IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the
same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply
with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates
for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since childhood under residency.
Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections based on
the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative.

Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different places. In the case at bench,
the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May
25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
 Tess Dumpit-Michelena vs. Boado, G.R. No. 163619-20, Nov. 17, 2005

Dumpit-Michelena is running for mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union. Her disqualification was sought on the claim
that she is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian and not Agoo, La Union. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she
already acquired a new domicile in Agoo when she purchased a residential lot there, designating a caretaker of her house.
Supreme Court held that Dumpit-Michelena failed to comply with the 1-yr. residency requirement in the place where she
intends to be elected.

REQUIREMENTS FOR A CHANGE OF DOMICILE:

(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose

Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile. Evidence shows that her house in Agoo is
beach house and a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence.
Moreover, her designation of a caretaker only shows that she does not regularly reside in the place.

DISQUALIFICATIONS (Sec. 68, BP 881)

 given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions
 committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy
 spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law
 solicited, received, or made any prohibited contributions
 permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country, UNLESS he waives such status

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA

June 29, 2013
GR No. 134577, November 18, 1998

FACTS:
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the
Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority
leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the
minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised
the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the
question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in
caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the
main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political
controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court
ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session
and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review).

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political
question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

SECOND ISSUE
There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does
not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the
minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent
on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must
be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is
not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by
another.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this
case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized
as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and
a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the
Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
 AVELINO VS. CUENCO
Political Question; Separation of Power; Legislative Branch
83 PHIL 17, March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner, vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent

Facts:
In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President
Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay
and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges
against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his
followers.
Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and
the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session which suggestion was
carried unanimously.
The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because the Assistance Secretary, who was then
acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator
Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same
was unanimously approved.
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President
and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did
not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.

Issues:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.
Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines Senate and oust respondent.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will be against the doctrine of separation of
powers.
In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the
majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least
fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House: does not mean “all”
the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the
House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority.
At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein
involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground as it involved a political question. The
Supreme Court should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves
who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn
for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
“There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr.
Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned.
The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for
the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Alejandrino v Quezon G.R. No. L-22041. September 11, 1924

Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby, declared guilty of
disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable
Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the
debate regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino.
Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court:
(1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to
recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator

Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is
the judgment of the court. So ordered.

Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer
must be sustained.

The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may,
nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the
Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must
determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts
restrain the other departments.

Osmena vs Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against
Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59.
Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity;
and asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the
petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia” wherein
he spoke of derogatory remarks of the President’s administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis
of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speech and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself as stated in the
provision that “xxx shall not be questioned in any other place”.

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the judiciary, because it is a
matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount
to encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the suspension of the House Rules,
which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, even expelled
by the votes of their colleagues.
 Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the
former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the
stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines

RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity
of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of
the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the
law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its
mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by
the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

De Venecia v Sandiganbayan GR 130240, 5 February 2002

Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To
Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered
the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation
of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116
adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de
Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr.,
in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property
Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.

Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension provided for in the
Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid Information.

As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to
the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a
House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain
order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from
Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and independent,
albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive
prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into
the internal affairs of either branch.

Casco Philippine Chemicals v. Gimenez

7 SCRA 347
FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner had bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde, raw materials for resin glues, and was thus paying for the margin fees at that time. Relying on Resolution No.
1529 of the Monetary Board of the said bank declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from
the said fee, the petitioner sought for a refund of the margin fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee

HELD:
Urea and formaldehyde are not exempt from fees by law. RA 2609 only exempts urea formaldehyde and not the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde as they are different, the former being a finished product. The enrolled bill which uses the
term “urea formaldehyde” is conclusive upon the courts. The courts cannot speculate that there had been an error I printing of
the bill as this shall violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall there have been any error in the printing, the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by a judicial decree.
 US v Pons G.R. No. 11530. August 12, 1916.

Facts: "The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal importation of opium,
committed as follows:

"That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did,
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the
court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency.

On motion of counsel, Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each
were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of
two years, to pay a fine of P1,000 to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment
of one-half of the costs. The same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000.
Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.

In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty was
not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The
validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned.

Issue: Whether Act 2381 was passed on 28th of February or March 1 of that year.

Held: For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Ratio: Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authentic of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most
permanent character. They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights
acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period
of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals."

In the case from which this last quotation is taken the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the American
Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has
been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine
Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states we do not hesitate to follow the courts in
that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914.
This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.

Mantruste Systems vs CA
G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989 [Judicial Power]

FACTS:
MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel, where it would operate the hotel for a
minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP.
The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation No. 50 and was consequently transferred
from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust for disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the interim lease agreement
to effect the disposition of the property. The APT granted the President of MSI's condition an extension of 30 days within which
to effect the delivery of the Bayview Hotel to APT.
However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property for more than 1 year the agreement is
long term in character and MSI have acquired preference in buying the property, while emphasizing that MSI has a legal lien on
the property because of its advances for the hotel operations and repairs which amounted to P12 Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding took place but MSI did not participate.
Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85 Million.
MSI filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the winning bidders. Trial court granted, but
the CA reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to Sec 1 of Proclamation No. 50: "No court or administrative agency
shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
transferred to it. Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such
purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it up held that it continues to be operative
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3 Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not been deprived of its
property rights since those rights are non-existent and its only property right was the alleged reimbursable advances made to
DBP, which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the
lower court against APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial power for MSI does not have a legally demandable
and enforceable right of retention over the said property.

ISSUE:
WoN the CA erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50, prohibiting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction by the TC.

RULING:
Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of
courts to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the
legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII
of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the
implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a
citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882.
December 1, 2004

Facts:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and
(3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western
Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).

On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of
certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP,
mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the
subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently
denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control
over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign
contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was
discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the
products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of
our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such
service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]),
Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC
(Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources?
Held:
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On
the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into in accordance
with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President
and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is
silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard,
the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not
inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must
restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the
resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and
answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise
by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George
Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication
conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches
of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme
law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.

The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve
narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and
reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our
posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal
groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an
otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA
contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the
nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining
operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State’s need to
maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the
basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and
Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA).