ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO SANCHEZ,

& MYRNA SANCHEZ vs CA, ROSALIA LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-

RANISES & ROBERTO LUGOD
G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalia is the only child of spouses Juan Sanchez
and Maria Villafranca while Arturo, Evelyn, and Roberto are the
legitimate children of Rosalia. Whereas, Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo,
and Myrna are the illegitimate children of Juan Sanchez. Maria died in
September 29, 1967.Then, on January 22, 1968, Rosalia filed a petition for
letters of administration over the estate of her mother and her father Juan
who was senile at that time. However, the petitioners, as heirs of Juan, filed
a petition for letter of administration over Juan’s estate of which was
opposed by the private respondent. But the two parties executed a
compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide the properties
therein of the spouses. Due to the missing properties in the compromise
agreement, the petitioners filed to submit a new inventory and filed a
motion to defer the agreement on the ground of fraud. The trial court ruled
in favor of the petitioners, making the respondent to file a motion for
reconsideration to CA. They dismissed it first and then they set aside
RTC’s decision and declared the compromise agreement valid and
binding.
ISSUE:
WON the Compromise agreement partitioning the property of the
estate without the approval of the probate court valid
RULING:
Yes. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement
as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Being a
consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the
parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. In the case
provided, the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid
compromise agreement where they negotiated its terms and provisions
for four months. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long
drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their
respective interests with the best they could, it is indubitable that the
parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. They should be bounded, in
order to be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real
claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto.
 MARCELO JERVOSO & NORMA CLOSA VS PEOPLE. & CA
G.R. No. 89306, September 13, 1990

FACTS:
RTC of Manila and the CA convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of
homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso; and convicted
Marcelo’s wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries committed against
the deceased. The RTC imposed the penalty of imprisonment and
ordered the petitioners to indemnify the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso
in the amount of P30,000. CA affirmed the order of indemnification.
ISSUE:
WON indemnity may be recovered by the heirs of R. Jervoso
despite the reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate
civil action against the accused.
RULING:
Yes. the Court Affirmed, except for the award of P30,000 as
indemnity for damages which should be deleted. Sec 1 Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court states that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Arts 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of
the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of the said civil actions separately
waives the others.
The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense
including consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide. Having
reserved and filed in the RTC Manila separate civil action to recover the
civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of
the deceased Rogelio, are not entitled from recovering damages in the
criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover
damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused.
 FLORENCE MALCAMPO- SIN VS. PHILIPP SIN
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS:
The petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in
January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In
June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its
trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson
filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that
he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate
therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more
was heard of him.

ISSUE:
WON the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the
absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.

HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition.
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment
or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”
The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as
the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence
that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-
law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, he went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, the couple got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a
month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return
by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money
for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but never responded. In 1991, she learned from
her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor
their child.
ISSUE:
WON Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligation.
HELD:
No. The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it
was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it
would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been
done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show
incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not
physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically
incapacitated.
 CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES,
GR No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

FACTS:
The plaintiff, a sister of the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains
that a donation made while they were living together without benefit of
marriage to the defendant was void. Defendant would uphold its
validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before
defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter's stand.
The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-
law spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary
to public policy”
ISSUE:
WON the ban on a donation between the spouses during a
marriage applies to a common-law relationship.
RULING:
The Court dismissed the petition.
The donation is void under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code
if it is made between the spouses during the marriage however, policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff
having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his
widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the... plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half
 FLORANTE MANACOP VS. CA and FF CRUZ & CO. INC
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a
residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner
failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment
signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein
(FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum
of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the
former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional
remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in
Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the
petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home
having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore
exempt from attachment.
ISSUE:
WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The petition was dismissed by SC.
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by
operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision
does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of
the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
 MERCEDES CRISTOBAL- CRUZ, ANSELMO CRISTOBAL & ELISA
CRISTOBAL- SIKAT V. EUROFISINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO
CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL & CA
G.R. No. 140422, August 7, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners claim that they are the legitimate children of
Buenaventura Cristobal (Buenaventura) during his first marriage to
Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents are also the
children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage
to Donata Enriquez where the former seeking for a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Damages. On June 18 1926, Buenaventura
purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters, and then he
died in the year 1930. Petitioners learned that private respondents had
executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and
transferred its title to their names. In the case of Mercedes who was born
on 31 January 1909, he produced a certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan attesting to the fact that records of her birth were
all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. Her claim was further
supported by witness Ester Santos testifying on petitioners’ relationship
with the deceased and they were living together alongside with the
private respondents.
ISSUES:
WON petitioners were able to prove their filiation with
Buenaventura.
RULING:
The Court granted the petition. In relation to Article 172 of the FC,
“Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,” may
consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation
respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of
RoC. In the present case, the baptismal certificates of the
petitioners were presented where it is one of the documentary evidences
to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the case
of Mercedes, she produced a certification stating that records of birth
were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. Petitioners likewise
presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners lived the
community where they reside as being the children of Buenaventura with
his first wife.
 REPUBLIC VS JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Respondent Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate before the RTC. She prayed to have her first name
changed from Jennifer to Jeff and her gender from female to male. She
alleged that is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a
rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and
female characteristics. The lower court decided in her favor but the OSG
appealed before the Supreme Court through a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law. The OSG
contends that the petition is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUES:
WON Cagandahan’s sex, and her first name as appearing in
her birth certificate can be changed.
HELD:
The Court Agrees.
Rule 108 no longer covers clerical or typographical errors. Where
it was amended by Republic Act No. 9048, which amended Article 376
and 412 of the Civil Code, where the correction or change of clerical or
typographical errors can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. Where the person
is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. It is
at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed. Furthermore, in the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will
not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's
sexuality and lifestyle preferences. Hence Cagandahan’s sex as
appearing in her birth certificate can be changed. Respondent's change
of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. This is proper since respondent's change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender.