LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Warranty

Ang vs CA In declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at the time the deed was forged, Soledad gave an
implied warranty of title. In pledging that he “will defend it from all claims and will save the vendee from any suit
by the government, Soledad gave a warranty against eviction.
Since it was an implied warranty, the prescriptive period to file a breach is six months after the delivery of the
vehicle, following Art. 1571. But even if the date of filing of the action is reckoned from the date Ange filed his
first complaint for damages on November 9, 1993, and not on July 15, 1996 when he filed the complaint of the
present petition, the action still prescribed, having been filed 16 months after July 28, 1992, the date of delivery
of the vehicle.
On the complaint for damages, the requisites for breach of the warranty against eviction under Article 1547 have
not been met; because there is no judgment depriving Ang of the vehicle and there was no suit for eviction in
which Soledad as seller was impleaded as codefendant at the instance of the vendee.
RCBC vs Court granted RCBC’s petition. The vendor, Odrada, is responsible for an implied warranty against hidden defects
Odrada pursuant to Article 1547 of the Civil Code. Article 1566 provides that "the vendor is responsible to the vendee for
any hidden faults or defects in the thing sold, even though he was not aware thereof.”
Law defines a hidden defect as one which would render the thing sold unfit for the use for which it is intended, or
would diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent that, had the vendee been aware thereof, he would not
have acquired it or would have given a lower price for it. In this case, Odrada and Lim entered into a contract of
sale of the Montero. Following the initial down payment and execution of the deed of sale, the Montero was
delivered by Odrada to Lim and the latter took possession of the Montero. Notably, under the law, Odrada’s
warranties against hidden defects continued even after the Montero’s delivery. Consequently, a
misrepresentation as to the Montero’s roadworthiness constitutes a breach of warranty against hidden defects.
When Lim acquired possession, he discovered that the Montero was not roadworthy. However, during the
proceedings in the TC, Lim's testimony was stricken off the record because he failed to appear during cross.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Redemption and Equitable Mortgage

Villarica vs CAISSUE: Whether the public instrument of absolute sale between Villaricas and Consujis was an equitable mortgage
HELD: NO. (1) The price of P35,000 was not inadequate. (2) The vendors did not remain in possession of the land
sold as lessees or otherwise. 3) The option to buy is different from the right of repurchase which must be
reserved by the vendor, by stipulation in the contract of sale, pursuant to Article 1601 of the Civil Code.
Conventional redemption is when the vendor reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold. Such is not a right
granted to the vendor by the vendee in a subsequent instrument, but is reserved by the vendor in the same
instrument of sale as one of the stipulations of the contract. Once executed, the vendor can no longer reserve
the right to repurchase, and any right thereafter granted to him by the vendee in a separate instrument cannot
be a right of repurchase but some other right like the option to buy in this case. (4) Vendors paid taxes up to the
time of the sale. Taxes due after the sale were paid by the vendees.
Vda de Urbano The right to redeem ends on its expiry date and its exercise after the period is not redemption but a repurchase.
vs GSIS Distinction must be made. Redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept
redemption. Repurchase however of foreclosed property, after redemption period, imposes no such obligation.
After expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell the property but no law will compel him to do so. And, he is
not bound by the bid price; it is entirely within his discretion to set a higher price, for after all, the property
already belongs to him as owner. Urbanos are not entitled to repurchase as a matter of right. The Board exercised
its discretion in accordance with law in denying their requests. GSIS cannot be faulted for petitioners‟ failure to
repurchase as it acted upon petitioners‟application under the Operation Pabahay.” The sale of the subject
property to r dela Cruz cannot be annulled on Urbanos’ alleged right to repurchase.
Legaspi vs. CA Whether Legaspi validly exercised his right to repurchase the properties within the five-year period as stipulated?
Yes. He made a valid tender of payment which was seasonably exercised within the stipulated period, such being
made by offering personally the amount of P25,000 to Salcedo who refused to accept it, claiming that the money
was devalued. Tender of payment is the manifestation made by the debtor to the creditor of his desire to comply
with his obligation, with the offer of immediate performance. It is a preparatory act to consignation as an attempt
to make a private settlement. Here, it was enough that a sincere or genuine tender of payment and not a mock
or deceptive one was made. The act of depositing the repurchase money with the Clerk of Court was simply an
additional security for Legazpi. It was not an essential act that had to be performed after tender of payment was
refused by Salcedo. The deposit was a tender of payment as proven by evidence such as official receipt.
San Pedro vs. Equitable mortgage arises under Article 1602 when:
(1) the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Lee way of a mortgage. None of these requisites was proven. Court found insufficient San Pedro’s reliance on Article 1602,
paragraph 6, which provides “any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.” Witnesses’ testimonies and
documentary evidence shows the contract was indeed a sale. The “Kasulatan”, being a notarized document, carries
evidentiary weight, and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It cannot be concluded that the price at which the
property was sold, or about P8.70 per square meter, was grossly inadequate. Mere inadequacy of price would not be
sufficient. The price must be grossly inadequate, or purely shocking to the conscience.
Ramos vs. The contract is an equitable mortgage because the contract was executed merely as security for a loan of
Sarao P1,633,034.19. A letter to Sarao’s lawyer required Ramos to pay under the heading “House and Lot Loan” —to
enable Ramos to repurchase the property was a clear indication that the property was to be used as security for a
loan. The decisive factor to determine the nature of a contract is the parties’ intention—as shown by their
conduct, words, actions and deeds— prior to, during, and after executing the agreement. Even if a contract is
termed as pacto de retro, the owner of the property may still disprove it by means of parol evidence, provided
that the nature of the agreement is placed in issue by pleadings filed. A contract purporting to be a pacto de retro
is construed as an equitable mortgage when the terms of the document and the surrounding circumstances so
require. The presence of even just one of the requisites in ARTICLE 1602 of the Civil Code converts a contract to
an equitable mortgage.
The vendor a retro‟s failure to exercise the right of repurchase within the agreed time vests upon the vendee a
retro, by operation of law, absolute title to the property.
Roberts vs. W/N deed was an equitable mortgage
Papio HELD: NO. A contract is an equitable mortgage if (a) the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale;
and (b) the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. The decisive factor is the intention of the parties.
In an equitable mortgage, the mortgagor retains ownership over the property but subject to foreclosure and sale at public
auction upon failure of the mortgagor to pay his obligation. In a pacto de retro sale, ownership of the property sold is
immediately transferred to the vendee a retro subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase the property
upon compliance with legal requirements for the repurchase.
By insisting he had repurchased, Papio admitted that the deed was a deed of absolute sale and not an equitable mortgage;
he had acquired ownership over the property. He is estopped from asserting otherwise unless there is allegation and
evidence of palpable mistake or fraud by Roberts.
If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulations shall control.
Cadungog vs. The deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties. Here, Franklin Ong, the vendee a retro, had
Yap acquired absolute title and ownership over the six parcels of land when Cadungog, as vendor a retro, failed to
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

repurchase the same within the stipulated period. In a sale with pacto de retro, the title and ownership of the
property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by a
vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Franklin Ong was the lawful owner of the six parcels of land.
Cadungog had no right to mortgage or sell the same to Jocelyn.
Si vs. CA Here, the lot had already been partitioned when their parents executed 3 deeds of sales in favor of the brothers.
The co-ownership was terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer
available. Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership when ownership of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different
people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described. The
right of redemption of a co-owner under Article 1623 is inapplicable.
Jose Armada was found to be well informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo’s share in the land. Co-owners
with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice which is a formal requisite to make certain that
the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the
limited period of 30 days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time or afterwards, a
written notice of a fact already known to them, would be superfluous.
Calma vs. The requisites for the exercise of legal redemption are: (1) there must be co-ownership; (2) one of the co-owners sold his
Santos right to a stranger; (3) the sale was made before the partition of the co-owned property; (4) the right of redemption must
be exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of 30 days from the time he or they were notified in writing by the
co-owner vendor; and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed the price of the sale. The exception to the written notice is when
a co-owner has actual notice of the sale.
This situation does not fall within the exception. Calma’s admission of the existence of a lease, and of the obligation to pay
rent on the subject property belies the claim that Calma notified respondents of his purchase. They are entitled to redeem
the portions sold. Calma’s action for partition will not prosper, unless respondents fail to redeem the property sold.
Aguilar vs. Here, Senen and Virgilio Aguilar bought a house for the benefit of their late father, Maximiano.
Aguilar Senen sued for legal redemption against Virgilio and another brother, Angel, alleging that while he knows that
Virgilio sold his 1/2 share of the property to Angel, he (Senen) was not furnished any written notice of the sale.
The trial court dismissed this on the ground of laches, Senen incurring a delay of 7 years before asserting his right
to redeem the property in question.
SC: Senen’s redemption period prescribed and his complaint is barred by laches. Senen admits that he has actual
knowledge of the sale in 1989. A co-owner with actual notice of the sale is not entitled to a written notice for
such would be superfluous. As provided by Article 1623, he has within 30 days from such actual knowledge w to
exercise his right of redemption. He waited for 7 years before filing his complaint. Such unexplained delay is
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

equivalent to laches. By the time Senen filed for legal redemption, his right was no longer available to him. After a
property has been subdivided and distributed among co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no
longer right of pre-emption or redemption.
Salatandol vs. Court earlier ruled that Art. 1623 of the Civil Code clearly and expressly provides that the 30 days for making the
Retes pre-emption or redemption is counted from notice in writing by the vendor. The seller of an undivided interest is
in the best position to know his co-owners who under the law must be notified of the sale.
Here, Salatandols have not been furnished any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by Eufemia Omole, the
vendor. Their right to exercise the legal right of preemption or redemption, given to a co-owner when any one of
the other co-owners sells his share in the thing owned in common to a third person, as provided for in Article
1623 of the Civil Code, has not yet accrued.
But, the right of redemption or pre-emption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code can no longer be invoked by the
plaintiffs over the portion relating to Omole. The portion of Eufemia Omole as well as those of the plaintiffs
having been identified, co-ownership no longer exist.
Cabrera vs. Cabrera was duly notified of the sale of the share of the property.
Villanueva For more than ten years, Cabrera remained unperturbed that Villanueva was already registered as a co-owner. It
was only several years later when the value of the property considerably increased that she asserted her right to
redeem under Art. 1623. Cabrera has thus slept on her rights and is now estopped from questioning the sale’s
validity. The receipt of a copy of the TCT, indicating Villanueva as one of the co-owners, may even be regarded as
service of the written notice required by Art. 1623. Her right to redeem expired a long time ago. Villanueva’s
letter to Cabrera about buying a portion of the property is by ITSELF a written notice of the sale. Since the 30-day
period expired by 10/30/1980 without redemption being exercised, Cabrera lost her right of redemption.
Francisco vs. The law is clear. The written notification should come from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other
Boiser else. I want nobody, nobody but you. Hence, period has yet to run when Francisco received the May 30, 1992
letter. There was thus a return to the doctrine laid down in Butte.
Because of this case’s exceptional circumstances, however, Francisco’s receipt of summons in Civil Case No.
15510 on August 5, 1992 was deemed to constitute actual knowledge of the sale from which the 30-day period of
redemption commenced to run. Why? Court said it is clear that by not immediately notifying the co-owner, a
vendor can delay or even effectively prevent the meaningful exercise of the right of redemption. In the present
case, for instance, the sale took place in 1986, but it was kept secret until 1992 when vendee (Boiser) needed to
notify petitioner about the sale to demand 1/5 rentals from the property sold. xxx It is, therefore, unjust when
the subject sale has already been established before both lower courts and now, before this Court, to further
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

delay Francisco’s exercise of her right of legal redemption by requiring that. Thus, SC allowed the service of
summons to be held as notice. Francisco had until September 4, 1992 within which to exercise her right of legal
redemption, but on August 12, 1992 she deposited the P10,000 redemption price. As her exercise of the right was
timely, this should be given effect.
Etcuban vs CA CA held that Dominico Etcuban failed to avail himself of the right of legal redemption within the period provided
for by law. He now contends that vendors (his co-heirs) should be the ones to give him written notice and not the
vendees, Songalias.
Although a written notice is required by the law, it is equally true that the same Art. 1623 does not prescribe any
particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long as he is informed in
writing of the sale, the 30 days for redemption start running, and the redemptioner has no real cause to
complain. Here, where the vendors or co-owners of Ectuban stated under oath in the deeds of sale that notice of
sale had been given to prospective redemptioners in accordance with the law, there was substantial compliance
with the requirement of the law. Since the answer with counterclaim was filed on March 18, 1972, the deposit
made on May 27, 1974 was clearly outside the 30-day period of legal redemption. The period within which the
right of legal redemption or preemption may be exercised is non-extendible. Thus, Ectuban failed to substantially
comply with the requirements of Art. 1623 on legal redemption.

Recsission of Sale over Immovable Property

Iringan vs. CA Article 1592 which governs the sale of an immovable property requires the rescinding party to serve judicial or notarial
notice of his intent to resolve the contract, whether automatic rescission has been stipulated. The entitled party should
apply to the court for a decree of rescission. Such party cannot exercise the right solely on their own judgment that the
other committed a breach of the obligation. Palao’s letter did not rescind the contract but when he sued before the RTC, he
complied with the requirement of the law for judicial decree of rescission.
The applicable prescriptive period under Articles 1191 and 1592, is in Article 1144: the action upon a written contract
should be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. The suit was brought on July 1, 1991, or 6 years
after the default, well within the period for rescission. Thus, the contract of sale can still be validly rescinded.
Ocampo vs. CA Buyer Ocampo’s failure to pay the price in full within a fixed period does not bar the transfer of the ownership or
possession, much less dissolve the contract of sale. Under Art. 1592 of the Civil Code, the failure of Ocampo to
complete her payment of the purchase price within the stipulated period merely accorded Tolosa the option to
rescind the contract of sale upon judicial or notarial demand.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

However, the letter of 2 August 1977 claimed to have been sent by Tolosa to Ocampo rescinding the contract of
sale was defective because it was not notarized and, more importantly, it was not proven to have been received
by Ocampo.
Civil Case No. 12163 could not be considered a judicial demand under Art. 1592 of the Civil Code because it did
not pray for rescission. Although the complaint sought to cancel Ocampo’s adverse claim on Tolosa’s OCT and for
the refund of the payments made, these could not be equivalent to a rescission. Seeking discharge from
contractual obligations and an offer for restitution is not the same as abrogation of the contract. To rescind is
“[t]o declare a contract void in its inception and to put an end to it as though it never were.” It is “[n]ot merely to
terminate it and release parties from further obligations to each other but to abrogate it from the beginning and
restore parties to relative positions which they would have occupied had no contract ever been made.”

Hidden Defects

66. Autozentrum Alabang vs. Bernardo, Jr.

FACTS: Spouses Bernardo bought a 2008 BMW 320i sports car for P2,990,000 from Autozentrum Alabang, Inc. Months later, spouses
occasionally brought the car to BMW Autohaus, the service center of Asian Carmakers Corporation, to repair its brake system and steering
colum, electric warning, door lock, and air conditioning systems. One of the rear tires did not have Running Flat Technology (RFT). Bernardos
demanded Autozentrum to replace the car or refund their payment. Autozentrum said that the car was pre-owned or used. Spouses sued to DTI
which ruled that Autozentrum violated Consumer Act of the Philippines provisions on defective products and deceptive sales. CA upheld DTI’s
decision.

ISSUE: Whether Autozentrum provisions of the Consumer Welfare Act

HELD: Yes. Autozentrum committed deceptive sales when they sold a defective car and represented a secondhand car as brand new to Spouses
Bernardo, violating Section 50 of RA 7394. A seller’s act is deceptive when it represents to a consumer that a product is new, original or unused,
when in fact, it is deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed or secondhand. A representation is not confined to words or positive
assertions; it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an
undue advantage. Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due to
its inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false
representation.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Yet, it cannot be liable under Article 97 of RA 7394 because Bernardos failed to prove that Autozentrum is the manufacturer, producer, or
importer of the car and that damages were caused to them due to defects in design, manufacture, construction, etc.

Via DAO No. 007-06, DTI adjudication officer may impose penalties, even if not been prayed. To protect the consumer against deceptive or
unfair sales, DTI can impose restitution or rescission of the contract without damages and payment of administrative fines. Autozentrum having
possession of the car, it is proper to order the return to Bernardos the value of the car and to pay administrative fines.

Article 1484

Equitable Savings Bank vs Palces

Palces bought a Hyundai Starex GRX Jumbo via loan granted by Equitable Savings Bank for P1,196,100.00. She executed a Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage, stating payment in 36-monthly installments, that failure to pay any installments shall give bank the right to declare the entire
obligation due and payable and may foreclose the mortgage; or file collection suit. She failed to pay installments in January and February 2007.
The bank demanded for payment but was unheeded so they sued her for Recovery of Possession with Replevin. Palces argued she called the
bank on such delay and got consent from a bank officer; and that she paid P103,000 the next month. RTC and CA favored the bank.

ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in ordering the bank to return the P103,000 late installment payments of Palces.

HELD: YES. Article 1484 which governs the remedies of a vendor in default of payments in installments does not apply here. In this case, there
was no vendor-vendee relationship between Palces and the bank. Palces never bought the vehicle from the bank but from a third party, and
merely sought financing from the bank for its full purchase price. A loan contract with the accessory chattel mortgage contract - and not a
contract of sale of personal property in installments - was entered into by the parties.

Because of the stipulations of the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, foreclosure proceedings must commence over the vehicle pursuant
to the Chattel Mortgage Law and since the bank has regained possession of the vehicle. There is nothing in the Promissory Note that bars the
bank from receiving any late partial payments. The bank’s acceptance of late partial payments will only reduce her outstanding obligation from
P664,500.00 to P561,500.00. After foreclosure sale, proceeds are applied to the reduced amount of Palces' outstanding obligation, and the
excess of proceeds, if any, should be returned to her.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Redemption (again)

Estrella vs Francisco

FACTS: Lope Cristobal owned a 23,933 sq. m. parcel of agricultural in Bulacan. Estrella was the registered agricultural tenant-lessee of the subject
landholding. Cristobal sold the landholding to Priscilla Francisco for P500,000 without notifying Estrella. Upon discovering the sale, Estrella sent
them demand letters which were ignored. He filed a complaint for legal redemption, recovery, and maintenance of peaceful possession before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). DARAB reversed the PARAD’s decision and denied Estrella the right of redemption. Citing
Section 12 of the Code, the right of redemption may be exercised within 180 days from written notice of the sale. CA denied Estrella’s appeal.

ISSUE: Whether an agricultural tenant’s right of redemption over the landholding cannot prescribe when neither the lessor-seller nor the buyer
has given him written notice of the sale

HELD: YES, the lessee’s right of redemption will not prescribe if he is not served written notice of the sale. Vendees’ being served written notice
of the sale to the lessee and the DAR prevents the running of the 180-day redemption period, reckoned from written notice of sale.

BUT, while Estrella timely exercised his right of redemption, it was ineffective because he failed to consign or tender payment in court which is
required for a valid exercise of the right. The filing for redemption with PARAD suspends the running of the redemption period. This period
resumes if the petition is not resolved within 60 days. After the lapse of 60 days, Estrella’s 180-day redemption period began running pursuant
to Section 12 of the Code. A tenant’s failure to such upon filing redemption suit can be cured by consigning payment with the court within the
remaining prescriptive period. Unfortunately, even after the lapse of 240 days, he failed to consign or pay the redemption price. Court found
that he, being declared twice as pauper litigant, appears to be unable to pay the full price.

Assignment of Credit

LIAM vs UCPB

Liam entered into a contract to sell with Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) to buy a condo unit. PPGI obtained a loan from UCPB and
partially settled its loan by transferring to UCPB its right to collect all receivables from filed a Complaint for specific performance before the
HLURB against PPGI and UCPB. UCPB maintained that it is merely a creditor of PPGI and only acquired PPGI’s right to collect its receivables from
Liam and other condominium buyers.

ISSUE: Can UCPB being assigned creditor of PPGI be compelled to deliver the condo unit to Liam?
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

HELD: NO. The transaction between UCPB and PPGI was an assignment of credit and not subrogation. An assignment of credit is the process of
transferring the right of the assignor to the assignee who would then have the right to proceed against the debtor. Subrogation is a process by
which the third party pays the obligation of the debtor to the creditor with the latter’s consent. The paying third party steps into the shoes of the
original creditor as subrogee of the latter. As a mere assignee, UCPB cannot be impleaded in Liam’s complaint for specific performance. UCPB
was merely assigned the receivables; there is no ground to hold UCPB solidarily liable with PPGI. UCPB should not be held liable for the
obligations and liabilities of PPGI under its contract to sell with Liam, considering that the bank is a mere assignee of the rights and receivables
under the Agreement it executed with PPGI.

White Marketing vs Grandwood

FACTS: Grandwood Furniture & Woodwork, Inc. obtained a loan of P40,000,000.00 from Metrobank. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land. Metrobank sold its rights and interests over the loan and REM to ARC which then assigned the same rights and
interests to CGAM3. Grandwood failed to pay the loan and property was foreclosed. In the Auction Sale, White Marketing acquired the property
as highest bidder. RTC denied Grandwood’s petition for redemption, saying that the redemption period applicable in the mortgage was Section
478 of R.A. No. 8791 or the “General Banking Law of 2000”; that Grandwood should have redeemed the property before registration of the sale
on September 30, 2013. CA reversed saying that said law applied only in cases of foreclosure by a mortgagee bank to provide remedies to banks
in case of unpaid debts or loans. Grandwood argued that White Marketing could not enjoy R.A. No. 8791 on the redemption period because it
was not a banking institution. White Marketing contends it acquired all the rights of Metrobank.

ISSUE: WHETHER SEC. 47 of R.A. NO. 8791 OR THE GENERAL BANKING LAW IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.

HELD: YES. White Marketing stepped into the shoes of Metrobank. In an assignment of credit, the assignee is subrogated to the rights of the
original creditor, such that he acquires the power to enforce it, to the same extent as the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor. The
new creditor is entitled to the rights and remedies available to the previous creditor, and includes accessory rights such as mortgage or pledge.
Thus, ARC and its assignees or successors-in-interest after like White Marketing acquired all the rights, benefits and obligations of Metrobank
under its mortgage contract with Grandwood. Grandwood’s redemption lapsed as it was done after the certificate of sale was registered on
September 30, 2013. Pursuant to Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791, it only had 3 months from foreclosure or before the registration of the certificate
of foreclosure sale, whichever came first, to redeem the property sole in the extrajudicial sale.

Albano vs. Ravanes

LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

FACTS: Mena Ravanes married to d Roberto Ravanes is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Caniogan, Pasig. A two-storey residential
house of petitioners stands on a part of the property. Heirs leased the property from Mena with the agreement that they will vacate it when the
latter and her family would need to use it. They refused to vacate when needed. Ejectment suit followed with Ravanes using as ground Section
5(c) of BP 877. Spouses said they need the property to build their daughter’s conjugal home. Heirs alleged among others that spouses handed
them the notice to vacate only on June 15, 2000, demanding them to vacate on or before July 13, 2000. Thus, they were given only a 28-day
notice, which was short of the 3-month notice requirement under BP 877.

ISSUE: What is the nature of the lease between Ravanes and Albanos? Did the spouses complied with Section 5(c) of BP 877.

HELD: I. The lease, although merely verbal, is deemed to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month. It is on a month-
to-month basis because the rentals are paid monthly. No specific period for the duration of the lease was agreed upon. Nonetheless, payment of
the stipulated rents was made on a monthly basis and, as such, the period of lease is considered to be from month to month in accordance with
Article 1687 of the Civil Code. A lease from month-to-month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each
month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.

II. Yes. The “formal notice” requirement under (BP) Blg. 877 does not refer to a written notice only. In Garcia v. CA, verbal demand to vacate
complies with the 3-month notice requirement. Soon after the sale, spouses wrote to Albano to vacate. After this and other demands were
ignored, he again made a demand in 1982. After this last demand was again ignored, he brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman who
sent summons to Albano, who, not only ignored it but also refused to accept it when served upon him. An ejectment suit was filed before the
MTC on December 7, 1982, or four months after his verbal demand on August 7, 1982. Thus, even disregarding the previous demands soon after
the sale, spouses had complied with the requirement of three-month notice.

NATIONAL INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs De Los Angeles

FACTS: Spouses Basilisa Roque and Francisco Bautista and other respondents sold several lots to Araceli W. Vda. de Del Rosario. After registering
the lots in her name, she mortgaged them to the PCIB. She failed to complete payment of the purchase price. RTC directed the rescission of the
contracts of sale and the reconveyance of the lots but such be without prejudice to the rights of the PCIB which was adjudged as a mortagree in
good faith. PCIB foreclosed its mortgage on the lots. It was the highest bidder in the auction sale. It assigned its mortgage rights and highest
bidder rights over the lots to NIDC.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Respondents alleged del Rosario had negotiated a loan with the NIDC by virtue of which the latter assumed the payment of, and did pay, del
Rosario’s mortgage indebtedness to PCIB. Since there was no privity of contract between them and del Rosario and the PCIB concerning the said
indebtedness, the mortgage lien of the PCIB over the lots subject of their motion was thereby discharged.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid assignment of credit

HELD: Yes. A valid assignment, binding upon the respondents, has been made by the PCIB to the NIDC of its mortgage rights as well as its rights
as purchaser of the lots. Nothing in law prohibits a creditor without the consent of the debtor from making an assignment of his credit and
accessory rights. An assignment of credit and its accessory rights does not obliterate the obligation of the debtor to pay, but merely puts the
assignee in the place of his assignor. Article 1634 of the new Civil Code recognizes that credits and other incorporeal rights in litigation may be
assigned pendente lite. There, the debtor may extinguish his obligation by making appropriate reimbursement to the assignee. An assignment of
credit pendente lite does not extinguish the credit or assigned accessory rights. It simply changes the bag into which the debtor must empty his
money in payment.

Teoco vs. Metrobank

FACTS: brothers Bienvenido Teoco and Juan Teoco, Jr. and Metrobank

Ramon Co mortgaged the said parcels of land to Metrobank for P200,000. Metrobank bought the land in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Ramon
Co failed to redeem it within the one year period. Metrobank filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession against Cos. Since Cos were no
longer residing in the Philippines, Metrobank was ordered to effect summons by publication against the Cos. Teocos alleged they are the
successors-in-interest of the Cos, and that they had duly redeemed the properties within the reglementary period and prayed for the petition’s
dismissal.

Metrobank alleged among others that assignment of the right of redemption by the Spouses Co in favor of the Teocos was not properly
executed, lacking necessary authentication from the Philippine Embassy.

ISSUE: Whether Brothers Teoco have sufficiently shown that the Spouses Co’s right of redemption was properly transferred to them

HELD: The Brothers Teoco may be brothers-in-law only of Ramon Co, but they are also the Brothers of Lydia Teoco Co, who is actually the
registered owner of the properties. Brothers Teoco are two of the persons referred to in the document of transfer of the right of redemption
executed by the Spouses Co.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Court interpreted the phrase “effect as against a third person” in Article 1625 of the Civil Code as to be damage or prejudice to such third
person. Metrobank would not be prejudiced by the assignment by Cos of their right of redemption to Teocos. Assignees would merely step into
the shoes of the assignors, Co. Teocos would have to comply with all the requirements imposed by law on the Spouses. Metrobank would not
lose any security for the satisfaction of any loan obtained from it by the Spouses Co. Such assignment would even be beneficial to Metrobank, as
it can foreclose on the subject properties anew, provided it proves that the subsequent loans entered into by the Spouses Co are covered by the
mortgage contract.

Licaros vs Gatmaitan

FACTS: Filipino businessman Abelardo Licaros had difficulty in retrieving investments he has with Anglo-Asean Bank, a private bank registered
under the laws of the Republic of Vanuatu. He executed a memorandum of agreement with Antonio P. Gatmaitan, a banker and investment
manager, to assume payment of Anglo-Asean’s indebtedness to Licaros. Gatmaitan executed a promissory note to this effect. Because of his
inability to collect from Anglo-Asean, Gatmaitan did not make good his promise to pay Licaros the amount stated in his promissory note. Licaros
filed complaint ordering Gatmaitan to pay him.

ISSUE: Whether the MOA between Licaros and Gatmaitan is one of assignment of credit or one of conventional subrogation

Whether Gatmaitan became liable to Licaros under the promissory note considering that its efficacy is dependent on the MoA, the note being
merely an annex to the MOA

HELD: The Memorandum of Agreement was in the nature of a conventional subrogation which requires the consent of the debtor, Anglo-Asean
Bank, for its validity. The fact that AngloAsean Bank did not give consent rendered the agreement inoperative. What the law requires in an
assignment of credit is not the consent of the debtor but merely notice to him as the assignment takes effect only from the time he has
knowledge thereof; Conventional subrogation requires an agreement among the three parties concerned—the original creditor, the debtor and
the new creditor, pursuant to Article 1301 of the Civil Code. Hence, Gatmaitan cannot be held liable under the promissory note which was
deemed never to have been operative.

---------------------------------------------------------

An assignment of credit has been defined as the process of transferring the right of the assignor to the assignee who would then have the right
to proceed against the debtor. The assignment may be done gratuitously or onerously, in which case, the assignment has an effect similar to that
of a sale. On the other hand, subrogation has beendefined as the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

in all his rights. It may either be legal or conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by operation of law
because of certain acts. Conventional subrogation is that which takes place by agreement of parties.

TRCDC vs Fausto

Tanay Recreation Center and Development Corp. (TRCDC) is the lessee of a land in Sitio Gayas, Tanay, Rizal, owned by Catalina Matienzo Fausto.
On this property stands the Tanay Coliseum Cockpit of TRCDC. The lease contract provides that TRCDC has "priority right" to purchase it. TRCDC
intended to renew the lease but they were asked to remove the improvements built, as Fauto’s daughter is the new owner of the property.
TRCDC sued for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Specific Performance with Damages, and Injunction. Fausto argues TRCDC is estopped from assailing
the deed’s validity as it acknowledged her ownership when it asked for lease renewal. RTC extended the lease for another 7 years and dismissed
TRCDC's claims. In affirming, CA acknowledged the TRCDC’s priority right to purchase, but said such right applies only in case the property is sold
to strangers and not to Fausto's relative.

ISSUE: Whether Fausto erred in not respecting the Right of First Refusal of TRCDC

When a lease contract contains a right of first refusal, the lessor is under a legal duty to the lessee not to sell to anybody at any price until after
he has made an offer to sell to the latter at a certain price and the lessee has failed to accept it. As in this case where section 7 of the lease
contract provided, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon.

A right of first refusal means identity of terms and conditions to be offered to the lessee and all other prospective buyers and a contract of sale
entered into in violation of a right of first refusal of another person, while valid, is rescissible.

The basis of the right of the first refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to purchase of any prospective buyer.

LEASE

Riviera Filipina vs. Reyes:

Riviera Filipina sued Juan L. Reyes, and others to transfer title of a 1,018 square meter parcel of land along EDSA, Quezon City for alleged
violation of Riviera’s right of first refusal. Since the loan with Prudential Bank remained unpaid upon maturity, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

the mortgage and emerged as highest bidder. Reyes offered to sell the property to Riviera at P5,000/sqm but Riviera bargained it to P3,500/sqm.
Later, Riviera offered to buy it at P4,000/sqm but Reyes asked this time for P6,000/sqm. Riviera increased its offer to P5,000/sqm but Reyes did
not accede. Realizing that he could not redeem the subject property, Reyes sold it to Cypress and Cornhill at P5,300 per sqm.

ISSUE: Did Riviera Filipina lose its Right of First Refusal?

YES. A right of first refusal means identity of terms and conditions to be offered to the lessee and all other prospective buyers and a contract of
sale entered into in violation of a right of first refusal of another person, while valid, is rescissible. But in interpreting contracts, the intention of
the parties shall be primarily considered and in case of doubt, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

Reyes and Riviera interpreted the lease provision "right of first refusal" to mean simply that should the lessor Reyes decide to sell the leased
property during the term of the lease, such sale should first be offered to lessee Riviera. This happened. And that is what exactly ensued
between Reyes and Riviera, a series of negotiations on the price per square meter of the subject property with neither party, especially Riviera,
unwilling to budge from his offer, as evidenced by the exchange of letters between the two contenders.

Riviera cannot now be heard that had it been informed of the offer of P5,300 of Cypress and Cornhill it would have matched said price. Its
stubborn approach in its negotiations with Reyes showed crystal-clear that there was never any need to disclose such information and doing so
would be just a futile effort on the part of Reyes.

Reyes was under no obligation to disclose the same. Pursuant to Article 1339 of the New Civil Code, silence or concealment, by itself, does not
constitute fraud, unless there is a special duty to disclose certain facts, or unless according to good faith and the usages of commerce the
communication should be made. Applied here is general rule since Riviera failed to convincingly show that either of the exceptions are relevant
to the case at bar.

Limbauan vs. Acosta

FACTS: Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant portion of the Tala Estate and built his house thereon. Paulino Calanday took possession of
the said property without the consent of Faustino. Paulino conveyed the beerhouse to Juanita Roces who entered into an oral contract of lease
over the parcel of land. Juanita conveyed the beerhouse to her nephew, Charles Limbauan, who assumed the lease. He stopped paying rentals
claiming that, since the property was government property, Faustino had no right to lease the same and collect the rentals. Congress enacted a
law converting a portion of the Estate for housing site for DOH employees. Faustino sued Charles with the Lupon for ejectment and demanded
him to vacate. Faustino later sued for unlawful detainer.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

ISSUE: Did the court have jurisdiction to try the ejectment suit?

HELD: The demand to pay rent and vacate is necessary if the action for unlawful detainer is anchored on the non-payment of rentals, as in the
instant case. For the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or to comply with
the conditions of the lease and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2,
particularly, 15 days in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for
unlawful detainer while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. Acosta
clearly satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand to vacate within the period set by the rules. The MTC validly acquired jurisdiction
over both the original complaint and the amended complaint.

Irao vs. By the Bay

By The Bay alleged that its lease contract had not been terminated because the lessor’s demand letter was merely a demand to pay the rental
arrears, without a notice to terminate contract, hence, it "has the right to occupy until June 30, 2007," the expiry date; and that, Irao’s taking
over the possession of the leased premises was illegal. MeTC dismissed it, because by its failure to pay monthly rentals, By the Bay "violated its
contractual obligations." RTC affirmed. CA ruled that By the Bay’s eviction was improper. While the contract provided that [i]n case of default,
the parties stipulated that the lessor (or authorized representative) could take over the physical possession of the premises ‘without resorting to
court action,’ [t]his empowerment, however, comes into play only ‘after due notice has been given to the LESSEE of the lease cancellation.

ISSUE: Whether the lessor’s demand letter contains a notice of termination of the lease contract and a demand to vacate the leased premises to
justify the taking over of possession thereof by the lessor and/or its representative

HELD: YES. In the letter, the lessor demanded the full payment of its unpaid rentals of ₱2.5 Million within five days from notice. The phrase
"otherwise we shall be constrained, much to our regret" in the letter sends a clear warning that failure to settle the amount within the stated
period would constrain the lessor to "terminate [the] Contract of Lease" and "take the necessary legal measures against [respondent] to protect
[its] interest without further notice."

Notice or demand to vacate does not have to expressly use the word "vacate," as it suffices that the demand letter puts the lessee or occupant
on notice that if he does not pay the rentals demanded or comply with the terms of the lease contract, it should move out of the leased
premises.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Court sustained the validity of a lease agreement empowering the sub-lessor to take possession of the leased premises, in case the sub-lessee
fails "to comply with any of the terms and conditions" of the contract "without necessity of resorting to court action," held that the stipulation
was valid.

Racaza vs. Gozum

Racaza and Paras co-owned a parcel of land in Pasig City. Ernesto Gozum monthly rented the back portion and continued to occupy it even after
the death of Carlos Torres. Sisters sent Gozum a letter of demand to vacate on July 1, 1995. Almost 2 years after ejectment suit’s dismissal,
plaintiffs sent another demand letter to vacate on the ground that the verbal contract of lease over the property had already expired sometime
in July 1995, and the same has not been renewed and since then, Gozum discontinued paying the monthly rentals. Unheeded, recovery of
possession was initiated before RTC Pasig City. Gozum argues he has a 10-year contract of lease which expires on September 30, 1999 and so,
the notice to vacate and case were premature. CA reversed RTC decision, dismissing the suit.

ISSUE: Whether sisters should have filed an action for unlawful detainer instead with the metropolitan or municipal trial courts.

Demand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement when the action is based on expiration of the lease. Any notice given would only
negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the lease. The law requires notice to be served only when the action is
due to the lessee’s failure to pay or failure to comply with the lease’s conditions. The one-year period is thus counted from the date of first
dispossession. The allegation that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is equal to saying that the lease expired every month. Since the
lease already expired mid-year in 1995 as communicated in sisters’ letter on July 1, 1995, at that time, Gozum’s occupancy became unlawful.

By Gozum’s own claim, the term of the alleged written lease contract expired on September 30, 1999 or several months before CA’s decision
was rendered. This material fact should have been considered as this is binding upon Gozum and is an admission mooting the issue of who has
better right of possession.

Leonin vs. CA

Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, Evangeline and Pepito Leonin, to occupy Apartment C without paying rent. GSIS foreclosed the
mortgage and the property was sold at public auction. Prospero’s brother, Teofilo, redeemed the property. He later sold it to his daughter,
Germaine Leonin. After Teofilo’s death, Germaine sent a letter to vacate to her father’s siblings asking as their occupation was by mere tolerance
and required them to enter a lease with her. This was unheeded. She sent another letter to vacate within 30 days from July 3, 1995, failing which
she would file a complaint for unlawful detainer. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision that MeTC had jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, it
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

having been filed within one year from her October 24, 1996 letter of demand; that Germaine acquired title to the property to entitle her to
possess it; and that the pendency of the annulment case did not deprive the MeTC of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.

ISSUES: I. whether the MeTC had jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, and 2) whether Germaine had the right to possess the property

HELD: YES. sThe allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, Germaine alleged that she is the registered owner of
the property and that Leonins, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate despite the notice sent. The one-year period for filing a
complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, because the lessor has the right to
waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. The filing of the complaint on
February 25, 1997 was well within the one year reglementary period. Germaine has the right to possess the property upon the execution of a
deed of absolute sale and the issuance of a transfer of certificate of title in her favor. Petitioners’ occupation of the property was on mere
tolerance of the former owners. When they failed to heed Germaine’s demand to vacate, they had become deforciant occupants. Pending action
for declaration of nullity of Germaine’s deed of sale and title does not abate an ejectment case.

Guda vs. Leynes

Spouses Peralta leased their residential house to Spouses Guda for 1 year, and that thereafter, unless terminated by notice at least 30 days
before expiration date, the agreement would be deemed renewed on a month-to-month basis. It also provided a right of first refusal to Gudas.
On 14 May 1988, Gudas continued to occupy the premises and pay rent. Almost 3 years later, Peraltas sold the property to Alan A. Leynes.
Gudas contend that when lessors did not give notice to terminate the lease 30 days at least before its expiration date and instead allowed
lessees to occupy the premises, all the terms thereof, including the provision granting them first option to buy, were automatically revived and
that the sale of the property to Leynes without giving them opportunity to exercise the option made the sale void.

ISSUE: Are all terms and conditions of the lease revived when lessors allowed Gudas to occupy the house?

The contract of lease allowed the lessees to continue with their occupancy on a month-to-month basis after its termination on 14 May 1988 if no
notice of such termination were given by the lessor at least thirty days before the expiry date. The renewal clause is valid but the contract itself is
not renewed until after notice or positive act is made to indicate its exercise by the parties. The juridical relation between the parties, constrained
by the continued enjoyment of the leased premises, is one of an implied lease. Article 1670 of the Civil Code is thus apropos; it provides:
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

"If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless
a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the
original contract, but for the time established in articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.”

The terms of the original contract carried over to the implied new lease cover only those terms that are germane to the lessees’ enjoyment of the
premises, such as the rent and terms of payment.

"If the presumed will of the parties refers to the enjoyment of possession the presumption covers the other terms of the contract related to such
possession, such as the amount of rental, the date when it must be paid, the care of the property, the responsibility for repairs, etc. But no such
presumption may be indulged in with respect to special agreements which by nature are foreign to the right of occupancy or enjoyment inherent
in a contract of lease."

Quite significantly, the option granted to petitioners would appear to have, in fact, been abrogated when the 1987 contract of lease was
ultimately superseded by an agreement executed on 22 April 1991.

The clear and unmistakable terms of Emily Guda’s letter, however, indicated the contrary as plaintiff-appellee Emily Guda therein acknowledged,
understood and accepted the fact that the first option to buy, or rather, the right of first refusal granted to them under the Contract of Sale, is
no longer subsisting or in force at the time when she and Haydee Peralta earlier agreed in writing for a new extended lease made subject to the
condition that once the property is sold to another, they will have [to] vacate the premises within one (1) month’s notice.

The clear terms of Emily Guda’s letter acknowledged and accepted that their first option to buy, under the Contract of Sale, is no longer subsisting
or in force at the time when she and Haydee Peralta earlier agreed in writing for a new extended lease made subject to the condition that once
the property is sold to another, they will have [to] vacate the premises within one (1) month’s notice.

With the Contract of Lease dated May 8, 1987 having been validly terminated and superseded by a new written agreement dated April 22, 1991
which also reiterated a month-to-month lease in force between the parties, the trial court thus erred in declaring that defendants-appellants
Manuel and Haydee Peralta violated the provisions of the Contract of Lease in selling the leased property to defendant-appellant Alan A. Leynes.

With the 1987 Contract of Lease validly terminated and superseded by a new written agreement in 1991 reiterating a month-to-month lease in
force, the trial court erred in declaring that Peraltas violated the provisions of the Contract of Lease in selling the leased property to Leynes.

FACTS: GMC leased a space of their building to CAMI with further stipulation among others that the property shall be used exclusively by CAMI
as vehicle garage and repair shop. GMC said CAMI violated the contract when CAMI subleased a portion and introduced improvements without
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

GMC’s consent; and c) CAMI did not deliver the required advance rental and deposit upon the execution of the lease contract. GMC sent CAMI a
letter terminating the lease contract and demanding that CAMI vacate the premises and settle all its unpaid accounts before the end of that
month. GMC won an unlawful detainer case with the MTCC against CAMI. RTC reversed this while CA reinstated MTCC decision.

ISSUE: whether GMC had complied with the requisites of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court prior to the filing of the unlawful detainer
complaint

HELD: GMC did not fully comply with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 70. Technically, no extrajudicial rescission effectively took place as a
result of the cited violations until the demand to pay or comply was duly served and was rejected or disregarded by the lessee. These actions
gave GMC no effective cause of action to judicially demand CAMI’s ejectment. It is only after the demands for payment or compliance are made
on the lessee and subsequently rejected or ignored that the basis for the unlawful detainer action arises. GMC’s letter merely informed CAMI
that GMC had terminated the lease based on the cited violations of the terms of the lease, and required CAMI to vacate. The letter DID NOT
demand compliance with the lease’s terms. Before filing such action, it is required that lessor demand lessee to pay or comply with the lease’s
conditions and to vacate. Mere failure to pay the rents or violation of terms does not automatically render possession as unlawful. Giving such
demands must be alleged in the complaint before MTC can acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Nakpil and Sons vs. CA

FACTS: In the early morning of August 2, 1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and the Philippine Bar Association’s building sustained
major damage. PBA sued United Construction, Inc. and Juan F. Nakpil & Sons for damages arising from the partial collapse of the building which
was recently completed in June, 1966. Lower court found the defendants liable for damages.

ISSUE: Whether defendants are liable

HELD: To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an “act of God,’ the following
must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either
unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

Both contractor and architect are liable for damages sustained by the building that collapsed due to the earthquake for making substantial
deviations from plans and specifications, failing to observe requisite workmanship in construction, and making plans that contain defects and
inadequacies.
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Fact that all other buildings withstood the earthquake, except this one, cannot be ignored. One who creates a dangerous condition cannot
escape liability although an act of God may have intervened. There was gross negligence and evident bad faith, without which damage would
not have occurred. Liability of architect and contractor for collapse of building is solidary.

Republic Act No. 9653 Rent Control Act of 2009".

Section 5. Coverage of this Act. - All residential units in the National Capital Region and other highly urbanized cities, the total monthly rent
for each of which ranges from One peso (P1.00) to Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and all residential units in all other areas, the total
monthly rent for each of which ranges from One peso (P1.00) to Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as of the effectivity date of this Act shall
be covered, without prejudice to existing contracts.

Section 8. Assignment of Lease or Subleasing. - Assignment of lease or subleasing of the whole or any portion of the residential unit,
including the acceptance of boarders or bedspacers, without the written consent of the owner/lessor is prohibited.

Section 9. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. - Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:

Assignment of lease or subleasing of residential units in whole or in part, including the acceptance of boarders or bedspaces, without the
written consent of the owner/lessor;

Arrears in payment of rent for a total of three (3) months: Provided, That in the case of refusal by the lessor to accept payment of the rent
agreed upon, the lessee may either deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in court, or with the city or municipal treasurer, as the case
may be, or barangay chairman, or in a bank in the name of and with notice to the lessor, within one (1) month after the refusal of the lessor
to accept payment.

The lessee shall thereafter deposit the rent within ten (10) days of every current month. Failure to deposit the rent for three (3) months shall
constitute a ground for ejectment.

The lessor, upon authority of the court in case of consignation or upon joint affidavit by him and the lessee to be submitted to the city or
municipal treasurer or barangay chairman and to the bank where deposit was made, shall be allowed to withdraw the deposits;

Legitimate need of the owner/lessor to repossess his or her property for his or her own use of for the use of an immediate member of his or
her family as a residential unit: Provided, however, That the lease for a definite period has expired: Provided, further, That the lessor has
given the lessee the formal notice three (3) months in advance of the lessor's intention to repossess the property and: Provided, finally,
That the owner/lessor is prohibited from leasing the residential unit or allowing its use by a third party for a period of at least one (1) year
from the time of repossession;
LAW 2-A ANTI KUPAL (NOT RED-GELO) NOTES

Need of the lessor to make necessary repairs of the leased premises which is the subject of an existing order of condemnation by
appropriate authorities concerned in order to make the said premises safe and habitable: Provided, That after said repair, the lessee
ejected shall have the first preference to lease the same premises: Provided, further, That the new rent shall be reasonably commensurate
with the expenses incurred for the repair of the said residential unit and: Provided, finally, That if the residential unit is condemned or
completely demolished, the lease of the new building will no longer be subject to the aforementioned first preference rule in this subsection;
and

Expiration of the period of the lease contract.

Section 10. Prohibition Against Ejectment by Reason of Sale or Mortgage. - No lessor or his successor-in-interest shall be entitled to eject
the lessee upon the ground that the leased premises have been sold or mortgaged to a third person regardless of whether the lease or
mortgage is registered or not.

Section 12. Application of the Civil Code and Rules of Court of the Philippines. - Except when the lease is for a definite period, the
provision of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, insofar as they refer to residential units covered by this Act,
shall be suspended during the effectivity of this Act, but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court on lease contracts, insofar
as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall apply.