Lowering the Age of Criminal

Commented [1]: ano title natin

Liability Commented [2]: di ba pweds yan na title? hahaha

Aquino, Angelica Marie V.

Balanag, Julia Iona I.

Dela Cruz, Mary Joy Ann B.

Famentera, Jydel Nova R.

I. Introduction 2
A. Statement of the Problem 2
B. History 2
C. Significance of the Study Error! Bookmark not defined.
II. Body Error! Bookmark not defined.
Arguments in favor of lowering the age of criminal liability Error!
Bookmark not defined.
Arguments against lowering the age of criminal liability Error! Bookmark
not defined.
III. Conclusion Error! Bookmark not defined.
I. Introduction
A. Statement of the Problem
The Philippine House of Representatives caused national and global
outrage when in early January 2019 it considered lowering the age of
criminal responsibility to 9 years old. The House resolved to
“compromise” and changed it to 12 in a revised bill. This sparked
much debate and became the subject of mixed opinions. The
question boils down to: “Should kids as young as 9 years old be held
accountable for their actions?”

B. History
1. Article 12, Revised Penal Code (1932)

A person under 9 years of age is exempt from criminal liability. A person

over 9 years of age and under 15, unless he has acted with discernment, in
which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 80 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. Presidential Decree 906 or the Child and Youth Welfare

Code (1974)

The age of criminal liability is the same as the Revised Penal Code but the
provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed
modified by the provisions of Chapter III of this decree.

3. Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and

Welfare Act of 2006

A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of
the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. A child above fifteen
(15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
municipality.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the
United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines,
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225[5] (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an
Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC
on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to
and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
While Balua’s petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado’s continued use of his US passport
effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to
comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that
the rule on succession should be followed.
Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the Comelec First Division erred
in applying the rule on succession.
On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the ruling of the Comelec First Division. It held
that Arnado’s use of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found
merit in Arnado’s explanation that he continued to use his US passport because he did not yet know that he had been
issued a Philippine passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after receiving
his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.
Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as G.R No. 195649.
While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections
officially began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC[6] for the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC
for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it annulled and set aside the Comelec En
Banc’s February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and declared Maquiling as the
duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members
of the Court opined that in his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus:
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that “Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his “Affidavit of Renunciation.” Tills does not mean that he failed to comply with the twin requirements
under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents
himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
xxxx
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same
Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not
only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.[7]
The issuance of this Court’s April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the present controversy.
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel
C. Arnado’s “Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April3, 2009.”[8]
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado’s lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a Petition[9] seeking to
disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was raffled to the Comelec’s Second Division. The
resolution of said petition was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84%
of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes cast) votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition[10] this time seeking to nullify Arnado’s proclamation. He argued that with the April 16,
2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective
office. Hence, Arnado’s proclamation is void and without any legal effect.
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division
On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution granting the petition in SPA No. 13-309
(DC) and disqualify Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time
he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same
was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in Maquiling.
The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the
May 13, 2013 elections. While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado’s “Affidavit of Renunciation dated April
3, 2009” was submitted in evidence, the same would not suffice because it should have been executed on or before the
filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012.
The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division’s Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is disqualified
from running in the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.[12] He argued that the Comelec Second Division erred in
applying Maquiling claiming that the said case is not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan’s Petition was
filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the
Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming
support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec Second Division’s September 6, 2013 Resolution be
reversed and that he be declared as eligible to run for mayor of Kauswagan.
On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Comelec Second Division. It accordingly annulled the
proclamation of Arnado and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the
Comelec En Banc’s Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED. The Proclamation of
Private Respondent Rommel C. Arnado as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
the May 13, 2013 Elections.
SO ORDERED.[13]
(8) [G.R. No. 199113. March 18, 2015.]
RENATO M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

THIRD DIVISION (Villarama, Jr., J.)

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the
filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time
he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-
born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months
later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is concerned.

In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon
their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot where they constructed a residential
house. However, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is a public land and part of the salvage
zone. In April 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land wherein he indicated
that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application and she also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents (Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile, David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship in
October 2007.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of the information in court. David filed a petition for
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the same was denied. Meanwhile, CENRO rejected David’s MLA,
ruling that the latter’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA. Thereafter,
an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the Municipal Trial Court and a warrant of arrest
was issued against the David. The latter then filed an Urgent Motion for Re- Determination of Probable Cause, which
was denied. David’s petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1. May David be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225?
2. Did the MTC properly deny David’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused?

RULING:
I
1. R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections
2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:
xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath (Emphasis supplied).

While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed
“not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section
3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs.
Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath ofallegiance is
required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, “reacquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after
the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of
the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of
allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the lawusing both re-acquisition and
retention.

Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first
category of natural born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by
taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control
of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is
considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." By electing Philippine citizenship,
such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.

4. ID.; ID.; FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY SUFFICED TO RENOUNCE AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP;
CASE AT BAR. — By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
Thus, in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC it was held: It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the
negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his
Filipino citizenship." On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: "By the laws of
the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath
of allegiance to the Philippine Government." These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long
before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of
the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. Until
the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, private respondent had dual citizenship. The acts attributed
to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar vs. COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at
bar: . . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands
to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or
"implied." To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines
and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as
far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS
MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election.
The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought to
intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared private respondent
qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed
private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the original party in
the disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has
yet been no final judgment rendered. As regards the issue of citizenship, the Court ruled that by filing a certificate of
candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced
his American citizenship.

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. No. 6646); INTERVENTION, ALLOWED IN
PROCEEDINGS FOR DISQUALIFICATION EVEN AFTER ELECTION IF THERE HAS BEEN NO FINAL JUDGMENT
RENDERED; CASE AT BAR. — Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who]
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final
and executory judgment." The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice
mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The
fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in
ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo vs. COMELEC, reiterated
in several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether
one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time
petitioner filed a "Motion for leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local
position" under Section 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter
was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because
he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of
the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.

2. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; DISTINGUISHED FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE. — Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born
in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino
fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their

On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the original party
in the disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has yet been no final judgment rendered. As regards the issue of citizenship, the Court ruled that by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in
effect renounced his American citizenship.

Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen
and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the
election. The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner
sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared private
respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

Criminal Law 2
Reference: Atty. Maximo P. Amurao, Jr.’s Commentaries on Criminal Law, Book 2 and/or
Luis B. Reyes’ The Revised Penal Code Book Two.
N.B. Only handwritten notes are allowed during class.

Assignment:
1. Title 8 of the Revised Penal Code (Arts. 246-266D)
2. RA 10591 – Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act
3. RA 9262 – Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act
4. RA 8049 as amended by RA 11053 – Anti-Hazing Law
5. RA 7610 - Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act
6. RA 9745 – Anti-Torture Act

Read the following cases:

Article 247
People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, 14 September 1987
People v. Oyanib, G.R. No. 130634, 12 March 2001
RA 8049 as amended by 11053
Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, 1 July 2015
People v. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, 18 February 2015

RA 9262
Dabalos v. RTC, G.R. No. 193960, 7 January 2013
Melgar v. People, G.R. No. 223477, 14 February 2018
Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 232678, 3 July 2019
Ang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, 20 April 2010
AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, 11 January 2018

Article 266A
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441, 8 October 2014
People v. Baay, G.R. No. 220143, 7 June 2017
People v. Deniega, G.R. No. 212201, 28 June 2017
People v. Niebres, G.R. No. 230975, 4 December 2017
People v. Caga, G.R. No. 206878, 22 August 2016
People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, 21 April 2014
Lutap v. People, G.R. No. 204061, 5 February 2018
Ricalde v. People, G.R. 211002, 21 January 2015

RA 7610
People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, 12 March 2019

CRIM DIGESTS

Norberto Cruz y Bartolome v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014
Bersamin, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
involving different victims. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz
guilty of both crimes charged, hence, this appeal.

Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic wares and
glass wares in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set up their tents to have a place to
sleep. Petitioner’s wife and their driver went back to Manila to get more goods. While
sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on top of her mashing her breast and touching her
private part. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she will be killed. AAA fought back and
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. AA left the tent to seek for help. When
she returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. This
prompted Norberto to leave the tent.
Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly do the acts
imputed out in the open as there were many people preparing for the “simbang gabi”. He
further assails the credibility AAA for the crime of rape, alleging that the complaints were
filed only for the purpose of extorting money from him.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?

HELD:
NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal
knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as “the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman,” in other words, rape is consummated once the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or
slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an
accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an

attempted stage. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of
the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the
commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender
performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by
which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to
rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim and was already touching her genitalia
with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and
no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. Such circumstances
remained equivocal, or “susceptible of double interpretation,” such that it was not
permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury.

The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act of touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. Petitioner’s embracing and
touching the victim’s vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her.
The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when
he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts
reflected lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred
against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt
acts leading to rape.
Hence, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.

BAAY – FULL TEXT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO DENIEGA

G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017

PERALTA, J.:
Facts: In an Amended Information, accused was charged with the crime of statutory rape,
as follows: that the accused feloniously, have carnal knowledge with a minor (16 years
old) AAA, whose mental age is only six (6) years old. Said carnal knowledge with the said
AAA is detrimental to her normal growth and development and that accused knew fully
well that the said AAA is suffering from mental disability and/or disorder.
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the prosecution and also
raised the defense of alibi. He contended that between the hours of 8 o'clock in the
morning and 12 o'clock midnight of May 2, 2007, he busied himself by painting the house
of a neighbor, then he went to GMA Cavite to have his electric fan repaired and,
subsequently, had a drinking session with his friend at the latter's house. He also admitted
that he and the victim were residing at the same place and, at the time of the incident, he
has known the victim for one month.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of statutory rape under Article 266- A, paragraph
1 (d) of the RPC.
Ruling: Yes. It is a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental
retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. In People v.
Quintas, the Supreme Court held that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled
person whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed
under paragraph 1 (d) and not paragraph l(b), Article 266-A of the RPC.
In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim, at the time of the commission
of the crime, was 16 years old but with a mental age of a 6-year-old child. The prosecution
was able to establish these facts through AAA's Birth Certificate, Clinical Abstract
prepared by a medical doctor who is a psychiatrist from the National Center for Mental
Health, as well as the testimonies of the said doctor29 and the victim's mother, BBB.
Ratio Decidendi: In determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under
Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological
age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age
if intellectual disability is established.
Gist: This is an ordinary appeal filed assailing the Decision of the CA, which affirmed in
toto the Decision of the RTC of San Pedro, finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime
of statutory rape.

People v. Niebres – FULL TEXT

People v. Caga - FULL TEXT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: Marital rape

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her

husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their
residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant
boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause
marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent
and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged
method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual
ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead,
rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here
to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and
abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him
and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his
desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by
warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to
resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued
to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the
rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their
businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over
their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape
cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause.
 The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital
rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of
the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property
rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him
alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets
another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s
legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was
raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual

violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party
to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353.

ISSUE

WON the creation by Congress of the Joint Committee to canvass the votes for president and vice
president in the 2004 elections is unconstitutional. (NO)

HELD

“Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress “to promulgate its rules for
the canvassing of the certificates.”In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial
 determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional
Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate

The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived

petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the

very Rules under attack, the decisions About 759,000 results (0.56 seconds)
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 Oct 1, 2013 - Ruy Elias C. ... Senate of the Philippines, House of Representatives, et al, (G.R. ...
163556, June 8, 2004) where the Supreme Court, voting 14-0, ruled: Section 4, Article VII of the
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and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.2 ... that he6 is the one elected president or vice-
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July 19, 1999 from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. ..... That does not
mean CASE IN POINT: Tañada vs Angara however that the Charter is ...... a Filipino citizen and
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Oct 19, 2017 - G.R. No. 163556 — CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ v. SENATE OF THE
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Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks [G.R. No. 167173,
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Gudani vs. Senga [G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]

In re Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio [G.R. No.
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Feb 10, 1998 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEJANDRO ATOP @ ALI,
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G.R. No. 124303-05 | 10 FEBRUARY 1998 Case Name PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
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 PEOPLE v. ALEJANDRO ATOP - Lawyerly

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Feb 10, 1998 - The trial court sentenced the appellant to death, holding that his common-law
relationship with the victim's grandmother aggravated the penalty.

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People v. Jackson was a 2005 criminal trial held in Santa Barbara County Superior Court in ......
"Michael Jackson dances atop SUV". UPI.com. January 16, 2004.

Court: Santa Barbara County Superior Court

Judge(s) sitting: Rodney Melville

Verdict: Michael Jackson found not guilty on all ...

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 Analyzing Linux server performance with atop | Enable ...

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The Trial Court found Martin Mandolado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder. The aggravating circumstances of (1) 'advantage was
taken of his being a draftee in the Philippine Army,' and (2) 'abuse of
confidence or obvious ungratefulness' without the presence of any
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Jun 28, 1983 - In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that
"there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the
crime was committed and the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the crime."
(People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155, 172).

Digest People vs. Mandolado - Art 14 Paragraph 4 People vs ...

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1.
The Trial Court found Martin Mandolado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The aggravating circumstances of (1) 'advantage was taken of his being a draftee in the Philippine
Army,' and (2) 'abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness' without the presence of any
mitigating circumstances.

People vs. Mandolado | Burden Of Proof (Law) | Deviance ...

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Nov 26, 2014 - People vs. Mandolado - Free download as Word Doc (.doc / .docx), PDF File (.pdf),
Text ... Comendador, in order for abuse of confidence to be

Crim1 Digest | Robbery | Victimology - Scribd

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Sep 13, 2017 - aggravating circumstance. SOMBILON v. PEOPLE PEOPLE v. ... There is nothing to
show that appellant Mandolado took advantage of his being a ... In order that abuse of
confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary ...

(PDF) CRIMINAL LAW Green Notes | Ralph John Valdez ...

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People, G.R. No. circumstances are circumstances are 181409, February 11, 2010). taken into ....
as the true motive of The general criminal intent (malice) is the conduct (People vs.
...... Mandolado, such condition (passion or G.R. No. ...... However, the crime the accused
was abuse of confidence under paragraph 1(b).

You visited this page on 11/20/19.

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Oct 13, 2015 - Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 475 (2000) - People v. ... Lapaz, 171 SCRA 539
(1989)- ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE AND OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS People v. ... Mandolado,
123 SCRA 128 (1983)- CRIME IN PALACE OR IN ...

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People v. Echagaray, G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682. Corpuz v. People, G.R.
No. 180016 .... Abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. People v. Mandolado, L-51304-
05, 28 June 1983, 123 SCRA 133 6. The crime is ...

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Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc, 22 Cal.App.5th 1308 ...

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People v Maldonado :: 2017 :: New York Court of Appeals ...

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Feb 16, 2017 - People v Maldonado 2017 NY Slip Op 01254 Decided on February 16, 2017 Court
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People vs Nunag

Rape case of five men on a girl with the girl identifying 3 of the men. All five are still convicted of rape since the two
showed indispensable cooperation.

People vs Dela Cerna

Murder of father and son with the killing the son as wasn't part of the plan. Serapio acted alone in killing the son.

People vs Doria

Marijuana entrapment case. There was no evidence of participation of Gaddao because she wasn't commiting,
planning to commit, nor committed any offense.

Those who force or induce others to commit

People vs Yamson

Jeanette was swindled of fake gold bars but there was no proof that she forced or induced the abduction and killing
of the victims.

People vs Bolivar
There was no sufficient evidence to convict Barrion of inducing Canaguran to kill Callao and no evidence was
presented to show that Barrion had moral ascendancy/dominance over Canaguran that the latter would be induced
to kill.

People vs Ong Chiat Lay

The two companions of Ong Chiat Lay are acquitted of arson but Ong Chiat was found guilty. Since it was claimed
that there was conspiracy, the acquittal of one means acquittal of all.

People vs Dela Cruz

Kidnapping. The inducer need not take part in the commission of the offense, one who induces another to commit a
crime is guilty as principal even though he might have taken no part in its material execution.

People vs Indanan

Indanan was the headman of Parang. He ordered his men to kill Sariol claiming that such order was from the
governor. His men committed a crime because of his command.

People vs Kiichi Omine

One who said "stab him!" is not guilty of inducement because inducement must precede the criminal act.

Indispensable cooperation

People vs Maluenda

Legarto’s participation as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime is not proven and he is merely an
accessory. His acts such as delivery of ransom money were limited after the abduction was already consummated.

People vs Montealegre

Montealgre did not himself commit the act of stabbing but he is equally guilty for having prevented the victim from
resisting the attack against him.
People vs Eguia

A conspiracy existed between Eguia and Reyes for the withdrawal of funds of the former. Eguia had no funds at all
during that time.

Accomplices

People vs Mandolado

An accomplice cooperates in the execution of the offence by previous or simultaneous acts, provided he has no
direct participation in its execution or does not force or induce other to commit it, or his cooperation is not
indispensable. Ortilliano only fired his gun every time Mandolado fired his.

People vs Doble

The owner of the banca is convicted as accomplices since they did not participate in the bank robbery and killing
per se.

People vs Doctolero

The two appellants were standing in the room ready to lend assistance to their brother who is killing the two women
and injuring a child.

People vs Elijorde

G.R. No. L-30028 - LawPhil

https://www.lawphil.net › juri1982 › may1982 › gr_l_30028_1982

1.
No. L-30028. CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE,
SIMEON DOBLE and ANTONIO ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants. This case refers to a bank
robbery committed in band, with multiple homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon
agents of persons in authority, on June 14, 1966, in Navotas, Rizal.

Missing: 3002 | Must include: 3002

G.R. No. L-41312 - LawPhil

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1.
SUPREME COURT Manila. SECOND DIVISION. G.R. No. L-41312 July 29, 1977.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,. vs. VICENTE C.

Missing: Doble, 3002

People v Doble | Accomplice | Conspiracy (Criminal) - Scribd

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Nov 14, 2016 - G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, ...
 Missing: 3002 | Must include: 3002

same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than

delict

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1.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of CA in People v. Castillo and ... G.R.
No. L-31665 August 6, 1975 LEONARDO ALMEDA, vs. HON.

Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... ...

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SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
 Mendiola, Manila

CRIMINAL LAW I

Prescribed textbook/s:
1. Revised Penal Code Book I by Luis B. Reyes and/or
2. Commentaries on Criminal Law Book I by Atty. Maximo P. Amurao Jr.

NB: Closed book policy shall be observed during class. Only handwritten notes will
be allowed.

I. General Principles of Criminal Law

A. Nature and definition
People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA
493
Ient v. Tullett Prebon, G.R. No. 189158, 11 January 2017
B. Characteristics of Criminal Law
1. General (Art. 2, RPC)
2. Territorial (Art.2, RPC)
People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, 30 August 2001, 364 SCRA
10
3. Prospective (Article 21 and 22, RPC)
a. Effects of repeal
C. Sources of Criminal Law
1. Revised Penal Code
2. Special Penal Laws
D. Constitutional Limitations on Criminal Law
1. Due process and Equal protection (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution)
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, 20
January 2009
2. Freedom of expression (Art. 3, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution)
3. Freedom of religion (Art. 3, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution)
Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, 22 June 2006, 492
SCRA 1
4. No excessive fines, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
(Art. 3, Sec. 19, 1987 Constitution)
People v. Echagaray, G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267
SCRA 682
Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014
5. Non-imprisonment for debt or non-payment of poll tax ( Art. 3,
Sec. 19, 1987 Constitution)
6. Bill of attainder (Art. 3, Sec. 22, 1987 Constitution)
 People v. Ferrer, L-32613-14, 27 December 1972, 48 SCRA
382
7. Ex-post facto laws (Art. 3, Sec. 22, 1987 Constitution)
US v. Diaz Conde, L-18208, 14 February 1922
E. Construction and interpretation
1. Liberally in favour of the accused
2. Spanish text of the RPC prevails over the English text
People v. Abilong, L-1960, 26 November 1948.
3. Retroactive application when favourable to the accused
4. Prescribed but undeserved penalties (Art. 5, RPC)
People v. Formigones, L-3246, 29 November 1950

II. General Principles of Criminal Liability

A. Felony, defined (Art. 3, RPC)
B. Elements of criminal liability
1. Physical element (Actus reus)
a. Act
b. Omission
People v. Sylvestre and Atienza, G.R. No. 35748,
14 December 1931, 56 Phil. 353
People v. Talingdan, L-32126, 6 July 1978, 84
SCRA 19
2. Mental element (Mens rea)
a. Deliberate intent (Dolo)
i. Elements of dolo
ii. General and specific intent
People v. Puno, G.R. No. 97471, 17
February 1993, 219 SCRA 85
iii. Mistake of fact
US v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, 19 March
1910, 15 Phil. 488
People v. Oanis, G.R. No. 47722, 27 July
1943, 74 Phil. 257
iv. Malum prohibitum as exception to the
requirement of mens rea
Padilla v. Dizon, AC No. 3086, 23
February 1988, 158 SCRA 127
Magno v. CA, G.R. No. 96132, 26 June
1992, 210 SCRA 475
Garcia v. CA, G.R. No. 157171, 14 March
2006, 484 SCRA 617
v. Intent distinguished from motive
b. Constructive intent (Culpa) Art. 3 and 365
 i. Elements
ii. Imprudence or lack of skill
iii. Negligence or lack of foresight
People v. Pugay, L-74324, 17 November
1988, 167 SCRA 439
Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17
November 2010.
c. Transferred intent (Art. 4, par. 1)
i. Aberratio ictus
People v. Guillen, L-1477, 18 January
1950, 85 Phil. 307.
ii. Error in personae
People v. Sabalones, G.R. No. 123485, 31
August 1998, 294 SCRA 751
iii. Praeter intentionem
People vs. Albuquerque, G.R. No. 38773, 19
December1933, 59Phil.150
3. Concurrence
4. Resulting harm
5. Causation
Bataclan v. Medina, L-10126, 22 October 1957, 102 Phil. 181
C. Impossible Crimes (Art. 4, Par. 2)
Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119, 21 October 1992, 215 SCRA 52
People v. Saladino, L-3634, 30 May 1951, 89 Phil. 807
III. Stages of execution
A. Attempted Stage
B. Frustrated Stage
C. Consummated crimes
US v. Eduave, G.R. No. 12155, 2 February 1917, 36 Phil. 209
Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188
Baleros v. People, G.R. No. 138033, 22 February 2006, 483 SCRA 10
D. Stages of execution in relation to specific felonies
1. Theft
Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007
Epifanio v. People, G.R. No. 157057, 26 June 2007
2. Illegal Trespass
People v. Lamahang, L-43530, 3 August 1935, 61 Phil. 703
3. Physical Injuries, Homicide, and Murder
People v. Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463, 18 December 1930, 55
Phil. 433
People v. Kalalo, G.R. No. 39303-05, 17 March 1934, 59 Phil.
715
 People v. Trinidad, G.R. No. 79123-25, 9 January 1989, 169
SCRA 51
Martinez v. CA, G.R. No. 168827, 13 April 2007.
Mondragon v. People, L-17666, 30 June 1966, 17 SCRA 476
People v. Sy Pio, L-5848, 30 April 1954, 94 Phil. 885
4. Robbery
People v. Dio, L-36461, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 151
5. Rape
People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, 3 April 1990, 184 SCRA 105
People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, 30 March 2000
E. Conspiracy and proposals to commit a felony (Art. 8)
1. Conspiracy and proposal, when punished?
2. As a manner of incurring criminal liability.

IV. Circumstances that affect criminal liability

A. Justifying circumstances
1. Defense of self, relatives, and strangers
People v. Decena, G.R. No. 107874, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA
67
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 128359, 6 December 2000, 347
SCRA 100
People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946, 76 Phil.
174
People v. Narvaez, L-33466-67, 20 April 1983, 121 SCRA 389
(see also dissents of J. Abad Santos and J. Gutierrez, Jr.)
Sabang v. People, G.R. No. 168818, 9 March 2007, 518 SCRA
35
People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006, 499
SCRA 64
Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 165483, 12 September 2006,
501 SCRA 533
2. Avoidance of greater evil
People v. Ricohermoso, L-30527-28, 29 March 1974, 56 SCRA
431
People v. Norma Hernandez, CA-G.R. No. 22553-R, 14 April
1959, 55 OG 8465
3. Fulfillment of duty
People v. Delima, L-18660, 22 December 1922, 46 Phil. 738
People v. Lagata,L-1940-42, 24 March 1949, 83 Phil. 150
Mamangun v. People, G.R. No. 149152, 2 February 2007
People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006, 499
SCRA 64
4. Obedience to a lawful order of a superior
 People v. Beronilla, L-4445, 28 February 1955, 96 Phil. 566
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103501-03, 17 February
1997, 268 SCRA 332
B. Exempting Circumstances
1. Insanity
People v. Taneo, L-37673, 31 March 1933, 58 Phil. 255
People v. Bonoan, L-45130, 17 February 1937, 64 Phil. 87
People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991, 199 SCRA 860
People v. Rafanan, L-54135, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 65
People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, 12 May 2000, 332
SCRA 99
People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA
581
People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, 17 March 2004, 425
SCRA 654
People v. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537
RA 9262 (Re: Battered Woman Syndrome)
See also: Maria Diory F. Rabajante, The Privilege of Being
Insane: An Examination of, and a Saner Alternative to the
Insane Rule on Insanity Defense, 49 San Beda L.J. 1 (March
2012)
2. Minority
RA 9344, Sec. 6
People v. Doqueña, G.R. No. 46539, 27 September 1939, 68
Phil. 580
Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008
3. Accident
US v. Tañedo, L-5418, 12 February 1910, 15 Phil. 196
People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, 29 June 2007, 526 SCRA
215
People v. Retubado, G.R. No. 124058, 10 December 2003
4. Irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of a greater injury
US v. Caballeros, G.R. No. 1352, 29 March 1905, 4 Phil. 350
People v. Loreno, L-54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311
People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, 14 April 1999, 305
SCRA 740
5. Insuperable cause
People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186, 30 September 1936, 63
Phil. 530 (see also: dissent of J. Villareal)
C. Other exculpatory causes
1. Instigation
People v. Lua Chu, G.R. No. 34917, 7 September 1931, 56 Phil.
44
 People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, 22 January 1999, 301 SCRA
668
2. Pardon (Art. 266-C and Art. 344)
3. Absolutory circumstances
a. Art. 6 (3)
b. Art. 20
c. Art. 247
d. Art. 280*
e. Art. 332
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v. People,
G.R. No. 181409, 11 February 2010.
D. Mitigating Circumstances
1. Classes of Mitigating Circumstances
a. Privileged
i. Art. 13 (2) and Art. 68
ii. Art. 13 (1) and Art. 69
People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21
February 1946, 76 Phil. 174
People v. Narvaez, L-33466-67, 20 April
1983, 121 SCRA 389
People v. Ulep, G.R. No. 132547, 20
September 2000
Guillermo v. People, G.R. No. 153287, 20
January 2009.
b. Ordinary
i. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
People v. Ural, L-30801, 27 March 1974,
56 SCRA 138
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139542, 21
June 2001, 359 SCRA 352
ii. Sufficient provocation
People v. Pagal, L-32040, 25 October
1977, 79 SCRA 570
Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, 20
January 2009
iii. Vindication of a wrong
People v. Benito, L-32042, 13 February
1975, 74 SCRA 271
Bacabac v. People, G.R. No. 149372, 11
September 2007
iv. Passion or obfuscation
US v. Hicks, G.R. No. 4971, 23 September
1909, 14 Phil. 217
 US v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 7094, 29
March 1912, 22 Phil. 429
People v. Gelaver, G.R. No. 95357, 9
June 1993, 223 SCRA 310
People v. Bello, L-18792, 28 February
1964
v. Voluntary surrender or plea of guilt
People v. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344-45,
10 January 1994, 229 SCRA 166
People v. Dela Cruz, L-45284, 29
December 1936, 63 Phil. 874
vi. Deafness, muteness, blindness, or other physical
defect which restricts the offender’s means of
action, defense, or communication
vii. Illness as would diminish the exercise of will-
power without depriving the offender of
consciousness of his acts.
viii. Analogous circumstances

E. Aggravating Circumstances
Art. 14 and 62 of the RPC.
People v. Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 136164-65, 20 April 2001
1. Classes of Aggravating Circumstance
a. Generic
b. Qualifying
c. Specific
d. Inherent
e. Special
2. Taking advantage of public office
People v. Capalac, L-38297, 23 October 1982, 117 SCRA 874
People v. Gapasin, G.R. No. 73489, 25 April 1994, 231 SCRA
728
3. Insult to public authority
People v. Tiongson, L-35123-24, 25 July 1984, 130 SCRA 614
People v. Magdueño, L-68699, 22 September 1986, 144 SCRA
210
People v. Tac-an, G.R. Nos. 76338-89, 26 February 1990.
4. Disregard of rank, age, or sex, and dwelling;
People v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-24002, 21 January 1974.
People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000,
348 SCRA 143
People v. Daniel, G.R. No. L-40330, 20 November 1978
5. Abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness
 People v. Mandolado, L-51304-05, 28 June 1983, 123 SCRA
133
6. The crime is committed in the palace of Chief Executive, in his
presence, where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of
their duties, or place dedicated to religious worship;
7. Nighttime, uninhabited place, or by a band;
People v. Garcia, L-30449, 31 October 1979, 94 SCRA 14
People v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881, 28 August 2007
People v. Damaso, L-30116, 20 November 1978, 86 SCRA 370
(uninhabited)
8. Crime committed on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity or misfortune;
9. Aid of armed men or persons who afford impunity;
10. Recidivism
People v. Baldera, L-2390, 24 April 1950, 86 Phil. 189
11. Reiteracion
12. Habitual delinquency (Art. 62, par. 5);
People v. Melendrez, G.R. No. 39913, 19 December 1933, 59
Phil. 154
13. Quasi- recidivism (Art. 160)
14. Price, reward, or promise;
15. Inundation, fire, poison, etc.
16. Evident premeditation;
US v. Manalinde, G.R. No. 5292, 28 August 1909, 14 Phil. 77
People v. Ilaoa, G.R. No. 94308, 16 June 1994, 233 SCRA 231
People v. Bibat, G.R. No. 124319, 13 May 1998, 290 SCRA 27
17. Craft, fraud, or disguise;
People v. Empacis, G.R. No. 95756, 14 May 1993, 222 SCRA
59
18. Taking advantage of superior strength, or means employed to
weaken the defense;
People v. Bigcas, G.R. No. 94534, 2 July 1992, 211 SCRA 631
19. Treachery;
People v. Sangalang, L-32914, 30 August 1974, 58 SCRA 737
People v. San Pedro, L-44274, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 306
People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282, 20 April 1998, 289 SCRA
213
People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000,
348 SCRA 143
People v. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA
603
People v. Villonez, G.R. Nos. 122976-77, 16 November 1998,
359 Phil. 95, 1998
 People v. Guzman, G.R. No. 169246, 26 January 2007
20. Ignominy;
People v. Torriefel CA-GR. No. 659-R, 29 November 1947, 45
OG 803
People v. Jose, L-28232, 6 February 1971, 37 SCRA 450
People v. Butler, L-50276, 27 January 1983, 120 SCRA 281
People v. Saylan, L-36941, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 159
People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, 27 April 2000, 331 SCRA
216
21. Unlawful entry;
22. Breaking of wall, roof, floor, door, or window;
23. Aid of persons under fifteen years old, use of motor vehicles,
airships, or other similar means;
24. Cruelty;
25. Organized or syndicated crime group;
26. Use of illegal firearms or explosives – see RA 10591
People v. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, 19 September
2000
Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, 29 June 2007
27. Use of dangerous drugs while committing a felony – Sec. 25 of RA
9165
F. Alternative Circumstances
1. Relationship
People v. Atop, G.R. No. 124303-05, 10 February 1998, 286
SCRA 157
2. Intoxication
3. Degree of Instruction
People v. San Pedro, L-44274, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 306
V. Persons Criminally Liable
A. Principals – Art. 17
People v. Yanson-Dumancas, G.R. No. 133527-28, 13 December
1999, 320 SCRA 584
People v. Maluenda, G.R. No. 115351, 27 March 1998, 288 SCRA
225
B. Accomplices – Art. 18
Abejuela v. People, G.R. No. 80130, 19 August 1991, 200 SCRA 806
People v. Doble, L-30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131
People v. Doctolero, G.R. No. 34386, 7 February 1991, 193 SCRA
632
People v. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, 18 August 1999, 312 SCRA 640
Garces v. People, G.R. No. 173858, 17 July 2007
C. Accessories – Art. 19 and 20 (RPC); PD 1612
People v. Talingdan, L-32126, 6 July 1978, 84 SCRA 19
VI. Complex Crimes (Art. 48)
People v. Sanchez, G.R No. 131116, 27 August 1999, 313 SCRA 254
People v. Mallari, G.R. No. L-58886, 13 December 1988
People vs. Hernandez, L-6025-26, 18 July 1956, 99 Phil. 515
Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, 5 June 1990, 184 SCRA 217
Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010.
People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 127663, 11 March 1999
VII. Penalties
A. Imposable penalties
1. Principal penalties
a. Capital punishment – Sec. 19, Art III of the 1987
Constitution; RA 7659, RA 8177; RA 9346; Art. 40 and
47 Revised Penal Code
Harden v. Director of Prisons, L-2349. 22
October 1948, 81 Phil. 741
b. Afflictive penalties
i. Reclusion perpetua – RA 7659, Art. 27 of
Revised Penal Code
People v. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172, 25 May 1994;
People v. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172, 9 January
1995;
People v. Latupan, G.R. No. 112453, 28 June
2001
ii. Reclusion temporal
iii. Perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification – Article 30
iv. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
– Art. 31
v. Prision mayor – Art. 27
c. Correctional penalties – Art. 27, 39, and 44
i. Prision correccional
ii. Arresto mayor
iii. Suspension
iv. Destierro
d. Light penalties – Art. 27, 39, and 44
i. Arresto menor
ii. Public censure
e. Common penalties – Art.25
i. Fines – Art. 26, 39, and 66
ii. Bond to keep the peace – Art. 27 and 35
2. Accessory penalties – Art. 40 -45
a. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
b. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
 c. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be
voted for, the profession or calling
d. Civil interdiction
e. Indemnification
f. Forfeiture or confiscation of the instruments and
proceeds of the offense
g. Payment of costs
3. Subsidiary penalty – Art. 39
B. Application and computation of penalties
1. General rules – Art. 5, 21, 28, 29 (see also RA 10592), 46, 73-77
2. Specific Rules
a. Complex Crimes (Art. 48)
b. Crime different from that which was intended – Art. 49
c. Effect of degree of participation and stage of
commission – Art. 50 -57, 60-61
d. Additional penalty for certain accessories – Art. 58
e. Impossible crimes – Art. 59
f. Effect of mitigating, aggravating, and qualifying
circumstances – Art. 62-66
g. Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances –
Art. 67 and 69
h. Minors – RA 9344
3. Indeterminate Sentence Law
People v. Lanuza, G.R. No. 188562, 17 August 2011
Talampas v. People, G.R. No. 180219, 23 November 2011
People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 December 2008.
See CJ Puno Dissent and J. Corona Separate Opinion
C. Execution and service of penalties
1. General rules – Art. 47, 70, 78, and 86-88,
In re Petition for Habeas Corpus, Pete Lagran, G.R. No.
147270, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 275
2. Probation Law (PD 968 as amended)
See also: RA 10707
3. Suspension of sentence
a. In cases of insanity – Art. 79
b. Minors
i. Section 31-35 of AM No. 02-1-18-SC
ii. RA 9344
VIII. Extinction of criminal liability
A. Total – Art.89-93
Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA
585
B. Partial – Art. 94-99; See also: amendments under RA 10592
 IX. Civil Liability arising from criminal liability – Art. 100-113

nant is the president and general manager of the company.2 In his Complaint3 dated March 7, 2006,
he narrated that he engaged the legal services of respondent in relation to a case for illegal dismissa
l 4 filed against him and the company. All the pleadings and orders were directed to respondent
because the company no longer had active presence in Bacolod, save for the stockpile of
construction equipment found in Barangay Mansilingan.5 Sometime in February 2000, complainant
signed the verification page of the position paper for the case and sent it to respondent for his
signature. However, respondent filed the position paper without signing it.6 The labor arbiter noticed
the unsigned pleading and directed respondent to sign it within 10 days from notice.7 Respondent did
not comply with the directive.

In a Decision8 dated October 21, 2004, the labor arbiter ruled against the company and noted that:
"[the company J filed an unsigned position paper which cannot be considered as such. Despite the
order to Atty. Salvador Sabio to sign said position paper, the order was deemed to have been taken
for granted " 9

Respondent received a copy of the Decision on January 13, 2005 but he did not

The Facts

Petitioner Ricardo N. Azuelo (Azuelo) was employed by the respondent ZAMECO II Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO) as a maintenance worker. It appears that sometime in March 2006,
Azuelo filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch (R

Today is Monday, November 18, 2019

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192573 October 22, 2014

RICARDO N. AZUELO, Petitioner,

vs.
ZAMECO II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated February 26, 2010 and Resolution3 dated June 10, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
107762, which affirmed the Decision4 dated September 22, 2008 and Resolution5 dated December 15, 2008 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 052567-07.

The Facts

Petitioner Ricardo N. Azuelo (Azuelo) was employed by the respondent ZAMECO II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO) as a
maintenance worker. It appears that sometime in March 2006, Azuelo filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the
NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga a Complaint6 for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits against ZAMECO. The
complaint was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB III-03-9912-06 and was assigned to Labor Arbiter (LA) Mariano" L. Bactin (LA
Bactin). After several mediations, LA Bactin ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers on July 14, 2006.

On July 14, 2006, Azuelo, instead of submitting his position paper, moved that the submission of his position paper be extended
to August 4, 2006, which was granted by LA Bactin. On August 4, 2006, Azuelo again failed to submit his position paper. LA
Bactin then directed Azuelo to submit his position papers on August 22, 2006. On the said date, Azuelo, instead of submitting his
position paper, moved for the issuance of an order directing ZAMECO to furnish him with a complete copy of the investigation
report as regards his dismissal. ZAMECO opposed the said motion, asserting that it has already furnished Azuelo with a copy of
its investigation report.

On November 6, 2006, LA Bactin issued an Order,7 which reads:

Record shows that respondent has already filed its position paper while complainant, despite ample opportunity given him, failed
to file his[,] leaving this office with no option but to dismiss this case for lack of interest.

WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby dismissed for lack of[merit].

SO ORDERED.8

Azuelo received a copy of LA Bactin's Order dated November 6, 2006 on November 17, 2006. On November 21, 2006, Azuelo
again filed a complaint with the RAB of the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga for illegal dismissal with money claims
against ZAMECO, containing the same allegations in his first complaint. The case was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-11-
10779-06 and was assigned to LA Reynaldo V. Abdon (LA Abdon).
On December 20, 2006, ZAMECO filed a Motion to Dismiss9 the second complaint filed by Azuelo on the ground of res judicata.
ZAMECO pointed out that Azuelo had earlier filed a similar complaint, which was dismissed by LA Bactin due to his
unreasonable failure to submit his position paper despite ample opportunity given to him by LA Bactin. ZAMECO likewise averred
that Azuelo should have appealed from LA Bactin's Order dated November 6, 2006 instead of filing a complaint for illegal
dismissal anew.

Azuelo opposed ZAMECO's motion to dismiss,10 alleging that the dismissal of his first complaint by LA Bactin was without
prejudice. He explained that his failure to submit his position paper was due to ZAMECO's refusal to furnish him with the
complete documents pertaining to his illegal dismissal. He further claimed that, since the dismissal of his first complaint was
without prejudice, his remedy was either to file a motion for reconsideration or to re-file the case within 10 days from receipt of
the order of dismissal.

On March 12, 2007, LA Abdon issued an Order,11 which dismissed Azuelo's second complaint for illegal dismissal on the ground
of res judicata. LA Abdon pointed out that the dismissal of Azuelo's first complaint for illegal dismissal was with prejudice; that the
appropriate remedy available to Azuelo against LA Bactin's dismissal of the first complaint was to appeal from the same and not
to file a second complaint for illegal dismissal.

On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision12 dated September 22, 2008, affirmed the Order issued on March 12, 2007 by LA Abdon.
The NLRC pointed out that LA Bactin gave Azuelo ample opportunity to submit his position paper, which he still failed to do. That
his failure to prosecute his action for unreasonable length of time indeed warranted the dismissal of his first complaint, which is
deemed to be with prejudice, unless otherwise stated. Considering that the Order issued on November 6, 2006 by LA Bactin did
not qualify the nature of the dismissal of the first complaint, the NLRC opined that the said dismissal is with prejudice. Thus, the
filing of the second complaint for illegal dismissal is already barred by the prior dismissal of Azuelo' s first complaint.

Azuelo sought reconsideration13 of the Decision dated September 22, 2008 but it was denied by the NLRC in its
Resolution14 dated December 15, 2008.

Azuelo then filed a petition for certiorari15 with the CA, alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
dismissal of his first complaint was with prejudice, thus constituting a bar to the filing anew of his complaint for illegal dismissal
against ZAMECO. He likewise asserted that, since the dismissal of his first complaint was without prejudice, the remedy available
to him, contrary to LA Abdon's ruling, was to re-file his complaint, which he did.

On February 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,16 which denied the petition for certiorari filed by Azuelo.
The CA held that the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the dismissal of Azuelo' s second complaint for
illegal dismissal on the ground of res judicata. That the dismissal of the first complaint, which was with prejudice, bars the filing of
a subsequent complaint for illegal dismissal based on the same allegations.

Azuelo's Motion for Reconsideration17 was denied by the CA in its Resolution18 dated June 10, 2010.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue

Essentially, the issue set forth by Azuelo for the Court's resolution is whether the dismissal of his first complaint for illegal
dismissal, on the ground of lack of interest on his part to prosecute the same, bars the filing of another complaint for illegal
dismissal against ZAMECO based on the same allegations.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such as the instant petition,
where the CA' s disposition in a labor case is sought to be calibrated, the Court's review is quite limited. In ruling for legal
correctness, the Court has to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented
to it; the Court has to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of
grave abuse .of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the
case was correct.19 "The phrase 'grave abuse of discretion' is well-defined in our jurisprudence. It exists where an act of a court or
tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility."20

After a thorough review of the records of the instant case, the Court finds that the CA did not commit any reversible error in
upholding the dismissal of Azuelo's second complaint for illegal dismissal on the ground of res judicata. The NLRC did not abuse
its discretion in ruling that the Order issued on November 6, 2006 by LA Bactin, which dismissed the first complaint filed by
Azuelo, was an adjudication on the merits.

At the core of the instant petition is the determination of the nature of the dismissal of Azuelo's first complaint, i.e., whether the
dismissal is with prejudice as held by the labor tribunals. The Order issued on November 6, 2006 by LA Bactin is silent as to the
nature of the dismissal; it merely stated that the complaint was dismissed due to Azuelo's failure, despite ample opportunity
afforded him, to submit his position paper.

Ultimately, the question that has to be resolved is this - whether the dismissal of a complaint for illegal dismissal due to the
unreasonable failure of the complainant to submit his position paper amounts to a dismissal with prejudice.

The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 Revised Rules), the rules applicable at the time of the controversy, is
silent as to the nature of the dismissal of a complaint on the ground of unreasonable failure to submit a position paper by the
complainant. Nevertheless, the 2005 Revised Rules, particularly Section 3, Rule I thereof, provides for the suppletory application
of the Rules of Court to arbitration proceedings before the LAs and the NLRC in the absence of any applicable provisions therein,
viz:

Section 3. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - In the absence of any applicable provisions in these Rules, and in order
to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines may, in the
interest of expeditious dispensation of labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient, be applied by analogy or in a
suppletory character and effect. (Emphases ours)

The unjustified failure of a complainant in arbitration proceedings before the LA to submit his position paper is akin to the case of
a complainant's failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time in ordinary civil proceedings. In both cases, the
complainants are remiss, sans reasonable cause, to prove the material allagations in their respective complaints. Accordingly,
the Court sees no reason not to apply the rules relative to unreasonable failure to prosecute an action in ordinary civil
proceedings to the unjustified failure of a complainant to submit his position paper in arbitration proceedings before the LA.

In this regard, Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation
of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Emphases ours)

"The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be
with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general
rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the
filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal
is without prejudice."21

Thus, in arbitration proceedings before the LA, the dismissal of a complaint on account of the unreasonable failure of the
complainant to submit his position paper is likewise regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of
another complaint, except when the

LA's order of dismissal expressly states otherwise.

As already stated, the Order dated November 6, 2006, which dismissed Azuelo's first complaint due to his unreasonable failure
to submit his position paper is unqualified. It is thus considered as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to filing of
another complaint. Accordingly, the NLRC did not abuse its discretion when it affirmed LA Abdon' s dismissal of the second
complaint for illegal dismissal. Azuelo' s filing of a second complaint for illegal dismissal against ZAMECO based on the same
allegations cannot be permitted lest the rule on res judicata be transgressed.

"Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term
literally means a 'matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment.' The principle bars a subsequent suit involving
the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that 'public policy requires that controversies
must be settled with finality at a given point in time."'22

Azuelo's insistence that the dismissal of his first complaint by LA Bactin was without prejudice since he was not remiss in
pursuing his complaint for illegal dismissal is plainly untenable. To stress, the Order dated November 6, 2006 was unqualified;
hence, the dismissal is deemed with prejudice pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. In any case, the Court finds
Azuelo's failure to file his position paper, despite ample opportunity therefor, unjustified. On this score, LA Abdon' s observation is
instructive, thus:

That complainant failed to prosecute his action for unreasonable length of time before Labor Arbiter Bactin is supported by the
records of the case. Records show that as early as July 14, 2006, complainant was already required to submit his position paper
on said date. However, instead of submitting one, he requested for "more time" or until August 4, 2006 within which to submit his
position paper x x x. Came August 4, 2006, complainant failed to submit the required position paper and again requested for an
extension of time until August 22, 2006. The reason given was due [to] "voluminous workload" xx x. Despite the extensions given
to complainant, the latter failed to submit his position paper on due date. Instead, what complainant submitted on August 22,
2006 is a Motion For the Issuance of Order Directing Respondent to Furnish Complainant The Complete Copy of Investigation
Report. As correctly ruled by Labor Arbiter Abdon, the filing of the said motion is of no moment. The fact remains that more than
one (1) month has already lapsed from the time complainant was first required to submit his position paper on July 14, 2006 up to
the last extension on August 22, 2006. Further, if complainant really intends to prosecute his case within the reasonable time, he
should not have waited for August 22, 2006 to file said motion.

It is also worth stressing that under Section 7, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, parties are directed to submit position
paper within an inextendible period of ten (10) calendar days from the date of termination of the mandatory conciliation and
mediation conference. Clearly, complainant went beyond this period.23 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

If indeed Azuelo could not prepare his position paper due to the alleged refusal of ZAMECO to furnish him with its investigation
report on his dismissal, he should have immediately sought the issuance of an order directing ZAMECO to produce the said
investigation report. However, Azuelo only moved for the production of the investigation report on the due date of the third
extension of time granted him by LA Bactin to submit his position paper. It is thus apparent that Azuelo's motion seeking the
production of the investigation report is merely a ruse to further extend the period given to Azuelo within which to submit his
position paper.
Nonetheless, Azuelo contended that technical rules of procedure, such as the rule on dismissals of actions due to the fault of the
plaintiff under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, does not apply to proceedings before the LAs and the NLRC. Hence,
Azuelo claimed, LA Abdon erred in dismissing his second complaint for illegal dismissal.

The Court does not agree.

Indeed, technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. The LAs and the NLRC are mandated to use every and all
1âwphi1

reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of the law or
procedure.24 Nevertheless, though technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves, they are necessary for an effective
and expeditious administration of justice.25

The non-applicability of technical rules of procedure in labor cases should not be made a license to disregard the rights of
employers against unreasonable and/or unjustified claims. Azuelo was given sufficient chances to establish his claim against
ZAMECO, which he failed to do when he did not submit his position paper despite several extensions granted him. He cannot
now be allowed to raise anew his supposed illegal dismissal as it would be plainly unjust to ZAMECO. It bears stressing that the
expeditious disposition of labor cases is mandated not only for the benefit of the employees, but of the employers as well.

It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic
inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put up the two parties on relatively
equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but
never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer, Justicia remini regarda est (Justice is to be denied
to none).26

Lastly, the Court notes that Azuelo sought the wrong remedy in assailing the Order dated November 6, 2006 issued by LA
Bactin. Considering that the dismissal of Azuelo's first complaint was already an adjudication on the merits, he should have filed
a verified memorandum of appeal with the RAB of the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga within 10 calendar days from
receipt of the said order pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 20

AB) of the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga a Complaint6 for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of benefits against ZAMECO. The complaint was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB III-03-
9912-06 and was assigned to Labor Arbiter (LA) Mariano" L. Bactin (LA Bactin). After several
mediations, LA Bactin ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers on July 14,
2006.

On July 14, 2006, Azuelo, instead of submitting his position paper, moved that the submission of his
position paper be extended to August 4, 2006, which was granted by LA Bactin. On August 4, 2006,
Azuelo again failed to submit his position paper. LA Bactin then directed Azuelo to submit his
position papers on August 22, 2006. On the said date, Azuelo, instead of submitting his position
paper, moved for the issuance of an order directing ZAMECO to furnish him with a complete copy of
the investigation report as regards his dismissal. ZAMECO opposed the said motion, asserting that it
has already furnished Azuelo with a copy of its investigation report.

On November 6, 2006, LA Bactin issued an Order,7 which reads:

Record shows that respondent has already filed its position paper while complainant, despite ample
opportunity given him, failed to file his[,] leaving this office with no option but to dismiss this case for
lack of interest.

WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby dismissed for lack of[merit].

SO ORDERED.8
Azuelo received a copy of LA Bactin's Order dated November 6, 2006 on November 17, 2006. On
November 21, 2006, Azuelo again filed a complaint with the RAB of the NLRC in San Fernando City,
Pampanga for illegal dismissal with money claims against ZAMECO, containing the same
allegations in his first complaint. The case was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-11-10779-06
and was assigned to LA Reynaldo V. Abdon (LA Abdon).

On December 20, 2006, ZAMECO filed a Motion to Dismiss9 the second complaint filed by Azuelo on
the ground of res judicata. ZAMECO pointed out that Azuelo had earlier filed a similar complaint,
which was dismissed by LA Bactin due to his unreasonable failure to submit his position paper
despite ample opportunity given to him by LA Bactin. ZAMECO likewise averred that Azuelo should
have appealed from LA Bactin's Order dated November 6, 2006 instead of filing a complaint for
illegal dismissal anew.

ground of due process in order to procure the publication of several Presidential

Decrees in the Official Gazette.

STATCON ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “unless otherwise provided”

disregards the requirement of publication

HELD (for statcon issue): The phrase “unless otherwise provided,” does not
disregard the requirement for publication. If publication was dispensed there would
be no basis for Article 3 of the Civil Code. Other than that, non-publication would
be violative of due process since it deprives people of the opportunity to be notified
of newly enacted laws.
 Unless laws are published, there will no basis for the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. (Article 2, Civil Code).
- The basis that is mentioned here is the CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published.

Section 6, Article IV (1973 Constitution) – right to be informed

MANILA, Philippines (UPDATED) – A group of inmates from the New Bilibid Prison
(NBP) filed the first petition before the Supreme Court seeking to nullify provisions of the
new Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act 10592 or what is now
better known as the Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) law.

The petitioners are a group of inmates convicted in the 90s for crimes such as rape,
murder and homicide.

The inmates filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition on September 24, which
sought to invalidate provisions of the new IRR that excluded heinous crime inmates
from the benefits of GCTA and other time allowances like special time allowance for
loyalty (STAL.)
The petitioners said that excluding heinous crimes from GCTA, STAL and Time
Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring (TASTM) should be "invalid..for going
beyond the law and for being tantamount to executive legislation."

NB: Closed book policy shall be observed during class. Only handwritten notes will
be allowed.

X. General Principles of Criminal Law

A. Nature and definition
People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA
493
Ient v. Tullett Prebon, G.R. No. 189158, 11 January 2017
B. Characteristics of Criminal Law
1. General (Art. 2, RPC)
2. Territorial (Art.2, RPC)
People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, 30 August 2001, 364 SCRA
10
3. Prospective (Article 21 and 22, RPC)
a. Effects of repeal
C. Sources of Criminal Law
1. Revised Penal Code
2. Special Penal Laws

Ordinance and resolution, distinguished: An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Original action for expropriation before the Pasig RTC.

FACTS

 October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City (MANDA) issued Resolution
No. 396, S-1994 authorizing then MAYOR Benjamin ABALOS to institute expropriation
proceedings over the property of Alberto SUGUITAN.



 power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint with the
proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of just compensation to
which the defendant is entitled.
NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN LGC & LGC-IRR

 Manda: A resolution is enough under the LGC-IRR. Art. 36 (a), Rule VI provides that if the LGU fails to
acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, it may expropriate said
property through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation
proceedings.
 SC: This has been settled in Mun. of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty: “§ 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely
prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law
is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides,
what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since
Art. 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive
of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.”
SC remains aware of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, but judicial sanction cannot be granted
to a LGU's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention

CASE 7. GERARDO VILLASENOR and RODEL DE MESA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

Special Prosecutor LOUELLA OCO-PESQUERRA

Facts:

In the wee hours of Aug 18, 2001, the Quezon City Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting to
the death of 74 people and injuries to others.

Petitioners Villasenor and De Mesa, are facing criminal charges of multiple homicide
through reckless imprudence and violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Policies
Act). Aside from that, being public officials, they were also charged administratively with gross
negligence, gross misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. The
cases were filed before the Sandiganbayan.

In line with the administrative case, the petitioners were preventively suspended for 6 mos.

During the pendency of the criminal case, respondent prosecutor Oco-Pesquerra filed a
motion for suspension.

Petitioners opposed the motion, contending that they had already been suspended for 6
mos relative to the administrative case. They argued that any preventive suspension in the
criminal case would be absorbed by the 6-month preventive suspension in the admin case.

Respondent court granted the prosecution’s motion and ordered the preventive
suspension of petitioners for 90 days.
Issue: WON the preventive suspension in line with the criminal case considered as penalty?

Ruling: No

RULING:
 Assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is acquitted of the
ten counts for insufficiency of evidence but is ordered to pay P500,000 to the private respondent, with
12% interest per annum from the date of finality of judgment.

RATIO:
1. NO. The court did not err in not granting retroactive effect to R.A. 7691.

A penal law, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for its violations. It also
defines crime, treats of its nature and provides for its punishment. R.A. No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or
provides penalties for its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment. Consequently,
R.A. No. 7691 is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not apply in the present case.

R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129, and vested on the Metropolitan, Municipal
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts jurisdiction to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6)
years. Since R.A. No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that said law is substantive.

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. R.A. No. 7691 was not yet in force at the time
of the commencement of the cases in the trial court. It took effect only during the pendency of the appeal before
the Court of Appeals. There is therefore no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 7691 should be retroactively
applied to this case and the same be remanded to the MTC. The Court has held that a "law vesting additional
jurisdiction in the court cannot be given retroactive effect”.

2. NO. The appellate court did not err in construing B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner: That because penal statutes must be strictly construed and resolved in favor of the accused, the
“insufficiency” of funds referred to in B.P. Blg. 22 must not be made to cover those accounts that are “closed” or
declared to have “no funds.” Post-dated checks, not being drawn payable on demand but rather on a fixed date,
should also be considered as ordinary and not special bills of exchange.

 Lozano v Martinez: Thrust of the Bouncing Checks law is to prohibit the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation as their effects directly affect public interest. Such intent
is reiterated in Cueme v People and in Recuerdo v People.
 Claim on “closed accounts” not being included in the coverage of the B.P. has no merit in view of
the legislative intent of the law which is to protect the interest of the community at large.
 People v Nitafan: The law does not distinguish but merely provides that any person who
makes/draws and issues any check knowing that he does not have enough funds shall be
punished.

3. YES. The notice of dishonor to the drawer is important.

Petitioner: That no notice of dishonor had been given to her as drawer of the dishonored checks, pursuant to the
requirement expressly provided in B.P. Blg. 22.

 Elements for conviction of violation of B.P. Blg. 22:

a) Accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value.
b) Accused knows at the time of issuance that he/she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with, the drawee bank for payment of the check in full upon its presentment.
c) The check is subsequently dishonored.

 For liability to attach, it is not enough for prosecution to simply prove that the checks were
subsequently dishonored. Prosecution must also prove awareness/knowledge of the accused at
the time of issuance.
- Basis of Yu Oh’s awareness of the lack/insufficiency was a line in her Counter-Affidavit where she
declares that she told the general manager that “the actual status of the checks that the same
might not be able to cover the amount of the said checks so stated therein [sic].”
 Presumption (provided in Sec. 2, B.P. Blg. 22) of knowledge cannot arise if such notice of non-
payment by the bank is not sent to the maker/drawer.
Jurisprudence has shown that notice of dishonor is vital insomuch as Sec. 2, B.P. Blg. 22
provides

STRICTLY CONSTRUED

PENAL LAWS

1. INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG v

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall
have passed into the possession of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living

together.

For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the
husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives
of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created
such relationship by affinity?
 Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?

Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law,
William Sato, a Japanese national.

Mediatrix alleged that Sato, by means of deceit, defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG. The said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who was already
then blind and 79 years old to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November
24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said
document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her four properties all located at
Tagaytay City.

And once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties,

said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.

Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-
in- law, was an exempting circumstance.

The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.

In an order dated April 17, 2006, the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the
criminal case.

Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, however dismissed it.

CA: There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from
criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies
to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita

Meaning of "at the time of his trial for one crime."

The phrase "at the time of his trial" should not be restrictively construed as
to mean the date of arraignment. It is employed in its general sense,
including the rendering of the judgment. It is meant to include everything
that is done in the course of the trial, from
ARTICLE/TOPIC CASE/DOCTRINE
General Principles People vs Genosa (Battered
Woman Syndrome)
Characteristics of Criminal Law
General NCC Art.14 – applicable to all
who live and sojourn the PH
Territorial Art. 2
People vs Tulin (Piracy – in high
seas)
Prospective Art 22 – exception.
effects of repeal
Constitutional Limitations White Light vs Manila (hotels)
Estrada vs Escritor (Jehovah’s
witness conjugal arrangement)
People vs Echagaray (raped
10yr old daughter – death
penalty– not excessive
People vs Ferrer
US vs Diaz Conde (usury law.
Prospectively. Not liable.)
Construction and Interpretation Pro reo doctrine
HELD/MEANING
(?) Classical Theory – basis:
free will. Presumed to have
acted with freedom, intelligence
and intent.
BWS 2 cycles of 3 phases:
1. tension-building
2. acute battering
3. tranquil, loving
-insufficient evidence on 3rd
Self-defense
1. Unlawful aggression
2. Reasonable means
3. Lack of provocation
-no unlawful aggression
1. General
2. Territorial
3. Perspective
Exceptions:
1. Treaties
2. Law of preferential app
3. Public International Law
offense while on a Philippine
ship?
piracy is an exemption to the
territoriality rule
retroactive when it favors the
accused unless habitual
delinquent
1. Due process and equal
protection
2. freedom of expression
3. freedom of religion
4. no excessive fines/ inhumane
punishments
5. non-imprisonment for
debt/poll tax
6. Bill of attainder
7. Ex-post facto laws
1. liberally in favor of the
accused

ART 1 Effectivity
ART 2 Territoriality
ART 3 Felonies
ART. 4 Criminal Liability
ART.5 Acts which should be
repressed but are not covered
by the law
ART. 8 Conspiracy
People vs Abilong (destierro.
“imprisonment”
People vs Formigones (killed his
wife. Not an imbecile)
January 1, 1932
Dolo
Culpa
People vs Guillen (tried to kill
President but killed other ppl)
He who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil
caused
Nullum crimen nulla poena sine
lege
Dura lex sed lex
Doctrine of Implied Conspiracy
Conspiracy
Proposal to commit a felony
2. Spanish over English text
3. Retroactive
4. Prescribed but undeserved
penalties
1. Freedom
2. Intelligence
3. Intent (Criminal
1. Freedom
2. Intelligence
3. Negligence/Imprudence
In culpable felonies, the injury
caused to another should be
unintentional, it being merely the
incident of another act
performed without malice
there is no crime when there is
no law punishing it
the law may be harsh but the
law is the law
-2 or more persons aimed acts
towards the accomplishment of
an unlawful act
although independent but
actually connected
TRIC-SM
DEAR ATe
TRIC