Also published inthis series Theories of Ethics edited by Philippa Foot Knowledge and Belief edited by A. Phillips Griffiths The Philosophy of Sclence edited by P. H. Nidditch ‘The Theory of Meaning edited by G. H. R. Parkinson Political Philosophy edited by Anthony Quinton ‘Philosophical Logi edited by P. F. Strawson The Philosophy of Perception edited by G. J. Warnock The Philosophy of Action edited by Alan R. White Other volumes are in preparation THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS Eéited by JAAKKO HINTIKKA OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1969Oxford University Press, Ely House, London W.1 © oxronp university Press 1969 CONTENTS m. v. ML vu. van. a x x ‘Sewanee ENTAILMENT AND FORMAL DERIVABILITY byE. W. Beth “Tur Cowrveressss oF Tue Finst-Onpen FUNCTIONAL ‘CaLcutus by Leon Henkin ‘Covruzreness 1 THe Tatory oF Tyres by Leon Henkin [LANGUAGES IN wc SELF REFERENCE 8 PossteLe by Raymond M. Smullyan TwFoRMAL RIOOUR AND COMPLETENESS PROOFS by Georg Kreisel SysTEas oF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS by Solomon Feferman ‘AN InTERPRETATION OF THE INTUTIONISTIC SENTENTAL, ‘Looie by Kurt Gédet ‘Tue Prasenr Tisony oF Tunino Macuine Comrurantry by Hartley Rogers, Jr ‘Matueuarica Lootc: What HAs It Dove FoR THE Punvosopay oF Manisarics? (Excerpt) by Georg Kreis! ‘Tue Meramnsics or tie Catcutus by Abraham Robinson ‘Waar 1s Eusnenrany Growerny? by Alfred Tarski [Nomis on rte ConTmipuroRs oes oF Nass 2 st " 95 ur 153, 164 176 178 1sINTRODUCTION ‘ray seem strange o reprint the papers collected hereunder th itl "The Philosophy of Mathematics’. In the majority of ther, n0 specially philo- sophicl problems sem to be discused ‘Although this impression is not unfounded, in the presen circumstances the papers appearing here nevertheless exemplify the kind of reading which judge to be by far the most wseful for 8 student of the plilosophy of ‘mathematics. In these day, the worthwhile articles and books devoted to the philosophy of mathematics inthe narrow sense ofthe wordpilsophy” are few, and thee quality frequently leaves a great deal tobe desired. Often the reader soon discovers that such a book or article isnot based on any- thing ike the adequate acquaintance with the large and important body of ‘materials which s indispensabe for any future philosophy of mathematics, ‘namely the literature of symbolic logic and foundational stdies. I is not likely that any substantial progress can be made in the genuinely philo- sophical study of mathematics without using the concepts and results ‘developed in this literature to a much greater extent than has happened so far. However true it may be that no philosophical problems are solved by results in logic, not 10 use the wealth of material which is available here simply makes the discussion as unrealistic asa discussion of legal philo= Sophy would bei it were not based on any knowledge of the actual oper ‘ton of the la. Thus the most useful contibuton that a book of readings can make inthis area isto ensure that some ofthe recent result in logic tnd foundational studies are accessible to an interested reader. To do this Js the fist im ofthe present volume. ‘What, theo, are these philosophically relevant insights that a philos- ‘opher of mathematics ought to be interested in? This question cannot be answered adequately within te confines ofthis introduction, for ananswer ‘would amount o a survey of an extensive, rapidly growin, and complex field. Furthermore, about as good a survey as anyone ean hope to find already exists in Andree) Mostowski's volume Thirty Years of Foundational ‘Studies, listed in the bibliography at the end ofthis volume. (All other ‘references in this introduction are also to works listed inthe same bibio- raphy, unless otherwise specified) ‘What can be done here is 10 try to supply enough background for the ‘selections reprinted i this volume to enable a reader to make use of ther ‘The following informal sketch cannot help being loose and inaccurate. I have tried mainly fo indicate some ofthe most interesting interconnections2 INTRODUCTION between the diferent types of recent work represented here, and aio 10 mention a few recent developments which ate not represented in our selections Probably the mest important large-scale recent development in logic and foundational studies isthe growth ofthe theory which used to be known a8 logical semantics but whichis now usualy referred to as mode! theory. It ‘an be characterized, very roughly, as a study of the interrelations of Tanguage—usually a! precise logical symbolism—and the “reality” this language represents. The basic questions concer the conditions in which a formula can be suid to be true ina structure or ‘mode’ Simple a this ‘question may seem, it soon leads 1 interesting problems. One of them concerns the class of sentences true in all models—the class of logical truths, as they are usually called. Can this class be represented athe the- ‘orems of some axiomatic system? This completeness question is answered afirmaively for firstorder languages (quantifcatonal languages). The first proof was given by Gade in the early thirties, (See Kurt G&del, ‘Die Vollstindigkeit der Axiome des ogschen Funktionenkalkil', Monats- ef far Mathematik und Physik, Vol 37 (1930), pp. 349-80.) One of the ‘mos important subsequent proofs i given in Henkin’ fit paper reprinted in the preent volume. Henkins proofs interesting for several reasons, one ‘of which is his strategy of forming e sequence of certain maximal consistent sts of sentences whose union can thea be sen to be usable as a mode! in ‘hich al its members are true. Certain es of formulas thus exemplify the very structure which these formulae impose on the models in which they are true, It is known that no similar proof exists in higher-order logics. Logical ‘truths abou arbitrary sets, unlike logical ruth about arbitrary individuals, ‘cannot be axiomatize. This fllows from G8del's incompleteness proof for arithmetic, forall the requisite arithmetical assumptions are eatily ex- pressed in terms of higher-order logics. Most ofthe purportedly popular discussions of Géde!'s famous result are somewhat tnstiefactory, how lever. One of the best seifcontained expositions seems to be Raymond, ‘Smullyan's paper reprinted here. The whole complex of problems concer ing Gode's proof of the impossibility ofa consistency proof ofa system containing arithmetic within the same system is discussed in a wider per- spective in Feferman’s salient paper “Arthmetization of Metamathe- matics However, Henkin’s other paper reprinted here shows that completeness can be reached even in higher-order logis if we ae willing to admit ‘non- Standard models in which quantification over “all sets’ no longer refers to all arbitrary subsets of our domain of individuals but only to all members INTRODUCTION a ‘of some' ‘arbitrary’ subset ofthe power set ofthe set of individuals; and similarly for pairs, triples, et. These subsets cannot be completly abiteary, however, fr they must be rch enough tallow the interpretation of al out formulas (second-order formulas). This sa rather strong requirement, for it means intr alaclosure wih espect to the ‘projective’ operations that correspond to different kinds of quantiation and no just with respect fo the Boolean operations. If this fact is overiooked, Henkin's completeness proof for type theory may give the impression that higher-order logics are ‘much simpler than they really are. Tie actual dic is illustrated, for example, by the complexity of the problem of extending the Gentzen- Herbrand techniques (10 be mentioned later) from first-order logic 10 higher-order logics. Takeut’s problem which is discussed in Schate, “Syntatial and Semantcal Properties’ and which ha only recently been partially solved (by Tait, Prawitz and others) sa cas in pont. ‘An intriguing aspect ofthe completeness and incompleteness results i that one of their starting-point (viz. our conoept of what constitutes com- pleteness) is inevitably an idea which ean perhaps be formulated in nave Set-theoretical terms bat which either is not formulated axiomatcally 10 ‘begin with or which (in the case of incompleteness) cannot even possibly be 0 formulated, Yet concepts of this kind are most intersting. We seem to hhave many clear intuitions concerning them, and itis important to develop ‘waysof handling them. Someaspectsofthissituationaredscusedin our first selection from Kreis, entitled ‘Informal Rigour and Completeness Proof ‘One might describe the phenomenon of incompleteness by saying that ‘one cannot axiomatcally rule out all non-standard models and catch oaly the intended ‘standard’ ones. The inevitable presence of non-standard ‘models can occasionally be turned into a blessing, however, 2% demon strated by Abraham Robinson's non-standard model for analysis. These models serve to vindicate some ofthe locations and idets ofthe old ‘metar physics ofthe calculus’ which meanvile have been relegated to the status ‘of hopelessly loose heuristic ideas. Even infnitesimals, the bugbear of every introductory calculus course, can thus be made perfecly respectable. Here is one of several recent developments that demonstrate scikingly the ‘elevance of current work t0 the tational issues in the philosophy of mathematics, ‘Completeness and incompleteness results are only samples, however, of the variety of results that have been obtained in model theory concerning ‘what can or cannot be expressed in diferent kinds of language and con- czming the variety of models that a theory can or cannot have. These insights into the limits of what can be expresed in diferent kinds of languages ae among the most important recent developments in the whole‘ INTRODUCTION tea of logic and foundations, and deserve mote attention than has been ven to them by philosophers. The only result that has provoked much Dhilosophial discussion i the Léwenheim-Skolem result that every axiomatizable first-order theory has a countable model. (For ie variants and generalizations, see Vaught’s 1964 paper.) The fact that this includes, systems of axiomatic set theory in which the existence of uncountable ses ‘an be proved is but a further instance of the dificult of ruling out n= desirable ‘non-standard’ models axiomatically, Other results are not much les interesting. A good example of them is Vaught’s survey of models of ‘compete theories, ‘Asillustated by the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem and by Gde!’s com- pleteness and incompleteness results, many ofthe earlier basic results of mode logic belong essentially to model theory. However, much of the ‘systematic development of this atea i relatively recent, often deriving its inspiration from Tarski Contributions tothe Theory of Models, etc.) and ‘Abraham Robinson. ‘Thedevelopment of model theory hasnot remained without repercussions {or the deetve techniques of first-order logic. The basic insights go back to Herbrand and Gentzen. Ther techniques were gradually adopted in the {orm of ‘natural deduction methods in many standard expositions, but an Interest in the underlying semantial ideas was not revived on a larget scale until 1955. Around that time, Hintkka, Beth, and Seite (inter alia) published treatments of firstorder logic in which the proof of logical truth of a first-order formula can be thought of as an unsuosesful attempt to describe a counter-example to it, These counter-example de- scriptions, reminiscent of Henkin’s completeness proof, could even be ‘thought of as actusl models in which the formula in question would be fase ‘The essential simplification lies inthe use of simpler descriptions of the ‘possible worlds" which would serve as counter-modele~descriptons simpler than Henkin’s very extensive maximal consistent sts. (This simplification is present also in Hintikka’s method, contrary to the i= pression which the concluding remarks of Beth's paper in the present, ‘olume might give) It is clear, however, that similar ideas were already inspiing Herbrand, although they were not developed systematically a the ‘Beth's paper included ere is the fst and perhaps the freshest, descrip- tion ofthe approach which he cals the method of semantical tableaux. A ‘completeness proof is sketched fr this method i his paper, and a number ‘of suggestive comparisons with other issues in logic and the philosophy of ‘mathematics are presented. “The basic idea of thinking of proof and disproofs as attempted mode! INTRODUCTION 5 constructions seems to me of great philosophical interest and importance. ‘The Herbrand-ype pont of vew hasin any cae led o fruitful and interest- Ing consequences especially inthe dretion of Craig's interpolation lemma {proved in is 1957 paper) From the stme point of view, arestment of intuitionistic logic was given in 1956 by Beth. Ie was commeated on by Kreisel and Dyson and carried further by Kripke, Kripke’ starting-point in his 1964 paper was bis earlier ‘madel-theoreticl treatment of modal logics along the same ins. Like so ‘many ideas underlying the work of the last few decades, the ist ideas in this diration go back to G8dal's early papers. In the paper entitled "Ene Interpretation des intltionstichen Aussagenkalkl’ and transite into English here, the connection between intuitionistic and modal logis i pointed out forthe frst time. Some ofthe other suggestions made in Godel's Paper, notably his remarks on what happens i's interpreted as express- ing provabiity in some particular logieal system, are developed further by Richard Montague in his discussion of “Syntatial Treatments of Modality’, Acta Philesophica Fennice, Vol. 16 (1963), pp 183-67 ‘The model-heoretical discussions by Beth and Kripke of intuitionistic logic do not decide the interpretation of intuitionistic mathematics, how ever this remains an interesting and lively area fr further work and even {or esentally new ideas. An interested reader wl ind a rich lode of sup- ‘estions in those writings (or parts or writings) of Georg Kresl which are not printed bere. “The idea that disproofs can be thought of as attempted model construc tions calls one's attention tothe broader problem of the elation of formulas and ther models. These relations turn largely on the concepts of truth and satisfaction, These conceps are normally explsined in fairly strong set- theoretical terms, Can thexe concepts be vated in suitable ways? Can they ‘beexplained so as to rule out already at thi stage some ofthe nonstandard models? No satisfactory answers to these questions ae kel tobe found inthe lteratore. Can formulae (Setences) and models be related to each ‘other some wiys which ae closer to our actual methods of eating them “im practie” than are the st-theoretical methods usually employed? In- teresting suggestions, couched In game-theortical terms, have been made ‘sentially inthis direction by Lorenzen. (In adtion tothe paper listed in fur bibliography, see W. Stegmiller, ‘Remarks on the Completeness of Logical Systems Relative to the Valiity-Concepts of P. Lorenzen and K. Lorenz’, Notre Dame Joural of Formal Logie, Vol. (1964), pp. 81-112) ‘A closely similar suggestion is put forward by Hintikka, who aso argues for the importance ofthese ideas in understanding te actual wse of quanti+ fication concepts inthe applications of language. (See ‘Language-Games‘ INTRODUCTION for Quant’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Supplementary Mono= ‘raph no. 2, 1968.) Thee suggestions seem to have at lest the mecit that they make it extremely natural to consider cetai types of deviations from classical logic. Lorenzen stresses the naturalness of intuitionistic loge from this point of view. Other deviations ean be obtained by requiring suitable kinds of recursvity (computability) of the strategies to be used in these ‘games. (What could it mean actually to se a non-recursve strategy In a ‘game? There doesnot seem to be any unique way of doing tis, however, land we soon run into the complex of problems connected with such more or less consirutivistic ideas at Géde's extension ofthe fnitstic point of ‘iew, the ‘no counterexample interpretation’ of logic and arithmetic, te. ‘The work represented inthe rest of our selections requires fewer com> ‘ments, The first pat of Feferman's paper i a lucid survey of the develop ‘ment of one important older idea inthe foundations of mathematics, vie the idea of predicativity. The second part presets important results con. ‘cerning this concept. Predicative reasoning turns out to be characterized, roughly, by transnite induction up to a definite ordinal of the second ‘number clas. (This isan interesting example of a general phenomenon: frequently the strength of one's assumptions turns out tobe measurable by the ordinals one needs in one's work) The details ofthis part of Fferman's paper may be rough going for most readers of this volume, but the main ‘and ther importance ought to be possible to grasp without all the ‘etal, Feferman’s new paper ‘Autonomous Transfiite Progressions te. forces and partly replaces the older one. (It contains an improved form lation of the technical results and extends them further: it also presents sharper appraisal of what has been accomplished and what remains to be ‘done in their area.) The reader i referred to ths new pape fora discussion ‘of recent developments in the study of predicativty. ‘The philosophical relevance of the theory of recursive functions ought to ‘be obvious, but nevertheless litle use hasbeen made of ts potentialities by philsophers. The fact thatthe only major conceptual idealization involved inthe theory of Turing machines, as compared with ral digital computers, {sinfnite memory aso illustrates the importance of thi theory Little more can be sti here, however, than to refer the reader not only to Hatley Rogers riliant expository paper, printed here, but to his long-awaited book. The theory of automata withou this idelizing assumption of infinite ‘memory is discussed inthe already classical paper by Rabin and Scot ‘Although we seem to have ia the notion of a Turing machine = good ‘explication of the idea of effective computability, the station is not a8 simple as it may appear. From G8del's note on “Eine bisher noch nih bendtate Erweiterung ds riten Standpunkts’ one can see that there are f INTRODUCTION 7 ways of extending the finite point of view by resorting to constructive ents of a higher type which are not initlly given any “mechanical ‘counterpart. From thi, a distinction between what is inistic and what ‘constructive seems to enue, Futher distinctions are due tothe fact that a proof ofthe termination ofa combinatorial procedure may not itself be combinatorial—a standard objection by the intuitionsts to the use of ‘ecursive function theory to explicate thei intentions. ‘Even more obvious than the relevance of recursive function theory isthe ‘connection between recent work and traditional problems in the case ofthe oundatons of geometry. The lines indicated in Tarsi's paper have been since followed by Schwabhiuser and by a numberof other logicians and ‘mathematicians ‘So far, have said nothing about what soften thought of asthe central area of foundational studies, viz. set theory. Nor is any selection on set ‘theory included inthe present volume. There exists, however, an excellent survey ofthe most important recent results in Paul Cohen's ite volume. te that is definitive can be suid ofthe subject mater of axiomatic set theory in the present situation, it seems to me. It has been found that some ‘of the mos important open questions (especially the status ofthe Con= tinuum Hypothesis) cannot be solved on the bass ofthe customary axioms ‘of set theory. Uhope that itis fir to say that most ofthe diferent ways of ‘extending these axioms are ether unconvincing or too weak to be of much interest. Although many interesting suggestions are being discussed, itis hard to tell where they will lead ‘The only point that T want to make here concerns the dretion in which urter axioms have been sought, (This, € seems 10 me, migh tun out 10 be the crucial philosophical problem in this area.) These new axioms have ‘often been formulated as postlations of suitable “very large’ cardinal numbers. Theres certain inner logic at work here, but one cannot help ‘wondering whether some completely diferent way oflooking a them might be philosophically defensible, After ll, these assumptions have in general defite purely arithmetical consequences, although we donot seem to have ‘strong enough intuitions about these arithmetical consequences to say ruc aboot them. But are some entirely different intuitions or heuristic ideas perhaps possible here? To ilustrat the implications ofthis question, itmay be mentioned that there exists a small and possibly frutese attempt to strike out in 2 completely diferent direction, to which the wider per- spectives just mentioned nevertheless lend some interest. Mycielski has ‘experimented with completely unorthodox assumptions formulated in fame-theoretical terms Which have certain very pleasant mathematical consequences. (See J. Mycielski, “On the Axiom of Determinatenest,5 INTRODUCTION Fandamenta Mathematicae, Vol. $3 (1964), and J. Mycielski and H. ‘Steinhaus,‘A Mathematical Axiom Contraditing the Axiom of Choice’, Bulletin de I Academie Polonaise des Sciences, Ser. 1M, Vol. 10 (1962)) ‘Whether they wil remain mere curiosities, nobody seems to know, and the nicely ordered infinite numbers have so far been too seductive for the ‘majority of logicians to trade them for Myeiesk's axiom, with its much ‘more disorderly consequences forthe interrelations of infnite numbers, Some philosophical suggestions of the recent work in logic and in foundational studies are made in Krese’s simulating paper, “Mathe- ‘matical Loge: What Has It Done forthe Philosophy of Mathematics, of hich an excerpt is reprinted her. (Some new information concerning the topics discused theres found inthe appendix to this pape, 28 wel a in Kreise’s subsequent papers) Some of the issues touched upon earlier in the preset introduction are also discussed by Kreisel inthis long essay. Other philosophical suggestions have been made elsewhere. For instance, in ‘Are Logical Truths Analytic and in other papers Hintkka argues that certain distinctions one can make in frst-order logic constitute the best modern ‘explication of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic peo- Pottions, at least in so far as this distinction applies to loge and mathe= matics. Some ofthe historical basi of this claim also appears from Beth's brief discussion (in Section II of his paper in the present volume) ofthe Aristotelian concept of ecthesir and its later history SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT AND FORMAL, DERIVABILITY EW, Berit “The aggrnate of al applications of loge wll not compare wih tte of he pre ery ta For when one hs Surveyed the whole subject one wil see that the theory ol logis instar at we atin to it the vision and the ata tment ofthat Ressorabeness ‘for the sake of which the ‘Heavens andthe Earh have ben created 8. Pance 1, Introduction, If Uy, Un aNd Var sentences (which may be ether true or fle) then we often say that is (oF n00) @ LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE Of Uy. Use vm oF that the conclusion V LOGICALLY FOLLOWS from the premisses Uj, Us, fr instance, we might say thatthe conclusion: ‘Some Panthers are not Swans, {oGteaLL roLLoWs from the premises ‘Some Panthers are not Mammels, ‘Some Mammals are not Swans. ‘isthe tsk of logic (an, in fac, its main task) to clarify his notion and to point out the conditions forts application. Now if we try to carry out ‘this task, we find thatthe term ‘logical consequence’ covers two distinct notions which, approximately, can be characterized as follows (@ Formal Decay. There are certain formal rales of inference, each of which, if applied to appropriate premises, yields a certain immediate fonclsion, Well-known rules of inference ate, for instance, the modus ponens: UP then Q: cetera 2 and the conerio simplex: Some A's are B; ‘Some B's are A From Madudsnge onde Kounkithe Nederland Akademie van Wetescharpen, fain Laverton. (Arteta 1939, 9p. 309. Reseed ‘ypermintion of te Royal Neibetands Academy of Scene0 5. W. BETH [Now Vis called a Locicat consequence of Uj, Us.» if it is formally Aerieable from U;, ay. thats i sartng from the premisses U, Uy tnd applying agin and again the fules of inference, we can finally obtain ‘the conclusion V. ‘Te rules of inference ae called ‘formal’ on account of the fact that they ‘an be stated in purely “‘ypegraphial terms, without any reference to the meaning ofthe sentences to which they are applied.) (Gi) Semantie Encaiiment. is known from Aristotle's logistics tha the conclusion: Some Panthers are not Swans does nt LOOICALLY FOLLOW from the premisses: Some Panthers are not Mammal, and: Some Mammals are ‘ot Swans. If we wish to show tis, we usually argue as follows. Let us replace the terms ‘Panther “Swar’, and “Mammal” by “Pi, ‘Swine’, and ‘Mammoth, respectively. Then we get new premises, namely’ ‘Some Pigs are not Mammoths, ‘Some Mammoths are not Swine, anda new conclusion, namely Some Pigs are not Swine [Now the new premises are true, whereas the new conclusion is false. Hence the new conclusion cannot Locicatty FOLLOW from the new remisses and in view ofthe simalarity as to logical form the old conclusion {doesnot LOGICALLY FOLLOW from the old premises, Inthis discussion, the “ath vale (that i, the truth oF falsehood) of the {oGCAL CONSEQUENCE whichis relevant inthe context may be denoted es semantic enalment, It can be defined as follows: Vissid tobe semantically entailed by Us, Uy if we cannot replace the terms in Uy Use va ind bby new terms in such & manner thatthe new premises UY, Uf... are ue ‘whereas the new conclusion V* is ale. If, however, a inthe above example, such new terms canbe found (in which case Vis not semantically entailed by U;, Us.) then we say that these terms provide us witha suitable courtererample for proving that V oes no! LOGICALLY FOLLOW from Ui, Use wil be clear that, on the other hand, the meaning of the old terms ‘Panther’ Swan’ nd Mammal’ is completely irrelevant in fac, the above counter-example shows that no conclusion ofthe Form: Some P's are not S, SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT " {is @ LOGICAL Consequence of the premises: ‘Some P's are not My Some M'sare no. Such expressions, containing indeterminates' 15, hich stand for arbitrary terms, were already frequently usd in traditional logic. Modern Topic instead uses formal Pe) aE oiR@ & MC) @IMOVESO ‘Though the meaning of such formulas will be pretty clear from the present content, twill be beter to Say afew words about the manner in ‘hich thay are fo be interpreted! ‘We select some (non-empty) set of individual, which will be called the universe of discourse (may, for instance, contain ) all human beings, oF @ all natural numbers). The letters °P' “Mf, ‘S", ... stand for tems (properties or predicates) which can be applied to some individuals inthe universe (for instance, () healt, mal, grown-up, o Gl) od, prime, square) ‘The letters", af used as earables ‘ranging’ over the universe, “The atomic formala “P(x 8 Wed t0 state the condition fora certain in- dividual x to have the propectyP. The quantifier “(xis used to express the fact (oF the supposition) that al individuals inthe universe full the con- ition which follows the quantiSer the quant “(Ex)” is sed to express the fat (or the supposition) that some individual in the universe ful the condition by which itis followed. The quantifiers") '(2vu (Es “(Ea), are to be interpreted in the same manner. Te symbols: ed nd "if. then’. Later on, we also se the symbols we which are read: or" and “and only I ‘A counter-example (which yf may not be suitable in some context) Is obtained by selecting a universe and by electing properties P, M, S, for all letters PMS? on? are read: not, and’, 1 A mor eed exposition ound, fr nance, in ny Podement lope des et pba tae conoiay owe he em modelo "errant ‘a bce sled Souseresample” Unaly, adel eran crpretion i 08)2 ew. BETH 2. The Completeness Theorem. The two notions of LOGICAL coNseQuENce hich have Been described in Section 1 are both wsed in applied loge this fact creates situation which, from a methodological point of view, i far from satisfactory. I wish fist to explain the situation and then to discuss its implications; my explanation is based upon the consideration that in some contexts the notion of formal dervability x more elpful, whereas in ‘other contexts we naturally tend to apply the notion of semantic entailment. @ Suppose that we wish to show that Vis a Lodicat CONSEQUENCE of Up, Uys then ts natural to resort to the notion of formal derivablity. ‘We ty to establish a formal deviation of V from Us, Us oon tha i, 8 sequence of applications of the rules of inference which, starting from the premises Ui, U,.-inallyyeldsthe conclusion Vis obviously sufficient {point out one such derivation If instead we should wish 10 apply the notion of semantic enailment, ‘then it would be necesary to examine a posible counter-examples and 10 show thet among them no suitable counter-example for proving that ¥ is ‘ota Locteat CONSEQUENCH of U;, Us, can be found, @ Suppose, onthe other hand, that we wish to show that ¥ does not {oateaLLy FOLLOW from Uj, Uy ..; then we would prefer to apply the notion of semantic enailment. For ii sufcent fo point out one suitable counter-example for proving that V does not LOGICALLY oLLOW from Uj, Uz... But if we should wish to apply the notion of formal derivailiy, then it would be necessary to examine all formal derivations which start, fromthe premises Uj, U0 pol ot that mane of tha the However, the practical advantages which can be obtained by using simultaneously two different notions of Locieat CONSEQUENCE cant, of cours, justify such a procedure. Specifically, by accepting it we incur the risk of obtaining conficting results @ ifthe notion of formal derivabilitis wider than the notion of semantic ‘nialimen, then it may happen tht a coaclusion Vis formally derivable from certain premisses U;, Us». without being semantically entaled by them; if Vis not semantically entailed by Uj, Us. then there is some suitable counterexample for proving ths fact. This counter-example enables us fo repace Uj, Ua. V by new sentences U3, US, ¥* such that His agin formally derivable from U3, US,» whereas U4, US, ‘sppenigh Bat fe iat fete pon ea thts cease eat fitmtie, The tational mame: G's counererample ie “nance Coraer Intec Arstote, Pry Anais Behe) ot nce here Se ‘Berutherobtiou soonest the pea SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT ry are rue and ¥* is fale. Now in the formal derivation of V* from Ut, U3, ve there must occu some rue of inference which is applied to certain true remiss 2, X°,.. nd yields an immediate cooctusion Y which is fale. ‘G) Suppose the notion of semantic entailment to be wider than the ‘notion of formal dervabiity. Then it may happen that a conclusion Vis ‘Semantially entailed by the premises U,, U,... but not formally derivable from them, In other words: Vis not formally drivable from Ui, Us but there is no suitable counter-example for proving that it does not oaIeALLy FoLLow from them. Tn both eases we throw the blame forthe discrepancy upon the notion of formal derivabilty (which shows, by the way, that the notion of semantic entailment isthe more fundamental one ofthe two) and we try toregularize the situation by revising the rues of inference. I this atempt i succesful, ‘then the formal rules of inference () do not yield a false conclusion if applied to tue premisses, and (jj) enable sto derive the conclusion ¥ from the premisses U;, Us... whenever itis semantically entailed by them. Now the two notion! of LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE are equpollent (ey have the same extension) and hence they may be used indiferently. In the systematic construction ofa logical theory, one usually proceeds 18 follows (0) The rules of inference ae stated andthe notion of formal derivability introduced. (AD) The notion of truth (or related notion) is introduced, and it ‘shown that from tru premises no false conclusion canbe formally derived. ‘lD) The notion of semantic entailment i introduced, and its shown ‘that, whenever Vis semantically entailed by Ui, Us »-» it cam aso be formally derived from them, This part ofthe construction, which is known ts the proof of the Completeness Theorem? for the logical theory under consideration, usually presents considerable ficulties. (On the bass of investigations which I have made during the lst few yearn Tam now able to construct logical theories 4: to avoid the above dificulis. The main idea ‘4. Heuristic Considerations: Transformation of Semantic Tableaux. Let us rearrange our tableau for problem (i) inthe following manner: we do ‘not change the left colums, but we extend it by adding below al formulas {nthe right column in the reverse order; the result is a8 follows. 1, M, Bosh, Ament Formal Lol Amsterdam, 1951) p.47; J. aasewen Arai Spepie Oxford 1950, 39 SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT n © eRe) =" (orem @ @SOeMON — Grm © S@aNG) ene) S30 ‘ Me ® © r= o 10) Fay _ ty 2) oD MG mse) © Pa rn) @ soe yan 0) © ESO&PA — hye) ‘This ought to be a pleasant surprise! For it provides us with formal Yin ale column or) Xe+ Yina right column, then the tableau must be spit up, and we insert (@) Xin one left subcolumn and Yin the other (©) Yinone left cokamn and Xin the right coluran nor conjugate with it. (Xin one right subcolumn and Yin the other. SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT a (@ Both Xand Yin one left column and once more both X and Yin the right column nor conjugate with (© Xin one lft subcolumn, Yin the right subcolumn conjugate witht, in the ote et subsolam, and Xie the remaining ght sub (iD) IF (Ex) XC) appeats ina let column oF (x)X(s) in right colon, then we introduce a new individual p and weinsertX(p) in the same column (tis convenient not o apply thisrule untill posibilties of aplying other ‘les have been exhausted; the par of the construction which stats with the introduction ofthe A" individual and which terminates atthe introduction ofthe (k +1)" ones denoted a it & sage), (Wil) If one and the same formula appears in two conjugate columns, then the corresponding tableau (r subtablea) is closed. (G0) Ill subtableaux subordinate to some tablea (or subtableay) are loved, then that tableau (or subtabesu) itself is also closed, 0 If all possiblities of applying rules ()-(vi) have been exhausted, ‘whereisthetableauis not closed, then the tableau provides us witha suitable counter-example, and is termined 1 wil be clear that the rules ()-(ei) exactly reflect the meaning of the words ‘all ome’ not ‘and’ "if. ther or If and only If, bof the symbols by which they have Been replaced. For instance, part of rule (iv) ‘corresponds tothe following rule of semantics: The sentence, "X and Ys true and the formla:'& ¥"is valid), ifand only both Xend Yare true (ce valid). However, these rules assume a completely formal character, if Instead of speaking about an individual p we speak about a symbol. Perhaps it will be useful to give an example ofthe application ofthe ules, ‘Let us construct a semantic tableau, taking as inital formulas (0) LAC V BON in the left column, and (40 V OB) inthe right column (se tableau on p. 2) ‘We have now taken care of point () on the programme outlined ia Section 5. So we tur to points (I) and (ID; these points can be handled ‘very quickly, by statin the following definitions @ A formal proof inthe System of Natural Deduction F of the sequent i, Use ove Va Pa {na closed semantic tableau in which the inital formulas are: Uj, Us. in the left column, and Yj, Fin the right column.2 BW. BETH Valid | Ira @ (Aw) V OBL) @ @ae @ GX) 4) V BON) OM W)A@V BON @ A@V BC) @ Ae) | © wa @ © B®) © 4@) | G0) Ba) GD 0) (40) V BON (12) A@)V BO) ww (3) 4@) « 14 2) (G) A formal derivation in F of the conclusion V from the premises U,, Uys formal proof in F ofthe sequent: Uy Ua (i A formal derivation in F ofthe formula U as a loical contradiction {4 formal proof in F ofthe vequnt ure (the symbol “Oi used to express the fact that no formula appears atthe right side ofthe sequen} iv) A formal derivation in F ofthe formula V a a logical identity is & formal proof inF of the sequent orr. “The main content ofthese defnitions could aso be stated as follows: A formal derivation in F ofthe conciusion Vfrom the premises Uj, Us, 18 ‘closed semantic tableau in which the intl formulas are: U,, Ui, the leftcolumn, and Vin the right column. twill be ler that on account of this treatment of point (IID we avoid ‘the ncesity of dealing with point (1V). It can, however, be argued that itis preferable to give the derivations in Fa more familiar shape. ‘We sball not yield to this argument, but nevrthees i is interesting to show that, i necessary, we could easily give the formal derivations in F a ‘more normal appearance. Specifically, we coud either borrow the general SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT a structure of Gentzen's Calculus of Natural Deduction or adapt the prin- °T Giples underlying his Callus of Sequents “Though the connections of our semantic tableau to some System of [Natural Deduction wee already discussed in Section 4, it wll be useful also to give our above tableau the familiar shape of a derivation in a system of this kin. UV BON (erem) OD WA@V BO 2) AY BO) (itemma) © Fo Galt) © WR) © 4 (ant2) @ We : @ @ADVOB) — Calt,2) we try to transform the closed table into a proofin some Calculus of Sequents, the result is as follows. We obtain a version of this Caleulus, Bs hich is closely related to Hasenjaeger's Symmetric Calculus Aca) AC) Bi) +B) ‘Aa)+ Aca) Be) BU) + Ala), BOD) Ala) VB) F AC), BOO) 0) A) V BOF AC), BO) (90) Ae) V BO] F(@)AC, (0) BO) CO) (A) V BON FAY OBO) ‘As these formal derivations have been constructed, so to speak, in & purely mechanical manner (we have indeed come alarmingly near the Tealization of the “ideal” of a calculus raiocinator, a “logical machine; 1 shal return to this point later on), one might expect them to be rather clumsy and cumbersome. But this anticipation is not corroborated; tothe ‘contrary, the above derivations are remarkably concise, andthe derivations ‘obtained by our procedure ean even be proved tobe, in a sense the shortest ‘ones which are posibe. The frst derivation, for instance, uses rather ‘daring dilemma, which I would certainly have avoided (by means of & ‘reductio), bat which sin view of the tableau, completely justified. I we are submited a derivation belonging to For to some other sytem, such a thse in Hilbert-Ackermann’s Grandsige or in Quine's Methods of Logic) which seoms 10 be incorrect or needesly involved, then, by con structing a suitable tableau, we obtain a correct ora simplied derivation, Drovided ruch a derivation can be found, In particular, an indirect proofu E,W. BETH willbe replaced by a direct one, whenever such a proof is avaliable this is tn interesting result in connection with a paper on ths subject by Liwen- beim? 1, Infinite Tableau. shall now show that in certain cases the construc tion of a semantic tableau involves infinitely many steps, and discuss the ‘posibility of pointing out the existence of a suitable counter-example if uch a situation arses. (0) The frst and rather obvious, case is that ofa sequent: Up, Upson aint FY, Which involves infritely many premisses Uj, Us In this ease, its con- Yenint slighty to change the division ofthe construction into sucessve age, o5 follows. We begin the fst stage by taking into account the initial formulas U and V and by introducing one individual . We pass on t & ‘ew stage either by takinginto count anew formula U, or by introducing 4 new individual p; if the A'™ stage stated with the introdvetion of anew {ndividualp then the (k= 1) stage muse star with taking into acount a ‘ew inital formula U,; and if the k stage started with taking into account ‘ew intial formala U, then the (+1) stage will mormally start with the introduction of « new individual p; however, it may happen that atthe end ofthe stage we have no reason to introduce a new individual, andin that fase the (E-1 stage wil tart with taking into account still another new {nial formula U,,,-—Itwil be clear that th above sequent willbe provable in F, if and only if for some the sequent Ui, Uren UG EY is provable in F. Accordingly, the conclusion 17s derivable in F from the premisses Uy, Uz, df if and only if for some jit is derivable from the premisses Uy, Uz. Uy (2) Even one single inital formula U may give rise to an infinite tableau, provided it contains some binary predicate (or relation). Let us consier as fan example the sequent: ure, “where Visa certain formal stdied by K. Schutt (1934): 2) ERE) CE) (REx) (2) IRE) > REED 2, ymin On aig ne Ph Data Ql spa Ma a is sor fetes wo eater woth by Boe and Sr hectis Sebts nt by encod arta, Mah ese Sons Gat ¥ SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT alia (© @) RED &ENREy) &() Fist sage » QDR RED GH. NSEILD 2 sage OMIT ORD © Gite ke.a1 8 RUD = Aa) 1 a) RUD (2 ROD RO2 T 4) RQ,2) 19 RED.) 06) R22, (18) (EYRE REDD ‘Third stage (19) RO,3) RENE} 20) 20,3) QD G)IRG.2)—- RE.) (2) R223) 2H RU,3) 25) RG,2) R23) (28) RG,2)>RG,3) GD RG.) RG.2 £0) of) RU R238) RED RE) (..) (8 stage Rk e+) BENE RuE+D, RU, K) = RO, +, Rk, R18) nei RG k) > RO ks Re b> REL kD) REREAD oh) R11) Rt 1) FETED REN.) 2) stage ROH KS) &EVL I Trwalid a7 R@,.2) 9) RG,2) 6 RGD 25) RG, Rb kD. Rk Des RU KD), RUB)6 BW, BETH “The corresponding semantic tableau is (schematically) represented on 1. 25 It is convenient, in such a cas, to denote the individuals by the ‘umerals 2, 3. [wih lay some stress onthe following points, () There is no counter-example with a fine universe. For in te first, ‘plac the universe must not be empy. So we tke some individual and give it the name 1; then we have R(T, 1) and, furthermore, there must be some individual which falls the conditions: RUJ,») and (2)(R(,1) > RG) a8 1 does not full the first condition, the individual we need now must be Giffereat from 1. If its piven the ame’ then we clearly have R(,2) and ()RG.1) > Rl,2) in adlition, we have RCD, and there must be some individual which ffs te conditions RO,y) and ()1R,2)—» Ry); we find that this individual must be diferent from I and 2 and we give it the name's" Ee Gi) In accordance with the discussion under (), the construction of our tableaw tums out tobe fatally determined by the data of the problem. On ‘account of rule (vib) a section 6, the tableau has to be split up again and fzain, but most ofthe subtableaux ths obtained are quickly closed whereas those which are not yield exactly the same truth values forthe atomic Formulas R(1), RCs2), ROB), on RON, RQ,2), oy RGD oe His ‘easy to ste thatthe tableau indeed provides us witha counter-example, ‘whichcan be simply desribed a follows: the universe consists of all natural fhumbers I 2 3, and forthe binary predicate R we take the relation Smaller han Between natural numbers. ‘Gi) One might suspect that the emergence of infinite tableaux (and, hence, of eountr-examples involving finitely many individual) points to some deficiency in our approach. However, sucha view would be mistaken. ‘We wish to establish logical theory which is adapted to such situations as may present themselves in sietic argument. For instance, it ought to provide the framework fra discussion on the (unsolved) problem whether ‘not Fermat's Last Theorem is drivable from the axioms of arithmetic. ‘The corresponding semantic tableau would look as follows Inealid Fermat's Last Theorem Now if counter-example isto satiny the conditions stated in the left, column, it must certainly favole infinitely many individuals So iin some SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT a manner we exclude infinite tableau, we cannot hope ever to tablish an appropriate framework for dealing with problems of the above kind {@) Te wil be clear that, generally speaking, with respect to the problem whether or not a czrain conclusion V LOGICALLY FOLLOWS from given promises Uy, Us. (the general problem whether or nota certain sequent OLDS TRUE is treated in the same manner), we have 10 anticipate three Fpossbiies, “@) The tableau provides us with a suitable ite counter-example for © proving that Vis nor semantically entailed by U, Usy- this ase, Vis ‘ot derivable in F from Uj, Us (@) The construction ofthe tableau breaks down: inthis case Vis both semantically entailed by, and derivable in F from Ujy Us (i) The construction ofthe tableau involves infinitely many steps; in his case the tableau isnot close, hence Vis not derivable in Ffrom Uj, Us, ‘In cases () and (i), the completeness theorem for the system F clearly holds tue. Ie will also old true incase (i) ifthe construction ofthe tableau provides us with asitabe counter-example. ‘In the particular situation which has just been examined, we were indeed able to point out the existence ofa suitable counter-example; however, this situation was exceptionally simple: the counter-example corresponded toa familiar mathematical structure, and soit was recognized rater than dis: covered. In general we must be prepared to mest with chaotic succession of, tableaux being split up and of subtableaux being closed. We cannot expect, that we will always be able to discover some regularity in the process and then to “ead” some counter-example from the tableau "Now inorder to have at least a guide in this labyrinth, we shall represent ‘our tablea by a certain configuration whch still more concise and there- fore gives an even clearer insight into the progres of our systematic attempt at constructing a suitable counter-example. This configuration consists of points and line segments, and is called a (binary) fre. For each formal which weinsertin our tableau, one points added tothe corresponding tee. The points corresponding tothe formulas in one and the same subuableau ar stringwise connected in accordance with the order ‘in which the formulas appear inthe tableau, the distinction between the two column a subtableau being discegarded, Ifthe tableau (or subtableu) is split up, thea the tee contains a fork; this shows the relations of subordi- nation which may exist between various tableaux. By way oflustration, we have constructed in fig 2 part of the tee which ‘corresponds tothe tableau on p. 25. To save space, we have omited the part (a, (0), and (2) which are exatly lke (02s BW. BETH willbe clear that the tre canbe considered as composed of branches, which star at the Yop” and stretch downward as far as possible. Such & branch corresponds toa Sequence of ‘ested’ subtableau, each subableau Jn the sequence being subordinate to all preceding ones. This sequence ‘obviously must belong to one of three ' types. (@) Tt may terminate on account ofthe fact that all possibilities of applying rules (oi) In Section 6 have been ex haustd, (i) Ht may break off on account of the closure ofthe last subtableau which iteconiins. {i) Tt goes on indefinitely; twill be ear that this situation will presen itelf ‘and only ifthe corresponding branch in the ree goes on indefinitely. ‘Type (i) i of no importance for us, ast does not provide s with a suitable ‘counter-example; however, both type () tnd type (i) yield suitable counter cexamples and hence will be discussed. ‘Actually, we shall only deal with type (ip, as itis very easy to adapt the argue seat to ype Let us suppose that Ui, Us, and ¥ ‘have been the initial formulas in the tableau and that they contain a property letter‘ anda relation leer Re the ‘universe consist of the numbers 1, 2, 3, ‘We consider the atomic formulas [A(p) 408 RR ET, 2,35 Wich fnpear in the tableau and subtableaux belonging to our sequence. AS none of these tables is closed, no formula can ‘appear both left and rig. Th order to obtain a counter-example, ‘we mow must select predicates for the leters'A"and (Section 1). We take ‘the property A and the relation R which ‘can be defined a follows SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT » (A) We sy that the natural number & has the property A, if and only if ‘the atomic formula 4(k) appearsin a left column (or subcolumn belonging to the above sequence (R) Wessay that the natural number jis in te relation Ro the natural ‘number k, if and ony ifthe atomic formula R(J,K) appears aleftcokuma {or subcoluma) belonging othe above sequence. Finally, we have to show thatthe counter-example thus obtained is a suitable counter-example for proving thatthe formula Vis not semantically entailed by U; and Uz. This means that we have to point out tha, for the fbove property A and relation R and with respect to the universe which consists ofall natural numbers, the formulas U; and Us are valid, whereas the formula Vis invalid. We do so by showing that all forms in a left column (f our sequence re valid and that al formulas in right column fe invalid; let us observe that, forall atomic formulas, this assertion is justified on acount of definitions (A) and (R). We now consider non-atomic formulas; it wl be sufcient to discuss few particular cases, in connection withthe rules fo the construction of semantic tableau. (Gi) Suppose that (2) (2) appears in a left column, but i invalid if (4).X()is invalid then, for some natural number k, X(8) must be invalids ‘on the other hand, al formulas X(K) appear ina left column. I follows that some formula X(K) appears in a let column, but is invali (Gia) Suppose that XV Y appear ina left column, buts invalid in all, continuations ofthis left column, either X or Y must appear; on the other hhand, if XV is invalid, then both ¥ and. ¥ must be Invalid It fllows that cher ¥ or ¥ appears ina left column, but is invalid. ‘On account of this discussion, ny discrepancy between the tableau and the counter-example is transferred to ever shorter formulas, and inal to the atomic formulas. But we know already that, fr atomic formula, there «am be no such discrepancy. So we have proved our assertion; itfllows that twe have indeed obtained a suitable counter-example (in fact, the above discussion merely shows thatthe rues ()4vi) in Setion 6 were stably chosen). So, even the construction of semantic tableau involves infinitely many steps, it will nevertheless enable ws to point out suitable counterexample, provided the corresponding tre contains a branch which goes on indef- Bitely. And hence the proof of the completeness theorem for our System F ‘can be concluded by showing that every tee which contains infinitely many Points has a branch ofthis kind. This can indeed be shown, but it demands A digression on the general theory of trees. 8. A Theorem on Tres. The configurations, which ae known 35 "ee, ‘an be generally characterized follows. There is one point0 BW. BETH ‘origin’, to which we assign the rank 1. Furthermore, there are a finite numberof point of rank 2 finite numberof points of rank 3,8 fini ‘umber of points of rank k, and 20 on; we neither exclude nor require that, ‘Starting witha certain rank , the numberof points iO; itis convenient intoduce, in addition, a zero-re, which does not contain any point. "A point of rank k can be an endpoint; otherwise, it is connected with a least one pint ofranik + I-A pointofrankk + Tis connected withexactly fone point of rank k, Two points whose ranks are not consecutive can never be connected, "A sequence of points of ranks 1,2 3, such that any two points of consecutive ranks are connected snd which, without violating this con- mak Fie} ition, cannot be extended, is called a Branch of the tee; such a branch Imus sart atthe oni, and it must either break off tan endpoint or goon indefaitely. Each point P ofa tee B clearly isthe origin ofa subiree BIP of B. If ‘BY contains only Snitely many points, then P is clled a point of the frat kind; otherwise, Pi sai to bea point ofthe second kind. Let B® be the configuration which remainsif, fom tree B, we cancel all points of the fst kin. “) Let P and Q be connected points of ranks k and k + 1 ina tree B; ‘then we have: @) if Piso the fist kind, then Q i also ofthe fist kinds and {Dif Q iso the second kind, then Ps also of the second kind {@) Lat P be of rank kin a tee B; then we have: () if Ps ofthe second kind, then its coonectd with at least oe point Q of rank k +1 and ofthe second kind; and (i fall points Q of rank k +1 and connected with Pare Of the first kind, then Pis also ofthe ist kind. SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT a (Tre cnfewation Bs abo ae, Foor By heaven (0 sb any pot @ of ak k +1 in BY econ sexed whet es on ot Penk in (6) No pit in 5 cab eno. Tl fallows rom 8 (5 Fora we tere onto potion namely) coins «only ty many pn a ey franc in Breaks of ad) 8 Contains ity any pin Sd henna east one trench ch foo on inde, Fie.4 roo. Lets consder te tee BY Now ther ae oly vo posi namely: (0 B® isthe zeroes and) B" contin teat oe poi 140) follows thatthe erin tf Bea po ofthe fit kind so BO = B ont onyEiely many point Bence very ranch nes {24i) 1 B* contine npn then by theorem, stmt contain branch ‘ich gr on nd. On, ths ranch sa ape in hence 8 must contain iniely many pot - "ew te ear tat theorem () ile oe ast gap in ou poo of the £ complcenes theorem for be Sy F |" Notwithstanding the eomentary sharacer ofthe above roo ofthe ice | theorem canal be ase rm a none plat of vio, at deans an ape othe pipe of he exloed ti. ee at an inuloicaly vad proof an be bigs rom Broun prot of he socalled Fundamental Theor on Flory Spreat, ba hs rues a 5 fecal intrpretion of the theorem by which ts apatin is seveey | Rte. In fat, my attention was drawn othe te there and tthe2 5 W. BETH problems connected with is proof by a discussion with L. Henkin, A. Heyting, and J. de Tongh during seminar on intuitionistic mathematics, eld iat November 1954: this discussion was followed by @ conversation ‘wth P. Eds and L, Henkin on related subjects. "Besides mathematics and botany, many other scenoes deal from time to ‘ene with res In traditional logic, we ind the arbor Porphyriana, whichis tuo Known asthe“ Ramean tree. According to Jevons("“Ieremy Bentham peaks (uly of "the matchless beauty of the Ramean tree’ In recent Philosophical literature, the configuration appears, for instance, in con ection with the interpretation of Plato's theory of ideal numbers, 28 ‘efended by J. Stenel and O. Becker, and in discussions on the intuitionistic theory of continuum." 9, Range of Applicaton In order to indicate the domain of aplication of te above methods, I shall use te following (summary) division ofthe ‘Somain of modern logic. Lets first make a horizontal distinction beween {) classical (or tvo-valved) logic, (I) intuitionistic and modal loi and {Ah the systems of many-raued logic. Within each ofthese domains, there {Sa vertical gradation into (a) the sentenil calculus, (elementary lic, lind (logic of higher order. Classical logic isthe system which s curently appli in sientiie argument, and hence it has been studied rather horoughly. It dsplas the fll hierarchy (a)-(0. The systems under (1) are fo sometimes applied, on account of certain objections fo classical lei. ‘The systems under (ID are experimental constructions, they have hardly ‘ver been applied. For the systems under (H) and II} we have as yet only (the sentential calculus, and () elementary log "The above treatment covered only the classical vententsl calculus and assical elementary log Ttean, however, be extended tothe classical logic “higher order and so virtuallycovers the entire domain of clasical ogc. "* ‘Ofcourse, it remains to be seen, wheter a similar treatments possible for the systems under (TD and (D- 10, Logical Machines. The sttongly mechanical character of the pro- cedures which we have described suggests the possiblity of constructing & “Torcal machine’, which would automaticaly solve any lgial problems of the types which have been discussed. The outer part of such a machine ‘Mould include: a dial for feeding’ the inital formulas to the machine, and 10, say Svat Th Price of Sec int, Landon, 13)». ; "ar pa ram, AH. We above Bd) ls SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT o repel, aa ren, nef which woul star barsig machine had turned during a certain time. ioral (@) The reds s mento annonce tht te emantc tbe forthe robles coved then te machine produc sa paper showing ‘corresponding formal derivation; Heeeeeecarae () The yellow lights meant to announce that the une thatthe construction of the tableau is terminated under rule (0); then the machine produces a stip of paper showing a suitable nite counterexample; (@) The green light is meant to announce thatthe construction of the tableau involves infinitely many steps; then the machine prodvcesasrp of per showing some pont of B, "inr prt th mchne wou em ie hie Would hve perm he lowing (A) To consti hema the machine; He {@) Toconirat he corespodig te (© Toco ee mrt ponte o const a mache whieh pro ‘the task under (C). For it will be clear that it would have heats ‘Be pottvie,org the ontion ofthe bea an ofS ogee Now ef te prt of Bwhch connie he pom oan ka toe oy beth pat of Bier knowe asso an Bsa Tei osome other tee CwstaneC = Baton tat Do Cy satiny ons that Can be conn in uch aan hat aco Sepang point wnkt= Thea C*s esos, nto abt rant Ray Hence snout const on bebe peae woecontcion st Tealows that ost const gl machin fhe above ind th coluion apes nih 2 fnew and comple eee) theorem ich vas pueda IN6ty A Cth Hower poe to comtt opal mache with fe ads yl gc and sash Iachie woud already be exten bp Friant wold crab Ute chk an gen dra, ad ml ie pone “he aboveccumef heconcpttn opal mtn so afi o serine th pro ch hs bsn en fete hae, Ti brot presen spun noon lor we tec et Wei-efoed en ths eas tht we sume te posi of oun Brotony pitt to ana, Hee toni, ‘uch ot tons cnet asp te ove oo On eee Ra, ist poste to prove the eonpicenen hear o te bss weet ‘sumo for conven, te conpcencs theorem Innes te ts til formals ‘ed! toPy fw. BETH theorem. It is possible, however, to give an intuitioniscally valid proof of fa weeker version ofthe completeness theorem (J. Herbrand, 1990)? "The logical machine with red and a yellow light displays a striking analogy tothe reasoning power ofthe human intellect and infact, itis able to perform a considerable numberof its operations and even to perform them witha higher degre of eciency and of accuracy. However, the human Fnttlociseauipped with aditional operations which go beyond the power fof such a logical machine. For instance, its not dificult to construct the toe BY if isthe ree of fig 2; S01 seems that our intellect isequipped wth 1 Find of green light, Nevertheless, we may not asume that our intellect ‘operates this green ight ina systematicand hence perfectly reliable manner; for this would imply thatthe human intellect incorporated, sto speak, 2 Jogical machine with a red, a yellow, and a green light, and we know that such a machine cannot exist 11, Historical Remarks—Tradional Logie and Symbolic Loge. ‘The above results may have given some impression of the progress made by Symbolic loge since Land's communication on this subject. At the seme time, the gap between symbolic and traditional logic has considerably nar- rowed: this i not due to the influence of regressive tendencies in con- femporary loge, but rather tothe development ofthe systems of natural ‘Seduction, which ave enabled symbolic logic to incorporate certain notions ‘which are alteady found in traditional loge but which remained foreign to ‘Symbolic logic in its ealer stages. In fact, none ofthe procedures which fhe been applied in the present communication: the introduction of penal symbols, and the construction of counterexamples, of semantic tableau, of formal derivations, and of tres, were entirely unknowa in 1211 sy be etl to ve a brie atateint concesig the fet of he adore cacti of our tf te completeness tne whit, 09 account of the I rr rong is here the aa of meaker ssp Pp root a Sram doesnot fet th al rot of he converse theorem, acoding 10. neh treat dacs saps tee etaent Section 2, We 2a ‘eu toon ar obvious the coment of ou eaten "Graf ee tb ols ofthe completes bere, tt doc no omg 0 ei ieee conglcnes tore to be tu, But wot prowl a sot ly Beet om ace tsampone se mre aly made athe above expo ‘Septbcythe cmitenen hoe other mnt be 8 ale eon rae fo feng pte here i vai (ii interpretation ss te {Eile hom he "norma eo” compen areas ppv Yo Fe 85 JPEN. Lanth"On s Ssppose Improvemect in Formal Look’ Vor. & Med 2e ® iT" Chnk, Convention Lope and Modes Lari (Woodstock, Ma, 195 : SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT 3s teaditionallogc; but novadayssuch devies are more systematically applied ‘and more thoroughly analysed, This factor, besides other ones (in particular, the interaction of logical research with investigations ito the foundations ‘of mathematics), explains the superiority of modern symbolic logic over {raion oi which appears, for nn, rom the following covert @ Symbolic logic provides a more detailed analysis for forms of aegu- Gi Mt shows that certain problems which were vividly discussed in tra- ‘tional logic derive from inaccurate notions and that, if these notions are corrected, these problems simply vanish, (i). Certain other problems, rightly asked by traditional lope but not solved in a satisfactory manner are solved by modern logic. (Gv) Symbolic logic has discovered certain fundamental problems which traditional logic overioaked on account oft failure to make a clea di tinction between the two notions of LoCICAL CONSEQUENCE as discussed i Section 1. ‘ad (i) AS an example T mention the above analysis of the syllogism in FisTNo, Wehave dissolved this type of argument nto nine successive steps. ‘As all formulas involved were dissolved into atomic formulas, ts prety ‘lear that a more detailed analysis i impossible, Now none ofthe steps (oF rules of inference) which are found in our analysis were unknown in tr tional logic; furthermore the genera idea which underlies our analysis fully agrees with the principe of Aristotle's method of proof by éxdeoss ‘Nevertheless, traditional logic never succeeded in ving’ « complete analysis ofthe diferent mod ofthe yogis, ‘ad () A problem which is frequently discussed in traditional logic is con- czmed with the possibility of reducing the so-aled hypothetical syllogia {othecategoricalsllogism.'* Now tis problem cannot arise the situation is correctly understood. Both te categorical andthe hypothetical syllogism ‘an be dissolved ino (and hence reduced to) a certain numberof rues of inference of more elementary character. The posit of such an analysis, was already clearly seen by Aristotle himself. The rules of inference which play roein the analysis ofthe hypothetical syllogism belong encusively 0 ‘the domain of the sentenial caleulus;!” an analysis of the categorical "pals ra 3 et eo ‘modus socanbo, which is closely related t0 the modus FesriNo. a ra Wi a suites osha aumento ete Sb Sire ean inneeeieeae sae Logic (Berkeley-Los Angses, 1983)36 5 Ww. BETH syllogism involves n adtion, certain rules of inference which belont to the theory of quantifiers. Hence the hypothetical syllogism is certainly of more elementary character, bat of couse it doesnot follow that it can be echoed to the categorical logis. (ad (ij) Let us consier a situation which frequently arse in mathematical ‘rgumenttion. Suppose, for instance, that we wish to establish a certain theorem on chordal quadrangles. Then we might stat as fllows: Let I'be 1 piven cil, and let PORS be a given quadrangle inscribed in it; then, tiding these supposition tothe ‘given premises’ (namely, the axioms of fometty), we might find that the quadrangle PORS has some peculiar (property E. And then we would argu: the special choice of the circle I’ does fot matter a all; the only pot i that forthe quadrangle PORS, sich a Grete T'can be found. Accordingly, we would state our concitsion 28 follows: Any quadrangle PORS, for which there isa circle J passing ‘through the four vertices P, Q,R, and S, bas the property vArstotle'* was presumably the fist to discuss this type of argument: “Therefore it has also been said that it is necessary to suppose some- thing fase just as even the geometers suppose to be afoot long what {nota foot ong. But this cannot be the case. For the geometers do not Suppose anything whichis false (for in the formal argument such & remiss does not cut) “The above example gives an illustration of what is meant. In a certain part of the proof it may appear asi the quadrangle PORS ought to be [scribed in the particular circle I, and this ofcourse isnot cores. So one right suspect thatthe proof of the theorem involves an appeal 1 a false ssumption. A similar situation arises inthe formal derivation which was ‘Sscuned in Section 4, after hypothesis 1 has been introduced. In al these tases, however, the (possibly false) assumption, which ata certain moment tna ben introduced scliminsted later on;s0it doesnot count asa premiss, and this is exacly what Aristotle observes. However, if we wish exactly t0 Know what is ging on, then we ought to consult the semantic tableau, In the formal derivation of Section 4, we know by premiss (2), that some individual fue the condition S()) & M(), and we agree o give this individual the name‘a’. Likewise, ifor PORS there i circle i which itis inscribed, thea we may agree t0 ve tis circle the name °I"; and, in ‘Arboles example if we are given a certain line segment, why should not tre take it ae a unity of length? 8 auto, Metophytes 2 108% 21-25 thi text connected wth Metpher AOR Bae ety, wih Pairir Sais A, 730 ¥ ee SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT ” CConsiderabe attention hasbeen given to this matter by Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant” The views defended by Locke, Berkley, and Hume are reasonable enough, even though, naturally, a detailed logical analysis ofthe situation was beyond ther power, According to Kant te introduction of ‘an individual (Tor a) is entailed by the necessity of connecting the formal argument with the construction of such an individual hence this type of argument involvesanappealto spatial intuition, i ischaractersticof mathe ‘matics and cannot be applied in other Hels. Curiously enough, & sini remarkis made by Aleander in connection with Aristotle'smethod of root by éndcous: he asserts that this method involves an appeal to perceptual evidence?” Such conceptions, however, are clearly inconsistent withthe Insight which we easily derive from an inspection of the semantic tableau. "Another problem which ha been discussed in traditional logic but which ‘only symbolic logic hasbeen abet reat nan efficient manner isconcerned ‘with the analysis of arguments which involve relations. We have seen in Section 7, thatthe analysis of arguments of this kd leas o considerable complictions. Strangely enough, itis sill maintained by some authors that itis easy to reduce such arguments to categorical syllogism ‘ad (iv) The two nations of Locrcat coNstQUENCE were (implicitly) used Long before they were clearly distinguished and correctly defined. In logical theory, people always tended to use the notion of formal deivability- The ‘method of the counter-example and hence the notion ofsemanticentalnent ‘was sed in philosophical discussion” The development of symbolic logic resulted, of couse inthe fist place ina clarification of the notion of formal B). (i) If Aisa wif and x an individual variable then (x) isa wf. Method for forming wisiscaled quantification with respect othe variable x. Any fecurrence of the variable x in the formula (s)A is called Bound. Any ‘ocurrence of «symbol which is not a bound occurence ofan individual ‘variable according to this rules called fre. Inauiton to formal manipulation of the formulas ofthis system we stall be concerned with their meaning according tothe following interpretation. ‘The propositional constants are to denote one of the truth values, Tor F, the symbol" denoting F, and the propositional variables are to have the set of these truth values as thee range. Let so arbitrary se, I, be specified ‘domain of individuals, and let each individual constant denote a par~ ‘ticular element of this domain while che individual variables have a8 theit ‘ange, The funcional constants (variable) of degree nar to denote (range ‘ver) subsets of the set of all ordered mtuples of Gtx, %) st have ‘the value T of F according as the ntuple xy.) of individuals is or is rot inthe st (4 > B) isto havethe value Fit is T and Bis otherwise ‘Tyand (x) is to bave the value T justin case has the value T for every clement xin 14 Aisa wi, Fa domain, and if there is some asignment of denotations to the constants of 4 and of values of the appropriate kind tothe variables tith free occurrences in 4, such that fortis assignment takes onthe value TT according to the above interpretation, we say that is savsfabe with respect fo. every such assignment yes the value T for A we sy that A Istelid with respect to I. Ais aid iis valid with respect to every domain, ‘We shall give ase of axioms and formal rules of inference adequate to permit formal proofs of every valid formula ‘Before giving the axioms, however, we describe certain rules of “4A more prc tact acount of tht det can be formated alone ties of ral aed Tash ‘ber Waster en oman Speech Su Phbnphce: Vat (1930), ps 24l-408) Bu tas seraata verwon wil {ce for our purpose“ LEON HENKIN abbreviation which we use to simplify the appearance of wis and formula Schemata. If 4s any wif and x any individual variable we write A for (ADP), (DA for ~@)~A. From the rules of interpretation it is seen that ~A hes the valve Tot F according a8 has the value F of T, while 3x)A denotes T justin case ‘thee is some individual xi J for which has the value T. Furthermore we may omit outermost parentheses, replace a let parea- ‘thesis by a dot omitting its mate at the same time if its mate comes at the end ofthe formula (except possibly for other right parentheses), and put Sequence of wis separated by occurences of" when association to the lets intended. For example, A>B24C>D>E for (A> B)2(C>D)>B), where 4, B, C, D, may be wis. oF abbreviations of ws IFA, B, Care any ws, the following are called axiom 1 €3.B5¢ 2 42 B>-4>(B20)>-42€ 3 A>fofoa 4 (A> B)> +> 098, where x is any individual variable with no {ree eecurencein 5. ()A> B, where «is any individual variable, y any individual symbol, and B is obtained by substituting y foreach fee occurrence of ¥ in A, Drovided that no free occurrence of x in Ais in a well-formed pat of A of the form (0). ‘There are two formal rules of inference: 1 (Modus Ponen). To infer B fom any pair of formulas 4, A> B. M Generalization) To infer (2) from 4, wheres any individual variable. A finite sequence of wisi called a formal proof from assumptions I where I's set of wis ifevery formula ofthe sequence is either an axiom, ‘an element of FoF elie arses from one or two previous formulas of the Sequence by madusponens or peeralization, except that no variable with 3 free occurrence in some formula of "may be generalized upon. If Ais he lastformulaofsucha sequence we write’ F A Instead of (Fy) + BUL.A) denoting the set formed from I’ by adjoining the wi 4), we shall write 7, Ab BLIET is the empty set we call he Sequence simply & formal proof and ‘rite Fin this ease 4 is called forma theorem, Our object is to show that every valid formula isa formal eorem, and hence that our eytem of| saxioms and rules i complete ¥ pe FIRST-ORDER FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS 45 ‘The following theorems about the fist-orde functional cleus are all cither wellknown and contained in standard works, of else very simply ‘erivable from such results, We shall use them without proof here, refering ‘the reader to Church for fuller account. (The Deduction Theorem). IFT, A t Bthen T'} A> B for any we A, Band any st of wi) 6 FB>2sf2.B>C 1. FBDeC>f>4B>C>f 8 Faxd>f)>.Gn4>F 9. BD />6GxXB2/) IV. If Pisa set of ws no one of which contains fee occurrence of the individual symbol wf isa wif and B i obtained from it by replacing ‘each fee occurrence of by the individual symbol x (none ofthese occur- ences of x being bound in B), then if I 4, also "FB. ‘This completes ou description of the formal sytem; or, more sccurately, ofa class of formal systems, a certain degree of arbitrariness having been Jeft wth espct tothe nature and numberof primitive symbols, Let $) be # particular system determined by some definite choice of primitive symbols. A set of wis of Sy will be called inconsistent if A Ff, ‘otherwise consistent. Aset A of wis of S willbe sid tobe simultaneously satisfable in some domain I of individuals if there is some assignment of eoctations (values) of the appropriate type to the constants (variables) ‘with fee occurences in formulas of, for which each ofthese formulas, ‘has the value T under the interpretation previously described. Tuonsne [fA is @ set of formulas of So in which no member has any occurrence of a free invidual variable and if A is consistent, then As ‘simultaneously satsfabl ina domain of ndaiuals having the same cardinal ‘number asthe se of primitive symbols of Sp. "Weshall cary out the ptoo forthe caze where Shas only a denumerable infinity of symbols, and indicate afterward the simple modifications needed in the peeral case Let (j= 1,23...) be symbols not occurring among the symbols of ‘Sq For each (71, 2,3, ..) let $; be the frstorder functional calculus ‘whose primitive symbols are obtained from those of S,.. by adding the symbols u, (J~ 1,2, 3 --) a5 individual constants. Let 8, be the system ‘whose symbols are those appearing in any one ofthe systems SIs ea5y ‘to 00 that the ws ofS, are denumerable,and we shall suppose that some 5 Alonso Chute, Iradacton to Mathmatal Lope, Part I, Anna of Matbe- sms sod Frinton Unverty Prey 54 LEON HENKIN particular enumeration i fixed on so that we may speak ofthe fist, second, th, formula ofS, inthe standard ordering. ‘We can use this ordering to construct in Sy a maximal consistent set of ‘nfs, T', which contain the given set A. (We use ew” to mean closed wf {2 which contains no free occurence ofan) individual variable.) Ty is ‘narimal consistent in the sense that i Ais any ew of Sy whichis notin Ty, then I, AF fs but not Ty Ff "To construct Ty let Toy be A and let B, be the first (in the standard ordering) cw 4 of S,such that (Ta) is consistent. Form Py, by adding 1B, to Ty, Continue this proces as follows. Assuming that I, and B have ben found let By, be the fist nf 4 (of S) after By such that (Py. A) is consistent; then form Poy; By adding B,,y #0 Py Finally let Ty becom posed of those formulas appearing in any To, (70, 1, Clanly Ty ‘contaas A. Tis consistent, fori Ty +f then the formal proof off from ‘assumptions I, would be a formal proof of from some finite subset of Fy 4s assumptions, and hence for some i (= 1,0, ...) Toy Ff contrary to onstruction of the sets of I, Finally, yi maximal consistent because if Ais owfl of Sy such that (Ty, A) is edosistent then surely (Fay) is ‘consistent foreach f hence will appear in some I, and so in Ty. Having obtained Ip we proceed tothe system S, and form a set of its cfs as follows, Select the first inthe standard ordering) cw of Ty which thas the form (3x) (unabbreviated: (2X) >), and let A” be the result of substituting the symbol uy, of S forall free oocurrences of the variable inthe WHT A. The set (Ta4’) must be a consistent st of ews Of Si. For suppose that Ip, A” Ff Then by II (the Deduction Theorem), Ty A'> f heave by IV, Tp F A> fi by Il Pp (3A); and so by 8 land i, Pe FCa)4>f. But by assumption I, (3x)A. Hence modus ones gives yf contrary tothe construction of I as a consistent st. "We proceed in tur to each ew of I, having the form (3x) 4, and forthe {ofthese we add to Ty the cwff of; obtained by substituting the ‘Constant wy foreach free occurence ofthe variable in the wi. Each of ‘here adjunctions leaves us with a consistent set of ews ofS, by the argu- ‘ment above. Finally, fer all such formulas 4’ have been added, we enlarge the resulting set of formlas to a maximal consistent set of ews ofS, in the same way that wat obtained from A in ,.Thisset of ews wecall “After the set has been formed in the system S, we construt Py in ‘Sia bythe same method used in geting I from Te but using the constants ust) G =I, 23s) in place of i, Finally we let, be the st of ews of ‘Se consisting of all those formulas which are in any I. It is easy to see ‘that I, possesses the following properties (@ Tg isa maximal consistent st of cus of Su FIRST-ORDER FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS a (i) If a formula ofthe form (3x)A is in I, then T, aso contains a formula 4’ obtained from the wil 4 by subsisting some constant wy for ‘each ree occurrence ofthe variable x. (Our entre construction has been forthe purpose of obtaining a set of, formulas with these two properties; they ae the only properties we shall ‘se now in showing thatthe elements of, are simultaneously satisiablein ‘ denumerable domain of individuals. Infact we tke as our domain I simply the st of individual constants of ‘Soy nd we assign to each such constant (considered as ¢ symbol in an interpreted system) itself (considered as an individual) a8 denotation. It remains to assign velues in the form of truthvalves to propositional symbols, and sets of ordered »-tuple of individuals to functional symbols of degree nn sch a way a to lead toa value T foreach ew of I, very propositional symbol, 4, of Sys a cwff ofS; we assign to tthe value Tor F according as I, F 4 or aot. Let G'be any functional symbol ‘of degre n. We assign tot the case of those m-tuples ay, Of ind ‘idual constants such tha FF Oy» ‘This assignment determines a unique truthvalue for each ew of 5. under the fundamental interpretation prescribed for quantification and" (We may note that the symbol ‘/" is assigned F in agreement with that {nterpretation since I's consistent.) We now go on to show the spesccesigreanepemmwamNmr Lesata, For cack ow A of S, the associated value fs T or F according at Tagh Aor not. “The proofs by induction oo the length of 4. We may notice, frst, that itwedonothave [, F Afor some ci 4 ofS, then wedahave I, Ff. For by property @)of I, we would have Py, A Ffand so, °4>/by m1. sre Tncase dian elementary cf the lemma i clearly true from the natureof the assignment Suppose Ais B> C. If hasthevalueT, by induction hypothesis P, # C; thea I, FBC by 1 and L. This agrees with the lemma since B>"C has ‘the vale Tin thiscase. Similarly, iB has the value F wedonothave I, +B by induction hypothesis, Hence I, # B>f, and I’, + B> C by 6 and | Again we have agreement with the lemma since B C has the value T in ‘his caze also, Finally if Band C have the values Tand F respectively, 0 that (induction hypothesis) I, FB while I, FC f, we must show that T., + B> C does not hold (sine B> C has the value Fin this case). But by 7 and two applications of we conclude that I, F B> C> f. Now we tee that if P, FB> C then, +f by I contrary to the fact that Tis fconsisent (property.“ LEON HENKIN Suppose A is (x) B. Ty F(2)B then (by $ and 1), +BY, where Bis ‘oluained by replacing all free occurences of x in B by some (arbitrary) individual constant. That i Gnduction hypothesis), has the value T for ‘every individual x of 1; therefore 4 has the value T and the lemma i ‘tablished in this ese. If, onthe other hand, we do not have T, F(A), then I, (3) B> f whence (by 9, DI F(28)(B>/). Hee, by property iWof Ps, for some individual constant m, we have I’, + B”> f, where 8° Is obtained from B by replacing each fre occurence of x by u,, Hence for this my we cannot have PF.’ else I, Ff by I contrary to the fact that Tis Consistent (property i). That is, by induction hypothesis, has the value F fr at Jest the one individual u, of I and so (2) B has the value F asserted by the lemma for this case. This concludes the inductive proof of the lemma. In particular the formulas of I, all have the value T for our assignment and so are simul- ‘ancously satisiable in the denumerable domain 7 Since the formulas of ‘A are included among those of I, our theorem is proved forthe case of a ‘system Sg whose primitive symbols are denumerable ‘To modify the proot in the cae of an arbitrary sytem Sp it is only necessary to replace the set of symbols wy by Symbols we, Where ranges ‘over the postive integers as before but «anges over a set with the same cardinal umber a5 the set of primitive symbols of 5,; and to fix on some particular well-ordring of the formulas of the new ‘in place of the Standard enumeration employed ebove. (Of course the axiom of choke must be used in this connection ) “The completeness ofthe system 5) is an immediate consequence of our theorem. (ConoaRy 1 If is aval wif of Sp then FA. Fst consider the case where 4 i a cw. Since A is valid A value F for any assignment with respect to any domain; ie, A >/'s not Satisiable. By our theorem iti therefore inconsistent: 4. Hence FA>f> fy land F A by 3 and ‘The case of wif 4 which contain some free oocurrence ofan individual variablemay be reduced tothe case ofthe ew A (Ihe clue of 4) obtained by prefxing to 4” universal quuntiers with respect to cach individual variable with free occurencesin (in the order in which they appeat). For itis clear from the definition of validity that if 4” is valid soi 4. But then 4. From which we may infer 4” by suscesive applications of Sand Conousany 2, Let Sy be a functional calculus of first order and m the cardinal number of the st of its primitive symbol. If A is a set of ets 7 sateen FIRST-ORDER FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS which is simultaneously satighable then tn partiealar A is simultaneously tisfale in some domain of cardinal m, "Thisisan immediate consequence of our theorem and the fact that if is simultaneovslysatisable it must also be consistent (ince ules of inference preserve the property of having the value fo any particular assignment in fry domain, and so could not lead tothe formula f). For the special case ‘where m is Ny this corollary is the well-known Skolem-Lwenkeim rest should be noticed, for this case, thatthe asetion ofa set of ens A can ‘no more compel a domain tobe finite than on-denumerably infinite: there js alvays a denumerably infinite domain available. There are also aways domains of any cardinality greater than Xin which a consistent set is simultaneously saisable, and sometimes finite domains. However, for certain A no finite domain wil do. ‘Along with the (rath functions of propositional calculus and quanti cation with espect to individual variables the fist-ordr functional caleulis sometimes formulated so ast include the notion of equality as between Individuals. Formally this may be accomplished by singling out some fune- tional constant of degree 2 8y Q, abbrevating Q(x») as x= (fr indie vidual symbols x, 9), and adding the axiom schemata EL. x=. EZ, x= 94> B, where Bis obtained from 4 by replacing some fee occurrence of x by a fre occurence of y Fora system Sof this kind our theorem holds if we replace “the same cardinal number &s° by ‘a cardinal number not greater tha’, where the ‘efnition of ‘simultaneously satisiable' must be supplemented by the pro- vision that the symbol ‘= shall denote the relation of equality between individuals, To prove this we notice that a set of ewfls in the system Sj say be regarded asa set of ews (1,E),E:) in the system S,, where Eis the set of closures of axioms El((~ 1,2) Since Ej, E Fx=p> y= and Ej, Ej bx=y>ay~z>x=2 we se that the assignment which gives & value to each formula of 4, Fj, Ems assign some equivalence elation ‘the functional symbol Q. If we take the domain I’ of equivalence clasce ‘determined by this relation over the original domain J of constants, and ‘assign to each individual constant (as denotation) the lass determined by itself, we are led to a new assignment which i easy sen to satisfy A (Gimutaneously) in 8, ‘A set of wis may be thought of 25a set of axioms determining certain, domains as models; namely, domains in which the wis are simultaneously ‘stisable, Fora frstorder calculus containing the notion of equality we ‘+7, sto, “Doers Grndapragi dec Mathena’, Sirfer ito ber Norse Vdshape-talen Or 808 a0 can find axiom ets which restit modesto be finite, unlike the situation for calcul without equality. More spcisclly, given any finite set of finite umber there exist axiom sets whose models are precisely those domains invwhich the numberof individual is one of the elements of the givens (or example, ifthe set of numbers isthe pair (1,3) the single axiom (OKE= 1) V4 NENG!) ~ Cem) A~CE= 2 (=2)A@aterviayvens will sufice, where 4 AB, Av B abbreviate ~(A > ~ B), A> B> B re: Spesively.) However, an axiom Set which has models of arbitrarily large finite cardinality must also poses an infinite model as one sees by con- sidering the formulas Ct Gxihe) -- Oxde~ ly ma) A~ EH =) Since by hypothesis any finite number ofthe C, are simultaneously sti LEON HENKIN Aa Guia fable they are consistent. Hence all the C; af consistent and so simul- ianeously satisiable—which can happen oaly in an infinite domain of individuals “There ate axiom sets with no finite models—namely, the set ofall for. ‘mulas €; defined above. Evey axiom set with an infinite model has models ‘wth arbitrary infinite cardinality. For if, B range over any set whatever the set of all formulas ~(xq ~ xp for distinct, B wil be consistent (since the assumption of an infnte model guacantes consistency for any finite Set ofthese formulas) and 50 can be simultaneously satis. ‘tm simplified form the proof of our theorem and corollary 1 may be caried out forthe propositional elculus. For this stem the symbols yy Sand the construction ofS, may be omitted, an assignment of values being fade direily from I. Wile such a proof of the completenes of the propositional alulus is short compared with other proofs the Iieratre the later are to be prefered since they furnish a constructive method for Finding & formal proof of any given tautology, rather than merely demon- strate its existence.” 1 [abou it des sot inefre wth th sebtnc of enki’ aie i shou be oa te don of forma rot fom tsumptone (pis somewat SEES Hors seu te dle and of method forcorretng ee Richard Miomgor ted Lave Henen “On the Deion 0 Formal Dedbcton”, Jere! of ‘Shooto Lop, Vol 20939), pp. 19. E4 piece eee MR nn COMPLETENESS IN THE THEORY OF TYPES! Leon Henkin? “Tus fst order funcional calelus was proved complete by Gd!" in 1930 Roughly speaking, this proof demonstrates that exch formula ofthe ealeulus is formal theorem which becomes a true sentence under every one of & ‘cetain intended cass of interpretations of the formal system. For the functional ealculus of second order, in which predicate variables may be bound, a very different kind of result is known: no matter what (ocursive) set of axioms are chosen, the system will contain a formula which is valid but not a formal theorem, This follows from results of Gide concerning systems containing a theory of natural numbers, because a finite categorical set of axioms forthe positive integers canbe formulated within a second order calculus to which a functional constant has been added, By a valid formula of the scond order calculus is meant one which ex- press a true proposition whenever the individual variable are interpreted 48 ranging over an (arbitrary) domain of elements while the functional ‘Variables of degree ange over al sets of ordered ntuples of individuals. ‘Under this dfition of validity, we must conclude from Gaels results that the calelus is essentially incomplete ‘Ithappens, however, that there isa wider clas of models which furnish an interpretation forthe symbolism ofthe callus consistent withthe usual fom lof ye in V8 9 HN Cnr 8 lle pt ee ce a emma ai aed Te cone ma ne ‘Doctor of Pauosophy and sxe in Qube 19 The reas were announeed at SEER ae en con men ot "TRE a SOht a? yrs ah ea Ty EN vata dros da ohn Rn, sm upset a mt RL i a St ieee nt See Ra ee we2 LEON HENKIN axioms and formal rules of inference. Roughly, these models consist ofan arbitrary domain of individuals, 25 before, but now an arbitra else of Sets of ordered m-tpes of individuals asthe range for functional variables of degree, If We redefine the notion of vali formula to mean one which expresses a true proposition with respect to every one ofthese models, we an then prove that the usual axiom system forth second order calculus is ‘complete a formulas valid if and ony if itis a formal theorem.* ‘similar result hold forte calcul of higher order. nts paper, we will sive the details fora system of order w embodying a simple theory of inte) types. We shall employ the rater eleznt formulation of Church,” the ets of which are summarized below: Type symbols (0 be used as subscript): 1. ond care type symbols 2 Ia, Bare type symbols so is (26). Primitve symbols (where a may be any type symbol) Improper: A,(,) Hae ‘Welt,formed formulas (fs) and thee ype: 1. A variable or constant alone i wif and has the typeof its subscript. 2, M Agg and By ar ws of type (eB) and fi respectively, then (4p) isa wff of pea 3. If 4, isa wif of te « and ap variable of type B then (ap 4a) is @ ‘wf of type (af. An oceurrenoe of variable isBoundiitis ina wi ofthe form (Aaya); others the occurence i free 2h cy aot ely te en nana arbiray manner ery {onus eo ave an inerpreation, For api, the formal FA) erp ‘eaning that wnat Cesta FU) mea thal inte comes ot ‘hence the tage fr functional vara sacha F shoud be ced ater come entation, Siar tf rer to tof ordre pin soee mde hese retina fant he mui nt) hs ion fhe ‘eth conpounding formes ofthe eur ha soca wih same Sere fon onthe drains of mol wth tesco whch te demas mut fe cael ‘The tauren of somplenens an be gen Peel Hod proved Yor Mode sng ‘hese dovreconsiions B) for (~A)¥ Be) ( for (Moa Ba) Ga)B, for (~(eX~AD) G0gB) f01 (iea(AteBe) Qrenyny £08 OOPS aMUon a) > Sone) A,= BD for (ion 4X8) In writing wis and subscrips, we shall practise the omision of pren- theses and their spplatation by dos on occasion, the principal rules of restoration being Bt thatthe formula shall be well formed; second, that association isto the lft; and thirdly, that dot sto be replaced by let parenthesis having is mate as far tothe right as posible. (For detailed Statement of usage, refer to Church’) “Axioms and Axiom Schemata 1 Gav) 2x2 GVI) 3 Gv 7) > 009 a) £57) 22Gev AIP EVI) $6 Tota Sos > forte 6. (90% ¥fonke) 474 Hojo fou 10. x58 28, %o UM Saaty —FuBXD > Sop =8ap MF fouta>Sealteon fo) Rates of Inference: 1. To replace any part Ay ofa formula by tho result of substituting ay for by throughout Ay, provide that bp is not a re variable of a 8nd ep docs not occur in TL. To replace any part (la, Ag), ofa wi bythe result of substituting £8, fora, throughout 4p, provided that the bound variables of 4p are ‘ine oth rom a, ad ie fre variables of B, TH, To infer A, from B, if B, may be iafered from Ay by a single pplication of Re TV. From Asya 10 infer 4.x Bs if the variable ¥. From ay Band 4, toate By, 10 infer yay dug Brovided tat the variable ag not ot fre in Aa* LEON HENKIN A Gite sequence of wis each of which is an axiom or obtained from preceding ements of the sequence by a single aplication of one ofthe ‘ules I-VI calle a formal proof. IA is an element of some formal prof, ‘wevwrite FA and sty that dis formal theorem. “This complete our description ofthe formal system. In order to discuss the question of ts completeness, we must now give a presse account of the ‘manner in which this formalism is tobe iterpreted. 'By a standard model, we mean fry of domains, ove for each type symbol, as follows Dis an arbitrary se of elements called indus, Dy fs the set consisting of two truth vals, T and F, and Dag isthe set of al functions dened over Dp with values nD. ‘By an assignment with respect 10 & standard model (D,), we mean 2 ‘mapping ¢ ofthe variables ofthe formal system into the domains ofthe ‘model such that fora variable ay of type «a argument the valve $a) OF isan element of D, ‘We shall associate with etch assignment # a mapping V4 of all the formulas of th formal sytem soch that ¥4(4,)isan element of, for cach ‘if Ay of ype a. We shal deine the values ¥4(4,) simultaneously forall 4 by induction on the length ofthe wi 4, (0 Agi avaiable set YA) = #49). Let V4(No) be the function whose vals are sven by the tele ] YYMot8) tl F Fl or Let V4(4oqs) be the function whose value for arguments T, F are the functions given by the tables 1,2 respectively. 2 | Milde XDA) 2x | VylAeesXPHD T Tr T T F T Fl oF 1) be the function which has the value T just for te single ‘argument which isthe function mapping D, int the constant value T Let V4lseoa) be Some fixed function whose valu for any argument fof Dye ‘one ofthe elements of D mapped into T by ff thet is wach an element). (i) IfAy as the form Bap Cp define Vs(BqgCp) 10 be the value of the function V4(Bzg) for the argument V4(Cy>- THEORY OF TYPES ss an bose ec eadainn eam sauces Fo Nosed hr neo waco ocr on neem gaara ae Me eas ae amauemneeeet ToL “T for every assignment ¢ with respect to every standard model (D,).* es mer orotcin aces arama niece Eeruitednots Cmca tetany Cuassoenoatanet Peet eect pacer hone ge cnet Sea ae eer deblae ti acta eaeetuean rane cicememeat aman on artes crete anne nevus cetcbes vinci So cerca rn teeeeenen cei pracesine oan mente tual cleat poe ca ol aleret geass irtaca tn eorssoae anton ferent one eee Leena cetneseramaamam a conte errr nes Se oe em pet teeta oar Hitcemen mame cece casio Ce ee eee ee nea eceaar ares So necuanieemienrteess colt cmtael macs Scencenans cones enema saoneencseeraas Sat cneay co nesa moan rinse arn mee oer ae ere ye Fr teen ant onteper iter Sone cn cctnantees eatiora eee tne Meawataeommevernits tart are er eae a icraeteevarcenomeame es * I aon to the noon of yy, the mappings Yay be wel to define tbe goo othe detain of «wit cain no ee xcerrence of an) vara Beeston yey Sand dae eens ae ee ‘hen te deta of Ze simpy Fs for any We tho ee the nto ot Seba tg tor ery ty tene nyt Pepe kp fo she model (By) I Fis susie with rape to some modal, Westy sy hat ‘irs% LEON HENKIN the axioms 1-6, 10%, 11% a formal proof can be obtained for some wi Ay, wwe ite A FAs 16 FA, for every wt, we say that is inconsistent, otherwise consent. ‘Tueonsn 1, IF ts any consistent ser of ew, there ia general model (in which each domain Dis denumerable with respect to which A stifle ‘We shall make use of the following derived results about the formal cakulus which we quote without proof: Vil. The deduction theorem holds: If A, 4, # By, then Ab A> By ‘where Ais any set of ews, 4, is any cw, and B, i any wl. (A proof is ‘iven in Church.) 12, bAgDe~ Ay >Be 1h bAL> Boe FEA, PCD eM 8G dy re C 1 year? Aaa Cu Anal) ~ An) TlajonyAos F AeaCa® Avalon Ce) FB, 8)> 5, BL FGA AL ‘The first step in our proof of Theorem 1 i to construct a maximal ‘consistent set of ews such that contains 4, where by maxima is met {hati 4, is any owt not in then the enlarged set (74, is inconsistent. Socha set P'may be obtained in many ways. If weenumerateal ofthe cw in some standard order, we may tet them one at aime, adding them to and previously added formulas whenever this does not result in an incon- Sistent set. The union ofthis ineeasing sequence of sets is then easy seen to be maximal consistent, ' THEORY OF TYPES 7 ‘has certain simple properit which we shall se. I 4 is any ows clea that we cannot have both IF and I" F~ 4, for hen by 12and ¥, ‘we would obtain /F Bs for any By contrary tothe consistency of On the ‘other hand, a least one ofthe tls Ay = gmt bein For otherwise, ‘singthemaximal property ofPwewouldhaveT’ 4, } Banal’ Act Dy for any By. By Vil then follows that I? 4, > 2, and + A> Be whence by 13 and V FB contary tothe consistency of Twoowils A, of ype ill beclleequtaletif 7+ Ay ~ By. Using 14, land V, ees Se tat this a genie congruence relatos so that the set ofall ews of type is partitioned into doin equivalent clases (4) 18.) -suchthat(4,)004 [2,]areequalifand only i 4, iseqivalet |" We now dtine by induction on 8 fame of domains (D,), and simul taneously one-one mapping ® of equivalence cases ont the domains © De such hat (4, isin Dy ‘Dye the et of two truth values, T and F, and for any cw 4, of ype 0 4 a((a,pis Tor Faccordiog a A, ox ~Ay isin 7 We must show that Ds ‘function of equivalence classes and doesnot realy depend onthe pats ticular representative 4 chosen. But by 17 andV, wesee thatifF VA. and 2B, 8 equivalent t0 4 ie, IF y= By) then Pt By: and siaaly it Te Asad By is equivalen to Ay then T t= B, by 8. To see that Bis ‘one-obe, we use 19 to show that if O{L4}] and O4(B,) are both T (ie, Tray and PFBQ, then Pb dy By 50 that (Ao (Be Siaely 29 shows that (4,] x (B]in case Lp and BEB at both F ', issimply the et of equivalence lasses [ofall ens of ype «And HUA.D is (4,0 that @ is certainly one ove "Now suppose that, and Ds have been defined, aswel as the value of © forall equivalence clases of formuls of type = and of tpe Pad that ery clement of Dy of Dy isthe value of for some (4.1, or (8) reper tively Define 4p) 10 be the function whooe value, forthe ment ‘®( B,D of Dp is MA,ppD. Ths deinon i jsied by the fat that if Aug tnd By are equivalent to. yp sd By respectively, then sg is atvalent to dag Bg, one ses by 21, To ace that sone, Soe {hat Od Ap) and BA have the sme valve for every ®B4) of Dy Hence OL 4p 8g) ~DCAepBl) and so, by the induction fypotkers {that is one-one for equivalence case of formulas of type a, AopB is 5 eauivalen to Azp8y foreach ew By In particulary, ite ake By be (Crp) ~ agny = Aegis) we sx by 2 tha dug and pave cauvalent so that (4291 (Aagh Theone-onetunstion @ having beet thas completely © efne, oe deine By tobe te st of valves (tay) for all ews dag | Nowlt#beany assignment mapping ach variable, ito some eneat= LEON HENKIN KAD of De where A sa of. Given ay wi Bp fet BS bea of tae rom By ty relacing al ee ocareneesin By of an able By some cts that dy) ~ UA. Lene For very and By we hae V4) ~ OUBfD- oot by induction on the nth of Bp Tibi aac ad Up ibe sent AAD € Dy then by anton wae ene Yo Hy a 1489 489 = iid UBD. ee By Nee Hs No (AD 8, thn by eon Pide whenie by 2 Pt~ Noo dy 9 that (Noy is. That SAUD maps T ito F. Convey, i (44) is F hen by defon PE das at NAD Hs ey MMe mas Fn. Hence V4 Bp ~ Bap i is case ee sey ha ens Bis day H ACCD 6 Te by Seton TF Cy wee by 381 F Ase fF a7 4a 20th AAs AD 1 To muter wheter (Aap Fo F. Sma, wing 28 and 26 we se that DAs Coed neo Fi BUC) Fe and LARD Tot F tapectvey Comparing tis with he dfiton of (Ane We se tha thetema holds inthis cae a0. Suppose Bp yey whence Bi Tuy Ibe Yalu of nF tenon MUA pia Ts then Poe dyg were by 277 FhosCu for crayon Cy soba (4a) mapsevery element of D, to T- On te tier and ae marsesery (CD int then web ig te foricaar case whe Cy 8 Ors) dagta FF Aa) ~ Aone) once y 28 Pr TTgyy ae ThA BUDD maps OAD oT “Th era hols in sas Suppone 2p tery whence Bf is ony Let Ayg bea cw soc that xa) abe sete BUC.D into T 30 tak PP AayCy. Then by 2 Pi igacerte) so that the webs of Alga forthe agumet Sica supped into by theater, Therefore we may ake lan tara) ; iy Spe that By haste form Bp Cy, We assume Gndtionhypo- ans) dat we have say shown OUD) ~ M(B) and ICSD VC). valve of B,D forthe argument (CRD, which $U88,C$D. Bat nc his simply BE, C2. Hence 4B) ~ H/C). ‘ay Soppe tat Bhs the foray, and ou incon hypothe is that Ge) = FCC) fr every assignment # Let (4) be any ee nmap nina asecanim piers THEORY OF TYPES 2 aentof Dy, Then he alc of (Ga, CD forthe argument (4, Disby Geiniion Sq) ‘But by applying I tothe right member of the instance F (Aa, C,)¥ Ay (22,6) of 16, we find F(a, Cy) y= CBwhere i the aslomeat ‘which has sae vlc sf forevery argument except the variable ad Hop MMl4yD. That i. (0a,C,)4,1~ (CE) 20 tha the vale of P44, C.D forthe argument H((4,) fs BCH) —oF ¥4{C,) by ind tion hypothesis. Since for every arguinent $(((Aa, C,)*D and ¥40a, C,) fave te same val they rust sequal “Tis concise the proof of ola, “Theorem I now follows die from the lemma, ta the fest plac, the frame of domains (D,) ia general model singe V4.8 s an lemon of Dp for every wit Bp and ssigment¢ Beaune the cements of any Da ae io ‘one-one coneapondence with equivalence cases of fy each domain is enumerble. Since for every ow 48 ~ du being an abirary asi. ten sinc therfore for every onl 4, of Pwohave MLA.) =, asnce ‘ise ssc of flows that V4) iT fr any clemant Avo Aes ‘Ais saisfiable wi spect othe todal (Dy) ‘Tutones 2 For any wif Ay, we have + Ay and only if Ay ald the general sms. From the definition of validity, we easly se that 4, is valid if and only ithe ew eg). ap Ay i8 Vali, Where yu AF the Vatables with free occurrences in ds; and hence Ais valid i and ony i V4(~(x,) (caa)Ao) is F for every assignment with respect t0 every general modal (D). By Theorem 1, this condition implies thatthe set 4 whose only ele- ‘ment isthe ew ~(r,).. (£a,)4y is inconsistent and hence, in particular, Un) oo» anda Flt) <2” od dee Now applying VII, 30, and 31 (several times), we ee that i Ai valid, then F 4. The converse can be veri directly by checking the Valdty ofthe axioms and noticing thatthe rules of inference operating on valid formulas lead only to valid formulas, ‘Taonta 3. A ser T' of ews i satgfiable with reapect ro some model of ‘demumerable domains Dyifand only if every ite subset Aof is suisiable By Theorem 1, if "isnot satisiable with respect to some model of denumerable domains, then I” is inconsistent so that, in particular, TF Gi) Since the formal proof of (x) contains only finite number ‘of formulas, there must be some finite subset = (dy, Ay) of T such tha jy ny Ay FC) whence by repeated applications of VHF Ay > « sss 2 dy (i) But then by Theorem ?, thew Ay > Ay > Chote is valid so that we must have Some ¥4(4) = F, = I for any 6 with respect to any model; ie, isnot salisSable, Thus, every fit subset@ LEON HENKIN of Pissatisfable, then Pi satisable with respect to a model of denumer- able domains. The converse is immediate. I Fis satsfable, then so are its rite subsets, and hence P's satistable swith respect t some mode! of denumerable domains, This may be taken {sa generalization ofthe Skolent-Lowenheim theorem forthe first order functional calculus a ete ies at a ra mune areuate steamy Sete Sennen iat paragon ranean omens Eee erence ete cc eh ate ee Tem ome psceearaatea pera ee ie ae arent) me eran aah a ace may Sere te emp ere reo a an rt neice Peers ote era ea Re eae rooeneeeteems Se er et na otha Bp cee are an phon oepeeerepi Sa aia oad ecteateres SS eer teatro ‘Constants es) must be replaced bya primitive notion of quantifiers. “Theorem 3 can be applied to throw ight on formalized systems of mamber theory. “The concept of elementary number theory may be introduced into the pre funcional calculus of order w by definition, a form particulary suited to the present formulation being given in Chureh? Under this approach, the haturl numbers ar identified with certain functions. Alternatively we may Choose 1 identify the natural numbers with the individuals making up the domain of type «In such system, its convenient to construct an applied aculas by introducing the constants 0, and S,, and adding the folowing {ormal equivalents of Peano's postulates: PL G)e~ Sux.=0, 00» Su = SH. PS Gada for0, > «EDL foa%s > flSuX1> (8) Socks THEORY OF TYPES a ‘The Peano axioms are generally thought to characterize the number- sequence fully inthe sense that they form a eategorcal axiom set any two ‘mods for which are isomorphic. As Skolem? points Out, however, this ‘concition obtains only if ‘se'—as it appears in the axiom of complete induction (our P3}—is interpreted with ts standard meaning. Since, how. lever, the scope Call sets of inividul’) ofthe quantifier (fa) may very | from one general model to another, it follows that we may expect non. standard models for he Peano anions “This argument may be somewhat ere if we consider in dtl the sual woof ofthe category of Peano’ postulates One easly shows that ay ode fr the snioms must conan sequence ofthe orde-type ofthe tatural nner by considering the ind 0,50, Sc(S,00e- ad UsingPl and P2toshow them dint and without ota cece Then the proof contnses flows ‘Suppose that the domain of individuals contained ements other than those of this sequence (which we may ae well identy with the natural umber themselves). Then conse the clas of individuals consisting of Just th natural numters Sine it contin eo (0. ands closed under the successor faction (S,), we infer fom the axiom of compete indocton (€3) tat it conan al individuals, contrary tothe hypothe that some ‘nds were not number By examining this proof wesc tat wecan conclude only that ia general sods! stsies Pean's anions anda the stme time possess domain of individuals ot isomorphic the nara numbers then the domain De of ses of individuals ato contain het consiting of ust hones ‘hich are number ‘Although Skolm indies thatthe meaning of ‘natural number rela tive tothe variable meaning of ee doesnot give any example of sonstandard number system satsying al of Peano sons In wo tet bapers! however, be proves thats impossible to characterize the nar umber sequence by any denumerble sytem of axioms formulated within the ist order functional eae (to wich may be aed any Seto ane: tooal onstans denoting numeri functions anda), the ini Thor Stole, “Obe eine Grandgefiagen der Mathematt’ keer it a are Vike ad on 609), om in ‘De whi ps every ment of Kino and every oe kena Due 3 Fer ae" Utah ne oldie Carte ‘er Zatlers ees ence Masonic No rei crs eno. 10 (995) py T-ah And Ober de Newtons ‘7 Canes music Wr abrilie wendleh Sace Ronse ae ‘Sine Zaenrarben, Fundaments matemacae, Vol 2) (S30 ge a@ LEON HENKIN ‘variables ranging over the ‘numbers themselves. Skolem makes ingenious _useofa theorem on sequences of functions (which he had previously proved) to construct, fo each set of axioms forthe number sequence (of the type ‘described above) ast of numerical functions which satisfy the axioms, but havea diferent order ype than te natural numbers. Tis result, for axiom. _ysters which do not involve class variables, cannot be regarded as being at all paradorical since the claim had never been made tat such systems were categorical. By appealing to Theorem 3, however, it becomes simple matter {0 construct a model containing @ non-standard number system which will tify all of the Pea postulates a well ab any preassigned set of further fxioms (which may include constants fr special functions as well s con- ‘tants and variables of higher type). We have oly to adjoin anew primitive constant u, and add to the given st of axioms the infinite list of formulas 105 # Sip ty # (SO), = Since any finite subset of the en- larged system of formula is clearysatisable, it follows from theorem that some denumerable mode! stisis the fl set of formulas, and such a model bas the properties sought. By adding a non-dequmerable numberof peimi- tive constants rf together with al formulas of of for €,#f, we may ‘even build models for which the Peano axioms are valid and which contain ‘number system having any given cardinal." ‘These same remarks suffice to show more generally that no mathematical, ‘axiom system can be genuinely categorical (determine its models to within isomorphism) unless it constrains its domain of elements to have some definite finite cardinal number—provided that the logical notions of set and function are axiomatized along with the specific mathematical notions. "The existence of non-standard models satisfying axiomesyatems for num ter theory throws new light on the phenomenon of avinconsstncy, fst investigated by Tarski and GBdel. A formal system is arinconsistent if for ome formula Ay, the Formas AyD Ao( S00) Ao(S(S.0)s > (edo, a all provable. Tarski, and later Gédel, showed th existence ‘of consistent systems which were w-inconisten, We can now se that such ‘stems can and must be interpreted as refering toa non-standard number ‘stem whose clements include the natural numbers asa proper subset {is generally recognized that all theorems of number theory now in the Iiterature can be formalized and proved within the funtional calculus of 12 imlar sea for formulations of athe within the fs ode untonl ala war eased by A Mase, "Unersuggen as dem Cebit e mathe Since Logi Resi mumarign, na Wal (936, pp 33-36. Maer ‘ud of pot beats cranes to the mend wd bate ay nde {o Protea Church or bringing tar Paper tomy tenon (Added Feb 1 0) THEORY OF TYPES « ‘order w with axioms PI-PS added. (Infact, much weaker systems suc.) ‘On the one hand, it follows from Theorem 1 thit thew systems can be reinterpreted as tue asetions about & great variety of numberaysems ‘thet than the natural numbers. On the other hand, i follows from the results of Gédel that there are true theorems about the natural numbers ‘which cannot be proved by extant methods (consistency assumed). "Now Gade’ proof furnishes ertain special formulas which are shown to be tue but unprovable, but tere is no general method inicated for estab lishing tht a given theorem cannot be proved from given axioms. From ‘Theorem 1, we see that such a method is supplied by the procedure of constructing non-standard models for number theory in which ‘set and “Tunetion’ are reinterpreted It therefore, becomes of practical interest to ‘number theorists to study the structure of such models. ‘A detailed investigation ofthese numerical structures is beyond the ope ofthe present paper. Asan example, however, we quote one simple result: Every nonstandard denumerable model forthe Peat axioms has the order type w + (a* + u)y, where 8 the type of the rational,Iv LANGUAGES IN WHICH SELF REFERENCE IS POSSIBLE! Raywonp M. SMULLYAN 1. Introduction. This paper treats of semanticl systems S of suient strength so that for any st W definable in ina sense which wil be made reise), there must exist a sentence X which is true in $ifand only itis fn element of H.? We call such an X a Tarsk sentence for W. It isthe Sentence which (in a purely extensional ens) says of itself that itis in 77 If IVs the set ofall expressions not provable in some syntactical system C, then X isthe Gidel sentence which i tue Gin $) if and only if is not provable (in C). We provide # novel method forthe construction of these Sentences, which yields sentences particularly simple in structure. The ‘method is applicable toa variety of systems, including a form of elementary arithmetic, and some systems of protosyntsk self applied In aplication to the former, we obtain an extremely imple and direct proof of theorem, Iwhich i essentially Tarski theorem that the uth et of elementary aithe Inetc snot arithmetical definable. “The erux of our method i in the use of a certain function, the ‘norm’ function, which replaces the classical use of the digeonal function. To givea 5547. Copii © 1957 From the our of Symbol Li, Vol 2 195), shor ihe poche ve Amen Mathemaal Sooty and Reprinted ty pein of te pols he Amer sty of Calforna at Los Anges, and to Profesor Jobn Kemeny and Dr. Edward J. ano Burcu lle fre vata arto Ya wi fk (By semuntia system 5 we mean ae of expressions tring of sg), togcher swith’, nln 8 of eles elle semen of 5 (Setermane by set of le of eon; oosber ia tbe ff mens eal re sete of $ (Gatrmind by ato aes of ut for 3 STA err msn a nina pen he oy a me can Find Sot cos tus fe teureme for ¥ tobe 2 Tas setece foe Mi ‘sce weak any sence ohc athe bth eu dino fae Se seve! However ihe wb mc awe ocd of 2 Tash seotence or ‘Susie rem we pte cng smc em, the ne mold ‘the former wil be care ou a this ape tnd the liter na forthcoming paper, ‘ptm Proonya Sa Appl ' SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES heuristic des of the norm function, let us define the norm ofan expression (of informal English) as E followed by its own quotation. Now, given set W (of expressions), to construct a sentence X which sys of tel that ie in W, we do $0 88 follow: FW contains the norm of "W contains the norm of This sentence X says ‘that the norm ofthe expression “W contains the norm of"isin W. However, thenorm of thisexpresionisX itself Hence X's trueifand only if X= W ‘This construction is much like one dve to Quine® We cary it out for some formalized languages. In Section 2, whichis esenilly expository, we construct avery precise, though uit rival semantical system 5 which takes quotation and the norm fonction as primitive. The study ofthis system will havea good deal of heuristic value, inasmuch a8 $, despite ts embodies the crucial ideas behind undcidabiity results for deeper systems. We then consider, in Section 3, the general use ofthe ‘norm funtion, and we finaly apply the results in Section 4, toasystem Sy, Which isa formal variant of elementary arithmetic. This variant consists of taking the lower functional calculus with class abstractors, rater than auantifers, as primitive. Ths alteration, though in no way affecting the strength of the system, nevertheless makes possible the particulary simple roof of Tarski or Gels theorem, sine the aithmetization of subst- {ution can thereby be circumvented quite simply. By the norm ofan expression E (of S,) we mean E followed by its own Gidet numeral x, the numeral designating its Godel number). Now, even any set 17 of expressions whose set of Gidel numbers is arithmeticlly ‘definable, we show quite easily the existence of an expression H of lass sbstraction, such that for any expression E, H followed by the Gédet ‘numeral of Bisa true sentence if and only ithe norm of Eis in W. Then, it ‘we follow H by its own Gede! numeral h the resulting sentence Hh which 1s the norm of H) is rue i and only if tis in WV. This i a rough sketch of ‘our procedure. 2. The Preliminary System S and the Semantcal System Sp Ya this section, we formalize the ideas behind the preceding heuristic account of ‘thenorm function. For convenience, we fist construct preliminary system tn contat wih thie contraction, let dine the dagnaation of E a he seul of substan the quotation of forall curt te sera in ‘Then ie lowing fara seme for when formalin) te cal cme: tin’ W contain the agomaaion of conta the Sgoruieaon sf, Tos ines kann ove ain Gon goa) hes the ‘ies Tr eser to ferme Scion 3) se eeeseertee nde ero cn yl ahod when apne« RAYMOND M, SMULLYAN ‘So, whose expressions wl be bul rom the three signs‘ Second sign wil seve as our formal quotation mark, since we reserve ‘ordinary quotation marks for metalinguistic use. The sign “N’ will be endowed withthe same meaning athe norm of’ The sign 4" willbe an tndeined predicate constant. For any property (se) Pof expressions ofS, ‘we then define the semantcal system by giving rule of uth for Sp. For Any Pf wil be interpreted in Spas designating P. Signs of Sy: $y *.. Preliminary Definivions, (1) By an expression (of Sq) we mean any string ‘ull from the three signs ofS. (2) By the formal) quotation of an ex- pression, we mean the expresion surrounded by stars. 3) By the ormof an txpresion, we mean the expression fllowed by its ovn (Formal oration Formation Rules fr (Individual) Designaor: () The quotation of any expresion ia designator. (@) If Bisa designator, sos "NE" (ie, °N' followed by E). Alternative Definition: (yA designator isan expression which is either a quotation (of some other expression) of a quotation preceded by one or more "N's. ues of Designation in Sy RI, The quotation ofan expression E designates E. RQ. IFE, designates E, then “NE, "designates the norm of Ey. Definition of « Sentence ofS (1) A sentence of 5) is an expression consisting of" followed by a designator. The Semaniical System Sy Forany property P, we define the semantical system S, 25 follows: () The rules for designators, designation and sentence formation in Sp are the same a in Sy {@) The rule of trith for Si he following 3. Forany designator, "gE istrucin Sp the expression designated by EGin Sp) has the property P. ‘Thionem 21. There exes an expression of Sy which designates itself Poor. #N" designates 'N’ (by Rule 1). Hence ‘N¢N* designates the norm of ‘N" (by Rule 2) which is "NPN" ‘Thus ‘NEN designates tse i SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES @ ‘Tuomun 2.2. There exists a sentence Gof Sy such shat for any property P, ts tre in Sp = G has the property P. oor. “N*#N* designates SN GN" (by RI and R2). ‘Thus G, viz, GN PN" is our desired sentence. Raaank. Gis, ofcourse, the formalized version of W contains the orm of W contain the norm of "fis but an abbreviation of W contains, and SN’ abbreviates the norm of" (Conotsany 2.3, P cannot be coextensive withthe set ofall fle (nontrae) sentences ofS nor i Peoextensive with he set ofall expressions of Sp which (re not true sentences of Sp. 2.4. Astnonorn ona oF minokin 2.2. By predicate we mean ether‘ (of followed by one or more'N. ‘We say that an expression F sais a predicate H (in S;) if H followed. by the quotation '*E* of, is truc in Sp. Lastly, we say that a set W of expressions of Si definable Gin) i thar exists a predicate H which is ‘atistied by all and only those expressions which are in W. tis worth noting at this point, that if, designates E, then Esatsies H if and only if "HE," is tru. This fllows from R3 by induction on the number of N's occurring in H. For any set W, we et (37) St ofall expressions whose norm iin W. Lenoua 25. IW ie definable in Sp, then 30 4) Proor. Let H be the predicate which defines WC, which is satsfed by Just thos elements which are in W), Then H followed by N' will bests by precisely those elements which ae in (W). Thus y() is definable Gn 5). "We can now state the following theorem, of which Theorem 22 is @ special case ‘Twsomsn 2.6, For any ser definable In Sp there Isa sentence X which i true, and only f X=. 21 we wished wo cons, a minature stem Lr which formalizes the dagosal ‘goctig athe same mayne S doe the or funciny me take four ti, wee tnd the rat By Came as Shy Ht Ey depen, ten BEY en a steel fu oc thdle tien Lek and only Ey asthe propery P Thes the expen of Finer, SWAG a Ba eT te sen 35a RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN Poor, Assume Wis definable, Then sois 1(W/) (by Lemma). Hence there ‘exists a predicate Hsuch that for any expression E, "HE Vis true in ,) = Een) ew. = TEE Taking EH, HH” is true = HOH” e. Thus X, viz, "HSH", i our desired sentence, Rewank, Theorem 2.6 says (in view of the truth functionality of the ‘conditional no more nor les than this: each set definable in Sp either contains some truths of Sor lacks some flschoods. Conottany 27. The se of false sentences of Sp isnt definable in Spy nor Is the complement (relative tothe set of allexpresions ofS) ofthe sof re sentences of Sp definable in Sp Conouiany 28, Suppase we extend Sto she enlarged semantical system ‘Sj by adding the mew sem’, and adn the folowing evo rales: 4, IE X's a sentence, 50 is "=H. RS, [His te in Sj Xis not tue in Sp. ‘Then in ths sytem Sp, the truth set of Sp is not definable Poor. For Sj has the property tha the complement of any set definable {nS is agai definable in S, since if H defines W, then °~H1" defies the complement of W. Hence the truth set fnot definable, ine its complement {isnt definable by Corollary 2.7. Raman Spi about as simple a system as can be constructed which has the interesting property that the ruth set of the system is not definable within the system and that, moreover, any possible extension of Swill retain this feature. By an extension, we mean any system constructed fom ‘S$; by possibly adding ational sign, and rules, bu retaining the old rues in which, however, the word ‘expression’ reinterpreted to mean an ex: pression of the enlarged system. Likewise if we take any extension of Sp, then although we may greatly enlarge the collection of definable sets, none ‘of them can possibly be coextensive withthe set of false sentences ofthe 2.8, EXTENSION OFS, 10 seuanrico-syeTACTICAL svSTEM Sf. Suppose row that we select an afbitrary set of sentences of Sand call them axioms, land select set of rues for inferring Sentences from other sentences (oF finite sets of sentences), The axioms, together withthe rules of inference, orm a so-called syntactical system, of calculus C. Let $ be the ordered SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES 6 pair (Sp,C). Thus $$ isa mathematical sytem, or nterpretedcaleulas, We Tet Tbe the set of tue Sentences ofS (lb called tras sentences of $$) nd Th, these of sentences provable in C (also called provable sentences, 0 theorems, of 59). Wealready know tha the complement T of T (relative to the set af expressions isnot semantically definable in S$ (i.e, not definable in Sp); however Th may wel happen tobe. Its, however, thea we have, san immediate corollary of26, the fellowing miniature version of Gaels theove: ‘Tasonsa29. these Tis semantically definable in S$, then ether some sentence trae in S§ camot be proved in Sor some false sentence can be proved. ‘This situation is sometimes described by saying that Sis either semmanti- cally incomplete oF semantically inconsistent. 2.10 We can easily construct a system Sf obeying the hypothesis of theorem 2.98 fellons: Before we choose a property P, Weis construct & completely arbitrary calculus C. Then we simply define Po be the set ofall expressions not provable in C. Then “4 itself wll be the predicate which semantically defines TH in Sand the sentence G, viz, "GN"IN®, of ‘Theorem 22 willbe our Gide sentence for Sf, which struc if and only it ‘not provable in the system. Infact, for purposes of ilustation, let us considera calculus C with enya finite umber of exioms, and no rules of inference. Thus the theorems of C are the axioms of C. Now, if G was included as one of the axioms, itis automaticaly fase (in ths system), ‘whereasifGwas left out, thenit steve, by very veweof being left out. Thus, tis sytem i, with dramatic larity, obviously inconsistent or incomplete, [Restanx. Suppose that we take P 10 be the set of sentences which are provable in C. Then G becomes the Henkin sentence for the system S$, ‘whic tre in this system, if and only if is provable in $5. Is G tre in ‘87 This obviously depends on C: If, for example, we take C such that its Set of axioms is null, then G is certainly both false and non-provable, An ‘example of a choie of C (ether than an obvious one in which G itself san axiom) for which G is trues the following: We take for our single axiom 14, the expresion *SN*AN**" We take a single rule R: If two desige ‘iors and E, have the same designatum in Sp then "AE i directly HE is true = FCE is tre (by Rule 9) = E satisfies F. Thus the seis respectively defined by H and F are the same, ‘A formula Fy, will be called normalize of forma Fi Fis satis by Just those expressions E whose norm satisfies F. Inthe light ofthe preceding Deragraph, the statement that Sis semantically normal equivalent tothe SMatement tht every formula F (vith oe fre variable) has «normalize Fy (ince Fy defines (1), when F defies 1). ‘Tutonen 4,5, 5 semantically normal, relative to roo. We must show that every Fhas a normalizer Fy. Wel tke Fy to be the result of replacing the free variable x of F by = 10" fr rather, bythe ‘unabbreviated form “(a) (HITT) 5 Had we used gy, rater than # or our Ge corspondece ten, if «were the gy oF Bt bn Ofte norm oC E hou tae bat DIO” RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN ‘Then, for any number x, Fy) ad F(n() have the sme trth-vaues. “Thos, for any expresion E, Essatisfis Fy Fy) is true = Fon) is troe “& thenorm of E satisfies F (since mE) isthe gn. of, norm of E!), Hence Fis satisfied by those E whose nem satisfies F and is ‘hus a normalizes of ConoLLany 4.2 (1) For every definable set ofS there isa Tarski sentence. (2) The complement ofthe truth set of snot definable nS (elatoe 8). (DT tse not definable nS, (elas 0). (@) Any proposed axiomari- ation ofS such thatthe ge fits theorems definable nS (relative fo) 8 semantically incomplete or inconsistent. (and (2) immediately fllow from the preceding theorem, together with the results of Section 3. In particular, in (1), to construct a Tarski sentence for a set W defined by formula F, we st construct the normalize Fy of F by the method ofthe preceding theorem, then take the abstraction H of Fy. and then fllow H by is own Godel number. Thus the Tarski sentence for Wis the norm of the abstraction of the normalize ofthe formula which defines W. 3) and (8) follow, since S, contains negation (definable fom , Resank. (4) of Corollary 4.2 can be thought of as one form of Gaels ‘theorem. Defnability in Si actually equivalent to definabiity in proto “syntax (nthe sense of Quine) Thus any formal system for S whose set of {theorems is protosyntactclly definable will be semantically incomplete or Inconsistent. This is esseatialy similar to Quine's result that protosyntax ives not protosyntacticallycompletable, “43, We have just shown a method for constructing normalizers which works for the particular Godel correspondence g, which we employed ‘Actually, i ill work for any G8del correspondence relative to which the ‘norm function (.e, the function which assigns to each expression its norm) is sre definable, nthe following sense ‘A function F (rom expressions to expressions) will be said tobe srcly , Fy is the Gidel numeral of Ei and only if GCE, Bis wus (which we express by saying that g itself is definable relative to a), then the formula F(ayiGty,). &-C(B.y.4))” defines the norm fonction and S, is normal Hence “Tneones 47, sufciencondiion for St be normal, relatice 1, i that concatenation ang isef bor be definable, relative tog [Restank, Gadel correspondences satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 47 include all those that are effective (ie, include all those such thatthe unetion h, which asigns to each mumber x the Gédel number of (he numeral designating) x, ia recursive function.” Ths, in conjunction with Drevious results, yields the proposition tha, relative to any effective Godel ‘correspondence g, the truth set of Sis not definable. This, in essence, is Taski's Theorem 5. Concluding Remarks: Diagonlization ws. Normalzaion. We should like, in conclusion, to compare the norm function, used throughout this paper, wth the more familiar diagonal function, used forsystemsinstandard formalization, Firstly, to sketch a general account of diagonalization,’ analogous to Section 3 Yor normalization, wecoasider now an arbitrary language L which (like $ of Section 2) contain expressions, sentences, true sentences, and individual constants. Instead of predicates, however, we now have certain ‘expresionscallodTormlas' and others called variables, andcertain ocur ences of variables in formulas termed “tee occurences, subject to the condition thatthe substitution of individual constants fr all fee occur- rences of variables in a formula always yields a sentence. We again have a Gide correspondence mapping each expression F onto an individual constant. For any formula F with one free variable 2 and any expression Ewe define F(E) asthe result of substituting E forall fee occurrences of 2 in F. Theexpression F(F) is defined 0 be the diagonalization of F. The st swetiy dena, mr ‘must eat a ore Tt i ‘ay or any Magis nena) eves we Pate eh We he ee ednon 2 alm: Aad (Bh 0a uber we ake 4) uber Then we die 8) (3) IA.) & Add. 109] Wh contraction can be simp by intoduing decors). Thus the icy eorspondene s+ |, etd ny for Pres of thy. sae Say SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES 7 ‘ofall E such that FE) is tr, i called the sot defined by F. For any set ‘we define D(W) a the et fall F whose diagonalization sin HW. Then the analogue of Theorem 3.1 18° sufcient condition forthe existence of a Tarski sentence for His that D(W) be definable’ Hence also, DOP) is not definable. We would then define normality for such a language L, by the ‘condition that whenever IY is definable iL, 0 is DCP). Then al other theorems in Section 3 have thee obvious analogues. "Toapply these general notions to systems in standard formalization, €. elementary arithmetic, ve would have, in analogy with the notion “nor- ‘malig’, that of ‘diagonalize’, where a dagonalizer Fp ofa formula F ‘ould be formula satisfied by just those expressions whose diagonalization tstisiedF, Then, i Ws defined by F, and if there exists a diagonalizer Fp for F, then the diagonalization of Fy (wbich is Fy(F,)) is the Tarski sentence for W. "This is essentially the classical construction, The construction of the iagonalizer Fs considerably more involved than the construction ofthe rormalizer Fy. Aga, we might say, this is du tothe fact that concate- nation is easier to arthmetize than substttion, We can profitably ato repetition of analogous arguments for S and by senading tha speach fore eral srctute Ths appronh vl te ‘wnt na oricoming peer “Atseat Sica of Uasiued There In hic we toy, In enuderaie generally, the Spe proper of Undesasbe ‘ema sncoveredby Goel tnd oer,v INFORMAL RIGOUR AND COMPLETENESS PROOFS Gtona Kreiste Iisa commonplace that formal rigour consists in setting out formal rues ‘and checking that a given derivation follows these rules; one of the more Jmportant achievements of mathematica loge is Turing’s analysis of what «formal rleis. Formal rigour doesnt apply tothe discovery or choice of formal rules no of notions; nether of basic notions such as se in so-called Classical mathematic, nor of technical notions such as group oF tensor (product (echncal, because formulated in terms of an alretdy existing basic framework), “The ‘old fashioned? ides is that one obtains rules and defnitions by analysing intuitive notions and puting down their properties. Ths is cet- tainly what mathematicians thought they were doing when defining length for ea of, for that mater, logiians when finding rule of inference or fxioms (properties) of mathematical structures such as the continuum. The teneral idea applis equally tothe so-called realist conception of mathe- ‘atics which supposes that these intuitive notions are related tothe external ‘world more of les asthe number 4 enters into configurations consisting of ‘elements, and to the idealist conception which denies this or, atleast, Considers tis relation as inessenal to. mathematics. What the ‘old fashioned’ ides assumes is quite simply that the intuitive notions are sienficant, be it in the external word or in thought (and a precise forme lation of whats signfcant in a subject is the result, nota starting point of research into that subject). Tigour wants () to make this analysisas precise as posible (vith lable, in particular to eliminate doubtful properties of the intuitive notions when drawing conclusions about them; and (i) to extend this analysis; in particular not to leave undecided questions which can be decided by full use of evident properties ofthese intuitive notions. Blow the principal emphasis ion intitive notions which do net occur in ordinary ‘mathematical practice (co-alled new primitive noions, but lead to new om Problem inthe Phivopty of Market, Ime Lakatos (Norh-Holn ing Copy. re. Reo h oy Seeman ofthe plover and thar {hela 4 peper of aesoy. pp. 38 iy rated teres topes ah some selene fragt hem Ea) RT OE, Seesneeenias INFORMAL RIGOUR » axioms for curent notions. We give three applications, mort following the ‘old fashioned” ide of pushing abit farther than before the analysis of the intuitive notions considered. Section I concerns the diference between familiar independence results, eg. ofthe axiom of paral from the other axioms of geometry, on the one hand and the independence of the con tinuum hypothesis on the other; the diference is formulated in terms of higher-order consequence. Section 2 deals withthe relation between in- twitve logical consequence on the one hand and so-called semantic resp. symtactic consequence on the other. Section 3 [i omited here—E8 Sections 2 and 3 affect completeness questions fr classical and intutinist predicate logic, which accounts for the title ofthis talk; quite generally, ‘roblems of completeness (of rues involve informal rigour, atleast when ‘one is trying to decide completeness with respect to an intuitive notion of| consequence, (©) The case against informal rigour (or: antiphilosophic doctrines). The present conference showed beyond a shadow of doubt that several recent results in logic, particulary the independence results for st theory, have leftlogicians bewildered about wha to do next: in other words, these results 4o not "speak for themselves’ (0 these logician). I believe the reasons underlying their reaction, necessarily also make them suspicious of informal ‘igour. I shall ry to analyse these reasons here (@) Doctrinaire objections (pragmatism, psitcism). Two falar objec. tions to informal rigour are these: (@) Why should one pay s0 much stenton to intuitive notions? What we ‘want are definitions and rules that are full they doa’t have o be faith ‘to notions that we have already, One might perhaps add: these notions are {ormed without highly developed experience; so why should they be exe pected tobe fruitful? ‘Besides this (pragmatic) objection we have a more theoretical (positivist) ‘objection. ‘These intuitive notions in particular the abstract) notions of vat, ‘se, natural number or, so ano! to eave out intitonism, intuitively con ‘incing proof, are illusions. When one examines them one finds that theit solid content fies in what we do, in how we act; and, in mathematic, this is ‘contained inthe formal operations we perform. ‘A certain supericial plausibility cannot be denied to these objections. First, when some abstract intuitive notion turns out 1 be equivalent, at least ina certain context, to a postvistc relation, Le, one definable in particulary restricted terms, this has always important consequences. For instance (ordeal se Section 2) logical consequence applied to frst order» GEORG KREISEL formulae, is equivalent to formal drivability; and fist order axiom systems permit a more general theory than higher order systems. Consequently, st ' particular stage, the (pragmatically) most rewarding work inthe subject ‘nay consist uit simply in exploiting the discovery ofsuch an equivalence, ‘Second, one may be impressed by the slow progres of work on sme of the intuitive notions, particularly thse associated wit traditional philosophic ‘questions: pragmatism discourages such work, and positivism tries to give theoretical reasons forthe slow progress. Now, objectively suc a negative attitude snot supported bythe acs because progress was also slow in cases ‘where decisions were evenally obtained. (About 30 years between Hilber’s fist formulation of his fintist programme, cf), p. 84, and Ges incompleteness theorems; nearly afrther 30 yeas lla precise analysis of finitst proof was attempted.) But, subjectively, if a particular person is discouraged by the slow progress he had surely better find himsef another ‘ocupation- Certainly, sentially speaking on is in a wholly futile posi- tion fone finds oneself tuck both wth philosophy asa profession and with antiphilosophical views such as pragmatism or positivism (perhaps, after Ihaving been attractod by traditional questions in one's youth). For, having repudiated specifcally philosophical otions one i eft with those tht are tbo familiar to specialists in other feds: what jobs can one hope to do as ‘well as these specialist? including the jobs of clarification or explication Gif tey are to be done in current tra)? T thik this futility i elt quite consciously by many of the people involved. Having granted all tht: whats wrong with () and i)? Quite simply this ‘Though the raise perfectly legitimate doubts or possiblities, they just do not respect the fect, atleast he facts of actual nellecrual experience. Tis is particulary ivtating because pragmatism pays so much ip service to ex- perience, and positivism claims tobe empirically minded. ‘Ad\i, Let us even take fr granted that we know roughly what is fitful afer al, here again (ie a8 the case of signitiance) a precise formulation ‘may only be possible after a good deal of experience, Perhaps we do not [know a general reason why intuitive nations should have stood the tests of ‘experience well; a8 one sometimes sas! they might not have done so. But the factremains tha hey or, at east, many of them have. Reflection shows that we certainly couldn't have what we understand by ‘scence if they had Instead of trying {0 find reasons for, of limitations of, this ‘eually remarkable situation, () denies ts existence! (a most unpragmatic pragmatism). Two related %o-alled pragmatic principles are to be men- tioned. One says that one must eat each problem ‘on its merits; one might yhave to; but taken iteraly this would leave litle room for general theory ot oo nate INFORMAL RIGOUR a for the distinction between whats Fundamentl and what i secondary, Or again (in_mathematcs), one sometimes criticizes complacently “old fashioned? disputes on the right definition of measure o the Fight topology, ‘because there are several definitions. The mos striking fact hee how few Sem 0 be useful: these haven't dropped from heaven; they, obviously, ‘were formulated before this applications were made, and they were not generally obtained by rial and error. If hey ad been So obtained, mathe- ‘maticians shouldn't be as contemptuous as they are about the stud of title ‘variants in definitions. Similar remarks apply tothe choice of axioms; but Since this is of direct logical importance the subject will be taken up in its proper place in (8). Ad i). Creal if, consciously or unconsciously, one insists on analysing the’ sold content in positivist, n particular, formal, terms thsis what one will ind. Though more specific points about formalism and formalization are taken up throughout this paper in particular (€) and Section 2 below, ‘some matters of principle are in order hee. It might have turned out that {he notions which present the most Serious dificult in practice are indeed abetract ones. But, quite nalvey, this isnot so: knowing whether two inscriptions mean the same soften no harder than knowing i they read the same! Equally, as was mentioned on p. 79 above, sometimes it does turn fut that some notion are fully represented in formalitic terms: but thishas {o be verfed and Section I shows limitations, Pethaps one should die: ‘inguish between formalism (and positivism), whichis merely a negative antiphilosophical doctrine, and a mechanisfe conception of reasoning (Cmechanism’ in the sense of Turin), which would lead one o expect full, formalistc analysis of actual reasoning Iti to be remarked that, sofa, the ‘most that has ever been shown in support ef this conception is that in curtain areas (@, elementary logic, Section 2) reasoning could be mech- ‘nial inthe sense that a mechanism would get the same esults; not that it that would follow the same route. It may be thatthe mechanistic conception isthe only moderately clear idea of reasoning that we have at present. But a good positivist should not conclude from this that therefore this idea ie correct. () Unrliablty of some inttive notions; the role of formalization in thelr ‘analysis. A much more serious pont than the portmanteau objections () land (i) under (a) concerns specie abstract notions, for intance—to take ‘the mest famous example—the notion of set. Have not the paradoxes shown ‘the comple unveil of our Intutve convictions at least about ths par- ticular notion? First of historically speaking, this couldn't be farther fom the truth!2 GEORG KREISEL Wasn't Cantor @ misunderstood martyr in the face of widespread re- actionry preludice against employing the notion of set (or, as it was then ‘called: clas) in mathematics? If 0, the paradoxes supported the intuitive ‘convictions of those reactionaries. Tt is probably tre to say thatthe reactionary caution was due to this class preseated itself as a vague notion, or, specifically, mixture of nations including () finite sets of individuals (.. objets without members), oi) sets of somethin (a in mathematics, sets of numbers, sets of points), but ‘so (i) properties or intensins where one has no a priori bound on the textension (which are very common in ordinary thought but nt in mathe- Inatics). If we are thinking of sets of something, eg, of objects belonging to fa then the comprehension axiom isto be resticted to read (for any pro- erty P) ax Vy exes [yea &POID: ‘ut if we are thinking of properties, given in intension, whose range of Por + DD) > Wx cone replaces the second-order quantierP by alist of those P which are xplicily defined in ordinary first-order frm (from + and x, for instance) ‘Rmemen’s reflection shows that the evidence ofthe firs-order axiom “theme detves from the second-order schema: the diference is that when ‘one puts down the fis-orde schema one is supposed to have convinced ‘nese that the specie formulae used in particular, the logical operations) re well defined in any structure that one considers this wil be taken up in (below. Warning The choos offrstorder schema isnot uniquely deter- (ploed by the sosond-order axioms! Thus Pean's own axioms mention tapi only the constant O andthe sucessr function S, not addition nor ‘multiplication, The first-order schema bailt up from O and S isa weak, Incidentally decidable, subsystem of classical first-order arithmetic above, land quite inadequate for formulating curtent informal arithmetic. Informal Figour requires a much more detailed justification Fr the choice of + and. tani usualy supplied.) “An interesting example of concept that needs a third-order definitions that of measurable cardinal? Such concepts are rare; for, whenever theorticlly a whole hierarchy resents itself in practice one only uses the first few levels or a notion ouside that hierarchy altogether; two coneets may bementioned here which re not definable by any formulain the whole Perarchy of languages of predate loge. Evident, neither the cumulative type structure itself not the structure consisting of the ordinals with the ordering relation is definable by any formula of finite (or transite) order: for (at least, usually) one requires, thatthe universe of the structures considered bea st, and no set iso ‘morphic Yo the totality of al ordinals, let alone of al ses. 'NB. The (somewhat crude cassfcationin terms of order of the language considered has recently been refined by the wse of infinite formulae, for Instance infinite first-order Formule. These or, a least, important classes ‘@ of them are intermediate between fist-order and second-order formulae since any structure definable by a formula in is also definable by means fof a (nite) second-order formula, but not conversely. The ordinal i an example. 2% tnt and Sct, “Casing nace cardial’, Noes Amer. Math soe Wve pa INFORMAL RIGOUR " iis ear hat wat i achive ne case of i tena of eta st of neers by means ft an of integer whch ed Seal i the tery of inint omals)—petap ss om ede fen to tee and bli es about, ine numbers The aon ite st aac nth "Whatirmach mor intresting han ts bv remake fst hata ‘ih theory on forma an be econ pty, any ato {herons tout nie neon onl ean eens oa onet (Canin chose at oto to nie cond oe forme {@) A redhtn of ertons aout igh cde cocci cxGer sateen inte lneguge oct hay Since henton elation a oral (of moe) of any gen re loratadine Cascmoton ote omy epee ey ty Be, ik aconanence ‘thc econo formula ened ty 2 ort formal oft ther. Moe precy expe by such fom ve he Quan tried trang: vel ct of teu pe str Ooe ‘Sos ply btn transi iat hs oder neve fanquat forall aera; so eet adequate for preing ‘omdorer comsqnc somebody nol ave node ‘sil cclaon eesti; soe te atone xa sane tse alos ta of franc see ony ead Ot ‘iar Var (oe al se) flowed by ora wove Gani ae ‘Rrced tLe (vic) one har frm onan se gas (VbEa). act As ool any contusion tat we ay formulates fon exter canaguce canals forme tes afore asrion Shout ie clave type tus, However, hia tat fer faving the fron nero, my be very afl oink nem of ‘ont ner serio ‘ample Let be Zermc's xo wth the tom of inf, nd et Cit sete (anni fomslasn o he conn hypotensin he flowing fom ye colecion of ereday fee witht indi, Cass Co WEah Cun ~ Corn 2 HC CH sett XE Cay > SEV =F, 4.06 canna be 100 percent sur: for instance, comer the sale th efi tio, Weave hee st Fo marl acer nay Gadel numbers af corde ‘ol fst hoary, sch tat ne Fee Stearn) sty Fi dead (= 4, &yVinw 5s DY ‘As Tar emphasind, 1 nol defable by ans of «fester formal i the rece bens bow)GEORG KREISEL which is expressed by means of quantifier over C2. As Zermelo pointed ‘ut (ee above), if we use the current set-theoretic definition Ze) of the ‘cumulative hierarchy, in any model of , this formula Z defines a G, for 8 Timit ordinal ¢ > o. Consequently we have (PROVE h~ cw). [Note that CH is formulated in first-order language of set theory (@) Distinctions formulated in terms of higher-order consequence. In contrast tothe example on CH above, Faenke’s replacement axiom i not {Gecided by Zermelo'sexioms (because 7 issatsied by Cys yy and Fraenke’s ‘axiom not); in particular it i independent of Zecmelo's second-order ‘ioms while by Cohen's proof, CH is only independent ofthe frs-order Schema (associated with the axioms) of Zermslo-Fraenkel ‘This hows, frst ofall, the (mathematical fact thatthe distinction bermeen second-order consequence and fst-order consequence (from the seems) is ot rca ‘Secondly, it shows a dference between the independence ofthe axiom of parallels in geometry on the one hand and of CH in first-order set theory Th geometry (a formulated by Pasch or Hilbert) wealso havea second-order txiom, namely the axiom of continuity of Dedekind’s section: the parallel ‘trim isnot even a second-order consequence of this axiom, i it oTte- Spon 10 Fraenkel’s axiom, not to CH. Finally, consider the empirical fat that nobody was astonished by the independence of Fracnkel’s axiom, but many people were surprised by (Cohen's result Tis reaction quite consistent with my assertion above that the evidence of the fist-order scheme derives from the second-order axiom, Even if one explained to a mathematician the distinction above he would ‘marvel atthe ingenuity equired to exploit; in his own work he never gives {T second thought tothe form of the predicate Used inthe comprehension tniom:! (Thisis the reason why, , Bourbaki is extremely careful tofsolate the assumptions of a mathematical theorem, but never the axioms of set theory implicit in a particular deduction, eg, what instances of the com> prehension axiom ate used. This practice is quite consistent with the fssumption that what one has in mind when following Bourbaki's proofs is the second-order axiom, and the practice would be horibly unscenifiif fone really took the restricted schema as basi.) {Connection between informal rigour and the notion of higher-order consequence. The fst point to notices that hs notions needed forthe ery ormulation of the distinction above. This illustrates the weakness of the positivist doctrine (in (a), p. 78, which refuses to accept a distinction Unless it is formulated in certain restricted terms. (NB. OF course if one sae INFORMAL RIGOUR ® ‘wants fo study the formalist reduction, Hilbert’ program of (6), p- 84, the restriction isnot only acceptable, but necessary. But the fact that the in tuitvelysignifiant distinction above cannot be so formulate, edces the foandatonl iors o frm aay, by erences of ‘Next itismot surprising that there ia certain arymetry between the role ‘of higher-order consequence for derivability results (Section a) and its role in independence results Seston 1b). The same is familiar, eg. from recursion theory. Thus to establish negative (ie, unsolvabily) resus one will aim in the first place to show recursive uncolvability, while to show solvability one gves a particular schema and a proof showing that the Schema works. Simiary, fend ofthe introduction; even if problem i ‘eursively solvable, one may wish to explain why it hasnt been solved by showing, €¢. that there ino schema ofa given kind which ean be proved towork by given methods orelseby showing thatcalculationsare oolong) Curiously enough, this obvious point is sometimes overlooked, nally, and thisis ofcourse the most direct link between the present and the main theme of this article, second-order decidablty of C1 (in the ‘xample of (@) above) suggests this: new primitive notions, eg. properties ‘of natural numbers, which are nor definable inthe language of set theory (uch as inthe footnote on p. 87), may have tobe taken seriously to decide CH; for, what is ft out when one replaces the second-order axiom by the schema, are precisely the properties which are not s0 definable, But 1 am sure dont know: the idea isfotally obvious; most people nthe eld are so accustomed t0 working with the restricted language that they may simply not succed in taking other properties seriously; and, finally, compared ith specific examples that come to mind, eg. the footnote on P. 87, the so-called axioms of infinity? which ae formulated in frsvorder form are more efficent. 2. Inuitce Logical Vality, Trth in all Settheorete Strctres, and Formal Deriablity. We shall consider formulae « of fit order (adeno ing formulae of order i, the predicate Vax to mean; xis intuitively valid, Via valid in all set-theoretic structures, and Dz: formally derivable by means of some fixed (accepted) eet of formal rls Forreference below. Vis definable inthe language of set theory and for recursive rules Da is definable unjormly, ie. foreach o>, the samme formula defines D when the variables range over C;. Below, we shall also ‘consider Vea: validity in classes (Le the universe ofthe structure is a class 1, Ge Remarks toe me Priceon Besser Confeence on problems ‘in mathematics The Undecided. M. Davis), New York (963), pp. 868.»” GEORG KREISEL and the relations are also asses) atleast fr formulae of fist and second order. What isthe Relation Between Val and V? (@) Meaning of Val. The intive meaning of Val differs from that of V in one particular; Va (merely assets that =i tre in all structures in the ‘Cumulative hierarchy, i inal sets nthe precise sense of se above, while Vala asets that =i rue inal structures (for an obvious example of the Aifferenc, see pp. 90-91). A curent view is thatthe notion of arbitrary structure and hence of intuitive logical validity i so vague that is absurd toa fora proof relating it toa precise notion such as Vor D,and thatthe ‘most one can do ito give a kid of plausibility argument. Let us go back to the fact (hic is notin doubt) that one reasons in ‘mathematical practice, using the notion of consequence or of logical con- Sequence, freely and surely (and, recall p. 84, the ‘cies in the past in ‘lasiclmathematis by (€) p 85, were ot due to lack of precision inthe ‘notion of consequence). Also, itis generally agreed that tthe ime of Frege ‘tho formulated rules for first-order logic, Bolrano’s set-theoretic definition of consequence had been forgotten (and had to be rediscovered by Tarski); ‘yet one recognized the validity of Frege's rules (D,). This means that imply WiValDpa! > Vala’) ‘was scepted, and therefore certainly Val was accepted as meaningful [Next comider the two alternatives to Val. First (eg. Bourbaki) “ut matey” inference 1s noting else but following formal rules, in other ‘words D is primary (hough now D must not be regarded as defined set- ‘theoretically, but combinatorial). This sa specially peculiar ida, because 59 percent ofthe readers, and 90 per cent ofthe writers of Bourbaki, don't have the rues in their heads tal! Nobody would expecta mathematician {a work on groups fhe dd not know the definition of group. (By Section 1b) the notion of set is treated in Boutbaki ike Val) Second, consider the suggestion that ‘ultimately inference is ematical, i.e Vismeant. Ths toois hardy convincing. Consider a formula a! with the binary relation symbol Eas single non-logical constant; lets, mean that 2 is true when the quantifiers ina range over al sets and E's replaced by the membership relation, (Note that a 4 Rstorder formula of set theory.) ‘Then intuitively one concludes ais logically valid then ay, be, (in symbols): Vale —> =. But one ‘certainly does not conclude immediately: Va»; for eequies that = betrue in thestructure consisting ofall ses (withthe membership relation); suniverse snot asta all So Va (is true in each set-theoretic structure) INFORMAL RIGOUR 1 oes not allow us to conclude a, ‘immediately: this is made precise by sneensof the results in (b) and (below. On the other and one does accept ViVatVale! > Va!) the moment one takes it for granted that loge applies to mathematical structures. "Nobody wil deny that one knows more about Val after one has established its relations with V and D; but thot dosn't mean that Val was vague before. Infact we have the theorem For I, given the two accepted propertis of Val above, Va'Valacr Va) and Wol(Valae+ Do) “The proof uses Gédel’s completeness theorem: Wal(Vx > Ds). Com- bined with Val(Dx > Vale) adove, we have Vel(Va+ Da), and with ViVedVala! > Va") above: Val(Va'e> Vale). Without Godel'scomplete- ress theorem we have from the two accepted properties of Val YVal(Dx -> Vs), incidentally theorem which does not involve the primitive notion Vata al ‘Atleast, Valis not 10 vague to permit a proof ofits equivalence to Vfor first-order a, by use ofthe properties of Val above! () Therelation between Va! (acontaining a binary Bas snglenon logical constant) and a, To discus this it is convenient to use the theory of ex- plisily definable properties (usually called: theory of clases) and the ‘elation ‘Sat(A,B:0) to mean: the property A and the relation B (= A x A) satisfy 2. We can represent finite sequences of classes 4y, ... dy. by a single class fn {imadinp & xe Ay). Hach A, is explcily éfnableso is 4. Now, ty standard techniques of forming truth definitions, Sai(4,B,) is defined by 3CE,B,C.9) where E doesnot contain clas variables other than (the free variables), BC. ‘Let U stand forthe elas ofall sets, and E for the membership relation restricted to U. ‘The denon has the fallowingIerance property. I he st variables in sang gat a Cy a oe conulutve Mesure the anes tre jt of Crt a te rte fetus above, for gen 4 an, aoe the sae eof wheter © ‘pes overall of Gray or ony ver omens Cot eaplely dinate fom 4 IN The coreponlig case or hiherordr formal ute era.2 GEORG KREISEL For each particular! we have: Vi! Sat(U, E,8) provable inthe theory of clases with axiom of infinity, hence Val 8, Cor, By a wellknovn result of Novak Gee App. AY), Va! -» is provable inet theory for each formula & "The proof ofthe theorem uses Va(Va! > Da!) for cut fre rules (e. Genteen'), and then, fr fited 8, Dg ~ Sau(U, £,2) by means ofa truth ZU, Fo,8)) is provable in the theory of classes. This reces to a purely set-theoretic formula o alta +E (Fay2)) which is proved in a finite subsystem S, of set theory; regarded asa formal ‘object of predicate logic (wth replaced by a binary relation symbol £2, Jet 5, be o,and let (*), regarded as formal objet, be. Thus Fay Wea, > 19) = ZitFloy +1 9).01 > Veh But for the particular formula 9-1, without use of induction, we verify that CU, satisfies oy Te bys ZuUFloy 1 9),0) + a] > (Sy + Wala > 2F aD. Since FS. and, by assumption, F,(*), we have Fs, W(oy 1). But this would prove the consistency of Sin, ‘Since edenty on the intended interpretation of the theory of classes (exliily definable properties) (2) is valid, we have found an instance of Yomited bere E41 INFORMAL RIGOUR ” e-incompletenest. Ths looking at the intuitive relation Val, leads one not ‘only to formal proofs a in (a) bu also to incompleteness theorems. (@) All this wis for rstorder formulas. For higher-order formulae we donot have a convincing proofof,e8., Va4 Var» Vala) though one would fexpeet one. A more specific question can be formulated in terms of the birarchy of types Cy. Let V® mean: truth nal structures that belong t Cy ‘Then Va! Vo > w(V"" ++ V9) (Skolem-Lowenheim theorem). What fs the analogue (10 0) for second-order formulac? e.g. if & is Zermelo’s sytem of axioms, V="*C1)is false, Y=") is tue. This analogue to eis certainly large. Let «assert of the structure (aye) that () itis Cy or limit numbers 6, e, that satisfies Zermelo's (Second-order axioms, (i) contains a measurable cardinal =. Here (is of second. order and (is ofirst order relative to ()-1FB = ae), we have PCB) foro the fist measurable cardinal», but not V" (1) for 2 > = ‘Since we do not even know a reduction analogous tothe basic Skolem- LLoewenheim theorem, itis perhaps premature to ask for an analogue to Wal(V#"la+ Da), For instance, a well rounded theory of higher-order formulae may be posible only for infinitely long ones. For ifsite fs ‘order formulae we do know an analogue when Ds is replaced by certain [generalized indutoedeiitions (wale) ‘General Conclusion. Tere is ofcourse nothing new n treating Va s an understood concept efter all Gédel established completeness without having to mention ¥; he simply used implicily the obvious VatVala > vera) and Va(Da — Vala) (incidentally for all 1), and proved Yal(7"!a-» Da). It seems a good time to examine this slted problem carefully because (besides Heyting's rules for intuitonst vai, of Section 3) we face problems about finitst validity (Val) and predicaive validity Val, not unlike those raised by Frege's rules. Thus, asin his case, wwe have (recursive) rules Dr, and Dy for fntistic and preicaive dedue- jon rexpectively, established by magns of autonomous progressions; and then equivalence to Valyy resp. Valp (for the languages considered) is most a plausible as wat Val» D af the time of Frege. But we have not yet found principles as convincing as those of Sestion 2a) above to clinch the matter in fact we do not have an analogue to V. POSTSCRIPT ‘The following bibliographical information seems useful; incidentally, it explains the omission of those sections of the original article which are not reprinted hereo GEORG KREISEL 1.79, Section 3 (omited here) analyses Brouwers empirical propositions which he uses ia his proof of Wal=~3a(exr ~0)> 3x(ex =O). “These propositions have been further analysed by Kripke and Myhil [M) ‘The paticular use of these propositions by Brouwer and analysed in Section 3 is superseded by a more delicate analysis of fee choice sequences in paragraph 4 of (K2} Incidentally, a much more interesting wse of these propositions was made by Kripke who refuted, rom them, Church's thesis by deriving ~Va 3p Vn 3mi7(p.nn) A an~ Un}. (Evidently we have a 3p Wn 3m{T.n.m) Man = Unt if ranges over lawless sequences, fe, thore generated by adie, snc it would be absurd to prove of any die that it must follow a predetermined sequence. Kripke's argument is needed because it concerns a diferent notion of sequence) ‘Appendix B i superseded by much stronger conservative extension results not only for non-standard arithmetie, but also for non-standard analysis (K3] 86. Parsgraph 4 of [Kt] treats the step from second-order axioms to first-order schemata systematically. 87. Second paragraph. A good theory of infinite formulae is developed in the dissertation of J, Barwise, Stanford Univesity 1967, 'p.93. Some addtional information about V* «iscontained on pp. 191-2 of KK) 16 fi a of Se a 9 OBE oe ooo tno Nt! Nob. Cn 93 Bh. nm mrt emt a hw coer \oleaton of mee! tar seer, ants ond roabny le, Rina ad TE nog ign rere tt VL SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS! SOLOMON FEFERMAN Dedicated to Professor Charles Loewner on the occasion of his Toth birthday, ‘Tia paper is divided into two pars. Patt I provides a resumé ofthe evol- tution ofthe notion of prdicativity 2 Pat Il describes our own work on the subject PART I 1. Conceptions of Sets Statements about sets lie at the heart of most modern attempts to systematize all (or, a least, ll known) mathematics. ‘Technical and philosophical discussions concerning such systematizations andthe underying conceptions have thus occupied a considerable portion ofthe literature on the foundations of mathematics. From these discussions we can distinguish fairly well at least the two extremes of what Sts are conceived tobe. In this section, we compare these {wo conceptions as they pertain to sts of fit type, in particular, ets of ‘natural numbers. The remainder ofthe paper is devoted to systematizations ‘of mathematical analysis based on one ofthese conceptions. From one point of view, often identified asthe Plroniste or Camtoran conception, sets have an existence which is independent of human def- rons and constructions. The words ‘arbitrary se are often wsed 10 ‘emphasize this independence, Various statements about ses are readily recognized tobe corect under this conception, for example the axioms of From he Jura of Syme Lge, Vo. 29 (96, 91-3. Copmit @ 164 nape by bern of the pits Apne Mathes Soe ad fin {CFaho nadustonp. 8 abore=—€8) ex oa edad deed to «mating ofthe Assoc for Symbol gest bec, Cafor, on Sane. 198 *Fror a recent tring eyo tae he reader shoul compare GK, “us pi lth Se Sect? Mins Pc Va i, sat prtcatoy in enrl a or ova work prt "seh of the revere fore new work deaeioed Fut 1 below was sup. ge one tome Ray Rte ie aan Se96 SOLOMON FEFERMAN ‘comprehension and of choice. Other statements, such as the continuum Fypothesis and its generalizations remain undecided on this conecption, (However the inability of humans to decide such questions can no more be charged at a defect of this conception than can their inability to decide Certain number-theoretical statements on the basis ofthe usual conceptions ofthe natural numbers) The other extreme is what we shal refer to asthe preicatve conception. ‘According to this, onl the natural numbers can be regarded a ‘given to ws (and, ia the even more severe nominalist point of view, not even these abstract objects are available tous). In contrast, sets are created by man to ‘acta convenient abstractions (fagon de parler) from particular conditions ‘oF definitions. In order, for example, to predcatvely introduce a set S of natural numbers we must have before us @ condition B(2), in terms of ‘which we define S by an Axtee $+ 801 lowever, before we can astert the existence of uch, should already have been relied that the defining conion (2) hs a well-determined meaning which is independent of whether or not there exists aset Satisfy (11) (but Which can depend on what sets have been previously realized t exist). In particular to determing what members has, we should not be ld via B(=) {nto avleiour-ciele which would retur us tothe very question we stare with. Conditions (3) which do so are said to be impredcave; it should be expected that mest conditions (x) involving quantifiers ranging over ‘arbi- trary sets ar ofthis nature. Finally, we can never speak sensibly (in the predictive conception) of the ‘totality’ of all sets a8 a ‘completed totality’ but only as potential orality whose fll contents never fully grasped but only realized in sages. "The least upper bound principle of clasical analysis provides an im- portant example of the use of impredicatve definitions. We can identify Fational numbers with certain natural numbers and then identify eal num bers with certain ses of natural numbers va Dedekind sections or Cauchy sequences, If we identify real numbers with the upperparts of Dedekind sections we se that the Lu.b. of a (bounded, non-empty) set of real ‘numbers (with rational Luis simply given by S = "1X Xe). If is sive by a condition 6), a2 AXLX6 os 6X), then the intersection Sis given by ay Asire $+ AX) > x6 29). SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS n ‘The existence of such Sis, of couse, clear under the Cantorian conception. However, to answer the question "What are the members of $7" we woul, in general, ist have to know what sets satisfy G(X), and in particular whether or not 6S) holds; this would, in tur, in general depend on Knowing what members Shas? ‘Objections tothe us of impredicative definitions in mathematics have been rised by @ number of writers. At fist, these objections centred on their role in the paradoxes (Poincaré, Russel), However, it became clear ‘before long that the paradoxes wer avoided by some simple restrictions on the use ofthe comprehension principle, while hardly abandoning impred- cative definitions ether wise. The more thorough-oing crits, such as Weal, ‘ejected their use throughout mathematics and in particular as applied in the Lub. principle of analysis. Basically, these eis refused to belive that there was any evidence to support the Cantorian conception of sets a5 independently existing entities. Weyl dscribed® impredicaive analysis 36 house built on sand’ ina Togcan’s paradise In defence ofthe Cantorian conception of sets we quote Gel p. 137 “te soems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite as estimate a8 the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to ‘believe in their existence. They are inthe same sense necessary to obain @ satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a fatisfactory theory of our sense perceptions and in both cases itis imposs- ibe to interpret the propositions one wants o asset about these entities 36 propositions about the “data, i, in the later case the actully occuring Sense perceptions” Earle in the same essay (p. 127), GBdel supports, as largely justified, the view tat the axioms of lic and mathematic. need ‘not necesaily be evident in themselves, but rather thei justification les (exactly asin physi inthe fact that they make it posible fr these "sense perceptions” tobe dedced: which ofcourse would not exclude that they also havea kind of intrinsic plausibility similar to tat in physics’. Presum- ably, the direct evidence of mathematics which is spoken of here and which Corresponds to the sense perceptions” of physics includes atleast fits cally verifiable propositions concerning the natural numbers (whichis not {say that these ar ll the data). "The actual development of mathematics strongly supports one interpre- 2A psc ame cmon which es iv cis can SEH Wea Der Rowman Krtache Unerecengen Sher dh Gradlg der ARR Git math lp, he Philnpy of Berton Ral New* SOLOMON FEFERMAN tation ofthis argument, Abstraction and generalization are constantly put- ‘sued as the means to reach rally satisfactory expanations which account for seared individual resus, In particular, extensive developmeats in algebra and analysis sernneceszary to give us el insight into the behavior ofthe natural numbers. Thus we are abe to realize certain results, whose instances can be fntstcally checked only by a detour via objects Such as ‘Meals, analytic functions) which are much more ‘abstract’ than those with Which we are finally concerned, “The argument is ss freefl when it is read as justifying some particular conceptions and assumptions, namely those of impredicative set theory, as formally necesary to infer the arithmetical data of mathematics. tis well ‘known that a number of algebraic and analytic arguments can be sytem- tically recast into form which can be subsumed under elementary (rst ‘order) number theory. According tothe thesis and results of Kreis, such arguments can be transformed even further into finitisticlly acceptable | SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS. * sible to the Cantorian and that he should be able to consider whether proposed explication of what constitutes predicative rezoning is both correct and complete. On the other hand, we eannot expect the confirmed predictivist to do any more than agree that say particular proposition ‘coming under this heading is (meaningful and) correct. For, whenever he ‘an recognize that all theorems of a certain set are correct, he can aso recognize thatthe statement of consistency ofthis sets correct. However, the consistency ofthe et ofall prediatvely provable statements isnot itself preicatvely provable Second, itis not contended here that the two estremes we have considered arethe only coherent or useful conceptions of es, Atleast one intermediate conception of great interest is what is called the contractive conception, ‘This permis, beside the use ofpredicative definitions, generalized inductive x6 XO], where Wis ‘tthmetcal and (0) holds. Suppose we were ata stage where we had predcatvely realized the existence ofall members ofa certain collection, {nd that all members of 4 are hyperarithmetic. Then we could not use the formula G(s) = AX(ULX) > xe X) to predicatively determine the exist- noe ofthe new st at this stage, forthe meaning of (2) will depend on whether or not we are including Oi the range ofthe quantifier AX. To see this let 2. ~ the collection of hyperrithmetic sets and (impredicatvey), Sp BAN MUA) 2x0 I), 8: = (EAL AUN) x © X)) and = ta: Bla)) = [AX go MX) > x6 H)). Then S, 2 8,20; but ‘Spe 3! by Kleene, s0 Sy O and hence also 5; # 0. For further dis- ‘cussion ofthese ideas, cf. Section 4 below. 2. Ramified Anatyis. The fst steps toward a formalization of pedi cative reasoning were made by Russel! by the introduction of type distine- tions and within types of order distinctions or ramifications or, a8 we call thom here, degrees. "The natral numbers are of type O; We use lees sf. YY raNge ‘over these: Sets of natural numbers are of type 15 we use letters S, T, {X, ¥.Z for these. Attype 2 we have collections, 4. of ets of natural ‘numbers, and soon. Thee relation ito hold ooly between members of one type and those ofthe next type. et us restrict attention forthe moment to types 1, and to conditions {3G) which involve variables just ofthese types. We cll (2) arithmetical itit involves no quantication over type I. Such conditions have perfectly ‘weldetermined meaning, given the natural numbers. We can introduce the Totalty of sets Salven by en Aabee Se €0) for any arithmetical conition W(x); we cll these the ses of degree 0. Now itwe consider an arbitrary condition (3), we ean form a well-determined set S given by en Asie $+ Bal M5. C. Kleene, Hieaoler of numbertheoretc pects Bulletin of the Amora Mathemaee Sacty, Yo 81 C985, pp. 9SI0. "Ow the fore of ‘eating of conic era i, NmercanJoureaof Mathemate, Se F959) pps 28 Tg Cian Quanication of mambersheerecFncions',Compoitio Marhe- tes Vol 999) 99.23 ‘XR Whtebead ind Rane, Principe Moremorca, ol. , Cambridge rity Pr, e928 SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS 101, here the subscript A, indicates relativzation ofall type 1 quantifiers in 1 to My, These sos are said tobe of degree I and the totality of them i: denoted by 4, We can proced in this way to describe the sets of degree 2,3.ete ‘More generally, gven any well-determined collection # and condition 1, we shall write for the result of relaivizing all ype 1 quantifiers in {of ie. every occurrence AX(..) in His replaced by Aq), ie AX(1e-M o>...) (and similarly for existential quantifiers). Thea we ine troduce: es 4° consists ofall sets 8 such that for some condition (2), we have Axtre Se Bal “This procedure described in the preceding paragraph const offntroducing the clletons by: 28) Me const ofall arthmeically definable ses; © MM. This semantical description in terms of definbility) isthe intended model, ‘of formal system fr types 0,1 Instead of one kindof variable for type 1, ‘we now have diferent variables ST... X,Y, foreach degree K- BY the depre of formula inthis system we mean 0, if it contains no free or ‘bound variables of typeI, otherwise the maximum of all m +1 such that variable X" appears bound in Gand of all msuch that a variable Y" appears fee in Thea the comprehension axiom Schema takes the form es ASA xixestes 5601 Jor each formula of degree k(n which S* does nt appear fre). Thisis the sential feature of Russel's ramified theory of types. It cartaaly accords ith part ofthe preicative conception of set Tn the above theory we have no way of talking about “arbitrary” real numbers as, say, Dedekind sections) We can only talk about real aumbers of degree 0, of degree 1, of degree 2, etc. Russell realized this would be Jdierous to practising analysts. Although be expressed great reservations concerning the following step, be found it necessary to introduce the ‘axioms of redutily: eo ASTVS® AxikeS!<+xeS") in efect wiping away the system of degres. Tt took Ramsey to finally ‘obierve thatthe system of types already avoided the paradoxes, to which102 SOLOMON FEFERMAN «the detour through degrees and back again via the axiom of reduciiity ftdded nothing. Thus analysis as analyst know itcould be developed in the imple theory of types without the obvious paradoxes being forth coming 13. Toward the Practice of Predcative Analysis. In his work Das Kon. tinuan' of 1918, Weyl 00k the resolute and well-needed step toward sing ‘actly how much remained in a sytem of analysis bull on strictly predi- tative foundations. Weyl also saw that analysis with real numbers of dilfer- tnt degrees was unacceptable; he thus decided to disregard al sets above ‘egree 0, Le, above the arithmetically definable sets. In modern formal terms (and now showing explicitly the possible use of additional free ‘variables in defining conditions is comprehension axioms were jst those ofthe form: o. AY,Z po VSA RESO WEY Doo YZ where is any arithmetical formula in which the variable 'S' does not “appear. We shal al he (second order) system of analysis built with this Fesricted principle the system of arithmerc or elementary anys should ‘beobserved that this system can be regarded asa subsystem of both ramified sod clasial analysis. “The sutprising result found by Weyl was that essentially the whole analysis of continuous functions as contained, say, inthe standard under- ‘raduate courses could be developed inthis system. We have, for example, fora continuous function ona closed interval of real numbers, existence of maximum and minimum, mean value theorem, uniform continuity, exist- ‘ce of Ricmann integral, andthe Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. "These results about continuous functions depend among othe things on the Bolzano: Weierstrass and Heine Borel Theorems. How is it posible to ‘obtain these without the ub. principe? The answer i that in the cases of fnerest we can deal with Lusb. of sequences, rather than sets and in fact ‘sequences of certain special form. we identify real numbers with (upper) ‘Dedekind sectionsin the rationals, wesay that sequence S, of real numbers is given if we havea sot T such that for each %, x€ Se» eT. Then the Lub. ofthe Sy, which we idetied eater with S,ve wis defined sithmeicallyin teres of T by Ax(xy) € 7) isin this sense that me can prove in elementary analysis that every Bounded sequence of reas asa east tipper bound. (There is no essential difference here if real numbers are rep ‘resented by Cauchy sequences in the rationals) The corresponding version Aya Sep. 9, 2016 SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS 103, ofthe Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, in the form that every bounded Sequence of reals contains a convergent subsequence, is then provable by the usual subdivision process, Similarly, we ean prove the Heine-Borel theorem when expressed in the form: Citen a sequence (tuts) f ope ‘atonal interoas, foreach m, Ur a(t doesnot cover (0) then there exists areal number r¢ (2,5) ~ eal t) The number ris aithmetically ‘efinable i terms ofthe given sequence “The carry-over of the above ideas to the complex mumbers and the classical theory of analytic functions is then straightforward, It ialso clear that all the usual spcial futons of clasical analysis, including the various algebraic and transcendental functions are arithmetically definable, as seen from their power series expansions. “The ideas of Weyl languished for some time, but they have received renewed interest in recent years. These ideas were carried out in modern form and in some detail by Graegorezyek'* and, in another form, by M. Kond6.” Beyond ths, Kreis has observed that somewhat further portions of real analysis can be developed arithmeticaly (but allowing higher type variables) for example, pats of the theory of Lebesgue measur- able sets and functions. [ti not claimed that the fll notion of (outer) ‘measure an be introduce, for this essentially involves the notion of g.. However, itisa consequence ofthe usual definitions of measurabiity that a set of rel numbers in (0,1 s measurable if and only if there isa Gy set OF 3 ol such that pF" — -#) =O (outer measure); equivalently that there fare Gy sts 4,2, 2 101] with °C") + uA) = L Now ‘we would say that a Gy set is given if we have a double sequence of Airs. Gamefg) of rationals such that = (ing Uz-clFa!ma- Theo H(A) fe arltmetically definable in terms of this sequence. We explain Similarly what is meant by giving sequence of Gs sets. Then we can deal in elementary analysis with measurable sats or sequences of such for which corresponding Gs sets (as above) or sequences of such ae given In this way ‘good deal of classical analysis can already be recaptured in elementary analysis, ‘This is of interest in two ways. With espect to questions concerning the foundations of mathematic, i bepins to bear ou the contetion of Section | that only predictive concepts need by assumed in order to derive all known, 6A. Grmporceet, “Elementary dtnable ana’, Fandemerte Mathematics, val $i (955)pp S138 “SM. Rondo Sar ler esas sommable ee fondemeat de Pray mathe mui lpanne Jura of thea, Yo, 26 (988) Dp. Elle Kounigh Nrlols hades sa Meencaptn, Pocedgy ts Ar WoL (is flags Matmonian, ol 24) (52h pp. 307-80108 SOLOMON FEFERMAN arithmetical results anda number of analytical results which are of mathe- ‘atical interest, On the other hand, it isolates various closure conditions on {collection of real numbers which are cesar to obtain such results, in this case closure undee arithmetical definabiity. This point 1 a diferent kind of eenealizaton of analysis than has been pursued by analysts up 10 ‘now, and one which i perhaps more related to the kind followed by algebras. ‘What is stl lacking t this point is an adequate explication of the fll cootent of predicative principles, Such an explication should somehow get fround the problem of dealing with real numbers of diferent depres; it ‘Should also give us seater freedom to deal with objects of higher types 4 Toward the Formalzation of Predicatve Analysis. The fist step to ‘oblain the desired explication ofthe notion, predcatiely provable statement of (clasical) analy, is 10 ob\ain a better understanding ofthe notion, Dredictvely definable set of natural member. Ths suggests a reconsidet- ‘tion of the collections, defined in (24). If we accept that each member ofeach is predicatively definable, then we should also accept this for Uutitk =e} This collection, which we denote by is prdicaivly ‘wolldetermined. Hence every member of /y.i~ 4/2 is prdicatively ‘efnable, and then s every member of /y.2 Mae 6 In general, ‘we define a transinite sequence of collections by: G41) My consist of alarithmetclly definable ses, i) Meas = foreach = and i) a= Ut giB< a for limit =. [Now we must make one important restriction on this procedure. Inthe predictive conception, the notion of farbitrary’ ordinal, i, “arbitrary” ‘pel-ordering relation, is just as meaningless asthe notion of ‘arbitrary’ st. Each ordinal used is to be determined by a well-ordering relation x-< y and this relation, considered asa set of ordered pairs x.y> must already ‘beamong the admitted set. This ead othe fllowing proviso of autonomy on (4.0 (42) In (6.1) Gl) we consider only those limit ordinal for which there is Some y In other words, the reference to the ‘completed totality” of al sets inthe aquantfcatios of (46) is only an apparent one, and one can ead thee ‘ual well and anambiguculy as reering ta potetia ttl, of whieh a welletermined part 34 is already before ws. “Thisleads to another arpument in support of 4). Given acoletion and an arbitrary second-order formula (2) with jst xe, we sy that 8 Indefinite relative to for every #2 A weave Axa) <> Bur) Inparticular, if is fnitive relative to. then Ax(G, gts)» BC). Then we introduce (48) 4 consists of all members of together with all et S such that Jor some formula B(x) whichis definite relative 10. we have Axtre So Ba) ZEE Klee. Went nts eet 52 In terme of fhe hyperrthnes Nerarcy of Kieoe's “rachis of number- tyne oy mated sont fae re oe He ice 85, oe at SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS 107 ‘This leads us to define a transite sequence of collections %, by (49) % cont ofall arithmetical definable et, Gi) Fury = 2h foreach and Gi) 22 U9 gEB ABZ), then we are allowed to infer VS Axe Se V¥WCY)) Because ofitsrelationto (4.6), wecall this the hyperarithmetc comprehension rale (HCR). Compared 1 deductions in ramified analysis, every statement proved using (HCR) has immediate significance in clasical analytic terms and, in fact, ia theorem of classical analysis. Furthermore, we have a predicatve justification of (4.11), which is the proo-theoreti analogue of Sefntenss. Tis was gven by Kreisel; we repeat it hee. (4.12), With each staxement 9 ina proof using (HER) we can associate @ collection M eich that Be correct no matter what MWe take with Mee. For suppose we have such associated with the hypothesis of an (HCR) asin (11), Suppose that there are no fre set variables inthis hypothesis, ‘Then we have AaV Veg Hs YNZ 4 BZN and AVY. MeV) 44 AZ p BMEZI 319. Larnzen, "Lapel Raton and Formal 198, lo. it 1H, Mang Secey of Mathemeal Loe op et 53 Wane Rin epeately deers he temo at formation in A Sey of Matematica Lapis Ce XIE XRY, bingo tate ae (ere ei fee ects ofp ntan, 2 SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS 109, {or any W'2 #, Thus we conclude that AalV Yor Me, VT a MID Hence if we take to consist of and (x:V ¥.q (x, 9), we see that VSp Axtee S++ V¥rY)) now holds for every W'2 lis (4.12) which allows Us fo make use of formally unrestricted set ‘quantifiers in a development of predicative analysis, where this would otherwise be ilegiimate, PART IL ‘We are now prepared to describe the geneai nature of our own contri- butions in this subject and which ace to be explained more fully below.3™ Unfortunately, space doesnot permit us fo give anything more than hint ‘ofthe proofs, ome of which have tuned out tobe rather long. A detailed ‘count ofthese i now being prepared and will appear elsewhere. ‘The starting point consists of two propesed formal explicatons of the notion predicarive procablty in (second order) analysis, both of which fall ‘under the general fame of autonomous progressions of theories. The ist ‘of these (originally suggested by Keeise™) isin terms of a transfinite Sequence of theories R, embodying transfinite ramified analysis, while the Second makes use ofa sequence of theories H, embodying the rule (HCR), aswell asa formalized rule. These proposals are described more precisely in Section 5 and Section 6, ‘Te turns out that these are essentially equivalent formalizations. By this we mean that certain mutual intrtansatabilty results hold; these are BOMI—+ AxBEO) is taken as an axiom. ‘The system based on (Ax,)-(Axq) is just ordinary classical number theory ‘expanded to include second-order logic. We call this system (2). Thesystem ‘of elassica analysts obtained by adding all instances ofthe comprehension 6 (Ax) VKAaKeXe> HOO, where G¢0{ = B(x.) any forma in which X is not free “The more constructive systems we deal with are obtained by restricting {fn Keomnowne von Oxdunguatien Gch tue Fantom’ms SOLOMON FEFERMAN thew of (Ax) in variow ways For ea, the sem of cemetary aps sed by acing) alliances of (Axa wich 3) Simartmet formal ‘Pome Kreps competetion re (411, me et Uatnguh formals ne and ral frm, ice we oot at ne of xia of choc we cnnot xpen te re ede manipaions for intercaning ope © and Ope 1 eta eng to tbe nora fos MYBO) and VZBOZ)- En Cena formu ean oe which can be trovg fo4 a term hich we hve ol ancl quater of Pe re timo peO an beerbeery acm onan ay postion itttat eee tye Tawa We dcie sina the nation of (raetaty yormaa © Then he conser: (82) (Ree HCR) Geno Ifomal B= Hx.) and Boma SES few) ien ee er Wane Xo) Fr pucosfllstation tel, we sal ot nt erie (re) Essie a= Aw an) AZ 2), The em of ie eta y(t) an ACR etd by SEEPn hene sion he uno omatg aiid a, Pasi eer rosso eden var wennit eanvenest wotowots one eyo Let S43) bay formula ith he wo ROU We do nies <3 fr M9) nan) 20 fe iiwnts Acie dr heen >and ay At Tra Eanc Line 0) be conjscon of sete er einen iter oan hve ns. Ten oer Boke ewe ake SB) (Pom BO0 = Aske xAAY AxBO, where 4*(G) < a. Finally, we need a formal axiom corresponding £ the limit generalization rule (LG). This is (61) ecards “AXE HORI) + AXE HOC Hee BO) eny grad formal with jut Xf, isan iit notation Mand d's any notion with 1-2 This ba combine refecton Scile afc iit eneraliaton astm Is alin ties Treatment tit notations, hat the raid rowesion ees fom Secon 5. Tr we hee in mind (6) Gv, i dear how we should also adapt out cater notion of autonony to tat of tonamy with espe t the Ero {Pesion of hore Asin, introduce (68) Aut (R) = the least ordinal greater th e forall autonomous with respect 1 the [Now we take as our second proposal: (69). A graded forma (i.e. formula of rarifed analysis) & predicatively provable If Rc for sme e autonomous with respect tothe pro= (resson of theories Ry. In order to compare and support the proposals (6.1) and (6.9) we have ‘obtained several results, The first main theorem is the following (6.10) Thc, Hat (H°) = Ha (RO) = Ha (H) = Bia (R) = Py ‘We shall try to sketch some ofthe ideas involved in the proof of this. The fist part tha is obtained most dirty from what is already known in the Iierature is that «en “This depends upon a cutetimination argument forthe systems (R), with the following as main lemma, (612) If 9 aa derivation of in (RS) and if | = Band || — a then we anconstact aut foe derivation 3 of & n(R3) with |S x". “Then (6.11) follows from: «, &< Py xf"! = Mp. (6.12) is very closely felated toa result of Schate™ However, the system he considered there facked the important imit generalization rule (LG) Kean be shown to ‘work with this modifestion as wel, The result (6.11) has been obtained Faun) s To. SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS 121 Independently by Schate, and will appear. Schutte has also established directly that Tp S Aut (R°). Mowever, we Shall obtain the stronger result Ty Aut (R); tis aly easy tose that Hat (8) Hae [Next we show oy Fai () 3 Hal (R. ‘Thisisaccomplished by "translation of (H") into (R") which s reminiscent ‘of the argument (4.12). Given any (ungraded) formula 8, let 5° be the result of replacing every bound or fee variable X in by X% Then we are able to associate with every derivation {@ in (HH) a certain collection of at), and then E + Ax((e) Igy). This leads us to: E F Prog) However, we can't conclude from ths in (E) that I) -» Ie), singe the Dredicate Ie) is not elementary. However, we claim that; for every a, gn; FG) If this is established, we have x§? = Aut (E) (and infact, we ‘i get equality ere). In general, glven a progression of theories S, based on the formalized ‘orule, there isa certain class of formulas (2) for which we can show Seay F (a) for an extensive set of notations a€ Oy, which we call the provably conditionally proresive formulas, abbreviated pep. These ate formulas fr which we ean prove in Sy: 61 © 6O @ 62) +6290 (i) the formalization of: for any lilt notation a, if Sys FAY IQ) for high values (fb This is taking e~ «, Aa(V4a) >» IMG). Nov, inorder to et the Fequired translation, we also need oe able to introduce sets Y defined by a ‘ataintransfinite recursion, We chink of ¥ as representing a sequence of feisY with x. €Y one Ye Wenrtedy, e [ters¢ ¥ determines the elements n(x,u),2) © YP of the zh collection for u~ 0, 1,2, (FFM {his is flloms that an axiom of choice can be determined for this collection; this willbe applied below.) The translation ofthe ramied progression into the H, then takes the following form. 625) Thvonen. With any c< Fy and such that RF we cam associate 4, 6< Ty such thar H, © AXB ae Now the Theorems (6.23 and (625) establish the intertransatabilty of UH,(a< Fy) and UR,(a< Ty) (ae Os). This isthe main evidence we have in support ofthe proposals (6.1) and (6), fr itestablishes the (in essence) ‘equivalence of the two basic approaches to the notion of prediative provablity, Tis leads uso identify ya the least welkordeing which impredicatice wth respect ro provabilty. What is striking isthe stability of this identification under the diferent methods of proof considered in (6.10), ‘An interesting application of the intertanslatabity results concerns & ‘cettain rule of cholee which was also sugested by Krisel® as being prod atively valid (6.26) (CH) Sippose 26, Y=8.Y, 64 2formaa, If ARVYOR,Y) 56.4. Kre.“The nim af choice and the cls of ypertsithmei fnton wiaslon ceSOLOMON FEFERMAN as been derived infer VKAKEIa Ay 9? € XD. Itis easly shown that HCR) isa derived rue from (Ci). However, we hae: (621) TheoneN. The theory Hy l-UH,la< is closed under Rule (Ch). “The idea forthe proof i that if we have, sty Hg F AxVY&(3,Y,U) where Te Te then we pet es d< Fp with Ry F AAVY"S!AR, YS U9 by (6.23) and hence a b-< Ty ith Hy, F AU gas ARV Y xs S.asoi ¥, 1) by (625). Tn particular, we can let X represent the cllection consisting of U alone land apply the axiom of choice for the coletios 4X) ‘Because of the use of the formalized w-rulein defining the systems Hy, it is not prima fate lear that Hi, ia subsystem of classical analysis. This is ‘extablished by the following. (628) Tueones Let (IR) (indctze-recursve analysis) be sven by the following retin alton 0(AX),(AN (@) Rule GHCR). i) 17a) derived, infer 180 for any forma 8. (Gi) 17 1a) i derived, infer AXNY Reg) for any arithetie Jorma ‘Then(IR) and Have the sme theorems. Moreover, ths olds even Uf we allow 1 and Re to be expressed with respect to an arbitrary crthmeti elation < yl=8(X)] In Hand Gi. ‘The inclusion IRE Hi, i established by (6.21) (0, i). The proof inthe ‘ther direction involves formalization ofthe infinitary consistency proof (Of Fr, We do not have space to give more details concerning this here ‘The connection ofthe above results and proofs withthe Hilbert con- sistency programme is given by the folowing theorem, which makes use of frguments of Kreise*” and Tait * (629) () URXeHry) ts @ conserotive extension, with respect 0 lis le ‘hunber-theoretc statements, of classical first-order umber theory when 1(H();d) is added 1 the later for each (2< Ty and each arhmetic i) The consistency of (IR) can be proved in primitive recursive ‘number theory by use of certain instances ofthe rule of transfite Induction wp to To 570, Keil, Ondinats of reife ans (bss), Jara of Symone ‘vo 33 US) bm, 39-1 Bia Tube enabttation mato’ to arene | SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS 125, “To our knowl, hi he ret prt of casa amas whi beenorove consent yan of ch ansints incom oer ta ‘storing, en by aos for generated sil mute ht ‘ope improves npr women ely Takeo fora tes Dering tote of denne ty ensnte reco atest so fren vetoing: Takes rot ws bane by means is ton {1 ordnagrm Ot conse poe for mae subse! pre ef aan have made woe of sonsesine or Senrcentie ns involving we fondenes in ther wap Spt by meas of far mori i ap Sot sete Pet ta 1. Predator Type Conlon We conde vith bet discon of predate Hc I coment kee ge lanier ope ates 4,2, Veteran ve nhs fonction (or fit eqn fc) ety te Opes The tion of osetia) Te nd Eos extended natal ay to igher types, is ‘Weft note that her ICR) ante rewriten fn le 03) For Beast, I18 Efron Fr a nny sriter infer XVI) Vp $00). ‘To derive the rule (HCR) from this, let B,, 2, be IT- and Z-formulas such that Ax(B,G)<- O,(8)) has been proved. We want to infer VAxt$(x) = D6 2,60), Using (F), is suicient 1 show ARVIy(0i(x) A ¥=Dv (8,60) ay = 1). Conversely, (F,)s easly obtained from (ICR). ‘This suggests the following general fnctionaiy rule for higher types: (1.2), () For 9(6,0) a E-formala, from Ayvtea, 8) 20,0» tdci tion it gate of mond era ©f the Mathematica! Society of Japan, Val. 131361), pp. 333-41. ee Spectr roma ane furs of tap Sona shah Eoin pee a Se Fae a aoa, Pan of Smee ic ii fe tnd, Hew ed Somes RE red mats Weta {SAAT ySe X, whe een uppe Sond in Or forte prom el Sikeelpton hase Sa tae a a ie15 SOLOMON FEFERMAN infer VoAgnW, B19). “The main results the following (dervabilty being under (Ax)-(Ay th ordinary logic and complete induction extended to higher types) (7.3) Tweones. The system with Rule (F) for arbitrary higher types is @ consercatve extention of the system with Rule (Fy) (equbaenty, GHCR), “The Rule (F) cam be given a direct predicatvejstifiation which ean, in ‘etect, then be formalized to prove (73). We have not been able to see Svhether there are any forther rules which should be considered predicative thither types. Hone accepts the thesis that H-IR) embodis predi- tative provablity for formulas of typeI, it seems reasonable to advance the thesis that addition of Rule(F) embodies predicative provabiity at arbitrary higher ite type. Iemay be expected that results corresponding to(7.3)can be obtained for various transite types (with those types which would be considered, restricted bya condition of autonomy); however we have not porsued this matter. “The ‘practical effects of Rules (HCR) and (F) in the development of predicatve analysis can be tested in terms of measure theory. First, we Feturn tothe question of Lub, A set of eal numbers can be identified with ‘coletion contained inthe collesion # ofall lower Dedekind sections 3. We write X'S ¥ to indicate that the ordering relation holds forthe corresponding real numbers. It can be shown that the general statement ‘of existence of, for bounded - isnot predicatively provable. However, Suppose that Xe 0A YS X=» Yea and that Is bounded above ‘Theo the Lub. Sof can be described by weSOVXLEMALEN), KESOAK(XE BANG M XEN, ise, $ =U = 149 ~ 4), Ths Scan be proved to exist i this case. This argument can be used to predcavely derive the formalization of the following (74) If nomempty conmected collection of real mumbers (Le an ineral s bounded abo thn has a least upper bound. Similary for “bounded below and greatest lower bound” Since Lub. and Bb. can be proved tobe unique, when they exist, we ean use (Fo intto- ‘duce the functionals Lb. (47) and eb. (for intervals For particular spplieations, one must frst veify that a given collection is predcatively SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS 127 Sete, ie is ven by agora) presi defied fenton and ‘emus havea poo! that nonempty and conned ‘We should not expect iat Letpue utr measure, considered a 2 funcional on clestons oof real number foe numbers Ped cats dines fonctions, ven we tit ation o esate Wit shoul be expat onthe bat of the preceding dcsion ad it or Son 3 that sprate ese fuconas can be inode for arcu lees of te Dod earch, Prom tis woul flow tat he lnc nreing consume Letesgue hear cane devoped ina predate manner oul sinteresting tee some ts Soa of thisworkedout as anextnsion ofthe work dested in Secon should beemphasied sin thatthe rest of ha developmen would constate *'igiean and eonstrucinly meaning pat of Casal ma et thananadtocatempto ty orton asa noon inconstucive ‘Ther ate some farther detons of aly wich may bat ia con nection withthe qoestons sted here. Fist would be to an pater insight the structure of varios mals of Hy ado iy apart ofthe wmode it higher pe obj. Another would fe oo what bres shape the formalin predating woul ake when coneed ina general settheortcl (pois) framework. Some ps hae been taken in this dresion by Wang but almost ety iti «raid tou housh we strongly Bev th th expliations proposed inthis paper forthe noon of pasate provi manages te Comet were nt convince thatthe mer his ten ed Cncsiey by te eas ehtane 3 a. te prem fo sy Jot vat would costae Sal evidence concerig this question. We et tha th wl be reveled at Ieastin party further ty ofthe thers onside ete, 21, Wang, 4 Sure of Mathematical Lt, 9p it, Ch, XXUEXXV,vin AN INTERPRETATION OF THE INTUITIONISTIC SENTENTIAL LOGIC Kurt Gépet ‘Owe can interpret! Heytin'sSententa ogc in terms ofthe concepts of the ‘ual sentenial logic and ofthe concept is provable’ (denoted by Bp), ‘fone assumes forthe later the following axiom system S 1 Bp 2 Bp-> .B(p@)—> Ba 3. Bp BBp In adation, we have to assume the axioms and rules of inference ofthe ‘ual senteniallogicfor the concepts, ~,-vplusanew rule of inference: From 4 ope may infer BA. "Heyting’s Basic concepts are to be translated in the following way: Pp Bp pa Bp — By pa Bp Ba bya oa We could also tanslate equally well 7p with B~ Bp, and png with ‘Bp Bg, The translation of an arbitrary valid formula of Heyting’s system follows from &, whereas the translation ofp vp doesnot follow from In general, no formula of the form BPV BQ is provable from &, unless [BP ot BQ is provable from S, Presumably, a formula of Heyting's calculus fs valid if and only it its translation i provable from & ‘The system Gis equivalent to Lewis's system of strict implication, i Bp {stranslated with Np (fp. 15 ofthis aumber [ue Ergebnisse, Vol.4—Ed) dif Lewis's system s completed with Becker's? Zusatzaxiom’ Np 3 Np. om Bashan les matematicenKelbquivn, Vol A Verng Franz entice, ‘ists 198) pp, aby tre hee by eta and Row Peed BF Demian of Verg Franz Deaths and te ui "Kolmogorov (Matherfiche Zetuhrify Vou 3% 8) ha given «somewhat, amar cet af he noon ements ob though Mut BOE a rca termi zor Logi der Modattte’,Jarbuck fir Phiovophie und phtnomenolorice orchng, No (1980) 8. 97. INTUITIONISTIC SENTENTIAL LOGIC 9 colt Me Pointed ou that naa formals provable from & hold forthe Pt ‘provable in a given formal system 5. For example, BUBP =p) ‘ever holds forthe later, i. it hols for no system which inchde athe etic, For otherwise eg. B(O 0) 04 O and hence also ~B(O 4 O) were Provable in Sie the consistency ofS were provableinS,vil THE PRESENT THEORY OF TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY! Hantisy Roots, Jn ‘asta whe todo with operations of theo perform yg Spetene or noncastenc ofcomputrmebods, rer than wih ates oceans Seeniiaen wanceermmcienes ‘yak wil fallin wo arts, approximately reflestng wo sin pases Sec for Inia and Arlt errand a tas pe Le, Copan 19 bythe Senet fo Indra atomars ot"? 959), pp. 4-30, Cons a'Afoad thera Ai Rips Reseed " psete by ination o SIAM at sumer meeting t Pesan Sate | TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY 1 Inthe historical development ofits subject. Pat I wil outline basic concepts and results that were formulated and obsained inthe decade prior to 1983, Part will suggest, ina limited way, some ofthe further developments and applications that have appeared at an accelerating pace upto the preseat PART I Inthispart we ook at acerain class of mathematical objets, the recurve Functions an a various equivalent formal defnitions from which thiselass can be obtained To fx our terminology, let N be the st of nonnegative integers, Henceforth, the words ‘aumber” and integer shall rele to mer bers of thisset. Consider the clas ofall mappings of into itself The word “Tunetion’ shall refer to members ofthis class. “ey, 7... shall denote faumbers."/,'e, shall denote Functions. The recursive functions will, constitute a certain subclass ofthe fonctions, Since the formal definitions ae too long for us to give them careful reat- rent, we adopt a compromise. We sugges the content of these definitions through an informal and somewhat anthropomorphic diagram. 1 believe that al the intuitive esentias willbe preserved and that you wl be able to ‘rasp without ambiguity the significant results in this fist phase of the theory. ‘Consider box B inside of which we ave a man L witha desk, pencils. and paper. On one side B as two sls, marked inpurand ourpur If we write ‘number on paper and pass it heough the input slot, L takes it and begins performing cern computations. Ifand when he finishes, he writes down a ‘number obtained from the computation and pastes it back tous through the ‘ulpat slo. Assume further that L has with him explicit deterministic {structions of finite length a to how the computation is to be done. We refer to these instructions as P. Finally assume that the supply of paper Jnexhaustble, and that B canbe enlarged in size so that an arbitrarily large mount of paper work ean be stored ini inthe course of any single com putation, (Indeed, this elasticity might be needed just to store the input ‘umber ithat number weresufcenty large.) think wehad better assume, too, that L himself is inexhaustible, since we do not care how longi takes for an eperator to appear, provided that it does eventually appear after a finite amount of computation. We refer tothe system B-L-P as M, ‘theres an output for every input, M represents (in the obvious sense) ‘function. Is important to koxp in mind that a given funetion might be ‘representable in several diferent way, that i to say, obtainable through several diferent instructions P. Several examples will reinforce or larity ourm2 HARTLEY ROGERS, JR. picture so far. The function [/(8) ~ 22] is obviously representable. Simi [iy the function LC) ~ the xh digit in decimal expansion of is rep- resontable (though, of course, we would expect that a P for fz would be father longer than the simplest P for f)). Consider nest the function Ty 1 ita run of exactly x sucessive 7's occurs somewhere in the (dtimal expansion of 9/2) 0 otherwise). No one knows whether fs {epresntable since noone kngws wheter finite instructions exist for com- ‘ating. In contrast tof consider the function [(x) = Lifarun of ar east Tussi Ts occurs somewhere inthe decimal expansion of wf Sctherwise|. After a momen’ refection, you will see that f¢ must either be the constant function [{()= 1] 0 it must be a function of the form [yla)= for 5 k3/(a) =O for x > k}for some integer k. Whichever case ‘xcurs instructions exit for computing. Hence fisrepresentable hove She do not Know at this time how to identify the correct P. “There remains a major area of vaguenes in our defnion. It centres on the question. exactly what constitutes admissible instructions P, and exactly how's the bebaviou of to depend upon P? Until thisis sted, we cannot {teat such further questions at is every function representable; are ony a ‘Countable infinity of function representable? Itis indeed conceivable that hore might be no single satisfactory class of instructions and that any praise definition could be augmented in such @ way a t0 represent func- lone nat previously representable. Several alterative ways t0 resolve this Vegueness wore developed in the 1920% in the work of Church, Gédel, Keene Post, Turing and others. Ary one of these ways canbe summarized fs follows, Fist, finite symbolism (hat is, finite alphabet and presse ‘ales for making arbitrarily long formulas) is given, and an admissible Pris {aken to be any finite sequence of formulas from this symbolism. Let us call this the Psymbolism. Secondly, finite sof ied specifications—let us call them L-P spectfcarons—is given which stipulate how the behaviour of Lis to pend opon P. We sall not g0 more deeply into the L-P specifications, ‘cept to remark that they remain constant as Ps varied, that they reseribe {for Lcertin simple digital bookkeeping operations, and that these oper- thlons are relsted tothe computation and to Pinan elementary symbokat- Time way ao that Lean deal with formula of arbitrary length? 1 For the curious reader, we eaborte somewhat fut, In al of the known ts SU pnt erie Atal mrss bootcepngapeatons preeribed for 1 Thom nue operations Of Sa toon operas af manne one symbol ame backward OF REnSg (enviar a or rom symbols penousy ween, operations of Ce raenar en i'n and toma! operons for taming ond ‘Toomin fom Bs po TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY 133 iota eer tae HOGSIO Mascara ee eee petri ees ran the entire system M is hence called a Turing machine. ‘ imneea eeneesaecece mee ae ane em ee able, since the class of all functions is uncountable. The question remains, teed Fierce eran Sia.tp manele icon vty oes Sr man eer Neen ome Comer mez’ Wht ftw sh tocall'fsivelycomputabie? Thee matiers were the subj stereos Samet fog fen: Seay pees {ok the form of detailed mathematical study. The results were toa setts extent unexpected, We now summarize them a88 single basie result, coset et este thin ram iets are ree acetal seam Stereo rh nlargements ofthe symbolism and specications, the case resuane us changed, In fact, ifeertain very reasonable criteria are lid down for what sana en yee ci nao ioateceer areas antenna ‘EERE y wuling ta uber ntoh competton 4 thr maga HARTLEY ROGERS. JR, the cas of unions obtained s abaya bla ofthe nina clas of hare: Klee and Turing Thi, any funtion eed to einuively Steve were ested ind vere shown to bemenbes ote max alsin “Tun, by at that shighynonivaint (.e epedent on aitay chu ne appar to hae arsed aa ara) and sgt css of finns Tey recede errfinclon The hi past of te as segue tt we ently tna intiive noon of etveness ‘Sintnepecbcconpt ofrecusvenes tr proposal knowns Carl's Th So amy hash te nen ones by deta inestation of ular cases aint itrtrtotay, nathr often contest eile fneon recurve wahoo Ging detaled argent. The ‘slatin anaphora tee los odity avheratcs The nesta etn omits much deta But be must be peepre tsa iif culled, Fo evi, in tered of sak, ma cep ciety fram ints efestnenan to an aston ot ‘univ The snes rebar, ower, al we fave soe “Surg sac of Paymbotsm and 1-P senators a mind and chat thee eve our oul presematheatal omen “Tete lan een of hobs ra ha afl inure work. The ener wi have nod that iis exe to thik of procedures which are tau eft the sos hatte tongue computations, bo “ch though flue to terminate for soneinpu, do ot erent fan om Latue we the itive ntonquscefetie to iclie all ach roses opie nit ths elective roel that J reeset un oer By uterine x means mapping wich is ened on some ‘SR or (ents empty post =) NC ary repens $gussuncon, hugh i ayo in snr representa fncion The talon nw te etenson the as revo Statement par een veces sal hit sun oti suse for functon and wh quasi sibel for ‘fev Thus ne ves saterl maxilla of curse qtfuntns? an, moreover, dnd verona Chars The lof the comments made above Shcce Chueh Thess and out ores of tonne to apes vrata toh extend exe ‘We nov turn toa ce study the elton between Pandthe behaviour cM Fint weave tha tee mefsv poser for enumerating Sela posite isucon Pat shen P>ymtism. Thea Se chee, fr fstance, by sting up a rode which sows through thes ae mre commonly ela te pr ees Scions TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY Bs successive sages, and which, in the ath stage, lists all instructions P not previously listed which consist of no more than formulas, each of which ontains no more than m symbols. Each posible P occurs exactly once Somewhere in the enumerated Sequence. From now on we assume that we have selected a fixed P-symbolism and fixed L-P specifications in one ofthe ‘known standard approaches, and that we have selected a fixed effective ‘enumeration ofthe istuctions P, The index of P shal be the position at ‘hich it occu in the enumeration, Observe that we ean effectively: @) find 8 P given its index, and (i find the index of any given Pin either case we simply look sufcently far in the enumeration. If x i the index of P, ‘we shall eall he corresponding B-L-P system M,. Nea, et us observe that there is abo an effective procedure for enumerating all ordered pairs of integers. For instance, we can take asthe zth ordered pai, the ordered pair where x and y are the unigue solution to the equation Fede 2ay-+y?+3x+)), Let us choose such an enumeration and sssciate with it (inthe obvious way) the notations 2 ~7(x,9), x= m2), ‘y= mG). 7m and my are effectively computable Having made the above ‘choos, we see the following procedure is intuitively quasi-ffective: given any find the instruction P whose index is (2); hen cary out the com putation made by Maj upon the input (2); if and when an output (occurs, take it and make it the final output ofthe whole procedure. The ‘extended version of Church's Thesis now suggests that theresa wsuch that My repress the above quis funn that st SES the flowing “TueoRen I. There exits au such that for any x and y, My es the same ouput to input o(,3) as My ives to inp 9 ‘The theorem can be formally proved; and an appropriate detailed con- stcuction of the P fr M,, while tedious, presents no serious dificult. For ‘our purpese today, we shall consider an appeal to Chureh’s Thesis as constituting proof. A single My, which can be used thus to simulate any fother M, was called by Turing @ aniersal machine, Various forms of ‘Theorem I were discovered in the frst period ofthe theory “Another problem considered early i the development ofthe theory ws the question of whether or not there isan effective prosedure for dentine ‘those instructions P which represent functions. Church's Thess Sugeest the 4 For te inte reader, we remack hate thatthe extn of «one-one fetve Shlgpo wo that which i asi the toay of conpanus facto othe el ‘umes The Stay of cus entns af eer aries edu Suc 0 tat Freer func of one waa z16 HARTLEY ROGERS, JR, following precise reformulation: is there a recursive function f sch that JG) ~ 1 if M, represent a function and /(2) ~ Oi M, doesnot represent 4 function? ‘The answer to ths was soon shown to be negative by the following argument. such an fexists, then using instructions for ftogether with istration forthe M, of Theorem, we can find insteuetions for the Function [@() ~ 0, if f(2)~03 eG) ~'+ | where y is the output of My ‘wth input if7() 1h. Let w bean index for these instructions Then M,, Tepresents a function, and My, with input w yields an output y which, By ‘ehnition of m,equals + 1. The result follows from this contradiction. You will observe that thie argument is similar tothe diagonal proof by which Cantor shows the real numbers to be uncountable, In our theory, such uments are often called ‘diagonal’. Some of out later methods —for instance, the proof of Theorem V telow-can be viewed as more subtle varieties of diagonal argument. In fac, our theory has been described asa “theory of diagonalization.” As we shall se, the theory is considerably richer ‘than sucha description might a fst lead us o believe. “The above negative answer i given in a somewhat stronger form inthe following theorem. “Taeonen Tl. The function {f(@) =1 if May wlth put (2) plelds an ‘output, and f2) =O otherwise ts ot recarsve Both ofthe above forms fllow as corollaries from Theorem V which we shall prove below. Further comments about ther will be made at that point. ‘Theovem Il in various forms, is sometimes referred to as yielding "the ecusive unslvabiity of the halting problem for Turing machines’ (he ‘word ‘hal’ being associated with the appearance ofan outpt). ‘Before leaving the fist phase of our theory, let us develop a few more clementary ideas, from which we ea abtain among other thing, proof for ‘Theorem II.'4'"B, "Call denote subsets of N.*A' shall denote the Set of numbers in N but nat in A.W," sall denote the set ofall outputs of Ma, We make the following definitions. A set is recursive if he function [/(e) = I for x in A; (2) =0 for x in) i recursive. This corresponds intuitively tothe existence ofan effective procedure for deciding whether oF not any number isin A.A set dis recursively enmerableifeither Ais empty fr is the range (tof ll outputs) of some recursive function. This corre- Sponds intuitively tothe existence of an effective procedure for listing all members of A. The following two theorems can be proved without aici. ‘Taronew II A i recursive if and only If Both A and A are recursively erumerabl, TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY ro ‘Taomun IV. A is recursively enmerable if and only if hee exists an x 0h that A~ Ws eave ther proofs to you for your amusement, with the remark that jjusitcation by Chure’s Thess wil be permissible, thatthe second isharder ‘than the first and tat it will elpif you teat the cass finite and A infinite separately. “The question now arises: can we havea set which recursively enumer able but not recursive? To settle this and to provide, atthe same time, ‘material for later illustrations, we introduce the following slightly more sophisticated concept A set 4s produtivef therexsts a ecurivedunction ‘auch that forall x, if W, is contained in A, then /(e) isin but notin Ws is then called a productive funcion for 4. Note that since every recursively ‘coumerable set is equal 10 Wy for some x, a productive set cannot be ‘recursively enumerabe, We can now prove the folowing. ‘Tutonsn V. Let A {s|Myo with inpa (2) yes am ouput). Then A ts recursively enamerabe, and Xs productive. Proor. Consider the following procedure: given any z cary out the ‘computation on of M, of Theorem I until an output by M, occurs; when thishappens, give output z Thisisa quasi-etective procedure. The se ofits ‘utputs isthe desired 4. Hence, going toa Pfor this procedure we find an {index w such that M, has 4 as its set of outputs. Hence, by Theorem 1V, A in recursively eumerable. : ‘Assume now that there exists «recursive function with the following property (1): for any z and any x, r(x) appears as an output of M, ifand ‘only if My with input x yields an output, I claim that if such a exists, then 4 is productive, with the function /(2)=(g(2),e(2) as productive function. fi larly recursive. Assume (**): W, contained in A. Then /(2) rust bein d but notin W,. For f(z) in A implies by definition of 4 that Me with input g(2) yields an output, which in turn implies by (2) that ‘F(@)~ rg), #(2)) i8 an ourput of Ma, which in turn implies by ( ‘that /(2)is in , a contradiction; and f(z) in W, implies by *) that Mya ‘with input ¢() vel an output, which implies by definition of A that ‘F(2)= rg(2),a(@) isin 4, which coatradets (+). Ieremains to show that a recursive function g exists with property (). Given aay fixed z, consider the following quasi-effecive procedure. For any x, begin computing M, with input O; after afew steps, start the computation for M, with input 15 then {0 back and work further on input O; then start input 2; then work further ‘oa inputs O and 1; ec In this way wecan obtain and effectively Ist ll the ‘tuts of M,. (This should give you a hint for proving Theorem IV.) If land when we find (xx) as one ofthese outputs, give O as ou inal outputne HARTLEY ROGERS, JR Instructions P canbe found fortis procedure without dificuly. In facta father natural version of P will employ the M, of Theorem Ifor computing IM, bence this P wil self depend eecvey on the parameter z. Tat isto say. if we now vary 2, we see that there i a recursive function g such that or any 222) ste index ofthe corresponding P. Thus ¢ has property (*) and we are through, Several corolaries follow: Conottany, There exits a se which is recursively enumerable bat not recursce. This follows by Theorem IIT and the fact that a productive set ‘anno be recursively enumerable) ‘Conouany. Theorem I follows (Since A is not recursive) ‘Conouany. There exists a productive st. ] Conoutane These B= (x, represetfinetn) na rear (ot inners we could fin a prosede for sting any ust of he orm des My wth int = ld an utp contaictiono Theorem We Suid. by acing with ywchguesion a M, hoes Sotelo foray apt tote te same output M, es forint = {eens econ and Recirverss FB would now up tamer) “heal corlary ges paral explanation fo theft hat he eat svenctonsgaturalsthy oe were sucha lng tineinbing discovered The teare futons are cnbded inthe ecu qusfueiny nd the gnc problem of dsnguhig, hom an roto, ther or aot ‘elves fncon select ula ‘Oncol slo heist phase of oo ior remain toe dei As important tool inter esearch eet aaa theorem, ‘thos tein te soiton of mpi function poles sim to he we Sitned pin tere i aay Is known the Recusin Theorem tndisdectoKlere | “Tuonea VI. Foran recursive function f there exttsan integer ysuck ta Mygyand M, represent the same quasi fucton. Poor. Fora fixed s, conser the following quas-fetive proce sive any x compute M, for input #; if and when any output, call it, ‘ecu, compute M, for input x give the result ofthis as final output. Since Instructions forthe above procedure, using My from Theorem T, can be ‘made to depend effectively on parameter =, we have @ recursive function ¢ Sich that Mra gives that procedure, Now the function /(g(2)) isa recursive function. Lat bean inex fort. Consider» = (0). Then M, My Which by our construction represents the same quasi-function as My, where w i TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY 1 the output of M, with input. But My with input» gives /(g(@). Hence = f(g(0) ~/0). Thus M, represents the samme quasfunction 26 My, and the proofs done. Not, incidentally thatthe proof gives us an elective ‘way of going from instructions fr fto the vale y. Hence we havea corok lary ConoutaRy, There exists a reewsve function suck that for any x, if isan index of instructions fora recursive fnetonf, hen My cay and Man ‘represent the same quast-fnction ‘This concludes our survey of the st part of the theory. A final comment isin order. Ite Peymboism and L-P specifications ae given in deta, all ofthe above informal proofs can be replaced by detailed constructions Within the P-symbolism. As we have remarked before, this means that, independeat of Church's Tess, the theorems canbe given precise conten. Inthe fst period of the theory, much work weat into carrying out these Constructions in etal. Ia the course ofthis work, the natural and invariant ‘quality of the objets concerned emerged more and more clearly. The naturalnes of these objets snow so well confirmed that the above informal roofs would certainly be accepted today, atleast i informal communi- cation between researchers. Infact, i you havea firm intuitive grasp of Our concept from my presentation so fa, you are equipped to do research yourselves, without ever getting into the deals of particular P-symbolis. (tis for this reason that I used the orisial anthropomorphic diagram) ‘You areina postion to do research much a the high sehool algebra student is in a postion o do research in number theory. This natural, almost primitive quality of our subject mater—it has een called one of the few! absolute concepts to emerge from modern work on foundations of mathe ‘matics—explains much of the ecent enthusiasm of investigators about the Subject. It also explains the somewhat extravagant remark with which Post ‘concluded his excellent address to the American Mathematical Society in 19442 “Indeed, if general recursive function isthe formal equivalent of, ‘elective calculbility its formulation may play a role in the history of ‘ombinatory mathematics second only to that of the formulation of the concept of natural number.” PART IT To pick 1943 a5 an epoch in our theory is somewhat arbitrary. For want ofa better dividing point, choos it because of papers of Kleen, Mestowski SEL, Pout, ‘Recusily emumerble wt of postive ners and thie dei eh ult oe rca Mate Soe), Vol 96 Ua op BE Ne10 HARTLEY ROGERS. JR. 1 compte tou tha tine, which apd a inventors Monova ontng ares and which hve eve a # contining mul reget noe von to suey there lopment ees sal ecg ser 50 For snp? out i estos hs papa ets toons ons etc Se eters een oy preater osu ul, Pane case Tne naan ofrecer enon meta uher arse scion any guy Sessing worker el be ‘Stthed Tne caper se: lope and ound; tere ns Suits nvaraneernuive acrer ervey and Bot Sone of earn, Tn face apie and fone at 18 ete aicnce Recursion try ha a revetonr ca sin wc See Ithas ono nuns a ea atu ane of eles nme orate gin soe ape ots won tent done; tn con, seeing rt [Sata byrne drole and ormute ne oes We preset Narita ay opal pen the posse oma of sot an be Ce eevee ina mune anlogeo tin spp shove or crete cout arsnes an an win beta prev five aa calor te sunbe to tom nate fo [BS ertnumeaton chown he unter ance ha orale 1 echiyeled ts Codd nmber wt lon wesallconees lt cae Gorman anf wee niet fees Ts il bn sored Ong ett af covepontng God mane In ch wr arurSoob to how ht ore nuton Gone Spend ‘Porte paras efesve enumeration wed othe Gel number. inet eet Caos here cscnont ued oa meer loge Our tno) ge svn att con wart feng pur of is tse We make he ma guy cbeaon hat any fe al te oop te of we honeys eovey coum 8 pres of ag one pou ualeyos our suegated pot for ning P38 active enum f the provable oral ow general {Spned tt nce) conn for femal tobe eed Toes! SS Dy comary cer, we shal ea he to a format +5 L Pow, id 8C Kleene, Recovers un Quaiter Tramacion fhe int etomana Se VoL 33 (953) Bye ae A, Masta, eae et of ponte tte, PandamenteMatbenatc, Voi 34 G34, pe ttl TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY ua ‘expressible using numerals, number variables,“ *", "=, parentheses and ‘avantifers over the number variabes—in the usual way. We sive the formulas the usual interpretation over the integers. Out ist partial restate. ‘ment ofthe Godel Theorem now is: she irae formulas of elementary arith ‘metic form a productive set. The use of the concept of truth as distne from rovatily i justiabein the sense that our whole dscusion ean be com ‘ceived of as carried out in some general set theory in which truth can be ‘defined by the well own foundational methods of Tarski. The concept of| truth is avoided, however, in the further restatement: given any methods of Proof os srong asthe usual ones e Pean’s axioms) then the set nom provable formulas of elementary arithmetic ether is empty o” is productive. ‘The second formulation directly implies the fst; I leave this to you and ‘omit details. Note how much information the fist formulation gives us there isan effective procedure such that given any fective enumeration of ‘ve formulas, we can explicily find from the instructions for that enumer= ation isla true formula not enumerated, ‘The logical system known as lower predicate caleulu furnishes a second, example. Church's Theorem ad the Gide! Completeness Theorem are two of ‘he most basic results about this system. Chuteh’s Theacem sates tha the Set of universally true formulasisnot recursive, while the Gadel Complete- ‘ness Theorem can be partially restated asthe asetion tha the same set of| formulas i recursively enumerabl ‘This concludes our dret treatment of logic and foundations, though, as ‘we shall se, the other categories have substantial overiap with ‘The second topic, eeursve unsolabiy, has also been of interest from, the beginning. It early became clear that our theory gives a natural and precise sense in which certain kinds of ‘problem’ can be described a8 “un- Solvable by efective methods’; namely, we calla problem recursively un solvable if itis equivalent to the problem of identifying members of nonrecursve set. Thus Church's Theorems, above, asserts that the ‘problem’ of identifying universally true formulas of lower predicate calculus is recursively unsolvable, The corollaries to Theorem Vin Part I above give similar results about the problem of identifying instructions that represent functions and the problem of identifying ordered pairs ¢x,9> such that M,, ith input y yields an outpat. ‘A further rest ofthis kind is contained in recent work of Novikov and ‘of Boone who show thatthe word problem for sroups is recursively une solvable. They exhibit particular ritely generated group with finitely ‘many relations such that, fall posible words are taken asthe basic GOdel- numbered formulas, the st of words reducible to the ident recursive et1a HARTLEY ROGERS, JR ‘A. challenging open question in this area is ibe’ 10th problem: the problem of deciding the existence of diophantine solutions to polynomial ‘aquations, The set of equations with solutions is clearly recursively enumer- ble. Ts it recursive? Several investigators have conjectured not, have Cartid their attempted proofs quite far, but have fallen short of a final "A numberof other nonreursive ses of specific mathematical ological inierest are known, Tarski and Robinson bave developed useful methods {or demonstrating unsolvablity ina broad class of formal theories. Sub- Santal workin discovering postive solvability results for certain logic {ystems has also been done, Ths, while the lower predicate calcul formu lation of group theory is unsolvable, that for abelian groups is solvable, ‘While tha forthe integers is unsolvable, that fr the eal numbers i solv= able, Despite Church's Theorem, large subclasses ofthe universally te Formulas of lower predicate calculus have been the subject of solvability investigations ‘One ofthe most widely studied ad satisfying areas of recent works the third area the rea of recursive iariance. Before going nt it wemake an ‘observation about our previous discussion. Thelistener wil have note that Some of our theorems and illustrations have depended upon a number of, apparently arbitrary choices—for instance Theorem V involves the choices ‘ofboth an enumeration of P's and an enumeration of ordered pairs. Con- Slder the collection ofall recursive functions which map N one-one onto ite T leave it to you to verify that 9 forms a group under ordinary com- position of functions; it is calle the group of recrsice permutations. Our previous results now acquire a more invariant signcance in the sense that {hey can be shown to ald under any recursive permutations of the original arbitrary enumerations as you can easily check. "The arca of recarsteltarance chiefly concerned with the exploration ‘of recursive function theory as apart of mathematics in its own right. AS ‘Dekker has suggested, the group #isusefl in deseibing its subject matter; ‘muh ofthe theory ean be described asthe study of those properties of ets Of integers which are invariant under members of . The properties of Fecursveness, recursive enumerabiity and productiveness are all invariant inthis way, as you may check. We all such properties recursively invariant Twosets ae called isomorphic if one is an image of the other under a men berof&, The Bomorphism classes are hence the basic objects of our theory. ‘An interesting recent result of Mil the theorem thatthe properties A Fecursvely enumerable and A productive are a complete family of in Variants; that ito say, any two sets possesing both properties are is morphic. This theorem takes on special significance in View of the fact, TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY 16 ‘that virtually all known unsolvallty results yield sets possessing these Dropeties. A natural question then 10 ask is are any two nonrecursive, recursively enumerable ses isomorphic? Post, in his paper of 1944, shows ‘hat thisis not true by constructing a recursively enumerabe set 4 such that contains no infinite recursively enumerable st (and hence is not peoduc- tive, a8 you can show). The interesting problem remains, what sort of suctural similarity com be found among the nonrecursive recursively en erable sets? Post proposed a weaker notion of similarity for use in this study, the notion of Turing equivalence. Two sets are Turing equivalent if ‘ach is reducible to the other. is reducible to B ifthe function (/ (2) ~ 1 forxin 4; /(2)~ for xin A) can be computed by an M provided that) L ‘nas avilable wo lists, possibly infnite, of the members and nonmembers (of B respectively; and (i) the P symbolism and L-P specifications are ap ropriately modified in such away that Lean be instructed to consult his B ist in the course of his computation. Turing equivalence gives us lager ‘equivalence clases, Until very recently, all known noncecusive recursively fenumerable sets could be shown to possess the property for any recar- seely eumerableB, Bis reducible o A. Hence ll were in the same euival= {ence class. The problem of whether o not tis was necessarily soacquired the ‘name Pos's Problem. The foundational significance ofthe problem can be seen from our earlier comment relating provabilit ina logical sytem to re= cursive enumerability. The problem remained unsolved until ast year (1956) ‘when Friedberg and Muchnik each gave an ingenious construction showing. that the recursively enumerabe ses lie in an infinity of ditne lass, “The Turing equivalence classes ate sometimes called degrees ofunzolt= ability; they ae partially ordered unde the reducbility relation. The papers of Kleene and Mostowski helped initiate their study, and demonstrated certain natural relationships between the degsee of a set and the logical complexity necessary to a formal definition of tat sex. Much interesting ‘work at the preseat time concerns this last topic. Fssontily the problem is ‘one of relating logical complexity, as measured by type and location of, ‘quantifiers, to “height inthe reducbilty ordering as measured in some appropriate weakly constructive way. Both Kleene and Mostowski have continued fo contribute important ideas to this work ‘As fina illustration, lt us tua for variety to a proof. We llstate the use of Theorem VI the fixed point result, in the area of recursive invariance ‘A set A is called completely productive, if tere exists a recursive funtion | Such that for any 2, /(2) les either in the intersection of 4 and MP, or inthe interseaton of, and 4. As Dekker as commented, a completely produc tive sets set which fails to be recursively enumeable, and does soi the strongly constructive sease thatthe counter-example /(2)ean be eetivelyut HARTLEY ROGERS, JR. exhibited, given any insrutionsP with index «Its immediate that a com= pletely productive set is productive. Is the converse true? Myfill has Ennounceda positive answer, We giv proof in the following theorem, “Tusoneo VI. If is productive, then A ts completly productive. ‘Proor. Let be @ productive function for A, Let z be fixed, Take any y ‘Comide the quasieffetve procedure: for any input x, search for /) in Wat when it appears, gve eutput /()). The index for this procedure will open eectivelyon Applying Theorem VI we see that for some , this Dracedare self has index y- Turing to the corollary to Theorem VE, we ‘Se that this fixed point’ ycan be found effectively from 23 hence there isa Fecursive function A such that this y~ M2) thats, My has a its outputs ther the empty st or the single number /(M), actording as /(M2)) ‘belongs to WF, oH. You may now verify that, with espeet to the Funston [7e) S02). is completely productive. “The fourth area, recursive structures, is concerned with the study of inte selations between recursive function theory and casical mathematics It Tncludes the sty of recursive representations of the classical concept, of recursive analoguss of the classical concepts and of direct imposition of Tecumivesructure upon the cassia concepts. Tis work as been pursued ‘ith increasing intensity i recent years, and has become fascinating part ofthe theory. “The clascal set theory of Cantor isa good illustration, and the results ‘obtained have obvious foundational significance, Essentially, we seek to find model ofthe Cantor theory within the class ofall sets of integers by {sing the Cantoian concepts subjet tothe restriction that all correspond= tneet and mappings be recursive, The ordinal numbers were sued fis. Tavestgators have inciided Church, Kleene and, more recently, Markald fand Spector. I, for instance, we consider all welLorderngs of integers Which, as relations (ets of ordered pairs), form recursive sets; and if we then consider the ordinal represented by these orderings, we obtain a proper sezment of the classical fis and second number classes which a framy respects, a successful ‘efetvid? model ofthe later classes. This Erament turns out 10 be, for instance, the largest segment for which notations enist and which i closed under limits of recursive increasing Sequences of order type , This Segment also proves to be a useful tool i measuring “eight i the redcibily ordering of degrees of unsolvabiliy. ‘A similar attack on the eardinal numbers has been bepun by Dekker and Myhll. Using a deceptively sraightforward modieation of the Cantor defnition, they have uncovered a rich theory. In their model, they have found, for instance, am intermediate class of somite infinite cardinals TURING MACHINE COMPUTABILITY us ‘whose arithmetic much closer to that ofthe integer than isthe arithmetic (ofthe elasial cardinals. ‘The approach to classical set theory is stil its early stages, and much ‘remain to be done. For example, satisfactory theory linking cardinal and ‘ordinal numbers does not yet exst.On a somewhat broader front, studies are being made, by Wang, Kreisel and others, of general axiomatic set theories that ae subject to cetain kinds of recursive constraints. The pros pect of further workin this whole region isan exiting one. ‘Another illustration of recursive structures is found in the work of| ‘Addison in exploring the relation of recursive invariance to parts of the Point set theory developed by the Polish schoo of topology. A number of lose analogues are found to exist between the two theories; the} give romising suggestions for further results in both fel ‘A further illustration is the work of Rabin on recursive structure in algebraic systems. A recursive structure is imposed on algebraic objects in ‘manner similar to that in which topological structure is often imposed. ‘Various new and suggestive ideas appear. chef valu of the work stat it gives a natural way of handling notions of effectiveness that already exit, somewhat awkwardly, inthe algebraic theory. For example a shor, elegant formulation and proof can be given for Van der Waerden's theorem onthe ‘existence ofa factorization algorithm fr separable extensions over a fed possessing such an algorithm. ‘The fifth are, ecusive analysis, could quite properly be included under ‘recursive structures. I has, however, been the object of independent explo- ration for some time, and I accord it separate, though Brie, mention, It ‘begins with the attempt to impose recursive structure on the usual theory of| ‘eal numbers. A class of el numbers called the recurve reas defined by requiring that each havea decimal expansion representable by recursive function. Tisclass proves tobe a natural one inthe sense hat ts invariant with respect to reasonable alternative definitions; and it can be shown to {form an algebraically closed field. A function rof areal variable is called effective, if hore exits a recursive function f sich that, when xis a Gel number for an inital segment of the decimal expression for any real number 1, then /(2) is a Gédel number for an initial sepment ofthe decimal ex- Dresson for r(?), and furthermore such that the output segments become arbitrarily long if longer and longer input segments are used. I lave it to you to show. using Theorem V, that every effective futon is continuous, Ifyou have got sufcently ino the sprit ofthe corollaries to Theorem V, ‘you will not find the proof dificult. If we develop a theory that limits set {othe recursive eals asthe only realsligibe fr any purpose, discontinuous functions can be made to reappea,HARTLEY ROGERS, JR, “The sith and last eatogary, intrinsic defintions of recursoeness, is an {teresting and challenging one. Few result exist inthis area, however; and {mst admit that including it a8 separate topic is a matter of personal taste, A whole complex of problems are concerned. Fist of al the listener ‘wll have noted that while various of our definitions prove to be incariant (with respect tothe group #), they are not inrlase—that i, they depend ‘pon Some choice. The orginal defition of recutsive function is good ‘example. It depends upon the choice of @ P-symbolsm and L-P speci Cations, Can a more intense formation be found? Some small progres foward this sade by Rogers” Secondly the more general question arses fan we somehow abstract our theory away from integers, Functions, et? ‘Can we finda development which will be tothe present cursive Function theory as abstract algebra isto the theory of numbers? (This problem, incidentally, isthe rock upon which atiempts completely 10 algebraize ‘modern logi have foundered upto the preset ime; though the partial fistematizations of Tarski, Halmos and others have been sucessful a fa Ss they go. Inattempts ofnd general algebraic analoguestotheincomplete- ‘ess theorems, there has been a residue of recursive function theory that bas not been eliminable) To ths incorporate recursive function theory into ‘eneral abstract algebra, at leas in part, would bea considerable achieve- ment and would doubtless give much new insight into the theory as we know it "This concludes Part IT of my tlk T closing let me make several com- ‘ments about the literature. Ifyou ae interested in locking further into the Sul, the basic theory of Part Is perhaps most directly accessible in the fortheoming book of Davis which uses Turing’ approach. This reference Jsalsoan excellent introduction to recent unsolvability result and contains material from other areas a8 well Klene's Irroduction to Metamathe- ‘matics gives a comprehensive teatment to the base theory and contains ‘uch valuable material in the ares of logic, foundations and recursive Jnvarance. Many results, however, exist only inthe journals tthe present time: Both the Davie and Kleene volumes have good bibliographies, M6 “a Rowe "lambert ri ota, ma of tba Companion Uucaiy, MeCra 9S. Ix MATHEMATICAL LOGIC: WHAT HAS IT DONE FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS? Grono Knetset MECHANISTIC THEORIES OF REASONING! 16 62 and throughout §2, 3 a question turned up over and over again, even when there was no doubt that the formulation ofa traditional notion ‘was natural. Was it signifcent? or feutfl? And this in turn leads tothe doubts in O(d). All these question have tobe faced when one seriously ‘wants fo find out about the nature of our experience. But there is one area ‘where, oughly speaking, th significance ofa notion consists in theft that ‘we find it significant, rely inthe study of theory making isl, Examples ofthis occured in f= mathematicians who find the nation of predicative setespciall intersting wll nly use axioms which re vali for preicative Sets (even if they ryt think of arbitrary sets); once we aspect this prycho= logical “kink we quickly discover a predcative formulation oftheir actual ‘mathematics. Similarly in §2(9, mechanistically minded mathematicians put down only those axioms for constructive functions which re consistent ‘ith the assumption that these functions are recursive Personally have no doubt ofthe objective signieance ofthe notion of mechanical procedure, and hence of recursive function, forthe analysis of reasoning; but even if fone has doubts about thay, there is no doubt of it significance for the analysis of reasoning actualy current, [wish to point out here a similar significance ofthis notion for theories, ‘outside mathematics isl, n particular to the subject of molecular biology. ince this subject is inthe process of development (and, in any ease, no Prom Bertrand Rus: Pb of the Contry by R Seow (Alen & nmin Ltd London and Atami ie, frou & Ca Hoon, 19) BB ae {Copia 962 by Allen Umea id Reprints by perma te pabes {nd th ator The compete ey tom pp. 012: see Er note Blow [This is Section of Profesor Krenn. Hie references noe sons ive beet psec ty do nat scm fo pate tli othe Ma os of hs Iestngdcuson even wher end apart om tne Serhan for rpaming hve ns pr he yt some of he omit stich sinus inthe peso volume Fo further information ape or recent fon eon acd y Ree Kea he Alden he ey otiher hime Ed " Heeue GEORG KREISEL several formulation has buen given) one cannot expect specific counter ‘ramples. But there sem tobe no doubt about the following points: First, is to be a general schema forthe explanation of biological processes, including those ofthe higher nervous stem: second, the basic elements of the explanation (master plan) ate of a discrete combinatorial kind, the fitting of shapes into one of rite number of permitted matrices; third, the complexity of biological phenomena is to be the consequence of the large numberof basic object involved and not of the complexity ofthe laws governing the basic objects, Certainly, the atracton of the subject pends on these thre features, Combinatorial base steps erated a (are) umber of times are characteristic of recursive processes. So, if the three properties of (current) molecular Biology are tobe retained, also the stable macroscopic properties of organisms would be expected to be recursive? So suppose there is an area of macroscopic experience which the theory is intended to cover and which (ve have reason to believe) satisies non- recursive laws: then the theory is defective. "The area of experience which I wish to consider is mathematics isl. “The argument is elated to Gadel’ well knowe interpretation of his in- completeness theorem: either there are mathematical objects external {0 furselves or they are our own constructions and ind is not mechanical It ifr from his in two respects: First donot make his assumption tha, it ‘mathematical objects ar our own constructions we must be expected t be able to decide al their properties; for, except under some extravagant Tesrctions on what one admits a the self T do not see why one should fnpect so much more control over one's mental produets than over one's bodily produts—which are sometimes quite surprising. Second, ¥ should ike to se an absract proof ofthe non-mechanical nature of mind (if L 0 there exist a standard 8 > 0 such that |/ (9 ~ £)~ f(a < «for all such that =| <8.—Indeed if any standard positive real number then the statement, “There exists an > 0 such that forall || = implies [f(xy * ‘Flxd)| = €, can be formulated asa sentence X within L. Thus, either X or ‘ot-X holds in R. But if aot held in R then it would belong to K and hence, would hold also in *R. Since Xholdsin °R, by its definition, wecon- clude tht actually X holds ais in R, And any fwhich realizes yin R must bestandard since there are no ether numbersin R. This proves our assertion, ‘We may also prove the converse, i. if for every standard > 0 there ‘exists a standard 8= Osuch that | /(xy + §)~ fC) = «forall such that JE) <8 in 8 then fxg + £)~ fs) for al infinitesimal in "R. This shows tha f(a) is continuous at Xin Rf andonly if e+ 6) 18 infitely close 10 HG) in *B, ‘Similarly, it can be shown tht (2) is diferetiable at xy if and only if the ratios (f(ra + £) ~ Fl have the same standard part, d, forall infinitesimal 0, and ds then the derivative of fx) atx in he ordinary Fora lat example let (,) be an infite sequence of real numbers in (On passing from R to *R, {5} is extended so as to be defined also for infinite natural aumbers m, Lets be a andard rel number, Itcan then be proved that «ithe limit of (s) im the ordinary sense, ims, — if and only i ss infstely close os (or, whichis the same, if that standard art of) forall infinite natural nimbers156 ABRAHAM ROBINSON ‘The above examples may sie inorder o give a hint how the Difleren- til and Integral Calculus can be developed within the framework of Non- standard Analysis, 4 I appears that Newton's views concerning the foundation of the CCalclus Were somewhat ambiguous. He refered sometimes to infinitesi= tals, sometimes to moments, sometimes to limits and sometimes, and perhaps preferentially, to physical notions. But although he and his soc ‘zsors remained vague on the eardinal points ofthe subject, he did envisage ‘thenoton ofthe limit which ultimately, became thecorerstone of Analysis. By contrast Leibniz and his svcoestos wished to base the Calculus, clearly and unambiguously, ona system which inches infinitely all quantities. ‘This approach is crystallized in the first sentence ofthe “Analyse des nfini- ‘ment pettspour? intelligence des iges courbes by the Marquisde "Hospital ‘We mention in passing that de "Hospital, who was a pupil of Leibniz and John Rernoul, acknowledged his indebtedness to his two great teachers De (Hospital begins with a number of definitions and axioms. We ‘quote in translation "Definition 1. A. quantity is variable if i increases or decreases con- ‘tinuously; and, on the contrary, a quantity is constant if it remains the same while other quantities change. Thus, fora parabola, te ordinates and abscissa ae variable quantities while the parameter isa constant quantity.” “Definition Tl. The infinitely small portion by whic a variable increases ‘or dereasescontinvousy i cae its ference." For diference read ferential. Tete fllows an example wit reference toa diagram and a corollary in which isstated as evident thatthe diferen- tial of a constant quantiy is zero. Next, de "Hospital introduces the 1, where isan ordinary natral number, then *R does not sats the axiom. ‘But if we mean by i that for any a->O there exists a natural number (Ghichmaybeffnite and that a >I, then Archimedes axiom does bold intk ‘5, Inthe view of many, including the author, the problem ofthe nature of infntary notions is sll of central importance in the Philosophy of 16, W, Labia, ‘Mémoire dM. G. G. Leni oacant Son sentiment se le cate ier dowra de Prva, 70), Mathemaihe Sein © 1 Gee fia, Vols. si p30 ' METAPHYSICS OF THE CALCULUS Mathematics, To a logical positivist, the entre argument over the reality ‘of a mathematical structure may sem pointless but even he will have {0 acknowledge the historical importance ofthe issue. To de V Hospital, the infinitely small and large quantities (which were still thought of as geo- ‘metrical entities) represented the actal infinite. On the other hand, Lebaiz stated specifically that although be believed inthe actual infinite in other "spheres of Philosophy, he did not assume its existence in Mathematics, He also said that he accepted the potential (or ashe put it, referring 0 the Schoolmen, ‘syncategorematic) infinite a5 exemplified, in his view, in the umber of terms of an infinite series. To sum up, Leibniz accepted the ideal, ‘or fictitious, infinite; accepted the potential infinite; and within Mathe- ‘matics, rected ora least dispensed wit, the actual infinite Like the proponents of the new theory, its rte also were motivated by «combination of technical and philosophical considerations. Berkeley's “Analyst's compare Strong,” constitutes a briliant attack on the logical ‘inadequacies both ofthe Newtonian Theory of Flusions and ofthe Leib- nizian Differential Calculus. In discrediting these theories, Berkeley wished to discredit also the views of the seientsts on theological matters. But beyond that, and more tthe point, Berkeley's distaste for the Calculus was related tothe fact that be had no place fer the infnitesimalsin a philosophy dominated by perception. 19 6, The second half ofthe eighteenth century saw several atemps to put the Calculus ona fim footing. However, apart rom d'Alembert’ afirma- tion of the importance of the limit concept (and, posibly, some of L. NM. ‘Carnot’ ideas, which may have influenced Cauchy), none of these made a contribution of lasting value. Lagrange’ attempt to base the entire subject ‘on the Taylor series expansion was doomed to failure although indirectly, itmay have had a postive influence on the development of the idea of ormal power series. tis generally believed that it was Cauchy who finally pt the Calculus on rigorous foundations. Andit may therefore come asa surprise to lear that {infinitesimal il playeda vital ole in hissystem. I translate from Cauchy's Cours d’Anaiyne? “When speaking ofthe continuity of functions, I was obliged to dscust sh Bc, Ast 1 Cott Wek, AU AA Lae aT ‘Unernay of Calder Pubes i Posptyy Wal ar here, aad ‘Anal, 1957, pe TWAS Gachy Cours ants de coe ovale Plchniue, 1 pri, Anaise ‘Aletbague Le (Oeumer compte see 3, Nt,10 ABRAHAM ROBINSON the principal proper of the inital quanti, popes wich Sst footnote intemal eeu Tiowener, Cauchy dino repr hs ce a bac but edo rive them tom be on of arabe: “Rae equ whichis hough to receive sucess ieent Aihco he sues numeral values of variable ees indfinisy so 10 teome sas hana ven umber, th variable beromes “ht ced an intestinal Cnet per cea ntl sal SR ie he vale wn ee su whichis appoethed ty here soas toler fom it ‘SSfusanone plese follows hata vale wich ecm iitesing tosses limi “Cauchy id mot wis o repr he infty a numbers. And he ssn tt thy stay he ste he rnary numb wich SOUT hated eptcly ty Lat war rote by Cauchy 5 ur ‘rans Marner, Catchy tate, b 8 ater seo, that wie Sateialsmupht epinatly be medina argument they had no lain the inl conten fone ucts profesed opinions in these mats notwithstanding telnet iil ty ere ordary mbes ‘aisatate the tain rae of Artes, And 8 Sapp ti oct ih to the coer in ost xcs athugh tee 3 Eun tnd much discus stason nthe tery of eres ontins in Ath he mas led to the wrong conclton. Here aan, Nonstandard tsi pte oft dflret tacground, provide semana a> opiate tel ote dison of auc suse an ares rez the tsi afaton/(coninous ata pot ithe safes Jeg 8. fle)i bnenlforniitcsima whch 2 inca of NonstndtaAnbs eSston 3 above abe a prec retin Cauchy's notion ofconinry. On eer hand in aring sihceng concn tthe sum of se of otras fnetions Sontnous provided tex, Cay we th rare rect hat Phase Cae ver anna th 5) a) fora he ina nits for init mI Nonstandard Aras i ns ot that thisis true for standard (ordinary) (2), Ce) and xo, but not in general for nonstandard 2p, e€ notify ~'%y = £ where xi standard and & i infrtesial Tn order to appreciate to what extent Cauchy regarded the infinitesimals METAPHYSICS OF THE CALCULUS 16 15 an integral part of his system, iis instructive to consider his defi ‘ofa derivative. To him, (2), wherever it exist, ithe limit of the ratio, i Ay _fee+9~se) ; ae where € is ifntesinal. nthe standard modern sporoach the assumption that is infitesima completly redundant or, more precisely, meaning. 1. les. The fact hat was everteesintrodued exp by Catchy shows that his mental image ofthe situation was fundamentally diferent from furs. Thus it would appear tat, to his ind, variable docs ot tan the limiter diet but only afer teaveling trough a tegion of inftesinal, ‘We have io add hatin out ‘classi framework te eae notion of variable in Cauchy's sense a «mathemati ently su genera, has no Place. Weight descbe varia, na jour mood as function which has lostts argument, wile Cauchy sininitesimals sills, towe Berkleys famous phrase, the ghosts of departed quantities. But such carping crits doesnot belp us o understand the jus recognition accorded to Cauchy's achievement, which i sil thought by many to ave resohed the funda ‘etal dficules that had beset the Calcul previously. If we wish o find the reasons for Cauchy's sucess we have o consider, ‘once again, both the technical-mathematical and the base phosophia aspects ofthe situation. Cauchy established the central poston of he mit concept for good. It is te that ’Alembert, who had emphasined the importance ofthis concept some decades clr, ina vnse went further than Cast by stating "We say that inthe Difeenial Calculus there re no inisitly small quantities at al.” But apparently WAlembert dd not work out the consequences of his sera principe; while the vast scope andthe sublet of Cauchy's mathe matical achievement showed othe worl that his tool enabled him fo go , farther and deeper tan his predecessors. He intodveed the tol at 3 {ine when be ret achievers of te erie and echnical moe pi tivemethod of infnitsials had become commonplace. Ths, the momea- {tur which had enabled tht method to disregard earlier attacks suchas |; Betkly's was exhausted before the end ofthe eigen century and due {teat was again gven to its logical weaknesses (which had been there, § foraltosee alte time). These weaknesses had been sociated throughout ith the introduction fetes which were commonly regarded denizens 1. LeR. Alber ate ‘ideretel ie nereopae méthode ov por onde 4 mative (Mathemaigoe, 3 vole, Pans Linge ieee1a. ABRAHAM ROBINSON ofthe world of actsl infty. It now appeared that Cauchy was able to ‘emove them from tht domain and to base Analysison the potential infinite (Compare Cantor and Carruccio!). He did this by choosing as basic the notion of variable which, intiely, suggests potentiality rather than ‘ctulity, And so ithappened that a grateful public was wiling to overlook the fact that, from a tity logical point of view, the new method shared Some of the weaknesses of is predecessors and, indeed, introduced new ‘weaknesses of is own, 17. When Weierstrass (who had been anticipated to some extent by Boizano) introduced the 3,emethod about the middle of the nineteenth ‘entury he mintained the limit concept in its ceatral pace. AK the same time, Weierstrass epproach is perhaps closer than Cauchy's to the Greck ‘method of exhaustion ora leat tothe feature ofthat method which was ‘escribed by Leibniz (pour que erreur soit meindre que erreur donnée’, see section 4 above), On the issue ofthe actu infinite versus the potetil infinite, the 8,emethod didnot, assoc, force its proponents into definite position, Tous, who at trained inthe set-theoretic tradition, a phrase such ts for every postive there exists posive 5.” does infact seem to contain a clear reference toa well-defined infinite totality, i, the totality ‘Of postive real numbers.On the other hand, already Kronecker made it ‘lear, in his lectures, that to him the phrase mean that one could compute for, every specified positive ea postive 8 with the required property However, it was not then known thatthe abstract and the constructive approaches actualy lad to dierent theories of Analysis, so that amathe- ‘maticia’s inability to provide a procedure or computing a function whose cxistence he has proved by abstract arguments isnot necessarily due to his personal inadequacy "At the sume time its rather natural that Set Theory should have aise, it dig, from the consideration of certain problems of Analjsis which fequited the further clarification of basic concepts. Andis creator, Georg (Cantor, argued forcefully and i great deal that Set Theory deals with the factual infinite. Nevertheless, Cantor’s attitude towards the theory of in- finitely small quantities was entirely negative, in fact e went 50 far 38 to claim that he could disprove their existence by means of Set Theory. quote (Granslated from Cantor, 09. ct): "The fact of (te existence of) actully-infinitely large mumbers is not a 190. Canon Milingn sr Ler som Trane, AT, Gena Abhand larga ed E Zara si, 198 gp Seabee Caracen Fongame ‘SHPRhaks) aes sel pensere) J" Apotne Cauchr. Bole dell Unione ‘Natomatie nn Set 3, V1 1957 ps 28-307. METAPHYSICS OF THE CALCULUS 18 ean forthe exstencof actuality smll uate: on hecot hel of eater cone pred ct me of fra fo do think ta ths ret canbe bien any ote ay fala ‘Neel 5 thet may fal and Te bie temo hich is surned up in hi ataton ws con cerned ot ont wih he pat twas ected qin Pu Bose Reon fd 0, Stole wo ha it resale amos but iors tory of "ow-Archimedean systems Ima be resale thay atthe tine, Cantor was feking hardin order oon eognion for hi ona eo, Cantor belt n testa execs of the lnfites oS Theory ti resominates inthe mater st phisosty may Felted to tat of de Hospital and Fontnle alough nce inte Suanies were thought 1o be conte and prone whe Cantar’ Inf ae abstract and voce rom the phys Word Siti te intuionss an ter consis fur tne may be etd he eis tothe Arstotetan rons of ang Matematis onthe polenta infinite Final, Leta’ approach akin fo bers orga foram fo Ltn ik Mier, re slay ei we eo, sdcion to conte Mathes. Thus we may cone hs tk i the observation tat hough the very sibct ater of foundation research a changed ral ovr test to Dune yea eo Femarhablepemaneney inthe coner wih he fain Mahe and {nthe various philosophical atitudes which have been adopted towards thisXI WHAT IS ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY? Aurrep Taaskt collogiaingue the tx elementary game ise os torte 10 be bay of motes and theorems which, flowing the tadon of a8G Beene ort subj ter of omety cousin secondary ‘howl Ths the term has no wel termined meaning ad can be sb ‘Gre to various ierpretations If we wis o make ementary geometry ‘Fp of metamateraticliavestigaton and to obs exact result (Dt ‘cu, about hs dciping, then a choieo dete interpretation comes meray Infact we ave then fo denibeprecely wich SSxuncs can be formulated inslementry geometry and which among ‘Shia be eognzed as valid; ter worth, we hae to deteine he Mezisotexpremtn and rot wih whch he dil s provided ins paper we sal prima Concer ores with a eoneepton of cement peony which can ugly be esrb 8 flows: we reeord th cement port of Exlcan omer nich can eformaaed ond ated thou! he ep of oy setter! dees ‘oce peste, elementary geometry cocsved here theory with sod ermaaton nese of Tas, Mosowa abd Robinon* rom The Asomatie Method wih Spell Reference 1 Geomery and Ph 8 Liem ey Spe and'A Far lon aan Pubs Company, Ame e351. Repel by perminon ofthe publishers andthe ator Tine peoer a prepared fr poeation whe he author as working 00 # reseath poke nthe untations of athens sponsored by he US. Nason Selo te mai purpose ofthis pdr Cent the significance of nation snd SF mon og ae mumatemats forthe saya the ound Seip lt Rees aoe wars: Ace ye sel reac See ig ence wit BL: Wan er Wanrden, Modern Algebra reve Engh edn, New York, ‘SSA iis volume (The Asiomae Method with Spcel Reference veoh mle tet tn te one ie re ea Ge ey slg Ree ean cea ean? Imaal pbc concen slemetnyfyprboe emp. 30-32) ah fo SN SR RC BIRO A 8 WHAT IS ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY? 16s {ts formalized within elementary logic, ie, first-order predicate calculus, “All the variables x,y,z... occurring inthis theory are assumed to range ‘over elements ofa ied set; the elements are refered to as point, and the ‘seas the space. The logical constants of the theory are () the senentat ‘connectives—the negation symbol "the implication symbol =», the dis- Junction symbol , and the conjunction symbol a; Gi) the quantisers—the ‘universal quantifier and the existential quantifier Vand (i) two speci binary predicates—the identity symbol ~ and the diversity symbol #. AS non-logical constants (primitive symbols of the theory) we could choose ‘any predicates denoting certain relations among points in tems of which all geometrical notions are known to be definable. Actually we pick two predicates for tis purpose: the ternary predicate P used to denote the ‘betweennes relation and the quaternary predicate 8 used to denote the ‘equidistant relation; the formula A(xyz) is read y ler between x and 2 (Ue case when y coincides with x or z nt being excluded), while Bayo) is ead xis as distant from at 2s from a ‘Thus, in our formalization of elementary geometry, only points are teeated 38 individuals and are represented by (frstorder) variables, Since lementary geometry has no settheoretcal basis its formalization does not provide for variables of higher orders and no symbols are available to represent or denote geometrical figures (point sets), clases of geometrical figures, etc It shouldbe clear that, nevertheless, we are able to expres in ‘our symbolism al the results which canbe found in textbooks of elementary ‘geometry and which are formulated there in terms referring to various special clases of geometrical figures, such as the sraght lines, the circles, the segments, the trangls, the quadrangles, and, more generally, the polygons with a fed number of vertices, a¢ well as to certain relations ‘between geometrical figures in these classes, suchas congruence and simi- larity. Thisis primarily a consequence ofthe fact that in each ofthe cases just mentioned, every goometrcal figure is determined by a fed fnite ‘number of points. For instance, instead of saying that point: lies on the ‘Heaght line through the poins x and y, we can state that either lxy2) or Boz») or A(zxy) holds instead of saying that two segments with the end Points x, y and x, y are congruent, we simply state that xy)? some ett ao to Robinson (RM. Robison, Binary elton a primi notions Ieflmenty rome Ph 9. Sin vanousformalzatons of promt (whether elementary oat) wich are non Yom the iteratar, und in parca ese whic flo the kes ot Hier: (D Hib, onndane der Groin Whe with estos tnd sppenents {yiF Bernay, Sitar 1956401 351 pp net oy pots tao ean ‘el gues re ete sida ane reprsted yf ondr vrs ‘hl th ont gure ete ni way are seas Hney anes se mare gees165 ALFRED TARSKI ‘A sentence formulated in our symbolism is regarded a vali fit follows ‘Gemanticaly) from sentences adopted as axioms, i, if t holds im every Shatheratialstuctae in which all the axioms bold. In the present case, by virtuof the completeness theorem for elementary logic this amounts to ‘ubing that sentence is valid if tis derivabe from the axioms by means of Some familia ules of inference. To obtain an appropriate et of axioms, we Mart nith an axiom system which known (o provide an adequate bass for the whole of Euclidean geometry and contains and 8 as the only non- logical constants. Usually the only non-clementary sentence in such & systems the continuity axiom, which contains secondary variables X,Y, Fanging over arbitrary point ses (in addition to first-order variables x. ‘anging ove points) and also an additional iogical constant, the member- ‘Ship symbole denoting the membership relation between points and point Sets, The continuity axiom can be formated, eg, 8 follows A XY sAaplre Xaye ¥> Ale > Vu hay tee Xa ye ¥ Blow). ‘We remove tis axiom ftom the system and replace it by the ifnite colle tion of al elementary continuity axioms, i. roughly, by al the sentences Which are obtained from the non-lemestary axiom ifx €Xis replaced by fn arbitrary elementary formula in which x occurs fee, and y €¥ by an Stetrary elementary formula in which y ours free. To fx the ideas, we restrict ourselves in what follows to the two-dimensional clementary feometry and quote explicitly a simple axiom system obtained in the way Js described. The system consists of twelve individual axioms, AI-AI2, ‘and the infinite collection ofall elementary continuity axioms, ALS. AL (ionerry sxdou ror serweesness A xpBaya) > = 991 Sine sobapacs The sesheoealelaton of membership ad incon betwen WTSRtRePS Stl psa Aue or teween tro sch ia ae replace Dy ‘Megsgmeje etn of mata ante il Sng atone 1S Sout staan can be repented by osond-order variables suming tat the aleve gon doce bprvdl wih ihcnea an) Tn aepcach rrapment Sf nce snty by peaea convent formalin of {Tc gen, aod lade to's rubmpn of ths peony under the age ake anes Tater antes of ramet an ensopcur recede can arly ‘eReuds he nouifor weetmet of roma figures es of nincaly Seu bce lpral scr fh undo of amet, ts ‘oe SOhskestns nthe developmen of tho dine (by necsstaing. > ‘Bathcion beware «wit ne andthe of al pots on ths i), a a re As ro ar a Ato aul An als WHAT IS ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY? 1 rRansmVirY AXIOM FoR METWEENNESS), A veal) yeu) -» Beye) {coxnsecriviry AxoM Yon aETwossees] A yz) ay) (a # 9) > BxzuY Bee) {neruextny Ax00M FoR equimisTaNce). A xy8o0972)] (toes aos ror equipstaNcs A oz(Baye2) > = 9) [rmansvrry axon FoR EQUIDISTANCEL A xyzuntBtayzada Beyow) > Beuw%)) (Pascws aston A tau Vo (Bata) n lous) — Ay)» lee) [Evcun's axon ‘A tay Vee [Bats ACe)9 Ge)» Blaze)» Bley) a flor) (rvestonenr ax), A xx yy 2 ways Yn Bloay 28 Baus’ wn Buy WA Blayeyn Bay 2m x 9) Bzwe'w)] (oom oF ssoue consrAueTION) A xyu Ve (Btxy2)4 83240) (Lower tension x00), V x92 B02) 180028) Ble) (oPren omens ax, 1 xyzaB(are) a Byun) Bue)» (WA 9) Blaye)v Boz)y Alex) (suesmncrany connor sssoMs]. All sentences ofthe form Now. V2 A a0i a > Be) > Vu A said > Boxy) where stands for any frmala in which the variables 0s bud iether y nor = nar, occur free, and similarly for, with sand y Interchange.ALFRED TARSKE emery sony ted upon te axons jit ned il be denote wf ie Teron bow we sae fname meamaonseal Ha Lwin be rersnaton problem. ithe robe cfttaterng modo tsa. By a mael of we understand sere etan Dy sch that). an airy No-one and 2a Dorerouethe cy andar ean mong semen 27m ste tans os rove td Hal he ails 6 se rancor deme off andthe coats 2nd areunie= ZBodto dente te atone Mand, royce Tr ear xp of mods of anon whch can easly te tunel by slgsetne mao) ae etn Caren sane ne vee ge We’ asume Town ner wht condons 4 oem qr es thre Pisnoctandareby operas i wich Fea Ste mayen btn mens fF efered o een geld andhow te gmbol0,ae sed fr reed AUR" AtSuerel ld wil be call scien if every no-metve cee tines aque ii cere cst I Ease td Sere ea ofa od eps wh otc a has aero nF. Serie ets rotalenrescouie =e wih and com caste tons By and Dp aoe ch CuBs es Site toning sao Balxy2) fad only fx — 104 ~ 22) = (23 “VA 2s 04 =} 20, and O.< (= DO — A): Dalsyzn)ifand only ix, = 9)? + (0a FG ne tem 649) ~(Ay BaD) cal the (n-dimensional) Ca Trerped eee Winbicl meae or8te are Bld of ay Ga «pone tt east apg ogo aman thal tae 83 Gece Ae ee ee eat aa ery ses Nena ee Ei, ants an ova waka seiner as carer carr a nay Bre atatas eociecromcetame, a mcg eugene rmsccme ei i cirremn eure tees sae Tua aerabie rom the emaring ones a tuned by a kali, Sebt Tayo Suey Aasasnasmibass aeaicumera WHAT IS ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY? 16 real numbers, we obtain the ordinary (two-dimensional) analytic space G00! Throne 1 (REPRESENTATION THEOREM), For SR fo be a model of € it is recessary and sufcien that B be isomorphe withthe Cartesian space GB) (ver some real closed field. Poor (in outline). Its wellknown thatal the axioms of holdin G3) and that therefore €,(3) it a model of €;. By a fundamental result in ¢ Decision Method, every real close fields elementarily equivalent with the field i, every elementary (rstorder) sentence which holds in one ‘ofthese two fields holds also inthe other. Consequently every Cartesian, space €,(5) over areal closed field is elementariy equivalent with C3) and hence isa model of €,; this cleatly applies to all ystems 5 isomorphic with €3(5) a5 wel To prove the theorem in the oppesite direction, we apply methods and results of the elementary geometrical theory of proportions, which bas been developed in the literature on several occasions" Consider a model SH (A,B, D> of €;; let 2 and w be any two dsint points of 4, and F be the straight line through and u, eth et of al points x such that Bs) ‘or B(uxz) or B(x2u). Applying some falar geometrical constructions, ‘we define the operations + and -on, and th relation < between, any two points x and y in F, Thus we say that xy ifeither x= or ele BCxzu) fand not B(x) of, Bally, BU) and not B(s24); + +» is defined asthe ‘unique point v in F such that D(zxye) and either = < x and y <0 or ese x<7 and v< y. The definition of xy is more involved; it refers to some points outside of F and is essentially based upon the properties of parallel lines. Using exclusively axioms AI-AI2 we show that 3 — CF4y,<) ivan ordered field; withthe help of AIS we arrive atthe conclusion that ¥s sctually areal closed fel. By considering a straight ine G perpendicular to F atthe point z, we introduce a rectangular coordinate system in Rand we establish a one-to-one correspondence between points, in A and ‘ordered couples oftheir coordinates &= (x3) 3 = Gur. FF. 5 Al the rents inthis ape extend (th obvious change Jo the neimenon serra ee fener gem a ewe veal by a rest in Scou’s“Dirtnsion in elementary Buclseangeomety AIT and ALE Ge bean ty shee ede ymin oh ie ‘eee for mmm comtracing ashe model for One-dnrshonalpomes we {Se gwered sian grouped fore fe, “Se Hite Grenager er Geomar p.10 ALFRED TARSKI ‘With the help ofthe Pythagorean theorem (which proves to be valid in 3) we show thatthe formula Dey) Jn if and only ifthe formula Dataset) holds for the correlated couples of coordinates & = x,23),F = Ov in Fx Fie, CaF +a GAP = AF an analogous conclusion is obtained for B(x). Consequently, the systems 3H and (5) are isomorphic, which completes the proof. ‘We turn tothe completenes problem fr €,. A theory is called complete every sentence o (formulated in the symbolism ofthe theory) hos either inevery model ofthis theory ori no such model. Fo theories withstandard {formalization this definition can be pot in several other equivalent forms; wwecan sy, e, that a theory is complete if for every sentence 9, either lor Wie valid or ifany two models of the theory are elementarily equivalent. ‘A theory is called consistent iit ha atleast one model; hee, again, several ‘auivalent formulations are known. If there is a model 3X such that a Senience holds in Sif and only i is valid inthe given theory, then the ‘theory is clearly both complete and consistent, and conversely. The solution ‘ofthe completeness problem for; is given inthe following holds for any given points x, “Tawonsa 2 (COMPLETENESS THEDREW). () A sentence formulated in & is lid fa only ft olds 6) (i) the theory € i complete (and consistent) Part @) of this theorem follows from Theorem and from fundamental resultin A Decision Method which was applied in the proof of Theorem (Gis an immesiate consequence of (). ‘The next problem which wil be discussed here isthe decison problem for 4, lis the problem of the existence ofa mechanical method which enables ‘sin each particular case to decide whether or nota given Sentence formu lated in i valid. The solution ofthis problem is again postive: “Tweonan 3 (oACIION THEOREM). The theory & is deeldable Infact, ¢, is compete by Theorem 2 and is axiomatizabe by its very esrintion (Ge, it has an axiom ssstem Such that we can always decide ‘whether a gven sentence is an axiom). It is known, however, that every ‘Complete and exiomatizable theory with standard formalization is deid- WHAT IS ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY? m able? and therefore @ is decidable. By analysing the discussion in A Decision Method we ca actually obtain decision method for €. ‘The last metamatheratical problem to be discussed for & the problem Of finite axiomarzabily. From the description of € we see that this theory hasan axiom system consisting of finitely many individual axioms and of an infinite collection of axioms fling under a singe axiom schema ‘This axiom schema (which ithe symbolic expresion occurring in AIS) ‘beslightly modiiedso as to forma single sentence in the system of predicate calculus with free variable frstorder predicates, and all the particular axioms of the infinite collection can be obtained from this sentence by substitution. We briefly describe the whole situation by saying that the theory ¢; i ‘almost finitely aximatizable’, and now we ask the question whether @; is fritely axiomatizabe inthe strict sense, ie, whether the ‘original axiom system can be replaced by an equivalent finite system of sentences formulated in €. The answer is negative ‘Turonene 4 (NO-AINITIZABILETY THEOREM). The theory 4; 6 not finitely axlomariable, Poor (in outline). From the proof of Theorem 1 itis seen thatthe infinite collection ofaxioms Alcan be equivalent replaced by an infinite sequence ‘of sentences SS. Sy states that the ordered field § constructed in the proof of Theorem 1s Evcldean, and, for n= Oexpressesthe fact that in this eld every polynomial of degree 2n' 1 has a zero, For every prime ‘number p we ean easily construct an ordered feld in which evry poly ‘nomial of an odd degree 2n-+ I< p has a 2eo while some polynomial of ‘degree p as no zero; consequently, if 2m + 1=pis& prime, then al the axioms AI-AI2 and 5, with nm hold in G,(5,) while Sy does not hol, ‘Thisimpies immediately thatthe infinite axiom system Aly AID Soy Sy has 80 finite subsystem from which all the axioms ofthe system follow: Hence by a simple argument we conclude that, more gonecally, there Js no finite axiom system which is equivalent with the original axiom for system for &, From the proof us outlined we see that & can be based upon an sxiom system AL, ., AIZ, Spy Sys in Which (a8 opposed tothe original axiom system) each axiom can be putin te form of either a universal Sentence oF an existential sentence or a universal-enstental sentence; Le ‘each axiom is ether ofthe form xy) 11Ct Tan, Mosowsl and Robioton, Undeidae Thar,m ALFRED TARSKI cor eae ofthe forrn Va... @) or finaly, ofthe form Dagyee Va) wheres a formula without quantifiers. A rather obvious consequence of this structural property ofthe axioms isthe fact that the union ofa chain (or fof dicted family) of models of 4 is agnin a model of €. This conse- ‘Quence can ako be derived directly ftom the proof of Theorem “The conception of elementary geometry with which we have been con- cerned 30 far is certainly not the only feasibe one. In what follows we shall tiscuss briefly owo other posible interpretations of the term ‘elementary feometry’; they willbe embodied in Wo diferent formalized theories, #3 and 2 "The theory 42 is obtained by supplementing the logical base of with ‘smal fragment of set theory. Specially, we include in the symbolism of ‘E; new variables X, Y, assumed to range over arbitrary finite sts of Points (or, what in this case amounts essentially tothe same, over arbitrary Finite sequences of points); we also include a new logical constant, the membership symbole, € denote the membership relation Between points “and fnite point es. As axioms for €% we again choose AI-AI3;it should be noticed, however, that the cllecton of axiom AL} is now more com- prehensive than in the case of € since andy stand for arbitrary formulas Constructed in the symbolism of 2%, Ia consequence the theory € con siderably exceeds & in means of expression and power. In @{ we can formulate and study various notions which are traditionally discussed in textbooks of elementary geometry but which cannot be expressed in #3; 2g, the notions of a polygon with arbitrarily many vertices, and of the ‘Sreumference and the area ofa circle "As regards metamathematicl problems which have been discussed and solved for in Theorems 1-4, thre of them the problems of represen- tation, completeness, and finite axiomatiabiity—are stil open when referred to 2%, In particular, we do not know any simple characterization Of all models of €, nor da we know whether any two such models are ‘equivalent with respect to all sentences Formulated in (When speaking ‘of models of #3 we mean exclusively the so-called standard models; Le, ‘when deciding whether @ sentence o formulated in € holds in given ‘mode, we assume that the variables x, oscurting in orange overall, ements ofa sc, the variables X, ¥, range over all finite subsets of this WHAT IS ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY? m Set, and € is always understood to denote the membership relation). The ‘Archimedean postulate can be formulated and proves to be valid in #3 Hence, by Theorem I, every model of ¢3 is isomonphic with a Cartesian space (5) over some Archimedean rel closed field. There ae, however, Archimedean real closed elds 5 such that €,(3) is nota model of 3: 8, the fed of rel algebraic numbers sof this kind, A consequence of the Archimedean postulate is that every model of € has at mos the power of ‘the continuum (while, if only by virtue of Theorem 1, € has models with arbitrary infinite power) In fat, € has models which have exactly the ‘power of the continuum, eg. €3(%), but it can aso be shown 40 have ‘Senumerable modes. Thus, although the theory € may prove to be com plete, it certainly has non isomorphic models and therefore is not eae torical? Only the decision problem for #5 has found so far 8 definite soli ‘TutoRss 5. The theory € is undecidable, and s0 are all lis consistent extensions, “This follows from the fact that Peano's arithmetic i laively)inter- protabein #3? ‘To obtain the theory 4; we leave the symbolism of 4; unchanged but we ‘weaken the axiom system of €. In fact, we replace the infinite coletion ‘of elementary continuity axioms, A13, bya single sentence, ALY, which is ‘consequence of one of these axioms, The sentence expresses the fact that “hgh et fon gram mn 2p aioe eerste ee 2 ee one eee a Behe Rooran autem rae haces Secor itt oa cenea meme nyate Sears manent eric nenaioac gees Edad eeprom an? Wiehe also Handed mode of The rot of thi hore sey fond HF Hakan Greet unworn Eoeieiser canes cite iacmemeor SF ec eeeemeeee eran ae iS Used enact Secreta, rile Stir) gucnemeeneneearern pee Soh eatis See ne anes eee Bee ge arumraaeeyernaintes sera ty ices Mahe eheeetetger atsnomsy Dinan ine owas: sah eater) meoned he nd GiPFari, Mono and Robison, Undelsble Their, pp. 3mm ALFRED TARSKI ‘a segment which joins two points, ne inside and one ouside given circle, always intersects the circle; symbolically ALY. A xpex’s WV yeux’) Bac lz) Baye) > ayn n la’ ¥ 291 ‘Asa consequence ofthe weakeningof theaxiom system, varioussentences ‘which are formulated and valid in & are no longer valid in 3. This applies Tn particular to existential theorems which cannot be established by means ‘of socalled elementary geometrical constructions (using exclusively ruler find compas), ep. to the theorem on te section ofan arbitrary angle. ‘With regard to metamatheratical problems discussed inthis paper the situation in the case of €; ust opposite to that encountered in the ase of {Fa The theee problems which are open for 4; admit of simple solutions ‘when referred to 4%. In particular, the solution of the representation problem is given ia the following “Tuonen 6, For to hea modelof€3 iis necessary and sficint that ‘be isomorphic with he Cartesian space E(B) oer some Euclidean fl "This theorem is essenilly known from the iterature. Thesuificiency of the condition can be checked directly; the ncesity can be established with the hep of the elementary geometrical theory of proportions (fhe proof of Theorem 1. " Using Theorem 6 we easly show tha the theory #3 is incomplete, and eomibe eseription of €, wesee at once that his theory isinitelyaxiomatize able ‘On the other hand, the decision problem for 43 remains open and ‘presumably is dificult. Inthe light ofthe results of J. Robinson” it seems {ikely thatthe solution ofthis problem is negative; the author would risk the (much stronger) conjecture that no iitely axiomatizable subtheory of (is decidable If we agree fo seferto an elementary geometrical sentence (Ge, a sentence formolated in 23) as valid if tis alld in 4, and as ce- tmentarily provable itis valid in, then the situation can be described follows: we know a general mechanical method for deciding whether aver clementary eometrical sentence fs elld,but we do not, and probably shall eter know, any such method for deciding whether a sentence of this sort is elementary provable. “The diferenoss between & and 5 vanish when we restrict ourselves to universal sentences, In fact, we have 18-Defnabiliy and deglon problems in athe Journal of Symbae Lonis vol MB) pp 98-8 f WHAT IS ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY? 1s Twom7 nera etn formated i ald Suteoatt nd Ciuc en aa To prove this we eal that very ott fd can etna to closed eld. Hence, by Theorems and every modelo can beemended toamodel of Comequnty erry universal sents which ada 4; is abo valid inthe omnes obvious (Am resale prot of ‘Theorem 7, and in at 4 prot independent of There Ions ocd en he ena by whch every fe substem ofan rere econ fe ‘aor nee he dred of al uss) re fea valid weemove Aon ie sine em of & Cant appli cen oso il weaker aa se), Tos west every ekentary una tence which vad fy ean he proved iio of hecortny sx The re cnn oa he Senter which nay no be ical when formulated in yb eon, Touhy speaking, beim universal when eared inthe haon of (Caestan spaet 63) ‘Asan inet consequence of Theorems 3and7 we obtain: Thom. The theory ls decd withrepet tthe seo es anes “his means that ther is& mechani meth for desing in parila case whether or nota gen univer sentence formulate ate Shey his never tose! of ts hey We cold daca some fre thors ated 0, and 66 tac ct os rt: fs a ma se ‘soem a 6 The problem of dsidng which of tie vations feral oe Stone cenentry srt cine orc aon colo! wage of tention ses tobe rather Ropes sd Sos sear oas encore the on embodied in & dstinguie self by te simpy and tar its metamathematical implications. oeNOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS Evert W. Beth (1908-64) was Profesor of Logic, History of Logic, and Philosophy of Science a the University of Amsterdam. He wrote widely on All these subjets, asthe bibliography of his works in Synthese, Vol. 16 (1966), pp. 90-106 shows. Profesor Beth's best known work is probably Foundations of Mathematics (1959); his ast book tobe published in English ‘was Mathematical Thought (1965). Solomon Feferman is Professor of Mathematics and Philosophy at ‘Stanford University. He is best known for his penetrating studies of the method ofaithmetization and ofthe scope of predcative methods. ‘Kurt Gadel is Professor atthe Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton. ‘Although he has published, in addition toa few papers, only one work of ‘monograph length (The Consistency ofthe Continua Hypothesis, 1940), his thought has revolutionized nearly all branches of contemporary logic and foundational sti. Leon Herkinis Profesor of Mathematics at the University of California, Berkely, and sometime (1962-4) President ofthe Association for Symbolic Logic. In addition to contributing to logic and foundational studies, Pro- {fessor Henkin is co-author of Retracing Elementary Mathematics (1962) — “the fist extensive treatment of the logical foundations of elementary mathematics. accesible to readers without advanced graduate training Georg Kreisel, FRS., is Professor of Logic and Mathematics in the Department of Philosophy of Stanford University, and is also Professor of ‘Mathematics tthe Université de Paris Inthe lst ew yearshe has surveyed his own extensive workin logic and foundations, a8 wel as the work of ‘other, in several important survey article and in his textbook (wth JL. Keivine) Elements de logive mathématigue (1967, English edition also 196. [Abraham Robinson is Profesor of Mathematics at Yale University. He 's probably best known as one of the main architects of contemporary ‘adel theory (On the Metamathematicsof Algebra, 951; Complete Theories, 1956; Inroduction to Model Theory, 1963) and as the main architect of nonstandard analysis (or-Standard Anas, 1960) NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS ” Hartley Rogers, Jr, is Professor of Mathematics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has contributed to several branches oflogicand foundational studies, especialy to recursive function theory (Theory of Recursive Functions and Efeetce Compuabllty, 1968). He is also koown asan excellent expositor and teacher Raymond Smullyan teaches at Lehman Collegeof the City University of [New Yark.Heis the author of Theory of Formal Systems (1961), First-Order Logie (1968), and numerous ates. Alfred Tarski is Profesor of Mathematics atthe University of California, Berkeley. He is probably the most influential and prolife contemporary logician. (Biblography of the Writings of Alfred Tarski, Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, 1965, lise 256 items.) ‘Some of his earlier writings are collected in the volume Logie, Semantic, ‘Metamathemarie (1986). 1n addition to shaping large parts of modern Tole and foundational studies, Tarsks work in semantics (mode theory) has exerted profound influence on philosophical discussions concerning the concept of wuth and concerning the philosophy of mathematic,BIBLIOGRAPHY (ot ncadng material nts volume) AwtnoLoats Jean van Heljenoor, ed, From Frege o Gadel. A Source Book in Mathe- mata! Logic 1875-1931 (Marvard University Press, Cambridge, Mas, 1967). Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, eds, Philosophy of Mathematics: ‘Seleted Readings (Prenice-Hal, Englewood Cs, NJ, 1964) Surveys ‘Andra Mostowski, Thirty Years of Foundational Stadis: Lectures on the ‘Development of Mathematica Logic and the Study of Foundations ix 1930~ 1964, hta Philosophies Fennice, Val. 17 Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1966). Georg Kreisel, Mathematical Losi’ a T-L. Saaty ed, Lectareson Modern “iathematics, Vol. 3 Joba Wiley & Sons, New York, London, and Sydney, 1968, pp. 95-195). Geyenat Works oN MatEMaricaL Lootc AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS David Hilbert and Paul Bernays, Grundlagen der Mathematik I-Il(Spinget- Berlin, 1934-9) S.C. Kleene, Inroduction to Metamathematics (Van Nostrand, New York, 1982). Alfred Tarski, Logie, Semantics, Metamathematcs: Papers rom 1923 10 1838, translated by J. H. Woodger (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956). [Evert W. Beth, The Foundations of Marhematis (North-Holland Publishing “Company, Amterdam, 1989; second edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1360, Joseph R. Shoenfekd, Mathematical Loge (Addison-Wesley Publishing ‘Company, Reading, Mass, 1967). PritosoriicaL DISCUSSIONS oF LocIc AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS Kurt Gide, ‘Russell's Mathematical Logi’, in Paul A. Schilpp, ed. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (The Libeary of Living Philosophers, BIBLIOGRAPHY 19 Evanston, Il (ater, Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle; 1), 1948), pp. 125-53 ‘Leon Henkin, “Some Notes on Nominalism, Journal of Symbolle Lote, Vol. 18 (1953), pp. 19-29, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks om the Foundations of Mathematics, ©. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M, Anscombe and translated by G. E. M. ‘Anscombe (Basil Blackwel, Oxford, 1961. Abraham Robinson, ‘Formalism 196, in Yehoshua Bar-Hillel ed, Logle ‘Methodology and Phesophy of Stenc, Proceedings ofthe 1964 Inter- ‘ational Congress (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1968), pp. 228-46. W. V. 0. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essay (Random House, ‘New York, 1966) Hilary Putnam, ‘Mathematics without Foundations’ Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64 (1967, pp. $-22. NATURAL Depuction Meriops AND Oren DeveLorments, IN Finst-Onpex Loate 4 Herbrand, Berit logiques. J. van Heijenoort, ed. (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1968). G. Gentzen, “Untersuchungen Uber das logische Schlessen LI, Mathe- ‘marische Zeitschrift, Vol. 39 (1934), pp. 176-221, 403-31. Reprinted in French in: G. Gente, Recherches su a déductonlogigue,R. Fes and J. Ladritre, eds. (Paris, 1988) and in English in American Philosophical ‘Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1964), pp. 288-306, and Vel. 2 (1965), pp. 204-18, HL. Rasiowa and R. Sikorski, ‘On the Gentzen Theorem’, Fundamenta ‘Mathematicae, ol. $8 (1960), pp. 59-69. Jaakko Hintikka, ‘Form and Content in Quantiation Theor’, Acta Philosophica Femnca, Vol 8 (1985), pp. 11-55. Kurt Schitte, Ein System des verknipfenden Schiessens’, Archlo fr ‘mathematische Logik und Grandlagenforschrg, Wo. 21956) pp. 5-67. ‘William Craig “Linear Reasoning: A New Form ofthe Herbrand-Gentzen ‘Theorem’, Journal of Symbaic Lagi, Vol. 22 (1957), pp. 250-68, Jacko Hintikka, ‘Distributive Normal Forms in First-Order Logic’, in BLN. Crossley and M, A. E. Dummett, Formal Systeme and Recrsve Funcions, Proceedings ofthe Eighth Logie Colloquium, Oxford, July10 [BLIOGRAPHY 1963 (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1965), pp. 47- 0. Mops THEORY Allred Tarski, "Contributions tothe Theory of Models IID, Jndagationes ‘Mathemateae, Vol. 16 (1958), pp. 52-81, 582-8, and Vol. 17 (1955), pp. 56-84, LW, Addison, Leon Heakin, and Alfed Tarski, eds, The Theory of Models, ‘Proceedings ofthe 1963 Tnterational Symposium at Berkeley (North: “Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1969) ‘Abeaham Robinson, Inroduction ro Model Theory and to the Metamathe- ‘matic of Algebra (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1963), Wiliam Craig, Three Uses ofthe Herbrand-Gentzen Theorem in Relating ‘Model Theory and Proof Theory’, Jounal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 22 (4957, pp. 268-85 Robert Vaught, ‘Models of Complete Theories’ Buller ofthe American ‘Mathematical Society, Vol. 9 (1963), pp. 299-313. Rotert L. Vaught, "The Lawenhsim-Skolem Theorem’, in Yehoshua Bar- Hillel ed, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Selene, Proceeding of the 1964 International Congress (North-Holland Publishing Company, ‘Amsterdam, 1965, pp. 81-9). Proor Tusory Kart Schutte, Beweitheorie (Springr-Veriag, Belin, Géttingen, Heidel ‘berg, 1960) Dag Prawitz, Natural Deduction: A Proof-Theoretcal Study, Stockholm ‘Studies in Philosopiy, Vol. 3 (Almavist & Wiksel, Stockholm, 1968). Georg Kreisl, “A Survey of Proof Theory’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 33 (1968, pp. 321-388. INcomPLeTENEss axD UnpecrDasiLiTY See also the work listed under ‘Recursive Function Theory’, especially ‘Rogers and the papers reprinted in Davis A. Tanski, A. Mostowski, and R. M. Robinson, Undecidable Theories (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1953). LoGRAPHY a Hao Wang, “Undecidable Sentences Created by Semantic Paradoxes’ Journal of Symbolic Logic, ol. 20 (1985), pp. 31-43. Solomon Feferman,“Arithmetization of Metamathematcs in a General ‘Setting, Fundamenta Mathematicae, Vol 49 (1960-1), pp. 35-92. Hiowen-Oxoex Looics Kurt Schatt, ‘Syntactical and Semantical Properties of Simple Type ‘Theory’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 25 (1960), pp. 305-26 Richard Montague, Set Theory and Higher-Order Logic, in J.N. Crossley ‘and M. A.E. Dummett, eds, Formal Systems and Recursioe Functions, Proceedings ofthe Eighth Logic Colloquium, Oxford, July 1963 (North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1963), pp. 131-48. Dag Prawita,‘Hauptsatz for Higher Order Logic, Journal for Symbolic ‘Logie, Vol. 33 (1968), pp. 482-57. Paepicativiry Solomon Feferman, ‘Autonomous Transfnite Progressions and the Extent ‘of Predcative Mathematics, in B. van Roottelaar and J, F. Staal, eds, Lori, Methodology and Philosophy of Science III, Proceedings of the 1967 International Congress (North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1968, p. 121-39) ‘Georg Kreis, La prédicatvi’, Bullen de la Société Marhimatigue de ‘France, Vol 88 (1960), pp. 371-91 Ser Tueory Kutt Gbdel, The Consistency ofthe Aviom of Choice and ofthe Generalized ‘Contin: Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set Theory, Annals of Mathe- matics Studies Vol. 3 (Princeton Univesity Pres, Princeton, NJ, 1940), ‘Kurt Gédel, ‘What I Centor’s Continuum Hypothesis”, American ‘Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 54 (1947), pp. S15-25. Reprinted with ‘additions in Benaceraf and Putnam, eds, Philosophy of Marhemates, ‘Selected Readings (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Ciiffs, N21, 1968), pp. 258-73, aul Cohen, Set Theory andthe Continuum Hypothesis (W. A. Benjamin, "New York and Amsterdam, 1966).1 BIBLIOGRAPHY LW. V. 0. Quine, Set Theory and Its Logic (Harvard University Press, ‘Cambridge, Mass, 1963), [Andtzej Mostowsi, “Recent Results in Set Theory’, in 1. Lakatos, ed ‘Problems in the Philosophy of Mashemarcs, Proctedings of the Iner- ‘ational Colloquium inthe Philosophy of Science (Londen, 1965), Vol. 1, p. 82-96 (discussion, pp. 97-118). A.A. Fraenkel and ¥. Bar-Hilll, Foundations of Ser Theory (Northe ‘Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1958) Dana Scott, ‘A Proof of the Independence of Continuum Hypothesis’, ‘Mathematical Systems Theory, No 1 (1966), pb. 89 RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS AND COMPUTABILITY, ‘Martin Davis, ed, The Undecidable: Basie Papers on Undecidable Pro- ‘ositions, Unsoleable Problems, and Computable Functions (Raven Pres, Hewlett, New York, 195). Harley Rogers, Jr, Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Compute- bility (MeGraw-Hil, New York, 1968. ‘Martin Davis, Computability and Unsolrabiliy (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1958). M.O, Rabin and D. Scot, "Finite Automata and Their Decision Problems’, {IBM Journal of Research ad Development, Vol. 3 (1959), pp. 114-25. L. E. J. Brouwer, ‘Historical Background, Principles and Methods of Intitionism, Suh African Journal of Science ol. 491952), pp 139-46. |A. Heyting, Intiionam: An Introduction (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1956) |A. Heyting, “After Thirty Years’, in Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes, and ‘alfed: Tarski, ed, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif, 1962). Evert W. Beth, ‘Semantic Construction of Intuitionistic Logi’, Medede- Tingenvande Koninklike Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschoppen, A. Leterkunde, N-R. Vol. 18, no 1 (1956), pp. 357-8. \V.H. Dyson and Georg Kreisel, Analysis of Beth's Semantic Consirucion of Innationistic Logic. Applied Mathematics and Statistics Laboratory, Technical Report no, 3 (Stanford University Stanford, Cali, 1961) inte BIBLIOGRAPHY 1s Saul Kripke, "Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logie 1, in J. N, Crosley and M. A. E. Dummett e., Formal Systems and Recorsive Funcrions, Proceedings ofthe Eighth Logie Colloquium, Oxford, July 1963 (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 92-130) S.C. Kleene and R. E. Vesley, The Foundations of Initionistie Mathe- ‘mates (Nosth-Holland, Amsterdam, 1965) Consructive AND Finitistic Founpations (OTHER THAN Ivruimionisu) Kur Gide, “Ober eine bsher noch nich hentate Erweiterung de iter Standpunktes’, in Lorica: Studia Poul Bernays Dedicata (Editions Griffon, Neuchatel, 1959), pp. 76-83, Paul Lorenzea, Ein dialogisches Konstrktivittsriterum, in fitistie ‘Methods, Proceedings of the Symposium on Foundations of Mathe- ‘matics (Pergamon Pres, London, and Passtwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszava, 1961), pp. 193-200 Now-Stanpann ANALYSIS ‘Abraham Robinson, Non-Standard Analysis (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1966), Marnswaricat. Discovery. THE DEVELOPMENT oF Marnaarics G. Polya, Mathematical Discovery I-I (John Wiley, New York, 1962-5. Ire Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations’, The British Journal forthe Philo- Sophy of Selene, Vo. 14 (1968), pp. 1-25, 120-39, 221-45, 296-342. Gromerny David Hilbert, Grundlagen der Geomerie, 8th ed. with revisions and supplements by P, Bernays, Stttgart, 1956. Wola Schwabhiusr, “Metamathematial Methods in Foundations of ‘Geometry’ in Yehoshwa Bar-Hille, ed, Loic, Methodology and Pix sophy of Science, Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress (Nerth- Holland, Amsterdam, 1963), pp. 152-68.BLIOGRAPHY Maruemarics AND Locic [Leon Henkin, “Are Logic and Mathematics Identical, Science, Vol. 138, ‘0, 3542 (16 November 1962), pp. 788-94 Hilary Putnam, "The Thess that Mathematics s Loge’, n R. Schoenman, (4, Bertrand Russell: Philosopher ofthe Centr (George Allen & Uns, London and Atlantc-Litle, Brown & Co., Boston, 1967), pp. 273-303. ‘Tue Status oF MATHEMATICAL AND Logicat TRUTHS W. V. 0. Quine, ‘Carmap and Logical Trth, in P. A. Schlipp, ed, The ‘Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap (Libary of Living Pilosophers, Vol. 1 Open Court, LaSalle, I, 1963), pp. 385-406, Jaakko Hintikka, “Are Logical Truths Analytic? Philosophical Review, Vol. 741965), pp. 178-203 INDEX OF NAMES (ror including thors mentioned omy in the Bidiveraphy) hese ale scone Ete ane Enis “Aristotle, 12n., 14, 16, 19m. 38, 36, 152 Feferman, S. eee 18a. Feys, R., 18n., 4ln, “A Bone mete me : Ee crew : meee me ‘ Ere pee : Benn. es Sena 6341.23.44, 15.116 Piel feces Beth EW. 45,8, 139, 370, Om Bostenst LM 1a, im. Botano, B., 24m, 3,90, 102, 10 Bourba Ni 8830 Brouwer, 12.1, 3,93 Canter, 6. Carp, (Carot:L Caruso, ‘Cauchy. A ‘Church A 1 82,136, 144, 162,168 tn (Geel, 24,546 130518, 37.41.42, 31 4, 6, 63,68, 74,7, 90,8, 199910813, 140, 165,148,150, Goodstein RL, 2, Greling 7, (Greeorcyi, A108, atmos, PR. 146 Niaat39 ant, WB Eig Hasenineger G18. 23,40, 1, 96,102,183, 19-162 Henkin 343240, S184, 640, "ai 87 Sin 283 4, Hertrand 3,4, 18,34 10, Sin 8.94 10, 133.133, 134, Hermes, Hie 135,133, 13914, 1,1 Hesenber”G. 24m (care J.T a, Heytng, A 32,98, 28 Hilbert .23, 2, 0, 34, 8,8, 124 142,163,165, 10, Miia KS, 840,41 Hokder, 0. 378, Howard, W., 1255, Hume, D. 37 Alember, 3. LeR, 155,19, 161 Huse, 37m Davis 46 Deed’ J.W. R888, 96,101,126 Tongh,J.J.de, 32 Dekker 1G. B, 1-14 evs, W.8.,32 et Hospital, C.F. A. 136-19, 163 oe Boorman, 8.50) Kali, Eva, 1680. ds Bole Reyna, 163 Kant i.8.37 Dyson v8 Kemeny, 3G, 6,16 INDEX OF NAMES Rasiowa, H, 880 Ream, GF. 83 obi, A 8 14,153 ‘lesae, 8.C. 18a, 41, 98, 10,105, 105 107, 110, tian, 132, 18, 134 158 14s, 1,144, 146 AN 138 Kondo, M, ib ‘eee, G33, 8, 960, 950,98 103, 10,7, 10 105,116, 14,11 Ie. 19,148 1 Kronecker 162 Ladvite 1, ain Tageange, 1159 Tae, PN eto, G.W 9m, 153, 156-160, 162, 163 Les, C1, 128 Locke, 3,37 Loewner 95 Lekanewice, 1,160 Mach, E378, Maley. An, Marital 31m Marka W144 Mate, By 350 Montagus. 5 On. ‘AI, 83.106, 13, 140, 143,164, in, 13a, Moctniek, A. 1. Myce 3.2.8 Mi, R93, 94, 98, 14,144 Newton, aac 183,186 Pas, A 8 Peano, G 340,606,686, 141,179, Petee,C'S..3 Plt, 195.32 owen, H 97,99, Poppe, KR 18 ost Ba 132 138, 40,143 ine, W.V. 18, 23,24. 40,42, 65, "Ty 4 Rabin, M.0..6 145, Ramsey, F108 oo Sehole H. 18 Senate, 3,4 18,24,98, 110,112, 11518, 120,121 -Sehwaase, 7,168, Seat D6, in, 1, Sexts pins, 37m. Sikorski, 30 Skolom, 7.4, 18, 4,6, 61, 62,98, Tin ‘mulvin, RM, 2 Spear C98 105, 106,125,144 Stegner, $ Stelahas, #8 Stent J 33 Stole, 0.163 Theophrasts, 3m. Tring AM 8,8 1134 an den Berg, A. 30, ‘Van er Waerde, BL 148, 168m sm der Wien, W328, Vaught, la, de ‘ebien, 0.112 Wane, H, 9,9, 108,127,144 ‘Wesersta, KT. W102, 153,162 ‘Wasi Hy 32m, 9,98 102,108 ‘Whateead,A°N, 10m Wisner E152 Zeno, 3, armel, E82 88, 48, 85,87, 8, 93 1, 130, 13,