G.R. No.

138896 June 20, 2000

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner,

vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO,
TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO,
LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD
SYLIANCO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the

jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the March 29, 1999 Order1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City (Branch 58) in Civil Case No. CEB-21978, in which it
dismissed a Complaint for eminent domain. It ruled as follows:
Premises considered, the motion to dismiss is hereby granted on the ground that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the Orders dated February 19, 1999 and February 26,
1999, as well as the Writ of Possession issued by virtue of the latter Order are hereby recalled for
being without force and effect.2
Petitioner also challenges the May 14, 1999 Order of the RTC denying reconsideration.
The Facts

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1)3 a Complaint
to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed
the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an
exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation.
In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such
power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action
for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court and not with this Court."4
Assailed RTC Ruling

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would
determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the
action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than
P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax Declaration of the land
involved that its assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00).
Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to,
or possession of, real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property
involved is located.
The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action
affecting title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property
involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That the right of eminent domain or
condemnation of real, property is included in a real action affecting title to or possession of real
property, is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus, "Real actions are those affecting title
to or possession of real property. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosures of
mortgage on, real property. . . ."5
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law.6 In a
Resolution dated July 28, 1999, the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being posted out of
time on July 2, 1999, the due date being June 2, 1999, as the motion for extension of time to file
petition was denied in the resolution of July 14, 1999."7 In a subsequent Resolution dated
October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated the Petition.8
Issue

In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for the consideration of this Court:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation
where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos?9
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Jurisdiction over an Expropriation Suit

In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . ." It argues that the present action involves
the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title
to or possession of real property. Thus, they argue that the case should have been brought before
the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as amended by Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. This law provides that
MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions that involve title to or
possession of real property, the assessed value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
test to determine whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this wise:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment
of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class
cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law
has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest
courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating
jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901). 10
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money.
Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private
property for public use. 11 In National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 12 the Court ruled that
expropriation proceedings have two phases:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action
and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before
the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. " This is done by the
Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be
final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be
done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of
private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity
of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. 1 In the main, the subject of an
expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it.1avvphi1 This, however, is merely incidental
to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with
the propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings
are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," 14 the forerunners of the regional trial
courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like
BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all
civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." 15 The
1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential
precedents.
We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that the present action involves the title to or
possession of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an
eminent authority in remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples
of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of land. 16
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal
actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of
courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases
is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private
property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents' title
to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the
government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent
sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the
public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." 17
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016

FILOMENA CABLING, Petitioner, v. RODRIGO DANGCALAN, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 declaring void for lack jurisdiction the Decision2 issued by the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Malitbog-Tomas Oppus, Southern Leyte, as well as the Decision3
rendered by Branch 25, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.

Antecedent Facts

This case stemmed from the Complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed by Filomena
Cabling (petitioner) against Rodrigo Dangcalan (respondent) over respondent's alleged
encroachment on petitioner's property.

In her Complaint,4 petitioner alleged that she owned a 125-square-meter parcel of land located at
San Vicente, Malitbog, Southern Leyte. It was denominated as Lot No. 5056 and had an assessed
value of P2,100. Adjoining her property was a parcel of land that respondent had bought from her
brother, Gerardo Montajes. Despite knowing the boundaries of their respective properties,
however, respondent constructed a perimeter fence that encroached on petitioner's land. After
several unheeded demands for respondent to remove the encroachment and a failed conference
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, petitioner filed the Complaint before the MCTC in May
2001.5chanrobleslaw

Respondent denied any encroachment on petitioner's property and raised prescription as an

affirmative defense.6 He claimed that he had constructed the perimeter fence together with his
house way back in 1987, and that petitioner knew about it. She had actually observed some phases
of the construction to ensure that it would not exceed their property boundaries. Yet, petitioner
filed her Complaint only in 2001, which was beyond the 10-year period for acquisitive
prescription under Article 1134 of the New Civil Code.7chanrobleslaw

Rulings of the MCTC and the RTC

After trial, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. Relying on the sketch plan and the
testimony of the court-appointed commissioner, it ruled that respondent's perimeter fence had
indeed encroached on some 13 square meters of petitioner's property. The court further ruled that
respondent was a builder in bad faith, because he did not verify the actual boundaries of the lot
that he had purchased from petitioner's brother. Respondent had the lot titled under his name in
1988, but it was surveyed only in August 2001.8chanrobleslaw

The dispositive portion of the MCTC Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant of the following to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Surrendering the defendant's possession of the portion of land in question to plaintiff, the true
owner of the portion of land, and as defendant is a builder in bad faith loses what was built on said
portion without right to indemnity. (Art. 448, Civil Code of the Philippines);

To pay the plaintiff of the monthly rental at P50.00 per month for the possession of said portion in
question starting from the time the defendant demanded by the plaintiff to vacate up to the time
the former actually vacate; and cralawlawlibrary

To pay the plaintiff for moral damages in the amount of P20,000, exemplary damages in the
amount of P10,000 and actual damages in the amount of P2,000.00 and

To pay the costs of suit.9

Upon appeal by respondent, however, the RTC ruled differently. Unlike the MCTC, it did not give
credence to the commissioner's sketch plan. The RTC noted that the sketch plan had no
accompanying Commissioner's Report, and that the basis of the survey was not clear. It also ruled
that the MCTC should have first ruled on the issue of prescription because respondent had raised it
in a timely manner, albeit via an Amended Answer.10chanrobleslaw
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the decision of the lower court declaring:
That the action has already prescribed and/or that plaintiff was already in laches when this action
was filed in 1990, and defendant has already acquired the portion in litigation by prescription;

That when defendant built the concrete perimeter fence on the lot in litigation in August 1987, he
was a builder in good faith;

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.11

CA Ruling

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the CA,12 raising the following
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE

PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND EXTINCTIVE
PRESCRIPTION.

II

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF THE
PETITIONER IS BARRED BY LACHES.

III

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS A

BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 24 January 2008, the CA denied the Petition and annulled both the RTC and MCTC Decisions
for lack of jurisdiction.14 Instead of ruling on the issues presented by petitioner, the appellate
court held that the threshold question was whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over petitioner's
complaint. After examining the averments therein, the CA ruled that the MCTC had no jurisdiction
because the Complaint was clearly an accion publiciana. As such, it was a plenary action for the
recovery of the real right of possession, which properly fell under the RTC's jurisdiction.
Accordingly, all proceedings in petitioner's Complaint, including her appeal before the RTC, were
invalid and the decisions rendered thereon could be struck down at any time.15chanrobleslaw

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Malitbog-Tomas Oppus, Southern Leyte dated June 2, 2004 and the January 17. 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 25, Maasin City reversing the
Decision of the MCTC are BOTH declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction, and the
instant Complaint for recovery of possession with damages is DISMISSED without
prejudice.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 1 April 2009, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.17 Hence, this Petition.

Issue

The only legal issue We shall resolve is whether the CA erred in f nullifying the RTC and the
MCTC Decisions on the ground that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over petitioner's Complaint for
accion publiciana.

Court Ruling

We GRANT the petition.

It is no longer good law that all cases for recovery of possession or accion publiciana lie with the
RTC, regardless of the value of the property.18chanrobleslaw

As early as 2001, this Court had already declared that all cases involving title to or possession of
real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000, if outside Metro Manila, fall under the
original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.19 This pronouncement was based on Republic
Act No. 7691,20 which was approved by Congress on 25 March 1994.

Jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein, as
set forth in Sections 19 (2) and 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129,21 as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, is as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x

(2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds [t]wenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(3)
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed [t]wenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
In Laresma v. Abellana,22 We clarified that the actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions
are accion publiciana and reivindicatoria. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint.
The Court explained further in Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and
Development Corporation23 that its jurisdiction would now be determined by the assessed value
of the disputed land, or of the adjacent lots if it is not declared for taxation purposes. If the
assessed value is not alleged in the complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The reason behind this rule is that the trial court is not afforded the means of
determining from the allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action pertains to it or to another court. After all, courts cannot take judicial notice of the
assessed or market value of lands.24chanrobleslaw

Clearly, the CA erred in nullifying both the RTC and the MCTC decisions.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations
in the complaint, as well as by the character of the reliefs sought. Once it is vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction remains vested in the trial court irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.25cralawred As the CA has correctly held, the allegations in the Complaint filed by
petitioner sufficiently made out a case for recovery of possession or accion publiciana. The same
cannot be said, however, of the ultimate outcome of her appeal from the RTC Decision. The
MCTC correctly exercised its exclusive and original jurisdiction in finding for petitioner as the
plaintiff. On the other hand, the appeal of respondent, as the defendant, properly fell under the
appellate jurisdiction of the RTC, under Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended. Hence, neither
decision can be struck down for being a total nullity.

Petitioner now argues that the CA's dismissal of her Complaint without prejudice to the filing of
another case before the RTC, would only force her to re-litigate the same issues that the MCTC
has already thoroughly considered. Additionally, she contends that the RTC Decision was not in
accord with the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code. She claims that respondent cannot
be deemed a builder in good faith, because he failed to verify the actual boundaries of his property
prior to the construction of his perimeter fence. Further, neither prescription nor laches applies,
because petitioner filed her Complaint in 2001, which was well within the 30-year prescriptive
period set forth in Article 1141 of the New Civil Code for real actions over immovables.26 For
these reasons, she urges us to reinstate the MCTC Decision.27chanrobleslaw

Respondent, on the other hand, has not filed any comment despite Our repeated directives to his
counsel on record.28chanrobleslaw
Suffice it to say that the errors ascribed by petitioner to the RTC Decision are factual issues that
properly belong to the jurisdiction of the CA. The test of whether a question is one of law or of
fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating
the evidence. If so, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.29chanrobleslaw

Good faith is a question of fact that must be proved.30 Similarly, the question of prescription of an
action involves the ascertainment of factual matters, such as the date when the period to bring the
action commenced to run.31chanrobleslaw

We resolve only questions of law; We do not try facts or examine testimonial or documentary
evidence on record.32 We may have at times opted for the relaxation of the application of
procedural rules, but We have resorted to this option only under exceptional circumstances, such
as when: (a) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) the CA's findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) the findings are conclusions without a citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; (j) the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (k)
the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.33chanrobleslaw

None of the above circumstances, however, are extant in this case. The simple reason is that the
CA opted to gloss over the factual issues raised by petitioner on the wrong premise that the
decisions of the trial courts were void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated 24 January 2008 and Resolution dated 1 April 2009 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88408 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for the prompt resolution of the case on the merits.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary