PEOPLE V.
JOCELYN ACBANGIN Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the property as it was only to
Accused was convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Two days
after the taking of the child, she informed the child’s parents of the whereabouts
of the child.
HELD:
In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether
there was actual deprivation of the child’s liberty and whether it was the intention
of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. The child in this
case was deprived of liberty. True, she was treated well, however, there is still
kidnapping. For there to be kidnapping, it is not necessary that the victim be
placed in an enclosure. It is enough that the victim is restrained from going
home. The intention to deprive the child’s parents of her custody is indicated by
the accused’s hesitation for 2 days to disclose the whereabouts of the child and
more so by her actual taking of the child. Accused’s motive at this point is not
relevant. It is not an element of the crime. The fact that she later on felt remorse
and showed the child’s parents where the former was, cannot absolve her. At that
point, the crime was consummated.
The testimony of the child is also credible. A witness’ young age will not deter
him or her from being a competent and credible witness. To be a competent child
witness, the following must be met: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of
recollection; (c) capacity of communication
BARSOBIA v CUENCO
The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining
parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis
Oriental (now Camiguin province).
The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado, who had
sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, who
were Filipino citizens.
Epifania who was then a widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong
King Po who later took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits of the property.
Ong King Po later litigated the property to Victoriano Cuenco, a naturalized
Filipino who immediately took possession of the property.
Epifania later usurped the controverted property who later sold one-half of the
property to Pacita Vallar.
evidence her indebtedness to Ong King Po.
Cuenco then filed a case for Forcible Entry against Epifania before the MTC
which was later dismissed since the question of possession could not be properly
determined without first settling the issue on ownership.
Cuenco later filed a case in the CFI for recovery of possession and ownership of
the said land. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of Epifania and Vallar.
The CA later reversed the Decision decreeing instead that Cuenco was the owner
of the litigated property.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the property? CUENCO.
HELD:
No private lands shall be transferred or conveyed to aliens.
There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by
Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning, because it
was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution,
which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos.
Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been
declared entitled to the litigated land.
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent,
as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property.
There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania
to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights
of ownership to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had
slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the
litigated property.
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.
LUZ FARMS v SEC of DAR
PEOPLE v PURISIMA
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila,
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General,
are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with
"illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above
issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be
recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a
common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.
ISSUES:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under
Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's
residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary
tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon
was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous
weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case
of statutory construction.
HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER
AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can
be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions
stated therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful,
evil, and injurious consequence
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of
Samar
Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the
accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential
Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said
informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing
the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts
constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential
element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence
of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of,
connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081
which seeks to maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The noninclusion of the
aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other legislation related to
the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned
that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was
intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is
not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum
prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The
City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and
that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.
ISSUE:
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 9?
HELD:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to
be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly.
3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of
such decree is to penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to
suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble
is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The
preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
CHAN v. KEH
Facts: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese
occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the
Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue
hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of
the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government
under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese
occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which
he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without
legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation,
those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a
de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving
their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless
suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during
war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds
of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the
laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for
MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase
“processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all
other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military
occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial
proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the
occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of
international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular
construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the
court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of
the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog
the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should
not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase
“processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are
continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from
him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as
required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established
continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT
CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the
Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of
Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them
have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue
exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending
therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished
or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said
government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws
continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be
applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law
of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending
before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets
possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains
itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade
and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government
of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants
of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state
PEPSI v SEC of LABOR
Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (PCEU) filed a petition for
certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining
agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines (Pepsi). The petition was granted,
but with the explicit statement that PCEU was affiliated with Union de Obreros
Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file unions, the PCLU and
the PEUP.
Pepsi then filed a petition for cancellation with the BLR against PCEU, on the
grounds that: (a) the members of PCEU were managers and (b) a supervisors'
union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the rank and file
union of the same company. It also filed an urgent ex-parte motion to suspend the
certification election.
PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, did not
prohibit a local union composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated to
a federation which has local unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates.
Furthermore, Book V, Rule II, Section 7 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code provides the grounds for cancellation of the registration certificate of
a labor organization, and the inclusion of managerial employees is not one of the
grounds.
However, on 1992, or before the SC decision, the PCEU issued a resolution
withdrawing from the UOEF.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PCEU may be affiliated with the rankand-file unions.
HELD:
PCEU's withdrawal from the affiliation made the case moot and academic. But for
the guidance of others similarly situated, the Court ruled No.
If the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with
the rank and file or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent
conflicting interests, then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to
affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where
that federation actively participates in union activity in the company.
The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-
file union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for
membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of
rank and file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this
case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they
directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.
In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on
the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its
interests are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if
these employees themselves are union members. It is the same reason that
impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included
in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential
employees were written in the provision. Said employees may act as spies of
either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
GORDON v VERIDIAN