G.R. No.

131457 August 19, 1999

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, et. Al. vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, et. al

FACTS:

This resolves the pending incidents, namely, respondents' and intervenors' separate motions for reconsideration of our
Resolution dated November 17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this Court En banc.

Respondents and intervenors jointly argue that the Court’s Resolution dated November 17, 1998, wherein It voted two-two on
the separate motions for reconsideration of Its earlier Decision or April 24, 1998, as a result of which the Decision was
deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been
referred to the Court sitting en banc.

Respondents and intervenors also assail the Court’s Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein the Court noted without
action the intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc" filed on
December 3, 1998 considering that the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the Court after their
motion for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the April 24, 1998 Decision.

In their respective motions for reconsideration, respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to this Court en
banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were
resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met, relying on the following
constitutional provision, Article VIII, Section 4(3):
 Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence
of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc

HELD:

No. A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction
between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters, which include
motions, are "resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to
"matters", applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision
whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the
aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted provision pertains to
the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case
then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not
leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to
muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is
lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in
the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier motions for reconsideration
of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed.
Foregoing considered, relevant incidents are all DENIED with FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or paper will be
entertained in this case.
G.R. NO. 157903 October 11, 2007
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
v.
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, Represented by his Assignee, JOSEFINA LUBRICA, Respondent.

Facts: Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro with a total area of 3,682.0285
hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948.1911 hectares of Suntay‘s land pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27. Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare,
for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68. Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for determination of just
compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Region IV, DARAB, docketed as
DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00. After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD rendered a decision fixing the total
just compensation for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration, but RARAD
denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in the RTC (Branch 46)
in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court, impleading Suntay and RARAD. The petition essentially
prayed that the total just compensation for the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion to
dismiss mainly on the ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section
11, Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to
the CA, which sustained the dismissal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank‘s petition for the determination of just compensation.

HELD: The Court has declared that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation under Republic
Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL) pertains to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a Special
Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being
contrary to the CARL; and that what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this
question. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank‘s petition. It bears stressing that the petition is not an appeal
from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination of the just compensation for respondent‘s
expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction.

The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657, as summarized in Landbank v. Banal,
is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform
and the compensation to be paid for their taking under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The
DAR, relying on the Land Bank‘s determination of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer through a
notice sent to the landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase price of the land
after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government. In case the
landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may
bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. In
determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.
Ariel T. Lim, Petitioner G.R. No. 190834
V
People of the Philippines November 26, 2014

FACTS:

Ariel T. Lim issued checks to Magna B. Badiee to apply on account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK NOs.
0013814 and 0013813 payable to cash in the amount of P100,000.00 each. The Petitioner knowing fully well that at the time
of issue he did not have sufficient funds. Lim was not able to arrange payments with Baddie within five banking days after
receiving notice of the said error. Although, Lim was able to give the full payment for the materials after a lapse of more than
one month.

The MeTC promulgated its decision finding Petitioner guilty of 2 counts of violation of B.P Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to RTC
and the RTC set aside the decisions of the lower court for lack of jurisdiction (Criminal case No. 327138). On Criminal Case
No. 327139 the decision was affirmed.

A petition for review was then filed with the CA and the CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the criminal case against him
on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before the Informations against him were filed
incourt.

ISSUE:
Whether the Petitioner is still liable for violation of BP. Blg. 22, even he has fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks
even before the informations against him were filed.

HELD:

No, the court finds the petition meritorious

While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless
checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find
if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When
the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is
especially so in this case where a debtor’s criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The
creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals,
viaauction sale, we find that holding the debtor’s president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said
collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two
years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be
validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22

It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the application of the
penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law

The decision of CA is set aside and the petitioner is acquitted.

Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado V. HRET and Philip Arreza Pichay

G.R. No. 219603 January 26, 2016

Facts:

Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First LegislativeDistrict of Surigao del Sur.

Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the
Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. She argued
that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse.

Pichay claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He contended that he did not personally perform the
acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing
company.

On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected Member of
the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition
for quo warranto before the HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of Representatives
because: (1) he was convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two
years have passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the penalty imposed on him.
HRET held that Pichay did not participated the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with his duty as
the president of the publishing company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET concluded that Pichay’s conviction for libel
did not involve moral turpitude.

Issue:

W/N the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay
for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude

Ruling:

A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the
Omnibus ElectionCode:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty
of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, the Court
found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether
they were false or not. The fact that another libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be considered
as further evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm. He committed an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow men, or society
in general,” and an act which is “contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals

The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation as publisher of the libelous articles. One who
furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees
whom he selects and control s may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and should be held responsible
therefor, whether he was individually concerned in the publication or not.

Accordingly, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to
disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the
day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes.
G.R. No. 184397
ROSALINDA G. PAREDES, Petitioner,
vs.
FEED THE CHILDREN PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or DR. VIRGINIA LAO, HERCULES PARADIANG and
BENJAMIN ESCOBIA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the National Director of FTCP. complaints were filed against her by 42 employees questioning
her leadership. Petitioner learned from Atty. Chatto that Program Manager Primitivo Fostanes and his co-
employees prepared a petition questioning her leadership and management of FTCP. She was only allowed to join
the meeting after three hours. The Board resolved to suspend petitioner because of her indifferent attitude and
unjustified refusal to submit to an audit. Before it could be implemented, respondent FTCP received her resignation
letter and stated that she will be working Up unti Dec. 31,2005. The board accepted but moved its effectivity to
Nov. 30, 2005.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal because the FTCP made employment for her virtually
impossible. The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents but on appeal by the petitioner, the ruling of the LA
was reversed and set aside by the NLRC. The respondents then appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of
the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether The CA can entertain cases involving question of facts already passed upon by the NLRC.
HELD:

YES. It is elementary that this Court is not a trier of facts, and only errors of law are generally reviewed in
petitions for review on certiorari. Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials' findings rest. As such, the findings of facts and
conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality
and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence

However, if the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are conflicting, as in this case, the reviewing
court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings. The exception, rather than the
general rule, applies in the present case since the LA and the CA found facts supporting the conclusion that
petitioner was not constructively dismissed, while the NLRC’s factual findings contradicted the LA’s findings
 G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick. Their relationship became sour then Grande left
for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for
Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio the court granted [Antonio’s] prayer for
recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. Grande then filed an appeal with the CA who granted to
the petitioner the sole custody to the children but directed the RTC to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.

On her appeal to the SC she argued that Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA)
9255, couched as it is in permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
ISSUE: Whether the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation.

HELD: NO. “However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register” . Art. 176 gives
illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children

The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion17 upon the illegitimate children
DENR v. United Planners Inc.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) v. UNITED PLANNERS

CONSULTANTS , INC.,
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015

FACTS:
 July 26, 1993 - Petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau (LMB), entered into an Agreement for
Consultancy Services (Consultancy Agreement) with respondent United Planners Consultants, Inc. in
connection with the LMB’s Land Resource Management Master Plan Project (LRMMP). Under the
Consultancy Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total contract price of P4,337,141.00, based on a
predetermined percentage corresponding to the particular stage of work accomplished.
 December 1994 - Respondent completed the work required, which petitioner formally accepted on
December 27, 1994. However, petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the total contract price in the amount
of P2,038,456.30.
 October 25, 1994 - The Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical Services Office Report (TSO)
finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14% excessive. This notwithstanding, petitioner, in a
letter dated December 10, 1998, acknowledged its liability to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60
and assured payment at the soonest possible time.
 For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated demands, respondent
instituted a Complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Due to the
 existence of Arbitration clause, the respondent moved for the issue to be tried through arbitration. The
Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award) in favor of respondent
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Arbitral Tribunal claimed that it had already lost jurisdiction
over the case after it had submitted to the RTC its Report together with a copy of the Arbitral Award
 March 30, 2011, the RTC merely noted petitioner’s aforesaid motions, finding that copies of the Arbitral
Award appear to have been sent to the parties by the Arbitral Tribunal, including the OSG, contrary to
petitioner’s claim. On the other hand, the RTC confirmed the Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A)36 of
the Special ADR Rules and ordered petitioner to pay respondent the costs of confirming the award, as
prayed for, in the total amount of P50,000.00. From this order, petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration.
 June 15, 2011 - Respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, to which no
comment/opposition was filed by petitioner despite the RTC’s directive therefor. In an Order dated
September 12, 2011, the RTC granted respondent’s motion. Petitioner moved to quash the writ of
execution, positing that respondent was not entitled to its monetary claims. It also claimed that the
issuance of said writ was premature since the RTC should have first resolved its May 19, 2010 Motion for
Reconsideration and June 1, 2010 Manifestation and Motion, and not merely noted them, thereby violating
its right to due process.
 In an Order dated July 9, 2012, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to quash.
 July 12, 2012 - Petitioner received the RTC’s Order dated July 9, 2012 denying its motion to quash.
Dissatisfied, it filed on September 10, 2012 a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 126458, averring in the main that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in confirming and
ordering the execution of the Arbitral Award.
  March 26, 2014 - The CA dismissed the certiorari petition on two (2) grounds, namely: (a) the petition
essentially assailed the merits of the Arbitral Award which is prohibited under Rule 19 of the Special ADR
Rules and (b) the petition was filed out of time, having been filed way beyond 15 days from notice of the
RTC’s July 9, 2012 Order, in violation of Rule 19.2852 in relation to Rule 19.853 of said Rules which
provide that a special civil action for certiorari must be filed before the CA within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside (or until July 27, 2012). Aggrieved,
petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules, resulting in the dismissal
of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari.
HELD:
 The petition is DENIED, Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004,” institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR
System) in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme Court
of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving cases pending
before all courts in the Philippines.
 May 7, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Arbitral Award in favor of respondent. Under Section 17.2,
Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no motion for reconsideration or new trial may be sought, but any of the parties
may file a motion for correction of the final award, which shall interrupt the running of the period for appeal,
Moreover, the parties may appeal the final award to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.
City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)

Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which
tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-
Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that
in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several
reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance is constitutional.
Held:
SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.
First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not
only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the
promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its
purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as
it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of
the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their business
operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which
permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and
a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of the property, as in this case.
Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies
are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to
all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for
prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-
Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located
outside the area.
Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in contravention of
the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed
the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.
Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.