ENGLISH FOR PSYCHOLOGY GRADO EN PSICOLOGIA ERSIDAD NACIONAL DE EDUCACION A DISTANCIA (UNED) SEPTIEMBRE 2014 Material permitido: — Ninguno Aciertos: +0,5 puntos Tiempo: 120 minutos (total) Errores: -0,16 puntos 6 minutos por pregunta Maxima nota: 10 puntos (sin contar las de reserva) 5,21 minutos por pregunta (contando las de reserva) INSTRUCCIONES Este examen se compone de un total de 20 preguntas mas 3 de reserva, repartidas en cuatro (4) secciones: (I) comprensién lectora, (Il) filling the gaps, (Ill) traduccién directa y (IV) preguntas sobre teoria y gramética, Sélo se puntuaran las 20 primeras preguntas (las que NO son de reserva) Las preguntas de reserva s6lo puntuarin si y sélo si alguna pregunta que no sea de reserva se anulara, En tal caso, el orden en el que las preguntas de reserva comienzan a ser validas es el orden numérico que tienen asignado en la prucba. Es decir, si se anulara una pregunta que no fuera de reserva, contaria la pregunta 21 pero no la 22 ni la 23. Si se anularan dos preguntas que no fueran de reserva, contarian las preguntas 21 y 22, pero no la 23. Finalmente, si se anularan tres preguntas que no fueran de reserva, contarian las preguntas 21, 22 y 23 Does your Self exist? If there is one concept which has been under constant attack by psychologists and philosophers over the last few decades, it is the idea of “you” - (11) that you are a real entity or “self” inside your ‘own mental space. Many modern philosophers and scientists suggest that this sense of being ‘someone’ is illusory, or just a simple product of brain activity. (12) Somehow the billions of neurons in your brain work together to produce it, and all of the thoughts and feelings which it incorporates. This view was expressed very graphically by the scientist Francis Crick, who wrote that “You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” From a less biological perspective, the philosopher Daniel Dennett speaks of the illusion of the ‘Cartesian theatre’, the sense that (13) there is ‘someone’ in our heads looking out at a world ‘out there’, and also watching our own thoughts pass by. In reality, says Dennett, there are only ‘mental processes. There are streams of thoughts, sensations and perceptions passing through our brains, but there is no central place where all of these phenomena are organised. Similarly, the psychologist Susan Blackmore has suggested that the self is just a collection of what she calls ‘memes’ - units of cultural information such as ideas, beliefs and habits. We are born without a self, but slowly, as we are exposed to environmental influences, the self is “constructed” out of the ‘memes we absorb. Modern neuroscience seems to reinforce such views. Neuroscientists claim to be able to ‘locate’ the parts of the brain responsible for mental phenomena such as aesthetic appreciation, Pagina I de 6us experience, love, depression and so on, but they haven’t found a part of the brain sociated with our underlying sense of self. Therefore, they feel justified in concluding that this doesn’t exist ‘Ghosts don’t Exist’, says the Ghost There are many problems with the attempt to ‘reduce’ our sense of self to brain activity. This is what is sometimes called the *hard problem’, to distinguish it from the “easy problems’ of mental abilities and functions such as memory, concentration and attention. Whilst we might be able to understand these phenomena, the problem of how the brain might produce a conscious self is on a completely different level. The brain is just a soggy clump of grey matter - (14) how could that soggy mass possibly give rise to the richness and depth of consciousness? To think that it could is a ‘category error’ - the brain and consciousness are distinet phenomena, which cannot be explained in terms of each other. And on a more practical basis, after decades of intensive research and theorising, no-one has yet put forward an even slightly feasible explanation of how the brain might produce consciousness. The ‘hard problem’ seems completely insurmountable. (15) There is a basic absurdity in these attempts to show that the ‘self’ is illusory. They always feature a self trying to prove that it doesn’t exist. They are caught in a loop. If the self is an illusion to begin with, how can we trust its judgements? It’s a bit like a ghost trying to prove that ghosts don’t exist. Perhaps it may be right, but its illusory nature doesn’t inspire confidence. Dennett and Blackmore are presuming that there is a kind of reliable, objective observer inside them which is able to pass judgement on consciousness - and that presumption contradicts their own arguments, That is the very thing whose existence they are trying to disprove, Related to this, there is a problem of subject/object confusion. All of these theories attempt to examine consciousness from the outside. They treat it like a botanist examining a flower, as an object to scrutinize and categorize. But of course, with consciousness there is no subject and no object. The subject is the object. You are consciousness. So it is fallacious to examine it as if it is something ‘other.’ Again, you are caught in a loop. You can’t get outside consciousness. And so any ‘objective’ pronouncements you make about are fallacious from the start. [Source: Psychology Today http://www psychologytoday.comvblog/out-the-darkness/201311/does- your-self-exist] 1, COMPRENSION LECTORA. Lea el texto “Does your Self exist?” y conteste las siguientes preguntas: 1, According to the text, “memes”: a. Have been defined by Dennet. b, Do not receive support from neuroscience. ¢. Are units of cultural information. d. Are ideas and belief’ but do not include any behavioral components such as habits 2. According to the text, neuroscience (mark the option that is FALSE): a, Can locate the parts of the brain responsible for mental phenomena b. Reinforces the existence of the existence of “memes” ¢. Cannot locate the part of the brain responsible for consciousness. d. Reinforces the existence of our underlying sense of self. 3. According to the text, the “hard problem”: a, Consists in reducing the self to brain activity Pagina 2 de 6b. in demonstrating the existence of the self. c in demonstrating the mental abilities and functions, 4. ists in demonstrating the existence of mental processes like memory, concentration and attention, 4. The author of the text supports the view of the non-existence of the self: a, True. b. False. The author provides empirical evidence supporting the existence of the self. c. False. The author provides arguments against the ideas of Dennett and Blackmore. d, False. The text does not say anything about the existence of the self, 5. According to the text, the “easy problems”: a, Are intelligible. b. Seem completely insurmountable. c. Have not received any slightly feasible explanation. d, Do not exist. Il. FILLING THE GAPS Lea el siguiente texto y elija Ia opcidn correcta para cada uno de los espacios en blanco: Most work in the cognitive sciences focuses on the manner (6) which an individual device—be it a mind, a brain, or a computer—processes various kinds of information. Cognitive psychology in particular is primarily concerned (7). individual thought and behavior. Individuals however belong (8). populations. This is true in two quite different senses. Individual organisms are members of species and share a genome and most phenotypic traits with the other members of the same species. Organisms essentially have the cognitive capacities characteristic of their species, with relatively superficial individual variations. In social species, individuals are also members of groups. An important part of cognitive activity is directed (9), other members of the group with whom they cooperate and compete. (10) humans in particular, social life is richly cultural. Sociality and culture are made possible by cognitive capacities, contribute to the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of these capacities, and provide specific inputs to cognitive processes. 6. a, In, b. By. cc. Which. d. Over. 7. a, On. b, To. cc. With. d. For. 8. a. To. b. OF c. At d. By. Pagina 3 de 6