Search of Moving vehicles/ customs searches/ checkpoints Ø that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request
ied the request of WON the seizure of the imported goods is validly done by herein
PAPA V. MAGO
FACTS:
l Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of
the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information
that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared
and undervalued, would be released the following day from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks,
l Upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila
and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, Petitioner
Alagao conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone.
l When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of
November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went
after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita,
Manila.
l The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and
the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police.
l Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods
and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
l Remedios Mago, herein respondent, said that she owns the
goods seized.
Ø That she purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San
Fernando, Pampanga;
Ø that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to
transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657
Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila;
Ø that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court;
counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the
goods contained therein be not examined;
Ø that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally
assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods
were no longer under the control and supervision of the
Commissioner of Customs;
Ø that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared
and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531
of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had
bought them from another person without knowledge that they
were imported illegally.
l Hence, respondent Mago filed for prohibition and certiorari.
l Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 67496 (regarding restraining
respondents from opening 9 bales), Judge Hilarion Jarencio
issued an order ex parte restraining the petitioners. However,
when the restraining order was received by herein respondent,
some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the
Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila
Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of
herein respondent Remedios Mago.
l Also, Remedios Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the
goods which the court granted.
l Petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods
under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department
had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure
proceedings.
l Without waiting for the court's action on the MR, and alleging that
they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for
prohibition and certiorari with a preliminary injunction before this
Court.
ISSUE:
petitioners
WON an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched
without search warrant
HELD:
1. YES. The seizure is valid.
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of
Cebu. Should they be found to have been released irregularly
from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure
and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act
1937.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment
the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no
warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually
seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from
that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the
goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and
customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less
then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction
over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had
issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967.
10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the
issuance of the said warrant was only an attempt to divest the
respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire
jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of
divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the
goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7,
1967releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of
the Manila Police Department, could not seize the goods in
question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be
sustained.
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa,
having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of
Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests,
and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo,
articles or other movable property when the same may be subject
to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff
laws.
He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or
other containers wherever found when he had reasonable cause
to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid.
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and
seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code
authorizes him to demand the assistance of any police officer to
effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to
render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the
case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and
seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in
question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the
Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo.
2. YES. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen
had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant
issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does
not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.
But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that
said: "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon a
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." It is our
considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search
of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
An automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent
development, which has multiplied by quantity production and
taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower,
animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are
rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in
immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling
express trains, they furnish for a successful commission of a
crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape
unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
question of their police control and reasonable search on
highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper
and broader than their use in so-called "bootlegging" or "rum
running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in
the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed
for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not
in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
especially guards against search and seizure without process.
The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to
facilitate the commission of a crime of all degrees, from those
against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary,
and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that
problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether the search of and
seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place
without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to
be determined as a judicial question in view of all the
circumstances under which it is made.
Therefore, the seizure by the members of the Manila Police
Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law
and by that seizure, the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of
the customs and tariff laws
Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 461, 1971.
Facts of the case
In the wake of a "particularly brutal" murder of a fourteen-year-old
girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police
activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a
warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the
Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it.
Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home
during the course of an interview with the suspect's wife. Coolidge
was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Question
Did the searches of Coolidge's home and automobile violate the
Fourth Amendment?
In a decision in which a number of justices chose to concur in part
and dissent in part, the Court held that the searches and seizures
of Coolidge's property were unconstitutional. Justice Stewart's
opinion held that the warrant authorizing the seizure of Coolidge's
automobile was invalid because it was not issued by a "neutral
and detatched magistrate." Stewart also rejected New
Hampshire's arguments in favor of making an exception to the
warrant requirement. Stewart held that neither the "incident to
arrest" doctrine nor the "plain view" doctrine justified the search,
and that an "automobile exception" was inapplicable.
PER CURIAM:
Almeida-Sanchez appeals from a conviction for knowingly
receiving, concealing and facilitating the transportation and
concealment of approximately 161 pounds of illegally imported
marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 176a. His sole contention is that the
district court erroneously denied a motion to suppress evidence,
marijuana, found in a search of his car, without a warrant. We
affirm.
Appellant's vehicle was stopped by two officers of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service who were conducting a roving check
for aliens some 50 miles north of the Mexican border on Highway
78. One of the officers looked under the rear seat of the
automobile and discovered packages that he believed to be
marijuana. A subsequent search revealed many other packages
of marijuana distributed throughout various parts of the vehicle.
While the officer himself had never found aliens under the rear
seat of an automobile, he had heard of several instances in which
aliens had been concealed there. The officers had just received
an information bulletin from the headquarters of the Border Patrol
stating that aliens entering the United States illegally, had recently
adopted the practice of sitting up directly behind the back seat of
an automobile with their feet and legs doubled up under the rear
seat cushion; springs would be removed from the rear seat to
provide space for their legs.
This court has approved the right of Immigration Officers acting
under 8 U.S.C. § 1357, 8 C.F.R. § 287.1, to stop and investigate
vehicles for concealed aliens within a hundred air miles from any
external boundary without a showing of probable cause. Duprez
v. United States (9 Cir. 1970) 435 F.2d 1276; Fumagalli v. United
States (9 Cir. 1970) 429 F.2d 1011; Miranda v. United States (9
Cir. 1970) 426 F.2d 283. A stop and search effected under 8
U.S.C. § 1357 is not a "border search" and does not depend for
its validity upon the law of border searches. See Duprez v. United
States, supra.
Since the initial search under the rear seat of appellant's
automobile was confined to a place where an alien might be
concealed, the search was reasonable in scope. See Miranda v.
United States, supra.
Affirmed.
Chambers v. Maroney
Brief Fact Summary. A robbery suspect was arrested while riding
in a car. The car was taken to the police station, searched, and
yielded incriminating evidence.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. “For constitutional purposes [there is] no
difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and
on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant.”
Facts. A service station was robbed. Two teenagers outside and
the cashier identified the type of car the suspects were driving, as
well as the clothing two of the men were wearing. The car was
stopped, the occupants were arrested, and the car was taken to
the police station, where it was thoroughly searched, yielding two
guns, proceeds from the robbery, and other evidence taken from
the station.
Issue. Whether evidence “seized from an automobile, in which
petitioner was riding at the time of his arrest, after the automobile
was taken to a police station and was there thoroughly searched
without a warrant” is admissible.
Held. Yes. The court first referenced the Carroll case, which held
that “if an effective search [of a car] is to be made at any time,
either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or
the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant” until a
warrant is obtained. The court pointed out that probable clause
applied in either circumstance, and so “there is little to choose in
terms of practical consequences between an immediate search
without a warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is
obtained.” Generally, the court held, the level of intrusion under
the Fourth Amendment, immediate search vs. seizure in
anticipation of a warrant, “may depend on a variety of
circumstances.”
Dissent. J. Harland dissented and concurred in part. In dissent,
Harlan stated that “a warrantless search involves the greater
sacrifice of Fourth Amendment values.”
Concurrence. The Court was correct in its recognition that “the
police could prevent removal of the evidence by temporarily
seizing the car for the time necessary to obtain a warrant.”
Discussion. “In terms of the circumstances justifying a warrantless
search, the Court has long distinguished between an automobile
and a home or office.
Roldan vs. Arca G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975 65 SCRA 320
(1975)
Facts: Respondent company filed with the CFI against petitioner
for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing
boats in question) which had been seized and impounded by
petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
Respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction with respondent court, but said prayer was, however,
denied. The CFI set aside its order and granted respondent
company’s motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary
mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent company took
Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by
virtue of the abovesaid writ. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta.
Winnie however, remained in the possession of respondent
company. The Petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the
Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex
III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for
alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. The two fishing
boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish
caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found
aboard the two vessels. The Fisheries Commissioner requested
the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against the
crew members of the fishing vessels. There were filed in the court
a couple of informations, one against the crew members of Tony
Lex III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI for
illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the
Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as
instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the
Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. Respondent
company filed a complaint with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction, against herein petitioners. it was alleged
that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the
same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast
of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated
September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the
Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were
settled. October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the
challenged order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the
filing by private respondent of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release
of the two vessels. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied.
Issue: Whether the enforcement of fishing and customs law is
exempted in applying for a warrant before the search and seizure.
Held: Yes, Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels
and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought
before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable
to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are
usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude
pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Another
exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for
a valid search and seizure, is a search or seizure as an incident to
a lawful arrest, a police officer or a private individual may, without
a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually
committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b)
who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which
has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has
escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from
temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while
being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at
bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in
flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite
license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the
vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as
an incident to a lawful arrest.
DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND ORLANDO MADDELA,
defendants-appellees.
Constitutional law; Search and seizure; Requisites for issuance of
valid search warrant.—A search and seizure to be reasonable,
must be effected by means of a valid search warrant. And for a
search warrant to be valid: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized.
Same; Same; Search by public official of premises of another
without proper search warrant constitutes violation of
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.—
There can be no question that without the proper search warrant,
no public official has the right to enter the premises of another
without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure.
Same; Same; Issuance of search warrant; Under old Constitution,
only judge or magistrate with authority to issue search warrant.—
Under the old Constitution the power to issue a search warrant is
vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no
search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the
time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or
rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a
search warrant.
Same; Same; Same; Under Republic Act 732, provincial fiscal
without authority to issue search warrant or order without warrant
seizure of personal property, even if property the corpus delicti of
a crime.—There is nothing in Republic Act 732 which confers
upon the provincial fiscals the authority to issue warrants, much
less to order without warrant the seizure of a personal property
even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No.
732 has broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct
preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or
magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing the
corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists
therefor.
Appeal on a question of law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Palawan in Civil Case No. 416, entitled "Delfin Lim
and Jikil Taha vs. Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando
Maddela", dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs and ordering
them to pay each of the defendants jointly and severally the sum
of P500.00 by way of actual damages; P500.00 by way of
attorney's fees; and P1,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain
Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launch
named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962
Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha
forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary investigation,
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery the Force
and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2719.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being
informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote
the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct
the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take
custody of the motor launch.1
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to
the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody
of the same.2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial
Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment
Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN
RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with
Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused.
Likewise, on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel
made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the
seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce
de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of
a criminal offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-
appellants Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha, on November 19, 1962, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a complaint for
damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce
de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962
Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a
search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor
launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon
order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office
was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private
property; that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim
from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been
given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of
the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not
materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch
had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of
exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond
repair. For the alleged violation of their constitutional rights,
plaintiffs-appellants prayed that defendants-appellees be ordered
to pay jointly and severally each of them the sum of P5,750.00
representing actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material
allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged
that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to
Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April
1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to
gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's
knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal
charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in
his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered
Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN
RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that
Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer
to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-
appellees alleged that because of the malicious and groundless
filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were
constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them
paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages in
the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them
awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.
On September 13, 1965, the trial court rendered its decision,
upholding the validity of the seizure of the motor launch on the
ground that "the authority to impound evidences or exhibits or
corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is inherent in the
Provincial Fiscal who controls the prosecution and who introduces
those exhibits in the court." Accordingly, the trial court dismissed
the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants and ordered them to pay
jointly and severally each of the defendants-appellees the amount
of P500.00 by way of actual damages another amount of P500.00
for attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Hence, this appeal.
Two vital issues call for resolution by this Court. First, whether or
not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to
order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a
warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly
the corpus delicti of the crime. Second, whether or not
defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for
damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of
the motor launch was unlawful.
The gravamen of plaintiffs-appellants' argument is that the taking
of the motor launch on July 6, 1962 by Orlando Maddela upon the
order of Fiscal Ponce de Loon was in violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures since it
was done without a warrant.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution then in force reads:
3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.3
A cursory reading of the above provision easily brings into focus
the unreasonableness of the seizure of the aforementioned motor
launch. A search and seizure to be reasonable, must be effected
by means of a valid search warrant. And for a search warrant to
be valid: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not
by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.4 Thus in
a long line of decisions, this Court has declared invalid search
warrants which were issued in utter disregard of the constitutional
injunction.5
Defendants-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela
entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor
launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he effected
the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the
consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the
proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search
and seizure.6 And since in the present case defendants-appellees
seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the
constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Defendants-appellees however would want to justify the seizure of
the motor launch even without a warrant because of Fiscal Ponce
de Leon's alleged inherent power to order the seizure of a
personal property which is the corpus delicti of a crime, he being a
quasi judicial officer who has the control of the prosecution and
the presentation of the evidence in the criminal case. They argue
that inasmuch as the motor launch in question was allegedly
stolen by Jikil Taha from Timbangcaya, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
could order its seizure even without a search warrant. We cannot
agree. Under the old Constitution7 the power to issue a search
warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer
and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant.
At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no
law or rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to
issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to justify the seizure of
the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de
Leon invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which
amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of the Revised Administrative
Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the
provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to
order without warrant the seizure of a personal property even if it
is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has
broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary
investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate
of its power to determine, before issuing the corresponding
warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor.8
Moreover, under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court 9 which complement the constitutional provision earlier
cited, two principles are made clear, namely: (1) that in the
seizure of a stolen property search warrant is still necessary; and
(2) that in issuing a search warrant the judge alone determines
whether or not there is a probable cause. The fact that a thing is a
corpus delicti of a crime does not justify its seizure without a
warrant. As held in U.S. v. de los Reyes and Esguerra, 10 citing
McClurg v. Brenton: 11
The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low
degree, gives him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary
private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home and subject
its occupant to the indignity of a search for the evidence of crime,
without a legal warrant procured for that purpose. No amount of
incriminating evidence whatever its source, will supply the place
of such warrant. At the closed door of the home be it palace or
hovel even bloodhounds must wait till the law, by authoritative
process, bids it open. (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon would also invoke lack
of time to procure a search warrant as an excuse for the seizure
of the motor launch without one. He claimed that the motor launch
had to be seized immediately in order to preserve it and to
prevent its removal out of the locality, since Balabac, Palawan,
where the motor launch was at the time, could only be reached
after three to four days' travel by boat. 12 The claim cannot be
sustained. The records show that on June 15, 1962 13 Fiscal
Ponce de Leon made the first request to the Provincial
Commander for the impounding of the motor launch; and on June
26, 1962 14 another request was made. The seizure was not
effected until July 6, 1962. In short, Fiscal Ponce de Leon had all
the time to procure a search warrant had he wanted to and which
he could have taken in less than a day, but he did not. Besides,
there is no basis for the apprehension that the motor launch might
be moved out of Balabac because even prior to its seizure the
motor launch was already without its engine. 15 In sum, the fact
that there was no time to secure a search warrant would not
legally justify a search without one. 16
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plaintiffs-
appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and
2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose
constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to
actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee
responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be
awarded. In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim claimed
that he purchased the motor launch from Jikil Taha in
consideration of P3,000.00, having given P2,000.00 as advanced
payment; that since or seizure on July 6, 1962 the motor launch
had been moored at Balabac Bay and because of exposure to the
elements it has become worthless at the time of the filing of the
present action; that because of the illegality of the seizure of the
motor launch, he suffered moral damages in the sum of
P1,000.00; and that because of the violation of their constitutional
rights they were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer
whom they have paid P1,500.00 for attorney's fees. We find these
claims of Delfin Lim amply supported by the evidence and
therefore should be awarded the sum of P3,000.00 as actual
damages; P1,000.00 as moral damages and P750.00 for
attorney's fees. However, with respect co plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is
not entitled to recover any damage which he alleged he had
suffered from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch
as he had already transferred the ownership and possession of
the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and
therefore, he has no legal standing to question the validity of the
seizure. Well settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 17
Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee, or lawful
occupant of the premise searched cannot raise the question of
validity of the search and seizure. 18 Jikil Taha is not without
recourse though. He can still collect from his co-plaintiff, Delfin
Lim the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his
hands of the incident by claiming that "he was in good faith,
without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury
to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha" 19 when he ordered the seizure of
the motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his defense of
good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted
with malice or bad faith. Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code
Commission, gave the following reasons during the public
hearings of the Joint Senate and House Committees, why good
faith on the part of the public officer or employee is immaterial.
Thus:
DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights; Attorney
Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to
make a public official liable for violation of another person's
constitutional rights only if the public official acted maliciously or in
bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for
these reasons:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or
criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice
or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main
purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual
rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the
pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to
official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in he nature of a tort.
Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles
introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There
is no real democracy if a public official is abusing, and we made
the article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an
abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is
liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public
officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of
the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of
desire to enforce the law to comply with one's duty. And so, if we
should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify
the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article
is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good
faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual
rights. 20
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held
accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the
order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be
held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer,
there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's
exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal
Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial
Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound
the motor launch despite repeated orders from his superior officer.
21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal
Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the
Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of the seizure of
the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the
launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking
custody of the same, 22 that he impounded the motor launch on
July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the
province, Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis
and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of his
superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor
launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his
Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the
vessel. In the light of the above circumstances. We are not
disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the seizure
illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de
Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00
as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in
addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees. With costs against
defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon. SO ORDERED
PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul
1988]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June
25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were
in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked
liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida
Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same
evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement
of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In
his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all
he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts
and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a
search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to
force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator
hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did
not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business
was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC
rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches
during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries
allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in
flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search.
At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor
was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be
appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore
he is acquitted of the crime as charged.
acts: Accused was arrested shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked
liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. However, and it is Aminnudin’s claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana
allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against
him under the Bill of Rights.
Issue: Whether the accused was caught in flagrante delicto hence
justifies the warrantless arrest
Held: No, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to
justify the warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court.
The present case presented no such urgency. It is clear that they
had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo
on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with
the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a “search warrant was not
necessary.” In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at
the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To
all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was
the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin
and immediately arrest him. While this is not to say that the
accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding
that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is
innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak
as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT [198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19
Jun 1991]
Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant
Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the
Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He
had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon
his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a
bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in
the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to
Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May
1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14,
Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish
a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports
that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received
by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM
officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the
front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole
foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's
waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him
to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The
bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The
wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning.
But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two
(2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of
the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer
noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel
like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the
bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM
at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation.
At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples
were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of
accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory
for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects
examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of
marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty."
For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his
personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2)
travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted
to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He
further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more seats
available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked
accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet
each other at the Dangwa Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him
guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his
personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as
evidence against him.
Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and
therefore the RTC ruling be reversed.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search
is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by
a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited
drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1)
of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the
NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, however,
under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal
effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10
or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted
to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.
PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA (1994) |SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds
to believe that a crime was being committed, and had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the
courts, the same constituted an exception to the prohibition
against warrantless searches.
Facts:
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) staged coup d’état in December 1989 against
the Government.
Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command,
together with his team, conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar
Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of December 1, 1989,
which surveillance actually started November 30, 1989 at around
10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an
intelligence report that the said establishment was being occupied
by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command
post.
Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a group of 5 men
disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance
car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the
area. However, as they passed the area, then 5 men drew their
guns and fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the
driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were
afraid that civilians might be caught in the crossfire.
Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team
raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and molotov.
Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in
the office of a certain Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping though door.
No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, there was so much disorder considering that
the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel
forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the
Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
Held:
YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed with a search
warrant at that time. It was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the
RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the
premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of
men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military
operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to
open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office.
The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and
solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could
not be justifiably or even colorably explained.
In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time
because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under
attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses
therein were deserted.
Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls
under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, in the prevailing situation, the
raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was
closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7
OCT 1994]
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local
elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of
security agencies or police organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.
COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the
summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning,
using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike
forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun
Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms
issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then
instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a
checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the
checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms.
Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the
order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was
only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a
security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against
petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified
from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that
“gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons”
and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to
petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on
the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was
rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the
elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for
instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the
basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his
car
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant
issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s
waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in
gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given
these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly
searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating
the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano,
the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms
obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the
PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the
checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the
PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not
informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the
preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right
to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was
fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as
he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the
case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot
be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set
aside.
Caballes vs. CA
FACTS:
On or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of
Pangasinan, and/or elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above
mentioned accused with intent to gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, the National Power
Corporation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away about 630 kg of Aluminium cable
conductors, valued at Php 27, 450.00, belonging to and to the
damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corporation,
in the aforesaid amount.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search without consent is valid?
HELD:
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2)
that person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right, and (3) said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is reversed and set aside,
and accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
CABALLES vs. CA G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002
Warrantless Search
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine
patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger
jeep unusually covered with “kakawati” leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the
two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven
by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did
not answer, and appeared nervous.
With appellant’s consent, the police officers checked the cargo
and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized
conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NPC). When asked where the wires came from, appellant
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8
kilometers away from Sampalucan.
The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft.
The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the flagging
down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol,
merely on “suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled goods,”
does not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is
admissible against the appellant.
RULING:
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the
police officers in the case at bar was not authorized by a search
warrant.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground
that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles
is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made
at borders or ‘constructive borders’ like checkpoints near the
boundary lines of the State.
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the
police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrants if made within the interior of the
territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s
right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks
into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s
doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to
a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine
check is conducted in a fixed area.
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at
bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or
visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle.They had to reach
inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be
considered a simple routine check.
The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police
officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they
saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves
which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute “probable cause” as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant.
Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an
implied acquiescence to the warrantless search.
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining
evidence on record are insufficient to sustain petitioner’s
conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search
and seizure.
The impugned decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
accused Rudy Caballes was ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations within its area
of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents
Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents
blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search
warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
THE ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizures?
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of
the people against unreasonable search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which
are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of
a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or
simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection,
the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and
their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in
the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA
“sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all
sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect
its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
Right against Searches and/or Seizures
JULY 5, 2018
FACTS:
As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) installed checkpoints
in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night
or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order.
ISSUES:
What constitutes a reasonable search?
Whether checkpoints violate the right against searches and/or
seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.
RULING:
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights
have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in
any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from
a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect that he had
been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the
military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of
his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to
enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of
a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or
simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
195 People vs. Escano, Usana and Lopez [GR 129756-58, 28
January 2000] First Division, Davide Jr. (CJ): 4 concur
Facts: On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some
law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P.
Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los Santos, and
Inspector Ernesto Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the
corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars going to Pasay
City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a
running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a
Kia Pride car with Plate TBH 493. P03 Suba saw a long firearm
on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was
later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified
as Julian D. Escaño, to open the door. P03 Suba seized the long
firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escaño, upon
order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other
passengers were searched for more weapons. Their search
yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escaño. The
three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station
Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the
precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since
SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested
Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and opened the
trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it,
which they asked Escaño to open. The bag contained a parcel
wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of
Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found
positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Virgilio T. Usana
and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escaño, were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in
Criminal Case 95-936 with violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act 6425, as amended. Escaño and Usana were also
charged in Criminal Cases 95-937 and 95-938 with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of Presidential
Decree 1866. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. In its
Decision of 30 May 1997, which was promulgated on 17 June
1997, the trial court convicted Escaño, Lopez and Usana in
Criminal Case 95-936, Escaño in Criminal Case 95-937, and
Usana in Criminal Case 95-938. Escaño filed on 19 June 1997 a
Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a Manifestation
and Withdrawal of Appeal, which was granted by the trial court in
its Order of 17 July 1997. Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of
Appeal on 30 June 1997, manifesting therein that they were
appealing to the Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeals.
Considering the penalties imposed, the decision in Criminal Case
95-936 was appealed to the Supreme Court, while the Court of
Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from Criminal Case 95-
938. In its Order of 30 June 1997, the trial court gave due course
to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal
Case 95-936 to the Supreme Court and the record of Criminal
Case 95-938 to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it is only the
appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case 95-936 that is before
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search conducted on Escano’s car is illegal,
and whether the evidence acquired therein would be sufficient to
convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs.
Held: The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal.
Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and
are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed.
For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent,
on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption," but it
cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks,
when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The
checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to
implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual
search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which
such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during
said period would know that they only need a car to be able to
easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do
not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of
the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba
admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed
suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just
to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would
stop, without opening the car's doors or subjecting its passengers
to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is
what the situation demands. Despite the validity of the search, the
Court cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for
violation of RA 6425, as amended. The following facts militate
against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño; (2)
the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and
after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was
driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until
the police station; (4) the car's trunk was opened, with the
permission of Escaño, without the presence of Usana and Lopez;
and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of
the car's trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the
police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez
to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with
Escaño in the latter's car before the "finding" of the hashish
sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their
presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense
of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact,
there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the
presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the
same before it was seized.
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
People v. Musa G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993 217 SCRA
597 (1993)
Facts: Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of
December 13, 1989, NARCOM conducted surveillance and test
buy on a certain Mari Musa which the poser-buyer was able to
buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The
next day, a buy-bust was planned. The buy-bust money had been
taken. poser-buyer approached Mari Musa said he wanted some
more stuff. poser-buyer gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked
money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his
house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. poser-buyer walked back
towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two
NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards
poser-buyer. Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing
dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa
was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office.
At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two
newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari
Musa.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in admitting the Plastic of Bag
containing Marijuana by means of plain view doctrine
Held: No, In the instant case, the NARCOM agents searched the
whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic
bag was, therefore, not within their “plain view” when they
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM
agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag. Moreover, when the
NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the
appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.he NARCOM
agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory
nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it.
Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently
came across the plastic bag because it was within their “plain
view,” what may be said to be the object in their “plain view” was
just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating
nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the “plain view” of said object. It cannot be claimed
that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its
contents are obvious to an observer.
What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with
a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the “plain view”
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves
to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with
a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the “plain view”
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
Warrantless Searches
There are recognized exceptions where “a search may be validly
made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result
of that search.” These include “a warrantless search … made
incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being arrested is
frisked for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the
arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to
prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in the
interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and aircraft
are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule
because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the
state's jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be
searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also
been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if
they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon
them inadvertently. ROAN vs. GONZALES, et al. [G.R. No.
71410. November 25, 1986.]”
WAIVER
Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin G.R. No. L-45950, June 20,
1938 65 Phil 68 (1938)
Facts: Anti Usury Law
Issue: Whether the issuance of the warrant of search and seizure
was valid
Held: No, In the instant case the existence of probable cause was
determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that
the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent
Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he
examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting
the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and
on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed
within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by
law. instead, they were turned over to the respondent provincial
fiscal and used by him in building up cases against the petitioner.
Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no
case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant
was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis.
The lower court is, therefore, correct in reaching the conclusion
that the search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the
peace of Tarlac, Tarlac.
Spouses Veroy v. Layague, G.R. No. L-95630, 210 SCRA 97,
June 18, 1992
"Qualified consent"
The permission to enter a house and search for persons and
effects may be qualified, and the searching officer may not act in
excess of the authority granted to him.
Although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be seized
simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary in the context of this case.
The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao City to a
caretaker who had keys to the kitchen only. The Veroys had the
keys to the interior of the house.
Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an information that rebel
soldiers are allegedly hiding there.
With the help of caretakers, they were able to enter only up to the
yard since the owner was not around and they did not have a
search warrant.
They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained that the house was
reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel
soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave permission to search the house
with the condition that Major Macasaet, a long-time family friend,
must be there during the search.
Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms,
including the children’s room, and confiscated a .45 caliber gun
and other effects, which were the basis of the charge of illegal
possession of firearms against them.
Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet
been served on them, petitioners voluntarily surrendered
themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since
it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter
refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not yet
received copies of their warrants of arrest.
The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the evidence for
being obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.
Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to
enter their house, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining
the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did
not include the authority to conduct a room to room search inside
the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the
exceptions for a warrantless search. The reason for searching the
house is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able
to enter the yard, he did not enter the house because he did not
have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This
shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant,
hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather
contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same.
Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to enter the house but only
to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
Under the circumstances the police officers had time to procure a
search warrant but they did not.
The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal
possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not follow
that the subjects may be seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable,
the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore
protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as
evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against
them for illegal possession of firearms.
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No 170180
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for
the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of
dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his
possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him
Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just
alighted from the bus when one of the barangay tanods
approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags.
The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house
of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag
opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.
Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first
time on appeal, that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully
and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to
law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a
warrant supporting the arrest and the search.
Held:
The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower
courts. The accused was acquitted by reasonable doubt.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides
for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at
the time of the arrest.
The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
None of the petitioner’s actuations (i.e. his looking around and
alleged fleeing upon approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite
suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.
However, the Court’s decision was not only hinged on this
premise but also on the fact that the lower courts failed to
establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of
custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the
prosecution witnesses.

Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the
accused was thus acquitted.

The Court added that the petitioner’s lack of objection to the

search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure.