Foundations of Physics, Vol. 18, No.

3, 1988

Quantum Statistical Determinism

Eftichios Bitsakis 1

Received April 8, 1987

This paper attempts to analyze the concept of quantum statistical determinism.

This is done after we have clarified the epistemie difference between causality
and determinism and discussed the content of classical forms of deter-
minism--mechanical and dynamical. Quantum statistical determinism transcends
the classical forms, for it expresses the multiple potentialities of quantum systems.
The whole argument is consistent with a statistical interpretation of quantum
mechanics.

1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE

The debate concerning determinism in quantum mechanics (QM) began

during the period of its formulation (1925; Congress of Como, 1927; 5th
Congress of Solvay, 1928). ¢1) This debate took a new impetus after the
formulation of Bell's inequalities (1964).
The question of determinism has often been treated, during this
debate, in a mechanistic way. In fact, the real dilemma is not to make a
choice between Laplacian determinism and indeterminism because, as I
shall try to show, in QM operates a new form of determinism: the quantum
statistical determinism.
Before going further, it is necessary to elucidate the meaning of the
categories of causality and of determinism because, in most cases, the two
categories are treated as synonymous. More than that, the lack of a
rigorous definition resulted in a generalized confusion. So one speaks of
rigorous or strong determinism and of flexible or soft determinism, of
mathematical determinism, of acausal (not determinate) transformations,

1 Department of Philosophy, University of Ioannina, and Department of Physics, University

of Athens, Athens, Greece.

331
0015~9018/88/0300-0331506.00/0 © 1988PlenumPublishingCorporation
332 BRsakis

of complete or incomplete determinism, of determinism as a form of

causality, of exact causality, of approximative or statistical causality, and
so on. The need for clarity is evident.
The principle of causality states that there are causes in nature (in the
case of physics, the causes are the four forms of interactions actually
known); that every phenomenon has its causes; that the cause-effect
relation means that A produces B via an irreversible transformation. Thus,
temporal order between cause and effect is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for a causal relation. Consequently, the causality principle is not
simply epistemic. The cause-effect relation is an objective, necessary, and
genetic one. Because of that, causality is also an ontological category. It
concerns nature itself, and not only our ideas about nature.
The laws of physics, the formal expression of the causal relations, are,
in most cases, linear. Nevertheless, the linearity, which presupposes the
independence of causes, is an idealization. As Einstein put it, the real laws
of nature are not linear. In fact, the physical processes are, in most cases,
nonlinear, and the relevant connections are not additive. The final state,
realized through a physical process, is, generally, a new one. But the
emergence of the new quality is incompatible with the mechanistic,
humean, and positivistic conception of causality. This aspect is essential for
QM because the so-called "reduction of the wave packet," the central
problem of its interpretation, is a nonlinear transformation.
Determinism, on the other hand, means that the effect is determined in
a certain way by its causes. In physics, for example, we have mechanical,
dynamical, statistical, and quantum statistical determinism. Therefore,
determinism is also an ontological category. It has its counterpart in
nature. It concerns real, objective determinations expressed in the form of
physical laws.
Determinism, consequently, presupposes causality but is not identified
with it. For it is possible to postulate the existence of causes, without
necessarily accepting that the causes determine in a definite way the effect.
It would be, for example, unreasonable to deny the existence of causes in
the quantum-mechanical level. It is, however, possible to affirm that the
causes do not determine the quantum-mechanical effects. In the last
analysis, this is the essential point of the indeterministic interpretation of
QM/21
Nevertheless, this is not the only aberration inherent in the
Copenhagen interpretation (CI). The identification of determinism with
causality is another source of epistemological fallacies. The third is the
identification of determinism with its mechanical form. Because of that, the
inadequacy of the classical forms in the quantum-mechanical level was
considered as a proof of the failure of the principle of determinism.
Quantum Statistical Determinism 333

It is well known that CI does not constitute a coherent dogma. We

can, nevertheless, affirm that the dominant ideas of that School are a
mixture of positivism, neoplatonism, and spiritualism. The realist positions
(Fock, Rosenfeld, sometimes Bohr) represent a weak current within this
School.
Quantum reality is incompatible with naive realism. But the
protagonists of the CI did not elaborate a dynamical conception of
physical reality; they simply rejected the realistic principle. For Bohr, to
take an example, it is difficult to distinguish between subject and object in
quantum mechanics. Even words like "to be" and "to know" lose their
unambiguous meaning. More than that, acco.rding to Bohr, there is no
quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum-mechanical description.
It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is.
Heisenberg has gone further: "If we attempt to penetrate behind this
reality, into the detail of atomic events, the contours of this "objective real"
world dissolve not in the mist of a new and yet unclear idea of reality, but
in the transparent clarity of a mathematics whose laws govern the possible,
not the actual."
In a similar way, the inadequacy of the classical forms of determinism
was understood as failure of this principle. Thus Bohr speaks of renouncing
the causal mode of description and the idea of causality, and of lack of
causality during the movement of particles; he claims that we can scarcely
avoid speaking of choice between various possibilities on the part of the
atoms. Jordan and Dirac, during the same period, claimed that particles
are endowed with free will, that the electron is free to decide between
possible states. [Bohr, later, in his discussions with Einstein (1949), was
forced to accept that "it is hardly reasonable to endow nature with volition
in the ordinary sense"]. And the list of citations is not exhaustive. (3)
The arguments of Bohr, Heisenberg, yon Neumann, Born, Jordan, and
others are not, in the last analysis, original. They constitute, to a certain
extent, a specific version of the philosophical ideas of the Vienna School.
But the positivist philosophy of Vienna is directly related to the
empiriocriticism of Ernst Mach. The philosophy of Mach, in its turn, has
as a starting point the ideas of David Hume. (4) Because of these affiliations,
Hume and Berkeley are the real ancestors of the "new" philosophy of the
Copenhagen School. (5)
Let us make concrete the above assertion: For D. Hume, the unique
source of knowledge is the sense data. It is illegitimate, he affirms, to accept
the existence of external objects, the source of these data: "By what
arguments can it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be
caused by external objects entirely different from them though resembling
them? Experience is and must be entirely silent. ''(6)
334 Bitsakis

Hume's thesis concerning the principle of causality is equally agnostic.

For the founder of modern agnosticism, there is no intrinsic necessity.
There is no reason to suppose that everything must have a cause. The
causal relation is simply reduced to a temporal order: first A, then B. Thus,
the causal relations describe regularities observed in nature. Nothing more:
"Should any one leave this instance and pretend to define a cause, by
saying it is something productive of another? It is evident he would say
nothing. For what does he mean by production? ''~v) Hume does not
attribute any ontological status to causal relation. More than that: The
sense perceptions are elevated by him to the status of unique legitimate
reality.
We know today the weakness of this argument. Because today we
know the realities, structures, and processes which are the objective source
of the "signals" producing sense perceptions. We know also the subjective,
neurophysiological processes via which the external "signal" is transformed
into sense datum. In spite of this knowledge, the subjective epistemology of
Hume became the basis of modern empiricism (positivism) and via
positivism, the basis of the "orthodox" interpretation of QM.
Hume woke up Kant from his "dogmatic sleep." Hume later was
considered by Mach as a more consistent thinker than Kant. ~8~ (Contrary
to Hume, Kant accepted in his ontology a realistic residue, the "thing in
itself'.) The philosophers of the Vienna Circle, in their turn, considered
themselves as heirs to the philosophy of Mach, and the Copenhagen
School was directly influenced by the dominant philosophy of Vienna, as
well as by Poincar6 and other positivists of the first decades of our century.
For Mach also, there is no cause and effect in nature. Nature simply is.
For Poincar6, the internal harmony of the world is the only objective
realityJ9) Carnap, after them, rejected causality, as well as the whole of
philosophy, which he identified with metaphysics: "Metaphysical
statements are neither true nor false, because they assert nothing. They
contain neither knowledge nor error, they are completely outside the field
of knowledge, of theory, outside the discussion of truth or falsehood.''~1°)
Carnap, and more generally the Vienna School, believed that they had
accomplished an elimination of "metaphysics." The rejection of causality
was one of the achievements of this radical catharsis. Accordingly, Carnap
believed that Hume was right not to see any intrinsic necessity in the causal
relation. As for QM, he assumed that "the existence of probabilistic laws
means the failure of determinism." Quantum physics is for him "essentially
nondeterministic" and he claimed that it is "fallacious to affirm that deter-
minism is valid in its domain.''~11) In the same way, Wittgenstein assumed
that the belief in the causal nexus is a superstition and affirmed that the law
of causality "is not a law, but a form of law.''~1~) All these agnostic ideas
Quantum Statistical Determinism 335

make part of the CI of Q M and, more specifically, of its conception of

determinism.
Finally, the neo-Kantian trend also rejected the "metaphysical"
(=realist) residue of the Kantian epistemology, accentuating its agnostic
component. Thus Cassirer writes: "It must be confessed that the causal
principle is not a natural law in the usual sense of the word. In this respect,
Mach is correct in affirming that there is no cause and no effect in nature."
Cassirer follows Kant: For Kant, causality is an a priori category of our
understanding; for Cassirer, the causality principle can be understood only
as a "transcendental statement referring, not to objects, but rather to our
cognition of objects in general." The agnostic thesis of Cassirer is
straightforward: "Ignorabimus is the only answer that science can give to
the question of the essence and origin of the consciousness. ''(13)
Why this philosophical prelude? Because, as already noted, the
principal theses of CI are directly related to the agnostic, positivist, neo-
Kantian and idealist trends of contemporary philosophy. These theses may
be summed up as follows:
• There is no objective, physical reality. The reality is reduced to the
totality of sense data, or/and to the clarity of mathematical forms.
• Quantum physics is incompatible with the principle of causality. Its
probabilistic laws are proof of the intrinsic indeterminacy of quantum
phenomena.
• Quantum mechanics is an algorithm. Its laws have no physical
counterpart and we have nothing to understand as their physical foun-
dations.
• Quantum mechanical description is complete and final. A deter-
ministic description of the microphenomena is, in principle, impossible.
As already noted, the inadequacy of the Laplacian form of deter-
minism was understood on the basis of the mechanistic conception of the
CI as the failure of determinism. But as is well known, the realist school
(Einstein, Schr6dinger, de Broglie, Langevin, Planck, and others) rejected
the postulates of the orthodox interpretation. Its epistemology was based
on a realist, causal and local conception of physical laws. This conception
continued and further developed a tong tradition whose forerunners are
Democrite and Aristotle. (For Aristotle, cause is "the intrinsic element
from which an object is made"(~4).) In the following I will try to analyze
the concepts of causality and determinism, in the light of a realist
epistemology.
336 Bitsakis

2. THE CLASSICAL FORMS OF DETERMINISM

Classical determinism is currently identified with its mechanical form.

Nevertheless, as I will try to show, we can distinguish two epistemicalty
different forms: the mechanistic and the dynamical one, which are valid in
classical theories of fields.

2.1. The Mechanistic Conception

The mechanistic conception of determinism is an integral part of a
more general point of view about nature. The nominalist-empirist tradition
played an essential role in the elaboration of this conception.
Thus, according to W. Occam (1270-1347), "entia ne sunt multipli-
canda praeter necessitatum," and "frustra fir per plura quod potest fieri per
pauciore." This principle of "economy''~5) was later adopted by I. Newton.
In fact, Newton writes in his Principia, in the part concerning the
"rules of reasoning in philosophy": "We are to admit no more causes of
natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their
appearances .... Nature does nothing in vain, and nor is in vain when less
will serve; for nature is pleased with simplicity and affects not the pomp of
superfluous causes. Therefore, to the same natural effects we must, as far as
possible, assign the same causes. ''(~6)
The principle of economy has a certain positivist coloration.
Nevertheless, in the beginnings of natural science, it was integrated in a
realist and deterministic conception of nature. In fact, classical determinism
was based on a certain number of ontological premises: (t) existence of
compact, indivisible atoms deprived of qualities; (2) Euclidean absolute
space and absolute, universal time; (3) interactions at-a-distance and,
consequently cause-effect simultaneity. The Galilean transformations were
to be later the formal expression of these premises.
In classical mechanics, the value of the variables defining a state at an
instant t = 0 determines their value at every subsequent moment. The
probability of prevision of the final state is thus equal to unity. It was
Laplace who generalized in a concise manner the philosophical
implications of this theoretical possibility: "Une intelligence qui, pour un
instant donn6, connaltrait toutes les forces dont la nature est anim6e, et la
situation respective des atres qui la composent si d'ailleurs elle ~tait assez
vaste pour soumettre ces donn6es fi l'analyse, embrasserait dans la m~me
formule les mouvements des plus grands corps de l'univers et ceux du plus
16ger atome: rien ne serait incertain pour elle, et l'avenir comme le pass6
serait pr6sent fi ses yeux.''(17~ The above citation is a classical case of reduc-
tionism. More generally: the mechanistic conception consists in the belief
 Quantum Statistical Determinism 337

that the whole of forms of existence, of structures, processes, and relations

of the material world can be reduced to structures and movements of
simple, compact atoms, interacting with forces propagating with infinite
velocity. Mechanistic determinism is a typical form of reductionism.
Today we know that the universe is not a machine and that matter in
its evolution is organized in qualitatively different levels. This does not
mean that we can ignore some essential merits of mechanical determinism,
which are: (1) It presupposed the objectivity of classical systems and the
ontic status of states and natural laws. (2) It excluded from science
metaphysical and anthropomorphic ideas. (3) It was characterized by a
gnoseological optimism concerning the possibility of our intellect to
discover the laws of nature (which are written, according to Galileo, in the
book of mathematics). At the same time, mechanical determinism was too
narrow to include quality, qualitative transformations, and forms of
determination different from those of the Newtonian physics.

2.2. The Classical Idealizations

The mechanistic conception of causality and determinism has been

elaborated on the basis of a certain number of inevitable idealizations.
• Mechanics is concerned with material points endowed with mass
and momentum, but deprived of any qualitative characteristics.
• The classical states are defined by an ensemble of observables and
they represent points P(qi, Pi) in the phase space. Thus the state is defined
with a variance equal to zero.
• The classical propositions correspond to Lebesgue-measurable sub-
ensembles of the phase space. For every state, there is a class of
propositions simultaneously true.
• Classical observables are represented by real functions on F,
forming a commutative algebra.

The preceding idealizations presuppose that the measurement does not

disturb the state of the system. In this way, the measurement of an obser-
vable does not modify the information concerning the other ones.
Therefore all the observables are compatible, and this fact results in the
compatibility of the ensemble of proositions concerning a classical system.
The Boolean structure of the set of propositions is the direct
consequence of the above idealizations. But, as is well known, the Boolean
structure is that of formal logic, and formal logic is the logic of identity.
Thus, on the basis of the above idealizations, movement is reduced to its
mechanical form. More generally, it is accepted that the system conserves

825/18/3-7
338 Bitsakis

its identity throughout the movement as well as during the measurement:

No new elements of reality are created by the interaction of the system S
with the apparatus A.
The above idealizations are necessary for the validity of the Laplacian
form of determinism. The mechanistic character of this form becomes
equally evident from other points of view:
(1) The Boolean structure of propositions is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for determinism. A Boolean system is not necessarily
deterministic. Atomicity, on the contrary, is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a Boolean system of finite degrees of freedom to be deterministic.
In this way, determinism and atomicity are equivalent. (18) But what is the
physical meaning of atomicity? Atomicity means conservation of the identi O,
of the system. Thus we find, from a logical point of view, that mechanical
determinism presupposes conservation of identity.
(2) The compatibility of all the propositions concerning a classical
system results in the possibility of measurement of a/x b. The validity of
the distributive law in classical physics is an implication of the
compatibility of classical observables. This is an essential difference from
quantum mechanics, where the distributive law is not valid. The so-called
quantum indeterminism is related, by CI, to the validity of the super-
position principle and the "reduction of the wave packet."
(3) In classical mechanics we have pure states and mixtures. In
classical mechanics there are also superpositions of states. What is then the
physical meaning of this fact, in classical and quantum mechanics?
In QM the validity of the superposition principle is an expression of
the potential character of the states, which are realized via the transfor-
mation of the initial state: ~--* {Ti}. Thus in the case of QM the initial
pure ensemble is transformed into a mixture. (According to the CI, this is
an essential argument against the validity of determinism.) In classical
mechanics, on the contrary, the only type of superposition is that of a
mixture. The states here exist before the measurement. They are real and
not potential. In classical mechanics there does not exist a nontrivial super-
position of pure states. (19) In this way, the conservation of the identity of
the ensemble and the validity of determinism are two complementary
characteristics of classical systems.
(4) The compatibility of classical observables means that the
probability of one of them is not modified by the measurement of the other
observables. Consequently, for n real stochastic variables xi defined in the
same probability space, we have

P ( x 1 , x2 ..... Xn) = Pl(xl) "" P , ( x , ) ( 1)

Quantum Statistical Determinism 339

This is impossible in QM, and this fact is another argument against

determinism. In classical mechanics, on the contrary, this is an indication
in favor of determinism. Nevertheless, this fact presupposes the mutual
independence of the variables, the conservation of the identity of the state,
and, more generally, the mechanistic character of the system.
(5) In classical mechanics there are statistical states, represented by
probabilistic measures in the phase space. A classical state is represented by
a nondispersive probabilistic measure. Accordingly, a dispersive state is
considered as a noncornplete description of S. But in classical mechanics it
is accepted that it is possible (in principle) to introduce a certain number of
hidden variables and to define a nondispersive state--in order to achieve a
complete specification of the state (a point of F). Thus, classical
probabilities were condidered as reducible to classical, nondispersive states.
(6) Consequently, chance was considered as a subjective or episternic
category. On the contrary, quantum probabilities were considered by CI as
essential, primordial, nonreducible, and so on, that is to say, as a proof of
the indeterminism inherent in quantum physics.

2.3. Criticism of the Classical Idealizations

Material point is an abstraction. The same is valid for the postulated
identity of the ensemble of particles forming a pure state. Theory deals with
ideal situations; but in real situations the identity is not a matter of fact.
This is an essential point concerning determinism.
It is accepted, in principle, that there exists a phase space in which the
particle has a definite position at any time. Thus its motion is determinate.
But as Bopp has demonstrated, even in classical mechanics it is not
possible to observe exactly a particle's position in the phase space. (2°) Bopp
also refers to a similar position of Max Born (21) and concludes that the
object of research is an ensemble of particles representing all possible states
of the single particle we are speaking of. This virtual ensemble is a
statistical ensemble. It should be added that it is not only a question of
possibility to observe a particle's position in the phase space. The state
possesses objectively a fine structure of stochastic character, determined by
the interactions of the particle with its milieu.
In a subsequent work, M. Born claimed that the uncertainties of the
initial conditions result in the fact that the predictions of classical
mechanics do not concern a precise trajectory, but an ensemble of
tragectories given by a distribution of probabilities. According to Born, it is
reasonable to formulate classical mechanics as a statistical theory/=) Thus,
the most "deterministic" discipline reveals an inherent stochastic character.
340 Bitsakis

This is an indication of an inherent link between chance and necessity,

which transcends the irreducible antithesis of the rigid schemes of formal
logic.
For the mechanistic epistemologies, chance is a subjective, epistemic
category that results from a partial ignorance of the determinations of
phenomena. From this point of view, real processes are too complex to be
possible for us to grasp the mutual linking of all relevant causes. Therefore,
chance is, in principle, reducible to determinism. Correspondingly,
probability is something inessential and secondary, determined by external
factors.
Nevertheless, chance is at the same time an ontological category. It
describes the objective situation of an ensemble of "identical" particles.
From this point of view, chance is the negation of necessity, not of
determination. Chance is the final result of hidden, necessary interactions.
Determinism, in its turn, is the dialectical transcendence of an ensemble of
stochastic processes. On the macroscopic level, chance is transcended and
transformed into necessity. Even classical determinism covers an ensemble
of individual stochastic processes. 123)

2.4. The Dynamical Form of Determinism

Electromagnetism and the relativistic theory of gravitation are

deterministic theories. This new form of determination was identified by the
majority of physicists and philosophers with the mechanical-Laplacian
form. Nevertheless, the two forms are epistemically different. This is an
essential distinction concerning the concept of quantum statistical deter-
minism. So, let us try to bring out their differences.
(1) Laplacian determinism presupposes action-at-a-distance. The
Euclidean frame and nonlocality are implications of this premise. On the
contrary, finite velocity of transmission of physical interactions is the
fundamental premise of the classical theories of fields. The principle of
relativity implies the local character of the phenomena, the Minkowskian
spatiotemporal frame, the separability of the systems separated by a space-
time interval, as well as the fact that natural processes have an '%paisseur
temporelle."
(2) Mechanistic determinism is based on fictitious, "immaterial"
forces. Dynamical determinism presupposes real, objective physical inter-
actions. The electromagnetic, gravitational, and other fields have a real,
objective existence; they are independent of their sources. More than that
photons, gravitons, etc. are carriers of qualitative characteristics; they are
emitted and absorbed, created and destroyed, via irreversible processes.
Quantum Statistical Determinism 341

The quality, the qualitative difference, and the production of new qualities
are inherent in the dynamical form of determination. This form transcends
the logic of the identity characteristic of the Laplacian determinism. New
elements of reality are created, and others are destroyed during the physical
interactions.
(3) The pseudo-Euclidean universe of Minkowski is the natural
spatiotemporal frame for the dynamical form of determination. In this
frame, the cause-effect relation manifests its concrete content. Thus, the
phenomena are not instantaneous events, void of physical content; they are
irreversible processes realized in space-time. The irreversibility is genetically
related to qualitative transformations. Now it is the arrow of time that
represents the direction of evolution of the systems. On the other hand, the
continuity of time (instant is continuity of time, for it is the limit of
time--Aristotle) has its counterpart in the continuity of physical processes.
In the universe of Minkowski the future has a concrete representation
intrinsically related to the cause-effect relations. The instant t = 0, "a begin-
ning and an end of time: not of the same part of time, but the end of the
past and the beginning of the future" (Aristotle), coincides with the com-
mon vertex of the cones of the universe of Minkowski. So, time is not the
universal, abstract Newtonian form, independent of matter and movement.
It is local, intrinsically related to evolutionary processes. Time is
inseparable from change; as Aristotle puts it, it is a measure of movement
and it is measured by movement. (24)
(4) The objectivity of the causal relations was expressed, in
prerelativistic physics, in the covariance of its equations with respect to the
Galilean transformations. The objectivity of the dynamical causal relations
is expressed in a more general frame (Lorentz group of transformations).
These transformations are the formal expression of the unity of space and
time in a dynamical-deterministic universe.
(5) Relativistic physics gave an answer to the ancient philosophical
problem concerning the eventual simultaneity of cause and effect. Because
of the finite velocity of interactions, there is a temporal hysteresis between
cause and effect, if the two systems are separated in space. In the case of
spatial coincidence the temporal hysteresis tends to zero.
(6) Dynamical determinism makes more evident the intrinsic relation
between chance and necessity. An enormous number of elementary-
stochastic electromagnetic or gravitational processes manifests itself, in the
macroscopic level, as a wave obeying a dynamical law. Thus, dynamical
necessity presupposes and at the same time transcends elementary
stochastic processes. In this level, chance is transformed into necessity. This
342 Bilsakis

intrinsic line is evident, even from a mathematical point of view: the

dynamical law is the limit of the more general probabilistic law; in its case
the probability is equal to one.

3. Q U A N T U M STATISTICAL DETERMINISM

Quantum mechanics, and more generally microphysics, demonstrated

the limits of classical determinism. In what follows, I will try to analyze the
new form of determination, manifested in quantum phenomena.

3.1. The Nonstatistical Character of the Copenhagen Interpretation

This paper is not the proper place to give a brief account of the
position of the Copenhagen School. In any case, the crucial moments of its
history are the following: The Congress of Como, Complementarity, Bohr,
1927; the "Impossibility proof" for a dynamical description of quantum
phenomena (Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, J. yon
Neumann, German edition, 1932); the demonstration of the non-Boolean
structure of the propositions concerning quantum systems (Birkhoff and
von Neumann, 1935), and the Einstein Bohr debate concerning the EPR
experiment (1935). On the other hand, the crucial moments of the
evolution of the ideas of the Realist School were the theory of double
solution (de Broglie, 1927), the EPR experiment (1935), the Schr6dinger
paradox (1935), the first versions of hidden-variable theories (Bohm,
Vigier, and others, 1952), and, finally, the inequalities of J. S. Bell (1964).
The indeterminism of CI is founded, as is well known, on the following
peculiarities of quantum mechanics:
(1) The inequalities of Heisenberg. The impossibility of simultaneous
measurement of x and Px for the same particle means, according to CI, that
the principle of determinism is not valid in QM. But this is a mechanistic
conception because, even if we know x and Px, it would be impossible to
predict with certainty the outcome of an individual measurement, resulting #t
the "'reduction" of a "wave packet." This transformation is not a linear,
mechanical phenomenon. Because of that, knowledge of its mechanical
parameters does not help us in predicting the transformation with
certainty.
(2) von Neumann's proof that a dynamical description is impossible
in QM., because even pure states are not dispersion-free. The
epistemological background of this theorem is Laplacian determinism.
More that that, as is well known, the validity of this theorem has been
contested from many points of view. ~2s)
Quantum Statistical Determinism 343

(3) The probabilistic character of the laws of QM. Nevertheless,

phenomena obeying probabilistic laws do have their causes. Thus, the real
question is the mode o f determination of quantum processes. The central
point here is the transformation of quantum systems the so-called "reduc-
tion of the wave packet." This "reduction" is, according to CI, an acausal,
indeterministic, proof of the indeterminism inherent in quantum
phenomena.
Let us insist on this last point. The "reduction" is provoked by causes
(interaction of S + A ) . Thus, the problem is the determination of this
phenomenon by its causes.
According to von Neumann, Bohr, Wigner, etc., two modes of
evolution of the state vector are possible:
(a) The "causal" ( = deterministic) one, for free particles obeying the
time-dependent Schr6dinger equation.
(b) The "acausal" ( = indeterministic) one, occurring in the case of a
measurement.
Let us take the system gt = ~ i ci g;i which interacts with an apparatus
described by the state vector ~b. (We do not examine here the meaning of
the expression "state vector" for a macroscopic system.)
Before the interaction, the whole system is described by

The interaction results in a superposition of states:

According to CI, the spontaneous "reduction" of (3) is impossible (a

pure state cannot evolve spontaneously into a mixture). The necessary deus
ex machina is in that case a consciousness: It is the observation that causes
the "reduction," and the realization of one of the eigenstates ~i.
The impasse and the solipsistic character of the orthodox inter-
pretation of measurement were demonstrated in a clear and humoristic way
by Schr6dinger. Let us recall the paradox in his own terms:
"A cat is placed in a steel chamber, together with the following hellish
contraption (which will be protected against direct interferencewith the cat). In
a Geiger counter, there is a tiny amount of radioactive substance, so tiny that
maybe within an hour, one of the atoms decays, but equally probably none
decays. If one decays, then the counter triggers and via a relay activates a little
344 Bitsakis

hammer which breaks a container of cyanide. If one has left the entire system
for an hour, then one would say that the cat is still living if no atom has
decayed. The first decay would have poisoned it. The ~u function of the entire
system would express this, by containing equal parts of living and dead cat. The
typical feature in these cases is that the indeterminacy is transferred from the
atomic to the crude macroscopic level, which then can be decided by direct
observation."~26~
Before the decay, the radioactive a t o m is described by
1
~=__ [~u + ~ d ] (4)

and the apparatus by the "state vector" q~o- Because of their interaction
during a time interval AT, the two systems are correlated and constitute a
unique system in superposition:

'/'o(Xl, x2,...) (~u+ 7'~) [ ~ ( a l , a2,...) ~'~+cb(d,, d2,...) ~'a]

(5)
The superposition (5) constitutes, according to CI, a unique system,
evolving in a perfectly deterministic way. N o spontaneous reduction is
possible, ~27) and we are forced to arrive at the conclusion that the cat is
now in a superposition of two states: "cat alive" and "cat dead," and this
with equal statistical weights. The cat will stay in this state for eternity! It is
only an eventual observation that can p r o v o k e the "reduction," realizing
one of the two possible states: it is the observer that saves or kills the cat!
N o one doubts that after an hour the cat will be alive or dead, and
this, independently of any "observation." The state is now

~(al, a2,...) ~'~ or q~(dl, d2,...) ~ (6)

because the system is in one of the possible states, realized via an irrever-
sible and dissipative process. Quantum mechanics says nothing about that: It
is impossible to answer whether the cat is alive or dead. The state vector
has changed before any observation, but the "observer" knows nothing
before opening the box.
This contradiction of the CI with reality results from the fact that the
o r t h o d o x school violates in practice Born's statistical interpretation. In fact,
CI presupposes that ~ describes a single system. In reality, ~u describes a
statistical ensemble, and the contradiction vanishes if we imagine an
experience with N unfortunate cats! The single system interpretation, on
the contrary, is b o u n d to transform into mystery the fact that the actual
linear formalism cannot describe the nonlinear evolution of q u a n t u m
systems.
Quantum Statistical Determinism 345

The whole system (radioactive atom + cat) is in fact a metastable one,

and passes spontaneously in one of the possible states. In this way a pure
state is transformed into a mixture (N/2 cats alive and N/2 dead). This is
impossible for CI; its formal interpretation implies two, equally unrealistic
solutions: (1) The reduction is impossible and the deus ex machina is
inevitable. (2) The state was already a mixture. Thus, according to Wigner,
"in order to obtain a mixture of states as a result of the interaction, the
initial state must have been a mixture already. This follows from the
general theorem that the characteristic values of the density matrix are
constants of motion. ''~28~ This argument of Wigner concerns systems
that are ideally isolated but is invalid for systems perturbed by external
interactions.
For some of the protagonists of CI, the state ~ = ~ i ci ~u describes a
superposition of real states, and the measurement is equivalent to a "spec-
tral analysis" of the state vector. This conception is included, for example,
in the analysis of J. yon Neumann's. This point of view is also untenable,
because the eigenstates {~ui} are potential states, and they are realized
during the measurement or "spontaneously," in nature, via a qualitative
transformation of the initial ensemble. The initial state is transformed into
a mixture, as a result of the interplay of the internal variables of the system
(variables of the type A) and the external perturbations (variables of the
type B or C).
A measurement consists of the initial microscopic event, in its
amplification and registration. The second and the third steps are irrever-
sible and deterministic. The so-called indeterminism concerns the initial
microscopic phenomenon. Thus, the essential question is now: Is it possible
to extend the principle of determination to the microscopic quantum
processesI29)?

3.2. Measurement and the Question of Determinism

The "strange dualism" of von Neumann, Wigner, and others concerns
the antithesis between the "causal" evolution of 7t and the "acausal"
( = indeterministic) reduction of the "wave packet." A full description of an
observation is, according to Wigner, impossible, since quantum mechanical
equations of motion are "causal" and contain no statistical element,
whereas the measurement does. (3°) Nevertheless, the probabilistic dis-
tribution concerns only a special class of quantum ensembles. Thus, we
must try a concrete analysis of the question.
In quantum physics, contrary to the abstract idealizations of classical
mechanics, there are actual or real elements of reality (and actual states) as
well as potential elements of reality (and potential states). An element of
346 Bitsakis

reality is actual if the result of a measurement which does not disturb the
system is predictable with certainty. A potential element (and state) does
not exist before the measurement; it is realized via the interaction S + A. In
this way, it is necessary to distinguish between measurements that do not
disturb the state (ideal measurements) and others that create new elements
of reality, i.e., those that transform a potential to an actual state
(measurements of the first kind).
A measurement corresponding to a question fl is called ideal if every
proposition a compatible with b defined by fl that was true before the
measurement remains true, when the answer is "yes." The ideal
measurement does not disturb the system and does not result in the
creation of new elements of reality. We have, in that case,

cbo ~i ~ 4~i ~i (7)

In this case it is only the apparatus that realizes an "eigenstate."

A measurement of the first kind, on the contrary, corresponds to a
property which was not actual, i.e., which was not an element of reality and
was realized during the measurement. The measurements of this type
disturb the system. As a result, the potential states become actual: Some
elements of reality disappear and other potential elements become
actual. (31)
If only one state is realized, we have

• o • gt--* qo, ~i (i=1) (8)

The state vectors of both the instrument and the microsystem are now
changed. In the case of a superposition, we have

Let us now proceed to a classification of states.

(1) Pure states in the narrow sense (sharp states). This is the case of
unidimensional Hilbert spaces (potential or real).
We have in that case:
(a) ~0 ~i -~ q~,-g~i, i = 1. This is the case of an ideal measurement.
The initial state is not modified. It is only the apparatus that realizes the
corresponding "eigenstate."
(b) ~0" gt__, ~igti, i = 1. This is the case of a measurement of the
first kind, and the creation of one and only one final state.
Quantum Statistical Determinism 347

In the case of pure states in the narrow sense, there is no question of

indeterminism.
(2) Mixtures. A mixture of states { ~i} with respective probabilities
0 ~<p~, P2,---, P2 ~< 1, Z~ P; = 1, remains a mixture with the same statistical
distribution. In this case also the states are actual; no elements of reality
are created, and the mixture is simply separated in pure subensembles. The
measurement is ideal and no question of determinism arises. The subspace
of the potential states of A is in this case in one-to-one correspondence
with the direct sum of the unidimensional subspaces corresponding to the
pure subensembles of the initial mixture.
(3) Superposition of states. We have, in that case,

~ = ~ ci~Ui and ~ { ~i}, with P,=lcil 2 (10)

i

This is the famous "reduction of the wave packet," which is considered

as the proof of quantum indeterminism, because from "identical" initial
conditions result many different states ~i.
As already noted, according to the single system interpretation, the
superposition (wave packet) represents actual states. Nevertheless, this is
an untenable position. Even Bohr and Heisenberg understood in some
cases the so-called reduction as a passage from the potential to the actual.
In reality (10) represents a transformation of the initial pure ensemble
through the interaction S + A. This interaction results in the realization of
its potentialities. From this point of view, the state vector is considered to
be a measure of the potentialities of the ensemble under given conditions.
The single-system interpretation, by contrast, attributes to the "wave
packet" the status of physical reality (the eigenstates are actual and in
superposition). According to the point of view formulated in this paper, the
wave packet is the formal expression of the potentialities of ~u under given
experimental conditions. The "reduction" is not an instantaneous or
impossible, noncausal transition, but an irreversible process with finite
'%paisseur temporelle."
The wave packet is a prequantal concept, transferred QM at a time
when its physical foundations were not clear. And it is characteristic
that the "p6res historiques" of this concept, i.e., L. de Broglie and
E. Schr6dinger, considered it as a useful convention: "Au point de vue
didactique, il est tr~s utile d'employer cette image, mais il n'est pas stir
qu'elle correspond fi la r6alit6. ''°2) In the volume in honor of L. de Broglie,
E. Schr6dinger also writes: "As tong as a particle, an electron, or a photon,
etc. was still believed to be a permanent, individually identifiable entity, it
could not adequately be pictured in our mind as a wave packet. For, as a
348 Bitsakis

rule, apart from artificially constructed and therefore irrelevant exceptions,

no wave packet can be indicated which does not eventually disperse into an
ever-increasing volume in space. ''(33)
The single-system interpretation, attributing a real existence to the
wave packet, (1) violates the statistical interpretation of QM; (2) gives a
subjectivistic interpretation to the process of measurement, an inter-
pretation which is an obstacle to the epistemological analysis of QM;
(3) affords a frame for the so-called indeterminism connected with the
"reduction of the wave packet."
Erwin Schr6dinger characterized the orthodox interpretation as
"a sort of transcendental, almost psychical interpretation" and the
so-called reduction as a "mysterious "fit and jerk theory" about jumplike
transitions." For him, the transformations of quantum systems must be
understood "as slow and actually describable processes." If one does not
understand the transitions, writes Schr6dinger, but only the stationary
states, one understands nothing/34) In fact, the central problem of the inter-
pretation of QM is the problem of transitions.
Finally, Einstein, at the 5th Solvay Congress and on other occasions,
considered the orthodox interpretation and the instantaneous collapse of
the "wave packet" in particular, as necessitating a special mechanism of
action at-a-distance which is incompatible with the principle of
relativity. (35)
Schr6dinger, Vogel, Fer, and others stressed the need for a "hereditary
mechanics" of irreversible processes. Bohm and Bub formulated a hidden-
variables theory, explaining the "reduction" as a causal process. Finally,
Gisin and Piron proposed a model describing the transformation of the
quantum systems as an irreversible, noninstantaneous, and deterministic
process. (36)

3.3. The Superposition Principle

It follows from the preceding analysis that the concepts of wave packet
and of superposition form the nucleus and, at the same time, the weak
point of the indeterministic interpretation of QM. We must thus insist on
the physical meaning of the superposition principle.
As already noted, the only form of superposition in classical mechanics
is a mixture o f actual states. In QM, on the contrary, the superposition is a
pure state (all the individual systems are represented by the same state
vector). Nevertheless, the superposition represents, as already stressed, not
actual but potential states. The state vector is the measure of the poten-
tialities of the ensemble in given conditions--in Aristotelian terminology,
"the potential is the measure of the actual. ''~3v) In every individual
Quantum Statistical Determinism 349

measurement, one of the possible eigenstates is realized. After a large num-

ber of measurements, we obtain the statistical distribution calculated on
the basis of the Schr6dinger equation. The actualization of every eigenstate
is irreversible and independent of the "consciousness" of the observer.
In the case of superposition, the measurement consists in the passage
from the potential to the actual. Let us make concrete this thesis by using
two welt-known examples:
(1) Let us consider a current of photons polarized in the direction e v
and moving in the direction oz. We interpose an analyzer A, making an
angle O with the direction ep. The photons pass in the direction e~; they
are absorbed in the direction %.
Our ensemble is represented by
ep = ex cos O + ey sin O ( t 1)

What is then the physical meaning of (11)? According to the single-

system interpretation, we have a real superposition of two states which are
separated by the analyzer. According to the statistical interpretation
exposed here, (11) is a measure of the potentialities of the state e v in the
given experimental conditions. A modification of O results in a
modification of the probabilities of ex and ey, because these states are
realized as a result of the interplay of S and A.
(2) Let us consider now a flux of particles with two possible states of
spin: Sz = _+1/2. The state vector of this ensemble is
T = 2 1 u + +12u_ with ;t12+222=/ (12)
In this case the initial state is in a random fluctuation and realizes the
two possible potentialities as a result of the interaction of the particle with
the measuring apparatus.
According to the realist-statistical interpretation, in every
measurement the pointer occupies a definite position, corresponding to the
realized eigenstate. The dispersion of the positions of the pointer
corresponds to the statistical distribution of the possible eigenvalues. This
is not the point of view of the single-system interpretation. According to
Wigner, for example, it is incompatible with the linear laws of QM to
consider that the pointer has a definite position after the measurement. (3s)
More that that, after the measurement the pointer is objectively indeter-
minate; it is the observer that "reduces" the wave packet and fixes the
pointer in a certain position. This point of view is inevitable in the frame of
the formal, single-system interpretation.
The transformation of quantum systems is not a linear phenomenon
and is not described by the linear laws of QM. Wigner is correct
350 Bitsakis

concerning this point. But lack of knowledge is not an argument for

indeterminism. The real nature of the "reduction" cannot be understood in
the frame of the orthodox interpretation.

3.4. Quantum Statistical Determinism

According to Newton, the same causes produce the same effects. This
is the basis of classical determinism. In QM, on the contrary, a pure initial
state results, under identical conditions, in different final states. Isn't this
strange fact incompatible with the validity of causality and determinism?
First, about causality: The microphysical processes are causal, in the
sense defined in Section 1 of this paper. They are the final product of the
interplay of the internal variables of the system and the external variables
related to the apparatus or to the environment. We know today at least
some of the causes operating in the quantum level. We know also, to a
certain degree, the mechanism of action of these causes. But our knowledge
is not exhaustive. The hidden variables, the subquantum level, and the
ether of Dirac are some of the propositions for a deeper understanding of
the causes producing the quantum phenomena.
So much for causality. But what about determinism?
(1) The mode of determination in QM is specific and more com-
plicated than in classical cases. In the general case, from one initial state
many final states can result. The multiple potentialities are expressed in the
statistical form of determination of the state. But what is the meaning of
the concept "statistical mode of determination"?
(2) The quantum state is defined by a °'complete" set of commuting
variables. The state vector is the measure of the possible states and the
corresponding probabilities. Consequently, the states are determined by the
nature of the system and the conditions. The fact that on the basis of these
data we can predict the set of the possible states is a proof of the deter-
ministic character of quantum phenomena.
(3) The predictions of QM were until now verified, even in the more
complicated cases. This is an argument of objectivity against the dominant
conventionalism and the pragmatic conception which reduces QM to the
status of a simple algorithm.
(4) There are possible and impossible states for a quantum system.
Both of them are determined by the nature of the system and the
conditions. The impossible states are never realized. The conservation taws
and the corresponding selection rules are respected in every case. This is
another argument for the deterministic character of quantum phenomena.
Quantum Statistical Determinism 351

(5) The modification of the conditions results in a modification of

the probabilistic destribution of the states. This is a direct proof of the
deterministic character of the "measurement," and more generally of the
transformations of quantum systems.
(6) In spite of the formal reversibility of the Schr6dinger equation,
the real quantum phenomena are irreversible. The irreversibility is another
indication of the objective and deterministic character of the quantum
processes.
The above specificities are characteristic of the quantum statistical
determinism. This is a new form of determination. In contrast to the
classical-mechanistic form, in its case the new state emerges through a com-
plicated process of annihilation and creation of elements of reality. The
interplay of the potential and the actual characterizes the quantum-
statistical form of determination. The non-Boolean structure of the
propositions and the validity of the superposition principle are the formal
expression of the fact that the fundamental law of formal logic--the law of
identity--is not valid in quantum processes.
The orthodox school cannot comprehend the fact that quantum
statistical determinism transcends the classical forms and expresses a new,
multivalent form of determination. For the orthodox school determinism is
identified with its Laplacian form. In this way, this school has to confront
the dilemma: determinism or indeterminism? Tertium non datur.
For the orthodox school, the simultaneous knowledge of the position
and momentum of a particle should be a necessary and sufficient condition
for the validity of determinism. This argument is characteristic of the
mechanistic spirit of this school because, as already noted, this knowledge
is a sufficient condition for the description of the movement of a particle in
an ideal isolation. But on the basis of these mechanical data, it is
impossible to predict with certainty the result of a "measurement." The
transformation of the quantum system is not a mechanistic, linear
phenomenon; it is a complicated nonlinear process determined by
qualitative transformations.
For the orthodox interpretation, the quantum probabilities are
"essential," "primordial," irreducible to a dynamical form of determination.
This agnostic conception of probability in QM coexists with the
positivist point of view, according to which the concept of probability is
not different in QM. This is true in the empirical level--the level of direct
"observation." But the internal mechanisms are not identical in classical
mechanics and QM. In the first case, the states are real before the
measurement. In the second, they are created by measurements. Quantum
probabilities are epistemically different from those of statistical mechanics,
352 Bitsakis

because they are the manifestation of the interplay between the potential
and the real. As Fock puts it, "the wave function is not a real field of
classical type: it represents the virtually possible. ''(391
Nevertheless, the difficult question remains open. Let us accept the
concept of the quantum statistical determination. What about the behavior
of the individual system? Why does the system, in a given measurement,
realize a given eigenstate and not another? Is this not a manifestation of
indeterminism, if not a manifestation of a free choice on the part of the
system?
As already stressed, the stability of the conditions makes it possible to
calculate the probabilities of all possible states. The stability of the
numerical values of the observed frequencies is a manifestation of the deter-
ministic character of the quantum effects. The actual theory makes it
possible to calculate the possible states and to verify the validity of the
quantum statistical determinism. But a deeper knowledge of the quantum
or the subquantum level of organization of matter does not exclude a priori
the possibility of a dynamical description of some kind of individual
processes. This possibility does not mean that quantum statistical deter-
minism is reducible to the mechanical form. The hidden-variable theories
are an answer to this epistemological question. But independently of these
theories, we can affirm that the stability of the conditions is the counterpart
of the stability of the frequencies observed. At the same time, we can affirm
that the state possesses a fine structure of dynamical stochastic character.
The stochastic fluctuations of the state, without modifying the set of the
possible states, can explain the realization of a given state in a given
individual measurement. The symmetric character of these stochastic
fluctuations explains the nonmodification of the numerical values of the
probabilities calculated on the basis of the essential variables of the
ensemble.
The relation between causality and probability, as Margenau says, "is
not one of antithesis or mutual exclusion, but of coordination. In par-
ticular, the causality principle has not been abandoned, since it governs the
behavior of states. "'(4°1 The same is valid for determinism: Quantum
statistical determinism is the dialectical transcendence of classical deter-
minism.

4. C O N C L U D I N G REMARKS
Causality is not an a priori category of our understanding. Causality
and determinism are historical categories intrinsically related to human
practice. These categories are not simply epistemic; they have an
ontological counterpart.
Quantum Statistical Determinism 353

The form and the concrete content of causality and determinism

correspond to the level of science, that is to say, to the level of theoretical
appropriation of nature. The mechanical, dynamical, classical, and
quantum statistical forms of determinism correspond to different levels of
theoretical approach to physical phenomena.
The determination in physics is mediated by the four actually known
forms of physical interactions. The diversity of these forms is an expression
of the diversity of the corresponding phenomena.
The finite velocity of interactions determines the local character of
physical processes. Locality and separability have the status of physical
concepts. Nonseparability, by contrast, is an a d hoc concept which
contradicts the principle of relativity.
Determinism is a principle of realist epistemology. Locality is not a
principle. But the actual data support the validity of this concept. The
violation of BelI's inequalities is not a proof of nonlocatity and non-
separability. The correlation of the EPR particles can be explained because
of their common origin. The results of measurement may be correlated, but
the measurements themselves are not necessarily correlated. (4~)
Q u a n t u m statistical determinism is a new form of determination of the
effects by their causes. This form is not, in principle, irreducible to physical
processes of dynamical determination.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. See Electrons et Photons, Rapports et Discussions du Cinqui6me Conseil de Physique

(Solvay, 1927) (Gauthier-Viltars, Paris 1928). The volume contains a reproduction of the
Conference of Bohr at Como (September 16, 1927).
2. For a further analysis, see E. Bitsakis, Le problkme du d~terminisme en physique, Th6se
d'Etat, Paris, t976.
3. See (1) N. Bohr, Atomic" Physics and Human Knowledge (Wiley, New York, 1958); Atomic
Theory and the Description of Nature (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1961);
Essays 1958-1962, on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, (Richard Clay, Suffolk,
1963); (2) W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (Allen and Unwin, London, 1958); (3)
J. yon Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1955). (4) M. Jammer, The Philosophy of" Quantum Mechanics (Wiley,
New York, 1974); (5) W. Pauli, ed., Niels Bohr and the Development of Physics
(Pergamon Press, New York, 1955).
4. See E. Mach, The Analysis of Sensations (Dover, New York, 1959).
5. See (1) D. Hume, Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding, (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1963); A Treatise of Human Nature (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960. (2) G. Berkeley,
Three Dialogues (Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, t954); Principle of Human Knowledge
(Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, t950).
6. D. Hume, Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding, op. eit., p. 119.
7. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, op. cit., p. 77.
8. E. Mach, The Analysis of Sensations (Dover, New York, 1959), p. 367.

825/18/3-8
354 Bitsakis

9. See H. Poincar4, La valeur de ta science (Flammarion, Paris, 1945); Science et MOthode

(Ftammarion, Paris, 1942).
10. R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (Egnatia, Athens, (bilingual edition), p. 48.
11. See R. Carnap, Les fondements philosophiques de la physique (A. Colin, Paris, 1973),
pp. 211, 275, and 278.
12. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logica-Philosophicus (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1963), 5.1361, 6.32.
t3. E. Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1956), pp. 5 and 58.
14. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1063 a-b.
15. For the principle of economy, the history of variational principles, and more generally the
ideas concerning the development of the science of mechanics, see W. Yourgrau and
S. Mandelstam, Variational Principles in Dynamics and Quantum Theory (Pitman, Lon-
don, 1960).
16. I. Newton, Principia (University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1947), p. 398.
17. Laplace, Oeuvres complOtes (Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1878), Vol. 7, p. 6.
18. See N. S. Kronfli, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 4, 141 (1971).
19. See S. P. Gudder, J. Math. Phys. 11, 1037 (1970).
20. F. Bopp, in Observation and Interpretation, S. K6rner, ed. (Butterworths, London, 1957).
21. M. Born, Phys. Bl. 11, 49, 304 (1955).
22. M. Born, J. Phys. Radium 20, 43 (1959).
23. For a detailed analysis, see E. Bitsakis, Physique et Mat&ialisme (Ed. Socia/es, Paris,
1983).
24. Aristotle, Physics, 22a. See also: (1) A. Einstein et al., The Principle of Relativity (Dover,
New York, 1923); (2) J.R. Lucas, A Treatise of Time and Space (Methuen, London,
1976).
25. See E. Bitsakis, in Determinism in Physics, E. Bitsakis and N. Tambakis, eds. (Gutenberg,
Athens, 1985).
26. Quoted from J. M. Jauch, Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Adisson-Wesley, New
York, 1968).
27. See J. yon Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, op. cir.
28. E. Wigner, Am. J. Phys. 31, 6(1963).
29. For the SchrNdinger paradox, see: (1) E. Bitsakis, Ann. bond. L. de Broglie 5, 263 (1980);
(2) A. Peres, Found. Phys. 14, 1131 (1984). For an argumentation against the single-
system interpretation, see E. J. Post, "A hidden proposition of the Copenhagen School,"
preprint, and E. Bitsakis, Le Problkme du ddterminisme en Physique contemporaine, op. cit.
Post writes: "The major unproven proposition in the Copenhagen chain of deductions is,
from the point of view presented here, the silent choice of giving SchrNdinger's equation a
single-system status, and then to extend this status also to the Heisenberg approach."
30. E. Wigner, Am. J. Phys. 31, 6 (t963).
3t. See (1) N. Gisin and C. Piton, Lett. Math. Phys. 5, 379 (1981); (2) E. Bitsakis, in
Microphysical Reality and Quantum Formalism, A. van der Merwe, F. Selleri, and
G. Tarozzi, eds. (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1988); Le probtbme du dkterminisme en Physique
contemporaine, op. cit.
32. L. de Broglie, La physique quantique restera-t-elle indOterministe? (Gauthier-Villars, Paris,
1953), p. 32.
33. E. Schr6dinger, in Louis de Broglie, physicien et penseur (Albin Michel, Paris, 1952), p. 20.
34. E. SchrNdinger, ibid.
35. See the thought experiment of Einstein in Electrons et Photons, op. cit., and in Albert
Einstein, Philosopher and Scientist, A. Schilpp, ed. (Open Court, La Satte, Illinois, 1951).
Quantum Statistical Determinism 355

36. N. Gisin and C. Piron, Lett. Math, Phys. 5, 279 (1981); see also F. Fer, IrrkversibilitO
(Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1977) and Th. Vogel, Ann. Fond. L. de Broglie 2, 217 (1977).
37. Aristotle, Physics, 207b.
38. E. Wigner, Am. J. Phys. 31, 6 (1963).
39. See, for example, V. Fock, Dialectica 19, 223 (1965), and Y. Satchkof, La Philosophic et
les conceptions du monde, dans les sciences modernes (Acad. Sc. URSS, Moscow, 1978).
40. H. Margenau, Physics and Philosophy (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1978), p. 36.
41. See E. Bitsakis, in Open Questions in Quantum Mechanics, G. Tarozzi and A. van der
Merwe, eds. (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983).