VASQUEZ V.
BORJA CASE DIGEST an extracontractual obligation, or an obligation
FACTS:
This action was commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Manila by Francisco de Borja against
Antonio Vazquez and Fernando Busuego to recover
from them jointly and severally the total sum of
P4,702.70 upon three alleged causes of action, to
wit: First, that in or about the month of January,
1932, the defendants jointly and severally obligated
themselves to sell to the plaintiff 4,000 cavans of
palay at P2.10 per cavan, to be delivered during
the month of February, 1932, the said defendants
having subsequently received from the plaintiff in
virtue of said agreement the sum of P8,400; that the
defendants delivered to the plaintiff during the
months of February, March, and April, 1932, only
2,488 cavans of palay of the value of P5,224.80 and
refused to deliver the balance of 1,512 cavans of
the value of P3,175.20 notwithstanding repeated
demands. Second, that because of defendants'
refusal to deliver to the plaintiff the said 1,512
cavans of palay within the period above
mentioned, the plaintiff suffered damages in the
sum of P1,000. And, third, that on account of the
agreement above mentioned the plaintiff delivered
to the defendants 4,000 empty sacks, of which they
returned to the plaintiff only 2,490 and refused to
deliver to the plaintiff the balance of 1,510 sacks or
to pay their value amounting to P377.50; and that
on account of such refusal the plaintiff suffered
damages in the sum of P150.
The defendant Antonio Vazquez answered the
complaint, denying having entered into the
contract mentioned in the first cause of action in his
own individual and personal capacity, either solely
or together with his codefendant Fernando
Busuego, and alleging that the agreement for the
purchase of 4,000 cavans of palay and the
payment of the price of P8,400 were made by the
plaintiff with and to the Natividad-Vasquez Sabani
Development Co., Inc., a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, of
which the defendant Antonio Vazquez was the
acting manager at the time the transaction took
place.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiff entered into the
contract with the defendant Antonio Vazquez in his
personal capacity or as manager of the Natividad-
Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc.
RULING:
The trial court found him guilty of negligence
in the performance of the contract and held him
personally liable on that account.
We think both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in law in so holding. They have
manifestly failed to distinguish a contractual from
arising from contract from an obligation arising
from culpa aquiliana. The fault and negligence
referred to in articles 1101-1104 of the Civil Code
are those incidental to the fulfillment or
nonfullfillment of a contractual obligation; while the
fault or negligence referred to in article 1902 is
the culpa aquiliana of the civil law, homologous but
not identical to tort of the common law, which
gives rise to an obligation independently of any
contract.
De Guia v. Manila Electric Co.
FACTS:
This is an appeal prosecuted both by the plaintiff
and the defendant from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, whereby the
plaintiff was awarded the sum of P6,100, with
interest and costs, as damages incurred by him in
consequence of physical injuries sustained while
riding on one of the defendant's car.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the court has the power to
moderate liability according to the circumstances
of the case (art. 1103, Civ. Code
HELD:
It results from the foregoing that the judgment
appealed from must be modified by reducing the
amount of the recovery to eleven hundred pesos
(1,100), with legal interest from November 8, 1916.
As thus modified the judgment is affirmed, without
any special pronouncement as to costs of this
instance. So ordered.
US v. Barias
Facts:
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136),
authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the
business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business
involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or
cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also
provides that the Collector may promulgate such
rules to implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No.
1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it
should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to
this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating
the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually
powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a
violation of Circular No. 397 because under said
Circular, only steam powered ships should be
allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in
the information against Barrias, it was alleged that
the imposable penalty against him should be a fine
not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court
– this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which
provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing
regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to
a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in
the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such
provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from
the penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only
provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note
at that time the peso-dollar exchange was more or
less equal).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is
valid.
HELD:
No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different
range of penalty different from that specified by
Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then
in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power
to legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon
the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
by that department to anybody or authority. Where
the sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; only by the
constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the constitution itself is changed. The
power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
this high prerogative has been entrusted can not
relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be
developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for
those to which alone the people have seen fit to
confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that
such a delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not
through the intervening mind of another. The
Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively
lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be
penalized in accordance to the penalty being
imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case, the Supreme
Court determined that the proper fine is $25.00.
Sarmiento v. Sps. Cabrido
FACTS:
Tomasa Sarmiento’s friend, Dra. Virginia Lao,
requested her to find someone to reset a pair of
diamond earrings into two gold rings. Sarmiento
sent Tita Payag with the earrings to Dingding’s
Jewelry Shop, owned and managed by spouses
Luis and Rose Cabrido, which accepted the job
order for P400. Respondent Marilou Sun went on to
dismount the diamond from original settings.
Unsuccessful, she asked their goldsmith, Zenon
Santos, to do it. He removed the diamond by
twisting the setting with a pair of pliers, breaking the
gem in the process. Petitioner required the
respondents to replace the diamond with the same
size and quality. When they refused, the petitioner
was forced to buy a replacement in the amount of
P30,000. Rose Cabrido, manager, denied having
any transaction with Payag whom she met only
after the latter came to seek compensation for the
broken piece of jewelry. Marilou, on the other hand,
admitted knowing Payag to avail their services and
recalled that when Santos broke the jewelry, Payag
turned to her for reimbursement thinking she was
the owner. Santos also recalled that Payag
requested him to dismount what appeared to him
as sapphire and that the stone accidentally broke.
He denied being an employee of the Jewelry shop.
ISSUE:
1. WoN dismounting of the diamond from its original
setting was part of the obligation
2. WoN respondents are liable for damages and
moral damages.
RULING:
Yes. The contemporaneous and subsequent acts of
the parties reveal the scope of obligation assumed
by the jewelry shop to reset the pair of earrings.
Marilou expressed no reservation regarding the
dismounting of the diamonds. She could have
instructed Payag to have the diamonds
dismounted first, but instead, she readily accepted
the job order and charged P400. After the new
settings were completed, she called petitioner to
bring the diamond earrings to be reset. She
examined one of them and went on to dismount
the diamond from the original setting. After failing
to do the same, she delegated it to the goldsmith.
Having acted the way she did, she cannot deny
that the dismounting was part of the shop’s
obligation to reset the pair of earrings.
Yes. Those who, in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages. Santos acted
negligently in dismounting the diamond from its
original setting. Instead of using a miniature wire,
which is the practice of the trade, he used a pair of
pliers. Moral damages may also be awarded in a
breach of contract when there is proof that
defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligation.
Doctrine:
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties. Corollarily,
those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages. The fault or negligence of
the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place.
Crisostomo v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner contracted the services of respondent
Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. to
arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and
accommodation in a tour dubbed Jewels of
Europe. Pursuant to said contract, the travel
documents and plane tickets were delivered to the
petitioner who in turn gave the full payment for the
package tour on June 12, 1991. Without checking
her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on
Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight for the first
leg of her journey from Manila to Hongkong. To
petitioner’s dismay, she discovered that the flight
she was supposed to take had already departed
the previous day. She learned that her plane ticket
was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She
thus called up Menor to complain. Subsequently,
Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take another
tour- the British Pageant. Upon petitioner’s return
from Europe, she demanded from respondent the
reimbursement of the difference between the sum
she paid for Jewels of Europe and the amount she
owed respondent for the British Pageant tour.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
breach of contract of carriage and damages
alleging that her failure to join Jewels of Europe was
due to respondent’s fault since it did not clearly
indicate the departure date on the plane, failing to
observe the standard of care required of a
common carrier when it informed her wrongly of
the flight schedule. For its part, respondent
company, denied responsibility for petitioner’s
failure to join the first tour, insisting that petitioner
was informed of the correct departure date, which
was clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket.
The travel documents were given to petitioner two
days ahead of the scheduled trip. Respondent
further contend that petitioner had only herself to
blame for missing the flight, as she did not bother to
read or confirm her flight schedule as printed on the
ticket.
facilitating petitioners booking, ticketing and
accommodation in the package tour. In contrast,
the object of a contract of carriage is the
transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this
sense that the contract between the parties in this
case was an ordinary one for services and not one
of carriage. Since the contract between the parties
is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care
required of respondent is that of a good father of a
family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. The
evidence on record shows that respondent
exercised due diligence in performing its obligations
under the contract and followed standard
procedure in rendering its services to petitioner. As
correctly observed by the lower court, the plane
ticket issued to petitioner clearly reflected the
departure date and time, contrary to petitioner’s
contention. The travel documents, consisting of the
tour itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were
likewise delivered to petitioner two days prior to the
trip. Respondent also properly booked petitioner for
the tour, prepared the necessary documents and
procured the plane tickets. It arranged petitioner’s
hotel accommodation as well as food, land
transfers and sightseeing excursions, in accordance
with its avowed undertaking. The evidence on
record shows that respondent company performed
its duty diligently and did not commit any
contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot
recover and must bear her own damage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Caravan Travel & Tours International

Inc. is negligent in the fulfilment of its obligation to
petitioner Crisostomo thus granting to the petitioner
the consequential damages due her as a result of
breach of contract of carriage.

RULING:

Contention of petitioner has no merit. A contract of

carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain
person or association of persons obligate
themselves to transport persons, things, or news
from one place to another for a fixed price. Such
person or association of persons are regarded as
carriers and are classified as private or special
carriers and common or public carriers. Respondent
is not an entity engaged in the business of
transporting either passengers or goods and is
therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier.
Respondent did not undertake to transport
petitioner from one place to another since its
covenant with its customers is simply to make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services
as a travel agency include procuring tickets and
facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking
customers for tours.

The object of petitioner’s contractual relation with

respondent is the service of arranging and