Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No
Are goals
achieved?
Yes
No
Are goals
achieved?
Yes
System effectiveness
System effectiveness
AND
Operational Mission Design
readiness availability
OR
adequacy
Reliability Maintainability
Reliability allocation
Once the system reliability goals have been defined, reliability must
then be allocated to the components and possibly subcomponents in
a manner that will support these goals.
h{R1 (t ), R2 (t ),..., Rn (t )} ≥ R * (t )
Exponential case
Optimal allocation
Let each component has a current reliability Ri where Π Ri < R*, the
optimal solution may be obtained optimizing:
n
Min z = ∑ Ci ( xi )
i =1
n
*
subject to ∏ ( Ri + xi ) ≥ R and o < Ri + xi ≤ Bi < 1
i =1
n
n
L( xi ,θ ) = ∑ ci xi2 − θ ∏ ( Ri + xi ) − R *
i =1 i =1
Where θ is the Langrangian multiplier. Now optimizing the function
∂
L ( xi , θ)
=2ci xi θ (
−∏
n
Rj +x j )=0
∂ xi j=
1
j≠
i
∂
L ( xi ,θ)
∏
n
(Ri +xi )−R*
∂i θ = i=1
=0
ARINC method
λi
wi =
newλ i = wiλ *
where n
i= 1,2,..n
∑ λi
i =1
AGREE method
The left side is the joint probability that ith component fails and results
in a system failure. The right side of the failure probability allocated to
the ith component. Solving for λ i result in:
ni
1 1 − R * (t ) N
λi = − ln 1 −
ti wi
n
−λiti
such that ∏ e ≤ R * (t )
i =1
Where
Design for reliability 7
Redundancies R2
R’ = 1-(1-R2)(1-R3) = R2 + R3 – R2R3
R '−R2
R3 =
1 − R2
If both component receive the same probability R, we have R’ = 2R–
R2, which has the solution R = 1-(1-R’)0.5
Design methods
A product fails prematurely because of the inadequate design
features, manufacturing part defects, abnormal stresses introduced
due to packaging or distribution, operator and maintenance error, or
external conditions that exceed the design parameters.
• Redundancy optimization
Design for reliability 9
Redundancy optimization
M
max ∑ln[1 − (1 − Ri (t )) ni ]
i =1
ln[1 − (1 − Ri (t )) ni +1 ] − ln[1 − (1 − Ri (t )) ni ]
∆i =
ci
Marginal analysis consist of following steps:
Failure Analysis
Failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) or failure mode effect, and
criticality analysis (FMECA) is formalized design process with an
objective to improve the inherent reliability.
1. System definition:
This step is to identify those system components that will be subject
to failure. A functional and physical description of the system provides
the definition and boundaries for performing analysis.
3. Determination of causes
For each failure mode an assessment is made as to the probable
cause or causes. A failure mode may have more than one
cause. Example includes:
4. Effect assessment
The impact each failure has on the operation or status of the system
is assessed. Effects may range from complete system failure to
partial degradation to no impact on performance
5. Classification of severity
C k = αkp βk λp t
Failure effect β
Certain β =1.0
Probable 0.10<β <1.0
Possible 0<β <0.10
No effect β =0
For a given p, the sum of α kp over all its failure modes would
normally equal 1.
Criticality index
Severity classification
A IV III II I
B
C
D
E
Logic gates
Does these
Yes events may
be broken
down?
Identify the causes Identify the
that may lead these relationship of these
events events to top event
Identify relationship
events and their Transform these
basic causes relationships in fault
tree using gates
Transform these
relationships in fault
tree using gates
Design for reliability 16
• Analytical Procedure
• Monte Carlo Simulation method
Start
Represent an undesired
event in terms of fault tree
No
Is optimization over
?
Yes
Transformation of
Probability analysis static probability to Probabilities
fuzzy probability set
Improvement index
calculation
Stop
Design for reliability 18
Start
OR AND
Open new row to Gate Check Gate
enter elements All entries of this
for type
of this gate of gate gate in same row
Calculate
factor 'G'
Take new
row
Is any Yes
gate present?
No
No Are all
rows checked?
Yes
Optimization
Apply optimization techniques
using optimization criteria
Criteria
Stop