4. People vs. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 131588 (2001) ***Read case for facts
Facts:
 On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum Highway in Cagayan de
Oro City, a team of PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course were
performing an Endurance Run.
 They were jogging at the right side of the lane. A speeding Isuzu Elf ran into them,
resulting to deaths and injuries. The accused surrendered to the Governor, and
was eventually convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and
Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to death by the Trial Court. Hence,
this automatic review.
Issue: Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to kill the policemen, or a mere
reckless imprudence
Held:
 From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic
event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on
Glenn’s part. First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita,
the place of the incident was "very dark," as there was no moon.
 And according to PAGASA’s observed weather report within the vicinity of
Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took
place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no break in the thick clouds
covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon and stars
to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.
 Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts,
black short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to
make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized
vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.
 Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the
other hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as
Glenn’s vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as
Glenn’s truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles
from behind.
 Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut Glenn’s testimony that he
had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming
vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have
been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle
when he plowed into the group of police trainees. Indeed, as pointed out by
appellant, instinct tells one “to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees
a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and
more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for
GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young
children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group
with his truck.
 We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of
persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony.
It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe
to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting
them with intent to kill. Glenn’s offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve
his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the movement he heard and felt the first
bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would have been spared.
 The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a
prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
 GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
 Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his
employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition;
and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
 GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should
have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon
hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his
own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going
downward; and, worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should
have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent
man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left
side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that
a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was
driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits,
this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing circumstances
and conditions at the time.
 Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the
result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
5. Mercury Drug vs. Baking, G.R. No. 156037 (2007
Facts:
 Sometime in 25 November 1993, Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr.
Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG, and several
examininations, Dr. Sy found the respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were
above normal.
consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular
accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful in
reading the prescription. Without the potent effect of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet,
it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in
collision. Petition DENIED.

 The doctor then prescribed two medical prescriptions- Diamicron for the blood
sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to Mercury
Drug Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines.

 The sales lady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for
Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware
of the wrong medicine, he took one pill on three consecutive days.

 On the third day he took the medicine, he met an accident while driving his car. He
fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision nor
felt its impact.

 Suspecting the tablet he took, respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked
after finding that what was sold was Dormicum instead of Diamicron. He filed the
present complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial court favored the
defendant which was affirmed by the CA hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is negligent, and if so, is the negligence the proximate
cause of the accident

Ruling:

 Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage suffered by the plaintiff,
2. fault or negligence of the defendant, 3. connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest.

 Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling the wrong

prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death
for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in
dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave
respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the physician.

 Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s
negligence in driving his car. Proximate cause is that cause, which in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred

 Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
6. Board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw, 20 SCRA 987 (1967)
 FACTS:
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO, for short) was chartered as a non-
profit governmental organization on avowedly for the protection, preservation and
development of the coconut industry in the Philippines. On August 1, 1946,
NACOCO's charter was amended [Republic Act 5] to grant that corporation the
express power to buy and sell copra. The charter amendment was enacted to
stabilize copra prices, to serve coconut producers by securing advantageous
prices for them, to cut down to a minimum, if not altogether eliminate, the margin
of middlemen, mostly aliens. General manager and board chairman was Maximo
M. Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were members of the
Board; defendant Leonor Moll became director only on December 22, 1947.
NACOCO, after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra trading
activities.
 RULING:
An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from fulfilling the
contracts it entered into. Nature supervened. Four devastating typhoons visited the
Philippines in 1947. When it became clear that the contracts would be unprofitable,
Kalaw submitted them to the board for approval. It was not until December 22,
1947 when the membership was completed. Defendant Moll took her oath on that
date. A meeting was then held. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation,
apprised the board of the impending heavy losses. No action was first taken on the
contracts but not long thereafter, that is, on January 30, 1948, the board met again
with Kalaw, Bocar, Garcia and Moll in attendance. They unanimously approved the
contracts hereinbefore enumerated.
 3 methods by which corporation may wind up it its affairs:
As was to be expected, NACOCO but partially performed the contracts. The buyers
threatened damage suits, some of which were settled. But one buyer, Louis
Dreyfus & Go. (Overseas) Ltd., did in fact sue before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The cases culminated in an out-of- court amicable settlement when the
Kalaw management was already out.
 With particular reference to the Dreyfus claims, NACOCO put up the defenses that:
 the contracts were void because Louis Dreyfus & Co. (Overseas) Ltd. did not
have license to do business here; and
 failure to deliver was due to force majeure, the typhoons. All the settlements
sum up to P1,343,274.52.
In this suit started in February, 1949, NACOCO seeks to recover the above
sum of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board chairman Maximo M.
Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges
Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Article
2176, new Civil Code); and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with
bad faith and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts. By
Executive Order 372, dated November 24, 1950, NACOCO, together with
other government-owned corporations, was abolished, and the Board of
Liquidators was entrusted with the function of settling and closing its affairs.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI-Manila: dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff was ordered to pay the heirs of Maximo
Kalaw the sum of P2,601.94 for unpaid salaries and cash deposit due the deceased
Kalaw from NACOCO.
ISSUE:
1. Whether plaintiff Board of Liquidators has lost its legal personality to continue with
this suit since the three-year period has elapsed, the Board of Liquidators may not
now continue with, and prosecute, the present case to its conclusion
2. Whether the action is unenforceable against Kalaw
3. whether the case at bar is to be taken out of the general concept of the powers of
a general manager, given the cited provision of the NACOCO by-laws requiring
prior directorate approval of NACOCO contracts.
4. Whether damages should be awarded
1. No, the provision should be read not as an isolated provision but in conjunction
with the whole. So reading, it will be readily observed that no time limit has been
tacked to the existence of the Board of Liquidators and its function of closing the
affairs of the various government owned corporations, including NACOCO.
The President thought it best to do away with the boards of directors of the defunct
corporations; at the same time, however, the President had chosen to see to it that
the Board of Liquidators step into the vacuum. And nowhere in the executive order
was there any mention of the lifespan of the Board of Liquidators.
1. Voluntary dissolution, "such disposition of its assets as justice requires,
and may appoint a receiver to collect such assets and pay the debts of
the corporation;
2. Corporate existence is terminated - "shall nevertheless be
continued as a body corporate for three years after the time when it
would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and of enabling it gradually to settle
and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to
divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the
business for which it was established;"
3. corporation, within the three year period just mentioned, "is authorized
and empowered to convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of
members, stockholders, creditors, and others interested
 Corpus Juris Secundum likewise is authority for the statement that "[t]he
dissolution of a corporation ends its existence so that there must be
statutory authority for prolongation of its life even for purposes of pending
litigation

Board of Liquidators escapes from the operation thereof for the reason that
"[o]bviously, the complete loss of plaintiff's corporate existence after the expiration
 of the period of three (3) years for the settlement of its affairs is what impelled the
President to create a Board of Liquidators, to continue the management of such
matters as may then be pending."
The Board of Liquidators thus became the trustee on behalf of the government. It
was an express trust. The legal interest became vested in the trustee — the Board
of Liquidators. The beneficial interest remained with the sole stockholder — the
government. At no time had the government withdrawn the property, or the
authority to continue the present suit, from the Board of Liquidators. If for this
reason alone, we cannot stay the hand of the Board of Liquidators from
prosecuting this case to its final conclusion. The provisions of Section 78 of the
Corporation Law — the third method of winding up corporate affairs — find
application.
2. Action against the Kalaw heirs and, for the matter, against the Estate of Casimiro
Garcia survives.
 claims that are barred if not filed in the estate settlement proceedings(Rule
87, sec. 5)
> actions that are abated by death are:
(1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the
decedent;
(2) judgments for money; and
(3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract
express or implied."
 it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must
arise from "contract express or implied"
 actions that survive and may be prosecuted against the executor or
administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1)
> 1. actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant (as in the case
at bar) survive the death of the latter.
 actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are:
(1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate;
(2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
(3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property.
3. The movement of the market requires that sales agreements be entered into, even
though the goods are not yet in the hands of the seller. Known in business parlance
as forward sales, it is concededly the practice of the trade. Above all, NACOCO's
limited funds necessitated a quick turnover. Copra contracts then had to be
executed on short notice — at times within twenty-four hours. To be appreciated
then is the difficulty of calling a formal meeting of the board
 So pleased was NACOCO's board of directors that, on December 5, 1946, in
Kalaw's absence, it voted to grant him a special bonus "in recognition of the signal
achievement rendered by him in putting the Corporation's business on a self-
sufficient basis within a few months after assuming office, despite numerous
handicaps and difficulties."
These previous contract it should be stressed, were signed by Kalaw without prior
authority from the board. Existence of such authority is established, by proof of the
course of business, the usage and practices of the company and by
the knowledge which the board of directors has, or must be presumed to have, of
acts and doings of its subordinates in and about the affairs of the corporation.
 If the by-laws were to be literally followed, the board should give its stamp of prior
approval on all corporate contracts. But that board itself, by its acts and through
acquiescence, practically laid aside the by-law requirement of prior approval.
 Under the given circumstances, the Kalaw contracts are valid corporate acts. Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong;
it means breach of a known duty thru some motive or interest or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. Applying this precept to the given facts
herein, we find that there was no "dishonest purpose," or "some moral
obliquity," or "conscious doing of wrong," or "breach of a known duty," or
"Some motive or interest or ill will" that "partakes of the nature of fraud."
4. No. This is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong
is here absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is
wanting. Of course, Kalaw could not have been an insurer of profits. He could not
be expected to predict the coming of unpredictable typhoons. And even as
typhoons supervened Kalaw was not remissed in his duty. He exerted efforts to
stave off losses. That Kalaw cannot be tagged with crassa negligentia or as much
as simple negligence, would seem to be supported by the fact that even as the
contracts were being questioned in Congress and in the NACOCO board itself,
President Roxas defended the actuations of Kalaw.
It is a well known rule of law that questions of policy of management are left solely
to the honest decision of officers and directors of a corporation, and the court is
without authority to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the board of
directors; the board is the business manager of the corporation, and so long as it
acts in good faith its orders are not reviewable by the courts."