive the mind as a soul or a spirit developed in such works as the Phenomenology
or any other sort of substance. He even has of Mind and the Philosophy of Mind, is re-
some difficulty with the notion of its continuity flected in his Philosophy of History and in his
comprehension of every human creature." What conscious affections of its own," James goes on
the mind is or how it exists, we may not be to say that "the bare phenomenon, however,
able to say; but Hume thinks that "if we can go the immediately known thing which on the
no farther than this mental geography, or de- mental side is in apposition with the entire
lineation of the distinct parts and powers of the brain-process is the state of consciousness and
mind* it is at least a satisfaction to go so far." not the soul itself."
Descartes' theory of mind seems to serve as a What the soul is and whether it exists
belong
point of departure in another direction from to metaphysics. So far as psychological obser-
CHAPTER 58: MIND 177
varion and analysis are concerned, the phenom- FINALLY, THERE is the theory in which mind is
ena of mind are to be found in the stream of neither one of the faculties of the soul, nor it-
thought or consciousness. States of mind are self a thinking substance; nor is it a soul or
statesof consciousness. James uses the words spiritwith a diversity of powers. "All our
"feeling" or "thought" to cover every type of knowledge," Kant writes, "begins with sense,
mental operation, every state of mind, every proceeds thence to understanding, and ends
form of consciousness, including sensations and with reason beyond which nothing higher can
emotions, desires and wishes, as well as concep- be discovered in the human mind for elabo-
tionand reasoning. rating the matter of intuition and subjecting it
Locke and Hume distinguish powers of the to the highest unity of thought." These three
mind according to different types of mental faculties have distinct functions for Kant. The
operation. James tends rather to analyze the sensitive faculty is a faculty of intuition. The
mind in terms of its diverse states according faculty of understanding is a
faculty of judg-
to different types of mental content. But he ment and scientific knowledge. The faculty of
also lays great stress on the dynamic inter- reason, when properly employed, performs a
connection of the various elements of con- critical and regulative function in the realm of
sciousness in the continuous flow of the stream thought, but when employed beyond the prov-
of thought. ince of its power leads thought into blind
Freud too presents an analysis of different alleys or dialectical frustrations.
types of mental content, and accompanies it by Mind is not one of these faculties, nor is it
a theory of the different layers of mind or the being in which these faculties inhere. The
psychic structure. He holds, for example, that notion of mind seems to have significance, for
"we have two kinds of unconscious that Kant, primarily in a collective sense. It repre-
which is latent but capable of becoming con- sents the unityand order of the triad of cogni-
scious, and that which is
repressed and not tive faculties. The faculties of feeling and will
capable of becoming conscious in the ordinary which Kant adds to these in his enumeration of
way. .That which is latent, and only un-
. . "the higher faculties" belong to the "tran-
conscious in the descriptive and not in the scendental ego," but they do not fall within that
dynamic sense, we call preconscious\ the term part of the transcendental structure which is
unconscious we reserve for the dynamically un- mind. Kant's distinction between the specula-
conscious repressed, so that we have three tive and the practical use of reason, and his dis-
terms, conscious (Cs), preconscious (Pcs), and tinction between the moral and the aesthetic
unconscious (Ucs)." judgment, involve different relationships be-
Like James, Freud is concerned with the tween mindor its triad of faculties and
dynamic interaction of various mental opera- these other faculties.
tions or contents. In addition, a further point of
between them. James says that
similarity exists THE FOREGOING SURVEY of conceptions of the
"the pursuance of future ends and the choice human mind gives some indication of the way
of means for their attainment are ... the mark in which other questions about mind are an-
and criterion of the presence of mentality . . . swered.
No actions but such as are done for an end, and With regard to the relation of mind and
show a choice of means, can be called indubi- matter, for example, the theories of Descartes,
table expressions of Mind." Freud goes further Spinoza, Locke, and James seem to affirm a
in the same direction. By identifying "psychic duality of substances, or of modes of substance,
energy in general" with what he calls "libido," or at least of realms the physical and the
he implies that mind in its most primitive form mental. They are confronted by the problem
has entirely the aspect of desire or seeking. It of the relation which obtains between the two
expresses itself in "two fundamentally different their independence or interaction.
kinds of instincts, the sexual instincts in the "Mental and physical events," writes James,
widest sense of the word . . . and the aggressive "are, on all hands, admitted to present the
instincts, whose aim is destruction." strongest contrast in the entire field of being.
178 THE GREAT IDEAS
The chasm which yawns between them is less as functions of material particles in motion.
easily bridged over by the mind than any inter- The reduction of mind to matter raises a
val we know. Why, then, not call it an absolute question which leads in the opposite direction.
chasm," he asks, "and say not only that the Why may it not be supposed that thought and
two worlds are different, but that they are in- feeling arc present in the universewherever
dependent?" matter an atom of mind inseparably con-
is
James thinks that to urge this theory of the joined with every atom of matter, as in the
complete independence of mind and body "is "mind-stuff" or "mind-dust" theory which
an unwarrantable impertinence in the present state William James considers and criticizes? Still
of psychology'." He prefers the common -sense another formulation of the relation of mind
theory that each acts on the other somehow. to matter is found in the theory of Aristotle
But earlier writers who consider body and mind and Aquinas, according to whom the rational
as distinct substances, find grave difficulties in soul is "the substantial form of an organic
the way of conceiving their interaction. "How body," but the intellect one of its powers
our minds move or stop our bodies by thought, is not united to matter in any way. Mind is
which we every moment find they do," is, ac- said to be immaterial in that understanding or
cording to Locke, "obscure and inconceivable." thought does not require a bodily organ.
According to Hume, there is no "principle in The angelic intellect, according to Aquinas, is
all nature more mysterious than the union of a "cognitive power which is neither the act of a
soul with body." He interprets one conse- corporeal organ, nor in any way connected
quence of the union to be that "a supposed with corporeal matter." The human mind is
spiritual substance acquires such an influence not so completely divorced from matter, for,
over a material one, that the most refined though man's intellect "is not the act of an
thought is able to actuate the grossest matter. organ, yet it is a power of the soul, which is the
Were we empowered by a secret wish, to re- form of the body." Among all bodily forms,
move mountains, or control planets in their the human soul alone has the distinction of pos-
orbit; this extensive authority," Hume thinks, sessing"an operation and a power in which cor-
"would not be more extraordinary, nor more poreal matter has no share whatever." But
beyond our comprehension." Aquinas also maintains that "the body is neces-
Denying that bodies Berkeley never-
exist, sary for the action of the intellect, not as its
give the materialists their external bodies," he sitive faculty. He conceives this dependence in
says, "they by their own confession are never the following manner. "For the intellect to
the nearer knowing how our ideas are pro- understand actually . there is need for the
. .
duced; since they own themselves unable to act of the imagination and of the other powers"
comprehend in what manner body can act upon that are acts of bodily organs. "When the act of
spirit, or how it is
possible that it should im- the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the
print any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident corporeal organ, for instance, in a case of frenzy,
that the production of ideas or sensations in our or when the act of the memory is hindered, as
minds can be no reason why we should suppose in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hin-
matter or corporeal substances, since that is dered from understanding actually even those
acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable things of which he had a previous knowledge."
with or without this supposition." The problem of body and mind is discussed
Those who deny the existence of matter, more fully in the chapter on MATTER. Other
anything im-
like Berkeley, or the existence of problems involved in the theory of mind simi-
material, like Lucretius orHobbes, are con- larly occur in other chapters as well as in this
fronted by problems of their own. Berkeley one, the problem of mind in animals and
e.g.,
must explain the mind's perception of bodies men (in the chapters on ANIMAL and MAN) the ;
or why the mind thinks of matter. Lucretius problem of the existence of minds superior to
must explain perception, thought, and choice that of man (in the chapters on ANGEL and
CHAPTER 58: MIND
GOD); the problem of the origin of ideas in the reason, nor does he find it
necessary to adopt
human mind (in the chapters on IDEA and Aristotle's notion of an active intellect to ex-
MEMORY AND IMAGINATION). It should be plain how the mind abstracts general ideas from
noted, however, that agreement or disagree- the particulars of sense-perception. So far as his
ment on the nature of the human mind does theory attributes to mind the power of sense,
not always determine agreement or disagree- Locke has more affinity with Berkeley and
ment with respect to these other questions. Hume than with Aristotle; yet on the question
Sharing the view that the mind is a spiritual of abstract ideas or the distinction between men
substance, Locke and Descartes do not agree and brutes, he is as much opposed to them as
about innate ideas or principles. Locke tends they are to Aristotle.
to agree with Aristotle when he says that the These few observations may be taken as a
mind is a tabula rasa, "void of all characters, sample of the many intricately crossing lines oi
without any ideas. How comes it to be fur- thought which make the complex pattern of the
nished?" he asks. "Whence has it all the ma- traditional discussion of mind. With few excep-
terials of reason and knowledge? To this I tions, almost any other choice of authors and
answer in one word, from Experience. In that topics would provide similar examples. That
all our knowledge is founded; and from that it fact, combined with the fact that almost every
ultimately derives itself. Our observation em- major topic in this chapter leads into the dis-
ployed either about external sensible objects, cussion of other great ideas, tends to make the
or about the internal operations of our own chapter on MIND a kind of focal point for per-
minds, is that which supplies our understand- spective on the whole world of thought. It is
ings with all the materials of thinking." not surprising that this should be the case, for
But Locke does not accept Aristotle's sharp on any theory, mind is somehow the place of
distinction between the faculties of sense and ideas or, as Aristotle says, "the form of forms."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAOB
I. Diverse conceptions of the human mind 182
10. Mind as intellect or reason, a part or power of the soul or human nature, distinct
from sense and imagination
(1) The difference between the acts of sensing and understanding, and the ob-
jects of sense and reason
(2) The cooperation of intellect and sense: the dependence of thought upon
imagination and the direction of imagination by reason 183
(3) The functioning of intellect: the acts of understanding, judgment, and
reasoning
(4) The distinction of the active and the possible intellect in power and function
ib. Mind as identical with thinking substance 184
(1) The relation of the mind as thinking substance to sense and imagination
(2) Thinking and willing as the acts of the thinking substance
id. Mind as soul or spirit, having the power to perform all cognitive and voluntary
functions
(1) The origin of the mind's simple ideas: sensation and reflection
(2) The activity of the understanding in relating ideas: the formation of com-
plex ideas
180 THE GREAT IDEAS
PAGE
ie. Mind as a triad of cognitive faculties: understanding, judgment, reason 185
(1) The relation of understanding to sense or intuition: its application in the
realm of nature; conformity to law
(3) The relation of reason to desire or will: its application in the realm of free-
dom; the summum bonum
if. Mind as intelligence or self-consciousness, knowing itself as universal: the unity
of intellect and will
ig. Mind as the totality of mental processes and as the principle of meaningful or
purposive behavior
(1) The nature of the stream of thought, consciousness, or experience: the va-
riety of mental operations
2b. The potentiality of intellect or reason compared with the potentiality of matter
or nature
2e. The reduction of mind to matter: the atomic explanation of its processes, and
of the difference between mind and soul, and between mind and body
3& Mentality as a common property of men and animals: the differences between
human and animal intelligence in degree or quality 189
^c. The states of the possible intellect: its potentiality, habits, and actuality
4<
The condition of the mind prior to experience
(1) The mind as completely potential: the mind as a tabula rasa
(2) The innate endowment of the mind with ideas: instinctive determinations
(3) The transcendental or a priori forms and categories of the mind 191
4/! Supernatural states of the human intellect: the state of innocence; beatitude; the
human intellect of Christ
CHAPTER 58: MIND 181
PAGE
5.
The weakness and limits of the human mind 191
5^. The natural limits of the mind: the unknowable; objects which transcend its
y. The elevation of the human mind by divine grace: faith and the supernatural
gifts 193
6. The reflexivity of mind: the mind's knowledge of itself and its acts
7.
The nature and phases of consciousness: the realm of the unconscious 194
7^.
The conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious activities of mind 195
80. The distinction between sanity and madness: the criterion of lucidity or insight
90. The distinction between the speculative and practical intellect or reason: the
9^. Reason as regulating human conduct: reason as the principle of virtue or duty
197
yd. Reason as the principle of free will: rationality as the source of moral and political
freedom 198
9*. Reason as formative of human society: the authority of government and law 199
9/ The lifeof reason, or the life of the mind, as man's highest vocation: reason as
the principle of all human work
lob. Nous or the intellectual principle: its relation to the One and to the world-soul
lod. The unity and separate existence of the active or the possible intellect
log. The divine intellect: its relation to the divine being and the divine will
182 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 I IOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PACJE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the lettcis a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psyehology,116a-ll9b the passage
:
t
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends m
the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
spcr) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, arc gi\en in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265 283] 12d.
BiBLh REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters 01 vciscs, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TLSTA-
MENr: Nehcmiah, 7:45 (D} // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The deaf Ideas, consult the Preface.
.
n . en 8 626c-627a
la. Mind as intellect or reason, a part or power 19 AguINAS Summa .
PAR r Q
Theologies, i, 75,
of the soul or human nature, distinct 38 o c -381b Q 76, A 3, CONTRARY
A ^ ANS ;
80d esp par 21 76c-d; BK xni, par 12 113b-d foSC^v-c^i] 504d 505a; CH 6 I987 29-b i8j ft
8 b
/ City of God, BK vn, CH 23, 256b-c; BK vin, 505b-d; BK in, CH 4 [999 24- 5] 518a-b; BK
CH 6, 269b-c; BK xi, CH 27, 337d-338a; BK vn, en 10 [1035^5-1036*12] 559b-c; CH 15
1*(2) to CHAPTER 58: MIND 183
a
563c-564c; BK vm, CH 2 [i(>43 i2-28] 567c-d; and REP 473b-475a; A 5, ANS and REP 4
i
lllb-c; BK 11, CH
19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK
possible intellect in power and function
b a
vn, CH 3 [246 2o-248 8] 330a-d / Soul, BK i, 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 4-5 661b-662d
CH i
[403*2-10] 632a; BK
CH 7 [431*1 4J-ui
in, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 54,
a
8 [432 i3] 663d-664d / Sense and the Sensible, A i, REP i 285a-d; A 4 287b-288a; Q 55, A 2,
CH 6 [445 b 4~i8] 683b-d / Memory and Rcminis- REP 2 289d-290d; Q 79, AA 2-5 414d-419b;
b a
ccnce, CH i [449 3o~45o 25] 690c-691a Q 84, A 4, ANS and REP 3 444d-446b; A 6 447c-
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 18 449a; Q 85, A i 451c-453c; Q 87, A i 465a-466c;
523a-b Q 88, A i, ANS and REP 2 469a-471c; Q 117,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, A i 595d-597c
A REP 2 380c-381b; Q 79, A 4, REP 3 417a-
3, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
418c; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 430c-431d; A 4 9a-10b; A 5, REP 1-2 lOb-d; Q 67, A 2,
Q 84, A 2, CONTRARY and REP i 442b-443c; ANS 82c-83b; PART HI, Q 9, A i, ANS 763b-
A 3, ANS 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A A 764c; A A 3-4 765b-767b; Q 12, A i, ANS and
6_8 447c-451b; Q 85, A i 451c-453c; A 5, REP REP 3 776c-777b; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A 3,
2 457d-458d; A 7, ANS 459c-460b; Q 86, A i, REP n 1034b-1037c
ANS and REP 2 461c-462a; A 4, REP 3 463d- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 31, SCHOL 366d-
464d; Q 88, AA 1-2 469a-472c; Q 89, A i, ANS 367a
184 THE GREAT IDEAS \b to \d(l)
(1. Diverse conceptions of the human mind.) 380d-382c; PROP 40 387a-388b; PROP 48-49
391a-394d; PART in, PROP 1-2, DEMONST
Ib. Mind as identical with thinking substance
396a-c; PROP 3 398b-c; PROP 9-14 399b-401a;
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a; PART V, PROP 23, SCHOL 458c-d
PART v, 56a-b / Meditations, 71b-d; 11 77d-
81d; iv, 89b; vi, 98c-d / Objections and Replies,
\d. Mind assoul or spirit, having the power to
114d-115a,c; DBF vi-vn 130c-d; PROP iv 133c; perform all cognitive and voluntary func-
tions
13Sb-136b; 152b,d-156a; 207a; 208c-d; 209c;
224d-225d; 248b; 249d-250b; 261a-b; 276b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i,
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, SECT 4 121d-122a; SECT 10 123b-d; CH vi
SECT 9-25 123a-127d; CH xix, SECT 4 176a-b 131b-c; CH ix 138b-141a passim, esp SECT i
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; 138b-c, SECT 15 141a; CH xi, SECT I-CH xn,
SECT 26-27 418a-b; SECT 98 432a; SECT 135- SECT 1 143d-147d; CH xix 175b-176b; CH xxi,
142 440a-441c passim SECT 5-6 179c-180a; CH xxiir, SECT 5 205a-b;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 130b-131a; 221a-226a esp SECT 15 208c-d; SECT 1 8 209a; SECT 22 209d;
221a222b SECT 28-32 211b-212d; BK iv, CH xiv 364b-
365a
lb(l) The relation of the mind as thinking 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b;
substance to sense and imagination SECT 7 414b-c; SECT 26-28 418a-c; SECT 89
31 DESCARTES: Rules, vm, 13a-b; 14b; xn, 430b-c; SECT 135-142 440a-441c passim
18b-c; 20a c; xiv 28a-33b passim / Discourse, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 194d-195a
PART i, 41d; PART iv, 53b; PART v, 59a-60c / 53 JAMES: Psychology, la; 118b-119b; 221a-226a
Meditations, n 77d-81d; vi 96b-103d esp 96b- esp 221a-222b
98c, 99d-101a / Objections and Replies, DEF
i-n 130a-b; POSTULATE n ld(l) The origin of the mind's simple ideas:
131a; 136d-137a;
sensation and reflection
137d; 207d-208a; 209c; 215b-c; 218c-d; 224d-
225d; 229d 230c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i,
35 BKRKKLKY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; SECT 1-8 121a-123a; SECT 23-25 127b-d; CH
SECT 158-139 440c-d n, SECT 2 128a-b; CH in, SECT i 128d-129a;
CH vn 131c-133b; en xi, SECT i7-cn xn,
Thinking and willing as the acts of the SECT i 147a-d; CH xn, SECT 8 148c-d; CH xiv,
thinking substance SECT 31 161d 162a; CH xvn, SECT 22 173d-
31 DESCARTES: Rules, in 3b~5a; xi 17b-18b; xiv 174a; CM xvni, SECT 6 174c-d; CH xx, &ECT
28a-33b passim / Meditations, in 81d-89a esp 1-2 176b-c; SECT 15 177d; CH xxi, SECT 4
81d-82a; iv 89a-93a passim; vi, 101d-102a / 178d-179c; SECT 75 200b-d; CH xxni, SECT i
Objections and Replies, DEF i-n 130a-b; 13 7d; 204a-b; SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15 208c-d;
162b; 170d; 218c-d SECT 29-30 211d-212b; SECT 32-37 212c-214b;
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; CH xxv, SECT 9 216d; SECT n 217a
SECT 26-28 418a-c; SECT 138-139 440c-d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i,
413a
lc. Mind as a particular mode of that attribute 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV
of God which is
thought 12-14 455d-456b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 14 359d-360a
PROP 25, coROL365b; PROP 29-31 366b-367a; ld(2) The activity of the understanding in re-
PART n, AXIOM 2 373d; PROP i, sciioL 374a; lating ideas: the formation of complex
PROP 5 374c-d; PROP 10, COROL 376d; PROP ideas
2. The human mind io relation to matter or 2b. The potentiality of intellect or reason com-
body pared with the potentiality of matter or
nature
2a. The immateriality of mind: mind as an 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247b i-
immaterial principle, a spiritual sub- B
248 9) 330b-d / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 2
stance, or as an incorporeal power func- a b
[K>46 37- 24] 571c-d; CH 5 573a-c / Soul, BK
tioning without a bodily organ HI, CH 5 662c-d; CH n [434*16-22] 667a
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-126c / Phaedo, 223b- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A
225c; 231c-234b / Timaeus, 452d-453b; ANS and REP 2-3 31d-32c; Q 14, A 2, REP 3
2,
466a-b 76d-77d; A 8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 19, A i, ANS
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 4 (4o8b 18-29] 638c; 108d-109c; Q 50, A 2, REP 2-4 270a-272a; Q
CH 5 [4ii b i3-i8] 641c-d; BK n, CH 2 [4i3b 24~ 55, A i 289a~d; A 2, ANS 289d-290d; Q 58, A i,
b ANS 300c-301a; Q 75, A 5, REP 1-2 382a-383b;
29] 643d-644a; BK in, CH 4 [429io- 23] 661b-
662 a; CH 5 662od Q 79, A 2 414d-416a; A 6, ANS 419b-420d; Q
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of'Animals, BK n, CH 3 84, A 2, ANS and REP 2 442b-443c; A 3, REP 1-2
[736"25-3 o] 277c 443d-444d; Q 85, A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; Q 87,
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 2, 107b-c A i, ANS 465a-466c; Q 91, A 3, REP 2 486b-
/ Fourth Ennead, TR vn, CH 8, 195b-196a; 487d; PART I-H, Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q
197cl98b 22, A i, ANS and REP i 720d-721c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 2, 43c-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
/ City of God, BK vm, CH 5, 268c-d; BK xix, A 4, REP 1-2 9a-10b; Q 55, A i, ANS and REP 5
CH 18 523a-b 26b-27a; PART HI, Q 9, A 3, ANS and REP 3
19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 3, 765b-766b; PART HI SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS and
A i, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; REP io 1025c-1032b
Q 75, A 2 379c-380c; A 3, REP 2 380c-381b; 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 494a-b
A 5, ANS 382a-383b; A 6 383c-384c; Q 79, A i, 53 JAMES Psychology, 153a
:
595d-596a 452d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE H, 689c- 53 JAMES Psychology, 84a 90b esp 84b 85b, 88a-
:
TIONS, 4 116a-d; 121 136c-d; 157 142b-c / 54 FREUD: Instincts, 413a-d / General Introduc-
Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c; 168b-d; tion, 591d-592b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
178a-b; 186a; 198a; PART i, 258a; PART in, 647a-648a / Ego and Id, 707b-708b esp 708a-b
304d-305b
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287a-c; 319b-c; 4. The various states of the human mind
331b-332a
4a. Individual differences in intelligence: de-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 689c-
690a grees of capacity for understanding
53 JAMES: Psychology, 85a-b; 678b-686b csp 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK vin [165-185] 223d~224a
686a-b; 691a-b 5 ARISTOPHANES: Frogs [1482-1499] 581d-582a
54 FREUD: Unconscious, 429c-d 7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 358a-360c; BK vi,
373c-375b; 383c-d; BK vn, 401b-c / Theaete-
3. Mentality as a common property of men tus, 513a-d; 528a; 540c-541a / Seventh Letter,
and animals: the differences between hu- 809c-810d esp 810c
man and animal intelligence in degree 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 34
or quality b
[89 io-i5] 122c / Topics, BK vin, CH 14 [163**
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH i 8-16] 222a
[588*18^4] 114b,d; BK ix, CH 7 [612^8-32] 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 10
b
138b-c / Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 [686 22-29] 218b-c / Rhetoric, BK HI, CH i
[686*22-687*23] 218b-d [1404*15-19] 654b; CH 2 [1405*7-9] 655b /
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1028- Poetics, CH 22 [1459*5-7] 694<*
1090] 74c-75b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK HI, CH 6, 182a-b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52b; 53a-b; 53d; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 31 26c-
54a; 63a; 64a-c; 79c; PART 11, lOOa-c; PART 27a; BK xm, par 47, 123d-124a
iv, 267b 19 AQUINAS : Summa PART i, Q 89,
Theologica,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215a-232c esp 216c-219a, A ANS 473b-475a; Q 117, A i, ANS 595d-597c
i,
(4. The various states of the human mind.) 4d. The condition of the mind prior to experi-
ence
4b. The mentality of children
7 PLATO: Laches, 3Sd / Apology, 200c-d / 4^(1) The mind as completely potential: the
BK 320c-321d mind as a tabula rasa
Gorgias, 261a-c / Republic, 11,
14 408d-409a
35 I IUME Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 33,
: 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 22, 127c-d;
463c-d BK IT, en n, 150a-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xir, 559d 17 PLOTINUS: First Enncad, TR n, CH 4, 8b-c /
53 JAMES: Psychology, 270a; 413b [fn 2); 456b- Fourth Ennead, TR in, CIT 25, 155b; TR iv, en
457a; 684b-685a 5 160d-161b / Fifth Ennead, TR in, CH 2, 216b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 241 b-c; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 10 73d-
363b-364b; 379d-380b / Narcissism, 400a / 74a; par 16-19 75b-76b; par 26-38 78a-81a /
General Introduction, 526d-527b / Civilization City of God, BK VTII, en 6, 269b-c / Christian
and Its Discontents, 768b-c Doctrine, BK i, CH 9 62 7a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84,
4c. The states of the possible intellect: its po- A 3 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6,
tentiality, habits, and actuality ANS 447c-449a; Q 89, A i, RLP 3 473b-475a;
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vii, CH 3 [247b i- Q 117, A i, ANS 595d-597c
a
248*9] 330b-d / Soul, BK n, CH i [4i2 6-i2] 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333d-335a
8 a a
642a; [4i2 22-28] 642b; CH 5 [4i7 2i-4i8 6] esp 334c-d
b B
647d-648d; BK in, CH 4 [429 5~43o 2] 661d- 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, lb-c
662b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 5c-d; 6d; VIH, 13c-d /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, Discourse, PARF iv, 53 b; PART v, 54c / Medi-
A ANS 108d-109c; Q 34, A i, REP 2 185b-
i, tations, ii-iii 77d-89a csp in, 83b; vi, 96d-
187b; Q 79, A 4, REP 2 417a-418c; AA 6-7 419b- 97a / Objections and Replies, 120c-d; 140c;
421c; A 10, ANS 423d-424d; A 12, ANS 425c- 215b-c; 224b,d
426b; Q 84, A 7, REP i 449b-450b; Q 86, A 2, 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PROP 23, SCHOL
ANS and REP 2 462a-463a; Q 87, AA 1-3 465a- 458c-d
468a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90d-91b; BK i
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 31, SCHOL 95b,d-121a,c esp CH i, SECT i 95b,d*96a,
366d-367a SECT 15 98d-99a, SECT 23 101b-102a, CH in,
4</(3) to 5a CHAPTER 58: MIND 191
n
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, en 5 [43o 2o-25] 25] 659b
662d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [353-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 21 265b-c 521] 48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a
13 VIKGIL: Acneid, BK vi [724-751] 230b-231a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK vn, SECT 55
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 18 283 b-c
TR in, CH 25-TR iv, CH 5 154d-161b
151b-c; 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 2, 323c;
18 AUGUSTINL: City of God, BK xxn, en 30, BK xix, CH 18 523a-b / Christian Doctrine,
618a BK i, CH 9 627a; CH 12 627c-d; BK in, CH 28
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77, 668a
A 8 406b-407a; Q 89 473a-480c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv A ANS and REP 2 lOOd-lOld; A 3 102d-103c;
i,
[i-io8j 91b-92c csp [79-84] 92b Q 84, A 8 450b-451b; Q 85, A i, REP i 451c-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PROP 21 458a; PROP 453c; A 6 458d-459c; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-
23 458b-d; PROP 40 462c-d 478b; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 233d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 192d-193c 53, A i, ANS 19d 21a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xin [88-
4/. Supernatural states of the human intellect: 142] 126b-d
the state of innocence; beatitude; the 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 57d-58a; 58d-60a
human intellect of Christ 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 14c-15a; 271a-276a csp
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:17-20; 3:4-7,22 / 273b-274a; 287b-292d; 497c-d; SOOb-d; 517d-
Exodus, 33:11-23 / Ezefyel, i; 10 (D) Eze> 518b
chiel, i; 10 26 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT v,
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:8 /John, 14:19-21 sc n [106-114] 136a
/ / Corinthians, 13:12 / // Corinthians, 12:1-4 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On
/IJohn,y.2 Animal Generation, 333 b-c
18 AUGUSTINE :
Confessions, BK ix, par 25 68c / 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; lla-
of God, BK x, CH 2 299d-300a; CH 28
City 15a passim; 27a-c; 38d-39a; 51c-d; 60a 61c
316b-d; BK xxii, CH 29 614b-616d esp 61b-c; 90b-d / Novum Organum, BK i
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 107a-136a,c passim, esp-APH 38-68 109c-116a
192 THE GREAT IDEAS
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9 .-9-18-- (D)
(5. The weakness and limits of the human mind.
OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 9:9-19 / Ecclesiasticus,
5a. The fallibility of the human mind: the
causes of error.)
1:1-3; 18:4-7; 24:27-29 (D) OT, Ecclesiasti-
cus, 1:1-2; 18:4-6; 24:37-39
31 DESCARTES: Rules, H, 3a; vnr, 13a-b; xn, NEW TESTAMENT: Mar\, 13:31-37 / John, 1:18
22c-23b / Meditations, i-n 75a-81d csp n, / Acts, 1:6-7 / Romans, 11:33-34 / f Corin-
80a, 80d-81a; in, 83a; iv 89a 93a; vi, lOOa- thians, 2:16 / / Timothy, 6:14-16 / James,
103d / Objections and Replies, 141a; 142c; 4:13-15
215b 216c; 229d-230d 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-95] 2a ' D
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 17, SCHOL 5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [1419-1421] 155c
381 b-d; PROP 24-31 383c-385c; PROP 40, 5 EURIPIDES: Helen [1137-1150] 309a
SCHOL 2-pROP 41 388a-c; PROP 44, COROL i, 7 PLATO: Parmenides, 489d-491a
SCHOL 389c-390a; PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-39Ia; 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH 4
[196*5-7] 272c;
PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d b
[i96 5-7] 273a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VHI [179-197] b R
[982 28-983 n] 501a-b; BK n, CH i [993*30-
b
236a-b n] 511b,d; BK XH, CH 7 [io72b i3~29] 602d-
33 PASCAL: Penstes, 82-^8 186b-189b; 365-366 603a
236a; 394-395 240b / Geometrical Demonstra- 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH
b a
5
tion, 440b-441b [644 2o-645 4] 168c-d / Ethics, BK x, CH 7
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, b
[H77 29-i 178*2] 432c
SECT 3 144c-d; CH xxi, SECT 60-70 194a-197b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of
Things, BK iv [469-521]
passim; CH xxx, SECT 2 238b-c; CH xxxm 50b-51a
248b-251d csp SECT 18 251a-c; BK in, CH ix, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i la-b; BK
SECT 21 290c-291a; CH x, SECT 16 295d; CH vi, par 6-8 36c-37c / City of God, BK vm,
xi, SECT 4 300c; BK iv, CH xvn, SECT 9-13 CH 6, 269b-c; BK x, CH 31 319b-d; BK xn,
377d-378c; CH xx 388d-394c CH 7 346c-d
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 19 AQUINAS: Summa
Theologica, PART i, Q i, A i
1-4 405a-d 3b-4a; Q A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 12, A 4 53b-
3,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 6, 54c; AA n-i2 59d-61c; Q 29, A i, REP i 162a-
453c; SECT v, DIV 45 469c; SECT VH, DIV 48 163b; Q 32, A i 175d-178a; Q 46 250a-255d;
470d-471c Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 79, A 4, ANS 417a-
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 194a; 234b-236b 418c; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c; AA 7-8 449b-451b;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, Id Q 85, A 8 460b-461b; Q 86 461b-464d; Q 88
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-b; 108a-d; 109b-c; 468d-473a; Q 94, AA 1-2 501d-504a; Q 117,
129c-173a esp 133c-d; 193a-b; 200c-209d; A 2, ANS and REP i 597c-598c
229b-c; 233d-234b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 68,
of Morals, 260d-261b; 283d-284d A 2 89c-90c; Q 91, A 4 210c-211c; Q
93, A 2
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER i, 29d; NUMBER 37, 216c-217b; Q 109, A i 338b-339c; Q 112, A 5
118c 359c-360c; PART H-II, Q 2, A 3 392d-393c;
43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b passim; 293d Q 8, A i 417a-d; Q 9, A i 423c-424b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 122b-125b; 241a-b;361a-b; 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VH
[61-96]
460a-469a esp 462b-464a, 468b-469a; 508a- lOb-c; PURGATORY, in [22-45] 56a-b; x [121-
520a esp 508a; 610b-625a passim, esp 618b- 129] 68c-d; PARADISE, n [46-148] 108b-109b
621a, 625a passim; iv [28-48] Ilia; xix [40-90] 135c-
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 148d-149a; 136a; xxi [82-102] 139a-b
210c-d; 337a-c; 379b-d / General Introduction, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49a; 52c; 54a-c;
453b-476a,c passim; 602b-c / War and Death, 78d-79a; PART n, 163a
760d-761a / New Introductory Lectures, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 209a-c; 212a-
819b-c 215a; 238c-239c; 267c-268a; 271b-273b; 291b-
294b; 497b-502c passim, esp 501d-502c
5b. The natural limits of the mind: the unknow- 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 273c-d / On
able; objects which.transcend its powers; Animal Generation, 389b; 492c
reason's critical determination of its own
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c;
limits or boundaries
17b-c; 41b-d; 54b-c; 96d-97b / Novum Or-
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33:12-33 / Job, 9:21; ganum, BK APH 1-2 107a-b; APH 9-10 107d;
i,
11:7-9; 26:14; 28:12-21; 36:26; 37:14-23; APH APH 37 109b-c; APH 48 HOd-
21 108b-c;
38:1-42:6 / Psalms, 139:1-6 (D) Psalms, llla; BK n, APH 15 149a
138:1-6 / Proverbs, 20:24; 25:3; 27:1 / EC- 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43c / Medita-
clesiastes,3:11; 6:11-12; 8:7,16-17; 9:11- tions,i 75a-77c
passim; in, 86d-87a; iv 89a-
12; 11:2-6 (D) Ecclesiastes, 3:11; 6:11-7:1; 93a; vi 96 b- 103d passim / Objections and Re-
8:7,16-17; 9:11-12; 11:2-6 / Isaiah, 55:8-9 plies, 112a-c; 123d-126b; 168d-169a; 215d-
(D) Isaias, 55:8-9 216c; 259a-b
5bto 6 CHAPTER 58: MIND 193
160c-d; CH xv, SECT n 165a-b; CH xxn, NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 17:1-9 / Lu%e, 2:25-
SECT 9 202c-203a; CH xxiri, SECT 12-13 207a- 35 /John, 1:1-18 / Acts, 2:1-21; g:r-3; 10:44-
208b passim; SECT 36 213c-d; BK rrr, CH m, 47/7 Corinthians, 2:6-16; 14 / // Corinthians,
SECT 2 254d-255a; CH vi, SECT 9 270d-271a; 12:1-9 / Revelation(D) Apocalypse
CH xi, SECT 23 305a-b; BK iv, CH in 313a- 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i la-b; BK
323d; CH vi, SLCT 4-16 331d-336d passim; vi, par 6-8 36c-37c; BK ix, par 23-25 68a-c;
CH x, SECT i9354a-c; CH xn, SECT 9-13 360d- BK x, par 65 87d-88a / City of God, BK x,
362d passim; CH xiv, SECT 1-2 364b-c; en CH 2-3 299d-301a; BK xi, CH 2 323a-c; BK
xvi, SECT 12 370b-371a; CH xvm, SECT 7 xix, CH 18 523a-b; BK xxn, CH 29, 614b-d /
383b Christian Doctrine, BK in, CH 37, 674c-d; BK
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTUO, SECT iv, CH 15-16 685c-686c
1-3 405a-c; SECT 81 428c-d;
SECT 101 432c-d 19 AQIJINVS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q i, A
35 HUME: Human Understanding, si-,cr i, DIV 2 1 3b-4a; Q 2, A 2, REP i lld-12c; Q 12 50b-62b;
451b c; DIV 6-10 453b-455b passim; SECT 11, Q 32, A i 175d-178a; Q 79, A 4, ANS and REP i
DIV 13-16 455d-457a; SECT iv, DIV 26 460b-c; 417a-418c; Q 84, A 5 446c 447c; Q 86, A 4, REP
DIV 29 461a-d; SECT v, DIV 36, 464d-465a; 2 463d-464d; Q 105, A 3 540c-541b
SECT vn, DIV 57, 475b-c; DIV 60 477a~c; SECT 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ
vin, DIV 62, 478c; DIV 71-72 482c-483c; DIV 68-69 87c-101c; Q 109, A i 338b-339c; PART
81 487a; SECT xi, DIV no 501a-b; SECT xn ii-n, QQ 8-9 416d-426c; Q 45 598c-603c
503c-509d passim, csp DIV 130 508c-d 21 DANrt: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, n [34-45]
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 308c-d 108a; xiv [34-66] 127b-c; xix [40-66] 135c-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason la-250a,c csp la-13d, 15c- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 209a-c; 212a-d; 238c-
16c, 19a, 20a, 25b-26b, 27b-28b, 29d-33d, 239c; 267c-268a; 292a-294b esp 294a-b
53b-54b,93c-99a, 101b-107b, 129c-130a, 133a- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17b-c;
134d, 146a-149d, 153a-c, 157d, 175b [fn i], 19b-c; 39d-40a; 41b-d; 54b-c; 55b-c; 95d-
196b-197c, 200c-209d, 215d-216c, 217d-218a, 97b
219a-227a, 229b-c, 230c-235a, 247a-b, 248d- 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 125b-
250a,c / Fund. Pnn. Metaphysic of Morals, 126a; 168d-169a
260d-261b; 281c-282d; 283d-287d / Practical 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xn [552-587)3313-
Reason, 296a-d; 307d-308b; 309b; 310d 314d; 332a
331a-332d; 335c-337c csp 33 7a c; 354d-355d 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 202 211a; 430-435 245a-251a;
/ judgement, 461 a-c; 465a-c; 497a-498b; 881 345b
547b-d; 551a-552c; 564a-c; 570b-572b; 574b- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 190d-191a
577a; 579a; 581a-b; 584c-d; 599d-600d; 603a- 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 394a-b; 395a-b
604b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 50b-c; BK v,
44 BoswhLL:/o^/wo>2, 126b; 129a 196a-198b; BK xi, 525c-d
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-376] lla-b; [558- 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i,
565] 15b; [602-655] 16b-17b; [1064-1067] 26b; 13c-d; BK vn, 189a-191a,c csp 191a,c
[1765-1784] 42 b; [1810-1815] 43a;
PART n
278a-b 6. The reflexivity of mind: the mind's knowl-
[4917-4922] 122a; [11,433-452]
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dtc{, 244b-245b; 272b- edge of itself and its acts
276b esp 276a-b; 366a-b 7 PLATO: Charmides, 8b-9d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 50b-c; BK v, 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 7
b
196a-197c; EPILOGUE n, 693d-694d [io72 i3-29] CH 9 [io74 b 35-
602d-603a;
b
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 1075*4] 605c / Soul, BK in, CH 4 [429 5-9]
120d-121c 661 d; [429 b 25~43oa9] 662 b-c; CH 6 [43ob 2i-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 223b-224a; 262a-269a; 26] 663b / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2
388a; 400a-b; 822b [452^3-28] 694d-695a
a b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 383 b-c / 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK ix, CH 9 [ii7o 28- i]
Unconscious, 430b-c 424a
194 THE GREAT IDEAS 7 to 7b
of itself and its acts.) 567b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 646b-
12EpicTETus: Discourses, BK i, CH i, 105a-b; 647c / Ego and Id, 697b-702c esp 697b-698d,
CH 17 122d-124a; CH 20, 126c-d 700a-701d / War and Death, 760a-b / Civiliza-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK xi, SECT i 302a-b tion and Its Discontents, 769a-770c / New
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR ix, CH 3, 137c-d Introductory Lectures, 834d-838c esp 83 6 b 837 d
/ Fifth Ennead, TR HI, CH 1-6 215d-219b
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 26 336d-
la. The nature of self-consciousness
337b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, Meditations, n, 77d-79a
\ 2, REP 1-3 76d-77d; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 28, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, en
A 4, REP 2 160c-161d; Q 56, A i, ANS 292a-d; xxvn, SECT 9-26 222a-227d passim; BK iv,
Q 85, A 2, ANS and REP i 453d-455b; Q 86, A CH ix, SECT 2-3 349a-c
1, REP 3 461c-462a; Q 87 464d-468d; Q 88, A 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 121a-123b / Practical
2, REP 3 471c-472c; Q 89, A 2, ANS 475a-d; Reason, 292d [fn i]
PART i-ii, Q 17, A 6 690 b-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART H, par 137-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvm 140, 48a-50a / Philosophy of History, INTRO,
[49-60] 80b-c 160c-161a; 165a b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a / 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 297 a- c
Meditations, n 77d-81d esp 77d-79a; vi, 96d- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 688a-
97a / Objections and Replies, 162b; 207b; 209d- 689b
210b; 276b-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 147a-149a; 188a-197a esp
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 21, SCHOL 383a; 191a-197a; 204b-259b esp 205a-206a, 213a-
PROP 23 383 b-c; PROP 27-29 384b-385a 240a; 471b-472b; 685a-686a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 767d-
93a 95d; BK n, CH i, SECT 1-8 121a-123a; 768d
SECT 10 123 b-d; SECT 24 127b-c; CH vi 131b-c;
CH ix, SECT 1-2 138b-c; CH xi, SECT 14, lb. The degrees or states of consciousness:
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK HI, 147c-148c; 266b; ACT iv, sc iv [1-20] 272b-c; sc vi [8o~
BK xr, 481a-482b; 524c-527a; BK xm, 583d; 294] 274b-276c; sc vn [14-82] 276d-277c /
BK xiv, 601c-602d Macbeth, ACT v, sc 1 306b-307a; sc HI [37-46]
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xx, 308a
337a-346a 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i, 75d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 98a-103b; 107a-114b esp 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 44, SCHOL
108b-109b; 130a-139a esp 130a-132a, 137a- 437d-438a
139a; 154a-b; 261a-262a; 643 b [fn i]; 836a- 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dicl(, 148b-150a; 306a-307a
850a passim, esp 839b-840b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 513d-515a;
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 137a-176d 524c-527a
passim, esp 149c-153c, 157a-164d, 169b-174d; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 241b-258b; 818b 819a
229d-230a; 234b-235c; 314c-320c esp 315b, 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86a-d; 90a b / Interpretation
319c-320b; 332a-340a esp 336d-340a; 352d- of Dreams, 174d-176d; 364c-d / War and
357c esp 353d-354a, 357a; 358d-359d; 366d- Death, 760b / New Introductory Uctures,
370a esp 367c-d; 373a-377b / Narcissism, 830d831a
408d-409a / General Introduction, 477d-483d
8a. The distinction between sanity and mad-
esp 478b-d; 485a-486a; 518c-519c esp 519b;
ness: the criterion of lucidity or insight
535a-c; 537a-539b esp 538d-539a; 617b-c /
Ego and Id, 703b / New Introductory Lectures, 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 96b 98a
811d-812c 10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159a-b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 10,
7c. The conscious, pre- conscious, and uncon- A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c
scious activities of mind 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 67b; 67d; 68b-c;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 8b-9a; 74b-78b; 107a- 69a
114b; 295b 298a; 774a; 849a-b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 166a-167a; 235b-c
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 26 SHAKESPEARE: Midsummer-Night's Dream,
Analysis, 5b-c / Hysteria, HOb-c / Interpreta- ACT v, sc i [1-27] 370d-371a
tion of Dreams, 348a-c; 352d-353b; 367b-d; 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [171-221]
369a-370d; 377c-385c passim, esp 382a-383c, 42b-d; ACT HI, sc iv [137-144] 56a; ACT iv,
384a-385c / Repression, 422a-42Sb / Uncon- sc v [1-75] 59c-60b; [154-200] 61b d / King
scious, 430d-443d esp 433b-c, 436b-437c, Lear, ACT iv, sc vn [14-82] 276d-277c
438b-439b / General Introduction, 452a-c; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi,
453b-476a,c passim, esp 455b, 473b-475a; SECT 13 146b-c; CH xxxm, SECT 3-4 248c-d
484a 491b esp 485a-486a, 489d; 499b-504d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV n,
esp 502d-504d; 512b-c; 531d-532c; 537a-539b 455bc
esp 537b-c, 538d-539b; 558d-568a esp 558d- 43 MILL: Liberty, 299d-300b [fn i]
561b, 566a-567d; 586b-d / Ego and Id, 697d- 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13c-14a; Hid; 354c-355a
701d; 703a-c / New Introductory Lectures, 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^ esp 122b-123b, 135a-
835a-839b esp 835c-836d 138a
51 TOLSTOY:War and Peace, BK xi, 525c
8. The pathology of mind: the loss or abeyance 52 DOSTOEVSKI '.Brothers Karamazov, BKxi,337a-
of reason 348d passim; BK xii, 356d 359c; 364d 365d
5 AESCHYLUS: Choephoroe [1021-1064] 80a-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 137a; 241b-244a esp 244a;
5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [282-345] 749a-750b esp 750b; 799a-806b esp 799a-
145d-146b 800a, 806a-b
5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes 340a-352a,c esp [847- 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86c / Interpretation of
1297] 347b-351a / Heracles Mad [815-1145] Dreams, 364c-d / Narcissism, 399b-d / Un-
371d-374d / Orestes [1-423] 394a-398b conscious, 433 b-c; 440a-442b / New Introduc-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 5 399a-d passim tory Lectures, 812a-b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vn [323-405] 245a-247b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 8^. The causes of mental pathology: organic
A ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- and functional factors
7,
591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 24, 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 86b; BK vi,
A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP i 199c-d; 201b-c
742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d; Q 48, AA 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d
b
3-4 824c~826a,c 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [o, 34-io*io] 15a
b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 74, / Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 i3-248*6] 330c-d
A 5, REP i 131d-132b / Soul, BK in, CH 3 [429*4-8] 661 b / Dreams,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy ', HELL, xxx [1-33] CH 2 [46o*32-b i6] 704b-c
44c-d 9 ARISTOTLE : Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 7
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT sc v 59c-62a; b
iv, [653 i-7] 178d-179a
ACT v, sc ii [236-255] 70b-c / King Lear, ACT 10 HIPPOCRATES Sacred Disease 154a-160d esp
:
Introductory Lectures, 81 2a; 866c-867a; 872b-d 314d esp 310d-311d; 319c-321b; 329a 337a,c
e.sp 329a-330c; 343a-d / Intro. Metaphysic of
8c. The abnormality peculiar to mind: sys- Morals, 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / Judgement,
tematic delusion 461a-475d esp 463a-467a, 474b-475d; 523d-
29 CERVANTES Don Quixote esp PART i, la-3b,
: 524a; 596c-598b; 599d-607c
50b 52d, PART n, 205a-209d 43 MILL: Representative Government, 346c-347a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, UK n, CH xi, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6a-7a;
SECT 13 146b-c ADDITIONS, i 115a-d; 4 116a-d / Philosophy of
44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 13c-14a History, PART iv, 360d-361a; 362d
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 232b-236a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1224-1237] 30b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 391d-394d; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 15a-b; 47b-c;
BK xi, 510b-d; 515a-517a; 525c BK ix, 361d-365c
52 DOSFOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 655a-661a passim, esp
337a-346a passim 656b; 729a-730a; 86 5 b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 242a-244b; 527b-528b
9b. The relation of reason to will, desire, and
[fn 3]; 818b-819a
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86a-d; 102a-106c / Nar- emotion
cissism, 408a-d / General Introduction, 547b- 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [658-660]
550c; 620c-622a csp 620c-d / Civilization and 120c
Its Discontents, 774c-d 5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus [373-430] 228b-d
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120a-c; 128a-129d / Phaedo,
9. Mind in the moral and political order
224a-226c; 230d-234c / Gorgias, 275b-280d /
Republic, BK iv, 346a-355a; BK ix, 425c-427b
9. The distinction between the speculative
/ Timaetts, 466a-467b
and practical intellect or reason: the 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK v, CH i [129*10-16]
spheres of knowledge, belief, and action 179a / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 5 573a-c; CH 7
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK n, CH i [993b 2o- [1049*5-12] 574c-d / Soul, BK i, CH 3 [407*34-
b
23] 512a / Soul, BK i, CH 3 [407*22-30] 636d- 4] 637a; BK in, CH 10 665d-666d
63 7a; BK in, CH 7 663c-664b; CH 9 [432*26- 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 236b-
CH b
433*6] 665c 237b / Ethics, BK i, 13 [no2 i3~i 103*10]
9* to 9c CHAPTER 58: MIND 197
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART I-H, Q 50, 801a / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-839b
A 5, ANS and RLP 3 lOb-d; Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; esp 838a-c; 843d-846a esp 845b
A 5, REP i 33c-34b; Q 60, A i, ANS 49d-50c;
9c. Reason as regulating human conduct: rea-
Q 72, A 2, REP 1,4 112b-113a; Q 74, AA 5-10
son as the principle of virtue or duty
131d-137c; Q 77, AA 1-3 14Sa-148b; Q 90, A i,
ANS and REP i 205b-206b; PART H-II, Q 45, 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 59c 64a / Phaedrus, 120b-c;
A 2, ANS 599d-600c; PART in, Q 18, A 2 811d- 128a-129c esp 129b-c / Republic, BK iv, 346a-
812b 355a / Laws, BK i, 643c-d; 650b; BK m, 669b-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxxi [46-57] 670c; BK iv, 681b-682c; BK xn, 792c-d
46c; PURGATORY, xvi ii [19-75] 80a-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 5 [4iob io-i6] 640c
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BKIV, STANZA 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [io97 b 23-
8299a 1098^8] 343a-c; CH 13 [i 102^1 3-11 03*1 o]
23 HOBBL.S: Leviathan, PART i, 64a-c; PART ii, 348a-d; BK n, CH 6 [1106*14-1107*9] 351c-
141a-b; CONCLUSION, 279a-c 352c esp [no6b 35-i 107*3] 352c; BK in, CH
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 184b-d; 200d-205b; 12 [ni9a35-b i9] 366a,c; BK vi, CH 2 387d-
232b-238d passim; 273d-276a; 432a-d; 486b- 388b; CH 5 389a-c; BK ix, CH 4 [1166*10-28]
b a
495a 419b-c; CH 8 422b-d; BK x,
[n68 28-n69 i2]
26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT i, so CH 7 [1177*11-18] 431d;[ii77b 26-ii78 a8] 432c;
ii
[13-20] 408b-c CH 8 [1178*16-24] 432d-433a / Politics,
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, BK vn, CH 13 [i332*39-b io] 537a-b; CH 14
b
sc ii [51-68] 114a-b; [163-182] 115b-c; ACT [1333*17-29] 538a; CH 15 [i334 8-28] 539b-d
in, sc ii
[74-81] 12 la / Othello, ACT i, sc in 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 18 161a-
[322-337] 212b-c / Sonnets, CXLVII 608d 162b; BK in, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 26, 212d-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c; 213a,c; BK iv, CH 5, 228a-229a; CH 8 23 5 b-
55b-d; 66c-67b; 78a-b 237d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART in, 50b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK ii,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART ii, PROP 48, SCHOL SECT 15-17 259a-d, BK in, SECT 3 260b, SECT
391b-c; PART iv, PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; AP- 6 261a-c, SECT 8-9 261d, SECT 12 262b-c,
PENDIX, n 447b; PART v, PREF 451a-452c SECT 16 262d-263a,c, BK iv, SECT 4 264a,
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vin [521-594] SECT 12 264c, BK v, SECT 9 270b-c, SECT 26
243b245a 272c, BK vi, SECT 16 275b-d, SECT 32 277a-b,
33 PASCAL: 412-413 242a; 423 243b /
Pensees, SECT 40 277d, BK vn, SECT 14-16 280d, SECT
Geometrical Demonstration, 440b 33 282a, SECT 55 283 b-c,* BK vni, SECT 7 286a,
198 THE GREAT IDEAS 9cto9d
43 MILL: Liberty, 276b-d
(9. Mind in the moral arid political order. 9c. 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-
Reason as regulating human conduct: rea-
171c; 189a-b; PART n, 280b-281b; PART in,
son as the principle of virtue or duty.)
312d-313a; PART iv, 353c-d
SECT 39-41 288c-d, SECT 48 289c, SECT 54 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 304a-305a; 310c-
290b, BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d, BK x, SECT 8 312c esp 310d, 311d-312a; 592b-593b
297d-298a, SECT 33 300c-301a, BK xi, SECT i 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 646b-c
302a~b, BK xn, SECT 2-3 307b-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 13b-15a; 202a-b; 807a-
14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 50b-c / Solon, 808a; 816a-819a esp 817b, 819a
66b-d / Pericles, 121a-122a / Timoleon, 197c- 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 625a-d / Ego
198a / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c esp 646b- and Id, 702c-d / New Introductory Lectures,
647b / Dion, 798b-d 840a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, en 4, 512a;
en 14 520a-d 9d. Reason as the principle of free will: ra-
tionality as the source of moral and
19 AQUINAS: Siimma Theologica, PART i, Q 18,
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 21, A 2, RLP i 125c-d; political freedom
Q 95, A 2 507c-508a; Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 230d-234c / Republic, BK iv,
3-4 517d 519a; PART i-n, Q 24, A i 727b-d; 347d-348d; BK ix, 425c-427b / Theaetctus,
Q 45, A 4, ANS 812b-813a 528c-531a / Laws, BK ix, 754a-b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 56, 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 1-2 355b,d-
A 3, ANS 31a 32b; A 4 32b 33c; Q 63, A i 358a; BK vi, CH 2 387d-388b
63a-64a; Q 74, AA 5-10 131d-137c; Q 90, A i, 12 KPICTETUS: Discourses, BK 11,en 2 140c-141c;
REP 3 205b-206b; PART in, Q 5, A 4 739a- BK in, CH 5 180d-181d; BK iv, en i 213a-
740b; Q 15, A 4 790d-791c; A 6, REP 2 792c- 223d
793c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK 11, SECT 2 257a;
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY 53a~105d SECT 5-10 257b-258a; SECT 16-17 259a-d; BK
esp xv [4o]-xvin [75] 75d-80c vi, SECT 32 277a-b; SECT 40-46 277d-278d;
22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a / BK vn, SECT 68-69 284c-d; BK XH, SECT 2
Parson's Tale, par 12, 503b 307b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 91b-92d 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR i, en 10 82b /
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 21d-22a; 117d-118c; Sixth Ennead, TR vni, CH 2-3 343c-344b
184b-d; 488b-489c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 59,
27 SHAKESPEARE Hamlet, ACT in, sc n [68-79]
: A 3, ANS and REP i 308b-309a; Q 83, A i 436d-
49c-d / Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, sc n [33- 438a; A 3 438d-439c; PART i-% Q 13, A 2, ANS
50] 113d-114a / Othello, ACT i, sc in [322-337] 673c-674c; A 6, ANS 676c 67?b; Q 17, A i esp
212b-c REP 2 686d-687c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 26a-27c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i-ii, Q 50,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 14-17 428a-d; A 3 8b-9a; Q 77, A 8, REP 3 151c-152a
PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; PROP 23 24 430c-d; 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [52-
PROP 26-28 431a-c; PROP 59 442b-d; PROP 61 84] 77b-d; xvin [40-75] 80b-c
443a-b; PROP 63 443d-444a; APPENDIX, iv 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT in, sc n [61-79]
447b-c; PART v, PREF 451a-452c; PROP 1-20 49c-d
452d-458a 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228c
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 146 200b; 252-253 219b- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 65-73 444b-
220a; 347 233b-234a 447a; PART v, PROP 42 463b-d
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en n-in 25d-29d 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BKIX [335-375] 254b-
passim; CH vi, SECT 57-63 36d-38c / Human 255b; BK xn [79-90] 321a / Areopagitica,
Understanding, BK 11, CH xxi, SECT 46-54 394b-395b
189d-192c; SECT 69 196d-197a 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 57-63
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 159b-160a; 165a-b; 36d-38c / Human Understanding, BK n, CH
173b xxi, SECT 7-13 180a-181b esp SECT 13 181b;
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK i, 393 b-c SECT 46-54 189d-192c; SECT 69 196d-197a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c-d; 236d-237a / 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK i, 393 b-c
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals 253a-287d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 237a-b / Fund. Prin.
esp 255a, 256d-257d, 260a-261d, 265c-266d, Metaphysic of Morals, 280b-c; 282b-285a /
269c, 272a-b, 274a-277b, 279c-d, 283d-287b Practical Reason, 291a-b; 292a-c; 296a-d;
/ Practical Reason, 297a-314d esp 307d-314d; 302a-d; 307d-311d / Pref. Metaphysical Ele-
321b-329a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of ments of Ethics, 378b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of
Ethics,373d; 378d-379a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 390b; 393a / Science of Right, 400b,d-
Morals, 386b-d; 388b-c; 390b,d-391c; 392b- 402a
393a / Judgement, 571c-572a; 586a-587a; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 4 12d-
596c-597d; 605d-606b [fn 2] 13a; par 29 19a-b; PART i, par 66 29a-c; par 71
9e to 9f CHAPTER 58: MIND 199
31b-c; PART in, par 187 65a-c; ADDITIONS, 24 609a-639a,c esp 633a-639a,c / Laws, BK v,
120d-121a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 690a-c / Seventh Utter, 808c-809a
158c-d; 160c-162a; 168b-d; 170c-171c; PART 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 1-2 499a-
b
in, 311b-d; PART iv, 316d-317a; 350b-c; SOlc; BK xii, en 7 [io72 i4-29] 602d-603a
353c-d; 359b; 360c-361a; 364d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 5 [io95 b i6-i8]
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 688a- 340d; CH 7 [io97 b 23-io98 a i8] 343a-c; CH 8
690a [1098^-1 099*6] 344a-c; BK vi, CH 12 [1144*
53 JAMES: Psychology, 706b i-6] 393c; BK x, CH 7-8 431d-434a / Politics,
b
BK vn, CH 3 [i325 i4~32] 529d-530a; CH 14
9e. Reason as formative of human society: the a
[i333 i7-29] 538a
authority of government and law 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61]
7 PLATO: Republic 295a-441a,c csp BK iv, 350b- 15a-d; BK in [1-93] 30a-31b; [307-322] 34a-b;
354b / Laws 640a-799a,c esp BK i, 650a-b, [1053-1075] 43c-d; BK v [1-54] 61a-d; [1113-
BK in, 669b-670c, BK iv, 681b-682c, BK ix, 1135] 75c-d; BK vi [1-42] 80a-d
754a-b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, en 2, 106d; BK
436a; PROP 40 43 7a; PROP 7$ 446c-447a; 150c-151a; Q 88, A i, ANS 469a-471c; PART MI,
APPFNDIX, xrr-xvi 448b 449c g i, A i, REP 3 609b-610b; g 3, AA 3-8 624b-
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH n 25d-28c 629c; Q 21, A 2, REP 2 718a-d
passim, csp SECT 6, 26b, SLCT 9-10 27a-b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PARTI-II, Q 66,
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld~2a; A 5, REP 1-2 79b-80c
2d;3c 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [285-308] 164a-b
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK i, 393b-c; 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 231d-238a; 395d
BK n, 400a-c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Pericles, ACT in, sc n [26-42]
42 KANT: Intro. Metaph\sic of Morals, 389a-b / 434d435a
of Right, 397a 399a; 416b 417a
Science 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 18a-b;
43 FtuLRALisr: NUMBER 49, 161a 27b-d; 69d-76a passim, esp 70b-d, 71b-c,
43 MILL: Representative Government, 327b,d- 72b-c, 73d-74a
332d passim / Utilitarianism, 469c-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules, i, Id / Discourse, PART i,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PRF.P, 6a-7a; 41d-42a; PART in, 49d-50b
PART in, par 187 65a-c; par 212 70d-71a; 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 26-28 431a-c;
par 258, 81c-82d [fn i]; par 272 89d-90c; APPENDIX, iv 447b-c; ix 448a; xxxn 450c-d;
ADDITIONS, 47 124a-b; 157 142b-c; 164 144c- PART v, PROP 24-40 458d-462d
145a; 184 149a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 346-348 233b-234a
170c-178a; PART in, 311b-d; PART iv, 316d- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 5
142b-c; 164, 144c-d / Philosophy of History, 20 AOUINAS: Summa Thcologica, I'ART i-n, Q 51,
INTRO, 170c 176b; PART i, 230a A I, RtP 2 12b-13c| I'ART III, Q 6, A 2, ANS
741c-742a
lOg. The divine intellect: its relation to the 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, P/VRATJISE, xv [37-84]
divine being and the divine will
128d-129b; xxxin {82-145] 157a-d
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xii, en 7 [io72 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 122a b;
14-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 605a d 228a-c
h
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 8 [ii78 8-23] 31 SPINOXA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 17, SCHOL
433b-c 362c-363c; PROP 32-33 367a-369a; PART n f
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Matters relevant to the conception of reason or intellect as a faculty distinct from sense and
imagination and also from will, see BEING 8a-8b; IDEA 2b; KNOWLEDGE 6c(3); MAN la,
4b~4c; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 5b, 6b-6c;SENSE la-id; SOUL 2c(2)-2c(3); WILL i,
5a(i); and for the further distinction of the various intellectual powers and acts, see
EXPERIENCE 2b; IDEA ib, 2g; JUDGMENT i; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(i); SENSE 53;
UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2b, 4c~4d.
Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as a thinking substance, see BEING
7^4); FORM 2d; IDEA 2b; MAN 33(1); SOUL ic.
Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as a finite mode of an attribute of
God, see BEING 70(4); IDEA ic; MAN 33; NATURE ib.
Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as soul or spirit performing all
psychological functions, see IDEA ic, 2c-2f; MAN 33; ONE AND MANY 43; SENSE id, 53.
Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as a triad of cognitive faculties, see
IDEA id, 2b; 1-4, 8d; KNOWLEDGE 6b(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2);
JUDGMENT
ONE AND MANY 4b; PRINCIPLE 2b(3); SENSE 30(5); SOUL id; WILL 53(4); and for the
consideration of its transcendental or a priori forms and cstegories, see EXPERIENCE 2c-2d;
QUALITY i; QUANTITY i; RELATION 4c; SENSE ic; SPACE 43; TIME 6c.
202 THE GREAT IDEAS
For: Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as self-consciousness, see HISTORY
43(3); IDEA if; SOUL id.
mind as consciousness or as a psychic structure in-
Matters relevant to the conception of the
cluding conscious and unconscious processes, see DESIRE 23, 5a~5c; EXPERIENCE i, 2a;
MAN 4; ONE AND MANY 43; SOUL 20; WILL 30.
The general problem of the relation of body and mind, or matter and spirit, see ELEMENT 56 ;
MAN 33-33(2), 3c; MATTER 4c~4d; SOUL 3C~3d; 3nd for the condition of the human mind
when the soul is separated from the body, see SOUL 4d.
The distinction between real and intentional existence, or being in nature and being in
mind, see BEING 7d, yd (2); FORM 23; IDEA 6a-6b; KNOWLEDGE i; and for the difference
between change in matter and change in mind, see CHANGE 6d.
Other comparisons of human and animal mentality, see ANIMAL ic, ic(2) EVOLUTION 7^3) ; ;
LANGUAGE i; MAN m-ic; SENSE 2c; and for the relation of reason and instinct, see
HABIT 3c.
The mind's knowledge of itself in relation to the nature and method of psychology, see
IDEA 2d; KNOWLEDGE 53(6); MAN 23-2^4); SOUL 53-5^
Other discussions of the weakness and limits of the human mind, see KNOWLEDGE 53-56;
TRUTH 3d~3d(i), 73; snd for the consideration of the training of mind, habits of mind,
intellectusl virtues, and supernatural gifts, see EDUCATION 53-5^ GOD 60(2); HABIT 5c-
5d; KNOWLEDGE 6c(5) PRUDENCE i RELIGION 13; SCIENCE ia(i) VIRTUE AND VICE 23(2),
; ; ;
3d; GOD 5f; IDEA ic; NATURE 33; SOUL la; WILL 43; WORLD 6c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under- JUNG. Two Essays on Analytical Psychology
standing . Instinctand the Unconscious
Monadology
. Mind and the Earth
.
INTRODUCTION
the traditionally recognized forms of
all solute and limited government in the various
OF government, monarchy is the easiest to terms in which that opposition is
traditionally
As the word indicates, it
define and to identify. expressed: royal as opposed to political, des-
is
government by one man. It is indifferent potic as opposed to constitutional government;
whether that man is called king or prince, or government by men as opposed to govern-
Caesar or Czar. Of all such titles, "king" is the ment by That opposition seems to be rele-
law.
most frequent; and in consequence monarchy vant to the theory of monarchy, certainly to
is often called kingship or referred to as the any conception of monarchy which tends to
royal form of government. identify it with absolute rule, or which sees
When monarchy is thus defined in terms of some affinity between royal and despotic gov-
the principle of unity, other forms of govern- ernment.
ment, such as aristocracy or oligarchy and de- The word "despotic" is, of course, some-
mocracy, tend to be characterized as govern- times used in a purely descriptive rather than
ment by the few or the many. But the numeri- a disparaging sense. Used descriptively, it desig-
cal criterion by itself is obviously inadequate. nates the absolute rule exercised by the head of
To those who
distinguish between aristocracy a household over children and slaves, neither of
and oligarchy, it makes a difference whether the whom have any voice in their own government.
few who rule are selected] for their pre-emi- Aristotle sometimes characterizes the royal
nence in virtue or in wealth. A tyranny, like a government of a political community as des-
monarchy, may be government by one man. potic to signify its resemblance to the abso-
Hence those who wish to use the word "mon- lute rule of the father or master. lie expresses
arch" or "king" eulogisticaily cannot be satis- the same comparison in reverse when he says
fied with a definition that fails to distinguish that "the rule of a father over his children is
between king and tyrant. royal."
It has been said by Aristotle, for example The derogatory sense of "despotic" would
that the perversion of, or "deviation from, seem to apply to those cases in which grown
monarchy is tyranny; for both are forms of one- men are ruled as if they were children, or free
man But," he adds, "there is the greatest
rule. men as if they were slaves. The great issue con-
difference between them; the tyrant looks to cerning monarchy, therefore, is whether royal
his ownadvantage, the king to that of his sub- government is despotic in this sense. Always, or
jects." Both Aristotle and Plato also say that only under certain conditions? And if despotic,
as tyranny is the worst form of government, so is italso tyrannical? Is monarchy in principle
monarchy at the opposite extreme is the best. the foe of human liberties ? To all these ques-
But though in their opinion tyranny is always tions there are opposite answers in the great
the worst form of government, Aristotle at books of political theory. Where Hegel says
least does not seem to think that monarchy is that "public freedom in general and an heredi-
always under all conditions best. tary monarchy guarantee each other," others,
Further complications appear when other likeRousseau and Mill, identify the freedom of
views are taken into consideration. The chap- citizenship with republican or representative
ters on CITIZEN, CONSTITUTION, and GOVERN- government.
MENT discuss the basic opposition between ab- This central issue is complicated not only by
204
CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 205
the various meanings of "despotism" (discussed the monarchical principle is present in the sense
in the chapter on TYRANNY), but also by varia- that one man may hold the office of chief execu-
tions in the meaning of the word "monarchy" tive. On the issue of a single as opposed to a
as it is used by different writers. The word is plural executive, Hamilton and Madison and
even used by the same writer in a number of with them Jefferson emphatically favor the
senses. Rousseau, for example, says in one place principle of unity in the executive branch of
that "every legitimate government is repub- the government. "Energy in government," ac-
lican," and in another that "monarchical always cording to The Federalist, "requires not only a
ranks below republican government." But he certain duration of power, but the execution of
also treatsmonarchy or royal rule as one form it by a
single hand." The qualities essential to a
of legitimate government. He describes the good executive, such as "decision, activity, se-
king, in whose hands all political power is con- crecy, and dispatch," Hamilton says, "will gen-
centrated, as only having "the right to dispose erally characterize the proceedings of one man
of it in accordance with the laws." He distin- in a much more eminent degree than the pro-
guishes not only between king and tyrant, but ceedings of any greater number; and in pro-
alsobetween king and despot. portion as the number is increased, these quali-
To avoid what may be only verbal difficulties ties will be diminished."
here, suggests the use of the word "auto-
Kant Yet the authors of The Federalist, and JerTcr-
crat" to signify "one who has all power" and son too, are equally emphatic in insisting upon
who in his own person "is the Sovereign." In the difference in kind, not degree, between the
contra-distinction "monarch" should signify power granted the President of the United States
the king or chief magistrate (sometimes called and that enjoyed by the King of Great Britain.
"president") who "merely represents the sov-
For them, monarchies and republics are funda-
ereignty" or the people who "are themselves mentally opposed in the spirit of their institu-
tions. Despotism is inherent in the nature of
sovereign."
monarchy not only absolute, but even limited
SOME POLITICAL theorists distinguish between monarchy.
absolute and limited (or constitutional) monar- If the Constitution of the United States does
chy. This in turn raises new problems of defini- not set up a constitutional monarchy, even
tion and evaluation. though it provides for one man as chief execu-
Is absolute government always monarchical tive, then a constitutional monarchy must have
in form, so that absolute government and abso- some other principle in it which distinguishes it
lute monarchy can be treated as identical? from a republic. That may be hereditary suc-
by itsvery nature must be absolute, neverthe- symbolic identification of the king with the
less treats aristocracy and democracy along with state. But in a monarchy, no matter how at-
that two or more Caesars often held power at Aristotle takes a similar view. Enumerating
the same time. The triumvirates were also ab- five types of kingly rule, he sets one form apart
solute dictatorships. from all the rest the form in which one man
It would seem, therefore, that the principle "has the disposal of everything. This form . . .
of absolute government can be separated from corresponds to the control of a household. For
the principle of monarchy. But can monarchy as household management is the kingly rule of
as a form of government be separated from a family, so kingly rule is the household manage-
absolute rule? ment of a city or of a nation." The other forms
The question is not whether, in a republic, are all, in one way or another, kingships accord-
206 THE GREAT IDEAS
ing to law. Of these, most clearly exemplified multitude, which is "unable to do either any
in the Spartan constitution, Aristotle says that great good or any great evil."
"the so-called limited monarchy, or kingship But all these forms of government, good and
according to law ... is not a distinct form of bad, better and worse, are compared by Plato
government, for under all governments, as for with a form of government which he says "ex-
cels them all, and is among States what God is
example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there
may be a general holding office for life, and one among men." It seems to be monarchical in
person is often made supreme over the admin- type, but, though not lawless like tyranny, it is
istration of a state." entirely above the need of written or customary
Whether or not there is a supreme command- rules of law. "The best thing of all," Plato
er or a chief magistrate, elected or hereditary, writes, "is not that the law should rule, but
the government is not distinctively royal if the that a man should rule, supposing him to have
man called
"king" subject to the laws and if
is wisdom and royal power." Whether such gov-
the other men in the state are not his subjects ernment can ever exist apart from divine rule,
but his fellow citizens. For somewhat different or perhaps the advent of the "philosopher king,"
reasons, Hobbes
agrees with the view that only the point remains that Plato seems to conceive
absolute monarchy is monarchy. When the king monarchy in two quite distinct ways both as
islimited in power, he says, the sovereignty is an absolute rule and also as one of the legally
always "in that assembly which had the right limited forms of government.
to limit him; and by consequence the govern- Montesquieu separates monarchy from abso-
ment not monarchy, but either democracy or
is lute government entirely. At the same time, he
aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta, where the distinguishes it from republics, whether aristoc-
kings had a privilege to lead their armies, but racies or democracies. According to him, mon-
the sovereignty was in the Ephori" Hobbes archy is as much a government by law, as much
government of one people over another
uses the opposed to despotism or absolute government,
people the mother country over colonies, or as are republics. Monarchies and republics are
the conqueror over a subjugated nation to the two main kinds of constitutional govern-
what he means by absolute monarchy.
illustrate ment, and democracies arc
just as aristocracies
This suggests a significant parallelism between the two main kinds of republic.
the problems of monarchy and the problems of Where Aristotle holds that constitutional
point that only absolute monarchy is truly should be called "despotism" instead. He criti-
monarchy, the issue concerning monarchy could cizes Aristotle's fivefold classification of king-
be readily translated into the basic opposition ships, saying that "among the number of mon-
between rule by men and rule by law. But such he [Aristotle] ranks the Persian empire
archies,
agreement seems to be wanting, and the prob- and the kingdom of Sparta. But is it not evi-
lems of monarchy are, in consequence, further dent," he asks, "that the one was a despotic
complicated. stateand the other a republic?" Since Montes-
Plato, for example, distinguishes in the States- quieu's own view of monarchy involves, in
man between three forms of government ac- addition to a king, a body of nobles in whom
cording to established laws, of which one is mon- intermediate and subordinate powers are vested,
archy. Monarchy is better than aristocracy and he thinks no true notion of monarchy can be
democracy, obviously not with respect to the found in the ancient world.
principle of the supremacy of law, but simply Hegel agrees with Montesquieu that con-
because government by one seems to be more monarchy is the very opposite of
stitutional
efficient than government by a few or many; despotism, but he goes much further than Mon-
is the worst form of mon-
just as tyranny government tesquieu in the direction of identifying
because, in violating or overthrowing the laws, archy with constitutional government. For him
one man can succeed in going further than a constitutional monarchy is the ultimately true
CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 207
ment of the modern world." He thinks Mon- republic still seems to represent the principle of
tesquieu was right in recognizing that the an- absolutism in government.
cient world knew only the patriarchal type of
Hegel, Montesquieu himself, in stressing the writers call a "mixed regime" is not a constitu-
role of the nobility, shows that he understands, tionalmonarchy in the Hegelian sense, nor is it
not the type of monarchy which is "organized what means when he uses that term.
Aristotle
into an objective constitution" and in which The mediaeval mixed regime is a combination
"the monarch is the absolute
apex of an organ- of two distinct principles of government the
ically developed state," but only "feudal mon- royal principle^ according to which absolute pow-
archy, the type in which the relationships re- er is vested in the sovereign personality of an
cognized in its constitutional law are crystal- individual man; and the political principle, ac-
lized into the rights of private property and the cording to which the supremacy of law reflects
privileges of individuals and corporations." the sovereignty of the people, who have the
It may be questioned, however, whether power of making laws either directly or through
Hegel's theory of constitutional monarchy their representatives.
avoids the issue raised by republicans who think This conception of a mixed regime of gov-
that monarchy is inseparable from some form of ernment which isboth royal and political ap-
government and despotism, Hegel seems to re- acy of a sovereign person, which is the essence of
gard the sovereignty of the state as absolute in royal government. The mixed regime would
relation to its own subjects at home no less also seem to be impossible in terms of Ilobbcs'
"The sovereignty of the people," writes He- fute the incompatibility of the principles which
gel, "is one of the confused notions based on the mixed regime combines? The answer may
the wild idea of the 'people.' Taken without its be that, like a mixture of oil and water, royal
monarchy and the articulation of the whole and political government can only exist as a
which is the indispensable and direct concomi- mixture in unstable equilibrium. Originating
tant of monarchy, the people is a formless mass under feudal conditions, the mixed regime tends
and no longer a state." Hegel thus dismisses the toward dissolution as these conditions disappear
notion of popular sovereignty (which to Rous- with the rise of the modern nation-state. It first
seau, Kant, and the Federalists is of the essence tends to be supplanted by a movement toward
of republican government) as inconsistent with absolute monarchy. Then, in the course of re
"the Idea of the state in its full development." action and revolution, it tends toward constitu-
A profound opposition, therefore, exists be- tional monarchies or republics through added
tween Hegel's theory of constitutional mon- limitations on the power of the throne.
archy and republican theories of constitutional These historic developments seem to indicate
government. Even though the issue cannot be that the principles of the mixed regime are ulti-
208 THE GREAT IDEAS
mately as irreconcilable in fact as they are in absolute monarchy. If, on the other hand, the
of history brought it into existence, it is unlikely is above the laws, and has certain powers not
would have conceived of a govern-
that anyone limited by law; in another way, his whole pow-
ment both royal and political. Montesquieu er is limited by the fact that he does not have
does not adopt the mediaeval description of a the power to make laws in his own right or
mixed regime, which, as stated by Aquinas, is authority. When a people are free and able to
"partly kingdom, since there is one at the head make their own laws, Aquinas writes, "the con-
of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number sent of the whole people expressed by custom
of persons are set in authority; and partly de- counts far more in favor of a particular observ-
mocracy, />., government by the people, in so ance, than does the authority of the sovereign,
far as the rulerscan be chosen by the people, who has not the power to frame laws, except as
and the people have the right to choose their representing the people." But Aquinas also
rulers." Yet Montesquieu's theory of monarchy says that the sovereign is "exempt from thelaw>
seems to be determined by characteristics as to its coercive power; since, properly speak-
peculiar to the mediaeval kingdom. ing,no man is coerced by himself, and law has
This seems to be the point of Hegel's obser- no coercive power save from the authority of
vation, already quoted, that Montesquieu's the sovereign."
theory of monarchy identifies it with the feudal The coercive power of the law belongs to the
kingdom. The point is confirmed in another sovereign as executive, not legislator. Admit-
way by the fact that Montesquieu's ideal of ting the king to a share in legislative power,
monarchy is the government of England at the Locke conceives his essential function that
end of the lyth century, which, he says, "may which belongs to him alone as executive. The
be justly called a republic, disguised under the absoluteness of this executive power Ix)cke de-
form of a monarchy." Locke's conception of the fines in terms of the royal prerogative, that
English government in his own day tends to "being nothing but a power in the hands of the
clarify this point. prince to provide for the public good in such
The form of a government, says Locke, "de- cases which, depending upon unforeseen and
pends upon the placing of the supreme power, uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable
which is the legislative." When the power of laws could not safely direct." Prerogative, he
making laws is placed in the hands of one man, then goes on to say, is the power "to act ac-
then it is a monarchy. But, according to Locke, cording to discretion for the public good with-
"the legislative and executive power are in dis- out the prescription of law, and sometimes even
tinct hands ... in all moderated monarchies against it."
and well-framed governments." Locke thus gives us a picture of the mixed
What Locke here calls a "moderated mon- regime in which the king's sovereign power is
archy" (intending to describe the government limited to the exercise of an absolute preroga-
of England), seems to be the mixed regime, the tive in performing the executive functions of
form of government which Fortescue had ear- government. In the executive sphere, the king's
lier called a "political kingdom," and Bracton power is absolute, yet his sovereignty is not ab-
a regimen regale et politicum.Tht legislative pow- solute; for in the legislative sphere, he either
er is in the hands of the people or their repre- has no voice at all where ancient customs pre-
sentatives. If it belonged exclusively to the vail, or, in the making of new laws, he can count
king as a right vested in his sovereign person, himself merely as one representative of the
and not merely as the people's representative people among others.
gerentthe government would be in form an king depends upon the extent to which mat*
CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 209
ters are explicitly regulated by law. When in ferent as the ancient and modern forms of the
the infancy of governments the laws were few democratic constitution.
in number, "the government was almost all In the ancient world, the choice between
prerogative," as Locke sees it. He thinks that purely royal and purely political government
"they have a very wrong notion of government underlies the meaning and evaluation of mon-
who say that the people have encroached upon archy. In the modern world, with its heritage
the prerogative when they have got any part of from the feudal institutions of the Middle
it to be defined by positive laws. For in so doing Ages, either the mixed regime or constitutional
they have not pulled from the prince anything monarchy is
thought to offer a third alterna-
that of right belonged to him, but only declared tive. The praise of monarchy may therefore be
that that power which they indefinitely left in the corollary of a justification of absolute gov-
his or his ancestors' hands, to be exercised for ernment or the absolute state, as with Hobbes
their good, was not a thing they intended him, and Hegel; it may be accompanied by an attack
when he used it otherwise." on absolute or despotic power, as with Locke
Here we see the seed of conflict between sov- and Montesquieu; or in defense of purely re-
ereign king and sovereign people in the com- publican principles, monarchy may be attacked,
bination of incompatible principles that con- as by Rousseau and the Federalists, without
stitute a mixed regime. As the king, jealous of differentiation between its absolute and limited
his prerogative, tries to maintain or even ex- forms.
tend his power, royal and political government This does not mean that there is no conti-
tends toward absolute monarchy. As the people, nuity between ancient and modern discussion. It
jealous of their sovereignty, try to safeguard
seems to exist with respect to both elements in
publican government through various stages of unity, Plato's argument that monarchy is the
limited or constitutional monarchy in which most of the several forms of govern-
efficient
the sovereignty of the king becomes more and ment which are otherwise equally just, seems to
more attenuated. be paralleled by modern arguments for a unified
When the king's prerogative includes the executive in the constitution of a republic. It is
also reflected in the reasoning of Montesquieu
power of calling parliament into session, noth-
ing short of revolution may resolve the issue; and Rousseau concerning the greater compe-
for, as Ix)ckc observes, "between an executive tence of monarchies to govern extensive terri-
in being, with such a prerogative, and tories. On the point of absolute power, there is
power
a legislative that depends upon his will for some continuity between ancient and modern
their convening, there can be no judge on discussions of government by men versus gov-
earth." ernment by law. But here there seems to be
greater similarity between ancient and modern
IN THE DISCUSSION of monarchy, as in the dis- arguments against giving sovereignty to an in-
cussion of democracy or other forms of govern- dividual human being than there is between
ment, the fundamental terms and issues do not the modern defense of monarchy and ancient
have the same meaning in the various epochs of speculations concerning royal government.
western thought. The
continuity of discussion Taking different shape in Hobbes and Hegel,
in the tradition of the great books must be the argument for the necessity of absolute gov-
thing made by man, but "divine and constant, justify their absolute power as a god-given right.
and exalted above the sphere of things that are Furthermore, in the political theory of Plato
made." and Aristotle, the analogy between royal rule
That kings have absolute power by divine and divine government works in the opposite
right is another
peculiarly modern argument direction. According to their view, the right to
for absolute monarchy. "Not all the water from absolute government depends upon a radical
the rough rude sea," says Shakespeare's Rich- inequality between ruler and ruled. If a god
ard II, "can wash the balm off from an anointed were to rule men on earth, as in the myth retold
king. The breath of worldly men cannot depose in Plato's Statesman, he would govern them
the deputy elected by the Lord." According to absolutely, deciding everything by his wisdom
the theory of divine right, the king is God's and without recourse to written laws or estab-
vicar, not, asAquinas thinks, the vicegerent of lished customs. If there were a god-like man, or
the people. The theory of the divine right of ifa true philosopher were to become king, he
kings does not seem to be a mediaeval doctrine. too would deserve to be an absolute monarch.
It appears later in such tracts as those by Bar- It would be unjust, says Aristotle, to treat the
clay and Filmer, which Locke undertakes to god-likeman merely as a citizen, and so to treat
answer. him as no more than "the equal of those who are
The controversy involves its adversaries in so far inferior to him in virtue and in political
dispute over the interpretation of Holy Writ. capacity." It would also seem to be unjust for a
The anointing of Christian kings is supposed to man who does not have great superiority over
draw its significance from the establishment of his fellow men to rule them like a king, instead
this practice among the ancient Hebrews. But of being merely a citizen entitled to hold public
the story of the origin of the Hebrew kingship office for a time.
they have not rejected thee, but they have re- government which is
appropriate to the village
jected me, that I should not reign over them." community rather than to the city-state. The
The Lord then describes the tribulations the kingly form of government prevails in the vil-
people will suffer at the hands of an earthly lage because it is an outgrowth of the family.
ruler with absolute power, a punishment they That is why, says Aristotle, "the Hellenic states
deserve for wanting to be ruled by a king, in- were originally governed by kings; the Hellenes
CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 211
were under royal rule before they came to- ment. "Leading-strings are only admissible," he
gether, as the barbarians still are." says, "as a means of gradually training the
In thinking that absolute or despotic govern- people to walk alone." When they have reached
ment befits the servile Asiatics, but not the free that stage of development where they are able
men of the Greek city-states, Aristotle takes a to govern themselves, the despotic ruler must
opponents of absolute monarchy do not assert the one hand, and Aristotle and Plato on the
that constitutional government is uncondition- other, onewhich goes to the very heart of the
ally better than despotism. For certain peoples, issueconcerning royal and political govern-
under certain conditions, self-government may ment. Both Aristotle and Plato seem to be say-
not be possible or advantageous. "A rude peo- ing that if the superior or god-like man existed,
ple," Mill writes, "though in some degree alive then royal government would be better than the
to the benefits of civilized society, may be un- best republic, even for the civilized Greeks. In
able to practice the forbearance which it de- calling royal rule the divine form of government,
mands: their passions may be too violent, or they imply that it is the ideal, even if it can never
their personal pride too exacting, to forego pri- be realized. This Mill most emphatically denies.
vate conflict, and leave to the laws the aveng- The notion that "if a good despot could be
ing of their real or supposed wrongs. In such a ensured, despotic monarchy would be the best
case, a civilized government, to be really ad- form of government, I look upon," he writes,
vantageous to them, will require to be in a con- "as a radical and most pernicious conception of
siderable degree despotic; to be one over which what good government is." The point at issue
is not whether the
they do not themselves exercise control, and good despot the god-like
which imposes a great amount of forcible re- ruler or philosopher king can be found. Sup-
straint upon their actions." Montesquieu seems pose him to exist. The point then to be made is
further to suppose that different races largely that the people ruled by "one man of super-
as a result of the climate in which they live human mental activity" would of necessity
are by nature inclined toward freedom or servi- have to be entirely passive. "Their passivity is
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
i. The definition of monarchy and the classification of the types of kingship
(i) The combination of monarchy with other forms of government: the mixed
regime
212 THE GREAT IDEAS
PAGE
2d. The myth of the royal personage: the attributes of royalty and the burdens of
monarchy
3.
The use and abuse of monarchical power 217
30. The good king and the benevolent despot in the service of their subjects: the
education of the prince
3^. The exploitation of absolute power for personal aggrandizement: the strategies
of princes and tyrants 218
40. The patriarchical character of kingship: absolute rule in the family or tribe,
and paternalism in the state
219
4^. The line which divides monarchy from despotism and tyranny
4?. The differences between kingdoms and republics with respect to unity, wealth,
and extent of territory
(3) The preference for the mixed regime: defense of royal prerogatives as abso-
lute in their sphere
4*.
The attack on monarchy or absolute government
(2) The justification of absolute rule or benevolent despotism for peoples in-
capable of self-government
5.
The absolute government of colonies, dependencies, or conquered peoples
50. The justification of imperial rule: the rights of the conqueror; the unifying and
civilizing achievements of empire
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) arc someiimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
The definition of monarchy and the classifi- la. The distinction between royal and political
cation of the types of kingship government
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [198-206] 12a
6H B RODOTus://s/ory. BKm,107c-108c 1^(1) Absolute or personal rule contrasted
th constitutional government or rule
7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 356a / Statesman,
598b-604b b y law
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK in, CH 7 [1279*33-34] 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound
[322-326]
476d; CH 14 483a-484a; BK iv, CH 10 [1295* 43c
b
3-18] 495a / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 [i365 38- 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [399-456] 261d-262b
1366*3] esp [1366*1-3] 608b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 107c-d; BK vn,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95, 233a-d
A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i 307d-309d 7 PLATO: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK in,
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH 1 3a-b; CH iv, 7a-b; 670c-676c; BK iv, 680d-682c; BK ix, 754a-b
CH ix 14c-16a; CH xix, 29c-d / Seventh Letter, 805d
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART n, 104d-105a; 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 6 [ii34 a3o-b 8]
106d-107c; PART in, 228b 382a-b/ Politics, BK i, CH i [1252*6-16] 445a-b;
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH x, SECT 132 CH 5 [i254 a34-b 9] 448a; CH 7 [i255 b i6-2o]
55a-b 449b; CH 12 453d-454a; BK HI, CH 15-17
58 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4a; 484b-487a; BK iv, CH 4 [1292*4-37] 491b-d;
7c-d; BK xi, 75b-76c CH 10 [1295*9-24] 495a-b; BK v, CH 10
58 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 410b; [131^37-1313*10] 515c
412c-d; BK iv, 427d 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 27d-28a / Caesar,
10 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b 591d / Cato the Younger, 638b-639a
12 KANT: Science of Right, 450a-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, la-2b; BK in, 51b-c;
16 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 273, 61c-62a
91c-d; par 281 95b-d / Philosophy of History, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81,
INTRO, 174a-d A 3, REP 2 430c-431d
214 THE GREAT IDEAS 1*(2) to \b(\)
SECT 135-139 55d-58a; CH xiv, SECT 163
(la. The distinction between royal and political 63a-b; CH xv, SECT 172-174 65b-d
government. la(l) Absolute or personal 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 3b-c;
rule contrasted with constitutional govern" BK ii, 4a; 8d-9a,c; BK in, 12a-13c; BK iv,
ment or rule by law.) 15a-c; BK v, 26c-31b; BK vi, 33d-34b; 39d-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90, 40d; BK vin, 54a-b; BK xv, 109a; BK xix,
A i, REP 3 205b-206b; Q 95, A i, REP 2 226c- 137c-d; BK xxv, 211c-d
227c; Q 96, A 5, REP 3 233d-234d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359a-c / Social Con-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 114b-115a; tract, BK i, 388b-389d
(D) I Paralipomenon, 28:1-107 II Chronicles, 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 52c; 58a b; BK iv,
a b
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 125c; 154c; 155a; 155d; [I3i4 37-i3i5 n]517b-518c
216b; 251b-d; 333b-c; 335c; 344a-b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i 253a-256d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 281- 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 32a 48d esp 47a-48c /
282 95b-96a; ADDITIONS, 173 146d Solon 64b,d~77a,c csp 68d-70d / Poplicola,
47 GOETHE: Faust, TART i [2211-2244] 52b-53b; 80d-81c / Poplicola-Solon, 86d-87a / Pencles,
PART ii [4761-4875] 118b-121a; [10,242-259] 129a-141a,c csp 129c-130a / Agesilaus, 480b,d-
249b-250a; [10,455-500] 254b-255b 481a / Alexander, 542d-544a / Phocion,
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 81a-82b; 93b-94a; 605b-d / Demetrius, 742c-743b / Dion, 782c-
107a-109b; 395a-b 788b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, ld-2b; 49b; 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xm, 125d-126a / His-
BK n, 87b-d; BK in, 135c-137c; 141b-142d; tories, BK i, 198b-c; BK n, 215c-d; BK iv,
147c-150a; 157a-161b; BK v, 230b-234a; BK 290ad
vi, 257c-259a passim; BK vin, 308d-309a; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
BK ix, 342a-346a; 348c-349c; 382a-388a,c; BK 105, A i, REP 2 307d-309d
x, 405b-406c; 444a 450a; 456a-459d; 465c- 21 I^)ANTE: Divine Comedy, PURC.ATORY, vn [61-
468a,c; BK 497c-499c; 518c-d; BK xn,
xi, 136] 63a-64a; x [70-96] 68a-b; PARADISE, xm
536a-537b; BK xm, 573b-c; 574b [88-in] 126b-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d; PART n,
3. The use and abuse of monarchical power 143d; 153a-159c; 164a,c
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
$a. The good king and the benevolent despot 26d-30c
in the service of their subjects: the edu- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essavs, 131b 132a; 314c-316a;
cation of the prince 386b-388c; 436c-439c
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 41 133,39-40 / Exodus, 26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry IV 434a 466d esp
18:21-26 / Deuteronomy, 1:13; 17:14-20 / ACT i, sc ii [218-240] 437c-d, ACT in, sc ii
Judges, 9:8-15 / / Samuel, 15:10-35 -(D) [93-161] 453d-454c / 2nd Henry IV 467a-502d
/ Kings, 15:10-35 / II Samuel, 23:3 (D) esp ACT v, sc ii [122-145]499b / Henry V,
II Kings, 23:3 / / Kings, 4:29-34; 11:26-40; ACT i, sc i 533a-d; ACT iv, sc i
[10^-321]
14:1-20 (D) /// Kings, 4:29-34; 11:26-40; 552d-554d
14:1-20 / // Chronicles, 1:7-12 (D) II Para- 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT in, sc iv [27-
lipomenon, 1:7-12 / Psalms, 2 esp 2:10-12; 72 36] 264c/ Macbeth, ACT iv, sc in [i-i39J303b-
(D) Psalms, 2 csp 2:10-13; 7 1 / Proverbs, 304d
8:15-16; 14:28,35; 16:10-15; 17:7; 20:26,28; 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 340b-
25:2-5; 28:2,15-16; 29:2,4,12,14; 31:4-5 / 343a; 345a-348c; 352b-356d; 360d-364a;
Ecclesiastes, 10:4-7,16-17 /Jeremiah, 23:3-6 366d-369b
(D) Jeremias, 23:3-6 / Ezetycl, 45:9 (D) 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, lb-2c; 20d-
Ezechiel, 45:9 25c; 74d-75a;94b-c/ New Atlantis, 205d 207b
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:1; 6; 9 (D) 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 94
OT, Bool( of Wisdom, i :i ; 6; 9 / Ecclesiasticus, 46a-c; CH vin, SECT 105-112 48c-51b passim;
10:1-4,14; 41:17-18 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, CH xiv 62b-64c; CH xvin, SECT 200 71a-c;
10:1-4,17; 41:21-22 / / Maccabees, 14 (D) SECT 202 71d-72a
OT, / Machabces, 14 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112a-113b
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK ix [1-172] 57a-58d 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 268c-269a
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [359-422] 5b- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 14d;
6b / Persians [647-680] 21d-22a; [759-786] BK xii, 93c-95b
23b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357b-c / Social Con-
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the Kittg [1-77] 99a-d / tract, BK in, 412d-414d
Antigone [162-210] 132c-d; [658-745] 136d- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 31b-32d; 50a-b;
137c 85d-86a; 260a-b; 284a c; 288b-289a; 338d-
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [339-358] 261 b-c / 340c; 341d-342c; 343c-344a,c; 448c-449c;
Iphigenia at Aulis [334-375] 427d-428b 577a-580d esp 577d-578a; 638a-646d passim
218 THE GREAT IDEAS
[124-195] 87c-88a / Richard III 105a-148a,c /
(3. The use and
abuse of monarchical power. Richard II 320a-351d esp ACT HI, sc iv [29-
3tf. The good king and the benevolent des-
90] 340c-341a / King John 376a-405a,c / 1st
pot in the service of their subjects: the educa- Henry IV, ACT iv, sc HI [52-105] 459d-460b /
tion of the prince.) 2nd Henry IV, ACT iv, sc v [178-225] 496b-d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 102b-104b; 176c-d; 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth 284a-310d
504c-505c 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VH, SECT 90-94
43 MILL: Representative Government, 342a-344d; 44d-46c passim; CH vm, SECT in 50d-51a;
351c-354b CH xi, SECT 138 57b-c; CH xiv, SECT 161-166
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 171 62d-64a; CH xvm, SECT 199-202 71a-72a;
146b-c / Philosophy of History, PART i, 21 2d- SECT 210 73b-c
213a; 243b-c; PART iv, 361d-362a 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 37a-b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 9c-10d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357a-c; 359 b-c/ Social
Contract, BK i, 391a; BK in, 412d-413a; 415d-
3b. The exploitation of absolute power for 416a
personal aggrandizement: the strategies 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 25a-26d; 29b-c;
of princes and tyrants 38a-c; 42b,d-43b; 60a-c; 70c-71b; 142c;
OLD TESTAMENT: Samuel, 8:11-18 (D) /
/ 155a-b
Kings, 8:11-18 / II Samuel, 11:6-12:13 (D) 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 39b-40b; 113c-
II Kings, 11:6-12:13 / / Kings, 12:1-15; 21 114a; 173b-174a
(D) III Kings, 12:1-15; 2I / H
Chronicles, 10 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: la-3b
(D) II Paralipomenon, 10 / Isaiah, 1:23; 3:14- 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 4, 35b; NUMBER 22,
15; 10:1-3; i4.'4-6-(O) Isaias, 1:23; 3:14-15; 83c; NUMBER 75, 223c-d
10:1-3; 14:4-6 / Jeremiah, 22:1-23:2 (D) 43 MILL: Representative Government, 366a-c
Jeremias, 22:1-23:2 / Eze^iel, 22:27; 46:18 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 300c-
(D) Ezechiel, 22:27; 46:18 / Daniel, 5:1-12; 302a
6:7-8 / Micah, 3:1-3; 7:3-4 (D) Micheas, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 9c-10d
3:1-3; 7:3-4 / Zephaniah, $'$--(0) Sophonias,
4. Comparison of monarchy with other forms
APOCRYPHA: of government
Judith, 2:1-12 (D) OT, Judith,
2:1-6 / Ecclesiasticus, 8 \2(D) OT, Ecclesiasti- 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 107c-108d
ens, 8:2-3/7 Maccabees, 1:41-64; 10:22-46 7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 356a; BK vm 401d-
(D) OT, / Machabees, 1:43-67; 10:22-46 416a esp 402a-d; BK ix, 416a-421a / Statesman,
5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia at Aulis [334-375] 427d- 598b-604b / Laws, BK in, 670d-676c
428b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vm, CH 10 412c-413b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 23b-24a; 35b-37a; passim, esp [1160*31-36] 412c / Politics, BK HI,
a b
BK in, 107c-d CH 7 476c-477a; CH 15 [i286 23- 22] 484c-
7 PLATO: Republic, BK i, 301b-304c; BK 11, 311b- 485a; CH 17-18 486c-487a,c; BK iv, CH 2
a b a
313a / Laws, BK HI, 672d-674d; BK iv, 681b- [I289 26- 4] 488b-c; CH 4 [!292 4~37] 491b-d
a b
682c / Seventh Letter, 811b-813d passim; BK v, CH 10 [i3i2 40- 9] 514d-515a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 6 [ii34 3o-b 8J ft
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 95,
:
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 34a / New 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b; 32c-33a
Atlantis, 207b-209d 44 Bos WELL Johnson, 195c-d
:
35 LOCKE: CM
Government, CH i, SECT 1-2 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 286
25a-c; CH vi 36a-42a; CH vn, SECT 86 43d-44a; 96c-97a; par 302, lOlb / Philosophy of History,
CH vin, SECT 105-107 48c-49d; SECT 110-112 PART iv, 342 b-d
SOc-Slb; CH xiv, SECT 162 63a; CH xv 64c-65d
4c. The differences between kingdoms and re-
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 216b
3b; BK publics with respect to unity, wealth,
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i,
and extent of territory
xvi, 118a-c; BK xix, 140a-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357a-b; 359b-c / Politi- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 148a
Economy, 367a-368c / Social Contract, BK
cal 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4a; BK
i, 388a; BK in, 414c v, 25c-d; 31b-33a,c; BK vn, 44d-46a; 50a-b;
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 412c-413b BK vin, 56b-57c; BK ix, 58b,d-61a passim;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 273, BK xi, 75b-76a; BK xin, 99d; BK xv, 112d-
91c-d; ADDITIONS, in 134d-13Sa / Philosophy 113a; BK xvin, 125a-c; BK xx, 147a-d
of History, INTRO, 172b-d;
PART i, 211b-c; 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK n, 400a; BK
212c-d in, 412c-414d; 415b-417c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 731 b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47d-48d; NUMBER
54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 686c-687d; 689a 14, 60d-61b;NUMBER 39, 125b-d; NUMBER 48,
157b-c; NUMBER 75, 223c*d
4b. The which divides monarchy from
line 43 MILL: Representative Government, 330a-c;
despotism and tyranny 346a-c; 350b-355b passim; 363b-364d
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 107c-d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 260b
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 352c-d
7 PLATO: Republic, BK ix, 418d-419a / States-
4d. The defense of monarchy or royal rule
man, 590c-d; 598b-604b / Laws, BK in, 672d-
674d 44(1) The necessity for absolute government
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 6 [ii34 B3<>-b 8] 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [198-206] 12a
a b
382a-b; BK vm, CH 10 [ii6o 36- n] 412c-d; 5 EURIPIDES Suppliants [399-456] 261d-262b
:
(44. The defense of monarchy or royal rule. 4</(l) 4e. The attack on monarchy or absolute gov-
The necessity for absolute government.) ernment
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 330 231b-232a
35 LOCKE: Civil Government en vn, SECT 90-94 The paternalistic or despotic character
',
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Discussions relevant to the distinction between royal and political government, see CITIZEN
2b; CONSTITUTION i; GOVERNMENT ib; LAW 73; SLAVERY 6b; TYRANNY 5.
Other considerations of the mixed regime and its distinction from the mixed constitution,
see CONSTITUTION 33, 5b; DEMOCRACY 3b; GOVERNMENT 2b.
Monarchy in relation to other forms of government, see ARISTOCRACY 2a; DEMOCRACY 3c;
GOVERNMENT 2-2e; OLIGARCHY 2; STATE 6a; TYRANNY 2a, 43; and for the compari-
son of monarchy with domestic or despotic government, see FAMILY 2b; GOVERNMENT ib;
TYRANNY 4b.
Another discussion of government in relation to the wealth and territorial extent of the state,
see STATE 4a~4c; WEALTH pf.
Matters relevant to the theory of the royal prerogative, see GOVERNMENT 36 LAW ye. ;
The controversy concerning the legitimacy or justice of absolute monarchy, and for the
statement of the issue in terms of the doctrine of natural rights and popular
sovereignty,
see CONSTITUTION 3b; DEMOCRACY 40; GOVERNMENT ig(i)-ig(3); JUSTICE 9c~9d; LAW
6b, yb; LIBERTY id, ig; STATE 2c; TYRANNY 5a~5c.
Matters relevant to the justification of absolute rule when it takes the form of a benevolent
despotism, see DEMOCRACY 4d; GOVERNMENT 2c; PROGRESS 4b; SLAVERY 6b-6c; TYRANNY
,,
4b:
The issues concerning imperialism as a form of absolute rule, see GOVERNMENT 5b; LIBERTY
6c; REVOLUTION 7; SLAVERY 6d; STATE lob; TYRANNY 6.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below ate works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliogiaphy of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
N
is
ATURE is a term which draws
merely a deviation, a falling away from, or we call "a state" result. States differ from one
sometimes a transgression of nature. another in features of their political
many
Most of the terms which stand in opposition organization. In this sense the state or political
to nature represent the activity or being of community is conventional rather than natural;
man or God. As appears in the chapter on its institutions are humanly contrived.
MEDICINE, Galen thinks of nature as an artist. The social contract
theory of the origin of
Harvey later develops this notion. But with the state not necessarily involved in the
is
these two exceptions, the traditional theory of recognition that the state is partly conven-
art conceives it not as the work of natureTbut tional. Aristotle, for example, who regards the
ofjnan." Despite other differences in the great state as natural he speaks of it as "a creation
books on the theory of art, especially with re- of nature" does not think of the political
gard to art's imitation of nature, there seems community as natural in the sense inwhich a
to be a common understanding that works of bee-hive is natural. That men should form
from productions of na-
art are distinguished politicalcommunities is, in his view, the result
ture by the fact that man
has added something of a natural desire, a tendency inherent in the
to nature. A world which man left exactly as nature of man as a political animal. But what
he found it would be a world without art or form the political community will take is at
any trace of the artificial in it. least partly determined by the particular ar-
The ancient authors who contrast the natural rangements men voluntarily institute. Man-
and the conventional and the modern authors made laws are conventional, but so also are
who distinguish man's life in a state of nature other institutions which vary from state to
from his life in civil society seem to imply that change from time to time.
state or
pears to be an exception here. He thinks that consideration of what is and is not natural
there is a natural as well as a civil, or political, about society or the state are discussed in other
225
226 THE GREAT IDEAS
the notion of nature is involved. The issues contrast between the works of nature and the
raised by the relation of art to nature are, for works of man ?
example, considered in the chapter on ART;
those raised by the distinction between nature THIS QUESTION points to one of the fundamen-
and nurture are considered in the chapter on tal issues in the traditional discussion of nature.
HABIT, and so on. Here we are concerned not Those who uphold the validity of the contrast
with the theoretical consequences of different defend its significance in terms of something
conceptions of nature, but with the various quite special about human nature. If man were
meanings of the term itself as it is used in dif- entirely a creature of instinct if everything
ferent contexts. man did were determined by his nature so that
Common to all meanings is the notion that no choices were open to him and no deviation
the natural is that which man's doing or making from the course of nature possible then the
has not altered or enlarged. The distinction human world would seem to fade into the rest
between nature and nurture confirms this. of nature. Only on the supposition that man
Man's activities are the source of modifications is
by nature rational and free do those human
in his own nature as well as in the nature of works which are the products of reason or the
other things. The human nature man is born consequences of free choice seem to stand in
with undergoes transformations in the course sharp contrast to all other natural existences or
of the acquirement of knowledge, the
life: effects of natural causes.
formation of habits (which are often called "sec- Of these two factors rationality and free-
lectively they give rise to the notions of culture choice. The laws of nature are often conceived
or civilization two more terms which present as expressing an inherent rationality in nature
a contrast to nature. In Rousseau and others itself,but they also state the uniformity of
we meet the feeling that man may have lost, nature's operations. Such maxims of nature as
not gained, by exchanging the natural for the 'nature docs nothing in vain,' 'nature abhors a
civilized life. The ideal of a return to nature in- vacuum,' or 'nature does nothing by jumps' are
volves more than a return to the soil, or an usually interpreted as describing nature's in-
exodus from the city to the country. In its most variable way of doing things. Aristotle's dis-
radical form, this ideal calls upon man to divest tinctionbetween things which happen natu-
himself of all the artifices and conceits with and those which happen by chance turns
rally
which he has thought to improve on nature on the regularity of the events which result
"by renouncing its advances," Rousseau says, from causes in the very nature of things. The
"in order to renounce its vices." natural is that which happens either always or
But why, it may be asked, is the whole world for the most part.
which man creates not as natural as the materi- Hence, even if there is
rationality of some
als which man finds to work with the resources sort in the structure of nature, that supposition
of physical nature and the native equipment does not seem to affect the position of those
which is man's nature at birth ? If man himself who connect human reason with human free-
isa natural entity, and if all human activities dom and who, in consequence, divide the
are somehow determined by human nature, things which happen as a result of man's free
then why are not the works of art and science, choice from everything else which happens in
the development of political institutions, the the course of nature. This may be exemplified
cultivation of human beings by education and by the Greek understanding of the difference
experience, and all other features of civiliza- between 'nature and convention. The laws of
tionwhy are not all these just as natural as Persia vary from the laws of Greece, the po-
the falling stone, the flourishing forest, or the litical institutions of the city-states vary from
bee-hive ? Why, in short, should there by any those of the Homeric age, customs and consti-
CHAPTER 60: NATURE 227
tutions differ from city to city. Unlike such separates the order of nature and the order
conventions, "that which by nature,'* Aris-
is of freedom into worlds as radically asunder
totle writes, "is unchangeable and has every- as the Cartesian realms of matter and mind.
where the same force, as fire burns both here The world of nature is the system or order of
and in Persia." The conventional is the vari- the objects of sense "the sum total of phe-
able, the natural the uniform. The variability nomena insofar as they ... are connected with
of conventions, moreover, seems to suggest that each other throughout." For Kant this means
they are products of freedom or choice. two things which are strictly correlative. Na-
The difference between the bee-hive and the ture is the object of the theoretic sciences and
human city is that one is entirely a creation of it is also the realm of time, space, and causality.
nature, a social organization entirely deter- Like Spinoza, Kant identifies the order of na-
mined by the instincts of the bees, so that ture with the order of causal necessity. But,
wherever bees form a hive, it is formed in the unlike Spinoza, Kant places the moral and po-
same way; whereas the human city involves of man in an order unconditioned by
litical life
something more than a natural desire of men, time, space, and causality. This realm of free-
since when these political animals associate in dom is the sphere of the moral or practical
different places, they set up different forms of sciences. The natural or theoretic sciences do
government and different kinds of law. The not extend to what Kant the "supersen-
calls
same comparison can be made between the sible" or the "noumenal" order the world of
spider's web or the beaver's dam and such things lying outside the range of sense-experi-
products of human art as cloth and houses. The ence.
separate the natural from what man contributes one sense natural, in another not. It is natural
thus seems to depend upon the conception of in the sense that what happens voluntarily in
man. Controversies concerning man's difference the realm of animal and human motions pro-
from other animals, especially the dispute ceeds from causes as natural as those responsible
about human freedom (considered in such for the motions of inert bodies. A
voluntary
chapters as MAN and WILL), bear directly on act, according to Aquinas, comes from "an in-
the issue of the naturalness of the things which trinsic principle," just as the falling of a stone
result from man's doing and making. proceeds from "a principle of movement in the
Spinoza, for example, in holding that human stone." But among the factors responsible for
actions constitute no exception to the reign of voluntary acts is "knowledge of the end"
necessity throughout nature, removes any knowledge of the object being sought. The
ground for distinguishing the effects of human sphere of the voluntary can therefore be equat-
operation from other effects. Man exercises no ed with the sphere of conscious desire, t.e. 9
freedom of choice; nor does man in any other with desire aroused by an object known, wheth-
way introduce a new principle into the order er known by sense or reason. The natural in
or process of nature. Hobbes and Locke concur the sense in which it is
distinguished from the
in the denial of free will, but they separate the voluntary is the sphere of motions in line with
inventions of man's mind or his social institu- natural desire, i.e., with tendencies founded in
tions from what happens without human con- the very nature of a body or organism and un-
trivance in the realm of thought or action. The accompanied by any awareness of the goal
difference between simple and complex ideas toward which it is thus inclined to move.
forLocke seems to parallel the ancient distinc- Aristotle's distinction between natural and
tionbetween nature and art. violent motion (which Galileo and other phys-
At the other extreme from Spinoza, Kant icists adopt) seems to throw light on a double
228 THE GREAT IDEAS
use of the term 'natural' here. Galileo treats ent in human conduct; that is the sense in
the motion of a freely falling body as natural, which the change effected is not the ultimate
in contrast to the motion of a projectile. In the end, but only a means to some further end
former case, it is the nature of heavy bodies to desired. Here there is an extrinsic final cause
gravitate toward the earth; whereas in the lat- as well as a final cause intrinsic to the change
ter case, in addition to the motion of gravita- itself. It may be with regard to this special
tion, another motion is
imparted to the body sense that Bacon says of final causes that they
when it is shot from a gun a motion which are "more allied to man's own nature than to
does not proceed from the body's own nature the system of the universe." Yet Bacon, far
but is caused by the motions of other bodies. from denying their presence in the scheme of
In terms of this distinction, voluntary motions things, assigns the investigation of final causes
are natural rather than violent. In fact, the to metaphysics (as a branch of natural philoso-
violent is sometimes thought to be even more phy) rather than to physics. For him the ascer-
opposed to the voluntary than to the natural, tainment of final causes does not discover a
in the sense that a man acting contrary to his purpose in the nature of things. Rather it looks
will under external coercion suffers violence. to God's plan and providence.
When he does what he wishes, his conduct is not
only voluntary but natural, i.c. 9 free from the WE HAVE so FAR dealt with that consideration
violence of external forces. of nature which opposes the natural to the
It is
necessary to consider the additional dis- works of man. The discussion of nature also
tinction between the voluntary and the free. moves on a theological plane. Here, on one
Animals acting from desires caused by the per- traditional view, the natural not opposed to,
is
ception of certain objects act voluntarily, but, but rather identified with the work of God.
in the theory of Aristotle and Aquinas, only "Things which are said to be made by nature,"
men freely choose among alternative objects Plato writes, "are the work of divine art."
of desire or between means for accomplishing Those who conceive the universe as God's
an end. The effects of voluntary action differ creation, and think of God alone as uncreated
from other natural events only because knowl- being, tend to use the word "nature" collec-
edge enters into their determination. But that tively for the whole world of creatures and dis-
which happens as the result of man's free choice tributivcly for each type of thing which has
isdetermined neither by his nature nor by his its being from God.
knowledge. Hence whatever comes into exist- The distinction between the supernatural
ence through man's choice stands apart from and the natural has many interpretations in
all that is naturally determined to exist. Christian theology, but none more basic than
One other matter bears on this consideration that which divides all being into the uncreated
of the natural in relation to the voluntary and and the created. On this view, the order of
the free. Spinoza excludes the operation of nature includes more than the world of physi-
final causes, as well as free choice, from the cal, sensible things. It includes the spiritual
order of nature. Purposes or ends are not prin- creation angels and souls as well. Immaterial
ciples of nature. Aristotle, on the other hand, beings are no more supernatural than bodies.
thinks that final causes are operative in every They, too, are created natures. Only God is un-
part of nature. He finds them in the sphere of created being.
inert bodies which naturally tend toward cer- Those who do not have or who deny a doc-
tain results. He finds them in the sphere of trine of creation use the word "nature" in a
animal and human motions, where the final less and in a more comprehensive sense. The
cause or end may be an object of conscious Greek philosophers, for example, seem to re-
desire. strict the natural to the physical, /.., to the
So far as the search for causes is concerned, realm of material, sensible, changing things.
nature presents the same kind of problems to Change is an element in the connotation of the
the physicist as to the biologist or psychologist. Greek word phusis, of which natura is the Latin
I n only one sense are final causes peculiarly pres- equivalent. As Greek scientists conceive the
CHAPTER 60: NATURE 229
study of nature, it is the business of physics to other attribute whatever, we shall discover one
investigate the principles, causes, and elements and the same order, or one and the same con-
of change. nection of causes."
Things which are thought to be untouched Except perhaps for the Stoics, like Marcus
by change, such as the objects of mathematics, Aurelius and Epictetus, Spinoza seems to stand
self-subsistentideas, or separate forms; or alone in this conception of nature as all-embrac-
things which are thought to be eternal and im- ing. The Stoics too regard nature as the system
mutable, such as immaterial substances or in- of the universe, with man a part of its cosmic
telligences, do not belong to the realm of phys- structure, and with God or divinity inherent
ics or natural science. In Aristotle's classification in nature as the rational principle governing all
of the sciences such beings are the objects of things. But with or without reference to God
mathematics and metaphysics, or theology. and creation, thinkers like Descartes and Hume
Since, for him, whatever is both sensible and tend to identify nature not with the totality of
mutable is also material, the realm of nature finite things,but with the world of bodies in
includes no more than the whole material uni- motion or changing sensible things.
verse, celestial as well as terrestrial. For Descartes, nature does not include the
The more comprehensive sense of nature ap- realm of thought or thinking substances, though
pears in Spinoza's identification of nature with these, like bodies, are finite and dependent
the infinite and eternal substance of God. "Be- creatures of God. For Hume, nature seems to
sides God," says Spinoza, "no substance can be be that which lies outside experience in a way,
nor be conceived. . . . Whatever is, is in God, the reality which underlies appearances. Where
and nothing can either be or be conceived Spinoza thinks that the system of ideas is as
without God." All finite things are modes of much a part of nature as the system of bodies
the divine substance or, more precisely, of the in motion, Hume speaks of "a kind of pre-
attributes of God, such as extension and thought. established harmony between the course of na-
Nature, therefore, is the totality of finite ture and the succession of our ideas."
things, both material and immaterial. But na- Hume's distinction between knowledge of
ture exceeds even this totality, for the infinite the relation between our own ideas and knowl-
substance of God is greater than the sum of its edge of matters of fact or real existence seems
parts. furthermore to imply that nature is the reality
To make this clear, Spinoza employs the known (however inadequately) when we assert
distinction between natura naturans and natura certain things to be matters of fact. Here we
naturata. "By natura naturans we are to under- perceive another meaning of nature, defined
stand that which is in itself and is conceived by another basic opposition, this time between
through itself, or those attributes of substance the real and the ideal or the imaginary. It is in
which express eternal and infinite essence; that this sense that mediaeval writers oppose entia
isto say, God in so far as He is considered as a naturae, i.e., natural or real beings, to entia
free cause. But by natura naturata I understand rationis, or things which have their being in the
time ... but to the unity in the existence of course of nature, natural" causes, operating un-
On
quite different principles of analysis, There is a third position which distinguishes
Berkeley also treats as natural things the ideas between the work of God in the creation of
or sensations which "are not produced by, or nature, and the work of nature in the produc-
dependent on, the wills of men." Natural be- tion of effects of all sorts, such as the natural
ings do not exist apart from the mind, but un- motions of bodies or the propagation of animals.
like imaginary ones, natural beings are those But though it ascribes efficacy to natural agents
ideas which are not subject to our will or the or second causes in the production of natural
human mind's own constructive activities. effects, it also regards natural causes as instru-
Such ideas are produced in our minds immedi- mental to the hand of God, the first or principal
ately by God. cause of everything which happens as well as
To the question whether "Nature hath no of everything which is. Aquinas seems to hold
share in the production of natural things," that God acts alone only in the original crea-
Berkeley answers: "If by Nature is meant the tion of things; whereas in the preservation of
visible series of effects or sensations imprinted created natures and in their causal interaction,
on our minds, according to certain fixed and God works through secondary, or natural,
general laws, then plain that Nature, taken
it is causes.
in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. "Some have understood God to work in
But, by Nature is meant some being distinct
if
every agent," Aquinas writes, "in such a way
from God, as well as from the laws of nature, that no created power has any effect in things,
and things perceived by sense, I must confess but that God alone is the immediate cause of
that word is to me an empty sound without any everything wrought; for instance, that it is not
intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so
the physical world, once He has formed matter doctrine raises two sorts of problems. The
into bodies and given them their initial impe- first concerns the efficacy of natural causes,
CHAPTER 60: NATURE 231
which are sufficient for the scientist to appeal Though "each of these kinds has various de-
to in explaining natural phenomena, yet are grees, according to the different ways in which
by themselves for the production
insufficient the power of nature is
surpassed," no miracle,
of natural effects. The second concerns the according to Aquinas, transgresses the order of
distinctionbetween the natural and the super- nature in the sense of accomplishing the im-
natural, now not in terms of the created and possible. Unlike the impossible, which would
the uncreated, but in terms of what happens destroy nature, the improbable can be elicited
naturally (or even by chance) as opposed to by God's power within the general framework
what happens as a result of God's intervention of nature.
in the course of nature. Hume, on the other hand, thinks that "a
Miracles, for example, are supernatural rath- miracle is a violation of the laws of nature."
er than natural events. They are not pro- And since, in his view, a firm and unalterable
duced by natural causes; nor do they happen experience has established these laws, the proof
by accident. They are attributed by the theo- against a miracle, from the nature of the fact, is
logian to divine causality, yet not in such a way as entire as any argument from experience can
that violence is done to nature. "The term be. "Why more than probable," he asks,
is it
miracle" Aquinas explains, "is derived from "that all men must die; that lead cannot, of
admiration, which arises when an effect is itself remain suspended in the air; that fire con-
manifest, whereas its cause is hidden. ... A sumes wood, and is extinguished by water; un-
miracle so called as being full of wonder; in
is less it be, that these events are found agreeable
other words, as having a cause absolutely hid- to the laws of nature, and there is
required a
den from all. This cause is God. Therefore violation of these laws, or in other words, a
those things which God does outside the causes miracle to prevent them ?
which we know arc called miracles." "Nothing is esteemed a miracle," Hume con-
The miraculous is that which is
beyond the tinues, "if it ever happens in the common
power of nature to accomplish. "A thing is said course of nature. . . . There must, therefore, be
to be above the ability of nature," Aquinas a uniform experience against every miraculous
writes, "not only by reason of the substance event, otherwise the event would not merit
of the thing done, but also because of the man- that appellation. And as a uniform experience
ner and the order in which it is done"; and amounts to proof, there is here a direct and
"the more the power of nature is
surpassed, the full proof, from the nature of the
fact, against
greater the miracle." Aquinas distinguishes the existence of any miracle; nor can such a
three grades of miracles. proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered
The first, he says, surpasses nature "in the credible, but by an opposite proof which is
goes backwards, or if a human body is glorified. proved against our uniform experience of the
Such things nature is absolutely unable to do; order of nature. But he also thinks that they
and these hold the highest rank among mir- are "dangerous friends or disguised enemies to
acles.Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of the Christian religion" who would try to defend
nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it its beliefs"by the principles of human reason.
. . The Christian
is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving .
religion not only was at first
sight to the blind, and the like. For nature can attended with miracles," he declares, "but even
give life, but not to the dead, and it can give at this day cannot be believed by any reason-
sight, but not to the blind. Such hold the able person without one. Mere reason is in-
second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing sur- sufficient to convince us of its veracity: and
passes nature's power in the measure and order whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is
the usual process of nature. . . . These hold the believe what is most contrary to custom and
lowest place in miracles." experience."
232 THE GREAT IDEAS
ONE OTHER TRADITIONAL conception of nature, "the essence of natural objects"; and, as he goes
implicit in much
of the foregoing, should be on to say, this implies the presence in them of
noted. The various senses of the term so far form as well as matter. "By an extension of
explicitly considered are alike in this: that they meaning from this senseof 'nature' every es-
justify the use of the word "Nature" with a sence in general has come to be called a 'nature,'
capital N and in the singular. This other sense because the nature of a thing is one kind of
of the term appears when we speak of each essence." This is the sixth and most general
thing as having a nature of its own, and of the sense, according to which the nature or es-
world as containing a vast plurality and radical sence of anything is the object of definition.
plicit theory of Nature or the natural. The Such questions about individual, specific,
discussion of the natureof any thing seems, for and generic natures raise problems of definition
the most part, to be a discussion of what it is. and classification which are discussed in the
To state the nature of anything is to give its chapter on EVOLUTION. They also raise prob-
definition; or if for any reason definition in a lems about the existence or reality of the tynds
strict sensecannot be given, then the attempt which men define and classify. Are they merely
to state the nature of the thing consists in try- what Locke calls "nominal essences," or do our
ing to say what characterizes this thing or kind definitions signify real essences, t.e. t the natures
of thing, in distinction from everything else of things as they really are ? Is the real world
or all other kinds. one which, as William James says, "plays right
Enumerating the senses of the term 'nature,' into logic's hands"? Does Nature consist of a
Aristotle gives this as the fifth meaning. The hierarchy of natures or distinct kinds; or is it a
first four comprise senses which distinguish the continuum of things all having the same nature
natural from the artificial or the immutable, and differing from each other only individually
and which indicate that the natural or the or accidentally, but not essentially? These
physical has an immanent principle of move- problems are discussed elsewhere, in such chap-
ment in itself and involves matter or potency. ters as ANIMAL, DEFINITION, EVOLUTION, LIFE
The fifth sense is that in which 'nature* means AND DEATH, and SAME AND OTHER.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
I. Conceptions of nature 234
la. Nature as the intrinsic source of a thing's properties and behavior
(1) The distinction between essential and individual nature: generic or specific
properties, and individual, contingent accidents
(2) Nature or essence in relation to matter and form 235
CHAPTER 60: NATURE 233
PAGE
ib. Nature as the universe or the totality of things: the identification of God and
nature; the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata 235
ic. Nature as the complex of the objects of sense: the realm of things existing under
the determination of universal laws
2b. Nature and convention: the state of nature and the state of society
237
2c. Nature and nurture: the innate or native and the acquired; habit as second
nature
2/i The order of nature and the order of freedom: the phenomenal and the noumenal
worlds; the antithesis of nature and spirit 239
3.
The order of nature
4& Nature in relation to diverse types of science: the theoretic and the practical
sciences; natural philosophy or science, mathematics, and metaphysics 245
4^ Nature
. as an object of history
5.
Nature or the natural as the standard of the right and the good 246
5#. Natural inclinations and natural needs with respect to property and wealth
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "csp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
3 16a-d; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 29, A i, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165b-c
REP 4 162a-163b; Q 39, A 2, ANS and REP 3 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 9a-10d passim
203b-204c; Q 60, A 2, ANS 311a-d; Q 115, A 2, . .
275b-c; BK vn, CH 3 [24^3-9] 329c-d / Gen- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica^ PART i-n, Q 85,
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19] 440d-441a,c / Metaphysics,
BK HI, CH i REP 2 710a-711c; A 2, ANS 711d-712d; PART
b BK v, CH 6 in SUPPL, Q 80, A 4, ANS and REP i 959c*963a
[995 27~3i] 514b; CH 3 517a-518a;
536a-537c;CH 8-9 538b-539a; CH 10 [1018*38- 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK 11, APH 4 137d-
b
8] CH 30 547a-d; BK VH, CH 10-15
539b-c; 138b; APH 29 159b-c
558a-564c; BK x, CH i [1052*28-37] 578d; en 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 186b-d
a a
3 [io54 30-i<>55 3] 581a-d; en 8-9 585b-586c; Ib. Nature as the universe or the totality of
BK xi, CH i [io59b 2i-io6o*i] 587d-588a
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i things: the identification of God and na-
ture; the distinction between natura
[486*15-487*1] 7b-d / Generationof Animals,
naturans and natura naturata
BK v, CH i [778*i5-b i9] 320a-321a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [449-482] 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [418-482]
6c-7a 6b-7a; [951-1051] 12d-14a; BK n [294-307]
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR in, CH 12 18d-19a
46c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 14 120d-121c
19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q 3, A 3
Theologica, 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d;
16a-d; A 4, ANS 16d-17c; Q 9, A 2, ANS 39c- SECT 3 257a-b; BK iv, SECT 29 266a; SECT 40
40d; Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 39, A 2, ANS 267a-b; BK v, SECT 8 269d-270b; SECT 30
203b-204c; Q 41, A 5 222b-223b; Q 119, A i, 273a; BK vi, SECT 36-45 277c-278c; BK vn,
ANS and REP 2 604c-607b; PART i-n, Q 2, A 6, SECT 9 280b-c; SECT 19 281a; SECT 25 281c;
ANS 619d-620d SECT 75 285c; BK ix, SECT 8-9 292b-d; BK x,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 49, SECT 6-7 297a-c; BK xi, SECT 18 304b-305b;
A 2, ANS 2b-4a; Q 51, A i, ANS 12b-13c; Q 85, BK xn, SECT 30 310a-b
A 6 182d-184a; PART in, Q 2, A i, REP 2 710a- 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 16 90c-
71 Ic; A 2, ANS 711d-712d; PART in SUPPL, Q 91c; TR vm, CH 1-4 129a-131a / Fourth En-
81, A 3, REP 3 966a-c nead, TR iv, CH 36-37 178c-179b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH in, 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, vi, 99c
SECT 6-20 255c-260a; CH vi, SECT 32 277c- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PARTI, DBF 3-6 355b; AXIOM
278b 1,3-5 355d; PROP 5-6 356b-c; PROP 8 356d-
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341c-342b passim 357d; PROP 10 358a-b; PROP 14-16 359d-362a;
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 28b-29a PROP 18 363c; PROP 24 365a; PROP 25, COROL
365b; PROP 28-31 365c-367a; PROP 33 367b-
10(2) Nature or essence in relation to matter 369a; PART n, PROP 1-2 373d-374a; PROP 6-7
and form 374d-375c; PROP 9-10 376a-377a; PART iv,
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH i PREF 422b,d-424a; AXIOM 424c; PROP 2 42 5a;
a b PROP 4 425b-d; APPENDIX, i 447a; VII-VIH
269b-270a; CH 2 [i94 ii- i5] 270c-271a; CH 8
[199*30-33] 276c; CH 9 277b-278a,c / Meta- 447d
physics, BK ii, CH 3 [995i5-i7] 513d;
BK v, 42 KANT: Judgement, 564c-565d csp 565c-d;
b
CH 4 [ioi4 27-ioi5*i9] 535a-c; BK vi, CH i 566c-d; 580c-d
b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 176b-c;
[io25 28-i 026*6] 547d-548a; BK vn, CH 7-11
555a-561a; BK vn, CH i6-BK vm, CH 6 564c- 186d; 190b-c; PART i, 220c-221a; 245d-246c;
570d; BK x, CH 8-10 58Sb-586d; BK xi, CH 7 PART n, 263d-265c
[1064*19-28] 592c; BK xn, CH 3 [1070*9-13] 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [430-521] 12b-15a
b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dicl(, 115b-117a; 140a
599b-c / Soul, BK i, CH i [403*2- i9] 632a-d;
BK n, CH 4 [4i5b 8-4i6a !8] 645d-646c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 40d
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 216d-218b;
[641*14-33] 163d-164b; [642*14-24] 165b
BK xm, 581c-582a; BK xiv, 608a-b; BK xv,
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 5 169b-c; 631a-c
BK n, CH 3 185a-186d
BK vn, SECT 23 281b; Ic. Nature as the complex of the objects of
12 AURELIUS: Meditations,
sense: the realm of things existing under
BK vm, SECT n 286b
the determination of universal laws
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 9-12
146d-149b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5d-6c; 15b-c; 25b-26b;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 29d-33d esp 32c-33a; 49c-51d esp 51c-d; 88b-
3,ANS 16a-d; A 4, ANS 16d-17c; Q 18, A 3,
ANS 91d; 109d-110d; 133a esp 133b [fn i]; 195a-c;
106b-107c; A 4, REP 3 107d-108c; Q 19, A i, 200c-209b esp 204c-205a / Fund. Prin. Meta-
ANS 108d-109c; Q 29, A i, REP 4 162a-163b; physic of Morals, 281c-282d; 283b; 285c-d /
A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; Q 39, A 2, ANS 203b- Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387 a-b / Judge-
204c; Q 45, A 8 249b-250a; PART i-n, Q i, A 3, ment, 550a~551a,c; 562a-b; 562d-563b; 574b-
ANS 611b-612a; A 5, ANS 613a-614a 577a; 581a-b
236 THE GREAT IDEAS 2 tola
2. The antitheses of nature or the natural 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51,
A I, ANS 12b-13cj PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A I,
2a. Nature and art: the imitation of nature; co- REP 4 951b-953b; A 2, REP 2,4 953b-955c;
operation with nature Q 80, A i, ANS 956c-957c; A 2, ANS 95 7c-
5 AESCHYLUS Prometheus: Bound [442-506] 44c- 958b
45a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xi [91-111]
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b 16a-b; PURGATORY, x [22-99] 67c-68b esp
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [195-218] 260a-b [28-33] 67d; PARADISE, xxvi [124-138] 147a-b;
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 260a 262a / Republic, BK n- xxvii [88-96] 148b
in, 320c-334b; BK x, 427c-434c / Critias, 22 CHAUCER: Physician's Talc [11,941-972] 366b-
478a-d / Sophist, 561b-d; 577d-578d / Laws, 367a
BK IT, 660a-662a; BK x, 760a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, INTRO, 47a-b; PART iv,
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH n 262c
H BK ii, CH i 268b,d-
[95 3-9] 129d / ^hysics, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 52c-d;93b-d; 216c-219a;
a b
270a; CH 2 Ji94 2i- i3] 270c-271a; CH 8 368d-369a; 527d-529b
B b
[i99 8- 33] 276b-277a /Generation and Cor- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT in, sc n [1-39]
ruption, BK n, CH 9 [335 b i8-336 a i3] 437b-d / 49a-b / King Lear, ACT iv, sc iv [1-15] 272b-c
Meteorology, BK iv, CH 12 390^-14] 494c / [ / Timon of Athens, ACT i, sc i [156-160]
Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [988*1-7] 506a; BK vi, 395b-c / Winter's Tale, ACT iv, sc iv [79-103]
CH i [io25 b i9-25] 547d; BK VH, CH 7-9 555a- 508c-d
b
558a; BK vni, CH 3 [io43 i9-23] 568a-b; BK 28 HARVEY On Animal Generation, 38Sa-c; 400d-
:
xi, CH 7 [1064*10-16] 592b-c; BK xn, en 3 401a; 428a-c; 443d 444c esp 444b-c; 450c;
a
[io7o 4-8] 599b/ Soul,
BK n, CH i [4i2b io-i8] 492a-b
642c-d 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 184a-187c;
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i PART n, 251d-252a
b
[630 i2-640"33] 161d-162d; [64^13-29] 164c-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 34b / No-
/ Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 21-22 269c- vum Organum, BK i, APH 3-4 107b; APH 66
271a; BK n, CH i [734*17-735*4] 274c-275c; 114d-115c; BK n, APH 4 137d-138b; APH 29
CH 6 f743b 2o-25] 285a; BK iv, CH 6 [775*17-23] 159b-c; APH 41 173d-174b / New Atlantis,
a
3\7b/ Ethics, BK vi, CH 4 [ii4o n-i7] 388d 203a-b
/ Politics, BK en
14 [1333*16-23] 538a;
vii, 31 DtscARTEs: Meditations, i, 76a-b
CH 17 [I336b 39-i337 a2] 542a,c; BK vin, en 5 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [291-297] 181 b
b b
[I339 42-i340 i8] 545c-546a / Rhetoric, BK 33 PASCAL: Pensces, 21 175a; 29 176a; 32 176a-
b
in, CH 2 [i404 2-26] 654c-655a / Poetics, en 4 b; 120 195a / Geometrical Demonstration,
b
[i448 4-23] 682c-d; [1449*19-27] 683b; CH 24 437a
b a
[i459 i7-i46o 4) 695d-696a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi,
10 HIPPOCRATES: Surgery, par 15 73b-c / Frac- SECT 40 280a-b
tures, par 1-3 74b,d-76a 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 195b-196a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 7 170c- 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 243a-b
171a; CH 12 172d-173c; BK n, CH 3 185a-186d; 38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 368d-369a /
CH 6, 189a-190a Social Contract, BK in, 419c-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [823-857] 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK n, 157a-b
55a-b; BK v [1361-1389] 78d-79a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 663d-664a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 2 259d- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 188c-189a / Judgement,
260a; BK vi, SECT 40 277d; BK xi, SECT 10 495a-496c; 521b-524b esp 523c-d; 525a-528c
303b-c esp 527b-528c; 557c-558b
13 VIRGIL: Georgics 37a-99a esp i
[118-159] 40a- 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBLR 14, 61d
41b 43 MILL: Representative Government, 327b,d-
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vin, CH 2, 129b-c 328d
/ Fourth Ennead, TR HI, CH 10, 147c-d; TR iv, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 56
CH 31, 174d-l75a / Fifth Ennead, TR vni, CH i 26b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165 b-c;
239b240a PART i, 244b-c; PART n, 263d-265c; 267b-
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 30 268b
651c-d 47 GOETHE: Faust, PRELUDE [134-157] 4a-b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18, A 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 41c-d; 87a-c;
3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 45, A 2, ANS 242d-244a; 233c-d
Q 91, AANS 486b-487d; Q 93, A 2, REP 4
3, 50 MARX: Capital, 16d-17a; 85a-88d
493a-d; Q 103, A i, REP 1,3 528b-529a; Q 104, 53 JAMES Psychology, 186b
:
A i, ANS 534c-536c; Q no, A 2, REP 3 565d- 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
S66d; PART i-n, Q i, A 6, ANS 614a-c; Q 2, A i Analysis, 2a / Civilization and Its Discontents,
615d-616c; Q 12, A 3, CONTRARY 670d-671b 778b-779d / New Introductory Lectures, 877a-b
Ib to Ic CHAPTER 60: NATURE 237
43 MILL: 293b-302c passim /
Liberty, 269c-d;
2b. Nature and convention: the state of nature
327b,d-332d pas-
Representative Government,
and the state of society sim / Utilitarianism, 459b-461c passim
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 52b / Cratylus 8Sa-114a,c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 194a; 311b; 363c-364a
csp 85a-87b, HOc-lllc / Gorgias, 271b-272b; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 57
273d-274c / Republic, BK n, 311b-313a / 26b-27a; par 93 36a-b; PART in, par 187
Theaetetus, 528b-c / Laws, BK x, 760a-c 65a-c; par 194 66c-d; ADDITIONS, 36 122b-c;
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK vi, CH 2 [140*6-18] 149 140d-141a; 152 141c-d; 164 144c-145a /
193a; CH 3
[141*15-22] 194b-c / Sophistical Philosophy of History, INTRO, 171b-172b;
Refutations, CH 12 [173*7-18] 238b-c; [173* 196d-197a; PART n, 260b-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 514c-d
27-30] 238c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, CH 7 382c-383a /
BK v, 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho -
Politics, BK i, CH 2 [1253*29-37] 446d; CH 6 Analysis, 20c-d / General Introduction, 452c-d;
448c-449b / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 15 [1375*25- 573c / War and Death, 757d-759d / Civiliza-
b tion and Its Discontents, 776b-802a,c
25] 619d-620b esp
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK 11 [14-37] 776b-777a, 780b-781d, 783c-784b, 787a-c,
15a-c; BK iv [823-857] 55a-b; BK v [925- 788d-789b, 791b-792a, 799b-802a,c / New
1027] 73b-74c Introductory Lectures, 853a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 12,
en 24- 2c. Nature and nurture: the innate or native
517d-518c / Christian Doctrine, BK u,
and the acquired; habit as second nature
26 648d-650a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 95, 7 PLATO: Republic, BK II-HI, 319c-339a; BK v-
A 2 227c-228c; A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 97, A 3, vn, 368c-401d / Statesman, 605d-608d
REP i 237b-238b 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [8 b 26~9a 27] 13d-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxvi 14b / Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 27 [7o b 6~3g]
[124-138] 147a-b 92c93a,c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [981*31-
b b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 56d; 84c-96b;
i, 7] 499d; BK ix, CH 5 [io47 3i-34] 573a
PART n, 99a-101a; 131a-c; 136d-137a; 138c; 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK iv, en 9
b
159d; PART iv, 272c [536 i4-2o] 63b / Ethics, BK n, CH i 348b,<l
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 63d-64b; 93b-94a; 349b; BK in, CH 5 [1114*32^25] 360c-d; in;
102a-103a; 424d-426b; 430b-d; 509a-b vi, CH ii [1143^-13] 393a; en 13 394b-d;
26 SHAKESPEARE: As You Life It 597a-626a,c BK vii, CH 10 [ii52 a28~33] 403 b / Politics,
BK CH a b
esp ACT n, sc i [1-20] 603c-d, sc
v 606b- vii, 13 [i332 39~ io] 537a-b; CH 14
a a
607a, ACT in, sc n [11-90] 609d-610c [i333 i6-23] 538a; CH 17 [i336 3~22] 541a-b
27 SHAKESPEARE: All's Well That Ends Well, / Rhetoric, BK i, CH n
[1370*5-14] 613b; BK
ACT n, sc in [112-151] 152c-153a / King Lear, in,CH i
[1404*15-19] 654b; CH 2 [1405*7-9]
ACT i, sc ii [1-22] 247d-248a / Timon ofAthens 655b / Poetics, CH 22 [i 459^-7] 694d
393a-420d csp ACT iv, sc I-ACT v, sc i 409c- 10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 14
419b / Cymbehne, ACT in, sc in [12-78] 15a-b
465c-466b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [288-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d; 322] 33d-34b
62c-63a; 94d-95b 14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, 174b,d-175a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18,
b
APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART in, 395a-d; 12-15] 211d; CH 10 [686 23-35] 218b-c /
PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a Generation of Animals, BK n, CH i [73i b 24~
b
33 PASCAL: Pens&s, 72, 184b; 75 185b-186a / 733 i7] 272a-274a
Vacuum, 359a-365b / Great Experiment 382a- 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [418-448]
389b esp 388b-389a / Weight of Air, 405b- 6b-c; BK ii
[865-930] 26a-d; BK v [783-836]
415b; 425a-429a 71b-72a
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, RULE i-m 270a 12 EPICTETUS Discourses, BK u, CH 8, 146a-b
:
271a esp RULE i 270a / Optics, BK i, 409b; BK 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 8 269d-
in, 528b-529a; 540a; 542a-543a 270b; SECT 16 271c-d; BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, BK xi, SECT 18, 304b-c
SECT 28-29 322a-323a 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR HI, CH 13 46c-
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 29-33 47b / Third Ennead, TR m
r CH 3 93d-94c
418c419a passim; SECT 62-66 425a-426a; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vii, par 16-23
SECT 103-109 433a-434b passim; SECT 150- 48c-50c / City of God, BK xi, CH 22 333d-
151 442d-443c 334c; BK xn, CH 2-5 343c-345b; BK xix, CH
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 44 12-17, 518c-523a
468d-469c; SECT vi, DIV 47 470b-d; SECT 19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18, A 3
:
viii, DIV 64-70 478d-482c passim 106b-107c; Q 23, A 5, REP 3 135d-137d; Q 47,
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK 11, 397a A 2 257b-258c; Q 48, A 2, ANS and REP 3
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 127a-128a; 220a-b / 260c 261b; Q 50, A i, ANS and REP i 269b-
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256d-257a; 270a; A 4 273b-274b; Q 57, A i, ANS 295a-d;
264d-265a / Judgement, 467d-468c; 550b- Q 71, A i, REP 4 367a-368b; Q 75, A 7 384d-
551a,c; 558b-c; 559c-d; 583d-584c 385c; Q 76, A 3, ANS 391a-393a; A 5, REP 3-4
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 394c-396a; Q 77, A 2 401a-d; A 4, REP i
41b-c 403a-d; Q 108 552c-562a esp A 4 555b-d; Q
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-b; 173b; no, A 3, ANS 566d-567b; PART I-H, Q i, A 4,
175b; 177a; 183a-b; 184a REP i 612a-613a; Q 5, A i, REP 3 636d-637c
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 582b-584a 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 7,
:
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod> BK xi, CH 22 333d- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 646c-
334c; BK xn, CH 4-5 344b-345b; BK xix, CH 647b; 650b-c
12-13, 518c-520a; BK xxn, CH 24, 610c-611c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-6b; 671b [fn i]
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologies PART i, Q 2, A 3,
: 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 401b / Instincts, 415b /
ANS and REP 2 12c-14a; Q 5, A 4, ANS 25d-26c; Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d-654c
Q 6, A i, REP 2 28b d; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-
107c; Q A i, ANS 108d-109c; A ANS lllc- 3c(4) Divine causality in relation to the course
19, 4,
of nature: the preservation of nature;
112c; Q 22 127c-132b; Q 23, A i, ANS and RRP
1-2 132c-133b; Q 44, A 4, REP 3 241a-d; Q 59, providence; miracles
A ANS 306c-307b; Q 60, A 5 313b-314c; Q 65,
i, OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2; 7-8; 11:1-9;
A ANS 340b-341b; Q 70, A 3, ANS 365b-367a;
2, 17:15-21; 18:9-15; 21:1-8 / Exodus, 3-4; 7-
Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A i, RLP 3 12; 13:20-22; 14:19-31; 15:22-25; 16:1-17:7
407b-409a; Q 82, A 4, ANS 434c-435c; Q 85, / Numbers, 12; 16-17; 20:1-13; 21:4-9;
A 3, REP i 455b-457a; Q 91, A 3 486b-487d; Q 22:21-34 / Joshua, 3; 6:1-20; 10:12-14 (D)
92, A i, REP i 488d-489d; Q 98, A i, ANS 516d- Josue, 3; 6:1-20; 10:12-14 / ^ Samuel, 12:14-
517c; Q 103 528a-534b; PART I-H, Q i, A 2 20 (D) / Kings, 12:14-20 / / Kings, 17-19
610b-611b; A 3, ANS and REP 3 611b-612a; A (D) HI Kings, 17-19 / Nehemiah, g(D)
6, ANS 614a-c; A 8 615a-c; Q 2, A 5, REP 3 11 Esdras, 9 / Job, 12:7-10; 36:24-42:2 /
618d-619c; Q 8, A i, ANS 655b-656a; Q 12, A 5, Psalms, 8; 18:6-17; 19:1-6; 65; 78; 89:8-
ANS 672a-c; Q 21, A i, ANS and REP 1-2 717a-d 12; 104; 106-107; r
3^ I
47 7~20
:
~0) Ps&lms,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 8; 17:7-18; 18:1-7; 64; 77; 88:9-13; 103;
Q 75, A 3, ANS and REP 4 938a-939d 105-106; 135; 146:7-147:20 / Jeremiah,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy PURGATORY, xvm ', 10:12-13; 31:35 (>) Jeremias, 10:12-13;
[94-142] 107b-d
[19-39] 80a-b; PARADISE, i 31:35 / Amos, 5:8; 8:8-12 / Jonah (D)
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 50a; PART iv, Jonas
271d APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 11:24-25 (D)
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 271b-273a; OT, Boo}(of Wisdom, n .-25-26 / Ecclesiasticus,
285c; 302c-304a,c / Circulation of the Blood, 43 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 43
309b-d / On Animal Generation, 349a-b; NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 1:18-25; 6:25-34;
355c-d; 390b-c; 401b; 402c; 418b-c; 426b- 8-9 csp 8:1-3, 9:27-36; 14:14-36; 15:30-39 /
429b passim; 439c-440a; 442d-443c; 447a-b; Lu^e, 1:5-66; 5:4-15; 13:11-13 / John, 2:1-
453c; 454b-c; 461a-c; 462c-d ii 9:1-34; 11:1-457 Acts, 3:1-16;
;
17:28 /Ro-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43a-d; 45a- mans, 11:36 / Colossians, 1:16-17
46a / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 48 HOd- 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 465d-466a / Sophist, 577d-
llla 578b / Laws, BK x 7S7d-771b passim
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, iv, 90a-b / Objec- 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 9 [192*16-24]
b
tions and Replies, 214d-215b 268b-c; BK 11, CH 4 [i96 5~7J 273a; CH 7
a a b
31 SPINOZA: PART i, APPENDIX 369b-
Ethics, [i98 22-29] 275b-c; [i98 35- 3] 275c / Heav-
372d; PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a ens, BK i, CH 4 [271*34] 362c; BK 11, CH 12
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [469-505] 185b- 383b-384c / Generation and Corruption, BK n,
186a CH 10 439a-b / ft
164d; 178a-179b; 190b-201a,c; PART i, 246b-c A 2, ANS and REP i 2b-4a; Q 51, A i, ANS 12b-
48 MELVILLE: Moby DicJ(, ixa-xxa; 221b-224b; 13c; Q 54, A 3 24c-25b; Q 63, A i 63a-64a; Q
243b-249a; 267a-271a; 335a-341 71, A 2 106d-107c; Q 85 178b-184a; Q 91, A 2
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 152a<166a,c csp 208d-209d; Q 94 220d-226b; PART 11-11, Q
165d-166a,c; 241d-243a 182, A i, ANS 620b-621d; Q 183, A i 625a-626a
50 MARX: Capital, 181d [fn 3] 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xi 15a~16b;
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE IT, 688a PURGATORY, xvii [82]-xvin [75] 79b-80c;
PARADISE, VIII [115-148] 118b-C
5. Nature or the natural as the standard of the 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagmel, BK i,
right and the good 65c-d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 60a-c; 71d-73a; 93b-
5a. Human nature in relation to the good for
94a; 216c-219a; 424d-426b; 502c-504c; 508a-
man 512a; 520b-d; 528c-529b; 538a-543a,c
5 SOPHOCLES Philoctetes [895-903] 190a
: 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT 11,
6TnucYDiDEs: War, BK i,
Peloponncsian n [173-188] 115b-c
sc
368a-d; BK iv, 461d-462a; BK v, 504c-507c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 70d-71b;
7 PLATO: Symposium, 155d-157a / Gorgias, 94d
282b 284b / Republic, BK i, 309b-310b; BK 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PREF, 423c; PROP
iv, 350a-355c; BK vm, 410a-c; BK ix, 421a- 18, SCHOL-PROP 28 429a-431c; PART v, PROP
5c. The naturalness of the state and political 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SLCT 2 259d-
obligation 260a
7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 316c-319c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 49,
b
9 ARISIOILE: Ethics, BK v, CH 7 [ii34 i8-ii35 a A 2, REP i 2b-4a
4] 382c-d / Politics,
BK i, CH 2 445b-446d; 21 DANTE:
Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, x [22-
CH 5 _6 447d-449b; CH 8 [i256b 2o-26] 450c; 67c-68b esp [28-33] 67d xn t 10 -? 2 ]
96] ;
6. Nature in religion and theology Colossians passim, esp 3:9-10 / James, 4:1-10
/ // Peter, 1:3-4 / I John passim, esp 2:15-16,
6a. The personification and worship of nature
3 :i 5 4~5
:
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Terms or discussions relevant to the conception of the nature of a thing as its essence, see
BEING 8c~8e; DEFINITION la; FORM 2c(2), 3c; IDEA 40(3); ONE AND MANY 3b~3b(i);
SAME AND OTHER 33-33(1).
Terms or discussions relevant to the conception of nature as the totality of things or
as the whole of sensible reality, see EXPERIENCE i; GOD ii; ONE AND MANY ib; WORLD
Other considerations of the distinction between nature and art, see ART 2a-2c, pa; and for the
distinction between the natural and the conventional in language, law, and justice, see
CUSTOM AND CONVENTION i; JUSTICE 6b, loa; LANGUAGE 2a-2b; LAW 2, 4f; SIGN AND
SYMBOL la-if; SLAVERY 2, 3.
CHAPTER 60 : NATURE 249
For: The distinction between the state of nature and the state of civil society, and for the problem
of the naturalness of the family and the state, see FAMILY i; LAW 4b; LIBERTY ib;
NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5b~5d; STATE i-ia, 30-30; WAR AND PEACE i.
Another consideration of the distinction between nature and nurture, see HABIT i, 3d.
Other treatments of natural and violent motion, see CHANGE 7b; MECHANICS 5ef2)~5f.
The distinction between the natural, the voluntary, and the free, see CAUSE 3; LIBERTY 4b;
WILL 3a(i)-3a(2), 6c.
The distinction between the natural and the supernatural, see GOD 6b-6c(4), 10; HABIT
5e(i)~5e(3); HAPPINESS yc; KNOWLEDGE 60(5); RELIGION 6f; THEOLOGY 2; VIRTUE AND
VICE 2b, 8d-8e; WISDOM la, ic.
Discussions bearing on the rationality or order of nature, see MIND loa; RELATION 5b; WORLD
6c; and for the special problem of continuity or hierarchy in the order of nature, see
ANIMAL ib-ic; EVOLUTION 43, 4c; LIFE AND DEATH 2, 33; MAN la, ic; WORLD 6b.
The reign of causality and the uniformity of nature, see CHANCE 2a; FATE 5; NECESSITY AND
CONTINGENCY 30; WILL 5c; snd for the problem of final causes in nature, see CAUSE 6.
Othei considerations of divine causality in relation to the order of nature, see CAUSE 7b~7d;
GOD ye.
Nature in relation to the various sciences, see METAPHYSICS 2a, 3b; PHILOSOPHY 2a-2b;
PHYSICS i-ib; SCIENCE $a; TRUTH 2c.
The nature of man as a standard in ethics, economics, and politics, see CITIZEN 8; DEMOCRACY
4b; DESIRE 3a; GOOD AND EVIL 33; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 50; SLAVERY 2d, 3d;
STATE 3b(i); WEALTH lob.
The theological discussion of nature and grace in human life, see GOD yd; HABIT 5e(i);
HAPPINESS ya; MAN9b(i)-pb(2); SIN 33, 30, y; VIRTUE AND VICE 8b.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
WHEWELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, BRIDGMAN. The Logic of Modern Physics, CH 4
VOL i, BK x, CH 3 EDDINGTON. The Nature ofthe Physical World, CH 13
TIIOREAU. A Wee^ on the Concord and Menimac\ LENZEN. The Nature of Physical Theory, PART n
Rivers LEVY-BRUHL. Primitives and the Supernatural
Walden
. SANTAYANA. Reason in Common Sense, CH 3-5
TYNDALL. The Belfast Address Scepticism and Animal Faith, CH 22
.
LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK i, CH 1-2; BK iv, CH 1-3 The Genteel Tradition at Bay, CH 2-3
.
.
Logic, BK n, CH 8 MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, CH 3
.
Metaphysics, BK n, CH 7-8 LOVE JOY. The Great Chain of Being, CH 10
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL vi, par 88-101, COLLINGWOOD. The Idea of Nature
395-4 2 7 PLANCK. "The Unity of the Physical Universe," in
NIETZSCHE. The Will to Power, BK in (2) A Survey of Physics
FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART i, CH 3-6; PART The Philosophy of Physics, CH 2
.
ROYCE. The World and the Individual, SERIES n SHERRINGTON. Man on His Nature, i-n, xii
(5) WOODBRIDGE. An Essay on Nature
C. READ. The Metaphysics of Nature KELSEN. Society and Nature
BERGSON. Creative Evolution, CH 3 CASSIRER. Substance and Function, PART n, CH 6
B. RUSSELL. Philosophical Essays, CH 2 The Myth of the State, PART n (9)
HENDERSON, The Order of Nature VON WEIZSACKER. The History of Nature
Chapter 61: NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY
INTRODUCTION
basic meaning of the words necessity man's action from the external necessity of
THE
and contingency is made known to us by coercion or constraint; or does it consist in a
the fact that we can substitute for them the man's being able to choose whatever he chooses,
familiar words must and may. "Is there any be- freely rather than necessarily? Is every act of
ing which must exist?" asks the same question the will necessarily determined, or are some
as, "Does anything exist of necessity?" "Are all acts of the will acts of free choice ?
things of the sort which may or may not exist, Are certain human institutions, such as the
or are they divided into those which must exist family and the state, necessary ? Are men com-
and those which may or may not exist?" means pelled to live socially or can they choose the
the same as, "Is everything contingent in be- ? If domestic and
solitary life political society
ing or do some things exist necessarily and some are necessary, are the ways in which they are
human history and social institutions. In each These questions indicate the range of subject
case, the problem is formulated by such ques- matters in which issues are raised concerning
tions as: Does everything which happens in the necessary and the contingent. They also
nature or history happen necessarily? Is every- which necessity
indicate that the other ideas to
thing contingent ? Or are some events necessary and contingency have relevance are too mani-
and others contingent ? Is the relation between fold to permit an enumeration of all the other
cause and effect a necessary connection, or do chapters in which some aspect of necessity and
some causes produce their effects contingently ? contingency is discussed. This chapter stands to
Are there some propositions which the mind the others as a kind of summary of the theme
must affirm because their truth is necessary? of necessity and contingency. It assembles in
Or are all propositions such that they may or one place the various topics, problems, or sub-
may not be true, our affirmation or denial of ject matters which traditionally engage the
them being contingent upon factors which lie human mind with that theme.
outside the propositions themselves? In reason- Two chapters alone demand specific men-
ing, does the conclusion always follow by neces- tion as, in a sense, being concerned with ideas
sityfrom the premises if it follows at all ? And seem to be inseparable from the notions of
that
are all conclusions which follow necessarily and contingency. They are FATE and
necessity
from their premises necessarily true, or may CHANCE. Though they stand opposed to one
some be necessary truths and some contingent ? another as the necessary to the contingent,
Are men necessitated in all their acts, or are they do not cover every application of this
certain actions contingent upon the exercise opposition. They are largely concerned with
of their will and in this sense free? Does hu- necessity and contingency in the realm of
man liberty consist merely in the freedom of a change, in the causation o!f the events of na-
251
252 THE GREAT IDEAS
ture or the happenings of history. They do not will, proceed from liberty, and yet, because every
deal, at least not directly, with necessity and act of man's will, and every desire, and inclina-
contingency in being or existence, in thought tion, proceeds from some cause, and that from
or knowledge, in human acts and social institu- another cause, in a continual chain (whose first
tions. link is in the hand of God, the first of all
from necessity."
causes), they proceed
THE NECESSARY AND the contingent do not Yet what Hobbes means by "external im-
if
seem to be opposed in exactly the same way pediments" represents the same nullification
in each of the four areas namely, being, of liberty which others call "compulsion" or
change, thought, and action in which they "restraint," then there is at least one meaning
raise basic issues. of "necessity" which stands opposed to liberty.
In the sphere of human action, for example, Enumerating the meanings of "necessary,"
writers like Hobbes, Locke, and Hume substi- Aristotle lists as one sense "the compulsory or
tute the notion of liberty for contingency as compulsion, i.e., that which impedes or tends
the opposite of necessity. The meaning of ne- to hinder, that which is contrary to impulse or
cessity alters in consequence. Liberty, accord- purpose ... or to the movement which accords
ing to these authors, implies the absence not of with purpose and with reasoning." It is in a
all necessity,but only of external necessity in related sense that Plato opposes necessity to
the form of compulsion. An internal necessity, intelligence. Necessity represents for him those
they think, is
quite compatible with complete resistant factors in nature which the mind of
freedom. man or God must overcome, or persuade to
Hume therefore dismisses the supposed con- give way, if reason or purpose is to prevail in the
flict between liberty and necessity as ground- coming to be of anything. In this sense, ne-
less. "By liberty," he writes, "we can only cessity like chance is opposed to purpose. Blind
mean a power of acting or not acting, according necessity and blind chance both exclude the
to the determinations of the ///'; that is, if we operation of final causes; both exclude the pos-
choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose sibility that the events of nature are directed
to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical toward an end.
everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. . . . WE SEEM TO HAVE found almost universal
Liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to con- agreement on the point that there is one sense
straint, is the same thing with chance; which in which necessity conflicts with liberty. But
is
universally allowed to have no existence." thisagreement docs not affect the issue whether
Similarly, Locke defines libeity as a man's liberty is more than freedom from external
power "to do or forbear doing any particular coercion. Theic are those, like Aquinas, who
action, according as doing or forbearance
its think that man's will is free in its acts of choice
has the actual preference in the mind, which is with regard to "particular contingent means."
the same thing as to say, according as he himself Aquinas agrees that what is called "necessity of
compulsion, to do what is contrary to his will operating within the sphere of the will itself.
or to refrain from doing what he wills. Aquinas names two modes of necessity which
Hobbes seems to go even further along the operate within the sphere of the will and restrict
same line of thought. Holding that liberty is its freedom. One is the natural necessity that
destroyed only by external impediments to the will should desire an ultimate end, such as
action, he uses "necessity" in a sense which the complete good or happiness. If a man wills
makes it consistent with liberty, or inseparable any object at all as the ultimate goal of his life,
from it. "The actions which men voluntarily he cannot will anything other or less than that
do," he says, "because they proceed from their which can satisfy all his natural desires. The
CHAPTER 61: NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 253
other necessity is that which concerns the use If now we shift from human action to the realm
of those means which are absolutely indispen- of becoming, change, or motion, we face the
sable conditions for reaching the end being question of the relation between necessity and
may be an absolute or a condition- its most general form.
sought. This causation in
al necessity. When the end is itself
necessary In the realm of nature the alternatives to
(e.g., happiness), whatever means are necessary necessity are referred to as "chance" and as
thereto necessitate the will absolutely. When a "contingency." The significance of these alter-
certain end is not necessary, but has been freely natives depends on the theory of causation. Ac-
adopted (e.g., a certain destination), and when cording to one opinion, every effect is neces-
only one means is available (e.g., one mode of sarily determined by its causes, and every
transportation), then it becomes necessary to cause necessarily produces certain effects. Given
choose that means. But this necessity is con- the causal chain of past events leading up to the
ditional since it remains in force only on the present, every future event is necessarily de-
condition that we continue to have a certain termined. Nothing that ever happens could
end in view an end we can relinquish at any happen otherwise. Nothing happens contin-
time as freely as we adopted it. gently or by chance. This theory of causation is
According to Aquinas, this leaves a great accordingly a doctrine of universal necessity or
many acts of the will which are in no way neces- absolute determinism in the realm of change.
sitated: those in no necessary
which there is "In nature," writes Spinoza, "there is noth-
connection between the means and a given end, ing contingent, but all things are determined
and those in which a given means is necessary from the necessity of the divine nature to exist
only on the condition that a certain end is and act in a certain manner." Though nothing
sought. If the end need not be sought, then which exists or happens is contingent, "God
the will is free not to choose the means of alone exists from the necessity of His own na-
achieving it; and if, when the end is
necessarily ture and acts alone from the necessity of His
sought, alternative means are -available, then own nature." The divine necessity is therefore
the will is free to choose one rather than an- different from the necessity of everything else
cessity. Furthermore, liberty seems to be re- termination by another. "That thing is called
lated positively to contingency, insofar as free- free," says Spinoza, "which exists from the
dom of choice depends on a contingent connec- necessity of its own nature alone, and is deter-
tion between means and ends, or upon the mined to action by itself alone. That thing, on
contingent, i.e., the conditional, character of the other hand, is called necessary, or rather
the end. On the other hand, those who hold compelled, which by another is determined to
that the will is never free from internal neces- existence and action in a fixed and prescribed
sity insist that the act of choice, even with manner."
respect to contingent means, is
always caused. Hume's statement that there is "no such
If being caused is
equivalent to being deter- thing as Chance in the world," would appear to
minedwhich seems to be the view of Hobbes, agree with Spinoza's denial of contingency. But
Locke, and Hume then whether or not we Hume also seems to deny the perception of any
know what causes a particular choice, our wills necessary connection between cause and effect.
are so determined that we could not have This is not to say that events happen without
chosen otherwise. cause, but only that"our ignorance of the real
cause of any event has the same influence on
THE PROBLEM OF the freedom of the will in the understanding" as if nothing were neces-
relation to the causes which determine its acts sarily determined by its causes.
isconsidered in the chapter on WILL. The fore- "We are never able," Hume thinks, "to dis-
going discussion suffices here for the purpose of cover any power or necessary connexion, any
throwing light on the meaning of necessity. quality, which binds the effect to the cause,
254 THE GREAT IDEAS
and renders the one an infallible consequence The issue concerning contingency in nature
of the other. . . . One event follows another; thus seems to be more sharply stated when
but we never can observe any tie between there no reference to our knowledge or ig-
is
them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. norance of causes. On this issue, Aristotle and
. . . Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causa- Spinoza appear to be more clearly opposed to
tion arises entirely from the uniformity ob- one another than Hume is to either.
servable in the operations of nature, where If thingsdo not take place of necessity, "an
similar objects are constantly conjoined togeth- event," according to Aristotle, "might just as
er, and the mind is determined by custom to easily not happen as happen; for the meaning
one from the appearance of the other.
infer the of the word 'fortuitous' with regard to pres-
These two circumstances form the whole of ent or future events is that reality is so con-
that necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Be- stituted that it
may issue two oppo-
in cither of
yond the constant conjunction of similar objects, site directions." For example, "a sea-fight must
and the consequent inference from one to the either take place tomorrow or not, but it is not
other,we have no notion of any necessity or necessary that it should take place tomorrow,
connexion." neither is it necessary that it should not take
But the question remains whether in the place, yet it is necessary that it either should or
order of nature itself particular events are nec- should not take place tomorrow." Though
essarilydetermined or happen contingently. Aristotle holds that "one of the two proposi-
The fact that we may be ignorant of real ne- tions in such instances must be true and the
cessities does not, as Hume seems to admit, insists that "we cannot say
other false," he also
imply their non-existence. Our saying it is only detcrminatcly that this or that is false, but
probable that the sun will rise tomorrow may must leave the alternative undecided."
reflect our inadequate knowledge of causes Aristotle's view with regard to propositions
rather than a real indeterminacy in the order of about future particular events is that our judg-
nature. On the other hand, to say as Hume ments cannot be cither true or false, not be-
does that chance has no place in nature, may cause of insufficient knowledge on our part, but
mean only that "nothing exists without a cause because future particulars arc in themselves
of its existence," rather than that whatever always contingent. Nothing in the nature of
happens is
necessarily determined by its causes. things or causes existent in the past or present
necessarily determines them to happen. They
As INDICATED IN the chapter on CHANCE, two will occur only if independent causes happen to
things must be distinguished here: the absolute- coincide. Since these causes are independent
tion. But by itself it may not be sufficient for lems for the theologian concerning God's knowl-
the production of that effect. If the maxim, edge and will. Does the fact that nothing hap-
"nothing exists without a cause of its exist- pens contrary to God's will imply that whatever
ence," requires a cause or causes adequate to happens happens necessarily? Aquinas answers
produce the effect, then the maxim is equiva- that "God wills some things to be done neces-
lent to the principle of sufficient reason. When- sarily, some contingently. Therefore, to
. . .
ever two or more causes, each of which may be some effects, He has attached necessary causes
necessary, are not sufficient in separation, the that cannot fail; but to others defectible and
existence of the effect depends upon their com- contingent causes, from which arise contingent
bination; and the effect is
contingent if the effects ... it being His will that they should
infallibly does not seem to Aquinas to be in- cannot be objects of scientific knowledge. But,
consistent with the real contingency of some according to Aquinas, "contingent things can
things. He explains that "whoever knows a be considered in two ways: either as contingent
contingent effect in its causes only, has merely or as containing some element of necessity,
a conjectural knowledge of it." But "God since every contingent thing has in it something
knows all contingent things not only as they necessary; for example, that Socrates runs is in
are in their causes, but also as each one of them itself contingent; but the relation of running to
is
actually in itself. . . . Hence it is manifest that motion is necessary, for it is necessary that
contingent things are infallibly known by God, Socrates moves if he runs."
inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight The contingency that Socrates may or may
in their presentiality; yet they are future con- not run does not alter the hypothetical neces-
tingent things in relation to their own causes." sity that //"he runs, he must move. In its con-
This has a bearing on the difference between cern with contingent things, natural science is
human and divine apprehension of future con- concerned only with such hypothetical neces-
tingent things. "Things reduced to actuality in sities. Unlike physics, other sciences may deal
time," Aquinas declares, "arc known by us suc- with absolutely necessary things. That the ob-
cessively in time, but by God they are known mathematics are of this sort seems to be
jects of
in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us an opinion shared by James and Kant, Hume
they cannot be certain, since we know future and Descartes, Plato and Aristotle. But they
contingent things only as contingent futures; do not agree on whether the necessities of
but they are certain to God alone, Whose un- mathematics belong to reality or have only
derstanding is in eternity above time. Just as he ideal existence, /.., whether they exist apart
who goes along the road does not see those who from or only in the human mind. This issue is
come after him; whereas he who sees the whole connected with another major issue concerning
road from a height sees at once all those travel- necessity and contingency, namely, whether
ling on
Hence," Aquinas continues, "what
it.
any reality has necessary existence.
is known by us must be necessary, even as it is
proper causes." It does not follow, therefore, theories of causation. With regard to being or
that everything tyown by God must necessarily real existence, however, there seems to be a
be\ for that statement, according to Aquinas, common understanding of the alternatives,
"may refer to the thing or to the saying. If it even among those who do not agree that God
refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for alone a necessary being because they think
is
the sense is, Everything which God %nows is that this world is also determined to exist as a
makes another distinction in answering the is," writes Aristotle, "and from this sense of
question whether man can have scientific or 'necessary' all its other meanings are somehow
certain knowledge of contingent things. If, as derived." This insight is sometimes expressed
Aristotle seems to hold, the objects of knowl- by the statement that the opposite of the nec-
edge are necessary, not contingent things, then essary is the impossible, whereas the contin-
the realm of contingency belongs to opinion, gentwhich is neither necessary nor impossible
conjecture, or probability. Insofar as the par- includes contrary possibilities.
ticular events of nature are contingent, they In logical analysis what is' called the "modal-
256 THE GREAT IDEAS
ity of necessity" is attributed to judgments the As Aristotle traces the implications of these
contradictories of which are self-contradictory; modes of we see that may-be implies
'to be,'
e.g.,
if the proposition 'the whole is not greater may-not-be, which contradicts must-be; and
than any of its parts' represents an impossible similarly that may-not-be implies may-be, which
judgment, then the contradictory proposition contradicts cannot-be.
'the whole //greater than any of its parts' repre- When we pass from the analysis of proposi-
sents a necessary judgment. In contrast, as tions or judgments to the consideration of being
Hume points out, "that the sun will not rise to- or existence, the situation is simpler. Since the
morrow no less intelligible a proposition, and
is impossible is that which cannot exist, whatever
implies no more contradiction than the affirma- does exist must either be necessary or possible.
tion that it will rise." These two propositions Here the necessary and the possible are gener-
represent contrary possibilities. No matter ally understood to exclude one another. The
which turns out to be true, the event could necessary is that which cannot not be, the pos-
have been otherwise. sible that which can not be.
In logical analysis some complication seems
to arise from the fact that the necessary has two IN SPITE OF THIS common understanding of the
opposites: the impossible on the one hand, and alternatives, there are basic differences among
the possible or contingent on the other. This the authors of the great books in regard to the
is usually clarified by the recognition that the analysis or demonstration of necessary being.
possible is the opposite of the impossible as well Aristotle, for example, tends to identify the
as of the necessary. In that sense of "possible" possible with the perishable with that which
which excludes only the impossible, the necessary both comes into being and passes away. Those
is,of course, possible, for what is necessary can- substances are necessary, in contrast, which
not be impossible. But in that sense of "pos- are not subject to generation and corruption.
sible" which implies contrary possibilities, the Holding that the matter of the celestial bodies
possible excludes the necessary as well as the differs from that of terrestrial bodies with re-
according to Aristotle, "that it is not impossi- as necessary beings, eternal in the sense of al-
which must necessarily be need not be; which changing things of this earth are all contingent
is absurd. But again, the proposition 'it is in being, for the mutability to which their mat-
necessary that it should be' does not follow ter inclines them includes coming to be and
from the proposition 'it may be,' nor does the passing away.
proposition 'it is necessary that it should not This analysis of necessity and contingency
be.' For the proposition 'it may be' implies a in terms of matter's potentialities leads to an-
two-fold possibility, while, if either of the two other conception of necessary being that of a
former propositions is true, the twofold possi- totally immutable being which has necessary
bility vanishes. For if a thing may be, it
may existence because it lacks matter entirely and,
also not be, but necessary that it should
if it is since it consists of form alone, is
purely actual.
be or that it should not be, one of the two alter- Whether or not there are for Aristotle sub-
natives will be excluded. It remains, therefore, stances other than the prime mover which are
that the proposition 'it is not necessary that it necessary because they are immaterial beings,
should not be* follows from the proposition 'it he attributes pure actuality only to that one
may be.' For this is true also of that which necessary being which is an unmoved mover.
must necessarily be." Aquinas seems to adopt both of Aristotle's
Of the same
thing we can say that it may be senses of "necessary being." He treats the celes-
and that it may not be; but we cannot say of the tial bodies and the angels as having necessity to
same thing both that it may be and that it must the extent that they are immutable. But their
be, or that it may not be and that it cannot be. immutability is limited in his opinion to the
CHAPTER 61: NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 257
fact that they arc by nature imperishable the essence of an infinite being, no less chan the
celestial bodies because of their matter; the equality of its angles to two right angles is in-
angels because they are simple substances, not volved in that of a triangle." But though this
composed of matter and form. Since they are suggests the notion of God's existence follow-
creatures they cannot be altogether immutable. ing from His essence, Descartes also says that
"All creatures," Aquinas writes, "before they "in God existence is not distinguished from
existed, were possible" and in this sense con- essence."
tingent as regards their being, not necessary. For Descartes as for Aquinas the basic point
"As it was in the Creator's power to produce remains that that which does not depend for
them before they existed in themselves," he its being upon any external cause, exists neces-
continues, "so likewise is it in the Creator's sarily. Descartes, furthermore, associates the
power when they exist in themselves to bring necessary existence of an independent being
them to nothing." Furthermore, at every mo- with that being's infinity or perfection of na-
ment of their existence, their contingent being ture. That which is conceived as infinite or per-
depends upon God's power. God preserves fect cannot be conceived as lacking existence.
ing, is truly a necessary being because in God whose essence involves existence." But unlike
alone existence is identical with essence. Only a him Spinoza also attributes necessity in an-
being whose very essence it is to exist is inca- other sense to every finite and mutable thing
pable of not existing; only such a being is nec- which God causes to exist; for in his view, God
essary in the sense of being purely actual. All not only exists necessarily but, acting from the
created things must be contingent, for if in necessity of His own nature, God also necessi-
their case to exist belonged to their very na- tates whatever follows as a consequence of His
tures, God
could not have created them by action. No other world than this is possible.
causing their natures to exist, nor when they "Things could be produced by God" Spinoza
did exist would His power be necessary to sus- writes, "inno other manner and in no other
tain them in being. order than that in which they have been pro-
Where Aquinas defines God's necessity in duced." Furthermore, since whatever is in
terms of the identity of essence and existence, God's power "necessarily follows from it, and
Descartes and Spinoza tend to conceive God consequently exists necessarily," it is impossible
as necessary because his essence is such that his for this world not to have existed. The existence
existence follows from it. The difference may of this particular world is as inseparable from
affect the meaning with which it is said that God's existence as God's own existence is in-
God is uncaused or that God is self-caused. "If separable from His essence or nature.
its existence is caused," Aquinas writes, "noth- In the tradition of western thought, there
ing can be the sufficient cause of its own exist- is, perhaps, no deeper theological issue than
ence." According to Descartes, to say that God that which opposes the freedom of God's will
is "cause of His own existence . . .
merely means to the necessity of God's acting according to
that the inexhaustible power of God is the His nature; and which, in consequence, sets
cause or reason why he needs no cause." the possibility of other worlds (or even of no
Descartes' position seems to be that that world at all) against the necessity that, if God
which is self-caused in the sense of having its exists, this particular world inevitably follows.
existence determined by its own nature or es- Taking the other side on both points, Aqui-
sence, is also uncaused in the sense that its exist- nas, for example, argues that "since the good-
ence not caused by anything outside itself.
is ness of God is
perfect, and can exist without
"Existence," he writes, "is involved in the other things inasmuch as no perfection can
258 THE GREAT IDEAS
accrue to Him from them, it follows that His i.e., as requiring a cause outside Himself in
willing things apart from Himself is not abso- order to exist. Kant, for example, admits that
lutely necessary." As for the particular features existence must be included in the conception of
of Aquinas says that "since God
this world, God as ens realissimumthe most real and per-
does not act from natural necessity" nor from a fect being. But he denies that the real existence
will that is
"naturally or from necessity de- of the object so conceived is implied by the
termined" to the things which exist, it follows logical necessity of the conception itself.
that "in no way at all is the present course of This amounts to saying that it is possible for
events produced by God from any necessity, a being we cannot conceive except as existing,
so that other things could not happen. . . . not to exist. Aquinas seems to make the same
Wherefore, we must simply say that God can critical point when he says that even if every-
do other things than those He has done." one understood by the word "God" something
Other, and even better, worlds than this are than which nothing greater can be conceived,
"God could make other things, or
possible, for and therefore a being necessarily existing, still
add something to the present creation; and it would not follow that "he understands that
then there would be another and a better uni- what the word signifies actually exists, but only
verse." mentally."
Nor docs the Christian theologian admit that Stated in its most general form, the problem
the divine nature subject to any necessity.
is is whether that which is inconceivable by the
"We do not put the life of God or the fore- human mind is impossible in reality ;
or whether
Augustine, "if we should say that it is neces- in thought, is also necessary in fact or existence.
sary that God should live forever, and fore- However that issue is resolved, it must be
know all things; as neither is His power dimin- noted that among the so-called a posteriori
ished when we say that He cannot die or fall demonstrations of God's existence, or argu-
into error for this is in such a way impossible ments from the existence of certain effects to
to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He the existence of their cause, one mode of rea-
would be of less power. But assuredly He is soning turns upon the distinction between con-
rightly called omnipotent, though He can tingent and necessary being.
neither die nor fall into error. For He is called //'contingent beings exist (as it is evident
omnipotent on account of His doing what He they do, from the mutability and perishability
wills, not on account of His suffering what He of physical things), and if each contingent being
wills not; for if that should befall him, He is
by definition incapable of causing its own
would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, existence, and
one contingent being cannot
if
He cannot do some things for the very reason cause the existence of another, and if every-
that He is
omnipotent." thing which exists must have a cause for its
impossible in fact for God not to exist. Those arguments for the existence of a necessary be-
who reject such reasoning do not deny that it ing, namely, that such reasoning always im-
is unintelligible or self-contradictory to think plicitly contains the ontological argument, and
of God as merely possible rather than necessary, is
thereby invalidated.
CHAPTER 61 : NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 259
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The meaning of necessity and contingency: the possible and the impossible 260
2#. The argument for the existence of a necessary being: the problem of logical and
ontological necessity
30. The distinction between the essential and the accidental cause: the contingent
effect; contingency and chance 263
3& The necessity of contingent events: absolute and hypothetical or conditional
necessity; necessitation by efficient or material and final or formal causes
4<
Mathematical necessity: necessity in the objects of mathematics and in mathe-
matical reasoning
50. Liberty and necessity in human conduct: the voluntary and the compulsory
(1) The necessitation of the will: the range of its freedom 266
5#. The necessity of family and state: the contingency of their forms and institutions
y. Necessity and contingency in relation to the natural and conventional in law 267
$d. The necessity or inevitability of slavery, poverty, war, or crime
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
358b-359d; PROP 17 362b-363c; PROP 20, 129c-d / Topics, BK n, CH 6 [ii2 b j-2i] 157d-
COROL 2 364a; PROP 24 29 365a-366c; PROP 158a / Physics, BK n, CH 6 [igHVijl 275a;
a
33 367b-369a; PART n, AXIOM i 373c CH 8 [i99 34 Jj i2] 276c-d; CH 9 277b-278a,c
Heavens, BK n, CH 5 [287 22-26] 379b;
l)
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 74b-76c /
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d- CH 8 [289^2-28] 381b; BK iv, CH 3 [310^3-
157c 32] 401 d / Generation and Corruption, BK
n, CH 6 13 3 3
tt
3 5-334*9] 434b-435a; CH n
2d. Thenecessary and contingent with respect 439c-441a,c / BK vn, CH 7
Metaphysics,
to properties, accidents, and modes
[1032*15 22] 555a-b; BK ix, CH 5 573a-c;
a
7 PLAIO: Phacdo, 244b 246c BK xi, CH 8 593a-d; BK xn, CH 3 [io7o 4-9]
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 13 [32 599b
4-14] 48b-c / Posterior Analytics, i, CH 4
BK 9 ARISTOTLE Parts of Animals,
: BK i, cu i
a b
lOOa-lOlb / Topics, BK CH i 178b,d-179b;
v, [64<) io- 5l 162b-163a / Ethics, BK HI, CH 3
b
CH 3 [i3i b i9~37] 182b-c; BK vi, CH 14 [i5i ft
[ni2 i8-32] 358a-b; BK x, cu 3 [ii73 4-7]
ft
b b n b
32- 2] 206b-c / Physics, BK i, CH 3 [i86 i9~ 427d / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 10 Ii369 3i- 4]
593a-b 463d-464d
9 ARISTOTLE: BK i, CH 3 [io94b23-27]
Ethics, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xvn [13-
a b
339d-340a; BK in, CH 3 [ni2 i9- i2] 358a-c; 45] 132b-c
BK vi, CH 3 [ii39b i8-24] 388b-c; CH 5 [ii4o a 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK iv, STANZA
b b
30- i]389a-b; [ii4o 24-28] 389c / Rhetoric, 145-146 107b
BK i, CH 2 [i357 i4-b2i] 596d-597c
ft
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [80-134] I37a-
19 AQUINAS: Summa
Theologica, PART i, Q 14, 138a
A ANS and REP 3 86d-88c; Q 19, A 3, REP 6
13, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 365a-b;
HOb-lllc; Q 47, A i, REP 3 256a-257b; Q 79, BK x, 441b-442a; BK xni, 584c-585c; EPI-
A 9, REP 3 422b-423d; Q 82, A 2, ANS 432d- LOGUE n, 685a
433c; Q 86, A 3 463b-d
4d. Mathematical necessity: necessity in the
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
objects of mathematics and in mathe-
84, A i, REP 3 174b-175a; Q 94, A 4, ANS
223d-224d matical reasoning
31 DESCARTES: Rules, H 2a-3b; xii, 21d-22b / 7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 361 b-c
Discourse, PART n, 47a; PART iv, 52a / Medi- 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH 9 [200*15-29]
tations, i 75a-77c; v, 95b-96a / Objections and 277c-d
Replies, 124d-125a 31 DESCARTES: Rules, n, 3a-b / Discourse, PART
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 44 389b-390a 11, 47b-c; PART iv, 52d-53a / Meditations, \,
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 93b-c / Objections and Replies, 113c-114a
SECT 9-16 315c-317c esp SECT 14 316b-d; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in,
SECT 28-29 322a-323a; CH vi, SECT 5-16 332b- SECT 18-20 317d-319c; SECT 29, 322c; CH iv,
336d passim; CH ix, SECT i 349a; CH xn, SECT 6 325a-b; CH vn, SECT 6 338b-c; CH
SECT 9 360d-361b; CH xv, SECT 1-3 365a-d; xni, SECT 3 364a
CH xvn, SECT 2 371d-372b; SECT 15-17 378d- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV
379c 20 458a-b; SECT xii, DIV 131 508d-509a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 17d-18d; 68a-
20-21 458a-c; DIV 30, 462a; SECTXII, DIV 131- 69c; 211c-218d esp 211c-212a, 215d-217a;
132 508d-509d passim 228c-d / Practical Reason, 295b-d; 330d-331a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c; 194b-c; 228c-d; / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 376c-d
240b-243c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, / Science of Right, 398c-399c esp 399a-b /
387a-d /Judgement, 601 d; 603 a- b; 603d-604b Judgement, 551a-553c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 365a-b; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 2
BK x, 441b-442a 9b-10a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 851a-890a esp 851a, 867a- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 874a-878a
868b, 879b, 889a-890a
4e. Necessity and contingency in logical
4b. Practical necessity as a cause of belief analysis
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART HI, 48b-50b /
4e(l) The modality of propositions or judg-
Objections and Replies, 126a-b
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 184-241 205a-217b ments: modal opposition
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 8 ARISTOTLE: CH 12-13 32d-35c
Interpretation,
126-128 507a-508a / Prior Analytics,CH 3 40a-c
BK i,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 124d-128a; 236b-243c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14,
esp 239a-240b, 241d-242c / Fund. Prin. Meta- A 13, REP 2 86d-88c
4<?(2) to 5a CHAPTER 61: NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 265
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14c-15c; 39c-41c csp 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vni, par 10-11
40d-41c / Judgement, 603a<b 55c-56b; BK x, par 65, 88a / City of God, BK
53 JAMES: Psychology, 851a v, CH i-io 207d-216c; BK xix, CH 5-6 513d-
515a; CH 15 521a-c / Christian Doctrine, BK n,
4e(2) Modality in reasoning: the logical ne- CH 25-26 649b-650a; CH 39-40 654c-656a
cessity of inference; the necessity and 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 23
contingency of premises and conclusions 132b-141b; Q 83, A i 436d-438a; PART I-H,
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH i [24 i8- QQ 6-10 644a-666a,c
26] 39c; CH 8-22 45b-57b / Posterior Analytics, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi
BK i, CH 6 [75*21-28] 103b / Metaphysics, BK [52-114] 77b-78a; PARADISE, i
[94-142] 107b-
b
v, CH 5 [ioi5 6~9] 535d-536a d; vni [91-148] 117d-118c
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [1357*14-30] 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK iv, STANZA
596d-597a 137-154 106b-108b / Knight's Tale [1312-
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 7, 112d-113d; 1324] 181b; [2987-3046] 209a-210a / Nun's
CH 26, 131b Priest's Tale [15,236-256] 456b-457a
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 31- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 59b; 86c; PART n,
34 651d-653b 112d-113c; 163d-164a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 19, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 52c-53c; 216c-219a;
A REP 3 116a-d; Q 44, A i, REP 2 238b-239a;
8, 528c-529b
Q 82, A 2, ANS 432d-433c; PART I-H, Q 13, 26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT i, sc n
A 5, ANS 675c-676b; A 6, REP 1-2 676c-677b [135-14!] 570d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 65c-d; 71c 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT i, sc n [128-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14d; 17d-18a; HOd- 164] 249a b; ACT iv, sc in [34-37] 272a
llla; 194b-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, 395a-d; PART iv,
PROP 2-4 425a-d; APPENDIX, i-n 447a-b
5. Necessity and contingency in human life and 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [80-134] 137a-
society 138a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 821 331b-332a
5a. Liberty and necessity in human conduct: 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK u, CH xxi,
the voluntary and the compulsory SECT 7-27 180a-184c; SECT 57 193b-c; SECT
4 HOMER: Iliad 3a-179d esp BK xxiv [513-551] 73 198c-199c; CH xxin, SECT 18 209a
176d-177a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 144
5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [160-226] 53d-54c 441d
5 EURIPIDES: Hecuba [864-867] 360b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vni
6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War,
: BK iv, 478b-487a
461d-462a; BK v, 506b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 56b; 59c-64a / Cratylus, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 133a; 190c-d; 234c-235a*
95b-c / Republic, BK v, 361 b-c; BK x, 439b- / Fund. Prm. Metaphysic of Morals, 279b,d-
441a,c 287d csp 279b,d, 282c, 286a-c / Practical
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 5 573a-c Reason, 292a-293b; 307d-314d / Science oj
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK HI, CH 1-3 355b,d- Right,400b,d-402a / Judgement, 571c-572a;
b
359a / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [i 357*1 4~ 2i] 587a-588a
b b
596d-597c; CH 10 [i368 i-i369 27] 611c-613a; 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 392d-393a; 549c
CH ii [1370*8-17] 613b-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 15
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK u [251-293] 16a-b; PART i, par 91-92 35d-36a; PART n,
18b-d par 118 42d-43b; ADDITIONS, 12 118a-c; 75
12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK v, 128a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-
SECT 8 269d-270b, SECT 19-20 272a, BK vi, 159b; 160c-190b passim, esp 162a-165b,
SECT 8 274b, SECT n 274c, SECT 39 277d, 168a-d, 186b-c
SECT 50 279a-b, SECT 58 279d, BK vn, SECT 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\ esp 121a, 159a, 395a-
54 283b, SECT 58 283c-d, SECT 68 284c-d, 397a
BK VIH, SECT 17 286d, SECT 32 287d-288a, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 221b-d; BK
SECT 35 288b, SECT 45-47 289a-c, BK ix, vn, 275a-276b; BK vni, 303d-304b; BK ix,
SECT 41 295c, BK x, SECT 3 296d, SECT 6 343b-d; EPILOGUE n, 688a-694d
297a-b, SECT 25 299c, SECT 33 300c-301a, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 84a-94b esp 89b-93a;
SECT 35 301b, BK XH, SECT 3 307b-d, SECT 291a-295b; 387b-388a; 796a-798b passim;
11-13 308b-c 820b-827a esp 821b-823b
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK iv, 68d-69b; BK vi, 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-
91b-d Analysis, 13a-c / General Introduction, 453b-
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR i, CH 8-10 81 d- 476a,c passim, esp 454b-c, 46 2d; 486b-488c
82b esp 486d-487a
266 THE GREAT IDEAS 5a(\) to 5b
(5a. Liberty and necessity in human conduct: the 298a, 307d-314d / Pref. Metaphysical Ele-
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK in, en 10 172d- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q
173c; BK xix, CH 5, 514a-b; CH 7 515a-c; CH 32, A 6 545b-546b
15 521a-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, llOb-c; 131b-132a; 216c-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92, A 218a passim; 489b 490c
;
i, REP 2 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 512d-513c 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT n, sc iv [263-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 94, 274] 261c; ACT in, sc iv [27-36] 264c
A 5, REP 3 224d-22Sd 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, APPENDIX, xxvm-
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH in, 5c; CH xiv, 21b; xxix 450a
CH xxi, 32a-d 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 91a-94a
268 THE GREAT IDEAS
300b-c / Demosthenes, 698a-699a / Marcus
(5* Necessity and contingency in human life and Brutus, 814d-815c
society. 5e. Economic necessities or lux- 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 49c; BK vi, 91b-d
uries.) / Histories, BK 11, 232d-233a
35 LOCKE Civil Government, CH v 30b-36a passim
: 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK i, PREF 129a-d;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vn, 44a; CH 36 149c-d; BK ii, CH 2-3 150c-151c; BK iv,
BK xni, 96a CH 33 206od; BK v, CH i 207d-208c; CH n-
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 327c-328a; 33 7b; 26 216c-230a,c; BK xv, CH i 397b,d-398c; CH
350a-c; 352a-353c; 364a-b; 365c-366b / 21-22 415b-416c; BK xvin, CH 1-2 472b,d-
Social Contract, BK i, 393d-394b 473d
39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations, BK i, 27b-37b pas- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vii [61-96]
sim; 63a-b; 70a-71d; 74d-75b;BK in, 163c- lOb-c; PURGATORY, xvi [52-129] 77b-78a
BK v, 383c-d
164c; 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH vi, 9a-b; CH xxv
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 22c 35a-36b
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 451d-452a 26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT iv, sc in
42 KANT: Judgement, 586b [215-224] 590d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 30, 102a-b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 609b-c; 630b
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 470d-471b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 590a~b
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 124d-125a; 389d-390a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 190- 340-360 110b-114a,c / Philosophy of History,
191 66a-b; par 195 66d-67a; par 203 68a-c; INTRO, 156c-190besp 156d-170b; 190b-201a,c;
ADDITIONS, 120 136b-c / Philosophy of History, PART i, 241d-242b; PART n, 274a-275a; 281d
INTRO, 193b-c; PART 11, 267a-b 282d; 283d-284a,c; PART in, 285a-b; 300c
50 MARX: Capital, 16c-17a; 81a-d; 88c; 112a-b; 301c; PART iv, 368d-369a,c
218d-219a; 253b-254b; 261c-262a; 280d-283c 50 MARX: Capital, 6d; 7b-c; lOb-lld; 174a-c
esp 282d-283b; 292c-296a esp 293c-294a 378b-d
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 421d-
5f. Necessity and contingency in history 422c passim; 425a-b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 21d-22a; BK ix, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK HI, 143a c; BK
291b-c ix, 342a-344b; BK x, 389a-391c; BK xi, 469a-
6TnucYDiDEs: Peloponnesian War, BK iv, 472b; BK xni 563a-587d; BK xiv, 588a-590c;
462a-b 609a-613d; BK xv, 618b-621b; 626d-630a;
7 PLATO: Laws, BK iv, 679a-c EPILOGUE i, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE n 675a-
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 8 [io74b 696d
11-13] 605a 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 801d-
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 18d; 20b-c / Timoleon 802a / New Introductory Lectures, 882b-884c
195a-213d esp 201a-203b / Phihpoemen, passim, esp 882c-d
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Matters relevant to the distinction between necessary and contingent being, see BEING 73,
7X3); CHANGE i5c; ETERNITY 3, 4b; GOD 2b, 43; and for the application of this distinction
to properties, accidents, and modes, see BEING yb(5)-7b(6), 8c-8e; NATURE ia(i).
Matters relevant to the distinction between necessity and contingency in the realm of
change, see CAUSE i-ia; CHANCE la, 2a; FATE 3; NATURE 3c(i).
Other discussions of the distinction between knowledge and opinion, and of the difference
between certainty and probability, see CHANCE 4; JUDGMENT 3, 9; KNOWLEDGE 4b, 6d(i)-
6d(2); OPINION i, 3b; TRUTH 2e; WILL 3b(i).
The moral certainty of the things in which it is
practically necessary to believe, see GOD 2d;
IMMORTALITY 33; METAPHYSICS 2d; WILL 5X4).
Other discussions of the truth of propositions about future contingents, see TIME 6f TRUTH
;
3b(a).
Necessity and contingency in logical analysis and in mathematical reasoning, see JUDGMENT
6c; MATHEMATICS ic; OPPOSITION id(2); PRINCIPLE 2b(2), 5; REASONING 3d; TRUTH
CHAPTER 61 : NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 269
For; The opposition between necessity and liberty in the sphere of human life and history, see
CAUSE 3; FATE 2-3, 5-6; HISTORY 43(1); LIBERTY ic, 43; NATURE if, 30(2); PRUDENCE
4a; WEALTH 11; WILL 5a(i)-5a(4), 50, 6a, yb; and for the related problem of divine prov-
idence in relation to human freedom, see FATE 4; GOD jb\ HISTORY 5a; LIBERTY 5a~5b;
WILL yc.
The necessary and contingent, or the natural and the conventional, with respect to the fomily
and the state, and also in language and law, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION i ; FAMILY i ;
JUSTICE loa; LAW 4f, 5e; NATURE 2b, 5c; PUNISHMENT 4c; STATE 30-3^
The consideration of the inevitability or necessity of certain social institutions or phenomena,
such as slavery, poverty, or war, see LAW 4h; NATURE 5b; OPPOSITION y\ SLAVERY 2, 3;
WAR AND PEACE 7; WEALTH pg, lob.
Another discussion of the distinction of the necessary, the possible, and the probable in
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
TN the great books of political theory the word tional government oligarchical and democratic
JL "oligarchy" is usually listed along with "mon- principles are the opposed sources of policy and
archy" and "democracy" among the traditional legislation. In modern as in ancient republics
names for the forms of government. According the division of men into political parties tends
to the meaning of their Greek roots, "oli- to follow the lines of the division of men into
garchy" signifies the rule of the few as "mon- economic factions. The ancient meanings of
archy" signifies the rule of one and "democ- oligarchy and democracy, especially for those
racy" the rule of the people or the many. observers like Thucydides and Aristotle who
These verbal meanings are somewhat altered, see the rich and the poor as the major rivals for
however, when we consider the actual conflict constitutional power, indicate the fusion of
between oligarchy and democracy in Greek po- political and economic issues.
involved an opposition, not simply
litical life. It The difference between oligarchy and de-
between the few and the many, but between mocracy, says Aristotle, is not well-defined by
the wealthy and the working classes. The con- reference to the few and the many, unless it is
test between these factions for political power understood that the few are also the rich and
dominated more than a century of Greek his- the many the poor. The issue is not whether
tory around the Periclean age; and that fact the few are wiser than the many, or whether it
justifies
Aristotle's remark that oligarchy and is more efficient to have the government in the
democracy arc the two principal conflicting hands of the few rather than the many. Such
forms of government. issues have been debated in the history of po-
We would not so describe the political strug- litical thought, but they are more appropriate
gle of our time. We
would not speak of oli- to the alternatives of aristocracy and democ-
garchy as one of the principal forms of govern- racy than to the conflict between oligarchy and
ment in the world today. Instead we tend to democracy.
think in terms of the conflict between democ- The between oligarchs and
historic struggle
racy and dictatorship or despotism. Even when democrats whether described as a struggle be-
we look to the background of present issues, it tween rich and poor, nobility and bourgeoisie,
is the age-old struggle between absolute and landed gentry and agrarian peons, owners and
constitutional government or between mon- workers, classes and masses is a
struggle over
archiesand republics which seems to supply the political privileges of wealth, the rights of
the obvious historical parallels for the contem- property, the protection of special interests. In
porary conflict between the principles of arbi- the tradition of the great books, Marx and
trary and legal government. The traditional Engels may be the first to call this struggle "the
terms of political theory, with the exception of class war," but they are only the most recent in
oligarchy, thus appear to have a certain liveli- a long line of political and economic writers to
ness in the consideration of current problems. recognize that the economic antagonism of rich
But though it does not have such frequency in and poor generates the basic political conflict in
our speech or familiarity in our thought, oli- any state. "Any city, however small," says
garchy may be much more relevant to the real Socrates, "is in fact divided into two, one the
of our day than appears on the surface.
issues city of the poor, the other of the rich: these are
Certainly within the framework of constitu- at war with one another."
270
CHAPTER 62: OLIGARCHY 271
OLIGARCHY is NOT always defined as the rule of parison. "Oligarchy and democracy," Aristotle
the wealthy, nor is it always conceived as the writes, "are not sufficiently distinguished mere-
opponent of democracy on constitutional ques- ly by these two characteristics of wealth and
tions. In the Statesman, for example, Plato first freedom." Though the "real difference be-
divides the forms of government into "mon- tween democracy and oligarchy is
poverty and
archy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the wealth," and though "wherever men rule by
many," and then divides "the rule of the few in- reason of their wealth, whether they be few or
to aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, many, that is an oligarchy," Aristotle does not
and oligarchy." Here aristocracy and oligarchy seem to think we can neglect the political sig-
seem to be regarded as oppositcs, the one a nificance of what he calls the "accidental fact
government in which the few rule according to that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor
the laws, the other lawless government by the numerous.
few. In both, the few are the wealthy; hence With regard to aristocracy and oligarchy, the
wealth is no more characteristic of oligarchy chief question does not seem to be one of prin-
than of aristocracy. ciple, but of fact. Plato in the Republic and
Some political theorists make no reference to Aristotle in the Politics define aristocracy as gov-
wealth at all in the discussion of oligarchy, ernment by the few best men, or the most
Hobbes divides the forms of government ac- virtuous.They also place it next to what is for
cording to whether the sovereign power is in them the ideal government by the supremely
the hands of one or more; and if in the hands of wise man the rule of the philosopher king, or
more than one, then whether it is held by some what Aristotle calls "the divine sort of govern-
or all. He callsthe several forms of government ment." In this context, oligarchy represents a
monarchy (one), aristocracy (some), and de- perversion of aristocracy, as tyranny represents
mocracy (all). There arc "other names of gov- a corruption of monarchy.
ernment in the histories and books of policy," Plato describes oligarchy as arising when
he adds, such as "tyranny and oligarchy. But "riches and rich men are honored in the State"
they are not the names of other forms of govern- and when the law "fixes a sum of money as the
ment, but of the same forms misliked. For they qualification for citizenship" and allows "no
that are discontented under monarchy call it one whose property falls below the amount
tyranny, and they that are displeased with aris- fixed to have any share in the government."
tocracy call it oligarchy." Like Hobbes, both But according to Socrates, wealth does not
Locke and Rousseau use no criterion except qualify men to rule, as virtue and wisdom do.
numbers forms of govern-
lo distinguish the "Just think what would happen," he says, "if
ment, Locke calling government by the few pilotswere to be chosen according to their
"oligarchy" and Rousseau calling it "aristoc- property, and a poor man were refused per-
racy." mission to steer, even though he were a better
Barely outlined in this way, the alternatives pilot." To which Adeimantus agrees that in
of monarchy, aristocracy or oligarchy, and de- government, as in navigation, the probable re-
and oligarchy is made to turn on whether the may not always be the case that the power of
few are men of virtue or men of property, or the few rests directly on wealth. The privileged
when, in the comparison of oligarchy with de- class may be a military clique or an hereditary
mocracy, the emphasis is not upon numbers but nobility. Yet these distinctions are seldom un-
on the principles of wealth and liberty. accompanied by the control of land or other
Nevertheless, the numerical criterion does forms of wealth, so that indirectly at least the
not seem to be totally irrelevant to the com- oligarchical factor is
thought to be operative.
272 THE GREAT IDEAS
THE CRITICISM OF aristocracies as masked oli- as a whole to the lower middle classes. He makes
garchies is discussed in the chapter on ARIS- this even plainer by what he has to say on
TOCRACY. The critical point seems to be that political discrimination as between the sexes.
nothing except superior virtue or talent justi- Suppose the suffrage to be extended to all men,
fies a political inequality between the few and he writes, "suppose that what was formerly
the many. The meaning of oligarchy is general- called by the misapplied name of universal suf-
ized in consequence to include any government frage, and now by the silly title of manhood
in which the special privileges or powers held suffrage, became the law; the voters would still
by the few cannot be justified, whether it is have a class interest, as distinguished from wo-
wealth or some other to pre-eminence
title men."
that is substituted for superiority in virtue or The oligarchical defect in representative gov-
talent. When it is so understood, the word "oli- ernment which Mill is here criticizing seems to
garchical" tends to become like "tyrannical," a have little or no basis in economic class divi-
term of reproach. sions. The exclusion of any class in the popula-
In describing different forms of democracy, tion from a voice in government renders that
Aristotle observes that their common principle government oligarchical with respect to them.
is to give a share in the government to all who The excluded class may even be a minority. So
meet whatever minimum qualification is set by conceived, oligarchy no longer means the rule
law. "The absolute exclusion of any class," he of either the rich or the few.
away from oligarchy accomplished by English seems to presuppose the typically modern con-
constitutional reforms in the i9th century. ception of democracy. As indicated in the chap-
"In times not long gone by," Mill writes, ter on DEMOCRACY, the distinguishing feature
"the higher and richer classes were in complete of the modern democratic constitution is uni-
possession of the government. ... A vote given versal suffrage. By this criterion, the conflict
in opposition to those influences . . . was almost between the democrats and the oligarchs of the
sure to be a good vote, for it was a vote against ancient world appears to be a conflict be-
the monster evil, the over-ruling influence of tween two forms of the oligarchical constitu-
oligarchy." But now that the higher classes are tionone in which the wealthier few and one
no longer masters of the country, now that the inwhich the poorer many have political rights,
franchise has been extended to the middle but in neither of which membership in the
a diminished form of oligarchy still re-
classes, political community includes all normal adult
mains. "The electors themselves are becoming human beings in the population.
the oligarchy" in a population where many Where ancient political theory could con-
are still disfranchised. "The present electors," ceive of a mixed constitution somehow com-
Mill continues, "and the bulk of those whom bining oligarchical and democratic principles
any probable Reform Bill would add to the the modern conception of democracy seems to
number, are the middle class; and have as much make any compromise with oligarchy impos-
a class interest, distinct from the working sible. Certain modern writers, notably Mosca,
classes, as landlords or great manufacturers. Michels, and Pareto, seem to insist, on the con-
Were the suffrage extended to all skilled la- trary, that oligarchy is
present in all forms of
borers, even those would, or might, still have a government, and is especially prevalent in rep-
class interest distinct from the unskilled." resentative democracies where the actual con-
Oligarchy remains, according to Mill, so long duct of government the effective power is in
as there is any un j ustifiable discrimination among the hands of a bureaucracy or an elite, whether
classes in the population. It is not in his view popularly chosen or self-appointed. But the
limited to discrimination based on the extremes contradiction may be more verbal than real if
of wealth and poverty, as he plainly indicates on one side the word "oligarchy" means some
by his remarks on the special interests of differ- degree of restriction in the franchise or citizen-
ent parts of the working class, or their relation ship, and, on the other, it
applies to any situa*
CHAPTER 62: OLIGARCHY 273
tion in which the whole people are not directly Aristotle seems to regard democratic and oli-
active in all the affairs of government and, con- garchical claims as complementary half-truths.
sequently, a small number of men administers "Both parties to the argument," he says, "are
the state. Understood in the latter sense, the speaking of a limited and partial justice, but
oligarchical principle does not seem to be in- imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute
compatible with representative democracy. justice." According to an adequate conception
Those who use the word in this sense
merely of political justice, it is as unjust to treat equals
call attention to an inevitable characteristic of unequally as it is to treat unequals equally. The
representative government. A representative oligarch violates the first of these principles, the
democracy may also have an aristocratic aspect democrat the second. "Democracy arises out of
when follows the principle that the men best
it the notion that those who are equal in any
qualified by virtue or talent for public office respect are equal in all respects; because men are
should be chosen by the suffrage of all their equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal.
fellow-citizens. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who
are unequal in one respect are in all respects
FULLER DISCUSSION of these aspects of oligarchy unequal; being unequal, that is, in property,
is found in the chapters on ARISTOCRACY and they suppose themselves to be unequal abso-
DEMOCRACY. Here we are primarily concerned lutely."
with political issues which have their source in Both forms of government have "a kind of
the opposition of economic classes in the state, by an absolute standard, they
justice, but, tried
primarily that extreme division of men into are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, when-
those who live by their labor and those who live ever their share in the government does not
on their property and the labor of others. It is accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up
in terms of this extreme division between men revolution In oligarchies the masses make
of leisure and working men that the conflict revolution under the idea that they are unjustly
between oligarchy and democracy takes place treated, because . they are equals and have
. .
not substantially. Only men of sizeable proper- more extreme forms of oligarchical constitu-
ty could afford to hold public office. tion, thattendency eventually leads to a kind
Aristotle weighs the arguments for and against of despotic government which Aristotle calls
oligarchy. On
the point of leisure, for example, "dynasty," or the lawless rule of powerful fam-
he holds that "nothing is more absolutely nec- ilies.
not only when in office, but when out of office, be less subject to revolution in favor of a con-
should have leisure." Yet "even if you must trary principle of government, and which shall
have regard to wealth in order to secure leisure," resist the tendency toward lawless rule, by
it is "surely a bad thing," he thinks, "that the either the masses or the powerful few, Aristotle
greatest offices, such as those of kings and gen- proposes the mixed constitution, which shall
erals, should be bought. The law which allows combine the elements of both democratic and
this abuse makes wealth of more account than oligarchical justice. But this will not work in ac-
virtue." tual practice, he thinks, unless the middle class
274 THE GREAT IDEAS
"is large, and stronger if possible than both the garchy only a part; next, that if the best guard-
other classes Great then is the good for- ians of property are the rich, and the best coun-
tune of a state in which the citizens have a sellors the wise, none can hear and decide so
moderate and sufficient property; for where well as the many, and that all these talents,
some possess much, and the others nothing, severally and collectively, have their just place
there may an extreme democracy, or a
arise in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives the
pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of many their share of the danger, and not content
either extreme These considerations will with the largest part, takes and keeps the whole
help us to understand why most governments of the profit,"
are either democratical or oligarchical. The rea-
son is that the middle class is seldom numerous IN MODERN POLITICAL thought, the discussion of
in them, and whichever party, whether the rich oligarchy seems to occur on two levels. There
or the common people, transgresses the mean is a
controversy on the level of constitutional
and predominates, draws the constitution its principles with regard to suffrage and repre-
own way, and thus arises either oligarchy or sentation and the qualifications for public office.
pears to affirm that the possessors of wealth de- weight which wealth seems able to throw onto
serve a special political status. For another thing, the scales of justice.
in his own formulation of an ideal polity, Aris- The great modern defense of the oligarchical
totle advocates the exclusion of the working constitution does not seem to be as plainly or
classes from citizenship. "The citizens must not forcefullymade in any of the great books as in
lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such the speeches of Edmund Burke, especially those
a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue. Neither in opposition to the suffrage reform measures
must they be husbandmen, since leisure is nec- proposed by Charles James Fox, wherein Burke
essary both for the development of virtue and argues for the principle of virtual representation.
the performance of political duties." All these It is unnecessary, he claims, for the franchise to
though it will include as necessary "the slaves The Federalists seem to take an opposite
who minister to the wants of individuals, or view. Reflecting on the system of British repre-
mechanics and laborers who are the servants of sentation in their day, they observe that, for
the community." the eight millions of people in the kingdoms of
Some of the great speeches in Thucydides' England and Scotland, "the representatives
History, which deal with domestic issues as well ... in the House of Commons amount to five
of war and peace, eloquently argue
as the issues hundred and fifty-eight." But, they go on, "of
the opposite side of the case. Debating with this number one ninth are elected
by three
Hermocrates before the Syracusan assembly, hundred and sixty-four persons and one half by
Athenagoras answers those who say that "de- five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three
is neither wise nor
mocracy equitable, but that persons. It cannot be supposed," they argue,
the holders of property are the best fitted to "that the half thus elected and who do not even
rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word resideamong the people at large, can add any-
demos, or people, includes the whole state, oli- thing either to the security of the people
CHAPTER 62: OLIGARCHY 275
tives and instruments of the executive magis- than a particular member of it."
trate than the guardians and advocates of the In another paper, the Federalists answer the
popular rights." Nevertheless, they do not charge that the constitution is oligarchical, be-
condemn such an oligarchical system of repre- cause "the House of Representatives will
sentation as entirely inimical to the virtues of be taken from that class of citizens which will
parliamentary government. "It is very certain," have least sympathy with the mass of the people
they declare, "not only that a valuable portion and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacri-
of freedom has been preserved under all these fice of the many to the aggrandizement of the
circumstances, but that the defects in the few." This objection, they say, while "leveled
British code are chargeable, in a very small against a pretended oligarchy," in principle
proportion,on the ignorance of the legislature "strikes at the very root of republican govern-
publican" system of government to avoid the ment has long been a matter of dispute. Wheth-
excessive factionalism of the pure or direct de- er the Federalists favor devices for protecting
mocracies of Greek city-states. the rights of property or repudiate oligarchical
"Theoretic politicians, who have patronized restrictions in favor of the rights of man has also
this species of government," Madison writes, been the subject of controversy. That this is so
"have erroneously supposed that by reducing may indicate at least a certain ambiguity in
mankind to perfect equality in their political their position. But on the question of the oli-
rights, they would, at the same time, be per- garchical influences on government the polit-
and assimilated in their pos- ical pressures exerted by propertied classes to
fectly equalized
sessions, their opinions, and their passions." By serve their special interests the opinion of the
a weighted system of representation, the power modern authors of the great books seems much
of sheer numbers may be counter- balanced by clearer.
the power given to other factors, thus pre- The most extreme statement of this opinion
venting the "accomplishment of the secret is, of course, to be found in the Communist Mani-
wishes of an unjust and interested majority. festo. There government, in fact the state it-
276 THE GREAT IDEAS
self, is
regarded as an instrument which the the wages of labor above their actual rate ....
economic oppressors wield against the oppressed. Masters too sometimes enter into particular
The final step in the bourgeois revolution, ac- combinations to sink the wages of labor even
cording to Marx and Engels, occurred when the below this rate." Furthermore, the parties to
bourgeoisie "conquered for itself, in the modern the conflict do not have equal access to legis-
representative State, exclusive political sway." lative protection. "Whenever the legislature at-
In the bourgeois state, legislation is nothing but tempts to regulate the differences between mas-
the will of this one class made into a law for all. tersand their workmen, its counsellors are al-
One aim of the communist revolution, beyond ways the masters."
the temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, is Almost a century later, Mill writes in a simi-
the withering away of that historic formation of lar vein concerning "the persevering attempts
the state in which "political power ... is so long made to keep down wages by law ....
merely the organized power of one class for Does Parliament," he asks, "ever for an instant
Though much less radical in intention than man ? .... On the question of strikes, for in-
Marx, Smith and Mill make statements which stance, it is doubtful if there is so much as one
seem to be no less radical in their criticism of among the leading members of either House
the oligarchical influences on modern parlia- who is not firmly convinced that the reason of
mentary government. It has been said, Smith the matter is
unqualifiedly on the side of the
observes, that "we rarely hear ... of combina- masters, and that the men's view of it is
simply
tions of masters, though frequently of those absurd." The remedy for this inequity, accord-
of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this ing to Mill, is not communism, but constitu-
account, that masters rarely combine, is as ig- tional reforms in the direction of universal suf-
norant of the world as of the subject. Masters frage which will no longer leave the working
are alwaysand everywhere in a sort of tacit, but classes "excluded from all direct participation
constant and uniform combination, not to raise in the government."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The oligarchical constitution: the principles and types of oligarchy 2 77
5.
The attack on oligarchy and on the political power of wealth 279
50. The objection to property as a basis for privilege with regard to citizenship or
public office
5#. The character of the oligarch: the man of property; the capitalist
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
:
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
b
[i296 i7~34] 496d-497a; CH 14-16 498b- 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK vi,
502a,c passim; BK v, CH i [1301*30-35] 502 b; 520a-d; BK vm, 575d-576b; 577b-c; 579d-
CH 12 [i3i6*30-b i5] 519c; BK vi, CH 6-8 524b- 580c; 587a-b
526d / Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6 553a- 7 PLATO: Republic, BK vm, 402b-d; 405c-406a
555c; CH 29 566b-d; CH 33-34 568b-569a / / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK iv, 680a-b
b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 3 [1131*24-29]
Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 [i365 32-i366*5] 608a-b
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK vi, 97b-c 378d; BK vm, CH 10 [ii6ob u-i6] 412d; [n6ob
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95, b
32-1161*3] 413a-b / Politics, BK n, CH 6 [i265
A 4, ANS 229b-230c 2 ?-39l *6H>; CH 10 [1272*27^10] 468c-469a;
CH n b
23 MACHiAVELLi:Priraf, CH v, 8a-b; CHIX, 14c- [i273*2- 7] 469c-470a; BK m, CH 5
15a [1278*15-34] 475b-c; CH 6 [i278b9-i4] 475d;
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 104d-105a; PART CH 7-13 476c-483a; CH 15 [i286b9-2i] 484d-
iv, 273a-b 485a; BK iv, CH 2-9 488b-494d passim, esp
278 THE GREAT IDEAS 3/o 4
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, P\RT ii, 149a-b; 152c
(2. The relation of oligarchy to monarchy, aristoc-
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xvm, SECT 201
racy, and democracy!) 71c
b
CH 3 [1290*13] -CH 4 [i290 2o] 489b-d, CH 5 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vin, 51d-
491d-492a, CH 6 [1293*11-34] 492d-493a; CH 52a; 52c-53a
b
ii [i295 35J-cH 12 [1297*12] 496a-497b; CH 43 MILL: Representative Government, 394a-d
b
14-16 498b-502a,c; BK v, CH 7 [i3o6 22-26] 46 PI ECI EL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 275b-
508c-d; CH 8-9 509d-512d; CH 12 [i3i6*i-b 28] 276a: 278d-279b; PART m, 300a-301c
518d-519d; BK vi, CH 6-8 524b-526d / 50 MARX: Capital, 377c-378d
Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 608a-c 50 M \RX-ENGLLS: Communist Manifesto, 421c-
14 PLUTARCH: Lyciirgus, 36a-37b; 47a-48a 425b esp 423d-424b, 425b; 429b-c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK vi, 97b c
20 AQUINAS: Sttmma Theologica, PART 1-11, Q 95, 3. The preservation of oligarchies against
A 4, ANS 229b-230c revolution
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, 104d-105a; PART 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK vi, 202c-203b
iv, 273a-b 6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War, BK
:
iv,
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH x, SECT 132 463a-465c; BK v, 482d-483a; 502d-504b; BK
55a-b vm, 580b-c; 582a; 582d-583d; 587b-589d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vm, 52c-d; 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH n [1273^*17-26]
BK xx, 151c-152a 470b; BK iv, CH 12-13 496d-498b; BK v, CH 6
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK HI, 419b [1306*9-12] 507d-508a; en 8-9 509d-512d; BK
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK in, 165c-166c; vi, en 6-7 524b-525b
BK v, 309c-310d 14 PLUTARCH: Lye in gut, 35c-d / Camillus, 117c-
42 KANT: Science of Right, 450a-c 121a,c / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Agis 648b,d-
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 57 176d-179b; NUMBER 656d / Tiberius Gracchus, 674c-681a,c esp
58, 181b-c; NUMBER 60, 185a-187a passim; 680b d / Cants Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c
NUMBER 63, 194b-195b; NUMBER 77, 228d- 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK HI, 165b-166c;
229a BK iv, 239c-240b
43 MILL: Representative Government, 363b-364d; 50 MARX: Capital, 305a [fn 2]
393c-395a 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART 11, 277c-d; 432b-d
PART in, 292d-293b
4. The defense of oligarchy: the political rights
3. The instability of oligarchical government and privileges of property
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 107d-108a
3*. The revolutionary changes to which oli- 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK vm,
garchy is subject: the change to despot- 575d-576b; 590a-b
ism or democracy 7 PLATO: Laws, BK v, 695a-c; BK vi, 699d~
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 108b-c 700b / Seventh Letter, 807a-b
dTnucYDiDEs: Peloponnesian War, BK in, 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH 6 [i265b 26-
436d-438b; BK vm, 568d-569a; 569c-585a 1266*30] 461b-d; CH n [1273*22-24] 469d;
b
esp 582a-c; 587a-590c BK in, CH 5 [i277 33-i278*2<5] 475a-c; CH 10
7 PLATO: Republic, BK vm, 408b-409a / Laws, 478d-479a; CH 12-13 480c-483a; BK iv, CH
BK iv, 680a-b / Seventh Letter, 801c 8-9 493c-494d; CH 11-12 495b-497b; BK v,
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK 11, CH 12 [i 273^6- CH i 502a-503b; BK vi, CH 3 521c-522a
b
1274*22] 470c-d; BK in, CH 15 [i286 9~2i] 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34d-35d / Solon, 70d-
484d-485a; BK iv, CH 5 [1292^1-22] 492a; 71c / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Dion, 800c
CH ii [i295 b 35-i296*2i] 496a-b; BK v, CH i 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK n, 32b-d; 35d
502a-503b passim, esp [1302*8-16] 503b; CH 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH v, 8a-b
b b
3 [i302 25~28] 504a; [i303 4-7] 505a; CH 6 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 140d
a b
507b-508c; CH 12 [i3i6 i- 28] 518d-519d / 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 16a-c / Civil Government,
Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6 553a-555c; CH CH vn, SECT 87 44a-b; SECT 94 46a-c; CH ix
32-41 568a-572a 53c-54d; CH xi, SECT 137-140 56d-58a
14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 68d-71c; 75c-76d / The- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 5b-c;
mistocles, 96b-c / Camillus, 117c-121a,c / Cori- 7b-c; BK v, 25a-c; 32b-c; BK vn, 45c-46a; BK
olanus, 176b-184c / Crassus, 444d-445d / xi, 71d-72b; BK xxvi, 221c-d
Pompey, 521c>d/ Caesar, 581d-582a / Phocion 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 354b-355b / Political
604b,d-619d / Agis 648b,d-656d / Cleomenes, Economy, 377c-d / Social Contract, BK in,
657a-663c / Tiberius Gracchus, 674c-681a,c / 412b-c
Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c / Cicero, 708a-b 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 309a-311c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK vi, 97b-c / Histories, 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81c-82a; 94d
BK n, 224d-225a 42 KANT: Science of Right, 436d-437c
CHAPTER 62: OLIGARCHY 279
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: iv [17-36] 5b-c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125c-126b; NUMBER
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 50b-d; NUMBER 35, 52, 165b-c; NUMBER 57 176d-179b; NUMBER
113b-114c; NUMBER 54 170a-172b passim; 60, 186c
NUMBER 57 176d-179b passim; NUMBER 60, 43 MILL: Representative Government, 345c-346c:
186a-c; NUMBER 63, 194d-195b; NUMBER
:
5. The attack on oligarchy and on the political 5b. The character of the oligarch: the man of
power of wealth property; the capitalist
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 108b-c 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [229-245] 260b-c /
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK vi, Hecuba [1206-1232] 363b
519c-520d; BK viii, 575d-576b 5 ARISTOPHANES: Wasps [653-724] 515c-516d
7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 342d-344a; BK vm, / Plutus [144-197] 630d-631b
405c-408a / Laws, BK iv, 680a-b; BK v, 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK VH, 221c-222a
695a-c; BK vm, 733b-734a / Seventh Letter, 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK vi,
800b-d 512c-d; BK vm, 587a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH 10 [1272*27- 7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 343a-b; BK vm,
b
io] 468c-469a; BK in, CH 7 476c-477a passim; 407a-408a / Laws, BK vm, 733b-734a; BK
b b
CH 13 [i283 27-33] 481d; BK iv, en n [i295 ix, 751c-d
b
2-i296 2] 495c-496c; CH 12 [i 296^5-1 297*1 3] 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH 7 [i267*36-b 9]
497a-b; BK v, CH i [1301*25-39] 502b-c; 463b; BK iv, CH 6 [1293*12-34] 492d-493a;
b b
[i30i 26-i302*8] 503a-b; CH 6 [1305*36^21] vi, en 7 [i32i*35- 2J 525a / Rhetoric, BK
BK
b
507b-c; en 9 [i309 i4-i 310*13] 511d-512b / CH 1 6 638b-c
11,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general discussion of constitutional government, see CONSTITUTION 1-3!); LAW 73;
MONARCHY ia-ia(i).
Other considerations of the relation of oligarchy to aristocracy and democracy, see ARISTOC-
RACY 2d; DEMOCRACY 2b, 3a~3b; GOVERNMENT 2a, 2c; and for the theory of the mixed
constitution as a compromise between democracy and oligarchy, see ARISTOCRACY 2b;
CONSTITUTION 5b; DEMOCRACY 33; GOVERNMENT 2b.
CHAPTER 62 : OLIGARCHY 281
For: The tyrannical and despotic extremes to which oligarchy can go, sec TYRANNY 20.
The revolutions generated by oligarchy, see ARISTOCRACY 3; REVOLUTION 3c(2).
Other discussions of property rights, see DEMOCRACY 4a (2); JUSTICE 8a; LABOR 70; WEALTH ya.
The general issues of economic and political justice in the conflict between democracy and
oligarchy concerning the qualifications for citizenship and the extension of the suffrage, see
CITIZEN 2c~3; CONSTITUTION 53; DEMOCRACY 4a(i); JUSTICE pe; LABOR yd, yf; LIBERTY
2d; SLAVERY 5a~5b; WEALTH ph.
Other discussions of capitalism, and of the class war, see DEMOCRACY 43(2);
OPPOSITION 5b; REVOLUTION 4a, 5a-5c; WAR AND PEACE 2c; WEALTH 6a, ph.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
TN Pragmatism and in his unfinished last work, opposed, that the one is not a many and the
JL Some Problems of Philosophy William James
> many not a one. Yet even that does not seem to
uses the problem of the one and the many as one be quite accurate for, as Socrates tells Protar-
of the crucialtests of the philosophical mind. chus in the Philebus, may also be said that
it the
In his famous table of doctrines or "isms" he one is a many and the many a one. These are
aligns monism with rationalism and idealism in "wonderful propositions," he says, wonderful
the column headed "tender-minded," and in because "whoever affirms either is very open to
the other column, headed "tough-minded," he attack."
places their opposites pluralism, empiricism, At this early moment in the recorded tradi-
and materialism. But as his own theories show, tion of western thought, the dialogues of Plato,
"isms" like monism and pluralism tend to over- so thorough in their exploration of the problems
simplify the issues. of the one and many, make no claim to having
Whoever emphasizes the oneness of the world, discovered or invented them. They were ancient
for example, may also acknowledge its many- even then. They seem to hang in the very
ness and recognize that it is somehow a pluri- atmosphere of thought, usually befogging those
verse as well as a universe. Some, like Bradley, who try to see the truth about anything else
may qualify this view by regarding the unity as without first clearing away their obscurities.
ultimate reality, the plurality as appearance or Socrates refers to "the common and acknowl-
illusion. Whoever finds the multiplicity of things edged paradoxes of the one and the many . . .
the primary fact may, nevertheless, find some that everybody has by this time agreed to dis-
unity in the order and connection of things. miss as childish and obvious and detrimental to
Some, like James himself, may insist that the the true course of thought." These aside, some
connection a loose concatenation of relatively
is
genuine perplexities remain. Protarchus asks
independent parts of reality, rather than an in- Socrates to instruct him about "those other
terpenetration of each part with every other in marvels connected with this subject which,"
the solid whole which James calls the "block as Socratesseems to have implied, "have not
universe." yet become common and acknowledged."
There may be another oversimplification in Socrates begins by calling his attention, not
James' consideration of the problem of the one to the unity of this man or this ox, but to the
and the many. He seems to be concerned largely, sense in which it is said that "man is one, or ox
ifnot exclusively, with the alternatives of the is one, or beauty one, or the good one." It is
block and the concatenated universe as con- necessary to ask, he says, first, whether such
ceptions of the structure of reality. But, as unities exist; then, such unities being always
some of the great books of antiquity make evi- the same, and admitting neither generation nor
dent, that is only one of the problems of the one destruction, how each is itself alone, is not only
and the many. Perhaps it should be said, not one but this one; finally, how these unities can
that there are many problems of the one and be conceived as dispersed and multiplied in the
the many, but that there is one problem having world of things which come to be and pass
many aspects or applications, for in every state- away. This question seems to be the most
last
ment of the problem there is at least this single- difficult it asks about the
because being of the
ness of theme; that the one and the many are same and one as it becomes in the one and manv.
282
CHAPTER W: UJNh AJNU MANY
Protarchusimpatient to begin clearing up
is motion of Plato's dialectic may be from the
these problems. Willing to undertake what he one to the many or from the many to the one;
calls "this great and multifarious battle, in or it may be on the level of the many as an in-
which such various points are at issue," Soc- termediate stage through which analysis must
rates is also anxious to let Protarchus and the go in proceeding from the infinite to the one.
other youths know the intellectual perils which Those who pass at once from unity to infinity,
lie ahead for novices who enter upon this in- says Socrates, do not recognize "the difference
together, in and out of every word which is For Aristotle, first philosophy or
metaphys-
uttered . . . This union of them will never ics, concerned as with "being qua being
it is
cease, and is not now beginning, but is ... an and the attributes which belong to anything
everlasting quality of thought itself, which qua being," also investigates unity. Unity is the
never grows old." first property of being. The meanings of one or
That is
why, he explains, "any young man, unity are as various as the meanings of 'to be.'
when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, If there is a difference between essential and
and fancies that he has found a treasure of wis- accidental being, there is a parallel difference
dom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy, he between essential and accidental unity. If nat-
leaves no stone, or rather no thought, un- ural and artificial things differ in substance or
turned, now rolling up the many into the one, being, so too must they differ in unity. "Being
and kneading them together, now unfolding and unity are the same," Aristotle says, "and
and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and are one thing in the sense that they are implied
above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his in one another as are principle and cause." Unity
neighbors, whether they are older or younger or is nothing apart from being, and nothing can be
of his own age that makes no difference; without being one in some sense of unity which
neither father nor mother does he spare; no is determined
by the way in which the thing
human being who has ears is safe from him, exists. Aristotle's analysis of any subject matter,
the one and the many in itself and in relation reducible to unity and plurality. . For all . .
to being and becoming, the intelligible and the things are either contraries or composed of con-
sensible, the definite and the infinite, the same traries, and unity and plurality are the princi-
dialogues of Plato and in Aristotle's treatises, western thought. The question, for example,
especially his Metaphysics, the one and the many whether there an irreducible duality in the
is
are connected with the basic terms of philo- relation of knower and known, or whether, in
any object such as pleasure or virtue or knowl- whether the state which is a multitude some-
edge. Anything, viewed under the aspect of its how united for a common lifehas, or should
being or its becoming, its definite sameness or have, the same degree of unity as the family,
its indefinite otherness and variety, must be is discussed
by Locke and Hegel as well as Plato
discussed both as a one and as a many. The and Aristotle.
284 THE GREAT IDEAS
The earlier controversy over the indivisi- such inquiry anyway would be "like arguing
bility of sovereignty becomes at a later stage the againstany other position maintained for the
central issue of federal union, to which e pluri- sake of argument ... or like refuting a merely
bus unum is the solution offered by the Federal- contentious argument." This description, he
ists.Questions concerning the simple and the says, "applies to the arguments both of Melissus
complex, or wholes and parts, as objects of and Parmenides: their premises are false and
knowledge, or questions concerning the unity their conclusions do not follow . . .
Accept one
and divisibility of time, space, or matter, en- ridiculous proposition and the rest follows a
gage the attention of inquirers and analysts no simple enough proceeding." Aristotle's treat-
less in modern than in ancient times. ment of Parmenides and Zeno in the Metaphys-
But there are certain problems which are ics seems to be no more sympathetic, though it
treated with unusual speculative vigor by the tacitly admits the relevance of the Eleatic
ancients alone. Unlike the problems just men- speculations to the study of being, if not to the
tioned, which deal with applications of the con- study of change and the principles of nature.
trast between unity and multiplicity, these Nevertheless, many of the questions concern-
are questions about the One itself what it is, ing the one and the many which both Plato and
whether it exists, whether it is identical with Aristotle deem worthy of discussion appear to
Being, whether it is itself a substance or the have some connection with the perplexities pro-
substance of ail things. pounded by Parmenides and his school.
The sustained inquiry into such matters in
antiquity seems to testify to the extraordinary THOSE WHO DO NOT deny either the unity of
power exerted upon ancient thought by Par- being or multiplicity tend to make the pri-
its
menides of Elea. The person called "the Eleatic mary fact about reality either its oneness or its
Stranger" represents his theories in such dia- manyness. This may seem at first to be of slight
logues of Plato as the Sophist and the Statesman. significance, but if the two views of the world
Parmenides, or his disciple Zeno, is probably which from this difference are examined,
result
the source of many of the paradoxes and riddles it may be found that the disagreement on this
which Socrates, in the Philebus, dismisses as no single point changes the perspective on every-
longer worthy of serious attention. One whole thing else. philosophers who magnify
The
dialogue, named Parmenides because of his part either the one or the many behold universes
in the discussion, exhibits the Eleatic demon- more radically dissimilar than the same object
stration that 'all is one.' It abounds in the sub- looked at from opposite ends of a telescope.
tleties of the various arguments which try to But that is not all. Almost every other funda-
defend the reality of the many or try to reduce mental conception of God and man, of the
that position to absurdity. mind and knowledge, of matter and motion, of
Questioned by Socrates concerning his para- cause and necessity seems also to be altered.
doxes, Zeno says that his writings "were meant Spinoza, for example, criticizes those who at-
to protect the arguments of Parmenides against tribute to finite things, of which there are
those who make fun of him and seek to show the necessarily many, the properties which belong
many ridiculous and contradictory results which to the infinite being, of which there can be only
they suppose to follow from the affirmation of one. This man, this stone, or any comparable
the one." When he addresses himself to the individual thing, is not a substance, having the
partisans of the many, Zeno says that he returns power to exist in and of itself; it consists merely
"their attack with interest by retorting upon "of certain modifications of the attributes of
them that their hypothesis of the being of many, God," the one infinite substance in which
if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous everything else "both is and is conceived." Ac-
than the hypothesis of the being of one." cording to Spinoza, those who suppose that the
Aristotle also deals with the Eleatic argu- finite many are substances "have not observed
ments. In the Physics, he says first that inquir- a proper order of philosophic study."
ing about whether being is one, cannot contrib- They begin with the objects of sense which
ute to the study of nature. He then adds that have the least reality and come last to the di-
CHAPTER 63: ONE AND MANY 285
vine nature, the infinite one, which "ought to natura naturans and natura naturata, discussed
be studied first because it is first in the order of in the chapter on NATURE, seems to permit him
knowledge and in the order of things . . . Hence to distinguish between the infinite or eternal
it has come to pass," Spinoza continues, "that and the finite or temporal the one and the
there was nothing of which men thought less many without implying a real separation be-
than the divine nature while they have been tween God and the world. Since God is im-
studying natural objects, and when they after- manent in the world, and since God not only
wards applied themselves to think about God, exists necessarily but also acts from the neces-
there was nothing of which they could think sity of His own nature, it follows (as is indicated
lessthan those prior fictions upon which they in the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY)
had built their knowledge of natural things, for that every finite and temporal aspect of nature
these fictions could in noway help to the knowl- is
necessarily determined. Nothing is contin-
edge of the divine nature." gent. Nothing could be otherwise than it is.
that which exists in itself and is conceived THIS EXAMINATION of a doctrine in which the
through itself, and with the definition of God primacy of the one absorbs as well as subordi-
as absolutely infinite being, "that is to say, nates the many, serves to exemplify the point
substance consisting of infinite attributes," that making the one primary is more than a
Spinoza undertakes to prove that there cannot matter of emphasis. It also shows that almost
be two or more substances having the same every fundamental question is affected. It pre-
nature or attributes, that substance is neces- what William James appears
sents a picture of
substance) must necessarily exist as that which Spinoza he uses the term 'substance.' Like
alone exists in itself and as that in which every- Spinoza he defines substance as that which
thing else has its finite being as a mode or afcc- exists in itself, not as an accident (a quality, for
tion of the attributes of God. example) which exists in another, e.g., the red-
Certain other consequences seem to follow. ness in the rose. But for him substance is not
The one infinite substance is indivisible: it is necessarily infinite, nor is it indivisible. A rose
not a whole made up of parts which can have or a man is a substance. Every physical thing
independent existence, as the parts of a quan- which has a natural unity is a substance.
titative whole seem able to exist when the Each is a finite whole, or rather each is a
quantity is divided. Furthermore, God, ac- whole in a number of different senses. Insofar as
cording to Spinoza, "is the immanent, and not it has essential unity, it is a whole composed of
the transitive, cause of all things." God causes matter and form which, according to Aristotle,
them not as one thing acting on another when are represented in the formulation of a defini-
both are independent in existence, but rather as tion by the genus and the differentia. Insofar as
the being in which all things are. God is not pres- it iscomposed of matter, it also has the unity of
ent in the world, as other theologians seem to a quantitative whole in virtue of which it moves
think, in the manner in which a cause exists in as one thing or uniquely occupies a place. Since
an effect that depends upon it. Rather the quantitative unity involves continuity, and
whole world is inGod as an effect which can in continuity entails divisibility, a substance re-
no way be separated from the existence of the mains one only so long as it is not divided into
cause, any more than an aspect can be separated its quantitative parts, just as it remains one
from that of which an aspect.
it is essentially only so long as its matter and form
For Spinoza, the unity and totality of being are not separated.
can be called "nature," as well as "infinite sub- A
substance is individual not because it is ab-
stance" or "God." His distinction between solutely indivisibleas for Lucretius the atom
286 THE GREAT IDEAS
is because it is
simple rather than composite. Its mains the fundamental feature of the world
individuality rather consists, being first, in its God creates. The Christian doctrine of creation
divided from other substances in such a way may attribute to the world a greater unity than
that it can perish without necessarily destroy- that possessed by any work of human art, in
ing them, or they can perish without destroy- proportion as the infinitely greater wisdom of
ing it; and, second, in the fact that, though the divine plan orders the separate things of
divisible into parts, it is one whole when these nature with an infinitely greater perfection
parts remain undivided. Yet as one substance it than man can achieve in putting things to-
has more unity than a mere collection of things. gether or in ordering them to his purpose. But
The difference between a man and a machine, if, according to the theologian, God in creating
according to Aristotle's differentiation between the world creates not one substance, but many
the unity of natural substances and of artificial substances, forming a single whole through the
things, is that a man is not composed of sub- pattern of their connection with one another,
stances (though the parts of a living organism then in a sense the world has less unity than
may come to exist as substances when it is de- each of its
component substances.
composed or they are separated from it), where- For Aquinas, one kind of substance may
as a machine, made up of separate pieces of have greater unity than another. The imma-
metal, is
nothing but a number of individual terial has more than the material; and God
substances arranged in a certain way. The unity more than any finite substance, since each of
of man does not appear to be the same, there- these is composed of matter and form, or es-
fore, when soul and body are conceived by sence and accidents, or at least of essence and
Descartes as two substances and by Aristotle existence, whereas the infinite being of God is
not as distinct substances but as form and mat- absolutely simple. The divine nature is without
ter which through their union constitute a sin- matter, without accidents; its attributes are
gle substance. identical with its essence, and its essence with
plurality of substances. Not itself a substance, seems to exclude all but one resolution of
but only an aggregation of substances, the the issue concerning the Trinity. According to
world is primarily a many rather than a one. the position Augustine takes in criticizing the
The unity it
possesses derives from the order Arian heresy, the position which is expressed
and connection of the substances which are its in the Nicene Creed, God is not a trinity of
component parts; and that in turn largely de- substances, but a trinity of persons aspects of,
rives from the way in which distinct substances or relations within, one substance. The plurality
related, constitutes a loosely-knit world, a con- ence. God and the world are two, not one. Infi-
catenated universe. nite being is absolutely prior to and independent
of finite beings. The one can exist without the
THE RELATION OF the world as a whole to God many. Though the many are said to participate
does give greater unity, if the supposition of a
it in being, when they do exist, they do not enter
plurality of finite individual substances re- into the being of the one, or share it in any way.
CHAPTER 63: ONE AND MANY 287
being, and that, as Aquinas says, "being is com- matters lend themselves to proof. Upon The
mon to all things only in an analogical sense," One follows immediately the Principle, which is
seems to put diversity above unity in the struc- at once Being and the Intellectual-Principle.
ture of reality, and to leave the ultimate plu- Third comes the Principle, Soul." These are
rality of this world unaffected either by the fact what Plotinus calls the three hypotases. He
that it one or by the fact of
was created as its finds some analogy for his trinity in a doctrine
IN THE TRADITION of the great books, the prob- Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a sec-
lem of the one and the many is often stated ondary One which is a One-Many, and a third
without using the notion of substance as the which is a One-and-Many."
pivotal term. The One, according to Plotinus, not only
It appears in Plato's consideration of being transcends being; it also transcends intelligence.
and becoming. It is sometimes present in his Knowing or thinking requires an object. The
treatment of the relation between intelligible relation of knower and known entails a duality
forms and sensible things between the uni- which would fracture the utter simplicity of
and the particulars which resemble
versal ideas The One. Even the complete reflexivity of The
them through some manner of imitation or One knowing only itself is excluded. The super-
participation. Iteven runs through the discus- essential is for Plotinus also the supra-cogitative.
sion of the realm of ideas itself; for the idea of "What stands above Being stands above intel-
the one is one idea among many, and yet each lection," he says; "it is no weakness in it not to
of themany ideas is in some way one. know itself, since as pure unity it contains noth-
The problem of the one and the many appears ing which it needs to
explore." Multiplicity be-
in Hume's consideration of the absolute dis- gins with the effort of the Intellectual-Principle
tinctness of each unit of experience from every to know the Transcendent. "It knows the
other, accompanied as it is
by his skepticism Transcendent in its very essence but, with all
concerning our ability to discover any connec- its efforts to grasp that prior as pure unity, it
tions which might tie these units together into a goes forth amassing successive impressions, so
real unity. Itappears in Kant's theory of the that, to it, the object becomes multiple The . . .
Idea which contains within itself all the variety since the Intellectual-Principle and the Soul
that becomes manifest as the Idea unfolds in the also belong to it? Plotinus answers that "The
processes of nature or history. One is all things and no one of them. The source
The substitution of one set of terms for of all things is not all things ... It is
precisely
another docs not seem to alter the fundamental because there is
nothing within the One that all
issue.Nor does it enable the mind to escape things are from it." Everything else in the
taking sides with those who give primacy to the totality of which the Transcendent is the source
one or to the many, except perhaps by trying emanates from it.
to balance them as correlatives. Among the "Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lack-
great books, however, the Enneads of Plotinus ing nothing," Plotinus declares, "The One is
develops a theory of the One which, putting it perfect and, in our metaphor, has overflowed,
above being and beyond knowing, seems to and its exuberance has
produced the new: this
transfigure all the traditional terms of analysis. product has turned again to its begetter and
The One of Parmenides is, after all, Being; has filled and has become its contemplator and
and this identification of Being with One raises so an Intellectual-Principle ... It is simulta-
288 THE GREAT IDEAS
ncously Intellectual-Principle and Being; and, itself a thing of multiplicity. The unity of an
attaining resemblance in virtue of this vision, it all-embracing vision may be required to appre-
repeats the act of the One in pouring forth a hend the ineffable unity of the Transcendent.
vast power. This second outflow is a Form or But the mysteriousness of unity is not confined
Idea representing the Divine Intellect as the to the Transcendent One. It confronts the
Divine Intellect represented its own prior, The mathematician as well as the philosopher. It
One. This active power sprung from essences challenges Nicomachus and Euclid as well as
(from the Intellectual-Principle considered as Plotinus.
is Soul. Soul arises as the idea and act of "Unity," writes Nicomachus, "occupying the
Being)
the motionless Intellectual-Principle. ... It place and character of a point, will be the be-
takes fullness by looking toward its source; but ginning of intervals and numbers, but is not it-
it image by adopting another, a
its self an interval or a number." What, then, is
generates
downward, movement. This image of Soul is unity or a unit in itself? Euclid answers with this
Sense and Nature, the vegetal principle." definition: "A unit is that by virtue of which
"
Nothing, writes Plotinus, "is
completely each of the things that exist is called one. Unity
severed from its
prior. Thus the human Soul is not
only the measure of existence, but also of
appears to reach as far down as to the vegetal numbers; for, according to Euclid, "a number is
order." In these successive emanations "all that a multitude composed of units." In mathemat-
is not One is conserved by virtue of the One, ics no less than in metaphysics or in
theology the
and from the One derives its characteristic na- relation of unity to number seems to be the
ture.'* Every thing except the One is a one-many. heart of the problem of the one and the many.
"If it had not attained such unity as is consistent "Number," according to Locke, "applies it-
with being made up of multiplicity, we could self to men, angels, actions, thoughts; every-
its existence." The Transcendent
not affirm thing that either does exist, or can be imagined."
alone is "a really existent One, wholly and Unity or one is, in his view, not only the sim-
truly One, while its sequent, poured down in plest of all our ideas, but the most omnipresent.
some way from the One, is all, a total which has "Every object our senses are employed about;
participation in unity and whose every member every idea in our understandings every thought ;
is
similarly ail and one." of our minds, brings this idea along with it.
If reason cannot fully grasp the Transcendent And therefore it is ... in its agreement to all
One, that may be because discursive reason is other things, the most universal idea we have"
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The transcendental one: the Absolute; the unity of being, of nature, of the universe 290
10. The relation of the one and the many: emanation of the many from the one 291
ib. The unity or duality of God and the world: the immanence and transcendence of
God
ic. The one and the many in relation to the universal and the particular: the abstract
and the concrete universal 292
2b. The unity of the indivisible or the simple: the individual thing, the point, the
atom, the quality 2 93
2c. The complex unity of a whole composed of parts: the distinction between the
indivisible and the undivided
CHAPTER 63: ONE AND MANY 289
PAGB
3.
Kinds of wholes or complex unities
293
(2) The comparison of the unity of natural things with man-made compositions
or aggregations: artificial wholes
(4) The unity of man as composite of body and soul, matter and spirit, exten-
sion and thought 296
(5) The unity of the human person or the self: the order of man's powers; the
split personality
4^.
The unity of sense-experience: the unity of attention; the transcendental unity
of apperception
4^. The one and the many, or the simple and the complex, as objects of knowledge:
the order of learning with respect to wholes and parts
4_/".
The unity of knower and known, or of subject and object 299
5#.
The unity of virtue and the many virtues
5^.
The unity of the last end: the plurality of intermediate ends or means
y. The unity of subjective will and objective morality in the ethical realm
5^. The unity of the family and the unity of the state: the limits of political or social
unification
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
:
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
BK xiv, CH b
24] 605d-606a; i
[io87 34~io88*4]
. The transcendental one: the Absolute; the 620a-b / Soul, BK n, CH i b
642c
[4i2 6~9]
unity of being, of nature, of the universe 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1023-
7 PLATO: Parmenides, 491d-511d / Theaetetus, 1104] 28a-29a
532c-533a / Sophist, 566a-567a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 14 120d-121c
8 ARISTOTLE: BK iv, CH i [121*14-19]
Topics, 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 3 257a-b;
b
169a; [i2i 4-8] 169c; CH 6 [i27 a26-4o] 176d- BK iv, SECT 29 266a; SECT 40 267a-b; BK v,
177a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 7 [169*21-24] SECT 8 269d-270b; SECT 30 273a; BK vi,
b
232d; [169*33-36] 233a; CH 10 [i7o i8-25] SECT 36-45 277c-278c; BK vn, SECT 9 280b-c;
235a / Physics, BK i, CH 2-3 259b-262a; CH 8 SECT 19 281a; BK ix, SLCT 8-9 292b-d; BK x,
a b
[i9i 23- i3] 267a-c; BK in, CH 6 [207*7-31] SECT 6-7 297a-c; BK xn, SECT 30 310a-b
285b-d / Heavens, BK i, CH 8-9 367b-370d / 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [724-729] 230b
Generation and Corruption, BK i, CH i 409a- 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR in, CH 13 46c-
410c; CH 8 [325*4^5] 423c-424a / Meta- 47b; TR ix, CH i, 65d-66a / Third Ennead,
b b
physics, BK i, CH 3 [983 7-984 8] 501d-502c; TR vni 129a-136a; TR ix, CH 3, 138a,c / Fifth
CH 5 [986b 8-987*2] 504c-505a; CH 6 505b- Ennead, TR i, CH 6-7 211a-212c; TR n, CH i
b
506b; CH 7 [988*34^5] 506c; CH 8 [988 23- 214c-215a; TR in, cii 11-17 222b-226c; TR v,
989*18] 506d-507b; BK in, CH i [996*4-9] CH 4-13 230b-235b; TR vi, CH 2-6 235d-237d
b
514c; CH 3 [998 i4~28] 517b-c; CH 4 [1001*4- / Sixth Ennead, TR 11, CH 8-12 272d-276a; TR
b b
CH 7-8 300b-301c; CH 11 302c-d; TR v
25] 519d-520c; BK iv, CH 2 [ioo3 23~i 005*1] iv,
b
522d-524a; CH 4 [ioo7 i9-ioo8*3] 527a-b; 305c-310d; TR ix 353d-360d passim
BK v, CH 4 [ioi4b 27~35] 535a-b; BK vn, CH 4 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 6, A 3,
[1030^-14] 553b; CH n [1036*26^20] 559d- REP i 29c-30b; Q n 46d-50b passim, esp A i
560b; CH 16 [1040^6-27] 564d; BK vni, CH 6 46d-47d; Q 30, A 3 169b-170c; Q 39, A 8 210a-
b
[i045*36- 7] 570b-c; BK x, CH 2 580 b-d; BK 213a; Q 44, A i, ANS 238b-239a; Q 47, A 3
b
xi, CH 2 [io6o*36- i9] 588c-d; BK xn, CH i 258c-259a; Q 93, A 9, ANS 500c-501c; Q 103,
a b
[1069*18-22] 598a; CH 4 [io7o 3i- 8] 599d- A 3, ANS 530a-c; PART i-n, Q 10, A i, REP 3
600a; CH 8 [1074*31-39] 604d; CH 10 [1075*12- 662d-663d; Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c
la to \b CHAPTER 63: ONE AND MANY 291
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologies PART HI, Q 4, 198a / Judgement, 564c-565d esp 565c-d;
A i, REP 4 730d-731d; Q 17, A 2, ANS 808d- 580c-d
809d; Q 19, A i, REP 4 816a-818b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b;
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 172b; PART iv, PART in, 306a
269d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i 355a-372d csp PROP
Ib. The or duality of God and the world:
unity
2-8 355d-357d, PROP 10, SCHOL 358a-b, PROP
the immanence and transcendence of
12 359b-c, PROP 13, COROL and SCHOL 359d,
God
PROP 14, COROL i 360a, PROP 15 360a-361d, 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XH, CH 10
PROP 16, COROL 1-3 362a, PROP 18 363c, PROP [1075*12-16]605d
25, SCHOL and COROL 365b, PROP 28 365c- 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 3 [699*11]-
366a, PROP 33, SCHOL I-PROP 34 367c-369a; CH 4 [700*5] 234a-235a
PART in, 395a-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 14 120d-121c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH vn, 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d;
SECT 7 132d; CH xin, SECT 26 154b-c; CH xvi, BK vii, SECT 9 280b-c
SECT i 165c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 2-3 lb-2a;
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 13 415c BK in, par 10 15b-d; par 18 18b; BK iv, par 26
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 43d-44a; 44c-45b / Judge- 25c-d; par 31 26c-27a; BK vi, par 4 36a-b; BK
ment, 550a-551a,c; 564c-565d esp 565c-d; vn, par 1-7 43b-45d; par 16-23 48c-50c esp
580c-d par 21 49d-50a; BK x, par 8-10 73b-74a; BK
xn, par 7 lOOd-lOla; par 21 103d-104a / City
la. The relation of the one and the many:
of God, BK iv, CH 12-13 195d-196b; BK vn,
emanation of the many from the one CH 6, 248a; CH 30 261b-d; BK x, CH 14 307c-
7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 370d-373c; BK vn, 308a; BK xn, CH 17 353a-354a; en 25 358b-
392b-394b / Parmenides 486a-511d / Sophist, 359a / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 12 627c-d
561d-574c esp 564d-574c / Statesman, 594d- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3,
595a / Philebus, 610d-613a A i, REP i 14b-15b; A 8 19d-20c; Q 4, A 3
R b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, en 8 [i9i 24- ia] 22b-23b; Q 6, A 4 30b-d; Q 8 34c-38c; Q 16,
267a-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 505b-506b; A 6 98b-d; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 44, AA 1-2
b
CH 7 [988 a 34-b <5] 506c; BK v, CH 6 [ioi6 i8- 238b-240a; Q 51, A 3, REP 3 277a-278c; Q 52,
B b i-
25] 537b; [ioi7 3-7] 537c; BK x, CH i [i<>52 A 2 279b-280a; Q 61, A 3, REP 2 316a-d; Q 90,
b
I053 8] 578d-580a; CH 6 583d-584c; BK xiv, A i 480d-481d; QQ 103-105 528a-545b; PART
CH 1-2 619b,d-622c i-n, Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vn, en 2 26c-d / 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q
:
Second Ennead, TR in, CH n 46b-c; CH 18 26, A 2, REP 3 511a d; PART in SUPPL, Q 84,
49c-50a; TR ix, CH 8 70a-d / Third Ennead, A 2, REP i 984c-985d
TR n, CH 16 90c-91c; TR HI, CH i 93b-c; TR 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, i [94-123]
vn, CH n 126a-d; TR vin 129a-I36a passim; 107b-c; n [112-148] 109a-b; xin [52-66]
TR ix, CH 3, 137b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR n 126a; xix [40-66] 135c-d; xxvin 148d-150b;
139c-141c; TR in, CH 2-5 142a-144c; TR iv, xxix [127-145] 151c-d; xxxin [76-145] 157a-d
CH i, 159b-d; CH 10-12 163a-164d; CH 30-45 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 162b
174b-183a; TR vin, CH 3~TR ix, CH 5 202a- 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 54d-56a /
207a,c / Fifth Ennead, TR i, CH 4-9 209d- Objections and Replies, 110b-112a; 123c-d;
213c; TR n, CH i 214c-215a; TR in, CH 10-12 158b-159a
221b-223c; TR iv 226d-228b; TR vn 238a- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i 355a-372d
esp DEF
239b; TR vin, CH 7 242d-243c / Sixth Ennead, 3-5 355b, AXIOM 1-2 355c-d, PROP 2-8 355d-
TR n, CH 1-8 268d-273c; CH 20-22 278d-280d; 357d, PROP 10, SCHOL 358a-b, PROP 13,
TR iv, CH 4 299a-d; TR v 305c-310d; TR vi, COROL-PROP 1 8 359d-363c, PROP 22-23 364d-
CH 7 313d-314a; TR vn, CH 4-17 323c-331a 365a, PROP 25, COROL and SCHOL 365b, PROP
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 3- 28-31 365c-367a, PROP 33-34 367b-369a;
ii 14a-50b passim; Q 14, A 6, ANS 80a-81c; PART n, PROP i-n 373d-377c
Q 16, A 6 98b-d; QQ 30-31 167a-175c; QQ 44-45 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [469-505] 185b-
238a-250a; Q 47 256a-259a; Q 77, A 6, REP i 186a; BK xi [334-346] 306b
404c-405c; Q 85, A 8, ANS 460b-461b; QQ 103- 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL,
105 528a-545b esp Q 103, AA 3-4 530a-531b; 370a-371a
PART I-H, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i 355a~372d esp DBF xin, SECT 18 152a-c; CH xv, SECT 2-4 162c-
3,5 355b, AXIOM 1-2 355c-d, PROP 1-8 355d- 163b; BK in, CH vi, SECT n-12 271b-272b
357d, PROP 11-16 358b-362a, PROP 18 363c, 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 149-
PROP 21-25 364a-365b, PROP 29 366b-c 150 442d-443b; SECT 155 444b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 43d-44a; 49c-51d esp 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV
51c-d; 74b-76c; 107b-c; 173b-177b; 197b- 56 475a-b
292 THE GREAT IDEAS \c to la
4, REP 2 49d-50b; Q 30, i, REP 4 167a-168a; A 54, A 4 25b-d; PART in SUPPL, Q 83, A 2,
A 2, REP 5 168a-169b; A 3 169b-170c; Q 85, REP 5 976c-978c; A 3, REP 4 978c-980d
A 8, REP 2 460b-461b; PART I-H, Q 10, A i, 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 20d-21b
REP 3 662d-663d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 12-15 359b~
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2, 361d; PART n, DEF 7 373c
A 3, REP i 713a-714c; A 9, REP x 719d-720c; 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 541 b
Q 17 806d-809d; PART in SUPPL, Q 79 951b- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH n,
956b SECT i 127d-128a; CH xv, SECT 9 164b-d;
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, CH xvi, SECT i 165c-d; BK in, CH iv, SECT
146c-147a 15-16 263a-c
31 DESCARTES: /fc/tt, xiv, 31b-c; 32a-b / 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
Geometry, BK i, 296a 7 406a-b; SECT 99 432b
31 SPINOZA: PART i, PROP 12-15 359b-
EfA/itf, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 120c-129c esp 12Ia-124d,
361d 126a-128b; 130b-133c csp 131c; 137a-140c
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 512 262a esp 137d-138d [antithesis]; 152a-d; 158a-
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, 159d; 161d-163a; 211c-213a
SECT 4-5 113b-c; BK n, CH xxvn 218d-228c
2c. The complex unity of a whole composed of
passim; BK iv, CH i, SECT 4 307b-c; CH in,
SECT 8 315b-c parts: the distinction between the in-
divisible and the undivided
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 12-13
415b-c 7 PLATO: Parmenides, 495c-497c; 505c-506b /
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-101b Theaetetus, 545b-547b / Sophist, 566a-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK vi, CH 13 [150*1 ]-CH
2b. The unity of the indivisible or the simple: B
14 [i5i 32] 204c-206a / Physics, BK i, CH 2
the individual thing, the point, the atom, b b
[i85 ii-i7J 260b-c; BK in, CH 6 [2o6 33-
the quality BK CH b
207*31] 285b-d; iv, 3 [2io*25- 8]
7 PLATO: Republic, BK vn, 392b-394b / Par- 289b-c / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 6 536a-537c;
menides, 506d-507b / Theactetus, 545b-547b CH 26 545c-d; BK x, CH i 578b,d-580a; CH 3
b
/ Sophist, 566a-d / Philebus, 611b-c [1054*20-23] 581a / Soul, BK in, CH 6 [430 6-
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [^3-9] 5c / 22] 663a-b
b
Topics, BK i, CH 1 8 [io8 23-32J 153a,c / 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 4 [ii74*i3-b i4]
b
Physics, BK i, CH 2 [i85 i7-i9J 260c; BK in, 428b-429a / Politics, BK i, CH i [1252*18-24]
a b
CH 7 [207 3i- io] 285d-286a; BK iv, CH 10 445b; CH 2 [1253*19-25] 446c
[218*3-30] 297d-298b / Generation and Cor- 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [599-634]
B
ruption, BK i, CH 2 [3 1 6 i 5-3 17*17] 411d-413a 8b-d
/ Metaphysics, BK i, CH 9 [992*18-24] 510b-c; 17 PLOTINUS : Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 2 142a-
BK in, CH 4 [iooi b 7~i9] 520b~c; BK v, CH 3 143b; TR ix, CH 5 206d-207a,c
b CH b Summa
[ioi4 3-i3] 534d; 5 [ioi5 9-i6] 536a; 19 AQUINAS: PART i, Q 6,
Theologica,
b
CH 6 [ioi6 24~3i] 537b; BK xi, CH 12 [1069*13- A 3, RKP i 29c-30b; Q n, A
ANS and REP 2 i,
16] 598c; BK xii, CH 7 [1072*33-34] 602b / 46d-47d; A 2, REP 2 47d-48d; Q 30, A i, REP 4
Soul, BK in, CH 2 [427*10-14] 659b-c; CH 6 167a-168a; Q 39, A 3, ANS 204c-205c; Q 85, A
b
[430 6-22] 663a-b 3, REP 2 455b-457a; A 8, ANS 460b-461b;
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 4 [ii74b 9-i4] PART i-n, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c
428d-429a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, DEFINITIONS, i la Q 79, A 2, REP 2 953b-955c
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 832b 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i
[483-634] 145b-146c; 150d-151c
7a-8d 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, RULE in 270b-
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 2, 271a
142b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxn,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 6, A SECT 4 201c-d; CH xxiv 214b-d; BK in, CH v,
3, REP i 29c-30b; Q 8, A 2, REP 2 35c-36b; SECT lo-n 266b-d
Q A i, ANS and REP 1,3,5 40d-41d; Q n,
10, 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 12-13
A ANS 46d-47d; A 2, REP 4 47d-48d; AA 3-4
i, 415b-c
49a-50b; Q 29, A 4, ANS and REP 3 165c-167a; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 168
Q 30, A i, REP 3 167a-168a; Q 40, A 2, REP i 145c-d
214b-215b; Q 42, A 2, REP 4 225d-227a; Q 50, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 104a-106b
A 2 270a-272a; Q 52, A 2 279b-280a; Q 53, A i,
REP i 280d-282a; A 2, ANS 282a-283b; Q 76, 3. Kinds of wholes or complex unities
A 8 397d-399b; Q 85, A 8, ANS and REP 2 8 ARISTOTLE Metaphysics, BK v, CH 6 536a-
:
460b-461b; PART i-n, Q 13, A 4, REP 2 675a-c 53 7c; CH 25-26 545 b-d; BK x, CH i 578b,d-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 580a
294 THE GREAT IDEAS 3a to 3*(3)
47, A 3, REP 2-3 258c-259a; Q 50, A 2, ANS 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 152d-
270a-272a; Q 119, A i, ANS 604c-607b 155d; 224d-225d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi,
A i, ANS 710a-711c; PART in SUPPL, Q 79, A i, SECT i-io 268b-271b passim, esp SECT 4 268d-
REP 3 951b-953b 269b; BK iv, CH vi, SECT 11 334b-335b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 139c- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i
153a passim, esp 147d-148b 413a-b; SECT 12 415b-c; SECT 99 432b
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 8 140b
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 112b
The distinction between essential and
accidental unity
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 541b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 10
b
xvn, SECT 12. 170d; CH xxnr, SLCT 31 212b-c; [93 3 6 -3 8 J 128b-c / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 6
CH xxix, SECT 16, 237b-d; BK iv, CH x, 536a-537c; CH 27 54Sd-546a; BK vn, CH 4-6
SECT 10, 351d-352a 552b-555a; CH 12 561b-562a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 47 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK vii, CH 8 [1328*21-24]
421c-422a 532c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, lOOc-d; 131c; 137a-140c; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 10,
152a-d; 161d-163a A ANS 45c-46d; Q 11, A i, REP 2 46d-47d;
6,
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103d Q A 8, ANS 397d-399b; Q 118, A 3, ANS
76,
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 850b,d- 603b-604b; PART i-n, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-
855a,c 689c; Q 28, A i, REP 2 740b-741a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2,
#(4) The unity and divisibility of time and A i, ANS 710a-711c; A 6 716b-718b; Q 3, A i,
space REP 2 723b-724a; Q 17, A 2, ANS 808d 809d;
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451a; 456a-457b PART in SUPPL, Q 79, A i, ANS and REP 4
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5*6-29! 9b-c / 951b-953b; A 2, REP 1-2,4 953b-955c
Physics, BK iv, en ii [219*10-13] 298d-299a;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi,
BK vr 312b,d-325d passim / Generation and SECT i-io 268b-271b passim, esp SECT 4
BK n, CH 10 [337*22-34] 439b-c /
Corruption, 268d-269b
BK v, CH 13 [1020*25 34] 541c /
Metaphysics,
CH 6 [430b 6-i9] 663a-b
Soul, BK in,
3(2) The comparison of the unity of natural
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vn, CH 8-13 things with man-made compositions or
123b-129a aggregations: artificial wholes
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xi, par 17-41 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK v, CH 6 (ioi5 b 35-
93b-99b 1016*9] 536b-c; CH 26 [1023^2 -36] 545c-d;
b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, BK vin, CH 3 [i043 i9~24] 568a-b; BK x, CH i
607b; PART 1-11, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 809d; PART in SUPPL, Q 79, AA 1-2 951b-955c;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 2, Q 80, AA 1-2 956c-958b; QQ 82-85 968a-992a
A i, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c; Q 3, A 7, REP i 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv
728a-729a; Q 17 806d-809d; PART in SUPPL, [34-78] 91d-92a
Q 79, A i, ANS and REP 4 951b-953b; A 2, REP 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 294c-295a; 311a b;
1-2,4 953b-955c 432b-d; 540a-543a,c
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 152d-155d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-49c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF 3 355b; PROP 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a; PART
5-10 356b-358b; PROP 12-15 359b-361d v, 60b-c / Meditations, n 77d-81d; vi, 98c-99a;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 99d-100a / Objections and Replies, 119d-120a;
xxin, SECT 1-6 204a-205c; SECT 37 213d- DBF vi-vn 130c-d; DEF x 130d; PROP iv 133c;
214b; CH xxvn, SECT 2-7 219b-221a; BK HI, 135d-136b; 152d-155d; 170b-c; 207d-208a;
CH vi, SECT i-io 268b-271b passim, esp SECT 209c; 224d-225d; 231a-232d; 248b; 276b-c
4 268d-269b, SECT 10 271b; SECT 21 273c-d; 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 11-13 377b-
SECT 42 280 b-c; SECT 49 282c; BK iv, CH vi, 378c; PART in, PROP 2 396c-398b; PART v,
SECTii334b-335b PREF 451a-452c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 63a; 63d-64a; 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 512 262a
74b-76c; 81b-83b; 91d-93b; 95a-d; 131c-d; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in,
137a-140c; I62b-I63a / Judgement, 556d-558a; SECT 4-5 113b-c; BK n, CH xxvii, SECT 6-8
559b-d; 565b-d; 575c-576a 220c-222a esp SECT 8, 221d-222a; SECT 15
224b-c; SECT 21 225d-226a; SECT 27-29 227d-
36(4) The unity of man as composite of body 228c; BK iv, CH in, SECT 6 313c-315b passim
and soul, matter and spirit, extension 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV
and thought 52 472c-473c
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93b-d / Phaedrus, 124b-d / 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229b-230a; 270b;
Phaedo, 231b-234c / Republic, BK in, 338a- 277a-b
339a / Timaeus, 453b-c / Laws, BK v, 686d- 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 198a-c
687c 42
KANT:/^tW7(?7?/,557c-558b
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 10 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 47-48
b BK vin, CH 3 [1043*29-
[io35 i3~32] 559a-b; 24a-c; ADDITIONS, 2 115d
b
4) 567d;CH 6 569d-570d; BK xn, CH 10 53 JAMES: Psychology, la-4a esp 2b-3a, 4a; 84a-
b
[io75 34~37] 606d / Soul, BK i, CH i [403*2- 93b esp 88a-90b; 116a-119b esp 118b 119b;
b b
i9) 632a-d; CH 5 [410^0-16] 640c; [4ii 5-i8] 130a; 139a-140a; 208a-b; 222b-223a
641 c-d; BK n, CH 1-2 642a-644c 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 5 [i254 a33~b 7]
448a 3^(5) The unity of the human person or the
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [94-176]
self: the order of man's powers; the split
31b-32b; [370-395] 34d-35a personality
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 6:12-14; 7~8* X 3 ;I 3~
BK iv, CH n, 240d-242d H
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 21 7 PLATO: Symposium, 16Sd-l66b/Gorgias, 270d-
265b-c; BK vn, SECT 55 2 83 b-c; BK ix,SECT 8 271b / Republic, BK iv, 346a-355a esp 350b-
292 b; BK xn, SECT 30 310a-b 355a / Timaeus, 453b-454a; 474b-d; 476a-b
17 PLOTINUS : First Ennead, TR i la-6b / Second 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 6-n 662d-667a
Ennead, TR i, CH 5, 37c / Fourth Ennead, TR 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3-4 108b-
in, CH19-23 15ld-154b; TR vn, CH 1 191c-d; HOa; CH 12 118d-120b; BK in, CH 24 203c-
CH 197c-198b / Sixth Ennead, TR vn, CH
8, 210a
4-8, 323c-325c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT i 253a;
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH n, 216c; BK v, SECT 36 273d; BK vn, SECT 13 280c;
BK ix, CH 8-17 289d-295c passim; BK x, CH 29 SECT 55 283 b-c; BK vin, SECT i 285a-b; BK
316d~318b; BK xm, CH 16 367a-d; CH 19 ix, SECT 9 292 b-d
369c-370c; BK xiv, CH 2-3 377a-378d; CH 5 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 18
379c-380b 166d-167b
CHAPTER 63: ONE AND MANY 297
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vin, par 10-11 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76,
55c-56b; par 19-24 58b-60a; BK x, par 39 A 2 388c-391a; Q 79, AA 4-5 417a-419b; Q 88,
81b-c A i, ANS 469a-471c
10 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
399b-407a; Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; QQ 93-101 A 4, ANS 9a-10b
492a-523d; PART i-n, Q 13, A i 672d-673c; 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 49c-51d esp 51c-d; 55a-
Q 16, A i 684b-d; Q 17, A 4 688d-689c; Q 36, 56c; 99a-101b; 110d-112a; 119a-b; 120c-129c
A 3 782b-783a esp 121a-124d, 126a-128b; 185b-c; 193a-200c
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 77,
:
esp 193d-194b, 194d-195a, 199a-c; 200c-204c /
A 2 145d-147c; QQ 81-83 162d-174b; PART Practical Reason, 329a-d / Judgement, 463a-
ii-n, Q 29 530b-533a; PART m, Q 2, A i, REP 2 475d; 570b-572b
710a-711c; A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 711d-712d; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par
Q 6 740b-745b; Q 17, A 2, ANS and REP 4 321-322 106c-107a; par 343 HOd-llla / Phi-
808d-809d; Q 19, A i, REP 4 816a-818b; PART losophy ofHistory, INTRO, 175c-177b
in SUPPL, Q 70, A i 893d 895d; Q 79, A 2 53 JAMES: Psychology, la-b; 154a-157b esp 156a;
953b-955c 159b-161a esp 160a-161a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy PURGATORY, iv [1-18]
',
b
658d; CH 3 [427*i6- 6] 659c-d; CH 4 661b- 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 16 271c-d;
662c; CH 5 [430*14-16] 662c; [430*20-22] BK vi, SECT 42 278a
b
662d; CH 7 [431*1-8] 663c; CH 7 [43i i3]-cH 8 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR iv, CH 4-16 14a-
[432*2] 664b-c / Sense and the Sensible, CH 6 19b / Sixth Ennead, TR ix, CH 6-n 357a-360d
b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vin, CH 4 266d-
[446 i3-27] 685a-b / Memory and Reminis-
cence, CH i [450*25-451*19] 691a~692b CH 8-9 270a-271a / Christian Doctrine,
267c;
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR ix, CH 1 136a-d / BK i, CH 35 634c-d
Fifth Ennead, TR in, CH 10 221b-222a; TR vi, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q i,
CH i 235b-d AA 5-8 613a-615c; Q 12, A 3, REP i 670d-671b;
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 17 75c-d; Q 13, A 3, REP 2 674c-675a; Q 16, A 3, CON-
par 19 76a-b; par 22-24 76d-77c; par 27-28 TRARY and REP 3 685b-686a
78b-d / City of God, BK vm, CH 6, 269b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART n-n, QQ
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, 2-4 390d-409d
A 2 76d-77d; A 6, REP 1,3 80a-81c; A 9, REP 2 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 234c-240b esp 235a-b,
83b-d; Q 27, A i, REP 2 153b-154b; Q 85, A 8, 236d-237a, 238c-239a / Fund. Prin. Mcta-
RP 3 460b-461b; Q A i 595d-597c; PART
117, physic of Morals, 257c-d; 266c-267d; 271d-
i-n, Q 28, A i, REP 3 740b-741a 279d esp 273d-277b; 286c-287d / Practical
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 52c-53a; 88b- Reason, 307a-d; 317a-b; 327d-329a; 337a-
91d 355d / Judgement, 588b [fn 2]; 591b-592c esp
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 31 592a-c: 594c-597d
19c-20a; PART in, par 146-147 55c-56a; par 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a; 461c-463d
343 HOd-llla; par 360 113d-114a,c / Philoso-
5c. The unity of subjective will and objective
phy of History, INTRO, 160c-161a
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 231a morality in the ethical realm
53 JAMES: Psychology, 142a-143b; 147a-b; 176a- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 8
178a; 232b-238b csp 232b-233a, 234a-235a, 14c; par 33 20b-d; PART 11, par 141 54b-d;
236a-237b; 307a; 309a-311a passim, esp 311a; PART in, par 155 57c; par 183 64a; par 185
852a 64b-d; par 229 75b; par 258 80b-81c; par 260-
261 82a-83d; par 270 84d-89c; par 353-360
5. Unity in moral and political matters 112b-114a,c esp par 360 113d-114a,c; ADDI-
TIONS, loo-ioi 133a-b; 118 136a-b
5a, The unity of virtue and the many virtues
7 PLATO: Laches, 32a-37b / Protagoras, 48a-50d; 5d. The unity of the family and the unity of the
state: the limits of political or social
58a-64d / Meno 174a-190a,c esp 174a-175d /
unification
Statesman, 605d<607a / Laws, BK xn, 795c-
797b 7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 343c-344a; BK v,
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK v, CH i [128^4-39] 356b-365d / Statesman, 605d-608d
178d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vm, CH i [1155*22-28]
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH i [ii29b i2]-cH 2 406d; BK ix, CH 6 420c-421a / Politics, BK i,
b CH
[ii3o 29] 377a-378b; BK vi, CH 13 394b-d BK n, CH i-^ 455b,d-461d
1-2 445a-446d;
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK vm, SECT 39 288c; esp CH 2 455d-456c; BK vn, CH 4 530a-d;
BK xi, SECT 10 303b-c CH 8 532c-533a
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR n, CH 7 9c-10a; 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK n, CH 21, 161b-c;
TR m, CH 6 lld-12b BK XH, CH 21 357a-b; BK xvii, CH 14, 464d;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 60, BK xix, CH 14-17 520a-523a
300 THE GREAT IDEAS 5e to 6a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologies PART i-n, Q 81, 6. Unity in the supernatural order
A i, ANS 163a-164d
23 HOBBES Leviathan, PART n, 99a-101a; 109c-d;
:
6a. The unity and simplicity of God
llla-b; 121a; 152c-d; 155b OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:1-6 / Deuteronomy,
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 871 344b 4:39; 5:6-10; 6:4; 32:29 / / Kings, 8:23,60
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 78-80 (D) HI Kings, 8:23,60 / Psalms, 18:31 (D)
42b-43a Psalms, 17:32 / Isaiah, 37:16,20; 43:10-15;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 3b-c; 44:6,8; 45:5-6,18,21-22; 48:12 (D) Isaias,
BK x, 64a; 64d-6Sb; BK xix, 140a-c 37:16,20; 43:10-15; 44:6,8; 45:5-6,18,21-22;
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 367a-369a pas- 48:12 / Jeremiah, 10:6 (D) Jeremias, 10:6 /
sim / Social Contract^ BK i, 392b~393b; BK Hosea, 13:4 (D) Osee, 13:4 / Zechariah, 14:9
in, 419c-d; BK iv, 425a-427a (D) Zacharias, 14:9 / Malachi, 2:10 (D)
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 18a Malachias, 2:10
42 KANT: Science of Right, 455c-456a APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 12:13 (D)
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1-2, 30d-32a; NUM- OT, Book of Wisdom, 12:13 / // Maccabees,
BER 14 60a~62d passim, esp 61b-c 1
124-25 (D) OT, // Machabees, 1:24-25
43 MILL: Representative Government, 352b 353a; NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 23:9; 28 / Marl^,
417c-433b passim / Utilitarianism, 460a-461c 12:29-34 / John, 17:3 / / Corinthians, 8:1-6;
44 BOSWELL-. Johnson, 56a-b 12:1-13 / Ephesians, 4:1-6 / / Timothy, 2:1-6 /
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par James, 2:19
158-159 58a; par 173 61a-b; par 181 63c-d; 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vin, CH 10 353b-355d
par 270 84d-89c; par 276 92b; ADDITIONS, 117 / Metaphysics, BK xn, en 7 [1073*4-11] 603a-b;
135d-136a; 161 143a-b; 168 145c-d; 178 147d- CH 8 [1074*32-39] 604d; CH 9 [1075*5-11]
148a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c- 605c-d
178a; PART i, 211a-212c; 222a-c; 236a-c; PART 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, UK vu, CH 14 [ii54b 2o-3i]
in, 302d-303a; PART iv, 363c-d 406c
50 MARX-ENGELS Communist Manifesto, 421a-d
: 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR ix 353d-360d
esp 421c-d; 427c-428b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 10 3b-c;
54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 677b-678b; 684d / par 12 4a; BK iv, par 24 25b-c; par 29 26b;
Civilization and Its Discontents, 785c-788d; BK vu, par 2 43c-44a; par 16-23 48c-50c esp
791b-c; 799a-800a par 21 49d-50a; BK xin, par 4 lllc / City of
God, BK vin, en 6 268d-269c; CH 11, 272c;
5e. The unity of sovereignty: its divisibility or BK xi, CH 10 327d-328d / Christian Doctrine,
indivisibility; the problem of federal BK i, en 5 625d-626a; CH 32 633c-d
union 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3 14a-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 97c-98a,c; PART 20c; Q 4, A 2, REP 1-2 21b-22b; A 3 22b-23b;
n, 100c-105c; 150b; 151a-152a; PART in, 198a- Q 6, A 3 29c-30b; Q 7, A 2 31d-32c; Q 8, A 2,
199a REP 2-3 35c-36b; A 4 37c-38c; Q n 46d-50b;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 3b; BK Q 13, A i, REP 2-3 62c-63c; A 4 65c-66b; A n
ix, 58b,d-60a 73c-74b; Q 14, A i, REP 2 75d-76c; A 4 78b-
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK i, 392b-393b; 79a; Q 26, A i, REP i 150b-c; Q 27, A i, REP 2
BK n, 395a-396a; BK in, 406b,d-410a; 420d; 153b-154b; Q 30, A i, REP 3-4 167a-168a; A 3
422a-c 169b-170c; Q 40, A i, REP i 213b-214b; Q 44,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 577b-c A i, ANS 238b-239a; Q 47, A i 256a-257b; Q 50,
42 KANT: Science of Right, 437c-d; 439a-441d; A 2, REP 3 270a-272a; A 3, REP 2 272a-273b;
452c-d; 455c-456a / Judgement, 586a-587a Q 54, A i, ANS 285a-d; A 3, Riip 2 286c-287b;
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: lla-20a,c pas- Q 55, A i, ANS and REP 3 289a-d; A 3, ANS
sim, esp ARTICLE VI [583-590] 16d, AMEND- 291a-d; Q 57, A i, ANS 295a-d; Q 84, A 2, ANS
MENTS, x 18a and REP 3 442b-443c; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1-14 29a-62d passim; 472c; PART i-n, Q 18, A i, ANS 694a-d
NUMBER 15, 63d-64a; 65c-d; NUMBER 18-20 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49,
71a-78b passim; NUMBER 32, 105d-107b A 4, ANS 5a-6a; Q 50, A 6, ANS lla-12a; Q 73,
NUMBER 39, 126b-128b; NUMBER 42, 138c; A i, REP 3 119c-120c; PART in, Q 2, A 2, ANS
NUMBER 44, 146d-147c; NUMBER 82 242 b- and REP i 711d-712d; Q 3, A 2, REP 3 724a-c;
244a A 3 724c-725b; Q 6, A 5, REP 2 744a-d
43 MILL: Representative Government, 428b-433b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xin [52-
passim 66] 126a; xxiv [115-154] 143d-144b; xxix
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofRight, PART in, par 276- [127-145] 151c-d; xxxin [76-145] 157a-d
6b to 6c CHAPTER 63: ONE AND MANY 301
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the problem of the one and the many in relation to the order of being,
nature, or reality, see BEING 2-23; GOD 5d~5e; NATURE ib; OPPOSITION 2b, 2e; RELATION
3; WORLD 3a~3b.
Problems closely related to that of the one and the many, see RELATION id; SAME AND OTHER
2b, 2e ; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR i.
The dialectical significance of the problem of the one and the many, see DIALECTIC 33, 3d;
OPPOSITION 2b.
Other discussions of numerical unity or identity, or the unity of the individual or the in-
divisible, see ELEMENT 53-5!); INFINITY 4b; MATHEMATICS 2c; QUANTITY 2, 6a; SAME AND
OTHER la-ib.
Discussions relevant to the unity and divisibility of matter, motion, time, and space, sec
CHANGE 5b; ELEMENT 5b; INFINITY 4b; QUANTITY 2; SPACE 33; TIME i.
The problem of essential and accidental unity, see SAME AND OTHER 33.
The problem of the unity of substantial form, see FORM 20(3).
The problem of the unity of man, or of unity in the human personality, see MAN 33, 5-53;
OPPOSITION 4~4b, 4d; SOUL 43.
Considerations of unity in the faculties or operations of thought or knowledge, see DEFINI-
TION id; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 60(2); MIND ig(3); SAME AND OTHER 40; SENSB
3c(5)-
302 THE GREAT IDEAS
For: The one and the many, or the simple and the complex, as objects of knowledge and in relation
to the order of learning, see IDEA 5d; KNOWLEDGE 50.
The unity and diversity of knower and known, see KNOWLEDGE i SAME AND OTHER 43. ;
The controversy over the unity of virtue and the plurality of virtues, see COURAGE 4; PRU-
DENCE 30; TEMPERANCE la; VIRTUE AND VICE ib, 3b.
Other discussions of the order of means and ends, see GOOD AND EVIL 5c; PRINCIPLE 43;
RELATION 53(2).
Unity as an aesthetic or an artistic principle, see ART yb; BEAUTY ic; POETRY 8a(i).
Matters bearing on the unity of the family and the state, and relevant to the process and
limits of social unification, see CITIZEN 8; FAMILY 2a; GOVERNMENT ib; STATE ib, ica-iof;
WAR AND PEACE na, nd.
Considerations germane to the divisibility or indivisibility of sovereignty, see GOVERNMENT
ig, 5d; STATE 9d.
Other discussions of the uniqueness and simplicity of God, and of the mysteries of the Trinity
and the Incarnation, see GOD 4b, pa-pb; MAN lie; RELATION 2.
ADDITIONAL HEADINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the dale, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
ALBO, The Boo^ of Principles (Sefer ha-ltyarim), B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 16-17
BK ii, CH 8, 10-13 H. ADAMS. Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres
G. Pico DELLA MIRANDOLA. Of Being and Unity MEYERSON. Identity and Reality
BRUNO. De la causa, principio, e uno BLOOD. Pluriverse
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphystcae, HI-VI, xv MCTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, BK in
(10), xxx (10), xxxiv, XLIV (n), XLVI (i), BROAD. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, CH i
XLVII (n, 14-15, 17) WHITEHEAD. Science and the Modern World, CH 10
Chapter 64: OPINION
INTRODUCTION
noble Houyhnhnms are paragons of Only when something better than opinion is
THE reason. They have no conceptions or proposed as attainable do the characteristics of
ideas of what is evil in a rational nature. 'Their opinion come to be questioned. That some-
grand maxim," according to Swift, their crea- thing may stand in relation to opinion as cer-
tor, "is to cultivate reason and to be wholly tainty to probability, as fact to conjecture, as
governed by it. Neither is reason among them adequate to inadequate knowledge, as demon-
a point problematical as with us, where men stration to persuasion. The chief source of dis-
can argue with plausibility on both sides of the agreement about the nature of opinion seems to
question; but strikes you with immediate con- be the meaning of the other term in the com-
viction, as it needs must do where it is not parison. Yet a few commonly recognized fea-
mingled, obscured, or discolored by passion and tures of knowledge if that is taken as the con-
interest." trasting term throw some light on the charac-
What Captain Gulliver finds most striking teristics of opinion. Certain things which are
in the contrast between men and this noble never said about knowledge seem to be gener-
race of hoiscs is that the perfect rationality ally said of opinion.
of the lifts them entirely above
Houyhnhnms
the vagaries and vicissitudes of opinion. "I re- AN OPINION, it is said, may be either true or
member it was with extreme difficulty," he false. But knowledge is never said to be false.
says, "that I could bring my master to under- For a great many writers, though not for all,
stand the meaning of the word opinion, or how doubt and belief are attitudes of mind which
a point could be disputable; because reason accompany the holding of opinions, but not
taught us to affirm or deny only where we are the possession of knowledge. It is possible to
certain, and beyond our knowledge we cannot opine and doubt at the same time, but not to
do So that controversies, wranglings,
either. know and doubt. Belief overcomes doubt with
disputes, and positiveness in false and dubious respect to opinion, but in those matters in
propositions, are evils unknown among the which the mind is convinced of the truth of its
Houyhnhnms." judgments, an act of belief does not seem to be
Among men it is not the meaning of "opin- necessary.
ion" but of "knowledge" which causes trouble. In the sense in which belief implies a willing-
If men had no conception of knowledge at all, ness to assent where assent might reasonably be
as the Houyhnhnms seem to have no concep- withheld, belief seems to be appropriate to
tion of opinion, they would find themselves opinion but incompatible with knowledge. The
disagreeing about many matters of opinion, but opposite of an opinion may be reasonably main-
probably not about the nature of opinion itself. tained, whereas the opposite of that which is
The great controversies concerning opinion known must be error or falsehood, and there-
in the tradition of western thought all relate fore untenable. The traditional distinction be-
to its distinction from knowledge, both with tween axioms and postulates (or assumptions)
regard to the difference in their respective ob- exemplifies this difference between knowledge
jects and with regard to the way in which and opinion. If a proposition is axiomatic, its
the mind works when it knows and when it
contrary must be false. But if something is pro-
probably will be postulated by those who arc judgment in difficult cases of conscience.
unwilling to grant what has been proposed.
This last point in the comparison of knowl- THE DISTINCTION between knowledge and opin-
edge and opinion appears to have political sig- ion is sometimes made in terms of a difference
nificance. It is not merely that men are accus- in their objects, and sometimes in terms of a
tomed to expect more disagreement in the difference in the way the mind works when it
sphere of politics than in science; they take a knows and when it opines. These two modes of
different attitude toward scientific and political differentiation may, of course, supplement one
controversy, largely because one is supposed to another the object of opinion being such that
occur in the domain of knowledge and the other the mind must operate in a certain way with
in the realm of opinion. Men speak of having a respect to it. The same authors usually treat
right to their own opinions, which includes a the matter both ways. But not all the great
right to persist in them despite the conflicting books in which these things are discussed use
opinions of others. The notion of a right lo a the words "knowledge" and "opinion" to sig-
certain obstinacy in differing from one's fellow nify the basic opposition.
men seems to follow from the nature of opinion Locke, for example, says that "the mind has
and to accord with its distinction from knowl- two faculties conversant about truth and false-
edge. With regard to matters concerning which hood: knowledge, whereby it certainly per-
first,
it is supposed that knowledge rather than opin- ceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agree-
ion is
possible, disagreement may of course oc- ment or disagreement of any ideas; secondly,
cur, but never without the expectation that judgment, which the putting ideas together,
is
reasonable men should be able to reach agree- or separating them from one another in the
ment on the disputed point by re-examining the mind, when their certain agreement or disagree-
facts. ment is not
perceived, but presumed to be so."
The differences between men which we ap- To the faculty of judgment belongs "belief,
peal to a consensus to resolve are differences of assent, or opinion, which is the admitting or
opinion, not knowledge. Sometimes conflicts of receiving of any proposition for true, upon ar-
opinion cannot be settled in any other manner, guments or proofs that are found to persuade
and for practical purposes it may be necessary us to receive it as true, without certain knowl-
to accept the opinion of the majority. The edge that it is so."
but for the most part they restrict the applica- or perceiving stands to judging or presuming.
tion of the theory to matters of opinion. Dis- Others, like Hume, tend to use the term 'belief
puted issues in mathematics or other theoretic in the place of 'opinion' as the opposite of 'knowl-
sciences are seldom, if ever, settled by counting edge'; or, like Spinoza, to assign opinion along
heads. The weight of numbers seems to be with imagination to the domain of inadequate
peculiarly relevant to measuring the worth of as opposed to adequate knowledge. But such
edge and opinion, and involves such related tween different statements of the objects of
terms as doubt, belief, faith, certitude, and knowledge and opinion. The knowable seems
probability. The second assumes that distinc- to have the properties of necessity and immuta-
tion for the most part, and deals with the prob- bility, of universality, clarity, and distinctness.
lems of decision and responsibility in the sphere That which is contingent and variable, or con-
of opinion the problem of liberty of con- fused and obscure, is usually regarded as the
science, of freedom of thought and expression, object of opinion.
CHAPTER 64: OPINION 305
Plato, for example, says that that which is It would seem, therefore, that Hume, like
apprehended by intelligence and reason "al- Plato, regards the objects of knowledge and
ways is, and has no becoming," whereas "that opinion, or science and belief, as belonging to
which conceived by opinion with the help of
is altogether distinct realms. They even seem to
sensation and without reason, is always in a proc- agree that physics cannot be classified as a
ess of becoming and perishing and never really science, though the probabilities it establishes
is." As understanding and reason divide the may be quite sufficient for action. But this
realm of knowledge, whose object is the im- agreement must be qualified by the fact that
mutable being of the intelligible forms, so fan- the realm of ideas is for Plato the reality which
cy and perception divide the realm of opinion, changing things image, while for Hume ideas
whose objects are the sensible things which have no reality at all.
They exist only in the
come to be and perish. rnind, which obtains them from the impressions
According to Aristotle, the object of science of sense-experience.
is the essential and the necessary, the object of A parallel between Hume and Aristotle might
opinion the accidental and the contingent. To also be drawn, at least insofar as both connect
whatever extent sensible particulars involve opinion with the contingent that which can
contingent accidents of all sorts, they belong to be otherwise. If the opposite of a proposition is
opinion, while the intelligible essences of things, not impossible or does not lead to self-contra-
universal in the sense of being common to many diction, then the proposition and its
contrary
individuals, belong to science. The parallel are matters of opinion. This criterion, in Aris-
which so far seems to be present between Plato's totle's terms, excludes all self-evident and de-
and Aristotle's statements of the objects of monstrable propositions. Such propositions, for
knowledge and opinion does not continue when both Hume and Aristotle, express knowledge,
we consider the consequences of their analyses. not opinion. Yet Aristotle, unlike Hume, does
For Aristotle, it is possible to have scientific not seem to think that the real existence even
becoming belongs exclusively to opinion, as the similar observations concerning Locke, Spi-
quite separate realm of being belongs exclusively noza, Kant, James in fact, almost every writer
to knowledge. In consequence, Aristotle's enu- who distinguishes between knowledge and opin-
meration of the sciences includes physics along ion by reference to characteristically different
with mathematics and theology, whereas the objects. In the tradition of western thought the
study of the physical world does not yield a sci- major controversies concerning the objects of
ence, according to Plato, but only, as he says in knowledge and opinion occur with regard to
the Timaeus, "a likely story" a plausible the kind of being or reality assigned to each
cerning the real existence of anything or the Skepticism approaches its limit when it is
causal connection of one thing with another, do maintained that everything is a matter of opin-
not permit demonstration. They are objects of ion. At the furthest extreme, it is sometimes
equally tenable opinions and gives man no hope by all who differentiate religious faith from
that he will ever be able to do better than adopt secular belief. The difference lies not in the ob-
opinions on insufficient grounds or else suspend ject, but in the causes of belief.
judgment No
axioms, according to
entirely. Those who distinguish between knowledge
Montaigne, have ever won the universal con- and opinion also admit that a difference in the
sent of mankind; no demonstrations have ever way the mind judges, is able to produce either
escaped the need to assume their initial prem- knowledge or opinion concerning the same ob-
ises. Unless men beg the question in this way, ject. It is
impossible, according to Aristotle, for
they cannot avoid an infinite regress in rea- the same mind with regard to the same object
soning. There is no proposition about which to know and opine at the same time. A given
men have not disagreed or changed their minds. individual, for example, cannot hold a proposi-
Illusions and hallucinations suggest the perva- tion of geometry to be true both as a matter of
sive unreliability of the senses, as errors of judg- knowledge and of opinion. But this does not
ment and reasoning suggest the radical infir- prevent the individual who once held the prop-
mity of the mind. osition to be true merely on the authority of
"How variously do we judge of things?" his teacher and thus as a matter of opinion
Montaigne asks. "How often do we alter our from subsequently learning the reasons for its
opinions? What I hold and believe today," he truth and thus coming to know what formerly
continues, "I hold and believe with my whole he merely opined. Two individuals may likewise
belief. could not embrace nor preserve any
. . .1 assert the same truth in different ways, the
truth with greater assurance than I do this; but one asknowledge, the other as opinion.
hasit not befallen me, not only once but a thou- The traditional account of the difference in
sand times, and every day, to have embraced the activity of the mind when it knows and
some other thing with the same instruments, when opines appears to involve two related
it
and in the same condition, which I have since points. The point which both Plato and Aris-
judged to be false ? A man must, at least, become totle emphasize is that the man who knows does
wise at his own expense; if I have often found not merely assert something to be true, but has
myself betrayed under this color, if my touch adequate reasons for doing so. The truth of
prove ordinarily false and my balance unequal right opinion is no less true than the truth of
and unjust, what assurance can I now have more knowledge. It differs, as the discussion in Plato's
than at other times ? ... We ought to remember Meno and Theaetetus seems to show, in that the
that whatever we receive into the understanding, man of right opinion cannot explain why what
we often receive things that are false; and that he asserts is true. He cannot give the causes of
by the same instruments that so often give
it is its truth, or trace its connections with other
themselves the lie, and are so often deceived." truths which help to demonstrate it. The fact
that an opinion is true does not prevent its be-
MONTAIGNE EXEMPTS religious faith from the ing overturned or given up, since without ade-
uncertainty of all beliefs or opinions which man quate reasonsit is insecure against attack. Un-
CHAPTER 64: OPINION 307
supported by reasons, opinion is not only un- our minds one way or the other are matters of
stable as compared with knowledge, but it is opinion.
also unteachable in the sense in which knowl- Though they vary in the terms of their anal-
edge can be learned and taught. The man of yses, Descartes, Locke, and Hume seem also
right opinion, unable to explain satisfactorily to agree that when the mind is moved to assent
why he thinks as he does, cannot help others by the relations it perceives between ideas,
understand the Tightness of his opinions. especially when these are clear and distinct, it
The other characterization of the mind's knows beyond doubt or the possibility of error.
activity in forming opinions seems to follow But when the mind, lacking such intuitive or
from the preceding observation. If reasons do rational grounds, nevertheless forms a judg-
not determine the mind to think this rather than ment concerning what is not evident, then the
that,what is the cause of its judgment? If the result is
opinion entertained as merely prob-
mind is not compelled by the object under con- able, accompanied by doubt, and subject to
sideration to think of it in a certain way, what error.
does move the mind in its act of assent or dis- For Descartes, the will, freely exercised,
sent to that which proposed? To such ques-
is moves the mind to such fallible judgments. Ex-
tions, the traditional answer seems to be wish or cept when it is so moved the mind, responding
desire,whether an act of free choice on the part to its object alone, is
naturally infallible. For
of the will or an inclination determined by the Hume, the mind is free to imagine whatever it
driving power of the emotions. pleases, but its beliefs are determined by a senti-
Pascal makes this point when he observes that ment or feeling of instinctive origin, "which
there are two ways in which men come to think depends not on the will, nor can be commanded
as they do. The more natural way "is that of the at pleasure." The issue between those who con-
understanding, for one should only agree to nect opinion with free will and those who deny
demonstrated truths; but the more usual ... is that beliefs are voluntarily formed is discussed
that of the will; for all men are nearly always in the chapter on WILL. It does not seem to af-
respect to all matters on which the reason can reject both alternatives and substitutes instead
judge. If "that which the reason apprehends is supernatural faith and ordinary belief. Aquinas,
such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g., first on the other hand, accepts knowledge and opin-
principles, it is not in our power to assent to it ion as exhaustive on the plane of the mind's
or to dissent. For in such cases," he holds, "as- natural operations and makes religious faith a
sent follows naturally, and consequently, prop- supernatural alternative to both.
erly speaking, is not subject to our command. He calls faith a mean or intermediate between
But some things which are apprehended do not science and opinion because he conceives it as
convince the intellect to such an extent as not having some of the characteristics of each. "To
to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least believe," he says, "is an act of the intellect as-
suspend its assent or dissent for some cause or senting to the truth at the command of the
other; and in such things, assent or dissent is in will." In this faith resembles opinion. The act
our power, and is subject to our command." of faith is due to the will rather than to the ra-
Knowledge, it would seem, consists in those tional evidence of the object. Faith is "the evi-
judgments wherein the mind is moved to assent dence of things unseen." But faith also resem-
solely by the matter being considered, whereas bles science because the affirmations of faith
all matters about which we are free to make up have the certitude or freedom from doubt
308 THE GREAT IDEAS
which characterizes knowledge. According to sented both optimistically and moralistically (if
Aquinas, faith has greater certitude than natu- such a combination could be), and withal so defi-
ral knowledge, since, as intellectual virtues, nitely conceived as to show us why our phenomenal
"science, wisdom, and understanding. .are .
experiences should be sent to us by Him in just the
based upon the natural light of reason, which very way in which they come"
falls short of the certitude of God's word, on
which faith is founded." Faith differs from OPINION RAISES moral and political as well as
knowledge in that the object of faith exceeds psychological issues of liberty. One of them is
the intellect's comprehension. That is why faith the problem of freedom of discussion. This
requires an act of the will to move the intellect problem has aspects which belong to other
to assent; but whereas ordinary opinions are chapters freedom in scientific inquiry to SCI-
adopted by a man's own voli tion, Aquinas a t trib- ENCE, freedom in artistic or poetic expression to
utes faith to God. "Faith," he writes, "as re- ART and POETRY, freedom of conscience and
gards the assent which is the chief act of faith, worship to RELIGION, freedom in teaching to
is from God moving man inwardly by grace." EDUCATION, and the general issue of freedom of
Just as skepticism with respect to science thought and speech to the chapter on LIBERTY.
takes the form of reducing all human judg- Yet what is common to all these related ques-
ments to opinion, so skepticism with respect to tions seems to be determined by the nature of
religion takes the form of attributing all belief opinion, particularly in its distinction from
to purely natural causes. If Freud is correct knowledge.
that all beliefs are the product of wishful think- None of the books which argue for freedom
ing, then it is difficult to separate religion from of expression Milton's Areopagitica, Locke's
James finds the will to believe in science as or falsehood fyiowingly. All of them argue that
well as religion. Like Freud, he explains belief the individual who claims the right to be heard
in terms of emotion and desire. "Will and Be- is
morally bound by the duty to speak the truth
meaning a certain relation between objects
lief, as it appears to him. Nor do those, like Plato
and the Self," he writes, "are two names for and Hobbcs, who recommend political censor-
one and the same psychological phenomenon." ship seek thereby to fortify the state by sup-
Except for those necessary truths which con- pressing truth. In saying that the sovereign
cern only ideal relationships, the mind in think- should "judge of what opinions and doctrines
ing about reality is free to choose between al- are averse, and what conducing to peace,"
ternative theories, in the sphere of science as Hobbcs observes that "though in matters of
well as in religion. To believe is to attribute re- doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the
pendent of objective criteria, neither is it peace can no more be true, than peace and con-
mainly determined thereby. cord can be against the law of nature."
"That theory will be most generally be- Since knowledge as distinct from opinion has
lieved," he says, "which, besides offering us ob- the character of incontrovertible truth, the
jects able
to account for our sensible experi- issue of freedom or censorship cannot be stated
ence, also offers those which are most interest- in terms of knowledge. But what some men hold
ing, those which appeal most urgently to our to be knowledge others regard as opinion. The
aesthetic, emotional, and active needs. .So- . . issue of free expression applies therefore to the
called 'scientific' conceptions of the universe entire range of human thought on the supposi-
have so far gratified the purely intellectual in- tion that no proposition or doctrine
is
exempt
terests more than the mere sentimental concep- from controversy, and no human judgment
tions have. But. .they leave the emotional and
. secure from contradiction. This supposition
active interests cold. The perfect object of belief does not abolish the distinction between knowl-
would be a God or 'Soul of the World? repre- edge and opinion; nor docs it flout the law of
CHAPTER 64: OPINION 309
prived of the opportunity of exchanging error ing the reasons which turn opinion into knowl-
for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as edge. It is not to multiply opinions but to ad-
great a benefit, the clearer perception and live- vance knowledge, not to encourage skepticism
lier impression of truth produced by its col- but to invigorate the search for truth, that Mill
lision with error." advocates the submission of all matters to open
Mill advances four distinct reasons for recog- dispute so long as any disagreement remains.
nizing "the necessity to the mental well-being His fundamental principle, like that of
of mankind (on which all their other well-being Locke, consists in divorcing political from logi-
depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom cal criteria. Logically, the disputants may stand
of the expression of opinion. First, if any . . .
opposed to each other as one who knows and
opinion compelled to silence, that opinion
is one who merely opines, or as one who holds a
may, aught we can certainly know, be true.
for true and one a false opinion, or even as one who
To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. enjoys God's gift of supernatural faith and one
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an who lacks such light; but considered politically,
error, it may, and very commonly does, con- the opponents represent a conflict of opinion,
tain a portion of truth; and ... it is only by with each party equally deserving the benefit
the collision of adverse opinions that the re- of the doubt that it may have the truth on its
mainder of the truth has any chance of being side. If the state were to intervene, it would be
supplied. Thirdly, even if the received opinion deciding a disputed question, not by reason,
be not only true, but the whole truth; unless but by force, in an area to which force is inap-
it is suffered to be, and actually is
vigorously plicable.
and earnestly contested, it will, by most of "The business of laws," Locke writes, "is not
those who receive it, be held in the manner of to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the
a prejudice, with little comprehension or feel- safety and security of the commonwealth, and
ing of its rational grounds. And not only this, for every particular man's goods and person.
but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine it- And so it ought to be. For the truth certainly
self will be in danger of being lost, or en- would do well enough if she were once left to
feebled." shift for herself. . . .She is not taught by laws,
The aim is not to perpetuate controversy; nor has she any need of force to procure her en-
nor is it to
keep all doctrines perpetually on trance into the minds of men. Errors indeed
the level of debatable opinion. "As mankind prevailby the assistance of foreign and bor-
improve," Mill writes, "the number of doc- rowed succours. But if Truth makes not her
trineswhich are no longer disputed or doubted way into the understanding by her own light,
willbe constantly on the increase; and the well- she will be but the weaker for any borrowed
being of mankind may almost be measured by force violence can add to her."
the number and gravity of the truths which Those who argue that state censorship is jus-
have reached the point of being uncontested. tified,whether the matters whose debate is
The cessation, on one question after another, of prohibited are speculative pr practical, moral,
310 THE GREAT IDEAS
political, or theological, appear to extend the Considered way, the principle of ma-
in this
safeguarding of the common good beyond se- jority rule leaves open the question whether
curity from immediate peril of violence; or to the majority should be a preponderance of the
proceed upon the hypothesis of sufficient wis- many or the few. Should it be a democratic ma-
dom in the rulers to discriminate unerringly jority or, according to some aristocratic stand-
between truth and falsehood. Those who dis- ard, the majority of the few who are wiser,
tinguish between church and state with regard more expert, or more virtuous than the many ?
to censorship tend to limit the application of With regard to some questions, Aristotle sug-
ecclesiastical authority to questions of faith and gests, the multitude may be a better judge than
morals, on which the church is supposed to any individual, even the most expert. "If the
have supernatural guidance in deciding what people are not utterly degraded, although in-
is true or sound. dividually theymay be worse judges than those
who have special knowledge, as a body they are
THE PRINCIPLE OF majority rule in matters of as good or better."
opinion seems to be opposite to the principle The opposing claims of the greater number
that the voice of a minority should be heard. and the more competent, as well as the possi-
To settle a difference of opinion by taking a bility of combining the merits of both, arc dis-
vote gives a decisive weight to numbers which, cussed in the chapters on DEMOCRACY and
itmay be thought, is as illegitimate as resolving ARISTOCRACY. The problem of majority rule
a debate by force. But when it is necessary to also appears in those chapters as a factor in the
legislate
or to act, debate must be terminated theory of representation, especially the ques-
and issues resolved. tion considered by Mill whether the represent-
On speculative questions, which may be an- ative shall exercise his own judgment or act on
swerable by knowledge rather than by opinion, the opinion of the majority of his constituents.
and with respect to which agreement may be Mill tries to separate those problems of gov-
possible, the end of truth seems to be served by ernment which should be submitted to repre-
permitting discussion to go on as long as reason sentative assemblies and decision by majorities
opposes reason. But if the discussion is for the from those which should be solved by experts.
sake of determining action and if, in addition, Bui even on matters subject to deliberation by
the subject under discussion is strictly a matter representatives of the people, Mill advocates
of opinion concerning which it is
possible for such measures as plural voting and minority
reasonable men perpetually to disagree, then it representation to offset the sheer weight of
may be necessary to appeal to some principle numbers and prevent its being the decisive
other than reason. force in settling political differences and deter-
Traditional political theory appears to offer mining action.
only two solutions. One principle of decision is Such qualifications of the principle of major-
to follow the opinion of a single man an abso- ity rule do not seem necessary to those who, like
lute monarch or an elected chief magistrate Rousseau, think that "the general will is found
whether or not that one man also has the wis- by counting votes." What Rousseau says of any
dom commensurate with such responsibility. individual opinion applies to minority opinions
The other principle is to accept the opinion of as well, namely, that when a contrary opinion
the majority. According to Aristotle, this sec- prevails, it
proves that what the minority
ond operative in every form of
principle is "thought to be the general will was not so." On
government except absolute monarchy. It is the question of how large a majority should be
not only in democracy, he says, that "the decisive,he thinks that "the more grave and
greater number are sovereign, for in oligarchy, important the questions discussed, the nearer
and indeed in every government, the majority should the opinion that is to prevail approach
rules." It is characteristic of every form of con- unanimity. . . .The more the matter in hand
stitutional state that "whatever seems good to calls for speed, the smaller the prescribed differ-
the majority of those who share in the govern- ence in the number of votes may be allowed to
ment should have authority." become."
CHAPTER 64: OPINION 311
There is, according to Rousseau, only one po- qualities of the general will still reside in the
liticaldecision which requires unanimity, and majority." When the principle of majority rule
that is the decision to enter upon the social con- is
unanimously adopted, each individual agrees
tract, to set up popular government under to substitute the general will for his own partic-
which individual liberty endures as long as "the ular opinion.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The different objects of knowledge and opinion: being and becoming; universal and
particular; the necessary and the contingent 312
2. The difference between the acts and sources of knowing and opining 313
2a. The influence of the emotions on the formation of opinion: wishful thinking,
rationalization, prejudice
30. The truth of knowledge and of right opinion: their difference with respect to
manner of acquisition, stability, and teachability
3#. Certain and probable, adequate and inadequate knowledge: degrees of certitude;
modes of assent
4#. Criticism
of superstitiouj or dogmatic belief as opinion without foundation or
warrant
5.
Freedom in the sphere of opinion
318
6a. Good and evil as matters of opinion: moral standards as customs or conventions
reflecting prevalent opinion
7.
The social and political significance of public opinion
70. The value of the majority opinion: the distinction between matters to be deter-
mined by the expert or by a consensus
7#. Majority rule, its merits and dangers: protections against the false weight of
numbers 320
312 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a~119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
2c. Reasoning and argument concerning mat- 2d. Reason, experience, and authority as
ters of opinion: comparison of demon- sources of opinion
stration and persuasion, principles and 7 PLATO: Meno, 174a-d / Theaetetus, 517b-
assumptions, axioms and postulates 518a; 522b-523a; 525a-527b
7 PLATO: Meno, 187c-189d / Gorgias, 256b-c / 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH i [ioob 2i-ioi a i5]
Republic, BK vi-vn, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 143b-d
457c-d 9 ARISTOTLE Ethics* BK I,CH 3 [i 094^9-1 095 a ^]
:
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [4a io-b i3] 8b-9a / 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 12 264c
Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 2 [7i b 8-i6] 97 d- 16 COPERNICUS Revolutions of the Heavenly
:
A 3 14b-15a; Q 67, A 3, ANS 83b-84d; PART 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 208a-294b esp
ii-n, Q i, AA 4-5 382c-384b; Q 4, A 8, ANS 212c-215a, 238c-246a, 258c-261c, 267c-268a,
409a-d; PART in, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-766b 271b-273b, 276b-278a, 285c-294b; 308c-d;
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333c-d 318a-319b; 439c-440a; 497d-502c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 57d-58b;
31 DESCARTES: Rules, n 2a-3b; in, 3d-4a; XH, 95d-96a / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 67
22a-b / Discourse, PART in, 49a-b; 49d~51a; 115d-116a
PART iv, 51b-52a; 53c-d / Meditations, 72b,d; 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 46b-c / Ob-
74a,c; 1-111, 75a-82d; v, 95b-96a; vi 96b-103d jections and Replies, 272a-273a
passim / Objections and Replies, 123b-125b; 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 385 238b-239a
126a-b; POSTULATE i-m 130d-131a; POSTU- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
LATE vi-vn 131c; 152d-153c; 226d; 237b-c 1-3 405a-c;SECT 86-88 429c-430b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, DBF 4 373b; PROP 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV
27-31 384b-385c; PROP 37-44 386b-390a; 26 460b-c; SECT iv, DIV 28-SECT v, DIV 38
PROP 49, SCHOL, 391d-392a; PART in, PROP 460d-466c; SECT vn, DIV 60 477a-c; SECT xn
17, SCHOL 401d-402a 503c-509d
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 233-241 213b-217b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 224a-227a / Practical Rea-
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO 93a-95d son, 294c-295d; 311d-313a
passim; BK iv, CH i, SECT 2 307a; CH 11, SECT 43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b passim
14, 312b; CH in, SECT 25-29 321a 323a passim; 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 121c-d
CH iv, SECT 3-12 324b-326d; CH vi 331b-336d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 2c-6a; 7a;
passim, esp SECT 13 335c-d; CH xi, SECT 9-11 PART in, par 270, 86b-c
356d-357c; CH xii, SECT 6-14 360a-363a pas- 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 428b-d
sim; CH xiv-xvi 364b-371c; CH xvn, SECT 2 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 194a*195a
371d-372b; SECT 14-17 378c-379c; CH xix, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi,
SECT i 384c-d 168b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 881d-882b
20-21 458a-c; DIV 30, 462a; SECT vi, 469d
4. Opinion, belief, and faith
[fn i]; SECT x, DIV 86-91 488d-491c passim,
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 463d / Beyond A 3, ANS 83b 84d; PART n-n, Q i, A 3, ANS and
the Pleasure Principle, 661c-662a REP 3 381d-382c; A 4 382c-383b; Q 2, A i,
ANS 391a-392a; Q 4, A i, ANS 402a-403d; Q 10,
3c. The skeptical reduction of human judg- A i 426d-427c; Q 18, A 4, ANS 464c-465a; PART
ments to opinion
in, Q 7, A 3, REP 3 747b-748a
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 86a-d; 107d-109a / Phaedo, 23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 65b-66c; 78a-b;
236c-238a / Republic, BK vn, 400a-d / Timac- PART in, 165b-166a; 238c; 241a-242a; PART
us, 457c-d / Theaetetus, 517b-532a passim, esp iv, 248c
517b-c, 522b, 525a-526c, 531b-532a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82a; 98b-99a; 150d-
4* to 4b CHAPTER 64: OPINION 317
151a; 208a-294b
esp 209a-c, 238c 239c, 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 200d; 308b 309a
250a-b, 259d-261a, 267c-268a, 271b-273b 42 KANT: Judgement, 604d-606d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c; 95d- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-
96a 160b
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, 69b-d / Objections 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196a-198b
and Replies, 125c-126a; 168b-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH 4b. Criticism of superstitious or dogmatic
xvin 380d-384b belief as opinion without foundation
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV or warrant
38-40 466b-467c 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 12d-13b; BK m,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 240b-243c / Practical Rea- 95c
son, 292a-c; 353a-354d / Judgement, 599d- 6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War, BK i, 353d-
:
23HonBEs: b R
Leviathan, PART i, 57d-58a; 61d- BK in, CH i [ino 27-iin 2i] 356c-357a; BK
62a; 78b-c; 96a; PART n, 140b; 149b-d; PART vi, CH 5 389a-c; BK vn, CH 2-3 395c-398a
iv, 272c passim
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 46b-47c; 93b; 102a- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 7
103a; 115b-119d; 122a; 124c-125a; 143c-144a; 651d-655a
146b-c; 278a-284c; 307b; 424d-426b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 91,
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [25.)- A 3, REP 3 209d-210c; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-
257] 43 b / Troilus and Cresi>ida, ACT n, sc n 224d
[5^-96] 114a-c; ACT in, sc in [125 130] 123d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 57d~58a
/ King Lear, ACT iv, sc vi [151 -176] 274d-275a 26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI, ACT n, sc iv
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 94d [1-74] llb-12a
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 46b c; PART 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b
in 48b-51b passim 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART in, 48b-49d;
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 371b- PART iv, Sic / Objections and Replies, 126a-b;
372c; PART in, PROP 9, SCHOL 399c; PROP 39, 237b-c
SCHOL 408b-d; PROP 51, SCHOL 411d-412b; 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 27a-44a
THE AFFECTS, DFF 27 419a-b| PART IV, PREF, 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK n, 396b; BK
423c-d; PROP 8 426b-c; PROP 19 429d; PROP iv, 434c
27-28 431b-c; PROP 63-64 443d-444b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 60a-c / Fund. Prin. Meta-
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 309 228b; 312 229a; 916- physic of Morals, 278d-279d / Practical Rea-
918 349b-350a son, 357c-360d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90a-d; BK i, of Ethics, 372b-d / Science of Right, 398c-399c
CH n, SECT 8 105d-106a; SECT 9-10, 106d; 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 454d-455a; 456d-457b;
SECT 21-23 llla-CJ BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 471b-473c
10-13 230b-231c; BK in, CH xi, SECT 15-18 44 Bos\v ELL: Johnson, 219a-b
303b-304b; BK iv, CH in, SECT 18-20 317d- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 227
319c; CH iv, SECT 7-9 325b-326b 74b-d; par 234 75d-76a; ADDITIONS, 144 140a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 53 JAMES: Psychology, 887a-888a
132, 509c-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 362b-d / Social Con- 7. The social and political significance of pub-
lie opinion
tract, BK iv, 434b-435a
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 346c-347d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 236d-237a / Fund. Prin. 7a. The value of the majority opinion: the dis-
tinction between matters to be deter-
Metaphysic of Morals, 263a; 270d-271c;
278a-b / Practical Reason, 320c-321b; 330d- mined by the expert or by a consensus
43 MILL: Liberty, 268d-271c; 298b-302c; 307b- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par
312a / Representative Government, 330a; 350b- 302 lOla-c; par 311-313 103d-104b / Phi-
355b passim; 355b-392b passim, csp 370a- losophy of History, INTRO, 172d-173a;
389b; 401a-409c; 410b-c; 431b 175b-c; PART n, 273d-274a; PART iv, 365c-
44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 261c-d; 422c 366b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the distinction between knowledge and opinion in terms of their objects,
see 8e; KNOWLEDGE 4b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 43; PRiNciPLE3c(2); TIME
BEING
TRUTH 3b(2); and for other discussions of this distinction in terms of psychological
6f;
causes, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION pa; DESIRE 5b; EMOTION 3b; WILL 3b(i).
The logic of argumentation in the sphere of opinion, see DIALECTIC 2b-2b(2); REASONING
5c~5d; RHETORIC 4c~4c(3).
The consideration of opinion in relation to truth and falsity, to certainty and probability,
and to adequate and inadequate knowledge, see JUDGMENT 9; KNOWLEDGE 6d(i)-6d(3);
NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 43; TRUTH 2e.
Other statements of the extreme skeptical position that everything is a matter of opinion,
seeCUSTOM AND CONVENTION pb; KNOWLEDGE 5c; PRINCIPLE 5; RELATION 6b; TRUTH ja-
7b; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR ya.
The more limited skepticism which treats philosophy as opinion in contrast to science, see
METAPHYSICS 43; PHILOSOPHY 6b; SCIENCE 73; and for still another variety of skepticism
which treats all moral or aesthetic judgments as matters of opinion, see BEAUTY 5; CUSTOM
AND CONVENTION 53; GOOD AND EVIL 6d; RELATION 6c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 70.
The special problem of applying moral principles or legal rules to particular cases, see JUSTICE
lod; LAW 5g; REASONING 56-56(3) UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 6c.
;
The conception of supernatural faith as distinguished from both science and opinion, see GOD
6c-6c(2); KNOWLEDGE 6c(5;; RELIGION la; THEOLOGY 2, 4b; TRUTH 43; WILL 3^3); and
for the treatment of religious faith as ordinary belief or as the result of the will to believe,
see GOD 13; RELIGION 6f; SCIENCE 73; THEOLOGY 5; WILL 3b(i), 3^3).
Other considerations of the problem of freedom in the sphere of opinion, see KNOWLEDGE pb;
LIBERTY 2a; PROGRESS 6e; TRUTH 8d.
Other considerations of the value of the majority opinion, the principle of majority rule, and
the problem of minority opinions, see ARISTOCRACY 6; CONSTITUTION p-pa; DEMOCRACY
2a, 30, 5b(i); GOVERNMENT ih; STATE 8d(3); TYRANNY 2c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
words in the vocabulary of com- convenience in certain cases of not having read-
CERTAIN
mon speech, used at almost every turn of ily familiar names to designate the opposites. In
discourse, indicate ideas so indispensable to hu- some instances, moreover, the opposition seems
man thought that they are often employed to involve more than a pair of terms, as, for ex-
without analysis. The word "is" is one of these, ample, is the case with poetry, history, and sci-
signifying the idea of being or existence. The ence; or physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.
word "not" and the pair of words "either. . . . In the tradition of the great books we not
or" have the same character. Taken together, only find the opposition of one idea to
"not" and "either. .or" signify the idea of
. . another, but we also find opposite points of
opposition. The quality of redness is not the view, conflicting theories or doctrines, in the
same as the quality of hotness, yet this negative discussion of almost every basic topic under the
relation by itself does not make them opposite, heading of these ideas. We find the same word
forsomething can be red-hot. It is only when a used with contrary meanings, the same propo-
thing can have either one quality or another, but sition affirmed and denied. We find reasoning
not both, that the qualities are said to be op- opposed to reasoning. The same conclusion is
posed. Opposites are more than merely dis- reached from apparently opposite principles, or
tinct; they exclude one another. opposite conclusions are drawn from premises
Opposition seems to be as pervasive as the apparently the same.
familiarwords which signify it. Even if it were But though opposition seems to be inherent
not one of the great ideas, it would be
itself in the realm of ideas and in the life of thought,
manifest in all the other basic notions which the idea of opposition is not itself explicitly
come in antithetical pairs, e.g., good and evil, thought about in many of the great books. This
lifeand death, war and peace, universal and does not mean that in the consideration of
contingency, same and other, one and many, of opposition go unnoted. On the contrary, all
virtue and vice. Each of these notions seems to the chapters dealing with the nature and con-
opposites,even though we have not explicitly The study of nature, as well as of man and
listed them, such as being and non-being, truth society, discovers opposition at the root of
and falsity, love and hate, justice and injustice, change. The physics of antiquity, for example,
wealth and poverty. defines the elements or the bodily humours in
The enumeration might extend to include terms of contrary qualities; according to Aris-
every fundamental notion, except for the in- totle, contraries are among the ultimate prin-
323
324 THE GREAT IDEAS
ciples of naturethe terms of change. The cos- than one opposite. Protagoras reluctantly ac-
mology of Lucretius makes the conflict of op- cepts the first alternative; he is apparently un-
posites the principle of growth and decay in willing to re-open the question concerning the
the universe. Destruction struggles against cre- pairing of opposites. But the question is re-
ativity; life against death. "The death-dealing opened by others. It is one of the great prob-
'
motions," the poet writes, 'cannot keep the lems in the theory of opposition, relevant to
mastery always nor entomb existence for ever- the distinction of different kinds of opposites.
more, nor on the other hand can the birth and The problem can most readily be stated in
increase-giving motions of things preserve them terms of the logical processes of division and
always after they are born. Thus the war of definition. On the hypothesis that opposites
first-beginnings waged from eternity is carried always come in pairs, every class can be divided
on with dubious issue: now here, now there, the into two sub-classes which not only exclude
life-bringing elements of things get the mastery
each other, but also exhaust the membership of
and are overmastered in turn." the divided class. Such division is called dichot-
Modern mechanics deals with action and re- omy. Many of the Platonic dialogues nota-
action in the impact of bodies and the resolu- bly the Sophist and the Statesman exemplify
tion of forces tending to produce opposite re- the method of dichotomous division, used as a
sults. The theory of evolution pictures the device for constructing definitions. The object
world of living organisms as engaged in the to be defined, the character of the statesman or
damental conception in man's thinking about In the Sophists, preliminary exercise is under-
nature and society, do not alter the point that taken in the method of division as preparation
stracted from special subject matters, to be- It will serve ushere as an example of dichotomy.
come itself the object of thought. Even so, not All the arts are first divided into two kinds, the
all of the great speculative works develop an productive and the acquisitive; then the ac-
explicit theory of opposition classifying its quisitive arts are divided into those making vol-
types, analyzing
its structure, formulating it as untary exchanges and those which obtain goods
a universal principle of being, mind, or spirit. by coercion; the coercive divides into fighting
Four authors especially treat opposition as a and hunting according to the alternatives of
primary theme, though not out of the context open or secret attack; hunting into the hunting
of such other notions as being, relation, one of the lifeless and the living; hunting of the liv-
and many, same and other, or identity and ing into hunting of swimming or walking ani-
difference.They are Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and mals; the hunting of swimming animals into the
Hegel. It should not be surprising that the same hunting of winged animals and the hunting of
authors are the principal figures in the chapter water animals; the hunting of water animals
on DIALECTIC. Their disagreement about the into opposite methods of catching fish, with
nature or meaning of dialectic has a parallel further sub-divisions made until the art of an-
here in their conflicting theories of opposition. gling can be defined as an acquisitive art which,
being coercive, is a form of hunting, distin-
SOCRATES ARGUES, in the Protagoras, for the guished from other forms of hunting by the
unity of virtue by using the principle that character of its object animals which swim in
"everything has one opposite and not more water rather than air and by the method used
than one." If wisdom is the opposite of folly, to catch them hooks or barbs rather than
and appears that folly is opposed by
if it also nets or baskets.
temperance, then either wisdom and temper- Aristotle objects to this process of division as
ance are the same, or a thing may have more a way of defining things. "Some writers," he
CHAPTER 65: OPPOSITION 325
says, "propose to reach the definitions of the sary to employ the negative term 'not-red.' But
ultimate forms of animal life
by bipartite divi- then another difficulty arises which Aristotle
sion. But this method is often difficult, and often recognizes when he calls the negative term "in-
impracticable." For one thing, it tends to asso- definite" and which Kant discusses when he
ciate or dissociate natural groups arbitrarily, treats the infinity of the negative. The not-red
e.g.,
the classification of birds with water ani- includes more than other colors which are not
mals, or of some birds with fish and some birds red, such as green and yellow. It includes every-
with land animals. "If such natural groups are thing in the universe, colored or colorless,
not to be broken up, the method of dichotomy which is not red, e.g., happiness or atoms or po-
cannot be employed, for it necessarily involves etry.
such breaking up and dislocation." Perfect dichotomy can be achieved by using
Aristotle also calls attention to the fact that positiveand negative terms as opposites, or
the method of dichotomy often uses negative what Aristotle sometimes calls "contradictory
terms in order to make an exhaustive division terms" such as man and not-man or just and
into two and only two sub-classes. But the class not- just. But the class which is thus divided is
says, to "get at the ultimate specific forms of rather than the contradictory of 'just/ for these
animal life by bifurcate division." He therefore opposites apply only to men, or laws, or acts;
proposes a method of defining by genus and dif- only certain kinds of things are either just or
ference, according to which it is possible in bio- unjust, and that is why it is said that contraries
logical classification to sub-divide a genus into are always opposites within a genus or a definite
more than two species. To avoid sub-division kind. In contrast, 'not-just' is the contradictory
into two and only two, that which differentiates rather than the contrary of 'just/ for these op-
each species from the others within the same posites apply to everything in the universe;
genus must be some positive characteristic. everything is either the kind of
thing to which
justand unjust apply or it is the kind of thing
As ALTERNATIVE methods of definition, dichot- to which neither of these terms apply, and so
omous division and the differentiation of spe- it is the not- just.
cieswithin a genus are discussed in the chapter In addition to separating contraries (both of
on DEFINITION. Here we are concerned with which are positive terms) from contradictory
the problem of the number of opposites pro- opposites (one of which is a positive, the other
duced by the exhaustive division of a class or a negative term), Aristotle distinguishes two
kind. For example, how many species of color sorts of contraries. On the one hand, such con-
are there? If the primary colors are more than traries as odd and even exhaustively divide a
two, would appear that each primary color
it limited class (e.g., integral numbers): on the
has more than one opposite, since the same ob- other hand, such contraries as white and black
ject at the
same time and in the same respect represent the extremes of a continuous series of
cannot be both red and yellow, red and green, shades, in which any degree of grayness can be
green and yellow. But Aristotle seems to restrict considered as the opposite of either extreme or
the notion of contrariety to pairs of opposite of a darker or a lighter gray.
qualities. "Red, yellow, and such colors, though There are still other kinds of opposite pairs,
qualities, have no contraries," he says. Whether according to Aristotle, such as the terms 'dou-
or not he would have regarded them as con- ble' and 'half/ which have the peculiarity of im-
traries if he had been acquainted with the chro- plying each other; or the terms 'blindness' and
matic series of the spectrum, remains a conjec- 'sight/ which are opposite conditions of the
ture. same subject. In this last case, one of the op-
To find a single opposite for red, it is neces- posites naturally belongs taa certain kind of
326 THE GREAT IDEAS
thing, and the other represents a loss of that form. Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to use
natural property or trait. It is therefore called the word "species" in two distinct senses which
a "privation." correspond to the two kinds of contrariety
Considering these various modes of opposi- with and without intermediates. "A thing's
tion, Aristotle proposes a fourfold classification difference from that from which it differs in
posites of possession and privation, such as sight called in several senses" leads him to observe
and blindness; the opposites of affirmation and that "their modes of completeness will answer
negation, such as man and not-man, or just and to the various modes of contrariety which at-
not-just. He discusses
the special characteristics tach to the contraries."
of each type of opposition, but it is only con-
trariety which he thinks requires further sub- THE LOGICAL OPPOSITION of propositions or
division. judgments depends in part on the opposition of
Even though both are always positive terms, terms or concepts. If contrary things are said
some odd and even, exhaust a
contraries, like about the same subject of discourse (i.e. if the t
definite class, just as positive and negative op- same number is called odd and even, or the
poshes exhaust the infinite. They admit of no same act is and courageous, or
called cowardly
intermediate terms and hence they differ from the same animal is and a mammal),
called a bird
contraries like white and black. White and black pairs of contrary statements are made, of which
are extreme limits of a continuous series and both cannot be true. But it does not seem to
thus permit an indefinite number of intermedi- follow that one of the two statements must be
ates which fall between them. Things which true. Both can be false. In the examples given,
differ only in degree are like the sort of con- the number may be a fraction and neither odd
traries which find their place in a continuous nor even; the act may be foolhardy and neither
series. Things which differ in kind are like the courageous nor cowardly; the animal may be a
sort of contraries between which no intermedi- reptile and neither bird nor mammal.
ates are possible. This characteristic of contrary statements
One of the great problems of classification, the impossibility of their both being true com-
especially with respect to living organisms, is bined with the possibility of their both being
whether the diverse species which fall within false can also be found, according to Aristotle,
a single genus differ in kind or only in degree. in propositions which have the same subject
The answer would seem to depend on whether and do not contain contrary terms as predi-
the several species are rekted by one or the cates. The propositions 'All men are white* and
other sort of contrariety. As the chapter on 'No men are white' cannot both be true, but
EVOLUTION indicates, the basic meaning of the they can both be false. The contrariety of these
word "species" changes when the possibility of two statements, which can be taken as typify-
"intermediate forms" is
rejected or admitted. ing the opposition of all universal affirmations
When a class is divided by contraries without and negations, does not depend on contrary
intermediates, the genus can have only two predicates, but on the opposed meanings of 'all
species, as for example, the division of animals are* and 'none is.'
into brutes and men. When a genus is divided Keeping the terms constant and varying
into more than two sub-classes, (e.g., the divi- only the quality and quantity of the proposi-
sion of vertebrates into fish, amphibians, rep- tions, Aristotle formulates two other typical
tiles, birds, and mammals), it would seem to fol- modes of opposition between pairs of state-
low that the species are like points in a contin- ments. Whenboth statements are particular or
uous series and admit the possibility of inter- limited, but one is affirmative and the other
mediate types. negative, both cannot be false though both can
According to Darwin's conception of species, be true, e.g., 'Some men are white' and 'Some
their contrariety always tends to take the latter men are not white.' This pair of opposites Aris-
CHAPTER 65: OPPOSITION 327
totle calls "sub-contraries." When one state- ONE OF THE BASIC controversies in the tradi-
ment is universal and affirmative and the other tion of the great books concerns opposition it-
is
particular and negative or when one is uni- self. Is the principle of contradiction the ulti-
versal and negative, the other particular and mate test of the truth of judgments and rea-
affirmative the two propositions are, accord- soning? Is the truth of indemonstrable propo-
ing to Aristotle, contradictory. Contradiction sitions or axioms certified by the self-contradic-
is the most complete type of opposition, for tion of their contradictories? For example, is
contradictory statements are opposite in both the truth of the proposition 'The whole is
quality and quantity. Of a pair of contradic- greater than the part' made necessary by the
tories, both cannot be true and both cannot be impossibility of the contradictory statement
false. One must be true and the other false, 'The whole is not greater than the part,' on the
traditionally known as "the square of opposi- which seem to be necessarily true, must not the
tion," appears to exhaust all possibilities. It in- contradictory of this conclusion be false or at
dicates, moreover, that every statement may least be incapable of demonstration by
propo-
have two opposites, a contradictory and either sitions which are also necessarily true?
ence, therefore, in facing the great controver- the general and altogether sufficient principle
sies in the tradition of western thought, to of all analytical knowledge, beyond this its
know whether the opposite views which men authority and utility, as a sufficient criterion of
have taken on fundamental issues arc genuine truth, must not be allowed to extend." In "the
contradictions, requiring everyone to take sides, synthetical part of our knowledge, we must no
or whether they are merely contrary positions. doubt take great care never to offend against
In the latter alternative, the inconsistency of that inviolable principle, but we ought never
the theories prevents us from agreeing with to expect from it any help with regard to the
both parties to the dispute, but it does not re- truth of this kind of knowledge."
quire us to agree with either, for contrary doc- The reason, Kant explains, is that "in form-
trines never exhaust the possibilities. Between ing an analytical judgement I remain within a
such extreme positions, for example, as that given concept, while predicating something of
everything is in flux and nothing changes, both it. If what I predicate is affirmative, I only pred-
of which cannot be true, the truth may lie in icate of that concept what is
already contained
the doctrine that some elements of permanence in negative, I only exclude from it the
it; if it is
thing which happens has a cause. The truth of Metaphysics and which he also appears to think
such synthetical judgments, according to Kant, is
capable of a demonstrative solution. For him,
is as
necessary and as a priori as the truth of ana- therefore, both are problems to which scientific
lytical judgments, but the principle of contra- answers can be given. But for Kant the demon-
diction does not provide their ground or vali- stration of the antitheses, or contradictory prop-
dation. ositions, iu both cases is as cogent as the dem-
For Aristotle, in contrast, those propositions onstrations of the theses; and therefore, since
which do not derive necessity from the princi- we know that both of a pair of conliadictory
validly demonstrated and the other cannot be limits of scientific thought and because he
demonstrated at all. But in the sphere of opin- thinks the issues are problems reason cannot
ion, dialectical opposition is
possible. Because ever solve.
the contradictory of a probable statement is With respect to conclusions affirming or de-
probable, probable arguments can be
itself also nying matters beyond experience, the antino-
constructed on the opposite sides of every dia- mies can be interpreted eilher as showing that
lectical issue. contradictory arguments are equally sound or
For Kant dialectical issues do not consist in a as showing that they are equally faulty. On
conflict of opposed probabilities. Far from set- either interpretation, Kant and Aristotle seem
ting probable reasoning against probable rea- to be opposed on the applicability of the prin-
soning, dialectical opposition consists in what ciple of contradiction to conflictingarguments
appear to be demonstrations of contradictory and conclusions (except, of course, those which
propositions. For example, in that part of the are merely probable). This difference between
Critique of Pure Reason devoted to the Tran- them accords with the difference in their con-
scendental Dialectic, Kant presents opposed ar- ceptions of science and dialectic, and in their
guments which look like demonstrations of theories of the scope and conditions of valid
them, but by a synthesis uniting the opposites This reconciling of opposites, by their union
and reconciling their differences. in a more inclusive whole embracing both, typi-
According to Aristotle, opposites exclude one fiesthe Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis,
another in existence as well as in thought. A and synthesis. The motion repeats itself as the
thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same synthesis of one contradiction faces its own op-
time; nor in any particular respect can it simul- posite and requires a higher synthesis to over-
taneously both be and not be of a certain sort. come the contradiction it has generated. Thus
Only with the passage of time and in the course every opposition in reality or thought is a phase
of change can opposites be realized, when a in the progressive realization of the Absolute,
thing passes from being to non-being, or gives wherein all contradictions are resolved.
up one attribute in order to assume its contrary. In Hegel's Philosophy of History and in his
The difference for Aristotle between becom- theory of the development of the state in the
ing and being between change and complete
(or Philosophy of Right, the dialectical process is ex-
actuality) seems to be that the one includes and emplified at every stage of progress. The con-
the other excludes opposites. Change cannot flict of interdependent opposites of opposite
occur except as one opposite comes into exist- classes or forces in society, of opposite political
ence while the other passes away. But oppo- institutions or principles calls for a resolution
sitescannot co-exist with complete actuality. which shall unite rather than exclude the op-
So far as reality consists of co-existent actuali- posites.
ties, it is limited principle of contradic-
by the Considering the division of labor, for exam-
tionas a principle of being to those which ple,Hegel writes: "When men are dependent
are not contradictory. All possibilities cannot, on one another and reciprocally related in their
therefore, be simultaneously realized, for, as work and the satisfaction of their needs, subjec-
Leibnitz states the principle, all possibilities are tive self-seeking turns into a contribution to
not "compossiblc." the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else.
alityeverything except the Absolute Idea it- jective self-seeking turns into the mediation
selfhas contradictory, as real as itself, and
its of the particular through the universal, with
co-existent with it. Contradictories imply one the result that each man in earning, produc-
another and require each other, almost as correl- ing,and enjoying on his own account is eo ipso
ative opposites do. Whatever is partial and in- producing and earning for the enjoyment of
complete presupposes something which is par- everyone else." The opposition between the
tial and incomplete in an opposite respect. The particular good of each individual and the uni-
opposition between them can therefore be over- versal good of all is thus overcome by that ad-
come by a synthesis which includes them both, vance in social organization which is the divi-
and which complements each by uniting it with sion of labor.
the other. Each of the stages of world history is, accord-
For example, the category of being is opposed ing to Hegel, "the presence of a necessary mo-
by non-being. These opposites both exclude ment in the Idea of the world mind." But the
and imply one another. They are in a sense even world mind itself is a synthesis, a resolution of
identical with one another, insofar as the notion the conflicting opposites of the various na-
of being contains the notion of non-being, and, tional minds "which are wholly restricted on
conversely, the notion of non-being, the notion account of their particularity. Their deeds and
of being. Except for the Absolute, everything destinies in their reciprocal relations to one
which is also is not, and everything which is not another are the dialectic of the finitude of these
also The apparent contradiction involved in
is. minds, and out of it arises the universal mind,
this simultaneous application of opposite cate- the mind of the world, free from all restrictions,
gories to the same thing is overcome by a third producing itself as that which exercises its right
being and non-being. Being and non-being are these finite minds in the 'history of the world
"
united in becoming. which is the world's court of judgment.'
330 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. Opposition in logic 331
la. Kinds of opposition among terms: correlation, contrariety, privation, negation
ib. The analysis of contrariety: the kinds of terms which can be
contrary; contrariety
with and without intermediates between extremes
2d. The opposition of good and evil in the world and in relation to God
2e. The reconciliation of opposites in the divine nature: the synthesis of all con-
traries in the Absolute
334
4*. Conflict in human life: opposed types of men and modes of life 338
5. Conflict
in society and history 339
50. Competition in commerce and the rivalry of factions in politics
5^. The class war: the opposition of the rich and the poor, the propertied and the prop-
ertyless, capital and labor, producers and consumers
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 IAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text
is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the
left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand
side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the
lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side
of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation ot
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
lr(l) Dichotomous division: positive and neg- \d. The opposition of propositions or judg-
ative terms ments
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 134b-c/ Sophist, 552b-561d;
577c-579d / Statesman 580a-608d esp 595a-d
Iff(I) The square of opposition: contradic-
610d-613a tories, contraries, subcontraries
/ Philebus,
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 31 64b- 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 10 [i3 b i~35] 19a-
65a / Posterior Analytics, BK n, en 5 125b-d; c / Interpretation, CH 6 26c-d; CH 10 29d-
en 13 [96 b2 5 97 b|5l 132a-133a / Topics, BK 31c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 2 [72*13]
b a
vi, en 6 [i43 n-i44 4J 197b-c / Metaphysics, 98c
BK vn, CH 12 [1038*8-14] 561d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 64,
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 2-3 A 3, REP 3 68b-69b
165d-167d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 64d-65c; 156d-157b;
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, en 4 lla-c / 174b-d
Sixth Ennead, TR HI, CH 8-10 285a-286d
42 KAN r: Pure Reason, 43d-44a l</(2) Modal opposition: the necessary and the
contingent
lc(2) Division of a genus by differentia: the 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 12-13 32d-3Sc
contrariety of species 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 22a-b
7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 548c-549d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 39c-41c esp 40d-41c;
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 3 [i i6-24] 5d; 193a-200c esp 194b-d
CH 22-b 23) 7b-8a / Posterior Analytics, BK
5 [3
a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 851a; 861 b
b b
n, CH 13 [96 25~97 6] 132a-133a / Topics, BK
a b b
i, CH 18 [io8 38- 9] 152d; [io8 i9-32] 153a,c;
le. Opposition in reasoning and proof: the
conflict of dialectical arguments; the an-
BK iv, CH 3 [i 23*20-1 24^] 171c-172c; CH 6
b a
BK tinomies of a transcendental dialectic
[I27 7-i7] 177a; [i28 2o-3o] 177d-178a;
vi, CH 5-6 196b~199c / Physics, BK i, CH 3 7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Phaedrus,
b CH a
[i86 i4-34] 261c-262a; 5 [i88 i8-25] 263c; 134b-c / Phaedo, 226d-227a / Republic, BK iv,
CH 6 [189*11-14] 264c; [189^3-27] 265b / 350c-351d; BK vii, 392b-393d / Parmenides,
Metaphysics, BK in, CH 3 [998^21-27] 51 7c; 491a-511d / Theaetetus, 525d<526b / Sophist,
BK v, CH 10 [ioi8 a 38-b 7] 539b; CH 28 [1024* 558b-d; 571d-574c / Statesman, 594d-595d
b b
37- 9J 546b-c; BK vn, CH 12 [io37 28-iO38 34] 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 30 [46*3-
ft
b a
561c-562a; BK vin, CH 3 [io43 24-iO44 i4J 10] 63d; BK n, CH 15 84b-85b / Topics, BK i,
568b-d; CH 6 569d-570d; BK x, CH 8-9 585b- CH n 148a-c / Sophistical Refutations, CH 9
586c / Soul, BK i, CH i [402b i5~403*2] 631d- 234b-d / Heavens, BK i, CH 10 [279b 4~i2]
632a 370d / Metaphysics, BK xm, CH 4 [io78 b i8-
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 2-4 28 610b
|
[996 26-997 i5] 515b-d; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 107a-b; 117b; 238b [fn 2]
BK iv, CH 3-6 524b-531c; CH 8 532b~d; BK v,
2c. Nonbeing as the opposite of being
CH 10 [ioi8 B22-26] 539a; BKix, CH 9 [1051*4-
22] 577a-b; BK xi, CH i
[1059*23-26] 587a; 7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 371c-373c / Parmenides,
CH 5-6 590a-592b 507c-511d / Theaetetus, 518a / Sophist, 561d-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q i, 577b
A 5, REP 2-3 613a-614a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 5 [188*18-25]
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 94,
: 263c; CH 9 [192*2-16] 268a; BK v, CH i [225*
A 2, ANS 221d-223a; Q 113, A 7, REP 5 366a- 20-29] 305b-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 4 [985**
b
367c 3-10] 503c; CH 5 [986 25-987*i] 504d-505a;
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART HI, PROP 4-5 398d; BK iv, CH 2 [ioo3*33-b n] 522b; [ioo4 b 27-
PROP 10 399c-d; PART v, AXIOM i 452c 29] 523d; BK vn, CH 4 [1030*25-26] 553a; BK
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH m, xn, CH 2 [i 060^27-34] 599a
SECT 15 316d-317a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vin 27b-34a /
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-101b; 107b-c; 179c- Second Ennead, TR iv 50a-57c / Third Ennead,
182b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, TR vi, CH 6-7 109d-lllc
367d-368a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xn, CH 2 343c-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 302a csp 302b [fn i] 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13,
A ANS 68d-70d; Q 14, A 9 83b-d; Q 16,
7,
2b. Opposites in the realm of being, mind, or A REP 2 96b-d; A 5, REP 3 97c-98b; Q
3,
spirit: the one and the many; the dialec-
17, A 4, REP 2 103c-104b; Q 104, A 3, REP i
tical triad of thesis, antithesis, and syn-
537b-d
thesis 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 71,
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 134b-c / Phaedo, 244b-246c A 6, REP i llOb-lllb
/ Republic, BK in, 333b-d; BK v, 368c-373c; 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, iv, 89c-d / Objec-
BK vn, 392b~394b / Parmenides 486a-511d / tions and Replies, 214d-215a
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR 11, CH 16-17, CH 20, 126c-d; CH 25 129d-131b; CH29 134d-
91b-92c; TR in, CH i 93b-c; TR vn 119b-129a; 138a
334 THE GREAT IDEAS 2e to 3a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxxm
(2. The metaphysical significance of opposition.
[76-145] 157a-d
2d. The opposition of good and evil in the 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 15 360a-361d;
world and in relation to God.) PART n, PROP 1-2 373d-374a
17 PLOIINUS: Ennead, TR viu 27b-34a csp
First 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-
CH 67 Third Ennead, TR n, en 5-7
29d-30d / 160a; 165a-b; 205d-206a,c; PART i, 237d-
85b-86c; CH 10-14 88a-89d 238c; 245b d; PART in, 306a-c
18 AUGUS-IINE: Confessions, BK in, par n 15d-
16a; BK iv, par 24 25b-c; BK v, par 20 32d-
3. Opposition in the realm of physical na-
ture
33a; BK vn, par 3-7 44a-45d; par 11-23 47a-
50d; BK viu, par 22-24 59a-60a; BK xin, par
a. The contraries as principles of change
45 123a / City of God, BK vni, CH 24, 283a~b;
3)
[104-142] 107b-d; xm [52-87] 126a-b; xix CH 1-5 428b,d-433d csp CH 4-5 431b-433d /
a
[40-66] 135c-d Metaphysics, BK i, CH 8 [989 i8~29] 507b-c;
23 HmiBhs: leviathan, PART n, 160d 161a BK n, CH 2 [994 B i9-b 6] 512c d; BK iv, CH 7
b
30 HA CON: Advancement of Learning, 17d-18a [ion 29~38] 531d; BK vni, CH 5 569b-d; BK
32 MILTON: Comus 33a-56b esp [414-475] 42b- ix, CH 9 [1051^-13] 577a; BK x, CH 7 [1057*
44a / Paradise Lost, BK n [496-505] 122a; BK 16-34] 584c-d; BK xi, CH 9 [io65 b 5~i4] 593d-
iv [32 104] 153a 154b; BK v [600 904] 188b- 594a; CH n 596a-d; BK xu, CH 2-3 598c-
195a; BK vn [519-549] 228b-229a; BK vin 599d; CH 10 [1075^5-34] 606a / Soul, BK 11,
[319-337] 239a-b; BK ix [679-779] 262a- CH 4 [416*18 -b 8] 646c-d / Longevity, CH 2-3
264a; BK xi [84-98] 301a / Areopagitica, 395a 710b-711b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 81b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK i, CH
a b
41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 230b; 330a-b 18 [724 2o- i3] 264b-d; BK iv, CH 3 [768*2 7]
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 316a-317d 309c / Ethics, BK vni, CH i [1155^2-8] 407a;
b
46 HLUEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160a; CH 8 [ii59 i9-23]411d
PART i, 237d-238c; PART iv, 346b-c 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2, 167b-d
47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE 7a-9b; PART n 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 813d-814b;
[11,676-843] 284a-288a BK n, 839d-840b
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dicl( csp 4b-5a, 135a-145a, 14 PLUTARCH: Agesilaus, 482c
171b, 370b-372a, 409b 410b, 414b-419b 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 8 lllc-d
52 DOSFOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, / Sixth Ennead, TR HI, CH 22 293d-294c; CH 27
120d-126d; BK xi, 308c-309a; 341a-345c 296b-297a
54 FRF.UD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 790d; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 23,
791b [fn i] A i, REP 3 132c-133b; Q 58, A 7, REP 3 305c-
306b; Q 62, A 7, REP i 322d-323b; PART i-n,
2e. The reconciliation of opposites in the di-
Q 18, A 8, REP i 699d-700b; Q 23, A 2 724c-
vine nature: the synthesis of all contraries 725c
in the Absolute 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 408c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 3 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART HI, PROP 4-6 398d-
14a-20c; Q 4, A 2, REP 1-2 21b-22b; Q 65, A i 399a; PART iv, PROP 29-35 431d-434a; PART
339b-340b; Q 91, A i, ANS 484a-485b v, AXIOM i 452c
3 to 40 CHAPTER 65: OPPOSITION 335
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 27a; 76c-83b esp 76c-d; 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 35, 163a
91d-93c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, AXIOM i 378c;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c-d; LEMMA 1-3 378c-379a
165a-b; 178a-d; 179b-d 34 NEWTON: Principles, DBF in Sb; LAW 1 14a
. Contrariety of quality in the theory of the 3d. The opposition of physical forces and its
elements or humours resolution
7 PLATO: Symposium, 155d-157a / Timaeus, 11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes, BK i,
462b-464b POSTULATES-PROP 7 502a-504b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH 9 [217*20-26] 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 969a 972a
297a / Heavens, BK n, CH 3 [286 n22-28] 377d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
/ Generation and Corruption, BK 11, CH 1-3 Q 84, A 3, REP 2-3 985d-989b
b
428b,d-431a; CH 7 [334 8~3o] 435d-436b / 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, llb-12d; BK n,
Metaphysics, BK i, cii 8 [989*18-29] 507b c 38a-39b; 52d-54d; 59a-d; BK HI, 65a-67a
/ Sense and the Sensible, en 2-7 674a-689a,c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
passim 209a-210a; 224d-225c; FOURTH DAY, 240a-d;
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK 11, en 7 243d-249b passim
177c-179a; BK in, en 7 [670^8-25] 199b; BK 34 NEWTON: Principles, COROL i-n 15a-16b; BK
a b
iv, CH 2 [677 5- i] 206d-207b / Generation i, PROP 57-69 lllb-130b
b h
of Animals, BK iv, CH i [765 8-766 25J 306d- 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
308a 9a-12d
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 13-20 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 691b~692a;
4c-7d 788c-793c; 817a-b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK n, CH 8 9 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xin, 570d;
191b-199a,c EPILOGUE n, 678a-b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [380- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 105a
415] 66a-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, g 66, ?>e. The struggle for existence: the competition
Theologica,
A 2, ANS 345d-347b; Q A ANS and REP 3 of species
91, i,
264a-266b Sod
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55b-d; 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 105c-107a; 350d-354b;
66c-d; 67a-b; 78a-d 381bc
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 1-18 424c- 26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT in, sc
429d; PROP 59-AppENDix, HI 442b-447b; n [71-127] 304a-c
APPENDIX, xxxn 450c-d; PART v, PROP 1-20 27 SHAKESPEARE: Sonnets, cxxix 606a
452d-458a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 17 401d-402a;
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vm [521-643] PROP 51 411c-412a; PART iv, DBF 5 424b;
243b-246a; BK xii [80- no] 321a-b AXIOM 424c; PROP i, SCHOL-PROP 7 424d-
33 PASCAL: Pcnstcs, 104 193a; 412-413 242a; 426b; PROP 9-18 426d-429d; PROP 60 442d-
423 243b 443a; APPENDIX, xxi-xxv 449a-c
CHAPTER 65: OPPOSITION 337
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 411 242a 5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [1011-1084]
42 KANT: Fund. Pnn. Mctaphysic of Morals, 38b-39d / Agamemnon [184-247] 54a-c / Cho-
258b-c cphoroe [885-930] 78d-79b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 17 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone 131a-142d esp [1-99]
16c; ADDITIONS, 13 118c 131a-132a, [162-210] 132c-d, [441-470] 134d-
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i
[354-429] lla-12b; 135a / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [895-1292]
[1064-1117]26b-28a; [1322-1706] 32b-41a; 190a-193c
[3217-3250] 79a-b; [3469-3501] 84b-85a 5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus [373-430] 228b-d /
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 311a-314b passim, Phoenician Maidens [1625-1746] 392 b-393c
esp 311a-b, 312d-313a; 318c-319a 5 ARISTOPHANLS: Lysistrata 583a 599a,c csp
50 MARX: Capital, 293c-294a [706 780] 592b-593b, [1072-1188] 596d 597d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK BK vi, HI, 120a; 6IIhRonoTus: History, BK vi, 197a-b; 201d-
235a-238c; 247d-249a; 265d-266b; BK vn, 202c; BK vn, 223c-d
292b-296a; BK vm, 338a-339c; BK xn, 560a- 7 PLATO: Symposium, 153b 157a / Laws, BK
562d vm, 737a-c
52 DOSTOIEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK iv, 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [1121-
95b-100c; BK VIH, 200c-201c H4o]58d-59a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 704b-706b; 717a-718a; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK iv, CH 2 223d 224b
720b; 729b; 734b-735b 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK iv [333-361] 176a-177a
54 FRLUD: Narcissism, 401b-c / Instincts, 414d- 14 PLUTARCH: Poplicola, 77d-79c / Fabius,
421a,c / General Introduction, 590a-593b; 152b-d / Coiiolanus, 189d-191c / Timoleon,
615b-616c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 196b-198b / Agis, 654c-6S5a
640c; 651d-654c csp 653c-d; 659b-d; 663c / 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR v, CH i lOOc-lOlc
Group Psychology, 677c-678c / Ego and Id, 20 AQUINAS: Sitmma Theologica, PART n-n, Q
708d-712a esp 709c-710c / War and Death, 24, A 12 499c-500d
758b; 766a-b / Civilization and Us Discon- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, x
tents, 789c-791d / New Introductory Lectures, [70-93] 68a-b
846b-851d 22 CHAUCKR: Troilus and Cressida, BK iv 88b-
120a csp STANZA 76-92 98b-100b, STANZA
4c. Conflict as the cause of repression and as a
223-229 117b-118b / Frantym's Tale 351b-
factor in neurotic disorders 366a esp [11,767-854] 363b-365a
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART in, 240a-c; 245c-
Analysis, 6a-9a esp 7a-c, 8a-b / Hysteria, 246a,c
65c-d; 81d-84a esp 82c; 117a / Interpretation 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 200d-205b; 381a-388c;
of Dreams, 370b; 377b-382a esp 380a-b, 467b-470a; 486b-488b
381d-382a / Narcissism, 406d-407c / Repres- 26 SHAKESPEARE: Two Gentlemen of Verona,
sion 422a 427a,c passim, esp 424b-d / General ACT n, sc iv [192-214] 238b; sc vi 239a-c;
Introduction, 566a-569c esp 568d-569b; 589c- ACT in, sc i
[4-21] 240c / {Jove's Labour's
591d; 593d-594c; 611a~623b esp 614c-615a, Lost, ACT iv, Romeo and
sc in 268b-272c /
616b-c; 623d 624d esp 624c-d; 626d-627b; Juliet 285a 319a,c csp PROLOGUE 285a b, ACT
633d-635a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in, sc ii [64 131] 303d-304c, sc v307a-309d
640c-d / Group Psychology, 690a-691c csp 691a / Richard II, ACT v, sc n [85-117] 347b-c; sc
/ Ego and Id, 704d; 712b-715a passim / In- HI [23-146] 348a-349c / Midsummer-Night's
hibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety 718a-754a,c Dream, ACT i, sc i [22 -127] 352d-353d / Much
passim, esp 719b-c, 720a-722d, 724b-725a, Ado About Nothing^ ACT n, sc i
[182 189]
726b-c, 731c-d, 746c-747b, 750a-d 509a-b / Julius Caesar, ACT in, sc n [11-44]
583d-584a
4d. The conflict of loves and loyalties, desires 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida 103a-
and duties 141a,c esp ACT iv, sc H-IV 126d-129d / Othello,
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:1-16; 22:1-12 / ACT i, sc in [175-189] 210d-211a / Macbeth,
Judges, 11:30-40 / Ruth, i / // Samuel, 11-13 ACT i, sc vn [1-28] 289b-c / Antony and
(D) II Kings, 11-13 / f Kings, 11:1-13 Cleopatra 311a-350d esp ACT i, sc n [92-204]
(D) III Kings, 11:1-13 313b-314c / Coriolanus, ACT iv, sc II-IH
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:15 (D) OT, 377d-379a
BooJ^of Wisdom, 9:15 / Susanna, 19-24 (D) 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 120b-137d
OT, Daniel, 13:19-24 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 24b
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 8:21-22; 10:34-37; 32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes [843-870] 358a-b;
12:46-50; 26:41 / Marf(, 14:38 / Romans, [1003-1007] 361b
6:12-14; 7-8; 13:13-14 / Galatians, 5:16-26 / 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 104 193a
Philippians, 1:21-26 / James, 1:12-17; 4:1- 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 77c-78b; 79d-80b;
2 / I Peter, 2:11 126c-127c
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK vi [369-502] 43d-45a 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 259a
338 THE GREAT IDEAS
in, CH 10 185d-187a; CH 15 190a-191a; CH 22
(4. Opposition or conflict in the psychological and 195a-201a; BK iv, CH 6 230b-232c; CH 8
moral order. 4d. The conflict of loves and 235b-237d
loyalties, desires and duties.) 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK ix [590-620] 295a-b
48 MELVILLE: Moby DicJ(, 394a-397a 14 PLUTARCH: Themistocles, 99b-c / Marcellus,
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310d-314c; 318d- 254c-256b / Demetrius, 726a-d
319a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH 1-3 lOa-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 273c-274a,c; lla / Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 18 166d-167b /
BK vii, 291a-292b; 301b-302d; BK vm, 327 a- Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH 1-2 246c-247b
329c; BK ix, 365d-366a; BK xi, 490a-493d; 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 39 81b-c
520a-521b; EPILOGUE i, 669b-c / Christian Doctrine, BK in, CH 14 663c-d
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92
58d-59a; BK iv, 95b-100a; BK x, 282b-283c; 488d-491d; Q 93, A 4, REP i 494c-495b; Q 96,
EPILOGUE, 402a-404c AA 3-4 512a-513c; Q 99, A 2 520a-d; Q 112,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 199b-201b; 293b; 791a- A i, REP 3 571d-573a; Q 113, A 2, REP 3 576d-
798b passim; 824a-b 577d; Q 115, A 3, REP 4 588c-589c; PART i-n,
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 452c-d; 467b- Q 8, A i, REP 1-2 655b-656a; Q 19, A 10, ANS
476a,c passim, esp 472d-475a / Group Psychol- and REP to CONTRARY 3 710b-711d; Q 46, A 5,
ogy, 694c-695b / War and Death, 757c-759d; ANS and REP i 815d-816d
764d-766d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 25,
:
253b 254a; BK vm, 264c; BK ix, 305d-306a sc in 437d-440d / 2nd Henry IV 467a-502d
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 366b- esp ACT iv, sc iv-v 492d-496d / Much Ado
367a; BK n, 396d-397a About Nothing, ACT i, sc in [1-41] 506d-507a;
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 223d-225a / Republic, BK i, ACT n, sc i [345-363] SlOd / Jultus Caesar,
308b-309b; BK in, 340b-341a; BK vin-ix ACT i, sc ii 569b-572c / As You Li^e It, ACT 11,
401d-427b / Theaetetus, 528c-531a / States- sc i [1-20] 603c-d; ACT iv, sc i [1-41] 617a-c
man, 605d-608d / Philebus 609a-639a,c / Laws, 27 SHAKESPEARE: Twelfth Night, ACT n, sc m-
BK v, 690a-c / Seventh Letter, 806a; 806d iv 8c-lld / Hamlet 29a-72a,c esp ACT n, sc n
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 5 340d-341b; [575-616] 46b-c, ACT in, sc i [56-90] 47c-d,
BK n, en 3 350a-c; BK vn, CH 14 [ii54b20-3o] sc n [58-79] 49c-d, [360-389] 52d-53a, ACT
406c; BK x, CH 7-8 431d-434a / Rhetoric, BK iv, sc iv [32-66] 59a-c / Troilus and Cressida
n, CH 12-17 636a-639a 103a<141a,c esp ACT i, sc in [17-54] 108b-c,
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 12-24 ACT n, sc i-n 112b-115d / Othello, ACT i,
14b-19a,c sc in 208d-213a / Antony and Cleopatra
12 LUCRLTIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61] 311a-350d esp ACT i, sc w
315d-316d /
15a-d; BK HI [59-86] 30d-31b; [830-1094] Coriolanus, ACT iv, sc vn [27-57] 384c-d /
40c-44a,c; BK v [1105-1135] 75c-d; BK vi Timon of Athens, ACT i, sc i [175-293] 395c-
[1-41] 80a-d 396d; ACT iv, sc in [197-398] 413a-415a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote esp PART i, 49c-
CH 29 134d-138a; BK n, CH n 150a-151b; BK 50b, 113b-115d, 145b-147d, PART n, 228a-d
5 to CHAPTER 65: OPPOSITION 339
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 18a-b; 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK ix, CH 6 420c-421a /
20c-d; 69d-76a passim; 76d-77c / Novum Politics,v, CH 9 [1309^4-1310*12] 511d-
BK
Organum, BK i, APH 42 109d; APH 53-58 51 2b / Athenian Constitution, CH 5 554d-
555a; CH 8, par 5 556c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART HI-IV 395a-450d passim 14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 68d; 75c-d / Pericles,
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK 11 [496-505] 122a 126c-d / Agesilaus, 482a-c / Pompey, 521c-d
33 PASCAL: Penstes, 125-183 195b-204b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK vi, 97b-c / Histories,
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 21b-23a BK n, 224d-225a
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 416c-417a 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH ix, 14c-d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 89d; 191c-194a; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 103d- 104a;
398d-399a; 409d-410a; 593b,d-599a passim; 121b d; 148d 149b; 150b-151a; 152b-d
632b-633d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 42a-b
43 MILL: Liberty, 290a-291d; 293b-302c; 303d- 26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI la-32a,c / 2nd
306c passim / Representative Government, Henry VI 33a-68d / 3rd Henry VI 69a-104d /
346c-348c Richard 111 105a-148a,c esp ACT v, sc v
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 39 [15-41] 148a,c / Richard II 320a-351d / 1st
21d; PART n, par 139 48d-49b; PART in, Henry IV 434a-466d / 2nd Henry IV 467a-
par 256 79d-80a; ADDITIONS, 128-129 137b-c 502d
/ Philosophy of History, INTRO, 192a-194a; 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT i,
PART i, 232d-233a; PART n, 276d-277a; 280b- sc in [75-137] 108d-109c
281b; PART in, 289d; PART iv, 318c-319b 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK in, 9d;
47 GOETHE: Faust, PRELUDE ^-PART i [429] BK xix, 142b-143a; BK xx, 148d-149a
2a-12b; PART i [522-601] 15a-16b; [1064-1117] 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 23c-27b esp
26b-28a; [3217-3250] 79a-b; [3469-3501 ]84b- 25c*26c; 42a,c; 51a-62a; BK n, 142c-d; BK iv,
85a; PART n [5199-5290] 128b-130b 192c 201d esp 193a-194b, 201b-d; 225d 228a;
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dicl^ esp 39b-40a, 79a-82a, 269d-271a; BK v, 420c-d
83a-91a, 122b-125a, 285d-288a, 303a, 317a- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 652b-655c
321a, 370b-371b, 394a-397a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 572c-d
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 318d-319a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 7, 42d-43c; NUMBER
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto 415a- 10, 49c-51b; NUMBER 43, 141d-142d; NUMBER
434d passim 50-51 161d-165a passim; NUMBER 60, 185b-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 15a-b; BK in, 187a; NUMBER 70, 212b-c
131c-135c; BK vi, 238c-243d; 244b-c; 249a; 43 MILL: Liberty, 289c-d; 312b-313a / Repre-
260a-262a; BK VH, 284c-285a; BK vin, 303d- sentative Government, 361b-362b; 366a-370a;
n!
538b-d
b
512d-513a; CH 12 [i3i6*39- 22] 519c-d / 14 PLUTARCH: Demetrius, 727d
Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6 553a-555c 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH in, 5c; CH xiv,
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 36a-37c / Solon, 68d- 21b; CH xvni, 25a-b; CH xxi, 32a-d
71c / Camillits, 117c-121a,c / Coriolanus, 23 HOBBES: Ijeviathan, PART i, 76c-d; 84c-86b;
176b-184c / Agis 648b,d-656d / Tiberius PART 11, 114b-c; 116c-d; 157a; 159c
Gracchus, 674c-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK 11 [496-505]
681b,d689a,c 122a
15 TACI rus :
Annals, BK vi, 97b / Histories, BK 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 76b-78b
ii, 224d-225a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 2d-3a;
23 MACHIAVRLLI: Prince, CH ix, 14c-d BK x, 61b,d-62b
27 SHAKLSPEARE: Cortolanus, ACT i, sc i [1-167] 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 324c; 355b-c / Socia
351a<353a Contract, BK n, 403c 404a
36 SWII-T: Gulliver, PART iv, 154b-155b 42 KANT: Science of Right, 452a-458a,c esp 457a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xi, 77b- 458a,c / Judgement, 504a-b; 586a-587a
83c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBiiR 3 10 33b-53a passim;
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 381c-382b / NUMBER 16, 68d; NUMBER 2^, 85b; NUMBER
Social Contract, BK iv, 429c-d 24, 88d-89c passim; NUMBER 28, 96c; NUMBLR
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 28a-d; 55d- 34, llOa-d; NUMBER 41, 132c-135a passim
56a; 61c-62d; BK iv, 239c-240a; 243b,d- 46 of Right, PART in, par 333-
HECJL.L: Philosophy
244a; 279b-288c esp 287d-288c; BK v, 309a- 334 109b-c / Philosophy of History, PART n,
311c 278c-279b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Ml, 126d-127c; 144a-d; 50 MARX-KNGLLS: Commimht Manifesto, 428a-b
501b-502c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 12d~13a; BK
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 574b 582b pas- ix, 342a-344b
sim 53 JAMES: Psychologv, 717a-b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 50b-51b; NUMBER 54 FREUD: War and Death, 755c-757a esp 755c;
35, 113b-114a; NUMBER 36, 114c-115a; NUM- 766c-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 787a-
BER 60, 185b-186a 788c
43 MILL: Representative Government, 345c-
5d. Opposition or strife as a productive prin-
346a; 366d-367b; 369b-370a / Utilitarianism,
473b-c ciple or source of progress
46 HLCEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 244 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God 129a-618d esp BK i,
77c; ADDITIONS, 149 140d-141a / Philosophy PREF 129a d, CH 36 149c-d, BK n, CH 2-3
of History, INTRO, 193b-c; PART i, 250a-c; 150c-151c, CH 33 206c-d, BK v, CH n-
BK iv,
PART n, 263b-d; 275b-276a; PART in, 287d- 26 216c-230a,c, BKxi, CH i 322b,d-323a,
288b; 295d-297a; PART iv, 335a-336c; 356c- CH 18 331d 332a, BK xn, en 21 357a-b, BK
357a xiv, CH 28-BK xv, CH i 397a-398c, BK xv,
50 MARX: Capital, 6c-lld passim, esp 7b, 8a-9c; en 21-22 415b-416c, BK xvin, CH 1-2 472b,d-
63b-c; lllc-146c esp 113c, HSc, 130a-131a, 473d, BK xix, CH 5-7 513d 515c
134c-d, 141b-c, 143a-c, 145a-146c; 209c-215a; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, lOOa-c
2 62 a; 282d-286a passim; 294b-295a; 354a- 38 ROUS&EAU: Inequality, 338c-339b
368b esp 354c-355b, 356c-358a, 366a-b, 367c- 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK in, 170c-
368b; 377c-378d 173b
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto 415a- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 633a-c
434d esp 415b-416d, 419b,d-420a, 422b- 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 327d-328a,c
425c, 428d-429c, 434c-d 43 MILL: Representative Government, 376a~c;
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi, 387c-d
165b-166a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 324
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 882c*d; 107a-d / Philosophy of History. INTRO, 178a-
884a 179c; 187d 188b; 205d-206a,c; PART i, 235d-
5d CHAPTER 65: OPPOSITION 341
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other considerations of the opposition of terms and propositions, or of opposition in reason-
ing and argument, see DIALECTIC 3b~3d; IDEA 40; JUDGMENT 73; NECESSITY AND CON-
TINGENCY 4e(i); REASONING 50; SAME AND OTHER 33(2).
The distinction between dichotomous division and the differentiation of a genus as methods
of definition, see DEFINITION 2a-2b.
Discussions of the law of contradiction as a principle of thought and of being, see LOGIC la;
METAPHYSICS 3c; PRINCIPLE ic; TRUTH 3c; and for the various ways in which dialectic is
concerned with opposition, see DIALECTIC 3a~3d.
The opposition of being and non being, one and many, same and other, see BEING i; DIA-
LECTIC 3a; ONE AND MANY la, ic; SAME AND OTHER 2e; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR i.
The theory of synthesis or the reconciliation of opposites, see DIALECTIC 3d; HISTORY 4a(3);
IDEA if; LIBERTY 6a; MIND if, iof-iof(2); PROGRESS la; STATE 2a(3).
The role of opposition in nature, ^ CHANGE 2b, 4; ELEMENT 3b; EVOLUTION 53; MECHANICS
6d(3); QUALITY 43-4^
Conflict in human nature and the life of man, see DESIRE 3d, 43; DUTY 6, 8; EMOTION 4:1
LOVE 3c; MAN 5-53; MIND 9b; ONE AND MANY 3^5); and for conflict in society and
history, see DEMOCRACY 5^4); LABOR 7c~7c(i); NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5d;
PROGRESS la; REVOLUTION 53; STATE 5d~5d(2); WAR AND PEACE 2c, 7; WEALTH 4f.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great BooJp of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
difficulties which attend the consider- the characteristic formations of our culture in
THE ation of any great idea by philosophers its
major epochs.
or others appear with peculiar force in the The
great books of antiquity, for example,
traditional discussion of philosophy itself. The seem to give no intimation of a division between
word "philosophy" not only varies in its de- science and philosophy. Particular bodies of
scriptive significance, now designating one part knowledge, such as physics or mathematics, are
of learning, now another, and sometimes even indifferently regarded as sciences or branches of
an attitude of mind or a way of life; but it also philosophy. The crown of knowledge is wisdom,
varies as a term of evaluation. It is seldom used approached as one the hierarchy of
rises in
without expressing either praise or dispraise of knowledge to the highest science or the first
the methods and accomplishments of philos- philosophy. Aristotle and Plato may disagree in
ophy, or of the calling and character of the phi- naming or defining the type of knowledge which
losopher. deserves to be called wisdom, yet for both it is
On the descriptive side the meaning of the the ultimate attainment of philosophical in-
word ranges from a conception of philosophy quiry or scientific work.
which covers all branches of scientific knowledge The differences between Plato and Aristotle
and which contrasts philosophy with poetry, discussed in the chapters on DIALECTIC and
history, and religion, to a conception of philos- METAPHYSICS the one using "dialectic" as the
ophy in which the primary point is its contrast name for the supreme form of knowledge, the
to science and its association with poetry and other using "theology" to name the summit of
religion as works of vision, speculation, or be- the sciences do not affect their agreement that
lief rather than of knowledge. the philosopher is a man of knowledge, not opin-
On its evaluative side, the word "philosophy" ion, and that his ultimate goal is wisdom.
sometimes eulogizes the love and search for If thereany distinction in antiquity be-
is
truth, the pursuit and even the attainment of tween science and philosophy, it seems to find
wisdom. At the other extreme, it derogates vain expression in the sense in which Socrates speaks
learning, idle disputation, and the dogmatism of philosophy as the love of wisdom, implying
of unsupported opinion. At one time, the good thereby its pursuit rather than its attainment.
name of the philosopher stands in contrast to A man would not be called a scientist in a par-
the questionable reputation of the sophist. At ticular field -mathematics, let us
say unless
another, "philosopher" carries almost the same he actually had some mathematical knowledge;
invidious connotation as "sophist." The dismis- but a man who is not actually wise can be called
salof philosophy as useless, or at best orna- a philosopher by virtue of his effort to become
mental, in the practical affairs of society is wise. Apart from this point of distinction, the
sharply opposed to the vision of an ideal state Greeks tend to identify philosophy with the
which can come to pass only if philosophers are fundamental sciences, which somehow yield
kings, or kings philosophers. speculative or practical wisdom.
Considering the whole of human learning, all
THESE SHIFTS IN the meaning of the words its arts and disciplines, we see that the things
"philosophy" and "philosopher" record crises the ancients distinguish from philosophy are
in the history of western thought. They reflect poetry, history, and the particular productive
342
CHAPTER 66: PHILOSOPHY 343
arts or crafts. Here again Plato and Aristotle do ophy like a mother from whom one gains solace
not make the distinction in the same terms. and help. "Return to philosophy frequently
Plato compares the poet unfavorably with the and repose in her," he tells himself, so that
philosopher in the Republic. The poet is an imi- "what thou meetest with in the court appears
tator of imitations and moves on the level of to thee tolerable, and thou tolerable in the
Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to pay po- of the word in which the familiar injunction
etry a compliment when in the Poetics he says to a person in distress "Be philosophical"
that it is more philosophical than history be- carries the same meaning as "Be stoical."
cause it deals with the universal rather than the Philosophy provides only peace of mind, not
particular. These attitudes toward poetry in re- worldly riches or external power. "Philosophy
lation to philosophy are somewhat reversed by does not promise to secure to man anything
the fact that for Plato myth and poetry provide outside himself," says Epictetus. Nor does it
materials from which philosophical insights can fulfill its promise of inner strength without
sometimes be distilled, whereas for Aristotle stern resolution to withdraw desire from the
sense-experience is the source from which, by goods of fortune.
induction, the principles or axioms of philo- "Do yousuppose that you can be a philos-
sophical knowledge are obtained. Despite these opher you do as you do now?" Epictetus
if
differences their accord on the supremacy of the asks. "Do you suppose that you can eat and
philosopher remains unaffected. drink as you do now, and indulge your anger
More than poetry and history and all the and displeasure just as before ? No, you must sit
knowledge that can be applied productively up late, you must work hard, conquer some of
philosophy represents the highest use of man's your desires. . . When you have carefully con-
faculties. On tins Aristotle and Plato seem to be sidered these drawbacks, then come to us ...
agreed, even though Aristotle distinguishes the ifyou are willing to pay this price for peace of
philosophical from the political life and assigns mind, freedom, tranquility." Do not try to be
the most perfect happiness to the contempla- "first a philosopher, then a tax-collector, then
tive activity of the philosopher, whereas Plato an orator, then one of Caesar's procurators.
in the Republic at least brings the philos- These callings do not agree You must be. . .
opher back to the shadows of the cave after he busy either with your inner man, or with things
has seen the light of truth itself, so that he can outside, that is, you must choose between the
put his wisdom to practice in the government of position of a philosopher and that of an ordi-
his less fortunate fellow man. nary man."
There seems to be no difference between the
THE PRACTICE OF philosophy seems to become, Stoic and Epicurean conception of philosophy.
for the Roman writers, more important than the Lucretius praises Epicurus, "thanks to whom
content of philosophy as a body of doctrine. sweet solaces of life soothe the mind," foras soon
"What is that which is able to conduct a man ?" as his philosophy "begins to proclaim aloud the
asks Marcus Aurelius. "One thing and only nature of things, the terrors of the mind fly
one, philosophy." It keeps the inner man "free away."
from violence and unharmed, superior to pains But for Lucretius philosophy achieves this
and pleasures, doing nothing without a pur- boon not merely by curbing the passions and
pose.*' It enableshim to "accept all that hap- quieting desires, but also, and primarily, by the
pens and all that is allotted . and finally to
. . truth ofits teachings about the constitution of
wait for death with a cheerful mind, as being the world and the causes of things. Nor is it
nothing else than a dissolution of the elements merely that the philosophical mind is able "to
of which every living being is compounded." dwell in the calm high places, firmly embattled
To Aurelius his imperial court is like a step- on the heights by the teaching of the wise,
mother to whom one must be dutiful, philos- whence you can look down on others, and see
344 THE GREAT IDEAS
them wandering hither and thither, going astray losophy is for the most
part regarded as inferior
as they seek the way of life "J^hiWftphy pm- to the teachings of religion.
vidcs a more specific remedy for the deepest of There are those the simply religious, the
human ills
by "freeing the mind from the
""
close devout, the mystical who abominate the pre-
bondage ot religion." tensions of reason and the vanity of philosophers
Men fear the thunderbolts of the gods, their who claim either merit or need for any knowl-
intervention in the course of nature and human edge beyond the truths which God himself has
and the punishments of the after-life.
affairs, revealed. This position is expressed by such
Before Epicurus taught them the mortality of Christian writers as Tertullian, Peter Damian,
the soul and the atomic determination of all Bernard of Clairvaux; or, in the Arabic tradi-
things, "the of man lay foul to see and grov-
life tion, by Al-Ghazzali's The Destruction of Philos-
is answered
elling upon the earth, crushed by the weight of ophy. Al-Ghazzali by Averroes in
religion." His teaching concerning "what can his Destruction ofthe "Destruction" which asserts
come to be and what cannot, and in what way the supremacy of philosophy. Averroes reserves
each thing has its power limited," rids the mind philosophy for men of requisite intellectual
of the terrors fostered by religion. This "dark- strength and relegates theology and religion to
ness of mind must needs be scattered ... by those who must substitute opinion and imagi-
the outer view and the inner law of nature." nation for reason.
Neither Augustine nor Aquinas goes to these
EXCEPT FOR Lucretius, the triumph of philos- extremes. They do not dismiss philosophy as
ophy over religion does not seem to be central useless learning or as dangerous folly, subversive
to ancient conceptions of philosophy's contri- of the wisdom of faith; but neither do they ad-
bution to the mind and life of man. In the pa- mit the sufficiency of philosophy for knowledge
gan world, religious belief is either combined of God the mysteries of the divine nature,
with philosophy to constitute the worship of God's providence and His gracious gift of salva-
the gods, which seems to be Plato's view in the tion to man.
Laws; or represents the superstitions of the
it Quoting St. Paul's warning to "beware lest
ignorant as opposed to the sophistication of the any man spoil you through philosophy and vain
educated. Gibbon describes the rift between deceit according to the tradition of men and
religion and philosophy not as a matter of intel- the rudiments of the world, and not according
lectual controversy, but as a division of society to Christ," Augustine defends his praise of the
into classes lacking or having the benefits of Platonic philosophy which in his judgment
education or, what is the same in the ancient comes nearest to the Christianfaith, on the
world, instruction in philosophy. ground that the Apostle also said to the gen-
But in the mediaeval world, the distinction tiles that "that which is known of God is mani-
between philosophy and religion seems to be festamong them, for God has manifested it to
essential to the consideration of the nature and them." Yet he adds that "the Christian man
value of philosophy. The importance of the dis- who is
ignorant of their writings ... is not,
tinction appears alike in the great books of the therefore, ignorant that it is from the one true
Christian tradition and in the great writings of and supremely good God that we have that na-
the Mohammedan and Jewish culturesin Au- ture in which we are made in the image of God,
gustine and Aquinas, Avicenna, Averroes, and and that doctrine by which we know Him and
Maimonides though the problem of philos- ourselves, and that grace with which, by cleav-
ophy's relation to religion and theology may be ing to Him, we are blessed."
quite differently solved by each. In all three Philosophy, according to Augustine, can thus
religious communities secular learning and sa- be dispensed with in all the major concerns of
cred doctrine are set apart by their origin the knowledge, love, or action. But Augustine does
one from the efforts of human reason, the other not argue that it should therefore be discarded.
from the word of God as revealed to the faith- "If those who are called philosophers," he says,
ful. Even when held in highest esteem as
it is "and especially the Platonists, have said aught
the best achievement of secular learning, phi- that is true and in harmony with our faith, we
CHAPTER 66: PHILOSOPHY . 345
are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim though reason sponsors one and faith the other,
it for our own use from those who have unlaw- there can be no conflict between philosophy
ful possession of it," even as the spoils of the and theology.
Egyptians belong to the Jews.
Though Augustine and Aquinas conceive the SOME MODERN philosophers, like Bacon and
relation of faith and reason differently, they Locke, seem to agree with mediaeval theolo-
seem to share a conception of philosophy as the gians about the subordination of philosophy
handmaiden of theology when faith seeks un- to theology. But for the most part the modern
derstanding. For Aquinas this does not appear tendency, increasingly evident in the writings
to imply lack of dignity or even the loss of a of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, is to in-
certainautonomy on the part of philosophy. sist upon the
complete autonomy of philosophy.
On the contrary, so highly does he regard the Hegel, for example, challenges "the imputa-
demonstrations of Aristotle, whom he calls "the tion against Philosophy of being shy of noticing
philosopher," that he opens the Summa Theo- religious truths, or of having occasion to be so,"
by a divine revelation. For the truth about ology to faith, are discussed in the chapters on
God, such as reason can knowwould only be
it, METAPHYSICS, THEOLOGY, and RELIGION. The
known by a few, and that after a long time, and problem which is more characteristic of the
with the admixture of many errors; whereas modern consideration of philosophy concerns
man's whole salvation, which is in God, de- its relation to science.
pends upon the knowledge of this truth. ... It To state the problem some distinction be-
was, therefore, necessary that besides the philo- tween the two is
necessary, and making this dis-
sophical sciences investigated by reason,
there tinction represents a novel departure, both in
should be a sacred science by way of revela- thought and language. As we have seen, philos-
tion."That sacred science is theology not the ophy and science arc almost identified through-
theology which is a part of philosophy, but the out the ancient and mediaeval tradition. Inso-
theology whose principles come from faith far as the word "science" means knowledge
rather than from reason. rather than opinion, the result of philosophical
"There is no reason," Aquinas writes, "why inquiry is science, and philosophy as a whole is
those things which are treated by the philosoph- divided into a number of sciences. There may
ical sciences, so far as they can be known by the be, as ancient writings seem to suggest, sciences
light of natural reason, may not also be treated which aim at useful productions rather than at
by another science so far as they are known by speculative or practical wisdom, and fall below
the light of the divine revelation." On this the level of philosophy; or there may be, as
view, sacred theology may treat of certain some Christian theologians hold, a sacred science
its wisdom to all the
things, such as the mystery of the Trinity, superior in philosophical
which do not belong properly to the philoso- sciences. But these exceptions to the identity of
pher because they exceed the power of reason philosophy and science merely confirm the
to demonstrate; but other matters concerning point that in the ancient or mediaeval view phi-
nature, man, and God may belong both to the losophy is scientific and consists of sciences,
philosopher and to the theologian, who con- even though there may be sciences which are
siderthem according to their different lights. not philosophical.
Since a truth cannot conflict with a truth, This use of the words "science" and "philos-
346 THE GREAT IDEAS
ophy" persists well into modern times. Hobbes, eighteenth century. The word "experimental"
for example, presents his classification of the applied to philosophy signifies a radical differ-
types of knowledge under the heading "science, ence in the method of inquiry and even in the
that Knowledge of Consequences, which is
is, objects to be investigated, for certain objects
also called Philosophy."Bacon proposes to "di- can be known only by experimental or empirical
vide sciences into theology and philosophy." research. Kant appears to be the first (in the
Descartes uses the words "science" and "phi- great books at least) to make a sharp separation
losophy" interchangeably. "Among the differ- between the investigation of either nature or
ent branches of Philosophy," he says, "I had in mind by what he calls "empirical" as opposed to
my younger days to a certain extent studied "rational" methods. He still uses the name
Logic; and in those of Mathematics, Geomet- "science" for both sorts of investigation, but
rical Analysis and Algebra three arts or he appears to restrict "philosophy" to the lat-
scienceswhich seemed as though they ought to terthe pure, the a priori, the rational sciences.
contribute to the design I had in view." In the Two other innovations must be noted.
Prefatory Letter to his Principles of Philosophy, Though Kant regards it as a rational discipline,
he likens "philosophy as a whole" to "a tree he excludes mathematics entirely from philoso-
whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is phy and criticizes its misleading influence upon
physics, and whose branches, which issue from those philosopherswho have tried to imitate
this trunk, are all the other sciences. These mathematical thought. And though he some-
reduce themselves to three principal ones, times uses "metaphysic" narrowly to designate
viz., medicine, mechanics, and morals." the critical examination of pure reason itself, he
Even as near the end of the eighteenth cen- also says that "this name of metaphysic may
tury as Hume, the word "philosophy" contin- be given to the whole of pure philosophy . . ,
ues to be the general name for the particular excluding all that belongs to the empirical and
sciences. It covers the experimental study of the mathematical employment of reason." Con-
natural what are for Hume
phenomena as well as sidering that has only two objects, nature and
it
the non-experimental sciences of mathematics freedom- that which /Vand that which ought to
and psychology. But it excludes divinity or be Kant divides philosophy into the specula-
theology, insofar as "its best and most solid tive and the practical use of pure reason, which
foundation is
faith and divine revelation"; met- gives rise to a metaphysic of nature and a meta-
aphysics, which is
"nothing but sophistry and physic of morals. "Metaphysic, therefore, that
illusion"; and all inquiries into particular as of nature as well of morals, and partic-
as that
opposed to general facts, such as "history, ularly the criticism of our adventurous reason
chronology, geography, and astronomy." which forms the introduction to and prepara-
Nor is this use of terms confined to what tion for it, constitute together," Kant writes,
readers today would call books of philosophy. "what may be termed philosophy in the true
The authors ofthe books which are today re- sense of the word. Its only goal is wisdom, and
eighteenth century, Lavoisier and Fourier nounce the separation of philosophy from math-
refer to themselves as philosophers and to the ematics and experimental science, which is only
science in which they are engaged, e.g., mathe- intimated by earlier modern writers. But Kant
matics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, as parts still uses the word "science" for both the phil-
or aspects of natural philosophy. They do, how- osophical and the empirical sciences. The final
ever, indicate an awareness of how they differ step is taken in the nineteenth century when
from ancient and mediaeval scientists (who also the word "science" is restricted to mathematics
called themselves philosophers) by calling their and to such knowledge of nature, man, and so-
own work "experimental philosophy." ciety as can be obtained by the methods of ex-
In this phrase lies the root of the distinction perimental or empirical research. William James,
between philosophy and science as that distinc- for example, stresses the fact that he is trying to
tion is
generally understood by writers since the expound psychology as one of the natural
CHAPTER 66: PHILOSOPHY 347
sciences, and to that end he tries to separate the or is philosophy to be identified with metaphys-
problems which are capable of empirical in- ics? If, in addition to metaphysics, there is a
vestigation from those which belong to philo- philosophy of nature, how are its principles and
For Freud that separation
sophical speculation. conclusions related to the findings of the natural
is an accomplished fact, and one which leaves sciences which appear to study the same object ?
to philosophy no problem that can be solved Similarly, if psychology is a branch of philoso-
by science. phy, how is it related to experimental or clinical
According to Freud, "it is inadmissible to psychology ? What is the relation of moral and
is one field of human in-
declare that science political philosophy to the empirical social
tellectual activity, and that religion and philos- sciences concerned with describing, not judging
ophy are others, at least as valuable, and that or regulating, human conduct and social insti-
science has no business to interfere with the tutions? Is economics a science or is it a branch
other two." On the contrary, Freud thinks it of moral philosophy; or, if it is both, how are
isright for scientific research to look "on the the two related ?
whole field of human activity as its own," and What is the use of philosophy, especially in
to criticize the unscientific formulations of its theoretic branches, if, unlike science, it can-
philosophy. The trouble with philosophy is not be applied to the mastery of physical nature
that "it behaves itself as if it were a science . . . and the production of utilities, whether bridges
but it parts company with science, in that it or bombs? What, finally, at the end of its long
can produce a com-
clings to the illusion that it
history, does philosophy come to if, in such
plete and coherent picture of the universe." marked contrast to the continuously acceler-
It is this illusion which science continually ated progress of the sciences, it cannot claim
punctures, since, in Freud's opinion, "that pic- any signal advance on which all philosophers
ture must needs fall to pieces with every new are agreed, but instead must admit that most of
advance in our knowledge." its problems seem to be perennially debated,
versity of definitions and postulates employed and the use of science in the sphere of the pro-
by different philosophers reduce philosophy to ductive arts, in the chapter on KNOWLEDGE; the
a collection of competing "systems" rather than accumulation of truth as measuring advances in
a single discipline in which philosophers work science and philosophy, in the chapter on PROG-
cooperatively as do scientists and mathema- RESS.
ticians ? Here we must observe that such answers to
However the foregoing questions are an- these questions as tend to subordinate philoso-
swered, there are still others. Does philosophy phy to science originate exclusively with mod-
have distinct branches, divided according to ern views of the nature of knowledge, of the
their objects of study like the natural sciences, criteriaof truth, and of the capacities of the
348 THE GREAT IDEAS
human mind, especially the power of reason. well as in every other business, improves dex-
Even those modern authors who write at a time terity and saves time. Each individual becomes
when the words "science" and "philosophy" more expert in his own peculiar branch, more
are, for the most part, interchangeable tend in work is done upon the whole, and the quantity
this direction. The points they make about the of science is considerably increased by it."
nature, aim, and method of what they call ei- Despite his use of the word "philosophy," it
ther science or philosophy have the effect of seems likely that Adam Smith is describing the
giving the status of knowledge only to math- division of labor in scientific research and the
ematics and the empirical sciences, and of re- specialization of scientists. Though philosophy
ducing philosophical speculation to the status has divisions, and though the distinction and
of opinion. order of its parts are discussed by the great phi-
Bacon's insistence, for example, that genuine losophers, their own work exhibits a spirit op-
knowledge gives us power over nature and gen- posed to specialization. In fact, one measure of
erates productions, seems to have this effect, the greatness of a philosopher is the comprehen-
certainly upon any part of traditional philoso- siveness of his thought, the range of subject
phy which cannot meet this test. Hume's in- matters and the scope of the problems with
sistence upon experimental reasoning with re- which he deals.
spect to all matters of fact seems to eliminate Those philosophers, like Aristotle, Bacon,
not only metaphysics, but any science or phi- Hobbes, or Kant, who show great interest in
losophy of nature which is not experimeiUal.The the divisions of philosophy seem to be largely
methodological reforms in philosophy which concerned with distinguishing the different ob-
these philosophers and others, like Hobbes, jects of philosophical thought and differentiat-
Descartes, and Spinoza, propose seem to be ing the concepts or principles peculiarly rele-
reforms which eliminate whatever in philoso- vant to each. Other chapters deal with subject
phy cannot become either experimental science matters, sciences, or disciplines that have been
or a quasi-mathematical system of thought. regarded, by one philosopher or another, as ma-
Among the modern reformers of philosophy, jor divisions of philosophy, e.g., LOGIC, META-
Kant represents the exception. By his critical PHYSICS, THEOLOGY, DIALECTIC, MATHEMAT-
method he hopes to establish philosophy above ICS, PHYSICS, and psychology (in the chapter on
and independent of all the empirical sciences; MAN). But one group of sciences or disciplines is
and to institute metaphysics as a science which not discussed elsewhere and must be briefly
neither imitates mathematics nor accepts it as noted here. Traditionally within the province
an equal in the scale of reason's accomplish- of the philosopher, they are sometimes expand-
ments. Yet even Kant seems to betray the typ- ed to his whole domain. They come nearer to
ically modernattitude toward philosophy. The what the ordinary man means by "philosophy"
intellectual revolution which he projects as the when he speaks of having a philosophy of life
philosophical parallel to the Copernican revolu- an over-all yet personal view of the human sit-
tion in astronomy is motivated by his desire to uation, illuminated by a sense of the values
secure for philosophy a stability and develop- which should direct conduct.
ment comparable to that en joyed by mathemat- The disciplines in question are traditionally
ics and the empirical sciences. called ethics and politics, or moral philosophy.
Socrates is credited with having accomplished
"!N THE PROGRESS of society," writes Adam the first great reform in
philosophy when he
Smith, "philosophy or speculation becomes, turned to such subjects and away from the in-
like every other employment, the principal or quiries of his predecessors. "I do not mean to
and occupation of a particular class of
sole trade speak disparagingly of the students of natural
Like every other employment too, it is
citizens. philosophy," he says at his trial, "but the sim-
subdivided into a great number of different ple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing
branches, each of which affords occupation to a to do with physical speculations." Subsequently
peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this he tells his judges that he "will never cease from
preaching those whom he questions with "un- two main speculative branches (physics and
der-valuing the greater and over-valuing the metaphysics) and two main practical branches
less," enjoining them not to take thought of (mechanics and magic). Psychology, logic, and
their persons or their properties, "but first and ethics belong to human philosophy; politics and
chiefly to care about the greatest improvement jurisprudence to civil philosophy. But with re-
of the soul." He will not foreswear philosophy spect to all of these Bacon does not apply the
even to save his life. "I cannot hold
my tongue," distinction between the speculative and the
he "Daily discourse about virtue ... is
says. practical which seems to him of the utmost im-
the greatest good of man," for "the unexam- portance in natural philosophy. The reason
ined life is not worth living." seems to be that Bacon uses the word "prac-
The conception of ethics and
politics and of tical" to mean the production of effects result-
their relation to other branches of philosophy ing from the knowledge of causes, rather than
seems to depend upon the acceptance or rejec- actions to be performed by men as the result of
tion of a fundamental principle in the division choice. Plis practical sciences correspond, there-
of philosophy. Aristotle and Kant, for example, fore, to what Aristotle conceives as arts, or pro-
divide the philosophical sciences into the the- ductive sciences the sphere of making or
oretic or speculative and the practical or moral, poetics in general not to what Aristotle means
according as they consider what is (the nature by the practical, the sphere of doing rather than
and causes of things) or what ought to be (the of making, of prudence rather than of art. These
objects of choice, the ends and means, in the matters are discussed in the chapters on ART
conduct of life and the institutions of society). and POETRY.
According to this conception of the practical, The problem of the relation of science to art
the practical sciences are ethics and politics, and becomes, restated in Bacon's terms, the prob-
if
with them economics and jurisprudence; or in lem of the relation of the theoretic to the prac-
another statement of the same divisions, the tical (i.e., productive) sciences. But in terms of
parts of practical philosophy are moral philoso- Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant, the problem of the
phy, the philosophy of right, the philosophy of relation between the speculative and practical
law.They are all conceived as normative, pre- branches of philosophy becomes the quite dif-
directing action in the sphere of human free- sought or ought to be done. In Hobbes' terms
dom. the problem shifts in still another direction to
Hobbes proceeds on a different principle. He the consideration of the bearing of physics
separates natural philosophy (including philoso- upon psychology, ethics, and politics.
phiaprima) from civil philosophy, or the theory How, on any of the foregoing views, do spec-
of the body politic. But he includes ethics and ulations concerning the nature of things affect
poetics under natural philosophy as part of the the theory of human life and society, or the
theoretic study of human nature. The distinc- practical principles by which man tries to lead
tion between the theoretic and the practical a good lifeand organize a good society ? What
seems to be here ignored, or even implicitly de- relation do the truths of physics and metaphys-
nied insofar as Hobbes would reject the basis of ics,or the major philosophical issues in these
the distinction the difference between natural fields,bear to the truths and issues in psychol-
necessity and human freedom. Necessity gov- ogy, ethics, and politics? Or, as William James
erns the motions of the human body and of the puts the question, must not any man who has a
body politic as much as it does the bodies stud- philosophy of life also have, implicitly at least,
ied by the physicist, and so ethics, politics, and a metaphysics ?
physics are alike sciences of determined con- Upon the answers to such questions depends
sequences. the varying esteem in which philosophy is held
Still another view seems to be taken by Bacon in the great periods of western culture. Unlike
who separates natural from human and civil supernatural religion and empirical science, and
philosophy and divides natural philosophy into especially when separated from them, philoso-
350 THE GREAT IDEAS
phy does not promise eternal salvation or earthly ning of philosophy, are of its essence the love
prosperity. The uses of philosophy, as com- of wisdom, and through it the search for a
pared with religion and science, must somehow human wisdom which shall be at once specula-
be assessed in the terms which, from the begin- tive and practical.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The definition and scope of philosophy 351
2#. The distinction between theoretic or speculative and practical or moral philos-
2c. The nature and branches of practical or moral philosophy: economics, ethics,
politics, jurisprudence; poetics or the theory of art 354
'4.
The uses of philosophy: diverse conceptions of its aim, function, and value
qc. The social role of philosophy: the philosopher and the statesman; the philosopher
king 357
5.
The character and training of the philosopher: the difficulty of being a philosopher
6. The philosopher and the man of opinion: sophistry and dogmatism, idle disputa-
tion, perpetual controversy
6c. The philosopher as a man of reason: the limits of reason; its supplementation by
experience or faith 359
6d. The philosopher as a man
of theory or vision: neglect of the practical; with-
drawal from the affairs of men and the marketplace
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 J AMES Psychology, 116a 1 19b, the passage :
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
~ " " " " ' '
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium^ 163b-164c, the passage begins in tthe lower half i
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
:-hand sid<
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, aic given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The icferences are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books 01 in the numbering of chapters or vcises, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:40.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "csp" calls the reader's attention to one 01 more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
7 PL\TO: Lysis, 20a / Euthydcmus, 74b-76b / Re- APH 54 lllc-d; APH 66 114d HSc; APH 80
public, BK n, 320b; BK v, 368c~373c; BK vi- 120a-b; APH 95 126b-c; APH 107 128c; BK n,
VH, 383d-398c / Sophist, 570a-574c esp 571a-c APH 9 140b-c
/ Philebi4s, 633a 635a esp 634b-635a / Seventh 31 DESCARTES: Rules, i-in la-5a / Discourse,
letter, 809a-811a PART n, 47a-48b; PART iv, 51b-52a
SARISIOHLE: Physics, BK i, CH i
[184*10-16] 35 HLIML: Human Understanding, SECT i 451a-
b
259a; CH 9 [192*33
-
2] 268c-d; BK n, CH 2 455b passim; SECT vin, DIV 81 487a; SECT xn,
270a-271a esp [i94b 9-i5] 271a; CH 7 [198*22- DIV 130-132 508c-509d
31] 275b-c / Metaphysics, BK i vi 499a-550a,c 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 5d-6a
esp BK i, CH 3 501c-502d, BK n, CH i 511b,d- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-13d; 211c 218d; 243c-
512b, BK in, CH 1-2 513b,d-516d, BK iv, CH 250a,c csp 245a-246a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic
1-3 522a-525a, BK vi 547b,d-550a,c; BK xi, of Morals, 253a-c; 254b-c; 264b-d; 270c-d /
CH i 587a-588a; CH 3-4 589a-590a; CH 7-8 Practical Reason, 337a-338c / Pref. Meta-
b
592b-593d / Soul, BK i, CH i
[403 io-i7] physical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a / Intro.
632 d Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c / Judgement,
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 3 388b-c; CH 6 463a-467a
389d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, lb-7d;
12 EPIC FETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH u 150a- ADDITIONS, 3 116a / Philosophy of History,
151b; CH 17 158d-161a INTRO, 156c-158a; 184d-185d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 8 14d- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 641a-b; 758a
15a / City of God, BK vin, CH i 264b,d- 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874a
265b
19 AQUINAS Summa PART A ** The elation of philosophy to theology or
:
Theologica, i, Q i, i
3b-4a religion
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART 60a b; 65c-d;
i, 7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 345d-346a/ Theaete-
71c-d; 72a-d; PART iv, 267a-272b tus, 528c-531a / Laws, BK xn, 797c-798b
352 THE GREAT IDEAS la to \c
(1. The definition and scope of philosophy, la. Ib. The relation of philosophy to mathematics
The relation of philosophy to theology or 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 75b / Republic, BK vi,
386d-388a; BK vn, 391b-398c / Philebus,
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK n, CH i [284b i~5] 633a-635a / Laws, BK VH, 728b-730d
376a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [982^8-983*11] 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH 2 270a-271a esp
b b
501a-b [i94 9-i5J 271a / Heavens, BK i, CH 10 [279
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [62-79] 32-280*11] 371b-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 9
b
ld-2a; BK in [1-93] 30a-31b; BK v [1-90] 61a- [992 24- 9] SlOc-d; BK n, CH 3 [995*15-20]
ft
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 77 186a; 185-195 205a- 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, la-b; BK n, 27b-c
210b; 219 212a; 226 212b-213a; 243-253 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
218a-220a;
265-290 221b-225a; 543 266a; 202d-203a; 214d
557-567 272b-273b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a-b; 42a-
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xi 497b- 43d; 46c-47c / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-
503c 106d; BK i, APH 15 108a; APH 51 lllc; APH 54
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-337a APH 62-64 113b-114b; APH 66 114d-
lllc-d;
40 GIBBON: Decline and 12d-13b; 159a-d;
Fall, APH 80 120a-b; APH 95 126b-c; APH 107
115c;
186a-d; 200d-201a; 204c-206d passim; 307b- 128c; BK n, APH 9 140b-c
309d esp 308b-309b; 670b-d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43d; PART vi,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 119a-c; 176a-c; 177b- 61b-c; 66d
192d esp 190a-192d; 236b-240b esp 239a-b / 34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; BK HI, 269a;
Practical Reason, 346b-347a; 349b-353a / RULE IH-IV 270b-271b; GENERAL SCHOL,
Judgement, 578a b; 588a-613a,c esp 593d- 371b-372a / Optics, BK in, 542a-543b
599d, 604d-606d, 607d-609b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d esp 5c-6c / Fund.
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 455a-c Prin.Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d / Intro.
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c- Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-d / Judgement,
160b; I77c-d; PART in, 308c-309d; PART iv, 561c-562a,c; 578a-d
368d-369a,c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d-
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 875b 183c
Idtolb CHAPTER 66: PHILOSOPHY 353
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUEn, 694c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vni, CH 4 266d-
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib xiva; 882a-886a pas- 267c; BK xi, CH 25 336b-d
sim 19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q i,
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401a / Inhibitions, A 4 5a-b; A 5, ANS 5c-6a; Q 14, A 16 90b-91b;
Symptoms, and Anxiety, 722a-b / New Intro- Q 79, A n 424d-425b; Q 84, A 8, ANS 450b-
ductory Lectures, 873d-875a esp 874d-875a 451b; PART i-n, Q i, A 6, REP 2 614a-c; Q 3,
A 5 626b-627a
Id. The relation of philosophy to myth, poetry, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i-n, Q 56,
and history A 3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a 40a;
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 57a-c / Phaedrus, 122d- Q 84, A i, REP 3 174b-175a; Q 94, A 4, ANS
123a; 138c-140d / Ion 142a-148a,c / Republic, 223d-224d; PART in, Q n, A i, REP 3 772b-
BK II-HI, 319c-334b; BK x, 427c-434c csp 773a; Q 13, A i, REP 3 780a-781b
434a-c / Timaeus, 443b-447d / Statesman, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d
586c-589d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16d-17a;
b
9 ARISTOTLE: Poetics, CH 9 [i45i 36- n] 686a
ft
40a-c; 42a-c; 55b-d; 65d 66a; 86b-c / No-
23 HORRES: Leviathan, PART i, 67b-c; 71c-d; vum Organum, BK i, APH 3 107b; BK n,
72a-d APII 9 140b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 41b-42a 31 DESCARTES: Rules, i la-2a / Discourse, PART
30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 32d; 38d- HI, 48b-49b; PART vi, 61b-c / Objections and
39b; 44c Replies, 126a-b; 162d; 206c-207a; 215a b;
31 DLSCAR-IES: Rules, in, 3c-d 237b c; 243c d
35 HLTMK: Human Understanding, SLCT i, DIV 5, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, si.cr
452d 453a; SECT vni, DTV 65, 479b-c 5-6 94b-95a; BK i, en n, SFCT i 103d-104a;
38 ROUSSFAU: Inequality, 333d-334a; 348a,c SECT 3-4 104b-105a; BK iv, CH xxi 394d-
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 345b-346b; 544c- 395a,c
545c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i 451a-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Vail, 40b-41a 455b; SECT vni, DIV 65, 479b-c; SECT xi,
42 KANT: Judgemenf, 575b-c DIV 104 498b-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 3 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d; 190c-191a; 234c-
10a-12c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c- 235a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
190b esp 177c-d, 184d-185d; PART iv, 368d- 253a-d; 260d-261d; 266c-d; 271a-c; 283d-
369a,c 284d / Practical Reason, 291a-297c; 307d-314d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 690a-b esp 310a-b; 319c-321b; 329a-337a,c esp
54 FRLUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 239c-240a; 329b-d Metaphysic of Morals, 388a d
/ Intro.
246b-248c passim / Civilization and Its Dis- 461a-475d esp 463a-467a, 474b-
/ Judgement,
contents, 796c 475d; 578a-b; 596c-598b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a
2. The divisions of philosophy 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 5c-6a;
20. The distinction between theoretic or specu- ADDITIONS, i 115a-d
lative and practical or moral philosophy:
53 JAMES: Psychology, 865b-866a
the distinction between natural and civil
philosophy 2b. The branches of speculative philosophy:
7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-8a / Statesman, 581a the divisions of natural philosophy
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, en 14 [io5 b i9~29] 7 PLATO: Republic, BK vn, 388a-398c esp
149c; BK vi, CH 6 [145*12-18] 198d / Heavens, 396d-398c / Philebus, 634b-635b
BK HI, CH 7 [306*14-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH 14 [io5 b i9 29]
BK i, CH 1-2 499a-501c esp CH 2 {982*30 b 2j] -
149c / Physics, BK i, CH 9 [i92 a 33~b2] 268c-d;
500c-501a; BK n, CH i [99^19-31] 512a-b; BK BK ii, en 2 270a-271a esp [i94 b 9-i5] 271a; CH
b
iv, CH 4 [ioo8 2~32] 527d-528b; BK vi, CH i 7 [198*22-31] 275b-c / Heavens, BK in, CH i
b
[i025 i8-28] 547d; BK xi, CH 7 [1064*10-19] [298^3-24] 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 9
b a b
592b-c; BK xn, CH 9 [io74 35-io75*2] 605c [992 29- 9] 510c-d; BK iv, CH 2 [1004*2-9]
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 523a; BK vi, CH
i 547b,d-548c; BK vn, CH
b a
[639 32-64o io] 162a-b / Ethics, BK i, CH 3 ii [1037*13-21] 560d; BK xi, CH 3 [1061*29]-
b
339d-340b; CH 7 [io98 2o- 8] 343c-344a; BK
tt
CH 4 [io6i b 34J 589c-590a; CH 7*592b-593a;
b
n, CH 2 [no3 26-i 104*9] 349b-c; CH 4 350d- BK xn, CH i [io69*30-b2] 598b*c; CH 8 [io73 b
b b
351b; BK in, CH 3 [iii2*3o- i2] 358b-c; BK 1-7] 603d / Soul, BK i, CH i
[403 io-i7] 632d
vi, CH 1-2 387a-388b; CH 5 389a-c; CH 7-8 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
[641*
b
390a-391c; CH 12-13 393b-394d 33- io] 164b-c
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 26 131b- 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812b 813d
132b; BK in, CH 6 181d-182b 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a 17 PLOTINUS First Ennead, TH in, CH 4-6 lla 12b
:
354 THE GREAT IDEAS 2c to 30
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61b-c; 66d-
(2. The divisions of philosophy. 2b. The branches
67a,c
of speculative philosophy: the divisions of 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 543b-544a
natural philosophy.) 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH xi,
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIH, CH 4 266d- SECT 15-18 303b-304b esp SECT 16 303c-d;
26 7c; BK xr, CH 25 336b~d BK iv, CH HI, SECT i8-20 317d-319c; CH
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A i, iv, SECT 7-10 325b-326b; CH XH, SECT 8
REP 2 3b-4a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c 360c; CH xxi, SECT 1-3 394d-395a; SECT 5
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 71c-d; 72a-d; 395c
PART iv, 269b-c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 1-5
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 15d; 39d- 451a-453b passim; SECT xn, DIV 131-132
48d csp 40a-41b, 42a-c, 43a-45a; 55b-61d csp 508d-509d passim, esp DIV 132, 509c-d
Novum Organum, BK n,
56c-58c, 59c-60c / 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-334a,c
APH 9 140b-c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 75d-80b passim
31 DESCARTES: Rules, i-n la-3b; iv 5a-7d / 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic ofMorals, 253a-
Discourse, PART n, 46c-48b / Objections and 254b; 264b-d; 266c-d; 271a-c; 283d-287d
Replies, 169c-170a / Practical Reason, 291a-296d; 300d [fn i];
34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b 304a-d; 307d-321b; 327c-d; 329a-337a,c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH esp 329b-d / Metaphysical Elements
Pref.
xxi 394d-395a,c of Ethics, 366d-368a; 370d-372a; 373b-c;
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 101, 374a-c; 378a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals,
432c 383a-d; 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / Science of
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b 337a 398a-399c / Judgement, 463a-467a;
Right,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-13d; 15c-16c; 34a- 515b-c;523d-524a; 596c-598b
37d esp 34c-35b; 59c; 210b-c / Fund. Prin. 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47a-d; NUMBER 31,
Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 264d; 266c-d 103c-104a passim
/ Practical Reason, 300d [fn i]; 351b-352c / 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passim;
Judgement, 463a-467a esp 463b-464a; 476a- 453c
479d; 485b-486d; 488a-495a,c; 515b~c; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, ld-7c;
578a-b INTRO, par i 9a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 867a 50 MARX: Capital, 6a-lld passim, esp 6a-d, 8a-
9b; 178d-179c; 265a-266a; 267c-d
2c. The nature and branches of practical or 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 680d-
moral philosophy: economics, ethics, 684a; 689b-c
politics, jurisprudence; poetics or the 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 800c-
theory of art 801b
7 PLATO: Republic, BK x, 427c-434c / States-
3. The method of philosophy
man, 604c 608d
CH 14 b
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, [io5 i9~29]
149c / Metaphysics, BK 11, CH i b 3*. The foundations of philosophy in experi-
[993 20-23J
b
512a; BK vi, CH i [io25 i9~28] 547d; BK xi,
ence and common sense
CH 7 [1064*10-19] 592b-c 8 ARISTOTLE Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 30 [46*
:
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK
1-4 339a-340d;
i, CH 18-28] 64a / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 18
b CH
CH 7 [io98*20- 8] 343c-344a; BK n, CH 2 lllb'C; 31 120a-c; BK n, CH 2 [90*24-30]
b CH
[iio3 26-no4*9] 349b-c; CH 4 350d-351b pas- 123b-c; 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK i, CH i
b b
sim; BK in, CH 3 [ni2*3o- i2] 358b-c; BK vi, 259a-b / Heavens, BK in, CH i [298 i3-24)
CH 8 390d-391c; BK x, CH 9 434a-436a,c / 390a-b; CH 7 [306*1-18] 397b-c / Generation
Politics, BK iv, CH i 487a-488b / Poetics 681a- and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 [316*5-14] 411c-d;
699a,c passim, esp CH 1-5 681a-684a CH 3 [318^19-31] 415c-d / Metaphysics, BK i,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK HI, par 14 16d- CH i 499a-500b / Sense and the Sensible, CH i
b
17a / City of God, BK VHI, CH 8 270a-d [436 i3-437*i6] 673c-674a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, AA 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i
[418-448]
4-5 Sa-6b; Q 14, A 16 90b-91b; Q 86, A 3, 6b-c; [693-700] 9c; BK iv [353-521] 48d-51a
CONTRARY 463b-d esp [469-521] 50b-51a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvin 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 267a-b
[40-72! 80b-c 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 58a-b; 72a-d; Animal Generation, 331b-335c
78b-c; 80d-81a; 95d-96b; PART n, 112c-d; 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a; 57d-
128d-129b; 158c-d; 164a,c; PART iv, 268d; 58b / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 19-22
CONCLUSION, 282c-d 108b-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 81d-95b / 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 53b / Medi-
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 3 107b tations, \ 75a-77c
CHAPTER 66: PHILOSOPHY 355
tions, 69a-71a,c; i 75a-77c / Objections and 150c-151a; PART i n, o ^, AA 4-5 625a 627a
Replies, 119c-d; 126a-b; 128a-129a;POSTULATE 20 AQUINAS* Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 66,
i PROP iv 130d-133a,c; 134b-c; 167a-c; 206a- A 5, REP 1-2 79b-80c
207a; 237b-238b; 267a-277a,c 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [285 -308] 164a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, en xn 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 70d-72a; 107a-112d;
358c-363b csp SECT 14-15 362d-363b 231d-246a; 395d; 503b-504c; 508a-512a;
35 BERKELEY: Unman Knowledge, INTRO 405a- 538a-543a,c
412a,c passim, csp SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c; 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 69d-76a
SECT 133 134 439c-440a csp 70b-72c, 73c-74a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 31 DESCARTES: Rules, i, Id / Discourse, PART i,
7 10 453c-455b; SECT VH, DIV 49 471c-d; 41d-42a; PART in, 49d-50b / Meditations, in,
SECT xn, DIV ii 6, 503d-504a 88d89a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-13d; 19a-22a,c; 36d- 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, APPENDIX, iv
37b; 101d-102a; 133c-134d; 146a-149d; 157d; xxxn 450c-d; PART v 451a-463d
447b-c;
196b 197c; 218d-227a csp 224a-227a; 248d- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 6
250a,c / Fund. Pnn. Metaphysic of Morals, 453b-c
253c-d; 273d-274a; 277d-279d
260d-261c; 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345a / Political Econ-
/ Practical 292a-296d esp 292d-
Reason, omy, 373d-374a
293b, 294a-b; 299d; 311d-313d; 320c-321b; 42 KANT: Judgement, 591b-592a
331a-332d; 335b-c; 336d-337a,c / Judgement, 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 451c
492c-d; 567c-568a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 368d-
54 FREUD: New Introductory lectures, 875a 369a,c
47GoLTHE: Paust, PART i
[614-685] 17a-18a;
4. The uses of philosophy: diverse conceptions 29b
[1194-1201]
of its aim, function, and value 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 255a; 308a-b
4a. The philosophic mode of life: contempla- 4b. Philosophy as a moral discipline: the con-
tion and happiness solation of philosophy
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Phaedrus, 122b- 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Meno, 183c-
128a / Symposium, 167b-d / Meno, 183c-184c 184c / Phaedo, 222a-226c; 231c-234c / Ti-
/ Apology 200a-212a,c / Phaedo, 223a-226c; maeus, 476a-b / Theaetetus, 528c-531a
231c-234c / Republic, BK v-vn, 368c-401d / 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [62-145]
Timaeus, 476a-b / Theaetetus, 528b-531a / ld-2d; BK ii [1-61] 15a-d; BK in [1-93] 30a-
Philebus 609a-639a,c csp 633a-639a,c / Laws, 31b; [307-322] 34a-b; [8^0-1094] 40c-44a,c;
BK i, 643c-d / Seventh Letter, 808c-809a BK v [1-54] 61a-d; BK vi [1-41] 80a-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK m, CH 2 [i 18*6-16] 12 EPICTEIUS: Discourses 105a-245a,c csp BK i,
164d-165a / Metaphysics, BK XH, CH 7 CH 4 108d-110a, CH 9 114c-116b, CH 15 121c-d,
14-29] 602d-603a CH 17 122d-124a, CH 24 129a-d, CH 27 132b-
CHAPTER 66: PHILOSOPHY 357
133b, CH 29 134d-138a, BK n, CH i 138b,d- 77a,c / Pericles, 122d-123c / Alcibiades, 156c-
140c, CH 14-17 153d-161a, BK in, CH 5 180d- 158b / Marcus Cato, 287d-288c / Alexander,
181d, CH 21-23 193d-203b, BK iv, CH i 213a- 543b-544a; 566a-567d; 571b-572a / Cicero,
223d, CH 10 238d-240d 717a-b / Dion, 782c-788b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK n, 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xiv, 153d-155a; BK xv,
SECT ii-i2 258a-c, SECT 14 258d, SECT 17 172c-173d
259b-d, BK in, SECT 3 260b, BK iv, SECT 3 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 164a,c
263b-264a, SECT 5 264b, SECT 46 267c, SECT 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in,
48 267d-268a, SECT 50 268c, BK v, SECT 9 127b,d-131a,c
270b-c, SECT 14 271b, BK vi, SECT 12 274c, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-62a
SECT 24 276b, SECT 47 278d, SECT 49 279a, 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 5a-b; 20b-
BK vii, SECT 32,35 282a, BK vin, SECT i 26a; 27c; 30a-c
285a-b, SECT 25 287b-c, SECT 31 287d, SECT 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 383a
58 290d, BK ix, SECT 3 291d-292a, SECT 21 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, UK in, CH x,
293b-c, SECT 41 295c, BK xn, SECT 35-36 SECT 8-9 293c-294a
310c-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 4,
13 VIRGIL: Georgics, n 65b
[490-493] 452a; DIV 5 452d-453b; SECT xi, DIV 115-114,
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vm, CH 3 266a-d; 502d-503b
CH 8 270a-d 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxiv,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 21d-22a; 28a-36b; 55d- 202d-203a
62a; 69d-75a; 23ld-237d; 240c-242d; 283b- 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345a / Political Econ-
284c; 401c-d; 503b-504c; 508a-512a; 529c- omy, 373d-374a
530c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 32a-b; 205d-206a;
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 26a-c; 73d- 284a-c; 338d-339c; 390d; 669b-c
74a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40b-41a; 72c;
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 67-73 444d- 76d-77b
447a; PART v, PROP 25-42 458d-463d 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 360d-361d
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 67 180b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 49, 159d-160a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 4b-7c /
1-4 451a-452c; SECT v, DIV 34 463d-464b Philosophy of History, PART n, 279d-281a;
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 388a-417b PART in, 303b-c; PART iv, 360b-c; 363d-
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 35a-d; 182a-c 364c
38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 373d-374a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic%, 107a-b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 644d-646a 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780a b
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
261c-d / 5. The character and training of the philoso-
Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics,
368c-d pher: the difficulty of being a philoso-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART HI, 303b~c pher
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [614-685] 17a-18a; 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 84a,c / Phaedrus, 125b-
PART ii [11,398-407] 277b 126c / Symposium, 163a-168a; 169c-172d /
Apology 200a-212a,c / Phaedo, 223a-226c;
4e. The social role of philosophy: the philoso-
231c-234c / Gorgias, 271a-b; 273b-d; 291c-
pher and the statesman; the philosopher 292b / Republic, BK n, 320b-c; BK v-vii,
king 368c-401d / Timaeus, 476a-b / Parmenides,
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 83c-d / Apology, 207a- 491a-c / Theaetetus, 525c-526b; 528c-531a /
208a / Gorgias, 272b-273b; 291c-292b / Re- Seventh Utter, 808c-809a
public, BK v-vi, 368c-383c; BK vn, 390b- 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH
p
391b; 398c-401d / Theaetetus, 525c-526a; [76*26-30] 104d / Topics, BK vin, CH 14 [163^
528c-531a / Statesman, 598b-608d / Laws, b
8-16] 222a / Heavens, BK 11, CH 12 [29i 24~29]
BK i, 643c-d / Seventh Letter, 801b-802c; 383b-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 500b-501c /
806bc Soul, BK i, CH i [402*1-22] 631a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [982*5-19] 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 6
[1096*11-17]
500b-c 341b; BK x, CH 7 [ii77*i9-b3] 431d-432a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK
vi, CH 7-8 390a-391c; 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 14, 178d-
BK x, CH 9 434a-436a,c / Politics, BK vn, CH 179a; BK in, CH 10, 207d
2-3 528a-530a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 8 113d-114c;
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61] CH 26 131b-132b; CH 29 134d-138a; BK n, CH
15a-d; BK v [1113-1135] 75c-d i 138b,d-140c; CH
3 141d-142a; CH 8-9 146a-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK vi, SECT 14 274d- 148c; CH ii-i2 150a-152c; CH 17 158d-161a;
275a CH 19 162c-164b; BK in, CH 2 177c-178d; CH
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 47a-48c / 19 192c-d; CH 21-22 193d-201a; BK iv, CH 6
Numa Pompilius, 59c-60b / Solon 64b,d- 230b-232c; CH 8 235b-237d
J58 THE GREAT IDEAS 6 to
QARISIOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 6 [io96 u n-i7] 57c-d; 59a-60a; 71a-b; 84a; PART n, 163a-b;
a
341b; BK vi, CH 7 [ii4i 9-i9] 390a; BK ix, CH PART iv, 267a-274d passim; 276c
b a b
i
[n64 2-6] 417b; BK x, CH 7 [ii77 i9- 3] 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
431d-432a / Politics, BK vn, CH 2 [1324*24- 18b-24a; BK n, 78b-80d; lOlb 106a; 124d-
34] 528b 125b; BK HI, 197b-200d
10 GALI.N: Natural Faculties, BK in, en 10, 207d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-62a; 74d-77d; 89c-
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [62-79] d; 239d-294b passim, esp 240c-246a, 257d-
ld-2a; BK in [1-30] 30a-b; BK v [1-54] 61a-d; 264a, 276b-278a; 448d-449a; 517b-519a
BK vi [1-41] 80a-d 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, la-28d esp
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 22 167d- Novum Organum,
2c-17b; 57d-58b; 66c-67c /
170a; CH 24 172d-174b; BK in, CH 9 184c- BK APH 44 HOa-b; APH 54 lllc-d; APH 56
i,
185d; CH 21-22 193d-201a; BK iv, en 5 228a- 112a; APH 62-65 113b-114c; APH 71 117a-c
230b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, n 2a-3b; x, 16d-17a /
12 AuRhLius: Meditations, BK v, SECT 9 270b-c Discourse, PART i, 43d-44b; PART n, 46b;
14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252a-255a PART vi, 64a-c
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR HI lOa 12b / 33 PASCAL: Pensees, ^27 231a-b
Fifth Enncad, TR ix, CH 1-2, 246c-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 89a-c; BK in,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 8 14d- CH iv, SECT 7-11 260d-262b passim; CH vi,
15a / City of God, BK vin, CH 3 266a*d; CH 10 SECT 24 274c; CH vin, SECT 2 284c-285a; CH
271a-d x, SECT 2 291d-292a; SECT 6-14 293a-295a;
6c to 6d CHAPTER 66: PHILOSOPHY 359
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Another discussion of the nature of philosophical science, see SCIENCE la, ic; and for various
conceptions of the highest philosophical knowledge, sec DIALECTIC 23; KNOWLEDGE 6c(4) ;
The relation of philosophy to theology and religion, see RELIGION 6g; SCIENCE 2a; THE-
OLOGY 2, 43; TRUTH 43.
The relation between philosophy and mathematics, see MATHEMATICS m-ib; PHYSICS ib.
The relation of the philosophical to the experimental and empirical sciences, see PHYSICS 2-
2b; PROGRESS 6b; SCIENCE ic.
The comparison of philosophy, poetry, and history, see HISTORY i; POETRY 5b; SCIENCE 2b.
Discussions relevant to the distinction between theoretic and practical philosophy, see
JUDGMENT KNOWLEDGE
2; 6e(i); MIND 93; PRUDENCE 2a; SCIENCE 33; THEOLOGY 30, 4d;
TRUTH 2c; WISDOM ib.
Other treatments of the branches of speculative or natural philosophy and their relation to
one another, see DIALECTIC 4; LOGIC i; MAN 20, 2b(4); MATHEMATICS la; METAPHYSICS
33- $c; PHYSICS i-ia; SCIENCE 13(2); THEOLOGY 33; TRUTH 4C.
Other treatments of the branches of practical, moral, or civil philosophy, see KNOWLEDGE
6e(2), 8a-8c; LOGIC 46; POETRY 8; SCIENCE 33; STATE 8tl; WEALTH 9.
Discussions relevant to the method of philosophy, see DEFINITION 6a-6c; EXPERIENCE 2C,
4a~4b; INDUCTION la, 3; KNOWLEDGE 6c(4); LOGIC 4d; METAPHYSICS 2c, 4b; PRINCIPLE
3-4; REASONING 6a, 6c-6d.
The uses of philosophy in the conduct of life and the organizstion of society, see HAPPINESS
2!) (7); WISDOM 2C.
The conception of the philosopher as a man of wisdom or as seeking wisdom, see TRUTH 8e;
WISDOM 3; and for the comparison of philosophical with supernatural wisdom, see
THEOLOGY 2; WISDOM id.
The association or contrast of the philosopher with the sophist, the rhetorician, or the dog-
matist, see DIALECTIC 6; METAPHYSICS 43; OPINION 4b; RHETORIC la; WISDOM 3.
The comparison of progress in philosophy and science, and for the conditions of progress in
philosophy, see PROGRESS 6b-6c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the
ides and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
'
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART i, CH i
GIBBON. An Essay on the Study of Literature, XLIV-
AUGUSTINE. Soliloquies, BK i, CH 7 LV
. Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil, KANT. Introduction to Logic, m-iv, x
BK n, CH xvin HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, PREF
AQUINAS. On the Trinity ofBoethius, QQ 2, 5-6 . The Philosophy of Mind, SECT in, SUB-
DANTE. Convivio (The Banquet), SECOND TREATISE, SECT c
CH 1 2-1 6; THIRD TREATISE, CH 1 1 -i 5 FOURTH ; .Lectures on the History of Philosophy
TREATISE, CH i ENGELS. Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science,
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PREF PARTI
362 THE GREAT IDEAS
W. JAMES. Pragmatism, LECT I-H NIETZSCHE. Beyond Good and Evil, CH i
THOMAS A KEMPIS. The Imitation of Christ, BK i, J. S. HALDANE. The Sciences and Philosophy, LECT
HEINE. Religion and Philosophy in Germany CARNAP. Philosophy and Logical Syntax
COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, INTRO, CH i MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, CH i
W. HAMILTON. Discussions on Philosophy and Liter- . De la philosophic chretienne
INTRODUCTION
the subject matter of of the reality of change or motion, cannot be
CONCERNING
V^/ physics, one thing seems to be tradition- treated as a physical theory. On the contrary,
ally taken for granted. The object onts_study it is, according to Aristotle, a complete
negation
is the sensible world of changing things or mat- of the subject matter of physics. No matter
ter in motion. When Plato, tor example, con- what other points physicists may dispute
ceiveTastronomy as dealing not with the actual among themselves, they must all at least agree
and observable motions of the heavenly bodies, in taking a stand against Parmenides. Aristotle
but with the possible forms of the motions of does not even seem to think that a book on
solids, he gives it the character of a mathemat- physicsis the
proper place to argue against Par-
ical rather than a physical science. He asso- menides. That argument belongs to another
ciatesit with geometry, as for a similar reason part of philosophy. The reality of change
he associates music divorced from concern seems to him sufficiently evident to assure the
with audible harmonies with arithmetic. In physicist that he has a subject matter to inves-
if a science does not investigate
anyone's view, tigate.
sensible realities, if it does not undertake to ac-
count for the motions of actual bodies, or, THE QUESTION whether the early physicists
statedmost generally, if it has no concern with were scientists or philosophers calls attention to
the phenomena of change, then it does not have methods of investigating natural phe-
different
the character of physical or natural science. nomena. Agreement on the subject matter of
The early Greek physicists, the pre-Socratics, physics may prevail, therefore, only in very
to whom Plato and Aristotle refer, inaugurate general terms. When, in a manner to accord
the study of change with speculations about with the method employed, the object of phys-
ultimate origins, the underlying principles or ical inquiry is more specifically defined, there
causes of natural phenomena. Sometimes they seem to be two physics, not one a philosoph-
are called philosophers and sometimes scientists ical and a scientific physics, a philosophy of na-
or, at least, precursorspf ernpiricdsciejice. ture and a natural science, or, to use Kant's
ferently. The realm of nature is the realm of of Aristotle seems, however, to involve more
363
364 THE GREAT IDEAS
ences, both are physicists, though both are not branches or affiliates are also treated in that
philosophers or scientists in the same sense. chapter. Still other chapters deal with funda-
There are other sources of variation in the mental terms representing concepts or prob-
definition of physics. The problem of the rela- lems in the larger domain of physics, philo-
tion of physics to other disciplines whether sophical or scientific, CAUSE, CHANGE,
e.g.,
metaphysics. In consequence they conceive stricted to the problems raised in the great
biology and psychology, or from the study of more than that. It is the case which tests
it is
e.g., ASTRONOMY
sciences, and MECHANICS. ity of metaphysical knowledge may be chal-
The latter tries to cover the various branches lenged, but no one has ever proposed an experi-
of mechanics and related fields of study, such mental metaphysics to challenge the meta-
as dynamics, optics, the theory of heat, mag- physics of the philosophers.
netism, and electricity; particularly so far as But physics seems to permit both an experi-
these are represented in the work of Galileo, mental and a philosophical treatment. Whether
Newton, Huygens, Gilbert, Fourier, and Fara- they are to be regarded as in conflict with one
day.The basic concepts of mechanics and its another depends on whether they are attacking
CHAPTER 67: PHYSICS 365
the same problems by different methods or which have the utmost simplicity in mathe-
whether they represent something like a divi- matical statement.
sion of labor. In the latter view, each would Onthe second and third points, Newton's
deal, according to its method, with different declarations seem to be most explicit. "Nature,"
problems and tend to supplement rather than he says, "is pleased with simplicity and affects
to exclude the other. Psychology is another not the pomp of superflous causes." Accord-
subject matter which seems to receive a dual ingly, Newton directs his efforts toward the
treatment philosophical and experimental simplest statement of the laws of motion, and
in the tradition of the great books. It raises these he seeks to give the universality requisite
issues similar to those just mentioned. They for covering every type of natural phenomenon.
are considered in the chapter on MAN. At the opening of the third book of the Mathe-
As the chapters on PHILOSOPHY and on matical Principles of Natural Philosophy, he ex-
SCIENCE indicate, the discussion of their differ- plains that in the preceding books, he has
ence from and relation to one another is com- "laid down the principles of philosophy, prin-
plicated by the double use of both terms. The ciples not philosophical but mathematical;
word "science," for example, is used for both such, namely, as we may build our reasonings
the philosophical and the experimental sciences upon in philosophical inquiries. These princi-
throughout the greater part of the tradition. ples are the laws and conditions of certain mo-
Similarly, until quite recently, the name of tions, and powers or forces." From these same
philosopher is taken by those who experiment principles, he will now undertake to "demon-
as well as by those who do not. strate the frame of the System of the World."
It impossible, therefore, to speak without
is In the Preface to the first edition of this
confusion of a scientific and a philosophical work, Newton describes the third book as one
in which he derives "from the celestial phe-
physics unless the verbal ambiguities are re-
solved by some convention, such as the under- nomena the forces of gravity with which bodies
standing that when the context indicates that tend to the sun and the several planets. Then
the words "science" and "philosophy" are be- from these forces, by other propositions which
ing used as oppositcs rather than as synonyms, are also mathematical," he goes on, "1 deduce
then "science" shall signify the experimental the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon,
and "philosophy" the non-experimental mode the sea." But he does not consider his work to,
of treatment. Beyond this, it is
necessary to have attained the goal of physics the compre-
proceed as if the chapters on PHILOSOPHY and hension of all natural phenomena by a few
SCIENCE formed a background for some of the simple mathematical formulae.
matters to be discussed here. Otherwise the His confession of failure may also be read as
consideration of natural philosophy and natural a prognostication of what an experimental
science would tend to become a general dis- physics based on mathematical principles
cussion of philosophy and science. might some day be able to achieve. "I wish we
could derive the rest of the phenomena of na-
THE GREAT BOOKS of experimental physics ture by the same kind of reasoning," he writes,
seem tohave three characteristics in common. "for I am induced by many reasons to suspect
First, and most naturally, they insist upon ex- that they may all depend upon certain forces
perimentation as either the indispensable source by which the particles of bodies, by some causes
or the ultimate test of scientific formulations. hitherto unknown, are either mutually im-
Second, they tend to rely upon mathematics as pelled towards one another, and cohere in
much as upon experiment, both for the formu- regular figures, or are repelled and recede from
lation of nature's laws and for the demonstra- one another." Einstein's unified field equations,
tion of the consequences or corollaries of the covering both gravitational phenomena on the
primary laws. Third, though experiments and astronomical scale and the electrical attractions'
observations multiply as science develops, they and repulsions of sub-atomic particles, seem to
seek to bring all the phenomena of nature un- realize,or at least closely to approximate, the
der the smallest number of generalizations, ideal Newton has in mind.
366 THE GREAT IDEAS
Midway between Newton and Einstein, curate determination of the first principles of
Fourier also bears testimony to the ideal of action of the most extraordinary and universal
he writes, "have extended their theories and Newton's optical experiments with mirrors and
given them an admirable perfection; they have prisms were adapted to the phenomena of light,
taught us that the most diverse phenomena are as Galileo's experiment with the inclined plane,
ulate all the movements of the stars, their form, hydrostatics, and electricity. The materials
ics,
the inequalities of their courses, the equilibrium employed, the apparatus or instruments de-
and the oscillations of the seas, the harmonic vised, the factors controlled or isolated from
vibrations of air and sonorous bodies, the trans- irrelevant circumstances, and the units of
mission of light, capillary actions, the undula- measurement in which the results are recorded,
tions of fluids, in fine the most complex effects naturally vary with the phenomena under ob-
of all natural forces. Thus has the thought of servation. Yet one thing is common to the
Newton been confirmed," he concludes, re- variety of experiments described in the great
ferring to Newton's geometry, whose
praise of books of physical science. They all involve the
glory it is that the few mathematical principles construction of an artificial physical system
it provided for use in physics should have been which permits more accurate and refined ob-
"able to produce so many things." servation than does nature uncontrolled or un-
tampered with.
ON THE EXPERIMENTAL SIDE, the great works The student of nature must observe in any
of physical science seem to contain diverse no- case, no matter whether he is a philosopher or
tions of the purposes served by experimenta- a scientist. To say that philosophical physics is
tion, accompanied by a fairly uniform recogni- non-experimental does not mean for Aristotle
tion of the dependence of natural science upon that knowledge of nature is possible without
experiment. In the field of magnetism, for observation or induction from experience. But
example, (filbert sets aside as unscientific all the experimentalists insist upon the distinction
those authors who "have written about amber between the kind of observations which men
and jet as attracting chaff . . . but with never a normally make in the course of everyday expe-
proof from experiments. These writers deal
. . . rience and the kind which involve the special
weight of air leads Pascal to conclude that the This point of distinction seems to be strik-
secrets of nature remain hidden until "the ingly illustrated by a passage in Galileo's Two
experiments which supply us with knowledge New Sciences. One of the persons in the dia-
about it" can be performed and multiplied. logue, Simplicio, declares "everyday experi-
"We
ought never to search for truth but by ence to show the propagation of light to be
the natural road of experiment and observa- instantaneous." He explains that "when we see
tion," writes Lavoisier; and Faraday describes a piece of artillery fired at a great distance, the
himself as "an experimentalist" who feels flash reaches our eyes without lapse of time; but
"bound to let experiment guide me into any the sound reaches the ear only after a notice-
train of thought which it
may justify." The able interval." Sagredo replies that this familiar
science of electricity, he finds, "is in that state bit of experience permits him to infer only
in which every part of it requires experimental that "sound, in reaching our ear, travels more
investigation, not merely for the discovery of slowly than light." It does not inform us, he
new effects," but ultimately for "the more ac- says, "whether the coming of light is instanta-
CHAPTER 67: PHYSICS 367
ncous or whether, although extremely rapid, increases with the units of time elapsed rather
it occupies time." The choice between
still than with the intervals of space traversed. But
these alternatives could not be determined by when Simplicio asks for an experiment to show
ordinary experience. An experiment had to be that the mathematical conclusion has physical
constructed in order to measure the velocity of reality, in the sense of describing observable
than an inductive function. As Iluygcns ob- term 'science, these treatises expound sciences,
serves, proof in physics does not have the certi- but they also constitute one part of philosophy,
tude of mathematical demonstration, but it can to be distinguished from mathematics and from
have an extremely high degree of probability what Aristotle regards as the first or highest
"very often scarcely less than complete part of philosophy, />., the science of meta-
proof" as a result of the experimental con- physics.
firmation of a conclusion deduced from the Aristotle's tripartite division of the theoretic
which have been demonstrated by the prin- mathematics, and metaphysics raises a question
ciples that have been assumed, correspond per- concerning his numerous biological works, and
fectly to the phenomena which experiment perhaps also his treatise On the Soul. Arc these
has brought under observation, especially when to be classified as physical sciences or parts of
there are a great number of them." A single natural philosophy? The fact that Aristotle
crucial experiment, so perfect in construction distinguishes between the forms and properties
that all relevant factors have been controlled, of living and non-living matter does not seem
makes unnecessary the multiplication of experi- to affect the answer. By his criteria of physical
ments to establish the conclusion. inquiry namely, that it investigates what nei-
A third use of experiment is illustrated by ther exists nor can be conceived apart from
Galileo when he measures the velocity of a ball matter and motion, and that it is concerned
rolling down an inclined plane, in order to de- with every type of change all these works be-
cide whether a certain mathematical definition long to the domain of physics. Accordingly
of uniformly accelerated motion describes the even such apparently psychological studies as
acceleration "which one meets in nature in the those dealing with sensation, memory, dreams,
case of falling bodies." The persons in the justify the title under which they have been
dialogue seem to be satisfied with some mathe- traditionally grouped Parva Naturalia, i.e.,
matical reasoning which shows that the velocity short physical treatises.
368 THE GREAT IDEAS
For all these more specialized considerations physical bodies, but only as separated, in
of natural phenomena the Physics seems to serve thought at least, from matter and motion.
as a general introduction, as well as being in its There are sciences which represent mixtures of
own right an exposition of the most funda- mathematics and physics, such as optics and
mental science in thesphere of natural philos- harmonics, but the existence of these mixed
ophy. It tries to define change and to state the sciences the equivalent of what is later called
"generation." It undertakes to analyze the Aristotle seems to think that physics has its
conditions or causes of change or motion, to own proper principles. If any deeper under-
distinguish what happens by chance from what standing of these principles is sought, it is not
happens of necessity, to discriminate between to be found in mathematics, but in meta-
natural and unnatural or violent motions, to physics, or what Aristotle calls "the first
aspects of motion, and to ask about the infinity principles. In such terms he is able to state his
of body and of change, and about the eternity insight that all change involves a substratum (or
of motion or the whole order of becoming, the that which changes) and contraries (or that from
natural world of things in motion. which and that to which the change occurs).
Aristotle's physics thus seems to stand in But the analysis of matter and form in terms of
sharp contrast to the physics of the experi- potentiality and actuality as modes of being,
mentalists, not merely in method, but in the and the consideration of form and privation in
questions it tries to answer and in the principles terms of being and non-being, belong to meta-
to which it appeals. The effort to define change physics rather than physics.
in general and to state the principles and Furthermore, Aristotle as a physicist deals
causes operative in every type of change might with bodies in motion and with the difference
appear to correspond to the search for formulae between the generation of bodies and their al-
of maximum generality to cover all natural teration, increase and decrease, or change of
phenomena. But where Newton and Fourier place. But he leaves to metaphysics to the
hope thereby to reduce nature's variety to the books which come after the books on physics
simplest terms a few laws of motion compre- the discussion of physical bodies as substances
hending the whole framework of nature composite of matter and form, and the distinc-
Aristotle tends on the contrary to insist upon tion of substance and accident which bears on
an irreducible variety of types of motion, kinds the difference between substantial and acci-
of matter, and causes of change. dental change (i.e., generation and corruption
Furthermore, the principles to which Aris- as opposed to the change in quality, quantity,
totle appeals are not mathematical. He criticizes or place).
the discussion of becoming which takes place in Though for Aristotle physics is as separate
Plato's Timaeus, on the ground that it tries to from metaphysics as it is from mathematics in
substitute mathematical for physical terms in subject matter, physics depends upon meta-
the analysis of change. "Physical bodies contain physics, as does not upon mathematics, for
it
surfaces and volumes, lines and points," he the establishment as well as the elucidation of
writes,"and these are the subject matter of its principles. It is in this sense that metaphysics
logically prior to experimental natural science. what Bacon calls "magic") through the
pro-
To the extent that the experimentalist employs duction of effects by the application of a knowl-
totle about the separation of physics from physics as inductive and empirical, if not exper-
mathematics. Rational (or pure, as opposed to imental.
empirical) physics is, according to Kant, "en- These issues concerning the relation of
tirely separate from mathematics." It is not to physics to mathematics and metaphysics have
be confused with "what is
commonly called significance for (he experimental as well as the
pure and unmixed natural philosophy." Even though Hume looks upon the conclusions
Bacon elsewhere observes that "the investi- of experimental reasoning as at best probable,
gation of nature is best conducted when mathe- it remains the case that questions about nature
matics are applied to physics." He does not which cannot be answered by physics cannot
deny "the great use of mathematics in physics," be answered scientifically.
but rather insists that mathematics be regarded The effect is the same as that achieved by
as "an appendage or auxiliary" of natural phi- Hobbes, who makes physics the primary science
losophy, not its master. He is writing against of reality on the ground that nothing exists
the mathematicians "who would have their except bodies in motion. The assertion of the
science preside over physics." primacy of physics, in short, may be due either
But to whatever extent Aristotle, Bacon, to the denial that immaterial objects can be
and Kant are agreement concerning the re-
in known by us, or to the denial that such objects
lation of physics and mathematics, their the- have any real existence. Of quite opposite
ories of the scope and subject matter of physics tenor is the view that only immaterial and
seem to be at variance. For Bacon, physics is eternal things can be scientifically known, and
only one of the theoretic parts of natural phi- that the sensible world of things which come to
losophy; the other is metaphysics. Both are be, pass away, and are forever undergoing
sciences of nature or the physical world, though change, belongs to the realm of probability
one investigates material and efficient, the and opinion, not knowledge.
other formal and final causes. Both studies, For Plato, mathematics and dialectic can be,
moreover, can be conducted experimentally and respectively, science and wisdom because they
can yield practical fruits (in mechanics and study the intelligible reality df being in its im-
370 THE GREAT IDEAS
mutable forms. But the physicists who try to ity with the certitude of mathematics. It praises
accept a tale which is probable and inquire no Furthermore, Hume, unlike Plato, does not
further." After discoursing at length of physi- think the probability of physics detracts from
cal matters,Timaeus apologizes for the merely its
utility, the sort of utility which Bacon mag-
conjectural character of his account of natural nifies more eloquently than Hume the inven-
phenomena, saying that "a man may some- tion of machinesand the technical applications
times set aside meditations about eternal things, of physics whereby man extends his dominion
and for recreation turn to consider the truths over nature. In the traditional discussion of the
of becoming which are probable only; he will dignity and value of physics, Plato and Bacon
thus gain a pleasure not to be repented of, and seem to represent attitudes as far apart as are
secure for himself a wise and moderate pastime." the theories of Aristotle and Newton in the
This view goes further than Hume's in de- discussion of the subject matter and method
preciating physics by contrasting its probabil- of physics.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Physics as the general theory of becoming and the order of nature or change: philo-
sophical physics, the philosophy of nature, pure or rational physics 371
2. Experimental physics and the empirical natural sciences: the relation of experimental
and philosophical physics
2a. The derivation of definitions, distinctions, and principles from the philosophy
of nature: the metaphysics of the scientist
2b. The treatment of causes in philosophical and empirical physics: description and
explanation, theory and prediction 373
3.
The role of mathematics in the natural sciences: observation and measurement in
relation to mathematical formulations
40. The distinction between simple observation and experimentation: the art of
creating ideal or isolated physical systems
5. The utility of physics: the invention of machines; the techniques of engineering; the
mastery of nature
CHAPTER 67: PHYSICS 371
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page.For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage :
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
:
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
268c-d; BK ii, CH 2 270a-271a; 0117-9 275b- PART vi, 61b-62c / Meditations, i, 76c /
b
278a,c; BK in, CH i [20o i2-24] 278a; CH 5 Objections and Replies, 215a-b; 285b-d
b
[204*34~ 3] 282b-c; BK iv, CH i [208*27-33] 35 LOCKE -.Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xxi,
b
287a; BK vin, CH 3 [253*32- 6] 337c / Heavens, SECT 1-2 394d; SECT 5 395c
b
BK i, CH [268*1-7! 359a; CH 5 [27i i-i8]
i 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 101-117
362c-d; BK in, CH i [298b i3~3o] 390a-b; CH 7 432c-436b
[306*1-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 9 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d esp 5d-6c; 18d-
b
[992*2o- 9] 510c-d; BK n, CH 3 [995*15-20] 19a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
513d; BK vi, CH i 547b,d-548c; BK vu, CH n 253a-d; 271a-c / Judgement, 578a-b
[1037*10-18] 560d; CH 3 [io6i*29~b i2]
BK xi, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a-886a; 889a-890a
589c-d; CH 4 589d-590a; CH 7 592b-593a / ^ L r . ..
Soul, BK i, CH i [403*25^19] 632b-d / Sense
la - The Cation of the philosophy of nature to
and the Sensible, CH i [43 6*i6-b2] 673b / metaphysics and dialectic
b
Youth, Life, and Breathing, CH 27 [48o 2i~3i] 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-242b / Republic, BK vi,
726d 385c-388a; BK vu, 391b-398c
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 2 [i 84^5-185*
b
161a-165d esp [639^2-640*10] 162a-b 19] 259c-260a; CH 9 [i92*33- 2] 268c-d; BK ir,
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a CH 2 [i94b 8-i5] 271a; CH 7 [198*22-31] 275b-c;
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vm, CH 2 265b- BK m, CH 5 [20434-b3] 282b-c; BK vm, CH i
372 THE GREAT IDEAS \b to la
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 695b-c
(1. Physics as the general theory of becoming and 53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a-883a
the order of nature or change: philosophical
physics, the philosophy of nature, pure or 2. Experimental physics and the empirical nat-
rational physics, la. The relation of the ural sciences: the relation of experi-
philosophy of nature to metaphysics and mental and philosophical physics
dialectic?) 7 PLATO: Republic, BK vn, 391b-398c
bn CH 8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK n, CH 13 [293 a i5~3i]
[25o -251*8] 334a-c / Heavens* BK m, i
b a
J298 i3-3o] 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 8 384d; BK in, CH 7 [3o6 3-i8] 397b-c / Gen-
b a
[989 2i-990 8] 507d-508a; BK 11, CH 3 [995* eration and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 [3i6 a 5~i4]
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 102 34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; DEF vin 7b-8a;
432d-433a BK in, RULE i -n 270a; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-
42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-b 372a / Optics, BK in, 542a; 543a-b
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553b~554a
36b; 41b c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH HI,
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a SECT 28-29 322a-323a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 582b-584a; 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 32
595a; 670a; 673d; 824a-b; 837b-c; 839b-c 418d-419a; SECT 50-53 422c-423a passim;
53 JAMES: Psychology, viib-viiia; 69b-70a; 84a- SECT 60-66 424b-426a passim; SECT 101-109
119b esp 89b-90a, 95a; 882a-886a; 889a-890a 432c-434b passim
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400c-401d / Instincts, 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 9
412a-b 454c-4S5a; SECT iv, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT vn,
DIV 57, 475d-476b [fn 2]; DIV 60, 477a; SECT
2b. The treatment of causes in philosophical
vin, DIV 67 480c-481a
and empirical physics: description and 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 46d-47c / Practical Rea-
explanation, theory and prediction son, 311d-314d /Judgement, 557c-558b; 564a-
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-246c / Republic, BK c; 581a-582c
vi-vn, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 455a-b 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c 9d-10b
passim, esp BK i, CH 13 107c-108c, BK n, CH 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-b
1-2 122b,d-123c, CH 9 128a-b, CH n 128d- 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c-240d
129d, CH 16-18 134b-136a / Physics, BK n, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 344a-b;
CH 3 [i94b i6-23J 271a-b; CH 7-9 275b-278a,c; BK xi, 470a-c; BK xm, 563a-b; EPILOGUE i,
BK iv, CH 4 [211*6-11] 290a / Metaphysics, BK 650b-c; EPILOGUE n, 694d-696d
a
i, CH i [98i 24-982 i] 499c-500b; CH 2 [982 53 JAMES: Psychology, 69b-70a; 89b-90a; 742a-b;
ft
a b
28-30] SOOc; BK in, CH 2 [996 i8- 26] 514d- 745b; 882a-884b passim, esp882b-883a, 884 b;
b
515b; BK vi, CH i [io25 i-i8] 547b,d; BK vn, 885a-886a
CH 17 [i04i*io-b ii] 565b-d; BK viii, CH 4 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 454b-c; 484a
a b BK xi, CH 7 [1063^6-
[i(>44 33- 2o] 569a-b;
592b 3. The role of mathematics in the natural
1064*9]
sciences: observation and measurement
9 ARISTOTLE : Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
b b in relation to mathematical formulations
[639 io-642 4] 161d-165d esp [642*1-30]
165a-c / Gait of Animals, CH i 243a b / Gen- 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 9
eration of Animals, BK i, CH i [715*1-18] 255a- [76*3-25] 104b-d; CH 13 [78^1-79*16] 108b-c
b; BK CH i [765*35~b 5] 306c; BK v, CH i
iv, / Physics, BK n, CH 2 [194*7-11] 270b-c; BK
b
320d
[778 7-io] vn, CH 5 333a-d / Metaphysics, BK xm, CH 3
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 4 169a [1078*5-17] 609b-c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [509-533] 9 ARISTOTLE: Gait of Animals, CH 9 247a-248a
67d-68a; BK vi [703-711] 89c-d 11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes 502a-
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 519b / Floating Bodies 538a-560b / Method
Spheres, 505a-506a 569a-592a
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 959a-960a 14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252a-255a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 32, 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 964b-965a
A i, REP 2 175d-178a; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b- 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 3-6 27c-
298a; Q 86, A 4, ANS 463d-464d 28c / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 29, 651b*c
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 60a-b; PART iv, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 32,
267a-b A i, REP 2 175d-178a; PART I-H, Q 35, A 8,
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, 6a-7a; BK n, ANS 779c-780c
27b-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART n-n, Q 9,
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, A 2, REP 3 424b-425a
202d-203a; FOURTH DAY, 252a b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d; 73 b; PART
28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 319c / On iv, 268c-d
Animal Generation, 335c-336c; 393b-c; 425a 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 42a-c; 131b-132a; 133b; FOURTH DAY, 245 b-d;
43a-d; 45a-46a; 46c-47c / Novum Organum, 252a-b
374 THE GREAT IDEAS
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, RULE ni-iv 270b-
(3. The role of mathematics in the natural sci-
271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a / Optics,
ences; observation and measurement in re- BK i, 379a; 386b-404b; 424a-440a; 450a-453a;
lation to mathematical formulations.) BK n, 457a-478b; BK u-iii, 496a-516a; BK in,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 46b-c / 543a-b
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 109, 129b; BK n, 34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
APH 8 140b; APH 39, 170b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi,
31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 7a-c; xiv, 31c-d / SECT 46-47 281d-282b; BK iv, CH xn, SECT
Discourse, PART i, 43b-c; PART in, 50d / 9-13 360d-362d passim
Objections and Replies, 169c-170a 42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-b
34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; DEF vm 7b*8a; 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2a-b;
BK i, PROP 69, SCHOL, 131a; BK in, 269a PART i, 10d-12d; 17a-20d esp 17a; 22d-24a;
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a 29d33b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 27 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a; 175b; 184a
460c-d 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 265a-273a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 94b-103a esp 272c-273a; 277a-300a; 319b,d-330d;
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 299b-c 347a-351c; 362d-366c; 371d-377d; 440b,d;
42 KANT: Judgement, 551a-552a 607a,c; 659a; 774d-775a; 851a-c
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 136b-139a passim
14a-c; 33b-36a; 41a-44d; PART in, 96b-103b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 126a-127a; 265a-268a;
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-b; 172a-173b; 341a-344b; 348a-357b passim; 385a-b
175b; 177a; 182b-184a; 249a-b
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 831b-c
4c. Experimental testing and verification: the
crucial experiment
50 MARX: Capital, 170a-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 13 173d-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 126a-b; 348a-359a esp 177a; BK in, CH 2 199d 200a; CH 4 201b-202c;
351a 354a; 675b; 876a-b; 882a-884b CH 8 205a-207b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, 11 [46-105]
4. The experimental method in the study of
108b-d
nature 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
148c-149c; 166d-168a; THIRD DAY, 200a-b;
4a. The distinction between simple observa-
202d-203a; 203d-205b; 207d 208c
tion and experimentation: the art of cre- 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268d-273c esp
ating ideal or isolated physical systems 268d, 273c; 286b-304a,c esp 286b-c, 295d-
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 296a / Circulation of the Blood, 311c-312c;
148d-149c; 166d-167b 324c-d
28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 320b 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 36
50 MARX: Capital, 6c 164a-168d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 126a-127b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61c-62c;
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 815a-c 66a-b
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-370a / Great Experi-
4h. Experimental discovery: inductive generali- ment 382a-389b / Weight of Air, 404a-405b;
zation from experiment; the role of 425a-429a
theory or hypothesis in experimentation 34 NEWTON: Principles, LAWS OF MOTION, SCHOL,
10 HIPPOCRATES Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 la-3b
:
19b-22a; BK n, GENERAL SCHOL 211b-219a;
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, la b; BK i, 6a- PROP 40, SCHOL 239a-246b / Optics, BK i,
7a; BK n, 27c-28a 392a-396b; 408a-410b; 412a-416b; 453a-
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 455a; BK in, 543a-b
131a 138b; 157b-171b passim; THIRD DAY, 34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
203d- 205 b; 207d-208a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH
28 HARVEY: Motion ofthe Heart, 273c-d; 280c-d; xii, SECT 13 362c-d
285c-d / On Animal Generation, 331b-333d; 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2a-b;
336b-d; 383d; 451b-c PART i, 17a-b; 32a-33a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a; 30d- 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 181 b; 184a
31a; 34b; 42a-c; 56c-59c / Novum Organum, 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 300b-316a;
PREP-BK 1 105a-136a,c esp BK i, APH 64 114b, 334b-335c; 377d-383a; 385b-c; 388c-389d;
APH 70 116b-117a,APH 82 120d-121b, APH 440b,d; 467a-b; 830b-832c
99-100 127b-c; BK n, APH 11-14 140d-148d; 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 12b-c; 149d-150a
APH 36 164a-168d 53 IAMES: Psychology, 865a; 882a-884b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61d-62c 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 291d-292a /
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 359a-365b / Equilibrium Narcissism, 401a / New Introductory Lectures,
of Liquids 390a-403a passim 815a b; 818c-819b
Uto 5 CHAPTER 67: PHYSICS 375
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
4</. Experimental measurement: the application 160d-161a; SECOND DAY, 191b-193b
of mathematical formulae 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 34b /
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK iv, 85c 89c; BK v, Not'um Organum, BK i, APH 81 120b>c; APH
92a-93b 124 133c-d; APH 129 134d-135d; BK n, APH
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 39, 170b-c: APH 44-51 175d-194c / New At-
136d-137c esp 137b-c; 148d-149c; 164a-166c lantis, 210d-214d
esp 165c-166c; THIRD DAY, 207d 208c 31 DF.SC \RTts: Discourse, PART vi 60d-67a,c
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 286c 288c esp 61b-c
34 NEWTON: Principles, LAWS OF MOTION, SCHOL, 33 P \SCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 392b-393a
20a-22a; BK n, GENLRAL SCHOL 211b-219a; 34 NJAVI-ON: Optics, BK i, 412a 423b
PROP 40, SCHOL 239a-246b 35 LOCKK: Human Undet standing, BK iv, en
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistr\, PART i, xn, SFCT n-12 361c 362c
14a-c; 17a-20b; 22d-24a; 30a-32d; 33b-36a; 36 SWIFI Gulliver, PART in, 99b 112a
:
PART in, 87d-90a; 91a-95a; 96b-103b 39 SMI in: Wealth of Nations, IK i, 5d-6a
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 175b; 184b-185b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Vail, 661c 663c
45 FARAUAY: Researches in Electricity, 277d-279a; 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 291d-292c; 509d-
316b-318c; 366d-371d; 444a-451a; 465d- 510a,c
467a,c; 768d 773d; 778b,d-793c 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general discussion of the distinction between philosophy and science, relevant to the
difference between a philosophical and an experimental physics, see KNOWLEDGE 6c(4);
PHILOSOPHY ic; SCIENCE ic.
SCIENCE ia(2).
The relation of mathematics to experimental physics, and for the nature of mathematical
physics, see ASTRONOMY 2c; MATHEMATICS 5!);
MECHANICS 3; SCIENCE 5C.
Other discussions relevant to the treatment of causes in philosophical and scientific physics,
see ASTRONOMY 3a~3b; CAUSE 5b; SCIENCE 4c; and for other treatments of problems or
concepts fundamental to physics, see CHANCE la-ib; CHANGE 2-2!), 5a~5b, 6a-6b, 7a~7d;
ELEMENT 3~3d, 5; INFINITY 3d~3e, 4a~4b; MATTER i-ib, 2a-2b; MECHANICS m-ic, 6a-
6e; NATURE 32-3^3); QUANTITY 5a~5c; SPACE i-2c, 3b; TIME i.
The logic of the experimental method in the study of nature, see INDUCTION 5; LOGIC 4b;
MECHANICS 2a; REASONING 6c; and for the theory of experimentation and the use of
hypotheses and measurements, see ASTRONOMY 2a-2b; EXPERIENCE 5a~5c; HYPOTHESIS
4~4d; MATHEMATICS 53; MECHANICS 2b, 3a; QUANTITY 6-6c; SCIENCE 5a~5b, 5d~5e.
Other considerations of the utility of physics or natural science generally, see KNOWLEDGE
8a; SCIENCE ib(i).
The various branches of physics, such as astronomy, statics, dynamics, optics, acoustics,
hydrodynamics, magnetism, and electricity, see ASTRONOMY Sa-pf; MECHANICS ib, 53-
5f(2), 6a-6e, ya, yb-jc, yd, ye.
Discussions relevant to the distinction between physics and biology or psychology, see
ANIMAL 43; CHANGE 6c-6d, pa-pb, ica-iob; LIFE
AND DEATH 2; MECHANICS 40-4^ MIND
2e; and for the treatment of one aspect of psychophysics, see SENSE 30(2),
376 THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
.
Experiments, Notes, etc. About the Mechanical BOHR. Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature
Origine or Production of Divers Paiticular Qualities HEISENBERG. The Physical Principles ofthe Quantum
VOLTAIRE. Letters on the English, xiv-xvn Theory
BLACK. Experiments upon Magnesia Alba, Quicl^- SANTA YANA. The Realm of Matter, CH i
lime, and Some Other Alcaline Substances M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK n, CH 2
J.PRIESTLEY. Experiments and Observations on Dif- LENZEN. The Nature of Physical Theory
ferent Kinds of
Air EINSTEIN. Relativity: The Special and the General
CAVENDISH. Experiments of Factitious Air Theory
. Electrical Researches . on Relativity
Sidelights
.
Experiments on Air .The Meaning of Relativity
SCHELLING. Ideen zu einer Philosophic der Natur On the Method of Theoretical Physics
.
T. YOUNG. Lectures on Natural Philosophy and the CARNAP. The Unity of Science
Mechanical Arts Philosophy and Logical Syntax, HI (5-9)
.
WHEWELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, GILSON. The Unity ofPhilosophical Experience, CH 9
VOL i, BK v-vi EINSTEIN and INFELD. The Evolution of Physics
TYNDALL. On the Study of Physics WATSON. On Understanding Physics
HELMHOLTZ. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, i D'ABRO. Decline of Mechanism in Modern Physics
HERSCHEL. A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of EDDINGTON. The Mathematical Theory of Relativity
Natural Philosophy .The Philosophy of Physical Science
.Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects, VI-VHI, RIEZLER. Physics and Reality
XIII P. FRANK. Between Physics and Philosophy
MENDELEYEV. The Principles of Chemistry B. RUSSELL. Our Knowledge of the External World,
W. THOMSON and TAIT. Treatise on Natural Philoso- HI-IV
phy . The Analysis of Matter, CH 1-26, 37
Elements of Natural Philosophy
. . Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, PART
INTRODUCTION
and pain, writes Locke, "like or "delight," "pain" or "uneasiness," and he
TREASURE
JL other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor observes that "whether we call it satisfaction,
their names defined; the way of knowing them delight, pleasure, happiness, etc., on the one
is ... only by experience." That pleasure and side, or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment,
pain are elementary experiences, attributed to anguish, misery, etc., on the other, they are
still but different
animals as well as enjoyed or suffered by men, degrees of the same thing."
is attested
by poets and physiologists alike, by Other writers use "joy" and "sorrow" or
economists and theologians, by historians and "grief" as synonyms for "pleasure" and "pain."
moralists. Yet in the tradition of western The words"pleasure" and "pain" are closely
thought, few of the great writers are content to associated in meaning with "pleasant" and "un-
leave the nature or meaning of pleasure and pleasant," though Freud sometimes uses "un-
pain to the intuitions of experience alone. plcasure" (unhtst) to signify an opposite of
Conflicting definitions are proposed. Psy- pleasure which is not the same as ordinary pain
chologists disagree about the conditions under The pleasant is often called "agree-
(schmerz).
which the feelings of pleasure and pain occur, able," "enjoyable," or "satisfying." In the
their causes and consequences, their relation to language of Shakespeare, the words "like" and
sensation, to desire and emotion, to thought, "dislike" have currency as the equivalents of
volition, and action. Moralists dispute whether "please" and "displease." A person who is dis-
pleasure is the only good and pain the only pleased by something says of it that "it likes
evil,whether pleasure is only one good among me not."
others to be assessed according to its worth in
the scale of goods, whether pleasure and pain THE PROBLEM OF what pleasure and pain are
are morally indifferent, whether some pleas- seems logically to precede the ethical consider-
ures are good, others bad, or all are intrinsi- ation of their relation to good and evil, happi-
cally evil. ness and misery, virtue and duty. But in the
Not onlyin the theory of good and evil, but tradition of the great books, the psychological
also in the theories of beauty and truth, pleas- questions about pleasure and pain are usually
ure and pain are fundamental terms. They are raised in moral or political treatises, and some-
affected by all the difficulties which belong times in connection with discussions of rhetoric.
to these great themes; and also with the diffi- What pleasure is, how it is caused, and the ef-
culties attendant on the ideas of virtue, sin, and fects produces are seldom considered apart
it
punishment, of duty and happiness, into the from whether pleasures should be sought or
consideration of which pleasure and pain tradi- avoided, whether some pleasures should be pre-
tionally enter. ferred to others, and whether pleasure is the
The traditional use of the words "pleasure" sole criterion of the good. Sometimes, as with
and "pain" complicated by more than the
is Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, the ethical
variety of definitions which have been given. point that pleasure and pain are in one sense
Other words are frequently substituted for morally indifferent is made without any psy-
them, sometimes as synonyms and sometimes chological account of the nature and origin of
to express only one part or aspect of their these experiences. More frequently, as in Pla-
to's Philebus and Aristotle's Ethics, or in the
meaning. Locke, for example, uses "pleasure"
377
378 THE GREAT IDEAS
writings of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Mill, seem to be bitter and harsh are made up of par-
the psychological discussion is imbedded in an ticles more hooked, and for this reason are wont
ethical or political context. to tear a way into our senses . . . Hot fires and
Even Lucretius and William James do not cold frost have particles fanged in different
seem to be complete exceptions. James* theory ways to prick the senses." But Lucretius is con-
that the feeling of pleasure accompanies activ- cerned to point out not only the basis of pain
which is unimpeded, whereas pain attends in the atomic nature of things, but also the
ity
arrested activity, seems to be a purely psycho- natural tendency of all sensible things to avoid
logical observation, and one which can be pain as the one besetting evil. "Nature cries
readily divorced from moral considerations on aloud for nothing else but that pain may be
the ground that it makes no difference to the kept far sundered from the body, and that,
occurrence of pleasure and pain whether the withdrawn from care and fear, she may enjoy
activity in question is ethically good or bad. in mind the sense of pleasure."
Yet James makes this observation the basis for Without giving any psychological explana-
arguing against those whom he calls "the pleas- tion of the pleasures of the mind, Lucretius
fuse, he thinks, the pursuit of pleasure itself makes clear seem to be inevitably followed by
with the pleasure which accompanies the suc- bodily torments or even to be admixed with
cessful achievement of other things which may them. The first maxim of nature, then, is not
be the goals of activity. to seek pleasure, but to avoid pain; and among
"A pleasant act" he writes, "and an act pur- pleasures to seek only the unmixed or pure, the
suing a pleasure are in themselves two perfectly pleasures of knowledge and truth. The distinc-
distinct conceptions, though they coalesce in tion between different qualities of pleasure
one concrete phenomenon whenever a pleasure (pleasures of the body and of the mind, mixed
is deliberately pursued Because a pleasure of
. . . and pure pleasures), which is made by Plato and
achievement can become a pursued pleasure Mill as well as by Lucretius, inevitably tends to
upon occasion, it does not follow that every- have at once both moral and psychological sig-
where and always that pleasure must be pur- nificance.
sued." One might as well suppose that "because If, in the great books, thereis
any purely
no steamer can go to sea without incidentally psychological theory of pleasure and pain,
consuming coal, and because some steamers divorced from moral considerations, it is prob-
may occasionally go to sea to try their coal, ably to be found in Freud. The pleasure-prin-
that therefore no steamer can go to sea for any ciple,according to him, automatically regulates
other motive than that of coal-consumption." the operation of the mental apparatus. "Our
Psychological observations of this sort have entire psychical activity," he writes, "is bent
an obvious relevance to Aristotle's theory of upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain."
good and bad pleasures, as well as to Locke's Though pleasure and pain are for him primary
and Mill's position that pleasure is the only elements of mental life, Freud admits the dif-
good or the only object of desire. They reveal ficulty they present for psychological analysis.
an ethical strain even in the psychologist's view "We should like to know," he writes, "what
of pleasure and pain. The same point can be are the conditions giving rise to pleasure and
made with regard to James' observation that pain, but that is just where we fall short. We
"pleasures are generally associated with bene- may only venture to say that pleasure is in some
ficial, pains with detrimental, experiences." way connected with lessening, lowering, or ex-
Lucretius appears to give a purely physiolog- tinguishing the amount of stimulation in the
ical account of pleasure and pain in terms of mental apparatus; and that pain involves a
the effectupon the sense-organs of various heightening of the latter. Consideration of the
atomic configurations. "Those things which most intense pleasure of which man is
capable,
can touch the senses pleasantly are made of the pleasure in the performance of the sexual
smooth and round bodies, but those which act, leaves little doubt upon this point."
CHAPTER 68: PLEASURE AND PAIN 379
Yet for Freud the pleasure-principle is not sation, including the sensation of pain, can be
the only regulator of mental life. In addition to pleasant.
the sexual instincts, which aim at gratification Even if pain, unlike pleasure, is found to be
and pleasure, there are the ego-instincts which, a specific mode of sensation with a special sense-
"under the influence of necessity, their mis- organ of its own, all other types of sensation-
tress, soon learn to replace the pleasure-princi- visual, auditory, olfactory, etc. might still
ple by a modification of it. The task of avoid- have painfulness or a feeling of unpleasantness
ing pain becomes for them almost equal in im- as an attribute. That such is the case seems to be
portance to that of gaming pleasure; the ego a matter of traditional observation. Locke, for
learns that it must inevitably go without im- example, says that "delight or uneasiness, one
mediate satisfaction, postpone gratification, or the other of them, join themselves to almost
learn to endure a degree of pain, and altogether all our ideas of sensation and reflection: there
renounce certain sources of pleasure. Thus is scarce any affection of our senses from with-
trained, the ego becomes 'reasonable,' is no out . . . which is not able to produce in us pleas-
longer controlled by the pleasure-principle, but ure or pain." So understood, pleasure and pain
follows the reality-principle, which at bottom or the pleasant and the unpleasant are not
also seeks pleasurealthough a delayed and opposite sensations, as are hot and cold, but
diminished pleasure, one which is assured by contrary attributes with which every sort of
its realization of fact, its relation to reality." sensation can be affected. All need not be. Some
This recognition of a conflict between pleas- sensations be neutral with respect to what
may
ure and reality, with a consequent attenuation call "affective tone" or "affec-
psychologists
or redirection of the pleasure-principle, is not tive quality."
amplified by Freud into a moral doctrine. It The kind of pleasure and pain which is called
does, however, bear a striking resemblance to "bodily" or "sensuous" would thus be sensuous
the theories of moralists like Kant who oppose because it is an attribute of sensations, and bod-
duty to pleasure; and also to the teachings of ily because sensations involve bodily organs.
those who, like Aristotle and Aquinas, con- But in almost every great discussion of pleasure
ceive virtue as the foregoing of certain pleas- and pain, other types are recognized: intellec-
ures and the endurance of certain pains, tual delights, the pleasures and pains of learning,
like sensations of color or sound, they would of a painful affliction of the senses. The human
pose a problem for the physiological psycholo- suffering with which the great poems deal is
gist no different from the problems which arise much more often a torment of the spirit than
in the fields of vision and audition. Modern of the flesh.
physiological research claims to have discovered To cover these other types of pleasure and
differentiated nerve-endings for pain which, to- pain, we must go beyond sensation to two
gether with the specific sense-organs for pres- other terms traditionally connected with the
sure, heat, and cold, make up the cutaneous psychological analysis of pleasure and pain. One
senses. But whether
there are special cells for is emotion, the other desire, the latter to be
the reception of pain stimuli or whether cuta- understood broadly as including both the sen-
neous pain results from the too intense stimula- sitive and the rational appetites both the pas-
tion of the pressure and thermal nerve-endings, sionsand the will. Aquinas, for example, treats
there seems to be no evidence of organs sensi- joy and sorrow as specific emotions which rep-
tized to pleasure as, for example, the nerve cells resent the appetite in a state of satisfaction or
of the retina are sensitized to light. The feeling frustration. So, too, the will as an appetite can
of pleasure, it would seem to follow, is not a come to rest in the attainment of its object and,
sensation. This seems to be confirmed by the with fruition, be in a state of joy.
traditional observation that every type of sen- As conditions of the appetite, pleasure and
380 THE GREAT IDEAS
pain (or joy and sorrow) can be either passions the attendant pleasure." This meaning of pleas-
and, like all other emotions, bodily states; or ure seems to be analogous to, if not identical
they can be acts of the will and, according to with, pleasure as satisfaction, at least insofar as
Aquinas at least, spiritual states. But either the satisfaction of a desire is that which com-
way pleasure and pain seem to represent the pletes the activity springing therefrom. There
satisfaction or frustration of desire rather than can be as many different kinds of pleasure as
objects desired or averted. To be pleased by the there are kinds of activity; the quality of the
attainment of an object desired, such as food pleasure is determined by the character of the
and drink or knowledge, is not the same as to activity it
accompanies.
desire pleasure itself, as, for example, the pleas- Though Mill refers to pleasure and freedom
ant sensations which may be involved in eating from pain as "the only things desirable as ends,"
or drinking. he admits many other objects of desire, in the
Aquinas talks about the desire for pleasure attainment of which men find pleasure or satis-
and the aversion to pain, as well as the pleasure faction. It is
wrong to suppose that human be-
and pain of satisfied and unsatisfied desires. ings, he writes, arc "capable of no pleasures ex-
Since the same words are almost always used to cept those of which swine are capable." Pre-
express both meanings, the two senses of pleas- cisely because "human beings have faculties
ure and displeasure may go unnoticed unless by more elevated than the animal appetites," they
context or by explicit mention the author re- have sources of pleasure or gratification not
fers to pleasure as an object of desire or iden- open to swine. Here as before two meanings of
tifies it with the satisfaction of any desire, pleasure seem to be involved. In pointing out
whether for pleasure or for some other object. that "money, in many cases, is desired in and
As a passage already quoted from James indi- for itself," Mill is naming an object of desire
cates, and as we shall presently see more fully, which, like health, knowledge, power, or fame,
the distinction between these two senses of is not
pleasure, yet which, through being de-
pleasure has a critical bearing on the dispute sired, a source of pleasure (/>., satisfaction)
is
between those who think that pleasure is the when achieved. Like other objects of desire,
only good, and those who think that pleasure is sensual or bodily pleasures may also be sources
one good among others. of satisfaction.
The generally recognized difference between
two kinds of painthe pain of sense and the THESE TWO MEANINGS of pleasure are most in
pain of loss or deprivation parallels the dis- need of clear distinction when the relation of
tinction which most writers acknowledge be- pleasure to happiness is being discussed. If hap-
tween sensuous pleasure and the pleasure of piness, as Aristotle and Mill seem to say, con-
possession or satisfaction. Plato's example of sists in having all desires satisfied, then the con-
the pleasure involved in the relief of itching by tent of the happy life can be described either in
scratching seems to catch both meanings, and, terms of the goods which the happy man pos-
in addition, to show that bodily pleasures may sessesthe objects of desires fulfilled or in
be either sensual objects or sensual satisfactions. terms of the pleasures which accompany the
In contrast, the pleasures of the mind arc satis- goods possessed, that is, the pleasures which are
factions of intellectual desire, as in the contem- satisfactions of desire. If pleasure in the other
plation of beauty or the knowledge of truth. meaning, especially sensual or bodily pleasure,
Aristotle deals with pleasure and pain as is
only one object of normal desire, then lack or
objects when he defines temperance as a moder- deficiency of pleasure may, like loss of health or
ate pursuit of bodily pleasures, and courage as fortune, impair a man's happiness. But the pur-
controlling the fear of pain and its avoidance. suit of pleasure in this sense cannot be identified
But he also conceives pleasure as that which with the pursuit of happiness. A life including
completes any activity, whether of the senses every sort of bodily pleasure and free from every
and the body or of thought and the mind. sort of bodily pain, if it lacked other things men
"Without activity," he writes, "pleasure does normally desire, would be marred by many
not arise, and every activity is
completed by dissatisfactions inconsistent with happiness.
CHAPTER 68: PLEASURE AND PAIN 381
Talking to Don Quixote of the island he duce or increase any pain, or diminish any
would like to govern, Sancho Panza says: "The pleasure in us." As for happiness, it is, accord-
firstthing I would do
my government, I in ing to Locke, "the utmost pleasure we are ca-
would have nobody to control me, I would be pable of, and misery the utmost pain; and the
absolute Now he that's absolute, can do
. . . lowest degree of what can be called happiness
what he likes; he that can do what he likes, can is so much ease from all pain, and so much
take his pleasure; he that can take his pleasure, present pleasure, as without which anyone can-
can be content, and he that can be content, has not be content."
no more to desire." Here, it would seem, San- In which sense of the term is Locke identi-
cho conceives happiness sum of pleasures
as the fying pleasure with happiness? Not sensual
in the sense of satisfactionsall desires come to pleasure, nor even pleasure as an object of de-
rest through the possession of their objects. sire, it would seem, for he says: "Let one man
Dr. Johnson seems to make the opposite place his satisfaction in sensual pleasure, an-
point about pleasure and happiness. Boswell other in the delight of knowledge; though each
asks him whether abstention from wine would of them cannot but confess there is
great pleas-
be "a great deduction from life." "It is a dimi- ure in what the other pursues, yet neither of
nution of pleasure to be sure," Johnson replies, them making the other's delight a part of his
"but I do not say a diminution of happiness." happiness, their desires are not moved, but
But, Boswell asks, "if we could have pleasure each is satisfied without what the other en-
always, should we not be happy?" Johnson ex- joys." Yet
understanding of happiness as
his
plains his negative answer by saying that "when consisting in the pleasures or satisfactions ac-
we talk of pleasure, we mean sensual pleasure. companying the possession of things desired
When a man says, he had pleasure with a wom- him to criticize "the philosophers of old"
leads
an, he does not mean conversation, but some- who "did in vain inquire whether the swnmum
thing of a different nature. Philosophers tell bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or
you that pleasure is
contrary to happiness." virtue, or contemplation; they might have as
This last observation does not seem to de- reasonably disputed whether the best relish
scribe the position taken by those philosophers were to be found in apples, plums, or nuts, and
who make happiness the greatest good or ulti- have divided themselves into sects upon it. For
mate end of human striving. Both Aristotle and as pleasant tastesdepend not on the things
Mill distinguish the life of pleasure, the bestial themselves, but on their agreeableness to this
or swinish life, from one which employs the or that particular palate, wherein there is great
higher faculties peculiar to man. In this sense, variety; so the greatest happiness consists in
perhaps, the life of pleasure can be regarded as the having those things which produce the
contrary or opposed to what Johnson, along greatest pleasure . . . These, to different men,
with Aristotle and Mill, calls "the rational life." are very different things."
But pleasure itself, far from being inimical to The difference between Locke's position and
happiness, either represents the state of satis- that of Mill seems, therefore, not to lie in a
faction which is identical with happiness, or different conception of the relation of pleasure
one of the things a man desires and hence a as object or as satisfaction of desire to hap-
constituent of the happy life.
piness, but rather in Locke's conception of de-
Hobbes and Locke seem go further in the to grees of happiness as being determined only by
direction of identifying pleasure with happiness larger and smaller quantities of pleasure, where-
or the good. "Pleasure," writes Hobbes, "is the upon diverse qualities of pleasure,
as Mill insists
appearance or sense of Good . and Displeas- . . and upon the possibility of ordering pleasures
ure, the appearance or sense of Evil." Simi- as higher and lower. In consequence, Mill can
contrary, we name that evil which is apt to pro- Locke's denial that happiness is the same
382 THE GREAT IDEAS
for all men explicitly takes issue with Aristotle's says, "will never let itself be brought around"
contrary view. It also involves an issue about to the view that "there is
any intrinsic worth in
pleasure. For Locke, as apparently for Hobbes the real existence of a man who merely lives for
arable. Nothing which satisfies a desire can be others." Admitting that "the greatest aggre-
evil. Whether, as in Locke's view, one satis- gate of the pleasures of life, taking duration as
faction is as good as another, and the only well as number into account," would appear to
thing which matters is the amount or number merit "the name of a true, nay, even of the
of satisfactions; or whether, as in Mill's view highest good," Kant adds that "reason sets its
one pleasure may be better than another, in no face against this, too." The line of duty is al-
case is a pleasure bad so long as some one de- ways set against the seductions of pleasure or
sires it, or desires the thing which produces sat- any calculations of utility, whether in terms of
isfaction when possessed. the means to achieving happiness or the ways
But, for Aristotle, desires themselves can be of augmenting life's satisfactions.
good or bad, and consequently there can be According to Stoics like Marcus Aurelius,
good and bad pleasures, as well as pleasures "pleasure neither good nor useful," nor is
is
which vary in quality and in degree of goodness. pain an evil, for when we are "pained by any
"Since activities differ in respect of goodness external thing," we should remember that "it
and badness, and some are worthy to be chosen, is not this thing which disturbs us, but our own
others to be avoided, and others neutral, so, judgment about it." Pleasure and pain are
too," Aristotle writes, "are the pleasures; for to morally indifferent, for like death and life,
each activity there is a proper pleasure. The honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure are
pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good, things which "happen equally to good men and
and that proper to an unworthy activity bad; bad" and therefore "make us neither better
just as the appetites for noble objects are laud- nor worse . . . and are neither good nor evil."
able, those for base objects culpable." From the same observation, that pleasure is
Pleasure and pain, in Aristotle's judgment, enjoyed by good and bad men, Aristotle and
are measured by virtue, not what is good and Plato seem to draw the conclusion, not that it is
evil by pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain morally indifferent, but, as we have seen, that
are elements common to the good life and the there are good and bad pleasures. Plato uses
bad, but only the pleasures which the good pleasure and wisdom to typify fundamentally
man enjoys, and the pains he willingly suffers, different kinds of good. Wisdom is
always true
can be called good. That is why "in educating and good, but like opinion, which can be cither
the young we steer them by the rudders of true or false, there are true and false pleasures,
pleasure and pain ... for to enjoy the things good and evil pleasures. Furthermore, wisdom
we ought and to hate the things we ought has or knowledge represents the kind of good
the greatest bearing on virtue or character." which is definite or intrinsically measured,
Virtue is
possessed only by those who habitually whereas pleasure, like wealth, is an indefinite
take pleasure in the right things. good, requiring something external to itself,
something like wisdom, to measure it and limit
As INDICATED IN THE chapters on HAPPINESS its
quantity.
and DUTY, the moralists who make duty rather If wisdom be allowed to choose among pleas-
than virtue the spring of right conduct, and ures, Socrates suggests in the Philebus, it will
who make the goodness of anything depend choose those associated with itself in the activi-
upon its
Tightness according to the moral law, tiesof the mind, not the bodily pleasures
see little difference among the various theories which are always mixed with pain. So far as
of pleasure and happiness as the ultimate good pleasure belongs to the realm of change or be-
and the standard of conduct. coming, it is, again like opinion, inferior to
The most eloquent tribute which Kant can knowledge and wisdom, which draw their good-
pay to the idea of duty is that it "embraces nessfrom the realm of immutable being. Yet
nothing charming or insinuating." Reason, he Plato does not seem to think that knowledge
CHAPTER 68: PLEASURE AND PAIN 383
and wisdom are the only goods. The argument full of ribaldry is the heart of man!" The fact
against those who think so seems to be as con- that "men spend their time in following a ball
clusive as against those who think that pleasure or a hare" and that "it is the pleasure even of
is the
only good. him how deep is the misery
kings," indicates to
Each of the simple lives the life of pleasure from which men try to escape through play and
or the life of wisdom is deficient. Only the pleasure. "If man were happy," Pascal sug-
mixed life, the life which combines both pleas- gests, "he would be the more so, the less he was
ure and wisdom, isthe complete life. Like the diverted." But "so wretched is man that he
happy life in Aristotle's view, it includes every would weary, even without any cause of weari-
kind of good; and the difficult problem, for ness, from the peculiar state of his disposition;
Plato as for Aristotle, seems to be finding the and so frivolous is he, that,
though full of a
principle which determines the goodness of the thousand reasons for weariness, the least thing,
mixture or the right order and proportion in such as playing billiards or hitting a ball, is suf-
which the variety of goods should be combined. ficient to amuse him." Men need such diver-
sions in order to "prevent them from thinking
THE MORAL ISSUES which have been raised of themselves."
here with respect to pleasure and pain are more Men indulge in pastimes for another reason,
broadly considered in the chapters on GOOD according to Aristotle. They "need relaxation
AND EVIL and on VIRTUE, TEMPERANCE, and because they cannot work continuously" and
SIN, as well as in the chapters on HAPPINESS "amusement is a sort of relaxation." But
"hap-
and DUTY. Other issues are reserved entirely piness does not lie in amusement. It would, in-
for discussion elsewhere, such as the role of deed, be strange," he says, "if the end were
pleasure in the perception of beauty and in amusement, and one were to take trouble and
judgments of taste (the chapter on BEAUTY), suffer hardship all one's life in order to amuse
or the role of pain in relation to the govern- one's self." It is true that "pleasant amuse-
ment of men (the chapter on PUNISHMENT). ments" resemble happiness in having the na-
Two special problems which involve pleasure ture of an end, because we engage in playful
and pain remain to be briefly mentioned. The activity "not for the sake of other things,"
first concerns the contrast between asceticism whereas we do serious work for some end be-
and self-indulgence or even profligacy. yond itself. But in Aristotle's opinion "a vir-
In the tradition of western thought and cul- tuous life requires exertion" and since "the hap-
ture, and in the ancient as well as in the mod- py life is thought to be virtuous," it follows
ern world, those who worship pleasure, though that "serious things are better than laughable
perhaps only as a minor deity to be celebrated things and those connected with amusement."
in bacchic revels, stand opposed to those who These reflections on work and play, and the
turn away from pleasure, as from the world, pains and pleasures they involve, lead us to the
the flesh, and the devil, even mortifying the second of the two problems mentioned above.
flesh and sanctifying themselves with pain. In That concerns pleasure and pain in the life of
their less extreme forms these contrasting atti- learning. Here there seems to be no funda-
tudes generate the traditional issue concerning mental issue, for the tradition speaks with an
the place of worldly recreations in man's life almost unanimous voice of the pleasure all men
and in the state. Is the pleasure of play a neces- find in knowing and the pain none can avoid
sary and proper relief from the pain of work, or in the process of seeking the truth. The prob-
is it always an indulgence which provides occa- lem rather a practical and personal one which
is
sions for sin ? Are the enjoyment of the theatre, the great books put to their readers, to solve in
of music and poetry, the gaiety of public festi- their individual lives, Their invitation to learn-
vals, and the diversions of games or sports ing should not be accepted, nor their promise
things to be promoted or prohibited by the of pleasure relied upon, by those unwilling to
state ? take the pains which, however great
initially,
Man's avidity for amusements and diversions gradually diminish as the mind, in the very
of all sorts leads Pascal to say, "How hollow and process of learning, learns how to learn.
384 JHb UKbAl
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAOB
i . The nature of pleasure and pain 385
40. The pleasant and unpleasant in the sphere of emotion: joy and sorrow, delight
and grief 387
\e. The kinds of pain: the pain of sense and the pain of loss or deprivation 390
5. The quantity of pleasure: the weighing of pleasures; the limits of pleasure 391
6a. Pleasure as the only good or as the measure of goodness in all other things
6b. Pleasure as one good among many: pleasure as one object of desire
6c. Good and bad pleasures: higher and lower pleasures 392
6d. Pleasure as the accompaniment of goods possessed: the satisfaction of desire
jb. The life of pleasure contrasted with other modes of life: the ascetic life
394
8. The conflict between pleasure and duty, or the obligations of justice: the pleasure
principle and the reality principle 396
8f. Perversions or degradations in the sphere of pleasure and pain: sadism and mas-
ochism
loa. The employment of pleasure and pain by parent or teacher in moral and mental
training
io. The use of pleasure and pain by orator or statesman in persuasion and government
CHAPTER 68: PLEASURE AND PAIN 385
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halvesof the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, en,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation ot
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
A 3 337a-c; PART I-H, Q 2, A 6, ANS and REP 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 11-57 399d-
2-3 619d-620d; Q 31, AA 3-7 7S4a-758b; Q 35 415b passim; THE AFFECTS 416b~422a,c
772b-780c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH vn,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 72, SECT 2 131c-d; SECT 5 132c; CH xx 176b-178a
A 2, ANS 112b-113a; PART in SUPPL, Q 81, A 4, passim, csp SECT 3 176d; CH xxi, SECT 40
REP 4 966d-967d 187d-188b; SECT 42 188c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 62a-c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i 413a*b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 432b-d; 537d-543a,c 42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27c-d; 44 Bos WELL: Johnson, i03b-c
73c-d 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-309c passim,
32 MILTON: V
Allegro 17b-21a / // Penseroso 21a- esp308d
25a / Paradise Lost, BK vi [327-343] 203b; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 197b; 324a; 391b392a;
[386-405] 204b-205a; [430-468] 205b~206b / 702a-703a; 718b-719a; 730a-b; 739b-740a;
Samson Agonistes [606-632] 352b-353a 754b-758a passim; 808b-809a
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 441b- 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 378c-d / In-
442a 418d-421a,c csp 419c-420a / Repression
stincts,
BK x, CH 3 [ii73 b20-ii74 a i2] 428a-b; CH 5 duction, 574a-d / Beyond the Pleasure Prin-
b b a
[ii75 24-i 176*29] 430b-d; CH 6 [ii76 8-ii77 ciple, 663a / Ego and Id, 711d-712a
ii 431a-c / Politics, BK vnx, CH 3 [1338*1-9]
]
8a. Pleasure and pain in relation to virtue: the A 3 47c-48c; Q 60, A 4, ANS 52b 53a; A 5, ANS
restraints of temperance and the endur-
53a-54d; Q 61, A 2, ANS 55c-56b; A 3, ANS
ance of courage 56b-57a; A 4 57a-58b; Q 74, A 6 132b-133a;
OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 7:6-27 A 8 134b-136a; Q 107, A 4, ANS 329d-330d;
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 19:5 (D) OT, Ec- PART II-H, Q 15, A 3 453c-454c; QQ 35-36
clesiasticus, 19:5 562d-570c; Q 46, A 3 604d-605a,c; PART in,
NEW TESTAMENT \
James, 1:12-16 Q 15, AA 5-6 791d-793c
4 HOMER: Odyssey 183a-322d esp BK iv [265- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, v [i]-vin [64]
295] 201d-202a, BK v [192-224] 209 d- 2 10 b, 7a-llc; xi [67-90] 15d-16a; PURGATORY, xvi
[282-493] 210d-213a,c, BK ix [82-104] 230a, [82-105] 77d; xvii [9i]-xvin [75] 79b-80c;
BK xii [153-200] 251d-252b, BK xx [1-55] xix-xxvi 81c-94c esp xix [1-69] 81c-82a;
296a-c xxx-xxxi 99b-102b esp xxxi [22-63] 101a-c;
5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [160-183] 53d-54a PARADISE, i
[103-142] 107b-d
5 SOPHOCLES: Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [1316- 22 CHAUCER: Talc of Mclibeus, par 4-7 401b-
1347] 193d-194a, [1408-1444] 194d-195a,c 402b
396 THE GREAT IDEAS to 8<r
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 93d-94a; 169a-b; xvin 19c-d; xxi 20c
174c-175c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 12, 58b-c
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 355a 43 MILL: Liberty, 302d-312a; 314b-316b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 44 BOSWELL '.Johnson, 301c-d
292b-d 54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 690b-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK iv, 174b; 188a-
190c; BK vi, 267c-d; 271c-273c; BK vni, 305b-
10. The social utility of pleasure and pain
307d; BK xi, 505a-511b; 520b-c; EPILOGUE i,
660d-661b 10*. The employment of pleasure and pain by
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, 4a-d; parent or teacher in moral and mental
BK n, 39a-40a; BK v, 121d-127b esp 122d- training
123a; BK xi, 307c-310c OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 13:24; 19:18; 22:15;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 718a-720b 23:13-14; 29:15
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 30:1-12 passim (D)
Analysis, 16d / Interpretation of Dreams, OT, Ecclesiasticus, 30:1-12 passim
204b-c / Instincts, 415d-418c / General Intro- 5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [1303-1464! 504b-
duction, 570a-572d; 577a-579d passim / Civ- 506c
ilization and Its Discontents, 790a-791b / 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 46b / Republic, BK in,
New Introductory Lectures, 847c-849b passim; 339b-340b / Laws, BK n 653a-663d esp 653a-
850a<b 656c, 662c-663d; BK vn, 713d-716a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 3 [ii04b 8-i8]
9. The regulation of pleasures by law 350a; BK x, CH CH 9
i
[1172*18-23] 426a;
b a
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:14,17 / Deuteron- [H79 20-n8o 4] 434c-d
omy, 5:18,21; 21:18-21 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 14-23 4c-7a
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:27 / City of God, BK xix, en 16 521d-522a
5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes 340a-352a,c csp [215- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 48,
369] 341d-343a A 6, CONTRARY 264a d
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 283a-285a / Republic, BK in, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95,
326c-328a; BK iv, 348a-d; BK x, 432a-434c A i, ANS 226c-227c; Q 99, A 6, ANS 250a-
/ Laws, BK i-n, 643b-663d esp BK n, 663b-d; 251a
BK in, 675c-676b; BK vi, 708c-709a; 712b; 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
BK vn, 713c-716b esp 713c, 716a-b; 718c- 26d-30c esp 30b-c
720d; BK vni, 731d-738c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 16c-d; 70d-74a; 90d-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH i [ii29b i9-24] 91a; 185c-d
b a
377a; BK x, CH 9 [ii79 3i-n8o i3l 434c-d / 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 55, SCHOL
b a
Politics, BK 11, CH 9 [i269 i3-i27o i4] 465d- 413b-d; THE AFFECTS, DBF 27, EXPL 419a-b
a b
466b; BK vn, CH 17 [i336 23~ 24] 541b-d 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40d-41a
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 36b-37b / 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264b
Lycurgus-Numa, 61b,d-62c [fn i] / Practical Reason, 357c-360d
15 TACITUS Annals, BK n, 31a-b; BK in, 57b<58d
: 43 MILL: Liberty, 287b-c / Utilitarianism, 463c-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 464d
100, A 4, ANS and REP 3 253d-255a; A 5, REP 5 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 191b-c; 199c-200d; 309c-d;
255a-257c 448a-b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [85- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 47b-48d; BK
n 4 ]77d-78a vni, 306b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 131b-132a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 290a-291a
27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure 174a- 54 FREUD: War and Death, 759b / New Intro-
204d passim, esp ACT 11, sc i [225-270] 181a-c, ductory Lectures, 876c
ACT in, sc n [91-128! 190c-d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 54a-b
10^. The use of pleasure and pain by orator or
statesman in persuasion and government
32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 390a-b; 393a-395b
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 8c-d 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 45b-d ,/ Apology, 208c-
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK v, 19a-d; 209b; 210b-d / Gorgias, 260a-262a / Sophist,
398 THE GREAT IDEAS
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 99,
:
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The relation of pleasure and pain to sensations and emotions, see EMOTION la; SENSE 30(2).
The discussion of intellectual pleasure with respect to beauty and truth, see BEAUTY 4;
EDUCATION 56 KNOWLEDGE 80(4).
;
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo{s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
I. II.
HUTCHESON. An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of SPENCER. The Principles of Ethics, PART i, CH 7
the Passions and Affections T. H. GREEN. Prolegomena to Ethics, BK in, CH 4(3)
BENTHAM. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals AVEBURY. The Pleasures of Life
and Legislation, CH 1-5 FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART vi, CH 8
LAMB. Hospita on the Immoderate Indulgences of the RIBOT. The Psychology of the Emotions
Pleasuresof the Palate WUNDT. Outlines of Psychology, (7)
DE QUINCEY. Confessions of an English Opium- BRADLEY. Ethical Studies, in
Eater . Collected Essays, VOL 1(14)
ALIBERT. Physiologic des passions TITCHENER. Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of
LEOPARDI. Essays, Dialogues, and Thoughts Feeling and Attention, H-IV, vin
COLERIDGE. The Pains of Sleep MOORE. Principia Ethica, en 2-3
J. MILL. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human ,
Ethics, CH 1-2
Mind. CH 17-23 ELLIS. Studies in the Psychology of Sex, VOL i, PART
W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, n, pp 66-188
VOL i (41-46) PROUST. Remembrance of Things Past
EMERSON. "Compensation," in Essays, i A. H. ALLEN. Pleasure and Instinct
WHEWELL. The Elements of Morality, BK n, CH 25 POWYS. In Defence of Sensuality
SCHOPENHAUER. "On the Sufferings of the World," BEEBE-CENTF.R. The Psychology of Pleasantness and
"On the Vanity of Existence," in Stttdies in Unpleasantness
Pessimism BERTRAND. The Art of Suffering
BAIN. The Emotions and the Will C. S. LEWIS. The Problem of Pain
Chapter 69: POETRY
INTRODUCTION
spirit in which the great poets
have cannot be bound by the laws of art or held ac-
HpHE countable to any established critical standards
JL read their predecessors differs remarkably
from the attitude toward the past which pre- would certainly receive sympathetic consid-
vails in other fields. The
philosophers and sci- eration from the man who formulated the rules
entists frequently feel assured that they can im- of poetry and its measures of excellence by the
prove upon their predecessors. The poets, for study of the productions of Greek genius.
the most part, wish only to do as well. Virgil's One way in which later poets have expressed
admiration for Homer; Dante's accolade to Vir- their disagreement with the Poetics confirms
gil;
Milton's praise of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Fielding's' insight.Those who have violated its
Euripides as "the three tragic poets unequall'd rules and yet produced great poems have been
yet by any"; the tributes which Cervantes and men of exceptional genius. Where the genius
Fielding pay to the poets of antiquity these has been lacking to create new forms, the viola-
is no battle between the tion of the rules has usually resulted in form-
testify that there
modern and the ancient books of poetry. lessness. But it is not only in the creative work
Contemporary novelists and dramatists es- of the poets that Aristotle's principles have
pecially those who are proud of their innova- been put to use and tested. His influence also
tions in the forms or materials of poetry may appears in the comments which the poets make
constitute an exception. But they would still be on the nature and purpose of poetry. The terms
the exception to a rule which can be verified for and distinctions of the Poetics are reflected in
almost all the great books of poetry. Part of the the writings of Dante, Chaucer, Shakespeare,
reason for such unusual accord may be that, in Milton, Goethe, and Melville, as well as in many
the tradition of the great books, one book en- essays in criticism from Horace and Demetrius
joys the unique distinction of having founded to Boccaccio, Boileau, Dryden, and Pope.
the science of poetry. More than that, it seems Socrates once complained of the wisdom of
to have gained from the poets a large measure the poets. Those whom he asked about their
of approval, and even adherence to its princi- poetry were tongue-tied. They finally resorted
during a period of more than 2000 years.
ples, to the mystery of inspiration or the inscruta-
Not that Aristotle's Poetics \s without sources. bility of genius. "There is hardly a person pres-
They exist in Plato's comments on the kinds of ent," he tells his judges in the Apology, "who
poetry; in Aristophanes' critical weighing of would not have talked better about their poetry
Aeschylus and Euripides; and, of course, in the than they did themselves." The poets of a later
original inventions of Homer and the great dra- age were, through benefit of Aristotle, better
matic poets, both tragic and comic. Not that able to discourse analytically of their art.
the acceptance of Aristotle's theory of poetry is
unaccompanied by some dissent, as, for example, IF WE TURN FROM the poets themselves, or
in Fielding's quarrel with the rules about the rather from their poems, to the analysis of poet-
unities of time and place. But Fielding, like ry by poets or others we find a number of
Cervantes who is another close student of the major issues. On what poetry is and on the end
Poetics, more frequently adopts than rejects it serves, the tradition does not seem to be
Aristotle's basic insights. His most rebellious either unified or harmonious. Basic disagree-
protest that the originality of creative genius ments begin with the ancients.
400
CHAPTER 69: POETRY 401
On the question, for example, whether the how different are the principles and considera-
poets have the same obligation to speak the tions appropriate to each.
truth and the same kind of truth as do These two points of view about the nature of
philosophers or scientists, Plato and Aristotle poetry are not always treated in this way.
seem to be opposed. On the question whether Sometimes one or the other is taken as the
the art of poetry lies in its use of language or is primary or even the only way of approaching
primarily the craft of fiction, Aristotle's Poetics the subject, and then a genuine issue ensues
and Horace's Art of Poetry represent the op- either with those who take the excluded point
posite answers which have been points of of view or with those who find it possible to em-
departure for divergent discussions of poetry brace both. The Alexandrian and Roman critics
throughout the whole tradition of western seem to create such an issue by considering
thought. poetry largely in terms of style. Modern criti-
With regard to the second of these two ques- cism, especially since the beginning of the iQth
tions, it may be wondered whether we are in century, goes even further in the direction of
the presence of the sort of disagreement which identifying poetry with verse.
requires us to take one side rather than the When Wordsworth discusses the art of poet-
other. The fact that Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, ry in his preface to Lyrical Ballads, he is con-
writes about poetry in a vein contrary to the cerned largely with its language. His definition
theory he advances in his Poetics, would suggest of poetry as "emotion recollected in tranquili-
the possibility of different but not inconsistent ty" indicates his emphasis upon the lyrical as-
points of view about poetry. Unless Aristotle pect of even narrative poetry. When Edgar
unwittingly contradicts himself, the rhetorical Allen Poe writes his Poetic Principle and Mat-
consideration of poetry is
simply a different thew Arnold his Essays in Criticism, each is con-
way of conceiving what is poetic. cerned almost exclusively with lyric poetry,
In the Advancement of Learning, Bacon re- with that kind of poetry which is written in
cords this difference in the meaning of poetry, verse rather than prose. The poet tends to be-
which had become traditional by his time. He come more and more a composer of verses so
treats moreover, as the sort of difference
it, much so that the free-verse movement can ap-
which does not require the rejection of cither pear to be a great revolution in poetry. In the
alternative as incorrect. Poetry, he writes, can Brothers Karamazov, Smerdyakov says, "Poetry
be "taken in two senses: in respect of words or is rubbish." At Maria's protest thai she is
very
matter. In thefirst sense it is but a character of fond of poetry, he adds: "So far as it's
poetry,
style, and bclongeth to the arts of speech, and it's
essentially rubbish. Consider yourself, who-
is not pertinent for the present. In the latter it ever talks in rhyme?"
is (as hath been said) one of the principal por- Just as the word "art" has come in popular
poetry as "feigned history" is germane to the tradition of the great books, novelists like
his present consideration of the kinds of learn- Cervantes, Fielding, and Melville call them-
ing. Just as Aristotle does not set his Rhetoric selves poets.The great books consider poetry
against his Poetics on the nature of poetry, so primarily as narrative rather than lyrical, as
Bacon does not exclude one of these concep- story rather than song.
tions in favor of the other when he observes This does not mean that they exclude the
402 THE GREAT IDEAS
other consideration of poetry. Fielding, for Just as Bacon later remarks that "a true narra-
example, says in one place that "poetry ... de- tive maybe delivered in verse and a feigned one
mands numbers or something like numbers" in prose," so Aristotle says that "the poet and
(/>., metre), but for the most part he insists the historian differ not by writing in verse or in
that the art of the novelist or romancer lies prose. The work of Herodotus might be put
mainly in the invention of good stories, not in into verse, and it would still be a species of
the mastery of rules of prosody which apply history, with metre no less than without it."
only to poems of the lyric sort, written in verse. That the between prose and verse
difference
Speaking of "the sweet influence which melody may of writing but not the es-
affect the style
and rhythm by nature have," Plato may ob- sence of storytelling is a point which has wide
serve "what a poor appearance the tales of the acceptance among writers who call themselves
poets make when stripped of the colors which poets. In the Prologue to Melibeus, Chaucer's
music puts upon them and recited in simple host commands him rhyming and
to leave off
prose"; but for Plato as for Aristotle the poet "tell a you might do worse
tale in prose
is a teller of tales, either in prose or in verse. wherein there's mirth or doctrine good and
Aristotle does not ignore the devices of lan- plain." Thinking of his History of Don Quixote
guage. In the third book of the Rhetoric, where as a species of epic poetry, Cervantes declares
he considers problems of style in all sorts of that "epics may be as well written in prose as
"prosaic" writing; and in the Poetics also he de- The use, by Cervantes and Fielding, of the
votes a few chapters to style. But when in the word "history" in the title of their novels indi-
latter case he deals with the language of poetry, cates the acceptance of the other point in the
he not concerned with the style of any sort of
is conception of poetry by reference to its sub-
composition, but only of dramatic and epic ject matter rather than to its linguistic style.
narratives.Except for a brief mention of the The great poets recognize that, as narratives,
form of verse known as the "dithyramb," Aris- their works resemble histories, but they also
totle does not discuss the isolated lyric as a kind know that the stories poets tell are, in the words
of poetry. He treats song and spectacle merely of Bacon, "imaginary history." Just as Fielding
as embellishments of the drama. In the Poetics writes at length in mock justification of him-
his emphasis is not upon the devices of language self as an historian, so Melville touches upon
or the sentiments of the poet, but upon the con- "the plain facts, historical and otherwise," of
struction of plot, the development of character, whale fishery, lest someone "scout at Moby
the diction and thought of the characters in Dick as a monstrous fable, or still worse and
short, upon the subject matter of the poem more detestable, a hideous and intolerable alle-
rather than upon the feelings of the poet and gory." In his chapter on the Leviathan's tail,
the eloquence with which he expresses them. he says, "Other poets have warbled the praise
Because he regards plot as the "soul of trage- of the soft eye of the antelope, and the lovely
dy"- and, by extension, the primary principle plumage of the bird that never alights; less
of all narrative poetry Aristotle insists that celestial, I celebrate a tail."
"the poet or 'maker' should be the maker of
plots rather than of verses." He is therefore led THE CONCEPTION of poetry as feigned or im-
to criticize the confusion apparently preva- aginary history seems to have a direct bearing
lent in his day as in ourswhich he thinks re- on the question of the poet's obligation to speak
sults from identifying the art of poetry with the truth. We shall return subsequently to
writing verse. "Even
skill in when a treatise on other aspects of the comparison of poetry with
medicine or natural science is
brought out in history and philosophy. For the present we are
verse," he writes, "the name of poet is given by concerned with the issue in the theory of poetry
custom to the author; and yet Homer and which arises from applying the standards of
Empedocles have nothing in common except knowledge to the inventions of the poet.
the metre, so that it would be better to call the Bacon, like Aristotle, denies that such stand-
one poet, the other physicist rather than poet." ards are applicable.Though he treats poetry as
CHAPTER 69: POETRY 403
"a part of learning," he holds that it is only re- mit to being judged by the same standards of
strained "in measure of words"; "in all other accuracy as anything else which claims to be
points,'* it is
"extremely licensed, and doth knowledge or right opinion. "Imitations," he
truly refer to the imagination; which, being be judged of by pleasure and
writes, "are not to
not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure falseopinion. . They are to be judged of by
. .
join thatwhich nature hath severed, and sever the standard of truth, and by no other what-
that which nature hath joined." Kant, on the ever." The competent judge of poetry must,
other hajid, like Plato, judges poetry in terms therefore, "possess three things: he must know,
of its contribution to knowledge. A thing of in the first place, of what the imitation is; sec-
the imagination, poetry, he maintains, serves ondly, he must know that it is true; and thirdly,
the understanding, for it conducts "a free play that it has been well executed in words and
of the imagination as if it were a serious business melodies and rhythms."
of the understanding." The issue concerning poetry and truth can
Though "the poet promises merely an enter- be most sharply drawn between Plato and Aris-
taining play with ideas," Kant continues, "yet totle, precisely because Aristotle thinks that
for the understanding there enures as much as if poetry is a form of imitation, but that knowl-
the promotion of its business had been his one edge does not have the character of imitation
intention."He achieves a certain "combination at all. Since poetry is not a kind of knowledge,
and harmony of the two faculties of cognition, the same standards do not apply to both.
sensibility and understanding, which, though
"There is not the same kind of correctness,"
doubtless indispensable to one another, do not he "in poetry as in politics" or "in
insists,
pulsion and reciprocal abatement." In so doing, poet's art is at fault if he "meant to describe the
the poet, in Kant's opinion, "accomplishes thing correctly but failed through lack of power
something worthy of being made a serious busi- of expression." But if a technical error in phys-
ness, namely, the using of play to provide food iology enters into his description because he
for the understanding, and the giving of life to meant to describe the thing "in some incorrect
its concepts by means of the imagination." way (e.g., to make the horse in movement have
Yet Kant and Plato do not agree in their both right legs thrown forward)," then, ac-
judgment of the poet. Regarding "the poet's cording to Aristotle, "his error in that case is
not in the essentials of the poetic art." The
promise" as "a modest one" "a mere play with
ideas is all he holds out to us" Kant praises poet's obligation is not to be truthful in such
him for achieving more in actual
performance particulars but to make his whole story seem
than he promises. Plato, on the contrary, seems plausible. Aristotle summarizes
his position
to think the poet promises more and achieves in the statement of his famous rule concern-
notions of the philosopher imitate the reality of turn relates to the moral problem of the in-
the Ideas, the images of the poet imitate sen- fluence poetry can have on human character or
sible appearances, which are themselves imita- virtue; and to the political problem of the reg-
tions of the Ideas or eternal Forms. Even when ulation of poetry by the state or the right of
it isaccurate or truthful, poetry must, there- poetry to be free from such censorship. It is not
fore, be an inferior form of knowledge. In surprising that Plato, conceiving poetry as he
Plato's terms, on the level of opinion, along
it is does, should banish poets from the ideal state
with fancy and belief. In any case, it must sub- described in the Republic* or that he should lay
404 THE GREAT IDEAS
down specific regulations for the content of tinct mediums of imitation. Others hold that
sorship itself as applied to poetry as well as entiation of the kinds of poetry can be made
toother forms of communication. But the tradi- neither in terms of the object nor the medium
tional defense of poetry, in essays bearing that of imitation, but only in terms of the manner.
title from the pen of Sidney and Shelley or in "The medium being the same and the object
the writings of Chaucer, Montaigne, and Cer- the same," Aristotle writes, "the poet may imi-
vantes, usually tries to answer Plato by praising tate by narration in which case he can either
SOME OF THESE issues touch on considerations stage plays pure imitations in the sense that the
dealt with in other chapters. The problem of author never speaks directly, but
tells his story
censorship is discussed in the chapters on ART entirely through the actions and speeches of
and LIBERTY; and the theory of imitation as the characters; whereas the type of poetry
applied to the arts in general, useful as well as which he calls narrative as opposed to imitative
fine, is discussed in the chapter on ART. Here may combine both methods of storytelling or
we are concerned with the bearing of that may, in some extreme instances, never resort to
seem to affect their use of this notion in treating ing to call the two major types of poetry "nar-
works of fine art, and more particularly poetry. ration" and "imitation," as Plato sometimes
What Hamlet tells the players is the purpose of does, or "narrative" and "dramatic," as Aris-
their play "to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up totle sometimes does. Bacon also speaks of
to nature" Aristotle says is the aim of such "narrative" and "dramatic" or "representa-
arts as poetry, sculpture, painting, music, and tive" poetry. lie defines narrative poetry as
the dance, which give both instruction and de- "such an exact imitation of history as to de-
the medium of language; painting and sculp- The difficulties of language seem to be re-
ture through lines, planes, colors, and shapes; moved by other terms which both Plato and
music through rhythm and harmony. Whether Aristotle use to express the main distinction.
Aristotle's statement that "the objects of imi- The manner of storytelling, exemplified by
tation are men in action" applies to poetry Homer, which either employs direct narration
alone or to all the fine arts, is a question of in- without dialogue or combines both, is
epic poet-
terpretation to which opposite answers have ry. That which uses dialogue alone, is dramatic.
been given. Some commentators seem to think These words "epic" and "dramatic" may
that human action as the object of imitation have their difficulties, too, especially for the
specifically defines poetry, whereas music and contemporary reader, unless a number of things
sculpture have distinct objects as well as dis- are remembered. First, epics and dramas may
CHAPTER 69: POETRY 405
be written either in prose or verse. Second, the allother poems." In similar vein, Marcus Aure-
arts of theatrical representation are
auxiliary lius praises
tragedy "for reminding men of the
to the art of the dramatic poet. The writing of things which happen to them and that it is ac-
a play completely independent of its acting,
is
cording to nature for things to happen so." He
"the production of spectacular effects depend- does not admit comedy to be of equal worth,
ing," as Aristotle says, "more on the art of the though he does look with some favor upon the
stage machinist than on that of the poet." older forms of comedy which were "useful in
Third, epic poetry differs from dramatic poetry reminding men to beware of insolence."
in other respects than the use of indirect dis-
According to Aristotle, "comedy represents
course as well as dialogue. men as worse, tragedy as better than in actual
On this last point, Aristotle observes that all He describes the action which tragic poet-
life."
the elements of epic poetry are found in drama, ry imitates as serious, adding that tragedies
whereas the dramatic form may include the "through pity and fear effect the proper purga-
embellishments of song and spectacle in addi- tion of these emotions." Whether comedies also
tion to plot, character, thought, and diction. arouse and purge certain emotions Aristotle
Even more important is his distinction of the does not say, for his promise to speak more fully
two terms of the unities of time, place, and
in of comic poetry is not fulfilled in the Poetics.
action. Because it need not be limited at all in Concerning the meaning of the tragic catharsis,
time and place, epic narration may have a much there are questions enough.
more complicated plot structure or even, as Augustine asks: "How is it that a man wants
Aristotle says, "a multiplicity of plots." to be made by the sight of tragic sufferings
sad
With this understanding of the distinction that he could not bear in his own person? . . .
between the two major types of storytelling, The more a man feels such sufferings in himself,
we can see why the great novels of Cervantes, the more he is moved by the sight of them on
Melville, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky should be the stage. Now when a man suffers himself, it is
classified as epic poems, and were apparently so called misery; when he suffers in the suffering
conceived by their authors, at least in the cases of another, it is called pity. But how can the
of Cervantes and Melville. As measured by the unreal sufferings of the stage possibly move
magnitude of its plot its reach in time, and pity?"
its scene the whole universe "from Heaven, Boswell begs Dr. Johnson to explain Aris-
totle's doctrine of the purging of the pas-
through the world, to Hell" Goethe's Faust,
even though dramatic in manner, seems to be sions as the purpose of tragedy. "Why, Sir,"
no less epic in its structure and proportions than Johnson replies, "you are to consider what
the poems of Homer, Virgil, Dante, and Milton. isthe meaning of purging in the original sense.
The story of a single white whale can be epic in It is to expel impurities from the body. The
pire on earth, and throughout the whole uni- bition a noble passion; but by seeing upon the
is
verse, not excluding its suburbs." stage, that a man who is so excessively ambi-
tious as to raise himself by injustice is punished,
ANOTHER TRADITIONAL division in the kinds of we are terrified by the fatal consequences of
poetry is that between the tragic and the comic. such a passion. In the same manner a certain
This distinction is variously expressed. Fielding degree of resentment is necessary; but if we see
sees the difference in terms of the misery or hap- that a man carries it too far, we pity the object
piness to which the poet brings his principal
of it, and are taught to moderate that passion."
characters in the end. Speaking of tragedy Johnson's interpretation seems to be more spe-
alone, Milton says that it has ever been held cific than Milton's notion that to purge the
"the gravest, moralest, and most profitable of passions by tragedy is "to temper and reduce
406 TOE GREAT IDEAS
them to just measure with a kind of delight, of the great comic vision. The same poem may
stirr'd up by reading or seeing those passions be both tragic and comic because the poet has
well imitated." been able to see far enough into the nature of
It be arguable whether the difference
may things to reveal a world which is at once dread-
between tragedy and comedy is well defined by ful and ridiculous. In this sense Moby Dic\ may
reference to the nobility or vulgarity of the be both a tragedy and a comedy. "Though in
leading characters; by the contrast between the many of its aspects," Melville writes, "this vis-
pride of the tragic and the wit of the comic ible world seems formed in love, the invisible
hero; by the seriousness or lightness of the spheres were formed in fright"; but he also re-
tragic and comic themes and by the passions marks that "there are certain queer times and
appropriate to each. In any case it seems clear occasions . . . when a man takes this whole uni-
that this division of poetry crosses the other verse for a vast practical joke."
division into epic and dramatic writing. The
plays of Sophocles and the Iliad of Homer, Aris- IN THE SCIENCE of poetics, certain principles
totle observes, are tragic poetry, yet dramatic or rules seem to apply to all the major forms of
and epic respectively in manner; but from an- poetry, where others relate specifically to epic
other point of view, Sophocles is to be com- or dramatic writing, or to tragedy or comedy.
pared with Aristophanes, for though the one Aristotle implies that his most general formula-
writes tragedies and the other comedies, both tions hold not only for long poems, but for
are dramatists. In the tradition of the great dithyrambic poetry as well. If that is so, they
books, there are comic as well as tragic epics should be capable of extension to other forms of
Chaucer's Troilus and Cressida, Rabelais' Gar- lyric poetry, such as, for example, the sonnets of
gantua and Pantagruel, Cervantes' Don Quixote, Shakespeare and Milton, and Milton's odes and
Sterne's Tristram Shandy and Fielding's Tom
',
elegies. Yet the two principal elements in Aris-
Jones }\is\.
as there are tragic and comic plays. totle's analysis of poetry plot and character-
The examination of these suggests that talk seem, superficially at least, to belong peculiarly
rather than action is the essence of comedy. to narrative poems, long or short. Whether they
The
chief thing which Aristodemus remem- are present in any comparable manner in the
bers of Socrates' discourse the morning after structure of a lyric, or whether the form and
the banquet, in Plato's Symposium, is Socrates' content of lyric poetry requires an analysis pe-
success in compelling Aristophanes and Aga- culiar to itself, are among the most difficult
thon "to acknowledge that the genius of come- questions in the theory of poetry.
dy was the same as that of tragedy, and that the In the tradition of the great books, there
true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy seems to be, as already observed, general agree-
also. To this they were constrained to assent, ment about the basic rules for writing narrative
being drowsy, and not quite following the argu- poetry. Since these rules aim to direct the artist
ment." Precisely what they assented to has toward the achievement of excellence, they are
never been entirely clear. On one interpreta- also the basic principles of criticism. The science
tion of Socrates' remark, examples of his point of poetics is at once an organon of production
are difficult to find in the great books except, and a canon of criticism.
perhaps, for the plays of Shakespeare which, in The simple rules such as those of plot con-
the sphere of dramatic poetry, seem to repre- struction afford an example. A well constructed
sent an equal genius for tragic and comic writ- plot must have a beginning, middle, and end.
ing. In the sphere of epic poetry, we have only It must observe certain unities (at least of ac-
Aristotle's reference to a lost poem of Homer's tion, if not of time and place). Certain effects,
the Margites which he says "bears the same it is held, can best be produced by the use of
relation to comedy that the Iliad and Odyssey recognition scenes and reversals of fortune.
do to tragedy." Whether the events narrated are possible or
According to another interpretation the in- impossible, the poet must at least invest them
sight of Socrates is that the totality of the great with plausibility or verisimilitude. Such rules,
tragic vision tends to approximate the totality formulated by Aristotle and discussed by Ccr-
CHAPTER 69: POETRY 407
vantes, Fielding, and others, provide standards This, in turn, relates to his general maxim of
for judging whether a poem is skillfully made, style which directs the writer "to be clear with-
as well as give directions for the attainment of out being ordinary. The clearest style," he says,
skill by the poet. "is that which uses only current or
proper
It may be held, of course, that the great poet words," but in order to avoid being common-
works by inspiration, by a divine madness place or ordinary, it must be admixed with
rather than by rule; that, as Theseus says lofty diction "raised above the common-
in AMidsummer-Night's Dream, "the lunatic, place by the employment of unusual words.
the lover, and the poet are of imagination all . .
Nothing contributes more to produce a
.
rolling, doth glance from heaven to earth, from monness than the lengthening, contraction, and
earth to heaven; and as imagination bodies alteration of words. Phrases which are not
. . .
forth the forms of things unknown, the poet's part of current idiom give distinction to style.
pen turns them to shapes, and gives to airy . . . But the greatest thing by far is to have a
nothing a local habitation and a name." But if command of metaphor. This alone cannot be
there is an art of poetry, then like any other art imparted by another; it is the mark of genius
it is a thing of rules, whether or not genius needs for to make good metaphors implies an eye for
plot derive from the greatest poems of antiq- those words which, if altered, would spoil the
ing an expansion of meaning combined with a tion between poetic and philosophic thought,
contraction of speech. or what he calls "the splendid and the analytic"
408 THE GREAT IDEAS
types of intellect. Poetic thought tends to de- the historian also may turn poet. Referring to
velop the implications of an analogy without the speeches in his history, Thucydides tells us
giving an explication of its grounds. This, in that it was his habit "to make the speakers say
James' view, explains "the abrupt transitions in what was in my opinion demanded of them by
Shakespeare's thought," which "astonish the the various occasions, of course adhering as
reader by their unexpectedness, no less than closely as possible to the general sense of what
delighthim by their fitness." Quoting a passage they really said."
from Homer, unfathomably rich in metaphor, Some of the great poems, notably the Divine
he says that "a man in whom all the accidents Comedy, Paradise Lost, and Faust, are frequent-
of an analogy rise up as vividly as this, may be ly called philosophical forwhat appear to be
excused for not attending to the ground of the other reasons: either because the discourse of
fames, being one of the few exceptions "whose trine, not in particular speeches, nor by argu-
strangeness proves the rule." ment, but in the symbolism of the poem as a
ally contrasted to philosophy and history. As in- throughout, not narrative at all; it aims to be a
dicated in the chapter on HISTORY, historians literal rather than an allegorical statement of
likeHerodotus, Thucydidcs, and Plutarch em- the truth. Bacon's definition of allegorical
as that "which represents intellectual
phasize the difference rather than the similarity; poetry
the historian is a reporter of fact, the poet a things to the senses" seems to characterize
creator of fables or fictions. The one gains cre- both the poetic aspect of philosophy and a dis-
dence by his display of evidence and reasons; the tinctively philosophical type of poetry.
other, by the intrinsic plausibility of his tale. Yet Aristotle's point, that poetry and phi-
"In a good poem," writes Hobbcs, "whether it losophy are alike, may remain valid. All poetry,
be epic or dramatic . both judgment and
. .
certainly all the great narrative poems, the
fancy are required, but the fancy must be more great epics and dramas, novels and plays, deal
eminent ... In a good history, the judgment with the abiding problems of human action and
must be eminent, because the goodness consists the perennial themes of human thought. It is
in themethod, in the truth Fancy has no
. . . not this moral or metaphysical content, how-
place but only in adorning the style." ever, which makes poetry more philosophical
Bacon associates poetry most intimately with than history. It is the poet's treatment of such
history, both being concerned with "individ- matters. In the persons and events of his story
uals, circumscribed by time and place," and he succeeds in giving the universal a concrete
differing only as one employs the imagination, embodiment. Precisely because these are only
the other the memory. Aristotle, on the other imaginary, not real particulars, they permit the
hand, finds poetry and philosophy more alike, abstract universal to be readily disengaged.
at least to the extent that poetry, unlike his- Poets like Chaucer and Cervantes, who insist
tory, "tends to express the universal," by which that their function is to instruct as well as to de-
he means "how a person of a certain type will light, do not assume the role of pedagogues or
on occasion speak or according to the law
act, preachers.They teach, not dogmatically, but as
of probability or necessity." Even if the poet experience does, by affording the mind the
"chances to take an historical subject, he is materials or occasions for insight and inference.
none the a poet; for there is no reason why
less As an artistic imitation, poetry may be better
some events that have actually happened than the experience it represents. It may im-
should not conform to the law of the probable prove upon experience as a teacher, because,
and possible, and in virtue of that quality in born of the poet's mind, it is already impreg-
them he is their poet or maker." In this sense nated with ideas.
CHAPTER 69: POETRY 409
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature of poetry: its distinction from other arts
410
10. The theory of poetry as imitation: the
enjoyment of imitation
ib. The object, medium, and manner of imitation in poetry and other arts 411
2. The origin and development of poetry: the materials of myth and legend
3.
The inspiration or genius of the poet: the influence of the poetic tradition
50. The aim of poetry to instruct as well as to delight: the pretensions or deceptions
of the poet as teacher 41 ^
5#. Poetry contrasted with history and philosophy: the dispraise and defense of the
poet
6b. The arousal and purgation of the emotions by poetry: the catharsis of pity and
fear
7.
The elements of poetic narrative
80. Critical standards and artistic rules with respect to narrative structure
(3) The significance of recognitions and reversals in the development of plot 416
8. Critical standards and artistic rules with respect to the language of poetry: the
distinction between prose and verse; the measure of excellence in style
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
numbers of the passages referred to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halvesof the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK 11
[265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 ()) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
(3. The inspiration or genius of the poet: the influ- 4. The major kinds of poetry: their compara-
ence of the poetic tradition.) tive excellence
CH 23 695a-c; CH 25 696d-698c
5a. The aim of poetry to instruct as well as to 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, la-b / Solon, 76a /
delight: the pretensions or deceptions Pericles, 140d
of the poet as teacher 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH i -3 lOa-lla
5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians [497-508] 460d- 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK n, CH 14 156c-
461a; [628-675] 462b-463a / Knights [503- 157c; BK iv, CH 26-27 202a-203c; BK vm, CH
511] 476b / Clouds [575-594] 495c-d / Frogs 13 273b-d
564a-582a,c esp [1008-1098] 576b-577c, [1417- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 9,
1533] 581a-582a,c REP i 8d-9c
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 140c-d / Apology, 202c-d / 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n Q
:
t
Id. Spectacle and song in drama 8a(2) Poetic truth: verisimilitude or plausibil-
7 PLATO: Republic, BK HI, 331c-333a ity; the possible, the probable, and the
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The comparison of poetry with history, philosophy, and science, see HISTORY i ; KNOWLEDGE
40; PHILOSOPHY id; SCIENCE 2b; TRUTH 40.
The consideration of the fine arts in general, see ART 73; and for standards of critical judg-
ment with respect to the beauty or excellence of works of fine art, ART 70; BEAUTY 2, 5.w
Another discussion of the theory of art as imitation, and for related doctrines, see ART 3;
FORM id(i).
The elements of inspiration, emotion, and tradition in the formation of poetry, see ART 8;
MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3d.
Other aspects of the distinction between tragedy and comedy, see HAPPINESS 4b.
Matters related to the theory of emotional purgation, see ART 8; DESIRE 4d.
The place of poetics among the sciences, see PHILOSOPHY 2C.
The discussion of poetictruth and probability, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 7b; TRUTH 4b.
Other considerations of the problem of style, see LANGUAGE 9; RHETORIC 2-2b.
Matters bearing on the interpretation of poetry, see RHETORIC 2d.
The role of poetry and other fine arts in education, see ART loa; EDUCATION 4d; VIRTUE AND
VICE 4d(4).
Other discussions of the problem of censorship, or of the political regulation of artistic
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
BOCCACCIO. On Poetry
*
P. SIDNEY. An Apology for Poetry
PLUTARCH. "How a Young Man Ought to Hear CORNEILLE. Examens
Poems," in Moralia . Trots discours sur Van dramatique
AUGUSTINE. On Music MOLIERE. La critique de Vecole des femmes (The
DANTE. De Vulgari Eloquentia School for Wives Criticised)
Epistle to Can Grande della Scala
. BOILEAU-DESPRE*AUX. The Art of Poetry
HUME. Of the Standard of Taste DRYDEN. An Essay of Dramatic Poesy
.
Of Tragedy .
Of Heroic Plays
GIBBON, An Essay on the Study of Literature, I-XLIII . A Discourse Concerning . . . Satire
A. SMITH. "Of the Affinity Between Music, Dancing POPE. Essay on Criticism
and Poetry," in Essays Philosophical and Literary Vico. The New Science, BK ii-ni
GOETHE. Poetry and Truth J. HARRIS. Three Treatises. The First Concerning Art.
Conversations with Ecfyrmann
. The Second Concerning Music, Painting, and
J. MILL. "Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties,"
S. Poetry. The Third Concerning Happiness
in VOL i, Dissertations and Discussions Upon the Rise and Progress of Criticism
.
INTRODUCTION
the three ways in which principles are sense of being before everything else; some-
OF considered in the tradition of the great times it means that which comes first only
books, the most familiar sense of the word is relatively, taking precedence over some things,
the one in which we speak of moral principles, but having others prior to itself. Since priority
a certain generality to principles. Just as rules which nothing else can be prior, they can legit-
cases, so any principle we appeal to in order to guish them from principles which come first
decide a practical problem or to weigh the only in a certain respect. Only if there are first
merits of an action undertaken, can be applied principles can regression to infinity be avoided
again and again in other circumstances. in the search for origins. The propositions
In addition to this characteristic of general- which lie at the foundation of a science may,
ity,principles seem to have the quality of un- for example, constitute its principles, but they
derlying or being the source 0/"other things. In may also be derived in turn from some prior
jurisprudence the search for principles con- science. Only the principles of a science which
sists inthe attempt to discover those few most is
prior to or independent of all others can be
fundamental precepts from which the more de- truly first principles.
tailed rules of law can be derived. The consti-
tution of a state provides the principles which THE FOREGOING example brings us to the other
underlie its particular laws and sets the stand- ^ meaning of principle that is popularly recog-
ards by which their legality is to be measured. nized. It is the sense in which men speak of
Governments are judged by the principles they principles in relation to conclusions, or of
followsseems to be more characteristic of the initions, postulates, and axioms are logically
idea of principle than the aspect of generality. prior to all the theorems he demonstrates by
420
CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE 421
is sufficient to make the prior proposition a the sensible particulars; and by habituation,
principle. Can a proposition be a
principle if, the moral particulars. Hence Aristotle insists
even though it is used as a premise in
reasoning, that "anyone who is to listen intelligently to
itlacks generality ? For example, is the partic- lectures about what is noble and just and, gen-
ular proposition that this bottle contains about the subjects of political science
erally,
poison a principle underlying the practical must have been brought up in good habits.
conclusion that its contents should not be For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is
neans; nor indeed can the particular facts be a which serve as the major premises in reasoning.
subject of it, as whether this is bread or has been In both the theoretic and the practical sciences,
baked as it should; for these are matters of per- principles express reason's understanding of
ception." The
perceived particulars thus func- universaland necessary relationships.
tion as principles along with the most general Kant differs from Aristotle in other respects.
of all practical propositions, namely, what the He between ordinary general
differentiates
end should be. Calling the faculty which appre- propositions which merely serve as major
hends principles "intuitive reason," Aris-
first premises in reasoning and the propositions he
totle says that "the intuitive reason involved in "synthetic judgements a priori." 1 le
classifies as
practical reasonings grasps the last and variable regards the former as principles only in a rela-
fact, i.e., the minor premise. For these variable tive sense and treats the latter alone as prin-
facts are the starting-points for the apprehen- ciples absolutely. He also distinguishes between
sion of the end, since the universals arc reached those principles of the understanding which he
from the particulars; of these therefore we must thinks are "constitutive of experience," and
have perception, and this perception is intui- those principles of the reason which should be
tive reason." used in what he calls a "regulative," not a con-
Perception, at least in the form of sense- stitutive manner. They determine the direc-
perception, seems to be only one of the two tionand goals of thought beyond experience.
ways in which we apprehend the particular But such differences concerning the nature and
facts which are principles in practical reasoning. kinds of principles do not affect the commonly
Like Aristotle, Aquinas uses the judgment, that accepted meaning of principle as that from
this is bread or iron, as an example of "facts which, in the temporal order of learning,
received through the senses" which are "prin- knowledge develops or that upon which, in the
ciples ..
accepted in the inquiry of counsel."
.
logical order, knowledge rests.
some by a certain habituation." By induction reality are discussed in such chapters as BEING,
we see the general truths; by sense-perception, CAUSE, CHANGE, FORM, NATURE, and MATTER.
422 THE GREAT IDEAS
If the word "principle" always connotes a be- of principles as incompatible with the very
ginning, every special sense of principle should notion of principle itself. In his analysis of
involve some kind of priority. As we have al- change or motion, he tries to prove that no
ready observed, principles may be either prior more than three principles are necessary, and
in time or prior logically. But the principles of no less will do. These are, as the chapter on
the universe or the principles of change are not CHANGE explains, matter, form, and privation.
usually thought to be prior in either of these Considering the principles of the universe as a
ways. For them Aristotle specifies another kind whole, Plotinus also enumerates three and tries
of priority priority in nature to explain the to prove that none can be added or subtracted.
primacy of those principles which constitute But whereas Aristotle treats the three principles
the nature of a thing. In his view, for example, of change as coordinate, Plotinus places the
matter and form are the principles of a physical cosmic principles in the absolute order of first,
substance. Since a substance composite of mat- second, and third.
ter and form cannot exist until its matter and "We need not go seeking any other Prir
its form matter and form are not prior
coexist, ciples," writes Plotinus. "This the One am
to the substance they compose. Their priority the Good is our First, next to it follows the
to substance consists only in the fact that that Intellectual Principle, the Primal Thinker, anc'
which has the nature of a composite substance upon this follows Soul. Such is the order ir
results from the union of matter and form as its nature. The intellectual realm allows no more
natural components. Because the substance is than these and no fewer. Those who hold to
the natural resultant, matter and form can prop- fewer Principles must hold the identity of
either Intellectual Principle and Soul, or of
erly be called its natural principles.
This way of considering principles at once Intellectual Principle and The First ... To
suggests a close relationship among principles, increase the Primalsby making the Supreme
elements, and causes; and also indicates the Mind engender the Reason-Principle, and this
connection between the present chapter and again engender in the Soul a distinct power to
the chapters on CAUSE and ELEMENT. The ulti- act as mediator between Soul and the Supreme
mate parts into which a whole can be divided Mind, this is to deny intellection to the Soul,
may be its principles as well as its elements. which would no longer derive its Reason from
The form or matter of a substance may be, in the Intellectual Principle, but from an inter-
Aristotle's theory, not only one of its prin- mediate. . . . Therefore, we must affirm no
ciples, but also a cause a formal or a material more than these three Primals."
cause. the great authors Aristotle and
Among In the sense in which Plotinus conceives the
Aquinas alone seem to dwell upon the relation- three primals, they are not only principles in
ship of these three terms. They give instances the order of reality, but are themselves the
in which the same thing is
principle, element, ultimate grades or modes of reality. Similarly
and cause, as well as instances in which a prin- for Plato soul is not only the principle of life
ciple is neither a cause nor an element, e.g., and thought in the universe, but it also has its
privation. In the sphere of human conduct, an own existence in the realm of being. For Aris-
end is both a principle and a final cause, but totle, in contrast, the principles of change do
not an element. The last end is the highest not have existence in and of themselves. Mat-
final cause and the first principlefirst in in- ter,form, and privation are not substances,
tention though last in attainment. but aspects of substance. They are present in
every changing substance and in every change,
THE TRADITIONAL issues concerning this idea but they are only the principles of mutable
differaccording to the general context in being; they are not mutable beings in them-
which the question of principles is raised. The selves.
main controversy, for example, with regard to Lucretius states two principles as the basic
principles in the order of reality is over their laws of nature.The first is that nothing comes
number and order. into being out of nothing; the second, that
Aristotle argues against an infinite number nothing is ever completely reduced to nothing-
CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE 423
ness.The word "principle" is obviously not WE SHALL PRESENTLY consider the issue con-
being used in the same sense here as when it cerning axioms or postulates whether the
designates The One for Plotinus, soul for Plato, principles of the sciences are self-evident truths
matter for Aristotle, or the atoms which Lu- or are only provisional assumptions. Those who
cretius calls the "first beginnings." Here it are willing to admit the existence of axioms do
does not refer to an entity, or even to an aspect not all agree, however, that such truths refer
of some real being, but rather to a law the to reality. Hume, for example, limits the con-
statement of a universal and necessary condi- tent of axioms to knowledge of the relations be-
tion which governs all that is or happens. It is tween our own ideas. They arc not truths about
in this sense that the proposition traditionally real existence or matters of fact.
called "the law of contradiction" that the Locke also grants self-evidence
only to per-
same thing cannot both be and not be in the ceptions of the agreement or disagreement be-
same respect at the same time is said by Aris- tween ideas. "Concerning the real existence of
totle to be the first principle of being as well allother beings" except ourselves and God, we
as of thought. have, he writes, "not so much a demonstrative,
The conception of the law of contradiction much less a self-evident, knowledge; and there-
and the related laws of identity and excluded fore concerning these there are no maxims."
middle as principles of thought raises problems But Locke docs think that our demonstrative
about logical principles in general whether knowledge of God's existence depends upon an
they arc axioms or postulates, whether they are intuitive knowledge of our own existence; and
in addition to knowing our own existence
merely rules of reasoning and demonstration
or aic themselves premises from which con- directly or without proof, he also thinks we
clusions can be deduced. If, for example, the have through our senses an equally direct
law of contradiction is
only a rule of thought, knowledge of the existence of other things.
which forbids the mind to affirm and deny the Such intuitive and sensitive knowledge of par-
same proposition, then it is not a principle of ticular existences is, like the truth of axioms,
knowledge in the sense in which the definitions immediate something known directly
that is,
and axioms of geometry function as premises in or without proof, without any appeal to prior
the demonstration of theorems. No conclusion propositions. Hence Locke is not denying that
can be drawn from concerning the nature of
it we know some immediate truths about reality,
things. But if, in addition to being a rule of but only that such truths consist exclusively of
sharply from Aristotle and Aquinas. He denies William James uses the word "intuitive"
that the laws of identity and contradiction are in a different sense from Locke to charac-
knowledge. "These mag-
fruitful principles of terize propositions that state "the necessary
nified maxims," he writes, "are not the prin- and eternal relations" which the mind "finds
ciples and foundations of all our other knowl- between certain of its ideal conceptions." Intui-
edge." Nor have they been, he adds, "the tive propositions are for him, therefore, what
foundations whereon any science hath been maxims are for Locke; and like Locke, James
built. There is, I know, a great deal of talk, also denies that such axioms of reason hold for
propagated from scholastic men, of sciences reality. "Only hypotlietically" he says, "can
and the maxims on which they are built; but we affirm intuitive truths of real thingsby
it has been my ill meet with any
luck, never to supposing, namely, that real things exist which
such sciences, much
any one built upon
less correspond exactly with the ideal subject of
these two maxims, 'what is, is* and 'it is im- the intuitive propositions . The intuitive
. .
possible for the same thing to be and not propositions of Locke leave us as regards outer lt
reality is. account for all the other contents of the mind
"The vindication of the intuitionist posi- its memories and imaginations, its
complex
tion," James continues, "is thus a barren vic- formations in terms of the simple impressions
tory. The eternal verities which the very struc- originally received by the senses.
ture of our mind lays hold of do not necessarily Concepts, as distinct from sense-perceptions,
themselves lay hold on extramental being, nor are also sometimes regarded as principles of
have they, as Kant pretended later, a legislat- knowledge by those who think that concepts
ing character for all possible experience. They from sensory mate-
originate by abstraction
are primarily interesting only as subjective rials, as well as by those who think that ideas
facts. They stand waiting in the mind, forming are primary principles, /.*., having no origin in
a beautiful ideal network; and the most we can any prior apprehensions. On either view, ideas
say is that we hope to discover outer realities or concepts function as principles insofar as
over which the network may be flung so that they are the simples from which the more
ideal and real may coincide." complex acts of the mind develop, such as the
The opposite view seems to be taken by acts of judgment and reasoning. Just as on the
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, level of language, words are the principles of all
Spinoza, and Kant. Though they are far from significant speech, out of which sentences and
being in complete agreement concerning the paragraphs are formed; just as, in the logical
principles of knowledge, the propositions which order, terms are said to be the principles of
they call axiomatic, self-evident, intuitive, or propositions and syllogisms; so concepts are the
a priori synthetic judgments, are not restricted principles of judgments and reasonings. The
by them to the mind's perception of the rela- definitions of Euclid, for example, state the
tions between its own ideas. There are self- notions of point, line, triangle, etc. which un-
evident or immediate truths in physics and derlie his theorems and demonstrations.
metaphysics, as well as in mathematics and One common characteristic of either sensa-
logic.Whether these are inductions from ex- tions or concepts as principles of knowledge
perience or innate possessions of the mind, seems to be simplicity. Nothing more elemen-
whether they are intuitive apprehensions of in- tary, out of which they can be formed, is prior
telligible being or a priori judgments having to them. Anothercharacteristic is that they are
a transcendental origin, these propositions are principles of knowledge or opinion without be-
held to describe the world of experience, or the ing themselves acts of knowledge or opinion.
nature and existence of things outside the hu- This point is made by all who hold that only
man mind. propositions whether statements of opinion or
of knowledge can be true or false.
THERE SEEM TO BE two degrees of skepticism The terms which express the simple appre-
with regard to principles in the order of knowl- hensions of the mind its sensations or con-
edge. Complete skepticism would consist in cepts cannot be true or false, because, unlike
denying principles in
every sense. That would propositions, which are composed of terms,
be the same denying any beginning or basis
as they do not assert anything. If sensations and
for even the opinions which men hold. No one concepts cannot be true or false in the sense in
seems to go that far. which propositions or judgments are, then they
The issue with respect to the foundations of lack the distinctive property of knowledge or
starting points are. It is sometimes said, for selves expressions of knowledge or opinion, not
example, that sensations are the principles or merely as its starting points or sources.
beginnings of all human learning. This view is
shared both by those who think that all our THE TWO DEGREES of skepticism previously
ideas or concepts are abstracted from the mate- mentioned apply only to those principles of
CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE 425
propositions can be immediately recognized by son," he writes, "can be established but upon
the mind, nevertheless deny that such self- the foundation of another reason; and so run
evident truths describe reality. This may or back to all
infinity." To those who say that
may not be accompanied by a further deprecia- there no disputing with persons who deny
is
tion of axioms on the ground that they are principles, he replies that "men can have no
merely analytical propositions and hence tri- principles, if not revealed to them by the
uninstructive, or tautological.
fling, Divinity; of the rest, the beginning, the
all
The chapter on JUDGMENT considers the is- middle, and the end are nothing but dream
sue which revolves around the derogatory use and vapor."
of such words as "tautology" or "truism" to If, however, for practical purposes, a begin-
designate self-evident truths. Though the in- ning must be made somewhere, Montaigne sug-
vidious connotation of the word "truism" does gests that it can be done by taking things for
not make
the truth to which this epithet is ap- granted and then getting others to grant our
plied any less true, the dignity of a truth does presuppositions. "It is very easy," he writes,
seem to be affected by the refusal to regard it as "upon granted foundations to build whatever
a statement of reality. Furthermore, a certain we please ... By this way, we find our reason
degree of skepticism results from such refusal. well-grounded and discourse at a venture; for
Hume exemplifies this. He holds that self- our masters prepossess and gain beforehand as
evident truths are possible only in mathematics, much room in our belief as is necessary for them
which deals not with matters of fact, but with towards afterwards what they
concluding
the relations between our own ideas. In con- please, as
geometers do by their postulates; the
sequence, he denies to the study of nature the consent and approbation we allow them giving
certitude or demonstrative character which he them power to draw us to the right and left,
finds in mathematical science. Since physics is and to whirl us about at their own pleasure."
concerned with real existences, no axioms or
self-evident principles are available to it; and IF THE ONLY principles upon which reasoning
so, according to Hume, it cannot demonstrate can be based or from which conclusions can be
its conclusions, but must advance them as drawn are assumptions, postulates, or hypoth-
eses rather than axioms, then everything is a
probabilities.
A more thorough-going skepticism seems to matter of opinion and probability; nothing can
consist in holding that there are absolutely no have the certitude of knowledge. As indicated
matters at all about which men have axiomatic in the chapters on KNOWLEDGE and OPINION,
knowledge. This appears to be the position of one theory of that distinction makes knowl-
Montaigne. No truths are self-evident. None edge an act of the mind independent of our
commands the universal assent of mankind; wishes or will and treats opinion as a judgment
none belongs to the nature of the mind so that voluntarily accepted or rejected. Accordingly,
all men must agree to it. Montaigne almost assumptions or postulates are perfectly repre-
holds it to be axiomatic that there are no sentative of opinion, and axioms express the
axioms, for if there were, he says, "there would very essence of knowledge. To assume or pos-
be some one thing to be found in the world . . . tulate anything is to take it for granted
that would be believed by men with an univer- voluntarily! A
postulate neither compels as-
sal consent; but this, that there is no one propo- sent, nor does it ever exclude the possibility of
sition that is not debated and controverted taking the opposite for granted. Where men
amongst us, or that may not
very be, makes it make postulates, there dispute is But
possible.
manifest that our natural judgment does not to assert something as an axiom is to command
very clearly comprehend what it embraces." assent on the ground that its opposite can be
426 THE GREAT IDEAS
immediately recognized as impossible. No prop- strability is regarded by Aristotle and Pascal as
osition can be regarded as an axiom if its ac- a virtue rather than a defect, for if they were
ceptance or rejection is in any way a matter of demonstrable, they could not be the principles
choice. or starting points of demonstration. If there
For Aristotle the area in which men can were no axioms, then nothing could be demon-
dispute with some reason on both sides belongs strated, because everything in turn would re-
to what he calls "dialectic," whereas what he quire proof in an endless regression.
calls "science" is the area from which dispute is To the ancient counterparts of the skeptical
excluded by demonstrations which rest on self- Montaigne, Aristotle replies that unless the
evident truths. One is the area of probability law of contradiction is an indisputable axiom,
and opinion; the other, of certainty and knowl- any form of reasoning, even probable reasoning
edge. Contrary assumptions are the starting from assumptions, is impossible. The principle
point of dialectical argument, whereas science which underlies all disputation cannot itself be
begins with axioms. These may be the first disputed. To those who, with skeptical intent,
principles which Aristotle and Bacon call "com- insist upon having everything demonstrated
mon notions" because they are common to before they will accept it, Aristotle offers an
diverse sciences; or they may be the axioms indirect defense of the law of contradiction by
peculiar to a single subject matter. asking the questioner to try denying that self-
The word "dialectic" is used by Plato in a evident principle without reducing himself to
support, dialectic in the conception of Plato strable truths, but some, like Descartes and
rises to the first principles of all knowledge. Kant, do not agree that they are inductions
In the hierarchical ordering of the sciences, from experience. The alternatives seem to be
Plato's dialectic, Aristotle's metaphysics, and that axioms arc innate possessions of the intel-
Bacon's philosophic* prima seem to occupy re- lect or that they are transcendental a priori
spectively the same primary position and to principles of pure reason, independent of ex-
perform the same function in virtue of being perience. Yet Locke, who denies innate ideas
the discipline which contemplates or considers and principles, or
anything prior to experience,
the absolutely first or most universal principles. does not treat what he calls self-evident maxims
For Bacon, as for Aquinas, the only higher as inductionsfrom experience. They are rather
science is sacred theology, whose principles are direct perceptions of agreement or disagree-
articles of supernatural faith, not axioms of ment among the ideas we have acquired through
reason. experience.
These matters are more fully discussed in the Aquinas, who, no less than Locke, denies in-
chapters on DIALECTIC, METAPHYSICS, and nate ideas and insists upon sense-experience as
THEOLOGY ; questions concerning different kinds
the source of all human knowledge, refers to
of principles or the principles of different sci- the assent we give first principles as a natural
ences are considered in HYPOTHESIS and LOGIC. habit of the mind the intellectual virtue he
The chapter on INDUCTION, furthermore, dis- calls "understanding," equivalent to what
cusses the inductive origin of axioms, as well as Aristotle calls "intuitive reason." As the chap-
the disagreement between Bacon and Aristotle ter on HABIT indicates, axioms are called "nat-
on the point of whether the highest axioms or ural" truths, not in the sense of being innate,
first principles are
immediately intuited from instinctive, or congenital, but only in the
the particulars of experience, or are reached sense that if the human reason functions nat-
with Locke in thinking that therefore such to the transcendental structure of pure reason
truths hold only for relations between our own For Aquinas, as already suggested, the
itself.
natural habit has, for Aquinas, more than a tion is known when we understand the mean-
verbal connection with the theory of natural ing of 'is' and 'not,' so the truth of the first
law. Of the various meanings of the phrase command of natural law 'Seek the good' is
"natural law'* which are distinguished in the known when we understand the meaning of
chapter on LAW, we are here concerned with 'seek' and 'good.' We hold such truths by the
what both Kant and Aquinas conceive as the natural habit of our minds, which in the case
moral law whose precepts are the fundamental of the natural law is
given the special name of
principles of human conduct. Both also speak synderesis.
of the precepts of the natural law or the moral Just as we find a certain skepticism with re-
law as the first principles of man's practical gard to the principle of contradiction and other
reason. axioms, so we find doubts about the existence of
For Aquinas, these principles are primary in natural law, or about indisputable and univer-
the order of practical truth and the moral sally acceptable principlesof morality. Refer-
sciences, metaphysical first principles are
as ring to those who think that there are some
primary in the order of speculative truth and laws "first, perpetual, and immutable, which
the theoretic sciences. "The precepts of the they call natural that are imprinted in mankind
natural law," he writes, "are to the practical by the condition of their own proper being,"
reason what the first principles of demonstra- Montaigne declares that "the only sign by
tion are to the speculative reason, because both which they can argue or infer some laws to be
are self-evident principles." As the proposition natural is the universality of approbation"; and
that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and he adds: "Let them produce me but one of this
denied at the same time" is the first principle of condition."
the speculative reason, so "the first precept of The consequences of skepticism are here the
law, that good is to be done, and evil is to be same as before. Without first principles, moral
avoided" is the first principle of the practical science either fails reduced to sys-
entirely or is
reason, which legislate a priori for the realm of press, not knowledge, but opinion. As John
freedom, play an analogous role to the prin- Stuart Mill observes, the utilitarians must, de-
legislate
a priori for the realm of nature or ex- if there is to be a science of ethics, "mortality
perience. It is this parallelism between the two must be deduced from principles," and ulti-
considered in connection with the axioms of totle says about the self-evidence of the law of
theoretic knowledge occur here in connection contradiction. "Questions of ultimate ends are
with the principles of moral knowledge.
first not amenable to direct proof," Mill writes. "To
Aquinas and Kant disagree, for example, about be incapable of proof by reasoning is common
the way in which we come into possession of to all first principles: to the first premises of
these principles. For Kant, the principles of our knowledge, as well as to those of our con-
mortality, like the principles of nature, belong duct."
428 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAOB
1.
Principles in the order of reality 429
la. The differentiation of principle, element, and cause
ib. The being, number, and kinds of principles in the order of reality
3& Principles and induction: axioms as intuitive inductions from experience; stages
of inductive generalization
(2) The difference between axioms and assumptions, hypotheses and principles,
between knowledge and opinion, or science
as a basis for the distinction
and dialectic 433
(3) The distinction and order of the sciences according to the character of
their principles
4. First principles
in the practical order: the principles of action or morality; the prin-
ciples of the practical reason
40. Ends as principles, and last ends as first principles: right appetite as a principle
in the practical order 434
5. The skeptical denial of first principles or axioms: the denial that any propositions elicit
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK 11 [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a 119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium. 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283! 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Another discussion of principle in relation to element and cause, see ELEMENT 2.
The consideration of the laws of identity and contradiction as both logical and metaphysical
The dependence of demonstration on axioms or self-evident truths, see INFINITY 2c; REASON-
ING 50(1); TRUTH 3c; and for the nature ofreductio adabsurdum arguments in defense of
axioms, see REASONING 4d.
Induction as the source of axioms, see INDUCTION 3.
Other discussions of the distinctionbetween axioms and postulates, hypotheses, or assump-
tions, and for the bearing of this distinction on the difference between knowledge and
opinion, or science and dialectic, see DIALECTIC 2a(2), 4; HYPOTHESIS 3-4; KNOWLEDGE 4b;
MATHEMATICS 33; OPINION 2c; TRUTH 4c; WILL 3b(i).
The principles of the several theoretic sciences, see ASTRONOMY 2b; DEFINITION 6a; LOGIC ia;
MATHEMATICS 33; MECHANICS 2b; METAPHYSICS 2b, 3c; PHILOSOPHY 3b; PHYSICS ib, 2a;
TRUTH 4c.
The consideration of ends as principles in the practical order or in moral and political science,
see GOOD AND EVIL 5c; GOVERNMENT ic; HAPPINESS 3; MIND 9a; NECESSITY AND CON-
TINGENCY 53(2) ONE AND MANY 5b; RELATION 53(2) TRUTH 2c and for other discussions
; ; ;
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
CH 2; vi, CH 4-7
Chapter jr. PROGRESS
INTRODUCTION
TIKE the idea of evolution, with which it has ance with this view,*' Darwin writes, "it seems,
I ^ some affinity, the idea of progress seems to if we turn to geological evidence, that organiza-
be typically modern. Anticipations of it may be tion on the whole has advanced throughout the
found in ancient and mediaeval thought, some- world by slow and interrupted steps. In the
times in the form of implicit denials of the idea. kingdom of the Vertebrata it has culminated
But in explicit formulation, in emphasis and in man."
importance, progress, like evolution, is almost a Whether strictly biological evolution has a
new idea in modern times. It is not merely more single or uniform direction
may be disputed in
prominent in modern discussion; it affects the the light of evidences of regression and the mul-
of nature and man. But the theory of evolution will tend to progress toward perfection." What-
is itself affected by the idea of progress. Since it ever the evidence may be, the popular notion
was a major theme at least two centuries before of evolution, especially when applied by writers
Darwin, progress does not depend for its signifi- like Herbert Spencer to human society or civi-
cance upon the theory of biological evolution. lization, connotes progress the gradual yet
The reverse relationship seems to obtain. The steady march toward perfection.
idea of evolution getssome of its moral, social,
even cosmic significance from its implication APART FROM THIS APPLICATION of the idea of
that the general motion in the world of living evolution to man's world, progress seems to be
things, perhaps in the universe, is a progress the central thesis in the modern philosophy of
from lower to higher forms. history. In the minds of some, the philosophy
Darwin thinks "Von Baer has defined ad- of history is so intimately connected with a
vancement or progress in the organic scale theory of progress that the philosophy of his-
better than anyone else, as resting on the tory is itself regarded as a modern development.
amount of differentiation and specialization of There seems to be some justification for this
the several parts of a being" to which Darwin view in modern works on the tendency of his-
adds the qualification that the organisms must tory which have no ancient counterparts, such
be judged when they have arrived at maturity. as the writings of Vico, Condorcet, Kant,
"As organisms have become slowly adapted to Proudhon, Comte, J. S. Mill, Hegel, and Marx.
diversified lines of life, their parts will have These writers do not all define or explain
become more and more differentiated and progress in the same way. Nor do they all sub-
specialized for various functions from the ad- scribe to an inviolable and irresistible law of
vantage gained by the division of physiological progress which has the character of a divine
labor. The same part appears often to have ordinance, replacing or transforming less opti-
been modified first for one purpose, and then mistic views of providence. But for the most
long afterwards for some other and quite dis- part the moderns are optimists. They either be-
tinct purpose; and thus all the parts are ren- lieve in man's perfectibility and in his approach
dered more and more complex. ... In accord- to perfection through his own efforts freely
437
438 THE GREAT IDEAS
turned toward the realization of ideals; or they tradition of western thought. Whatever their
see in the forces of history whether the man- readers think on this subject, the great
may
ifestations of a world spirit or the pressure of authors, having read the works of their prede-
material (t.c. t economic) conditions an inevi- cessors, offer their own interpretations of the
table development from less to more advanced intellectual tradition. In
many cases, especially
stages of civilization, according
to a dialectical among the modern writers, their point of de-
pattern of conflict and resolution, each resolu- partureeven the conception they entertain
tion necessarily rising to a higher level. of the originality and worth of their own con-
As opposed to the optimism of expecting a tribution stems from their concern with a
continual improvement in all things or an irre- deplorable lack of progress, for which they offer
versible ascent to new heights, the pessimistic new methods as remedies.
view denies that progress is either the law or Before we enter upon the discussion of eco-
the hope of history. It believes rather that nomic, political, or intellectual progress, it
everything which goes up must come down. As seems useful to distinguish between the fact and
indicated in the chapter on HISTORY, the the idea of progress. When men examine the
theory of cycle after cycle of rise and decline fact of progress, they look to the past and find
or even the notion that the golden age is past, there evidence for or against the assertion that
that never to be regained, and that things
it is a change for the better has taken place in this or
are steadily getting worse prevails more in the that respect. Two things are involved a study of :
ancient than in the modern world. the changes which have occurred and the judg-
The modern exceptions to optimism in the mentbased on some standard of appraisal
philosophy of history are notably Spengler and, that the changes have been for the better. But
to a much extent, Toynbee. But modern
less when men entertain the idea of progress, they
pessimism never seems to reach the intensity of turn from the past and present and look to the
the Preacher's reiteration in Ecclesiastes that future.They regard the past merely as a basis
"there is no new thing under the sun" and for prophecy, and the present as an occasion
that "all is
vanity and vexation of spirit." Nor for making plans to fulfill their prophecies or
does the modern theory of cycles of civilization, hopes. The fact of progress belongs to the rec-
even in Vico, seem to be as radical as that of the ord of achievement; the idea of progress sets a
ancients. In his vision of cosmic cycles Lucretius goal to be achieved.
sees the whole world crumbling into atomic This distinction seems to be exemplified by
dust to be reborn again. Herodotus docs not re- the difference between ancient and modern
lieve the gloom of his observation that, in the considerations of progress. The ancients ob-
of cities, prosperity "never continues long in
life serve the fact of progress in some particulars
one stay." The eternity of the world means for almost never universally. Thucydides, for ex-
Aristotle that "probably each art and each sci- ample, in the opening chapters of his History,
ence has often been developed as far as possible contrasts the power and wealth of the modern
and has again perished." city-states of Greece with "the weakness of
ancient times." "Without commerce, without
LEAVING TO THE chapter on HISTORY the dis- freedom of communication either by land or
cussion of progress so far asconcerns an explic-
it sea, cultivating no more of their territory than
it philosophy of history, we shall here deal the exigencies of life required, destitute of cap-
with considerations of progress as they occur in ital,never planting their land (for they could
economics, in political theory, in the history of not tell when an invader might not come and
philosophy and the whole intellectual tradition take it all
away, and when he did come they
of the arts and sciences. had no walls to stop him), thinking that the
In this last connection, the great books play necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied
a dual role. They provide the major evidence at one place as well as another, they cared little
which, on different interpretations, points for shifting their habitation, and consequently
toward opposite answers to the question neither built large cities nor attained to any
whether or not there has been progress in the other form of greatness."
CHAPTER 71: PROGRESS 439
But Thucydides does not seem to draw from tions of capital stock. But the essential point
these observations any general idea of prog- for him about these successive systems of pro-
ress. He does not concretely imagine a future duction is their effect upon the status and con-
excelling the Periclean age in the magnitude of ditions of labor. The Communist Manifesto
itswars and the magnificence of its wealth, as notes respects in which, under the capitalist
that period dwarfs antiquity. He does not infer system, the supposedly free workingman is
that whatever factors worked to cause the ad- worse off than were his servile ancestors. But if
vance from past to present may continue to op- economic progress is conceived as the histori-
erate with similar results. It might almost be cally determined approach to the final libera-
said that he does not think about the future; tion of labor from its oppressors, then capitalism
certainly he docs not think of it as rich in prom- represents both an advance over feudalism and
ise. "Knowledge of the past." he writes, is "an a stage in the march to communism.
aid to the interpretation of the future, which in Each successive economic revolution brings
the course of human things must resemble if it mankind nearer to the goal of the ideal or
does not reflect it." classless economy. Capitalism creates the pro-
Adam Smith's thinking about economic prog- letariat the revolutionary class which is to be
ress represents the contrasting modern empha- that system's own undoing. The overthrow of
sis
upon the future. In one sense, both Thucyd- the landed aristocracy by the bourgeoisie thus
ides and Smith measure economic progress in prepares the way for the dictatorship of the
the same way, though one writes of the wealth proletariat, as that in turn liquidates the obsta-
of cities, the other of the wealth of nations. cles to the realization of the perfect communist
Both Smith and Thucydides judge economic democracy.
improvement in terms of increasing opulence, We are not here concerned with the details of
the growth of capital reserves, the expansion of this history and prophecy but only with the
commerce, and the enlarged power in war or theory of progress which it involves. In the
peace which greater wealth bestows. But first place, it seems to set an ultimate
goal to
Smith, in the spirit of Francis Bacon, seeks to progress, while at the same time it makes prog-
analyze the causes of prosperity in order to ress a necessary feature of what is for Marx, as
make them work for further progress. He is the it is for Hegel, the "dialectic of history." Those
promoter of progress, not merely the historian who think that the inevitability of progress
who witnesses the beneficial effect on produc- ought to render progress as interminable as his-
tivity of an increasingly refined division of la- tory itself, find some inconsistency in this tenet
bring about the opulence of modern nations as which the Absolute Idea reaches perfect reali-
compared with the miserable poverty of primi- zation in the German state. Can progress be the
tive tribes or even the limited property of an- inner law of history and yet reach its goal before
cient cities is to know how to formulate policies the endof time?
which shall still further expand the wealth of na- There may be some answer to this question
For Smith the study of the means and
tions. in a second aspect of the theory of progress
methods by which economic progress has been which goes with a dialectic of history. The
made serves to determine the policy which is
progress which the successive stages of history
most likely to ensure even greater increments represent resides in the quality of human insti-
of progress in the future. tutions rather than in the nature of man. If
more economic justice or greater political lib-
MARX APPEARS TO measure economic progress erty is achieved, it is not because the later gen-
by The transition from the
a different standard. erations of men are born with a nature more
slave economies of antiquity through feudal disposed to goodness or virtue, but because
serfdom to what he calls the "wage-slavery" of better institutions have evolved from the con-
the industrial proletariat may be accompanied flict of historical forces. Furthermore, accord-
stances of his lifeby the system of production In his Ideaofa Universal History and his Prin-
under which he lives. Hence though institu- ciple of Progress, Kant finds the possibility of
tional progress may arrive at its historical goal progress in man's potentialities for improve-
with the establishment of the ideal economy, ment. He regards the realization of this possi-
it
may be possible for further progress to be bility as a work of freedom rather than a mani-
made throughout the rest of time by the im- festation of historical necessity. Political prog-
provement of men themselves, when at last ress may have an ultimate goalthe world
their natures can develop under ideal circum- republic or federation of states. But this, ac-
stances. cording to Kant's conclusion in the Science of
is an
Right, impracticable idea, and serves only
WE HAVE NOTED TWO great issues in the char- the regulative purpose of "promoting a contin-
problem of the evolutionist: whether a higher the same as that which we observed between
form of life on earth will evolve from man or Thucydides and Adam Smith with regard to
whether the future belongs to the progressive wealth. The
ancients assert the superiority of
development of human nature biologically or the present over the past, and even trace the
culturally. Darwin is unwilling to admit that stages by which advances have been made from
"man alonecapable of progressive improve-
is
primitive to civilized conditions. But they do
ment," but he does affirm that man "is capable not extend the motion they observe into the
of incomparably greater and more rapid im- future. The moderns look to the future as to a
provement than is any other animal." fulfillment without which present political ac-
Rousseau, on the other hand, claims that tivity would be undirected.
"the faculty of self-improvement" is one dis- According to Aristotle, for example, the state
tinction between man and brute "which will isthe last stage in the development of social life
admit of no dispute." But he also thinks that which begins with the family. "When several
this faculty is the cause of human decline as families are united, and the association aims at
well as progress. "A brute, at the end of a few something more than the supply of daily needs,
months," he writes, "is all he will ever be during the first society to be formed is the village."
his whole life, and his species, at the end of a The village or tribal community, in turn, be-
thousand years, exactly what it was the first comes the unit out of which a larger and more
year of that thousand .While the brute,
. . .
truly political community is formed. "When
which has acquired nothing and has therefore several villages are united in a single complete
nothing to lose, still retains the force of instinct, community, large enough to be nearly or quite
man, who loses, by age or accident, all that his self-sufficing, the state comes into existence."
perfectibilityhad enabled him to gain, falls by Aristotle sees this development not merely as
this means lower than the brutes themselves." a progress from smaller and weaker societies to
One other issue concerning progress remains larger and more powerful ones, but also as an
to be stated. It raises the question of freedom or advance toward the realization of man's politi-
necessity in history. Is progress inevitable in cal nature. Absolute or despotic government by
the very nature of the case, or does it occur only the eldest, natural to the family, still persists in
when men plan wisely and choose well in their the tribe. "This is the reason why the Hellenic
CHAPTER 71: PROGRESS 441
states were originally governed by kings; be- According to Mill, the ideally best polity is
cause the Hellenes were under royal rule before representative government on democratic prin-
they came together, as the barbarians still are." ciples. By a just distribution of political rights
Not until the domestic or tribal form of govern- and by the fullest grant of liberties, it serves
ment is replaced by political or constitutional better than any other form of government "to
government not until kings and subjects are promote the virtue and intelligence of the peo-
replaced by statesmen and citizens is the state ple themselves." This is the ultimate end of po-
or political community fully realized. litical progress. Inferior forms of government,
But Aristotle does not conceive the develop- such as despotic monarchy, may be justified for
ment he describes as one continuing into the people as yet unfit for self-government, but
future. He does not imagine a larger political only if they also work for progress, i.e., "if they
unity than the city-state, as Kant is able to en- carry those communities through the interme-
visage a world state as the ultimate formation diate stages which they must traverse before
toward which the progressive political unifica- they can become fit for the best form of gov-
tion of mankind should tend. Though Aristotle ernment."
recognizes that new institutions have been in- The whole theory of good government is
vented and old ones perfected, his political thus for Mill a theory of progress in which we
theory, unlike Mill's, does not seem to measure must take "into account, not only the next
the goodness of the best existing institutions by step, but all the steps which society has yet to
their devotion to further progress. make; both those which can be foreseen and
Considering the criterion of a good form of the far wider indefinite range which is at pres-
government, Mill criticizes those who separate ent out of sight." We must judge the merits of
the maintenance of order, or the preservation diverse forms of government by that ideal form
of existing institutions, from the cultivation of "which, if the necessary conditions existed for
progress. "Progress includes Order," he writes, giving effect to its beneficial tendencies, would,
"but Order does not include Progress." Order more than all others, favour and promote not
"is not an additional end to be reconciled with some one improvement, but all forms and de-
Progress, but a part and means of Progress it- grees of it."
self. If a gain in one respect is purchased by a
more than equivalent loss in the same or in any IN THE FIELD OF THE ARTS and sciences or cul-
Progress fails to define good government, progress in a science is taken to indicate that it
Mill adds, unless we understand by the term not has not yet been established on the right foun-
merely "the idea of moving onward," but dations or that the right method for discover-
"quite as much the prevention of falling back. ing the truth has not yet been found. Lack of
The very same social causes ... are as much re- is the chief
agreement in a particular field symp-
quired to prevent society from retrograding, as tom of these defects.
to produce a further advance. Were there no The fact that philosophy "has been culti-
improvement to be hoped for, life would not be vated for centuries by the best minds
many
the less an unceasing struggle against causes of that have ever lived, and that nevertheless no
deterioration; as it even now is. Politics, as con- single thing is to be found in it which is not a
ceived by the ancients, consisted wholly in this subject of dispute, and in consequence which is
.. .
Though we no longer hold this opinion; not dubious," leads Descartes to propose his
though most men in the present age profess a new method. He hopes this may ensure prog-
contrary creed, believing that the tendency of ress in philosophy, of the same sort which the
things, on the whole, is toward improvement; new method has, in his view, accomplished in
we ought not to forget that there is an incessant mathematics. The Novum Organum of Bacon
and everflowing current of human affairs seems to be dedicated to the same end of pro-
toward the worse." gressively augmenting knowledge in all those
442 THE GREAT IDEAS
fields in which, according to the inventory while,on the other hand, we do not collectively
made in the Advancement of Learning of the foil,but everyone says something true about
present state of the sciences, no or little prog- the nature of things, and while individually we
ress has been made since antiquity. Similarly, contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the
Locke, Hume, and Kant insist that a study of union of all a considerable amount is amassed."
the human mind should precede all other stud- Aristotle puts the intellectual tradition to use
ies in order to save men from fruitless disputes by adopting the policy of calling "into council
concerning matters beyond their capacities the views of those of our predecessors who have
forknowledge; they hope thereby to encour- declared any opinion" on whatever subject is
age research in areas where progress can be being considered, "in order that we may profit
made. by whatever is sound in their suggestions and
The comparison of different disciplines or avoid their errors."
subject matters with respect to their progress But, in the opinion of the moderns, the intel-
leads to the condemnation of those which lag lectual tradition can also be the greatest
imped-
behind. The
great scientific advances of the iment to the advancement of learning if it is
ryth century tend to intensify the complaint received uncritically and with undue reverence
about philosophy, especially metaphysics. The for the authority of the ancients. "The respect
progress which has been made from the begin- in which antiquity is held today," Pascal says,
ning in mathematics and more recently in "has reached such extremes in those matters in
physics means to Kant that each of these dis- which it should have the least preponderance,
ciplines has found the
"safe way" or the "se- that one can no longer present innovations
cure path" of a science. By comparison, meta- without danger." This is the common com-
physics has not yet even made a beginning. A plaint of Hobbes, Bacon, Descartes, and Har-
hundred years William fames is still to
later, vey. "The reverence for antiquity and the au-
say that, by comparison with the progress of thority of men who have been esteemed great
knowledge in the natural sciences, metaphysics in philosophy have," according to Bacon, "re-
belongs to the future. tarded men from advancing in science, and al-
The notion that any field of learning has at- most enchanted them."
tained its full maturity seems to Bacon to be Harvey agrees with Bacon that philosophers
the presumption of those philosophers who, or scientists should not "swear such fealty to
seeking "to acquire the reputation of perfec- their mistress Antiquity, that they openly, and
tion for their own art," try to instill the "belief even in sight of all, deny and desert their friend
that whatever has not yet been invented and Truth." Harvey has a much higher opinion
understood can never be so hereafter." When- than Bacon of the achievements of antiquity.
ever such belief prevails, learning languishes. "The ancient philosophers," he writes, "whose
"By far the greatest obstacle to the advance- industry even we admire, went a different way
ment of the sciences, and the undertaking of to work, and by their unwearied labor and
any new attempt or departure, is to be found in variety of experiments, searching into the
men's despair and the idea of impossibility." nature of things, have left us no doubtful light
to guide us in our studies. In this way it is that
THOUGH THE ANCIENTS do not evidence this almost everything we yet possess of note or
presumption of perfection in their arts and sci- credit in philosophy, has been transmitted to
ences, neither do they fret about lack of prog- us through the industry of ancient Greece."
ress. Nor does disagreement of minds
the His admiration for the ancients does not,
seem to them to signify an unhealthy condition however, lead Harvey to rest on their achieve-
which requires new and special methods to ments. "When we acquiesce in the discoveries
cure. of the ancients, and believe (which we are apt
"The investigation of the truth is in one way to do through indolence) that nothing farther
hard, in another easy," writes Aristotle. "An remains to be known," then, in his opinion,
indication of this is found in the fact that no "we suffer the edge of our ingenuity to be taken
one is able to attain the truth adequately, off, and the lamp which they delivered us to be
CHAPTER 71: PROGRESS 443
extinguished. No one of a surety," he con- things, so," Pascal suggests, "must we accept
tinues, "will allow that all truth was engrossed those which they found for us and follow their
by the ancients, unless he be utterly ignorant example by making them the means and not
(to pass by other arts for the present) of the the end of our study, and thus try to surpass
many remarkable discoveries that have lately them by imitating them. For what would be
been made in anatomy." more wrong than to treat the ancients with
In his own anatomical researches, Harvey more caution than they did those who preceded
adopts an attitude toward the work of his them, and to have for them this inviolable re-
predecessors, both ancient and recent, which spect which they only deserve from us be-
remarkably resembles the attitude expressed by cause they did not feel a similar respect for
Aristotle toward his scientific forebears. "As we those who had the same advantage over them ?"
are about to discuss the motion, action, and use
of the heart and arteries, it is
imperative on MODERN WRITERS SEEM to conceive the law of
us," Harvey declares, "first to state what has intellectual progress by an analogy between the
been thought of these things by others in their mind of the race and the individual mind.
and what has been held by the vulgar
writings, Where Aquinas says merely that "it seems nat-
and by tradition, in order that what is true ural to human
reason to advance gradually
may be confirmed, and what is false set right by from the imperfect to the perfect," adding, in
dissection, multiplied experience, and accurate the past tense, that hence the imperfect teach-
observation." It is
precisely this attitude which ing of early philosophers "was afterwards per-
Bacon expressly condemns. fected by those who succeeded them," Pascal
Bacon sees no genuine method of science, but generalizes the insight and gives it future sig-
merely a cultivation of opinion, in those who nificance. "Not only does each man progress
prepare themselves for discovery by first ob- from day to day in the sciences, but all men
taining "a full account of all that has been said combined make constant progress as the uni-
on the subject by others." Those who begin in verse ages, because the same thing happens in
this way, it is the judgment of Descartes, sel- the succeeding generations of men as in the dif-
dom go further. Particularly the followers of ferent ages of each particular man. So that the
Aristotle "would think themselves happy," he whole succession of men, in the course of so
they had as much knowledge of nature
says, "if many centuries, should be regarded as the same
as he had, even if this were on the condition man who exists always and learns continually."
that they should never attain to any more. At this point Pascal applies his metaphor to
They are like the ivy that never tries to mount effect a reversal of the relation between the
above the trees which give it support, and moderns and the ancients. "Since old age is the
which often even descends again after it has time of life most distant from childhood, who
reached the summit; for it
appears to me that does not realize that old age in this universal
such men also sink again that is to say, some- man should not be sought in the times closest to
how render themselves more ingnorant than his birth, but in those which are farthest away
they would have been had they abstained from from it? Those whom we call ancients were
study altogether. For, not content with know- really novices in all things, and actually be-
ing all that is intelligibly explained in their au- longed to the childhood of man; and as we have
thor, they wish in addition to find in him the added to their knowledge the experience of the
solution of many of which he says
difficulties centuries which followed them, it is in ourselves
nothing, and in regard to which he possibly had that may be found this antiquity which we
no thought at all." revere in others."
Pascal takes a more moderate view. We can Whether by accident or borrowing, this
profit,he thinks, from a limited respect for the modern view of the advan-
characteristically
ancients. "Just as they made use of those discov- tage progress confers upon modernity is ex-
erieswhich have been handed down to them pressed in similar language by Hobbes and
only as a means for making new ones and this Bacon. "Though I reverence those men of an-
happy audacity opened the road to great cient times," writes Hobbes, "who either have
444 THE GREAT IDEAS
written truth perspicuously or have set us in a avoidance of two extremes, the affectations of
better way to find it out for ourselves; yet to antiquity and novelty, for "antiquity envies
the antiquity itself I think nothing due; for if new improvements, and novelty is not content
we will reverence age, the present is the oldest." to add without defacing." Since "antiquity de-
"Antiquity, as we call it," writes Bacon, "is the serves that men should stand awhile upon it, to
young state of the world; for those times are view around which is the best
way," the great
ancient when the world is ancient; and not books of the past can lay the foundations for
those we vulgarly account ancient by comput- progress, but only if they are properly read,
ing backwards; so that the present time is the "Let great authors, therefore, have their due,"
real antiquity." Bacon declares, "but so as not to defraud time,
To secure a sound, not specious, progress in which is the author of authors, and the parent
all things of the mind, Bacon recommends the of truth."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The idea of progress in the philosophy of history 445
10. Providence and necessity in the theory of progress: the dialectical development
of Spirit or matter; conflict as a source of progress
ic. Skeptical or pessimistic denials of progress: the golden age as past; the cyclical
motion of history 446
3.
Economic progress
3^. The improvement of the status and conditions of labor: the goals of revolution
and reform
y. Man's progressive conquest of the forces of nature through science and invention 447
4. Progress in politics
4^. The growth of political freedom: the achievement of citizenship and civil rights
6d. Plans for the advancement of learning and the improvement of method in the
arts and sciences 451
6e. Freedom of expression and discussion as indispensable to the progressive discovery
of the truth 452
CHAPTER 71 : PROGRESS 445
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
:
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. The idea of progress in the philosophy of 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 320d; 321c; 322d-
history 323a; 328b-c; 596c
la.
.,
Providence and necessity
, ....
m
the theory of
e 50 MARX: Capital, 6c-7d; lOa-lld esp llb-d
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto ,419b,d-
progress: the dialectical development 4255
of Spirit or matter; conflict as a source 51 TOLSTOY: War an d Peace, EPILOGUE i, 645a-
of progress 650c esp 646 b- C EPILOGUE n, 675b-d; 676d-
;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 179d- tions of labor: the goals of revolution
and reform
180c; 183d-184d
47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE [281-292] 8a; PART 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 4
b
i
[4072-4095] 99b-100a 447b-c; BK n, CH 9 [i269*33- 7] 465c; CH 12
b a
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 316b [I273 36-i274 22] 470c-d / Athenian Consti-
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 323a tution,CH 2 553a-c; CH 5-6 554d-555c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 645a- 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 36a-37c / Solon, 68d-
646c 70c / Agis 648b,d-656d / Tiberius Gracchus
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 776c- 671b,d-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-
777d 689a,c
CHAPTER 71: PROGRESS 447
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xm, 132a-c 46 HLGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 195b-d;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i-n, Q PART i, 243d-244c; PART n, 267a-b; PART iv,
105, A 4, ANS and REP 1-4 318b 321a 347d-348a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xv, llla-c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [6835-6860] 167b-
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 6a-d; 27b- 168a
37b csp 33c; 51a-62a passim; BK HI, 165b- 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 204a-b
175b; BK iv, 182a-b; 200a-201a; 251c d 50 MARX: Capital, 86a-c; 170a-c; 180d-188c esp
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 16c-17b; 144a-c; 181c-184b, 187d-188a; 239c-d; 253a-255aesp
628c-629a 253d-254b; 299b-d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 452d-453a,c 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 420d-
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARIICLE iv, 421a; 421d
SECT 2 [529-535] 16b; AMENDMENTS, XIII 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 777a-c;
18c 778b-779a; 802a,c / New Introductory Lectures,
43 MILL: Representative Government, 332c; 339d- 882d 883a
340c;393c-394d
44 BoswhLL:/o/;wiWj, 172b-d
4. Progress in politics
50 MARX: Capital, 7b; 8c-9c esp 9c; lllc-146c
4a. The invention and improvement of politi-
esp 113c, 115c, 131a-146c; 209c-215a; 231b-
248d csp 235a, 236c-238c, 241a-c, 248c-d; cal institutions: the maintenance of po-
litical order in relation to progress
295a-d; 367b-368b; 377c-378d
50 MARX~ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 415c- 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b
416d; 419b,d; 423b-425b; 426b-d; 429b-c; 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 366d-
432b-434d 367a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 211a-213a; 7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 316c-318a; BK iv,
BK vi, 235a 344b-d / Laws, BK in, 663d 666d
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi, 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 2 445b-446d
b a
165b-c esp [i252 27~i253 i] 446a-b; BK n, CH 8
b
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 787 d- [i268 23 1269*28] 464d-465b; BK vn, CH 10
b
788a esp 787d-788b [fn 3] / New Introductory [i32</40- 35] 533d-534b / Athenian Con-
Lectures, 883d-884c stitution 553a-584a,c passim, esp CH 41 571c-
572a
c. Man's progressive conquest of the forces of 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1011-
nature through science and invention
1027] 74b-c; [1105-1160] 75c-76b
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c- 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [254-296] llOa-llla; BK
45a vi [845 -853) 233b-234a
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 32a-48d / Solon 64b,d'
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [195-218] 260a-b 77a,c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, UK v [1241- 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, 51b-c
1296] 77b-78a passim; [1361-1378] 78d-79a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
13 VIRGIL: Gevrgics, i [121-146] 40b-41a 97, A i, AN& 236a-d
14 PLUTARCH: MarceUus, 252a-255a 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xxvi 36b-37d
28 GILBLRT: Loadstone, BK v, lOOc-lOld 23 HtjBBts: leviathan, PART n, 153c-154a;
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 164a,c
191b-193b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xm, SECT 157-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 14b- 158 61c-62b
15a; 56b / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 15 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 5,
107a-b; APH
120b c; APH 124 133c-d;
81 453a-b
APH 129 134d-135d; BK n, APH 39 169d-170c; 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK in, 9c-d;
APH 49-51 188b-194c / New Atlantis, 210d- BK iv, 16a-17a; BK x, 62b-c; BK xi, 75b-d; BK
214d xiv, 107d; BK xix, 140d-141a; BK xxi, 170a;
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi 60d-67a,c esp BK xxiv, 201b-c
61b-d, 66d-67a,c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323a-325b esp 324d;
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 106a-107a 354d 355b; 356a-b / Political Economy 367a-
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xvni, 385a,c / Social Contract, BK i, 391b-392a; BK
126c-d; BK xxin, 191a-c n, 400c-406a; BK HI, 420a-c; 423a-424a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 339b-c; 348d-353c; 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 617a
363b;365b-366b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 71d-80b; 202a-d;
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i. 5b-6d 218c-219a; 403b-404d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 633d-634a,c 42 KANT: Science of Right, 438d-439a; 450d-
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 452a-b 452a; 456b-458a,c / Judgement, 586b<c
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 170a-172a; 183b- 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9 47a-49c; NUMBER 14,
184a 60c-d; 62a-d; NUMBER 37-38 117d-125a:
448 THE GREAT IDEAS
43 MILL: 267b,d-268c / Representative
Liberty,
(4. Progress in politics. 40. The invention and Government, 328d-332d esp 331a; 352a-b;
improvement of political institutions: the 367b-c; 381b-382c; 394a-396d
maintenance of political order in relation 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 275b-
toprogress.) 276a; PART in, 288c; 295d-296c; PART iv,
92a; par 355 112d-113a; ADDITIONS, 166 145b-c 348c passim; 387c-d / Utilitarianism, 452a-b
/ Philosophy of History, INTRO, 187d-188b; 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 211b-c; 297b; 307c-d;
PART 209b; 235d-236a; 257a-c; PART n,
i, 380d-381a; 512d-513a
280b-281b; PART in, 302a-d; PART iv, 351b- 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 33a
353a; 367a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 247
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1972-1979] 46b-47a; 78a-b / Philosophy of History 153a-369a,c esp
PART n [7963 -7964] 194a INTRO, 182b-c, 185a-186a, PART i, 217c-219c,
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 228b-229b 235d-236a, 248a-c, 251a-b, 253b-c, PART n,
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 323a 277d-278a, PART in, 300d-301a, PART iv,
50 MARX: Capital, 6d-7a; 174b-c; 234a-236c; 318a, 346c-348a, 351b-353a, 361a-362b
239b-240b 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [570-573] 16a
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 424b- 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 320a-330a,c esp
c; 426b-428d passim; 429c-433d passim, esp 323a-324b, 327b-330a,c; 596c
433c-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196b; BK xi,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 239a~240a; 498b-d; EPILOGUE n, 695d-696d
240b-d; BK vm, 303a-305b; BK ix, 354b-c; 54 FREUD: Psycho -Analytic Therapy, 125d-126a /
BK x, 403a-c; EPILOGUE i, 645a-646c; 647b-c; Civilization and Its Discontents, 776d-780b;
666c-669d 781a-d; 801c-802a,c / New Introductory Lec-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 79b tures, 849d
54 FREUD: War and Death, 759c-761c esp 759c-d
and Its Discontents, 776c-777c; 6a. Progress in the arts
/ Civilization
780d-781d esp 781c; 783c-791d esp 785c, 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c-
791b-d; 799a-802a,c esp 800c-801c / New 45a
Introductory Lectures, 834c; 853a-b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK 11, 49d-50a
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 350b-
6. Intellectual or cultural progress: its sources 351a
and impediments 7 PLATO: Critias, 479c-d / Statesman, 601 b-
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK in, CH
10 207b-d 603a / Laws, BK n, 654c-655b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 97, 8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34
b b
A i, ANS 236a-d [i83 i6-i84 8] 253a-d / Metaphysics, BK i,
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 274c-d CH CH b
i
[98^13-24] SOOa; BK xii, 8 [io74 8-
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK 11,
81d-82b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [1098*21-25]
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 271b-c 343c-d / Politics, BK n, CH 8 [1268^5-38]
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 464d / Rhetoric, BK in, CH i [i4o^ b i5-i404 R 39J
166c-d; 203c-d 653b,d-654c / Poetics, CH 4-5 682c-684a
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c; 285b-c 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-4 la-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning la-lOld esp 2c; par 12 4b-c
la-15a, 20b-25c, 29a-32c, 33d-34a, 35b-36c, 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [330-337]
38d-39a, 51d-54b / Novum Organum, BK i, 65b-c; [925-1160] 73b-76b; [1241-1457] 77b-
APH 38-46 109c-110c; APH 85 121d-122d; 80a,c
APH 129 134d-135d / New Atlantis, 203d- 13 VIRGIL: Georgics, i [121-146] 40b-41a
207b 14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252a-255a
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 45b-46a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XXH, CH 24,
32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 384a-b 610a-c
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 355a-358b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 46,
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH x, A 2, REP 4 253a-255a
SECT 6-13 293a-294d passim 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 85c; PART n,
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336a-337a; 337d-348a; 153d; PART iv, 267c-269b passim
348d-353c; 362a-363a,c / Social Contract, BK 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n,
i, 393b-c 81d-82b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 21c-24a,c; 88d-90d; 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 85 121d-
158d-159c; 601b-d; 627d-630a passim, esp 122d; APH 129 134d-135d
627d-628b; 633c-634a,c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61a-c
41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 161c-162b; 225a-b; 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART m, 103b-115b esp
298a-300c esp 300a-b; 326b-328a,c; 347a,c; 106a-107a
451c-453a,c; 522b-528a,c esp 523a-b, 527d- 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 224b-225a
528a,c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336a-337a; 338d-339a;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 222a-c / Judgement, 339d-342c; 346d-347a; 348d-353c; 365b-366b
504a-b; 586a-587a 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 190d-191a;
43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-302c; 311d-312a / Repre- BK v, 308c-309a,c
u
450 THE GREAT IDEAS 6b to 6c
CH 1-2 587a-589a; CH 5-6 590a-592b; BK XH, 31 DESCARTES: Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART i,
CH 8 [io74b i-i4J 604d-605a; CH 10 [i075 a 42b-44c, PART ii, 46c-48a, PART in, 49d-50b,
25-1076*4] 606a-d; BK xm-xiv 607a-626d / PART vi 60d-67a,c / Objections and Replies,
Soul, BK i, CH 2-5 633a-641d 278a-293a,c passim
9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals, BK in, CH 3
: 32 MILTON: Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 384b-
[513*7-11] 36c-d / Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 389a, 398a-b
[642*25-30] 165b-c / Ethics, BK i, CH 6 341b- 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 355a-358b
342c esp [1096*11-16] 341b 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 526b-529a
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 12 4b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 85a-c; BK i,
/{Regimen in Acute Diseases, par i 26a-d CH in, SECT 23-24 119b-120c; BK iv, CH xvn,
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 14, 178d- SECT 4, 373a-b
179a; CH 16 180c-182b esp 181d-182b; BK n, 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, PREP 404a-b;
CH 8, 192a-b; CH 9, 198d-199a,c; BK in, CH INTRO, SECT 24 411d-412a
10 207b-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 346d-347a
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 6b 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b<337a
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 23d-24a,c
Spheres, 508a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 198c-d; 298a-300a;
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 846a-850a / Har- 522d-528a,c esp 523b-c, 526c-527a, 527d-
monies of the World, 1009b-1010a 528a,c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 13-15 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 220b-221b / Judgement,
47c-48c / City of God, BK vin-x 264b,d- 513d-514b
322a,c passim; BK xix, CH 1-5 507a-514b 43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b
/ Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 40 655b- 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 129a
656a 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 3b-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 22, 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 332a-b
A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 44, A 2, ANS 239b-240a; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 265c-
Q 65, A 4, ANS 342b-343c; Q 66, A i 343d- 266a; PART iv, 346c-348a; 361a-362b
345c; A 2, ANS 345d-347b; Q 75, A i, ANS 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic1(, 243a
and REP 1-2 378b-379c; Q 76, A i, ANS 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 590a
385d-388c; A 3, ANS 391a-393a; A 4, REP 4 50 MARX-ENGELS Communist Manifesto, 428b-d
:
393a-394c; Q 79, A 4, ANS 417a-418c; Q 84, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n 675a-
A i, ANS 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; 696d
A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 5, ANS 446c-447c; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 125b-126a; 221a-239a;
A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d- 305a-312a; 627a-635a; 879b-882a
455b; Q 88, A i, ANS 469a-471c 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 550d-551a /
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q New Introductory Lectures, 879c-880b
95, A 3 228c-229b; Q 97, A i, ANS 236a-d;
PART ii-n, Q i, A 7, REP 2 385c-387a 6d. Plans for the advancement of learning and
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, the improvement of method in the arts
i [61-87] 1(1-
and sciences
2a; iv 5c-7a;PURGATORY, xxi [76]-xxn [129]
85d-87d; xxvi [88-148] 93d-94c 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49d; 56b-d; 58d- 161a-165d esp [642*i4-b 4] 165b-d
61a passim; 71a-b; PART n, 114d-115a; 150c- 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 la-
151a; PART iv, 247a-248a; 267a-274d; 276c; 3b / The Law 144a-d
CONCLUSION, 282b-283a 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK in, CH 10,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 65b-66b; 208b-c; 259d- 207d
261c; 271b-c; 276b-278a; 524d-525a 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 331c-337a,c
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, 2b-d; BK i, 3a- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning la-lOld /
7b; BK n, 34c-36c; BK in, 60c~61a; BK iv, Novum Organum 105a-195d / New Atlantis
77d-78a; 84a-d; BK vi, 107c-110d; 113c- 199a-214d
115a 31 DESCARTES: Rules la*40a,c passim, esp i-m,
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 157b- la-4a, iv 5a-7d / Discourse 41a-67a,c esp
160a PART i, 41d-42a, PART H, 45b-47b, 48a-b,
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-269a; PART in, 50b-51a, PART iv, 52a, PART v,
274a-b; 279d-280c; 285b-c / Circulation of 54b-c, PART vi, 61a-d, 62c-63c, 66d-67a,c /
the Blood, 306a-c; 319c-d / On Animal Gen- Geometry 295a-353b esp BK i, 298b, BK n,
eration, 331a-332a; 336d-337a,c; 364a-365a; 322a,BK HI, 353a
377a-c; 457b; 458a-b 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 430a-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 14b-15d 434a; 442a-443b
esp 15a-d; 16c; 27d-28c; 29b-c; 32a; 47d-48d; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH HI,
64a-b / Novum Organum, BK i, APR 56 112a; SECT 22 319c-320a; CH iv, SECT 17 328d; CH
APH 84 121b-d; APH 94-97 126a-d xn 358c-363b esp SECT 14-15 362d-363b
452 THE GREAT IDEAS 6d to 6e
(6. Intellectual or culturalprogress: its sources ami 6e. Freedom of expression and discussion as
impediments. 6d. Plans for the advance" indispensable to the progressive dis-
went of learning and the improvement of covery of the truth
method in the arts and sciences.) 7 PLATO: Statesman, 601c<602c
35 BERKELEY: HumanKnowledge, INTRO, SECT 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT 14 254b-c
21-25 411b-412a,c; SECT 133-134 439c-440a 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 283c-d
35 HUME: Human Understanding SECT vu, DIV 49 32 MILTON: Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 384 b-
471c-d 390a, 398a-b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 106a-115b 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 15c / Human Understand-
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 331 b,d- ing, BK IV, CH III, SECT 20 319D-C
356d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xi, DIV
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c; 5a-13d; 15c-16c; 102 497b-d
19a-22a,c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 40 Gi B BON Decline and Fall, 668d-671 b esp 669b,
:
253c-d 670b-c
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 6d- 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 523a
7a,c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 220b-221b; 223a-c
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 175b 43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b; 297b-299a
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general discussion of the philosophy of history, see DIALECTIC 2d; HISTORY 4a(2)~4
4b; and for the consideration of fate, fortune, and freedom in relation to progress, see
CHANCE 20; FATE 3; HISTORY 43(1); LIBERTY 43; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 3.
The religious aspects of optimism and pessimism, see GOD 7!!, 8e, 9f; HISTORY 53; PROPHECY
4c-4d.
The notion of progress in the theory of biological evolution, see EVOLUTION 4d.
Other discussions of the myth of a golden age, see LABOR ra; MAN 93; TIME 8b.
Discussions relevant to the theme of economic progress, see LABOR 43, 5a~5d, 70(2), 7f;
LIBERTY 6b; REVOLUTION 43, 5c; SLAVERY 3c, 5b; WEALTH Qb, 12.
10; DEMOCRACY
Discussions relevant to the theme of political progress, see CONSTITUTION
4d, 7; GOVERNMENT 6; LIBERTY 6a-6c; MONARCHY 46(2); SLAVERY 5b; STATE 23(3);
TYRANNY 8; and for the distinction between Utopian and practical ideals as goals of
political progress, see CITIZEN 8; STATE 6, icf; WAR AND PEACE iid.
Attitudes toward change which have a bearing on progress, see CHANGE i2b; CUSTOM AND
CONVENTION 8; TIME 7.
Evidences of progress in the arts and sciences, and for the comparative progress of different
fields of learning, see ART 12; KNOWLEDGE 10; PHILOSOPHY 7.
The conditions on which intellectual progress depends, see KNOWLEDGE 9b; LANGUAGE 6;
OPINION 5b; SCIENCE 6a-6b; SIGN AND SYMBOL 4c; TRUTH 6, 8d.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
J. S. MILL. "Civilization," in VOL i, Dissertations SPENCER. Progress: Its Law and Cause
and Discussions BAGEHOT. Physics and Politics
S. BUTLER. Erewhon
II.
GEORGE. Progress and Poverty
Vico. The New Science T. H. HUXLEY. Methods and Results, I-H
VOLTAIRE. Candide MAINE, Ancient Law
"Optimism," in A Philosophical Dictionary
. .
Popular Government, HI
FERGUSON. An Essay on the History of Civil Society, BELLAMY. Looking Backward
PART III FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART i, CH 3, 5; PART H,
LESSING. Nathan the Wise CH 7; PART vn
The Education of the Human Race
. SUMNER. The Absurd Effort to Ma{e the World Over
HERDER. Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of JENSEN. The Long Journey
Man SOREL. Les illusions du progre*s
CONDORCET. Outlines of an Historical View of the B. RUSSELL. Proposed Roads to Freedom, CH 4-8
INTRODUCTION
'"T" T
HE name of prophet signifies, throughout deceiving impostor or a self-deceived victim of
JL a great part of the western tradition, an his own pathology.
eminence and dignity not shared by the scien- Similarly, the Christian theologians who
tist,the philosopher, the statesman, or even the pagan cult of oracles and all forms
criticize the
sage. The soothsayer and the seer in pagan antiq- of divination which seek to pry into divine
uity and the prophet of the Lord in Israel do mysteries, seem to imply that the seers and
not claim to speak from a merely human wis- soothsayers of Greece and Rome, unlike the
dom or to declare truths they have learned by Hebrew prophets, did not have the gift of
inquiry or reflection. Nor are their utterances prophecy. The acceptance or rejection of
concerned with the nature of things. The proph- prophets and of ways of foreseeing what has
et claims toknow what men cannot know by been planned in Heaven cannot, it seems, be
any exercise of human powers. He enjoys spe- separated from a whole system of religious be-
cial gifts. He is divinely inspired. He is in- liefs. In this respect, prophets arc like miracles.
structed by God or has in some way been ad- Without faith, both are incredible. "There be
mitted to the secrets of the gods. His knowl- two marks," writes Hobbes, "by which to-
edge is not only of supernatural origin; it deals gether, not asunder, a true Prophet is to be
with supernatural matters. known. One is the doing of miracles; the other
Prophecy is more than a prediction of the is the not teaching any other religion than that
future. It unveils what Fate holds in store for which is
already established." In Hobbes' view,
men; it of providence. In
foretells the course that there be a religion already established
most predicted has deep moral
cases, the future among a people is the one indispensable condi-
significance, expressing the pleasure or displeas- tion for their reception of prophets or their ex-
ure of the gods with individuals or nations, or perience of miracles.
manifesting Clod's justice in the rewards prom- Issues concerning prophecy may, therefore,
ised those who keep His commandments, and occur within a single religious community, or
the punishments awaiting those who break be relative to differences between religious
them. The prophet's foresight discerns more communities, as, for example, the opposition
than the future; it discovers what men can between the Jewish and Christian interpreta-
hope for or must fear according to their merits, tion of the messianic prophecies in the Old
not in the eyes of men but in the sight of God. Testament. Necessarily, then, there is an issue
This understanding of prophecy seems to be between the unbelievers and the religious of
involved in the major issues which the great any faith. Those who deny the existence of
books raise about prophets. For example, the God or the gods, or divine agency in the tem-
problem of distinguishing between true and poral affairs of men, and certainly those who
false prophets goes beyond the mere truth or deny the credentials of revelation, cannot but
falsity of a prophet's utterances to the validity regard prophets as misled and misleading and
of his claim to special sources of knowledge or a those who accept prophecy as gullible or su-
ing all other religious beliefs or being them- example, leaves foresight in the hands of the
selves atheists. gods; for, as most of the anecdotes in Herodo-
Some who reject religious prophecy do not tus and Thucydides show, only the Pythoness
concede that man's natural desire to peer into herself knows unequivocally the meaning of
the future need be completely balked. But the her oracular utterances.
secular substitutes for religious prophecy ap- To men is left the task of interpreting what
pear to alter the meaning of prophecy. Scientific the oracle means. The pagan unlike the Hebrew
predictions of the future of the world or of life prophet seems to be a man of skill in penetrat-
on example, those which
this planet (as, for ing the secrets of the gods a skill which may
occur in the writings of Lucretius or Darwin) itself be
divinely bestowed but he is not a man
may be accompanied by attributions of moral to whom the gods have spoken plainly, so that
qualities to Nature, but usually they connote he may in turn unerringly advise others. "No
Nature's sublime indifference to man's welfare. man, when in his wits," according to Plato,
They are seldom, if ever, read as promises or "attains prophetic truth and inspiration."
threats of what man deserves to have befall There are passages in the Greek poets and
him. historians which seem to suggest that the
gods
Similarly, historians turned prophets, or begrudge men too clear a vision of the future,
philosophers of history who, like Spcngler, and may even on occasion mislead them or at
prophesy decline and doom, do not exhort men least permit them to be misled. In
Aeschylus'
to avert disaster, as do the prophets of the Old play, Prometheus declares that "because he
Testament. Nor do
those who, like Hegel and gave to men gifts claimed by the gods," he is
Marx, foresee the ultimate goal toward which "bound in durance here." He gave them radiant
events inevitably march, urge men to prepare fire, the mechanical arts; he "took from men
themselves for it as do the prophecies of the the expectancy of Death"; he gave them medi-
New Testament, which speak of the second cines and healing drugs. Last in his own enu-
coming of Christ. Secular prophecies which meration and in a sense most significant, he en-
bespeak the inevitable operation of necessary dowed men with the divine gift of foresight.
causes are, in this respect, like pagan previsions "I drew clear lines for divination," Prome-
of Fate. At most, they leave man only the theus says, "and discerned (before all
others)
illusion of free choice. Jewish and Christian what from dreams is sure to come to pass in
and freedom in the chapters on FATE and Does the wisdom of foreknowledge, gained
NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. through the arts of divination, give men
strength to resist the will of the gods or to
IN PAGAN ANTIQUITY, prophecy does not seem struggle against them?
to be confined to men especially appointed Prometheus himself is the answer to the
by the gods. The gods themselves foretell the question.The power he wields over Zeus, which
future to men. When people wish to know the Zeus tries to wrest from him by bribes and
future, they go or send emissaries to the temple threats and by the infliction of titanic pain, is
at Delphi over which a goddess, the Pythoness, the foreknowledge which Prometheus possesses
presides. The institution of the oracles, of of the doom to befall the son of Kronos. No
which Delphi is
perhaps the most illustrious threat of Zeus will get him to divulge it,
456 THE GREAT IDEAS
Prometheus says, because "nought can surprise ing an example of a clear prediction, he adds,
me who foreknow . . .
Nought in his power "When I look to this, and perceive how clearly
shall bend me to reveal whom Fate prepares to Bacis spoke, I neither venture myself to say
work his overthrow." anything against prophecies, nor do I approve
A myth which Socrates relates in the Gorgias of others impugning them."
appears to contain a sequel to the legend as told Thucydides appears to take a contrary view.
by Aeschylus. It also seems to confirm the point He singles out one example as "an instance of
that foresight is a divine privilege in which faith in oracles being for once justified by the
men should not share, lest they become too event." He puts into the speech of the Athenians
god-like. According to the myth, Zeus, in or- at the Melian Conference the warning not to
der to prevent men from evading the divine "be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such
judgment, says: "In the first place, I will de- security as human means may still afford, when
prive men of the foreknowledge of death; this visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to
power which they have, Prometheus has al- invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other
sent to Delphi to ask whether Timo should be misinterpretation. Croesus dreamed that his
punished for this, the Pythoness forbade them, son Atys would die by the blow of an iron
saying, "Timo was not at fault; 'twas decreed weapon. Subsequently when Atys wished to go
that Miltiades should come to an unhappy end; boar hunting with Adrastus, he persuaded
and she was sent to lure him to his destruction." Croesus that the dream could not have been a
There is also the story, told by Thucydides, warning against this undertaking because a
of Cyclon who, inquiring at Delphi, was told boar does not have hands to strike with, nor
to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand does it wield iron weapons. But during the
festival of Zeus. This, too, turned into a disas- hunt Atys was killed by the spear which Adras-
Thucydides observes, "whether the grand fes- On another occasion, Croesus inquired of
tival that was meant was in Attica or else- Delphi how long his kingdom would last. The
where was a question he never thought of, Pythoness answered, in effect, until "a mule is
and which the oracle did not offer to solve." monarch in Media." This not only pleased him
For the most part, however, the calamities because "it seemed incredible to him that a
which befall men who seek guidance from the mule should ever become king of the Medes,"
oracle seem to be due to their own misinter- but also gave him confidence when he engaged
pretation of the Delphic deliverance, itself al- in war with the Medes and Persians, led by
ways admittedly difficult to understand. He- Cyrus. The war ended in his defeat and capture
rodotus and Thucydides abound with such but, according to Herodotus, he had no right
stories, and alsowith instances in which the to complain of the oracle because "he had mis-
same oracular statement is given conflicting in- understood the answer which had been given
terpretations, one of which must be wrong. him about the mule. Cyrus was that mule; for
Nevertheless, Herodotus declares himself un- the parents of Cyrus were of different races
willing "to say that there is no truth in proph- and of different kinds" his mother a Median
ecies," and he is
certainly not willing to ques- princess, his father a Persian subject.
tion "those which speak with clearness." Giv- The attitude of the ancients toward these
CHAPTER 72: PROPHECY 457
"despising the omens," carried out his plans true and false religion, Hobbes goes further
against their forebodings; and at another how than the theologians in condemning "the in-
an eclipse of the moon, being interpreted as of numerable other superstitious ways of divina-
good omen, rejoiced Xerxes who, "thus in- tion," such as "the ambiguous or senseless an-
structed, proceeded on his way with great swers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon,
gladness of heart." And again, when Xerxes re- and other famous oracles," or "the prediction
ports to Artabanus the advice concerning his of witches that pretended conference with the
war against the Greeks which he received dead, which is called necromancy, conjuring,
from a dream apparition, Artabanus scoffs, say- and witchcraft, and is but juggling and con-
sleep, and is said to be based on dreams," cultures seem to exhibit a certain parallelism
Aristotle writes, "we cannot lightly either dis- with regard to the belief in supernatural fore-
miss with contempt or give it implicit con-
it knowledge. The spirits of the departed, in the
fidence." Nevertheless, he himself seems to con- Odyssey and the Aeneid, are able to inform the
clude that most so-called prophetic dreams are visitor to the underworld of coming events on
"to be classed as mere coincidences"; and that earth. They speak plainly and with perfect
"dreams are not sent by God, nor are they de- prescience. The veil which hides the future
signed for this purpose," /.*., foretelling the from mortal eyes has been lifted. So, too, the
future. One proof that they are not sent by damned souls and the blessed foretell future
God is, in his opinion, the fact that the persons things to Dante, no less accurately though less
having them "are not the best and wisest but extensively than, in Paradise Lost, the arch-
merely commonplace persons." The fact that angel Michael unfolds to Adam the whole fu-
"the power of foreseeing the future and of ture history of mankind.
having vivid dreams is found in persons of in- But so far as the foreknowledge of mortal
ferior type implies that God does not send men is concerned, the Hebrew prophets seem
them." to be unique. Unlike pagan diviners or sooth-
Though their criticism seems to be directed God speaks to them directly and, through
especially against astrology, it applies to the in- them, to the Chosen People. For the most part
terpretation of terrestrial as well as celestial their prophetic speeches, unlike those of the
signs. Augustine refers to "the lying divina- oracles, seem to be unambiguous. At least the
tionsand impious dotages of the astrologers," intention seems to be to reveal, not to conceal,
and Aquinas explains how the astrologers are God's plan on such matters as He Himself
able to foretell things in a general way without wishes men to foresee the course of providence.
458 THE GREAT IDEAS
Where pagan prognosticators may claim to Augustine plainly shown by the agreement of
be divinely inspired in the sense of having the prophets with one another and by their
special powers of interpretation, the Hebrew continuity with Moses and the patriarchs;
prophets speak from a different kind of super- whereas Augustine can find nothing but disa-
natural inspiration. They are the vessels greement and dissension among even the best
through which the Lord Himself speaks. They teachers of the pagans. Among them, false
are interpreters only in that they make known teachers or prophets seem to be accorded the
to others what God has made known to them. same recognition and to attract the same fol-
plethe direction of their conduct toward the by no means confounded with similar license
Promised Land or the rebuilding of the Temple. false prophets with the true prophets; but,
Sometimes when the prophecy is one of doom agreeing together, and differing in nothing,
rather than of hope, as in the case of the de- acknowledged and upheld the authentic au-
struction of Jerusalem, the Babylonian captiv- thors of their sacred books. These were their
punishments the prophets foresee. according to God who hath spoken to them."
Mere prognostication does not seem to be the Hobbes also conceives the prophets of the
chief purpose of Hebrew prophecy, fust as the Old Testament as more than foretellers of the
Covenant which God makes with Abraham, future. "The name of prophet," he writes, "sig-
Isaac, and Jacob consecrates the Jewish people nifies in Scripture sometimes prolocutor] that is,
to a special mission; just as the Law which God he that speaketh from God to man, or from
hands down through Moses sets them apart man to God; and some times predictor, or a fore-
from the Gentiles and prescribes for them the teller of things to come." In addition to their
way of righteousness and sanctity; so the reve- being divinely appointed teachers, the proph-
lations of God's providence
through the proph- ets,according to Hobbes, seem to perform a
ets tend to remind the Chosen People of the political function. They check the power of the
meaning of the Covenant and the Law as well as kings, or seek to awaken their consciences to
to disclose their destiny as a nation. the dictates of justice and mercy. "Through the
The prophets speak not only of the future, whole history of the kings, as well of Judah as of
but of the present and the past. They are di- Israel, there were prophets that always con-
vinely appointed teachers, no less than the trolled the kings for transgressing the religion;
and Moses. Yet they may rank below
patriarchs and sometimes also for errors of state."
Moses (who is sometimes also regarded as a A secular view of the Hebrew prophets seems
prophet) by reason of the manner in which they to give prominence to their political role in the
are addressed by God. As Hobbes points out, theocratic community of the Jews. Comparing
"God himself in express words declareth that the Jewish state with other sacerdotal societies,
to other prophets he spake in dreams and vi- Mill observes that "neither their kings nor their
sions, but to his servant Moses, in such manner priests ever obtained, as in those other coun-
as a man speaketh to his friend" face to face. the exclusive moulding of their character.
tries,
The content of Hebrew prophecy, in short, Their religion . . . gave existence to an inestima-
seems to be continuous with the rest of God's bly precious unorganized institution the Or-
revelation of Himself to His Chosen People. der (if it may be so termed) of the Prophets.
The difference between the prophets as the in- Under the protection, generally though not al-
struments of God's teaching and the pagan ways effectual, of their sacred character, the
philosophers as merely human teachers seems to Prophets were a power in the nation, often
CHAPTER 72: PROPHECY 459
more than a match for kings and priests, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel. . . .
kept up, in that little corner of the earth, the For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is
antagonism of influences which is the only real given," Isaiah goes on, "and the government
security for continued progress." shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall
pels contains a number of prophetic beliefs pe- peace, there shall be no end, upon the throne
culiar to Christian doctrine. Such, for example, of David and upon his kingdom, to order it and
is the prophecy of the second coming of Christ, to establish it with justice from henceforth even
the prophecy of the Last Judgment on that oc- for ever." And Jeremiah tells his people, "Be-
casion, and the prophecy of a final conflagration hold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will
to cleanse the world, which will precede the raise unto David a righteous Branch and a King
resurrection of the body as that in turn pre- shall reign and prosper and shall execute judg-
cedes the general judgment of souls. ment and justice in the earth. In his days, Judah
Aquinas discusses the various signs which will shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely."
foretell the imminence of these events. He also Two of the great issues between the Jewish
raisesthe question whether the time of the end and Christian faiths concern these messianic
of the world and of the resurrection can be prophecies in the Old Testament. One arises
known exactly. On this he agrees with Augus- from opposite interpretations of the event pre-
tine that "that time is hidden from men." It dicteda messianic age in which the kingdom
cannot be calculated by natural reason, nor is of the Jews will be established on earth in per-
it revealed. "Of that day and hour," it is writ- petual righteousness and glory, or the coming
ten in Matthew, "no one knoweth, no, not the to earth of God's only begotten son, incarnate
angels of heaven." When the apostles asked in human form, for the salvation of all man-
Christ about His second coming, He answered, kind. The other arises from opposite answers to
according to Saint Paul, "It is not for you to the question whether the prediction on either
know the times or moments which the Father interpretationhas been fulfilled.
hath put in His own power." It is, of course, the Christian view that the
What Christ refused to tell the apostles, Aqui- prophets foretold the coming of Christ and that
nas adds, "He will not reveal to others. Where- their prophecy has been fulfilled. But more
fore all those who have been misled to reckon than that, Christian apologists and theologians
the aforesaid time have so far proved to be un- seem to make the fulfillment of Hebrew proph-
truthful; for some, as Augustine says, stated ecies,interpreted as foreshadowing the truths
from our Lord's ascension to His last coming of the Christian religion, a source of verifica-
400 years would elapse, others 500, others i ,000. tion for these truths.
The falseness of these calculators is evident, as The difference between Jesus Christ and Ma-
will likewise be the falseness of those who even homet, according to Pascal, is that "Mahomet
now cease not to calculate." was not foretold; Jesus Christ was foretold. I see
The single greatest prophecy in the Judaeo- many contradictory religions, and consequent-
Christian tradition perhaps, the messianic
is, ly all false save one," he writes. "Each wants to
prophecy the foretelling of a Messiah or of a be believed on its own authority, and threatens
messianic age. The prediction of a Messiah or unbelievers. I do not therefore believe them.
Saviour, who shall be born of the house of Everyone can say this; everyone can call him-
David and be king of the Jews, runs
shall self a prophet. But I see the Christian religion
throughout the prophetic books of the Old wherein prophecies are fulfilled; and that is
says Isaiah. "Behold a virgin shall conceive and of predictions about Jesus Christ, as to the time
460 THE GREAT IDEAS
and manner, and Jesus Christ had come in con- who understood not, all that has transpired
formity to these prophecies, this fact would since the advent of Christ until now, and all
have infinite weight. But there is much more that will transpire." Not only the explicit
here. Here is a succession of men during four "prophecies which are contained in words,"
thousand years, who, consequently and with- but all the rituals and ceremonies, the offices
out variation, come, one after another, to fore- and institutions, of the Jewish religion prefig-
tell this same event." ure Christianity, signifying and fore-announc-
Centuries earlier Augustine writes in a similar ing "those things which we who believe in
vein. The Hebrew people as a whole are chosen Jesus Christ unto eternal life believe to have
to perform this prophetic function to fore- been fulfilled, or behold in process of fullill-
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature and power of prophecy 461
i a. Prophecy as the reading of fate, the foretelling of fortune, the beholding of the
future
ib. Prophecy as supcrnaturally inspired foresight into the course of providence 462
ic. Prophecy as the instrument of providence: prophets as moral teachers and
political reformers
3^. Omens and portents: celestial and terrestrial signs; signs as confirmations of
prophecy
4. Particular prophecies
of hope and doom 468
4^. The destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of Israel: the restoration of
Israeland the rebuilding of the Temple
4^. The coming of a Messiah: Hebraic and Christian readings of messianic prophecy
4</.The second coming of the Lord: the Day of Judgment, the end of the world,
and the millcnium 469
5. The criticism and rejection of prophecy: the distinction between true and false proph-
ecy; the condemnation of astrology and divination as impiety or superstition
CHAPTER 72: PROPHECY 461
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page.For example, in 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, en,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehetniah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. The nature and power of prophecy 239c-240d; 248b-c; 255c-d; BK vin, 263b-c;
268b-d; 270c-271a; 273b-c; 276d-277a; BK
la. Prophecy as the reading of fate, the fore-
ix, 308a-c
telling of fortune, the beholding of the 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 123b d / Symposium,
future
153a-b; 156d-157a / Apology, 210d-211a /
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xvi [843-861] 121c; BK Gorgias, 292b-d / Timaeus, 466d-467c
xvni [94-137] 131a-c; BK xxn [355-366] 159a 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH 15 [i375 b 35~
/ Odyssey, BK x [487-540] 241a-c; BK xi
[90-137] 244a-c; BK xiv [321-336] 263b-c; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 17, 123b-
BK xix [291-307] 292b 124a
5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [739-842] 23a-24b / 13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, iv 14a-15b / Aeneid, BK i
Seven Against Thebes [1-38] 27a-c / Prome- [223-304] 109a-llla; BK vin [608-731] 275a-
theus Bound [88-114] 41a-b; [907-940] 49d- 278b
50a / Agamemnon [104-159] 53a-d; [248-254] 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 20b-c / Numa Pompil-
54d; [1072-1342] 63c-66b ius, 52b-c / Poplicola, 82a-b / Pericles, 123c-
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [300-512] 102a- 124a / Fabius, 141d-142a / Marccllus, 259c-
103d / Oedipus at Colonus [1348-1555] 126c- 260c / Sulla, 371d-372c / Lucullus, 404d-405a
128b / Antigone [988-1114] 139c-140c / Ajax / Caesar, 601c-602a / Tiberius Gracchus,
[745-783] 149c-d / Trachiniae [155-177] 171c; 679a-680b / Demosthenes, 698b-699a
[821-830] 177b / Philoctetes [604-619] 187c; 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 22
[1326-1347] 194a; [1408-1444! 194d-195a,c S25b-c
5 EURIPIDES: Trojan Women [308-461] 272d- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 183b-d
274a / Electra [1233-1359) 338b-339a,c / 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT i, sc in 285b-
Phoenician Maidens [834-1018] 385c-387b / 287b; ACT iv, sc i 300b-302b; ACT v, sc vin
Iphigenia Among the Tauri [1234-1283] 422b-c [9-22] 310a-b / Cymbeline, ACT v, sc v [426-
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 12b-d; BK n, 475] 488b-d
77a-b; BK vi, 189a-b; 190c-d; 199d-201a; 40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 56b
201d-202c; 204b-c; BK VH, 223b-e; 227a; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 217b-c
462 THE GREAT IDEAS \b to \c
19 AQUINAS: Summa
Theologica, PART i, Q 12,
(1. The nature and power of prophecy, la. Proph- A ii, ANS 59d-60d; A 13, ANS 61c-62b; Q 57,
ecy as the reading offate, the foretelling of A 3, REP i 297b-298a
fortune, the beholding of the future.) 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 7,
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART 11
[8094-8133] 197a- A 8, ANS and REP 2 750d-751d; Q 26, A i, REP
198a i 845b-846a
48 MELVILLE: Moby Did(, 364b-365a; 415a- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xv [1-99] 21a-
418a 22a; PURGATORY, XXH [55-93] 87a-c; xxiv
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 822b 825c [76-93] 90c; xxxin [22-90] 104b-105a; PAR-
ADISE, ix 118c-120a esp [61-63] H9b; xvn
ib. Prophecy as supernatural!? inspired fore- 132a-133c; xxvn [10-66] 147b-148a; [121-
sight into the course of providence 148] 148c-d
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 4:10-17 / Numbers, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 53d; PART n,
11:16-17,24-30; 12:1-9; 22:35-23:26 passim 149c-d; PART in, 173c; 176d-177b; 183d-186b
/ Deuteronomy, 18:18 / / Samuel, 10:1-13; passim
28:15-20 (D) / Kings, 10:1-13; 28:15-20 32 MILTON: Christs Nativity [1-7] la / Paradise
/ II Samuel, 7:4-16 (D) // Kings, 7:4-16 / / Lost,BK in [183-193] 139b; BK xi-xn 299a-
Kings, 13:1-2,32; 14:1-16; 16:1-4; 17:13-16; 333a esp BK xi [656-775] 313b-316a, [802-
19:15-18; 20:13-14,22,28,35-42; 21:17-24,28- 834] 316b-317b, BK xii [235-248] 324b,
29 (D) III Kings, 13:1-2,32; 14:1-16; 16:1- [315-330] 326a-b
4; 17:13-16; 19:15-18; 20:13-14,22,28,35-42; 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT x, DIV
21:17-24,28-29 / II Kings, 1-2; 7:1-2,17-20; 101 497a-b
- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 189b-c
8:1,7-15; 9:30-10:17; i9:i-7 2 2I 28 -3M7;
20:1-6,14-19; 22:14-20 (D) IV Kings, i-
Ic. Prophecy as the instrument of providence:
2; 7:1-2,17-20; 8:1,7-15; 9:30-10:17; 19:1-
20:1-6,14-19; 22:14-20 / prophets as moral teachers and political
7,20-21,28-33,37;
reformers
/ Chronicles, 17:7-15 (D) / Paralipomenon,
17:7-15 / II Chronicles, 15:1-8; 18:4-16,31-34; OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 3:6-15; 4:10-17;
20:14-16,37; 21:12-20; 34:22-28; 36:15-23 6:13,28-30; 7-12 passim; 24; 31:18; 34:1-4
(D) II Paralipomenon, 15:1-8; 18:4-16,31-34; / Numbers, 11:11-17 / Deuteronomy, 4:14-29;
20:14-16,37; 21:12-20; 34:22-28; 36:15-23 / 7-11 passim; 18:15-19; 28-30 /Joshua, 3:7-8;
Isaiah passim, esp 46:9-10 (D) Isaias passim, 4:14; 23-24-(Z)) Josue, 3:7-8; 4:14; 23-24 /
esp 46:9-10 /Jeremiah passim, esp i, 7 125-26 Judges, 6:7-10 / / Samuel, 2:27-36; 8:10-
(D) Jcremias passim, esp i, 7:25-26 / Ezetyel, 18,22; 10:1-8; 12:6-25; 13:11-14; 15:1 (D)
1-39 passim (D) Ezechiel, 1-39 passim / I Kings, 2:27-36; 8:10-18,22; 10:1-8; 12:6-25;
Daniel, 2 esp 2:36-45; 4:4-8,24-37; 5:25-31; 13:11-14; 15:1 / // Samuel, 7:4-17; 12:1-14;
7-8; 9:20-27; 11-12 (D) Daniel, 2 esp 2:36- 24:10-14 (D) // Kings, 7:4-17; 12:1-14;
45; 4:1-4,21-34; 5:25-31; 7-8; 9:20-27; 11-12 24:10-14 / I Kings, 14:5-16; 17-19; 20:13-
/ Hosea passim (D) Osee passim / Joel, 2-3 14,22,35-42; 21:17-24; 22:1-23 (D) ///
esp 2 :28-29 / Amos passim, esp 3 7-8 / Jonah, Kings, 14:5-16;17-19; 20:13-14,22,35-43;
(D) Jonas, 3 / Micah passim (D) Micheas
3 21:17-24; 22:1-23 / II Kings, 1-2', 3:14-20;
Nahum passim / Habatyul^ passim
passim / 5:1-19; 9:1-10; 17:9-14,23; 19:1-7,20-37; 20;
(D) Habacuc passim / Zephaniah passim 21:10-15; 22:14-20; 24:1-4 (D) IV Kings,
(D) Sophonias passim / Haggai, 2 (D) 1-2-, 3:14-20;
5:1-19; 9:1-10; 17:9-14,23;
Aggeus, 2 / Zcchariah passim, esp 8:9 (D) 19:1-7,20-37; 20; 21:10-15; 22:14-20; 24:1-4
Zacharias passim, esp 8:9 / Malachi passim / I Chronicles, 17:3-15; 21:9-13,18-19 (D)
(D) Malachias passim / Paralipomenon, 17:3-15; 21:9-13,18-19 /
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 42:19; 48:22-25 II Chronicles, 11:2-4; 15:1-8; 16:7-10; 18:4-
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 42:18-19; 48:25-28 22; 19:2-3; 20:14-16; 21:12-15; 25:5-10,14-
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 2:3-6; 3:1-3; 10:18- 16; 28:8-15; 34 :22 -33; 36:14-16 (D) // Par-
20 / Marl(, 1:7-8; 6:1-4 / fci 1:67-79; alipomenon, 11:2-4; 15:1-8; 16:7-10; 18:4-22;
2:25-26; 4:22-24; 16:14-16 /John, 1:6-8,15- 19:2-3; 20:14-16; 21:12-15; 25:5-10,14-16;
2 75 8 :5i-53 / ^#2:17-18; 3:20-24; 19:1-7 28:8-15; 34 :22 ~335 36:14-16 / Ezra, 9:10-
/ Ephesians, 2:19-22; 3:3-6 / // Peter, 1:19-21 ii (D) / Esdras, 9:10-11 / NeJiemiah, 9:30
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 467b-c (D) // Esdras, 9:30 / Isaiah passim, esp
8 ARISTOTLE Prophesying, CH i [462 b2o-26]
:
1:10-23, 2:10-22, 5:8-13, 5:20-25, 6:1-13,
707a-b; CH 2 [463^1-23] 708a-b; [464*19-23] 10:1-2, 28:1-29, 30:1, 30:8-14, 32:1-33:24,
708d - ~
37 :I ~7 37 :2 i~3 8 3 8: 4~8 49 :i I2 5 6:i .
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xi, par 25 95a / 59:21, 61:1-3, 65:1-25 (D) Isaias passim, esp
City of God, BK VH, CH 30, 261b; BK x, CH 25 1:10-23, 2:10-22, 5:8-13, 5:20-25, 6:1-13,
313c-314c; BK xi, CH 4 324a-d; BK xix, CH 22 10:1-2, 28:1-29, 3 o:i > 30:8-14, 32:1-33:24,
525b-c 37:1-7, 37' 2 i-38, 38:4-8. 49'.i-i 2 56:i-
\dtola CHAPTER 72: PROPHECY 463
59:21, 61:1-3, 65:1-25 / Jeremiah esp i, esp 1:1-14, 2:6-13, 3:7-11, 4:3-7, 5:5-6,
5:14, 7:25-26, 11:1-10, 16:1-13, 17:19-20, 8:8-i2/ II Peter, 1:19-21
[745-783] 149c-d / Philoctetes [604-619] 187c; 14,22,37-42; 21:17-24; 22:14-22 (D) ///
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH 15 [i375b 35~ 43:3; 44:4 / Ezefyl, 2:1-5:4; 12; 33:30-33
1376*2] 620c (D) Ezechiel, 2:1-5:4; 12; 33:30-33 /
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK HI [356-462] 157a-160a Daniel, 2; 4-6 (D) Daniel, 2; 3:98-6:28 /
14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 52b-c / Popli- Amos, 7:14-17 / Jonah(D) Jonas
cola, 82a-b / Camillus, 103b-104a / Pericles, APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 39:1-11; 45-46; 48-
123c-124a / Timoleon, 207c-d / Aemilius 49 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 39:1-15; 45-46;
Paulus, 214b-d / Marcellus, 259c-260c / 48-49 / Bel and Dragon, 33-39 (D) OT,
Aristides, 268a-d; 271a-c / Caius Marius, Daniel, 14:32-38 / // Maccabees, 2:1-7 (D)
339b-c; 351d-352a / Cimon, 398d-399b / OT, // Mackabees, 2 -.1-7
Nicias, 424d / Alexander, 541a-542a; 552b-c / NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 3:1-3; 5:17-18; 10;
Caesar, 594b-c / Dion, 789b-790a; 791a-792a 11:20-24; 12:36-45; 13:53-57; i9 :2 7-3; 2 3-
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK n, 30d-31a; 37b; BK vi, 25 esp 23:29-39 / Marfa 1:4-9; 6:1-4 / fc
91b; BK xi, 103d>104a; BK xn, 121d / Histo- 4:22-24; 16:14-16 / John, 1:15-27; 4:43-44;
ries, BK i, 195b-c; BK n, 214d-215c; 235a-c; 8:52-53 / Acts, 3:22-26
BK iv, 285d-286a; 287b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VH, CH 32
22 CHAUCER: Troilusand Cressida, BK iv, STANZA 262a-b; BK xvn, CH 1-3 449a-451c;BK xvm,
196-202 114a-115a; BK v, STANZA 208-218 CH 27, 486c
147b-148b 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 7,
:
3. The varieties of prophecy and the instru- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
ments of divination 66b-67d; BK in, 158b-171a; 173d-175c; 215c-
219b
3tf. The institution of oracles: the interpreta- 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 18d-20d
tion of oracular or prophetic utterances 27 SHAKESPEARE: Cymbeline, ACT v, sc v [426-
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK xiv [321-336] 263b-c; 475] 488b-d / Winter's Tale, ACT n, sc i 495b-
BK xix [291-307] 292b 497c esp [172-198] 497b-c
5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [742-777] 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 607 280a; 659 293a; 672
35b-c / Prometheus Bound [484-499] 45a; 296a; 678 297a-b; 683-692 298b-301a
[640-682] 46d-47b / Choephoroe [269-305] 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK n, 401d-402a
72d-73a; [1021-1076] 80a-d / Eumenides [i- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 121a; 170c; 225c-d
33! 81a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 252d-
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [1-1185] 99a " 253a; PART n, 264d-265c; 273b-c; PART HI,
HOb / Oedipus at Colonus [386-419] 117d- 311ab
118a / Trachiniae [155-177] 171c; [821-830]
177b 36. Omens and portents: celestial and terres-
5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [1234- trial signs; signs as confirmations of
270c-271a; 278c; 285c-286a; BK ix, 289d- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 14b-c; 54c-
290a; 296c-297a; 298b-c; 301d-302a; 307d- 55a
308c; 313d-314a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [594-599] 106b;
6THUCYDIDES: Peloponncsian War, BK n, BK vin [511-514] 243b
389a-b; BK VH, 552c; 560d 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 173 203b-204a
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK in, CH n 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xix,
[518*32-36] 43a; CH 20 [522*13-20] 47a-b; BK SECT 15 388a-c
b
vi, CH 2 [559 i6-2o] 86b; CH 22 [576*1-4] lOlc 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 332a-334b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [43-55] 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 3c; 457d; 547a-b;
80d-81a; [379-422] 85b-d 571a; 614b-c
12EpicTETus: Discourses, BK i, CH 17, 122d- 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 232a-c
123c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 263d-
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [387-401] 113b-114a; BK 265c; PART in, 292b-d
ii [162-233] 128b-130b;
[679-704] 143b-144a; 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [4947-4976] 122b-
BK in [388-393] 157b-158a; [523-547] 161b- 123a
162a; BK vi [185-211] 216a-b; BK vn [59-80] 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 121a; 175b-176a;
237b-238a; BK vin [520-540] 273a-b; BK xn 409b-410b; 413b-414a
[245-265] 360b-361a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 259c-d; BK
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 19b-20c / Numa Pom- vn, 292d-293b; 298d-300a; BK vm, 340d-
pilius, 52b-c / Poplicola, 80b-d; 82a-b / The- 341a,c; BK ix, 377b-379a; BK x, 428a-429a
mistocles, 94d / Camillus, 103b-104a / Pericles, 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 467a-b
123c-124a; 138d / Fabius, 141d-142a / Timo-
3c. Dreams, visions, visitations
leon, 198c-d; 207c-d / Aemilius Paulus, 214b-d
/ Marcellus, 248c-d; 259c-260c / Aristides, OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 16:7-13; 18:1-15;
271a-c / Caius Marius, 339c-d / Sulla, 371d- 19:12-22; 20:3-7; 21:17-19; 22:11-19; 26:1-6;
372c / Lucullus, 403d-404a; 404d-405a; 411d- 28:10-22; 31:11-13,24; 32:24-32; 35:9-13;
412a / Nicias, 429d-430b; 435b-d / Crassus, 37:1-11; 40-41 / Numbers, 12:5-8; 22:15-35 /
447c-d / Agcsilaus, 483a-b / Alexander, Deuteronomy, 13:1-5 /Judges, 2:1-4; 6:11-23;
568a-b; 575a-576a / Phocion, 615b-d / Caius 7:13-15; 13 / / Samuel, 28:6-20 (D) / Kings,
Gracchus, 685c-d / Dion, 789b-790a / Marcus 28:6-20 / 77 Samuel, 7:4-17 (D) 77 Kings,
Brutus, 818a-b; 822b / Galba, 866d-867d / 7:4-17 / 7 Kings, 3:5-15; 9:1-9; 19:2-8; 22:17-
Otho, 871b-c 23-(D) 777 Kings, 3.5-15; 9:1-9; 19=2-8;
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 9a-b; 9d; BK n, 27b; 22:17-23 / 11 Kings, 1:3-4,15 (D) IV Kings,
BK iv, 79b; BK vi, 95d-96a; BK xi, 103b; BK 1:3-4,15 / 7 Chronicles, 21:15-20,28-30 (D)
XH, 119b; 124b; BK xin, 141a-b; BK xiv, 144c; I Paralipomenon, 21:15-20,28-30 / 77 Chroni-
147a; 149b-c; BK xv, 159b-c; 168d-169a / cles, 18:11-22 (D) II Paralipomenon, 18:11-
Histories, BK i, 189d-190a; 206a; 212d-213a; 22 / Esther, io(D) Esther, 10:1-3 /Job, 4:13-
BK 11, 228a-b; 235a-c; BK in, 256d; BK v, 21 ; 33:14-16 / Isaiah, 6 (D) Isaias, 6 / Jere-
298b-c miah, i; 14:14; 23:16,25-32; 24; 29:8-9 (D)
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR in, CH 7 44c- Jeremias, i; 14:14; 23:16,25-32; 24; 29:8-9 /
45a / Third Ennead, TR i, CH 5-6 80a-81b Ezekiel, 1-3; 8-n; 37:1-^1; 40-48 (D)
18 AUGUSTINE Confessions, BK iv, par 4-6 20a-d;
:
Ezechiel, 1-3; 8-n; 37:1-11; 40-48 / Daniel,
BK vn, par 8-10 45d-47a / City of God, BK v, 2; 4; 7-12 passim / Joel, 2:28-29 / Zechariah,
CH 1-7 207d-212c; CH 9, BK vn, CH 35
213b-c; 1:7-6:15 (D) Zacharias, 1:7-6:15
263c-264a,c / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 21- APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther, 10:4-11:12 (D) OT,
24 647a-649a Esther, 10:4-11:12 / Wisdom of Solomon, 17;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 70, 18:14-19 (D) OT, BooJ( of Wisdom, 17;
A 2, REP i 364b-365a 18:14-19 / Ecclesiasticus, 34:1-7 (D) OT,
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 80c-d; 81d-82b; Ecclesiasticus, 34:1-7 / Bel and Dragon, 33-39
PART in, 188a; 188d-189c (D) OT, Daniel, 14:32-38 / 77 Maccabees,
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 15:11-16 (D) OT, 77 Machabees, 15:11-16
146a-150d; 175c-178a; BK iv, 268b-269c; NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 1:20-25; 2:12-13,19-
277d-279b 23; 17:1-8; 28:1-7 / Mark 9:1-10 / Luke,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 18d-20d; 223d-224a 1:11-38; 2:8-15; 9:28-43; 24:1-10 / Acts, 2:17-
26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT v, sc vi 18; 9:3-8; 10 18:9-10 / 77 Corinthians, 12:1-4
;
BK
Histories, iv, 293a-294a Josue, 1:1-9; 37-8; 4-'i-3J 6:1-5; 8:1-2; 10:8
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 19-20 / / Samuel, 3; 16:1-13 (D) / Kings, 3; 16:1-
18b-19a / City of God, BK vni, CH 16 275c- 13/7 Kings, 19:9-18 (D) III Kings, 19:9-18
276a; BK xi, CH 2 323a-c / Isaiah, 6; 48:2-5 (D) Isaias, 6; 48:2-5 /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, Jeremiah, i (D) Jeremias, i / Ezefyel, 1-39
A H, ANS 59d-60d; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d passim, esp 1-2 (D) Ezechiel, 1-39 passim, esp
20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 7, 1-2 / Hosea, 1-3 (D) Osee, 1-3 / Amos, 7-9
A 8, REP i 750d-751d NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 17:1-9 / Acts,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxxni [13-75] 26:13-18
49c-50b; PURGATORY, ix [13-69] 66a-c; xix 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 3 323d;
[1-63] 81c-82a; xxvn [91-117] 95c-d BK xvi, CH 16-29 433c-441a; CH 36 443d-
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA 444b; CH 38 445a-446a
46-56 126a-127b; STANZA 177-186 143b-144b; 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 12,
STANZA 207-219 147a-149a; STANZA 245 152a / AII, ANS and REP i 59d-60d
Nun's Priest's Tale [14,976-15,162] 452b-455b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 165d-166a;
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 51d*52a; 69d-70c; 183d-184a; CONCLUSION, 281d-282a
PART in, 173c; 176d-177b; 184a-187a; CON- 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xn [106-151]
CLUSION, 281d-282a 321b-322b; [173-269] 323a-325a
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
150d-156c; BK iv, 278d 127b-137c
468 THE GREAT IDEAS
4. Particular prophecies of hope and doom 25; 66 / Jeremiah, 1-45 passim; 49-52 passim
(D) Jeremias, 1-45 passim; 49-52 passim /
4a.The Covenant and the Promised Land Lamentations / Ezeljiel, 4-7; 9; 11-24; 28:20-
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 9:8-17; 12:1-7; I 3 :r 4~ 26; 33-48 passim, esp 33:23-29, 36:1-37:28,
18; 15; 17-18; 22:1-19; 26:1-6,24-25; 28:11- 39:22-40:2, 43:1-10, 47:1-23 (D) Ezechiel,
22; 35:9-13 / Exodus, 2:23-3:22; 6:2-8; 19:4- 4-7; 9; 11-24; 28:20-26; 33-48 passim,
6; 20:1-17; 32:11-14; 33:1-3; 34:10-11 / Leviti- esp 33:23-29, 36:1-37:28, 39:22-40:2,
cus,26:40-45 / Numbers, 14:6-9; 32; 34:1-12 43:1-10, Hosea, 2; 3:4-5; 5-11
47:1-23 /
/ Deuteronomy, 1:7-8,19-31; 3:16-23; 4:12- (D) Osee, 2; 3:4-5; 5-11 /Joel, 2-3 / Amos
13,23-40; 5; 6:1-3,10-11,18-19; 7:12-13; 8:7- passim / Obadiah passim (D) Abdias passim
10,18-20; 9:1-6,23-29; 10:11; ii ; 26:1-11; / Micah(D) Micheas / Nahum passim /
27-32 esp 27:1-3, 28:1-14, 29:1-29, 31:16-20; Habakku\(D) Habacuc / Zephaniah(D)
34:1-4 / Joshua esp i, 23:1-24:13 (D) Josue Sophonias / Zechariah passim (Z)) Zacharias
esp 23:1 -24 :i3 /Judges, 2 :i-6 / / Kings, 8 156
i, passim
(D) III Kings, 8:56/7 Chronicles, 16:13-22 APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 14:4-5 (D) OT, Tobias,
(D) I Parahpomenon, 16:13-22 / Nehemiah, 14:6-7 / Ecdesiasticus, 49:4-50:2 (D) OT,
9 (D) // Esdras, 9 / Psalms, 74:19-20; 78:1- Ecdesiasticus, 49:5-50:2 / Baruch, 5 (D)
7,52-55; 105:6-44; in; 132 (D) Psalms, OT, Baruch, 5
73:19-20; 77:1-7,52-55; 104:6-44; no; 131 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 24:1-2 / Mar^,
/ Isaiah, 54:1-10; 56:4-6; 59:20-21; 61:7-9 13:1-2 / Litl^e, 21:5-6; 19:41-44
(D) Isaias, 54:1-10; 56:4-6; 59:20-21; 61:7- 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xvn, CH 7
9 / Jeremiah, 11:1-10; 31:31-34; 34:12-18 458c-459d; BK xvm, CH 46 500a-d; CH 48,
(D) Jeremias, 11:1-10; 31:31-34; 34:12-18 / 501b-c
Kzetycl, 16:60-63; 37:26-28 (D) Ezechiel, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART ITT, 179a-b; 244b-c
16:60-63; 37:26-28 / Hosea, 2:16-18; 6:4-7 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 638-641 289b-290a; 713-719
-(D) Osee, 2:16-18; 6:4-7 304b-309a; 722 309a-312a; 726 313a-315b
APOCRYPHA: Ecdesiasticus, 44:19-23 (D) OT,
Ecclesiasttcus,
4c. The coming of a Messiah: Hebraic and
44:20-26
NEW TESTAMENT: Lu^e, 1:71-75 Christian readings of messianic proph-
/ Acts, 3:25;
Romans, 9:1-9; 11:25-27 ecy
7:1 -8 / / Galatians,
3:13-18; 4:22-31 / Ephesians, 2:11-13 / OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 3:15; 12:3; 18:18;
Hebrews, 8:6-9:28; 10:14-17 21:12; 22:18; 26:4; 28:14; 49 '.i 0-12,22-26 /
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xvi, CH 16-29 Numbers, 24:15-25 / Deuteronomy, 18:15-19
433c-441a; CH 32 441c-442c; CH 36 443d- / / Chronicles, 17:11-14 (D) / Paralipomenon,
444b; CH 38, 445a-d; BK xvn, CH 7 458c- 17:11-14 /Job, 19:25-27 / Psalms, 2:7; 8:5-6;
459d; BK xxii, CH 3 588a-b 14:7; 16:10; 19:4-5; 21-22; 40:1-8; 45:7;
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART HI, 177c-180a 50:1-3; 68; 72; 80:16-18; 85; 89:19-29,36-
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [880-897] 318b; 37; no; 118:22,26 (D) Psalms, 2:7; 8:5-6;
BK xn [101-126] 321b-322a; [151-172] 322b- 13:7; 15:10; 18:6; 20-21; 39:1-8; 44:7; 49:1-
323a; [259-269] 324b-325a 35 67; 71; 79:16-18; 84; 88:19-29,36-37;
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 637-640 289b-290a; 675 109; 117:22,26 / Isaiah,
8:3-4; 7:10-16;
296b-297a; 713 304b-308a; 717-719 308b- 9:6-7; 11:1-5; 16:1; 22:20-25; 28:16-29; 3 2 5
309a 35:4; 40:1-11; 41:2-3,8-14,25; 42:1-7; 45;
46:11-12; 49:1-13,22-23; 52-55; 59-66 pas-
4b. The destruction of Jerusalem and the dis-
sim, esp 59:16-21, 61:1-3, 62:11-63:14, 64:1-5
persion of Israel: the restoration of (D) Isaias, 7:10-16; 8:3-4; 9:6-7; 11:1-5;
Israel and the rebuilding of the Temple
16:1; 22:20-25; 28:16-29; 32; 35:4; 40:1-
OLD TESTAMENT: Leviticus, 26:27-39 / Deuter- n; 41:2-3,8-14,25; 42:1-7; 45; 46:11-12;
onomy, 4:25-31; 28:15-30:10; 31:16-18 / 49:1-13,22-23; 52-55; 59-66 passim, esp
Joshua, 23:12-16 (D) Josue, 23:12-16 / // 59:16-21, 61:1-3, 62:11-63:14, 64:1-5 /
Kings, 17; 20:12-21; 21:10-15; 22:12-20; Jeremiah, 23:5-6; 30:7-9; 31:31-33; 33 i- :
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 244b-c; PART iv, 248a-b; 251c-252b; 254b-c
100, A 12, ANS 264d-265d; Q 103, A 2, ANS 32 MILTON: Christs Nativity [125-172] 4b-5b / At
and REP 1-2 299b-300d; Q 107, A 2 327b- a Solemn Musicf( 13a-b / Paradise Lost, BK
329a; PART in, Q 26, A i, REP i 845b-846a in [274-343] 141b-143a; BK vn [139-173]
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxn [55- 220a-221a; BK xi [45-83] 300a-301a; BK xii
93] 87a-c [451-465] 329a; [537*5571 331 * / Areopagitica,
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART in, 179d; 187b-c; 404a-b
204a-207b passim; 229c; 242b; 243a-b 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 757 321a
32 MILTON: Upon the Circumcision 12b-13a / 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 17a-b
Paradise Lost, BK xi [22-44] 299b-300a; BK 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 187c-188c
xn [227-244] 324a-b; [284-330] 325b-326b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 233c-234d
esp [307-314] 326a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i,
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 607-609 280a-b; 613 282b- 13c-d; BK v, 127b-137c
283a; 616-619 283b-285a; 662-664 293b-
294a; 673 296a; 675 296b-297a; 692-741
5. The criticism and rejection of prophecy: the
distinction between true and false
300b-319a; 747-749 319b-320a; 751-761 320a-
322a prophecy; the condemnation of astrol-
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 181b; 206a-b; 207d; ogy and divination as impiety or super-
stition
308a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 134b OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 7:10-13,22 / Deuter-
onomy, 13:1-5; 18:15-22 / / Samuel, 28:1-10
4d. The second coming of the Lord: the Day
(D) I Kings, 28:1-10 / / Kings, 13:11-34;
of Judgment, the end of the world, and
18:17-40; 22:5-25 (D) /// Kings, 13:11-34;
the millenium
18:17-40; 22:5-25 / // Kings, 17:17 (D)
OLD TESTAMENT :/o, 19:25-29; 21 esp 21:30-32 IV Kings, 17:17/7 Chronicles, 10:13-14 (D)
/ Psalms, 50; 96:10-13; 97-98
72; (D) I Paralipomenon, 10:13-14 / II Chronicles,
Psalms, 49; 71; 95:10-13; 96-97 / Ecclesiastes, 18 (D) // Paralipomenon, 18 / Isaiah, 8:18-
3:16-17; 11:9-10; 12:14 / Isaiah^ 2-4; n; 22; 30:9-11; 41:21-29; 47:12-13 (D) Isaias,
24; 26:1-28:15; 30; 34-35; 65:17-25; 66- 8:18-22; 30:9-11; 41:21-29; 47:12-13 / Jere-
(D) Isaias, 2-4; n; 24; 26:1-28:15; 30; 34- miah, 2:8; 5:12-14,31; 14:13-16; 23:9-40;
35; 65:17-25; 66 / Daniel, 7:21-27; 11-12 / 27:9-18; 28; 29:8-9,29-32; 36-38 esp 37:18-
Micah, 4 (D)
Joel, 1:14-2:11; 2:27-32; 3 / 20 (D) Jeremias, 2:8; 5:12-14,31; 14:13-16;
Micheas, 4 / Zephaniah~(D) Sophonias / 23:9-40; 27:9-18; 28; 29:8-9,29-32; 36-38
Zechariah, 14 (D) Zacharias, 14 / Malachi, esp 37:17-19 / Ezekiel, 13; 14:9; 21:21-23;
3-4 (D) Malachias, 3-4 22:23-31 (Z>) Ezechiel, 13; 14:9; 21:21-23;
APOCRYPHA: (D) OT, Tobias,
Tobit, 13:9-14:15 22:23-31 / Daniel, 1:19-20; 2:1-23; 4:1-27;
13:11-14:17 / Judith, i6:i7-(D) OT, Judith, 5:5-17 / Micah, 3:5-12 (D) Micheas, 3:5-12
16:20-21 / Zechariah, 10:2; 13:2-6 (D) Zacharias,
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 10:14-15; 11:20-24; 10:2; 13:2-6
12:34-36; 13:24-50; 24-25 / Mar^, 13:4-37 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 14:27-29 (D)
/ Luke, 17:20-37; 19:11-28; 21 /John, 12:48; OT, Boo^ of Wisdom, 14:27-29 / Ecclesiasti-
14:3-4 / Acts, i -.9-11 2:17-21; 17:31 / Romans,
; cus, 34:1-7 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 34:1-7
2:5-11 / / Corinthians, 15:23-28 / Philippians, NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 7:15-23; 12:38-40;
3 :20-2 1 / / Thessalonians, i :9-i o 2 1 9 ; 4 1 2-
;
: :
!3 54-57; l6:i ~45 23:29-39; 24:11,23-28 /
:
5:11 / // Thessalonians, 1-2 I II Timothy, 3; Marf(, 6:1-5; 8:11-12; 13:21-22 / Luke, 6:26;
ii :i6,29 /John, 4:44 / // Peter, 2:1-3 / I John,
4:1,8 / Hebrews, 9:26-28 / James, 5:7-9 /
/ Peter, 4:5-7 / // Peter, 2:9; 3 / I John, 2:18- 4:1-6
470 THE GREAT IDEAS
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115,
(5. The criticism and rejection of prophecy; the A 3, REP 4 588c-589c; AA 4-6 589d-592d;
distinction between true andfalse prophecy; PART i-n, Q 9, A 5 660d-662a
the condemnation of astrology and divina- 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xx 28b-29d
tion as impiety or superstition.) 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xn [195-250] 84a-d / 52-55 127a-b; STANZA 183-185 144a-b; STANZA
BK n, [146-207] 189c-190b
Odyssey, 218 148b / Parson's Tale, par 38 522b
5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [248-254] 54d; 23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 80d; 81d 82b;
[1178-1213] 64c-65a PART in, 165d-167b; 183b-d; 186c-188a;
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [300-512] 102a- 190a-b
103d; [702-725] 105d-106a / Antigone [1155- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
1171] 140d-141a 66b-67d; BK n, 82c-d; BK HI, 158b-171a;
5 EURIPIDES: Helen [744-760] 305b / Iphigenia 173d-175c; 215c-219b
Among the Tauri [570-575] 41 6a / Iphigenia 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 18d-20d; 94d-95a; 98b-
at Aulis [948-960] 433d-434a 99a; 284d-285b
5 ARISTOPHANES: ATfl/^A/j [108-2 33] 471b-472d; 26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT i, sc iv
[941-1099] 481d-483d / Peace [1039-1126] [35-114] 290d-291d
537d-539a / Birds [959-991] 554c-555a 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT i, sc n [112-
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, lOa-c; BK n, 86c; 166] 249a-c / Macbeth, ACT v, sc vin [9-22]
BK in, 116a-b; BK vin, 273b-c 310a<b
6TnucYDiDEs: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 381a b
389a-b; BK v, 489a-b; 506b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, S4c-5Sa
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 466d-467b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, v 7d-8a
8 ARISTOTLE: Prophesying 707a-709a,c 33 PASCAL: Pensces, 173 203b-204a; 597-598
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [80-135] 278b-279a; 817-818 330b-331b; 835 334b
2ad 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT x, DIV
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 7 145b-146a 94 492d-493c
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT 6 253b 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 217b-221a; 332b-
14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 123c-124a; 138d / Alex- 334b
ander, 575a-576a / Marcus Brutus, 816d- 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK u, 401d-
817c 402a
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK iv, 79b; BK vi, 91a-d; 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 3c; 52b; 93b;
BK xn, 121d / Histories, BK i, 191d; 194a-b; 121a-b; 170b-c; 225c-d; 460b; 463b; 877c
195b-c; BK iv, 274b; 283b; BK v, 298b-c [n 5 i]
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 4-6 20a-d; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 217b-c;
BK vii, par 8-10 45d-47a / City of God, BK v, PART n, 263d-265c; 273b-c; PART HI, 311a-b
CH 1-7 207d-212c; CH 9, 213b-c; BK vn, CH 35 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 232a-235a
263c-264a,c; BK xvm, CH 41, 496b-c; BK xix, 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 387a,c /
CH 23 525c-528a / Christian Doctrine, BK 11, General Introduction, 467a-b / New Introduc-
CH 21-24 647a*649a tory Lectures, 822b-825c
CROSS-ZEFERENCES
For: Other discussions of man's knowledge of the future by natural or supernatural means, see
FATE 5-6; KNOWLEDGE 53(5); NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 40; TIME 6f; TRUTH 30(2).
Another consideration of the religious significance of prophecy and its fulfillment, see
RELIGION 10(3).
Other discussions of the interpretation of oracles, omens, portents, and visions, see LANGUAGE
10; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8a; SIGN AND SYMBOL 50; and for other treatments of
dreams and their meaning, see LANGUAGE 10; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8d-8d(2);
SIGN AND SYMBOL 6a.
The religious dogmas related to particular prophecies in Judaism and Christianity, see GOD
7h, 8b, 8e, pf; WORLD 8.
CHAPTER 72: PROPHECY 471
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
the Oracles Cease to Give Answers," in Moralia FONTENELLE. Histoirc des oracles
AUGUSTINE. De Genesi ad Litteram, BK xn, CH 9 LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under-
. On the Spirit and the Letter standing, BK iv, CH 19
AQUINAS. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate> VOLTAIRE. "Prophecies," "Prophets," in A Philo-
Q 12 sophical Dictionary
. Summa Theologica, PART 11-11, QQ 171-175 PAINE. The Age of Reason, PART i
F. BACON. "Of Prophecies," in Essays J. H. NEWMAN. Lectures on the Prophetical Office of
INTRODUCTION
F the qualities or virtues attributed to the Even there, however, the conception of pru-
intellect, prudence seems to be least con- dence is used more frequently than it is ex-
cerned with knowledge and most concerned pounded. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes,
with action. When we call a man a scientist or and Kant seem to be the exceptions, and of
an artist, or praise the clarity of his understand- these only Aristotle and Aquinas offer an ex-
ing, we imply only that he has a certain kind of tended analysis Aristotle in his book on in-
knowledge. We admire his mind, but we do not tellectual virtue in the Ethics, Aquinas in cer-
necessarily admire him as a man. We may not tain questions of his Treatise on Habits in the
even know what kind of man he is or what kind Summa Theologica^ but more extensively in his
of life he leads. It is
significant that our lan- Treatise on Prudence (see the questions from
guage does not contain a noun like "scientist" the Summa Theologica cited in the list of
or "artist" to describe the man who possesses Additional Readings).
than just to his mind. experience and a possession of reason which, un-
Prudence seems to be almost as much a moral like science or art, cannot be expressed in prop-
judgment of his prudence than whether he had design, or what design they may conduce to; if
a cultivated mind. The extent of his education his observations are such as are not easy or
or the depth of his learning might not affect usual; this wit of his is called Prudence, and de-
our judgment at all, but we probably would pends on much experience and memory of the
consider whether he was old enough to have and their consequences heretofore,"
like things,
learned anything from experience and whether Whereas science can achieve some certainty,
he had actually profited from experience to be- the judgments of prudence are, according to
come wise. Hobbes, all uncertain, "because to observe by
These observations not only express the ordi- experience and remember all circumstances
nary sense of the word "prudence," but also that may alter the success, is impossible." It is
give a summary indication of the idea for which the opposition between experience and science
that word stands in the great books. Like other which seems to lead Hobbes to distinguish pru-
fundamental traitsof mind or character, pru- dence from wisdom. "As much experience is
472
CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE 473
and sophiaboth of which are sometimes trans- cerned not with action but with the nature of
lated in English by "wisdom." But Aristotle, things Aristotle alone raises a further ques-
likeHobbes, insists upon the distinction be- tion about the distinction between practical
tween the wisdom which is the ultimate fruit wisdom and art.
of the speculative sciences or philosophy and In making something, the artist also deals
the wisdom which belongs to the sphere of with particulars. In this sense, art is also prac-
moral and political action. Wishing to preserve tical. But, according to Aristotle, the word
Aristotle's sense that phronesis and sophia have "productive" should be used in distinction
something in common which deserves the from "practical" to signify the difference be-
eulogistic connotation of "wisdom," his trans- tween making and doing two kinds of human
lators usually render these words in English by activity which, though alike as compared with
the phrases "practical wisdom" or "political scientificknowing, represent knowledge differ-
wisdom" (for phronesis) and "speculative wis-
,
ently applied. The knowledge which the artist
dom" or "philosophical wisdom" (for sophia). possesses can, furthermore, be formulated in a
The English rendering of Aquinas, on the other set of rules. An individual can acquire the skill
hand, usually translates his prudentia by "pru- of an art by practicing according to its rules.
dence," and his sapientia by "wisdom." What a man knows when he is prudent seems to
Whether it is permissible to use "prudence" be much less capable of being communicated
and "practical wisdom" as synonyms may be by precept or rule. What he knows is how to
more than a question of verbal equivalence; for deliberate or calculate well about things to be
there is a fundamental issue in theory concern- done.
ing the unity of wisdom, on which Plato differs This, in Aristotle's view, marks prudence off
from both Aristotle and Aquinas. The question from all other virtues. That prudence is a qual-
about the relation of knowledge and virtue ity of mind seems to follow from the fact that
knowledge is evident," Aristotle declares. This PRUDENCE is NOT ALWAYS described as skill of
is confirmed, he adds, "by the fact that while mind in deliberating about alternative courses
young men become geometricians and mathe- of action, nor
is it
always regarded as entirely
maticians and wise in matters like these, it is praiseworthy or admirable inseparable from
thought that a young man of practical wisdom virtue and the good life.
cannot be found. The reason is that such wisdom It is, for example, sometimes identified with
is concerned not only with universals but with foresight or even conjecturing about the future.
experience is
important for the development of it may be said that "even some of the lower
prudence or practical wisdom precisely be- animals have practical wisdom, viz., those
cause "it is practical and practice is concerned which are found to have a power of foresight
with particulars." But though both also agree with regard to their own life."
that this explains the distinction between pru- Identifying prudence with foresight, Hobbes
dence and scientific knowledge which is con- conceives perfect prudence as belonging only
474 THE GREAT IDEAS
to God. When the event answers expectations, not stop at treachery or treason when the
the prediction is attributed to prudence, yet moment seems ripe for action which, if quickly
human foresight being fallible, "it is but pre- taken, may succeed.
sumption. For the foresight of things to come, Aristotle and Aquinas would use such facts
which is Providence, belongs only to him by to argue against what, in their view, is the mis-
whose will they are to come." Aquinas gives a conception of the prudent man as the opposite
quite different reason for saying that "pru- of the impetuous. The prudent man, in their
dence or providence may suitably be attributed opinion, does not stand at the other extreme of
to God." It is that the ordering of things to- undue caution. In their theory of the virtues
ward their ultimate end is "the chief part of asmeans between extremes of excess and de-
prudence, to which two other parts are directed fect, prudence, like courage or temperance,
namely, remembrance of the past, and un- represents a mean consisting in neither too
derstanding of the present; inasmuch from the much nor too little. As cowardice and fool-
remembrance of what is past and the under- hardiness are the opposite vices of too much
standing of what is present, we gather how to and too little fear and as both are opposed to
provide for the future." the mean of courage which involves a modera-
Prudence sometimes described, not as a
is tion of fear so excessive caution and impet-
virtue of the mind, or even as the power of uosity are the vices opposed to prudence as
foresight, but as a temperamental trait, an well as to each other.
emotional disposition. It is associated with Nor are prudence and imprudence simply
timidity or caution in those who are fearful of matters of temperament. Men may differ in
risks or unwilling to take chances. It is in this their temperamental dispositions; but, accord-
sense that Bacon seems to oppose hopefulness ing to Aristotle and Aquinas, these are not to
to prudence, "which is diffident upon principle be confused with virtues and vices. One man
and in all human matters augurs the worst." may be by nature more fearful or fearless than
The cautiousness of the over-deliberate man another, but regardless of these differences in
may involve thought as well as fear. Hamlet emotional endowment, either may become
thinks too much and on too many sides of every courageous, by forming the habit of controlling
action. His action being "sicklied o'er by the fear for the right reasons. So, too, one man
pale cast of thought," he is irresolute. He la- may be naturally more impulsive or more cir-
ments his misuse of reason. "Whether it be cumspect than another, but either can acquire
bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple of prudence through learning to take sufficient
thinking too precisely on the event a thought, counsel and to deliberate enough before action,
which quartered, hath but one part wisdom while also forming the habit of resolving thought
and ever three parts coward I do not know into action by reaching decisions and com-
why yet I live to say 'this thing's to do,' since manding their execution.
Failing to satisfy
I have cause, and will, and strength, and means these conditions of prudence, either may de-
to do it." velop the vices of imprudence, becoming, like
When prudence is conceived as excessive Hamlet or Nicias, irresolute; or, like Alcibiades,
caution, its opposite is usually described as impatient of counsel or ill advised, lacking care
rashness, precipitateness, or impetuosity. Thu- in deliberation and soundness in judgment.
position of reasons for and against the under- Aristotelian theory of prudence as a virtue.
taking, but also represent an opposition of Other moralists, especially those who take a
types of human character. Both come to grief: different view of virtue generally, do not seem
Nicias, the overcautious leader of the expedi- to lookupon prudence as wholly admirable.
tion, who earns a not inevitable defeat by his Even when they do not condemn prudence as
ever-delaying tactics, and Alcibiades, who does an indisposition to act promptly or decisively
CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE 475
enough, they seem to give prudent deliberation to give a definite conception of happiness, the
the invidious connotation of cold and selfish imperatives of prudence would correspond
calculation. exactly with those of skill."
A suggestion of this appears in Mill's con- As Kant sees it, "the sole business of reason
trast between duties to ourselves and duties to in the moral philosophy of prudence is to bring
others, wherein he remarks that "the term duty about a union of all the ends, which are aimed
to oneself, when it means anything more than at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end
prudence, means self-respect and self-develop- that of happiness^ and to show the agreement
ment." It would seem to be implied that pru- which should exist among the means of attain-
dence means something less something more ing that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason
selfish than a proper and justifiable self-inter- cannot present to us any more than pragmatical
est, the violation of which involves "a breach laws of free action, for our guidance towards
of duty to others, for whose sake the individual the aims set up by the senses, and is incom-
is bound to have care for himself." petent to give us the laws which are pure and
Kant, more explicitly than Mill, associates determined completely a priori" Hence the
prudence with expediency and self-seeking, and precepts of prudence "are used by reason only
separates it from action in accordance with as counsels,and by way of counterpoise against
duty under the categorical imperative of the seductions to an opposite course."
moral law. Prudence has meaning only in rela- The issue between Kant and Aristotle (or
tion to a hypothetical imperative "which ex- Aquinas) with respect to prudence thus appears
presses the practical necessity of an action as a to be part of the larger issue between them on
means to the advancement of happiness." the fundamental principles of morality, dis-
Granted that a man seeks his individual happi- cussed in the chapters on DUTY and HAPPINESS.
ness, then "skill in the choice of means to his In Kant's view, Aristotle and Aquinas, no less
own greatest well-being may be called pru- than Mill, are pragmatists rather than moral-
dence'' Consequently, "the imperative which ists. They are all utilitarians in the sense that
refers to the choiceof means to one's happiness, they regard happiness as the first principle of
/.<?., the precept of prudence, is still always human conduct and concern themselves with
hypothetical; the action is not commanded ab- the ordering of means to this end. Since the
purpose," or, as Kant says elsewhere, "the weighing of alternatives as more or less expe-
maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the dient, prudence becomes indispensable to the
law of morality commands" Furthermore, he pursuit of happiness. The choice of the best
holds that "what duty is, is plain of itself to means is second in importance only to the elec-
everyone; but what it is to bring true durable tion of the right end.
advantage, such as will extend to the whole of Kant admits that those who live for happi-
one's existence, is
always veiled in impenetrable ness require a great deal of prudence, in order
obscurity, and much prudence is required to to adapt practical rules to variable circum-
adapt the practical rule founded on it to the stances and to make the proper exceptions in
ends of life, even tolerably, by making excep- applying them. None is
required by those who
tions." live according to the moral law. "The moral
In terms of Kant's division of the impera- law commands the most punctual obedience
tives of conduct into the pragmatic and the from everyone; it must, therefore, not be so
moral, according as they refer to welfare and difficult to judge what it requires to be done,
happiness or duty and law, prudence is merely that the commonest unpracticed understand-
pragmatic. It does not belong to morality. The ing, even without worldly prudence, should
pragmatic imperative of prudence is more like fail to apply it rightly." That "the principle
the technical imperative of art, which is also of private happiness" is "the direct opposite of
conditional and concerned with determining the principle of morality" Kant seems to think
means to an end in this case, the thing to be is evident from the questionable worth of pru-
produced by skill. "If it were only equally easy dence; "for a man must have a different crite-
476 THE GREAT IDEAS
rion when he is compelled to say to himself: I nessman who, without regard to justice, cal-
am a worthless fellow, though I have filled my culates well how to maximize his profits, or
purse; and when he approves himself, and Machiavelli's prince who exercises cunning to
says: I am
& prudent man, for I have enriched get or keep his power, exhibits, not prudence,
my treasure." but its counterfeits. In some cases, the clever-
Kant does not limit his criticism of prudence ness or shrewdness may simulate prudence
as pragmatic or practical rather than moral without involving the knavery of craft or
to the fact that it serves what he calls "private cunning. Some men have what Aquinas con-
happiness." It may serve the public welfare. ceives as artistic (or technical) rather than
"A history is
composed pragmatically," he moral prudence. Those who are "good coun-
writes, "when it teaches prudence, i.e., instructs sellors in matters of warfare or seamanship are
the world how it can provide for its interests said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not
better." But he also distinguishes between simply prudent. Only those are simply pru-
worldly and private prudence. "The former is dent who give good counsel about all the
a man's ability to influence others so as to use concerns of life."
them for his own purposes. The latter is the and Aquinas make the relation be-
Aristotle
sagacity to combine all these purposes for his tween prudence and moral virtue reciprocal.
own lasting benefit." Nevertheless, the pru- The moral virtues depend, for their formation
dence which aims at individual happiness is and endurance, as much upon prudence as
cising an influence over other men so as to use ing about and choosing means is truly the
them for his own purposes, is clever or cunning intellectual virtue of prudence unless the man
rather than prudent. Hobbes, for example, says who habitually calculates well is also habitually
that if you permit to prudence "the use of un- inclined by the moral virtues to choose things
just or dishonest means . . .
you have that for the right end, whether that be happiness or
Crooked Wisdom, which is called Craft." the common good of society.
Aristotle goes even further in his insistence Conversely, the moral virtues depend upon
that "it is
impossible to be practically wise prudence because, in Aristotle's view, they are
without being good," or, as the same point is formed by the making of right choices. His
made in the language of Aquinas, "one cannot definition of moral virtue names prudence as an
have prudence unless one has the moral virtues; indispensable cause. Since the mean between
since prudence is right reason about things to extremes, in which the virtues consist, is in
be done, to which end man is
rightly disposed most cases subjective or relative to the indi-
certain cleverness, but the clever man who is impossible to have one moral virtue without
merely smart cannot be called practically wise. having all. On this basis, Aristotle says, we can
By this criterion the clever thief who plans and "refute the dialectical argument . . , that the
executes a successful robbery, the shrewd busi- virtues exist in separation from one another."
CHAPTER 73: PRUDENCE 477
As no moral virtue can exist apart from prac- there be any sort of good which is distinct from
wisdom, so with it, all must be present.
tical
knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if
Aquinas mentions another intellectual virtue knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be
as indispensable to the moral virtues, namely, right in thinking that virtue is knowledge."
the virtue of understanding which consists in To test these hypotheses, he proceeds to con-
knowing the first principles in practical as well sider the various things which whether or not
as speculative matters. The first principles of they are the same as virtue are like virtue in
the practical reason (i.e., the precepts of the being advantageous to men. None of these
natural law) underlie prudence as well as the things, such as courage or temperance, seems
moral virtues. Just as sound reasoning in specu- to profit men unless accompanied by what, in
lative matters "proceeds from naturally known English translations, is sometimes called "wis-
principles ... so prudence which is
also does dom" and sometimes "prudence."
right reason about things to be done." Never- Socrates points out that "everything the
theless, though prudence and the moral virtues soul attempts, when under the guidance of
depend upon it, Aquinas does not include wisdom" or prudence "ends in happiness;
understanding as he does not include art, but in the opposite when under the guidance of
science, and wisdomin his enumeration of folly" or imprudence. "If then," he says,
the four cardinal virtues, cardinal in the sense "virtue is a quality of the soul, and if it be of
of being the virtues indispensable to a good necessity always advantageous, then virtue
human life. must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the
things of the soul are either advantageous or
THESE MATTERS, especially the interconnection hurtful in themselves, but they are all made
of the virtues and the theory of the cardinal advantageous or hurtful by the addition to
virtues, are discussed in the chapter on VIRTUE. them of prudence or imprudence" wisdom
The problem of the relative worth of the moral or folly. From this, says Socrates, we can con-
and the intellectual virtues is also considered clude that "prudence is virtue, either the whole
there and in the chapter on WISDOM, where the of virtue or some part of it at least" or, as
contributions to happiness of prudence and this is sometimes translated, "virtue is either
wisdom or of practical and speculative wis- wholly or partly wisdom."
domare specifically compared. In the light of his own view that all the moral
Here there remains to be considered the virtues depend on practical wisdom, Aristotle
Socratic conception of the relation between criticizes the Socratic position. "Socrates in one
knowledge and virtue, for there seems to be an respect was on the right track while in another
issue between his theory of this matter and the he went astray. In thinking that all the virtues
foregoing view of the relation between pru- were forms of practical wisdom he was wrong,
dence and the moral virtues. but in saying that they implied practical wis-
In the Meno, Socrates argues that whatever dom he was right . . . Socrates thought the
a man desires or chooses he either knows or virtues were rules or rational principles . . .
deems to be good. The man who chooses some- while we think they involve a rational prin-
thing evil for himself does not do so knowingly, ciple." Similarly, in considering the question
but only through the mistake of deeming that whether there can be moral without intellec-
which is in fact evil to be advantageous or good. tual virtue,Aquinas writes: "Although virtue
Except for such mistakes, "no man," says be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not
Socrates, or chooses anything evil."
"wills only is it according to right reason, insofar as it
Apart from error or ignorance, evil is never inclines a man to do that which is in accord
voluntarily chosen. Hence, if virtue consists with right reason as the Platonists maintained;
"in willing or desiring things which are good, but it also needs to be joined with right reason,
and in having the power to gain them," it as Aristotle declares."
would seem to follow that knowledge of the Aquinas furthermore interprets the opinion
good is closely related to its practice. that "every virtue is a kind of
'prudence,"
Subsequently, Socrates suggests that "if which he attributes to Socrates, as meaning
478 THE GREAT IDEAS
when "a man in possession of knowl- is known
that is ticulars to their universal by the gen-
edge, he cannot sin, and that everyone who eralname of 'political wisdom' Practical . . .
sinsdoes so through ignorance." This, he says, wisdom also is identified especially with that
"is based on a false supposition, because the form of it which is concerned with the indi-
appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blind- vidual man, and this is known by the general
of knowledge he docs not provided that sin; called deliberative and the other judicial."
this knowledge involves the use of reason in Does this mean that skill of mind in deter-
the individual act of choice." mining the best means to an end is different
Whether those who criticize the position of according to differences in the end whether
Socrates accurately perceive his intention and the happiness of an individual or the common
state the issue fairly are problems of interpre- good of a society? Docs it mean, furthermore,
tation as difficult as the question of where in that the prudence involved in managing a
matter the truth If Socrates household is different from the
this lies. is
saying prudence con-
that a man will do good if he knows the good, cerned with political affairs; and that, in the
what sort of knowledge is
implied knowledge state, the prudence of the ruler (prince or
of the good in general or knowledge of what is statesman) is different from the prudence of
good in a particular case? Do both types of the ruled (subject or citizen), because the one
knowledge of the good lead as readily or surely moves on the level of general laws, the other on
good will or right desire is essential, it may be prudence of laws, is the prudence of the legis-
held that prudence required to apply moral
is lator or lawmaker different from the prudence
principles aiming at the good in general to of the judge who applies the law?
particular cases. "There exists no moral sys- In his Treatise on Prudence, Aquinas an-
tem," writes Mill, "under which there do not swers these questions affirmatively. He dis-
arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obliga- tinguishes between private, domestic, and
tion. These are the real difficulties, the knotty political prudence, and within the political
points, both in the theory of ethics and in the sphere places special emphasis upon what he
conscientious guidance of personal conduct. calls "reignative prudence," the sort of pru-
They are overcome practically, with great or dence Dante calls "a kingly prudence," which
less success, according to the intellect and vir- sets the prince apart from ordinary men.
tue of the individual." Mill seems to imply Hobbes, on the other hand, asserts that "to
that both prudence and virtue arc essential to govern well a family and a kingdom, are not
good action on the level of particulars, and different degrees of prudence, but different
that without them the kind of knowledge sorts of business; no more than to draw a pic-
which is expressed in moral principles does not ture in or as great, or greater than
little, life,
dom, while that which is related to this as par- Finally, if the democratic theory is that all men
CHAPTER 73 : PRUDENCE 479
arc capable of being citizens though not all, specialmode of reignative prudence; or merely
perhaps, are equally eligible for the highest a higher degree of the same prudence by which
public offices must not political prudence be they govern their private lives and their do-
conceived as attainable by all men? mestic establishments; or, as Hobbes suggests,
The question remains open whether those have other abilities whereby they can apply the
who deserve the highest magistracies have a same prudence to a different kind of business.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature of prudence: as practical wisdom, as a virtue or quality of the deliberative
mind 480
3. The interdependence of prudence and the moral virtues: the parts played by deliber-
ation, will, and emotion in human conduct
30. Moral virtue as determining the end for which prudence makes a right choice of
means: right desire as the standard of practical truth 482
3#. Prudence as a factor in the formation and maintenance of moral virtue: the de-
termination of the relative or subjective mean
40. The confinement of prudence to the things within our power: the relation of
4#. The restriction of prudence to the consideration of means rather than ends 484
5.
The nature of a prudent judgment
5#. The acts of the practical reason in matters open to choice: decision and command,
leading to execution or use 485
6a. Political prudence: the prudence of the prince or statesman, of the subject or
citizen
REFERENCES
To numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
find the passages cited, use the
numbers of the passages referred For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
to.
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
printed
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
page.
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
2. The place of prudence among the virtues of 2c. The relation of prudence to intuitive reason
the mind or to the understanding of the natural
law: the moral perception of particulars
2a. Practical or political wisdom distinguished 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK CH B b
i,4 [io95 3o- i2J
from speculative or philosophical wis- 340c-d; CH a b
343d-344a; BK n,
7 [i(>98 35- 8]
dom CH b
9 [no9 2o-23] 355c; BK HI, CH 3 [ni2 b 34-
7 PLATO: Statesman, 581c-582a / Philebus, 1113*2] 358d-359a; BK vi, CH 5-6 389a-d;
633a-635b CH 8 [ii42 a i2-3i] 391b-c; CH n [ii43 a25-b 5J
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 8 [io98b 24-26] a b
392d-393a; BK vn, CH 3 [ii47 25- 6] 397c-d
b b
344b; BK vi, CH i [ii38 i7]-cn 3 [ii39 i8] 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 56,
b
387a-388b; CH 7~8390a-391c; en n [i I43 i4]- A 3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, A 4, ANS and REP 2 38a-
CH 12 [1144*36] 393b-394a; CH 13 [1145*6- 39a; A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; A 6, ANS and REP 3
b
12] 394d / Rhetoric, BK i, CH n [i37i 26-28] 40a-41a; Q 58, A 4, ANS 44a-d; A 5, ANS and
615b REP i 44d-45c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i,
A 6, ANS 6b-7a 3. The interdependence of prudence and the
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 66, moral virtues: the parts played by de-
A 5, REP 1-2 79b-80c liberation, will, and emotion in human
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xin [88-
conduct
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 58, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
A 2, ANS 42a-43a; A 3, REP 2 43b-44a; Q 65, 108, A 3, REP 5 334a-336b
A i 70b-72a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxvi [49-142]
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 312c-314b 38c-39c
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [334-369] 306b- 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK HI, STANZA
307a; [527-551] 310b-311a / Samson Agonistes 42-47 60a-b; STANZA 129 71a-b / Nun's
[38-59] 340b Priest's Tale 450a-460b esp [15,273-452]
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxvin, 457b-460b / Manciple's Tale [17,206-311]
259b 491b-493b
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xxv, 36b
3*. The vices of imprudence: precipitance and 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 77d; 79c-d
undue caution 25 MONTAIGNE: 22d-23b; 53c-55d;
Essays,
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 25:29-34 / Proverbs, 174a-d
7:6-27; 14:16,29; 18:13; 19:2; 20:21; 25:8; 26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT HI, sc
29:11 / Ecdesiastes, 5:2-3; 7:9 (D) Ecclesi- in 304d-306d / 1st Henry IV, ACT i, sc in
astes, 5:1-2; 7:10 437d-440d; ACT n, sc HI 443b-444b; ACT in,
APOCRYPHA: Eccksiasticus, 2:2; 4:29; 6:7-8; 8:19; sc i [147-190] 451c-452a; ACT iv, sc in [1-29]
9:18; 19:4,8-9; 20:8; 21:25-26; 28:11; 30:24 459b-c
(D) OT, Eccksiasticus, 2:2; 4:34; 6:7-8; 8:22; 27 SHAKESPEARE Hamlet 29a-72a,c esp ACT iv,
:
9:25; 19:4,8-9; 20:8; 21:28-29; 28:13; 30*26 sc iv [33-66] 59a-c / Troilus and Cressida,
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 13:19-23 / Marf(, ACT in, sc in [184-241] 124b-12Sa / Othello
4:3-20 / Luke, 8:5-15 / Acts, 19:36 205a-243a,c esp ACT v, sc 11 [338-356] 242d-
4 HOMER: Iliad, UK i [1-492] 3a 8a; BK ix [i- 243a / King I^ear 244a 283a,c / Coriolanus
172] 57a-58d / Odyssey, BK ix [461-542] 351a-392a,c esp ACT in, sc n-in 373c-377a /
234a-d; BK xn [260-419] 252d-254c Timon of Athens 393a-420d esp ACT n, sc n
5 AESCHYLUS: Persians 15a-26d esp [739-786] 400c-403b / Henry VIII, ACT i, sc i [122-149]
23a-c / Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c esp 551b-c; sc 11 [68-88] 553c-d
[631-719] 34a-35a / Prometheus Bound 40a- 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 8c-10a;
51d esp [259-398] 42d-44a, [930-1093] 50a-51d 116a-117b; PART n, 252c-257a; 291d
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c / 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 92
Antigone 131a-142d esp [633-767] 136c-137d 125b-d
/ Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [654-683] 148d-149a, 33 PASCAL: Penstes, 172 203b
[748-783] 149c-d / Electra 156a-169a,c esp 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 203a-207b
[121-403] 157b-159b, [938-1057] 163c-164d / 44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 149b-c
Philoctetes 182a-195a,c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dieses? 148b-150a
5 EURIPIDES: R/icsus 203a-211d esp [1-148] 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 15d 18b; BK
203a-204c / Suppliants [465-510] 262b-d / in, 139a-c; BK v, 211a-213a; BK vin, 321d-
Bacchantes 340a-352a,c esp [215-433] 341 d- 322d; 328c-333a; 334d-335a; 336b-337d; BK
343b / Phoenician Maidens [443-593] 381d- ix, 344b-346a; 366d-367b; BK x, 42 6b; BK
383a xiii, 569d*570b; BK xiv, 596c-d; 603a 604b;
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 94c-d; 97b-c; EPILOGUE i, 655c-656b
BK vn, 216d-218b; 225c-d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK x,
6TnucYDiDEs: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 273a-d
370a-c; BK n, 393a-c; 402a-404d esp 402c-d f 53 JAMES :
Psychology, 799b-807a passim, esp
403b-c; BK iv, 449b-c; 462d-463a; BK v, 800a-801a, 806b-807a
507a-c; BK vn, 545b-c
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 62b-64a 4. The sphere of prudence
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 2 [1104*10-26]
349c-d; BK vi, CH 5 [ii40b i3-i9] 389b-c; CH 9 4a. The confinement of prudence to the things
b within our power: the relation of pru-
[ii42 i7-34] 391d-392b; BK vn, CH 6 399d-
b dence to free will, choice, and deliber-
400c; CH 9 [ii5i"28- i6] 402b-c / Rhetoric,
BK H, CH 12 [1389*2]-^ 14 [i390b n] 636b- ation
638a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 2-3 357b-359a;
b
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vn [572-600] 252a-b; BK BK vi, CH 2 [ii39*32- n] 388a-b; CH 5 [1140*
b b
xi [376-444] 338b-340a 3i- 5) 389a-b; CH 7 [ii4i 8-i4) 390c
14 PLUTARCH: Fabius-Pericles, 154d / Pelopidas, 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH i 105a-106c;
232a-233a; 244c-245a / Marcellus-Pelopidas, CH 18 124a-125a; CH 29 134d-138a; BK n, CH
484 THE GREAT IDEAS 4 to 5a
5 EURIPIDES: Rhesus [1-148] 203a-204c / Sup-
(4. The sphere of prudence. 4a, The confinement pliants [465-510] 262b-d / Phoenician Maid-
of prudence to the things within our power: ens [443-593] 381d-383a; [697-747] 384a-d /
the relation of prudence to free will, choice,
Iphigenia at Aulis [378-414] 428b-c
and deliberation.) 5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [366-382] 546d-547a
5 142c-144a; CH CH 23 170a-
10 148c-150a; 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 31c-d; 46c-d; BK
172d; UK HI, 2 177c-178d; CH 10 185d-
CH vn, 217a; 218c; 219a-c; 258d; BK vm, 269c-
187a; CH 18 192a-c; BK iv, CH i 213a-223d 270a
12 AUKEMUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 6 257c; 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 383d-
SECT 9 257d; SECT n 258a-b; SECT 16 259a; 384a; BK n, 397b-c; BK in, 427a-c
BK v, SECT 19 272a; SECT 34 273c; BK vi, 7 PLATO: Meno, 183d-184c; 188b-189a / Repub-
SECT 16 275b-d; SECT 22 276a; BK vn, SECT lic, BK in, 337b-338a; BK x, 439b-441a,c
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The distinction between prudence and wisdom, or between practical and speculative wisdom,
see KNOWLEDGE 6e(i); MIND 93; PHILOSOPHY 2a; WISDOM ib.
The relation of prudence to the other intellectual virtues, see ART i; HABIT 5d; KNOWLEDGE
6e(2), 8b(3); LAW 43; SCIENCE ia(i); VIRTUE AND VICE 23(2); WISDOM 2a.
The relation of prudence to the moral virtues, see COURAGE 4; KNOWLEDGE 8b(i) PRINCIPLE ;
43; TEMPERANCE ib; TRUTH 2c; VIRTUE AND VICE ic, 30, 50.
The relevance of freedom and of the distinction between means and ends to the operations of
prudence, see GOOD AND EVIL 5c; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5a(i)-5a(2) WILL 20(1)- ;
2c( 3 ), 5b(2).
The elements which enter into the making of a prudent judgment, see EXPERIENCE 6a;
JUDGMENT 3; OPINION 6b; REASONING 56(3); WILL 2c(3), 5b(2).
Considerations of the prudence of the statesman or citizen, and of the legislator or jurist,
see CITIZEN 5; GOVERNMENT 3d; LAW 5d, 5g; MONARCHY 33; STATE 8d.
ADDITIONAL HEADINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
problem of punishment divides into a lem of punishment in its most general terms,
THE
number of questions. In what does pun- for the most part considering the foregoing
ishment consist ? What purpose should punish- questions without regard to the distinction of
ment serve, or what should be its principle or sin, crime, and vice; or to the differences be-
reason ? Who has the authority to punish and tween divine and human punishment, or be-
under what conditions shall this authority be tween punishment by the state and in the fam-
exercised ? Who shall be punished and who shall ily (i.e.y punishment as involved in the enforce-
be exempt from punishment? What are the ment of law and punishment as an instrument
forms or kinds of punishment ? Are any of these of education or training). These more special-
reprehensible cither in principle or for their ized topics belong to other chapters: e.g., pun-
ally considered
in relation to vice, to crime, and LAW. One other chapter PLEASURE AND PAIN
to sin. According to the type of wrongdoing of peculiar relevance to the question about
is
being considered, the punitive agent may be the nature of punishment. Concerning the na-
the wrongful individual himself or his family, ture of punishment there seems to be no great
his state, his church or God. difference of opinion in the tradition of western
The lines which separate these areas of the thought. Punishment is generally conceived as
problem of punishment cannot be sharply the infliction of pain, though some writers dis-
drawn in all cases, for as certain acts simultane- tinguish between corporeal and spiritual pun-
ously violate the moral, the civil, and the di- ishment according as the pain inflicted is the
vine law, they may also cause a person to be pain of sense or the pain of deprivation and loss.
simultaneously subject to punishment from di- Imprisonment, for example, always entails the
verse sources. The wrong or injury which pun- pain of loss the loss of freedom but it may
ishment supposed to redress may in some
is also carry with it the suffering of physical hard-
under none of these headings, as, for
cases fall ships or even tortures. The torment of the
example, acts of war or rebellion. It is some- damned according to some theologians, both
is,
times questioned whether the theory of punish- corporeal and spiritual the agony of hell-fire
ment remains the same when punitive steps are and the anguish of the soul deprived of God's
taken by one state against some or all the peo- love and presence.
ple of another; or again, when a government ap-
plies penalties for a rebellion engaged in by IF THERE is LITTLE DISPUTE about the nature of
members of own community.
its
punishment, the opposite situation prevails
In this chapter, we shall deal with the prob- concerning its purpose. Why men should be
488
CHAPTER 74: PUNISHMENT 489
punished is one of the most controversial ques- ment should yield, the only desire it should
tions in the field of moral and political thought, satisfy, is that of seeing the moral law upheld.
and in psychology and theology as well. We should punish only because we have, under
The major opposition in the tradition of the the moral law, a duty to do so.
those who think it cannot be justified without anything besides strict justice such as the ref-
reference to utility or expediency. While
its ormation of the criminal, the deterrence of
this debate goes on, for more than twenty others, the welfare of society, or the slaking of
centuries, punishments in actual practice the thirst for vengeance. "Juridical punish-
whether in accordance with the law or uncon- ment," he says, "can never be administered
trolled by it tend generally to be severe and merely as a means for promoting another good,
often fiendish or ferocious. Not until Beccaria either with regard to the Criminal himself, or
in the i8th, and Bentham in the iQth century, to Civil Society, but must in all cases be im-
does the discussion of punishment lead to ma- posed only because the individual on whom it is
jor reforms in the spirit and provisions
of the inflicted has committed a Crime. The Penal . . .
penal codes. But the opposite positions in the Law a Categorical Imperative; and woe to
is
debate across the centuries are never without him who creeps through the serpent-windings
practical significance for penal institutions and of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage
punitive measures, even when theory is not that may discharge him from the Justice of
immediately reflected in practice. The specula- Punishment, or even from the due measure of
tive significance of the issue is, however, always it."
immediately apparent. Although justice and What shall determine the mode and measure
law arc more fundamental and comprehensive of punishment? Kant answers: "It is just the
ideas than punishment, this one problem of Principle of Equality by which the pointer of
punishment the question of its purpose the Scale of Justice is made to incline no more to
critically tests the meaning of anyone's theory one side than the other. It may be rendered by
of law and justice. saying that the undeserved evil which anyone
It may be that the issue cannot be fairly commits on another, is to be regarded as perpe-
stated in terms of purpose. To use that word trated on himself. . . . This is the Right of Re-
may beg the question, since one of the basic po- and properly understood
taliation (ius talionis)\
sitions in the controversy appears to be that it is the only Principle which ... can
definitely
punishment has no purpose in the sense observ- assign both the quality and the quantity of a
ing some end beyond itself,
or producing some just penalty. All other standards are wavering
desired consequence in the future. This is the and uncertain; and on account of other consid-
theory shared by Kant and Hegel that pun- erations involved in them, they contain no
ishment should be purely retributive. principle conformable to the sentence of pure
According to this view the effect of the pun- and strict Justice."
punishment of the transgressor may assuage the the loss of or damage to his chattel. But it is
sometimes been taken to mean that all punish- out with a life of brute force, lay exhausted
ment simply vengeance; and that instead of
is from its and therefore the more readily
feuds;
submitted ofits own free will to laws and
returning injury for injury, the Christian it
should love his enemies and forgive them. "If stringent codes. As each man moved by anger
you think someone has wronged you," Princess took measures to avenge himself with more
Mary says to Prince Andrew in War and Peace, severity than is now permitted by equitable
"forget it and forgive! We have no right to laws, for this reason men grew sick of the life of
not be the same when the punishment of the popular confusion of retribution with revenge.
evildoer is a question for the state rather than "In that condition of society," he writes, "when
for the individual. "Avenge not yourselves," there are neither magistrates nor laws, punish-
St. Paul commands; "for it is written, Ven- ment always takes the form of revenge; revenge
thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he thing personal. Yet it is not something personal
beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the but the concept itself which carries out retribu-
*
minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath tion. Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord/ as the
upon him that doeth evil." Bible says. . The Eumenides sleep, but
. .
A life for a life appears to be the symbolic crime awakens them, and hence it is the very
statement of the lex talionis in the Greek as well act of crime itself which vindicates itself."
as the Hebrew tradition. "Justice claims aloud The apparent contradiction in the identity
her debt," the Chorus explains in the Choephoroe and difference of retribution and revenge can,
of Aeschylus. "Who in blood hath dipped the in Hegel's opinion, be resolved. On the one
ty does not determine the mode of retribu- principally revenge, which is just in its content
tion. "People want even the justice of Rhada- insofar as it is retributive." The demand that
manthus to mean this: Should a man suffer what this contradiction be resolved "is the demand
he did, right justice would be done." Yet, Aris- for justice not as revenge but as punishment."
totle points out, "in many cases, reciprocity and Hegel's resolution seems to be in terms of a
rectincatory justice are not in accord, e.g., if an distinction between the particular and the uni-
official has inflicted a wound, he should not be versal. "When the right against crime has the
wounded in return, and if someone has wounded form of revenge, it is only right implicit, not
an official, he ought not to be wounded only right in the form of right, i.e., no act of revenge
but punished in addition." Retaliation consists is
justified. Instead of the injured party, the in-
is "in accordance with a
in reciprocity only if it jured universal now comes on the scene, and this
CHAPTER 74: PUNISHMENT 491
has its proper actuality in the court of law. It in a political assembly; and the question is not
takes over the pursuit and the avenging of justice, but how to make the Mytilenians useful
crime, and this pursuit consequently ceases to to Athens. ... I consider it far more useful for
be the subjective and contingent retribution of the preservation of our empire to put up with
revenge, and is transformed into the genuine injustice, than to put to death, however justly,
reconciliation of right with itself, *.*., into pun- those whom it is our interest to keep alive. As
ishment." for Cleon's idea that in punishment the claims
On this conception of punishment, Hegel of justice and expediency can both be satisfied,
like Kant decries every utilitarian purpose for facts do not confirm the possibility of such a
punishment. Such misconceptions of punish- combination."
ment arise, he says, from the supposition that In the chapter on justice in Utilitarianism,
both crime and annulment are "unqualified
its Mill seems to place justice above expediency,
evils," which makes it seem "quite unreason- but he also seems to reduce retribution to re-
able to will an evil merely because 'another evil venge and call it just. "The sentiment of jus-
is there already.* To give punishment this su- tice," which includes as "one of its elements . . .
presupposition of those which regard it as a pre- Retribution, or the giving of "evil for evil," he
ventive, a deterrent, a threat, as reformative, says "becomes closely connected with the sen-
,
justice and expediency, with the utilitarians of punishment is not incompatible with its re-
identifying retribution with revenge and de- tributive justice. The great theologians, for ex-
manding that punishment serve some good or ample, considering the difference between the
mitigate some evil. But sometimes the question eternal punishment of the damned in Hell, and
is whether justice and expediency are compati- the cleansing punishment of the repentant in
ble. Purgatory, do not find it impossible for divine
In the debate on the treatment of the My- justice to include both absolute retribution and
tilenians, which Thucydides reports, Cleon punishment which may be remedial as well as
says, "was not involuntary, but of malice and think that punishment can ever be justified
deliberate," and they deserve to be punished. simply by its utility by the good it achieves
"If you follow my advice, you will do what is without any reference to the retaliation of evil
time expedient. . . . For if they were right in In the context of saying that the institution
rebelling, you must be wrong in ruling. How- of slavery among men is a just punishment for
ever, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, Adam's sin, and that "God knows how to award
you must carry out your principle and punish fitpunishments for every variety of offence,"
the Mytilenians as your interest requires." Augustine observes that "we must not only do
Diodotus objects to the policy of putting the harm to no man, but also restrain him from sin
Mytilenians to death on the ground that it is or punish his sin, man himself
so that either the
not a question of justice but of expediency. who is punished may profit by his experience or
"We are not in a court of justice," he says, "but others be warned of his example." Here there
492 THE GREAT IDEAS
seems to be no thought that retribution ex- that "no one punishes the evil-doer for the rea-
cludes a reformative or deterrent use of punish- son that he has done wrong only the unrea-
ment. Aquinas even more explicitly combines sonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But
the remedial and the deterrent utility of pun- he who desires to inflict rational punishment
ishment with the function of punishment to does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot
preserve the order of justice by meting out an be undone. He has regard to the future, and is
according to Aquinas. "The order of justice doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of
belongs to the order of the universe; and this prevention, thus clearly implying that virtue is
through fear of punishment." Punishment is a who see him corrected, may utterly hate injus-
proper effect of human law, not merely be- tice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-
cause justice requires it, but because "the law doing." Yet he also goes on to say that the law
makes use of the fear of punishment in order "should aim at the right measure of punish-
to ensure obedience." ment, and in all cases at the deserved punish-
In discussing the proportion between the ment." This qualification seems, in turn, to be
severity of the penalty and the gravity of the balanced by his remarks on the death penalty
fault in the punishment of sin under the Mosaic which he thinks should be imposed only on the
law, Aquinas explains that in addition to the incurable who cannot profit from punishment
reason of justice (that "a greater sin, other and whose execution "would be an example to
things being equal, deserves a greater punish- othermen not to oflcnd."
ment"), there is the purpose of reformation The notion of desert in Plato's
theory of pun-
("since men are
not easily cured of habitual sin ishment appeals to justice without implying
except by severe punishments") and the pur- any separation between retribution and reform.
pose of prevention ("for men are not easily de- In the Gorgias, Socrates says that "to suffer
from such is another name for
terred sins unless they be severely punishment being justly
punished"). Here three reasons for punish- corrected when you do wrong." A wrongdoer
ment are stated side by side. But in the opinion who escapes punishment suffers a greater evil
of Aquinas retribution is more than the pri- than one who is punished, for he "who is pun-
mary, it is the one indispensable reason; for ished and suffers retribution, suffers justly."
punishment cannot be justified except as doing Thereby justice is restored to his soul. The
the work of justice. judge who prescribes just punishments cures
the soul, as the physician who prescribes the
THE VIEW OF KANT AND Hegel that retribution right remedies cures the body. The criminal
or retaliation is the only basis for punishment who, having been unjust, goes unpunished "has
not merely the primary or the indispensable no deliverance from injustice."
reason meets its exact opposite in what ap- The fact that just punishments are deserved
pears to be the completely utilitarian theory of does not seem to be the reason why men should
punishment to be found in the writings of be punished. Considering the penalties imposed
Plato, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. by gods and men, in the next world or in this,
In the Protagoras, arguing for the proposition Socrates summarizes his argument by saying
that virtue can be taught, Protagoras insists that "the proper office of punishment is two-
CHAPTER 74: PUNISHMENT 493
fold: he who is rightly punished ought either to even for the sake of making an example, anyone
become better and profit by it, or he ought to whom it can leave alive without danger." Or,
be made an example to his fellows, that they as Fetyukovitch says in his address to the jury
may see what he suffers, and fear and become in the Brothers Karamazovi "The Russian court
better. Those who are improved when they are does not exist for punishment only, but also for
punished by gods and men, are those whose sins the salvation of the criminal. Let other nations
are curable; and they are improved, as in this think of retribution and the letter of the law,
world so also in another, by pain and suffering." we will cling to the spirit and the meaning
Like Plato, Hobbes places the reason for pun- the salvation and the reformation of the lost."
ishment in the future rather than in the past
in its utility to procure certain effects rather THIS GREAT ISSUE CONCERNING the reason for or
than in its effecting retaliation. He states it as a purpose of punishment seems to affect most of
law of nature that "in revenges (that is, retribu- the other questions which men raise about the
tion of evil for evil), men looJ^not at the greatness penalties to be imposed for wrongdoing
ofthe evil past, but the greatness ofthe good to fol- whether the wrong is a sin, a crime, or a vicious
low. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict pun- act, and whether it is God or the state, nature
ishment with any other design than for the cor- or the individual himself, who inflicts the pain.
rection of the offender, or the direction of The reverse also seems to be true. These other
others." Anything else he calls "an act of hos- questions raise difficulties or issues which test
tility."
the conflicting theories that punishment should
The chief aim of punishment, in securing the be a just retaliation exclusively, or should be
reformation and the deterrence of criminals, justified onlyby its consequences, or should
Hobbes thinks, is to maintain public peace. "A somehow be a combination of awarding just de-
thority" on those who have transgressed the For example, the question of how the various
end that the will of men may there-
law, "to the modes and measures of punishment should be
by the better be disposed to obedience." A determined and assigned to diverse acts of
law, without a penalty attached, is "not a law, wrongdoing does not seem to be answerable in
but vain words." It fails to achieve the end of the same way when the principle is simply retri-
law, which is the same as the end of punish- bution and when the purpose of punishment is
ment. The worst offenses those to be pre- reformation and deterrence. On the principle
vented by the most severe penalties are of retribution the gravity of the offence ap-
crimes, not against individuals, but those that pears to be the only determinant of the severity
"are of most danger to the public." of the punishment. The punishment should fit
Locke also derives from natural law the right the crime, not the nature of the criminal as
to punish those who transgress that law, "for someone capable of being benefitted by punish-
restraint and preventing the like offence," to ment.
which he adds that "each transgression may be Kant and Hegel do not think that the justi-
punished to that degree, and with so much fication of thedeath penalty, for example, de-
severity as to make it an ill bargain to the of- pends on the curability or incurability of the
fender, give him cause to repent, and terrify offender. Nor do they think that the taking of
others from doing the like." This theory of the criminal's life should be motivated, as
punishment applies not only to man living in a Aquinas and Locke seem to suggest, by the
state of nature, but in civil society as well. desire to protect society from his future dep-
Though Rousseau describes the wise states- redations. It is sufficient that he has taken a
man as one who knows how, by punishing or committed some equally serious injury,
life,
crimes, to prevent them, he lays greater em- which ought to be repaid by a proportionate
phasis on the other motive for punishment requital.
the reformation of the criminal. "There is not a "What is involved in the action of the crim-
single ill-doer who could not be turned to some inal," Hegel writes, "is not only the concept of
good. The State has no right to put to death, crime, the rational aspect in crime as such
494 THE GREAT IDEAS
whether the individual wills it or not, the as- II and Napoleon to abolish it, "we have begun
pect which the state has to vindicate, but also to see," Hegel thinks, "which crimes deserve
the abstract rationality of the individual's voli- the death penalty and which do not. Capital
tion. Since that
is so,"
Hegel argues, "punish- punishment has in consequence become rare,
harmless, or with a view to deterring or re- tial offenders. The modes and degrees of pun-
individuals to allow themselves to be executed not seem to think that punishment can improve
was included in the social contract." Rousseau the character of the individual, he believes that
takes the diametrically opposite view. He argues a certain proportion between the penalty and
for thedeath penalty on the ground that "we the offense may tend to reduce the extent and
consent to die if we ourselves turn assassins" in gravity of crimes. "In Russia," he says, "where
order to protect ourselves from falling victims the punishment of robbery and murder is the
to assassins. In making this consent a part of same, they always murder."
the social contract, Rousseau holds that "we In general, Montesquieu is
opposed to un-
think only of securing [our own lives], and it is duly severe punishments, and especially to
not to be assumed that any of the parties then cruel and unusual punishments, not so much on
Hegel disagrees with both Beccaria and libertyand public morals. Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. According to him, the state is not Rousseau similarly discuss the severity of pun-
based upon a social contract; nor does he admit ishment with reference to its
utility, and, like
that "its fundamental essence [involves] the Montesquieu, they face the problem that the
unconditional protection and guarantee of the same measure or degree of punishment may not
life and
property of members of the public as be equally effective for the purposes of refor-
individuals. On
the contrary," he holds, "it is mation and deterrence. Severe penalties, for ex-
that higher entity" the state "which even ample, may have a greater deterrent effect up-
lays claim to this very life and property and on potential offenders than milder forms of
demands its sacrifice." punishment, but they may also tend to harden
The state, therefore, according to Hegel, can- criminals instead of reforming them.
not be denied the right of inflicting capital The conflict of principles in the determina-
punishment. Hegel admits that "Beccaria's re- tion of punishments seems to be even more
quirement that men
should give their consent marked in the case of those who try to combine
to being punished is right enough," but he retribution with utility. If, for example, the
adds that "the criminal gives his consent already death penalty is the just desert for murder,
by hisvery act. The nature of the crime, no should it be applied on the grounds of retribu-
less than the private will of the individual, tion, even though a particular murderer can be
requires that the injury initiated by the crim- reformed by milder treatment ? If heavy pen-
inal should be annulled. However that may be," alties were to prove highly effective as deter-
he continues, "Beccaria's endeavor to have rents, should they be applied to minor offenses,
THERE SEEMS TO BE AGREEMENT for the most and vice are intrinsically good and evil, and
part on who shall have the authority to punish sometimes to mean that through their natural
and who shall be subject to punishment, in the consequences they heap benefit or injury on
relation of men to one another, to the state, and their possessor.
to God. Punishment seems to be annexed to Augustine, for example, says that by the sins
law, as indispensable for its enforcement, so which he committed God did justly punish
that whoever has the authority to set rules of him, for "every disorder in the soul is its own
conduct for another also has the authority to punishment"; and Kant distinguishes juridical
impose penalties for their violation. Yet the from natural punishment "in which Crime as
notion that punishment is a
necessary sanction Vice punishes itself, and does not as such come
for law which is
apparently shared by those within the cognizance of the Legislator." The
who take the retributive and those who take other interpretation seems to be represented by
the utilitarian view of punishment docs not Hobbes' theory that "intemperance is natu-
seem to fit both views equally well, at least not rally punished with diseases injustice with . . .
to the extent that the end of law and its en- the violence of enemies cowardice with op-
. . .
forcement is the common good or the public pression." In the chain of consequences started
welfare. by any action, he discerns the pains which are
Again,seems to be generally agreed that
it "the natural punishments of those actions that
moral responsibility on the part of offenders is are the beginning of more harm than good."
an indispensable condition of just punishment But according to Freud it is the craving for
for their misdeeds. Unless the sinful or the punishment rather than the punishment which
criminal act is voluntary, unless it is intentional is natural, i.e.,
psychologically determined. In-
rather than accidental or if negligent, capable dividuals punish themselves or seek to be pun-
of being attributed to a willful error of judg- ished for what is either real or fancied guilt.
ment-- the act is without fault and the agent "The unconscious need for punishment plays a
without guilt. But although those who make part in every neurotic disease," Freud writes.
punishment retributive and those who make it "It behaves like a part of the conscience, like
reformative or deterrent seem to agree upon the prolongation of conscience into the uncon-
responsibility as prerequisite, this principle scious; and it must have the same origin as con-
does not seem to be equally consistent with science; that is to say, it will correspond to a
both theories at least not to the extent that piece of aggressiveness which has been internal-
the exemplary punishment may deter others ized and taken over by the super-ego. If only
the words were less incongruous, we should be
quite apart from the responsibility of the per-
son punished. justified ... in calling it 'an unconscious sense
The question of responsibility raises other of guilt.'"
difficulties, e.g., the metaphysical issue about Whatever its psychological validity, Freud's
personal identity, on which Locke takes the theory does not resolve the moral issue con-
stand that unless the human individual is an cerning the justice or utility of punishment.
enduring substance, he cannot deserve subse- Nor does it eliminate the possibility of other
quent punishment for his prior acts; and the motives for submitting to punishment volun-
issue of free will and causality, on which Hume's tarily. Socrates
in the Crito explains that he re-
position seems to be that unless human actions fuses to escape from the death penalty he thinks
are subject to causal necessity, a man cannot be he does not deserve, in order to uphold the law
blamed for his acts or "become the object of which is itself just even though in his own case
punishment or vengeance." it has been unjustly applied by men. Thoreau
Finally, there is the problem of a natural and Gandhi refuse to obey laws their con-
need for punishment and of the penalties which sciences cannot approve, but do not resist the
nature imposes for wrongdoing to fulfill
itself state's demand that they be punished for the
this need. The familiar statement that virtue is law's infraction. In an unjust society, going to
its own reward and vice its own punishment, prison is for them the necessary fulfillment of
is sometimes interpreted to mean that virtue the revolution begun by civil disobedience.
496 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The general theory of punishment 497
10. The nature of punishment: the pain of sense and the pain of loss
ib. The retributive purpose of punishment: the lex talioni$\ retaliation and revenge;
the righting of a wrong
$b.
Vice its own punishment 502
4^. The justice of legal punishment: the conventionality of the punishments deter-
mined by positive law
4</.
Grades of severity in punishment: making the punishment fit the crime
5.
The punishment for sin
506
y. The pain of remorse and the torment of conscience: the atonement for sin 507
5*/.
The modes of divine punishment: here and hereafter, temporal and eternal 508
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad,
BK n 1265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TLSTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (/)) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
405a
Ib. The retributive purpose of punishment: the
10:4 (D) OT, // Machabecs, 6:12-17; 7 33J : 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 87a-b; BK v, 164c
10:4 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 400d-
NEW TESTAMENT: I Corinthians, n 132 / Hebrews, 401 a; BK in, 426b-d; 427d-428a
12:5-11 / Revelation, 3:19 (D) Apocalypse, 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 45b-d / Gorgias, 293d-
3:19 294c / Laws, BK v, 690d-691b; BK ix, 743c-
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [1348-1353] 142d 744a; 747d; 757a; BK x, 769d-770c; BK xi,
5 EURIPIDES: Orestes [491-525] 399a-b 782a-b
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [1303-1464] 504b- 9 ARISTOTLE: BK in, CH 5 [ni3 b 2i-
Ethics,
506c 1114*2] 359d-360a; BK x, CH 9 [ii7933-n8oa
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 45b-d / Gorgias, 267c- 32] 434a-435a / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 14 [1375*1-
270c; 293d-294c / Republic, BK n, 321d-322d; 20] 619b-c
BK 426d-427a / Critias, 485b-d / Laws, BK
ix, 10 HIPPOCRATES The Law, par i 144a-b
:
v, 688d-689a; 690d-691b; BK ix, 743c-744a; 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 49d-50a; 57a; 61c-d;
747d; BK x, 769d-770c; BK xi, 782a-b; BK BK xiv, 151d-152b / Histories, BK i, 200d
xu, 785c-786a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 16 521d-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 3 [no4b i4-i8] 522a
350a; BK x, CH 9 [i 180*5-13] 434d 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 87,
:
316a; PART H-II, Q 33 550a-558d; PART in n, SECT 7-13 26c-28b passim; CH xiv, SECT
SUPPL, Q 99, A i, REP 3 1078c-1081a 159 62b-c; CH xv, SECT 171 65a-b / Human
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 94a; PART n, Understanding, BK i, CH n, SECT 13 107d-108c
141b; 147a-b; 157d-158a 35 HUME Human Understanding, SECT vin, DIV
:
(3. Punishment in relation to virtue and vice.) 32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes 339a-378a esp
[1-46] 339b-340b, [356-380] 347b-348a, [667-
36. Vice its own punishment 709] 354a-355a, [1156-1177] 364b-365a
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 14:5-10 (D) OT, 38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 372c
Ecclesiasticus, 14:5-10 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 54c-55a
Gorgias, 262a-267c/ Republic, BK ix,
7 PLATO: 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 458b-459b
417b-418d; BK x, 436c-441a,c / Theaetetus, 46 HI-.GEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 100
530d / Laws, BK n, 656d-658b; BK v, 689d- 37d-38a; PART in, par 220 73a-b
690c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 221d; BK ix,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [1014- 373b-374d
1023] 43a-b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 30c-
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 28, 134b-c; 32a; BK in, 50c-54b; BK xn, 369a-373c; 380c-
BK u, CH 10, 149c-d; BK in, CH 24, 206b~208a; 386a; EPILOGUE, 404c-408a passim
BK iv, CH 5 228a-230b 54 FREUD: Civilisation and Its Discontents, 792 b-
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 16 259a; 793d esp 792d-793a, 793d; 795d-796a; 797c-
BK viu, SECT 55 290b; BK ix, SECT 4 292a; 798c / New Introductory Lectures, 831b
SECT 42 295c-296a,c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 19 5d; BK
4. Crime and punishment: punishment as a
political instrument
in, par 16 17c-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK vi, 191a-b
85 86 178b-185c; Q 87, A i, ANS and REP 3 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK in,
185d-186c; Q 89, A i 199a-c 424d-428d
23 HOBIIKS: leviathan, PART u, 163d~164a 7 PLATO: Laws, BK ix 743a-757d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 174d-176c; 389c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 4 [ii3i b 25]-cn 5
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III, ACT i, sc iv [1-75] [iM3
ft
$] 379b-380c; CH n [ii^Vnl 386b-c
b
114d-115b / Politics, BK iv, CH 16 [i:$oo i9-:$8] 501c-d;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH n, BK vi, CH 8 [i32i b 40-i322 a28] 525d-526a; BK
sucr 5 6 105a-c passim vii, CH 13 [1332*12-16] 536d / Athenian Con-
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vi, 39b stitution, CH 52-53 576b-577b; CH 56, par 6-
42 KANT: Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, CH 579a-580c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 12
59, par 7
374a-c 615c-617c; CH 14 619a-d
52 DOSFOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xn, 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1136-
381c-d; 398a-b 1160] 76a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 83a-b 14 PLUTARCH: Cicero, 710c-712d
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 793a- 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xiv, 151d-152b / His-
794a tories, BK i, 200c-d
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 6 514b-
3c. Guilt, repentance, and the moral need for 515a
punishment 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 87,
OLD TESTAMENT: Leviticus, 26:40-4} / / Kings, A i, ANS 185d-186c; PART n-n, Q ^, A i, ANS
8: 4 6- 5 i-(D) /// Kings, 8:46-51 / Psalms, 6; and REP i 550b-551a; A 3, ANS 552d-553b; A
32; 38; 51; 102; 150; 143 (D) Psalms, 6; 31; 4, ANS 553b-554b; A 6, ANS and REP i 555a-d
37; 50; 101; 129; 142 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH vii, llb-c; CH vin,
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 12:10 (D) 14a-c
OT, Boof( of Wisdom, 12:10 / Ecclesiasticus, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 138d-148b; CON-
20:3; 21 :6 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 20:4; CLUSION, 281a-d
21:7 26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT in, sc i
NEW TESTAMENT: Lufy, 16:27-31 / Revelation, [223-281] 49c-50a
2:5,16-22 (D) Apocalypse, 2:5,16-22 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 68b-73a;
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 9c-10a 177a-b
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 267c-270c; 293d-294c 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3c-4a; 5b-6a; 14a-15a /
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 14d / Histories, BK in, Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 87-88 44a-c;
255b-c CH xv, SECT 171 65a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xn, CH 3 343d- 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 28a-b; 29b
344 b; BK xix, CH 13 519a-520a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vi, 37d-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica^ PART i-n, Q 87, 43d; BK xn, 85a-92b
A i, ANS and REP 3 185d-186c; PART n-n, Q 33 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 351b-d / Political
550a-558d Economy, 371a-c / Social Contract, BK n,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 388c-395b passim 398b-399a
27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure, ACT n, 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 309a-c
sc in [19-42] 184b-c / Cymbelinc, ACT v, sc iv 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 197b; 198d-200a;
[1-29] 481a-b 215b-216a; 225d-229b; 387d-388d; 437b-d
4a to CHAPTER 74: PUNISHMENT 503
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 91a-94c; I87b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 617b-d
42 KANT: Science of Right, 446a-448b 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 306b-c / Science of
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE i, SECT Right, 446a-d
8 [210-212] [220-225] 13b; ARTICLE in, SECT 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 15, 65a-b; NUMBER 21,
3 [57-5"] 16a 78b-d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 15, 65a-b 43 MILL: Liberty, 302d-303a / Representative
43 MILL: Liberty, 304d-305b; 313a-b Government, 329d-330a / Utilitarianism, 467d-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 90- 468c; 471d-472d
103 35d-39b esp par 96-100 36c-38a; PART in, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART m, par 220
par 218 72c-d; ADDITIONS, 138 139a-b 73a-b; par 233 75d; ADDITIONS, 60 125d; 138
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 223a-232a 139a-b; 173 146d
passim; BK xi, 505a-511b; BK xn, 547a-551c 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xn
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 348b,d-401d passim, esp 395a-401d
30b-32a
4b. The forms of punishment available to the
4a. Punishment for lawbreaking as a necessary state
sanction of law 5 EURIPIDES: Orestes [491-601] 399a 400a
5 AESCHYLUS: Eumenides [490-562] 86b-87a; 7 PLATO: Apology, 209d-210a / Gorgias, 264b
[681-710] 88b-c / Laws, BK v, 690d-691b; BK ix 743a-757d
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [640-680] 136d-137a passim; BK xi 771b-784b passim; BK xn,
5 EURIPIDES: Orestes [478-606] 398d-400a 784d-786b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK v, 164c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 5 [ii32b 2 1-1133*
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK m, 4]380b-c; CH n [1138*4-13] 386b-c; BK x, CH
427d-428a 9 [1180*5-13] 434d / Athenian Constitution,
7 PLATO: Statesman, 601c-602d / Laws, BK ix, CH 52-53 576b-577b passim; CH 56-60 578c-
747d; 757a; BK x, 769d-770c; BK xu, 792c- 580d passim; CH 67, par 5 583b
793a 15 TACI-IUS: Annals, BK xiv, 152d-153a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 4 379b-380b; 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xxi, CH n,
CH ii [1138*4-13] CH 9 [ii79 a
386b-c; BK x, 570c-d
33-1180*32] 434a-435a / Politics, BK vi, CH 8 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q
b a
[i32i 4o--i322 28] 525d-526a; BK vn, CH 13 105, A 2, REP 9-12 309d-316a; PART in SUPPL,
[1332*10-16] 536d 99, A i, ANS 1078c-1081a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 6 514b- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 146b-147b
515a; BK xxi, CH n, 570c-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 23b-24a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 92, 26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT iv,
A 2, ANS and REP 3-4 214d-215a,c; Q 96, A 5 sc i [346-400] 429a-d
233d-234d; Q 105, A 2, ANS 309d-316a 35 LOCKE Toleration, 3a / Civil Government, CH i,
:
31:10-18 (D) Ezechiel, 31:10-18 / Daniel, 73c, xvii [76-139] 79b-d, xvm [76-145] 80d-
12:2 81b, xix [97-126] 82c-d, xxi [34-75) 85b-d,
APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16:17 (D) OT, Judith, xxv [109] -xx vi [90] 92c-93d, xxx-xxxi
Wisdom of Solomon, 4:16-5:14
16:20-21 / 99b-102b
(D) OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 4:16-5:15 / Ec- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 251b-c; 255b-
clesiasticus, 7:16-17; 18:22,24; 21:9-10 (D) 258b
OT, Ecclcsiasticus, 7:18-19; 18:22,24; 21 :io-ii 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc v [9-22] 37a
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 3:7 12; 5:22,29; 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 173d
8:12; 10:14-15,28; 11:20-24; 13:41-42,49-50;
6. Pathological motivations with respect to
18:9; 23:33; 25:41-467 Marl(, 9:42-48; 16:16
/ Lu^e, 12:5; 16:19-26 / John, 15:6 / Ro- punishment: abnormal sense of sin or
guilt; perverse desires to inflict or suffer
mans, 2:5-9; 13:2 / // Thessalonians, 1:7-9
/ Hebrews, 10:26-31 /James, 5:1-6 / Jude, 6-13 punishment
/ Revelation, 9; 14:9-11; 19:17-21; 20:9-10,12- 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 95d-97c
15; 21 :8 (D) Apocalypse, 9; 14:9-11; 19:17- 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK iv, CH 5 [1126*9-30]
21; 20:9-10,12-15; 21:8 373a-c; BK ix, CH 4 [11 66^2-24] 419d-420a
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK xi [568*600] 248d-249a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [1014-
5 ARISTOPHANES: Frogs [137-159] 565d-566a 1023] 43a-b
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 249c-250a / Republic, BK x, 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 13c-d; 14d-15a; BK
437c-438c / Laws, BK ix, 757a; BK x, 767c- xv, 168a-c
768c 26 SHAKESPEARE: Titus Andronicus 170a-198d
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xni, CH 2 360b- esp ACT i, sc i [90-141] 171c-172a, ACT n, sc
361a; CH 12 365d-366a; BK xiv, CH i 376b,d- in [89-191] 178d-179d, sc iv 181b-d
377a; BK xix, CH 13 519a-520a; CH 28 529d- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b-
530a,c; BK xxi, CH 11-12 570b-571c; CH 16-18 307a; sc in [37-46] 308a
573b-575b; CH 23-24 576c-579d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, S5a-d; 127d-128a;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 21, 216a-c; 389b-c
A 4, REP i 126c-127c; Q 63, A 8, ANS 332c- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 224b-d;
333b 228b; PART iv, 354a-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 79, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 24a-25a; BK
A 4, REP 2 158d-159c; Q 87, AA 3-5 187b-189c; iv, 174b; 183d-186c; 188a-190c; BK v, 216a-d;
6 CHAPTER 74: PUNISHMENT 51 1
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Another discussion of the distinction between the pain of sense and the pain of loss, see
Another consideration of the penal use of labor, see LABOR ic; SLAVERY 33.
The sacramental aspect of the punishment of sin, see SIN 46; and for the nature and justice of
divine punishment, see GOD 5!; HAPPINESS ycQ); IMMORTALITY 5d~5e; JUSTICE iia; SIN
6c-6e.
Other discussions of the sense of sin and of repentance, and of the desire or need for punish-
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
SAADIA GAON. The Bool^ of Beliefs and Opinions, DICKENS. Oliver Twist
TREATISE ix . Nicholas Nickfcby
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. Cur Deus Homo? HAWTHORNE. The Scarlet Letter
512 THE GREAT IDEAS
HUGO. Les Misfrablcs SALEILLES. The Individualisation of Punishment
R. BROWNING. The King and the Bool^ BRADLEY. Collected Essays, VOL i (7)
S. BUTLER. Erewhon PIRANDELLO. The Outcast
MAUDSLEY. Responsibility in Mental Disease WHARTON. Ethan Frame
T. HARDY. The Return of the Native FAUCONNET. La responsabilitS
T. H. GREEN. The Principles of Political Obliga- MALINOWSKI. Crime and Custom in Savage Society
tion^ (K) EWING. The Morality of Punishment
S. M. GREEN. Crime: Its Nature, Causes, Treatment Ross. The Right and the Good, n (i)
and Prevention O'NEILL. Emperor Jones
IBSEN. Ghosts .
Mourning Becomes Electra
. Hedda Gabler SHAW. Crude Criminology
Chapter 75: QUALITY
INTRODUCTION
TT is sometimes supposed that the fundamen- not verbal distinctions. Their agreement on
JL tal categories in terms of which men think this point seems to be shared even by those,
they are describing reality or their experience like Hume, who question our ability to know
merely reflect the conventions of their language. whether substances exist; or those, like Berke-
Substance and attribute and among attri- ley, who question the validity of the distinction
butes, quality and quantity happen to be fun- between quality and quantity.
damental categories in western thought, it is In one sense, no one questions the existence
held, only because the group of languages which of qualities, as they do the existence of sub-
the western cultures use have a grammatical
all stances the enduring things, material or other-
structure that involves a distinction between wise, inwhich qualities are supposed to inhere.
noun and adjective and between different kinds Everyone somehow acknowledges the hot and
of adjectives. It is said, for example, that Aris- the cold, the light and the dark, the moist and
totle's enumeration of the categories is
merely the dry, the hard and the soft. But such
a verbal classification based on Greek grammar. acknowledgement does not preclude a number
When he says that the basic terms of discourse of basic questions about quality on which much
exists.
represent substances, qualities, quantities, re- disagreement
and so forth, he is recognizing the gram-
lations, Are qualities attributes? Do they exist, that
matical difference between such words ashman" is, only as qualifiers, only as belonging to some-
and "white," or between "white" and "six feet thing else ? Or do they exist independently, in
tall" and "double." The lineaments of reality, and of themselves? If qualities are attributes,
the varieties of being, or the modes of experi- do they belong to things quite apart from our
ence are not,it is held, thereby finally described. experience of them, or do they belong to things
In the tradition of the great books, another only as experienced and have no separate real-
? Do
interpretation generally prevails. Even those ity things have in reality certain attributes
who disagree in one way or another about the that cause in us the experience of other traits
basic categories do not regard them as conven- which we then attribute to the things them-
tional or of linguistic origin.
Kant, for example, selves?
disagrees with Aristotle's listing of the cate- Are all the attributes of things, whether in or
gories. He makes substance a mode of relation apart from experience, to be conceived as qual-
rather than coordinate with quality, quantity, ities, and if so, are there different kinds of qual-
hand, draws his categories from experience. He These questions appear to be related in ways
thinks that they represent fundamental modes which make the issues they raise dependent on
of being and that they are, therefore, the basic one another. If, in addition, their presupposi-
concepts in terms of which thought apprehends tions and implications are observed, it will be
reality. Despite all these differences, Kant and seen that they cannot be fully discussed without
Aristotle agree that the categories signify real entering into matters considered in other chap-
513
514 THE GREAT IDEAS
ters, such as the notions of substance and acci- their being perceived, does not turn qualities
dent in the chapter on BEING; the theory of into substances, for qualities as perceived Arc the
experience and the various accounts of sense- qualities of bodies as perceived, and both to-
perception and the objects of sense in the chap- gether have their existence in the perceiver.
ters on EXPERIENCE and SENSE; and, of course, The contrary view that qualities exist in
some of the principal topics considered in the and of themselves does not seem to receive
Anyone who acknowledges the distinction ory of qualities which Plato attributes to
between substance and accident also conceives Heraclitus or his followers illustrates this.
qualities as accidents or attributes, i.e., as exist- "Their first principle," Socrates tells Theaete-
ing in the things they qualify. Spinoza, Des- tus, "is that all is motion, and upon this all the
cartes,Locke, and Aristotle do not conceive affections of which we were just now speaking
substance in the same way, nor do they all use are supposed to depend; there is nothing but
the word "accident" to name the characteris- motion, which has two forms, one active and
tics which inhere in substance. Locke, for ex- the other passive, both in endless number; and
ample, uses the word "quality" with almost the out of the union and friction of them is
gener-
same generality that Spinoza gives to the word ated a progeny endless in number, having two
"mode," or Descartes and Aristotle to "acci- forms, sense and the object of sense."
dent." And the word "substance" Locke uses For example, "when the eye and the appro-
in a sense that nearer to Aristotle's meaning
is
priate object meet together and give birth to
for the word "matter," when, in trying to con- whiteness and the sensation connatural with it
not what," Locke defines this substratum as whiteness proceeds from the object which com-
that which supports qualities. Apart from its bines in producing the color. . . This is true of
.
qualities, substance has no positive character- all sensible objects, hard, warm, and the like,
istics. which are similarly to be regarded not as having
Nevertheless, such differences in theory leave any absolute existence, but as being all of them
untouched the point of agreement that qualities generated by motion in their intercourse with
do not float freely without any supportin one another ... for the agent has no existence
either reality or experience. Even Berkeley's de- until united with the patient, and the patient
nial of matter, or of bodies existing apart from has no existence until united with the agent. . . .
CHAPTER 75: QUALITY 515
And from all these considerations," Socrates trary to one another, like hot and cold, white
says, "there arises a general reflection that there
and black, good and bad. A
quality may have
is no self-existent thing, but everything is be- a correlative as well as a contrary, e.g., if knowl-
Socrates explains that, for those who assert a its correlative, whereas ignorance of the object
universal flux, qualities are not only the prod- is the contrary of knowledge. In some cases,
ucts of motion, but also are themselves in mo- the contrary qualities may be the extremes or
tion "not even white continues to flow white, limits of a continuous series of intermediates,
and whiteness itself is a flux or change which is e.g., white and black with all the intermediate
passing into another color." There is no need to greys. In some with knowledge and ig-
cases, as
refute this doctrine, Socrates thinks, since it norance, the contrary qualities have no inter-
refutes itself by its unintelligibility or, worse, mediates. (Contrariety and correlation, most
its anything definite in conse-
inability to say frequently exemplified by qualities, are con-
quence of denying that words can have a con- sidered in the chapter on OPPOSITION.)
stant meaning from moment to moment. Still another mark of distinction between
Aristotle concurs in this attitude toward "the substance and quality, according to Aristotle,
most extreme view of the professed Heracli- is that
qualities do and substances do not admit
teans," but goes on to remark that "not even at of variation in degree. "One man cannot be
different times does one sense disagree about more man than another," he writes, "as that
the quality, but only about that to which the which is white may be more or less white than
quality belongs. I mean, for instance, that the some other white object The same quality,
same wine might seem, if either it or one's body moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying
changed, at one time sweet and at another time degrees at different times. A white body is said
not sweet; but at least the sweet, such as it is to be whiter at one time than it was before, or a
when it exists, has never yet changed." The warm body is said to be warmer or less warm
sweet thing may become sour, either in itself than at some other time."
or to us, but sweetness itself never becomes This observation raises a number of ques-
sourness. tions. Does variation in the degree of a quality
from time to time imply that qualities them-
THAT QUALITIES DO NOT change into one an- selves undergo change, just as substances un-
other, whereas substances undergoing altera- dergo change in quality ? Do they remain one
tion change from one quality to another, seems and the same in kind while varying in degree?
to Aristotle to distinguish quality from sub- Is this change which qualities undergo as
they
stance. "The most distinctive mark of sub- increase or decrease in intensity, a change in
stance," he writes, "appears to be that, while quantity? Furthermore, does the fact that
remaining numerically one and the same, it is something white can become more or less white,
capable of having contrary qualities. Thus, . . . mean that a quality can have a certain quantity
one and the same color cannot be white and even body can ? Aquinas suggests an answer
as a
other types of change which substances can un- But this still seems to leave a very difficult
dergo, is on CHANGE.)
discussed in the chapter question to be answered. How can qualities
Aristotle suggests another mark of distinc- have the attribute of quantity without becom-
tion between substance and quality. One sub- ing substances? On the principle which both
stance, he says, never stands to another as its Aristotle and Aquinas accept that accidents
contrary, in the way in which qualities are con- exist only in substances how can one kind of
516 THE GREAT IDEAS
accident (quantity) exist in another (quality) ?
problem of how qualities and quantities are re-
The view which William fames holds, namely, lated, the question of the order of these two
is
that variation in intensity creates differences in attributes. Can it be said that quantities are
color asmuch as variation in hue, would solve the more fundamental attributes of things and
the problem, or rather it would dismiss the that they somehow precede or underlie qual-
problem as not genuine by denying Aristotle's ities? Is it the reverse? Or are qualities prior in
thesis that a color can remain the same while certain respects and quantities in other respects ?
However handled, the problem is not peculiar give absolute primacy to quality in the realm
to qualities. Actions and passions, Aristotle of material things. The four elements of matter
Nor are qual-
points out, also vary in degree. arc characterized by combinations of two pairs
distinguished from everything else in the
ities of contrary hot and the cold, the
qualities, the
world by having contraries. Correlatives can dry and the moist. On the other hand, the
alsohave contraries, as can actions and passions. atomic theory of Lucretius appears to make
Furthermore, not all qualities have contraries. and weight, the primary
quantities, such as size
Not all admit of variation in degree. Shape, like properties of matter. Newton's enumeration of
triangular or square, which Aristotle regards as what he calls "the universal qualities of all bod-
a kind of quality, cannot vary in this way. The ies whatsoever," including, of course, their
square thing cannot become more or less square. "least particles," lists "extension, hardness, im-
In view of all this, Aristotle concludes that there penetrability, mobility, and inertia." As in-
is one characteristic alone which differentiates dicated in the chapter on QUANTITY, the very
quality not only from substance, but also from reason Newton gives for calling these qualities
everything else. Quality is the basis for saying "universal" would seem to justify calling them
that things are like or unlike, similar or dissim- "quantities" rather than qualities. In any case,
ilar, as quantity is the basis for saying that Newton's view, like that of the ancient atom-
things are equal or unequal. ists, seems to be opposed to the theory of the
Other contrasts between quality and quan- elementary and contrary qualities.
tity, especially
those bearing on the reduction But Aristotle himself also appears to hold a
of quality to quantity, are discussed in the chap- view which makes quantity prior to quality.
ter on QUANTITY. Here it may be illuminating Considering the way in which the quality white
to apply the foregoing distinction between is in a body, he says that it is in the
body in vir-
quality and quantity to shapes or figures. tue of the body's extended surface. If surface or
ity about quantity, since the nature of shape haps other qualities. Aquinas, for example, says
consists in fixing the bounds of magnitude." that "quantity is the proximate subject of the
This seems to be evident in the fact that shapes, qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of
like quantities, do not admit of variation in color," and, again, that "quantity is in sub-
degree. But it may also be seen in the fact that stance before sensible qualities are."
Euclid deals quite separately with problems This last statement can be interpreted to
concerning the equality of triangles and prob- mean that quantity is universally prior to qual-
lems concerning their similarity. ity among the attributes of substance. Or it can
be understood to mean that quantity is prior
EXCEPT FOR THE QUESTION of whether quali- only to sensible qualities and then only among
ties subsistby themselves or are the attributes the physical attributes of bodies. Which inter-
of substances, most of the problems of quality pretation is chosen depends in part on whether
seem to concern its distinction from or relation all qualities are sensible.
quality among the accidents of substance. The moral and spiritual qualities of men seem
Natural qualities, Aquinas writes, "may be in to afford another example of qualities either
the intellectual part or in the body and its prior to, or at least independent of, quantities.
powers." Certainly the qualities inherent in the Even in the case of inanimate bodies, it may
man's nature are not sensi-
intellectual part of be that certain fundamental properties or pow-
ble; nor arc the first two of the four species of ers are essentially qualitative rather than quan-
quality which both Aristotle and Aquinas titative. Theproposition that in substances,
enumerate. quantities are prior to qualities or that qual-
In their enumeration, human qualities the ities inhere in substances in virtue of their
habits or dispositions of a man, such as knowl- quantities may apply only to sensible qual-
edge and virtue, or beauty and health are ities, as, for example, colors in relation to sur-
e.g., the power of sensitivity in animals, the western thought concerns our perception or
power of rationality in men, are qualities proper knowledge of qualities. If certain characteris-
to these species and are, therefore, sometimes tics which are not directly sensible are to be
called "properties." This second type of qual- called "qualities," then the problem of how we
ity does not seem to be restricted to living know such qualities does not differ from the
things. Inanimate bodies also have, among their problem of how we know anything else that
properties, certain
fundamental powers of ac- cannot be apprehended by our senses. We may,
tion or reaction. The third and fourth types of for example, be able to infer such qualities as
quality differ from the first two in that both are habits or powers from the sensible evidences of
sensible, i.e., capable of affecting the senses di- a thing's behavior, even as in turn we infer the
rectly and, therefore, sometimes called "affec- thing's nature or essence from its proper qual-
tive qualities." Of these, the third type
shape ities or properties. With regard to sensible
or figure has already been discussed. The qualities, the problem does not seem to be hotv
fourth type colors, sounds, textures, odors, we know them for the fact that they are sen-
tastes, and such thermal qualities as hot and sible means that they are knowable by the
cold are, more than shape or figure, regarded senses. The question is rather one of the mode
being dispositions or powers as well as being and secondary qualities states the problem. It
affective qualities, need not invalidate his four- is
preceded by his distinction between the
fold classification. His classification of the same qualities of things and the ideas in our minds.
attribute under two distinct species of quality "A snow-ball," he writes, has "the power to pro-
seems to imply that it can be considered from duce in us the idea of white, cold, and round.
two points of view. The elementary qualities, The powers to produce those ideas in us, as
for example, are affective or sensible qualities they are in the snow- ball, I call qualities; and
but they are also the active qualities or powers as they are sensations or perceptions in our
the properties of the elements. understandings, I call them ideas; which ideas,
In view of this classification of qualities, it if I speak of them sometimes as in the things
does not seem to be the case that quantities are themselves, I would be understood to mean
prior to all the qualitative attributes of sub- those qualities in the objects which produce
stance. On
the conception of living things as them in us."
composite of soul and body, the qualities which The primary qualities of bodies are those
are vital powers are usually regarded as proper- which are utterly inseparable from body such
ties which the thing has in virtue of having a as "sense constantly finds in every particle of
of body, which we may observe to produce what he calls secondary qualities no reality at
simple ideas in us, viz., solidity, extension, fig- all, that is, no existence outside the mind. The
ure, motion or rest, and number," closely re- secondary qualities are not qualities of things,
sembles Newton's list of the universal qualities but of sensations or images. Descartes, for ex-
*
of perceptible bodies and of their 'least par- ample, says that nothing belongs "to the nature
ticles" or atoms. or essence of body except , . . length, breadth
In contrast, the secondary qualities, such as and depth, admitting of various shapes and
"nothing in the
colors, sounds, tastes, etc., are various motions. ... On the other hand, colors,
objects themselves, but powers to produce odors, savours, and the rest of such things are
various sensations in us by their primary qual- merely sensations existing in thought, and
my
ities, i.e., by the bulk, figure, texture, and differing no less from bodies than pain differs
motion of their insensible parts. . . . From from the shape and motion of the instrument
whence," Locke declares, "I think easy it is which inflicts it."
to draw this observation, that the ideas of Hobbes similarly regards the various sensible
primary qualities of bodies, are resemblances of qualities as feelings in us the seemings or fan-
them, and their patterns do really exist in the cies of sense. All these "qualities called sensible
bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us are in the object that causes them, nothing but
by these secondary qualities, have no resem- so many several motions of the matter The
blance of them at all. There is
nothing like our object is one thing, the fancy is another." One
ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They type of "absurd assertion," in the opinion of
are in the bodies we denominate from them, Hobbes, consists in giving "the names of the
only a power to produce those sensations in us: accidents of bodies without us, to the accidents
what is sweet, blue, or warm, in idea, is but the of our own bodies, as they do that say, the color
certain bulk, figure and motion of the insensible is in the body, the sound is in the air, etc."
parts in the bodies which we call so." The attributes or accidents which Descartes
Locke thinks the sensation of pain confirms and Hobbes assign to bodies seem to be quan-
this insight. As the piece of steel which by its tities rather than qualities. Accordingly, where-
corporeal properties has the power to produce as Locke attributes both primary and second-
pain in us, does not itself have the quality of ary qualities to bodies, Hobbes and Descartes
pain, so it does not have anything correspond- seem to be saying that bodies differ from one
ing to the ideas of blueness or coldness which it another only quantitatively, and that qualities
produces in us, except the power to produce or qualitative differences occur only in the realm
these ideas through the action of its
primary of sense or thought. Expounding the atomism
qualities on our senses. Yet Locke maintains of Democritus and Epicurus, Lucretius ap-
that our simple ideas of quality not only of
all pears to make precisely this point when he says
primary, but also of secondary qualities "agree that the first-beginnings or atoms are charac-
By agreement he does
with the reality of things." terized only by size, weight, shape, and motion.
not mean resemblance in the sense of copying; "The bodies of matter," he writes, "have no
and therefore he thinks he can, without incon- color at all." They are bereft not only of color;
sistency, deny any resemblance between sensa- "they are also sundered altogether from warmth
tions of color or taste and the secondary qual- and cold, and fiery heat, and are carried along
of bodies, while saying that "if sugar pro-
ities barren of sound and devoid of taste." These
duces in us the ideas we call whiteness and qualities, caused by the blows of the atoms upon
sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar the sense-organs of animals, are the qualities of
to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they sensations, not of things.
could not have been produced by it."
Locke's point, however, is sometimes given THE CRITICISM OF THIS THEORY whether in the
exactly the opposite implication. Earlier think- formulation of Locke or in that of Descartes,
CHAPTER 75: QUALITY 519
Hobbes, and Lucretius seems itself to take proper than of the common sensibles, e.g., the
two forms. Aristotle, for example, criticizes stick in water which looks bent to the eye feels
Democritus and the atomists for treating per- straight to the hand.
ceptible qualities differently from perceptible
quantities. According to his own theory of the PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE direction seems to be
objects of sense, some, like colors, sounds, taken by Berkeley and Hume. Where Aristotle
odors, flavors which Locke calls "secondary criticizes the atomists for treating quantities (or
qualities" and the others simply "qualities" common sensibles) as objective, and qualities
are the proper objects of the special senses, such (or proper sensibles) as subjective, Berkeley
as sight, hearing, smell, taste. In contrast to criticizes Locke for treating primary and sec-
these "proper sensibles," each exclusively per- ondary qualities differently. Where Aristotle's
ceived by one and only one sense, there are the own theory assigns the same reality to all ob-
"common sensibles," such as size and shape, jects of sense, granting them an actuality apart
number, movement and rest, which can be per- from perception, Berkeley makes the actuality
ceived commonly by several senses, e.g., shape of the primary as well as the secondary qualities
is visible and tangible, motion is visible and dependent upon their being perceived.
audible. Such sensible attributes of body, which "Some there are," writes Berkeley, "who
Locke "primary qualities," Aristotle, no
calls make a distinction betwixt primary and second-
lessthan Hobbes or Lucretius, regards as quan- ary qualities. By the former they mean exten-
not qualities. Reporting his view, Aqui-
tities, sion, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impene-
nas writes that "the common sensibles are all trability and number; by the latter they denote
reducible to quantity." all other sensible qualities, as colors, sounds,
Aristotle's critical point seems to be that the tastes and so forth. The ideas we have of these
atomists "reduce the proper to the common they acknowledge not to be the resemblances
sensibles, as Democritus does with white and of anything existing without the mind 01
black; for he asserts that the latter is a mode of unperceived, but they will have our ideas
the rough and the former a mode of the smooth, of the primary qualities to be patterns 01
while he reduces savours to the atomic figures." images of things which exist without the mind,
The atomists sometimes make the opposite in an unthinking substance which they call
error of representing "all objects of sense as ob- Matter."
jects of touch." But in either case they have no Berkeley then argues that the so-called pri-
ground, in Aristotle's opinion, for giving to mary qualities are incapable of being separated,
certain sensible attributes whether these be in reality or thought, from the secondary qual-
tangible qualities or the commonly sensible ities, and one like the other
that, therefore, the
quantities an objective reality they deny to exists only in the mind. "In short, let anyone
other sensible traits, like colors, sounds, and consider those arguments which are thought
odors. manifestly to prove that colors and tastes exist
Aristotle's theory of sensation and the sen- only in the mind, and he shall find they may
sible is discussed more fully in the chapter on with equal force be brought to prove the same
SENSE. According to it, the qualities, no less thing of extension, figure, and motion." His
than the quantities, perceptible by sense have own arguments, he thinks, "plainly show it to
real or actual existence as the attributes of be impossible that any color or extension at all,
bodies. On this score Aristotle does not differen- or other sensible quality whatsoever, should
tiate between qualities (the proper sensibles) exist inany unthinking subject without the
and quantities (the common sensibles). Just as mind, or in truth, that there should be any
a body actually has the shape we perceive it to such thing as an outward object."
have, so it actually has the color we perceive it Hume adopt Berkeley's reason-
professes to
to have, on the supposition, of course, that our ing. "It universally allowed by modern en-
is
perception is accurate in both cases. If the quirers," he writes, "that all the sensible qual-
senses are fallible at all, we are less prone to itiesof objects, such as hard, soft, hpt, cold,
make errors, Aristotle thinks, in the field of the white, black, etc., are merely secondary, and
520 THE GREAT IDEAS
exist not in the objects themselves, but are we examine it accurately, we shall find to be
perceptions of the mind, without any external unintelligible, and even absurd."
archetype or model which they represent. If One fundamental point about sensible qual-
this be allowed, with regard to secondary qual- itiesmay, however, remain unaffected by this
ities, it must also follow with regard to the sup- long and many-sided controversy. No one de-
posed primary qualities of extension and solid- nies that sensible qualities are the elements of
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The nature and existence of qualities: the relation of quality to substance or matter;
the transcendental categories of quality 521
2b. Primary and secondary qualities: the related distinction of proper and com-
mon sensibles
30. The distinction between quality and quantity: its relation to the distinction
between secondary and primary qualities
3</.
The priority of quality or quantity in relation to form, matter, or substance
4.
The relation of qualities to one another 524
Af.
The similarity of things with respect to quality: likeness and unlikeness in quality
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMKR: Iliad, BK n [265-283] I2d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For exam pic, in 53 JAMES: Psychology,116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
CH b A 2, ANS 2b-4a
[437*3-10] 673d-674a; [4423O- i8]
4
680a-b; CH 6 [445^-446*20] 683b-684c 23 HOBBES: Lctiathan, PART i, 49b-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 8 [1142*23-31] 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19a-c / Objections and
391bc Replies, 162d-165d esp 164d-16Sa; 228c-229c;
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 6, 169c-d 231ab
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [398-521] 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH vm,
20a*21c; [730-864] 24b-26a; BK iv [522-721] SECT 7-26 134b-138b passim, esp SECT 9-10
51a-53d 134c-d; CH xxi, S-ECT 3 178d; CH xxm, SECT
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 8-9 206a-c; SECT n 206d-207a; SECT 37,
A 3 esp REP 2 410a-411d; A 4, REP 2 411d-413d 214a-b; BK iv, CH n, SECT 9-13 311b-312b;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, CH in, SECT 12-14 316a-d esp SECT 13 316a-b;
Q 92, A 2, ANS 1032b-1034b SECT 28 322a-c
3* to 3d CHAPTER 75: QUALITY 523
35 BERKELEY: Human
Knowledge, SECT 9-15 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50,
414d-416a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 73 A i, REP 3 6a-7b; QQ 52-53 15d-22d; Q 54, A 4,
427b-c; SECT 102 432d-433a REP 1,3 25b-d; Q 72, A 7, ANS 117a-118a;
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XH, DIV PART II-H, Q 5, A 4 412d-413c; Q 24, AA 4-10
122 505c-d 491d-498a; PART HI, Q 7, A 12 754c-755c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 23a-24a; 29d-33d 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
esp 30c-31a, 31d-32a, 32d-33b [fn i); 66d-72c 131d-132a; THIRD DAY, 200b-202a; 205b-d
esp 68a<72c; 211c-213a 30 BACON: Novum Organ um, BK n, APH 13 145b-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 63 148d
28b-c; ADDITIONS, 40 122d-123b 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK HI, RULE in 270b
50 MARX: Capital, 149d 271a / Optics, BK i, 431a-443a; BK n, 458b
53 IAMES: Psychology, 320a-322a 460a; 466a-467b; 472b-474a; 482b-485a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xvi,
3. Shape or figure as qualified quantity SECT 3 165d-166a; CH XVH, SECT 6 169a-b;
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [10*11-16] 15a-b; CH xxvin, SECT i 228c; BK iv, CH n, SECT
16a-b / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 14
[11*5-14] 11-13 311c-312b
a b
[i020 35- i] 541c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 68a-72c
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK vu, DEFINITIONS, 16- 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i
19 127b 14a-b; PART in, 99d-103b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 831d-841c 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-172a; 177a-
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR HI, CH 14 288b- 193a
289a 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 411c-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A i, 412c
REP 2 31a-d; Q 78, A 3, REP 2 410a-411d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 319b-322a esp 319b-320a;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 49, 329a-330a; 346a-b; 540a-547a esp 541a, 544a,
A 2, ANS 2b-4a; PART in, Q 2, A i, ANS 710a- 547a
711c 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 262b Dreams, 384d / Narcissism, 403d-404a /
31 DESCARTES: Geometry 295a-353b esp BK i, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639b-d
298b-304a, BK n, 308a-314b
33 PASCAL: Arithmetical Triangle, 455a-456a 3</. The priority of quality or quantity in re-
lation to form, matter, or substance
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 212a-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 548b-552a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 2 [i85 2o-b 4]
ft
4. The relation of qualities to one another 5. Change of quality: the analysis of alteration
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 226d-227b / Parmenides,
4a. Qualities which imply correlatives 509b-510a / Theaetetus, 533a-534a
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [o^-S] lla; CH 8 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [4*io-b i9] 8b-9a;
b CH 14 [15*14-32] 20d-21a / Topics, BK vi, CH 6
[11*20-39] 16b-c; CH [n 27-33) 17a /
10
b
Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [246^-248*8] 329c-330d [145*2-13] 198c-d / Physics, BK i, CH 7 [i9o 5~
b
9]266b; BK v, CH 2 [226*26-29] 306d; [226 i-
46. The contrariety of qualities: with or with- 307a; BK vi, CH 10 [241*26-32] 325b c; BK
9]
out intermediate degrees b
vn, CH 2 [244 i-245*i2] 328b-d; CH 3 329a-
b
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 226d-227b; 243c-244b 330d; BK vm, CH 7 [26o*26- i4] 346b-c /
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [4*io-b i9] 8b-9a; Heavens, BK i, CH 3 [270*26-36] 361c; CH 12
b
CH 8 [iob n-25] 15d; CH 10 [12*9-25] 17b-c / [283 i7~23] 375c-d / Generation and Corrup-
BK iv, CH 9 [2i7*34-b n] 297b / Gener-
Physics, tion,BK i, CH i 409a-410c; en 4 416c-417a /
and Corruption, BK n, CH 1-3 428b,d-
ation Metaphysics, BK i, CH 8 [989*18-29] 507b-c;
431a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 5 [986 22-b 4] BK v, CH 21 544a-b; BK xi, CH 12 [1068^5-19]
ft
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR vi, CH i 60c- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 98b-105a passim, esp
61c / Sixth Ennead, TR i, CH 10-12 257b-259d; 104a-105a; 184b; 327a-341a esp 327a-b, 329a-
TR HI, CH 16-19 289c-292b 331b; 363b; 452a-471a esp 452a-4S6a, 459a-b,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologies PART I-H, Q 35, 469a-471a; 479a; 502a-505b esp 505b; 520a-
A 4, ANS 774d-775d 521a; 526b-527a; 540a-635a esp 541a, 548b-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d; PART iv, 549a, 552a-564a, 589b-595a, 606b-608b,
272b 627a-628b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 54 FREUD: Interpretation ofDreams, 352d; 367b-
SECT 9 14Sb-c; CH XH, SECT i, 147b-c; BK in, c; 384c-385c
CH iv, SECT 4-11 260b-262b passim, csp
SECT 7 260d; SECT 16 263b-c
6c. The objectivity of sense-qualities: the com-
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 6-19 parative objectivity of primary and sec-
414b-416d passim, esp SECT 7-10 414b-415a; ondary qualities
SECT 99 432b 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 462b-466a / Theaetetus,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xu, DIV 517b-520b; 521d-522a; 533b-d
122 505c-d 8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK i,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 73c-74a CH 2 Ui5 b 33-3i6 3] 411c / Metaphysics, BK iv,
ft
53 JAMES: Psychology, 185a-b; 305a-308b esp CH 5 [ioiob 3o-ion*2] 530c / Soul, BK in, CH
308a-b; 329a-331b csp 331a-b; 503a-b; 668a- 2 [426*20-26] 658c / Sense and the Sensible,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Discussions relevant to the problem of the existence of qualities and of their relation to sub-
stance, matter, or experience, see BEING 70, 7b(5)~7b(6); EXPERIENCE i; MATTER 2c.
Discussions relevant to the conception of the categories as transcendental concepts of the
understanding, see FORM ic; JUDGMENT 8c-8d; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(a); MIND
PRINCIPLE 2b(3).
ic(i);
The consideration of such non-sensible qualities as habits, dispositions, and powers, see
BEING 7c(2); HABIT i; LIFE AND DEATH 2; MAN 4d; NATURE ia(i); SOUL 2a, 2c.
The distinction between proper and common sensibles, and the related distinction between
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofe of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
BOYLE. The Origin of Forms and Qualities, According BORING. The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness ,
INTRODUCTION
AS indicated in the chapter on QUALITY, the this point. Newton refers to "extension, hard-
JL\ traditional consideration of that funda- ness, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia" as
mental notion involves questions concerning "the qualities of bodies" which "are to be es-
the relation of quality and quantity and the teemed the universal qualities of all bodies
priority of one or the other in the nature of whatsoever." Following him, Locke calls our
things. According to one theory of the ele- simple ideas of "solidity, extension, figure, mo-
ments, difference in quality rather than in tion or rest, and number" ideas of "the original
quantity seems to be the denning characteristic. or primary qualities of bodies," and says that
Certain kinds of qualities, it is thought, inhere even if bodies are divided "till their parts be-
in substances directly and without being based come insensible, they must retain still each of
upon But it is seldom
their quantitative aspects. them those qualities. For division
all can . . .
ifever suggested that quality takes universal never take away either solidity, extension, fig-
precedence over quantity. ure, or mobility from any body, but only makes
In the tradition of western thought, the op- two or more distinct separate masses of matter,
posite view that quantities are primary- of that which was one before."
seems to occur with some frequency, at least so Though Locke uses the word "quality" for
far as the realm of material things is concerned. those attributes which belong to bodies even
It is held that bodies have only quantitative when they are not sensed or are not even sensi-
attributes. Such sensible qualities as colors, ble, he also appears to recognize that number,
odors, tastes, textures are thought to have no extension, and figure are, as the traditional ob-
reality apartfrom experience; or, as it is some- jects of the mathematical sciences, traditionally
times put, red and blue, hot and cold, sweet regarded as quantities rather than qualities. "It
and sour are the qualities of sensations, not of has been generally taken for granted," he writes,
separably associated. For matter to exist with- od and application in us ... that demonstration
out existing in some quantity seems to be as in- has been thought to have so little to do in other
conceivable as for experience to exist without parts of knowledge." Yet, he adds, "in other
qualitative diversity "As if there could be mat- simple ideas, whose modes and differences are
ter,'* says Hobbes, "that had not some de- made and counted by degrees, and not quan-
termined quantity, when quantity is nothing tity, we have not so nice and accurate a dis-
elsebut determination of matter; that is to say, tinction of their differences as to perceive, or
of body, by which we say that one body is find ways to measure, their just equality."
greater or less than another by thus or thus Newton also gives some indication that his
much." "universal qualities" are quantities. He restricts
The use of the word "quality" where quanti- them to attributes "which admit neither in-
ty appears to be meant only slightly obscures tensification nor remission of degrees. *' One dif-
527
528 THE GREAT IDEAS
fcrence between quantity and quality, accord- it is exactly as if I had said: body is extended, or
ing to an ancient opinion, is that qualities are better, the extended is extended''
subject to variation in degree, quantities not. But, Descartes adds, when we consider the
One thing may be white or hot to a greater or expression extension is not body, "the mean-
less degree than another, Aristotle observes, but ing of the term extension becomes otherwise
"one thing cannot be two cubits long in a great- than as above. When we give it this meaning
er degree than another. Similarly with regard there is no special idea corresponding to it in
to number: what is 'three* is not more truly the imagination." It becomes a purely abstract
1
three than what is 'five is five . . . Nor is there entity, which may properly be the object of the
any other kind of quantity, of all that have geometer's consideration; but then it should be
been mentioned, with regard to which variation treated as an abstraction and not as if it had
in degree can be predicated." independent reality.
was a thing with length, breadth, and depth, ad- body. Number and figure arc as fundamental.
mitting of various shapes and various motions. Still another enumeration of corporeal quan-
I found also that its
shape and motions were tities is
given by Lucretius in his descrip-
only modes, which no power could make to tion of the properties of atoms. According to
exist apart from it ... Finally, I saw that grav- him, atoms vary in size, weight, and shape.
ity, power of heating, of attract-
hardness, the Each of these attributes is a distinct quantity,
ing, and of purging, and all other qualities not reducible to the others. In addition, atoms
which we experience in bodies, consisted solely have the property which Newton calls "impen-
in motion or its absence, and in the configura- etrability"and Locke "solidity." But whereas
tion and situation of their parts." atoms may be unequal in size and weight, and
With motion and figure modes of extension, different in shape or configuration, they are all
and all the other properties of bodies the result equal in their solidity, being absolutely indi-
of their motions or configurations, the three di- visible through lack of void or pores.
mensions of extension (or spatial magnitude)
become almost identical with body itself. Con- THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN mathematical and
sidering the statement body possesses extension, physical quantity and the enumeration or or-
Descartes points out that, though "the mean- dering of diverse quantities seem to require the
ing of extension is not identical with that of consideration of two prior questions. What is
body, yet we do not construct two distinct ideas the nature of quantity? What are the kinds or
in our imagination, one of body, the other of ex- modes of quantity?
tension, but merely a single
image of extended Terms like quantity and quality do not ap-
body; and from the point of view of the thing pear to be susceptible of definition. Quantity is,
CHAPTER 76: QUANTITY 529
perhaps, the fundamental notion in the mathe- These two characteristics (lack of contrarie-
matical sciences, yet neither it nor such terms ty and of variation in degree) do not, however,
as magnitude, figure, and number are defined satisfy Aristotle's search for a distinctive mark
in the great books of geometry or arithmetic. of quantity. They apply to substances, such as
In Aristotle's theory of the categories as the tree or man, as well as to figures and numbers.
highest genera, such terms as substance, quan- This fact could have some bearing on the issue
tity, quality, and relation are strictly indefin- whether the objects of mathematics have a
able, if to define a term is to give its genus and separate existence comparable to that of sub-
differentia. stances, but in Aristotle's view at least, quan-
With quite a different theory of the cate- are not substances. Physical quantities are
tities
derstanding. He uses such terms as quantity, Conceiving quantity as one of the attributes
quality, and relation, with modality as a co- of substance, Aristotle says that "the most dis-
ordinate fourth, to represent the four major tinctive mark of quantity is equality and in-
groupings of the categories. In his table of the equality." Only when things are compared
categories, Kant's treatment of quantity, under quantitatively can they be said to be equal or
which he lists the concepts of unity, plurality, unequal; and, conversely, in whatever respect
and totality, parallels the treatment of quan- things are said to be equal or unequal, in that
tity in his table of judgments, according to respect they are determined in quantity.
which judgments are classified as universal, par- "How far is it true," Plotinus asks, "that
ticular, and singular. All these considerations of equality and inequality are characteristic of
quantity belong to what Kant calls his "tran- quantity?" It is significant, he thinks, that tri-
scendental logic." So far as Kant considers quan- angles and other figures are said to be similar as
tity in its mathematical or physical (rather than well as equal. "It may, of course, be the case
logical) significance, he discusses it in connection that the term 'similarity' has a different sense
with the transcendental forms of space and time here from that understood in reference to qual-
which provide, according to him, the a priori ity"; or another alternative, Plotinus adds,
foundations of geometry and arithmetic the may be that "similarity is predicablc of quan-
sciences of magnitude and number. But in none tity only insofar as quantity possesses [qualita-
of these connections are quantity and its prin- tive] differences." In any case, comparison,
cipal modes, magnitude and number, defined. whether in terms of equality or likeness, seems
Though indefinable, quantity can, according to generate the relationships fundamental to
to Aristotle, be characterized by certain dis- the mathematical treatment of quantities.
tinctive marks. As we have already observed, Euclid does not define magnitude in itself,
where qualities admit of variation in degree, but only the relation of magnitudes to one
quantities do not. With few exceptions, each another. The first four definitions in the fifth
quality has a contrary, whereas definite quan- book of his Elements illustrate this. "i. A mag-
tities such as an extent or a number are not op- nitude is a part of a magnitude, the less of the
posed by contrary quantities. Aristotle con- greater, when it measures the greater. 2. The
siders the possibility that such apparently quan- greater a multiple of the less when it is meas-
is
titative terms as 'large' and 'small' may also ured by the less. 3. A ratio is a sort of relation
appear to be contrary to one another, as hot is in respect of size between two magnitudes of
to cold, or white is to black. But, he argues, the same kind. Magnitudes are said to have a
4.
these terms represent quantities only relatively, ratio to one another, which are capable, when
not absolutely. When things are compared with multiplied, of exceeding one another."
respect to size, one may be judged to be both Archimedes also states his understanding of
larger and smaller than others, but the sizes of the distinction between kinds of magnitudes
each of two things unequal in size are not con- without defining these kinds by reference to
one another. It follows that an indivisible point with finite quantities." If the notion of quan-
and a finiteor divisible magnitude, such as a tity entails the possibility of equality or in-
line, are not of the same kind, for they cannot equality between two quantities of the same
have a ratio to one another. For the same rea- tynd, then either infinite quantities are not
son, the length of a line, the area of a plane, and quantities, or each infinite quantity belongs to
the volume of a solid are not magnitudes of the a kind of its own.
same kind. Since they bear no ratio to one The principle of incommensurability seems to
another, they are quantitatively incomparable. be applied by mathematicians to distinguish
dition of the great books, mathematicians and are incommensurable magnitudes. The number
philosophers seem to agree that arithmetic of days in a year and the number of years in in-
and geometry have as their objects the two finite or endless time are incommensurable
magnitude. This is the opinion of Euclid, Ni- The distinction between magnitude and mul-
comachus, Descartes, and Galileo; it is the opin- titude (or number) as two modes of quantity
ion of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon, Hume, appears to be based upon another principle,
and Kant. But writers like Russell and White- that of continuity and discontinuity. Yet the
head, who reflect developments in mathemat- question can be raised whether magnitudes are
ics sincethe iQth century, reject the traditional commensurable with numbers, at least to the
opinion as unduly narrowing the scope of math- extent of being measured by numbers. It may
ematics. be necessary, however, to postpone answering
To give adequate expression to the univer- it until we have examined the fundamental dif-
salityof mathematics, they sometimes propose ference between magnitude and multitude as
that it should be conceived as the science not generic kinds of quantity.
merely of quantity, but of relations and order. What if magnitude and multitude, or con-
In view of the fact that the great books of math- tinuous and discontinuous quantity, do not di-
ematics deal with quantities largely in terms of vide quantity into its ultimate kinds? Aquinas,
their relationship or order to one another, the for example, proposes that the two basic kinds
broader conception seems to fit the older tradi- are dimensive and virtual quantity. "There is
ing the definition of mathematical subject mat- things, and has, therefore, no place in God.
ter may depend, therefore, on whether the There is also quantity of virtue,which is meas-
fundamental terms which generate the systems ured according to the perfection of some na-
of relationship and order are or are not essen- ture or form." It is in the latter sense, accord-
tially quantitative. To this question the tradi- ing to Aquinas, that Augustine writes: "In
tional answer seems to be that the mathema- things which are great, but not in bulk, to be
tician studies not relations of any sort, but the greater is to be better."
relation of quantities. Just as dimensive quantities can be incom-
The problem of the kinds of quantity seems mensurable with one another, so with respect
to appeal for solution to the principle of com- to virtual quantities, God's infinite perfection
mensurability. For example, Galileo's observa- makes him incommensurable with finite crea-
tion that finite and infinite quantities cannot tures. But a dimensive quantity cannot be
be compared in any way, implies their utter either commensurable or incommensurable with
CHAPTER 76: QUANTITY 531
a virtual quantity. The standard of measure- quantity, the letters of a written word or the
ment by which dimensive quantities are com- syllables of vocal utterance comprise a multi-
pared, and the standard by which virtual quan- tude rather than a continuum or magnitude
tities are ordered,
represent utterly diverse "because there is no common boundary at
principles of commensurability. Euclid's state- which the syllables join, each being separate
ment that "those magnitudes are said to be and distinct from the rest." The continuity of
commensurable which are measured by the magnitudes can be readily seen, according to
same measure, and those incommensurable Aristotle, in the possibility of finding a common
which cannot have a common measure," cannot boundary at which the parts of a line join or
be extended to cover dimensive and virtual make contact. "In the case of a line," he says,
quantities, for the very meaning of "measure" "this common boundary is the point; in the
changes when we turn from the dimensions of a case of a plane, it is the line. . . .
Similarly, you
body to the perfections of a being. can find a common boundary in the case of the
The distinction which Aquinas makes be- parts of a solid, namely, either a line or a plane."
tween dimensive and virtual magnitudes has its Accepting the principle of the distinction,
parallel in the distinction he makes between
Plotinus insists that "number and magnitude
two kinds of number, for both depend on the are to be regarded as the only true quantities."
difference between material and formal quan- All others, like space and time, or motion, are
tity. "Division is twofold," he writes. "One is quantities only in a relative sense, that is, inso-
material, and is division of the continuous; from far asthey can be measured by number or in-
this results number, which is a species of quan- volve magnitude. Galileo raises another sort of
tity. Number in this sense is found only in ma- difficulty. The Aristotelian conception of mag-
terial things which have quantity. The other nitudes as continuous quantities implies their
kind of division is formal, and is effected by op- infinite divisibility. This means, in his terms,
posite or diverse^ forms; and this kind of divi- that "every magnitude is divisible into magni-
sion results in a multitude, which does not be- tudes" and that "it is impossible for anything
many. Only this kind of multitude is found in ing up continuous quantities out of indivisible
immaterial things." According to the example quantities" on the ground that "the addition
suggested in the context, such is the multitude of one indivisible to another cannot produce a
which is the number of persons in the Trinity. were so it would render the
divisible, for if this
indivisible divisible."Suppose a line to com-
THE MATERIAL quantities of physics and math- prise an odd number of indivisible points. Since
ematics seem to fall under the two main heads such a line can, in principle, be cut into two
of magnitude and multitude. "Quantity is ei- equal parts, we are required to do the impos;
ther discrete or continuous," writes Aristotle. sible,namely, "to cut the indivisible which lies
"Instances of discrete quantities are number exactly in the middle of the line."
and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, To this and other objections which seem to
and, besides these, time and place." Nicomachus him of the same type, Galileo replies that "a
explains the two kinds of quantity by examples. divisible magnitude cannot be constructed out
"The unified and continuous," he says, is exem- of two or ten or a hundred or a thousand indi-
plified by "an animal, the universe, a tree, and visibles, but requires an infinite number of
the like, which are properly and peculiarly them. ... I am willing," he says, "to grant to
called 'magnitudes' "; to illustrate the discon- the Peripatetics the truth of their opinion that
tinuous, he points to "heaps of things, which arc a continuous quantity is divisible only into
called 'multitudes,' a flock, for instance, a parts which are still further divisible, so that
people, a chorus, and the like." however far the division and subdivision be
The principle of this distinction appears to continued, no end will be reached; but I am not
be the possession or lack of a common bound- so certain that they will concede to me that
ary. To take Aristotle's example of speech as a none of these divisions of theirs can be a final
532 THE GREAT IDEAS
one, as is
surely the fact, because there always posite." To illustrate the latter, Nicomachus
remains 'another*; the final and ultimate divi- asks us to compare 9 with 25, "Each in itself,"
sion is rather one which resolves a continuous he writes, "is secondary and composite, but
quantity into an infinite number of indivisible relatively to each other they have only unity as
quantities/' a common measure, and no factors in them have
The question remains whether these indivisi- the same denominator, for the third part in the
ble units, an infinite number of which constitute former does not exist in the latter nor is the
the continuity of a finite magnitude, can prop- fifth part in the latter found in the former."
erly be called quantities. At least they are not The even numbers are divided by Nicoma-
magnitudes, as is indicated by Euclid's defini- chus into the even-times-even (numbers like
tion of a point as "that which has no part," or 64 which can be divided into equal halves, and
by Nicomachus' statement that "the point is their halves can again be divided into equal
the beginning of dimension, but is not itself a halves, and so on must stop); the
until division
dimension." If, in addition to having position, even- times-odd (numbers like 1 8 which
6, 10, 14,
a point had size or extent, a finite line could not can be divided into equal halves, but whose
contain an infinite number of points. This prob- halves cannot be divided again into equal
lem of infinite and infinitesimal quantities is
halves); and the odd -times-even (numbers like
more fully discussed in the chapter on INFINITY. 24, 28, 40 which can be divided into equal
parts, whose parts also can be so divided, and
WITHIN EACH OF THE two main divisions of perhaps again these parts, but which cannot be
quantitymagnitude and number further divided in this way as far as unity). By another
sub-divisions into kinds are made. Relations of principle of classification, the even numbers fall
equality and inequality, or proportions of these into the superabundant, the deficient, and the
ratios, may occur between quantities different perfect. The factors which produce superabun-
in kind different plane figures, for example. dant ordeficient numbers, when added together,
But the great books of mathematics indicate amount to more or less than the number itself;
other problems in the study of quantity than but a number is
perfect, Nicomachus writes,
those concerned with the ratios and proportions when, "comparing with itself the sum and com-
of quantities. The classification of lines and fig- bination of all the factors whose presence it will
ures results in the discovery of the properties admit, it neither exceeds them in multitude
which belong to each type. Possessing the same nor is exceeded by them." It is "equal to its
dition to developing the properties of such spectively, and these added together make 6
straight lines as perpendiculars and parallels, or and arc equal to the original number." At the
such curved lines as circles and ellipses, para- time of Nicomachus only four perfect numbers
bolas and hyperbolas, the geometer defines the were known 6, 28, 496, 8128; since his day
different types of relationship in which straight seven more have been discovered.
lines can stand to curves, e.g., tangents, secants, The further classification of numbers as lin-
bers into the prime and the composite into Nicomachus or Pascal represents one of the
those which are divisible only by themselves great bridges between arithmetic and geometry,
and unity, such as 5 and 7, and those which of which the other, in the opposite direction, is
have other factors, such as 9 and 15. The com- the algebraic rendering of geometrical loci in
1
posite are further differentia ted into the variety Descartes analytical geometry.
which is
simply secondary and composite and In either direction of the translation between
"the variety which, in itself, is secondary and arithmetic and geometry, discontinuous and
composite, but relatively is prime and incom- continuous quantities seem to have certain
CHAPTER 76: QUANTITY 533
properties in common, at least by analogy. Eu- urable. Thus it is not merely the case that
clid, for example, proposes numerical ratios as length, breadth, and depth are dimensions; but
the test for the commensurability of magni- weight also is a dimension in terms of which the
tudes. "Commensurable magnitudes have to heaviness of objects is estimated. So, too, speed
one another," he writes, "the ratio which a is a dimension of motion, and there are an in-
number has to a number." With the exception finite number of similar instances. For that very
of infinite numbers, all numbers are commen- division of the whole into a number of parts of
surable and so provide the criterion for deter- identical nature, whether it exist in the real
mining whether two magnitudes are or are not order of things or be merely the work of the
commensurable. understanding, gives us exactly that dimension
Introducing the notion of dimensionality in- in terms of which we apply number to objects."
to the discussion of figurate numbers, Nicoma- The theory of dimensions can be illustrated
chus observes that "mathematical speculations by the choice of clocks, rules, and balances as
are always to be interlocked and to be explained the fundamental instruments for the measure-
one by means of another." Though the dimen- ment of physical quantities. Theyrepresent the
sions by which linear, plane, and solid numbers three dimensions in the fundamental equations
are to be distinguished "are more closely re- of mechanics time, distance, and mass.
lated to magnitude ... yet the germs of these Additional dimensions may be introduced in
ideas are taken over into arithmetic as the sci- electricity or thermodynamics. In developing
ence which is the mother of geometry and more the theory of heat, Fourier, for example, enu-
elementary than it." The translation does not merates five quantities which, in order to be nu-
seem to fail in any respect. The only non-di- merically expressed, require five different kinds
mensional number, unity, finds geometrical its of units, "namely, the unit of length, the unit
analogue in the point, which has position with- of time, that of temperature, that of weight,
out magnitude. and finally the unit which serves to measure
When diverse magnitudes are translated into quantities of heat." To which he adds the re-
numbers, the diversity of the magnitudes seems mark that "every undetermined magnitude or
to be effaced by the fact that their numerical constant has one dimension proper to itself, and
measures do not have a corresponding diversity. that the terms of one and the same equation
The numbers will appear to be commensurable could not be compared, if they had not the
though the magnitudes they measure are not, same exponent of dimension"
as magnitudes, comparable. As Descartes points A fuller discussion of the basic physical quan-
out, necessary, therefore, to regard each
it is tities, measurement, and their
their definition,
"By dimension," Descartes writes, "I under- on MECHANICS. The consideration of time and
stand nothing but the mode and aspect accord- space as quantities, or physical dimensions, oc-
ing to which a subject is considered to be meas- curs in the chapters devoted to those subjects.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The nature and existence of quantity: its relation to matter, substance, and body; the
transcendental categories of quantity 535
la. The relation between quantity and quality: reducibility of quality to quantity 536
\b. The relation of quantities: equality and proportion
30. Straight lines: their length and their relations; angles, perpendiculars, parallels
534 TOE GREAT IDEAS
PAGB
(2) Ellipses
(3) Parabolas
3^. Surfaces
4.
Discrete quantities: number and numbering
5. Physical quantities
5<f.
Mass: its relation to weight
$e.
Force: its measure and the measure of its effect
6. The measurements of quantities: the relation of magnitudes and multitudes; the units
of measurement
7. Infinite quantity: the actual infinite and the potentially infinite quantity; the mathe-
matical and physical infinite of the great and the small
CHAPTER 76: QUANTITY 535
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which arc the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad* BK 11 [265-283) 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
G:ed side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included m
the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
35 BERKELEY: Human
Knowledge, SECT 9-15
(1. The nature and existence of quantity: its rela-
414d-416a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 73
tion to matter, substance, and body; the 427b-c; SECT 102 432d-433a
transcendental categories of quantity!) 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-15 122 505c-d
414d-416a; SECT 73 427b-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 23a-24a; 32d-33b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b<c; 41c-45b csp 43d- [fn ij; 68a-72c; 211c-213a
44a; 69c-72c; 74b-76c; 137a-140a,c; 161d- 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448c-d; 475b [fn i]
163a; 211c 213a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 63
53 JAMES: Psychology, 551a; 874a-878a csp 875a- 28b-c; ADDITIONS, 40 122d-123b
876b, 878a 50 MARX: Capital, 149d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 104b; 319b-322a; 346a-
la. The relation between quantity and quality: 348a
reducibility of quality to quantity 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of
7 PLATO: Meno, 176d-177a / Timaeus, 458b- Dreams, 384d / Narcissism, 403d-404a /
460b; 462b-46Sd / Philebus, 615c-616c Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639b-d
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, en 7 [6 2o-26] lib;
CH 8 [10*11-16] 15a-b; [io b26-n*i4] 15d-16b / \b. The relation of quantities: equality and
Generation and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 \^\^ proportion
32-316*4] 411b-c / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 4 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228d-229c / Parmenides,
b b b
[ioi4 2o-27J 535a; CH 14 [io2o ^-8] [i02o 494a-c; 500c-502a; 508c-d; 510d-511a /
b
14-17] 541d; CH 28 BK x,
[io24 io-i6] 546c; Theaetetus, 518b-519b
b b
CH i [io52 i-io<53 8] 578d-580a; BK xi, CH 6 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [6*27-35] lOd-
[1063*22-28] 591c; BK xn, CH i [1069*18-25] lla / Generation and Corruption, BK n, CH 6
598a; UK XHI, CH 8 [1083*1-17] 614d / Soul, [333*27-34] 434a / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 13
b
BK in, CH [425*14-19] 657b / Sense and the
i
[1020*22-26] 541c; CH 15 [io2o 26-io2i*i4)
b b
Sensible, en 6 J445 4-446*2o] 683b-684c; CH 7 542a-c; BK x, CH 3 [io54 i-3] 581b; CH 5-6
b
[448*20 i6] 687a-d; [449*21-30] 688d-689a
-
583a-584c; BK xiv, CH i [1088*20-29] 620c /
b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2, 167d- Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [452 7~23]
168b 694b-d
b
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK VH, DEFINITIONS, 16-19 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 6 [no6*26- 8]
127b 351d-352a; BK v, CH 3-5 378c-381d passim /
b
11 NICOMAGHUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 831d-841c Politics, BK v, CH i [i }oi 29-36] 503a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [298-304] 11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, COMMON NOTIONS 2a;
4d; BK n [398-521] 20a-21c; (677-687] 23c-d; PROP 4 4a-b; PROP 8 6b-7a; PROP 26 16a-17b;
[730-864] 24b-26a; BK HI [221-227] 32d-33a; BK v 81a~98b esp DEFINITIONS, 5 81a, 7,9-
BK iv [26-268] 44b-47d; (522-721] 51a-53d 10 81b; BK vi, PROP 23 117a-b; BK x 191a-
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 13 55b-d 300b
/ Fourth Ennead, TR VH, CH 8, 196a-b / Fifth 11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i,
Ennead, TR i, CH
210c / Sixth Ennead, TR
4, ASSUMPTIONS 404b / Spirals, 484b / Quadra-
in, CH 13-15 287d-289c ture of the Parabola, 527a-b
10 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i-n, 821d 831d;
A REP 3 35c-36b; Q 42, A i, REP 1-2 224b-
2, BK n, 841c 848d
225d; Q 78, A 3, REP 2 410a-411d 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1012b-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 49, 1014b; 1078b; 1080a
A 2, ANS 2b-4a; Q 50, A i, REP 3 6a-7b; Q 52 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR in, CH 15 289a-c
15d-19c; Q 53, AA 2-3 21a-22d; PART H-II, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13,
Q 24, A A 4-10 491d-498a; PART HI, Q 7, A 12 A 7, ANS 68d-70d; Q 42, A i, ANS and REP i
754c-755c 224b-225d; Q 47, A 2, REP 2 257b-258c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-d; PART HI, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
172b 113, A 9, ANS 368d-369c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19a-c / Objections and 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
Replies, 162d-165d; 228c-229c; 231a-b 142a-145a
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK i, 428a-b; 431a-455a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 47c/ Geom-
esp 450a-453a etry, BK i, 295a-298b; BK in, 332b-341b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH vin, 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA i 25a;
SECT 9-26 134c-138b passim; CH xxi, SECT 3 LEMMA II, SCHOL, 31b-32a| BK II, LEMMA I
178d; SECT 75 200b-d; CH xxm, SECT 8-9 159b; LEMMA 2 168a-169b
206a-c; SECT n 206d-207a; SECT 37, 214a-b; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH n,
CH xxxi, SECT a 239b-d; BK iv, CH n, SECT SECT 9-10 311b-c
9-13 311b 312b; CH HI, SECT 12-14 316a d; 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract* BK HI, 407b-
SECT 28 322a-c 408b
2 to 3a CHAPTER 76: QUANTITY 537
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 73c-d; 211c-213a / Judge- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV
ment, 497a-498b passim 124-125 506a-507a
50 MARX: Capital, 19a-25d esp 19d-20b, 25a-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 66d-72c esp 68a-72c;
53 I AMES: Psychology, 551a; 874a-878a esp 874b- 131c; 135a-140a,c esp 137d-138d [antithesis];
875a 152a-d; 161d-163a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d
2. The kinds of quantity: continuous and dis-
continuous 3. The magnitudes of geometry: the relations
7 PLATO: Parmenides, 499d-500c / Theaetetus, of dimensionality
515b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5*1-23] 9b-c; CH
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 2o~5*37] 9a-d
[4 8 [10*11-16] 15a-b/ Topics, BK vi, CH 6 [i43 b
/ Physics, BK iv, CH 4 [21 1*29-^] 290c; CH 1
1-23] 197b/ Heavens, BK i, CH i 359a-c; BK n,
b b
5 [2i2 3~6] 291d; BK v, CH 3 [227*10-34] CH 4 [286 i2-33] 378a-c / Metaphysics, BK i,
CH 9 b
307d-308b; BK vi, CH 1-2 312b,d-315d / [992*10-24] 510b-c; BK v, CH 6 [ioi6 25-
Heavens,BK i, CH i [268*6-11] 359a / Genera- 31] 537b; BK xin, en 2 [1077*14 -37] 608b-d
and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 [3i5 b 25-3i7*i7]
tion 11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, DEFINITIONS, 1-2,5
411b-413a; BK 11, CH 10 [337*22-34] 439b-c / BK xi, DEFINITIONS, 301a
la; 14 Ib; i
b
Metaphysics, BK in, CH 4 [iooi*4- 25] 519d- 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 832b-d
b a
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 865a-b
520c; BK v, CH 6 [ioi5 35-ioi6 i7] 536b-c;
b
[ioi6 6~32] 537a-b; CH 13 [1020*9-14] 541b; 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR n, en 13 276a-c;
BK viii, CH 3 [io43 b 33-i044*i4] 568b-d; BK x, TR in, CH 13-14 287d-289a
CH i [1052*1 5-37] 578b,d; CH 3 [1054*20-29] 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 85,
b A 8, REP 2 460b-461b
581a; BK xi, CH 12 [io68 26-io69 i4] 597d-
ft
b a
598a,c; BK xiv, CH i [io87 34-io88 i4J 620a-b 23 HOB BBS: J^eviathan, PART iv, 269d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 6 [1106*26-28] 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv, 29b-32a / Discourse,
351d PART iv, 52d 53a / Meditations, v, 93a-d; vi,
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK v, DEFINITIONS, 3-5 96b-d / Objections and Replies, 216d-217c;
81a; BK vii, DEFINITIONS, 2 127a; 20 127b; 228c-229a
BK x, PROP i 191b-192a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xm,
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, SECT 5-6 149b-d
ASSUMPTIONS, 5 404b / Spirals, 484b / 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 25a-b
Quadrature of the Parabola, 527a-b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 876b-878a
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811d-812b
3*. Straight lines: their length and their re-
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 7, 52c /
Fourth Ennead, TR n, CH i, 139d-140a / Sixth lations; angles, perpendiculars, parallels
BK CH 24 b
Ennead, TR i, CH 4 253b-254b; TR in, CH 13, 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, i, [4i
287d-288a 14-21] 58c; CH 35 66c-d; BK n, CH 16 [64^8-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i, 65*9] 85c-d / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 4
REP 14b-15b; Q
i 7, AA 3-4 32c-34c; Q 11,
A 2 [73*34-38] lOOb; en 5 101b-102b
passim; CH 24
b
47d-48d; Q 30, A 3, ANS and REP 2 169b-170c; 37-863] 117b-c / Topics, BK vi, CH n
[85
b b
Q 42, A i, REP 1-2 224b-225d; Q 52, A i 278d- [i48 23-33J 203a / Heavens, BK i, CH 2 [268 i5-
279b; Q 85, A 8, REP 2 460b>461b 20] 359d / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 9 [1051*23-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 24, 26] 577c
A 4, REP i 491d-492b; PART HI, Q 7, A 12, REP 9 ARISTOTLE: Gait of Animals, CH 9 [7o8 b 34-
i 754c-755c 709*2] 247b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, DEFINITIONS, 2-4,8-
139c-153a passim; THIRD DAY, 201a-202a 12 la; 23 2a; POSTULATES, 1-2,4-5 2a; PROP
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 48 llOd- 1-34 2b-21b; BK n, PROP n 38a-39a; BK iv,
llla PROP 10 73b-74b; BK vi, DEFINITIONS, 2-3
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv, 32b-33b / Discourse, 99a; PROP 2-17 100b-112a; PROP 30 123a-b;
PART iv, 52d-53a / Meditations, v, 93b / PROP 32 124b-125a; BK x 191a~300b passim;
Geometry, BK i, 295a-296b BK xi, DEFINITIONS, ii 301b; PROP 1-23 302b-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 13, COROL 359d; 31 9a; PROP 26 321b-323a; PROP 35 332b-334b;
PROP 15, SCHOL 360b-361d BK xin, PROP 5-12 372b-381a
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 434b- 11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i,
439b DEFINITIONS, 1-2 404a; ASSUMPTIONS, i 404b;
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA i 25a; PROP 2 405a-b / Spirals, PROP 1-2 484b
LEMMA n, SCHOL, 31a-32a 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 26a-28b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xv, 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
SECT 9 164b-d; CH xvi, SECT 3-4 165d-166b Spheres, BK i, 543a-545b; BK n, 569b-570a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 123-132 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 85
437c-439c A 8, REP 2 460b-461b
538 THE GREAT IDEAS 3 to 3(3)
772b-775b; PROP 42 780b-782a; PROP 45-50
(3. The magnitude* of geometry: the relations of 783b-790a; PROP 53-54 792b-796a
dimensionality. 3*. Straight lines: their 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 14a-21a; 26a-28b;
length and their relations; angles, perpen- BK vi, 208a-b
diculars, parallels.) 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, BK i, 532b-538a; 545b-556b
Spheres,
149d-150d; THIRD DAY, 233d 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA 16 53b-54a; 149d-150d; 155b-156d
LEMMA 23 67a; LEMMA 26 71a-72a; BK in, 31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK ii, 313b-314a
LEMMA 7 339b 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA 29 138a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, HOa; 212c-d
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 3*(2) Ellipses
121a-b 11 ARCHIMEDES: Conoids and Spheroids, PROP
53 JAMES: Psychology, 876b-877a 4-9 459a-464a; PROP 11-14 464b-467a
11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK i, PROP 13 61 8a-
36. Curved lines: their kinds, number, and 620a; PROP 15 621b-624a; SECOND DEFINI-
degree TIONS, 9,11 626a; PROP 17-19 626a-627b;
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK i, CH 2 [268b i5-2o] PROP 21 628a-629a; PROP 23 630a-b; PROP 25
359d 631a-b; PROP 30 636a-637a; PROP 32 638a-
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, DEFINITIONS, 2-3 640a; PROP 34 641a-643a; PROP 36-41 643b-
la 653b; PROP 43 654b-655b; PROP 45 657a-658b;
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, PROP 47 659b-660b; PROP 50 663a-666b;
DEFINITIONS, 1-2 404aj ASSUMPTIONS, 2 404b PROP 56-58 675b-679b; BK ii, PROP 6-7
/ Spirals, DEFINITIONS -PROP 28 490a-501a 686b-687a; PROP 26-30 700b-702b; PROP 44-
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 45 710b-711b; PROP 47-50 712b-723a; BK n,
195b-c PROP 52-BK in, PROP 3 726b-735b; BK in,
31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK I-HI, 298b-332b; PROP 16-17 747b-750a; PROP 27 761 b- 762 b;
BK in, 341a-353b PROP 37-38 772b-775b; PROP 42 780b-782a;
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA n 29b-30b; PROP 45-50 783b-790a; PROP 52-54 791 b-
LEMMA I5-PROP 29 and SCHOL 50a-75b; 796a
LEMMA 28 76b-78a; PROP 48-50 102b-105a; 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 975a-984b passim
BK n, LEMMA 3 189b-190a; BK HI, LEMMA 5 31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK n, 308b-313b
338b339a 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA 12 41a;
LEMMA I5-PROP 29 and SCHOL 50a-75b csp
3*(1) Circles LEMMA I5-PROP 1 8 50a-51a; LEMMA 28, COR-
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, cny [7^9-33] 12c-d/ OL-PROP 31 and SCHOL 78a 81a
b 34 HUYCENS: Light, CH v, 604b-606b
Prior Analytics, BKI, CH24 [4i i4-2i] 58c; BK
ii, en 25 [69*30-34] 91a-b / Posterior Analytics,
Ib; BK m-iv 41a 80b; BK vi, PROP 33 125a- 11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK i, PROP ii 615a-616a;
126a; BK xu, PROP 2 339a-340b; PROP 16 PROP 17-20 626a-628a; PROP 22 629a-630a;
362b-363a PROP 24 63 la; PROP 26-27 631b-634a; PROP
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, 32-33 638a-640b; PROP 35 643a-b; PROP 42
ASSUMPTIONS, 5 404b; PROP 405a; PROP 3-6
i 653b-654b; PROP 46 659a-b; PROP 49 661 b-
405b-408a / Measurement of a Circle 447a- 663a; PROP 52-53 668a-670b; BK ii, PROP 5
451 b / Spirals, PROP 3-9 485a-488a / Boo{ of 686a; PROP 7 68 7a; PROP 24 699b-700a; PROP
Lemmas 561 a- 568 b 28-30 701b-702b; PROP 44 710b-711a; PROP
11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK i, PROP 4-5 606b- 46 711b-712a; PROP 48-51 713a-726a; BK HI,
608b; PROP 9 613b-614b; PROP 17-19 626a- PROP 1-3 731a-73Sb; PROP 16-17 747b-750a;
62 7b; PROP 21 628a-629a; PROP 32 638a-640a; PROP 37-38 772b-775b; PROP 41 778b-780b;
PROP 34 641a-643a; PROP 36-41 643b-653b; PROP 54 793b-796a
PROP 43 654b-655b; PROP 45 657a-658b; 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY,
PROP 47 659b~660b; PROP 50 663a-666b; BK 193a-195c; FOURTH DAY, 238d-239d
ii, PROP 6-7 686b-687a; PROP 26-30 700b- 31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK n, 308b 310b
702b; PROP 44 710b-711a; PROP 49-51 714b- 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA 13-14 45a;
726a; BK in, PROP 1-3 731a-735b; PROP 16-17 LEMMA I5-PROP 29 and SCHOL 50a-75b esp
747b-750a; PROP 27 761b-762b; PROP 37-38 PROP 19 51a; PROP 30 76a-b
33(4) to 3d(i) CHAPTER 76: QUANTITY 539
618a; PROP 14 620a-621b; PROP 16-19 624b- 15-22 lb-2a; POSTULATES, 3 2a; PROP i 2b-
62 7b; PROP 21-22 628a-630a; PROP 24 63 la; 3a; PROP 22 13b-14a; PROP 46 27b-28a; BK
PROP 26 631b-632b; PROP 28-32 634a-640a; vi, PROP 1 8 112a-b; BK xi, DEFINITIONS, 2
PROP 34 641a-643a; PROP 36-41 643b-653b; 301a
PROP 43-45 654b-658b; PROP 47-48 659b-661a; 11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i,
PROP 50-51 663a-668a; PROP 54-55 670b-675a; DEFINITIONS, 3-4 404a
PROP 59-60 679b-681b; BK n, PROP 1-5 682a- 11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK i, FIRST DEFINITIONS,
686a; PROP 7-23 687a-699b; PROP 25 700a; i604a
PROP 28-45 701b-711b; PROP 47-51 712b-726a; 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK 11, 832c 833b
BK in, PROP 1-26 731a-761a; PROP 28-40 763a- 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228c-229a
778b; PROP 42-51 780b-791b; PROP 53-56
792b-798b 3</(l) The measurement and transformation
of areas
31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK n, 306b-307a;
308b-312b 7 PLATO: Meno, 180c-182c
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA 12 41a; 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [7b 29-33] 12c-d;
LEMMA I5-PROP 29 and SCHOL 50a-75b esp CH 14 [15*29-32] 21a / Prior Analytics, BK n,
LEMMA I5-PROP 1 8 50a~51a CH 25 [69*30-34] 91a-b / Sophistical Refuta-
CH b b a
tions, ii [i7i i2-i8] 236b; [i7i 34-i72 7l
3c. The relations of straight and curved tines: 236d CH 2 [185*14-17] 259d-
BK
/ Physics, i,
(5. Physical quantities. 5b. Time: the number of BK it [80-108] 16a-b; [294-296] 18d
5c;
motion.) 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 970b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH xiv 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR vn, CH 1-2
155b-162a esp SECT 22 159d; CH xv 162b- 62d-64b
165c passim 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK vi, 115d-116a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 97-98 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
431d-432a 158b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 24,
124-125 506a-507a 154d-155a; APH 35, 163c-d; APH 36, 166b-c;
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 292a-293b APH 40, 171d-172b; APH 48, 179d-180a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 26b-33d csp 34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF i 5a; BK n, PROP 24
27a; 72c-76c; 130b-133c 203a-204a; BK HI, PROP 6 279b-281b; PROP 8
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 249a-251b pas- 282b-283b; PROP 20 291b-294b
sim 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 249a-251b pas-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-c sim
53 JAMES: Psychology, 398a-408a passim, esp 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 632a
399a-b, 407a-408a
5e. Force: its measure and the measure of its
DEFINITIONS, 5 81a, 7 81b; BK vi, PROP i 99a- 316b-318c; 366d-371d; 444a-45la; 465d-
lOOa; PROP 4-7 102a-105b; BK vn, DEFINI- 467a,c; 768d-773d; 778b,d-788c
TIONS, 20 127b; PROP 2-3 128b-130b; PROP 34 53 [AMES: Psychology, 56a-57b; 348a-355b;
146a-147a; PROP 36-39 147b-149b; BK x, 401a-404a
PROP 3-4 193a-195a
7. Infinite quantity: the actual infinite and the
11 ARCHIMEDES: Measurement of a Circle, PROP 3
448b-451b / Equilibrium of Planes, BK i potentially infinite quantity; the mathe-
502a-509a / Sand-Reckoner 520a-526b / matical and physical infinite of the great
and the small
Floating Bodies, BK i 538a-542a
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 14a-24b; 26a-28b 7 PLATO: Parmenides, 495d-497b
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 2 [i 85*28^4]
b
Spheres, BK i, 532b-556b 260a*b; BK in, CH i [2oo i5~i9] 278a; CH 4-8
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 280c-286d / Heavens, BK i, en 5-7 362c-367b
178c-179c / Generation and Corruption, BK i, CH 3 [318*
b
31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK in, 332b-341b 13-24] 414c-d / Metaphysics, BK n, CH 2 [994
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA i 25a; 23-27] 513a-b; BK ix, CH 6 [1048^-17] 574a;
LEMMA 28-PROP 31 and SCHOL 76b-81a; BK BK xi, CH 10 [io66a35~b22] 594d-595b; BK xn,
in, LEMMA 5 338b-339a CH 7 11073*3-13] 603a-b
544 THE GREAT IDEAS
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 112b
(7. Infinite quantity: the actual infinite and the 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 15, SCHOL
potentially infinite quantity: the mathe- 360b-361d
matical and physical infinite of the great 33 PASCAL: Pens&s, 121 195a; 231-233, 213b-
and the small.) 214a / Geometrical Demonstration^ 434a-
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK ix, PROP 20 183b-184a; 439b
BK x, PROP i 191b-192a 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA i-n and
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, SCHOL 25a-32a esp LEMMA 11, SCHOL, 31a-b;
ASSUMPTIONS, 5 404b / Spirals, 484b / Sand- BK ii, LEMMA 2 168a-169b; BK in, GENERAL
Reckoner 520a-526b / Quadrature of the Parab- SCHOL, 370a-b / Optics, BK HI, 543a
ola, 527a-b / Method 569a-592a passim 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xin,
11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK n, PROP 14 691b-692a SECT 4 149b; SECT 6 149c-d; CH xiv, SECT 26-
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812a; BK n, 27 160c-161a; SECT 30 161c-d; CH xv, SECT 2-4
829b 162c-163b; SECT 9 164b-d; CH xvi, SECT 8-
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [551-634] CH xvii, SECT 22 167c-174a esp CH xvn, SECT
7d-8d; [951-1113] 12d-14d 7-8 169b-170a, SECT 12-21 170d-173d; en
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 973a-975a xxix, SECT 16 237b-238a
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR vi, CH 2-3 31 Ib- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 123-132
312b; CH 17, 319d-320a 437c-439c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 5 324d- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV
325c; BK xn, CH 18 354b-d 124 506a-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 24d; 26d; 130b-133c;
31a-34c; PART i-n, Q i, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a 135a-137a,c; 152a-d; 158a-159d; 160b-163a /
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART m, Q 7, Judgement, 498b-501b
A 12, REP i 754c-755c; Q 10, A 3, REP 1-2 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103d
769d-771b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 17
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 119a
139c-153a passim, esp 145b-146c, 150d-151c; 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d;
THIRD DAY, 201a-202a; 205b-d; 224b-c EPILOGUE ii, 695b-c
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Discussions relevant to the problem of the existence of quantities and of their relation to
matter, substance, and body, see BEING 7b, 7b(5)~7b(6); MATTER 2a; QUALITY 3d.
Discussions relevant to the conception of the categories as transcendental concepts of the
understanding, see FORM ic; JUDGMENT 8c-8d; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(i); MIND
ie(i);PRINCIPLE 2b(3).
Other considerations of the relation between quantity and quality, see MECHANICS 4b;
QUALITY 33.
The conception of equality and inequality as the basic relation between quantities, see SAME
AND OTHER 3d; and for the general theory of ratios and proportions, see MATHEMATICS
4c; RELATION 53(3); SAME AND OTHER 30.
The division of quantities into magnitudes and multitudes, or continuous and discontinuous
quantities, see MATHEMATICS 2c; ONE AND MANY 33 (2) -33 (4); and for the conception of
space and time as magnitudes, see MECHANICS 33; SPACE la; TIME i.
Other discussions of magnitudes and numbers as the objects of geometry and arithmetic, see
MATHEMATICS 2; ONE AND MANY 2a; SPACE 3b-3c; TIME 6c.
Other discussions of such physical quantities as space, time, motion, mass, and force, see
ASTRONOMY 7; CHANGE 5a~5b; MECHANICS 5d~5e(2), 6b-6e; SPACE 3d; TIME 4.
The general theory of measurement, see MATHEMATICS 53; MECHANICS 33; PHYSICS 4d.
Other discussions of infinite quantity, see INFINITY ib, 33-36; SPACE 33; TIME 2b,
CHAPTER 76: QUANTITY 545
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo\s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
the tradition of western thought, certain sometimes in terms of antecedent and conse-
INverbal expressions have become shorthand quent, as by Hobbes. The premises (/.<?., the
for the fundamental ideas in the discussion of statements which precede the "therefore")
which they happen to be so often repeated. cause the conclusion, it is said. We know that
This may be due to the influence of the text- Socrates is mortal because we know that Soc-
books used in the schools, which copy one from rates is a man and that all men are mortal. The
another and hand down an easily recited jargon premises are the cause in the sense of the reason
from generation to generation. In most cases why the conclusion may be regarded as true.
the great books themselves are probably the The conclusion is also said to follow from the
original source, though they have usually suf- premises, or the premises are said to imply or
fered over-simplification or distortion when yield the conclusion. If the premises are true,
their insights arc thus transmitted. then the truth of the conclusion can be inferred
"Fcathcrlcss biped" and "rational animal" or proved. The relationship between the prem-
are, forexample, stock phrases to illustrate the ises and the conclusion seems to be the same
idea that a definition consists of genus and dif- whether the act of reasoning is called "proof
ferentia- -the class to which man, in this in- or "inference." The distinction in
meaning be-
stance, belongs and the attribute which differ- tween these two words seems to be one of di-
entiates him from other members of this class. rection. We speak of "proving" a conclusion
Statements such as "the whole is greater than when we look toward the premises as the foun-
the part'* or "two plus two equals four" simi- dation for truth; we speak of "inferring" a
its
laily serve to represent axioms or at least state- conclusion when we look toward it as some-
ments which, whether or not they can be thing which can be drawn from the premises.
proved, are usually accepted as true without The words "if* and "then" indicate that rea-
proof. In the field of reasoning, the familiar ver- soning is a motion of the mind from one state-
bal landmark is "All men are mortal, Socrates is ment to another. Sometimes the inference is
a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." Even immediate, as when we argue that if all men are
those who have never heard of syllogisms, or mortal, then some mortals are men. Here only
who are throughly innocent of the age-old con- two propositions are involved, one of which is
troversies about the theory of the syllogism and simply the converse of the other. Those who
the difference between deduction and induc- deny that immediate inference is
truly infer-
tion, might offer this sequence of statements if, ence (because a proposition and its converse are
pressed to say what reasoning is, they tried to merely two ways of stating the same fact), insist
answer by giving an example. that, implicitly or explicitly, reasoning always
The example, shopworn though it is and far involves at least three statements. In any case, a
from being the perfect paradigm, does convey single statement like "Socrates is a man," or
certain insights into the nature of reasoning even a pair of statements connected by "and"
which are generally undisputed. rather than "if-then"^., "Socrates is a man
The word "therefore," which connects the and Socrates is mortal'' does not express
third statement with the first two, signifies a what is commonly recognized as reasoning. The
relationship which is sometimes described in motion of reasoning does, however, appear in
terms of cause and effect, as by Aristotle, and this sequence of statements, "If Socrates is a
546
CHAPTER 77: REASONING 547
man, then Socrates is mortal/' even though it one denies that reasoning is
thinking, nor does
omits a statement that may be necessary to the anyone deny that there arc forms of thinking
validity of the reasoning, namely, "All men are which are not reasoning, since conceiving and
mortal.'* judging arc generally regarded as kinds of think-
Thus, the familiar grammatical distinctions ing or modes of thought. Reasoning is merely
of word (or phrase), sentence, and paragraph that mode of thought which is a process the
do not seem to provide a perfect parallel for the going step by step from one statement to an-
distinctions which the logicians make between other.
terms, propositions, and syllogisms. But this The problem which arises from the compari-
much is clear. Just as a single word or
phrase, son of reasoning with other modes of thought
like "man" or "rational animal," can never ex- turns on the question whether the mind can
press a proposition, but only a term, so a sim- learn anything without having to think ration-
are related in such a way that the truth of one is of such modes of thought as do not consist in
caused by the truth of the others. reasoning. The theory discussed in the chapter
on INDUCTION that induction is prior to rea-
THE CHAPTER ON IDEA (and perhaps also the soning because intuitive generalization from ex-
chapter on DEFINITION) deals with that content perience must provide the starting-points for
or act of the mind whether a percept or a con- demonstration indicates one solution of the
which involves not only two or more ideas, but cupies the lowest rank because he reasons. But
alsotwo or more judgments so connected that even the pure intelligences, which know intui-
themind passes from one to another. tively, rank below the One, because even the
Whether the logical structure that Aristotle some duality of
simplest act of thought involves
calls a "syllogism" represents all forms of the subject and object. The One, according to Plo-
mental activity called reasoning, is one of the tinus, transcends thought even as it transcends
great traditional issues. Hume suggests, for ex- being. "The super-essential," he says, "is the
ample, that animals reason without making use supra-cogitative." The One "has no need for in-
of syllogisms; and Descartes and Locke seem to tellection,
being always self-sufficing."
hold that the highest forms of thinking, such as Other writers do not go as far as this. Chris-
occur in mathematics or philosophy, cannot be tian theologians do, however, contrast the hu-
reduced to syllogisms, except perhaps by a tour man mind with the angelic intellect and the
one another in the manner which mediaeval kind of thinking which is not an instantaneous
writers call "composition and division"). No act of vision or an immediate intuition involves
548 THE GREAT IDEAS
the mind in a process of thought, somehow akin affirm or deny a single proposition "as move-
to change or motion; and
the theologians
this, ment is to rest, or acquisition to possession."
ing the angels or God. DESCARTES USES THE word "intuition" to name
The human intellect, according to Aquinas, the way in which we know certain truths imme-
gradually comes to know the truth "by a kind diately and with certitude. He distinguishes
of movement and discursive intellectual opera- "intuition from deduction by the fact that into
tion ... by advancing from one thing known to the conception of the latter there enters a cer-
another. But if from the'knowledge of a known tain movement or succession, into that of the
principle [men] were straightway to perceive as former there does not. . The first principles
. .
known all its consequent conclusions, then there are given by intuition alone, while, on the con-
would be no place for discursiveness in the hu- trary, the remote conclusions are furnished
man intellect. Such is the condition of the an- only by deduction." But while deduction, which
gels, because in the truths which they know Descartes says he understands to be "all neces-
naturally, they at once behold all things what- sary inference from other facts that are known
soever that can be known in them." with certainty," supplements intuition, it is
That, says Aquinas, is
why the angels "are never at any stage of the reasoning process in-
called intellectual beings" and men "are called dependent of intuition.
light. For if they possessed the fullness of in- premises of reasoning, but it also certifies each
tellectual light, like the angels, then in the step in the process. He asks us to "consider this
grasping of principles they would at once
first consequence: 2 and 2 amount to the same as 3
comprehend all that they implied, by perceiv- and i. Now we need to see intuitively not only
ing at once whatever could be reasoned out of that 2 and 2 make 4, and that likewise 3 and i
plified in God's knowledge. "In the divine If in addition to knowing the premises by in-
knowledge," according to Aquinas, "there is tuition, the drawing of a conclusion from them
no discursiveness" no succession, neither the is, as Descartes says, itself "effected by intui-
turning from one thought to another, nor the tion" if the act of inference rests on the intui-
advance from the known to the unknown by tion that the conclusion follows logically from
reasoning from principles to conclusion. The di- the premises in what way does deduction or
vine knowledge, Aquinas explains, is a single all- reasoning supplement intuition ? To this ques-
embracing act of vision, in which "God sees all tion, Descartes replies that though the mind
things in one thing alone, which is Himself," "has a clear vision of each step in the process,"
and therefore "sees all things together and not itcannot comprehend in one intuition all the
successively." Apart from participation in the connections involved in a long chain of reason-
vision of God through supernatural light, all ing.Only by taking the steps one after another
human thinking on the natural plane is'discur- can we "know that the last link in a long chain
Kven the conception and the judgment
sive. is connected with the first, even though we do
arc discursive in the sense that the one involves not take in by means of one and the same act of
an act of abstraction or definition and the other vision all the intermediate links on which that
involves a composition or division of concepts. connection depends, but only remember that
But though it is always discursive, human we have taken them successively under review."
thinking is not, according to Aquinas, always Like Descartes, Locke contrasts intuition
involved in the motion of reasoning, that is, the and reasoning, or intuitive and demonstrative
transition from one thought to another. "Rea- knowledge. "Sometimes the mind perceives the
soning," he says, "is compared to understand- agreement or disagreement of two ideas imme-
ing" I.*., the act of judgment by which we diately by themselves, without the interven-
CHAPTER 77: REASONING 549
tion of any other: and this," says Locke, "we that reasoning extends knowledge, even though
may call intuitive knowledge. . . . When the it may not be the method of initial
discovery.
mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by A somewhat contrary view seems to be taken
their immediate comparison ... to perceive by Hume. If the objects under consideration
their agreement or disagreement, it is fain by are matters of fact rather than the relations be-
the intervention of other ideas ... to discover tween our own ideas, the kind of reasoning
the agreement or disagreement which it search- which goes from premises to conclusion avails
es; and this is that which we call reasoning." not at all. The beliefs we hold about such mat-
Again like Descartes, Locke asks, "What need ters, according to Hume, result from mental
is there of reason?" It is necessary, he thinks, operations which are "a species of natural in-
"both for the enlargement of our knowledge stinct . . . which no reasoning or process of
"
and regulating our assent Sense and intui-
. . .
thought is able either to produce or to prevent.
tion reach but very little of the way. The great- What he calls "experimental reasoning" or "rea-
est part of our knowledge depends upon deduc- soning concerning matters of fact" is founded,
tions and intermediate ideas; and in those cases he says, "on a species of Analogy, which leads
where we are fain to substitute assent instead of us to expect from any cause the same events
knowledge, and take propositions for true with- which we have observed to result from similar
out being certain they are so, we have need to causes."
find out, examine, and compare the grounds of Not only men, but also animals reason in this
their probability." But though reasoning en- way. But Hume thinks "it is impossible that
larges our knowledge beyond what can be this inference of the animal can be founded on
known intuitively, reasoning produces certain any process of argument or reasoning by which
knowledge, according to Locke, only if "every he concludes that like events must follow like
step in reasoning . . . has intuitive certainty. objects. . . . The experimental reasoning itself,
necessary to perceive the immediate agreement on which the whole conduct of life depends, is
of the intervening ideas, whereby the agree- nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical
ment or disagreement of the two ideas under power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves;
examination (whereof the one is always the and in its chief operations is not directed by
first, and the other the last, in the account) is any such relations or comparisons of ideas, as
found." are the proper objects of our intellectual facul-
On this view of reasoning, nothing can be ties."
clusion is implicitly contained in the truth of turns upon his understanding of the difference
the premises, so that the advance which reason- between the objects of certain knowledge and
ing appears to make from the known to the un- the objects of probable opinion. This difference,
known consists in coming to know actually he says, makes it "equally foolish to accept prob-
what is
already potentially known. Neverthe- able reasoning from a mathematician and to
ess they, unlike Descartes and Locke, maintain demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs."
550 THE GREAT IDEAS
Hume's distinction between a priori and a poste- sis, in natural science as well as mathematics,
riori reasoning between reasoning from
/.., consists in going from effects to causes, while
principles and reasoning from experience de- the method of synthesis goes from causes to
pends upon his understanding of what matters effects. Newton relates the difference between
must be submitted to experience and of the analysis and synthesis to the difference between
manner in which experience generates belief. inductive and deductive reasoning. This way
The distinction which Aquinas makes between of distinguishing between inductive and de-
demonstrations propter quid and demonstrations ductive reasoning, in terms of going from
quiai.e., between proving what something is effects to causes orfrom causes to effects, would
from its causes and proving that it is from its also seem to be related to the distinction
effects depends upon his understanding of the Aquinas makes between demonstration quia
difference between essence and existence as ob- (i.e., reasoning which proves only that some-
moral sciences, seems to rest upon his view that stration quia\ it is also a posteriori reasoning or
all knowledge consists in the comparison of reasoning from effect to cause. But he would
ideas. In contrast to this, other theories, which not call it "inductive." In one passage at least,
hold that the mode of reasoning differs in dif- he seems to regard induction as the method
ferent disciplines (especially in mathematics and whereby we can come to some knowledge of
morals, or in metaphysics and the natural sci- what God is. "From natural things," he writes,
ences), seem to arise from the contrary view "one does not come by a demonstration of
that, in these different fields of inquiry, the ob- reason to know non-natural things, but by the
jects and conditions of knowledge are different. induction of reason one may know something
Sometimes a distinction in the modes of rea- above nature, since the natural bears a certain
though he makes it in different terms. "The treme and the middle by means of the other
method of proof twofold," he says, "one
is extreme,e.g., if B is the middle term between
being analytic, the other synthetic. Analysis A and C, it consists in proving through C that
shows the true way by which a thing was A belongs to B." Starting from C (particular
methodically discovered, as it were effect from cases of long-lived animals, such as man, horse,
cause. Synthesis employs an opposite pro-
. . .
mule), we can
argue inductively from the fact
cedure, one in which the search goes as it were that these long-lived animals are bileless, to the
from effect to cause." For both mathematical general connection between B (being bileless)
and metaphysical reasoning, Descartes prefers and A
(being long-lived). Such reasoning is
the analytic to the synthetic method. valid, Aristotle adds, only if we can treat "as C
According to Newton, the method of analy- made up of all the particulars; for induction
CHAPTER 77: REASONING 551
the place which is assigned to definition in rule of conduct, the minor premise a particular
reasoning. Hobbes, for example, regards reason- perception of fact. In the example Aristotle
ing as a kind of calculation with names, which gives of the practical syllogism, the major
wholly depends upon the determination of their premise is the rule that everything sweet ought to
meanings. The operations of addition and sub- be tasted, and the minor premise is the percep-
traction when done with words rather than with tion that this particular thing is sweet. These two
numbers are, he thinks, equivalent to "conceiv- premises lead to the practical conclusion that
ing of the consequence of the names of all the this particular thing ought to be tasted.
totle, with the theory that definitions state the The process by which general rules are derived
not just the mean-
essential natures of things, from even more general principles the pre-
ings of words, holds that a definition may be cepts of law or morality involves, according
"the conclusion of a demonstration giving es- to Aquinas, a form of thinking distinctly differ-
sential nature," as well as "an indemonstrable ent from the theoretic or speculative sort. He
statement of essential nature." In the latter points out in his Treatise on Law that we are
case, the definition functions as a principle in able to formulate certain practical rules only by
demonstration. making particular determinations of universal
According to William fames, reasoning, like principles, not by drawing deductions from
definition,is "a selective
activity of the mind" them. "Something may be derived from the
which serves an individual's interest or purpose. natural law in two ways," he writes: "first, as a
"My thinking," he says, "is first, last, and al- conclusion from premises; secondly, by way of
ways for the sake of my doing. . . .
Reasoning is determination of certain generalities. The first
always for a subjective interest, to attain some way is like that
by which, in the speculative
particular conclusion, or to gratify some special sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn
curiosity." It makes no difference whether the from the principles; while the second mode is
interest is
practical or the curiosity speculative. likened to that whereby, in the arts, general
The process of reasoning will be the same, forms are particularized as to details." Of these
though the element which provides a solution two ways of thinking in the field of law, it
to the problem in any emergency will be called would appear that it is only the second type
"
a 'reason' if the emergency be theoretical, a which is peculiar to the practical as opposed to
'means' if it be practical." the speculative order.
Those writers who, like Aristotle and Aqui-
nas, regard the speculative and the practical as THE DISCUSSION OF reasoning in relation to
distinctthough related orders of thought and knowledge, opinion, and action, or in relation
knowledge, seem to think that practical reason- to different disciplines and sciences, usually pre-
ing has its own syllogistic form. Practical delib- supposes a theory of the form which reasoning
erations for them are different from theoretic takes regardless of its subject matter or use.
demonstrations. The conclusion of theoretic This fact is most explicitly attested by the or-
reasoning is an assertion that something is either der of three great books concerned with reason-
true or false, whereas the conclusion of prac- ing. Aristotle's Posterior Analytics deals with the
treats of the syllogism in terms of itspurely subject in both in the second and third figures
formal structure and its various forms. In the respectively. Then according to whether the
later tradition, the distinction between the premises are universal propositions or particular
problems of the Prior and the Posterior Analytics ('All M
is P' or 'Some S is M'), and each is ei-
comes to be represented by the separation be- ther affirmative or negative ('All is P' or M
tween what are called "formal" and "material" 'Some S is not M'), he further distinguishes
logic.
within each figure a number of valid moods, or
formal analysis of reasoning centers on
The formally correct patterns of inference.
the problem of its cogency. Quite apart from For example, in no figure can a valid mood be
any consideration of the truth of its premises or constructed with two particular or two negative
conclusions, reasoning is true or false according premises. No conclusion can be drawn from the
as it is valid or invalid on purely
logical grounds. two particular statements that some poisons are
From premises which are in fact false, a conclu- liquids and that some liquids are indispensable
sion, which may be either true or false, can be to life; nor can any conclusion be drawn from
truly inferred if the structure of the reasoning the two negative statements that no triangles
is formally valid that is, if the form of the are parallelograms and no rhomboids are paral-
premises stands in a certain logically prescribed lelograms. In the first figure, the minor premise
relation to the form of the conclusion. The logi- can be particular and must be affirmative, the
cal problem, then, is to prescribe the formal re- major can be negative and must be universal.
lationships among propositions which permit In this figure the following combinations of
valid inference from certain propositions to oth- premises "some figures are not rectangular"
ers, without regard to the content of the propo- with "all rectangular figures are parallelograms,"
sitions or their truth in fact. or "all prime numbers are odd" with "some odd
their being so," Aristotle says, "I call that a per- clusion from two affirmative premises. Nothing
fect syllogismwhich needs nothing other than follows from the two affirmative statements
what has been stated to make plain what neces- that all fish swim and all whales swim. In the
sarily follows; a syllogismimperfect, is if it needs third figure, only a particular conclusion can be
either one or more
propositions which are in- drawn from a pair of premises both of which are
deed the necessary consequences of the terms universal. From the proposition that no men
set down, but have not been expressly stated as are wise and the proposition that all men are
premises." Using the letters S and P to symbol- mortal, we can conclude only that some mor-
ize the subjectand predicate of the conclusion, tals are not wise.
and the letter M
to symbolize the middle term, From these examples it will be seen that Aris-
the term which appears in the premises but not of the syllogism are rules concern-
totle's rules
in the conclusion, Aristotle states the form of a ing the quantity and quality of the premises re-
perfect syllogism in the following manner: "All quired in each figure to permit a valid infer-
M is P, all S is M; therefore all S is P." ence; and as in the third figure these rules per-
The first of these propositions, the one which mit only a particular conclusion to be drawn,
contains the predicate of the conclusion, is so for all figures they determine the character
called the major premise; the second, the one of the conclusion which can be drawn from
which contains the subject of the conclusion, premises of a certain quantity and quality. If
the minor premise; the subject of the conclu- one premise is
negative, the conclusion must be
sion is called the minor term, the predicate the negative. If one premise is particular, the con-
major term. Aristotle syllogisms into
classifies clusion must be particular.
three figures, or formal types, according to the There seems to be one universal principle of
position of the middle term, either as subject of the syllogism which underlies all these specific
the major premise and predicate of the minor rules for the valid moods in different figures.
CHAPTER 77: REASONING 553
Aristotle says, "all that which is predicable of tivity as it appears in the relation of implica-
the predicate will be predicable also of the sub- tion; for if P implies Q, and Q implies R, then
ject." The
negative aspect of this principle is P implies R.
immediately obvious. What cannot be predi- James recognizes this when he writes that
cated of a predicate, cannot be predicated of its "the principle of mediate predication or subsump-
ond, and that second class is included in a third, tion in whichstands to any intermediate
it
the first is included in the third; and if one class term; in other words, that whatever has an attri-
excludes another, the classes which it includes bute has all the attributes ofthat attribute; or more
are also excluded from that other. briefly still, is of a kind is of that
that whatever
The principle of the syllogism is
traditionally find's kind." Along with "the axiom of mediate
"
called the dictum de omniet nullo. The dictum de equality, 'equals of equals are equal,' the rule
omni, which Kant in his Introduction to Logic of mediate predication or subsumption is, ac-
calls "the supreme principle of affirmative syl- cording to James, a special case of the law that
logisms," is thus
expressed by him: "Whatever "skipping intermediary terms leaves relations
is
universally affirmed of a concept is also af- the same. This AXIOM OF SKIPPED INTERMEDI-
firmed of everything contained under it." The ARIES Or of TRANSFERRED RELATIONS . . . Seems
dictum de nullo, according to Kant, states that to be on the whole the broadest and deepest
"whatever is
universally denied of a concept is law of man's thought."
also denied of everything that is contained un-
der it." Kant appears to think that both these JAMES' ATTEMPT TO state a law of thought or
rules followfrom even more general principles: principle of reasoning which relegates all the
that "an attribute of an attribute is an attri- rules of the syllogism to the status of a special
bute of the thing itself" and that "whatever is case represents one type of attack on the syllo-
inconsistent with the attribute of a thing is in- gism. Whether, for instance, the sample of rea-
consistent with the thing itself." soning which Descartes asks us to consider-
James also attempts to make a more general that if 2 and 2 make 4, and 3 and i make 4, then
formulation of the dictum de omni et nullo. This 2 and 2 amount to the same as 3 and i can be
law of thought, he says, is
"only the result of the reduced to the syllogistic form of subject and
function of comparison in the mind which has predicate, or must be formulated under a more
come by some lucky variation to apprehend a general principle of "transferred relations," il-
series of more than two terms at once." As lustrates the basic issue here between subject-
James states what he calls the "principle of me- predicate logic and relational or mathematical
diate comparison," it appears to be broader logic.Other aspects of that issue are discussed
than the principle of the syllogism. It applies to in the chapters on LOGIC, JUDGMENT, and RE-
any series of related terms to the relation of LATION.
equal and unequal quantities in mathematics, Another type of criticism of the traditional
of subjects and predi-
as well as to the relation theory of the syllogism accepts the syllogism as
cates in the logic of predication or classes. the form of all reasoning, but objects, as Kant
James' principle of mediate comparison itself does, to what he calls "the mistaken subtilty"
depends on what in mathematical logic and the of the classification of syllogisms according to
logic of relations is called the "transitivity" of figures and moods. But Kant does not deny all
relations. The relation of larger than, for exam- distinctions among syllogisms. On the contrary,
ready knew in the premises; whereas in induc- make. Aristotle, for example, seems to present
tive reasoning, Mill, like Bacon, thinks that the syllogism as a method of expounding argu-
the mind goes beyond anything contained in ments rather than of discovering them, and of
the premises and genuinely discovers a new testing the validity of reasoning rather than of
truth. learning the truth about things. "All instruc-
seems to be Descartes' opinion that "the
It tion given or received by way of argument," he
syllogistic forms are of no aid in perceiving the writes, "proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.
truth about objects." Locke makes the same This becomes evident upon a survey of all the
point more extensively. Admitting that "all species of instruction. The mathematical sci-
right reasoning may be reduced to [Aristotle's] ences, and other speculative disciplines, are
all
forms of syllogism," he denies that they are acquired in this way, and so are the two forms
"the best way of reasoning for the leading of of dialectical reasoning, syllogistic and induc-
those into truth who are willing to find it and tive; for each of these latter makes use of old
desire to make the best use of their reason for knowledge to impart new, the syllogism assum-
the attainment of knowledge. . . . The rules of ing an audience that accepts its premises, induc-
syllogism," he writes, "serve not to furnish the tion exhibiting the universal as implicit in the
mind with those intermediate ideas that may clearly known particular."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. Definitions or descriptions of reasoning: the process of thought
556
i a. Human reasoning compared with the reasoning of animals
ib. Discursive reasoning contrasted with immediate intuition 557
ic. The role of sense, memory, and imagination in reasoning: perceptual inference,
rational reminiscence, the collation of images
30. Formal and material truth: logical validity distinguished from factual truth
$d. Necessity and contingency in reasoning: logical necessity; certainty and prob-
ability
4& The direction and uses of reasoning: the distinction between proof and infer-
ence, and between demonstration and discovery 560
50. The fact and the reasoned fact: mere belief distinguished from belief on
rational grounds
*)d.
Rhetorical reasoning: the rational grounds of persuasion 564
6c. Inductive and deductive inference in the philosophy of nature and the natural
sciences 566
6d. Induction and demonstration in the moral sciences
556 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265 -283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES -.Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 36a-37d esp 36b-37b; 26] 39c; CH 8-22 45b-57b; CH 30 [46a3-io]
180c-182b; 193a-b 63d; BK n, CH 25 91a-b / Posterior Analytics,
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 134c-d BK i, CH 2 [72 a25-b 4] 98d-99a; CH 6 [75*12-28]
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 683d- 103a-b / Topics, BK i, CH i [iooa25-b23J
684a 143a-b; BK n, CH 5 [112*16-23] 157b-c; BK
a b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 872b; 879b-885a esp VIH, CH 12 [i62 35- 2J 220c / Physics, BK n,
880b-882a CH 9 277c-d / Metaphysics, BK v,
[200*1^-29]
CH 5 [ioi5b 6-8] 535d-536a; BK VH, CH 15
3. Lack of cogency in reasoning: invalid syl- b
[io39 3 1-1040*8] 563d-564a; BK xn, CH 8
logisms; formal fallacies [1074*14-16] 604c
CH b
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 16-21 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, 3 [io94 i2-27]
85c-89b / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 12 339d-340a; CH 7 [1098*25^7] 343d-344a; BK
b BK i, CH 2
[77 i6-34] 106d-107a / Physics, vi, CH 3 388b-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH i [1355*3-
B
[185*5-12] 259d; CH 3 [186*4-9] 260d-261a 18] 594b; CH 2 [i357 i4-3o] 596d-597a; BK n,
b
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK n, CH 24 649d-651d CH 25 [i402 i3-i403*i7] 652b-6S3a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 7 112b- 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 7, 112d*113d;
113d CH 26, 13 Ib
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK 11, CH 31- 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
34 651d-653b Spheres, 505a-506a
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12,
23b-c A ANS and REP 2 56a-57b; Q 19, A 8, REP 3
7,
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 126b-127c 116a-d; Q 44, A i, REP 2 238b 239a; Q 47, A i,
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-369a REP 3 2S6a-257b; Q 82, A 2, ANS 432d-433c;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 109b-c; 133d PART i-ii, Q 13, A 5, ANS 675c-676b; A 6,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 108a-b; 227b-228a; 236b REP 1-2 676c-677b
[fn i]; 526b [fn i] 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 94,
A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART II-H, Q 4, A 8
3c. Lack of truth in reasoning: sophistical argu- 409a-d; PART HI, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-766b
ments; material fallacies 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 65c-d; 71c
7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Phaedo, 237b- 31 DESCARTES: Rules, n 2a-3b; xn, 23b /
238a Discourse, PART n, 46c-48b / Meditations, i,
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 34-35 76c
66b-d; BK n, CH 18 87a-b / Posterior Analytics, 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-369a
BK i, CH 16-17 109b-lllb / Topics, BK i, CH i 34 HUYGENS: Light, PREP, 551b-552a
b b
[ioo 23-ioi*i8] 143b-d; BK vin, CH 10 [i6o 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xv,
23-39] 218b-c; CH 12-13 220c-221d / Sophisti- SECT 1-3 365a-d esp SECT i 365a-c; CH xvi
cal Refutations 227a-253d / Physics, BK i, CH 2 366d-371c passim; CH XVH, SECT 2 371d-
[185*5-12] 259d; CH 3 [186*4-9] 260d-261a 372b; SECT 15-17 378d-379c
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK H, CH 24 649d-651d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 7 112b- 20-21 458a-c; SECT vi 469d-470d esp 469d
113d [fn i]; SECT x, DIV 87-88 489b-490b
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 31 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 348a,c
651d-652b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14d; 17d-18a; 194b-d /
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56b-d; 58d-60c Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 60a-61d / 53 JAMES: Psychology, 878a-884b
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 38-69 109c-116b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, x, 16d-17a / Objections
4. The types of reasoning, inference, or argu-
and Replies, 126b'U7c ment
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 367a-368b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 4a. Immediate inference: its relation to medi-
SECT 10, 123c; CH xi, SECT 13 146b-c; BK iv, ated inference or reasoning
CH XVH, SECT 19-21 379d-380a 7 PLATO: Euthyphro, 196d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vin, DIV 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 7 [i7b23~37]
75, 484c; SECT xn, DIV 132 509a*d 27b-c; CH 10 [20*16-37] 30d-31b / Prior
560 THE GREAT IDEAS 4b to 4/
PART VI, 61d-62c / Objections and Replies,
(4. The types of reasoning, inference, or argument. 167c-d
4a. Immediate inference: its relation to
34 NEWTON: BK RULE iv 271b /
Principles, in,
mediated inference or reasoning?) BK 543a-b
Optics, in,
BK i, CH 2-3 39d-40c; BK n, CH
Analytics, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xn,
b
8-10 79b-81b; CH 22 [67 26-68*24] 89b-d SECT 6-13 360a-362d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18a; 109d-lHc esp 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 9
109d-110a, HOd-lllc 454c-455a; SECT in, DIV 19, 458a; SECT iv,
DIV 26 460b-c; SECT vni, DIV 65, 479b-c;
4i. The and uses of reasoning: the
direction SECT ix, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT xn, DIV 131-132
between proof and inference,
distinction 508d-509d passim
and between demonstration and dis- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 45b-46a; 195d-197b
covery 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passim;
7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi, 383d-388a 475b,d [fn i] passim
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 3 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 659a
b BK i, CH 2 143d-144a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 690b
[72 25-33] 99c / Topics,
/ Sophistical Refutations, CH 2 227d-228a; CH 53 JAMES Psychology, 674a-675b esp 675b
:
lo-n 234d-237c
44. Direct and indirect argumentation: proof
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 4 [i<>95 3o-b i3]
ft
(5&. Scientific reasoning: the theory of demonstra- 56(3) A priori and a posteriori reasoning: from
tion. 56(1) The indemonstrable as a basis causes or from effects; from principles
for demonstration^ or from experience; analysis and syn-
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333d-334d thesis
60, 477a; SECT ix, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT xn, BK iv, CH 2 [ioo4b i8-27] 523d; BK xi, CH 3
b b
DIV 132, 509b-c [io6i 8-i2] 589d; BK xin, CH 4 [io78 i8-28]
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 348a,c 610b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 46d-47c; 164a-171a; 183b 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH i
[1355*28-39]
/ Fund. Prin. Metaphysic ofMorals, 285c-
[fn i] 594c-d
286a / Practical Reason, 310d-311d; 339a / 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 8 113d-114c;
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-184a 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 9,
:
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 454b-c; 483d- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CM xvi,
484a SECT 9 369b*c
564 THE GREAT IDEAS 5dto5e(2)
(5. Reasoning in relation to
knowledge, opinion, 5e. Practical reasoning
and action. 5c. Dialectical reasoning: the 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics,BK HI, CH 1-4 162a-166b
opposition of rational arguments.) / Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 7 [io32 a25~b22]
33 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT x, DIV 555b-d / Soul, BK i, CH 3 [407*22-23] 636d;
86-91 488d-491c BK in, CH 9 [432 b26-433*5] 665c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-b; 36d-37d; 108a>d; 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701*5-
b
120c-173a csp 129c-130b, 133c; 174b-177b; 39] 236b d / Ethics, BK i, en 3 [i094 i2-27]
b
187a-192d; 200c-209d; 219a-220b; 229b-c; 339d-340a; CH 4 [io95*3o- i3] 340c-d; en 7
a b
231c-232a / Fund. Prin. Mctaphysic of Morals, [io98 20- 8] 343c-344a; BK 11, CH 7 [1107*27-
260d-261b; 283d-284d / Practical Reason, 32] 352d-353a; BK x, CH i [i
172*34^7] 426b-c
291a-292a; 302a-d; 331c-337a,c; 340a-342d; 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK in, CH 2 177c-
348d-349a / Science of Right, 407a-408b / 178d
Judgement, 540a-546d; 562a-578a esp 562d- 23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 53a-54a; 60b-61a;
564c, 575b-578a; 584c-d 66c-68a; 78a-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 135 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 57d-58b;
47b-d 81d82a
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 545d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART in, 48b-50b
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 27a-80b; 90a-127a
5d. Rhetorical reasoning: the rational grounds 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 60a-c; 149d-150a; 190c-
of persuasion 191a / Fund. Prin. Metuphysic of Morals, 253a-
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 50d-52d; 57a-c / Phaedrus 255d; 260d-2Glb; 264b-265b; 266b-d; 271a-
115a-141a,c esp 129d-141a,c / Meno, 176d- c; 277d-279d; 283d 287d esp 283d-284d /
177a / Gorgias 252a-294d / Timaeus, 457c / Practical Reason, 291a-297c; 298a-300a; 300d
Sophist, 558a-561a [fn i]; 306d-307a; 307d-321b esp 307d-309b,
8 ARISTOTLE Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 27 92a-
: 309d-310b; 329a-337a,c esp 329b-d; 338c-
93a,c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH i
[71*1-10] 343d; 349b-350c / Pref. Metaphysical Ele-
97a / Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 5 [1009*16-22] ments ofEihics, 372b-d / Intro. Mctaphysic Oj
528c Morals, 383a-d; 388d; 390b,d-391a; 393a /
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 3 [io94b 23~27] Scienceof Right, 398c-399c; 416b-417a /
339d-340a / Rhetoric, BK i 593a-622d esp CH i Judgement, 461a-467a esp 463a-467a; 596c-
b
[1355*4 22] 594b-595a; BK n, CH 18-26 639a- 598b
653a,c; BK HI, CH 15 669d-670c; en 17-19 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445c-d; 456a-457b
672a-675a,c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 186a; 381b-385b csp 382a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 16, 180c-
181a 5e(l) The form of the practical syllogism
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 5 llOb-c; 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH n [434*16-22]
CH 8 113d-114c 667a
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 36- 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701*5-
37 653d-654b; BK iv, en 4 676d-677a 39] 236b-d / Ethics, BK vi, CH 9 391c-392b esp
b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 83, [ii42 2o-26] 392a; BK vii, CH 3 [1146^4-
b
A ANS 436d-438a; PART i-n, Q
i, 7, A i, REP i Ii47 i9] 396d-398a passim
651d-652c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81,
23HosBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 67c; PART n, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 86, A i, REP
127d; 128d 2 461c-462a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 446d-450a; 453c-454d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 76,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 58c-59a; A i, ANS 141a-c; Q 77, A 2, REP 4 145d-147c
66c-67c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, x, 16d-17a 5e(2) Deduction and determination in legal
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 440b- thought
442a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 7 382c-383a; CH
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH x, 10 385c-386b / Politics, BK in, CH n [i282b i-
SECT 34 299d-300a 6] 480b-c; CH 15 [1286*10-37] 484b-d; CH 16
b
36 STCRNE: Tristram Shandy, 227a-228a [1287*23-28] 485d; [i287 i5-25] 486a-b
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 261c-d; 320c 321b 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95,
:
b
b; 588b [fn 2]; 595a d 589c; CH 4 589d-590a; CH 7 [io63 36-io6.j 9J
ft
b
43 MILL: 276b-277a;
Liberty, 294d-295b / 592b; BK xiii, CH 2 [io77 i-io] 608d-609a;
Utilitarianism, 456a-457b CH 3 609a-610a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 122 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK n, en
44a 6 [742 b23-35] 283d-284a / Ethics, BK i, CH
j
b b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 794a-798b esp 794a, [io94 i9-27] 339d-340a; BK HI, CH 3 [ni2
796a-b 20-24] 358d; BK vii, CH 8 [1151*15-19]
402a
6. The character of reasoning in the various 11 ARCHIMEDES: Method, 569b-570a; PROP i,
disciplines 572b
11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK n, PROP 44-47 710b-
6a. Proof in metaphysics and theology 713a; PROP 49-51 714b-726a
7 PLATO: Parmenides 486a-511d csp 491a-c / 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56b; 58a-c;
Sophist, 570a-d / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 59c
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 2 [1004* 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, Ib-c
b
25-31] 523b-c; BK vi, CH i [io25 i-i8] 547b,d; 31 DESCARTES: Rules la-40a,c passim, esp n, 3a,
BK ix, CH 6 [io48*25-b9] 573c-574a; BK xi, iv, 7c, vi 8a-10a, xiv, 30d-33b, xvi-xxi
CH 3 [1061*10-18] 589b; CH 7 [1064*1-9] 33d-40a,c / Discourse, PART i, 43b-c; PARTII,
592b 46c-47c; PART iv, 52d-53a / Meditations, 73a;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i 3a- i, 76c; v, 93a-d / Objections and Replies, 128a-
lOc; Q 2, A 2 lld-12c; Q 32, A i, REP 2 175d- 129a / Geometry 295a-353b csp BK it 295a-
178a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a 298b, BK ii, 304a-b, BK HI, 353a
566 THE GREAT IDEAS 6c to 6d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi 60d-67a,c csp
(6. The character of reasoning in the various dis-
61d-62c / Objections and Replies, 215a-b
ciplines. 66. Demonstration in mathe- 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 365b-371a
matics: analysis and synthesis.) 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK HI, RULES 270a-271b;
33 PASCAL: Petuecs, 1-5 171a-173a / Vacuum, GENERAL scHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK in,
365b-366a / Geometrical Demonstration, 430a- 541b-542a; 543a-b
434a; 442a-443b 34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b<552a
34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b / Optics, BK in, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i,
543a-b SECT 10 123b-d; BK iv, CH in, SECT 25-29
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xvi, 321a-323a passim; CH vi, SECT 13 335c-d; CH
SECT 4 166a-b; BK iv, CH i, SECT 9, 308d- xii, SECT 9-13 360d-362d
309b; CH ii, SECT 9-10 311b-c; CH HI, SECT 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 107,
18-20 317d-319c passim; CH XH, SECT 1-8 434a
358c-360c passim, csp SECT 7 360b-c; SECT 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 9
14-15 362d-363b; CH xvn, SECT n 378b 454c-455a; SECT m, DIV 19, 458a; SECT iv,
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT DIV 26 460b-c; SECT vn, DIV 48 470d-471c;
12 408a-b; SECT 15-16 409a-d DIV 60, 477a; SECT ix, DIV 82 487b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 20 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 165a-b
458a-b; SECT vn, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT XH, 42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-b /
DIV 131 508d-509a Judgement, 578d~582c esp 579b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 17d-18d; 46a-b; 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 659a;
68a-69c; 211c-218d esp 215d-217a / Practical 774d-775a
Reason, 295b-d; 330d-331a / Pref. Meta- 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 42a; 239c
physical Elements of Ethics, 376c-d / Science 50 MARX: Capital, 6a-c
of Right, 399a-b / Judgement, 551a-553c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 91a-94b esp 94b; 126a-
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-d 127a passim; 295a-b; 324b; 385a-b; 674a-
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2b 675b esp 675b; 677b; 862a-865a; 882a-884b
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 173a-b passim
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d; 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401b / Instincts,
EPILOGUE n, 695b-c 412a-b / General Introduction, 483d-485a esp
53 JAMES: Psychology, 874a-878a passim 484c-48Sa; 502d-503d; 54Sc / Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, 661c-662a / New Intro-
6c. Inductive and deductive inference in the
ductory lectures, 879c
philosophy of nature and the natural
sciences 6d. Induction and demonstration in the moral
8 ARISTOTLE: BK n, CH 7-9 275b-278a,c sciences
Physics,
CH 5 379b-c; BK HI, CH 7 b
/ Heavens, BK n, 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 3 [io94 i2-27]
a b
[306*1-18] 397b-c / Generation and Corruption, 339d-340a; CH 4 [i095 30- i3] 340c-d; CH 7
b b
BK i, CH 2 [316*5-14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, [io98 25- 7] 343d-344a; BK vn, CH i [ii45
fl
b
BK n, CH 3 [995*1 5-17] 513d 1-7] 395b; BK x, CH i [ii72*34- 7] 426b-c /
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK in, CH Politics, BKi, CH i [1252*17-24] 445b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other comparisons of human and animal intelligence, see ANIMAL ic(2); LANGUAGE i;
MAN xa-ic; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6b; MIND 3a~3b.
Another discussion of the distinction between the intuitive and the discursive or rational,
see KNOWLEDGE 6c(i); and for the consideration of supra-rational knowledge, see EX-
An examination of immediate inference, see JUDGMENT 7b; and for the distinction between
inductive and deductive reasoning, and a priori and a posteriori reasoning, /^EXPERIENCE
2d; INDUCTION ib; SCIENCE 5d.
The elements of scientific reasoning, see BEING 8d, 8f; CAUSE 5b; DEFINITION 5; INFINITY 2c;
PHILOSOPHY PRINCIPLE 3a(2)~3a(3); SCIENCE 5d~5e.
3c;
The analysis of dialectical and rhetorical reasoning, see DIALECTIC 2b, 2c(2), 30-3^ OPINION
2c; OPPOSITION ic; RHETORIC 4C, 4c(2).
Other discussions relevant to the study of practical reasoning, see GOOD AND EVIL 5c; JUDG-
MENT 2; KNOWLEDGE 6e(i)-6e(2); LAW 5g; LOGIC 4e; OPINION 6b; PRUDENCE 53, 6b.
The character of reasoning in the various disciplines, see BEING 8f; GOD 2b-2c; IMMORTALITY
2; LOGIC 43, 4C, 46; MATHEMATICS 33, 3c; MECHANICS 2; MEDICINE 3c; METAPHYSICS 2c;
PHILOSOPHY 3c; THEOLOGY 4c; WILL 5C.
The general problem of the rationality of the universe, *?<?MiND loa; NATURE 33; WORLD 6c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booths ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL n, SECT i, CH 3 MANSEL. Prolegomena Logica. An Inquiry into the
J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK 11, v Psychological Character of Logical Processes
FARADAY. Observations on the Education of the G. C. LEWIS. A
Treatise on the Methods
of Observa-
Judgment and Reasoning in Politics
tion
W. JAMES. "The Sentiment of Rationality," in BOOLE. An Investigation of the Laws of Thought
The Will to Relieve DE MORGAN. Formal Logic, CH 5-6
A Budget of Paradoxes
.
II.
TAINE. On Intelligence
QUINTILIAN. Institutio Oratorio (Institutes of Ora- SlGWART. Logic, PART I, CH 3; PART III, CH 3-4
tory), BK V, CH IO-I4; BK VII, CH 8 JEVONS. The Substitution of Similars
SEXTOS EMPIRICUS. Against the Logicians, BK n, The Principles of Science, CH 4, 6-7,
. n
CH 3-6 CLIFFORD. Seeing and Thinking
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, BK I-H
. LOTZE. LoglC, BK I, CH 3; BK II, CH 4-7
PETRUS HISPANICUS. Summulae Logicales (Logical Outlines of Logic, DIV i, CH 3
.
ARNAULD. Logic or the Art of Thinking, PART in-iv DEWEY et al. Studies in Logical Theory, i-iv
LEIBNITZ. Essays Concerning Human Under-
New WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL. Principia Mathematica,
standing, BK n, CH 19
PART I, SECT A
EULER. Letters to a German Princess BRADLEY. The Principles of Logic, BK II-IH; Ter-
T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, minal Essays, i
VII Appearance and Reality, BK n, CH 15
.
MAINE DE BIRAN. The Influence of Habit on the . Collected Essays, VOL 1(12)
Facultyof Thinking .
Essays on Truth and Reality, CH 12
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL n, DEWEY. How We Thinly
SUP, CH 10 Essays in Experimental Logic, n-vi
.
BROWN. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human PARETO. The Mind and Society, VOL i-in
Mind, VOL n, pp 497-525 BOSANQUET. Logic, VOL II, CH I~2, 6-7
BENTHAM. Rationale of Judicial Evidence Implication and Linear Inference
.
INTRODUCTION
quantity and quality, relation is gen- terms it relates exist. The ancients, however, do
ElE erally recognized as a basic term or cate- not appear to regard the relation as something
gory. But its meaning, like theirs, cannot be having a reality distinguishable from the reality
defined. Relation is, perhaps, the prototype of of the correlative terms. It seems to be signifi-
an indefinable notion. As Bertrand Russell cant that both Plato and Aristotle discuss
any statement of what relation is without using For the most part, they signify relations by us-
the notion of relation in doing so. ing a pair of words which name things standing
Any term which is
essentially relative seems in a certain relation to one another.
also tobe incapable of definition. Its meaning Thus in the Categories, Aristotle refers to
cannot be stated without referring to its cor- 'double' and 'half/ 'master' and 'slave,'
relative; and since the meaning of the latter 'greater' and 'less,' or 'knowledge* and 'object
reciprocally involves the former as its correla- known' examples of correlative terms. "All
as
tive, each member of a pair of correlative terms relatives," he says, "have a correlative." Some-
draws upon the other for its meaning. A part is times it is necessary to find the precise word, or
a part of a whole; a whole, a whole of parts. even to invent the right word, for in order to
Similarly, the meaning of parent involves the indicate that a given term is relative, its cor-
notion of child and the meaning of child the relative must be appropriately named. "Con-
notion of parent. cubine," says Locke, "is, no doubt, a relative
Plato applies this maddening fact about cor- name, as well as wife; but in languages where
relative terms to all comparatives which pre- this, and like words, have not a correlative
suppose the correlation of more and less. "Com- term, there people are not so apt to take them
paratives such as the hotter and the colder," he to be so, as wanting that evident mark of rela-
writes, "are to be ranked in the class of the in- tions which is between which seem
correlatives,
finite." They cannot be measured or defined. to explain one another, and not to be able to
Terms like 'much* and 'little,' 'great' and exist but together."
'small' look like quantities, but, according to When "reciprocity of correlation does not
Aristotle, they are "not quantities, but rela- appear to exist," Aristotle suggests that it may
tives, for things are not great or small absolute- be the result of our failure to use words care-
ly; they are so called rather as the result of an fully. If we wish to use tho term 'rudder' as
act of comparison." relative, we cannot call its correlative a 'boat,'
Concerning quantities and qualities, the an- for "there are boats which have no rudders."
cients ask how they exist. The alternatives seem Since there is no existing word,it would be
to be either that they exist in and of them- "more accurate," Aristotle thinks, "if we coined
selves,or that they exist as the attributes of some word like *ruddered' to name the correla-
substances such as stones and trees. But with tive of 'rudder.'" Similarly, in the case of
regard to relations, the question seems to be 'slave' as a relative term, its correlative is not
whether they exist rather than how they exist. 'man' understood in any sense, but only man
The supposition that a relation cannot exist understood as 'master.'
apart from the terms it relates may be thought The things which are designated by a pair of
to imply that the relation does exist when the reciprocally relative terms must, according to
569
570 THE GREAT IDEAS
Aristotle, coexist. One man cannot be called right and left, double and half any actuality?
a master unless another man exists who can . . . What can
be the meaning of correlatives
be called his slave; something cannot be called apart from our conception of their juxtaposi-
larger unless something coexistent
with it can tion ? 'Greater' may refer to very different mag-
be called smaller. Aristotle considers possible nitudes; Different' to all sorts of objects. The
to be an object actually known, except simul- calls "the elusive character of relation," he
taneously with someone's coming actually to is willing to affirm the reality of relations "when
know it. the actuality of the relationships is derived
from no other source than relation itself." He
THE COEXISTENCE OF things which are correla- thinks that one quantity may be the double of
tive to one another stillleaves a question con- another, "quite apart from our speech or
cerning the existence of the relation between thought." The fact that one quantity is the
them. When conceived as an attribute, a qual- double of another is an additional fact about
ity or a quantity can be said to exist in the the two quantities over and above all their
thing it somehow modifies. In the language of other properties. "In all the conditions in
Aristotle, such accidents inhere in substances, which we assert relation," Plotinus declares,
and accordingly have reality as long as the sub- "the mutual relation exists over and above the
stances in which they inhere exist. But a rela- objects; we perceive it as already existent; our
tion does not seem to inhere in a substance. It knowledge isdirected upon a thing, there to be
cannot be the attribute of a single thing. It known a clear testimony to the reality of
somehow lies between two things, inhering in relation."
neither, for if
it
belonged to either one alone it The problem thus seems to become one of
could have some reality if that one existed and distinguishing between relations which have
the other did not. The question, therefore, is independent reality and those which exist only
whether relations really exist at all, or are only in the mind. "Some have said that relation is
in the mind of him who compares things or not a reality but only an idea. But this,"
considers them relative to one another. Aquinas declares, "is plainly seen to be false
"A sign that the relative is least of all a sub- from the very fact that things themselves have
stance and a real thing," writes Aristotle, "is a mutual order and relation." Not all relations
the fact that it alone has no proper generation are real, however. "Relations which result in
or destruction or movement; as in respect of the things understood from the operation of
quantity there is increase and diminution, in the intellect alone are logical relations only, in-
respect of quality alteration, in respect of place asmuch as reason observes them as existing be-
locomotion, in respect of substance simple gen- tween two understood things." For example,
eration and destruction. In respect to relation "the relation of a thing to itself is not a real
there is no proper change; for, without chang- relation," for "reason, by apprehending one
ing, a thing will be now greater and now less thing twice, regards it as two; and thus it ap-
or equal, if that with which it is compared has prehends a certain relation of a thing to itself
changed in quantity." . The same is true of those relations that
. .
Plotinus also questions the reality of rela- follow upon an act of reason, as genus and
tions. "Has relationfor example, that of species, and the like."
CHAPTER 78: RELATION 571
Aquinas offers, in contrast, "other relations *R(a,b,c,).' The first is a dyadic relation, the
which are with regard to both ex-
realities second a triadic relation.
tremes; as when a relation exists between two Relations are classified not only with respect
things according to some reality that belongs to the number of the terms they relate, but also
to both. This is clear of all relations consequent with respect to such formal properties as
upon quantity, great and small, double and symmetry, transitivity, reflexivity. The rela-
"sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a can also say that B is the brother of A.
reality, while in the other extreme, it is only The type of relationship remains the same
an idea. This happens whenever the two ex- regardless of the character of the terms. Un-
tremes are not of one order . . . Since God is
equal quantities are asymmetrically related,
outside the whole order of creation and all equal quantities symmetrically; 'to-the-right-
creatures are ordered to Him, and not con- of is an asymmetrical
spatial relation, 'next-to'
thing is related to another but the second is not then A is to the right of C.
related to the first. But the more important The modern analysis of propositions as rela-
of western thought, seem
issues, in the tradition tional structures which differ in type according
to be whether there are both real and logical to the character of the relations, not the charac-
relations, *.., relations both in nature and in ter of the terms, has an antecedent in Locke's
the mind, and whether, in either case, relations analysis of judgments as acts of comparison
enter into the very nature of the things related which look to the relation between ideas rather
or are merely external, so that the character of than to the ideas themselves. Both analyses
a thing is unaffected by the relations in which lead to a theory of inference which is based on
it stands. the convertibility of symmetrical relations and
on the transitivity of certain relationships and
As INDICATED IN THE chapters on JUDGMENT, the intransitivity of others. As indicated in the
REASONING, and LOGIC, relation tends to dis- chapter on REASONING, the factor of transi-
place predication in certain typically modern tivity appears in William James* discussion of
theories of the proposition and of inference. the "principle of mediate comparison." He
What is currently called "relational logic" is states this in the formula "more than the more
set against "subject-predicate logic." Relations is more than the less'' Then he explains that
themselves, without regard to the character of "such a formula would cover all possible cases;
the terms related, become the primary object as, earlier than early is earlier than late, worse
of logical analysis. example, that
It is said, for than bad is worse than
good, east of east is
1
the proposition 'John hit James has the form east of west; etc., etc., ad libitum. Symbolically,
'aRb' or *R(a,b),' and that the proposition we might write it as a<b<c<d and say
. . .
'John went to school with James' has the form that any number of intermediaries may be ex-
572 THE GREAT IDEAS
punged without obliging us to alter anything the syllogism' can be expressed as a sort of com-
in what remains written." ment upon, and relatively simple application of,
James thus formulates what he regards as the the transitivity of the subsumption relation."
most fundamental law of thought. For series According to Royce, William James' axiom of
"
of "homogeneously related terms, the law is skipped intermediaries represents a step in the
that "shipping intermediary terms leaves the rela- right direction, but it fails to achieve complete
"
tions the same The factor of transitivity enters generality.
the picture when fames distinguishes between Russell disposes of the traditional theory of
relations which are and relations which are not the proposition in the same fashion that Royce
geneous series allow of intermediaries being tion (i.e., of proposition not stating a relation
skipped. It depends on which series they are, between two or more other propositions),
on what relations they contain. Let it not be namely, the form which ascribes a predicate to
said that it is a mere matter of verbal associa- a subject." It is, therefore, "unable to admit
tion, due to the fact that language sometimes the reality of relations; all relations, it main-
permits us to transfer the name of a relation tains, must be reduced
to properties of the
over skipped intermediaries, and sometimes apparently related terms." Russell insists, on
does not; as where we call men 'progenitors' of the contrary, that "propositions stating that
their remote as well as of their immediate pos- two things have a certain relation have a differ-
terity, but refuse to call them 'fathers' thereof. ent form from subject-predicate propositions."
There are relations which are intrinsically This can be most easily seen, he thinks, in the
transferable, whilst others are not. The rela- case of asymmetrical relations. The proposition
tion of condition, e.g.,
is
intrinsically transfer- which states that A and B are related by the
able. What conditions a condition conditions symmetrical relation of equality, can be inter-
what it conditions-Vcause of cause is cause of preted to mean that A and B both possess a
effect.' The relations of negation and frustra- common property. "But when we come to
tion, on the other hand, are not transferable: asymmetrical relations, such as before and after,
what frustrates a frustration does not frustrate greater and less, etc., the attempt to reduce
what it frustrates. No changes in terminology them to properties becomes," in Russell's opin-
would annul the intimate difference between ion, "obviously impossible." The relational
these two cases." theory of the proposition, therefore, includes
the subject-predicate theory as a special case.
THE FOREGOING PASSAGES from James reflect A defense of the subject-predicate logic
the general tenor of the theory of the calculus would not make the counterclaim that rela-
of relations. He himself does not systematically tional logic can be treated as a special case.
expound it. Its elaboration is to be found in the Rather it would insist that the two logics are
writings of Boole, Couturat, and De Morgan, of radically different in principle that the one
Jevons, Pierce, Bradley, Royce, Russell and belongs to a philosophy of nature and a meta-
Whitehead (whose works are cited in the Ad- physics, inwhich substance is the primary con-
ditional Readings). Is this relational logic more cept; whereas the other belongs to the empirical
general than the subject-predicate logic that is sciences and to modern mathematics, in which
traditionally called "Aristotelian," or is the re- the concept of relation supplants substance.
verse the case ? Whichever side of the controversy is taken, the
The modern answer insists upon the greater undeniable difference between a relational and
generality of relational logic. Royce, for ex- a subject-predicate logic represents one of the
ample, denning "subsumption" as a non-sym- great differences between modern and ancient
metrical, transitive relation which obtains be- thought.
tween two classes when one includes the other, It is not only in logic that the modern em-
declares that "the entire traditional 'theory of phasis seems to be upon relations rather than
CHAPTER 78: RELATION 573
upon things related on relations denuded of and of the collected members of the subdivision
their terms rather than on terms treated as to each other." These are, he writes, "all the
correlatives. The same tendency appears in relations ofthought in judgements."
modern mathematics, in algebra, in the cal- Pointing out that he borrows the term from
culus, and especially in the theory of equations Aristotle, Kant calls the pure concepts of the
and functions, of sets and series. It also appears understanding "categories" and constructs a
in modern physics where, according to Cassirer, table of categories which runs parallel to his
the great conceptual revolution consists in dis- table of judgments; because, as he explains,
placing substance by function, and the casual "the same function which imparts unity to
interaction of substances by functional rela- various representations in one judgement im-
tionships and systems of order. Such substitu- parts unity likewise to the mere synthesis of
tions obviously parallel the shift in logic from various representations in one intuition, which
the consideration of terms related as subjects in a general way may be called the pure con-
and predicates, to the consideration of rela- cept of understanding." Kant's categories, in
tions without regard to differences in the terms contrast to Aristotle's, afford a striking example
related. of the shift from substance to relation.
In the tradition of the great books, this con- Where for Aristotle substance is the primary
ceptual revolution seems to be announced by category and all other categories signify the
the treatment which Hume and Kant accord accidents of substance, among which relation
to the notion of substance. Hume appears to seems to have least reality in the nature of
conceive of experience as a series of events things, Kant makes relation one of the four
related, as he says, by "only three principles of major groups of categories, and under relation
connexion . . .
namely, Resemblance, Contiguity places subsistence and inherence (or substance
in time or place, and Cause or Effect." These and accident) along with causality and depend-
relations make up the fabric of experience. So ence (or cause and effect) and community (or
long as it consisted in such connections, our reciprocity between the active and the passive).
experience would be the same whether or not Itis not substance, but the relation of substance
there were enduring things or substances. and accident, which is for Kant a transcen-
"Nature has established connexions among dental category.
edge of matters of fact depends upon the asso- relations exist in the very nature of things, as
ciation of ideas, or the relations of resemblance, belonging to their essence, or only exist as
contiguity, and causation among the elements connections between things. In the latter al-
of experience. All other knowledge has for its ternative, there is still the question whether
object those relations between ideas which do relations between things are externally affixed
not connect them causally or place them in a to them or are internally inherent in them
spatial or temporal order. In either case, rela- and affect the natures of the things related.
tions of all sorts, rather than things and their According to the Christian doctrine of the
properties (or substances and their attributes), Trinity, there are real relations in God, each
seem to be the prime constituents of nature really distinct from the others, yet each iden-
and of knowledge. tical with the divine essence. These relations
Kant
presents a fourfold classification of are the persons of the Trinity the relations
judgments according to their quantity, quality, Aquinas "paternity, filiation, spiration and
calls
relation, and modality. Under the head of rela- procession," the relation of the Father and the
tion, he distinguishes the categorical, the Son, and of the Holy Spirit to them both.
hypothetical, and the disjunctive according to "Relation in God," he writes, "is not as an
the following criteria: "a. Relation of the pred- accident in a subject, but is the divine essence
icate to the subject, b. Relation of the cause to itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine
its effect, c. Relation of subdivided knowledge, essence is subsistent. Therefore, as the Godhead
574 THE GREAT IDEAS
is God, so the divine paternity is God the though it be certain we have no clear or distinct
Father, Who a divine person. Therefore, a
is idea of that thing we suppose a support."
divine person signifies a relation as subsisting." The various simple ideas of qualities which,
Since the three persons of the Trinity are of together with the indistinct notion of a sup-
the same essence, the principle of their real porting substratum, constitute the complex
must be found elsewhere. Denying
distinction idea of a particular substance, are, in Locke's
that "there can be discerned between them a theory, compounded, not related. Relation is
of the divine essence,"
real distinction in respect itself acomplex idea, consisting in "the con-
Descartes does not reject the possibility of a sideration and comparing of one idea with
distinction "in respect of their relation to one another." The ideas related may be either sim-
another." Aquinas considers "two principles of ple or complex, but the relations are between
difference among the divine persons . . . origin ideas, not in them certainly not in simple
and relation" but thinks it is "better to say ideas, nor in complex ideas of modes and sub-
that the persons or hypostases are distinguished stances, which are combinations, not relations,
presuppose, but brings about, distinction." tween them which, Locke says, "it gets from
It would seem to follow that, except in God, their comparison one with another. Since . . .
relations are not subsistent. In Aristotle's any whether simple or complex, may be
idea,
theory of corporeal substances, for example, the occasion why the mind thus brings two
the matter and the form which constitute a things together . .
any of our ideas may be
.
physical thing are united, not related. Though the foundation of relation"; but, Locke adds,
matter and form are conceived as really distinct "there must always be in relation two ideas, or
really subsist, then those principles which of the things that are related or that are thus
must be united in order for a thing to subsist compared." The relation is unaffected by the
cannot be really related to one another. things it relates, as they in turn are unaffected
leads the mind to the consideration of another, goods, of means and ends, of duties, of loves.
as it would if the event could not be under- Just as the status of each thing in nature is
stood by us except as intrinsically related or affected by whether the universe is conceived
connected with that other. as a whole of internally related parts or as a set
In the tradition of western thought, the of externally related wholes, so the status of
issue concerning the internality or externality the individual in society is affected by whether
of relations has profound implications for man's the state is conceived as an organic whole or
conception of the order of nature or the struc- merely as a political order formed by the free
ture of the world. The difference, discussed association of individuals.
in chapter on CHANCE, between what
the The consideration of the various types of
William James calls the "block" and the "con- order occurs in other chapters, such as NATURE,
catenated" universe presupposes not only dif- WORLD, SOUL, STATE, GOOD AND EVIL, and
ferent views of causality, but also different BEAUTY. Particular types of relationship are
positions with respect to the internality or ex- also discussed in chapters concerned with the
ternality of relations, as is indicated by James' terms between which such relationships hold
criticism of Hegel and Bradley. the relation of cause and effect in the chapter
The relation of part and whole, and of one on CAUSE; spatial and temporal relationships
part to another in the structure of an organic in the chapters on SPACE and TIME; the rela-
whole, seems to be the prime example of in- tion of species and genus in the chapters on
ternal relationship. Each part is
thought to be EVOLUTION and IDEA; relations of equality and
constituted, both in its being and nature, by inequality in the chapter on QUANTITY; and re-
the being and nature of the whole to which it lations of similarity and dissimilarity in the
belongs and by the other parts which comprise chapter on QUALITY.
that whole. This may be seen in Spinoza's This last type of relationship, more broadly
theory of God or Nature as the one and only conceived as including not merely likeness in
substance, in and through which everything quality, but the sameness or similitude of
else both is and is conceived. All things are things in every sort of respect, is the main con-
locked together in a system of internal relation- sideration of the chapter on SAME AND OTHER.
shipsthe finite parts with one another through The theory of analogy is discussed there also,
the infinite whole which determines each to be for though it is concerned with relation
a pro-
what it is, in itself and in relation to all others. portion being a ratio of ratios the specific
relationship by which relations are themselves
RELATION SEEMS TO BE the principle of order. related in analogies or proportions seems to be
At least it can be said that the various concep- one of similitude (either identity or similarity).
tions of order which appear in the great books Finally, the idea of relation seems to be in-
involve the idea of relation and of different volved in the contrast between the absolute
kinds of relationship. and the relative. Things are said to be con-
The order of the universe or of nature, for sidered absolutely when they are considered in
example, seems to be differently conceived themselves, and relatively when they are con-
according as things are causally related to one sidered with reference to something else. By
another, related as lower and higher species in extension of these meanings, relativism tends
a hierarchy of grades of being, or as the parts to assert that with regard to most things, if not
of one all-embracing whole. In each case, it all,what they are depends on the point of
makes a difference, as we have already ob- view, i.e., their relation to man, to this group
served, whether the relations involved are of men, or even to this man. Absolutism goes to
thought to be real or logical, and internal or the opposite extreme of saying that things are
external to the things related. what they are independently of man's view of
Relation similarly enters into conceptions of them. The opposition of these two tendencies
psychological, political, and moral order the creates familiar issues concerning the true, the
order of the parts of the soul, the order of good, and the beautiful, which are discussed in
classes or functions in the state, the order of the chapters devoted to those subjects.'
576 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1 . The general theory of relation 577
i a. The nature and being of relations: the distinction between real and logical or
ideal relations
ib. The effect of relations on the nature and being of things: internal and external
relations
2. Order and relation in God : the divine processions and the relations constituting the
Trinity of persons
3. The relation of God to the world: divine immanence and transcendence 579
4.
Relation in the order of thought or knowledge
4</.
Relations as objects of knowledge: ideas of relation
^f.
The types of relationship underlying the association of ideas in thought, memory,
and dreams
50. The nature and typesof order: inclusion and exclusion; succession and coexistence;
priority, posteriority, and simultaneity
6a. Absolute and relative with respect to space, time, motion 585
63. Absolute and relative with respect to truth
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMLS Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
a -b
xiv, CH i [io88 I5 4 ] 620b-d
lb - The effect of relations on the nature and
9 ARISTOTLE: BK CH 6 bein of thin S s: internal and external
Ethics, i, [1096*17-29]
341 b-c relations
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR i, CH 6-9 254d- 7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 521d-522b
a
257a 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [8 i2-b 24]
19 AQUINAS S#wm0 Theologica, PARTI, q6, A 2, 13a-d / Physics, CH 2
BK b
: v, [225 n-i3J
REP i 28d-29c; Q 13, A 7 68d-70d; Q 28, AA 305d / Metaphysics, BK xi, CH 12 [1068*10-
a b
1-2 157c-160a; A 4, ANS and REP 1,3-4 160c- ^1 596d-597a; BK xiv, CH i [io88 i5- 4]
161d; Q 40, A 2, REP 4 214b-215b; Q 42, 620b-d
A i, REP 4 224b-225d; Q 45, A 3, REP 1-3 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13,
244a-d A 7 68d-70d; Q 28, AA 1-2 157c-160a; Q 30,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49, A i, REP 3 167a-168a; Q 40, A 2, REP 3-4 214b-
A i, ANS lb-2b; PART in, Q 2, A 7, REP 2 215b; Q 44, A i, REP i 238b-239a; Q 45, A 3
718b-d 244a-d
578 THE GREAT IDEAS \cto2
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i
The general theory of relation. Ib. The
[486*15-487*1] 7b-d; BK vni, CH i [588*18-
(1, effect
of relations on the nature and being of b Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 4 167d-
5) 114b,d /
things: internal and external relations.) b
168c; CH 5 [645 i-33] 169b-d / Generation of
b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologies PART HI, Q 2, Animals, BK i, CH i [7i5 i7~26] 255d; BK in,
A 7, REP 2 718b-d; PART HI SUPPL, Q 79, A 2, CH 10 [760*9-17] 301b / Ethics, BK i, CH 6
b
REP 2 953b-955c [i096 27-29] 342a; BK v, CH 3-5 378c-381d
b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, AXIOM 5 355d; passim; BK vm, CH 7 [ii58 2o-33] 410d /
b
PROP 2-3 355d-356a Politics, BK v, CH i [i30i 29~36] 503a /
b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK H, CH xxv, Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [i357 25-i358*2] 597c-d;
SECT 4-5 215c-d; BK iv, CH vi, SECT n 334b- BK H, CH 20 [1393*22-1394*8] 640d-641d;
3355 BK in, CH 4 657b-d; CH 10 662c-663d; CH n
b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-101b [I4i2 33~i4i3*i3] 665c-d / Poetics, CH 21
b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 74 [i457 6-33] 693a-c
31d / Philosophy of History, PART i, 220c 11 EUCLID: Elements,BK v 81a-98b esp DEFINI-
53 JAMES: Psychology, 142a-b; 458a-459b; 550b- TIONS, 3-6 81a; BK
vii, DEFINITIONS, 20 127b
551b [fn 2); 640b [fn ij; 644b-645a; 660a-b; 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 841c-d
669a 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1078b-
1080a
Ic. The coexistence of correlatives 19 AQUINAS: Summa PART i, Q 4, A 3
Theologica,
7 PLATO: Charmides, 8d-9d / Gorgias, 267c- 22b-23b; Q 5, A
REP 3 27c-28b; Q 12, A i,
6,
268a / Republic, BK iv, 3Slb-352b / Theaete- REP 4 50c-51c; Q 13, AA 5-6 66b-68c; A 10 72c-
tus, 520a-b; 521b-522b 73c; Q 14, A 3, REP 2 77d-78b; Q 16, A 6, ANS
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [6b26-8 a i2] llb- 98b-d; Q 33, A 3, ANS 182c-183c; Q 44, A 3,
b ANS 240b-241a; Q 54, A 3, ANS and REP 2
13a; CH 10 [n 23-33l 17a / Topics, BK v, CH 6
b
[i35 i7-26] 187b-c; BK vi, CH 4 [142*22-33] 286c-287b; Q 66, A 2, ANS 345d-347b; Q 93,
195c-d A i, REP 3 492a-d; PART i-n, Q 20, A 3, REP 3
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK n, CH 19 [i392b3-4] 713c-714c; Q 27, A 3, REP 2 738c-739c
640a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 61,
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 4 169a A i, REP i 54d-55c; PART HI, Q 60, A i, ANS
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR i, CH 7, 255d- 847b-848a; PART HI SUPPL, Q 69, A i, REP 2
256a 885c-886c; Q 92, A i, REP 6 1025c-1032b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i,
A 7, REP 6 68d-70d; Q 40, A 2, REP 4 214b- 12d-13b
215b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 336b-d;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxv, 449a-b; 469d-470d
SECT 2 215b-c; SECT 5 215d 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK H, APH 27 157b-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 83b-84d 158d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 72 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 158b-
31c; par 74 31d 161d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
Id. Relational unity or identity of relation: the
XXVIH, SECT i 228c
notion and use of analogy or propor- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix, DIV
tionality 82 487b-c
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 267c-268a / Timaeus, 448b-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-74b / Judgement,
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 10 601d-603a
b
[76*36- 2] 105a; BK n, CH 14 [98*20-23] 134a; 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 212cf-213c
CH 17 [99*1-16] 135a-b / Topics, BK i, CH 17 53 JAMES: Psychology, 688a-689b passim
[108*6-14] 152b; BK iv, CH 4 [124*15-20] 172d;
BK CH 7 b CH 8 [i38 b 2. Order and relation in God: the divine pro-
v, [i36 33-i 37*20] 189a-c;
cessions and the relations constituting
23-27] 191b-c / Physics, BK i, CH 7 [191*8-12]
the Trinity of persons
266d; BK vn, CH 4 [249*22-24] 332b / Genera-
tion and Corruption, BK n, CH 6 [333*27-34] 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK x, CH 24 312d-
434a / Meteorology, BK iv, CH 9 [387^1-6] 313c; BK xi, CH 10 327d-328d
491c / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 6 [ioi6b32-ioi7* 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3 14a-
3] 537c; CH 9 [1018*12-13] 538d; BK vn, CH n 20c; Q n, AA 3-4 49a-50b; Q 28 157c-161d;
[1037*5-9] 560c; BK ix, CH i [1046*4-8] 570d- Q 29, A 4 165c-167a; QQ 30-40 167a-217c
571a; CH 6 [1048*31^8] 573d-574a; BK XH, passim; Q 41, A 5 222b-223b; Q 42 224a-
CH 4-5 599d-601a passim / Soul, BK HI, CH 7 230a
b
[43i*20- i] 663d-664a; CH 8 [43 1^0-432*2] 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxiv [127-
664b-c 147] 144a; XXXIH [76-145] 157a-d
CHAPTER 78: RELATION 579
22 CHAUCER: Second Nun's Tale [15,794-809] SCHOL 362c-363c, PROP 24-30 365a-366d,
467a-b PROP 33, SCHOL 1-2 367c-369a; PART n,
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 97c; PART in, PROP i-u 373d-377c
207b; 207d-208c; PART iv, 259d 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [334-346] 306b
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, v 93a-96a / Objec- 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL,
tions and Replies, POSTULATE v 131 b-c; 159b- 370a-371a
161d; 217d-218b; 232b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xin,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DBF i 355a; DBF 3-6 SECT 18 152a-c; CH xv, SECT 12 165b-c
355b; DBF 8, EXPL 355c; PROP 7 356c; PROP 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 149-150
10-11 358a-359b; PROP 15, DEMONST 360a; 442d-443b; SECT 155 444b-c
PROP 17, SCHOL 362c-363c; PROP 20 363d- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV
364a; PROP 23 364d-365a; PROP 29, SCHOL 56 475a-b
366b-c; PROP 32, COROL 2 367b; PROP 33, 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 192c-d / Practical Rea-
SCHOL 2 367d-369a son, 334b-335b / Judgement, 566c-d; 580c-d;
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [56-415] 136b- 592a-c
144b esp [315-341] 142a-b, [383-389] 143b- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 220c-
144a; BK v [600-^615] 188b; BK xn [469-551] 221a; 224a-b; 246c-247a; PART in, 306a-c;
329b-331a PART iv, 322a-c; 349b-350a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307b; 310b-313b
4. Relation in the order of thought or knowl-
esp 310b-311d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 422a-c; 521c edge
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in,
306a-c 4a. The definability or indefinability of relative
terms
3. The relation of God to the world: divine 7 PLATO: Philebus, 615c-616c
immanence and transcendence 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [6B36~7b i4] lla-
a b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 2-3 lb-2a; 12b; [8 i2- 24] 13a-d / Topics, BK iv, CH
BK HI, par 10 15b-d; BK iv, par 26 25c-d; i
b
[i20 36-i2i*6] 168d; CH 4 [i24b i5-34]
a b
par 31 26c-27a; BK vi, par 4 36a-b; BK vn, 173c-d; [i25 i4- i4] 174a-c;BK vi, CH 4
b a
par 1-2 43b-44a; par 7 45a-d; par 17 49a; par [142*22-33] 195c-d; CH 5 [i42 30-i43 i2]
a b
21 49d-50a; BK x, par 8-10 73b-74a; BK xn, 196b-c; CH 6 [i45 i2- 2o] 198d-199b; CH 8
a
par 7 lOOd-lOla; par 21 103d-104a / City 200b-201a; CH 9 [i47 23~32] 201b; CH 12
of God, BK vn, CH 6, 248a; CH 30 261b-d; [149^-23] 203d-204a / Sophistical Refuta-
BK xn, CH 2 343c-d; CH 17 353a-354a; CH tions, CH 13 238d-239a; CH 31 250c-d
25 358b-359a; BK xix, CH 13 519a-520a / 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 44,
Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 12 627c-d; CH 32 A i, REP i 238b-239a
633c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 8 4b. The proposition or judgment as a state-
ment of relation: relation in reasoning
19d-20c; Q 6, A 2, REP i 28d-29c; Q 8 34c-38c;
Q A 7 68d-70d; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 26,
13, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH i,
A REP 3 157c-158d; A 4, ANS 160c-161d;
i, SECT 1-7 307a-308a esp SECT 7 307d-308a; CH
44, A i, REP i 238b-239a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2
Q xn, SECT 6-8 360a-c
242d-244a; A 3 244a-d; Q 51, A 3, REP 3 277a- 35 HUME Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 20
:
SECT 1-7 337a-338c esp SECT 2 337a; CH xi, CH [1252*17-24] 445b; CH 5 [1254*29-33]
i
b
SECT 13-14 357d-358c esp SECT 13, 358a; CH 447d-448a; BK in, en i [i275*35- 2] 472b
xii, SECT 6-8 360a-c 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 813a-d
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 89, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xii, par 40
430c 109b-110a / City of God, BK xix, CH 13,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 20 519b
458a-b; DIV 30, 462a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-45b esp 42c; 43d~44c; ANS 14b-15b; A 6, ANS and REP 2 18c-19a; Q 12,
61a-64a esp 62d-63c; 99a-108a,c; 119b A 10 59a-d; Q 16, A 4 97a-c; Q 45, A 3, REP 3
53 JAMES: Psychology, 167b-176a esp 168a, 174b- 244a-d; Q 66, A 4, REP 4 348d-349d; Q 94, A 3,
176a; 300b-301b [fn i]; 319b-320a; 867a-879b ANS 504a-505a
esp 868b-869a, 874a, 878a 879b; 889a-b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49,
A 2, ANS 2b-4a; Q 50, A 2, REP 3 7c-8a; Q no,
4f. The types of relationship underlying the A 4, REP 4 350d-351d
association of ideas in thought, memory, 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390c; 445c;
and dreams 447a-b
8 ARISTOTLE :
Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-b
b b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP i 355d
[4 5 i 7-452 6] 692d-694b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xiv,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 18 381 d- SECT 1-12 155b-157c passim, esp SECT 3-4
382b 155c-156a, SECT 6 156b-c, SECT 12 157b-c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV
xxxin 248b-251d esp SECT 5-18 248d-251c 41-43 467d-468d
5*0) CHAPTER 78: RELATION 581
53 JAMES: Psychology, 319b-322a passim, csp REP 3 538d-539c; A 5, ANS and REP 3 542a-
319b; 346a-b; 399a-b; 547a-549a csp 547b 543b; Q 112, A i, ANS 571d-573a; Q 114, A 3,
[fn i], 548b-549a; 571b-573a; 631b
ANS 583b-d; Q 115, AA 1-2 585d-588c; Q 118,
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 779c A 2, REP 3 601c-603b; PART I-H, Q i, A 2, ANS
610b-611b; Q 46, A i, ANS 813b-814a
5a(l) The order of the causes or of cause and 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theelogica, PART i-n, Q 66,
effect A 6, REP 3 80c-81b; Q 112, A i, REP 1-3 356c-
7 PLATO: Lysis, 24b / Phaedrus, 124b-c / 357b; PART H-II, Q i, A 7, REP 3 385c-387a;
Euthyphro, 195c-d / Gorgias, 267c-268a / PART III, Q 6, A 5, ANS 744a-d| Q 7, A I, REP 3
Timaeus, 455a-b; 465d-466a / Theaetetus, 745d-746c; A 7, REP i 750a-d; Q 18, A i, REP 2
521d-522b / Philebus, 617b-c / Laws, BK x, 810a-811c; Q 19, A i, ANS and REP 2 816a-818b;
762b-763b Q 62, A i 858c-859d; A 5, ANS 862b-863a;
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 12 [i4 io-22] 20b Q 64, A 5 874a-d; A 8, REP i 876c-877c; PART
b a in SUPPL, Q 70, A 3, ANS 897d-900d; Q 74, A 3,
/ Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 2 [7i 33~72 6]
98b-c; BK n, CH 12 129d-131b; CH 16-18 134b- REP 2 927c-928d; Q 76, A i, REP i 939d-941a;
136a / Physics, BK n, CH 6 [198*5-13] 275a; A 2 941b-942b; Q 80, A i, REP i 956c-957c
en 8-9 275d-278a,c; BK in, CH 2 [202*2-12] 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, n [112-
279c; BK vn, CH 1-2 326a-329a; BK vm 334a- 148] 109a*b
355d / Heavens, BK i, CH 7 [275 a i-b i2] 366a-d; 22 CHAUCER: Tale ofMelibeus, par 37 41 7b
b 23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 78c-d; 79d-
[275 i8-29] 366d-367a / Generation and Cor-
ruption, BK i, CH 7 421d-423b / Metaphysics, 80a
BK CH i [993 b 2}]-cH 2 [994 b 3i] 512a-513b;
ii, 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
v, CH 2 533b-534c; BK xi, CH 8 [1065*2-4]
BK 135c-136b
593d; BK xii, CH 3 [1070*21-24] 599c; CH 4 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390c-d;
b
[io7o 22-35] 600b; CH 5 [1071*35-36] 601a; 416b-c; 426a-429b; 442c-443c; 445c; 447a-b
CH 6-8 601b-605a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 52a-d /
9 ARISTOTLL: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i [639b Meditations, in 81d-89a csp 84b-85a, 87b 88c
11-642*24] 161d-165b esp [639^1-31] 161d- / Objections and Replies, 110a-112a esp llld-
b AXIOM i-v
162a; BK n, CH i [646 25~ io] 170b-c / Mo- 112a; 120c-123a; DBF ni-iv 130b;
ft
(5a. The nature and types of order: inclusion and 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX 369b-
exclusion; succession and coexistence; priori- 372d; PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a; APPENDIX,
ty, posteriority, and simultaneity?) v447c
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 94a-97a / Penstes,
5(2) The order of goods or of means and 505 261a-b; 793 326b-327a
ends: the order of loves 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi,
OLD TESTAMENT: / Kings, 3 15-1 4 (D) III Kings, SECT 52-53 191d-192b; SECT 55-56 192c-193b;
3 5-'4
: SECT 62 194c-d; SECT 72 198a-c
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 13:44-46 / Philip- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 235a-b; 238c-239a /
plans, 3:7-16 Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-b;
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 6c-8a 257c-d; 266a-267d; 268b; 271d-279d /
7 PLATO: Lysis, 23a-c / Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Practical Reason, 316a-317d; 327d-329a /
502d; CH 6 505b-506b;
5a(4) The order of kinds: hierarchy; species CH 9 508c-511c; BK VHI, CH 3
and genus
n] 568b-c; BK xi, CH 8 [i 065^-4] 593d; BK
7 PLATO: Statesman, 582d-583c; 594a-595a xn, CH 6-8 601b-605a; CH 10 [1075*12-24!
b b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [2 6~3*5] 6c-7b; 605d-606a; BK xiv, CH 3 [i09o i4~2i] 623b
CH 13 [i4b 32-i5 a i2] 20c-d / Topics, BK iv, CH / Soul, BK n, CH 2 [413*20^4] 643b-c; BK in,
b CHI i I433 b 3 2 -434 a9l 666d
2 [123*13-19] 171c; BK vi, CH 4 [i4i i5~34]
195a-b; CH 5 196b-d / Physics, BK iv, CH 3 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH r
a
[2io i7-i9]289a / Metaphysics, BK v, CH 25 114b,d-115b / Parts of Animals, BK i, CH r
b
545b-c; BK vn, CH 10-11 558a-561a; BK VHI, [64^13-29] 164c-d; CH 5 [644 22-645*26]
CH 6 569d-570d; BK x, CH 8-9 585b-586c 168c-169a; BK iv, CH 5 [681*12-14] 211d; CH
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH i 10 [686b23~35] 218b-c / Generation ofAnimals,
b
114d-115a / Parts of Animals, BK i,
fcSSV 1 ?! BK n, CH i 272a-b / Politics, BK i,
[73i 24~33]
CH 2-4 165d-168c CH 5 [1254*24-35]447d-448a; BK vn, CH 4
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 813a-b [1326*29-35] 530b-c
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 2 142a- 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [418-448]
143b 6b-c; BK n [167-183] 17a-b; [294-307] 18d-
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 5,
: 19a; [569-580] 22b; [865-930] 26a-d; [1023-
ANS 17c-18b; A 6, REP 2 18c-19a; Q 13, A 7, 1174] 28a-30a,c; BK v [146-234] 63a-64a;
ANS 68d-70d; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 28, [783-836] 71b-72a
A i, ANS 157c-158d; Q 29, A 2, REP 4 163b- 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 8, 146a-b;
164b; Q 30, A 4, ANS 170c-171b; Q 47, A 2, ANS BK iv, CH 7, 234b
257b-258c; Q 50, A 2, REP i 270a-272a; A 4 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 9 257d;
273b-274b; Q 66, A 2, REP 2 345d-347b; BK iv, SECT 3-4 263b-264a; SECT 40 267a-b;
Q 75, A 7 384d-385c; Q 76, A 3, ANS and REP SECT 45-46 267b-c; BK v, SECT 8 269d-270b;
4 391a-393a; Q 77, A i, REP i 399c-401b;
SECT 16 271c-d; SECT 30 273a; BK vi, SECT i
A 4, REP i 403a-d; Q 85, A 3, ANS 455b-457a; 274a; SECT 9 274b; SECT n
274c; SECT 36
A 4, ANS 457a-d; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-472c; 277c; SECT 38 277c-d; SECT 40-44 277d-278c;
PART I-H, Q 18, A 7, REP 3 698c-699c; Q 23, BK vn, SECT n 280c; SECT 75 285c; BK vin,
A i, ANS 723c-724c; Q 35, A 4, ANS 774d-775d; SECT 26-27 287c; BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d; BK x,
A 8, ANS and REP 3 779c-780c SECT 6 297a-b; BK xi, SECT 18, 304b-c
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 54,
: 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1023b-
A i, REP i 22d-23d; Q 61, A i, REP i 54d-55c; 1080b
Q 72, A 7, ANS 117a-118a; PART in, Q 2, A i, 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR in, CH 7 44c-
ANS 710a-711c 45a; CH 13 46c-47b; CH 18 49c-50a / Fourth
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH in, Ennead, TR iv, CH 10 163a-c; TR ix 205a-
SECT 6-9 255c-256c; CH vi, SECT 32 277c- 207a,c / Fifth Ennead, TR n 214c-215c; TR ix,
278b; SECT 36-41 279a-280b CH 12-14 251a-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 16-23
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 193a-200c esp 196b-198d 48c-50c / City of God, BK xi, CH 22 333d-
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 30d-31b; 64a; 334c; BK xn, CH 2-5 343c-345b; BK xix, CH
207a-208a; 210b-211b; 238b-c; 241d-242a 11-17 516d-523a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 870b-871a 19 AQUINAS: Summa
Theologica, PART i, Q 2, A 3
12c-14a; A i, ANS 14b-15b; A 2, ANS 15c-
Q 3,
5b. The order of the universe or of nature: the
16a; Q 5, A 5, ANS 26c-27c; Q n, A 3, ANS 49a-c;
hierarchy of beings Q 13, A 7, ANS 68d-70d; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 11:20 (D) 107c; Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c; A 8 116a-d;
OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 11:21 Q 21, A i, REP 3 124b-125b; Q 23, A 5, REP 3
5 EURIPIDES: Phoenician Maidens [528-548] 135d-137d; A 7, ANS 138d-140a; Q 42, A i, REP
382c-d 1-2 224b-225d; A 3 227a-d; Q 47 256a-259a;
5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [685-703] S51b-c Q 48, A i, REP 5 259b-260c; A 2, ANS and REP
7 PLATO: Symposium, 155d-157a / Gorgias, 3 260c-261b; Q 50, A i, ANS and REP z 269b-
284a-285a / Timaeus, 446d-477a,c / Philebus, 270a; A 2, REP i 270a-272a; A 4 273b-274b;
618b-619d Q 57, A r, ANS 295a-d; Q 61, AA 3-4 316a-
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 13 [23*18-26] 317c; QQ 65-74 339a-377a,c; Q 75, A i, REP i
35b-c / Physics, BK n, CH 8-9 275d-278a,c; 378b-379c; A 7 384d-385c; Q 76, A i, ANS
BK VHI, CH i [252*5-23] 335d-336a / Heavens, 385d-388c; A 3, ANS 391a-393a; A 6, REP 1-2
BK i, CH 2 359d-360d; BK n, CH 9-10 382b- 396a-d; Q 77, A 2 401b-d; A 4, REP i 403a-d;
b
383a; CH12 383b-384c; BK in, CH 2 [30o i6- Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-472c; QQ 103-119 528a-
301*20] 392a-c / Generation and Corruption 608d; PART i-n, Q i, A 4, REP i 612a-613a; A 8
BK n, CH 3-5 430c-433d; CH 9-11 436d- 615a-c; Q 2, A 5, REP 2-3 618d-619c; Q 22, A 2,
441a,c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 3 REP i 721c-722c
584 THE GREAT IDEAS 54/06
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 55b 62a; 63d-
(5. Order as a system of relationships or related 64d; 96b-98a,c esp 96b-c; 179b-180d; 228c-
things. 56. The order of the universe or of
229a,c; 238b-239a; 241 be; 243b d / Descent
nature', the hierarchy of beings.)
of Man, 340d-341d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologies PART i-n, Q 52, 53> JAMES:
JAM Psychology, 95b-98a; 314a; 571b-572a;
A i, ANS 15d-18a; PART n-ii, Q 2, A 3, ANS and 641a-643a; 862b-863b [fn 2]; 873a-b; 882a-
REP i 392d-393c; Q 23, A 3, REP 3 485a-d; 886a; 889a-890a
Q 26, A i, REP 2 SlOc-Slla; PART in SUPPL, Q 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 779c
91 1016a-1025b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, i [103-142]
5c. Order as a principle of beauty
107b-d; ii [46-148] 108b-109b; x [1-27] 7 PLATO: Republic, BK in, 333b-334b; BK iv,
120b-c; xiii [52-87] 126a-b; xxvn [97-120] 342b-c / Timaeus, 474d-475a / Statesman,
148b-c; XXVIH 148d-150b; xxix [13-36] 594a-c / Philebus, 637d
150b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [246*io-b i9]
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK in, STANZA 329c-330a / Metaphysics, BK i CH 3 [984b 8-
b
1-7 54b-55b; STANZA 250-253 87a-b / Knight's 22] 502d; BK xin, CH 3 [io78*39- 5] 610a
Tale [2987-3016] 209a-b 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 5
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 78d-79a [645*4-26] 168d-169a / Politics, BK v, CH 9
26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT i, sc HI [1309^3-30] 512a; BK vn, CH 4 [1326*29-35]
[62-7i]573b 530b-c / Poetics, CH 7 685b-c
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT i, 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 814a; 826d-
sc in [75-139] 108d-109c 827a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 400d 401a; 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 868b
426b 429b passim, esp 426d-427a, 428a-c; 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vi, CH i, 21c-d /
470a Sixth Ennead, TR vn, CH 22 332d-333b
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 17 149b- 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 20 24b-c
d; APH 27 157b-158d; APH 29-30 159b-d; APH / City of God, BK n, CH 21, 161 b-c; BK xvn,
48 179d-188b CH 14,464d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 54c-56a / 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A 4,
Meditations, iv, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, REP i 25d-26c; Q 96, A 3, REP 3 512a-c
139b c; 215a-b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 29 366b-c; PROP 49, A 2, REP i 2b*4a; Q 54, A i, ANS 22d-23d
33 367b-369a; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART n, 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, en xn,
PROP 6-7 374d-375c; PART in, 395a-d; PROP 2 SECT 5 148a-b
396c-398b; PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a; PROP 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345d-346a
2 42 5a; PROP 4 425b-d 42 KANT: Judgement, 488a-489a; 544c-545b;
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [397-505] 184a- 557c-558b
186a; BK vin [1-178] 232a-236a; [314-356] 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 301d-302a
239a-240a; BK ix [99-113] 249 b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 755a; 865b
33 PASCAL: Pense*es, 119-121 195a
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in 269a-372a 6. The absolute and the relative modes of con-
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix, sideration
SECT 12 140c; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11-12 271b- 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 242c-244b
b
272b; BK iv, CH in, SECT 27 321d-322a; CH 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5 n-29] lOa-b /
vi, SECT n 334b-335b; CH xvi, SECT 12,
b
Topics, BK n, CH ii [ii5 3-35] 161c-162a,c;
370c-371a BK v, CH i 178b,d-179b; BK vi, CH 4 [i4i b 3~
B
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 29-33 142*16] 194d-195c; CH 8 [i 46^6-1 47 ii] 200d-
418c-419a passim; SECT 146-153 442a-444a 201a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 5 [i66b 37-
passim 167*20] 229d-230a; CH 8 [170*12-19] 234a; CH
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 44 25 248b-249b / Physics, BK i, CH i [184*16-21]
468d-469c; SECT vin, DIV 79-80 486b-d 259a / Heavens, BK in, CH 5 [303 b i3-304*7J
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, la-2b 394d-395b / Metaphysics, BK v, CH n 539c-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 93c-99a; 133a-c; 187c- 540a; BK x, CH 6 583d-584c
189a; 199c-200c; 220a-b; 237b / Fund. Prin. 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A i,
Metaphysic of Morals, 2S6d-257a; 264d-265a REP i 23c-24a; Q 7, A 2 31d-32c; Q ii, A i, REP
/ Practical Reason, 292a-d; 301d-302d; 307d- 2 46d-47d; A 2, REP 1,3-4 47d-48d; Q 13, A 2
314d / Judgement, 467a-470c csp 467d-468c; 63c-64d; AH, REP 2 73c-74b; Q 30, A i, REP
578d-580a csp 579b-c 2-4 167a-168a; Q 70, A 3, REP 2 365b-367a;
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 173b Q 93, A 3, ANS 493d-494c; PART i-n, Q 2, A 5,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 168 REP 2 618d-619c; Q 6, A 6, ANS and REP 2
145c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160b- 649a-650a; Q 17, A 4 688d<689c; Q 22, A I,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The conception of identity as a logical rather than a real relation, see SAME and OTHER i, 2d;
and for the conception of the relation between creatures and God as partly real and partly
logical, see GOD 5e; ONE AND MANY ib; WORLD 3b.
Another consideration of correlative terms, see OPPOSITION la.
The theory of proportionality or analogical similitude, see SAME AND OTHER 30; and for the
applications of analogy and proportion in metaphysics and mathematics, see IDEA 40(4);
MATHEMATICS 40; QUANTITY ib; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d, 5f.
Other discussions of indefinable terms, see DEFINITION ic; PRINCIPLE 23(3).
The issues raisedby a relational theory of judgment and reasoning, see IDEA 5b; JUDGMENT
5c, 6d, yc; REASONING 2.
Discussions relevant to the conception of the categories as the transcendental concepts of the
understanding, see FORM ic; JUDGMENT 8c-8d; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 60(2); MIND
4d(3); PRINCIPLE 2^3).
The consideration of the relations between ideas as objects of knowledge, see IDEA la;
KNOWLEDGE 63(3).
Other discussions of the association of ideas, see IDEA 56; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 2C.
Another discussion of the prior, the posterior, and the simultaneous, see TIME 5d.
The order of causes, see CAUSE ib.
The order of goods, or of means and ends, see GOOD AND EVIL 5b~5c.
The relation of quantities and the relation of qualities, see QUALITY 4c; QUANTITY ib;
SAME AND OTHER 3c~3d.
The order of kinds, see ANIMAL 2a; EVOLUTION ib; IDEA 4X3); OPPOSITION icfa); SAME
AND OTHER 3a(i)~3a(3); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 50.
Order in the soul, in the state, and in the universe or nature, see MAN 5~5a; NATURE 3a~3b;
ONE AND MANY 3b(5); SOUL 2b; STATE 5a~5c, 6a-6b; WORLD la-ic, 6a-6c.
CHAPTER 78: RELATION 587
For: The doctrine of the Trinity as concerned with order and relation in God, see GOD pa.
The absolute and the relative in space, time, and motion, .^CHANGE 7c(3); SPACE 2a;TiME i.
The absolute and the relative in truth, goodness, and beauty, see BEAUTY 5; CUSTOM AND
CONVENTION 9a-pb; GOOD AND EVIL 6d; OPINION 3c, 6a; PRINCIPLE 5; TRUTH
UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 73-70.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
ARGUMENT is
unprofitable worse than is God's gift rather than man's own will to be-
tence and the philosopher or scientist who ap- Many consequences follow from this unargu-
peals to it, no common ground exists. Between able difference concerning the meaning of reli-
the man who obeys the rule not to contradict gion. Religion to the man of faith usually means
himself and the man who finds nothing repug- much more than the acceptance of a creed. It
nant in answering Yes and No to the same ques- means and worship, recourse to
acts of piety
tion, there can be no argument. There is an prayer, the partaking of sacraments, the ob-
issue between them, but the position each takes servance of certain rituals, the performance of
reduces the other to silence. sacrifices and purifications. It means rendering
Lack of a common measure for judging op- to God what is His due, obeying His command-
posed views tends to render them incommu- ments, beseeching and gaining the help of His
nicable to one another. For men to be in this grace,whereby to lead a life which shall seem
plight is the exception in science and philos- worthy to Him. When religion is conceived
o'phy, but it seems to be the typical situation asnothing more than a set of beliefs which men
where the basic issues of religion are concerned. have adopted, it is restricted to one part of life.
Of all subjects the most controversial, religious It may or may not involve action as well as
issues seem to be the least capable of being thought, but it is not the fabric of a whole life.
settled by controversy. No divisions among It docs not qualify every other part of it. It does
men certainly not those which separate phi- not demand that inner devotion and external
losophers or scientists are as unbridgeable as conduct constitute the practice of a man's belief
the chasm between the faithful and those they if he is to avoid hypocrisy.
call infidels, between Jew and gentile, or Chris-
tian and pagan. Faith and lack of faith, or the ACCORDING TO THIS difference in the concep-
diversity of faiths, seem to render certain ques- tion of religion as supernatural or natural, men
tions as imponderable as they are weighty. seem to hold incommunicably different views
On the definition of religion itself, the deep- of religiousbelief, of revelation, miracles, and
est issue lies between those who conceive it as prophecies.But those who agree that religion is
having a supernatural foundation in God's rev- not man-made, that it requires, in some form,
elation and authority, and those who think of divine authority and inspiration, do not all
religion as having a purely natural origin in have the same faith, worship in the same way,
certain human tendencies, which makes it no or conform to the same rites. The issue, there-
different from philosophy and science as an ele- fore, between men of different faiths men
ment of culture. But religion can be supernat- who according to the rules of different reli-
live
ural only for those whose faith declares it to be gious communities is almost as difficult as that
so. Those who deny that
it is supernatural
may between the religious and the irreligious.
many reasons for thinking so, and try in
offer In the western tradition, the plurality of re-
many ways to explain away faith. What they all ligions necessarily raises a question of truth and
come to is that it is an illusion to suppose faith falsity for any religionist whose faith excludes
588
CHAPTER 79: RELIGION 589
the possibility of several equally true religions. even in some cases to the community or culture
"Idolatrous" and "superstitious," "heretical" in which the opinion arises. It is not as neces-
and "schismatic," are epithets which draw their sary, for example, to know whether
the man
tians," he says, "bestowed it on their mortal gious and what religion he espouses.
enemies, the Mahometans." The Mohammed- The distinction between sacred and profane,
ans, in turn, held the view, according to Gib- and between religious and secular, applies to
bon, that "all except themselves deserved the books as well as to other things. In the tradition
reproach of idolatry and polytheism." The of the great books, only one book is set apart as
charges of idolatry and superstition occur also sacred. None of the writers included in this set
in the conflictbetween Jew and Christian, be- regard the Koran as sacred scripture, though
tween Protestant and Catholic, countered often Gibbon an historian reports the Mohammed-
as
by charges of infidelity or heresy and schism. an belief in the Koran. Mohammedans believe
Quite apart from the general problem of that the Koran is the word of God revealed to
church and state, with its issues of political tol- His one and only prophet, as Jews believe that
eration and freedom of worship, the very mean- the Old Testament is
divinely inspired writing,
ing of religion raises the question of tolerance in and Christians believe in both Testaments as
its most acute form. It is not a question of politi- Holy Writ.
cal rights and liberties, but of being right or But though the Bible is the traditionally sa-
wrong in one's religious beliefs and acts. To the cred book of the west, it is not read as such by
extent that the communicants of one religion all who write about it. The historian or the
regard themselves as believing what God has philosopher who is not himself a religious Jew
revealed to them, and to the extent that they or Christian may acknowledge the belief of
hold their religious practices to be prescribed others without sharing it. He reads the Bible as
by divine law, they are not free in conscience, a collection of human writings which have exer-
it seems, to entertain contrary beliefs and prac- cised an unparalleled influence upon western
tices as conceivably true alternatives. culture.Whatever the merit of these writings
The conflict between men of diverse faiths, as wisdom, history, preachment, or poetry,
alike in their understanding of faith as divinely they do not command a special kind of reading
inspired, somehow appeals beyond any human unless they are distinguished from all others by
God himself for judgment. The con-
decision to being the word of God, not man. Controversies
troversy between men of any religious faith over interpretations of the Bible may thus be-
and those who treat such faith as a purely hu- gin with each side begging the main question in
man prejudice seems to be even less susceptible issue. Is the Bible sacred scripture, or is it no
of resolution by the ordinary processes of dis- different in kind from the poetry of Homer and
the sayings of the Greek wise men ?
The two ways of reading the Bible are in-
IF THESE OBSERVATIONS are accurate and just, commensurable. If the Bible is not sacred, a
the materials of this chapter cannot be assem- critical reading may be expected to disclose in-
bled dialectically either as opposed views or consistencies in it, and many of the things it
as belonging together simply by reference to says may be questioned in fact or in principle.
the content of the various opinions which can But if, though humanly recorded, it is the re-
be found in the great books. In this chapter, as pository of divine revelation, then it has an au-
in no others except, perhaps, those which treat thority which puts it above questioning, though
of matters connected with religion- such as not beyond the need for interpretation.
GOD, IMMORTALITY, SIN, and THEOLOGY -it There is one sort of proposition, says Locke,
seems necessary to pay some attention to the which challenges "the highest degree of our
opinion's author as well as to the opinion, and assent upon bare testimony, whether the thing
590 THE GREAT IDEAS
proposed agree or disagree with common expe- material object, so to speak," and "that where-
rience, and the ordinary course of things, or no. by it is known, which is the formal aspect of the
The reason whereof is, because the testimony is object. Thus, in the science of geometry, the
of such a one as cannot deceive, nor be deceived, conclusions are what is known materially, while
and that is of God himself. This carries with it the formal aspect of the science consists in the
an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond means of demonstration, through which the
exception. This is called by a peculiar name, conclusions are known. Accordingly, if in faith
revelation; and our assent to it, faith: which as we consider the formal aspect of the object, it is
absolutely determines our minds, and as per- nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith
fectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge of which we are speaking does not assent to any-
and we may as well doubt of our own be-
itself; thing, except because it is revealed by God."
ing, as we can whether any revelation from The of religious faith may be drawn
articles
God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure from the content of Holy Writ, but that Holy
principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no Writ is the revealed truth of God must first be
manner of room for doubt or hesitation. Only accepted by an act of faith. Aquinas seems to be
we must be sure that it be a divine revelation, meeting Locke's point by saying that it is faith
and that we understand it right." itself which makes us sure that the propositions
Locke seems to be putting two qualifications to which we assent by faith are the matter of di-
concerns our assurance that we are not mistak- ON LOCKE'S OTHER point concerning the right-
en in accepting something as revealed. The sec- ness of our interpretation of Scripture, Locke
ond concerns the correctness of our under- himself remarks that "though everything said
standing of that which we take to be God's in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader
word. may be, nay, cannot choose but be, very fallible
On the first point, Hobbes, though he says in the understanding of it. Nor is to be won-
that "faith is a gift of God, which man can nei- dered that the will of God, when clothed in
ther give nor take away by promises of rewards words, should be liable to that doubt and un-
or menaces of torture," also says that faith de- certainty, which unavoidably attends that sort
pends "only upon certainty or probability of of conveyance." From which he concludes
arguments drawn from reason or from some- that since "the precepts of natural religion are
thing men believe already." Faith does not and very intelligible to all mankind, and
plain,
come "by supernatural inspiration or infusion" seldom come to be controverted; and other re-
but, according to Hobbes, "by education, dis- vealed truths, which are conveyed to us by
cipline, correction, and other natural ways, by books and languages are liable to the common
which God worketh them in his elect, at such and natural obscurities incident to words, me-
time as he thinketh fit." The object of faith is thinks would become us to be more careful
it
not God, but the men whom God has appoint- and diligent in observing the former, and less
ed to instruct us; belief, which Hobbes distin- magisterial, positive, and imperious, in impos-
guishes from faith, goes beyond faith to the ac- ing our own ideas and interpretations of the
ceptance as true of what they say. "Conse- latter."
quently," Hobbes writes, "when we believe That Scripture is difficult to interpret and
that the Scriptures are the word of God, having subject to various interpretations Augustine al-
no immediate revelation from God himself, our so acknowledges, but he differs somewhat from
belief, faith, and trust is in the Church, whose Locke concerning the task or duty which that
word we take,and acquiesce therein." fact imposes upon the religious man. "Let no
On this same point, Aquinas gives a different one then go on bothering me," Augustine
answer. He distinguishes between the material writes, "with such words as 'Moses did not
and the formal aspects of the object of faith, As mean what you say, he meant what I say.' If he
in the object of science, so in the object of faith said to me: 'How do you know that Moses
there is "that which is known . . . and is the meant by these words what you say ?' -I should
CHAPTER 79: RELIGION 591
take the question with complete calmness. . . . the faith that it is God's word, with latitude of
But when he says: 'He did not mean what you interpretation in determining what that truth
say, he meant what I say/ yet does not deny is, appealing here to the ordinary standards of
that what each of us says is true, then, O Life of what seems to be true to the thinking mind. In
the poor, O my God, in whose bosom is no con- the course of commenting on Augustine's own
tradiction, rain down the gift of moderation interpretation of certain passages in Genesis,
upon my heart, that I may hear such talk with Aquinas summarizes what he takes to be Augus-
patience. For what they say, they say not be- tine's two rules. "The first is, to hold the truth
cause they are godly men and have seen it in of Scripture without wavering. The second is
the mind of Your servant Moses, but because that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a
they are proud men: it is not that they know multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a
the opinion of Moses, but that they love their particular explanation only in such measure as
own opinion, and this not because it is true but to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with
because it is their own." certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be
Confronted by a variety of interpretations, exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and ob-
each of which may be true, Augustine remarks stacles be placed to their believing."
ses ... if 1 had been the same as he and You had distinction between religious and secular writ-
given me the book of Genesis to write, I should ing seems relevant to what the great books have
have wished that You would grant me such skill to say about religion.
in writing, such an art for the construction of In the pagan tradition, for example, Herod-
what I had to say, that not even those who can- otus in his History reports and discusses a
not yet grasp how God creates would reject my great variety of religious doctrines and prac-
words as too much for and again
their strength; tices as characteristic of the peoples he visits or
that those who can grasp so much, would find inquires about. There seems to be no indication
fully contained in the few words of Your serv-
that Herodotus is judging the truth or falsity of
ant whatever truths they had arrived at in these various religions, either by reference to
their own "who thirst for
thinking." Those their reasonableness or from convictions born
truth and not for vanity" honor the human dis- of his own adherence to one of these religions as
pensers of God's revelation, Augustine thinks, against all the rest. For the most part, he is
by believing that, when under God's inspira- writing about religion rather than religiously >
tion they wrote these words, they "had in mind with the possible exception of those passages in
whatever is most excellent in them
by the illu- which he expresses his own views, discussed in
mination of truth and their fruitfulness for our the chapter on PROPHECY, on the oracles, omens,
both are true; and if in the same words some Lucretius On the Nature of Things is about reli-
should see a third and a fourth meaning and giona passionate attack on religion by a man
any other number of true meanings, why should who is not religious. It may be thought that the
we not believe that Moses saw them all, since aim of Lucretius is to purify religion when he
by him one God tempered Sacred Scripture to wishes to banish "all belief in things degrading
the minds of many who should see truths in it, to the gods and inconsistent with their peace,"
yet not all the same truths." so that men can "approach the sanctuaries of
Augustine's position combines belief in the the gods with a calm breast," and "with tran-
truth of Scripture, which is a consequence of quil peace of mind." But even a person who
592 THE GREAT IDEAS
thinks this will still find a marked contrast be- "But where God himself," Hobbes contin-
tween Lucretius and poets like Aeschylus or ues, "by supernatural revelation, planted reli-
Dante who are writing from religious convic- gion; there he also made to himself a peculiar
tions to which they adhere as members of a kingdom, and gave laws, not only of behavior
religiouscommunity. toward himself, but also toward one another; and
Both kinds of writing may be found in the thereby in the Kingdom of God, the policy,
same author. Hobbes, for example, in examin- and laws are a part of religion; and there-
civil,
ing thephenomena of religious belief, seems to fore, the distinction of temporal and spiritual
make public acceptance the criterion of the dis- domination has there no place."
tinction between religion and superstition. "Fear Again it is as a man of Christian faith that
of a power invisible, feigned by the mind," he Hobbes ascribes belief in Christian teachings to
says, "or imagined from tales publicly allowed," that faith. "The causes why men believe any
is
religion; when they are "not allowed, super- Christian doctrine are various," he writes. "For
stition." Still writing as an observer, he says faith is the gift of God, and he worketh it in
that "this fear of things invisible is the natural each man by seemeth good to
such ways as it
seed of that which everyone in himself calls re- him. The most ordinary immediate cause of our
enumerates, "religion," he says, "by reason the "only article of faith, which the Scripture
of the different fancies, judgments, and passions makes necessary to salvation, is this, that Jesus
of several men, has grown up into ceremonies so is The Christ," he becomes the theologian with
different, that those which are used by one man whom other theologians within the Christian
are for the most part ridiculous to another." community may disagree, on this or other
Yet Hobbes also writes religiously, when he points of dogma.
treats all other religionsfrom the standpoint of The disagreements we find between Augus-
the special truth of his own. "These natural tine or Aquinas and Hobbes or Locke, or the
seeds of religion," he points out, "have received differences in dogma which appear in a com-
culture from two sorts of men. One sort have parison of the Divine Comedy and Paradise Lost,
been they that have nourished and ordered represent the division between Catholic and
them, according to their own invention. The Protestant Christians. But such theological dis-
other have clone it by God's commandment and agreements do not obliterate certain common
direction. ... Of the former sort were all the tenets of religious belief among all who profess
founders of commonwealths and the law-givers Christianity. Above all, they leave untouched
of the Gentiles. Of the latter sort were Abra- the belief in religion itself as transcending all
ham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour, by whom merely human teaching and as providing the
have been derived unto us the laws of the King- precepts of life
through which God himself di-
dom of God." rects and helps man to his salvation.
It is as a Christian that Hobbes compares the This belief even if no other except the be-
state religion of the Romans with the divine re- lief in one God Who created the universe and
ligion of the Jews. The Romans, he writes, made man in His image seems to be shared
"made no scruple of tolerating any religion by Jews and Christians. It marks the difference
whatsoever in the city of Rome itself, unless it between the religious writings of ancient poly-
had something in it that could not consist with theism and of those which draw their inspira-
their civilgovernment; nor do we read that tion from the Pentateuch and the Gospels. It
any religion was there forbidden, but that of makes the issue, as Pascal suggests, between
the Jews, who (being the peculiar Kingdom of those who write about a religion which they
God) thought it unlawful to acknowledge sub- themselves either have or seek, and those who,
jection to any mortal King or State whatso- neither having nor seeking, oppose all religions
ever. And thus you see how the religion of the equally or treatall with the same secular de-
WRITING AS A CHRISTIAN apologist, Pascal says gion has asked of God [the power] to love and
that "it is the glory of religion to have for ene- follow him. That we must love one God
. . .
mies men so unreasonable; and their opposition only a thing so evident, that it does not re-
is
to it is so little dangerous that it serves on the quire miracles to prove it." Yet Pascal also
contrary to establish its truths. For the Chris- interprets Christ's saying, "Though you believe
tian faith goes mainly to establish these two not Me, believe at least the works," as meaning
facts, the corruption of nature, and redemption that miracles are the strongest proof of a reli-
by Christ. Now I contend that if these men do gion, "Miracles," he writes, "furnish the test in
not serve to prove the truth of the redemption matters of doubt, between Jews and heathens,
by the holiness of their behavior, they at least Jews and Christians, Catholics and heretics, the
serve admirably to show the corruption of na- slandered and slanderers, between the two
ture by sentiments so unnatural. crosses."
"Let them at least be honest men," he adds, After criticizing the evidence for miracles on
"if they cannot be Christians. Let them . . . rational grounds, Hume
appears to agree that
recognize that there are two kinds of people "the Christian not only was at first at-
religion
one can call reasonable: those who serve God tended with miracles, but even at this day can-
with all their heart because they know Him, not be believed by any reasonable person with-
and those who seek Him with all their heart out one." But his meaning seems to be that
because they do not know Him. But as for belief in miracles is itself the miracle of faith.
those who live without knowing Him and with- "Mere reason," he says, "is insufficient to con-
out seeking Him, they judge themselves so little vince us" of the veracity of the Christian reli-
worthy of their own care, that they are not gion; "and whoever is moved by Faith to assent
worthy of the care of others; and it needs all the to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his
charity of the religion which they despise, not own person, which subverts all the principles of
to despise them even to the point of leaving his understanding, and gives him a determina-
them to their folly." tion to believe what is most contrary to custom
The very existence of other religions, accord- and experience."
ing to Pascal, helps to prove the truth of the
Christian religion. "I should equally have re- HERE is ANOTHER ISSUE on which philosophers
jected the religion of Mahomet and of China, of and theologians disagree. Where Hume says
the ancient Romans and of the Egyptians, for that "our most holy religion is founded on
the sole reason, that none having more marks of Faith, not on reason" with the further impli-
truth than another, nor anything which should cation that to adhere to it with faith requires
necessarily persuade me, reason cannot incline the abandonment of reason Augustine and
to one rather than the other." As for Judaism, it
Aquinas think that there can be no conflict be-
seems to Pascal to be divinely intended as the tween faith and reason, though faith declares
historic foundation and the prophetic forerun- the truth of more than reason can prove; and
ner of Christianity. that the support which reason can give to faith
Apart from these comparative judgments, in no way lessens the merit of believing.
Pascal attributes certain unique signs of truth With this Hobbes seems to agree, at least to
to the Christian religion. "Every religion is the extent of holding that it discredits super-
false," he writes, "which as to its faith does not natural religion to make it consist in believing
religionmust have as a characteristic the obli- supernatural and natural religion turns on what
gation to love God. This is very just, and yet one must believe both without and against rea-
no other religion has commanded this; ours has son as contrasted to what one believes as the re-
done so. It must also be aware of human lust sult of a reasonable interpretation of the evi-
and weakness; ours is so. It must have adduced dence. Like philosophy, natural religion, "which
remedies for this; one is prayer. No other reli- is
nothing but a species of philosophy, will nev-
594 THE GREAT IDEAS
er be able to carry us beyond the usual course of The point which is
being called in question is
experience, or give us measures of conduct and whether there is a divine spirit and a revelation;
behavior different from those which are fur- and it surely cannot be a conclusive reply to
nished by reflections on common life." say that the question cannot be asked because
Those who, like Marx and Freud, regard reli- the Deity cannot be called in question."
gion as a social imposture or the response to a Marx takes a similar view of the theologians.
neurotic need, not only impute falsity or worse According to him, the theologians beg the ques-
to the traditional religions of the west; they tion in much the same way as do the classical
also tend to reject natural religion. Science is economists for whom there are "only two kinds
enough for truth's sake, for the conduct of of institutions, those of art and those of nature.
life, for society's welfare. Yet in commenting Feudal institutions are artificial institutions,
on the following lines from Goethe, those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions.
In this," Marx says, "they resemble the theolo-
He who has Science and has Art,
gianswho establish two kinds of religion. Every
Religion, too, has he; own is an invention of men,
religion but their
Who has not Science, has no Art,
while their own religion is an emanation from
Let him religious be!
God."
Freud says that "on the one hand, these words Plato, on the other hand, excoriates those
contrast religion with the two highest achieve- who think that "all religion is a cooking up of
ments of man, and on the other, they declare words and a make-believe." It is almost as if he
that in respect of their value in life, they can had Marx and Freud in mind when, in the
represent or replace each other." In these terms Laws, the Athenian Stranger carries on the dis-
Freud thinks the religion of the ordinary man cussion of religion in terms of the distinction
is justified "the only religion that ought to between nature and art, and refers to those who
bear the name." If a man does not have science "would say that the Gods exist not by nature,
or art to live by, he must have religion, for "life but by art, and by the laws of states, which are
as we find it is too hard for us" and "we cannot different in different places, according to the
do without palliative remedies." agreement of those who make them." They are
It is the religion of the philosophers and the the very same people who hold that "the hon-
ject for its investigations." They deny that sci- the gods. The Athenian Stranger answers
lief in
ence has any competence whatsoever "to sit in those who think it is "dreadful that [we] should
judgment on religion If we are not deterred legislate on the supposition that there are Gods,"
by brusque dismissal," Freud declares, "but
this by saying why "it is a matter of no small conse-
inquire on what grounds religion bases its claim quence ... to prove that there are Gods, and
to an exceptional position among human con- that they are good and regard justice more than
cerns, the answer we receive, if indeed we are men do." The reason he gives is that "no one
honored with an answer at all, is that religion who in obedience to the laws believed that
cannot be measured by human standards, since there were Gods, ever intentionally did any un-
it isof divine origin, and has been revealed holy act, or uttered an unlawful word, but those
to us by a which the human mind can-
spirit who did must have supposed one of three
not grasp. might surely be thought," he
It things either that [the Gods] did not exist,
continues, "that nothing could be more easily which is the first possibility, or secondly, that if
refuted than this argument; it is an obvious they did, they took no care of man, or thirdly,
pctitio principii,
a 'begging of the question/ that they were easily appeased and turned aside
CHAPTER 79: RELIGION 595
from their purpose by sacrifices and prayers.** other, would, without doubt, have every na-
That is why the demonstration of the exist- tion blessed with the best civil, the best politi-
ence of the gods "would be the best and noblest cal laws; because these, next to this religion, are
prelude of all our laws." the greatest good that men can give and re-
Rousseau's legislator, like Plato's, is also con- ceive." Montesquieu meets the argument that
cerned with the role which religion plays in the "true Christians cannot form a government of
foundation and life of the state. But the ques- any duration,*' by saying that the more men
tion "Which religion?" arises at once for Rous- "believe themselves indebted to religion, the
seau, as it does not for Plato, who can treat the more they would think due to their country.
nature of the gods and the nature of the state as The principles of Christianity, deeply engraved
equally within the province of the political phi-
on the heart, would be infinitely more powerful
losopher. But
for Rousseau, living in a Chris- than the false honor of monarchies, than the hu-
tian civilization, the political philosopher can- man virtues of republics, or the servile fear of
Christianity, says Rousseau, "not the Chris- Three main positions seem to be taken: one
tianity of today, but that of the Gospel, which which calls for the integration of church and
is entirely different," is the religion of man, not state, one which calls for a subordination of
of the citizen. "So far from binding the hearts either state to church or church to state, and
of the citizens to the State, it has the effect of one which insists upon the autonomy of each
taking them away from all earthly things. I as a basis for their relation to one another, or
know of nothing more contrary to the social carries separation even further, to the point of
would not be a society of men. . , . The country hood was in the service of the king. Hobbes
of the Christian is not of this world." defines a Christian commonwealth in almost
What the state needs, Rousseau goes on to parallel terms. It is indifferent whether it is
say, is "a purely civil profession of faith, of called a "church** or a "state," because it is "a
which the Sovereign should fix the articles, not company of men professing Christian religion,
exactly as religious dogmas, but as social senti- united in the person of one sovereign." It fol-
ments without which a man cannot be a good lows, Hobbes argues, that "there is on earth, no
citizen or a faithful subject." He then enumer- such universal church as all Christians are bound
ateswhat he calls "the dogmas of civil religion'* to obey; because there is no power on earth, to
which "ought to be few, simple, exactly word- which other commonwealths are subject.
all
ed, without explanation or commentary," such There are Christians in the dominions of sev-
as "the existence of a mighty, intelligent, and eral princes and states; but every one of them is
sanctity of the social contract and the laws.** son. And therefore a church, such a one as is
Montesquieu takes the diametrically oppo- able to command, to judge, absolve, condemn,
site view. "With regard to the true religion,** or do any other act, the same thing with a
is
he writes, "I have never pretended to make its civil commonwealth, consisting of Christian
interests submit to those of a political nature, men; and is called a civil state, for that the sub-
but rather to unite them. . . . The Christian re- jects of it are men] and a church for that the
ligion, which ordains that men should love each subjects thereof are Christians."
596 THE GREAT IDEAS
According to Hobbes, "temporal and spiritual and state, but subordinates priest to king, in a
government are but two words brought into manner which corresponds to the Averroistic
the world, to make men see double, and mis- subordination of theology to philosophy. Agree-
take their lawful Sovereign. . . . There is there- ing with both that church and state are dis-
fore no other government in this life, neither tinct, Dante agrees with neither on the relation
of state, nor religion, but temporal." Agreeing which should obtain between the temporal and
with Hobbes on the unity of government and the spiritual domains, or between civil and
the integration of church and state, writers like ecclesiastical government.
Augustine and Roger Bacon place kings in the Whereas Aquinas holds that only man's spir-
service of the priesthood, and make the supreme itual end is ultimate and that all temporal ends
pontiff, who governs both spiritually and tem- are intermediate, Dante insists that man has
porally,the only earthly sovereign. Gilson two ultimate goals. "Man exists for a double
summarizes their view by saying that for them purpose," he says in De Monarchia. "Since he
"the definition of the Church includes the alone among beings partakes of both corrup-
State," and that the church has a universality tibility and incorruptibility, he alone among
which embraces "the temporal and the spiritual beings belongs in two final orders one of which
domains alike." ishis goal as a corruptible being, the other as
The position of Aquinas is indicated in the incorruptible." Man has two beatitudes, or two
Treatise on Law, in the passage in which he forms of happiness an earthly perfection which
declares that no civil law can be valid or bind- consists in thecomplete realization throughout
ing if what it commands is contrary to divine time of the intellectual powers of mankind, and
law. It is more explicitly developed in his little a heavenly perfection which consists in the
tract On the
Governance of Rulers. "It is not the vision of God. "These two states of bliss,"
ultimate end," he writes, "of an assembled mul- Dante argues, "like two different goals, man
titude to live virtuously, but through virtuous must reach by different ways. For we come to
living to attain to the possession
of God. Fur- the first as we follow the philosophical teach-
thermore, if it could attain this end by the ings, applying them to our moral and intellec-
power of human nature, then the duty of a tual capacities; and we come to the second as
king would have to include the direction ot we follow the spiritual teachings, which tran-
men to this end." But, Aquinas holds, men scend human reason according to our theological
attain this end by divine, not human, power capacities, faith, hope,and charity."
and therefore divine, not human, government In terms of this theory of man's two ends,
is needed to direct men to their end. "Conse- and of the distinct spheres of reason and faith,
quently," he maintains, "in order that spirit- or philosophy and civil law on the one hand,
ual things might be distinguished from earthly and religion and divine law on the other, Dante
things, the ministry of this kingdom has been formulates his doctrine of the autonomy of
entrusted not to earthly kings, but to priests, state and church. "The reins of man," he
and in the highest degree to the chief priest, writes, "are held by a double driver according
the successor of St. Peter, the Vicar of Christ, to man's two-fold end: one is the
supreme pon-
the Roman Pontiff, to whom all the kings of tiff, who guides mankind with revelations to
Christian peoples are to be subject as to our life eternal, and the other is the emperor, who
Lord Jesus Christ Himself. For those to whom guides mankind with philosophical instruc-
pertains the care of intermediate ends should tions to temporal happiness." Church and state
be subject to him to whom pertains the care of may be related as sun and moon in the sense
the ultimate end, and be directed by his rule." that the state receives some illumination from
This last statement indicates that Aquinas, the church even about matters within its own
unlike Augustine and Roger Bacon, assigns to jurisdiction; but, according to Dante, the state
the state a subsidiary dominion and to the king has its own source of light in reason. "Temporal
a subordinate jurisdiction.The opponent of power," he maintains, "receives from spiritual
its being, nor its power or
Aquinas is usually thought to be Marsilius of power neither
Padua, whose Defensor Pacts separates church authority, nor even its functioning, strictly
CHAPTER 79: RELIGION 597
speaking; but what it receives is the light of the just bounds that lie between the one and
grace, which God in heaven and the pope's the other. The commonwealth," Locke
. . .
the exception, perhaps, of the doctrine of Mar- themselves together of their own accord in
siliusof Padua conceive religion as having a order to the public worshipping of God in such
supernatural source and the church as having a manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and
supernatural foundation, both being instituted effectual to the salvation of their souls."
for the sake of guiding man to his supernatural Locke's doctrine of the separation of church
end. They differ from one another according and state is reflected in the Constitution of the
to the view they take of man's earthly or tem- United States. In the form which Jefferson
poral goods, the power of his reason, and the gives it, it appears in the declaration that "Con-
jurisdiction of his laws. Their difference, gress shall make no law respecting an establish-
according to Gilson, verifies the principle that ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
"the manner in which one conceives the rela- cise thereof." Mill carries out the same princi-
tionship of the State to the Church, that in ples in his attack on "Sabbatarian legislation."
which one conceives the relationship of philos- Such laws, he thinks, exceed the power of civil
ophy to theology, and in which one conceives government. They represent an "illegitimate
the relationship of nature to grace, are neces- interference with the rightful liberty of the
persist, with certain modifications, in modern opinion, "the foundation of all the religious
times. But the characteristically modern view persecutions ever perpetrated." Hegel, on the
of the matter begins with a different view of other hand, holds that "the state should re-
religion itself. Its mediaeval prototype is to be quire all citizens to belong to a church," but he
found in the rationalism of Marsilius. Within points out that "a church is all that can be said,
the secular state, the church is a purely human because since the content of a man's faith de-
institution, religion defended by philosophy
is
pends on his private ideas, the state cannot
for the contribution it makes to the peace of interfere with it."
the civil community or, perhaps, condemned The positions men take on the great issues of
by the apostles of earthly progress as "the church and state thus seem to be determined in
opiate of the masses." The principle of religious part by the diverse conceptions men have of
tolerance involves not merely tolerance of reli- religion. This is no less true of opposing views
gion, but tolerance for a diversity of religions on religious liberty, on the treatment of heresy
and often the complete rejection of all religion. and schism, on religious education, the mission-
"I esteem it above all things necessary," ary calling, and the conversion of infidels. In
writes Locke in his Letter Concerning Toleration, the discussion of religion, perhaps more than
"to distinguish exactly the business of civil anywhere else, the first Yea or Nay seems to
government from that of religion, and to settle determine all other affirmations or denials.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
, Faith as the foundation of religion 599
la. The nature, cause, and conditions of faith: its specific objects
2/i Purificatory rites: the remission of sin by baptism and penance 609
3. The religious life: religious offices and the religious community 610
30. The Jewish conception of the religious community: the Torah and the Temple
3^. The Christian conception of the church: the doctrine of the mystical body of
Christ 611
3</.
The monastic life: the disciplines of asceticism
4. Church and state: the issue concerning temporal and spiritual power 614
4#. The service of religion to the state and the political support of religion by the state
y. Religious education
(1) Orthodoxy and heresy: the role of dogma in religion; the treatment of heretics
(2) Sects and schisms arising from divergences of belief and practice 619
6d. The relation of men of diverse faiths: the attitude of the faithful toward infidels
6f. The rejection of supernatural foundations for religion: the criticism of particular
beliefs and practices; the psychogenesis of religion
6g. The relation between sacred doctrine and secular learning: the conflict of
science and religion 621
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Hud, BK u [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
A 4, ANS 62b-63a; Q 65, AA 4-5 73d-75a; Q 66, passim, esp 3:21-5:2, 9:30-33 / I Corinthians,
A 6 80c-81b; PART II-H, QQ 1-7 380a-416d; 2:4-10 / 77 Corinthians, 4:3-4 / Galatians, 3;
PART in SUPPL, Q 99, A 4, ANS and REP i 5:22/7 Thessalonians, 2:13; 5:8 / Hebrews
1083a-1084a esp 4:2, 11:1-12:3 / James, 2 esp 2:17-26 /
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxiv [52- I Peter, 1:7-9,21 / / John, 2:23-24; 4:1-3;
81] 143b-c 5:4-5
600 THE GREAT IDEAS la to
PART m, 290b-292a; 307b308a; 311b-d;
(1. Paitb as the foundation of religion, la. The 312d-313a; PART iv, 349b-350a
nature, cause, and conditions of faith: its 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [3414-3468] 83b-84b;
specific objects) PART n [10,113-121] 246b-247a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i la-b; par 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 302b-303d; 593b-c
17-18 5b-d; BK HI, par 6-10 14b-15d; BK in, 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196a-198b
par I9-BK iv, par i 18b-19c; BK v, par 12-13 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, lla-
30a-c; par 23-25 33c-34c; BK vi, par 7-8 36d- 15a,c esp lla-b, 13a-d; BK ii, 21b-24d; 26b-
37c; BK vii, par 24 50d-51a; BK vin 52c-61c 27d; BK in, 64c-67a; BK v, 129c-132b; BK vi
esp par 29-30 60d-61c; BK ix, par 14 65a-c; 146b,d-170d; BK vn, 171a-180a esp 172c-
par 23-25 68a-c / City of God, BK x, CH 2 177b; 189a-191a,c; BK xi, 313c-314d; 337a-
299d-300a; BK xi, CH 2 323a-c; BK xix, CH 346a; BK xii, 396d-397a
18 523a-b; BK xxi, CH 5, 564b-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 652a-659a passim; 661b;
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i 3a- 826b-827a
lOc; Q 2, A 2, REP i lld-12c; Q 12, A 13 61c-62b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 62, \b. The sources of religious belief
A 3, ANS and REP 2 61c-62b; Q 67, A 3 83b-
84d; Q 100, A 4, REP i 253d-255a; Q 108, A 2, 16(1) Revelation: the word of God and divine
REP i 332b-333d; Q no, A 3, REP i 350a-d; authority
Q 112, A 5, ANS and REP 2 359c-360c; PART OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 12:1-9; 13:14-17;
ii -ii, QQ 1-9 380a-426c
15;17-18; 21:12-13; 22:1-18; 26:1-6,23-24;
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, in [34- 28:10-22; 32:23-32; 35:1-15; 46:1-4 / Exodus,
45] 56b; PARADISE, ii
[37-45] 108a; xix [69- 3-4; 6:1-8,28-30; 7:1-5; 19-20; 24; 33-34
xxiv 142d-144b
77] 135d; / Numbers, 12; 14:20-25 / Deuteronomy,
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 63b; 66a-c; 78d- 4:10-15,36; 5; 8:3; 18:18; 29:29; 31:14-21 /
80d; 83a-84c; PART n, 149c-d; PART in, 209b; Joshua, 1:1-9 (D) Josue, 1:1-9 / 7 Samuel,
209d; 240a-246a,c passim, esp 241a-242a 3-(D) 7 Kings, 3/7
Kings, 3:5-15; 9:1-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 98b-99a; 209a-c; 21 Ib- 9; i9:9-i8-(>) 777 Kings, 3:5-15; 9:1-9;
213a; 239b-c; 267c-268a; 293d-294b 19:9-18 / Job, 33:14-17; 38:1-42:5 / Psalms,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 19b-c; 12:6; 119:81-82,103-105,114-116,130-133,147-
Novum Organum, BK
55b-d; 95d-97c; lOOc / 148 (D) Psalms, 11:7; 118:81-82,103-105,
i, APH 65 114b-c; APH 89 124a-d 114-116,130-133,147-148 / Proverbs, 30:5 /
31 DhscARTEs: Rules, in, 4d-5a / Meditations, Isaiah, 6; 48:3-8 (D) Isaias, 6; 48:3-8 /
69a-d / Objections and Replies, 125c-126a; Jeremiah, i; 26:1-6 (D) Jeremias, i; 26:1-6
168c; 232b; 284d / Ezetyel, 1-3; 8-i2-(D) Ezechiel, 1-3; 8-12
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 147b; 163a-166b I Amos, 7 / Zechariah, i-6(D) Zacharias,
passim / Pensfrs, 242-245 217b-218b; 248 1-6
219a; 254-256 220a; 262 221a; 265-290 221b- APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 16:26 (D)
225a esp 278-282 222b-223b; 425 243b- OT, Boot( f Wisdom, 16:26 / Ecclesiasticus,
244b; 523 264a; 543 266a; 561-567 272b- 17:6-14 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 17:5-12
273b; 585-588 277a-b; 619-620 284b-286a; NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 3:16-17; 7:28-29;
794-796 327b 10:1-20,26; 11:25-27; 13:10-23; 17:5; 21:23-
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3b-4a; lOc-d; 15b / Hu- 27; 28:18-20 / Marf(, 1:9-11,22; 4:1-2,10-23;
man Understanding, BK iv, CH vn, SECT ii, 9:3-7; 11:27-33 / Lukey 2:25-26; 3:21-22;
340b-c; CH xvi, SECT 14 371b-c; CH xvn, 4:4,31-32; 8:4-15; 9:33-35; 10:21-22; 12:1-3
SECT 23-24 380b-d; CH x vin 380d-384b passim / John, 2:22; 3:2,9-12; 4:41-42; 5:31-47 esp
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT x, oiv 5 395 9 : 35-3 8 ; 10:26-27; 12:28-30; 15:15;
:
27:3-
17, 11:1-15, 12:14-21, 13:57-58, 21:1-5,
(16. The sources of religious belief, \b(2) Miracles 28:18-20 / Marl( passim, esp 1:1-8,
10, 27:35,
and signs as divine confirmation.)
6:4-6, 16:15-16 / Lu%c passim, esp 1:67-79,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 180b-c; 189b-190d; 4:16-21, 4:24, 11:48-50 / John passim, esp
294a-296d esp 295c-296b; 445d-446b; 465d- 1:6-8, 1:45, 4:43-44. 5-39. 7-'37-52> 12:37-41
467b; 547a-b / Acts passim, esp 2:1-36, 3:18, 3:20-25, 7:35-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 232a-c; 398b-399b 60, 8:30-39, 9:15, 13:27-41, 15:13-17, 19:1-
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 126b-c; 359a; 481d-482a 7, 24:14-15, 26:15-20, 28:16-27 / Romans,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 10:12-11:36 / / Corinthians, 2:4-5; 3 5? M?
:
uel, 7:18-29; 22:4-20 esp22-.7;24:io-25 (D) (D) OT, / Machabees, 4 :8-i i 7 137 /;
II Macca-
II Kings, 7:18-29; 22:4-20 esp 22:7; 24:10-25 bees, 1:5-6,8,23-30; 2:10; 3:14-36; 12:39-45;
/ I Kings, 3:5-15; 8; 9:2-3; 13:6; 18:36-39 i5:2i-29-(D) OT, // Machabees, 1 15-6, 8,23-
(D) III Kings, 3:5-15; 859:2-3; 13:6; 18:36- 30; 2:10; 3:14-36; 12:39-46; 15:21-29
39 / // Kings, 4:32-35; 6:17-18; 19:14- NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:5-15; 7:7-11;
20:11 (D) IV Kings, 4:32-35; 6:17-18; 19:14- 18:19-20; 21:17-22; 26:36-45 / Mar%, 9:14-
20:11 / I Chronicles, 4:10; 17:16-27; 21:8-27 30 esp 9:28-29; 11:24-26; 13:33; 14:32-39
(D) / Paralipomenon, 4:10; 17:16-27; 21:8-27 / Lu^e, 11:1-13; 18:1-14; 21:36; 22:40-46 /
/ // Chronicles, 6:14-42; 7:12-22; 14:10-13; John, 4:10; 9:31; 14:13-16; 15:7; 16:23-26;
16:12; 20:1-25; 30:18-20,27; 32:19-24; 33:11- 17 / Acts, 4:23-33; 6:4; 8:22-24; 9:36-41;
13,18-19 (D) // Paralipomenon, 6:14-42; 10:1-4,30-31 / Romans, 8:26-27; 10:12-13;
7:12-22; 14:10-13; 16:12;
20:1-25; 30:18- 12:12 / / Corinthians, 11:4-5; 14:13-16
20,27; 32:19-24; 33:11-13,18-19 / Ezra, 8:22- / Ephesians, 6:17-18 / Philippians, 4:6 /
23; 9-'5-i5C0) i Esdras, 8:22-23; 9:5-157 Colossians, 4:2-3 / / Thessalonians, 5:17 /
Nehemiah, 1:4-11; 9:27 (D) II Esdras, 1:4- II Thessalonians, 3:1-2 / / Timothy, 2:1-8;
ii ; 9:27 / Job, 6:8-9; 8:5-6; 9:13-16; 10; 4 4-5; 5 5 / Hebrews, 13:18 / James, 4:3;
: :
16:17-22; 21:15; 22:27; 30:20; 33:26-28; 5:13-18 / / Peter, 3:12; 4:7 / I John, 3:22;
42:8-10 / Psalms passim, esp 4:1-3, 5:1-3, 6:9, 5:13-16 / Ret/elation, 5:8 (D) Apocalypse,
9:12, 17:1-6, 18:1-19, 21:1-4, 22:1-5, 28:1-9, 5=8
30:8-31:17, 31:22, 38:9-15, 39:12, 40:1-2, 4 HOMER: BK i [i-ioo] 3a-4b; BK n [394-
Iliad,
42:8-11, 50:15, 54:2-55:2, 55:16-17, 61:1-3, 421] 14a-b; BK ix [485-512] 62a-b; BK xvi
64:1, 66:17-20, 69:13-18, 81:7, 86:1-7, 88:1- [218-254] H4c-d / Odyssey, BK HI [43-68]
13, 102:1-2, 102:17, 107:1-30, 116:1-6, 119:58, 193c-d; BK v [436-463] 212b-c; BK xx [91-
119:170, 130:1-8, 140:6, 141:1-5, 142:1-143:1, 121] 297a-b
145:18-19 (D) Psalms passim, esp 4:2-4, 5:2- 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens la-14a,c esp
5, 6:10, 9:13, 16:1-6, 17:1-19, 20:2-5, 21:2-6, [1-175] la-3a, [516-710] 7c-10b, [1018-1073]
27:1-9, 29:9-30:18, 30:23, 37:10-16, 38:13, 13d-14a,c / Persians [215-225] 17c; [517-693]
39:2-3, 41:9-12, 49:15, 53:4-54=3. 54 :i 7~ l8 20c-22b / Sewn Against Thebes [69-282]
60:2-4, 63:2, 65:17-20, 68:14-19, 80:8, 85:1- 28a-30b / Agamemnon [351-398] 55d-56b;
7, 87:2-14, 101:1-3, 101:18, 106:1-30, 114:1- [810-854] 60d-61a
6, 118:58, 118:170, 129:1-7, 139:7; 140:1-5, 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [151-218] lOOc-
141:2-142:1, 144:18-19 / Proverbs, 15:8,29; lOlb; [863-910] I07b-c / Oedipus at Colonus
28:9 / Isaiah, 1:15; 26:16; 37:14-38; 43:22; [46i-509]*118b-d / Ajax [684-692] 149a
55:6-7; 56:7; 58:7-9; 66:24 (D) Isaias, 1:15; 5 EURIPIDES: Eleclra [190-212] 328c-d
26:16; 37:14-38; 43:22; 55:6-7; 56:7; 58:7-9; 5 ARISTOPHANES: Peace [973-1016] 537a-c /
66:24 / Jeremiah, 7:16; 11:14; 14:11-15:1; Thesmophoriazusae [295-371] 603d-604c
17:13-18; 29:7,12-14; 32:16-44; 42:1-6,20 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 20d-21a; BK vi,
(D) Jeremias, 7:16; 11:14; 14:11-15:1; 17:13- 196d-197a; BK vii, 226c; 239d-240a; BK vin,
18; 29:7,12-14; 32:16-44; 42:1-6,20 / Lam- 270c
entations, 3:8,44,55-57 / Daniel, 6:4-13; 9 / 6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War, BK vi,
:
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 14, 74b 25:1-12, 26:2 / Numbers, 5:5-9:14; 15; 18-19;
/ Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 30 174b-c; CH 40- 28-29 / Deuteronomy, 5:6-15; 6:13; 12; 14;
41 180b-d 15:19-17:1; 26; 32 passim / Joshua, 5:2-9;
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i la-b; BK 22:9-34-(D) Josue, 5:2-9; 22:9-34 / Judges,
n, par i 9a; BK v, par i 27a-b; BK vi, par i 11:30-40 / / Samuel, 2:1-10 (D) I Kings,
34c-35a; BK ix, par 34-37 70c-71b; BK x, par 2:i-io/// Samuel, 6:1-15; 22 (D) II Kings,
1-7 71c-73a; par 37-40 81a-c; par 42 82a; 6:1-15; " / I Kings, 8-() 777 Kings, 8 / 77
BK xi, par 1-4 89b-90b / City of God, BK x, Kings, 17:36 (D) IV Kings, 17:36 / 7 Chroni-
CH 12 306d-307a; CH 19 310d-311b; CH 22 cles, 15:25-16:36; 17:16-27; 29:10-22 (D) 7
312a-b Paralipomenon, 15:25-16:36; 17:16-27; 29:10-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologies PART n-n, Q 22 / 77 Chronicles, 5:1-7:9; 15:1-15; 30; 35:1-
181, A 3, REP 3 618c-619b; PART in, Q 21 19 (D) II Paralipomenon, 5:1-7:9; 15:1-15;
823d-827c; PART in SUPPL, Q 71, A i, ANS 30; 35:1-19 / Ezra, 1-8 passim (D) I Esdras,
901b-902b; A 9, ANS and REP 5 910d-912b; 1-8 passim / Nehemiah, 9 csp 9:14; 10:31;
Q 72 917c-922b 13:22 (D) II Esdras, 9 esp 9:14; 10:31; 13:22
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, in [133- / Esther, 9:20-32 / Psalms passim / Song of
129] 73a-b; xxm [76-96] 89a; PARADISE, xx 29:18-19; 40:9-31; 42:10-12; 44:23; 45:23-25;
[94-148] 137d-138b; xxxi [79-102] 154a-b; 49:13; 56:1-7; 58; 66:18-23 (D) Isaias, 1:10-
xxxn 156a-d
[i39]-xxxin [54] 18; 2:2-3; 8:13-14,17; 12; 25-26; 27:13; 29:18-
22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [2221-2419] 196b- 19; 40:9-31 ; 42:10-12; 44:23; 45:23-25; 49:13;
199b / Tale of Man of Law [4869-4895] 56:1-7; 58; 66:18-23 /Jeremiah, 15:16; 17:21-
242b-243a 27; 20:11-13 (D) Jcremias, 15:16; 17:21-27;
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 162d; 163b; PART 20:11-13 / Ezetyel, 20:12,20; 44:24; 46:3 (D)
in, 182d-183b Ezechiel, 20:12,20; 44:24; 46:3 / Hosea, 6:6-7
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, (D) Osee, 6:6-7 / dmos, 5:21-24 / Micah,
32c-35a; 49c-d 6:6-8-(D) Micheas, 6:6-8 / Habakfat^, 3:18-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 152b-153d; 155c-156d 19(D) Habacuc, 3:18-19 / Zephaniah, 2:11
26 SHAKESPEARE Richard III, ACT i, sc iv [66-
:
(D) Sophonias, 2:11 / Zechariah, 14:16-21
74] 115b (D) Zacharias, 14:16-21
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT in, sc in [36-72] APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16 (D) OT, Judith, 16 /
53d-54a / Measure for Measure, ACT n, sc iv Rest of Esther, 13:14; 16:20-22 (D) OT,
[1-17] 184c-d Esther, 13:14; 16:20-22 / Wisdom of Solo-
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [185-197] mon, 10:19-20 (D) OT, Boof( of Wisdom,
139b; BK v [205-208] 179b; BK x Jio86]-BK 10:19-20 / Ecclesiasticus, 1:11,25; 17:24-29;
xi [71] 298a-300b / Samson Agonistes [356- -
35:1-7; 39:15-35; 47 :8 10 5o-5'-() OT,
'.
A 4, ANS 302a-304a; Q 108, A 2, ANS and REP 2 8:62-64; 9:25; 18:16-39 (D) 777 Kings,
332b-333d; PART II-H, Q i, A i, REP i 380b- 8:62-64; 9 :2 5; 18:16-39 / // Kings, 16:12-16
381a; A 3, REP 4 381d-382c; A 8, REP 6 387a- -(D) IV Kings, 16:12-16 / / Chronicles,
388c; Q 2, A 7, ANS 396a-d97c; Q 3, A i, REP i 29:1-9,14,20-21 (D) I Paralipomenon, 29:1-
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 162d-165d 15 / Song of Three Children, 14-17- (D) OT,
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xn [436-445] Daniel, 3:37-40 / Bel and Dragon, 1-22 (D)
328b-329a OT, Daniel, 14:1-21 / / Maccabees, 4:49-56
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 71b-80b; 128b- (D) OT, 7 Machabees, 4:49-56 / II Maccabees,
137b / Pensees, 554 270a; 862, 343a; 870 i:i8-36;2:9-n; 3:3i-35-(D) OT, II Mocha-
344a-b; 904-905 348b-349a; 923 351b bees, 1:18-36; 2:9-11; 3:31-35
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 12a / Human Understand- NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:22-24; 9:13; 12:7;
ing, BK iv, CH xx, SECT io 391c-392a 26:26-29 / Marf(, 12:32-33,41-44; 14:22-
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 221a-224a; 257a- 25 / Lu%e, 2:22-24; 21:1-4; 22:14-20 / John,
259b; 260b 261a; 373b 376a 11:51-52 / Romans, 5:7-11; 12:1 / / Corinthi-
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 193a-b; 297c-d ans, 5:7; 11:23-29; 15:3/77 Corinthians, 5:14-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 329d; 334b-c 21 / Ephesians, 5:2 / Hebrews, 5:1-3; 7:26-27;
44 BOWELL: Johnson, 173d-174a; 481c 8:3-4; 9:1-10:22; 11:4,17; 13:9-16 / 7 Peter,
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 331d- 1:18-19; 2:5,24; 4:1 / I John, 1:7; 3:16
332c; 338a-d; 349d-350a 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i [1-120] 3a-4b; [304-317]
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 38b; 43b-44b; 6b; [364-392] 6d-7a; [428-471] 7c-8a; BK n
BK iv, 183c-d; BK xi, 476c-478a [394-431] 14a-b; BK vi [263-311] 42d-43b;
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Kara mazov BK n, 21d-,
BK vn [313-326] 49b; BK ix [527-549] 62c;
22b; BK HI, 80c-81a BK xn [1-33] 82a-b; BK xxm [54-261] 161d-
163d; BK xxiv [64-76] 171d-172a / Odyssey,
2d. Sacrifices and propitiations BK HI [i-ii] 193a; BK ix [543-555] 234d-235a;
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:1-16; 8:18-22; 15:6- BK XH [352-365] 253d-254a; BK xiv [233-261]
17; 22 / Exodus, 8:1,25-29; 9:1; 10:3-11,24- 262c-d
26; 12:1-13:16; 20:24-26; 22:29-30; 23:19; 5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [215-225] 17c; [517-693]
24:5-8; 29-30; 34:19-20,26; 35:20-21,29 / 20c-22b / Seven Against Thebes [265-282] 30b
Leviticus, i-io; 12;
14:1-32; 16-17; 19:5-7; / Agamemnon [40-257] 52c-54d csp [205-238]
21-23; 2 7 / Numbers, 3:12-13; 5-9; 10:10; 15- 54b-c; [1412-1425] 67a / Choephoroc [514-539]
16; 18:1-19:6; 28-29; 3 1 :2 5~54 / Deuteronomy, 75a-b
12; 14:22-29; 15:19-21; 16:1-17; 17:1; 21 :i- 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [461-509]
9; 26:10-15 /Joshua, 8:30-31; 22:9-12,21-29 118b-d / Ajax [646-692] 148c-149a / Electra
(D) Josue, 8:30-31; 22:9-12,21-29 / Judges, [404-471] 159b-d
608 THE GREAT IDEAS 2dto2e
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 250b-251c
(2. The virtue and practice of religion: piety as 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 12a-13a
justice to God. 2d* Sacrifices and propitia- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK xxv, 211a-c
tions!) 40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 93b; 98a; 121a-b;
5 EURIPIDES: Haradeidae [403-629] 251c-253c 349c-350b; 397b; 460a-b; 461 d; 463a-c;
/ Ion [247-282] 284a-c / Electro, [998-1034] 547b
336b-c / Hecuba [501-582] 357a-d / Phoeni- 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 226d-227b
Maidens [896-1018] 386a-387b / Iphigenia
cian 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 482a-b
Among the 7flr/411a-424d esp [1-41] 411a-b, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 227c-
[456-471] 414c-d / Iphigenia at Aulis 425a- 228a; PART in, 305b-c
439d esp [87-110] 425d-426a, [358-365] 428a, 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [8568-8590] 208b-
[i164-1208] 435d-436a 209a
5 ARISTOPHANES: Peace [180-194] 528a; [362-
2e. Fasting and almsgiving
426] 530b-d; [922-1022] 536c-537c / Plutus
[1107-1209] 641a-642d OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 34:27-28 / Leviticus,
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 6a; 32d-33a; 48c; 19:9-10; 25:35-37 / Deuteronomy,
23:22;
BK n, 57b-58b; 59a; 72d-73a; 77c-d; BK iv, 15:7-11; 24:17-22; 26:12-13 / fudges, 20:24-28
125a-b; 134b-d; 142b-c; 157b; BK v, 174d- / / Samuel, 7:3-6 (D) I Kings, 7:3-6 /
175b; BK vi, 199d-200a; 200d; BK vn, 226c; II Samuel, 12:15-23 (D) II Kings, 12:15-23 /
235a; 248c-d; 250c-d; BK vin, 267a; 282b-c Ezra, 8:21-23; 1 0:6 (D) I Esdras, 8:21-23;
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 122d-123a / Symposium, 10 :6 / Esther, 4:1-3,15-17 / Job, 29:11-16;
163a / Euthyphro, 198a-c / Phaedo, 247a / 31:16-22 / Psalms, 35:13; 41:1-3; 69:10-11;
Republic, BK i, 295d-296a; 297b-c; BK 11, 109:21-24 (D) Psalms, 34:13; 40:2-4; 68:10-
313d-314d / Critias, 484d-485a / Laws, BK iv, ii ; 108:21-24 / Proverbs, 3:27-28; 11:24;
683a-b; BK vi, 712a; BK vn, 719b-d; 721b-c; 14:21,31; 19:17; 21:13,26; 22:9; 28:27; 29:7
724a-b; BK vin, 731d-732d; BK x, 768d- / Ecclesiastes, 11:1-2 / Isaiah, 58:3-12 (D)
769c; 770d-771b; BK xn, 791d-792a Isaias,58:3-12 / Jeremiah, 14:12 (D) Jere-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vin, CH 9 [1160*19-29] mias, 14:12 / Ezefyel, 18:4-21 (D) Ezechid,
412b-c / Politics, BK vi, en 8 [1322^9-29] 18:4-21 / Daniel, 10:2-3 / Joel, 2:12-18 /
526c Zechariah, 1(D) Zacharias, 7
12 LUCRETIUS: "Nature of Things, BK i [80-101] APOCRYPHA: Tobit,
1:16-17; 2; 4:7-11,16-17;
2a-b; BK v [1194-1203] 76d 12:8-10; 14:10-11 (D) OT, Tobias, 1:19-20;
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [728-740] 123a-b; BK n 2; 4:7-12,17-18; 12:8-10; 14:10-11 / Judith,
[108-136] 127a-b; BK in [356-462] 157a-160a 4:13 (D) OT, Judith, 4:10-11 / Ecclesiasticus,
esp [404-440] 158a-159a; [525-550] 161b-162a; 3:30; 4:1-8; 7:10,32-33; 12:1-7; 14:13; 17:22-
BK iv [48-67] 168b-169a; [195-237] 172a-173b; 23; 29:1-2,8-13,20; 34:26; 35:2; 40:24 (D)
[450-456] 179b; BK v [42-103] 188a-190a; OT, Ecclesiasticus, 3:33; 4:1-8; 7:9-10,36-
[762-778] 207a-b; BK vi [212-263] 216b-218a; 37; 12:1-5; 14:13; 17:18-19; 29:1-2,11-17,26;
BK xn [166-215] 358b-360a 34 3i; 35:4540:24
:
14 PLUTARCH: Theseus la-15a,c passim / Romu- NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 4:1-4; 5*42; 6:1-
lus,25b-26a / Themistodes, 94a-b / Camillus, 4,16-18; 9:14-15; 10:8,40-42; 17:14-22; 19:16-
108d-109c / Fabius, 142d-143a / Pelopidas, 22 / Mar\, 2:18-20; 9:24-29; 10:17-22; 12:41 -
239d-240c / Marcellus, 248c-249d / Anstides, 44 / Lu\e, 3:11; 4:1-4; 5-33-35; 6:30,38;
273b-c / Agesilaus, 483a-b 11:41; 12:33; 14:12-14; 18:11-12,18-23; 21:1-
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xin, 140d-141a; BK xiv, 4 / Acts, 10:1-4; 20:35 / Romans, 12:8 /
148d-149a; BK xv, 168a-b / Histories, BK n, 7 Corinthians, 13:3 / // Corinthians, 6:4-6;
215a; BK iv, 282d-283b 8-9 / Galatians, 2:10 / 7 Timothy, 6:17-19
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK x, CH i 298b,d- 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK iv, 156d-157a
299d; CH 3-7 300b-303a; CH n 305b-306d; 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xxi, CH 22
CH 16-21 308b-312a; CH 24, 313a-b; CH 25-26, 576a-c; CH 27, 583a-584c
314b-315b; CH 31 319b-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 3,
20 AQUINAS : Summa
Theologica, PART I-H, Q 101, A i, ANS 400c-401a; Q 32 540a-550a; Q 187, A 2
A 4 269a-270b; Q 102, A 3 272b-276c; A 5, 665a-666a; A 3, ANS and REP 4 666a-669b;
REP 2 283c-292c; Q 103, A i, REP i 298b-299b; AA 4-5 669b-673b; PART in SUPPL, Q 71,
A 2, ANS 299b-300d; PART ii-n, Q 2, A 7, ANS A 9, ANS and REP 1-2,6 910d-912b
and REP 2 396a-397c; Q 182, A 2, REP 3 621 d- 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 66a; 91a-94a
623a; PART in, Q 22 827c-833a; Q 62, A 5 862 b- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 82a; 197b-d;
863a; PART m
SUPPL, Q 71 900d-917b passim 198b-d; 596c-597a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, v [13-84] 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, HOd-lllc; 232c;
112b-113a 233a-c
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART n, 162d; 163b; 42 KANT: Science of Right, 443b-d
PART in, 197d-198a; 204b-c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dict(, 60b-65a
2fto 2g CHAPTER 79: RELIGION 609
21 DANTE Divine Comedy, HELL, iv [23-42] 5c-d;
:
63,20:1-49, 23:38-39, 33:i-37^ 4Q^:43-27/ 5:11, 16:1-40, 22:14-15 / Romans esp 1:8-16,
Hosea passim, esp ii (D) Osee passim, esp 2:5-4:25, 8:14-17, 9:1-11:14, 12:1-15:7 / I Co-
ii / Amos passim,
esp 3:1-2 /Jonah, 2:4 (D) rinthians esp 4:9-13, 10:16-17, 12:28-29, 13:1-
Jonas, 2:5 / Micah, 4:1-2 (D) Micheas, 4:1-2 13, 15:1-11 / // Corinthians passim, esp 1-2,
/ Habafyul(, 2:20 (D) Habacuc, 2:20 / 5-9 / Galatians, 1:1-2:9 esp 1:15-16; 3-4;
Zephaniah passim, esp 3:8-20 (D) Sophonias 5:14; 5:22-6:2 / Ephesians esp 1:22-23, 3:8-
passim, esp 3:8-20 / Haggai(D) Aggeus / 12, 4:1-5:2, 5:23-33 / Philippians, 1:27-2:4 /
Zechariah passim, esp 2:10-13, 6:12-15, 8:9- Cohssians esp 1:15-2:3, 3:12-15 / / Thessa-
23, 14:20-21 (D) Zacharias passim, esp 2:10- lonians, 4:9-10 / Hebrews, 3:5-6; 10:24-25;
13, 6:12-15, 8:9-23, 14:20-21 / Malachi pas- I 3 :i ~3 / J*mc$, 2:8-17 / * Peter* i:22 5 2:1-10
sim, esp 1:1-3, 3:1 (D) Malachias passim, // John/ II John
b. The Christian conception of the church: the 3c(l) The institution of the priesthood and
doctrine of the mystical body of Christ other ecclesiastical offices
OLD TESTAMENT: Song of Solomon (D) Can- OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, i^:i^~2o/ Exodus, 19:6;
ticle of Canticles 28-29; 30:17-21,30; 39; 40:12-15 / Lcviti-
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 4:18-22; 5:38-48; cus passim, esp 4 13-12, 7:5-10, 8:1-10:20, 14:13,
8:21-22; 9:35-10:42; 13; 16:18-19,24; 18:15- 16:1-34,21:1-22:16, 24:1-9 / Numbers, 1:49-
20; 19:19; 20:25-28; 22:34-40; 24:14; 25; 54? 3-5; 6:10-11,16-27; 8; 10:1-10; 15:24-
28:16-20 / Mark 10:42-45; 12:28-34; 13:10; 28; 16:1-19:7; 20:23-29; 25:6-13; 27:18-23;
16:14-20 / Lu\e, 4:43-44; 6:27-38; 9:1- 35:24-28,32 / Deuteronomy, 10:8-9; 12:18-
.
6; 10:16,25-37; 12:11-12; 22:24-30; 24:47 / 19; 17:8-13; 18:5-7; 20:1-4; 2I: 5J 2 4
:
^ 2 6-'i-
612 THE GREAT IDEAS
7 PLATO: Statesman, 597c-598a / Laws, BK vi,
3c. The nature ami organization of the religious 700d-701b; BK XH, 787b-c
community. 3^(1) The institution of the 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK vi, CH 8 [1322*19-
priesthood and other ecclesiastical offices?) 29] 526c; BK VH, CH 9 [1329*26-34] 533d
4; 33:8-11 1 Joshua* 3:3,6-17; 4:1-18; 6:1-20;
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 16, 122c-d
8:33; 19:51 (D) Josue, 3:3,6-17; 4:1-18; 6:1- 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK n [108-136] 127a b; [162-
20; 8:33; 19:51 / I Samuel, 2:12-17,27-36; 233] 128b-130b; BK m
[356-462] 157a-160a;
4:10-18; 21:1-9; 22:9-21 (D) I Kings, 2:12- BK v [700-718] 205b-206a; BK vi [33-101]
17,27-36; 4:10-18; 21:1-9; 22:9-21 / // Sam- 212a-213b; BK vm [280-305] 266b-267a
uel,15:24-29 (D) II Kings, 15 124-29 /I Kings, 14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 53d-56c /
8:1-11; 12:30-32; 13:33-340) m
Kin&> Camillus, llOb-d
8:1-11; 12:30-32; 13:33-347 II Kings, 12:4-10; 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK iv, 67d-68a / Histories,
16:10-16; 17:26-28,32; 22:3-14; 23:4-9,20 BK iv, 285d-286a; 287a-b
(D) IV Kings, 12:4-10; 16:10-16; 17:26-28,32; 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xvn, CH 4, 451c-
22:3-14; 23:4-9,20 / / Chronicles, 15:11-27; d; CH 4-6, 455b-458a
16:4-6,37-42; 23-26 (D) I Paralipomenon, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 91,
15:11-27; 16:4-6,37-42; 23-26 / // Chronicles, A 5, CONTRARY 2!lC-212c; Q 98, A 5, REP 2-3
5; 7:6; 8:14-15; 11:13-15; 13:9-12; 15:3; 243c-244b; Q 103, A i, REP 3 298b-299b; A 2,
19:8-11; 23:1-24:16; 29-31; 34:8-15; 35:1- ANS and REP 1-2 299b-300d; PART n-ii, Q i,
9; 36:14 (D) II Paralipomenon, 5; 7:6; 8:14- A 10 389d-390d; Q n, A 2, REP 3 439a-440b;
15; 11:13-15; 19:8-11; 23:1-
13:9-12; 15:3; Q 184, AA 5-8 633c-639b; Q 185 639c-650b;
24:16; 29-31; 34:8-15; 35:1-9; 36:14 / Ezra, Q 187, A i 663c-665a; Q 189, A 7 695d-696c;
1:1-5; 2; 6-12 passim, esp 6:16-20, 7:24-25,
PART in, Q 22 8 2 7c- 833 a; Q 26, A i, REP i
8:24-30 (D) I Esdras, 1:1-5; 2; 6-12 passim, 845b-846a; Q 64 870b-879c; Q 65, A i, ANS
csp 6:16-20, 7:24-25, 8:24-30' / Nehemiah, and REP 3 879c-881d; A 2, ANS and REP 2
8; 10:37-39; 12:27-47; i3:4-n,28-3i-(D) 881d-882c; A 3, ANS and REP 2 88 2 d -883d;, A
II Esdras, 8; 10:37-39; 12:27-46; 13:4-11,28- 4, ANS and REP 3 883d-884a,c
31 / Psalms, 110:4 (D) Psalms, 109:3 / Isaiah, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, 1x^73-
61:6; 66:20-21 (D) Isaias, 61:6; 66:20-21 / 145] 66c-67b
Jeremiah, 2:8; 5:30-31; 6:13; 8:10; 18:18; 23:1- 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [477-528] 167b-168a /
4,11; 33:18-22 (D) Jeremias, 2:8; 5:30-31; Prologue of Pardoner's Tale 372a-374a /
6:13; 8:10; 18:18; 23:1-4,11; 33:18-22 / Lam- Pardoner's Tale [12,829-902] 381b-382b
entations, 4:13,16 / Ezetyel, 7:26; 22:26; 34; 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 83a-84c; PART in,
44 19-3 1 ; 45 .-4-5 ; 48 :i o-i i (D) Ezechiel, 7 .-26 ; 177c-180d; 182d-186b; 199a; 200b-203b;
22:26; 34; 44:9-31; 45:4-5; 48:10-11 / Hosea, 205a; 207b-240a; PART iv, 248b-250c; 266a-
4:4-10 (D) Osee, 4:4-10 / Micah, 3:11 (D) c;272d-273a; 273d-274a; 275a-278d
Micheas, 3:11 / Zephaniah, 3:4 (D) Sopho- 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK 11,
nias, 3:4 / Haggai, 2:11-13 (D) ^ggeus, 2:12- 119b-122a passim; BK in, 186d-188c; 195d-
14 / Zechariah, 3; 6:9-13 (D) Zacharias, 3; 196b; 219b-222b; BK iv, 273c-274b; 285c-
6:9-13 / Malachi, 1:6-2:9 (D) Malachias, 297b
1:6-2:9 30 BACON Advancement of Learning, 7d
:
/ I Kings, 5-6; 8-(D) /// Kings, 5-6, 8 / 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK, v 347d-354a
I Chronicles, 17 (D) I Paralipomenon, 17 / 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 197a-b; 233d;
77 Chronicles, 1-7; 19:11 (D) II Paralipome- 299b-304d passim, esp 299b-d; 390c-393d
non, 1-7; 19:11 / Ezra(D) I Esdras passim; 443d-446b esp 444c-445b; 452b-453a;
APOCRYPHA: 11:26-27 (D) OT,
/ Maccabees, 582c; 611d-612a; 623d-624b; 631d-632a;
/ Machabees, 11:26-27 / // Maccabees, 7:30 642c-643a
(D) OT, // Machabees, 7:30 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, HOb-llld; 138b-
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 17:24-27; 22:15-22 140a; 145d-150c passim, esp 147d-148b; 195a;
(D) Matthew, 17:23-26; 22:15-22 / Mar\, 199c-202d; 204b-207a esp 205d-206b; 212d-
12:13-17 / Lufy, 20:19-26 / Acts, 5:29 / 213d; 214c-215c; 320d-321b; 356c; 360b-
Romans, 13:1-7 / Titus, 3:1/7 Peter, 2:13-17 361b; 417b-418d; 557c-563d esp 560d-561c;
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vin, CH 9 [1160*19-29] 567c-569d; 582c-S89d esp 586a-c, 588b-589d
412b-c 42 KANT: Science of Right, 442c-d; 444a-c /
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 30 138a,c; Judgement, 509d-510a
BK u, CH 5, 143d-144a; BK iv, CH 3 224b-d 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE vi
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 59d-60c [591-599] 16d; AMENDMENTS, i 17a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 15 17a-b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 52, 165c; NUMBER 57,
/ City of God, BK i, PREF 129a-d; BK iv, CH 177b
33-34 206c-207a,c; BK v, CH 15-16 220d-221b; 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 314c-315b
CH 25 228b-c; BK xi, CH i 322b,d-323a; BK 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 270
xv-xvin 397b,d-507a,c esp BK xv, CH 1-5 84d-89c; ADDITIONS, 162 143b-144c / Philos-
397b,d-400c, BK xvn, CH 1-3 449a-451c, BK ophy of History, INTRO, 175c-177b; 192c-d;
xvni, CH 1-2 472b,d-473d; BK xix, CH 5 205d-206a,c; PART in, 308b-c; 310c; PART iv,
513d-514b; CH n 516d-517b; CH 14 520a-d; 316a-317a; 325d-326b; 330b-331d; 336c-
CH 17 522b-523a; CH 19-26 523b-529a 337d; 345c-346c; 350b-c; 351b-354a; 365b-c
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 96,
: 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [10,977-11,034] 267a-
A 4, REP 2-3 233a-d; A 5, REP 2 233d-234d; 268b
PART H-II, Q 10, A 10 434c-435c; Q 12, A 2 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 28b-
443b-444b 32c; BK v, 133c-135a
40 to 50 CHAPTER 79: RELIGION 615
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK i, CH 1-6 129d-
4a. Religion in relation to forms of govern-
132d; CH 34 149a; BK xix, CH 26 528d-529a
ment: the theocratic state 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q
:
OLD TESTAMENT: Numbers, 27:12-23 / Judges, 187, A 2 665a-666a; Q 188, AA 2-4 675d-679d
8:22-23 / f Samuel, 8; 10:18-19,24; 12:12- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 80d-81a; 82b-d;
14,17-19 (D) I Kings, 8; 10:18-19,24; 12:12- PART iv, 258d
14,17-19 / Isaiah, 43:15 (D) haias, 43:15 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 306a-d; 324c-326b
/ Daniel, 4:17,25,32 (D) Daniel, 4:14,22,29 26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry IV, ACT i, sc i
APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther, 14:3 (D) OT, [187-215] 470a-b; ACT iv, sc i [30-87] 487c-
Esther, 14:3 488a; sc n [1-42] 489d-490a / Henry V, ACT
7 PLATO: Statesman, 597c-598a / L0tf, BK vi, i, sc i 533a-d
136] 40a-41b; PURGATORY, in [103-145] 57a-c; A 10 399b-400b; PART in SUPPL, Q 96, A 11,
xvi [58-129! 77c-78a; xxxn [37]-xxxm [78] ANS 1063d-1064d
102cM05a; PARADISE, v [64-84] 112d-113a; 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 208a-294b esp 208a-
ix [109-142] 119d-120a; xi [118-139] 123b-c; 215b, 238c-239c, 250a-b, 270a-271a, 293d-
xn [82-126] 124c-125a; xvin [118-136] 134d- 294b
135a; xxi [i2i]-xxn [18] 139c-d; xxn [61-96] 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 122b-c
140b-c; xxvn [1-66] 147b-148a; xxix [67- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 41b-d;
126] 151a-c lOla-b
22 CHAUCER: Second Nun's Tale [15,749-769] 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, 69a-71a,c / Objec-
466b / Parson's Tale, par 63-64 530a-531a tions and Replies, 125d-126a
23 HOUSES: Leviathan, PART i, 51d-52b; 78d- 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 219-241 212a-217b; 289-
83a passim; PART in, 172b-d; PART iv, 247a- 290 224b-225a; 430-609 245a-280b; 803-
267a 858 328b-342a
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xi, DIV
53a-c 107 499c-500b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 18d-20d; 91b-c; 152b- 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK xxiv, 200b-
156d; 209b-213a; 246a-258b passim; 497d* 201a; 202a-b
SOlc 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 206a-b; 348c-d,*
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, lOla-b / 670b-c
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 46 llOb-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART HI, 309a-d
32 MILTON: Christs Nativity la-7b esp [165-228]
5b-7a / Paradise Lost, BK i [331-621] lOOb-
6c. The unity and tradition of a religion
107a; BK xn [101-126] 321b-322a / Samson
349a-3SOa; [871-902] 6c(l) Orthodoxy and heresy: the role of dogma
Agonistes [433-471]
in religion; the treatment of heretics
358b-359a; [1139-1243] 364b-366b
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 71b-80b; 87a-88a; NEW TESTAMENT: Acts, 4:1-22; 5:14-42; 6:7-
94a-97a 8:3; 9:1-25 esp 9:1-2, 9:22-25; 13:4^5?
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 543b-544a 15:1-31; 17:5-14; 18:12-16; 21-26 passim /
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 13b-15a / Corinthians, 1:10; 11:18-197 Galatians, 1:8-
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 94 9; 5:19-20 / Titus, 3:10-11 / // Peter, 3:16 /
431b-c II John, 9-1 1
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 20a-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 10-18
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 437a-c 15b-18b esp par 18 18b; par 21 19a-b; BK v
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 184b-185d; 457b,d; 27a-34c passim; BK vn, par 25 51a-c / City of
458d-459c; 460a-463c; 600d-601a God, BK xvi, CH 2, 422b-d; BK xvin, CH 51
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 195a-202a passim; 502d-503d / Christian Doctrine, BK in, CH 33
207a-208c; 229c-230b; 252b-c; 328a 334c 670b-c
passim, esp 329c-330b, 334c 19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 28,
:
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 83a; 182d-184b; APOCRYPHA: (D) OT, I Mach-
/ Maccabees, 1-2
198d-200a; 305a-313d esp 305a-d, 310b- abees, 1-2 / II Maccabees, 6-7 (D) OT,
312b; 438b-443d esp 438b-c, 441a-443d; // Machabees, 6-7
541a-c; 601d-605b NEW TESTAMENT: Acts esp 7:54-8 13, 9:1-5, 9:22-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 134a-151c esp 24, 12:1-6, 12:18-20, 13:27-29, 13:44-50,
134d-138a, 143c-145d; 198a-202a; 328a- 14:4-5, 16:19-40, 17:5-14, 18:12-16, 19:23-40,
335a,c esp 330b-334a; 421b,d-423c 28:17-29 / Romans, 8:35-36 / / Corinthians,
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER i, 30a 4:9-13; 15:9 / II Corinthians, 1:5-8; 12:9-10 /
44 Bosw'ELL: Johnson, 221d-224a passim Galatians, 1:13-24; 2:1-5; 4 :2 9! 5 '-10-12; 6:12
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 270, / Philippians, 1:28-30 / / Thessalonians, 2:14-
88c-89a / Philosophy of History, PART i, 16
245d-246c; PART in, 313b-d; PART iv, 331d- 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 97c-98a; BK iv,
332c; 340d; 355a<b 137a-c; 138a-c; BK vm, 287c-d
47 GOETHE: Faust, PARTII [4897-4916] 121b-122a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK n, 44b-c; BK xv,
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 168a<c
128b-135a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK i-x 129a-
322a,c; BK xvin, CH 14 479c-d; BK xix, CH
6c{2) Sects and schisms arising from diver- 17 522b-523a; CH 23 525c-528a; CH 26 528d-
gences of belief and practice 529a / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 40 655b-
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK 11, 52c-d 656a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 10-18 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 98,
15b-18b; BK v 27a-34c passim; BK vn, par AA 4-5 242b-244b; PART n-n, Q i, A 5, REP i
25 51a-c / Christian Doctrine, BK in, CH 33 383b-384b; Q 3, A 2, REP 2-3 401a-d; Q 10
670b-c 426c-437d esp AA 7-12 431b-437d; Q 12, A 2
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q i, 443b-444b
A 10, ANS and REP i 389d-390d; Q 10, A 8, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, iv 5c-7a;
REP i 432b-433b; Q n, A i, REP 3 438a-439a; PARADISE, xix-xx 135a-138b
Q 39 574a-577d 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxvm 41b- 265-267 154b-155a / Tale of Man of Law
43a 236b-255b esp [4638-4686] 238a-239a, [4750-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 229d 4777] 240a-b, [4960-4970] 244a / Prioress's
27 SHAKESPEARE: Henry VIII, ACT v, sc in [8- Tale [13,418-620] 392a-395b
31] 581a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 80d; PART in,
32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 404b-405a; 406a-b; 246a,c
409b-410a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 116d-117c
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 7a-13a / PensSes, 26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice 406a-433d
862, 342b esp ACT i, sc in 409c-411b
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 22c-d / Human Under- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 41b-d;
standing, BK n, CH xxxin, SECT 18 251a-c; BK 96c-d / New Atlantis, 209a-b
iv, CH xix, SECT ii 386d-387c 32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes [433-471] 349a-
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 22a-b; PART iv, 350a; [871*902] 358b-359a; [1139-1243] 364b~
149b-150b 366b; [1334-1379] 368b-369b / Areopagitica,
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 332a-334b 386a<b; 388b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 344a-b; 33 PASCAL: Pcnstcs, 589-692 277b-301a passim;
345b-346c 852 341a-b
620 THE GREAT IDEAS 6eto6f
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 345b-346c
(6. Truth andfalsity in religion. 6d. The relation 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12b-14a; 231a-c;
of men of diverse faiths: the attitude of the 290c-291c;349a-c;383a-b;390c-391a;464b-d;
faithful toward infidels.) 603b; 607b-c; 642c-d; 643c-d
35 LOCKE: Toleration la-22d esp 6a-b, 13c-d / 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 227b-d; 285d;
Human Understanding, BK 11, CH xxxm, 333d-335a,c esp 334d-335a,c; 480d-481a
SECT 18 251a-c; BK iv, CH xix, SECT n 386d- 42 KANT: Science of Right, 444a-c
387c 43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: HI 5b
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 257a-268a passim 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE vi
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 152a-153b; 379c- [591-599] 16d; AMENDMENTS, 1 17a
380a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER i, 30a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK xv, HOa-d; 43 MILL: Liberty, 270c-271a; 274b-293b passim;
BK xix, 139d; BK xxi, 169b-c; BK xxiv, 307d-309a; 310c-312a
201c-d; 206c; BK xxv, 208a-c; 209a-b; 212d- 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 221d-224a; 421d; 436d-
214a,c 437a; 445b-c; 512c-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 435a-436a; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 353c-
437a-c; 439b-c d; 367a-b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 344a-b; 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 39a-b
345b-346c 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 428b-c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12a-d; 83a-b; 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
179d-181a; 188d-189a; 206b,d-234a,c esp 127b-137c passim
207b-211a, 225b-d; 290b-291a; 328c-330a,c;
348d-361a,c passim, esp 348d-349c, 352c- 6f. The rejection of supernatural foundations
for religion: the criticism of particular
354d; 457b,d-464d passim; 607 b-608a; 643c-d
beliefs and practices; the psychogenesis
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 138d; 148c-149b;
of religion
227d-228a; 237c-243b; 285d-288a; 323a-c;
377b-380d esp 378d, 380c-d; 383c-384b; 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [62-158]
386c-387a; 401b-d; 531b-534a ld-3a; BK n [167-183] 17a-b; BK in [417-
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 50c 1094] BK v [146-234] 63a-64a;
35c-44a,c;
43 MILL: Liberty, 270c-271a; 307d-309a; 311a- [1161-1240] BK vi [43-79] 80d-
76b-77b;
312a / Representative Government, 437d-438b 81b; [379-422] 85b-d
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 173b-174b; 285a-c; 299b- 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 69c-71b; 78d-
d; 313a; 347a-c; 431a-b; 436d-438b; 512a-d 80d; 83b; 90c; PART n, 149c-d; 151a-c; 162a-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART HI, 311d- 163b; PART in, 165b-166a; 172b-d; 176d-
312a; PART iv, 322c-323a 177b; 188a-198a; 198d-199a; 212d-215b;
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 39a-b; 60b-66a 236b-238c; PART iv, 247a-278d passim
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK HI, 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 256c-d
64c-67a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT x 488d-
54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 676c-d / Civiliza- 497b
tion and Its Discontents, 788c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 93b-c; 189d-190c;
200d-201b; 294a-297a esp 295c-296d; 345b-
6e. Religious liberty: freedom of conscience; 347a passim, esp 347a; 465b-467d; 599b-c
religious toleration 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 334a-d; 449a-d;
OLD TESTAMENT: Daniel, 6 452b; 476b-477a
APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther, i6(D) OT, Esther, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 21 7b-
16 c; 220c-221a; 227c-228a; 244c-245a; 253b-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 10, 254b; PART in, 292b-d; 304b; PART iv, 348d-
A 9, ANS 433b-434c; A n 435d-436b; A 12, 349b; 354d-355b; 361b-c
ANS 436b-437d; Q n, A 3 440b-441a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 302b-303d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 82d; PART n, 50 MARX: Capital, 31d; 35b-c; 181d [fn 3]; 305d-
102d-103a; 104a; 149b-c; 163c-d; PART HI, 306b [fn 2]
209a-211a; 245c-246a,c; PART iv, 249b; 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 428b-
273c-d d; 430a-b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 23b-c; 153d-155c; 208b- 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 21 d-
c; 324c-326b 22b; BK v, 123b-125c; 127b-137c passim, esp
32 MILTON: New Forcers of Conscience 68a-b 129b-130b; BK xi, 312b-c; 313c-314d; 337a-
35 LOCKE: Toleration- la-22d esp 5d-lla 346a passim
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 257a-258a 54 FREUD: Psycho- Analytic Therapy, 126c / In-
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xn, 85d- terpretation of Dreams, 138c-d / Group
86a; 86d-87b; BK xix, 144c-145a; BK xxv, Psychology, 692a-693a / Ego and Id, 707c-d /
211d-213d; BK xxvi, 218d-219a War and Death, 763b-c / Civilization and Its
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 439b-c Discontents, 767a-772a esp 767a-c, 770c-771b;
6gto7 CHAPTER 79: RELIGION 621
774c-d; 793b-c / New Introductory Lectures^ 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 239d-240a / Practical
875d-879c Reason, 346b-347a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 455a-c
6g. The relation between sacred doctrine and 44 Bos WELL Johnson, 102c-d
:
secular learning: the conflict of science 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 270,
and religion 87c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-
7 PLATO: Laws, BK vii, 729d-730d; BK xn, 160b; PART iv, 361b-c
797c-798b 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c-d / Descent
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK n, CH i [284b i-5] of Man, 593d
376a 50 MARX: Capital, 305a-306b [fn 2]
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [62-158] 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196a-197c;
ld-3a; BK in [1-93] 30a-31b; BK v [1-90] 61a- BK vi, 248d-249a; EPILOGUE n, 675a-677b;
62b 680b-c; 684b-d; 696a-c
14 PLUTARCH: Nicias, 435b-d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK iv,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 3-5 27c- 87c-d; BK vi, 164b
28c / City of God, BK vin, CH 1-12 264b,d- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 847b-848a
273a; BK xvm, CH 41 495b-496c; BK xix, 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874a-881c
CH 1 8 523a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH esp 875a-d, 878d-880b, 88 Ic
18-40 646a-656a; CH 42 656c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i 3a- 7. Historical observations concerning reli-
lOc passim; Q 2, A 2, REP i lld-12c; Q 12, AA gious beliefs, institutions, and contro-
versies
12-13 60d-62b; Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c; Q
32, 175d-178a; Q 39, A 7, ANS 209a-210a;
A i 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 5d-6a; 8b-c;
46, A 2, ANS 253a-255a; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c 31a-c; 32d-33a; 36b-c; 39a-b; 40d-41b; 45a-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q b; 48c; BK ii, 49d-50a; 52c-d; 56d-64c; 66c-
109, A i 338b-339c; PART H-II, Q i, A i 380b- d; 72d-73a; 75a-c; 76b-c; 77a-b; 77c-d; 78d;
381a; AA 3-5 381d-384b; Q 2, A 4 393c-394b; 80b-85d; BK in, 92c-93a; 95a-c; 97c-98a;
A 10 399b-400b; Q 4, A i, ANS 402a-403d; A 8 99d-100a; BK iv, 125a-b; 126d-127a; 129c-
409a-d 130b; 134b-d; 136d; 137a-c; 138a-c; 140c-
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, in [16- 141a; 142b-c; 155c-156a; 156d-157a; 157b;
45] S6a-b BK v, 176a-b; 183d-184a; BK vi, 199d-200a;
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 70c; 83b; PART 200d; 205c-d; BK vn, 235a; 242d-243a;
ii, 163a-b; PART in, 165a-c; PART iv, 260b-c; 248c-d; 250c-d; BK vm, 267a; 282b-c; BK
274c-d ix,308a-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 89c-d; 155a-c; 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK iv, 471b-
208d-209c; 212a-d; 238c-239c; 267c-268a; 472a; BK vi, 516b-c; 517d-518a
272d-273b 7 PLATO: Apology, 204c-205c / Phaedo, 220a-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 17b- 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [291-296] Ilia; BK xn
20a; 33c-d; 39d-42a esp 41b-d; 95d-97c / [829-842] 376a-b
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 65 114b-c; APH 79 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus la-15a,c passim / Romu-
119d~120a; APH 89 124a-d lus, 25b-26a / Numa Pompilius 49a-61d pas-
31 DESCARTES: Rules, in, 4d-5a / Discourse, sim, esp 56d / Solon, 68a-d / Camillus, HOb-d;
PART i, 43c / Meditations, 69a-d / Objections 114c-116a / Fabius, 142d-143a / Akibiades,
and Replies, 125b-126a; 162c-165d esp 164d- 162d-165b / Coriolanus, 185b-186a / Aemilius
165d; 283d-284a; 284d Paulus, 214b-d / Pelopidas, 239d-240c /
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 163a-166a / Marcellus, 247c-249d / Aristides, 271b-273c /
Pensees,226 212b-213a; 243-253 218a-220a; Lysander, 365a-366a / Alexander, 541b-c /
265-290 221b-225a; 434 248a-250a; 561-564 Demetrius, 735c-d
272b-273a / Vacuum, 355b-356b; 365b-366a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 4c; BK HI, 59b; 59d-
/ Geometrical Demonstration, 440a-b 60c; 62b-c; BK iv, 67d-68a; BK xn, 112d-
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH 113a;BK xni, 140d-141a; BK xiv, 148d-149a;
xvn, SECT 23-CH xvin, SECT ii 380b-384b; BK xv, 168a-c / Histories, BK n, 214d*215a;
CH xix, SECT 4 385b; SECT 14 387d-388a BK iv, 282d-283b; 293a-294a; BK v, 295b-
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xi, DIV 296a
102 497b-d; DIV 104, 498c; DIV 107 499c-500b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK i-x 129a-322a,c;
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 333d-334a; 362d BK xvm, CH 50 502b-d
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 334c-335b; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 98,
336b-337a A 6 244c-245b; Q 102, A 6, REP i-n 292c-
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 12d-13b; 159a-d; 298a passim; Q 103 298b-304a; Q 106, AA 3-4
190c-d; 200d-201a; 204d-205b; 205d-206a; 323a-325c
307a-309d; 599c; 658 b-c; 670b-d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxn
41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 335a,c [55-93] 87a-c; XXXH [100-160] 103c-104a
622 THE GREAT IDEAS
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 9d-IOa; 49d-50d;
(7. Historical observations concerning religious 109b-llld; 124b-133d esp 124c, 128d-130c,
beliefs, institutions, and controversies.) 133b-c; 134a-161a,c; 195a-220a,c csp 195a-
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xi 16d-17d 202a, 204b-209c, 214c-215c; 226a-310d esp
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 79b-84c; PART n, 226a-246c, 251d-261b, 282c, 285d-288a,c,
104a; PART in, 207b-240a; PART iv, 258b- 306a-307a; 320d-321b; 323a-324c; 328a-
267a; 275a-278d 335a,c; 345d-347a,c; 351d-367d passim, csp
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 152b-156d; 246a-258b; 352c-353b, 360b-361b, 365a-b; 371a-372a;
324c-326b 377b-441b esp 377b-387c, 406a-409c, 417b-
27 SHAKESPEARE: Henry VIII 549a-585a,c 420c, 422a-424d, 434d-437a; 451c-453a,c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 19c-d passim; 460d-464a; 476b-477b; 480d-481a;
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters la-167b 510b,d-522b; 529c-537a; 538b,d-556d pas-
35 LOCKE: Toleration, lOb / Human Understand- sim, esp 544b-545c; 557a-572d esp 565a-569d;
ing,
BK i, CH ii, SECT 9, 106b-c; CH in, SECT 8 582c-589d
114a-c 43 MILL: Liberty, 270c-271a; 278c-281c; 285c-
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xvi, 116c; 286b; 307d-309a; 310c-312a
BK xix, 144c-145a; BK xxiu, 196c-197c; BK 44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 314c-315b; 436d-438b
xxv, 208a-211a passim 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 192c-d;
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK iv, 435a-439c PART i, 216b-217c; 227b-228d; 233b-235c;
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 334c-335b; 237a-239c; 246c-247a; 252a-d; PART n, 268b-
343b,d-356d 271c; PART in, 289d-293b; 303c-317d esp
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12a-14a; 80d-83b; 313c-d; PART iv, 321d-323c; 330b-335a; 337d-
93b-d; 98a-c; 179a-234a,c; 289b,d-330a,c; 342a; 348b-355b; 358b-360c
344a-361a,c; 3 82 a -3 83 b; 387d-388d; 390c- 50 MARX: Ctf/>//*/, 358a-d
393d; 438a-453a; 457b,d-467d; 529b-532a; 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 428b-c
541a-542c; 547a-c; 582b-584b; 593b,d-608a,c; 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents,
611a-615a; 622c-624c; 629a; 642c-644a 788c
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the nature and causes of faith, sec GOD 60(2); KNOWLEDGE 60(5);
OPINION 43; TRUTH 43; WILL 3X3); and for the relation of religious faith to theology, see
THEOLOGY 2,
40, 5.
Other considerations of divine revelation and the problem of interpreting the Word of
God, see GOD 23, 6c(i); LANGUAGE 12; RHETORIC 2d; SIGN AND SYMBOL 56; THEOLOGY
4 b.
Matters bearing on the religious significance of miracles, omens, portents, and prophecies,
see GOD ye; NATURE 30(4); PROPHECY id, 33-30; SIGN AND SYMBOL 50.
Other discussions of religion as a virtue and of the virtues of the religious life, see GOD 3c~3e;
JUSTICE lib; TEMPERANCE 6a; VIRTUE AND VICE 8b, 8f-8g; and for the related doctrines
of grace and the theological virtues, see GOD yd; HABIT 5e(i)~5e(3); LIBERTY 5c; LOVE
5b~5b(2); NATURE 6b; SIN 7; VIRTUE AND VICE 8b, 8d-8e;WILL ye(2).
The theory of religious sacraments, see GOD ye; SIGN AND SYMBOL 5c.
The comparison of ecclesiastical and civil government, and of the religious with other com-
munities, see GOVERNMENT ib; STATE id.
Other discussions of the Jewish and Christian conceptions of the religious community, see
GoD8a-8d,9d.
The problem of church and HISTORY 5b; STATE 2g.
state, see
Another consideration of religious education, see EDUCATION y-yb; GOD 6c(i).
The general issue concerning truth and falsity in religion, and concerning orthodoxy and
heresy in religion, see GOD 10, 12-14; LIBERTY 2b; OPINION 4b; PROPHECY 5; THEOLOGY
4C 4e.
The relation of religion to science and philosophy, see PHILOSOPHY la; SCIENCE 2a; TRUTH
CHAPTER 79: RELIGION 623
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofys ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
"Jews," "Martyrs," "Mass," "Messiah," "Mir- CLAUDEL. The Tidings Brought to Mary
acles," "Religion," "Superstition," in A Philo- HARRISON. Ancient Art and Ritual
sophical Dictionary HUGEL. Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of
HOLBACH. The System of Nature Religion
WOOLMAN. Journal JOYCE.A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man
LrssiNG. Nathan the Wise BOSANQUET. What Religion Is
PALEY. A View of the Evidences of Christianity BUBER. Jewish Mysticism and the Legends of Baal'
JEFFERSON. Democracy, CH 6 shem
BLAKE. The Boo% of Thel Hasidism
.
INTRODUCTION
"A
yf
OST of the words commonly used as syn- fraud." Though fraud does no physical violence,
JL VJL onyms for "revolution," such as "insur- it does violence to the will of those who are de-
rection," "uprising," "rebellion, "or "civil war," ceived. In some cases when fraud is used, "the
carry the connotation of violence and the use of citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a
armed force. Most of the great revolutions in change of government, and afterwards," Aris-
western history which come readily to mind totle observes, "they are held in subjection
those in the city-states and empires of the an- against their will." In other cases, they may
cient world, the Peasants' Revolt in Germany subsequently be persuaded and their allegiance
by Crom-
in the i5th century, the rebellion led and good will won. But as Machiavelli's later
well in 1 7th century England, the American consideration of these two techniques of seizing
and French Revolutions in the i8th century, power indicates, the choice between force and
the Russian and the Spanish Revolutions in our fraud is one of expediency rather than of prin-
own time have been affairs of bloodshed. Yet ciple. He recommends guile as an alternative to
neither in political theory nor in historic fact force, with force held in reserve should cunning
does revolution always involve the use of force fail. Both methods, however,
employ the strat-
or the resort to violence. egy of warfare.
Thucydides describes both violent and non- As opposed to both force and fraud, and even
violent revolutions in the alternations of de- to the method of civil disobedience, which acts
mocracy and oligarchy in the constitution of the outside the law or in violation of it, the writers
Greek city-states. In England, the Great Re- of The Federalist conceive the possibility of a
bellion which, by civil war, succeeds in behead- revolutionary process which is at once peaceful
ing one Stuart king, is followed by the Blood- and legal. It is precisely because they think that
less Revolution of 1688 which, without any war the Constitution of the United States affords
at all, unseats another. Some of the revolutions the opportunity for achieving political change
in the European states in the middle years of the by constitutional amendment that they defend
ipth century are accompanied by barricades and the clause which guarantees "to every State in
fighting. Some, however, like the revolutions this Union a republican form of government,"
accomplished by the Reform Bills in England and promises to protect each of them, upon ap-
or by constitutional amendments in the United plication to the federal government, "against
States, are fundamental changes in government domestic violence." To the objection that such
effected by due process of law, by peaceful a guaranty may involve "an officious interfer-
shifts in the distribution of political power. ence in the domestic concerns of the members,"
A revolution may involve action in defiance Hamilton replies: "It could be no impediment
of the law and yet be prosecuted without vio- to reforms of the State constitutions by a m'a-
lence on the part of the revolutionists, as in the jority of the people in a legal and peaceable
which Gandhi led against
case of the rebellion mode. This right would remain undiminished.
British rule in India by the method of civil The guaranty could only operate against changes
disobedience. The use of armed force may not, to be effected by violence. Towards the preven-
however, be the only technique of revolution- tion of calamities of this kind, too
many checks
ary violence. "Revolutions are effected in two cannot be provided."
ways," according to Aristotle, "by force and by In another of the Federalist papers, Madison
626
CHAPTER 80: REVOLUTION 627
considers the possibility of "an insurrection these strive to reform and innovate, one this
pervading all the States, and comprising a su- way, another that way; and thereby bring it
periority of the entire force, though not a con- into distraction and civil war."
stitutional right." He thinks such a case beyond Locked principle seems to be that "whoever
"the compass of human remedies." It is enough uses force without right as everyone does in
if the Constitution "diminishes the risk of a society who does it without law puts himself
calamity for which no possible constitution can into a state of war with those against whom he
provide a cure." Nor does "a conflagration so uses it." Having entered into society "and
through a whole nation, or through a very large introduced laws for the preservation of proper-
proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty ty, peace and unity amongst themselves," men
causes of discontent given by the government who "set up force again in opposition to the
or from the contagion of some violent popular laws, do rebellarethat is, bring back again the
paroxysm" seem to Hamilton to "fall within state of war and are properly rebels."
any ordinary rules of calculation." In his esti- Aquinas also seems to align revolution (which
mation, "no form of government can always he calls "sedition") with war and strife,
though
either avoid or control" such revolutions. But, he thinks it differs from them in two respects:
he adds, "where the whole power of the govern- "First, because war and strife denote actual ag-
ment is in the hands of the people, there is the gression on either side, whereas sedition may be
lesspretence for the use of violent remedies in said to denote either actual aggression or the
partial or occasional distempers of the State." preparation for such aggression. . Secondly, . .
gests, may be the result of accidents rather mutually dissentient parts of one people, as
than of planned actions. "Political revolutions," when one part of the state rises in tumult
he writes, sometimes "spring from a dispropor- against another part."
tionate increase in any part of the state. . . .
And this disproportion may sometimes happen THOUGH THE WORD "revolution" may be used
by accident, as at Terentum, from a defeat in in both senses, it nevertheless seems to be the
which many of the notables were slain in a case that traditional discussions of the causes
battle with the lapygians just after the Persian and prevention of revolution, theories of revo-
War, the constitutional government in conse- lutionary strategy and tactics, and the great
quence becoming a democracy." Or "when the issue of the right of rebellion all seem to con-
rich grow numerous or properties increase, the template the resort to, or at least the threat of,
form of government changes into an oligarchy force to gain an end. This also seems to be im-
or a government of familes." plied in the popular conception of the differ-
On the other hand, to writers like Hobbes ence between revolution and evolution.
and Locke, revolution means war and is insepa- The contrast between revolution and evolu-
rable from violence, Those who "deny the tion may explain why the note of violence, dis-
authority of the Commonwealth" apart from order, or disruption colors the idea of revolu-
which, according to Hobbes, men live in a state tion. The word "evolution" usually signifies
of war by renouncing their subjection to the change which gradual and which tends in one
is
Sovereign, "relapse into the condition of war direction rather than another, that direction
commonly called Rebellion. . . . For rebellion is being for the most part toward a progressive
but war renewed." Unlike bees and ants, the development of changes already accomplished.
peace of whose societies is never threatened by Revolution is abrupt. Revolutions can occur in
rebellion, there are "amongst men . . .
very either direction, against the tide as well as with
it. As action and reaction can be
many that think themselves wiser, and abler to equal and op-
govern the public, better than the rest; and posite in physical motion, so in social change
628 THE GREAT IDEAS
revolution and counter-revolution can aim in olutionary document. Its signers are prepared
opposite directions. In either case, whether rev- to use force to overthrow the established order
olution reverses the direction of change or pre- which, in their view, has worked grievous
cipitates a radical transformation toward which iniquities and injustices upon the colonies. But
things are moving too slowly, revolution seems in the Marxist view the rebellion of the colo-
to involve overthrowing the established order nists, unlike the French Revolution, is
political
rather than developing its latent tendencies. rather than economic, even if it has economic
It is in this sense that the revolutionist is a as well as political motivations. This distinction
radical. He may also be a reactionary in the between economic and political revolution
sense that the radical change he is willing to use seems to be peculiarly modern.
force to achieve, is a return to some earlier con- It is not that the ancients Thucydides,
dition rather than one which, in the judgment Plato, and Aristotle, for example fail to recog-
of his opponents, is in the line of progress or nize the "class war," which is paramount for
evolution. But whether reactionary or progres- Marx. They observe (as is indicated in the chap-
sive the revolutionist is never conservative. If ter on OLIGARCHY) the struggle between the
the established order does not submit readily rich and the poor for control of the state. They
to the radical change which a revolutionary know that the opponents, in the frequent and
violent revolutions which disturbed the
person or party seeks, or if it resists, it must be Greek
forced to yield. The revolutionist can be reluc- city-states, are the oligarchs and the democrats
tant to use force, but he can never forswear it the men of great property and the men of
entirely. little or none.
This seems to be the sense in which Marx and The revolt of the Helots in Sparta is the ex-
Engels conceive the program of the Communist ceptional case of a rebellion of slaves against
Manifesto as a revolutionary program. Their their masters. For the most part, the struggle
conception of a revolutionary class or party is isbetween free men belonging to different eco-
not, however, limited to the proletariat in their nomic classes. The oligarchical and democratic
struggle against the bourgeoisie. They apply it revolutions which these classes in society fo-
to the bourgeoisie, not in the contemporary ment are political in the sense of seeking to
world when the established order of capitalism change the constitution rather than the eco-
makes the bourgeoisie conservative or reaction- nomic system itself, even though the constitu-
ary, but in the i8th century when may have economic
the bour- tional changes as well as
geoisie overthrew the landed aristocracy. political effects."In the opinion of some," Aris-
'The bourgeoisie," they write, "historically totle reports, "the regulation of property is the
has played a most revolutionary part. The . . . chief point of all, that being the question upon
French revolution, for example, abolished feu- which all revolutions turn."
dal property in favor of bourgeois property." Aristotle is
willing to admit that "the equal-
And again: "When Christian ideas succumbed ization of property" may "prevent the citizens
in the i8th century to the rationalist ideas, feu- from quarrelling," but he does not think that
dal society fought its death-battle with the then economic injustice is the only cause of revolu-
revolutionary bourgeoisie." That the French tion, or economic justice its absolute cure.
Revolution represents the struggle not between "The avarice of mankind," he writes, "is in-
the propertied and the propertyless classes, but satiable; at one time two obols was pay enough;
between two propertied classes the bourgeoi- but now, when this sum has become customary,
sie and the aristocrats- seems evident to Marx men always want more and more without end;
in the fact that "during the very first storms of for it is of the nature of desire not to be satis-
the revolution, the French Bourgeoisie dared fied, and most men live only for the gratifica-
to take away from the workers the right of tion of it. The beginning of reform," in his
association just acquired." opinion, "is not so much to equalize property
No LESS THAN THE Communist Manifesto, the desire more, and to prevent the lower from
American Declaration of Independence is a rev- getting more; that is to
say, they must be kept
CHAPTER 80: REVOLUTION 629
equalization of political status, not the equali- the nobility ... the bourgeoisie has at last,
had succeeded in abolishing the institution of in the modern representative State, exclusive
cal change in an economy based on manufac- without open warfare, no less violent than the
tures, when mass production by machines in earlier struggle of the bourgeoisie against the
factories replaces the system of production by aristocrats. Standing "face to face with the
workers using their own tools in their own bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a
a handicraft?" But for Marx the meaning of Manifesto distinguishes between communism
economic revolution is not limited to radical and socialism, especially the "utopian" variety
changes in the physical conditions of produc- of the latter. The Socialists "reject all political,
tion. Such changes necessarily involve equally and especially all revolutionary action; they
radical changes in the social relationships of wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and
economic classes, and in their possession of po- endeavor by small experiments, necessarily
power. In the Manifesto, "the modern
litical doomed to failure, and by the force of example,
bourgeoisie" is said to be "itself the product of to pave the way for the new social Gospel. . . .
a long course of development, of a series of They, therefore, endeavor, and that consis-
revolutions in the modes of production and ex- tently, to deaden the class struggle and to rec-
change." The bourgeoisie, in turn, "cannot oncile the class antagonisms." Communist
exist without constantly revolutionizing the in- strategy, on the contrary, everywhere supports
struments of production, and thereby the re- "every revolutionary movement against the ex-
lations of production, and with them the whole isting social and political order of things. . . .
According to Marx and Engels, "each step and aims. They openly declare that their ends
in the development of the bourgeoisie was ac- can be attained only by the forcible overthrow
companied by a corresponding political ad- of all existing social conditions."
vance of that class. An oppressed class under the Though fundamentally economic, the com-
sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self- munist revolution cannot help having political
governing association in the mediaeval com- effects. "Political power," according to Marx
630 THE GREAT IDEAS
and Engcls, merely the organized power of
"is er oligarchy or monarchy or any other, try to
one oppressing another." This applies
class for get the administration into their own hands."
to the proletariat's conquest of power. Yet they To these two types of revolution Aristotle adds
also seem to think that the dictatorship of the a third, which "may be directed against only a
away the conditions for the existence of class ciple of constitutions can be changed from oli-
antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will garchy to democracy by amendments or legal
thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a reforms which extend the franchise. The struc-
class." In aiming at the economically classless ture of the government, as to its offices or their
society, with the consequent transformation of organization, can be changed by some form of
the state, the communist program seems to con- peaceful plebiscite. As the Federalists point out,
ceive its revolution as abolishing the possibility the polls provide a "natural cure for an ill-ad-
of or need for any further revolutions, peaceful ministration in a popular or representative con-
or violent, economic or political. stitution," namely, a change of men. But such
question whether an economically classless soci- being radical transformations of the polity.
ety means the withering away of the state, or What is true of constitutional changes in ancient
at least such changes in political institutions republics is also true of monarchies and tyran-
that revolution would cease to be possible or nies, both ancient and modern.
necessary. Even a hypothetical consideration ot When absolute power is concentrated in the
this question seems to call for attention to the hands of one man, his subjects are necessarily
various ways in which political revolutions take without juridical means for redressing their
place. With the advent of the "classless society," grievances by changing the occupant of the
no opportunity would remain, at least in theory, throne, much less for abolishing the monarchy
for the type of revolution in which one ruling entirely in favor of self-government. Machiavel-
class replaces another. But in such a society it li's advice to the prince on safeguarding his
conceivable that the equivalent of a pal-
is still
power against usurping rivals or rebellious sub-
ace revolution might substitute one ruling indi- seems to be written against the back-
jects,
vidual for another
by the old-fashioned ground of force and fraud as the normal methods
methods of assassination or usurpation. of changing rulers or modes of rule. They are
For Aristotle, however, all revolutions which the very same methods which the prince in
produce a change from one form of government power must employ to maintain his position.
to another also involve the replacement of one "There are two ways of contesting," Machia-
ruling class by another. He distinguishes be- velli writes, "the one by law, the other by
tween such revolutions as affect the constitu- method is proper to men, the
force; the first
"when men seek to change from an existing
tion, second to beasts; but because the first is fre-
form into some other, for example, from de- quently not sufficient, it is necessary to have
mocracy into oligarchy, or from oligarchy into recourse to the second. Therefore it is
necessary
democracy," and those revolutions which do for a prince to understand how to avail himself
not affect the constitution, when men, "with- of the beast and the man. . . .
Being compelled
out disturbing the form of government, wheth- knowingly to adopt the beast, [a prince] ought
CHAPTER 80: REVOLUTION 631
to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion deals with in theory as the degeneration of the
cannot defend himself against snares and the state into anarchy by the repudiation of the
fox cannot defend himself against wolves." It social contract, calls to mind no historic ex-
follows, according to Machiavelli, that the amples; but the few historic instances of "wars
prince seldom can be, though he should always of secession" certainly illustrate the point.
try to appear to be, "merciful, faithful, humane, They aim to dissolve a federal state by severing
religious, upright. ... A
prince, especially a ties of union which have something like a con-
new one, cannot observe all those things for tractual character.
which men are esteemed, being often forced, in The distinction between these types of civil
order to maintain the state, to act contrary to war may be clear in theory, yet difficult to
fidelity, friendship, humanity, and religion." apply to historic cases. Which sort of insurrec-
The stories of oriental despotism told by tion a rebellion of colonies or a secession of
Herodotus, the account of the Caesars given by states does the Declaration of Independence
Tacitus and Gibbon, the chronicle of the Eng- announce? A theory current among American
lish monarchy in the historical plays of Shake- 1775 suggests that the thir-
political writers in
speare, all seem to indicate that crowns seldom teen colonies claimed the status of self-govern-
change heads without bloodshed. Machiavelli's ing dominions in a confederacy united under
rules for the prince do not greatly enlarge upon the British crown. On this theory, does the
Aristotle's description of "the arts by which the principle stated in the Declaration that it is
tyrant preserves his power." Even when Aris- sometimes "necessary for one people to dissolve
an alternative method, that
totle proposes, as the political bands which have connected them
the tyrant can try to be benevolent, he adds with another, and to assume among the powers
the Machiavellian suggestion that the tyrant of the earth the separate and equal station to
should at least "appear to act" like a good king. which the laws of nature and of nature's God
The tyrant, Aristotle writes, "should lop off entitle them" cover the secession of the South-
thosewho are too high. He must put to death ern states from the American union, as well as
men of spirit. ... He must be on his guard the revolt of the American states from Great
against anything which is likely to inspire either Britain, or the British Commonwealth of na-
courage or confidence among his subjects. He tions Questions of fact are involved, of course,
?
must prohibit literary assemblies or other meet- in any comparison of the Revolutionary War
ings for discussion, arid he must take every of 1776 and the war between the states in
means to prevent people from knowing one 1 86 1 but the question of principle turns on the
;
another." After enumerating many similar prac- whole issue of whether revolution is a matter of
tices which he calls "Persian and barbaric arts," might or right.
Aristotle concludes that "there is no wicked-
ness too great for the tyrant" if he is to main- THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION does not seem to be
tain himself in power. a central consideration in ancient political the-
These matters are more fully discussed in the ory. The ancient discussion of revolutions ap-
chapter on TYRANNY. In our present considera- pears to be more concerned with their causes,
tion of the types of revolution, we must note their methods, and their prevention. This does
one other political change which usually in- not mean that the ancients treat revolutions
volves the widespread turbulence of civil war. entirely as contests for power. On the contrary,
That is the rebellion of subject peoples against Aristotle declares that "the universal and chief
their imperial masters. Unlike civil uprisings, cause of the revolutionary impulse" is "the de-
which seek to overthrow governments or effect sire of equality, when men think that they are
a change in the ruling classes or persons, these equal toothers who have more than themselves;
wars of rebellion seek to liberate one people of inequality and superior-
or, again, the desire
from another or to establish the independence ity, when
conceiving themselves to be superior
of colonies at the expense of empire. they think that they have not more but the
Still another type of insurrection aims at the same or less than their inferiors pretensions
dissolution of the state itself. What Rousseau which may or may not be just."
632 THE GREAT IDEAS
Nevertheless, Aristotle's elaborate treatise on The right to resist a tyrant, or a king turned
revolution in the fifth book of his Politics deals despot, may lead to regicide, but this seems no
alike with revolutions that spring from real and Locke from the punishment of any
different to
apply to particular states, and out of what and continues, "he has a right, when he prevails, to
into what they mostly change; also what are punish the offender, both for the breach of the
the modes of preservation in states generally, or peace, and all the evils that followed upon it."
in a particular state, and by what means each Rousseau is even hesitant to condone tyran-
less
state may be best preserved" not how revolu- nicide. "The contract of government is so com-
tion can be justified or why rebellion is the pletely dissolved by despotism," writes Rous-
crime of treason or the folly of anarchy. Such seau, "that the despot is master only so long as
questions seem to come to the foreground in he remains the strongest; as soon as he can be
modern political theory, though they also have expelled, he has no right to complain of vio-
a certain prominence in mediaeval teaching. lence. The popular insurrection that ends in
Aquinas, for example, holds that sedition is the death or deposition of a Sultan is as lawful
"a special kind of sin" because it is "opposed to an act as those by which he disposed, the day
a special kind of good, namely, the unity and before, of the life and fortunes of his subjects.
peace of a people." He qualifies this, however, As he was maintained by force alone, it is force
in the case of an uprising against tyranny, even alone that overthrows him."
if itinvolves civil strife. Since in his view "a Those who say that "it may occasion civil
tyrannical government is not just, because it is wars or intestine broils, to tell the people they
directed, not to the common good but to the are absolved from obedience when illegal
private good of the ruler . . . there is no sedition attempts are made upon their or prop- liberties
in disturbing a government of this kind, unless erties may as well say upon the same
. , .
indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordi- ground," in Locke's opinion, "that honest men
nately that his subjects suffer greater harm may not oppose robbers and pirates because
from the consequent disturbance than from the this may occasion disorder or bloodshed." Nor
tyrant's government. Indeed," Aquinas writes, does Locke think that the right to resist injus-
"it is the tyrant rather who is guilty of sedition, tice means that governments will be overthrown
since he encourages discord and sedition among "upon every little mismanagement in public
his subjects, that he may lord over them more affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part," he
securely." writes, "many wrong and inconvenient laws,
Holding that "the end of government is the and all the slips of human frailty will be borne
good of mankind," Locke asks, in a similar vein, by the people without mutiny or murmur.
which is better: "that the people should be al- But if a long train of abuses, prevarications,
ways exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, and artifices, all tending the same way, make
or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to the design visible to the people ... it is not to
be opposed when they grow exorbitant in the be wondered that they should then rouse them-
use of their power, and employ it for the de- selves and endeavor to put the rule into such
struction and not the preservation of the prop- hands which may secure to them the ends for
erty of their people" ? Sintfe "force is to be op- which government was at first erected."
posed to nothing but unjust and unlawful Hence, to those who say that his revolution-
Locke argues that a king may be resisted
force," ary principle "lays a perpetual foundation for
when he exceeds his authority or prerogative disorder," Locke replies that it will never oper-
and uses his power unlawfully. Since such a king ate until "the inconvenience is so great that the
"has dethroned himself, and put himself in a majority and are weary of it, and find it
feel it,
state of war with his people, what shall hinder necessary to have it amended." Rebellions will
them from prosecuting him who is no king, as occur only when the majority feel that "their
they would any other man who has put himself laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and
into a state of war with them?" lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion
CHAPTER 80: REVOLUTION 633
too," and so will exercise their natural right to "food, air, medicine, or any other thing with-
resist, with force if necessary, the illegal force out which he cannot live."
used against them. But strictly, it is not the Kant disallows rebellion as a matter of right,
ducing it from other natural rights of life, juridical constitution "may be vitiated by great
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is to defects and coarse errors, it is nevertheless abso-
secure these rights that "governments are in- lutely unallowable and punishable to resist it."
stituted among men," so that "whenever any Since, in his view, public right is founded on
form of government becomes destructive of the institution of "a sovereign will, uniting all
some qualification on their denial of a right of latter situation corresponds to the Idea of the
resistance or rebellion. Hobbes, for example, state fully realized, for Hegel, only in a con-
denies the right of men to change their form of stitutional monarchy, never in a despotism or
government, or of subjects to resist their Sover- tyranny. "A rebellion in a province conquered
eign, exceptfor the sake ofself-preservation. When by war," he says, "is a different thing from a
men covenant to form a commonwealth, they rising in a well-organized slate. It is not against
are bound, Hobbes
uphold the actions
says, to their prince that the conquered are in rebellion,
and judgments of the Sovereign they have cre- and they arc committing no crime against the
ated; they "cannot lawfully make a new cove- state, because their connexion with their master
nant amongst themselves, to be obedient to any is not a connexion within the Idea, or one within
other without his permission.
. . .
They . . . the inner necessity of the constitution. In such
that arc subjects to a monarch, cannot without a case, there is only a contract, no political tie."
his leave cast offmonarchy, and return to the With such qualifications on their position,
confusion of a disunited multitude." those who disfavor revolution or deny its basis
judgments of the Sovereign instituted, it fol- justified. There may be qualifications on the
lows," according to Hobbes," that whatsoever other side too. Aquinas, for example, justifies
he doeth, it can be no injury to any of his sub- sedition, not against any government or ruler,
jects; nor ought he to be by any of them ac- but only against tyranny. The signers of the
cused of injustice." Yet "every subject has Declaration of Independence speak of a right to
liberty in all those things, the right whereof alter or abolish "any form of government," but
cannot by covenant be transferred," such as the the writers of the Federalist papers do not seem
right of a man to defend his own body, "to re- equally willing to acknowledge a right to over-
sist those that assault him," or to have access to throw the Constitution of the United States.
634 THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature of revolution 635
10. The issue concerning violent and peaceful means for accomplishing social,
2^. Change in the persons holding power: deposition, assassination, usurpation 637
2c. Change in the extent of the state or empire: dissolution, secession, liberation,
federation 638
30. The aims of political revolution: the seizure of power; the attainment of liberty,
justice, equality
5.
The strategy of economic revolution
5#. Revolution as an expression of the class struggle: rich and poor, nobles and
commons, owners and workers 642
5^. The organization of a revolutionary class: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as
revolutionary classes in relation to different economic systems
6a. The right of rebellion: the circumstances justifying civil disobedience or violent
insurrection
6b. The right to abrogate the social contract or to secede from a federation 643
7. Empire and revolution: the justification of colonial rebellion and the defense of
imperialism
CHAPTER 80: REVOLUTION 635
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK u [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
:
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side eft he page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
page.
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
:
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 ()) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
d, [162-183] 576b, ACT in, sc i [164-176] Henry IV, ACT i, sc i 434b,d-435c / Julius
582b Caesar, ACT in, sc i [253-275] 583b
35 LOCKE: Toleration, 14d / Civil Government, 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xin, SECT 155
CH xix, SECT 226-229 77a-78a 60d-61a; CH xix, SECT 224-243 76d-81d esp
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 33a-38a; PART in, SECT 224-230 76d-78c
114b-115b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 48d-49a; 113b;
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xn, 88a- 437d
90c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 474a; 594b-595b
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK 11, 398d 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: la-3b esp
40 GIBBON': Decline and Fall, 251d; 474c-475a; [80-94] 2b-3a
525d-526b 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE iv,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 93c; 473b-d; 587b- SECT 4 16b-c
588a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 16 66c-68d; NUMBER
42 KANT: Science of Right, 439a-441d; 450d- 28 96c-98b; NUMBER 29, 99b-101a; NUMBER
451a 43, 141a-142d; NUMBER 46, 152a-153a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE in, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in,
SECT 3 15d-16a; AMENDMENTS, xiv, SECT 2-4 297a-d
18d-19a 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 424d;
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 43, 140c-d; NUMBER 69, 428a-b
208c-d; NUMBER 74, 222b-d
43 MILL: Liberty, 274b,d [fn i] 2. The nature of political revolutions
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 172
146c-d 2a. Change in the form of government or con-
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [4812-4830] H9b- stitution
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 258, 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth 284a-310d esp ACT
81a-b; ADDITIONS, 166 145b-c / Philosophy of iv, sc in 303b-306b / Tempest, ACT i, sc n
8a-c; CH vi, 9b-10a; CH vn, llb-c; CH vin-x, tract, BK H, 402b-d; 404c-d; BK in, 418a-
5a. Revolution as an expression of the class 6a. The right of rebellion: the circumstances
struggle: rich and poor, nobles and justifying civil disobedience or violent
commons, owners and workers insurrection
b b a b
BK v, CH 3 [i303 5-8] 505a; CH 4
[i304*i8- 6] 468d-469a; BK v, CH i [i3oi 38- 2J 502b-c
a
505d-506a; en 7 [1306^2-1 307 2] 508c-d; CH 14 PLUTARCH: Tiberius Gracchus 671b,d-681a,c
b
9 [1310*19-25] 512c; CH 10 [i3io 9-i5] 512d- esp 678b-d
b
513a; CH 12 [i3i6*39- 22] 519c-d / Athenian 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 6b-7a; lOd-lld; BK
Constitution, CH 2 553a-c; CH
554d-555a 5 xv,174b-d/Hw/or;,BKi,198d-199c;212a-b;
14 PLUTARCH Solon, 68d-70c/ Pericles, 124a-130b
: BK n, 234b-d; BK iv, 290a-c
csp 126d-127a / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Agis
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 96,
648b,d-656d/ Cleomenes,6S7a-663c / Tiberius A 4 233a-d; PART II-H, Q 42, A 2, REP 3
Gracchus 671b,d<681a,c / Caius Gracchus 584b-d
681b,d-689a,c / Cicero, 708a-713b 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xxvi 36b-37d
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK 11, 224d-225a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 91b-92b passim;
26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT iv, sc n PART n, 101a-102c; 104b-d; 112b-c; 115a-116a;
57d-59d 153c; PART iv, 273a-b; CONCLUSION, 279d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus, ACT i, sc i [1-47] 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 47a-51a; 318c-319b;
351a-d 462c-465c; 504c-506a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xi, 77b- 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard HI, ACT v, sc in [237-
79b 270] 146b-c / 1st Henry IV, ACT iv, sc m[52
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 126d-127c; 144a-c 105] 459d-460b / 2nd Henry IV, ACT i, sc i
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 574b-582b passim, [187-215] 470a-b; ACT iv, sc i 487b-489d /
esp 575a-d, 578c-581a Julius Caesar, ACT n, sc i [10-191] 574c-576c;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART n,263b-d; ACT in, sc i [78-121] 581b-d
275b-276a; PART HI, 295d-296c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT iv, sc in 303b-
50 MARX: Capital, 8d-9c; 113c; 131a-146c esp 306b
131a, 134d, 137a, 138b-c, 141c, 146b-c; 209c- 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 16d-17c / Civil Govern-
210c; 294b-295a ment, CH in, SECT 18 29b; CH xm, SECT 149
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto 415a- 59b-d; SECT 155 60d-61a; CH xiv, SECT 168
434d 64b-c; CH xvi, SECT 176 66a-b; SECT 190-192
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 410c-421c 69b-d; SECT 196 70b-c; CH xvni-xix 71a-81d
54 FREUD: New Introductory lectures, 884a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vin, 54b-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 361a-362a
5b. The organization of a revolutionary class: 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 71b-74a esp 73b-c;
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as 144a-c
revolutionary classes in relation to dif- 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 92 d; 166a-167d;
ferent economic systems 473b-d
50 MARX: 354a-378d esp 356c-358a,
Capital, 9c;
42 KANT: Science of Right, 439a-441d; 457a
371d-372b, 378c, 378d-379b [fn 2] 43 DECLARATION OP INDEPENDENCE: la-3b
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 4lfa-d\ 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47a-c; NUMBER 14,
419b,d-425b esp 419d-420c, 421d-422a, 422c, 62b-d; NUMBER 21, 78d-79b; NUMBER 26,
423b-424b;428d 92a-94b; NUMBER 28 96c-98b; NUMBER 60,
184b-d
5c. The of eco-
classless society as the goal 43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-268b; 274b,d [fn i]
nomic revolution: the transformation of 44 EOSWELL: Johnson, 120a-c; 195c-d; 219d-220a
the state 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of'History;PART iv,342c-d;
50 MARX: Capital, 9c 364a-c
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto,416c~d', 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 430a;
424d-425b; 429b-c 432b-c;434d
6 to 7 CHAPTER 80: REVOLUTION 643
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 9d-10b; 14 PLUTARCH: Flamininus 302b,d-313a,c pas-
EPILOGUE i, 668a-669d; EPILOGUE n, 680b< sim
684a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 17c-d; BK iv, 76a;
82d-83a; BK XH, 117c-d; BK xiv, 149a-b /
6b. The right to abrogate the social contract or
Histories, BK i, 191d-192a; BK iv, 269d-270b;
to secede from a federation
290a-d; BK v, 301c~d
6 THUCYDIDKS: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 358d- 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK HI, CH 14 175b-
360c; BK in, 418d-419d 176d; BK iv, CH 3-4 190a-d; CH 15 196c-197a;
7 PLATO: Crito, 216d-219a,c esp 217c-218b / BK v, CH 12, 216d-218a; BK xix, CH 21, 524c-d
Laws, BK vi, 706b-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART u, HOb-llla; CON-
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 91a-92b; PART n, CLUSION, 279d-281a
101a-102a 26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st
Henry VI la-32a,c esp ACT
35 LOCKE: Government, CH vin, SECT 95-99
Civil i, sclb,d-3c / 2nd Henry VI 33a-68d esp
i
46c-47c passim; SECT 113-122 51b-53c passim; ACT i, sc i 33b,d-36b, ACT in, sc i [82-92]
CH xix, SECT 211 73d- 74a; SECT 243 81d 47d-48a / 3rd Henry VI 69a-104d esp ACT in,
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 358b-359a / Political sc in 88a-91b / Henry V 532a-567a,c esp
Economy, 374a-b / Social Contract, BK in, ACT i, sc n 534a-537b, EPILOGUE 567c
419a-b;424d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Cymbeline, ACT HI, sc i 463c-
42 KANT: Science of Right, 449d; 450d-451c 464c
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: la-3b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xvi, SECT 176
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: xin 9c 66a-b; SECT 192 69c-d; SECT 196 70b-c; CH
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS, xix, SECT 211 73d-74a
xiv 18d-19b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 182b-183a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 22, 84d-85a; NUMBER 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK x, 62b-63d
43, 143b~144a; NUMBER 58, 181d-182a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 355c-d / Social Con-
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 172 tract, BK n, 402d-403a; 403d-404a
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The consideration of revolution as civil war, see OPPOSITION 50; WAR AND PEACE 2a-2c.
Other discussions relevant to the process of political change by violent or peaceful means, see
CONSTITUTION 7-73, 8-8b; GOVERNMENT 6; LAW 7d; LIBERTY 6b-6c; MONARCHY 53-50;
PROGRESS 43; SLAVERY 6c-6d; STATE 3g; TYRANNY ic, 6-8.
The cause and prevention of revolution under different forms of government, see ARISTOC-
RACY 3; CONSTITUTION 7, 70; DEMOCRACY 73; OLIGARCHY 33-30; TYRANNY 8.
644 THE GREAT IDEAS
For: Other discussions relevant to economic change and to the strategy of economic revolution,
see HISTORY 43(2); LABOR 7c(j); LIBERTY 6b; OPPOSITION 50; PROGRESS 30; SLAVERY 3c;
STATE 5d(2)~5e; WAR AND PEACE 2c; WEALTH ph.
The general problem of the right of rebellion or the right of secession, see JUSTICE lob; LAW
6c; LIBERTY 6b; TYRANNY 3; and for the issue concerning anarchy and the condemnation
of the rebel as an anarchist, see GOVERNMENT ra; LIBERTY ib; TYRANNY 3.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
is regarded as rhetoric with being an art of enchantment or a
TJHETORIC traditionally
JlV one of the liberal arts. When the liberal form of flattery also distinguish between a true
arts are counted as seven, and divided into the and a false rhetoric, the one associated with di-
three and the four the trwium and the quad- wholly admirable pursuit, the other
alectic as a
logic, not with the mathematical arts of arith- from virtue. According to Bacon, the aim of
metic and geometry, astronomy and music. rhetoric is to support reason, "not to oppress
The implication of this grouping seems to be it." Rhetoric may be misused, but logic also has
that rhetoric, like grammar, has something to its abuses. "Rhetoric can be no more charged,"
do with language or discourse; and that, like in Bacon's opinion, "with the
coloring of the
concerned with thought, with reason-
logic, it is
worse part, than logic with sophistry, or moral-
Upon the way this challenge is met depends not persuasion, is the ultimate goal. The rules
not only the definition of rhetoric, but also the of rhetoric are supposed to give one power not
value put upon it. In the tradition of the great merely to move the minds of men to certain
books, rhetoric is both praised as a useful disci- conclusions but, through persuasion of their
pline which liberally educated men should pos- minds, to move men to act or not act in a cer-
sess, and condemned as a dishonest craft to which tain way.
decent men would not stoop. Like the words The sphere of rhetoric, so conceived, is lim-
"sophistical" and "dialectical," the epithet ited to moral and political problems. The things
"rhetorical" carries, traditionally as well as cur- about which men deliberate before acting, the
rently, a derogatory implication. The three things on which they pass moral judgments or
words sometimes even tend to merge in mean- make political decisions, constitute the subject
ing, expressing the same reproach against trick- matter of oratory, or what Hobbcs calls "ex-
ery. Yet of the three, "sophistical" alone im- hortation and dehortation," that is, "counsel
plies an unqualified rebuke. accompanied with signs in him that giveth it,
We do not speak of good and bad sophistry. of vehement desire to have it followed."
But dialectic has its defenders as well as its de- In the narrower conception, rhetoric seems
tractors; and even those who, like Plato, charge to be confined to oratory. It is with oratory and
645
646 THE GREAT IDEAS
orators that Socrates seems to be concerned the patient," he says, "to do for me what he
when he discusses rhetoric with Phaedrus or would not do for the physician, just by the use
with Gorgias. Gorgias, who was a teacher of of rhetoric." Similarly, in a contest for public
rhetoric, praises the power of the orator to per- office between a rhetorician and a man of any
suade "the judges in the courts, or the senators other profession, "the rhetorician more than
in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, any other would have the power of getting
or at any other public meeting." In view of this himself chosen, for he can speak more persua-
Socrates asks him whether he will accept the sively to the multitude than any of them, and
definition of rhetoric as "the artificer of persua- on any subject. Such is the nature and power
sion." When Gorgias admits that "persuasion of the art of rhetoric!"
is the chief end of rhetoric," Socrates goes on to In comparing it with dialectic, Aristotle
ask whether rhetoric "the only art which
is seems to have a different conception of the func-
brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same tion of rhetoric. "Neither rhetoric nor dialec-
effect ? Docs he who teaches anything persuade tic," he says, "is the scientific study of any one
men of that which he teaches or not?" If so, separate subject; both are faculties for provid-
"then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an aitif- ing arguments." Both also are concerned with
icer of persuasion." arguments which fall short of scientific demon-
Gorgias reminds Socrates of his initial point stration, that with matters of opinion con-
is,
about the orator, that "rhetoric is the art of cerning which something probable can be said
persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies on either side of the issue.
. . about the just and unjust." But Socrates is
.
Though for Aristotle rhetoric is the counter-
still not satisfied that rhetorichas been sharply part of dialectic, in that both deal with argu-
defined. He introduces the distinction between ments on any subject, his differentiation be-
knowledge and belief or opinion, and gets Gor- tween the two disciplines seems to indicate that
gias to agree that, whereas there cannot be false rhetoric is limited to the consideration of ora-
knowledge as well as true, beliefs and opinions tory in the familiar sense of public speaking.
may be either true or false. Persuasion can, The rhetorician is concerned with persuading
therefore, be of two sorts "one which is the an audience, not, as the dialectician is, with car-
source of belief without knowledge, as the other rying on a dispute in which two individuals
is of knowledge." may be privately engaged. The persuasion, fur-
Gorgias is
willing to limit rhetoric to that thermore, is directed to obtaining a certain re-
form of persuasion "which only gives belief," sponse from that audience not merely agree-
to which Socrates adds the emphatic negative ment, but either action, or a decision to act, or
that "the rhetorician does not instruct thecourts approval which, charged with emotional force
of law or other assemblies about things just and or enthusiasm, has practical significance.
unjust, but creates beliefs about them." If an The divisions of rhetoric, according to Aris-
assembly wishes to learn about matters con- totle, are determined by the kinds of oratory,
nected with medicine or shipbuilding, it con- as these, in turn, are determined by the types
sults the physician or shipwright, not the ora- of audience to be addressed. "Of the three ele-
tor.Hut, says Gorgias, "when a decision has to ments in speech-makingspeaker, subject, and
be given in such matters, the rhetoricians are person addressed," Aristotle writes, "it is the
the advisers; they are the men who win their one, the hearer, that determines the speech's
last
point." He confirms this by reminding Socrates end and object. The hearer must be either a
that the speeches of Themistocles and Pericles, judge with a decision to make about things past
not the suggestions of the builders, determined or future, or an observer. A member of the as-
the Athenian assembly in the construction of sembly decides about future events, a juryman
the harbor, the docks and walls. about past events; while those who merely de-
By way of further illustration, Gorgias tells cide on the orator's skill are observers.
of occasions when he has succeeded in getting "From this it follows that there are three di-
patients todo what they would not do on the visions of oratory: (i) political, (2) forensic,
advice of their physicians. "I have persuaded and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display" or,
CHAPTER 81: RHETORIC 647
as these three are sometimes named, delibera- upon the perception of certain words, without
tive, legal, and epideictic. "Political speaking any ideas corning between."
urges us either to do or not do something. . . .
Engaged in the oratorical task of persuading
Forensic speaking either attacks or defends the people of New York to ratify the federal
play either praises or censures somebody. These are aware that "a torrent of angry and malig-
three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different nant passions will be let loose" in the debate of
kinds of time. The political orator is concerned that issue. They realize that arguing for the
with the future; he tries to persuade men about adoption of certain political principles or con-
things to be done or not done hereafter. The clusions is not like teaching geometry, the ob-
party in a case at law is concerned with the jects of which are "entirely abstracted from
past; one man accuses the other, and the other those pursuits which stir up and put in motion
defends himself, with reference to things al- the unruly passions of the human heart."
ready done. The ceremonial orator is, properly Hamilton admits at once, in the opening
speaking, concerned with the present, since all paper, that "the plan offered to our delibera-
men praise or blame in view of the state of tions affects too many particular interests, in-
things existing at the time, though they often novates upon too many local institutions, not
findit useful also to recall the past and to make to involve in its discussion, a variety of objects
guesses about the future. foreign to its merits, and of views, passions, and
"Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one prejudices little favorable to the discovery of
for each of its three kinds. The political orator truth." Nevertheless, he tries to persuade his
aims at establishing the expediency or the harm- audience to judge the issue on the merits of the
fulness of a proposed course of action Parties argument alone.
in a lawsuit aim at establishing the justice or in- The opponents of the Constitution, he says,
justice of some action. . . . Those who praise or "may be actuated by upright intentions." The
attack aman aim at proving him worthy of opposition may "spring from sources, blameless
honor or the reverse." at least, if not respectable the honest errors of
minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and
THIS CONCEPTION OF rhetoric as concerned fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are
with oratory or public speaking gives one the causes which serve to give a false bias to the
answer to the question of what rhetoric adds to judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see
grammar and logic as arts of discourse. In ora- wise and good men on the wrong as well as on
tory more is involved than the communication the right side of questions of the first magnitude
of ideas, the marshalling of arguments, the to society."
making of proofs. Discourse, whether written To recognize this, Hamilton tells his audi-
or spoken, has an effect upon the emotions as ence, to be on guard "against all attempts,
is
well as upon the mind, and disposes a man to from whatever quarter, to influence your deci-
mind to assent.
act as well as the sion ... by any impressions other than those
"The communicating of ideas by words," which may result from the evidence of truth."
Berkeley observes, "is not the chief and only He wishes them to consider him as relying upon
end of language, as is commonly supposed. nothing but the merits of his case. "I frankly
There are other ends, of some pas-
as the raising acknowledge to you my convictions," he writes,
sion, the exciting to or deterring from an ac- "and I will freely lay before you the reasons on
tion, the putting the mind in some particular which they are founded. . . .
My motives must
disposition to which the former is in many remain in the depository of my own breast. My
cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely arguments will be open to all, and may be
omitted I entreat the reader to reflect with judged by all. They shall at least be offered in a
himself, and see if it doth not often happen, spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth."
either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the We can detect here another element in the
passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, dis- art of rhetoric. The orator seems to be con-
dain and the like, arise immediately in his mind cerned, not only with the strength of his argu-
648 THE GREAT IDEAS
mcnts and with the passions of the audience oratory seems to lead Socrates to tell Phaedrus
which he hopes to move by these arguments, that Thrasymachus or anyone else who teaches
but also with the impression he makes upon rhetoric ought "to give an exact description of
that audience as a person of good character and the nature of the soul," to explain "the mode in
honest intentions, devoted to the truth and, which it acts or is acted upon." The rhetorician,
above all, to the best interests of those whom he he goes on, "having classified men and speeches,
addresses. and their kinds and affections, and adapted them
The great speeches reportedor perhaps one to another," will be able to "tell the reasons
polished, if not inventedby Thucydidcs ex-
of his arrangement, and show why one soul is
emplify this effort on the part of the orator, as persuaded by a particular form of argument,
do also the orations written by Shakespeare and another not."
for his characters, of which the speeches of
Brutus and Antony in Julius Caesar arc among THIS FACT ABOUT rhetoric that it must adapt
the most notable as well as the most familiar. speech to persons as well as to subject matters-
The pointalso illustrated by the Communist
is seems to occasion Socrates' definition of oratory
which is denounced as as "the art of enchanting the soul." It is not,
Manifesto, "propagan-
da" by those who mistrust the writers, but he tells Phaedrus, confined to courts and public
to those who trust them is powerful and persua- assemblies. Whether this art is a good or evil
sive oratory. thing depends on whether it requires the speak-
Separating the use of witnesses and docu- er to know more than the nature of the person
ments by the forensic orator from what he calls he is
addressing the truth about the matters
the strictly artistic means of persuasion i.e., spoken of. To engender probabilities in the
the means intrinsic to the art of rhetoric minds of the many by the likeness of the truth,
Aristotle divides the latter into the three ele- necessary, says Socrates, to know the truth.
it is
ments already noted. Persuasion, he says, de- "He who knew the truth would always know
pends "on the personal character of the speaker best how to discover the resemblances of the
... on putting the audience into a certain frame truth." Such a man might be able, not only to
of mind .
[and] on the proof, or apparent
. .
pleaseand so to persuade his audience, but also,
proof, provided by the words of the speech it- perhaps, he might "be able to say what is ac-
self. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's ceptable to God."
personal character when the speech is so spoken The issue about rhetoric then at least so far
as to make us think him credible. . . .
Secondly, as that issue concerns its being an art consistent
persuasion may come through the hearers when with virtue seems to turn on the admixture of
the speech stirs their emotions. Thirdly,
. . .
pleasure and truth. The question is whether,
persuasion is effected through the speech itself given a particular sort of audience to persuade,
when we have proved a truth or an apparent the orator does not have to choose between
truth by means of the persuasive arguments pleasing them and telling them the truth. Does
suitable to the case in question." the art of rhetoric extend to the persuasion of
These being the three technical means of ef- bad men as well as good? Is the skill of the
fecting persuasion, Aristotle concludes that rhe- orator to be measured by his success in persuad-
torical skill must consist in the ability "(i) to ing, without regard to the character of the au-
reason logically, (2) to understand human char- dience he has persuaded and the means he has
acter and goodness in their various forms, and been forced to use? Does the goodness of the
(3) to understand the emotions ... to know orator and of his speech depend upon his be-
their causes and the way in which they are ex- ing morally virtuous as well as rhetorically
cited." The art of rhetoric, therefore, involves skillful?
to persuade, he writes, "one must consider the can point out any rhetorician of this stamp,
person with whom one has to deal, whose spirit who is he?"
ing, to such an extent is it true that men are orator adheres to the truth and aims at the good,
controlled more by whim than by reason.*' He even if such highmindedness defeats his efforts
does not doubt that "there are rules which are at persuasion with an audience whom he thus
with respect to pleasing as there are
as reliable displeases; or the orator takes persuasion as his
for demonstrating"; nor does he seem to con- end and subordinates everything else to the
demn rhetoric for being such an art, unless he rhetorical means for succeeding with any sort
writes with irony when he says that "pleasing of audience.
isincomparably more difficult, more subtle, Bacon rises to the defense by rejecting the
more useful, and more admirable." dilemma ungenuine. "The duty and office of
as
Rhetoric so conceived appears to Locke to be rhetoric," he writes, "is to apply reason to the
a "powerful instrument of error and deceit"; imagination for the better moving of the will."
and to Plato to be no art at all, but a form of He admits that rhetoric is controlled by other
As cookery
flattery. tries to please the palate considerations than the truth. Though "logic
without caring what is
good for the health of handle th reason exact and in truth," and though
the body, so rhetoric, according to Plato, aims "the proofs and demonstrations of logic are
to delight without caring what is good for the toward all men indifferent and the same . . .
soul or the state. Cookery and rhetoric are the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to
shams or simulations of the genuine arts of med- differ according to the auditors."
icine and politics, which aim at the good, not at Nevertheless, Bacon thinks "it was great in-
pleasure. "This is the sort of thing," Socrates justice in Plato, though springing out of a just
tells Callicles, "which I term flattery, whether hatred for the rhetoricians of his time, to re-
concerned with the body or the soul, or when- gard rhetoric as a voluptuary art, resembling it
ever employed with a view to pleasure and to cookery that did mar wholesome meats, and
without any consideration of good and help unwholesome by a variety of sauces to
evil." please the taste. For we see that speech is much
Socrates then asks Callicles whether he knows more conversant in adorning that which is good
people as with children, and trying to amuse he was ever inveighing against eloquence and
them, but never considering whether they are good speech knowing that no man can speak
better or worse for this." fair of courses sordid and base."
When Callicles replies that he thinks "there Aristotle's defense of rhetoric seems to be im-
aresome who have a real care for the public in plied in the remark that "its function is not
what they say," Socrates says that he is "con- simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to
tented with the admission that rhetoric is of discover the means of coming as near such suc-
two sorts: one, which is mere flattery and dis- cess as the circumstances of each case allow."
graceful declamation; the other, which is noble Just as, for him, the sophist differs from the
and aims at the training and improvement of dialectician not in the skills of argument or dis-
the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what pute, but in moral purpose or respect for truth,
isbest, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the so the name "rhetorician" may be applied to
audience." But, he asks Callicles, "have you two sorts of men. Rhetoric may signify "either
ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and the speaker's knowledge of his art, or his moral
650 THE GREAT IDEAS
purpose." For want of separate names, both contribution to rhetoric. In the case of this sci-
the honest and the sophistical orator are called ence, as with few others, Bacon finds no serious
and can claim to be "rhetoricians," and it is deficiencies in the accepted tradition. He calls
this which confuses the issue. rhetoric "a science excellent and excellently
well labored," and places "the emulation of
IN THE TRADITION of the great books, Aris- Aristotle" first among the causes why later writ-
totle's Rhetoric occupies a place comparable to ers "in their works of rhetorics exceed them-
that which, as noted in the chapter on POETRY, selves."
his Poetics unquestionably fills. It seems to be Yet by another standard Aristotle's Rhetoric
not merely the first but the standard treatise on may be judged deficient. Because he confines
oratory. It divides rhetoric into three parts his attention almost exclusively to oratory,
the first concerned with invention, the second Aristotle's discussion leaves rhetoric in a larger
with the disposition or order of a speech, the sense almost untouched. This limitation of rhet-
third with problems of expression. To the last oric to the subject matter of oratory does not
of these belongs the analysis of the orator's use go unexplained. "Every other art," Aristotle
of language and his style in speaking; to the writes, "can instruct or persuade about its own
second, the analysis of the structure of an ora- particular subject matter; for instance, medi-
tion into such parts asproem, statement, argu* cine about what is healthy and unhealthy, ge-
mcnt, and epilogue; and to the first, under the ometry about the properties of magnitudes,
head of invention, belongs the consideration of arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true
the means of persuasion. of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric," he
As we have already noted, the artistic means says, "we look upon as the power of observing
of persuasion are, according to Aristotle, three- the means of persuasion on almost any subject
foldemotions, character, and argument. The presented to us."
how to arouse and use the
orator must consider This last statement would seem to give rhet-
passions of his audience, as well as calculate oric complete generality. Aristotle qualifies it,
how far to go in displaying his own emotions. however. "People fail to notice," he says, "that
He must consider the moral character of the the more correctly they handle their particular
audience to which he is
appealing, and in subject the further they are getting away from
this connection he must try to exhibit his pure rhetoric." So far as knowing good argu-
own moral character in a favorable light. Final- ments and knowing how to use them are con-
ly, he must know the various types and sources cerned, the physicist and the mathematician
of rhetorical argument not only what sorts of need no help from rhetoric. The art of rhetoric
argument arc available for a particular purpose, is
necessary only in dealing with such topics as
but also how to employ each argument most do not fall within the subject matters or systems
persuasively. In this last respect, Aristotle dis- of the established arts and sciences. Such topics
tinguishes rhetorical proof from rhetorical in- are precisely those with which the orator must
ductionthe use of what he calls the "enthy- "The duty of rhetoric," Aristotle writes in
deal.
meme" as opposed to the use of examples and summary, "is to deal with such matters as we
he relates this distinction to the difference be- deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide
tween dialectical proof and induction which he us, inthe hearing of persons who cannot take in
treats in the Topics. at a glance a complicated argument, or follow
Cicero andQuintilian may extend Aristotle's a long chain of reasoning." This is his answer to
analysis in certain directions, but neither they those who have given rhetoric "a far wider sub-
nor modern writers like Campbell and Whately ject matter than strictly belongs to it."
depart far from the framework Aristotle sets up But Aristotle's explanation of his limitation
for the discussion of oratory. Even those who of rhetoric limited to only one of its
is itself
reject Aristotle's authority in logic, natural major namely, the construction of argu-
parts,
philosophy, and metaphysics pay him the trib- ments. As contrasted with the mathematician,
ute of following (as does Hobbes) his treatment the physician, and the philosopher, whose mas-
of oratory, or of approving (as does Bacon) his tery of the subject matter of their arts or sci-
CHAPTERS!: RHETORIC 651
ences gives them a command of the relevant and poetry and to other types of discourse as
orator needs the special art of rhetoric to pro- Kant seems to hold this broader conception
vide him with the topics from which examples of rhetoric when he says that "the arts of speech
and enthymemes can be drawn and to give him are rhetoric and poetry" In the tradition of west-
skill in the use of such arguments. But it is not ern thought, the two arts tend to become identi-
only the orator who must consider the character fied when each is separated from any particular
and emotions of his audience. It is not only the subject matter. As appears in the chapter on
orator who must consider the best way in which POETRY, poetry like rhetoric has a broader and
to order the parts of an elaborate discourse. a narrower meaning. In the narrower meaning,
Above not only the orator who is faced
all, it is it is the art of the narrative,
just as in its nar-
with the problem of using language more or less rower meaning, rhetoric is the art of oratory.
effectively in the expression of thought, and The other sense in which poetics as an art can
especially in its communication to others. All be understood is, according to Bacon, with re-
these considerations and problems are common spect to words, not matter. "In this sense," he
to the orator and the teacher. They are con- writes, "it is but a character of style, and be-
siderations and problems which must be faced longeth to arts of speech."
not merely by the public speaker who tries to In this sense the poetic art
is
hardly distin-
move an audience to action, but by anyone guishable from the rhetorical art. The prob-
poet, philosopher, or scientist who tries to lems involved in composing a good speech are
write whatever he has to say as effectively as not the same as those involved in writing a
with respect to these other considerations and they tend to become one and the same art an
problems, which he faces when he tries to com- art of style or expression, an art of preaching or
municate his knowledge or thought. Here, then, teaching the truth about any matter on which
isthe possibility of a broader conception of the one mind seeks to communicate with another.
pression of thought. totle's Rhetoric does for that art in the limited
We find this view of rhetoric reflected in sphere of oratory. But Augustine's treatise On
Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. In his Prologue, the Christian Doctrine engages in a general rhetorical
Franklin asks his companions "to forgive his analysis that is in a way comparable to Aristot-
crude speech" ; for, he explains, "I never learned le's analysis of oratory. In this work Augustine
you the truth; whatever I say
rhetoric, to tell brings his own professional training as an orator
must be blunt and plain. I never slept on Mount to bear on the problems of reading, interpreting,
Parnassus or studied Marcus Tullius Cicero." and expounding Sacred Scripture. The fact that
And the Squire apologizes for the inadequacy he is dealing with Sacred Scripture and hence,
of his English to describe the beauty of Canace. in his view, with the teaching of the most funda-
"It would take an excellent rhetorician," he mental truths, lifts him above the limited con-
says, "who knew his colorful figures of speech, cerns of the orator; but the fact that he limits
to describe her adequately.*' Though Aristotle's himself to Sacred Scripture also prevents him
Rhetoric for the most part neglects this broader from formulating his rules of interpretation and
conception of rhetoric in order to expound the exposition with the complete generality they
rules of oratory, the third book of his treatise, would have to possess in order to be the rules of
which deals with the use of language, indicates a general art of rhetoric.
that problems of style are common to oratory At the opening of the fourth book of Chris-
652 THE GREAT IDEAS
(tan Doctrine, Augustine declares that, having instruction," the temperate style "in order to
considered in the preceding books "the mode give pleasure," and the majestic style "in order
of ascertaining the proper meaning" of Scrip- to sway the mind."
ture, he will now treat "the mode of making The great books of history, science, and phi-
known the meaning when it is ascertained." losophy provide additional materials for gen-
He disclaims any intention "to lay down rules eral rhetorical analysis. They offer us the light
the side of truth." To this end he tries to show Augustine's commentary on Scripture, give us
how Scripture itself, and such holy men as St. the guidance of rules. Such historians as He-
Cyprian and St. Ambrose in commenting on rodotus, Thucydides, Tacitus, and Gibbon ex-
Scripture, have employed the art of rhetoric. hibit a diversity of styles in the writing of his-
"Itthe duty," Augustine writes, "of the
is tory. The diversity is not only on the gram-
interpreter and teacher of Holy Scripture . . . matical level of the use of language, but also on
both to teach what is
right and refute what is the logical level of order and argument. Rhetor-
wrong; and in the performance of this task to ical principles control the way in which the
conciliate the hostile, to rouse the careless, and language and the organization of the parts are
to tell the ignorant both what is
occurring at suited to each other and to the historian's pur-
present and what is probable in the future. But poseto the effect he wishes to produce upon
once his hearers are friendly, attentive, and his reader.
ready to learn, whether he has found them so, The way in which Euclid writes the Elements
or has himself made them the remaining ob-
so, is a style of exposition, having rhetorical as
in whatever way the
jects are to be carried out well as logical features. In its rhetorical (if not
case requires." The first rule of a general rheto- form it is applicable to other
its strictly logical)
ric would thus seem to be one of creating a re- subject matters. This may be seen in Spi-
ceptive frame of mind in the persons being ad- noza's adoption of it in his Ethics and in New-
dressed. This accomplished, the teacher must ton's adaptation of it in his Mathematical Prin-
proceed with various alternatives in mind. of Natural Philosophy. The dialogue form
ciples
"If the hearers need teaching," Augustine which Plato seems to have invented for writing
writes, "the matter treated of must be made ful- philosophy appears to recommend itself rhetor-
ly known by means of narrative. On the other ically not only to other philosophers, but also to
hand, to clear up points that are doubtful re- a scientist like Galileo in the composition of
quires reasoning and the exhibition of proofs. his Two New Sciences. If the doctrines of the
If,however, the hearers require to be roused Summa Theologica or of the Critique of Pure
rather than instructed, in order that they may Reason were separated from the very special
be diligent to do what they already know, styles of these two works, they would probably
is needed. Here en- not have the same effect upon the reader; and
greater vigor of speech
treaties and reproaches, exhortations and up- as they are written, they affect different readers
braidings, and all the other means of rousing differently, as differently as do the styles of
the emotions, are necessary." Dante, Milton, Melville, Dostoevsky, Adam
In Scripture and its great commentators,Au- Smith, and Karl Marx.
gustine finds"wisdom not aiming at eloquence, Some methods of exposition may be more ap-
yet eloquence not shrinking from wisdom." He propriate than others to certain subject matters.
also findsexamples of the three kinds of style "There is a great difference in the delivery of
which Cicero had distinguished the eloquence mathematics," says Bacon, "and of politics."
of those "who can say little things in a subdued But in every subject matter or field of learning,
style, moderate things in a temperate style, and there is the common problem of how to make
great things in a majestic style." These three language serve most effectively to enlighten or
styles Augustine connects with the three ends convince in the communication of thought.
which Cicero had assigned to eloquence teach- The problem arises in the writing of a single
ing, giving pleasure, and moving. The subdued sentence as well as in the organization of a
THE CHOICE OF WORDS and the formation of sion in language" "can scarce pass for faults.
new words, the invention and employment of But," he adds, "if we would speak of things as
figures of speech, by which abbreviation or am- they are, we must allow that all the art of rhet-
plification
of discourse may be achieved and the oric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial
Scripture. They suggest the rules of a general knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought
rhetoric, founded on principles as universal as a great fault, either of the language or person
Pascal's insight that "words differently arranged that makes use of them."
have a different meaning, and meanings differ- Descartes also declares that "those who have
ently arranged have a different effect." the strongest power of reasoning, and who most
This observation indicates a further answer skilfully arrange their thoughts in order to ren-
to the question raised much earlier, namely, der them clear and intelligible, have the best
why the art of rhetoric is needed over and power of persuasion even if they can but speak
above the skills of grammar and logic. For ora- the language of Lower Britanny and have never
tory the question has been answered by refer- learned rhetoric." Yet he qualifies this severity
ence to those rules of rhetoric which deal with somewhat by identifying dialectic with rhetoric
the passions and with moral character. But for a and granting its "possible use ... to serve to ex-
more general rhetoric, concerned with all dis-
plain at times more easily to others the truths
course, the answer must be in terms of rules of we have already ascertained."
style of the sort Pascal's observation suggests. Plato for the most part tends in the opposite
If there were never more than one grammat- direction, keeping dialectic and rhetoric poles
ically and logically correct way of saying any- apart. Butthere were a true as opposed to a
if
thing, then grammatical and logical standards false rhetoric, a rhetoric concerned with knowl-
would suffice for the regulation of sound dis- edge and truth, not merely opinion and pleas-
course. But if there are always several ways of ure, hewould be willing, it seems, to admit it to
stating something and if each of them satisfies the company of dialectic, and regard it as an
the rules of grammar and logic, but differs in aid in the teaching, if not the discovery, of the
the impression it makes on the mind, then cri- truth. The pedagogical utility of rhetoric as
teria other than those of grammar and logic will well as dialectic appears in the summary which
be needed to determine our choice of which Socrates gives to Phaedrus, after they have fin-
to use. ished examining the speeches about love.
Such criteria may take the passions and the "Until a man knows the truth of the several
imagination into account, but they may also particulars of which he is writing or speaking,"
look primarily to the manner in which the mind Socrates says, "and is able to define them as
itself naturally works. The fact that there are they are, and having defined them again to di-
several ways of presenting the same truth to the vide them until they can no longer be divided,
mind and usually several ways in which the and until in like manner he is able to discern the
mind can interpret the same statement de- nature of the soul, and discover the different
fines the scope of a general rhetoric and the modes of discourse which are adapted to differ-
relation of its rules to those of grammar and ent natures, and to arrange and dispose them in
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature and scope of rhetoric 655
10. The distinction of rhetoric from dialectic and sophistry: the rhetorician and the
philosopher
2a. The devices of rhetoric: figures of speech; the extension and contraction of dis-
course
3. The role of rhetoric as concerned with persuasion in the sphere of action: the analysis
of oratory
TJb.
The structure of an oration: the order of its parts
4. The means of persuasion: the distinction between artistic and inartistic means
4#. The orator's consideration of character and of the types of audience: the signifi-
cance of his own character
4^. The orator's treatment of emotion: his display of emotion; the arousal of his
audience 660
(3) The topics or commonplaces which are the source of premises: the orator's
knowledge of various subject matters
5.
The evaluation of oratory and the orator: the justification of rhetorical means by the
end of success in persuasion
5^.
The orator's concern with justice, law, and the good: the moral virtue of the
orator
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-28 }J I2d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, en,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, arc given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCED: The references arc to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
fames version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehcmiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "csp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. The nature and scope of rhetoric la. The distinction of rhetoric from dialectic
7 PLATO: Phaedrns 115a-141a,c esp 136a-141a,c / and sophistry: the rhetorician and the
Meno, 176d-177a / Gorgias 252a-294d csp philosopher
260a-262a, 280d-283a 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK HI,
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric 593a-675a,c esp BK i, 425c-d
CH 1-3 593a-599c, CH 4 [i359b i-i8] 599d, BK 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 39d-42c; 47d-48a; 50d-
a
in, en i [i404 i-2j 654a 52d; 57a-d / Euthydemus 65a-84a,c csp 83a-b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, en 16, 180d- / Phaednts, 131b-141a,c / Apology, 200a-201b;
181a 203a-205c / Gotgias 252a-294d esp 253b-256c,
12 KPICTLTUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 8 113d-114c; 258b-259c, 265a-267c,280d-285a/ Theactetus,
BK n, CH 23 170a-172d 525d-526a; 528c-530b / Sophist, 555d-556b;
14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 129b-130a 559c-561a; 579a-d / Philebus, 634b-635a
17 PLOHNUS : Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 31, 175a / 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH 3 144a-b
Fifth Ennead, TR 250d
ix, CH 11, 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH 1-2 593a-598b;
b
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 36- CH4[i359 9 i7)599d
37 653d-654b; BK iv, CH 1-5 675b,d-677d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT 7 253b d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 27, 14 PLUTARCH: Themistocles, 88d
A 2, REP 2 737d-738c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 7-8 14c-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d 15a;BK v, par 10 29b-d / Christian Doctrine,
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 147b-d BK n, CH 36-37 653d-654b; BK iv, CH 5
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 56b; 62c- 677a-d; CH 12 683d-684c; CH 27 -28 696a-697a
69c esp 66b-67c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 83,
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 439b- A i, ANS 436d-438a
446a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n,
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH x, 101b-106a
SECT 34 299d-300a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 446d-450a; 453c-455a
42 KANT: Judgement, 532b-d; 535b-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 66c-67c
656 THE GREAT IDEAS \b to la
26. The canon of excellence in style 2c. Methods of exposition in history, science,
5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights [1373-1383] 486d- philosophy, and theology
487a / Clouds [314-340] 491c-492a; [518-562] 6 THUCYDIDES Pcloponnesian War, BK i, 354b-c
:
a
594b; CH 2 [i35636-i358 35] 596a-598b; CH 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK v, 169a-d; BK vi,
8b; BK in, par 6-7 14b-d; BK iv, par 2 19d; 394] 10c-13d; BK vni [1-37] 51a-b; BK ix
BK v, par 22 23 33b-34a; BK ix, par 2 61 d- [225 655] 59c-63c; BK x [203-253] 67a-c; BK
62a / Christian Doctrine, BK iv, CH 3 676a-d; xi [655 -803] 79a-80c; BK xn [309-328] 85b-c;
CH 5 677a-d BK xix [54-275] 137c-139d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, llb-12c; 5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians [352-627] 459c-
31a-d; 66b-c 462b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 338d-339a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK v, 182b-d; BK vn,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 19b; 364a-b; 389d- 214d-220a; BK vni, 269c-270c; 279b-280b;
390a; 529c; 669a-670b 286b-287d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40b 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 357a-
360d; 365a-371b; 378c-380a; 384c-386c; BK
7. The history of oratory: its importance under n, 389d-390b; 395c-399a; 402a-404d; 41 Ib-
various social conditions and in different
412c; BK in, 418d-420c; 424d-429a; 429d-
forms of government
434c; BK iv, 449b-c; 451a-452c; 461b-463a;
5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights [211-222] 472c; [342- 468a-469b; 469d-470b; 478d-479b; BK v,
358] 474a-b; [815-880] 480a-481a 484a-c; 504d-507c; BK vi, 511c-516a; 518a-
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 141a-c / Apology 200a- 520d; 529b-534d; BK vn, 555b-557b; 559d-
212a,c / Gorgias, 285a-294d / Republic, BK 560b
vni, 413d-416a 7 PLATO: Phaedrus 115a-141a,c / Symposium,
8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 169c-172d / Apology 200a-212a,c
b b
[i83 i7-i84 i] 253a-c 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK xi [234-444] 334b-340a
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK iv, CH 4 [1292*4-38] 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 124d*125b / Coriolanus,
B
491b-d; BK v, CH 5 [i305 7-i5] 506d / Athe- 179c-184c / Aemilius Paulus, 217d-218a; 226c-
nian Constitution, CH 28, par 3-4 565d 566a / 227c / Cato the Younger, 628b-d; 643a-
Rhetoric, BK i, CH i [1354*12-1355*3] 593a- 644b / Demosthenes, 697c-698b / Cicero,
CH b
594a; BK HI, i
[i403 i
5-1 404*39] 653b,d- 709a-b; 719d-720a / Marcus Brutus, 815d-
654c 81 6a
8 CHAPTER 81: RHETORIC 663
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 6c-8a; 12c-13d; BK 11, 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 255a-256a; 393a-
26c-27a; 34d-35c; BK m, 56a-b; BK xiv, 395a
150b-c/ Histories, BK i, 198c-199c; 211c-212b; 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 320c-321b
BK in, 241d-242c; 244c; BK iv, 269d-270b; 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 25b-c; 64a-c; 269b-
290a-d 270a; 337a-b; 384d-385b; 427a-c; 564b-c
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK iv, CH 7 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 381a-d; 408d-
678c-682a; CH 20-21 688a-693c 409c; 426b-c; 428c-d; 574b-575d; 577b-d;
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n, 587b-588a
101b-106a 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [1-6] la;
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard ///, ACT v, sc in [95-108] 3a
[237-270] 146b-c / Henry V, ACT iv, sc in 48 MELVILLE: Moby Did(, 30a 36b
[16-67] 555d-556b /Julius Caesar, ACT in, sc 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 415a-
ii 583c-586c 417a,c
27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus, ACT i, sc i [1-167 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK HI, 149d-150a;
351a-353a BK ix, 380d-381c; BK x, 415b-416c; 426a-430b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 23a-26a; passim; 445c; 466b-467a; BK xi, 482b-484c;
69a-b 497c-499c; 504b-c; BK xii, 533a-534d; 536a-
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK n [1-487] llla- 537b; BK xin, 565a-b; 566a-c; 572b-573b;
121b; BK v [663-904] 189b-195a; BK vi [414- BK xv, 621b-622c
495] 205a-207a / Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi,
381b383b 148c-170b; BK xn, 369a-398d
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The general consideration of the liberal arts, see ART 4; EDUCATION 50; and for the relation
of rhetoric to such liberal arts as grammar and logic, see LANGUAGE ra-ib, 8; LOGIC }b.
The role of rhetoric in the sphere of philosophy, and its relation to or distinction from
dialectic and sophistry, see DIALECTIC 5; PHILOSOPHY 6b; TRUTH 40!.
The function of oratory in the sphere of politics, see DEMOCRACY 7a; EMOTION 5d; STATE
8d(2).
Discussions relevant to the broad conception of rhetoric as the art of achieving eloquence
and effectiveness in any sort of discourse, and as concerned with problems of style and
principles of interpretation, see LANGUAGE 33, 6, 12; POETRY 8b-8c; SIGN AND SYMBOL
4c~4d.
Discussions relevant to the narrow conception of rhetoric as the art of oratory, and as
concerned with the means of persuasion in the sphere of action, see EMOTION 5d; HONOR
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication
of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
I. II.
TACITUS. A
Dialogue on Oratory ISOCRATES. Aegineticus
PLUTARCH. "Lives of the Ten Orators," in Moralia .
Against the Sophists
AUGUSTINE. Divine Providence and the Problem of .
Panegyricus
Evil . Antidosis
The Harmony of the Gospels
. DEMOSTHENES. Philippics
HOBBES. The Whole Art of Rhetoric CICERO. Orations
664 THE GREAT IDEAS
CICERO. DC Oratorc (On Oratory) DE QUINCEY. Rhetoric
. Brutus WHATELY. Elements of Rhetoric
. Orator T. CARLYLE. "Stump-Orator," in Latter -Day Pam-
LONGINUS. On the Sublime phlets
QUINTILIAN. Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Ora- SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL n,
tory),
BK. II-VI, VIII, X-XII SUP, CH II
DEMETRIUS. On Style . "The Art of Controversy," in Complete
ALCUIN. Rhetoric Essays
T. WILSON. Arte ofRhetorique LEWES. The Principles of Success in Literature
FLNELON. Dialogues on Eloquence EMERSON, "Eloquence," in Society and Solitude
LA BRUYERE. "Of the Works of the Mind," in VERLAINE. Art poStique
Characters PATER. An Essay on Style
J. HARRIS. Hermes, or A
Philosophical Inquiry Con- BRUNETIERE. An Apology for Rhetoric
cerning Universal Grammar CROCE. Aesthetic as Science of Expression
BUFFON. Discours sur le style ."On Telling the Truth," in The Conduct of
VOLTAIRE. "Style," in A Philosophical Dictionary Life
W. G. HAMILTON. Parliamentary Logic BUCHANAN. Symbolic Distance
G. CAMPBELL. Philosophy of Rhetoric .The Doctrine of Signatures
BLAIR. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres RICHARDS. The Philosophy of Rhetoric
BENTHAM. The Boof( of Fallacies .
Interpretation in Teaching
Chapter 8i: SAME AND OTHER
INTRODUCTION
'""THHE problems of identity and diversity physical discussion as indulging in "vicious ab-
JL of sameness and otherness, similarity and stractions" or as verging on the meaningless,
difference occur at that level of philosophical can easily avoid such notions as identity and
classes under which certain things fall and Semantics currently has vogue as a critical
others do not. Not everything is a substance or instrument for safeguarding discourse from
a quantity, but in Aristotle's opinion there is ambiguity and nonsense and perhaps also for
nothing of which it cannot be said that it is a spotting metaphysical legerdemain. But seman-
some kind of tics itself cannot go far in its own analysis of
being in some sense, that it has
unity, that it is identical with itself, and that, words and meanings without having to explain
compared with anything else in the whole uni- how the same word can have different meanings
verse, it is in certain respects the same, in others or how the same meaning can be expressed by
different. different words. It does not seem likely that an
The fundamental relation of quantities with adequate explanation could be developed with-
one another, namely, equality, consists in their out some theory of sameness and otherness.
being the same. The fundamental relation of
qualities consists
in their being alike, or the THE "SENSE OF SAMENESS," says William James,
same in spite of some difference in degree or "is the very keel and backbone of our think-
intensity, e.g., a brighter and a darker red of ing." He is here speaking "of the sense of same-
the same hue. The notion of relation itself ness from the point of view of the mind's struc-
seems to be as fundamental as that of sameness, ture alone, and not from the point of view of
since in comparisons one thing is said to be the the universe. . . . Whether there be any real
same or different only in relation to something sameness in things or not, or whether the mind
else;yet it also seems to be true that relations be true or false in its assumptions of it," he goes
can be the same or similar, for the essence of on, the point remains that "the mind makes
proportion or analogy lies in one thing's being continual use of the notion of sameness, and if
related to a second as a third is to a fourth. The deprived of it, would have a different structure
sameness of two relationships is the object of from what it has. . . . Without the psychologi-
the comparison. sameness might rain down
cal sense of identity,
Such considerations are sometimes called upon us from the outer world forever and we
"metaphysical" with an invidious tone. But no be none the wiser. With the psychological
one, not even those who would eliminate meta- sense, on the other hand, the outer world might
665
666 THE GREAT IDEAS
be an unbroken flux, and yet we should per- itbeing impossible for two things of the same
ceive a repeated experience." kind to be or exist in the same instant in the
James distinguishes three principles of iden- very same place, or one and the same thing, in
tity.In addition to the psychological law ac- different places. That, therefore, that had one
cording to which we feel a later experience to beginning is the same thing; and that which had
be the same as an earlier one, he refers to the a different beginning in time and place from
ontologicd principle which "asserts that every that, is not the same, but diverse." In short,
real thing is what it is, that a is a, and b, b"\ across a lapse of time a thing remains identical,
and the logical principle which declares that in Locke's view, or maintains its identity, if
contrary view. He finds the identity of all ideas applies without difficulty to an atom of matter
self-evident, while to him the real identity of which, being at a given instant "what it is and
things is much more difficult to grasp. nothing else ... is the same and so must con-
The principle of identity and its companion tinue as long as its existence is continued; for
principle of contradiction are, according to so long it will be the same, and no other. In
Locke, expressed in the propositions 'Whatso- likemanner, if two or more atoms be joined
ever is, is*
impossible for the same
and 'It is together into the same mass, every one of those
thing to be and not to be' "these two general atoms will be the same by the foregoing rule;
propositions amounting to no more, in short, and whilst they exist united together, the mass
but this, that the same is the same, and the consisting of the same atoms, must be the same
same is not different." But, Locke adds, "the mass or the same body, let the parts be ever so
mind, without the help of any proof or reflec- differently jumbled. But," Locke continues, "if
tion on either of these general propositions, one of these atoms be taken away, or one new
perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly, one added, it is no longer the same mass or the
that 'the idea of white is the idea of white, and same body."
not the idea of blue,* and that 'the idea of The problem of identity in living organisms
white, when it is in the mind, is there and is Locke does not find so easy to solve. "In the
not absent,' that the consideration of these state of living creatures," he says, "their iden-
axioms can add nothing to the evidence or cer- tity depends not on a mass of the same par-
tainty of its knowledge. ... I appeal to every- ticles, but on something else. For in them the
one's own mind, whether this proposition 'A variation of great parcels of matter alters not
circle is a circle' be not as self-evident a proposi- the identity; an oak growing from a plant to a
tion as that consisting of more general terms great tree, and then lopped, is still the same
'Whatsoever is, is.'" oak; and a colt grown up to a horse, sometimes
But unlike the comparing of an idea with fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same
itself, real identity, according to Locke, re- horse, though in both these cases there may be
quires us to consider a thing "as existing at any a manifest change of the parts, so that truly
determined time and place" and to "compare they are not, either of them, the same masses of
it with itself existing at another time. . . . matter."
When, therefore, we demand whether anything The problem of the real identity or con-
be the same or no? always to some-
it refers tinuity of living things through time and
thing that existed at such a time in such a place, change is, as we shall see presently, only a
it was certain, at that instant, was the
.which, special case of the larger problem of whether
same with itself and no other; from whence it anything at all remains identical for more than
follows that one thing cannot have two begin- an instantin the universal flux of things. But
nings of existence, nor two things one beginning, supposing that problem solved in favor of en-
CHAPTER 82: SAME AND OTHER 667
during substances, or things which somehow and the same life, it is the continuity of the
remain continuously the same while changing same consciousness which "makes a man be
in this or that respect, the point of Locke's himself to himself" and establishes his personal
observation about living things still holds, for identity.
their identity does not seem to lie in the con- "Whatever has the consciousness of present
tinuity or permanence of the matter the and past actions," Locke writes, "is the same
particles of which they are composed. person to whom they both belong. That . . .
The familiar riddle about the pipe whether with which the consciousness of this present
it is in any respect the same after it has its thinking thing can join itself, makes the same
broken bowl replaced by a new one, and then person, and is one self with it, and with nothing
has a new stem added to the new bowl may be else. ... If the same Socrates, waking and
propounded for living organisms. But in their sleeping, do not partake of the same conscious-
case, Locke argues, a principle of identity can ness, Socrates, waking and sleeping, is not the
be found. A plant, he says, "continues to be same person. And to punish Socrates waking
the same plant as long as it partakes of the same for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking
life, though that life be communicated to new Socrates was never conscious of, would be no
particles of matter vitally united to the living more right than to punish one twin for what
plant, in a like continued organization con- his brothertwin did, whereof he knew nothing,
formable to that sort of plant." because their outsides were so like that they
The principle, he thinks, applies to animals could not be distinguished."
and men. "The case is not so much different William James also attributes the sense of
anyone may hence see what
in brutes but that personal identity to continuity of conscious-
makes an animal and continues it the same. ness, but for him there still remains a problem
Something we have like this in machines, and of explaining that continuity. In the flow of
may serve to illustrate it. For example, what consciousness from moment to moment, "con-
is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit tinuity," he thinks, "makes us unite what dis-
nothing but a participation of the same con- of a continuum of feelings (especially bodily
tinued life by constantly fleeing particles of feelings) experienced along with things widely
matter, in succession, vitally united to the different in all other regards, thus constitutes the
same organized body." real and verifiable 'personal identity* which we
feel. There is no other identity than this in the
IN THE CASE OF MAN, however, Locke thinks Stream' of subjective consciousness. ... Its
we must face the additional problem of per- parts differ, but under all their differences they
sonal identity. What makes a man the same are knit in these two ways; and if either way of
person from moment to moment, sleeping and knitting disappears, the sense of unity departs.
waking, remembering or not remembering his If a man wakes up some fine day unable to re-
past? In what does the continuity of the self call any of his past experiences, so that he has
consist, on the identity of which, Locke insists, to learn his biography afresh hefeels and he
. . .
"is founded all the right and justice of reward says that he is a changed person. He disowns
and punishment" ? His answer seems to be that, his former me, gives himself a new name, iden-
as a living organism is identical throughout one tifies his present life with nothing from out of
668 THE GREAT IDEAS
the older time. Such cases are not rare in mental with matters discussed in the chapter on ONE
pathology." AND MANY.
In the tradition of the great books, other For both Plato and Aristotle, the relation
solutions are offered to the problem of personal between these two pairs one and many and
identity. Kant thinks, for example, that a same and other seems to be much closer. In
"transcendental unity of apperception" is nec- the comparison of two things, Aristotle appears
essary to constitute "in all possible phenom- to treat sameness as a kind of oneness, referring
ena which may come together in our experi- to the various ways in which two things can
ence, a connection of all these representations be "one and the same." Of sameness, he says
according to laws. Unity of consciousness," he that "it a unity of the being, either of more
is
writes, "would be impossible if the mind, in the than one thing or of one thing when it is treated
knowledge of the manifold, could not become as more than one"; and of the one he says that
conscious of the identity of function by which to it "belong ... the same and the like and the
it unites the manifold synthetically in one equal, and to plurality belong the other and
knowledge. Therefore, the original and neces- the unlike and the unequal."
sary consciousness of the identity of one's self The enumeration he gives of kinds of unity
is at the same time a consciousness of the equal- seems to be paralleled by his enumeration of
ly necessary unity of the synthesis of all phenom- kinds of similitude. As a thing may be one es-
ena according to concepts." sentially or one by accident, so two things may
Where Kant posits a transcendental
ego to be the same essentially or by accident. Aris-
account for the experienced identity of the totle's statement that "some things are one in
self, other philosophers who hold one or an- number, others in species, others in genus,
other theory of the soul as an imperishable sub- others by analogy," finds its counterpart in his
"
stance or an unchanging principle seem to find statement that 'different' is applied to those
no special subtleties in the problem of the which, though other, are the same in some
identity of living organisms or persons. So far respect, only not in number, but either in
as such theories bear upon that problem, the species or in genus or by analogy."
consideration of them belongs to the chapter As indicated in the chapter on RELATION, a
on SOUL. Here we arc concerned with the no- distinction is
traditionally made between re-
tions of same and other as they apply to every- lationships which really exist among things
thing in the universe. Hence we must face all apart from the mind, and logical relationships
the problems of how two things can be the which occur in thought alone. This distinction
same, not merely the problem of self-sameness seems to separate self-sameness or identity from
or the identity of a thing with itself. all relations of similitude which obtain between
a synonym for "same," as when we say that only if it is taken in regard to absolutely the
two things are identical in a certain respect. same thing, because such a relation can exist
But without the qualification expressed by "in only in a certain order observed by reason as
a certain respect," it is seldom if ever said that regards the order of anything to itself. The
two things are identical, for if they can be dis- case is otherwise, however, when things are
criminated from one another in any respect at called the same, not numerically, but generi-
all, they are two, not one, and therefore not cally or specifically."
identical. This seems to be the sense of Leib- Nevertheless, identity seems to underlie all
same for an instant; and "the professed Hera- If the latter alternative is chosen, then two
clitean," Cratylus, went even further, according individuals two men, example may be
for
to Aristotle: he "criticized Heraclitus for saying thought alike only because both somehow re-
that it is impossible to step twice into the same semble, as Plotinus suggests, the separate ar-
river; for he thought one could not do it even chetype Man. What is common to the two men
once." lies in a third and separate reality, of which
In saying of men that "they are nothing but a Plotinus says that it is "present in multiplic-
bundle or collection ofdifferent perceptions, which ity," as if "in multi-impression . . . from one
succeed each other with an inconceivable ra- seal." But as Parmenides observes, in Plato's
and are in a perpetual flux and move- dialogue of that name, if a separate idea of Man
pidity,
ment," Hume does more than deny personal is
required to explain how two individuals are
identity. He affirms
an utter diversity "as if alike in being men, then still another idea is
there were no manner of relation" at all be- needed to account for the likeness between
tween distinct perceptions, each of which is for each individual man and the idea Man.
him a distinct existence. The opposite point of On the other hand, the view that the real
view affirms things which have an enduring sameness of two individuals, or the reality of
existence and which can, as Aristotle says of sub- the one kind to which both belong, resides in
Hegel's language, there is identity in diversity; nessexist only the general meaning of
in
or, in the language of Aquinas, a real com- words, or in the mind's abstract concepts, or as
munity exists, according to which some one separate archetypes? But, then, what truth is
thing is common to two. there in the familiar statement that two indi-
The problem of the sameness of two things vidual things are in some respect really alike or
can be stated in terms of the significance of the same?
what Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume call com-
mon or general names. Denying that such THESE QUESTIONS indicate that the traditional
words as "man" or "tree" or "stone" express discussion of the same and the other tends to
abstract or general ideas, they seem to say that involve not merely the theory of the one and
common names like these signify what is com- the many, but also, in certain issues at least,
mon to two or more individuals whether the problem of the individual and the universal.
things, perceptions, or ideas.Those who, like As the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Locke, take general or shows, the several positions traditionally taken
common names to signify abstract ideas, seem with regard to universals afford different an-
to say such ideas themselves signify that in swers to the problem of how any sameness be-
two or more things have something in
reality tween two or more things exists. The factor of
common. Still another view is that, apart from similitude in knowledge (the nature of the like-
allindividual things, real universals exist as the ness between image or idea and its object) and
objects of the mind's conceptions. the function of similitude in love (the attrac-
670 THE GREAT IDEAS
tion, or repulsion, of like by like) also extend diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not
the consideration of sameness and diversity into differ. For simple things are diverse through
. . .
the field of problems dealt with in other chap- themselves, and do not differ from one another
ters. Here attention must be given to the mean- by differences as their components. For in-
ing of sameness itself, as that is affected by the stance, a man and an ass differ by the difference
distinction between the same and the similar, of rational and irrational, but we cannot say that
by the enumeration of various kinds or degrees these again differ by some further difference."
of likeness, and by the range of opposite mean- The specific difference between man and ass
ings in the notions of diversity and difference. with respect to rationality, accompanied by
Discussing discrimination and comparison, their generic sameness with respect to animal-
William James, for example, draws a sharp line ity, makes them similar. If they were utterly
between the simple and complex components diverse, i.e., the same in no respect, they would
of our experience. Simple impressions, he seems not be said to differ; just as if they were iden-
to think, are either absolutely alike or absolute- tical in all respectsexcept number, they would
ly unlike. Here there can be no degrees of re- not be called similar. "The other and the same,"
semblance or similarity. "Two
resembling writes Aristotle, "are thus opposed. But differ-
things," he writes, "owe their resemblance to ence is not the same as otherness. For the other
their absolute identity in respect to some at- and that which it is other than need not be
tribute or attributes, combined with the abso- other in some definite respect but that . . .
lute non-identity of the rest of their being. which is different is different from some par-
This, which may be true of compound things, ticular thing in some particular respect, so that
breaks down when we come to simple impres- there must be something identical by which
sions." The latter, apart from their numerical they differ."
non-identity or otherness, are either the same But within the area of this agreement on
in quality or diverse. But compound things fundamental terms, there seems to be some dis-
may be more or less alike, varying in degree of agreement about whether two things can be
similarity or difference according to the num- utterly diverse. Since they are two, they cannot
ber of simple respects in which they are or are be the same in all respects certainly not in
not the same. number but can they be totally incompar-
"Similarity, in compounds," says fames, "is able? James appears to say Yes in his remark
partial identity," and he gives the following about the football and the gas jet having "no
illustrations. "The moon is similar to a gas-jet, common point, no identical attribute." Yet he
it is also similar to a foot-ball; but a gas-jet and alsoseems to hold that no two things are ever
a foot-ball are not similar to each other. . . .
absolutely incomparable. They may not differ
Moon and gas-jet are similar in respect of lu- or be similar as the diverse species of the same
minosity and nothing else; moon and foot-ball genus, e.g., man and ass; but regarding them
" "
in respect of rotundity, and nothing else. Foot- as 'thinkablcs' or 'existents,' he writes, "even
ball and gas-jet are inno respect similar that the smoke of a cigarette and the worth of a
is, they possess no common point, no identical dollar bill are comparable still more so as
composite, since they differ in some respect and differ as species or subordinate kinds within
in some respect they resemble each other. In this genus. Kant answers this question by af-
ness. According to this principle, "there are no If the example seems inappropriate on the
different original and first genera, as it were ground that the soul and the hand are of the
isolated and separated from each other, but all same genus, i.e., both substances or parts of the
diverse genera are divisions only of one supreme same substance man, it may be
necessary to
and general genus" Kant states a correlative introduce the distinction between natural and
to which 'every genus requires species, and material and a spiritual substance can both be
these again sub-species, and as none even of these called "substances" as a matter of logical classi-
sub-species is without a
sphere . reason in its
. .
fication, but they are not in the same genus by
utmost extension requires that no species or their own natures. In this sense, Aquinas as-
sub-species should in itself be considered as the signs a geometrical solid and a physical body
lowest." to the same logicalgenus 'body' but regards
Aristotle's theory of species and genera ap- them as of heterogeneous natures; and Des-
pears to be exactly opposite to Kant's on both cartes, calling an extended and a thinking sub-
points. For Aristotle, there is no single all-em- stance both "substances," insists upon the utter
bracing genus, but rather a number of diverse diversity of their natures.
yet supreme genera, such as substance, quan- An easier example, however, may not be too
tity, quality, etc. There is a finite, not an in- difficult to find. A man and a number belong to
finite variety of species. The lowest species is different genera, according to Aristotle one a
further divisible only into kinds which differ, substance, the other a quantity. But the man
as individuals of the same species do, in acci- can be related to his sons as the number one is
dental, not essential respects, e.g., white man related to any other whole number. The rela-
and red man differ in the same way as John and tion which is the same in both cases is that of
James do within the species 'man,' not as the priority, according to which the man and unity
species 'man' and 'ass' differ within the genus are the principles or generators respectively of
'animal.' Furthermore, where Kant insists upon his sonsand other numbers. Here, then, we
a third principle of continuity, according to see two heterogeneous things
a substance and a
which between any two species "there always quantity which are, nevertheless, the same by
remain possible intermediate species, differing analogy, each standing to another in the same re-
from the first and the second by smaller degrees lationship', both, therefore, can be called "prin-
than those by which these differ from each ciple" or "generator" analogically.
other," Aristotle seems to find no intermediates Aristotle's other indication that a special
possible between the contrary species of a single mode of similitude obtains between hetero-
genus. The order of species is for him a dis- geneous things, occurs in all those passages in
continuous series like the order of the whole which he says that terms like 'being' can be
numbers, between proximate members of predicated of things in every category or genus.
which no fractions are admitted. Just as James seems to think that any two things
Does Aristotle's position with respect to the may be comparable as'thinkables'or'existents,'
heterogeneity of an animal and the color blue so Aristotle seems to hold that all things,
the one in the genus 'substance,' the other in though otherwise heterogeneous, are at least
absolutely diverse in genus, arc absolutely in- istence. Yet the term 'being' cannot be equated
comparable? His answer seems to be twofold. with Kant's single supreme genus. Though
In one place he says that things which are di- Aristotle agrees with Kant that every genus
verse in genus may still be the same by analogy: must be capable of division into species, he
"things that are one by analogy are not all one does not think that 'being' can be so divided by
in genus." In another, he gives us an example specific differences.
of analogical resemblance (between the soul
and the hand): "As the hand is a tool of tools, Two POINTS MUST be observed concerning
so the mind is the form of forms and sense the term
Aristotle's theory of the predication of a
ties, qualities, and so forth. Hence when such found in all things, he says, "is common to all
heterogeneous things are all called 'beings,' the only according to some sort of analogy," not
implication cannot be that, as beings, they are "according to the same specific or generic
all the same. The point seems to be that they formality." This is most easily seen in the
are somehow at once both the same and diverse. "likeness of creatures to God," which is "solely
As, to use an example from Aristotle's Physics, according to analogy, inasmuch as God is es-
a tone and a taste can both be sharp, though sential being, whereas other things are beings
the sharpness of a tone is as diverse from by participation."
the sharpness of a taste as tone and taste are Aristotle's statement that "things which are
qualitatively diverse from each other; so a one by analogy are not all one in genus," seems
man and a number can both have being, though to be converted by Aquinas into the proposi-
their modes of being are as diverse as substance tion that things which are not one in genus, and
is from quantity. If the word "similarity" were yet are ali^e in some way, are all one by analogy.
to be used to signify not the combination of For Aristotle, sameness by analogy may be
separable elements of sameness and diversity, either simple sameness or diversified sameness
but rather the inseparable fusion of the two to (i.e., similarity); and diversified sameness may
constitute a diversified sameness, then hetero- or not be analogical, that is, it may be the
may
geneous things should be called similar, not the kind of similarity which two heterogeneous
same, in being. things have in respect to being or in respect to
Second, Aristotle does not identify such some relation in which they stand to other
similarity of heterogeneous things with the things. For Aquinas, on the other hand, when-
sameness by analogy which heterogeneous ever heterogeneous things are the same in any
things can have. 'Being' is not a relative term single respect, their diversified sameness is al-
and therefore it cannot be predicated analog- ways analogical', and whenever the similitude
ically, as 'principle' or 'generator' can be. between two things is truly analogical, then
Terms which are predicated analogically, as it is always similarity, that is, a diversified, not
'principle' can be predicated of a father and a simple sameness. Likeness in being, according
the number one, may signify similarity (in the to Aquinas, affords us the prime example of a
sense of diversified sameness) rather than simple similitude which is at once an analogical and a
sameness in a single respect. The relation of diversified sameness.
generation which creates the analogical simili- Aquinas applies his theory of the analogy of
tude between a father and the number one being to the great traditional issue, which puts
seems to be the same relation in the two cases all theories of similitude to the test the ques-
(between a father and his sons, and between tion of the resemblance between God and crea-
one and other numbers); it is not, however, tures, or between infinite and finite being.
simply the same, for that relation is diversified Against the answer first given by Maimonides,
according as the things related substances in and later expressed by Spinoza when, of all
the one case, quantities in the other are abso- comparisons between God and man, he says
lutely diverse in genus. But in Aristotle's that "His essence . . . could resemble ours in
analysis it does not follow that because some an- nothing except in name"; and against those,
alogical predicates signify diversified rather than on the other hand, who think that whatever
simple sameness, all do; or that because some names apply to both God and creatures (such
instances of diversified sameness happen to be as "being" or "good" or "one"), apply simply
analogical sameness in a relation), all are.
(i.e., in the same sense, Aquinas seems to take the
The interest in Aristotle's separation of these middle ground. The names which are properly
two points lies in the fact that Aquinas com- applicable to both God and creatures, accord-
bines them in a theory which states that, when ing to him, are said of them, not equivocally
being and other terms (which are not genera and not univocally, but analogically.
and yet are above all genera) are predicated of This threefold distinction of univocal, equiv-
CHAPTER 82: SAME AND OTHER 673
problem of the similitude between God and they have the kind of sameness which things
creatures confronts us with three basic alterna- have when they belong to the same genus. Or
tives in man's speculation about the sameness we can say, (3) that they are only similar in the
and diversity which exists among all things, sense of a diversified sameness, whether such sim-
We can say, (i) that infinite and finite being are ilarity is or is not always analogical in character.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGB
1. The principle of identity: the relation of a thing to itself 674
la. Oneness in number or being: numerical diversity or otherness
ib. The identity of the changing yet enduring individual: personal identity, the
continuity of self; the denial of identity in the realm of change 675
2C. The distinction between sameness and similarity and their opposites, diversity
and difference: the composition of sameness and diversity; degrees of like-
ness and difference
2d. The distinction of things in terms of their diversities and differences: real and
logical distinctions 676
2ff. The limits of otherness: the impossibility of utter diversity
3</.
Sameness in quantity, or equality: kinds of equality
4<z
. Likeness or sameness between knower and known knowledge
: as involving imi-
4^. Sameness and diversity in the meaning of words or the significance of terms:
the univocal and the equivocal
6. Similitude between God and creatures: the degree and character of the similitude;
traces or images of God in creatures 680
674 THE GREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK 11 [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in S3 JAMES Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
322b, 324a-b, 327a-334a; 550b-551b [fn 2]; BK vn, CH i [242 a32-b 4] 326c-d; CH 4 330d-
867a-874a; 878a; 880b 333a / Generation and Corruption, BK n, CH n
b
[338 i2 -19] 440d-441a,c / Metaphysics, BK in,
2e. The limits of otherness: the impossibility a b
CH 3 517a-518a; BK v, CH 6 [ioi6 24- i] 536d-
of utter diversity b a
537a; [ioi6 32-ioi7 3] 537c; CH 9 [1018*4-11]
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [i b 25~2a 4] 5d-6a 538d; CH 10 [ioi8*38- 8] 539b-c; CH 28
b BK CH
/ Metaphysics, BK in, CH 3 517a-518a; BK x, [io24 io-i6] 546c; x, i
[1052*28-37]
b b
CH 3 [io54 i4~23] 581b-c 578d; CH 3 [io54*33> 2] 581a-b; CH 8-9 585b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 5 586c
17c-18b; A 8, REP 3 19d-20c; Q 11, A r, REP 2 9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals, BK i,
: CH i
or proportional similitude
297a; Q 66, A 2, REP 2 345d-347b; Q 75, A 3,
REP i 380c-381b; Q 76, A 3, REP 4 391a-393a; 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 267c-268a / Timaeus, 448b-d
Q 77, A 4, REP i 403a-d; Q 79, A 5, REP 3 41 8c- 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 10
a b
419b; Q 85, A 3, ANS and REP 4 455b-457a; [76 36- 2] 105a; BK n, CH 14 [98*20-23] 134a;
A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c- CH 17 [99*16] 135b / Topics, BK i, CH 17
A i, REP i 22d-23d; Q 72, A 7, ANS 117a- i-n, Q 20, A 3, REP 3 713c-714c; Q 27, A 3,
118a REP 2 738c-739c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi, 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 61,
SECT 39 279c-280a A i, REP i 54d-55c; PART HI, Q 60, A i, ANS
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 197b-198a and REP 3 847b-848a; PART in SUPPL, Q 69,
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 30d-31b; 241d- A i, REP 2 885c-886c; Q 92, A i, ANS and REP
242a 6-7 1025c-1032b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 344b-345b; 387b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagrucl, BK i,
12d-13b
3*(3) Generic otherness or heterogeneity 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 336b-d;
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [i b 25-2*4] 5d-6a 449a-b; 469d-470d
/ Topics, BK i, CH 15 149d-152a passim; CH 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, AFH 27 157b-
16 [io7 b 37]-CH 17 [io8 i4] 152a-b / Physics,
a 158d
BK vn, CH 4 330d-333a esp [249*3-24] 331 d- 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 158b-161d
332b / Metaphysics, BK in, CH 3 517a-518a; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH
BK v, CH 28 [io24b io-i6] 546c xxvin, SECT i 228c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 3, A 5 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix, DIV
17c-18b; Q 4, A 3 22b-23b; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 82 487b-c
471c-472c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-74a / Judgement,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 197b-198a 601d-603a
678 THE GREAT IDEAS 3c to 4a
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR in, CH 15 289a-c
(3. The modes of sameness and otherness or diver- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 42, A
3&. Relational sameness: sameness by
i, ANS and REP i 224b-225d; Q 47, A 2, REP 2
sity.
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions of the principle of identity and of its significance for being, change, and
thought, see BEING 2b, 7X5); CHANGE 2; LOGIC la; ONE AND MANY 2a; PRINCIPLE ic,
3a(3); RELATION la; and for the problems of personal identity and the identity of a state,
see SOUL id; STATE 3g.
CHAPTER 82: SAME AND OTHER 681
For: Other considerations of sameness or similarity, and of the problem of the reality of kinds or
universals, see FORM 2a; IDEA la, 6b; ONE AND MANY ic; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR
2a-2C.
Matters relevant to the analysis of essential and accidental sameness, specific and generic
sameness, and otherness in species or in genus, see EVOLUTION ib; IDEA 4^3); NATURE
,
ia(i); ONE AND MANY 3b(i); OPPOSITION ic(a); RELATION 53(4); UNIVERSAL AND
PARTICULAR 5b.
The nature of the similitude between heterogeneous things, and for the problem of signifying
such similitude, see BEING i; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d; and for the related distinction between
univocal, equivocal, and analogical terms, see IDEA 4^4); SIGN AND SYMBOL 3b~3d.
Another discussion of sameness by analogy or relational sameness, see RELATION id, 53(3);
and for sameness in quality and quantity, see QUALITY 3C, 4c; QUANTITY ib.
Similitude in the relation of knower and known, of lover and loved, and in imitation, see
ART 3; FORM id(i); KNOWLEDGE i, 4d; LOVE 43; NATURE 2a; ONE AND MANY 4f.
The principle of similarity in the association of ideas, see IDEA 56; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION
2c; RELATION 4f; SENSE 3d(i).
The theory of definition as constituted by the statement of genus and difference, see DEFINI-
TION 2b; NATURE 43; OPPOSITION ic(2).
The problem of the similitude between God and creatures, and for its bearing on the signifi-
cance of the names we apply to God, see GOD 3f, 6a-6b; MAN i la; NATURE ib; ONE AND
MANY ib; SIGN AND SYMBOL 5f; WORLD 33-30.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date,place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
INTRODUCTION
TN our time, science, philosophy, and religion same, between empirical and rational physics.
JL have come
to represent three quite distinct Hume is willing to admit only mathematics
intellectual enterprises. Each appeals for alle- to the status of a rational science, capable of
giance not merely on the ground that it can demonstrating its conclusions with certainty.
answer fundamental questions, but also because He insists upon experimental reasoning in the
of its contribution to human life and culture. study of nature, wherein only probable conclu-
In other periods, philosophy and religion com- sions can be attained. But he does not make
peted for supremacy, though, as appears in the these critical points in terms of science versus
guing for the complete compatibility of reason rather than science, but because it
represents a
and faith. Nevertheless, before the I9th cen- from
failure in philosophy or science, resulting
tury, the issue, if one existed, was between phi- the wrong method of dealing with matters of
losophy and religion. Science had not yet be- fact.
thing quite distinct in method and subject mat- ences" in the eulogistic sense of that term. In
ter from traditional philosophy may actually contrast, philosophy is mere speculation, and
make appearance as early as the iyth cen-
its religion is
superstition. The word "speculation"
tury. But not until Kant are two kinds of sci- is for the positivist only slightly less invidious
ence plainly set apart. Not until then are they than "superstition." Whereas superstition im-
so defined that one becomes identified with plies irrational belief, speculation represents a
what men have always called "philosophy" and futile attempt by reason to go behind the phe-
the other gradually appropriates the name of nomena in order to discover ultimate causes or
"science" and regards itself as a quite separate substances. This cannot result in anything but
philosophy. It also corresponds with a later di- to do more than explore and describe the phe-
vision into the experimental or inductive and nomena and because it tries to do whatever it
the philosophical or deductive sciences. But does without investigation or experiment.
Kant does not seem to contemplate the possi- From many sources in addition to Comte
bilityof conflict between science and philos- similar views converge to form an attitude gen-
ophy between the experimental study of na- erally prevalent in the world today under the
ture and metaphysics or, what is for him the name of positivism. All its current varieties
682
CHAPTER 83: SCIENCE 683
seem to have this much in common: the identi- or limitations, that scientific research looks on
ficationof science with knowledge of fact, and the whole field of human activity as its own,
further, the restriction of such knowledge to and must adopt an uncompromisingly critical
conclusions obtained and verified empirically. attitude towards any other power that seeks to
Whatever does not accord with this conception usurp any part of its province."
of science is either, like mathematics or logic, a As a threat to the dominion of science over
purely formal discipline or, like philosophy and man and society, "religion alone is a really seri-
religion, it is conjecture, opinion, or belief ous enemy." Philosophy, Freud thinks, "has no
personal, subjective, even wishful. immediate influence on the great majority of
mankind"; whereas "religion is a tremendous
IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE that the most recent force which exerts its power over the strongest
author in the set of great books should provide emotions of human beings." Religion and sci-
gion. It is also fitting that he should be a scientist more comforting, and more ennobling than
in the field of psychology, since psychology is a anything they could ever get from science,"
late-comer the disciplines which, once
among would only say: 'It is a fact that I cannot give
branches of philosophy, now claim to be posi- you what men commonly call truth; to obtain
"
tive sciences. Not only late, but last, according that, you must go to science.'
to Freud, for "sociology, which deals with the But religion cannot say that, Freud thinks,
behavior of man in society, can be nothing without losing "all influence over the mass of
other than applied psychology. Strictly speak- mankind," and science cannot, on its side, yield
ing, indeed, there are only two sciences psy- at all in its claim to being the only avenue to
chology, pure and applied, and natural science." truth. Employing a method which "carefully
In his New Introductory Lectures on Psycho- examines the trustworthiness of the sense per-
Analysis^ Freud concludes with a statement of ceptions on which it bases its conclusions,"
what he the "scientific Weltanschauung."
calls which "provides with new perceptions
itself
In essence, he thinks, "it asserts that there is no . not obtainable by everyday means," and
. .
other source of knowledge of the universe, but which "isolates the determinants of these new
the intellectual manipulation of carefully veri- experiences by purposely varied experimenta-
fied observations, in fact, what is called re- tion," science alone can "arrive at correspond-
search, and that no knowledge can be obtained ence with reality." It is "this correspondence
from revelation, intuition, or inspiration." with the real external world we call truth"; and
Freud makes the drastic implications of this thus when "religion claims that it can take the
statement quite explicit. "It is inadmissible to place of science and that, because it is benefi-
declare," he writes, "that science is one field of cent and ennobling, it must therefore be true,
human intellectual activity, and that religion that claim is, in fact, an encroachment, which,
and philosophy are others, at least as valuable, in the interests of everyone, should be resisted."
and that science has no business to interfere Philosophy does not seem to Freud to offer
with the other two, that they all have an equal men a genuine alternative to scientific truth.
claim to truth, and that everyone is free to Unlike religion, it is not in his view necessarily
choose whence he shall draw his convictions it even behaves "as
opposed to science; at times
and in which he shall place his belief. if it were a science," and to some extent makes
"Such an attitude," he goes on, "is consid- "use of the same methods." But insofar as it
ered particularly respectable, tolerant, broad- parts company with by clinging "to the
science
minded, and free from narrow prejudices. Un- illusion that it can produce a complete and co-
fortunately, it is not tenable; it shares all the herent picture of the universe," philosophy
gion, offer a substitute for science. Both to- tained the empirical correlation of the various
gether fall under Freud's interdict. Both to- sorts of thought or feeling with definite condi-
gether would be outcasts from human culture tions of the brain, can go no farther can go no
if what he calls "our best hope for the future," farther, that is, as a natural science. If she goes
that is, "the intellect -the scientific spirit, rea- farther, shebecomes metaphysical. All attempts
sonshould in time establish a dictatorship to explain our phenomenally given thoughts as
human mind.*'
over the products of deeper-lying entities ... are meta-
physical."
WILLIAM JAMES, ALMOST contemporary with This scientific point of view, James admits,
Freud, also draws a sharp line between science "is anything but ultimate The data assumed
and philosophy. Writing his Principles of Psy- by psychology, just like those assumed by
chology at a time when the experimental physics, must sometime be overhauled. The
methods of the natural sciences, especially effort to overhaul them clearly and thoroughly
ence, and to separate the questions which can things when she injects herself into a natural
be properly considered by a scientist from those science."
which belong to the philosopher. But, unlike Science and metaphysics should be kept
Freud, James does not seem to regard the phi- quite separate, even though the sciences, in
losopher as engaged in a futile effort to solve accumulating "a mass of descriptive details,"
problems which are either insoluble or better run "into queries which only a metaphysics
left until science finds means for solving them. alive to the weight of her task can hope success-
For James the distinction between science fully to deal with. That
perhaps be centu-
will
and philosophy does not seem to lie only in the ries hence; and meanwhile the best mark of
methods they employ, though the empirical or health that a science can show is this unfinished-
comprehensively, but without any implication sciences of Classification, Logic, and Mathe-
of finality or totality. He recognizes that his de- matics." Yet in his view metaphysics does rep-
scriptive formulations are tentative and incom- resent philosophy as opposed to science, be-
plete, always subject to the discovery of new cause it aims at ultimate reality or underlying
data or a more refined presentation of the evi- causes. For example, he rejects the theory of a
dence. Above all, he admits that he
is
only de- soul, not because he knows it to be false, but
scribing, not explaining not laying bare the because he thinks it has no place in "a psychol-
ultimate reality which gives the phenomena ogy which contents itself with verifiable laws"
their deepest intelligibility, or ascertaining the and which is to "remain positivistic and non-
causes which show why, not merely how, things metaphysical."
happen they do.
as James seems to embrace the positivist view,
In the Preface to his Principles, James says prevalent in the ipth century and our own
that he has "kept close to the point of view of day. He limits science to, as well as excludes
natural science throughout the book . . . This philosophy from, the domain of empirical
CHAPTER 83: SCIENCE 685
knowledge. In discussing the possibility of free matics from physics with respect to the latter's
will, he says that "Psychology will be Psy- need for experimental evidence. All the sciences
chology and Science, Science, as much as ever are for him alike i; being "the demonstrations
(as much and no more) in this world, whether of consequences of one affirmation to another,"
free-will or not. Science, however,
be true in it regardless of "the diversity of the matter." The
must be constantly reminded that her pur- "certain and infallible" sign that a man is a sci-
poses are not the only purposes, and that the entist in any field of subject matter is that he
order of uniform causation which she has use can "demonstrate the truth thereof perspicu-
for, andtherefore right in postulating, may
is ously to another."
be enveloped in a wider order, in which she Hobbes, furthermore, seems to think that
has no claims at all." what is true of
geometry is true of every
science, namely, that it must begin with defini-
THOSE MODERN SCIENTISTS and philosophers tions. "In geometry," he says, "men begin at
who do not make a sharp distinction between settling the signification of their words; which
science and philosophy and who antedate any settling of significations, they call definitions."
and as having for its goal the formulation of acquisition of science; and in the wrong, or no
general laws describing and correlating the definitions, lies the first abuse, from which pro-
phenomena. They do not all exclude causes ceed all false or senseless tenets."
from the consideration of the natural scientist; Freud expresses the opposite view, which is
nor do they all, as stringently as fames, rule out generally more characteristic of the attitude of
explanation in favor of description or correla- the modern
scientist, especially the experimen-
tion. Furthermore, the almost universal em- talistor empiricist in method. "The view is
phasis by modern writers upon the experimen- often defended," he writes, "that sciences
tal character of the natural sciences does not should be built on clear and sharply defined
mean a universal identification of science with basal concepts." But "in actual fact, no science,
the experimental disciplines. not even the most exact, begins with such
Mathematics, for example, is
usually re- definitions. The true beginning of scientific
garded as a science in spite of its being non- activity," Freud holds, "consists rather in de-
experimental. For Locke and Hume, as well as scribing phenomena and then proceeding to
for Descartes, it exhibits certain characteristics group, classify and correlate them. Even at the
the self-evidence of principles, the certainty stage of description, it is not possible to avoid
of demonstrations which make it more genu- applying certain abstract ideas to the material
inely worthy of the high name of science than in hand, ideas derived from various sources and
are the tentative hypotheses and probable con- certainly not the fruit of new experience only.
clusions of experimental physics. Other disci- . . .
They must at first necessarily possess some
plines are called "sciences" by comparison with measure of uncertainty; there can be no ques-
mathematics rather than physics. Descartes, tion of any clear limitation of their content.
for instance, seems to think that metaphys- So long as they remain in this condition, we
ics can as surely be made a science as mathe- come an understanding about their meaning
to
matics can be. Locke argues that demonstration by repeated references to the material of ob-
from axioms is not limited to the science of servation, from which we seem to have deduced
quantity. As much clarity and certainty is at- our abstract ideas, but which is in point of fact
tainable in reasoning about moral matters. subject to them."
Ethics is no less a science than mathematics. The basic concepts or definitions of a science
Hobbes appears to take a similar view of poli- are, according to Freud, "in the nature of con-
tics, though it must be noted in his case that he ventions; although," he adds, "everything de-
diners from Descartes and Locke, from Bacon, pends on their being chosen in no arbitrary
Hume, and others in not distinguishing mathe- manner, but determined by the important
686 THE GREAT IDEAS
relations they have to the empirical material. ple, in presenting his own work as economic
... It is
only after more searching investigation science, seeks to explain how it can be scientific
of the field in question that we are able to for- even if it is not experimental.
mulate with increased clarity the scientific con- "The physicist," he writes, "either observes
cepts underlying it. ... Then indeed, it may be physical phenomena where they occur in their
time to immure them in definitions. The prog- most typical form and most free from disturb-
ress of science, however, demands a certain ing influence, or, wherever possible, he makes
elasticity even in these definitions/' This may experiments under conditions that assure the
not be true of mathematical concepts or defini- occurrence of the phenomenon in its normal-
tions, but, Freud points out, the science of ity." If experiment, in the strict sense, is
impos-
physics illustrates "the way in which even those sible in economics, at least the student of eco-
'basal concepts' that are firmly established in nomics can be scientific in his effort to observe
the form of definitions are constantly being the phenomena "in their most typical form."
altered in their content." England, Marx thinks, offers the most typical
speculative sciences. All three disciplines are well as in the chapters on HYPOTHESIS and
thought of as proceeding in the same way: by INDUCTION. Here seems pertinent to note
it
the demonstration of conclusions from princi- that neither the distinction between induction
ples obtainedby induction from experience- and deduction, nor the distinction between hy-
ordinary sense-experience, that is, not the potheses and axioms, unequivocally marks the
special experiences artificially contrived in a line which separates science from philosophy.
laboratory under experimental conditions. But Aristotle and Bacon, for example, regard in-
it should be observed that, in the modern duction as the source of axioms in metaphysics
period, even those authors who use "science" or philosophia prima as well as in physics or the
in the foregoing sense when they discuss mathe- philosophy of nature. They may have different
matics and metaphysics, treat physics differ- theories of induction, but only insofar as one
ently.They hold that physics must be experi- conceives induction as an intuitive generaliza-
mental if it is to be scientific. tion from ordinary sense-experience, and the
In proportion as modern physics becomes other makes induction an inference from experi-
more and more the model of science, the mean- ments, does the difference between them seem
ing of the word "science" tends to become re- to have a bearing on the distinction between
served for experimental study, or at least for em- philosophy and science.
pirical investigation, so that non-experimental Similarly, the difference between the scien-
tioned when they call themselves "sciences." potheses seems to lie not in the role they play in
Other disciplines try to establish themselves as reasoning or argument, but rather in their hav-
sciences by imitating physics. Marx, for exam- ing or not having a special relation to experi-
CHAPTER 83: SCIENCE 687
mentation, either to guide it or to submit to are necessary in order to test rival hypotheses
its test. or alternative mathematical formulations of the
Experiment, then, seems to be the distin- laws of motion, he seems to express a preference
guishing mark of science on the side of method; for the rigor of purely mathematical physics.
and, by an extension of meaning, even in those In the Fourth Day of the Two Nctv Sciences,
subject matters where experiments in the strict discussing the parabolic path of projectiles, one
sense in laboratories, with apparatus, under person in the dialogue, Sagredo, says that "the
controlled conditions are impossible, the sci- force of rigid demonstrations such as occur only
entist differsfrom the philosopher in an analo- in mathematics fills me with wonder and de-
gous point of method. The scientist investigates, light." The understanding thus derived, he
does research, makes observations which go be- adds, "far outweighs the mere information ob-
yond the experiences which ordinary men have tained by the testimony of others or even by
in the course of daily life. repeated experiment." Agreeing with this,
It seems to be in this spirit that Newton another person in the dialogue, claims
Salviati,
opens the Optics with the statement that "my that "the knowledge of a single fact acquired
design in this book is not to explain the proper- through a discovery of its causes prepares the
ties of light by hypotheses, but lo propose and mind to understand and ascertain other facts
prove them by reason and experiments." In the without need of recourse to experiment, pre-
same spirit Faraday says
of himself: "As an ex- cisely as in the present case, where by argumen-
perimentalist, I feel bound to let experiment Author proves with certainty
tation alone the
guide me into any train of thought which it that the maximum range occurs when the ele-
may justify; being satisfied that experiment, vation is
45. He thus demonstrates what has
like analysis, must lead to strict truth if
rightly perhaps never been observed in experience,
interpreted; and believing also that it is in its namely, that of other shots those which exceed
nature far more suggestive of new trains of or fall short of 45 by equal amounts have equal
thought and new conditions of natural power." ranges."
Lavoisier imposes upon himself the rule
"never to form any conclusion which is not an THE CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE as consisting in a
immediate consequence necessarily flowing rigorous demonstration of conclusions from axi-
from observation and experiment." Gilbert oms whether in mathematics or other subject
criticizes those who write about magnetism matters seems to be modern as well as ancient.
by tradition" concerning the motion of the has been mathematicians alone who have been
heart and arteries,Harvey proposes to separate able to succeed in making any demonstrations,
true from false opinions "by dissection, multi- that is to say, producing reasons which are evi-
plied experience and accurate observation." dent and certain"; yet he also hopes to make
Even a scientist like Fourier, who conceives metaphysics a science after the model of mathe-
physical theory as a kind of applied mathemat- matics.
ics, says that "no considerable progress can here- This conception of science is somewhat quali-
after be made whichnot founded on experi-
is fied by Descartes when he discusses the study
ments ... for mathematical analysis can deduce of nature. Here he tends toward experimental-
from general and simple phenomena the expres- ism. Here he says that "experiments become . . .
sion of the laws of nature; but the special appli- so muchthe more necessary the more one is ad-
cation of these laws to very complex effects de- vanced in knowledge." Referring to particular
mands a long series of exact observations." Like effects which "might be deduced from the
Fourier, Galileo also combines mathematics and principles in many different ways," he thinks
experiment in the study of nature. But though that the only way to overcome the difficulty of
he is willing to introduce experiments where they discovering the principles on which the effects
688 THE GREAT IDEAS
do depend is "to try to find experiments of such But Aristotle also defines science as the cer-
a nature that their result is not the same if it tain demonstration of universal and necessary
has to be explained by one of the methods, as it conclusions from self-evident principles. "Sci-
would be if explained by the other." entific knowledge," he writes, "is judgment
On the other hand,the conception of science about things that are universal and necessary;
as knowledge founded upon experiment, or at and the conclusions of demonstration follow . . .
least upon extended observation, seems to be from first principles (for scientific knowledge in-
ancient as well as modern. Aristotle criticizes volves apprehension of a rational ground)." The
those of his predecessors in physics whose "ex- emphasis here on knowledge of causes, and on
is
planation of the observations is not consistent the certainty and necessity of conclusions which
with the observations." The test of principles can be demonstrated from axiomatic truths.
"in the knowledge of nature," he says, "is the By these criteria, metaphysics and mathe-
unimpeachable evidence of the senses as to each matics are, in Aristotle's conception of the three
fact." It is for this reason that he praises the philosophical sciences, perfect examples of sci-
method of Democritus as scientific. entific knowledge; physics as a general philoso-
"Lack of experience," Aristotle writes, "di- phy of nature is also scientific knowledge in this
minishes our power of taking a comprehen- sense; but the particular natural sciences, such
sive view of the admitted facts. Hence those as astronomy or zoology, are more empirical
who dwell in intimate association with nature than philosophical in character. At least they
and its phenomena grow more and more able to involve admixtures of demonstration from
formulate, as the foundations of their theories, principles with the verification of hypotheses
principles such as to admit of a wide and coher- by observation. To the extent that they are
ent development; while those whom devotion empirical, they are qualified by an uncertainty
to abstract discussions has rendered unobserv- and a tentativeness in formulation which do
ant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on not seem to be present in Aristotle's conception
the basis of a few observations. The rival treat- of the purely philosophical sciences.
ments of the subject now before us will serve to It might even be said that the knowledge of
illustrate how great is the difference between a nature which depends on empirical research is
'scientific' and a 'dialectical' method of inquiry. not strictly scientific at all. Locke appears to
For whereas the Platonists argue that there say just that. "How far soever human industry
must be atomic magnitudes 'because otherwise may advance useful and experimental philoso-
"The Triangle" will be more than one,' Democ- phy in physical things," he writes, "scientifical
ritus would appear to have been convinced by will be out of our reach." Holding that
still
arguments appropriate to the subject, /.*., "our knowledge of bodies is to be improved only
drawn from the science of nature." by experience," Locke adds: "I deny not but a
There are many passages in which Aristotle man accustomed to rational and regular experi-
rejects an astronomical hypothesis because it ments, shall be able to see farther into the na-
does not account for the observations, or favors ture of bodies, and guess righter at their yet un-
one theory against all others because it alone known properties, than one that is a stranger to
seems to fit the sensible phenomena. So, too, in them; but yet, as I have said, this is but
judg-
his biological works, he makes experience the ment and opinion, not knowledge and cer-
test of theories. Speaking of the generation of tainty. This way of getting and improving our
bees, for example, he says that if we ever learn knowledge in substances only by experience
the truth about this matter, "credit must be and history makes me suspect that natural
. . .
given to observation rather than to theories, philosophy is not capable of being made a
and to theories only if what they affirm agrees science."
with the observed facts." And in his treatise On
the Motion of'Animals, he calls for "reference to WHETHER THE EXPERIMENTAL study of nature
particulars in the world of sense, for with these is the type of all scientific
knowledge (in its
in view we seek general theories, and with these object, itsmethod, and the character of its con-
we believe that general theories ought to har- clusions) or whether, according to another con-
monize." ception, the philosophical disciplines are the
CHAPTER 83: SCIENCE 689
more perfect, perhaps even the only examples truth is more dignified and exalted than any
of science, there seems to be no question that utility or extent of effects." In addition he
different values attach to these two meanings thinks that the truth of science can be tested by
of science or, as it is
currently expressed, to its
productive "That which is most use-
utility.
science and philosophy. ful in practice,** he writes, "is most correct in
Thephilosophical sciences may be either theory.'*
theoretic or practical according as they aim at Bacon's position with regard to the produc-
wisdom or at action, but they are seldom tive utility of science would not be contrary to
praised as being useful productively. The prac- the traditional view if by "the philosophy of
tical sciences which are also traditionally re- nature" he meant science in the experimental
garded as branches of moral philosophy such rather than the philosophical sense. His empha-
as ethics, politics, and economics may be sisupon experimentation in all parts of the
knowledge put to use in the guidance of indi- study of nature suggests that that is the case.
vidual conduct or the affairs of society, but The fact that he places equal emphasis upon
apart from poetics, which may direct produc- machinery and inventions and power over na-
tion in the sphere of the fine arts, there does not ture also suggests that technology is the other
seem to be any philosophical science, or branch face of any science which is experimental in
of philosophy, that provides a mastery of mat- method.
ter or some control over nature. None has ap- Bacon and Descartes seem to be the first to
plications in the sphere of the useful arts. perceive that knowledge which is experimental
As indicated in the chapters on ART, KNOWL- in origin must be by its very nature capable of
EDGE, and PHILOSOPHY, Bacon appears to take technological applications. The instruments and
a contrary view. Using the word "practical" to apparatus which Bacon regards as necessary im-
mean productive rather than moral or civil, he plements of science, no less than the machinery
divides the philosophy of nature into specula- and inventions which science can be expected
tive and practical branches. He regards me- to produce, represent the very same techniques
chanics as the application of physics to useful of operating upon nature. Experimental science
is thus seen to be at once the creature and crea-
purposes, and finds a productive counterpart to
metaphysics in what he calls "magic.** tor of technology. As Plato's Republic projects a
Nor is Bacon's point merely that "the real society which cannot be realized unless it is
and legitimate goal of the sciences is the endow- ruled by the science of the philosopher, so
ment of human life with new inventions and Bacon's New Atlantis prophesies a civilization
riches," in opposition to those whom he criti- which the dominance of experimentalism and
cizes for thinking that "the contemplation of technology have brought to present reality.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PACE
i .
Conceptions of science 691
(1) The intellectual virtue of science: its relation to understanding and wisdom
technology 693
ic. The issue and philosophy: the distinction and relation be-
concerning science
tween experimental and philosophical science, or between empirical and
rational science
690 THE GREAT IDEAS
PAGE
2. The relation of science to other kinds of knowledge 694
2a. The relation between science and religion: the conception of sacred theology as
a science
3.
The relation of science to action and production 695
30. The distinction between theoretic and practical science: the character of ethics,
politics, economics, and jurisprudence as sciences
3& The distinction between pure and applied science: the relation of science to the
useful arts
4#. The objects of science: the essential and necessary; the sensible and measurable 697
4*-.
The role of cause in science: explanation and description as aims of scientific
inquiry
4</.
The generality of scientific formulations: universal laws of nature 698
4^. The certitude and probability or the finality and tentativeness of scientific con-
clusions: the adequacy of scientific theories 699
5. Scientific
method
5<r.
The use of mathematics in science: calculation and measurement
5</.
Induction and deduction in the philosophy of nature and natural science 701
5*.
The use of hypotheses: prediction and verification
6b. The place of science in society: the social conditions favorable to the advance-
ment of science
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page, For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and Tower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand sideof
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nchemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
(la. Science as a philosophical discipline: certain 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
or perfect knowledge.) 171a-d; THIRD DAY, 202d-203a; 207d-208a;
214d
la(2) The division and hierarchy of the philo- 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-268d /
sophical sciences On Animal Generation, 331a-337a,c; 411c-d
7 PLATO: Republic, BK vn, 391b-398c / Philcbus, 30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 13a-c; 16a;
634b635b 42a-c; 57d-58b / Novum Organum 105a~195d
8 ARISTOTLE :Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 7 passim, csp BK i, APH 9 107d, APH 46 llOb-c,
103c-d; CH 9 104b-d; CH n J77 a26]-cH 12 APH 49 Ilia, APH 51 lllc, APH 54 lllc-d, APH
b b
[77 i5] 106b d; CH 13 [78 3i-79*i6] 108b-c; 63-64 113d-114b, APH 67 115d-116a, APH 74
CH 27-28 119b-c / Topics, BK i, CH 14 [i05 b i9~ li8b, APH 95 126b-c, APH 98-106 126d-128c,
29] 149c / Sophistical Refutations, CH 9 APH 126 134b / New Atlantis, 210d-214d
b
[i7o*2o- 3] 234b-c / Physics, BK i, CH 9 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi 60d-67a,c
b
[i92*33- 2] 268c-d; BK n, CH 2 270a-271a; CH passim
7 [198*22-31] 275b-c / Heavens, BK in, CH i 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 356a-357a; 361a / Weight
b
[298 i3-24J 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 of Air, 429a
500b-501c; CH 9 [992*29-^9] 510c-d; BK n, 34 NEWTON: Principles, lb-2a; BK in, RULE m-
CH 3 [994b 3i]-BK in, CH 2 [997*34] 513c-516a; iv 270b-271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a /
BK iv, CH 1-3 522a-525a; BK vi, CH i 547b,d- Optics, BK i, 379a; BK in, 542a; 543a-b
548c; BK vn, CH n [1037*13-21] 560d; BK xi, 34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553a-b
CH i 587a-588a; CH 3-4 589a-590a; CH 7 592b- 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 105-109
593a; BK xn, CH i [i 069*30^2] 598b-c; CH 8 433b-434b
a b
[107^3-7] 603d; BK xni, CH 3 [io78 9- 6] 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 36,
a b
609c 610a / Soul, BK i, CH i [403 25- i9J 465a-d [fn i]; DIV 38 466b-c; SECT xn S03c-
632b-d 509d passim, esp DIV 116, 504a, DIV 129-130
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 508a-d
[639^2 -640*10] 162a-b; [641*33^10] 164b-c 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 103b-115b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812b-813d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d esp 5c-6c; 146a-
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a 149d; 248d-250a,c / Judgement, 567c-568a
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in 10a-12b 45 LAVOISILR: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, Ic-
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vin, CH 4 266d- 2c; 6d-7a,c; PART in, 87b-c
267c; BK xi, CH 25 336b-d 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 175b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, AA 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 276d [fn 5];
1-8 3b-8d csp A 5 5c-6a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 318d-319a,c; 332b; 440b,d; 659a; 774d-775a;
451c-453c; PART i-n, Q 35, A 8, ANS 779c-780c 848c; 851a-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 54, 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 361a-b
A 2, REP 2 23d-24c; Q 57, A 6, REP 3 40a-41a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 253d
23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 71c-d; 72a~d; 53 JAMES: Psychology, xiva; 3b-4a; 89b-90b;
PART iv, 268c-d; 269b-c 862a-866a passim; 882a-884b
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 258b c 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 463d; 503 c-d /
30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 15d-16b; New Introductory lectures, 818c-819b; 874a-c;
40a-48d esp 40a-41b, 43a-45a / Novum Orga- 879b-882b esp 879c, 881b-c, 882b
nttm, BK i, APH 80 120a-b; BK 11, APH 9 140b-c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, I-H la-3b; iv 5a-7d / Dis-
The utility of science: the applications of
107d; APH 8 1 120b-c; APH 124 133c-d; APH 129 [214-217] 13b
134d-135d; BK n, APH 39 169d-170c; APH 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 452a-b
44-51 175d-194c passim / New Atlantis 199a- 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, I70a; 172a; 174b-
214desp210d-214d 175a; 184a; 213b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi 60d-67a,c esp 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 343d-
61b-d, 66d-67a,c 344a
33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 392b-393a 50 MARX: Capital, 170a-c; 176d-178d esp 177a;
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK i, 412a-423b 180d-250c esp 180d-181a, 181d [fn 3], 186b-d,
34 HUYGENS: Light, CH vi, 607a-b 188b-c, 190d [fn 2], 192d-195c, 197a-200a,
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART HI, 106a-107a 205c-207a, 211a-212b, 214a-215a, 216d-217b,
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 363b 219d-220a, 239b-241a; 299b-301b esp 299b-d
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 5d-6a; BK v, 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 421 d-
308d-309a,c 423a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 661c-663c 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK vi,
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 291d>292c; 509d- 158c; 164b-d; BK xi, 311d-312d
510a,c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 866a-b [fn 2]
43 MILL: Representative Government, 346c-347a / 54 FREUD: Psycho-Analytic Therapy, 127a,c /
Utilitarianism, 452a-b Civilization and Its Discontents, 777a-779a /
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, New Introductory Lectures, 882d-883a
26c-27a;41a-44d;45c-d
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 170a; 183b-184a; Ic. The issue concerning science and philos-
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c- 107a-136a,c esp APH 15 108a, APH 51 lllc,
45a APH 63-64 113d-114b, APH 66 114d-115c, APH
5 SOPHOCLES Antigone [332-375] 134a-b
:
95 126b-c, APH 109 128d-129c; BK n, APH 9
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK APH n 107d;
i, 140b-c
APH 81 120b-c; APH 124 133c-d; APH 129 134d- 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43d; PART vi
135d; BK n, APH 49-51 188b-194c 60d-67a,c passim, esp 61d-62c / Objections
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61b-d; 66d- and Replies, 285b-d
67a,c 34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; BK in, 269a; RULE
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH XH, HI-IV 270b-271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a
SECT 10-12 361b-362c passim / Optics, BK in, 542a-543b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 5 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in,
452d-453b esp 453a-b SECT 26 321b-c; SECT 29 322c-323a; CH vi,
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 78a-b; PART HI, 106a- SECT 13 335c-d; CH XH, SECT 9-13 360d-362d
107a esp SECT 10 361b-c
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxin, 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV
191b-c 20-sECT v, DIV 38 458a-466c passim; SECT xn,
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 363a-366d passim, esp DIV 131-132 508d-509d
363a-b 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 336b-c
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 308d-309a,c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 299a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 633c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d esp 5c-6c; 93d-
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 291d-292c; 509d- 94b; 175b [fn i] / Fund. Prin. Mttaphysic of
510a,c Morals, 253a-d; 264d; 271a-c; 277d<279d /
694 THE GREAT IDEAS I to Ib
(1. Conceptions of science. \c. The issue concerning tions, 69a-71a,c / Objections and Replies, 125b-
scienceand philosophy: the distinction and 126a; 127d; 162c-165d; 168b-169a; 283d-284d
relation between experimental and philo- 33 PASCAL: PensSes, 77 186a; 185-195 205a-210b;
sophical science, or between empirical and 219 212a; 226 212b-213a; 245-253 218b-220a;
rational science.)
265-290 221b-225a; 543 266a; 557-567 272b-
Practical Reason, 331a-332d / Judgement, 463a- 273b / Vacuum, 355b-356b
467a; 561c-562a,c; 578a-b 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK in, 543b-544a
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PRRF, lc-2d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xi, DIV
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d- 102 497b-d; SECT xn, DIV 132, 509c
183c 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 336b-337a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 197b; EPI- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12d-13b; 159a-d;
LOGUE n, 694c-d 186a-d; 200d-201a; 204d-205b; 307b-309d
53 JAMES Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 89b-90b; 882a-
:
esp 308b-309b; 599c; 658b-c; 670b-d
886a passim 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 177b-192d esp 190a-192d;
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d / General Introduc- 236b-240b csp 239a-b, 239d-240a / Judge-
tion, 545c-d / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and ment, 560d-561b; 578a-b; 591b-592c; 600d-
Anxiety, 722a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 601c;607d-609b
874a-875b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 455a-c
44 BoswtLL: Johnson, 102c-d
2. The relation of science to other kinds of 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 270,
knowledge 87c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-
160b; 177c-d; PART in, 308c-309d; PART iv,
2a. The relation between science and religion:
361b-c; 368d-369a,c
the conception of sacred theology as a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c-d / Descent
science
of Man, 593d
7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 345d-346a / Theaete- 50 MARX: Capital, 305a-306b [fn 2]
tus,528c-531a / Laws, BK xn, 797c-798b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 197b; BK vi,
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK n, CH i [284 b i~5] 248d-249a; EPILOGUE n, 675a-677besp676a-b;
b a
376a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [982 28-983 n] 680b-c; 684b-d; 695d-696d
501a-b 52 DOSTOLVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK iv,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [62-158] 87c-d; BK vi, 158b-159a
ld-3a; BK in [1-93] 30a-31b; BK v [55-90] 53 JAMES: Psychology, 847b-848a
61d-62b 54 FRLUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874a-881c
14 PLUTARCH: Nicias, 435b-d csp 875b-d, 877d-880d, 881c
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK
2b. The comparison of science with poetry and
v, par 3-9 27c-
history
29b of God, BK vm, CH 1-12 264b,d-
/ City
273a; BK xi, CH 2 323a-c; BK xvm, CH 37 7 PLATO: Lysis, 19d-20a / Protagoras, 57a-c /
493c-494a; CH 41 495b-496c / Christian Doc- Phaedrus,' IZSc-lWd / Ion 142a-148a,c / Re-
trine, BK n, CH 40 655b-656a; CH 42 656c-d public, BK x, 427c-434c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q i 3a- 9 ARISTOTLE: Poetics, CH 9 [i45i 36-b 32J 686a-c
ft
lOc; Q 2, A 2, REP i lld-12c; Q 12, AA 12-13 20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PARTI-II, Q 101,
60d-62b; Q 14, A 6, REP 2 80a 81c; Q 19, A 5, A 2, REP 2 267a-268a
REP 2 112d-113c; Q 32, A i 175d-178a; Q 39, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 67b-c
AA 7-8 209a-213a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a; Q 84, 25 MONTAIGNL: Essays, 41b-42a; 258c-259a
A 5 446c-447c 28 HARVLY: Circulation of the Blood, 316a-b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 71, 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 38c-
A 6, REP 5 llOb-lllb; PART n-n, Q 2, AA 3-4 39a; 44c
392d-394b; Q 19, A 7, ANS 469d-470c; Q 45 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43a-b
598c-603c csp AA 3-4 600c-601c 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 355a-356b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 65b-66c; 70c; 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 5,
83b; PART n, 137b-c; 160b; 163a-b; PART in, 452d-453a; SECT vni, DIV 65, 479b-c; SECT
165a-c; PART iv, 260b-c; 267a-c; 269b-271c; xn, DIV 132, 509c
274c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 333d-334a; 348a,c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 89c-d; 155a-c; 208d- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 345b-346b
209c; 212a-d; 238c-239c; 267c-268a; 271b- 42 KANT: Judgement, 526a-527b; 532b-c; 575b-c
273b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 157b-
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 4c; 19d- 158a;182d-183c
20a; 39d-40c; 41b-d; 55b-d; 95d-101c esp 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-470c;
96d-97b / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 65 BK xni, 563a-b; EPILOGUE n, 690a-b; 694d-
114b-c; APH 79 119d-120a; APH 89 124a-d 696d
CHAPTER 83: SCIENCE 695
53 JAMES: Psychology, 687a; 863a A i, REP 3 772b-773a; Q 13, A i, REP 3 780a-
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 239c-240a; 781b
246b-248c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 60c-61a; 72a-d;
796c 78b-c; 95d-96b; PART n, 158c-d; 164a,c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16d-17a;
3. The relation of science to action and pro-
40a-c; 42a-c; 46c-47c; 55b-d; 65d-66a; 81d-
duction
82a; 86b-c / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 3
7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 369c-d; BK vi, 375b- 107b; BK n, APH 9 140b-c
383b passim; BK vn, 401b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, i la-2a / Discourse, PART i,
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK vi, en 6 [145*12-18] 44a-b; PART in, 48b-49b; PART vi, 61b-d /
198d / Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 7 [i032 a 26-b 2()j Objections and Replies, 126a-b; 162d; 206c-
555b~d; CH 9 [1034*22-29] 557c; BK ix, en 2 207a; 215a-b; 237b-c; 243c-d
571c-572a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH n,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i -u, Q 57, SECT i 103d-104a; SECT 4 104d-105a; BK in,
A 5, Rhp 3 39a-40a CH xi, SECT 15-18 303b-304b; BK iv, CH in,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 65d-66a / SECT 18-20 317d-319c; CH iv, SECT 7-10 325b-
Novum Organum, BK n, APH 1-9 137a-140c 326b; CH xn, SECT 8 360c; CH xxi 394d-
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61b-d; 66d- 395a,c
67a,c 35HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 1-5
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 5 451a-453b; SECT vin, DIV 65, 479b-c csp 479c;
452d-453b SECT xi, DIV 104 498b-c; SECT xn, DIV 131-132
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphy sic of Morals, 266c- 508d-509d passim, esp DIV 132, 509c-d
267a / Practical Reason, 300d [fn i] / Intro. 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 78a-b
Metaphysic of Morals, 388d; 390b,d-391a / 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-334a,c
Judgement, 463a-464c; 523d-524a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 75d-80b passim
43 MILL: Representative Government, 346c-347a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d; 148c; 190c-191a;
50 MARX: Capital, 170b-c; 190d [fn 2] 234c-235a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
253a-254b; 260d-261b; 264b-d; 266a-b;
30. The distinction between theoretic and
271a-c; 283d-284d / Practical Reason, 291a-
practical science: the character of ethics, 297c; 314d-321b; 329a-330c;
politics, economics, and jurisprudence Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 366d; 367c /
as sciences Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-d; 388a-d;
7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-8b / Statesman, 581a; 390b,d-391a / Science of Right, 397a-b; 398c-
604c-608d / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 463a-467a,
399c
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, en 14 [io5 b ig-29] 474b-475d; 578a-b; 596c-598b
149c; BK vi, en 6 [145*12-18] 198d / Heavens, 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47c-d; NUMBER 31,
BK in, en 7 [306*14-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, 103c-104a; NUMBER 37, 119b-120b
BK i, CH 2 [982*30-b 4] 500c-d; BK n, CH i 43 MILL: Liberty, 283d 284 b / Utilitarianism,
b BK CH 2 [996*23-36] 445a-447a passim; 453c
[993 2o 23] 512a; HI,
b
514d-515a;BKiv,cH4[ioo8 2-}2]527d-528b; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 5c-6a;
BK vi, CH i [io25 b i9-28] 547d; BK xi, CH 7 INTRO, par 2-3 9b-12c; PART i, par 101 38b-
[1064*10-19] 592b-c; BK xn, CH 9 [1074^7- 39a; ADDITIONS, i 115a-d; 19 119c-d; 120
1075*2] 605c 136b-c
b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i [639 50 MARX: Capital, 6a-lld passim, esp 6a-d, 8a-
32-640*10] 162a-b / Ethics, BK i, CH 1-3 339a- 9b, lOb-llb
-b War and Peace, BK ix, 361d-365c;
340b; CH 7 [1098*20 8] 343c-344a; BK n, CH 2 51 TOLSTOY:
[110^26-1104*9] 349b-c; CH 4 350d-351b; BK EPILOGUE n, 680d-681a; 689b
a b
in, CH 3 [iii2 }o- i2] 358b-c; BK vi, en 2 53 JAMES: Psychology, 865b-866a
387d-388b passim; BK x,CH 9 [u8o b 2o- 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 800c-
n8i b 24] 435c-436a,c / Politics, BK iv, CH i 801 b / New Introductory Lectures, 883c-d
487a<488b
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a 3 b. The distinction between pure and applied
science: the relation of science to the
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VHI, CH 4 266d-
useful arts
267c; CH 8 270a-d; BK xi, CH 25 336b-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 4 7 PLATO: Lysis, 16c-18b / Protagoras, 43b-d /
5a-b; A 5, ANS 5c-6a; Q 14, A 16 90b-91b: Ion 142a-148a,c / Gorgias, 261a-262a / Re-
Q 79, A n 424d-425b; Q 84, A 8, ANS 450b- public, BK vn, 392a-398c / Statesman, 580d-
451b; PART i-n, Q i, A 6, REP 1-2 614a-c; Q 3, 581a; 581c-582a / Laws, BK iv, 684c-685a
A 5 626b-627a 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 56,
:
[100*6-9] 136c / Topics, BK vi, CH 6 [145*12-
A 3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; 18] 198d / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i 499a-500b;
Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART HI, Q n, BK vn, CH 7 [1032*26-1033*4] 555b-556a; en
696 THE GREAT IDEAS 3 to 4a
300d [fn i] / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388d
The relation of science to action and produc-
(3. //w</<rrotf,463a-464c; 523d-524b; 551a-556a
tion. 3. The distinction between pure and 43 MILL: Representative Government, 369a
applied science: the relation of science to the 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172b; 181a-b; 184a;
useful arts.) 213b
9 [1034*21-32] 557c; BK ix, CH 2 571c-572a; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 218d-
CH 5 573a-c; CH 7 [1049*5-12] 574c-d; BK xn, 219a
CH 9 [io74b 35~i 075*2] 605c / Sense and the 50 MARX: Capital, 170b-c; 183b<184a; 190d
a b
Sensible, CH i
[436 i6- 2] 673b / Vow/A, Life, [fn2];239c-d;299b-d
and Breathing, CH 27 [480^*21-3 1] 726d 54 FREUD: Psycho- Analytic Therapy, 123a-125a /
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH i 339a-b; CH 7 Civilization and Its Discontents, 777a; 778b-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 60a-c / Fund. Prin. Meta- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 56c-59c /
physic of Morals, 266c-267a / Practical Reason, Novum Organum, BK i, APH 63 113d- 114a;
4 to 4r CHAPTER 83: SCIENCE 697
APH 82-83 120d-121b; APH 103-106 127d-128c; 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
APH 121 132b-d; BK n, APH 4-5 137d-139a 202d-203a
31 DESCARTES: Rules, in, 4a-5a; iv, 5c-d; 6d; 30 B A CON Advancement ofLearning, 42a-c 43a-c
:
; ;
vin, 13c-d; ix, 15b-c / Discourse, PART n, 47a; 45a-46a / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 51 lllc;
PART iv-v, 51b-54c; PART vi, 61d~62c; 66a-b / BK n, APH 2-20 137b-153a
Meditations, i 75a-77c; HI, 82a-d; 83c-d; iv, 31 DESCARTES: Rules, n 2a-3b; vi, 8d-9a; xiv,
89b-c; v, 95b-96a / Objections and Replies, 30d-32a / Discourse, PART n, 47b-d; PART v,
123a-d; 125a-b; POSTULATE I-VH 130d-131c; 54c;55a-b
162a; 226d; 229c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 37-47 386b-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40 387a-388b 391a
33 PASCAL: PensSes, i 171a-172a / Geometrical 34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; BK in, RULE in
Demonstration, 430b-434b passim 270b-271a
34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; DEFINITIONS-LAWS 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi
OF MOTION 5a-24a; BK HI, 269a / Optics, BK i, 268b-283a passim, esp SECT 9 270d-271a; BK
379a; BK HI, 541b-542a iv, CH n, SECT 9-13 311b-312b; CH in, SECT
34 HUYOENS: Light, en i, 553a; en v, 600a-601b 29 322c-323a; CH vi, SECT 13 335c<d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH xi, 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 106
SECT 15-18 303b-304b; BK iv, CH vn 337a- 433c-d
344d esp SECT i 337a, SECT 10-11 339b-342d; 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV
CH xn, SECT 1-6 358c-360a; SECT 12, 362b-c; 20-21 458a-c; SECT xn, DIV 131-132 508d-
SECT i5363a-b 509d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 2 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 46d-47c / Intro. Meta-
451b-c physic of Morals, 387a-d /Judgement, 550a-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 68a-69c; 179d-182b; 211c- 551a,c; 562d-563b; 564a-c; 581a-582c; 603d-
218d csp 215d-216d / Practical Reason, 293c- 604b
294b;302d-303b;330d-331a / Science of Right, 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, Ib
457a-b 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 177a; 183a-
43 FLDKRALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a 184a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447a passim; 461c- 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 851 b-c
464d passim 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, Ib-c 53lAMEs: Psychology, 89b-90b; 647b-648b;
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169b-170a; 172a 876a-b;882a-884b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 2 9b- 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874a b;
lOa; PART in, par 279, 93b / Philosophy of 879c-d
History, INTRO, 157b-158a
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib; 862a-864a passim
4c. The role of cause in science: explanation
and description as aims of scientific
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401a / Instincts,
412a-b inquiry
7 PLATO: Meno, 188b-189a / Phaedo, 240d-246c
4b. The objects of science: the essential and / Republic, BK vi-vii, 383d-398c / Timaeus,
necessary; the sensible and measurable 455a-b
7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 370d-373c; BK vi-vn, 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c pas-
383d-398c csp BK vn, 391b-398c / Philebus, sim, esp BK n, CH 1-2 122b,d-123c, CH 9
633a-635a esp 634b-635a 128a-b; CH n 128d-129d, CH 16-18 134b-136a
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 13 [32 b 4- / Physics BK n, CH 3 [i94 i6-23] 271a-b; CH 7
23] 48b-d / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 4-9 [198*22-24] 275b; BK iv, CH 4 [211*6-11] 290a
100a-104d; CH 30-31 119d-120c; CH 33 121b- / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [981*24-982*1] 499c-
122a,c; BK n, CH 1-2 122b,d-123c; CH 19 136a- 500b; CH 2 [982*28-30] 500c; BK n, CH 2
b b
137a,c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 1-2 499a-501c; [994 i6-3i] 513a-b; BK in, CH 2 [996*1 8- 26]
b
BK HI, CH2 [996*1 8-997*34] 514d-516a; UK vi, 514d-515b; BK vi, CH i [io25 i-i8] 547b,d;
CH 1-2 547b,d-549c; BK xi, CH 8 593a-d / BK vn, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK vin, CH 4
Soul, BK CH
[402*10-403*2] 631b-632a
i, i 568d-569b; BK xi, CH 7 [1063^6-1064*9] 592b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i 161a-169d 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i
b b b a
esp CH 5 [644 2i-645*37] 168c-169b / Ethics, [639 io-642 4]161d-165desp[642 i-3o]165a-c
b
BK vi, CH 3 [ii39 i8-25J 388b-c; BK x, CH 9 / Gaitof Animals, CH i 243a-b / Generation of
b Animals, BK i, CH i [715*1-18] 255a-b; BK iv,
[n8o i3-23]435b-c
b b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a 812a CH i [765*3 5- 5] 306c; BK v, CH i [778 5-io]
b
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 57,
: 320d / Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [i098*35- 8] 343d-
A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 86, A 4, ANS 463d-464d 344a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 84, 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 4 169a
Ai,REP3l74b-175a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [509-533]
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 60a-b 67d-68a; BK vi [703-711] 89c-d
698 THE GREAT IDEAS
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 157b-
(4. The nature of scientific knowledge. 4c. The 158a
role of cause in science: explanation and 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c~240d
description as aims of scientific inquiry) 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 344a-b; BK
16 COPERNICUS: "Revolutions of the Heavenly xi, 470a-c; BK xni, 563a-b; EPILOGUE i,
84a-87a; iv, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
AXIOM 1 131d; 158b-162a; 215a-b 197a-b; 200a-b; 202d-203a; FOURTH DAY, 238a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, AXIOM 4 355d; PROP 8, 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-334d
SCHOL 2 356d-357d; APPENDIX 369b-372d; esp 334c-d
PART iv, PREP 422b,d-424a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 98c / No-
34 NEWTON: Principles, lb-2a; DEF vm 7b 8a; vum Organum, BK i, APH 17-25 108a-d; APH
BK RULE i-n 270a; GENERAL SCHOL,
in, 103-106 127d-128c; APH 130 135d-136a,c; BK
371b-372a / Optics, BK in, 541b<542a; 543a- n, APH 5 138b-139a; APH 33 161b-d
544a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 47c-d; PART
34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553a-b v, 54c; 55b / Objections and Replies, 167c-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, 395a-d
SECT 9-17 315c-317c; SECT 28-29 322a-323a; 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 358a-b
CH vi, SECT 5-15 332b-336d passim 34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; BK in, RULES
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 29-33 270a-271b; PROP 7 281b-282b; GENERAL
418c-419a esp SECT 32 418d-419a; SECT 50-53 SCHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK in, 541b-542a;
422c-423a passim; SECT 60-66 424b-426a esp 543a-b
SECT 65-66 425d-426a; SECT 102-109 432d- 34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
434b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH i,
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 9 SECT 9, 308d-309b; CH in, SECT 14 316b-d;
454c-455a; SECT iv, DIV 21-22 458b-459a; SECT 28-29 322a-323a; SECT 31 323c-d; CH vi,
DIV 26 460b-c; SECT vn, DIV 57, 475d-476b SECT 4-16 331d-336d passim; CH xn, SECT 7-
[fn 2]; DIV 60, 477a; SECT vni, DIV 67 480c- 13 360b-362d passim
481a; DIV 70, 481d-482a; SECT ix, DIV 82 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
487b-c; SECT xn, DIV 132 509a-d esp 509b-c 12 408a-b; SECT 15-16 409a-d; SECT 62-66
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-336d 425a-426a; SECT 103-109 433a-434b passim;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 46d-47c / Fund. Prin. SECT 126-128 438b-d
Metaphysic of Morals, 285c-286a / Practical 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 9
Reason, 311d-314d / Judgement, 557c-558b; 454c-455a; SECT iv, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT xii,
564a-c; 581a-582c DIV 132, 509c
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 9d- 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 195d-200a esp 197b-198a;
lOb 211c-218d / Judgement, 562d-563b; 564a-c;
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-184a 581a-582c
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 298d; 45 FOURIER: Theory ofHeat, 169a-b; 173b; 175b;
440b,d 177a; 184a
4f to CHAPTER 83:
45 FARADAY: Researches m Electricity, 391a*d; CH vi, SECT 5-16 332b-336d passim, esp SECT
398c; 406b; 440b,d; 59 5a; 603d; 655c; 13 335c-d; CH XH, SECT 7-14 360b 363a pas-
670a-b; 673b,d-674a; 851b-c; 85Sa,c sim, esp SECT 8 360c, SECT 10 361b-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 120 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 58-59
136b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d- 424a-b
183c; PART iv, 361a-b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 8,
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 98c 454b-c; SECT iv, DIV 20-21 458a-c; DIV 26
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-470c; 460b-c; SECT ix, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XH,
BK XHI, 563a-b; EPILOGUE n, 693d-696d DIV 129-132 508a-509d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 524a; 861b-886a passim 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART HI, 118a-119a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 348a,c
4e. The certitude and probability or the finality 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 129c-130a; 133c-134d;
and tentativeness of scientific conclu-
194b-c; 218d-222b esp 221c-222b; 227a-230c;
sions: the adequacy of scientific theories 248d-250a,c / Practical Reason, 311d-313d;
7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi, 386d-388a; BK vn, 335b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-d
397a-398c / Timaeus, 447b-d / Judgement, 603a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 13 [32b 4~ 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a
23] 48b-d / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 2 97d- 43 MILL; Liberty, 277a; 283d-284b / Utilitarian-
99a; CH 6 102b-103c; CH 31 120a-c; CH 33 ism, 445a-447a passim
121b-122a,c / Heavens, BK 11, CH 5 [287^8- 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 9d-
288*2] 379b-c; CH 13 [293*15-31] 384d; BK HI, lOa; 32d-33a
CH 7 [3<>6 a i-i8] 397b-c 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 181b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 3 [i<>94b n-27] 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 273b [fn 2];
a b
339d-340a; CH 7 [ro98 2o- 2] 343c-d; BK 11, 298d; 391a-c; 774d-775a; 8SOb,d-851c
CH 2 [no3b 26-i 104*9] 349b-c; BK vi, CH 3 49 DARWIN: Origin ofSpecies, 42a; 239c / Descent
388b-c of Man, 590a
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK HI, 83a; BK xin, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 89b-90b; 647b-648b esp
429a-b 648a; 655a-659a passim, esp 655a, 658b-6S9a;
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 863a-866a esp 863a, 864a; 882a-884b passim
Spheres, 505a-506a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 463c-d; 484c-
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 888b-890a; 929a 485a; 546a-b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 32, 661c-662b esp 661d / New Introductory Lec-
A i, REP 2 175d-178a; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b- tures, 818c-819b
b
[1095*30-%] 340c; CH 7 [io98*35- 3) 343d / Spheres, 505a-506a; 507a-508a
Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [1356*36-1358*35] 596a- 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 852a-853a; 888b-
598b; BK n, CH 20-22 640d>645a 890a; 911a-b; 92 9a; BK v, 964b
10 HIPPOCRATES Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 la-3b
: 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 32,
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK in, CH 1-2, AREP 2 175d-178a; Q 86, A 4, ANS 463d-
i,
199c-d 464d
16 COPERNICUS Revolutions of the
:
Heavenly 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK vi, 119a-b
Spheres, 505a-506a 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 285c-d; 286b-
19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 32, 304a,c esp 286b-c, 295d-296a / Circulation of
A i, REP 2 175d-178a the Blood, 316a-b
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 18, 149d;
207d-208c; FOURTH DAY, 252a-b APH 36, 165d-166a
702 THE GREAT IDEAS
31 DESCARTES: Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART vi
(5. Scientific method. 5e. The me of hypotheses: 60d-67a,c
prediction and verification!) 34 NEWTON: LAWS OF MOTION,
Principles, la-2a;
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61d-62c; SCHOL, 19b-20a; BK n, PROP 52, SCHOL,
65d66b 265a-b; PROP 53, SCHOL 266a~267a / Optics,
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vin [66-84] 233b- BK in, 526b
234a 34 HUYGENS: Light, PREP-CH i, 552a-553b
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-369a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 89a-b
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, RULE iv 271b; 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 224b-225a
GENERAL sciioL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK i, 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-337b
379a; BK in, 543a b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 23d; 148a-b
34 HUYGENS: Light, PRRF-CH i, 551b-553b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 298a-300a; 325d-
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 328a,c esp 326b-327b; 526c; 664d [n 55-
SECT 16 317a-c; CH xn, SECT 12-13 362a-d 56]
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 105 42 KANT: Pure Reason, ld-2b [fn 2]
433b-c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 119b-d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix, DIV 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 3c-4a
82 487b-c; SECT xi, DIV 107, 499d-500a 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-b
38 ROUSSKAU: Inequality, 333d-334a; 348a,c 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 391a-c;
42 KANT: Science of Right, 457a-b 440b,d; 824a-b
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 9d- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 21 7c-
lOb; PART n, 62a 63a 219c
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 184a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 590a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 607a,c; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 3b-4a; 37b; 125b-127b
758a-759c; 777d-778c; 850b,d-855a,c csp passim
850b,d-851c 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 137b-139a
46 I! KG EL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 285d- csp 138d-139a / General Introduction, 545d-
286a 546b; 550d-551a / New Introductory Lectures,
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c 880d-881c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xm, 563a-b;
EPILOGUE 694d-696d 6a. The technical conditions of scientific prog-
ii,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 95a; 357b; 647b-648b esp ress: the invention of scientific instru-
ments or apparatus
648a; 863a 865a; 882a-884b passim
54 FKMJD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351c / Nar- 16 PI'OLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 24b-26a; BK n,
cissism, 400d-401d esp 401 a / General Intro- 38b-39b; BK v, 143a-144a; 166a-167b
duction, 483d-485a passim; 502d-503a / 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
Group Psychology, 686c-d / New Introductory BK n, 558b-559b; 567b; 586b-589a;
Spheres,
Lectures, 840a-b BK iv, 705b-706a
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 908a-b
6. The development of the sciences 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 30d-31a /
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK n, CH i
[993*30- Novum Organum, BK i, APH 50 lllb; BK n,
b APH 39 169d-170c; APH 45, 176a / New At-
8] 511b,d
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, 210d-214d
lantis,
403a-b / Sand- Reckoner, 520a-b / Quadrature 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 362a
of the Parabola, 527a-b 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK i, 412a-423b
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 6b; 10b-12b; BK 34 HUYGENS: Light, CH v, 599b-600a
HI, 77a-83b; BK iv, 109a-112a; BK vn, 223a- 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xn,
232b; BK ix, 272a-273a; BK xin, 465b SECT n, 361d-362a
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 299b-d
Spheres, 505a-509b; BK i, 511a; 515a-b; 517b- 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART in
520b 87a-133d passim, esp 87a-d
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 845a-850a; 851a; 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 277d-279a;
852a-853a; 857b-863b; 907b-910a / Har- 316b-318c; 366d-371d; 444a-451a; 465d-
monies of the World, 1009b-1010a 467a,c; 768d-773d; 778b,d-793c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 276b-278a 50 MARX: Capital, 170a-c; 187d-188a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 126a
197a-b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 14c-15c 6b. The place of science in society: the social
conditions favorable to the advancement
csp 15a-b; 16c-d; 29c-32c esp 30d-31a; 48d-
49b; 51d-53d / Novum Organum, BK i, APH
of science
30-31 109a; APH 50 lllb; APH 70-115 116b- 7 PLATO: Republic, BK vn, 395a-b / Statesman,
130d 601c-602c
7 to 76 CHAPTER 83: SCIENCE 703
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [98i i3~ 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART 11-11, Q
b
24] 500a; BK n, CH i [993 30- 8] 511b,d AA 4-5 382c-384b
tt
i,
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan^ PART i, 73b; PART iv, 23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, S6b-d; 60a-c;
267c-d 65c-d
28 H \RVEY: On Animal Generation, 472d-473a 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREP, lc-2a
30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 7a; 14c-15a; 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY,
29c-32c csp 30d-31a, 32a; 54a-b; 56b / No- 168a-b
vum Organum, BK i, APH 72 117c-d / New At- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 13a-c; 14b-
lantis, 214a-b 15a; 54c-55a; 57d-58b / Novum Organum
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART in, 51b; PART 105a-195d passim, esp BK APH 46-49 HOb-
i,
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The treatment of the philosophical sciences, ^DEFINITION 6a; MATHEMATICS i-ib; META-
PHYSICS i,PHILOSOPHY i, 20; PHYSICS i-ia; THEOLOGY 33; and for the consideration
3b;
of science as one of the intellectual virtues, see VIRTUE AND VICE 23(2); WISDOM 2a.
Matters relevant to the conception and spirit of science as experimental inquiry, see EX-
PERIENCE 30; KNOWLEDGE 5c; OPINION 43; PHYSICS 2; and for the discussion of particular
experimental or empirical sciences, see ASTRONOMY i MAN 20; MECHANICS 4-43, 7-76(5)
; ;
4d; TRUTH 2c; WISDOM ib; and for the consideration of the practical or moral sciences, see
KNOWLEDGE 6e(2), 8b-8c; LOGIC 46; PHILOSOPHY 2c; STATE 8d; WEALTH 9.
The relation of science to art, and for the technological applications of scientific knowl-
edge, see ART 6a, 6c; EXPERIENCE 3; KNOWLEDGE 6e(2), 8a; LABOR le; PHYSICS 5; PROG-
RESS 3C.
Other discussions bearing on the nature and objects of scientific knowledge, see ASTRONOMY
i, 3a~3b; CAUSE 53-5^ HYPOTHESIS 43-4^ KNOWLEDGE 5c; MECHANICS 4; PHYSICS
2a-2b; PRINCIPLE 3c(i)~3c(3) TRUTH 4c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4f.
;
Other discussions of scientific method, see ART 6b; ASTRONOMY 2a-2c; DEFINITION 4;
EXPERIENCE 5-5^ HYPOTHESIS 4d; INDUCTION ib; LOGIC 4b; MATHEMATICS 5-50;
MECHANICS 2-3; PHYSICS 3, 43~4d; REASONING 4C, 50-5^4).
The effects of science on humsn life, see STATE 7b; WEALTH 33; 3nd for the socisl condi-
tions favorable to the advancement of science, see KNOWLEDGE 10; OPINION 5b; PROGRESS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Booty ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
place,
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
CLIFFORD. The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences J. S. HUXLEY. Science and Social Needs
FRAZRR. The Golden Bough, PART i, CH 4; PART vn, Science and Wisdom, pp 3-33
.
INTRODUCTION
nature of sensation seems at first to be tion between the senses and the higher facul-
THE as obvious as its existence. In the tradition ties of reason or intellect. The chapter on
of the great books there may be controversy MEMORY AND IMAGINATION deals with these
concerning the existence of sense in plants as two functions their relation to sense and
in
well as in animals, and there may be contro- sense-perception; and the contrast between
versy over the existence in man of faculties sensible and intelligible reality is discussed in
higher than sense. But no one disputes that men the chapters on BEING, FORM, IDEA, and MAT-
and other animals are endowed with a power TER. Some of these topics necessarily recur
of sense. here, especially as they bear on what for this
The extent of this power may be questioned, chapter are the primary problems the nature
but not the fact that animals and men, when of sensation, the analysis of the power of sense,
awake, experience sensations or perceive and the character of the knowledge which is
through their senses. Sleep, according to Aris- afforded by the senses.
totle, can occur only in those living things
which have the power of sense-perception. "If As WE HAVE ALREADY observed, no difficulty
there be an animal not endowed with sense- seems to arise at first concerning the nature of
perception, it is impossible that this should sensation. It is supposed by many inquirers,
either sleep or wake, since both these are affec- early and late in the tradition, that matter is
tions of the activity of the primary faculty of sensitive as well as sensible. Animals have
something which causes sensation and can be organs, as in the case of touch and taste; or, as in
sensed also seems to escape denial or dispute. the case of vision, hearing, and smell, they ex-
The existence of a purely intelligible reality ert their influence through an intervening me-
of a world of immaterial things incapable of be- dium, yet in a manner which seems to be no less
ing sensed is
subject to debate in all
periods the action and reaction of bodies.
of western thought. The sensible world is some- Those who distinguish between living or-
times regarded as the only reality; sometimes it ganisms and inanimate bodies tend to regard
is
regarded as mere seeming, or appearance, in sensitivity as a property of living matter, but
comparison with the reality of purely intelli- it does not follow for all who make this distinc-
gible being. Men may also differ on the ques- tion that other than material factors are needed
tion whether things possess sensible qualities to explain sensation. On the contrary, some
when they are not being sensed. But with few writers seem to think that the motions of mat-
exceptions, notably Berkeley and Hume, the ter account for sensation as readily as the laws
existence of a sensible world of material things of mechanics account for all the sensible changes
is not denied or seriously doubted. we are able to perceive.
The controversies and issues indicated above Lucretius, for example, holds that living
are, for the most part, discussed elsewhere. The things consist of body and soul, and that the
chapter on ANIMALconsiders the sensitivity of soul (or mind) differs from the body only in
plants. There also, as well as in the chapters on the size, the fineness of texture, and the mobility
MAN, IDEA, and MIND, is considered the distinc- of the material particles which compose it. It
706
CHAPTER 84: SENSE 707
theirbody; for that voice, too, and sound are grant that external sense-impressions or in-
bodily you must grant, since they can strike terior fancy can produce knowledge without
tions in the animal which are sensation; or, ac- of a purely corporeal kind." In contrast, "that
cording to Lucretius, minute replicas or images power by which we are said to know things is
composed of atoms, as all things are fly off purely spiritual, and not less distinct from every
from the surface of distant bodies and enter part of the body than blood from bone, or hand
through the pores of our sense-organs to awaken from eye." In men as well as animals, the ex-
in us vision, hearing, or smell. In either case, ternal senses, "in so far as they are part of the
imagination and memory, even thought, are just in the that wax receives an impression
way
consequent motions in the atoms of the mind from a Fancy or imagination is also "a
seal."
further bodily reverberations, as it were, of genuine part of the body"; and "memory, at
sensation. least that which is corporeal and similar to that
"The cause of sense," writes Hobbes, "is the of the brutes, is in no respect distinct from
external body or object, which presses the imagination."
organ proper to each sense, either immediately, These corporeal faculties are, according to
as in taste and touch, or mediately, as in seeing, Descartes, of use to the understanding or the
hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mind only when it "proposes to examine some-
mediation of nerves, and other strings and thing that can be referred to the body"; but if
membranes of the body, continues inwards to it "deal with matters in which there is
nothing
the brain and heart, causes there a resistance or corporeal or similar to the corporeal, it cannot
counter-pressure, or endeavor of the heart, to be helped by those faculties." Hence, for Des-
deliver itself; which endeavor, because outward, cartes, the "mind can act independently of the
seems to be some matter without. And this brain; for certainly the brain can be of no use
seeming or fancy is that which men call sense." in pure thought; its only use is for imagining
The object seems to be colored or hot or and perceiving."
sweet when it causes certain sensations in us For others, like William James, the distinc-
which are projected outward upon it, in re- tion between sensation and thought, so far as
sponse or counter-action to the inward motions their relation to matter is concerned, seems
it sets
up. But, says Hobbes, these sensible quali- quite untenable. He objects to those who look
ties are, in the object, nothing but "so many upon sensational consciousness as "something
several motions of the matter by which it ^ttfltf-material, hardly cognitive, which one
presses our organs diversely. Neither in us that need not much wonder about," while they re-
are pressed, are they anything else but diverse gard rational consciousness as "quite the re-
motions (for motion produces nothing but verse, and the mystery of it [as] unspeakable."
sations, aware of mere qualities, involve the soul "affections of the complex of body and
mystery as much as thoughts, aware of com- soul, or there any one among them peculiar
is
tion, no mental act, no knowledge. ... If the places sensation and imagination midway be-
sentient be a material entity (as we are invited tween the vegetative functions and rational
to believe), sensation could only be of the order thought. The power of
thought, or "the intel-
of seal-impressions struck by a ring on wax." lectual power," Aquinas says, "does not belong
Perception is not a passively received impres- to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is
sion. It is, according to Plotinus, an act of the act of the eye; for understanding is an act
awareness "determined by the nature and char- which cannot be performed by a corporeal or-
acter of the living being in which it occurs. . . . gan, like the act of seeing."
In any perception we attain by sight, the object At the other extreme from this "operation of
is
grasped there where it lies in the direct line the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal na-
of vision. The mind looks outward; this is
. . . ture that it is not even performed by any cor-
ample proof that it has taken and takes no inner poreal organ," are those "operations of the soul
imprint, and does not see in virtue of some .
performed by a corporeal organ and by virtue
. .
distinguishing that which has soul in it from gan, but not through a corporeal quality."
that which has notself- movement and sensa- He explains this further by means of a dis-
tion." By self-movement he appears to mean tinction between natural and spiritual immuta-
such things as the nutrition and growth which tion physical and psychic change. "Natural
is found in
plants, as well as the additional ani- immutation takes place by the form of the
mal faculty of local motion. Both self-move- thing which causes the immutation being re-
ment and sensation require soul as well as body. ceived, according to its natural existence, into
"Nothing grows or decays naturally," he the thing in which the immutation is effected,
writes, "except what feeds itself, and nothing as heat is received into the heated thing."
feeds itself except what has a share of soul in Vegetative activities, while remaining psychic
it." So, too, "nothing except what has soul in in the sense of occurring only in living or be-
CHAPTER 84: SENSE 709
souled matter, involve only natural immuta- judgment, and reasoning. They also take the
tions in the vital organs involved. position that man, while sharing sense-percep-
In contrast, "spiritual immutation takes tion, memory, and imagination with other ani-
place by the form of the thing causing the im- mals, alone possesses the higher faculty. The
mutation being received, according to a spirit- difference between men and brutes is thus con-
ual mode of existence, into the thing in which ceived as one of kind, not of degree, when the
the immutation is effected, as the form of color difference between the senses and the reason in
is received into the eye, which does not thereby man is also conceived as a difference in kind.
become colored." Though some sensations A functional relationship between sensation and
may require a natural immutation of the sense- thought is not thereby denied, but a distinct
organ, as hot and cold do, all sensations neces- faculty isaffirmed to be necessary for going
becoming colored. "Otherwise," Aquinas says, The distinction between sense and reason
"if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the as faculties of knowing is sometimes stated in
sense's action, all natural bodies would feel terms of a difference in their objects the par-
when they undergo alteration." ticular versus the universal, becoming versus
are the only faculty of knowing is an issue to objects immediately, the other forming con-
which the great books seem to give a variety cepts, judgments, or conclusions about objects
of answers. which are either beheld by the senses or cannot
The opposite answers appear to be correlated, be intuitively apprehended at all.
ination, those who hold this view also tend to WE HAVE ALREADY observed the opposition be-
attribute thought to animals and to regard man tween Hobbes and Aquinas with regard to mat-
as differing from them only in degree. ter and spirit in relation to the activity of the
Those who take the contrary view that senses. Hobbes, like Lucretius, not only treats
knowing involves an immaterial principle or all mental phenomena as manifestations of bod-
cause a soul as well as a body tend to dis- ily motion, but also reduces thought to the train
tinguish the various functions of sense from the or sequence of images. Images are in turn re-
activities of thought such as conception, ducible to the sensations from which they derive.
710 THE GREAT IDEAS
"As we have no imagination," Hobbes tinguished by their different degrees of force
writes, "whereof we have not formerly had and The less forcible and
vivacity. lively are
sense, in whole or in parts; so we have no transi- commonly denominated thoughts or ideas" The
tionfrom one imagination to another, whereof other he calls"impressions," meaning thereby
we never had the like before in our senses." "all our more lively perceptions." Impressions
Using the word "thoughts" to stand for the are the source of all other ideas, the creative
images derived from sense, Hobbes goes on to power of the mind consisting in "no more than
say that "besides sense, and thoughts, and the the faculty of compounding,
transposing, aug-
train of thoughts, the mind of man has no
menting, or diminishing the materials afforded
other motion though by the help of speech and us by the senses" and every
;
simple idea being
method, the same faculties may be improved to "copied from a similar impression."
such a height as to distinguish men from all Yet, though Berkeley and Hume seem to
other living creatures." Hobbes
agree with in
reducing all thought to
Only man's use of words makes the differ- primary sense-perceptions and derived memo-
ence in the exercise of the imagination "that ries or imaginations, Hume does not
attempt to
we generally call understanding," and which, explain thought by the motions of matter.
according to Hobbes, "is common to man and Berkeley differs even more radically. He de-
beast." Similarly, it is
only the fact that com- nies that matter or bodies exist, and so he re-
mon names have general significance which gards sense-perception, like all the rest of
gives human discourse the appearance of ab- thought, as purely spiritual. The soul passive-
stract thought, for Hobbes denies abstract ly receives its
original impressions directly
ideas. Thoughts or images are no less particular from God andactively forms the ideas it is
than sensations, "there being nothing in the able to derive from these
impressions.
world universal but names."
Berkeley and Hume seem to agree with NOR DO ALL THOSE who somehow conceive man
Hobbes that man has no abstract ideas or ascomposed of both body and soul agree upon
universal concepts; that the operations of
all the function of sense in relation to the rest of
thought are merely elaborations of the original thought. Locke, for example, uses "understand-
impressions of sense; and that no special power, ing" to cover all sorts of mental activity. Men-
but only the use of language, distinguishes men tal
activity begins with the passive reception
from other animals. of the simple ideas of sense the impressions
Berkeley uses the word "idea" to stand for produced in us when "the bodies that surround
sense-impressions "ideas actually imprinted us do diversely affect our organs" and the
on the senses" and for whatever
"perceived is
simple ideas of reflection which arise from an
by attending to the passions and operations of awareness of our own mental operations. But
the mind." To these two he adds a third: "ideas mental activity also includes the formation of
formed by the help of memory and imagina- complex ideas by the compounding of simple
tion, either compounding or dividing, or barely ones, and even the act whereby we form ab-
representing those originally perceived in the stract ideas, in doing which man, in Locke's
aforesaid ways. "The only difference between the
opinion, is distinguished from brutes.
and the third is that "the ideas of sense are
first All these activities require soul as well as
more strong, lively, and distinct than those of body. All are somehow nothing more than a re-
the imagination." But our ideas of sense and
working of the original sensations passively re-
imagination do not cover all the objects of ceived. In this last respect, Locke's view ac-
which we can think. He admits, therefore, the cords with that of Hobbes,
Berkeley, and
our having notions, whereby we
possibility of Hume, though he differs from them with re-
understand the meaning of a word like "spirit" spect to abstract ideas and in his theory of body
or "soul" which refers to a substance of which and soul. On the very point which he holds in
we can form no idea. common with Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume,
Hume divides "all the perceptions of the Locke seems to disagree with Descartes.
mind into two classes or species, which are dis-
Thinking, for Descartes, is the activity of a
CHAPTER 84: SENSE 711
purely spiritual substance the rational soul- tion that Locke sees no need for a special facul-
peculiar to the dual nature of man; whereas ty to obtain abstract ideas. On the other hand,
sensation and imagination, common to men Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes all seem
and brutes, are purely corporeal functions. In to agree in holding that understanding is as
man, the soul or thinking substance may form immaterial as its objects. Unlike sense, which
certain of its ideas, those relative to bodies, requires bodily organs, rational thought is, ac-
under the influence of sense or fancy; but with cording to them, an activity peculiar either to
regard to other ideas, such as those we have of the soul itself or to a power of the soul which
geometrical figures, Descartes says he cannot is not embodied in an organ, as the power of
admit that they "have at any time entered our is embodied in the
vision eye or the powers of
minds through the senses." He objects to the memory and imagination are embodied in the
use of the word "idea" for images, or what he brain.
calls "pictures in the corporeal imagination, William James denies this, I le holds the view
/'.., in some part of the brain." He criticizes that all forms of consciousness arc somehow
those who "never raise their minds above the functions of the brain. Yet he also insists that
things of sense," so accustomed are they "to percept and concept are radically distinct forms
consider nothing except by imagining it," with of consciousness. To this extent, James makes
the result that whatever "is not capable of as sharp a separation as the authors above men-
being imagined appears tothem not to be in- tioned between the sensory and the rational
nation to understand these ideas," he adds, "act discussion of sense are unaffected by the basic
in the same way as if, to hear sounds or smell issues just considered. For example, most writ-
odours, they should wish to make use of their ers tend to make some distinction between the
Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Kant. Yet for mative or cogitative powers. Yet not all who
Descartes as for Plato, the intellect in its own consider memory and imagination as activities
sphere of objects is like the senses in theirs, consequent upon sense-perception call them
since each is able to behold its proper objects "interior senses." Not all recognize a distinct
intuitively; whereas for Kant as for Aristotle, estimative or cogitative power even when they
sense alone is a faculty of intuition. The ideas recognize a kind of thinking about particulars
by which we apprehend intelligible objects, done by animals and men with sensory materi-
according to Plato, Descartes, and Spinoza, als. Nor do all who discuss discrimination or
are not derived from sensations or images. Ac- comparison, and the collation or combining of
cording to Aristotle and Aquinas, on the other the impressions received from the special
hand, the intellect abstracts all its ideas, or senses, attribute these functions to the special
universal concepts, from the particulars of faculty which Aristotle first calls "the common
sense. sense."
In this respect Aristotle and Aquinas seem to Frequently the same analytical point is made
be in agreement with Locke, even though that in different ways. As indicated in the chapter
agreement must be qualified by the observa- on QUALITY, the distinction which Aristotle
712 THE GREAT IDEAS
and Aquinas make between proper and com- ery time a present sign suggests an absent real-
mon scnsibles, according as the quality, such ity to our mind, we make an inference, and if
as colorand odor, belongs to a single sense, or, every time we make an inference we reason;
like shape and motion, can be perceived by then," James admits, "perception is indubita-
two or more senses, seems to parallel the dis- bly reasoning. Only one sees no room in it for
tinction between what Locke calls "secondary" any unconscious part." No inference is con-
and "primary" qualities. But where Locke and sciously made in perception; and James thinks
others treat the so-called "secondary qualities" that "to call perception unconscious reasoning
as entirely subjective, occurring only in the iseither a useless metaphor, or a positively mis-
experience of the sentient organism and having leading confusion between twodifferent things."
no reality in the sensible thing, Aristotle takes In his opinion, "perception differs from sensa-
a contrary view. tion [simply] by the consciousness of further
When it is not actually seen or smelled, the facts associated with the object of sensation."
sensible thing, according to Aristotle, is
po- For him, "perception and reasoning are coor-
tentially colorful or odoriferous; just as when dinate varieties of that deeper sort of process
it isnot actually seeing or smelling, the sense known psychologically as the association of
of vision or smell is also in a state of potenti- ideas."
ality with respect to these qualities. But when What James treats as the object of sensation,
the sensible actually sensed, then,
thing is Aristotle refers to as a quality sensed by one or
Aristotle says, "the actuality of the sensible more of the special senses, either a proper or a
object and of the sensitive faculty is one actu- common sensible. What James treats as the ob-
ality." The thing is
actually colored when it is
ject of perception, Aristotle calls an "accidental
actually seen, it is
though
only potentially object of sense," because it is strictly not sen-
colored whenmerely able to be so seen.
it is sible at all by any of the exterior senses, singly
"Earlier students of nature," he writes, "were or in combination. When we call "the white
mistaken in their view that without sight there object we see" the son of Diarcs or a man, we
was no white or black, without taste no savor. have an example of an accidental sensible or an
"
This statement of theirs partly true, partly
is
object incidentally perceived, because 'being
1
false: 'sense' and 'the sensible object arc am- the son of Diares' is incidental to the directly
biguous terms, />., they may denote either po- visible white patch" we see with our eyes.
tentialities or actualities. The statement is true This distinction between sensation and per-
of the latter, false of the former." ception seems to have a bearing on the prob-
Another example of the same analytical lem of the fallibility of the senses. Again the
point (which is made differently by different same point seems to be differently made. Aris-
writers) concerns the distinction between sen- totle, forexample, holds that whereas each of
sation and perception. According to William the senses is normally infallible in the appre-
fames, "perception involves sensation as a por- hension of its proper object or appropriate
tion of itself, and sensation in turn never takes quality, error is
possible in the perception of
place in adult life without perception also being the complex thing which is not strictly an ob-
there." The difference between them is that ject of the special senses. "While the perception
the function of sensation is "that of mere ac- that there is white before us cannot be false,"
quaintance with a fact," whereas "perception's he writes, "the perception that what is white
function ... is knowledge about a fact, and this is this or that may be false."
knowledge admits of numberless degrees of Lucretius likewise insists that the senses
complication." Hearing a sound is having a themselves are never deceived, but that all
sensation, but perception occurs when, as the errors attributed to the senses are the result
James points out, we "hear a sound, and say 'a of a false inference or judgment which reason
"
horse-car.' makes on the basis of the evidence presented
But James does not agree that, when percep- by the senses. That also seems to be the opinion
tion is so described, it is, as other psychologists of Descartes, who thinks that "no direct ex-
have suggested, a species of reasoning. "If, ev- perience can ever deceive the understanding if
CHAPTER 84: SENSE 713
it restricts its attention accurately to the object our own existence intuitively, and God's ex-
it. ... Thus if a man istence demonstratively, but "the
presented to suffering knowledge
from jaundice persuades himself that the things of the existence of any other thing we can have
he sees are yellow, this thought of his will be only by sensation." And though, he adds, "the
composite, consisting partly of what his imagi- notice we have by our senses of the existing of
nation presents to him, and partly of what he things without us ... be not altogether so cer-
assumes on his own
account, namely, that the tain as our intuitive knowledge or the deduc-
color looks yellow, not owing to the defect in tions of our reason . . .
yet it is an assurance that
his eye, but because the things he sees really deserves the name of knowledge."
are yellow. . . . We
can go wrong only when the Against such views, the most fundamental
things we believe are in some way compounded skepticism goes further than doubting the
by ourselves." Descartes holds that "no falsity veracity of the senses because of the illusions
can reside" in sensations themselves, but only and hallucinations they cause us to suffer. "By
in those judgments which, on the basis of sensa- what arguments," Hume asks, "can it be
tions, we are "accustomed to pass about things proved that the perceptions of the mind must
external to us." be caused by external objects and could not . . .
THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL judgment which men or from the suggestion of some visible or un-
make on the basis of sensation is that an ex- known spirit ?"
ternal world a reality not of our own
exists a question of fact," he adds, "whether
"It is
making. Descartes argues from the evidence of the perception of the senses be produced by
the senses to the independent existence of a external objects, resembling them. How shall
world of bodies. Though Berkeley argues, on this question be determined? By experience
the contrary, that bodies do not exist except as surely; as all other questions of a like nature.
objects of perception, he attributes the sense- But here experience is, and must be, entirely
impressions, over which we seem to have no silent.The mind has never anything present
control, to the action of an external cause to to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly
God, who uses them as signs for instructing us. reach any experience of their connexion with
Locke defines sensitive knowledge as that objects.The supposition of such a connexion
which informs us of "the existence of things is, therefore, without any foundation in rea-
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1 . The nature of sense 71 5
la. The power of sense as distinct from the power of understanding or reason
ib. Sense and intellect in relation to becoming and being, particulars and universals
2^. The degrees of sensitivity in the animal kingdom: the genetic order of the
several senses 717
2C. Comparisons of human and animal sensitivity
714 THE GREAT IDEAS
PAGE
3. The analysis of the power of sense: its organs and activities 717
30. The anatomy and physiology of the senses: the special sense-organs, nerves, brain
3^. The distinction between the exterior and interior senses 718
(1) Enumeration of the exterior senses: their relation and order
(2) Enumeration of the interior senses: their dependence on the exterior senses
(2) The attributes of sensation: intensity, extensity, affective tone; the psycho-
4^. The object of sense-perception: the evident particular fact; judgments of per-
ception and judgments of experience
4^. The relation of sense and the sensible: the subjectivity or objectivity of sense-
qualities 723
4<
The limit, accuracy, and reliability of sensitive knowledge: the fallibility of the
senses
50. Sensation as the source or occasion of ideas: the role of memory or reminiscence;
the construction of complex ideas; the abstraction of universal concepts 725
6. The role of sense in the perception of beauty: the beautiful and the pleasing to sense;
sensible and intelligible beauty
727
CHAPTER 84: SENSE 715
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, thcletters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-2831 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
TR ix, CH 5 248a-249a / Sixth Ennead, TR i, iv, CH ii, SECT ii 311c-312a; CH iv, SECT 4
CH 27-28 266c-267c 324c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VH, par 23 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i
50b-c 413a-b; SECT 25-33 417d-419a passim; SECT
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A 36 419c-d; SECT 135-142 440a-441c pas-
ii Q
84c-85c; A 2, ANS 105c-106b; A 3, ANS
18, sim, esp SECT 139-140 440d-441a, SECT 142,
106b-107c; Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 57, A i, REP 2 441c
295a-d; A 2 295d-297a; Q 75, A 5, ANS 382a- 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n 455b-
383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 86, A i, 457 b passim
ANS and REP 4 461c-462a; A 3 463b-d; PART 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 115b-c
i-n, Q i, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 2, A 6, ANS 53 JAMES: Psychology, 144a-145a; 160a; 313b-
619d-620d; Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3 748b- 314a; 452a-457a esp 453a-454a, 455a-456a;
749a 472b-473a; 593a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-333b 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 352d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn 18b-25a; xiv 28a-33b
2. Sensitivity in relation to the grades of life
passim / Discourse, PART iv, 53b / Medita-
tions, n, 79a-81d csp 81d; vi, 96b-d / Objec-
tions and Replies, 130a-b; 136d-137a; 218c-d;
2a. The differentiation of animals from plants
in terms of sensitivity
219b-c; 229d-230c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d-342a 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 469d-470a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445d-446a 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 5 [4iob i6-4ii a 2]
a b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 307a-311a esp 309a, 311b- 640d-641a; BK ii, CH 2 Ui3 3i- 4] 643c; CH 3
a
312b [fn i) [4i4 28-33] 644c; [41 4^2-4 15*3] 645a-b; CH
a b
12 [424 32- 4] 656b-c / Sense and the Sensible,
Ic. The distinction between perception or in- b
CH i [436 8-i2] 673c / Sleep, CH i [454^2-18]
tuition and judgment or reasoning: the b ft
696c-d; [454 23-4 55 2] 697b-c / Youth, Life,
transcendental forms of intuition and Breathing, CH i [467 b 2}-25] 714b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-41c csp 23a-24a, 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH i
b B
34a-c, 38c-41c; 42a; 45d-46a; 47c-48a; 53b- [588 4-589 i] 114d-115b / Parts of Animals,
54b; 58a-64a esp 61a-64a; 66a-d; 98c; 109d- BK n, en 10 [655 b 33~656 ft4l 182a; BK iv, CH 10
b a
HOa; 112d-113b; 115b-c; 199b-c / Fund. Pnn. [686 23-687 i] 218b-c / Gait of Animals, CH
a b
Metaphysic of Morals, 282 b-c / Practical 4 (705 26- i3J 244a-b / Generation ofAnimals,
Reason, 307d-308b; 329b-c / Judgement, 461a- BK i, CH 23 [73i a24-b 8] 271c-d; BK ii, CH i
a b
475d esp 461a-462d, 464c-467a, 474b-475d; [732*12-14] 272c; CH 3 [736 25~ i4] 276d-
b
482d-483d; 492c-d; 570b-572c 277b; CH 4 [74o 25]-CH 5 [741*30] 281d-282b;
53 JAMES: Psychology, 629a-631a BK in, CH 7 [757b i4-3o] 298c-d; BK v, CH j
321a-b / Ethics, BK i, CH 7
Id. Sense-perception as a primary function of
the mind or understanding: sensations 10 GALEN: Natural BK CH
Faculties, i, i
as received impressions; the distinction 167a-b
between sensation and reflection, ideas 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK vm, SECT 7 286a;
and notions, percepts and concepts BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [231-251] 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vn, CH 23,
33a-b; BK iv [26-41] 44b-d; [722-817] 53d- 256b-c
54d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18,
23 HOBBES Leviathan, PART i, 49a-d; 52b-c; 54a;
: A ANS and REP 1 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-
2,
PART iv, 2S8b-c 107c; Q 69, A 2, REP i 361c-362c; Q 78, A i,
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 14-18 380c- ANS 407b-409a
382b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 368a-b;
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH i, 369d-370b; 372b; 397c-398c; 457c-d
SECT 15 98d-99a; BK n, CH i-n 12Ia-128c esp 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix,
CH i, SECT 1-8 121a-123a, SECT 20-25 126d- SECT 11-15 140b-141a
127d; CH HI, SECT i, 128d; CH vin, SECT i 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 114b-115c esp
133b-c; SECT 8 134b-c; CH ix 138b-141a pas- 115a-b
sim, esp SECT i 138b-c, SECT 15 141a; CH xi, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 8a
SECT I7-CH xii, SECT i, 147a-b; CH xix, SECT 54 FREUD: Unconscious, 429c-d
2b to 3a CHAPTER 84: SENSE 717
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK
i, ld-2a
2b. The degrees of sensitivity in the animal 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a
kingdom: the genetic order of the sev- 42 KANT: Judgement, 479b
eral senses 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 25
b
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK n, CH 2 [4i3 4~io] 643c; 121a
[414*1-3] 644a; BK in, CH b
n a
[433 3i-434 4l 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 244a-245b
666d; CH 12-13 667a-668d / Sense and the 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 259d-260a; 261c-
b
Sensible, CH i [436 i2-437*i7J 673c-674a 26 2a; 301c-302b; 366c; 568d-570a
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH 3 53 JAMES: Psychology, 19b-42b passim, esp 41a-b
b
[489*17-19] lOb; CH 9 [49i 26-34] 13c; CH n
B 3. The analysis of the power of sense: its organs
[492*27-30] 14a-b; BK n, CH 12 [5O4 i9-23]
and activities
26c; 13 [505*32-34] 27d-28a; BK iv, CH 7
CH
[532*5-7] 58d; CH 8 59d-62a; BK v, CH 16
b b 3*. The anatomy and physiology of the senses:
[548 io-i5] 75b-c; BK vin, CH i [588 i7~3i]
b the special sense-organs, nerves, brain
115a<b / Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 8 [653 22-
29] 179b; CH 10-17 181d-188a,c passim; BK in, 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 454b-455a
CH 4 [667*9-14] 195b; BK iv, CH 5 [68i b i4-i7] 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK n, CH i
[412^8-24]
212b; CH n b
[690 i7-69i*28] 222d-223c / Gait 642d; CH 8 [420*2-19] 651b-c; CH 9 [421*19-
b b
of Animals, CH 4 [705^-13] 244b / Generation 26] 652d; [42i 8-422*6] 653a-c; CH 10 [422 i-
b CH n
of Animals, BK i, CH 23 [73i*24- 8] 271c-d; 9] 654a; [422** 17-424*9] 654b-655d; BK
b
BK v, CH i [778 2o]-cn 2 [78^29] 321a-324a n, CH 12 [424*24]-BK in, CH i [425*13] 656a-
b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [633-721] 657a; BK in, CH 2 [426 8-i7] 658d; CH 13
b
52c-53d [435*1 i- 3) 668a-b / Sense and the Sensible,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18, A CH 2-5 674a-683b passim / Youth, Life, and
b b
3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 78,
A 3, ANS 410a-411d Breathing, CH 3 [468 28]-CH 4 U69 6] 715b-
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 59a-c 716a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix, 9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals, BK i, CH 4
:
b
SECT 11-15 140b-141a [489*24-27] lOc; CH 15 [494 n-i6] 16d; BK n,
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 261c-262a; 366c; CH 10 25b-c; CH 12 [504*19-23] 26c; CH 13
b
397d-398a; 402b-c; 406c; 432c-434c passim; [505*32-34] 27d-28a; BK iv, CH i [524*3 3- 5l
447b-448a passim; 456b-d; 474a-b; 480a-482b 50a; CH 7 [532*5-10] 58d-59a; CH 8 59d-62a /
passim; 529a-b; 553d-554b; 568d-569b; 595b- Parts of Animals, BK n, CH i [647*1-34] 171a-c;
596a CH 8 [653b i9-29] 179b; CH 10-17 181d-188a,c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 27a-42b passim, esp 40a, esp CH 10 [656*i4]-cn 12 [657*24] 182b-183d,
41b CH 16-17 185d-188a,c; BK in, CH 4 [666*io-b i]
b
193d-194b; CH 5 [667 22~32] 196a; BK iv, CH
2c. Comparisons of human and animal sensi- b b ft
102b,d-103b 651a
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 244a-245b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 85d-87c; 90b-c / 3^(2) Enumeration of the interior senses: their
Descent of Man, 259c 261c; 397d-398a; 595d- dependence on the exterior senses
596a 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, en 19
b B
53 JAMES: Psychology, 8a-52b esp 27a-42b; [99 36-ioo 6] 136b-c/ Metaphysics, BK CH i
i,
367b-c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 647a- 19-20] 237c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH n [1370*28-
648a 31] 613c
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 29
3. The distinction between the exterior and
157b-d; TR w, CH 8, 161d-162b; TR vi 189b-
interior senses 191c
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-15
h
[99 }6 100*3] 136b-c / Soul, BK in, CH 2 74b-75b
657d 659c; en 3 [428*5-16] 660b; CH 7 19AguiNAs: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78,
[43i
tt
i4
l)
2] 663d-664a / Sleep, CH 2 [455*3- A 4 411d-413d; Q 84, A 7, REP 2 449b-450b;
b 697c 698b
i3] Q in, A 3, REP i 570b-571b
17 PLO riNus Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 29 157b-d
: 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvn
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, iM i]78c
A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, 23lIoBBLs: Leviathan, PART i, 50a-c; 52b-c;
REP 3 430c-431d; PART i-ii, Q 35, A 2, RLP 2 54b-c; PART iv, 262a-c
773b-d 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 334c-d
23 HOBHRS: Leviathan, PART i, SOa-c; 52b-c; 31 DESCARTES: Rules, xii, 19a-20d
PART iv, 258b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 17-18 380d-
28 HARVKY: On Animal Generation, 457b 382b
31 DESCARTI s: Rules, xn, 19a 20a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 24a-b; 26b-29d / Intro. SECT 21 118b 119a; BK n, CH n, SECT 2-3
Mctaphysic of Morals, 386d-387a,c 128a-c; en x 141b-143d esp SECT 7 142c-d;
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 367b-c; CH xi, SECT 1-7 143d-145b; CH xn, SECT i,
384c-385b 147b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT 11, DIV 13
Enumeration of the exterior senses: their 455d-456b
relation and order 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-42b; 54b-55a
8 ARISTOILF: Generation and Corruption, BK n, 53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a; 391a; 480a
CH 2 [}29h 6 i?l 429c / Soul, BK n, CH 7-11 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-c
649b 656a; BK in, CH i -2 656b,d-659c / Sense
and the Sensible 673a-689a,c 3c. The activity of the exterior senses
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK iv, CH 8
59d 62a / Parts of Animals, BK 11, CH 10 The functions of the exterior senses: the
CH n nature and origin of sensations
[656*24] [657*18] 182c-183c
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159d 7 PLATO: Meno, 177b-d / Republic, BK vi, 385c-
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [434-443] 386c / Timaeus, 453b-454a; 454c-455a; 463d-
20c; [680-687] 23c-d; BK iv [478-499] 50b-d 465d / Theaetetus, 518b-522b; 533b-534b /
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18, Philebus, 621a-c
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q ANS 394c-396a;76, A 5, 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [9*28 -b 8] 14b-c /
b
Q 78, A 3 410a-411d; Q 91, A 3, REP i 486b- Topics, BK CH
14 [io5 4-9) 149b; BK iv,
i,
b
487d; PART i -ii, Q 31, A 6 756d-757c CH 5 [i25 i5-i8] 174d / Generation and Corrup-
to 3c(3) CHAPTER 84: SENSE 719
(3c. The activity of the exterior senses. 3r(3) The 3c(5) Sensation and attention: pre-perception
classification of sensations or sense-qualities: and apperception; the transcendental
proper and common sensibles; primary and unity of apperception
secondary qualities?) Sensible, CH 7
8 ARISTOTLE: Sense and the
428b,d-431a / Soul, BK n, CH 6 [4i8 6-i9)
ft
685c-689a,c
648d-649a; CH 9 [^21^27^2] 652d; CH 10 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, iv [i-
b b
(422 io]-cH ii [422 33] 654b-c; BK HI, CH i 18] 57c
b
[425*14-29] 657b-c; [425 4-io] 657c-d / 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 14a-15c,
Sense and the Sensible, CH i [437*3-10] 673d- 23a-33d, 41c-42b, 48d-59b, 66d-93c
674a; CH 3-5 676a-683b; CH 6 [445^-446*20] 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 244a-245a
683b-684c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xiv, 605c-d
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 6, 169c-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 184b-185a; 232b-235a;
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [398-521] 262a-291a esp 262b-268a, 275b-276b, 282a-
20a-21c; [730-864] 24b-26a 288a; 295b-297a; 328a-329a; 469a-b; 522b-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, A 525a; 562a-b; 620b-621a
3 esp REP 2 410a-411d; A 4, REP 1-2 411d-413d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 5d. The activity of the interior senses
Q 92, A 2, ANS 1032b-1034b
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 49b-d; PART in, 3</(l) The functions of the common sense:
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR HI, CH 28-32 / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640d-641a /
156d-159a; TR vi 189b-191c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-17 721c esp 720c-d; 737b-d; 751a-752b / New
74b-75d Introductory Lectures, 845a-846a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 55, A
3e. The relation of sense to emotion, will, and
2, REP 2 289d-290d; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 3
411d-413d movement: the conception of a sensitive
a b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d-342a 21]387d; BK vn, CH 3 [ii47 25- 6] 397c-d;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-42b; 54b-64a / CH 4 [ii48"4-22] 398b-c; CH 6 [1149*23^3]
Judgement, 493c-d 399d-400a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 219d- 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [877-891]
220a 55d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a-15a esp 13a; 145a; 12 EPICTETUS Discourses, BK n,cii2}, 170a-171a
:
A ANS 76d-77d
2, 323d; 324c-d / On Animal Generation, 332a-
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 333c
Q 82, A 3, ANS 971a-972d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 51c-d; 57d-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-d; 57b; 59d; 58b / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 10 107d;
PART in, 172b APH 14-17 107d-108a; APH 41 109c-d; APH 50
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 285b*292d passim lllb; BK n, APH 6 139b-c; APH 39-40 169d-
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XH, 19a-c / Meditations, 173d; APH 44, 175d
vi, lOOa / Objections and Replies, 162d-165a; 31 DESCARTES: Rules, vm, 13a-b; xn, 18c; 22c-
228c-229c; 231a-b 23a / Discourse, PART iv, 53b / Meditations, i
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK i, 428a-b 75a-77c; HI, 83d-84a; vi 96b-103d esp 103a-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH vm / Objections and Replies, POSTULATE i 130d;
133b-138b passim; CH xxi, SECT 3 178d; SECT 206c-207a; 229d-230d
75 200b-d; CH xxm, SECT 7-13 205d-208b; 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 16, COROL 2
SECT 37, 214a-b; CH xxx, SECT 2 238b-c; CH 380d; PROP 24-28 383c-384c; PROP 29, COROL
xxxi, SECT 2 239b-d; CH xxxn, SECT 14-16 384d-385a; PROP 40. SCHOL 2-pRop 41 388a-c
245c-246b; BK iv, CH n, SECTii-i4 311c-312d; 32 MILTON Paradise Lost, BK v [544-576] 187a-b;
:
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT in, DIV 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 684a
19, 458a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 307a; 456a; 647b-648b esp
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341c-342b 648b [fn i]; 655a; 863a-865a; 881a-b
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 659a 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 819d-820a;
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART iv, 361a b 879c
CHAPTER 84: SENSE 727
180, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c; PART in SUPPL,
6. The role of sense in the perception of Q 82, A i, REP 5 968a-970c; Q 91, A A 3-4 1020d-
beauty: the beautiful and the pleasing to 1023d
sense; sensible and intelligible beauty 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxx [19-
7 PLATO: Symposium, 167a-d / Republic, BK v, 36] 152a
370d-373c; BK vi, 385c-386c / Theaetetus, 27 SHAKESPEARE: Sonnets, LIV 594c; LXIX 596d;
513a-b;535c xcin-xcv 600b-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 5 [645* 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 175a-
a
4-26] 168d-169a / Ethics, BK in, CH 10 [m8 i- 176c
b bi
y] 364c-365a; BK x, CH 4 [n74 5- 1175*3] 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 381d 382a
429a-b; CH 5 429d-430d / Rhetoric, BK in, en 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23d [fn i] / Judgement,
2 [i405 b i7-2o] 656a / Poetics, CH 7 b
[i45o 34- 476a-479d; 482b-483d: 492b-495a,c; 501b-
a
I
4 5i 6] 685b-c 502d; 506a-511a csp 508b-c; 537a-539d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK iv, en n 240d- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 220b c;
242d PART n, 266a-267a; PART in, 304a; PART iv,
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vi 21a-26a / Fifth 346d347a
Ennead, TR vin 239b-246c / Sixth Ennead, 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [11,288-303] 274b-
TR vn, en 30-34 336b-338d 275a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 38 81a / 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 307b-308b
City of God, BK vin, en 7 269c-d; UK XXH, 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 95a-d esp 95d /
CH 19, 605b / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 4 Descent of Man, 301c-302a; 451b; 568d 569b;
625b-c 577b; 595d-596a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, 52 DosTOEViKYiBrofhersKaramazw, BK ni,53c-
A REP i 25d-26c; Q 91, A 3, Rtp 3 486b-
4, 54b
487d; PART i -ii, Q 27, A i, REP 3 737b-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 157a; 755a-758a csp 755b
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART H-II, Q
: 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 775b-c
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Discussions relevant to the controversy over the distinction between sense and reason or
intellect, and the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, see BEING 7c, 8a-8b;
EXPERIENCE 4a; IDEA ib-ic, 2c-2g; KNOWLEDGE 6a(i), 63(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION
la, 5b, 6c(i), 6d; MIND la, id, ig; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4d; and for the related is-
sue concerning the difference between animal and human faculties, see ANIMAL 10(2);
EVOLUTION yb(3); MAN la-ic; SOUL 2c(2)-2c(3).
The intuitive character of sense-perception as contrasted with the discursive nature of judg-
ment and reasoning, see INDUCTION la; KNOWLEDGE 6b(4), 6c(i); PRINCIPLE 2b(i);
REASONING ib; and for the theory of space and time as transcendental forms of intuition,
see FORM ic;MATHEMATICS ic; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2); MIND ie(i), 401(3);
SPACE 43; TIME 6c.
The differentiation of plant, animal, and human life with respect to sensitivity, see ANIMAL
ia(i), ib, ic(i); LIFE AND DEATH 3a~3b; MAN 4b; SOUL 2c(i)-2c(2).
The discussion of the nervous system, see ANIMAL 5g.
The theory of memory and imagination as interior powers of sense and as dependent on the
exterior senses, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION la, ic; and for another consideration of the
estimative power, see HABIT 3b.
The pleasantness and unpleasantness of sensations, see PLEASURE AND PAIN 4b, 46; and for the
variation of sense-qualities in degree or intensity, see QUALITY 3c; SAME AND OTHER 3C.
The distinction between proper and common sensibles, or between primary and secondary
qualities, see QUALITY 2b; and for the issue concerning the objectivity or subjectivity of
these qualities, see QUALITY 6c.
The distinction between sensation and perception, and the problem of our sensitive knowl-
edge of substances as opposed to qualities, see BEING 8c; IDEA 2f; KNOWLEDGE 6b(i);
MEMORY AND IMAGINATION la; PRINCIPLE 23(1); and for the doctrine of the transcenden-
tal unity of apperception, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2); ONE AND MANY 4b.
728 THE GREAT IDEAS
For: The relation of sense to emotion and will, and for the distinction between the sensitive and
the rational appetite, see DESIRE 3b(i); EMOTION i; GOOD AND EVIL 43; MEMORY AND
IMAGINATION id; WILL 2b(2).
The comparison of sensitive with other forms of knowledge, sec KNOWLEDGE 6b(i)-6b(3);
and problem of truth and falsity in sensation and sense-perception, see MEMORY
for the
AND IMAGINATION 26(4), 5c; PRINCIPLE 2b(i); TRUTH 3a(i)~3a(2).
The contribution of sense to thought, and for the role of sense in theories of reminiscence,
induction, and abstraction, see EXPERIENCE 3b, 4b; IDEA 2b, 2f-2g; INDUCTION 2; MEMORY
AND IMAGINATION 33, 3c, 6c-6d; MIND 13(2); REASONING ic; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICU-
LAR 4c.
The role of sense in the perception of beauty, see BEAUTY 4-5; PLEASURE AND PAIN 4c(i).
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
II.
HERSCHEL. Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects,
THBOPIIRASTUS. On the Senses IX
EPICURUS. Letter to Herodotus E. HARTMANN. Philosophy of the Unconscious, (B)
CICKRO. Academics VIII
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Outlines of Pyrrhonism LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK HI, CH 2
ALBERTUS MAGNUS. De Sensu et Sensato GALTON. Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its
R. BACON. Opus Majus, PART v Development (Sensitivity, Sequence of Test
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Tho- Weights, Whistles for Audibility of Shrill Notes,
misticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART iv, QQ 4-8 Appendices c, D, E)
MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la veritt, BK i, MACH. The Analysis of Sensations
CH 5-9, 10 (2, 4-6), 12-15, 17-20 BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK i, CH i, 5
Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, iv-v
. BERGS ON. Matter and Memory, CH 4
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under- WUNDT. Principles ofPhysiological Psychology, PARTI
standing, BK n, CH 2-9 Outlines of Psychology, (6, 8-n)
.
INTRODUCTION
A
A SIGN
thing. Sign
points to something. symbol
stands for or takes the place of another
and symbol are sometimes differ-
Some things are simply things, and not signs at
all.Some (for example, "the ram which Abra-
ham offered up instead of his son") are not only
entiated according to whether emphasis is things, but "also signs of other things." And
sic or mathematics either "signs" or "symbols." The distinction between natural and conven-
Words, too, are traditionally spoken of as signs tional signs falls within this threefold division.
or symbols. Words and other conventional no- "Natural signs," Augustine says, "are those
tations for expressing meaning both point to which, apart from any intention or desire of
and stand for something else. It is only in using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowl-
certain cases that one of these two functions edge of something else, as, for example, smoke
seems to predominate, as the road marker when it indicates fire. For it is not from any
points out the direction to take, and paper intention of making it a sign that it is so, but
money takes the place of the precious metal through attention to experience we come to
whose value it represents. know that fire is beneath, even when nothing
On what is common
to signs and symbols of but smoke can be seen. And the footprint of an
all seems to be no disagreement
sorts there animal passing by belongs to this class of signs."
throughout the tradition of western thought. Augustine seems to find natural signs in
From Augustine's statement that "a sign is a things that are related as cause and effect.
thing which, over and above the impression it Berkeley, on the other hand, tends to substi-
makes on the senses, causes something else to tute the relation of sign and thing signified for
come into mind as a consequence of itself," to the relation of cause and effect. "The fire which
Freud's analysis of the symbolism of dreams, of I see," he writes, not the cause of the pain I
"is
symptoms, and symptomatic acts, the great suffer upon my approaching, but the mark that
books consider sign or symbol as one term in a forewarns me. In like manner the noise that I
relation, the relation being one of meaning or, hear is not the effect of this or that motion or
as Freud says, of "significance, intention, tend- collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign
ally discussed concern the nature of meaning Every natural thing or event thus tends to
itself, and the modes of signification which vary become the sign of something else, so that the
with the kinds of things that function as signs whole of nature constitutes a vast symbolism or
and the kinds of things they signify. language by which God informs us of his plan.
Aristotle tends, in the opposite direction, to
WITH RESPECT TO THINGS which function sym- limit natural signs to those things which, ac-
bolically, the primary distinction seems to be cording to our knowledge and experience, per-
that between natural and conventional signs. mit a necessary or probable inference to some-
Augustine at firsi suggests a threefold division. thing else. The fact that a woman is giving milk
730
CHAPTER 85: SIGN AND SYMBOL 731
he regards as an infallible sign that she has lately ventional signs raises the central problem con-
borne a child; the fact that a man is breathing cerning their meaning or significance. Utterly
fast is merely a probable and refutable sign that words in different languages can have
dissimilar
he has a fever. the same meaning, and identical sounds or
In any case, signs are generally acknowledged marks in different languages can mean quite
to be natural if they satisfy Augustine's crite- different things. Since the sounds or marks
rion that they were not intentionally devised by which constitute spoken and written words do
men for the purpose of signifying, "Conven- not possess meaning naturally, from what
on the other hand," he writes, "are
tional signs, source do such conventional signs get the
those which living beings mutually exchange meanings they have ?
for the purpose of showing, as well as they can, The usual answer, given by Aristotle, Locke,
the feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, and others, is that words get their meanings
or their thoughts." Of conventional signs, from the ideas, thoughts, or feelings which men
Augustine goes on to say, words hold the chief use them to express.
"Spoken words," writes
place, because everything which can be ex- Aristotle, "are thesymbols of mental experi-
pressed by gestures, or by such non-verbal sym- ence and written words are the symbols of
bols as flags or bugle calls, can also be expressed spoken words. Just as all men do not have the
in words, whereas many thoughts which words same writing, so all men do not have the same
readily express do not lend themselves easily to speech sounds, but the mental experiences,
other modes of expression. which these directly symbolize, are the same
Except for the hypothesis (discussed in the for all, as also are those things of which our ex-
name, it is never proposed that words are any- "be able to use these sounds as signs of internal
thing but conventional signs. As Aristotle says, conceptions, and to make them stand as marks
"nothing by nature a noun or a name it is
is for the ideas within his own mind, whereby
only so when it becomes a symbol." The audible they might be made known to others." Thus
sound or the visible mark becomes a symbol words came to be used by men "as the signs of
only by human institution or convention. their ideas; not by any natural connexion that
Yet not all the audible sounds which men and there is between particular articulate sounds
other animals make to express their feelings or and certain ideas, for then there would be but
desires are, in Aristotle's opinion, to be re- one language amongst men; but by a vol-
all
garded as words. "Inarticulate sounds, such as untary imposition, whereby such a word is
those which brutes produce, are significant, yet made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The
none of these constitutes a noun." Nor are such use then of words is to be sensible marks of
cries, whereby one animal calls another or com- ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their
municates fear or anger, strictly conventional proper and immediate signification."
signs; for, as Augustine points out, they are in- Locke goes further. Not only does the im-
stinctive modes of expression, and so are natural mediate signification of words lie in the ideas
rather than conventional. They are not volun- they stand for, but in his view words "can be
tarily instituted. signs of nothing else." Yet he also considers the
changes from time to time and place to place suppose their words to stand also for the reality
and that which is everywhere and always the of things." Locke thinks, nevertheless, that
same no one would question the convention- "obscurity and confusion" enter into the sig-
alityof words and of all other non-verbal sym- nification of words "whenever we make them
bols which are peculiar to one people, one stand for anything but those ideas we have in
culture, or one epoch. That words are con- our own minds."
732 THE GREAT IDEAS
But though the meaning of a word may come is also a thing" has a different meaning when
from the idea it signifies, the word which is it is of the sensible things which also hap-
said
thus made meaningful seems, in the common pen to be signs and of the things of the mind
usage of mankind, to serve as the name or desig- concepts or ideas which cannot be without
nation of some real thing. It refers to some- being signs. The understanding of this differ-
thing other than ideas or concepts in the human ence helps to explain the relation between ver-
mind. Locke himself talks of "the application bal signs and the mental signs through which
of names to things," and in his consideration of they signify or from which they get their
the distinction between proper and common meanings.
names is concerned to point out that, though Whereas words are in the first instance
they differ in meaning (i.e., differ in the type of meaningless marks and sounds which get mean-
idea they signify), both refer to the same sort ing when men use them to express their
of reality individual existences. Aristotle and thoughts or feelings, ideas and images are at
other writers who distinguish between things once meaningful, however they arise in the
in the order of nature and the concepts we form mind. They are natural signs in the sense that it
of them, tend to take both views of the signifi- seems to be their very nature to signify. They
cance of words. Words signify the real things do not get meaning. They do not even have
which they name as well as the ideas whose meaning, in the way in which smoke as a nat-
meanings they express. If we waive for the ural sign of fire has a meaning which is distinct
moment the possibility that some words may from, though a consequence of, its nature as
signify only ideas, whereas others signify both smoke. An idea is a meaning, an intention of
ideas and two questions may be asked.
things, the mind, as it is sometimes called, a reference
Are there any words which signify things alone ? to an object thought about. The idea of fire
What is the relation between the idea and the is the meaning the word "fire" has when it
thing a word signifies, when a word signifies designates the natural phenomenon which that
them both; that is, when a word has both sorts word conventionally used to name; and as
is
of significance, how are they related to one Aristotle suggests, the conventional signs of dif-
another ? ferent languages
[e.g.,
"fire" and "fcuer"] have
Aquinas answers the second question by say- the same meaning because the idea of fire is the
ing that since "words are the signs of ideas, and same, and the natural phenomenon experi-
ideas the similitudes of things, it is evident that enced and thought about is the same, for men
words function in the signification of things of diverse tongues.
through the conceptions of the intellect." Ideas That ideas or mental images are themselves
may be the immediate or proximate object meanings or intentions the symbols of things
which words signify, but through them words thought about seems to be recognized in dif-
ultimately signify the real things which are ferent ways by many writers in the tradition
themselves the objects of ideas. According to of the great books. In the Cratylus, Socrates
this theory, an idea may be both the object suggests that signs should be like the things
signified by a word and the medium through they signify. Some conventional signs, he
which that word also signifies the thing of which thinks, are better than others in this respect.
we have the idea. Aquinas seems to think that He implies that all words are inferior to mental
medium where-
ideas are always required as the images, which, by their very nature, imitate or
by words signify things. "We can give a name resemble their objects.
to anything," he says, "only insofar as we can The act of memory, according to Aristotle,
understand it." Accordingly, it is impossible for requires a memory image which is "something
words to signify things directly, i.e., without like an impression or picture" of the thing re-
the mediation of ideas. membered. If the memory image, through its
resemblance to something once experienced,
THIS POSITION HAS A number of consequences did not function as the sign of that absent
for the theory of signs and raises a number of thing, memory would not be memory, for,
issues. Augustine's statement that "every sign Aristotle argues, it would consist in beholding
CHAPTER 85: SIGN AND SYMBOL 733
the memory image itself, which is present, or "cat" become general in their significance,
rather than the absent thing it stands for. according to Locke, "by being made the signs
Aquinas, perhaps, is the writer most explicit of general ideas."
in his treatment of images and ideas as in their To the question of what kind of signification
very nature meanings or intentions of the mind. it is that general words have, Locke replies: "As
His calling them "mental words" seems to in- it is evident, that
they do not signify barely one
dicate that in his view they, like physical and particular thing; for then they would not be
sensible words, are signs; but the added quali- general terms, but proper names; so, on the
fication of "mental" also implies their differ- other side, it is as evident, they do not signify a
ence. "The vocal sound which has no significa- plurality; for man and men would then signify
tion," he writes, "cannot be called a word; the same. That, then, which general words
. . .
wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a signify," Locke declares, "is a sort of things,
word from the signifies the interior
fact that it and each of them docs that by being a sign of an
concept of the mind. It follows that, first and abstract idea in the mind."
chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is It seems to follow, therefore, that those who,
called a word." The mental word or concept like Hobbes and Berkeley, deny the existence
suffices "when mind turns to the actual
the of abstract ideas or universal concepts, must
consideration of what it knows habitually," for offer a different explanation of the meaning of
then, he adds, "a person speaks to himself." common nouns or general names. "There being
But unlike angels, who can make their concepts nothing in the world universal but names,"
known to one another immediately, men re- Hobbes writes, a name is universal when it "is
quire the medium of external speech. They imposed on many things for their similitude
must use sensible physical signs to communicate in some quality or other accident; and whereas
"concern only signs, whether words or ideas. gests to the mind." And, in another place, he
Words are general . when used for signs of
. .
says that "an idea which, considered in itself, is
general ideas and. ideas
. .are general when particular becomes general by being made to
they set up as the representatives of many par- represent or stand for all other particular ideas
ticular things; but universality belongs not to of the same sort." He
does not himself explain
things themselves, which are all of them par- how we come by the notion of "the same sort,"
ticular in their existence, even those words and or how one particular idea can represent the
ideas which, in their signification, are general." sort to which other particular ideas belong. But
The basic issue to which Locke is addressing he rejects Locke's explanation because it in-
himself is discussed in the chapter on UNI- volves ideas which are not only general, but
VERSAL AND PARTICULAR. Locke's solution also abstract.
seems to involve the affirmation of abstract The attempt to account for the meaning of
ideas, which are general or universal in their general names is, in Berkeley's view, the cause
significance and through which common names of Locke's acceptance of abstract ideas. "If
come to have a different sort of meaning from there had been no such thing as speech or uni-
the meaning of proper names. "Ideas become versal signs," he writes, "there never [would
general by separating them from the circum- have] been any thought of abstraction." Not
stances of time and place, and any other ideas only do men mistakenly suppose that "every
that may determine them to this or that par- name has, or ought to have, one only precise
ticular existence." Common nouns like "man" and settled signification, which inclines [them]
734 THE GREAT IDEAS
to think there are certain abstract, determinate used in the first and the second intention. When
ideas that constitute the trueand only immedi- the word "man" is used to signify a living or-
ate signification of each general name"; but ganism of a certain sort, it is used in the first
they also suppose that "it is by the mediation intention because a reality, not an
it signifies
comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, intention when it signifies an idea rather than a
in truth," Berkeley concludes, "there is no thing. For example, in the sentence, "man is a
such thing as one precise and definite significa- species," the word "species" signifies a logical
tion annexed to any general name." Where classification and so is in the second intention;
Locke would say that a common name gets its and the word "man" is also in the second in-
general meaning by signifying one idea which tention because it refers to the idea which is
itself has general significance, Berkeley reiter- denominated a species.
ates that a general name gets its meaning from In some cases, an idea may not signify things
"a great number of particular ideas," all of at all, but only other ideas, such as the logical
which it
signifies indifferently.
notions of genus and species. Words like "genus"
and "species," unlike the words "man" and
THE RELATION OF WORDS to ideas raises still "stone," can therefore be used only in the sec-
other problems in the theory of signs, problems ond intention. The idea man is called a "first
which have peculiar interest in the tradition of intention of the mind" because its primary
the liberal arts. One of these problems has al- function is to signify the living thing. Only
ready becnmentioned.Itisthequestion whether secondarily does it signify itself as an object
some words signify ideas alone, in contrast to able to be considered. The idea species, on the
words which signify ideas and, through them, other hand, is called a "second intention" be-
things. This suggests the parallel problem of cause its sole function is to signify ideas which
words which signify words, in contrast to words stand to other ideas in a certain relation.
which are the names of things. I lobbes
concisely summarizes most of these
In his littleConcerning the Teacher,
tract points when he points out that some words
Augustine points out that some words, such as "are the names of the things conceived,"
"noun" and "adjective," signify kinds of words, whereas "others are the names of the imagina-
just as other words, such as "man" and "stone," tions themselves, that is to say, of those ideas
signify kinds of things. Furthermore, in the or mental images we have of all the things we sec
sentence "man is a noun," the word "man" sig- and remember. And others again are names of
nifies itself as the object referred to; whereas in names ... as 'universal,' 'plural,' 'singular,' are
the sentence "man is an animal," the word the names of names." The names which we
"man" signifies a living organism of a certain apply to particular species and genera, such as
sort. The same word, therefore, may signify "man" and "animal," Aquinas says, "signify
both some thing other than itself.
itself and the common natures themselves, but not the
These differences which Augustine observes in intentions of these common natures, which are
the signification of words come to be formu- signified by the terms genus or species."
lated in the traditional distinction between the
first and second imposition of words. A word is ANOTHER TRADITIONAL distinction in the modes
used in the first imposition when it is used to of signification is that between intrinsic and ex-
signify things which are not words, as, for ex- trinsic denomination. A name is said to be an
ample, the word "man" when it refers to a intrinsic denomination when applied to a
it is
human being. A word is used in the second im- thing in order to signify its nature or its in-
things, as, for example, the word "noun" said ample, when we call a thing "animal" or "ra-
of "man," or the word "man" when it is used tional," "white" or "square." A name is said
to refer to itself in the sentence "man is a to be an extrinsic denomination when it is ap-
noun." plied to a thing only in order to signify some
A parallel distinction is that between words relation in which that thing stands to some-
CHAPTER 85: SIGN AND SYMBOL 735
thing else, as, for example, when we call sun- Speaking of a man and a pig as a "pig" repre-
shine "healthy" because it helps to produce sents the metaphorical type of equivocation,
healthy organisms or when we apply the names in which the same word is used to name the
of animals, such as "pig" or "fox," to men be- nature of a thing and something else of a dif-
cause we think the men bear certain resem- ferent nature which has only a likeness to that
blances to these animals. The same word can be nature.
used in different connections both as an intrin- Metaphors, in turn, can be divided into
sic and as an extrinsic denomination. "I lealthy" types. Some are based on a direct similitude
means an inherent quality when it is applied to between two things in some accidental respect,
living organisms, and a causal relation to or- e.g., the man who is like a pig in manner of
meanings he intends to express; but they hold this he gives an example in the Ethics when he
that a word can be used equivocally without discusses general and special justice, using the
ambiguity if its user makes plain that he is word "justice" narrowly to signify one of the
employing it now in this sense, now in that. special virtues and broadly to mean all the vir-
Aristotle says two things arc named
that tues considered in their social aspect. There is a
equivocally "when though they have the same sense of the word "justice," he writes, in which
name, the definition corresponding with the it
signifies "not part of virtue but virtue en-
name differs for each"; and "on the other hand, tire"; "this form of justice is complete virtue,
things are said to be named univocally which though not absolutely, but only in relation to
have both the name and the definition an- our neighbor." The word "injustice" is also
swering to the name in common." When we used in a correspondingly wide sense. But there
call a man and a pig an "animal," we arc using is"another kind of injustice which is a part of
that word univocally because we arc using it injustice in the wide sense." This "particular
with the same definition or meaning in both injustice," Aristotle says, "shares the name and
cases; but when we call a pig and a man a "pig," nature of the first, because its definition falls
we are using that word equivocally because we within the same genus." As Aristotle treats this
are using it with different meanings, signifying type of equivocation in the Rhetoric and the
having the nature of a pig in one instance and Poetics, it includes three possibilities: the trans-
being Ifye a pig in certain respects in the other. fer of the name of a genus to one of its species,
Aristotle distinguishes several types of equiv- the transfer of the name of a species to its
ocation, of which we have already noted two. genus, and the transfer of the name of one spe-
The use of the word "healthy" to describe an cies to another in the same genus.
animal and sunshine is that type of equivoca- It may be questioned whether this type of
tion in which the same word is used to name equivocation is
properly classified as metaphor-
an inherent attribute and also a cause of that ical, on Aristotle's own definition of metaphor
attribute; in other instances of the same type, as "giving a thing aname that belongs to some-
itmight be used to name the nature or attri- thing else." In the type of equivocation exem-
bute and the effect rather than the cause. plified by the use of the word "justice,"
now
736 THE GREAT IDEAS
with a generic and now a specific meaning, the does not seem to be equivocation by chance,
name does not seem to belong to the genus any for the word "sharp" seems to have some com-
more than it does to the species, or conversely. mon meaning as applied to the three objects
In contrast, when the name "father" is given to which affect the diverse senses of touch, taste,
a king in relation to his people, the usage is and hearing; nor is it like all other cases of
metaphorical, because the name "father'* be- equivocation by intention, in that no one of
longs to something else, i.e., the man who is a these three meanings of "sharp" seems to be
nation; for example, as applied to the animal, paring them with the word "healthy" as said
the word "pig" is an intrinsic denomination, of an animal, and of other things which either
but it is an extrinsic denomination when it is cause health or are effects of health. It may be
applied to a man in order to signify a certain questioned, however, whether "being" is equiv-
resemblance to the animal to which the name ocal in the same way that "healthy" is, since
belongs. The same is true in the case of the word italways carries the significance of an intrinsic,
"healthy" as said of an animal and of sunshine. never of an extrinsic denomination. "Being"
In all these cases of equivocation, the two as said of heterogeneous things seems to be
meanings of the same word are not totally dis- more like "sharp" said of diverse sensible qual-
tinct. On the contrary, the two senses have itieshaving a meaning which remains some-
something in common. One of the meanings how the same while it is diversified in each case
seems to be derived from the other; one ap- according to the diversity of the objects to
pears to be secondary (usually the one involved which it
applies.
in the extrinsic denomination) and the other
primary. What is traditionally called "equiv- THESE CONSIDERATIONS of the univocal and the
ocation by chance," in contrast to equivoca- equivocal sign, along with the treatment of
tion by intention, is the extreme case in which ambiguity and intrinsic and extrinsic denomi-
the same word is used in two utterly distinct nation, indicate the extent and manner in which
senses, having no common element of meaning the great books anticipate the kind of analysis
at all; e.g., the word "pen" used for a writing which in our time has come to be called "se-
instrument and an enclosure for animals. Equiv- mantics." The chapter on LANGUAGE gives fur-
ocation by intention, in which the different ther evidence of the fact that many of the
meanings of a word have something in com- points and distinctions made in contemporary
mon, thus appears to be intermediate between semantics have a long history in the tradition
equivocation by chance (in which the meanings of the liberal arts. Furthermore, as the chapter
share no common element) and univocal usage on LANGUAGE indicates, contemporary seman-
(in which the meaning is exactly the same each tics cannot even claim novelty for its great
time the word is used). interest in freeing men from the tyranny of
In the Physics, Aristotle seems to discover still words or in serving as a critical instrument to
another type of equivocation. "A pen, a wine, cut through the "vicious abstractions" of meta-
and the highest note in a scale are not com- physics. Hobbes and Locke, frequently dis-
mensurable," he writes. "We cannot say wheth- miss theories not on the ground that they are
er any one of them sharper than any other
is false,but rather because they think that the
. . . because it is
only equivocally that the statement of them consists in so many mean-
same term 'sharp' is
applied to them." This ingless words.
CHAPTER 85: SIGN AND SYMBOL 737
In the tradition of the great books, the anal- in the definition of the same name taken in
ysis of words and their modes of signification other significations; for instance, "being"
as,
brought to bear upon the theological problem based on cause and effect, as exemplified by
of the meaning of the names men apply to God the word "healthy"; that involving broader
and on the way in which they interpret the and narrower meanings, exemplified by the
words of Sacred Scripture. word "justice"; metaphors, of the sort exempli-
The problem of the names of God is dis- fiedby calling a man "pig," and of the sort
cussed in the chapter on SAME AND OTHER in based on analogies, when we speak of a king
terms of the kind of likeness which can obtain as the "father" of his people; and, finally,
between an infinite being and finite creatures. the very special type of equivocation found
As there appears, Aquinas takes the position in "sharp" applied to a tone, a taste, and a
that God and creatures are neither the same in touch.
any respect, nor are they in all respects so di- If Aquinas places the kind of signification he
verse as to be utterly incomparable. Though an calls "analogical" in the general area of equiv-
infinite and a finite being are in his view in- ocation by intention, it
may be asked whether
commensurable, yet they can also have some the various names of God are all analogical in
sort of Mmilitudenot an unqualified same- the same way. The answer seems to be negative,
ness,but the kind of similarity which can be for he distinguishes those names which have
described as an intrinsically diversified same- only a metaphorical sense when said of God,
ness. such as "angry" or "jealous"; and he denies the
Aquinas holds, therefore, that no names can opinion of those who say that God is called
be applied to God and creatures univocally, "good" only in an attributive sense, i.e., sig-
for "no name belongs to God in the same sense nifying him
to be the cause of the goodness
that it belongs to creatures." Nor, he goes on, found in creatures. On
the contrary, he thinks
"are names applied to God and creatures in a that words like "good" and "wise," and es-
purely equivocal sense," for it would follow pecially the name "being," are to be inter-
then that "from creatures nothing at all could preted as intrinsic denominations when applied
be known or demonstrated about God," which to both God and creatures.
supposition Aquinas denies. Between these two For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, that would
extremes of the simply univocal and the purely appear to make the pattern of meaning exhib-
equivocal, he finds a middle ground in a type of ited by the word "sharp" the model for the
signification which he calls "analogical." The significance of "being" rather than that found
meaning of an analogical name, he says, "is not, in the merely attributive equivocation of the
asit is in univocals, one and the same; yet it is word "healthy" whether "being" is said of
not totally diverse as in equivocals." substance and accidents, or of God and crea-
What he means by "pure equivocation" tures. The
point seems to be unaffected by the
seems to be what earlier writers call "equivoca- fact that Aquinas calls this type of significa-
tion by chance," and what he means by the tion "analogical," whereas Aristotle always re-
"analogical" seems to correspond to what they fers to "being" as equivocal. Aristotle never
call "equivocation by intention." "Univocal treats any type of equivocation as analogical
names have absolutely the same meaning," he except the metaphor which results from trans-
writes, "while equivocal names have absolutely ferring the name of one term in a proportion to
diverse meanings; whereas in analogical, a another term standing in the same or a similar
name taken in one signification must be placed relationship.
738 THE GREAT IDEAS
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN literal and figura- scientific definitions and demonstrations re-
tive or metaphorical speech seems to be of quire the avoidance of metaphors, as of all other
prime importance in the theologian's rules for forms of equivocation. So, too, Hobbes in-
interpreting the word of God. As indicated in veighs against metaphors and figures of speech,
the chapter on RELIGION, Augustine insists giving as one of the main causes of absurdity in
that the language of Holy Writ must be read science "the use of metaphors, tropes, and
in many senses.Aquinas distinguishes a basic other rhetorical figures, instead of words prop-
literal sense from three modes of spiritual mean- er; for though it be lawful to say (for example)
ing. That signification "whereby words signify in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth
things belongs to the first sense, the historical or hither or thither, the Proverb says this or that
literal. That signification whereby things sig- (whereas ways cannot go, nor Proverbs speak);
nified by words have themselves also a significa- yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such
tion is called the spiritual sense, which is based speeches are not to be admitted."
on the literal and presupposes it." The spiritual Darwin looks forward to the day when "the
sense Aquinas divides into the allegorical, the terms used by naturalists, of affinity, relation-
moral, and the analogical. ship, community of type, paternity, morphol-
To grasp the various spiritual meanings, the ogy, adaptive characters, rudimentary and
reader must understand that in Holy Scripture aborted organs, and so forth, will cease to be
"divine things arc metaphorically described metaphorical and will have a plain signifi-
by means of sensible things." As in the symbol- cance." Freud, on the other hand, aware of
ism of the sacraments, physical things serve as how pervasive symbolism is in all the works of
the outward and visible signs of an inward and man, normal and neurotic, dreaming and
spiritual grace,
so also "in Holy Scripture spir- awake, seems to be reconciled to the inevita-
itual truths are fittingly taught under the like- bility of metaphors in scientific discourse. The
ness of material things." difficulty we meet with in picturing certain
A
theologian like Aquinas thus justifies met- psychological processes, he writes, "comes from
aphors not only in Scripture, but also in sacred our being obliged to operate with scientific
doctrine or theology, as "both necessary and terms, i.e., with the metaphorical expressions
useful," whereas in his view the poet's employ- peculiar to psychology. . Otherwise we
. .
ment of them is solely for the sake of pleasure. should not be able to describe the correspond-
Philosophers and scientists, on the other hand, ing processes at all, nor in fact even to have re-
often take the opposite view that metaphors marked them. The shortcomings of our de-
have a place only in poetry and should be avoid- would disappear if for the psycholog-
scription
ed in the exposition of knowledge. ical terms we could substitute physiological or
In the writing of poetry, "the command of chemical ones. These, too, only constitute a met-
metaphor," says Aristotle, "is the mark of aphorical language, but one familiar to us for a
genius," but all his rules for the construction of much longer time and perhaps also simpler.'*
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
, The theory of signs 740
10. The distinction between natural and conventional signs
ib. The intentions of the mind: ideas and images as natural signs
ic. The things of nature functioning symbolically: the book of nature 741
id. The conventional notations of human language: man's need for words
le. The invention of non-verbal symbols: money, titles, seals, ceremonies, courtesies
if. Natural signs as the source of meaning in conventional signs: thought as the
medium through which words signify things 742
CHAPTER 85: SIGN AND SYMBOL 739
PAGE
2. The modes of signification 742
20. The firstand second imposition of words: names signifying things and names
signifying names
2#. The first and second intention of names: words signifying things and words signi-
fying ideas
2C. Intrinsic and extrinsic denominations: the naming of things according to their
natures or by reference to their relations
(2) The same word used with varying degrees of generality and specificity: the
broad and narrow meaning of a word
(3) The same word used to signify an attribute and its cause or effect
qc. The nature and utility of semantic analysis: the rectification of ambiguity; the
clarification and precision of meanings
4^. The use of metaphors and myths in science and philosophy 746
4^. The use of signs in reasoning: necessary and probable signs; the interpretation
of symptoms in medicine
5^. The symbolism of the sacraments and of sacramental or ritualistic acts 748
50*.
The symbolism of numbers in theology 749
5<?.
The interpretation of the word of God
5/ The names of God: the use of words to signify the divine nature
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PACE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halvesof the page. For example, in53 JAMES Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "csp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
478a-b; 502a-503a; 553b-558b esp 555a-b, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 107,
558b-561b [fn 2]; 573b-574a; 606b-610b esp AREP 1-3 549b-550b
i,
6-7 536a~538b; en 9 538c-539a; BK VH, CH i 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 57d-58a; PART in,
b
550b,d-551a; BK x, CH i [i052 i-i5] 578d- 172a
a b
579a; CH 2 580b-d; UK xi, CH 2 [io6o 36- io] 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH ix,
588c; BK xn, CH 4-5 599d-601a SECT 15-16 288d~289c; CH x, SECT 22 297c-
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 6 [1096*17-29] 298a; en xi, SECT 7-26 301a-306d passim
341b-c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 4, 62-63 478b-d
REP i 16d-17c; A 6, REP i 18c-19a; Q 4, A 3, 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 307b-308b
ANS 22b-23b; Q 13, AA 5-6 66b-68c; A 10
4c. The nature and utility of semantic analysis:
72c-73c; Q 29, A 4, REP 4 165c-167a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 61, the rectification of ambiguity; the clari-
fication and precision of meanings
A r, REP i 54d-55c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 52d-57a / Euthydemus,
xin, SECT 18 152a-c 68c-d / Cratylus, 107c-114a,c / Phaedrus^
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 181b-182b 120a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH i
[1*13-16] 5b; 0117
4. The determination of meaning in science b b
[6 26-7 i4] llb-12b; en 8 [io
a
26-b n] 15b-c /
and philosophy CH 15 149d-152a; CH 18 [108*18-
BK
Topics, i,
9:8-17; 28:10-22; 37:1-11; 40-41 / Exodus, 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [976-986] 108b
3:1-4:9; 7-17 passim; 31:18; 32:15-16; 40:34- / Oedipus at Colonus [1447-1666] 127b-129b
38 (D) Exodus, 3:1-4:9; 7-17 passim; 31:18; / Antigone [988-1097] 139c-140c / Electra
32:15-16; 40 ^2-36 / Numbers, 9:15-23; 11-12; [404-515] 159b-160a
16-17; 20:1-13; 22; 26:9-11 / Deuteronomy, 5 EURIPIDES :
Iphigenia Among the Tauri [42-
4:9-14,32-39; 5:22-27;6:20-25; 7 :I 7-23J 60] 411c-d; [1234-1283] 422b-c
10:20-11:9; 13:1-5; 28:1-29:9 / Joshua, 3-4; 5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [708-722] 551d-552a
748 THE GREAT IDEAS 5b to 5c
26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT i, sc in
(5. Symbolism in theology and religion. 5b. Super-
572c-573b; ACT iv, sc m
[1-71] [275-289]
natural signs: omens, portents, -visitations, ACT v, sc i [71-89] 592d
591c;
dreams, miracles.) 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc i [64-125]
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 4d; 8a-b; 12b-d; 30b-31a / Macbeth, ACT 11, sc iv [1-20] 294a-b
17a-b; 18b; 20d-21a; 38a-b; 39c-40a; BK 11, / Cymbeline, ACT v, sc iv [91-122] 482a-b
60d-61b; 79a-c; 83b-c; 86c-87a; BK in, 90d- 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 381a-b
91a; 95d; H6a-b; BK iv, 124d-125a; 126d- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 8c; 19b;
127a; 135b-c; 138a-b; 150b-d; 154c-d; 155b-c; 41b-c; 54c-d; 55b-d / New Atlantis, 202c-
BK v, 170c-d; 176c-d; 183d-184a; BK vi, 203c
190c-d; 200d-201a; 204b-c; 208b; BK vii, 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [594-599] 106b;
219a-c; 238d-239a; BK vm, 266b-d; 267a; BK v [28-128] 176a-178a; BK xi [193-366]
270c-271a; 283d; BK ix, 289d-290a; 302c; 303b-307a / Areopagitica, 389a-b
309d-310a; 313d-314a 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 803-856 328b-341b passim
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 66a / Apology, 207b-c; 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xvi,
211a b / Timaeus, 467a-c SECT 13 371a-b; CH xix, SECT 15 388a-c
8 ARISTOTLE: Prophesying 707a-709a,c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 63
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK HI, CH n 425b-c
[5 1 8*32-36] 43a; CH 20 [522*13-19] 47a-b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT x, DIV
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1161- 92-101 491c-497b esp DIV 98-101 495d-497b
1240] 76b-77b; BK vi [43-79] 80d-81b; [379- 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 180b-c; 189b-190d;
422] 85b-d 206b-d; 294a-296b; 445d-446b; 465d-467a;
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 17, 123c- 547a-b; 571a; 605b-d; 614b-c
124a; BK in, CH i, 177a-b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 232a-c; 398b-399b
13 VIRGIL: Aencid, BK i [387-401] .113b-114a; 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 126b-c
BK ii [162 233] 128b-130b; [679-704] 143b- 47 GOETHE: Paust, PART i [430-513] 12b-14b
144a; UK in [90-101] 149b-150a; [135-191] 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 377b-379a;
150bl52b; [388-393] 157b-158a; [523-547] BK xii, 561b-562a
161b-162a; BK vi [190-211] 216a-b; BK vn 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i,
[59-80) 237b-238a; BK vm [26-89] 259b- lla-b; BK v, 129c-135a
261b; [520-540] 273a-b; BK xn [244-265] 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 138a-c /
360b-361a General Introduction, 477b-c
14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 52b-c / Popli-
coh, 82a-b / Timoleon, 198c-d / Pelopidas, 5c. The symbolism of the sacraments and of
239d-240c / Aristides, 268a-d / Sulla, 371d- sacramental or ritualistic acts
372c / Lucullus, 404d-405a; 405c / Agesilaus, OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 17 19-14 / Exodus, 12 :i-
483a-b / Alexander, 568a-b / Demosthenes, 13:16; 20:8-11; 24:5-8; 31:13-17 / Leviticus
698b-699a / Dion, 781d-782a / Marcus passim, esp 16, 23 / Numbers, 15:37-41; 16:37-
Bnitus, 818a-b; 822b 40 / Deuteronomy, 5:12-15; 6:5-9; 11:18-21;
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 9a-b; BK n, 26c; 27b;
16:1-17 / Joshua, 4:1-9 (D) Josue, 4:1-9 /
BK iv, 79b; BK vi, 95d-96a; BK xi, 105c; BK Esther, 9:20-32 / 20:12,20
Eze\iel, (D)
xn, 112d-l 13a; 119b; 124b; BK xiv, 149b-c; BK Ezechiel, 20:12,20
xv, 168d-169a / Histories, BK i, 206a; 212d- APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther, 16:20-22 (D) OT,
213a; BK n, 228a-b; 235a-c; BK in, 256d; Esther, 16:20-22 / II Maccabees, 1:18-22 (D)
BK iv, 293a-294a OT, // Machabees, 1:18-22
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK HI, par 19-20 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 26:26-28 / Mar\,
18b-19a / City of God, BK x, en 8 303a-d; CH 14:22-24 / Luke, 22:19-20 / John, 3:3-7; 6:30-
12-13 306d-307c; CH 16-18 308b-310d; BK xi, 59 / Acts, 2:38-39; 22:16 / Romans, 6:3-4 / /
CH 2, 323b; BK xxii, CH 8-10 591d-599b Corinthians, 10:16-17; 11:23-27
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 51, A 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK x, CH 5-6 301b-
2, REP
i 276b-277a; Q
104, A 4, ANS 538a-c; 302d; CH 19-20 310d-311c; BK xvi, CH 26
Q A 7 544a-d; Q 106, A 3, ANS and REP 2
105, 438c-439a; BK xxi, CH 20 575c-d; CH 25
547c-548b; Q no, A 4 567c-568b 579d-581a / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 3
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, ix [13- 637c-d; BK in, CH 5-9 659d-661c; BK CH
iv,
69] 66a-c; xix [1-63] 81c-82a; xxvn [91-108] 2i,690d-691b
95c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92,
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA A3, ANs490c-491b
52-55 127a-b; STANZA 177-186 143b-144b; 20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I-H, QQ
:
415b; BK xx, CH 7 535b-536d; BK xxn, CH 30, 160b-c; PART in, 165a-188a; 191b-199a; 215b-
618c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 16, 644d- 216b; 246c; PART iv, 247a-258b; 259a-260c
645d; BK in, CH 35 672a-d 27 SHAKLSPEARE: Cymbeline, ACT v, sc v [426-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, 485] 488b-d
A 5, REP i 26c-27c; Q 74, A 3, REP 3 375a- 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 17b-
377a,c 20a; 98a-100b
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL,
: 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b; 163a-
Q 96, A 4 1054b-1055c 164b / Pensecs. 570-588 273b-277b; 642-692
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy 290b-301a; 775 323b-324a
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 259a-b 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 21c-22d / Human Under-
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 248b-c; BK standing, BK in, CH ix, SECT 9 286d-287b;
ix,377c-378c SECT 23 291b-c; CH x, SECT 12 294b-c
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 51 Ic 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 256a-258a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 329d-330a
5e.The interpretation of the word of God 42 KANT: judgement, 547b-d
OLD TESTAMENT: Daniel, 2:47; 5 5~2 ^ : 43 MILL: Liberty, 290a-b
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 12:1-12; 13; 15:10- 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1220-1237] 30a-b
20; 18:23-35; 19:3-9; 20:1-16; 21:28-45; 22:1- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 377c-378c
14,31-32; 25:1-30 / Marl(, 2:23-28; 4:1-34; 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
10:2-9; 12:1-12,18-27 / Luke, 6:1-5,39-49; 129c-135a; BK vi, 150d453d
8:4-18; 12:16-21,36-48; 14:7-11,15-33; 15-
5/. The names of God: the use of words to
16; 18:1-8; 19:11-27; 20:9-19,37-38 / John,
signify the divine nature
.
36 / Romans, 4; 9-11 passim; 12:19-20; 14:10- OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 3:13-14; 6:2-3; J 5 3J :
13; 15:1-4 / Galatians, 3-4 passim / / Peter, 20.7; 34:5-7,14 / Leviticus, 19:12; 21:6; 22:32
1:10-16; 2:5-8 / II Peter, 1:19-21 / Deuteronomy, 5:11; 28:58-59 / // Samuel,
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [645-668] 46d- 22:2-3; 23:3 (D) // Kings, 22:2-3; 2 3 3 / :
i ii, Q
14, A i, RHP 2 677b-678a; g 47, A i, [1-7 }] 114d-115b / Romeo and Juliet, At r i,
KM- i 819c820b sc iv [49 103] 291a-c / Midsummer-Night's
21 D\NIK: 7)/r/w Comedy, PARADISIC iv [28 48] Dream, ACT n, sc n [145 156] 360b-c / Julius
Ilia; xxvi [124-138] 147a-b; xxx [34-99] Caesar, ACT n, sc n [58 107] 578d-579b
152ad 27 SIIAKI.SPE\KL: Miiibclh, ACT v, sc i 306b-
23 HOHHI-S: Leviathan, PART i, 54b; 78d-79a; 307a / Cvmhehne, M.V v, sc iv [30-150] 481c-
79d 80b passim; PART n, I62a-163b; PART in, 482c; M/v[|26-485]488bd
'
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The theory of language, and for the distinction between the natural and the conventional in
signifywhat is common to heterogeneous things, see BEING i; IDEA 40(4); RELATION id;
SAME AND OTHER 311(5)" }b, 4c.
The relation of the univocal and the equivocal to definition and demonstration, see DhriNi-
TION }; LANGUAGE la, 7; RI-ASONING 3!); and for other logical considerations in the use of
language, see LANGUAGE 6-7; LOGIC }a.
Other discussions of the language of poetry, and of problems of style in the exposition of
Other discussions of the symbolism of dreams, see LANGUAGE 10; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION
8d(i)-8e; and for the theory of the neuroses and neurotic behavior relevant to the inter-
pretation of psychological signs, see DESIRE 4a~4d; EMOTION 33-3^4); MEMORY AND
IMAGINATION 2e(2); OPPOSITION 4C.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Boofe of the Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
II.
Supplementary Essay (2)
PIIILODEMUS. On Methods of Inference J. C. WILSON. Statement and Inference, PART n (18)
QUINHLIAN. Institutio Oratona (Institutes of Ora- WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL. Pnncipia Mathematica,
tory), BK vn, CH 9 CH 3
Sux'ius KMPIRICUS. Against the Logicians, BK 11, WLLBY-GREGORY. What Is Meaning?
CH 2 Signifies and Language
.
MAIMONIDRS. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART i, W. E. JOHNSON. Logic, PART i, CH 6-8; PART n,
CH 1-30, 37-45, 61-64 cii3
BONAVHNTURA. Brcviloquium, PROLOGUE WITTGENSTEIN. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
. Itincranum Mentis in Deum (The Itinerary of QGDEN and RICHARDS. The Meaning of Meaning
the Mind to God} SANTAYANA. Scepticism and Animal Paith, CH 18
DUNS Scoius. Opus Oxoniense, BK iv EATON. Symbolism and Truth
OCKIIAM. Studies and Selections, Logic, CH 11-12 EUDINGFON. The Nature ofthe Physical Woild, CH 12
THOMAS OP KRUJRI*. Grammatica Spcculativa WHITEHEAD. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
NICOLAS OF CUSA. De Docta Ignorantia, BK i, en Natural Knowledge, CH i
12 Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effects
.
SUAKPZ. Disputationes Mctaphysicac, xxvm (3), PENIDO. Lerole de I' analogic en theologie dogmatique
xxx (i$), XKXII (2), xxxix (3) RICHARDS. Mencius on the Mind
Bo EH VIE. The Signature of All Things BUCHANAN. The Doctrine of Signatures, CH 1-2,
JOHN or SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Tho- 5-6
misticus, Ars Logica, PART i, OQ 1-3; PART n, DEWEY. Essays in Experimental Logic, iv
QQ 21-22 .
Experience and Nature, CH 5
ARNAULD. Logic or the Art of Thinking, PART i, .
Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, CH 18
CH 11, 15 B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 4-8, 27
Lht UNITZ. Characteristica The Analysis of Mind, LECT 10
.
. New Essays Concerning Human Undo standing, . An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, CH 1-6,
BK III
13-15,22
CON DILL AC. Essai sur Vorigine des connaissances hu- MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, en 2
maines, PART n Ransoming the Time, CH 9
.
A
Philosophical Dictionary The Myth of the State, PART i (1-3)
.
T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, i, AYER. Thinking and Meaning
CH i ; vi, en 5 CARNAP. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics
CRP.UZER. Symbolil( und Mythologie dcr alien Voider . Introduction to Semantics
EMERSON. Nature .
Meaning and Necessity
VENN, Symbolic Logic DEWEY and BENTLEY. Knowing and the Known
Chapter 86: SIN
INTRODUCTION
sin of Satan and the sin of Adam are Yet there is a difference between Adam and
THE
among the great mysteries of the Christian Satan. The fallen angels "by their own sug-
religion. Satan is
highest among the angels, the gestion fell, self-tempted, dcprav'd." Satan,
first of God's spiritual creatures. lie is only less having sinned, becomes man's tempter. "Man
than God in the perfection of his nature. Adam falls deceiv'd by the other first: Man therefore
is created with supernatural graces and gifts, shall find grace, the other none."
his immortal body completely responsive to
is As Satan approaches the Garden of Eden to
his spirit, his appetite in all things is submis- work his will on man, he contemplates his
sive to his reason, and his reason is turned plight. He docs not deny his sin, he does not
toward God, according to the original justice repent he docs not seem fully to understand
it,
which harmonized his faculties and the ele- it. Thus Milton has him speak:
ments of his nature. O thou that with surpassing Glory crowned,
The only evil latent in either Satan or Adam Look'st from the sole Dominion like the God
would seem to reside in the privation of in- Of this new World; at whose
sight all the Starrs
Hide thir dimimsht heads; to thcc I call,
finite being, power, and knowledge. But this But with no friendly and add thy name
voice,
is not a moral evil in them; it is neither a sin nor
Sun, to tell thee how I hate thy beams
a predisposition to sin. Hence the only cause of That bring to my remembrance from \\liat state
their sinning, if God himself docs not predes- 1 fell, how glorious once above thy Spheare;
tine them to sin, must be a free choice on their Till Pride and worse Ambition threw me down
Warring in Ilcav'n against Ilcav'ns matchless King;
part between good and evil. If God positively Ah wherefore! he deserved no such return
predestines them lo sin, then they would seem From me, whom he created what I was
to be without responsibility, and so without In that bright eminence, and with his good
sin. Ifthey are not predetermined to evil if, Upbraided none; nor was his service hard.
What could be less than to afford him praise,
except for the weakness of being finite, they are The easiest recompense, and pay him thanks,
without positive blemish how does the con- How due! yet all his in
good prov'd ill me,
flict arise in them which opens the choice be- And wrought but malice; lifted up so high
tween good and evil and impels them, almost I sdeind subjection, and thought one step higher fl
In Milton's Paradise Lost, God says of Adam: O had powerful Destiny ordained
his
"I made him just and right, sufficient to have Me some inferior Angel, I had stood
stood, though free to fall." Of Satan and fallen Then happie; no unbounded hope had rais'd
Ambition. Yet why not? some other Power
angels, as well as of Adam, God observes:
As great might have aspir'd, and me through mean
They therefore as to right bclongd, Drawn to his part; but other Powers as great
So were created, nor can justly accuse Fell not, but stand unshak'n, from within
Thir maker, or thir making, or thir Fate; Or from without, to all temptations arm'cl.
As if Predestination over-rul'd Hads't thou the same free Will and Power to stand?
Their will, dispos'd by absolute Decree Thou hads't: whom has thou then or what to accuse,
Of high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed But Heav'ns free Love, dealt equally to all?
Thir own revolt, not I if I foreknew,
: Be then his Love accurst, since love or hate
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault, To me alike, it deals eternal woe.
Which had no less prov'd certain unforcknown. Nay cursed be thou; since against his, thy will
753
754 THE GREAT IDEAS
Chose freely what it now so justly rues. and Evil as they know." Eve succumbs and, as
Me miserable! which way shall I flie
Milton tells the story, Adam, knowing fully the
Infinite wrauth, and
infinite despaire ?
evil of his act, joins Eve in disobedience, not
Which way Hell; my self am Hell;
I flie is
And in the lowest deep a lower deep from envy of the gods, but out of love for her,
Still threatmng to devour me opens wide, willing to die because unwilling to live ..ithout
To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heav'n. her.
O then at last relent: is there no place
Left for Repentance, nor for Pardon left ? Willing "to incurr divine displeasure for her
None left but by submission; and that word sake, or Death. . . .
speaks of the forbidden fruit Maker." She tells Dante that "this nature, thus
And why not Gods of Men, since good, the more banished from Paradise, because it turned aside
Communicated, more abundant growes, from the way of truth and from its own life."
The Author not impair'd, but honourd more?
Man can fall from his nobility by "sin alone . . .
"Here, happie Creature," the vision says to which disfranchises him, and makes him unlike
her, the Supreme Good, so that he is little illumined
the Iliad* Phoenix cautions Achilles to "battle templation of the absolute truth; there are
with your pride and beat it; cherish not your some fearful ones who have given themselves
anger for ever; the might and majesty of heav- over to Satan and his proud spirit entirely. For
en are more than ours, but even heaven may be such, hell is
voluntary and ever consuming;
appeased; and if a man has sinned he prays the they are tortured by their own choice. For
gods, and reconciles them to himself by his pite- they have cursed themselves, cursing God and
ous cries." life."
In pride and disobedience we find the deep To avoid sin, the only positive command-
disorder of love which lies at the heart of sin. ment, according to Father Zossima, is to love in
Pride is self-love in excess of what the self de- accordance with God's love. "Love a man even
serves. Disobedience, as in the case of Milton's in his sin," he counsels, "for that is the sem-
Adam, may be prompted by a love which, too, blance of Divine Love and is the highest love
exceeds the worth of the object loved. The on earth. . . . And let not the sin of men con-
measure of that worth, or the bounds put upon found you in your doings. Fear not that it will
the love of self or other, is set by the Supreme wear away your work and hinder its being ac-
Good which, ordering all other goods, should complished. There is only one means of salva-
also order our loves in proportion to their tion; then take unto yourself, and make your-
self responsible for, all men's sins; that is the
goodness.
This seems to be the central insight of the truth, you know, friends, for as soon as you
Divine Comedy. It is
given a summary statement sincerely make yourself responsible for every-
in Purgatory, where Virgil explains how love thing and for all men, you will see at once that
the root both of virtue and of sin. "Neither it is really so, and
is you are to blame for every-
Creator nor creature," he says to Dante, "was one and for all things. But throwing your own
ever without love, either natural or of the indolence and impotence on others, you will end
mind, and this thou knowest. The natural is by sharing the pride of Satan and murmuring
always without error; but the other may err against God. Of the pride of Satan, what I
either through an evil object, or through little think this: it is hard for us on earth to com-
is
or too much vigor. While love is directed on prehend it, and therefore it is so easy to fall in-
the primal goods, and with due measure on the to error and to share it, even imagining that we
secondary, it cannot be the cause of ill delight. are doing something grand and fine."
But when it is bent to evil, or runs to good with In the disorder of love which leads to sin,
more zeal, or with less, than it ought, against sin is itself enjoyed for its own sake, and the
the Creator his own creature is
working. I lence disobedient act is
pleasant because it is forbid-
thou canst comprehend that love is of neces- den. In that also there the pride of supposing
is
sity the seed in you of every virtue, and of one's self to be a law unto one's self. In his
every action that deserves punishment." Confessions^ concerned most immediately with
Dostoevsky offers us further thoughts con- his own sinfulncss, Augustine reflects upon the
cerning the relation of love and sin. In the pears he stole in his youth, not, as he says, from
Brothers Karamazov, Father Zossima makes "any desire to enjoy the things I stole, but
lack of love the punishment as well as the sub- only the stealing of them and the sin." He asks
stance of sin. To those who ask, "What is Hell ?" himself: "What was it then that in my wretched
Father Zossima replies: "I maintain that it is folly I loved in you, O
theft of mine, deed
agony, their still greater spiritual agony would of any one of those pears, it was the sin that
"Perhaps," he finally answers, "it was the thrill feelings, according to the Freudian view, take
of acting against Your law at least in appear- on the attributes of pathological distortion and
ance, since I had no power to do so in fact, the become part of the symptomology of ^e neu-
delight a prisoner might have in making some roses. There is no question about the
sincerity
small gesture of liberty getting a deceptive of the person who is thus agonized, but only
sense of omnipotence from doing something about the true causes of the agony.
forbidden without immediate punishment. I "When one asks how a sense of guilt arises
was that slave, who fled Lord and pur-
from his inanyone," Freud says, "one is told something
sued his Lord's shadow. O rottenness, O mon- one cannot dispute: people feel guilty (pious
strousness of life and abyss of death! Could you people call it
'sinful') when they have done
find pleasure only in what was forbidden, and something they know to be 'bad.' But then
only because it was forbidden?" one sees how little this answer tells one." What
depend upon the relation of man to the gods or one to be threatened with a loss of love; be-
to God, whether that itself be considered in cause of the dread of this loss, one must desist
terms of law or love. The vicious act may be from it. That makes little difference
is
why it
gressedmay be the natural law that God instills guilt before this. ... At this second stage of
inhuman reason, but the act is sinful if the per- development, conscience exhibits a peculiarity
son who commits the act turns away from God which was absent in the first. That is, the . . .
to the worship or love of other things. more righteous a man is, the stricter and more
To disbelieve in God, in divine law and suspicious will his conscience be, so that ul-
divine punishment, is also to disbelieve in sin timately it is precisely those people who have
at least in the sense in which religious men have carried holiness farthest who reproach them-
distinguished between saints and sinners, be- selves with the deepest sinfulness. ... A rela-
tween the righteous and the wicked in the eyes tively strict and vigilant conscience is the very
of God. "There are only two kinds of men," sign of a virtuous man, and though saints may
writes Pascal: "the righteous who believe them- proclaim themselves sinners, they are not so
selves sinners; the rest, sinners, who believe wrong, in view of the temptations of instinc-
themselves righteous." tual gratifications to which they are peculiarly
Those who reject the religious meaning of liable since, as we know, temptations do but
sin do not deny the wide prevalence of a sense increase under constant privation, whereas they
of sin, nor do they deny that many men suffer subside, atany rate, temporarily, if they are
remorse for transgressions which they suppose sometimes gratified."
to be evil in God's eyes; but, with Freud, they Freud applies his theory of the origin of
interpret these feelings of guilt in terms of nat- feelings of guilt (in "the dread of authority"
ural causes. They hold that the person who first and later in "the
dread of the super-ego,")
is tormented by conscience surfers from an illu- to the religious sense of sin. "The people of
sion concerning the true nature of his guilt. Israel," he writes, "believed themselves to be
When the sense of sin is intensely active and is, God's favoritechild, and when the great Fa-
in addition, apparently unexplained by the ther hurled visitation after visitation upon
CHAPTER 86: SIN 757
them, it still never shook them in this belief sin," he writes, "consisting in the committing
or caused them to doubt His power and His (by deed or word) of that which the law for-
justice; they proceeded instead to bring their biddeth, or the omission of that which it hath
prophets into the world to declare their sinful- commanded. So that every crime is a sin, but
ness to them, and out of their sense of guilt they not every sin a crime. To intend to steal or kill
constructed the stringent commandments of is a sin,
though it never appear in word or fact,
their priestly religion." for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay
In general, Freud thinks, the great religions it to his charge; but
till it
appear by something
"have never overlooked the part played by the done, or said, by which the intention may be
sense of guilt in civilization. What is more, they argued by a human judge, it hath not the name
come forward with a claim ... to save man- of crime.
kind from of guilt which they call
this sense "From this relation of sin to the law,"
sin. We have drawn our conclusion from the Hobbes continues, "and of crime to the civil
way in which in Christianity this salvation is law, may be inferred, first, that where law
won the sacrificial death of one who therewith ceaseth, sin ceascth. But because the law of
takes the whole of the common guilt of all upon nature is eternal, violation of covenants, in-
himself, about the occasion on which this pri- gratitude, arrogance, and all facts contrary to
mal sense of guilt was first
acquired." The con- any moral virtue, can never cease to be sin.
clusion referred to is developed in two of Secondly, that the civil law ceasing, crimes
Freud's works which are devoted to the con- cease; for there being no other law remaining,
and sin the Future of an
sideration of religion but that of nature, there is no place for accusa-
Illusionand Totem and Taboo. In the latter of tion; every man being his own judge, and ac-
these books, Freud tells us, he had first "ex- cused only by his own conscience, and cleared
pressed a suspicion that perhaps the sense of by the uprightness of his own intention. When
guilt in mankind as a whole, which is the ulti- therefore his intention is
right, his fact is no
mate source of religion and morality, was ac- sin; if otherwise, his fact is sin, but not
what is evil, and where everyone is bound to son, while the supreme rule is the eternal law.
Though Hobbes does not identify crime and turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said
sin, his distinction between them does not to be a sin." Elsewhere he says that "every
seem to be based on the contrast between the created will has rectitude of act only so far as it
civil law and the divine law, unless the latter is is regulated according to the divine will. . . .
equated with the law of nature. "A crime is a Thus only in the divine will can there be no sin,
758 THE GREAT IDEAS
whereas in the will of every creature, consid- Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should
die? saith the Lord God: and not that he should re-
ered according to its nature, there can be sin."
turn from his ways, and live ?
appear to be more fundamental than the simi- Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam to Moses,
larity. even over them that had not sinned after the simili-
In the first
place, the sins of the fathers from tude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of
which later generations suffer are the individual him that was to come.
sins of men whose natures are predisposed to But not as the offence, so also is the free gift. For
sin, as Adam's, before the fall, was not. In the
if through the offence of one many be dead, much
mote the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which
second place, the punishment is visited not
is
by one man, lesus Chiist, hath abounded unto
upon the whole human race, but only upon many.
the Chosen People, and in the form of temporal
And not as it was
by one that sinned, so is the gift:
scourges rather than in a corruption of human for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but
nature itself. the free gift is of many offences unto justification.
Furthermore, the Hebrew prophet FLzckiel For by one man's offence death icigned by one;
if
questions the justice of collective responsibility. much more they which receive abundance of grace
"What mean and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by
ye," he asks,
one, Jesus Christ.)
that yc use this proverb concerning the land of Israel,
Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came
saying, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the
upon all men to condemnation; even so by the
children's teeth are set on edge?
righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men
As I the Lord God, ye shall not have
live, saith unto justification of life.
The understanding of the sacraments; the tions" which he thinks only the Christian re-
theory of grace in relation to the original and ligion explains. In the state inwhich men now
fallen nature of man; the issue concerning grace are, he writes, "there remains to them some
and good works, or God's justification and feeble instinct of the happiness of their former
man's merit, in the achievement of sanctity state; and they are plunged in the evils of their
and salvation; the distinction between the ever- blindness and their lust, which have become
lasting perdition of Hell and the expiatory their second nature."
punishments of Purgatory all these funda- "As the result of original justice," Aquinas
mental theological problems are involved in writes, "the reason had perfect hold over the
the consideration of sin and its consequences, lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was
both temporal and eternal. perfected by God in being subject to Him.
Some of these problems are discussed in the Now this same original justice was forfeited by
chapters on MAN, ANGEL, IMMORTALITY, and the sin of our first parent ... so that all the
PUNISHMENT. Other matters, such as the clas- powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute
sification of according to the distinction
sins of their proper order, whereby they arc nat-
between spiritual carnal, mortal and venial,
and urally directed to virtue. This destitution is
and the enumeration of the various species of called a wounding of nature. ... In so far as the
both mortal and venial sin in the order of their reason deprived of its order to the true, there
is
the theological virtues; and among the theo- the wound of weakness; and in so far as the
logical virtues, especially to chanty, which is concupisciblc is deprived of its order to the
the principle of sanctity, even as pride is the delectable as moderated by reason, there is the
principle of sin.
wound of concupiscence. Accordingly, these
Of all
points in the consideration of sin, the are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of
distinction between original and acquired sin human nature as a result of our first parent's
is
perhaps the most important, not only because sin."
inherited sinfulness is conceived as the predis- Aquinas rejects the supposition that "the
posing cause of all other sins, but also because entire good of human nature can be destroyed
the human nature corrupted by sin is con- by sin," arguing that what sin diminishes is
ceived as fallen below the perfection of a purely "the natural inclination to virtue, which is be-
natural man as well as below the state of grace fitting to man from the very fact that he is a
in which Adam was created. As Adam had gifts rational being." But "sin cannot entirely take
which made him superior to the natural man- away from man the fact that he is a rational
immortality, infused knowledge and freedom being, for then he would no longer be capable
from error, immunity from concupiscence, ex- of sin."
emption from labor and servility so the chil- Other theologians take a more extreme view
dren of Adam, cast out of Eden, have ingrained than Aquinas and Augustine. They attribute
weaknesses which make them unable to achieve depravity rather than weakness to human na-
the goods or attain the ends proportionate to ture as a consequence of original sin. "On the
their human nature. Calvinistic theory," Mill writes, "the one great
According to some theologians, the purely offense of man is self-will." Under the maxim
natural man, without either the gifts of grace that "whatever is not a duty, is a sin," men are
or the wounds of sin, has never existed. It is this left with no choice. "Human
nature being
mystery of man, having natural aspirations radically corrupt," Mill continues, "there is no
which exceed the weakened powers of his fallen redemption for any one until human nature is
nature, that Pascal seems to contemplate in all killed within him." But, according to Augustine
his observations on "the greatness and wretch- and Aquinas, original sin does not deprive the
edness of man" the "astonishing contradic- individual man entirely of the power to cstab-
760 THE GREAT IDEAS
lish hisworth, though it puts him in need of tion by the merit of their own good works,
God's help to be worthy of salvation. Between Augustine and Aquinas try to take the middle
the one extreme which holds that men can be position, according to which neither grace with-
savcd by God's grace alone, and the other ex- out good works nor good works without grace
treme which supposes that men can win salva- will avail.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
1. The nature of sin: violation of divine law; disorder in man's relation to God 761
30. The condition of Adam before sin: his supernatural state of grace; his preter-
natural gifts
$d. The need for a mediator between God and man to atone for original sin
Af. Pride as the principle of sin: the tragic fault of hybris 766
4<f.
The consequences of actual sin: the loss of charity and grace
4^. The prevention and purging of sin: purification by sacrifice; the sacrament of
penance; contrition, confession, and absolution
5.
The remorse of conscience and feelings of guilt: the psychogenesis and pathological ex-
pression of the sense of sin 767
6d. The eternal punishment of sin: the everlasting perdition of the unrepentant in
Hell 770
6e. The purifying punishments of Purgatory 771
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage
:
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references arc to book, chapter, and verse. When the King fames
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemtuh, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation ot
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
( 1. The nature of sin: violation of divine law; dis- 2b. The distinction between spiritual and car-
order in man's relation to God.) nal sin
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus,2o:i-ij/ Deuteronomy,
435b-436a 5:6-21
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost 93a-333a esp BK i
[128- NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 4:1-11 / vfc, 4:1-
168] 96a-97a, [209-220] 98a, BK 11 [648-666] i} / // Corinthians, 7:1 / I John, 2:16
125b, [746-814] 127b-129a, BK in [1-415] 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 16 17c-d;
135b-144b, BK iv [32 113] 153a-155a, BK v BK v, par 4 27d-28a; BK x, par 41 64 81c-87d
[600-004] 188b-195a, BK vi [262-295] 202a-b, esp par 41 81c-d, par 54 85a-b / City of God,
BK vn [519-549] 228b-229a, BK vm [316-337] BK xiv, CH 2-3 377a-378d / Christian Doc-
239a-b, BK ix [679-779] 262a-264a / Areopa- trine, BK III, CH 2, 658b-C
395a
gitica,
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 63,
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 19b; 24b-26b; A 2 326c-327b
45a-b; 78b-80b / Fences, 668 294b-295a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 72,
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH A 2 112b-113a; Q 73, A 5 123a-d; Q 77, A 5
xxvm, sncr 7-8 229d-230a 149a-150a; Q 100, A 4, ANS 2S3d-255a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Vail, 93c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, v [25-45]
43 MILL: Liberty, 296b-d 7b-c; PURGATORY, xvn [76-139] 79b-d
46 HEGFL: Philosophy of History, PART HI, 304c- 22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 18, 507b
306a; PART iv, 354a-c
48 MELVILLL-,: Moby Dic{, 30a-36b esp 31a 2c. The distinction between mortal and venial
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 689b sin
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK HI, NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 12:31-32 / I John,
65a-67a; BK v, 132b-c; BK vi, 165b-c 5:16-17
18 AUGUSTINL: City of God, BK xxi, CH 24,
2. The kinds and degrees of sin 577d-578a
r
OLD YE<MAMEK r:Exodus,2o:i-ij/ Deuteronomy,
f
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i u, Q 72,
5:6-21525:2 A 5 115a-116b; Q 74, A 4 131a-d; AA 8-10
NEW TLSTAMENT: Matthew, 4:1-11; 5:22; 12:31- 134b-137c; Q 77, A 8 151c-152a; Q 88 192d-
32 / Marf(, 3:29 / Luke, 4:1-13; 12:10,47-48 / 198d; Q 89, A i 199a-c; PART H-II, Q 186, A 9
John, 19:11 / I Corinthians, 8:10 -12 / Galatians, 661a-662b
5:19-21 / / Timothy, 1:13 / Hebrews, 10:26-29 22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 21 509a-b
/James, 2:10 / I John, 2:16; 5:16-17 33 PASCAL: Provincial Lettets, 66a-b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK ix, SECT i 291a-c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 47 7d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 9-16 lOd-
12d; BK in, par 16 17c-d; BK x, par 41-64 2c(l) The classification and order of mortal
sins
81c-87d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:1-17 / Deuteron-
72-73 lllb-128d; Q 100, AA 4-6 253d-258c omy, 5:6-21
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL la-52d esp xi 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i -n, Q 63,
15a-16b; PURGATORY 53a-105d esp xvn [91- A 2, REP 2 64b-65a; Q 84 174b-178a; Q 100,
1
39] 79b-d AA 4-6 253d-258c; PART 11 -n, QQ 10-15 426c-
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale 495a-550a 454c; QQ 20-21 474d-480d; QQ 34-43 558d-
23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART iv, 257c-258a 592d; Q 46 603c-605a,c
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 125d-126a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, ix [52-63] 12d-
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters la-167b passim, esp 13a; xi 15a-16b; PURGATORY, xvn [91-139]
27a-127a 79b-d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 198d; 220c-221b 22 CHAUCER: Summoned s Tale [7587-7670]
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 196b-c 290a-291b / Pardoner's Tale [12,397-593]
374a-377b / Parson's Tale, par 23-84 510b-
2a. The distinction between original and actual 542b
sin 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 33b-34a; 67a;
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 5:14-16 118b-119b;140a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xiv, CH i 42 KANT: Science of Right, 440b-441b
376b,d-377a; en 3 378a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 8r, 2c(2) The classification and order of venial
A i, ANS 163a-164d; A 2 164d-165c; A 3, ANS sins
165d-166b; Q 82, A i, REP 2 168a-d; PART in, NEW TESTAMENT: / Corinthians, 3:12-15
Q i, A 4, ANS 706a-707a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 89,
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi A 2 199c-200d
[52-114] 77b-78a 22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 22 509b-510b
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 18, 507b 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 67b; 118a-119b
ItoZb CHAPTER 86: SIN 763
A 5, REP 2 167a-d; Q 89, A 3 200d-201d; Q 109,
3. The doctrine of original sin A 2, ANS 339c-340b; A 3, CONTRARY and ANS
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:16-17; 3 es P 3 :I 7~ J 9 340c-341b; A 4, ANS 341c-342a; A 8, ANS and
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:23-24 (D) REP 3 344d-346a; A 10, REP 3 347a-d; PART
OT, Boof^ of Wisdom, 2 123-25 ii-n, Q 2, A 7, ANS 396a-397c; Q 5, A i, ANS
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 5 esp 5:12-19 410a-411b; PART HI, Q r, A 3, REP 1,5 704d-
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 18 5c-d / 706a
City of God, BK xn, CH 21-22 357a-c; BK XIH, 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxvm
CH 1-15 360a-366d; BK xiv, CH 376b,d-377a;i
[i]-xxix [36] 96a-98a / PARADISE, vn [64-
CH 10-16 385b-390b; BK xxi, CH 12 571a-c 84] 115d-116a; xin [31-111] 125d-126c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 47, 22 CHAUCER: Monl(s Talc [14,013 020] 434b /
A 2, ANS 257b-258c Parson's Tale, par 18, 506b-507a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 191b-c; 192a-b;
81-83 162d-174b PART iv, 250d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURG \TORY, xxvm 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 68, SCIIOL
[91-96] 97a; xxix [22-30] 97d-98a; xxxm 445a-b
[52 72] 104d-105a; PARADISE, vn [16-120] 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [650 654] 107b;
115b-116b BK in [56-371] 136b-143b; BK iv [32 538]
22 CHAUCER: Pardoner's Tale [12,432-445] 375a 153a-164a esp [131-171] 155a-156a, [205 392]
/ Parson's Tale, par 18 S06b-507b 157a-161a; [610-775] 165b-169a; BK v [1-560]
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17d-18a; 175a-187b; BK vn [40-108) 218a-219b; [519-
81a / Novum Organum, BK n, APH 52, 195c-d 550] 228b-229a; [617-632] 230b 231a; BK vm
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 68, SCIIOL 232a-246b; BK ix [192-454] 251b-257a; BK xi
445a-b [45-71] 300a-b; BK xn [63-1:0] 320b-321b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost 93a 333a esp BK i [i- 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 560 272b
26] 93b-94a, BK in [80-415] 137a-144b, BK iv 46 HLGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 179d-
[411-439] 161b-162a, [512 520] 163b, BK v 180c; PART in, 304d-305a
[28-94] 176a-177a, [224-247] 180a-b, [512- 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 275a
553] 186b-187a, BK vm
[316-333] 239a-b, BK
ix [647-1004] 261b-269a, [1110-1133] 271b-
.The sin of Adam
272a, BK x [585 640] 287a-288b, [720-844] OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 3 / Hcclcstastes, 7:29
290a-292b, [1013-1104] 296b-298b, BK xn (D) Ecclesiastes, 7:30
[386-435] 327b-328b / Areopagitica, 394b- APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:13-16; 2:23-
395b 24 (D) OT, Boo^of Wisdom, 1:13-16; 2:23-
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 434-435 248a-251a; 445-448 25
251b-253a NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 5:12
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 38d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, VK. \n,cn 21 357a-b;
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 183b-c BK xin, CH i 360a-b; en 12-15 365d 366d;
43 MILL: Liberty, 296b-d BK xiv, en 11-15 385d-390a; BK xxi, CH 12
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 18 571a-c; BK xxii, CH 24, 609a-b
16c-d; ADDITIONS, 14 118c-d / Philosophy of 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 81,
History, PART in, 304d~306a A 5 167a-d; Q 82, A 2, RLP i 168d-169c; Q 89,
50 MARX: Capital, 354b A 3 200d-201d
54 FREUD: War and Death, 763b-c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxvm
[91-96] 97a; xxix [22-30] 97d-98a; PARADISE,
3<4. The condition of Adam before sin: his su- vii [16-120] 115b-116b; xxvi [109-117] 147a
pernatural state of grace; his preter- 22 CHAUCER: Pardoner's Tale [12,432-445] 375a/
natural gifts
MonQs Tale [14,013-020] 434b / Parson's Tale,
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, i
.-27-29; 2:7-8,15-25 / par 18, 507a-b
Ecclesiastes, 7:29 (D) Ecclesiastes, 7:30 23 IIoBBEs: leviathan, PART n, 112a-b; PART in,
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:13-14; 2:23 177d; 191b-c; 195d
(D) OT, Book, of Wisdom, 1:1^-14; 2:23 / 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 233b
Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-15 (D) OT, Eccksiasti- 30 BACON Advancement of teaming, 81a
:
7 :2 1 ,28-30 ; 9 -.3 / Jeremiah, 17 :g (D)]eremias, NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 1:21; 9:2-6; 18:11-
5:21 esp 5:12-21; 7; 8:20-21; 9:29/7 Corin- 10:37-43; 13:23,26,32-39; 16:30-31 / Romans,
thians, 15:21-22 / Galatians, 2:16; 3 esp 3:11, 1:16; 3:20-26; 5-6; 8:1-11,31-39; 9:29-10:21 /
3:22; 4:1-7; 5:19-21 / Ephesians, 2:1-5 / ^ / Corinthians, 5:7; 15:1-4,12-23,55-57 / II
John, 2:15-17 Corinthians, 5:14-21 / Galatians, 1:3-4; 2:16-
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 18 5c-d / 21 3:19-27; 5:1-5 / Ephesians, 1:5-7,12-14; 2
;
City of God, BK xn, CH 21-22 357a-c; BK xm, / Colossians, 1:12-14,19-24; 2:11-15; 3:1-10 /
en 1-15 360a-366d; BK xm, CH 2^-BK xiv, / Timothy, 1:15; 2:5-7 / H
Timothy, 1:8-10 /
CH 5 372a-380b; BK xiv, en 12-13 387a-388c; Titus, 3:4-7 / Hebrews, 1:1-3; 2:9-18; 5; 7:1-
en 15-27 388d-397a; BK xxi, CH 12 571a-c; 10:22; 12:24; 13:12 / 7 Peter, 1:7-9,18-21;
CH 15 572c-573b; BK xxn, CH 22 606d 608b; 3:18; 4:1 / 7 John, 2:1-2.12; 3:5-10 / Revela-
CH 30, 617c~618a tion, 1:4-6 (D) Apocalypse, 1:4-6
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 97, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, HK vn, par 24 50d-
Ai, RBI* 3 513c-514c; Q 98, A 2 517d-519a; 51a / City of God, BK ix, CH 1-18 285b,d-295d
PART i -ii, Q 17, A 9, REP 3 692d-693d esp CH 15-17 293a-295c; UK x, CH 22 312a-b;
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, OQ CH 24-25 312d-314c; HK xi, CH 2-3 323a-d;
81-83 162d-174b; Q 85 178b-184a; Q 91, A 6 BK xm, CH 2-4 360b-362a; CH 23-24 372a-
212c-213c; Q 94, A 6, REP 1-2 225d-226b; 376a,c; BK xvn, CH n 462c-463a; BK xxi,
Q 109, A 2, ANS 339c-340b; A 3, ANS 340c- en 16 573b-574a / Christian Doctrine, BK i,
341b; A 8, ANS 344d-346a; PART HI, Q 8, A 5, CH 14-18 627d-629a; CH 34 634b-c; BK n,
REP i 760a-d; QQ 14-15 784a-796a CH 41 656a-c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, in [16- 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 97,
45] 56a-b; x [121-129] 68c-d; XXVIH [91-96] A i, REP 3 513c-514c; PART i-n, Q 5, A 7, REP 2
97a; xxix [16-30] 97d-98a; PARADISE, vn 642a-d
[16-120] 115b-116b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q
22 CHAUCER: Tale of Man of Law [4778-4791] 100, A 12264d-265d; Q 103, A 2 299b-300d;
240b-241a / Pardoner's Tale 374a-382b esp PART in, PROLOGUE-Q i 701a-709c; Q 3, A 8
[12,132-445] 375a, [12,829-837] 381b / Par- 729b-730b; Q 22, A 3 829c-830c
son's Tale, par 1 8, 507b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vi [82-93]
23 HOBBIES: leviathan, PART n, 112a-b; PART in, vn [19-120] 115b-116b
114c;
191b-c; 192a-c; 19Sd 22 CHAUCER: Pardoner's Tale [12,834-837] 381b /
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n, Parson's Tale, par 87, 545a
Slab 23 HOBBLS: Leviathan, PART HI, 191c-d; 197d-
25 MONTAIGNE: Essa\s, 213a-215b; 218c-219a; 198a; 204a-c
233a-234a; 238b-239c; 250a-b; 294a-b 32 MILTON: Christs Nativity [1-14] la-b; [125-
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 52, 156] 4b-5a / The Passion 10b-12a / Upon the
195c-d Circumcision 12b 13a / Paradise Lost 93a-333a
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK HI [167-216] 139a- esp BK i [1-26] 93b-94a, BK in [56-415] 136b-
140a; [274-304] 141b-142a; BK ix [780-1189] 144b, BK xi [1-44] 299a-300a, BK xn [285-
264b-273a; BK x 274a-298b esp [103-123] 484] 325b-329b
276b-277a, [229-409] 279b-283a, [585-640] 33 PASCAL: Pensees, 430 245a-247b; 527-550
287a-288b, (720-844] 290a-292b; BK xi [84- 264b-267b; 556 270b-272a; 560 272b; 692
98] 301a; [162-180] 302b-303a; [251-262] 300b-301a; 780-783 324b-325a
304b-305a; BKXi[423]-BKxn [371] 308b-327a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 482a-d
33 PASCAL: Provincialletters, 82a / Pensfcs, 426- 46 HEGEL: Philosophy o/7//V/0ry,pARTHi,306b-c;
427 244b; 430-431 245a-247b; 434-435 248a- PART iv, 331d-333b
251a; 439-450 251a-253a; 560 272b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v,
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 38d 127b-137c passim
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 183b-c 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 797b-c
CHAPTER 86: SIN 765
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2 csp 2:24; 14:
3*. The remission of sin: baptism; the state of
22-29 (D) OT, Boo^of Wisdom, 2 esp 2:24-
the unbaptized
25; 14:22-29 / Ecclesiasticus, 8:2; 10:9,13;
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 3:11-17; 28:19 / 11:10; 12:13-14; 19:2; 23:1-6,13,16,18; 25:24;
Mar1(, 1 14-8; 16:16 / Lufy, 3:3,16 /John, i -.2%- 26:29; 27:2,10; 31:5-11,25-31; 47:19-20 (D)
26,33; 3 5 / dels, 1:5; 2:38-41 esp 2:38; 3:19;
:
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 8:2-3; 10:9,15-16; 11:10;
8:35-38; 10:43-48; 11:16; 19:1-5; 22:16 / 12:13; 19:2-3; 23:1-6,17,21-23,25-26; 25:33;
Romans, 3:20-26; 5-6; 8:1-11; 9:29-10:10 / / 26:28; 27:2,11; 31:5-11,30-42; 47:21-22
Corinthians, 12:13 / II Corinthians, 5:14-19 / NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 13:18-23; 15:10-20
Galatians, 3:19-27 / Ephesians, 2; 4:5 / Colos- / MarJ(, 4:1-20; 7:14-23 / Luty, 4:1-13; 8:4-15
sians, 2:8-15 / Titus, 3:5-7 / Hebrews, 6:1-6 / / Romans, 1:18-32; 6:19; 7:22-23 / / Corin-
/ Peter, 1
118-23 thians, 7:4-5; 8:9-13; 9:27; 15:56 / // Corin-
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 6 2b-c; thians, 2:10-11; 4:3-4 / Galatians, 5:16-21 /
par 17-18 5b-d; BK n, par 15 12b-c; BK iv, Ephesians, 4:22 / Colossians, 3 15-7 / / Timothy,
par 7-8 20d-21b / City of God, BK x, CH 22 6:9-10 / // Timothy, 2:25-26 / Titus, 3:3 /
312a-b; BK xn, CH 22 357c; BK xin, CH 7 James, 1:15; 2; 4:1-6 / / Peter, 4:1-3; 5:8-9 /
362d-363b; BK xxi, CH 16 573b-574a II Peter, 1:4; 2:10-22 / I John, 3:4-9
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 97, 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK n, par 6-18 lOa-
A REP 3 513c-514c
i, 13a; BK in, par 16 17c-d; BK vn, par 4-5
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 81, 44b-d; BK vin, par 10-11 55c-56b; BK x, par
A i, ANS 163a-164d; Q 89, A 6, ANS 203b- 41-66 81c-88b / City of God, BK i, CH 16-27
204a,c; Q 113 360d-370b; PART in, Q 3, A 8, 139c-146a; BK xiv, CH 3-6 378a-380c; CH 13-
ANS and REP 3 729b-730b; Q 65, A i, ANS 14 387c-388d; BK xv, CH 22 416a-c; BK xix,
879c-881d; A 4, ANS 883d-884a,c; PART in CH 6 514b-515a
SUPPL, Q 69, AA 4-7 889c-893c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 48, A
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HLLL, iv Sc-7a; PUR- 5, RF,P 3 263a-d; Q 63, A 7, ANS 331c-332b;
GATORY, vn [1-36] 62c-d; xxn [55-93] 87a-c; A 8 332c-333b; Q 92, A i, REP 3 488d-489d;
PARADISE, xix [22-111] 135b-136a; xx [31- Q 114 581d-585c; PART i-n, Q i, A 7, REP i
148] 137a-138b; xxxn [37-84] 155a-c 614c-615a; Q 42, A 3 802d-803c
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 3 496a; par 18- 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, QQ
19, 507b-508a 75-84 137c-178a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 206c-207a; 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL la-52d passim,
211c-212b; 244d-245a esp xi 15a-16b, xin [31-108] 18b-19a, xxiv
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xn [436-445] [1-78] 34d-35b, xxvn [55-132] 40a-41a;
328b-329a PURGATORY 53a-105d passim, esp xi 68d-70b,
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 221a-224a xin [103-129] 73a-b, xv [40-81] 75d-76a,
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 297c-298b xvi [52-114] 77b-78a, xvii [9i]-xvin [75]
79b-80c, xix [i -69] 81c-82a, xxx-xxxi 99b-
4. Actual or personal sin
102b; PARADISE, i [94-142] 107b-d
22 CHAUCLR: Friar's Tale 278a-284a / Prologue
4a. The relation of original sin to actual sin
of Pardoner's Tale 372a-374a / Pardoner's
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 3:7-26; 5:12-21 Talc 374a-382b esp [12,397-593] 374a-377b,
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions,BK i, par 17-18 [12,829-852] 381b / Tale of Mclibeus, par
5b-d / City of God, BK xiv, en i 376b,d-377a; 48-52 421b-425b / Second Nun's Prologue
CH 3 378a-d [15,469-489] 461a / Parson's Tale 495a-550a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 114, esp par 3 496a, par 20-86 508b-544a
A 3, ANS 583b-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 85d; PART n,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 81, 138d-139c; 151b; PART iv, 272d
A i, ANS 163a-164d; Q 89, A 6 203b-204a,c; 26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT v, sc i
PART in, Q i, A 4 706a-707a [175-190] 66d-67a
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 18-19 507b- 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc n [129-137]
508b 32d-33a; ACT in, sc in [36-72] 53d-54a; sc
32 MILTON: Paradise BK in [167-216] 139a-
Lost, iv [144-152] 56a-b / Measure for Measure,
140a; [274-343] 141b-143a; BK ix [994-1080] ACT 11, sc ii [162-187] 183d-184a; sc in [10-
269a-271a / Areopagitica, 394b-395b 39] 184b-c; ACT in, sc i [95-151] 187d-188b /
Othello, ACT i, sc in [60-69] 209c / Pericles,
4b. The causes and occasions of actual sin ACT i, PROLOGUE-SC i 421b-423c / Cymbeline,
OLD TESTAMENT: Numbers, 15:27-31 /Job, 1:1- ACT in, sc iv [76-80] 467c / Henry VIII, ACT
5; 31 / Proverbs, 1:10-19; 10-19 passim; 21:4; in, sc n [435-457] 5 ?3c-d
24:9; 28:20; 30:8-9 / Ecclesiastes, 7:26 (D) 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 125d-126a
Ecclesiastes, 7:27 / Isaiah, 5:11-12,22-23; 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK iv [505-535] 163b-
28:7-8 (D) Isaias, 5:11-12,22-23; 28:7-8 164a; BK v [26-94] 175b-177a / Samson
766 THE GREAT IDEAS 4cto 4<?
22 CHA