Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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No. SC19-1341
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PER CURIAM.
Florida Constitution upon a question affecting his executive powers and duties.
language that was added to article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution by the
“Amendment 4”—that restores the voting rights of certain convicted felons “upon
completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.” Art. VI, § 4(a),
Fla. Const. The Governor asks whether the phrase “all terms of sentence”
that “all terms of sentence” encompasses not just durational periods but also all
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In alignment with the colloquy with the Florida Supreme Court,
after Amendment 4 was approved by voters, the ACLU of Florida,
League of Women Voters of Florida, LatinoJustice, and the Florida
Rights Restoration Coalition delivered a letter to former Secretary of
State Ken Detzner regarding implementation of Amendment 4.
Exhibit 1, December 13, 2018 Letter. In part, the letter explained,
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part, Mendez alleges chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida, violates
Article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution because it adds
requirements for the restoration of voting rights above what was
prescribed in the Florida Constitution. Additional complaints were
filed by numerous plaintiffs, including organizations referenced
above, alleging provisions of chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida
violate the First, Eighth, Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments
of the United States Constitution. These challenges are only directed
at chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida, and do not question the
constitutionality of Article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.
Article IV, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution prescribes
the supreme executive power shall be vested in the Governor, that he
“shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and “transact all
necessary business with the officers of government.” Article IV,
section 6 of the Florida Constitution places direct administration and
supervision of all functions of the executive branch, including the
Department of State, under the constitutional authority of the
Governor. See also § 20.02(3), Fla. Stat. (the administration of any
executive branch entity shall at all times be [“]under the constitutional
executive authority of the Governor”); § 20.10, Fla. Stat. (creating the
Department of State, headed by the Secretary of State who is
appointed by the Governor). Furthermore, the Secretary of State is
the chief elections officer with the responsibility to maintain
uniformity in the interpretation and implementation of voter
registration and election laws. See § 97.012, Fla. Stat.
....
I, as Governor of Florida, . . . want to ensure the proper
implementation of Article VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution
and, if applicable, chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida. This includes
the ability to direct the Department of State to fully implement Article
VI, section 4 of the Florida Constitution by determining whether a
convicted felon has completed all terms of their sentence, including
the satisfaction of LFOs. I will not infringe on the proper restoration
of an individual’s right to vote under the Florida Constitution.
Understanding there is ongoing litigation in federal court
challenging chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida under the First,
Eighth, Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments of the United
States Constitution, I do not ask this Court to address any issues
regarding chapter 2019-162, Laws of Florida or the United States
Constitution.
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Therefore, I respectfully request an opinion of the Justices of
the Supreme Court of Florida as to the question of whether
“completion of all terms of sentence” under Article VI, section 4 of
the Florida Constitution includes the satisfaction of all legal financial
obligations—namely fees, fines and restitution ordered by the court as
part of a felony sentence that would otherwise render a convicted
felon ineligible to vote.
Letter from Governor Ron DeSantis to Chief Justice Charles T. Canady dated
After concluding that the Governor’s request was within the purview of
article IV, section 1(c) of the Florida Constitution, we agreed to exercise our
file briefs and to present oral argument before the Court. See art. IV, § 1(c), Fla.
Const. 1 During oral argument, counsel for the Governor made clear that the
Governor requests advice solely as to the narrow question of whether the phrase
1. Timely initial briefs were submitted by the following: (1) Governor Ron
DeSantis; (2) The Florida Senate; and Bill Galvano, in his official capacity as
President of the Florida Senate; (3) The Florida House of Representatives; (4)
Secretary of State, Laurel M. Lee; (5) Adam Richardson; (6) Mark R. Schlakman,
joined by The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; (7) Fair Elections
Center; (8) The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Florida State Conference
of Branches and Youth Units of the NAACP, Orange County Branch of the
NAACP, and League of Women Voters of Florida; (9) Jennifer LaVia and Carla
Laroche; and (10) Bonnie Raysor, Diane Sherrill, and Lee Hoffman.
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“all terms of sentence” includes LFOs ordered by the sentencing court. We answer
The arguments presented by the interested parties generally fall into one of
two categories. On the one hand, the Governor, the Florida Senate, the Florida
Parties) all argue that “all terms of sentence” includes all LFOs ordered by the
sentencing judge. They largely rely on plain language, case law, and the common
understanding of penalties imposed for criminal acts. On the other hand, the
arguments against some or all LFOs being included within the scope of “all terms
of sentence.” Some Non-State Parties argue that “all terms of sentence” refers to
durational periods rather than to obligations and thus contemplates only periods of
imprisonment and supervised release. Others assume that “all terms of sentence”
refers to obligations including some LFOs, but they argue for the exclusion of
certain LFOs. These latter Non-State Parties focus on what they label as punitive
a criminal sentence.
The answer to the Governor’s question largely turns on whether “all terms of
that the phrase, when read and understood in context, plainly refers to obligations
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and includes “all”—not some—LFOs imposed in conjunction with an adjudication
of guilt. Before explaining our opinion, we briefly address our jurisdiction as well
as the Secretary of State’s concerns that the events leading up to the adoption of
JURISDICTION
Article IV, section 1(c) of the Florida Constitution authorizes the Governor
to “request in writing the opinion of the justices of the supreme court as to the
interpretation of any portion of this constitution upon any question affecting the
governor’s executive powers and duties.” Upon receiving such a request, “the
justices shall determine whether the request is within the purview of article IV,
section 1(c).” Fla. R. App. P. 9.500(b). Here, we readily concluded that the
executed,” art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const., and the exercise of his clemency powers, art.
arguments are meritless. These Non-State Parties argue, for example, that it is
a statute and that the Governor in effect impermissibly seeks advice regarding the
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necessity or validity of chapter 2019-162 and the interpretation of its provisions.
But neither the existence of chapter 2019-162 nor the possibility that our advice
may touch upon that legislation precludes us from answering the Governor’s
question. Indeed, though the Governor’s request does not ask us directly to
address the constitutionality of chapter 2019-162, we note that this Court since
1968 2 has issued advisory opinions to the Governor addressing the validity of
legislation that affected his executive powers and duties. E.g., In re Advisory
Opinion of Governor Civil Rights, 306 So. 2d 520, 521-22 (Fla. 1975) (concluding
that the Florida Correctional Reform Act of 1974—an act that had already been
signed into law and that purported to reinstate the civil rights of convicted felons
constitutional power of the Governor to restore civil rights”).3 In any event, given
the narrow question presented here, we need not address chapter 2019-162.
2. The 1968 Constitution for the first time permitted interested parties to be
heard in advisory opinion cases. See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 243 So.
2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1971) (examining the constitutionality of a proposed corporate
income tax and recognizing that “Section 1(c), Article IV, Constitution of 1968,
enlarged to some extent the power of this Court to be of assistance”); Opinion to
the Governor, 239 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1970) (examining the constitutionality of the
1970 General Appropriations Act and recognizing that it was “noteworthy that in
the 1968 constitutional revision, authority and direction were given this Court to
permit interested persons to be heard”).
3. Civil Rights reiterated this Court’s long-held view “that the power of
pardon is reposed exclusively in the . . . executive” and is not to be infringed upon
by the other branches. 306 So. 2d at 522; see also Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d
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These Non-State Parties additionally argue among other things that the
(Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 280-81 (Fla. 1997), this Court’s conclusion that the
question there fell “within the purview of article IV, section 1(c)” was based in part
on the fact that the constitutional amendment at issue directly affected the
Governor’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws, including the duty to
affects among other things his general constitutional duties, including the duty to
The Governor’s request satisfies the requirements of article IV, section 1(c).
AMENDMENT 4—BACKGROUND
Prior to Amendment 4’s adoption, article VI, section 4(a) of the Florida
clemency. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (“[T]he exclusion
312, 315 (Fla. 1977) (noting that article IV, section 8 of the Florida Constitution
“vest[ed] sole, unrestricted, unlimited discretion exclusively in the executive” in
restoring civil rights).
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of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .”). The text of Amendment 4, which amended article VI, section
was asked by the Attorney General whether Amendment 4 met the legal
requirements for placement on the ballot. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voting
Restoration Amendment, 215 So. 3d 1202 (Fla. 2017). This Court unanimously
answered in the affirmative. Id. at 1209. In its brief to this Court arguing in
Floridians for a Fair Democracy (the Sponsor), asserted: “Specifically, the drafters
murder or a felony sexual offense, will automatically regain their right to vote
upon fulfillment of all obligations imposed under their criminal sentence.” Initial
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Amendment, 215 So. 3d 1202 (Fla. 2017) (Nos. SC16-1785 & SC16-1981)
(emphasis added). In other words, the Sponsor intended that “all terms” refer to
Amendment 4.
Oral argument in that case took place on March 6, 2017. During the oral
argument, counsel for the Sponsor stated—consistent with the Sponsor’s brief—
judge puts into a sentence.” As noted in the Governor’s letter, that oral argument
the process for confirming payment of LFOs. Counsel for the Sponsor summed up
under these specific conditions.” It is beyond dispute that the Sponsor expressed
the intention that “all terms of sentence” include all LFOs ordered by the
sentencing judge.
As the Secretary notes here, the Sponsor advertised a similar message to the
voting public via its “Paid Political Advertisement” website. See Initial Brief of
Secretary of State at 7, and App. at 33-68. Among other things, the website states
with past felony convictions who fully complete their entire sentence – including
any probation, parole, and restitution – before earning back the eligibility to vote.”
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As the Secretary also notes, similar messages were disseminated by some of
the very same nonprofit organizations that are currently involved in the lawsuits
challenging chapter 2019-162 and that now argue to this Court that “all terms of
For example, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida (ACLU of
Florida) in its 2018 voter guide informed voters that Amendment 4 “includ[ed] any
probation, parole, fines, or restitution.” See id. at 7, and App. at 69. Indeed, the
ACLU of Florida and other organizations along with the Sponsor spread a
consistent message before and after Amendment 4’s adoption. As noted in the
Although the representations to this Court and to the public close the door on
any credible suggestion that “all terms of sentence” was intended by the Sponsor to
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involved a “bait and switch” attempt to amend our State’s constitution. Indeed, our
opinion is based not on the Sponsor’s subjective intent or campaign statements, but
rather on the objective meaning of the constitutional text. The language at issue,
read in context, has an unambiguous “ordinary meaning” that the voters “would
including LFOs. The Sponsor’s expressed intent and campaign statements simply
are consistent with that ordinary meaning that would have been understood by the
voters.
ANALYSIS
The Governor asks whether the phrase “all terms of sentence,” as used in
article VI, section 4, encompasses LFOs imposed by the sentencing court. The
Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc. (FACDL), 978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla.
parallel to those of statutory interpretation. First and foremost, this Court must
examine the actual language used in the Constitution. If that language is clear,
unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue,” then our task is at an end.
Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So. 3d 597, 603 (Fla. 2013) (quoting FACDL, 978
So. 2d at 139-40).
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But this Court has sometimes suggested that the first step in construing a
objective meaning of the text. See, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419
(Fla. 1978) (“In construing the Constitution, we first seek to ascertain the intent of
the framers and voters, and to interpret the provision before us in the way that will
best fulfill that intent.”). We believe that such statements can be misleading
because they may be understood to shift the focus of interpretation from the text
can result in the judicial imposition of meaning that the text cannot bear, either
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text
means.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
We also adhere to the view expressed long ago by Justice Joseph Story
plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to
the United States 157-58 (1833), quoted in Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 69.
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This Court in construing constitutional language approved by the voters
often “looks to dictionary definitions of the terms because we recognize that, ‘in
terms presented to the voters.’ ” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana
for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So. 3d 786, 800 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Everglades,
706 So. 2d at 282). The dictionary meaning of the word “terms,” when viewed in
or conditions. See The American Heritage Dictionary 1796 (5th ed. 2011)
But the fact that the word “terms” itself can carry different meanings does
not render the phrase “all terms of sentence,” as used in Amendment 4, susceptible
to more than one natural reading. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233
(1993) (“[A] single word cannot be read in isolation . . . .”). As the Supreme Court
isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’ ” Textron
Agric. Implement Workers of Am., Int’l Union, 523 U.S. 653, 657 (1998) (quoting
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)). And when viewed in context,
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“all terms of sentence” has only one natural reading—one that refers to all
As the Governor and others correctly note, Amendment 4 refers to the voting
disqualification arising from “a felony conviction” and later refers to “all terms of”
the singular “sentence” resulting from that singular conviction. See art. VI, § 4(a),
Fla. Const. We know from its explicit reference to “parole or probation” that
Amendment 4 uses the term “sentence” to designate more than just imprisonment.
viewed as having only one durational term rather than multiple durational terms.
For example, in Ramirez, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the
parole,” 418 U.S. at 34, referred in the singular to an individual felon having
“completed the serving of his term,” 418 U.S. at 55; see also id. at 56-57
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Each of the respondents . . . had fully served his term of
felon convicted of a singular felony had “completed the serving of his terms” when
the time of his incarceration and parole had been completed. Although a singular,
overall “sentence” naturally has only one durational term (albeit sometimes with
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distinct components), it can have multiple conditions or obligations—i.e., “terms.”
fact read the words “all terms” to refer solely to durational periods. We are not
a contextual one. They note that Amendment 4 does not expressly mention LFOs
but does mention “parole or probation,” which are forms of supervised release that,
like incarceration, can each be said to have a durational “term.” They thus argue
that those two forms of supervised release provide an “illustrative list” to guide this
Visiting Servs. of Se. Fla., LLC, 226 So. 3d 774, 784 (Fla. 2017). This line of
First, under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon, “the mention of
one thing implies the exclusion of another.” Id. at 781. But this Court has noted
Legislature used the word ‘include,’ ” as that is “a word of expansion, not one of
limitation.” Id. Here, the phrase “parole or probation” comes immediately after
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Second, under the ejusdem generis canon, “where general words or phrases
construed as applying to the same kind or class as those that are specifically
mentioned.’ ” Marijuana for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So. 3d at 801 (quoting
Fayad v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1088-89 (Fla. 2005)).
Application of the canon thus requires that the enumeration of specifics precede
the general words. But Amendment 4 involves the exact opposite: the specific
words “all terms of” in the constitutional text. These Non-State Parties interpret
Amendment 4 as if it had omitted the words “all terms of” and simply read: “upon
completion of sentence including parole or probation.” The words “all terms of”
Parties. This Court, of course, ordinarily avoids interpretations that “render any
language superfluous.” Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Millender, 666 So. 2d 882, 886
we are similarly “not at liberty to . . . ignore words that were expressly placed there
at the time of adoption of the provision.” Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 (Fla.
2009).
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In the end, Amendment 4 was not drafted to require completion of “the term
Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the
require completion of “all terms of sentence.” Art. VI, § 4(a), Fla. Const. That
natural reading.
obligations. These cases further undercut the argument that Amendment 4 refers
only to durational periods. They demonstrate that phrases such as “all terms of
Washington, 163 P.3d 757, 763 (Wash. 2007) (quoting Wash. Rev. Code
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and fees. Id. at 761 n.1. In describing the respondents who were suing to have
their voting rights restored, the court noted that each “has satisfied all of the terms
of his sentence, with the exception of full payment of his LFOs.” Id. at 762
(emphasis added); see also State v. Donaghe, 256 P.3d 1171, 1178 (Wash. 2011)
the terms of their sentences, except for paying legal financial obligations.”).
Madison’s reference to “all of the terms of” a singular, overall “sentence” refers to
related context. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 745, 749 (6th Cir. 2010)
required felons to among other things have paid all restitution, and describing
financial legal obligations”); Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1070, 1079 (9th
that required felons to among other things have paid all fines and restitution, and
concluding that the state had “a rational basis for restoring voting rights only to
those felons who have completed the terms of their sentences, which includes the
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payment of any fines or restitution orders”—that is, “only those who have satisfied
discipline, the Supreme Court of South Carolina used a similar phrase in a similar
manner. See In re Allmon, 753 S.E.2d 544, 545 (S.C. 2014) (“Respondent shall
complete all terms of his criminal sentence, including payment of restitution and
durational terms but also obligations and therefore includes all LFOs imposed in
One Non-State Party argues that costs and fees are categorically excluded
from “all terms of sentence” because those LFOs do not bear any of the hallmarks
those LFOs mentioned in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(d) (Form for
Sentencing) and excludes all LFOs listed in any of rule 3.986’s other forms (e.g.,
Form for Restitution Order (rule 3.986(g)). But these Non-State Parties improperly
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view the phrase “all terms of sentence” as a term of art that turns on a nuanced
legal analysis of the word “sentence.” Indeed, their attempts to isolate and parse
the word “sentence” to carve out certain LFOs improperly interprets that word “in
a technical sense” absent any “suggest[ion]” in the text of Amendment 4 that the
word was to be given something other than its “most usual and obvious meaning.”
Wilson v. Crews, 34 So. 2d 114, 118 (Fla. 1948) (quoting City of Jacksonville v.
Glidden Co., 169 So. 216, 217 (Fla. 1936)). These opponents also implausibly
suggest that the voters who adopted Amendment 4 would have understood the
comprehensive phrase “all terms” to include only those terms that courts deem
“punitive.” Here, “the natural and popular meaning in which,” id., the voters
would understand the broad phrase “all terms of sentence” is that it includes all
anywhere in the Florida Statutes. But the word is defined in various dictionaries.
See, e.g., Sentence, Black’s Law Dictionary 1569 (10th ed. 2014) (“The judgment
that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the
court of the penalty imposed on a defendant for the offense of which the defendant
has been adjudged guilty.” Rule 3.701(b)(2) later explains that punishment is the
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“primary” but not the sole “purpose of sentencing.” That rule also uses the words
overly technical fashion here, Amendment 4 expressly includes “parole” within its
scope, and yet courts have explicitly or implicitly distinguished parole from a
“sentence.” E.g., Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 26 (noting that the respondents had
cannot be limited to any one form set forth in rule 3.986. Indeed, parole cannot be
captured by any of those forms. Parole, of course, is granted, and its terms set, by
generally chs. 947-49, Fla. Stat. (2019). In other words, parole is not
Amendment 4 thus uses the word “sentence” in its plain, common sense.
And it does so in the context of the broad phrase “all terms of sentence.” Absent
any suggestion in the context of Amendment 4 that the word “sentence” carries a
technical meaning restricting its scope, there is no basis to conclude that “all terms
abundance of statutory and case law supports the conclusion that fines, restitution,
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and fees and costs all comfortably fit within the ordinary meaning of “all terms of
sentence.”
Beginning with restitution, this Court has referred to that obligation as part
of a “sentence,” and even as “punishment.” See, e.g., Noel v. State, 191 So. 3d
370, 375 (Fla. 2016) (“The ‘purpose of restitution is not only to compensate the
victim, but also to serve the rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals of the
criminal justice system.’ ” (quoting State v. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla.
1991))); Kirby v. State, 863 So. 2d 238, 244 (Fla. 2003) (recognizing “the trial
Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 914 (Fla. 1997) (“As part of his sentence, he
was also ordered to pay restitution to Beall’s.”); State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874,
concept . . . .”). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has noted that “[s]entencing
courts are required to impose restitution as part of the sentence for specified
crimes.” Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1270 (2017). Certain
legislative enactments also support including restitution within the meaning of “all
terms of sentence.” See, e.g., § 812.15(7), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“The court shall, in
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Fla. Stat. (2019) (authorizing downward departure sentences if “[t]he need for
payment of restitution to the victim outweighs the need for a prison sentence”).
referred to fines as part of a “sentence.” E.g., Morganti v. State, 573 So. 2d 820,
821 (Fla. 1991) (“A lawful sentence may comprise several penalties, such as
incarceration, probation, and a fine.”); see id. (“[A] sentence of five and one-half
years’ incarceration, eighteen months’ probation, and a $10,000 fine is clearly not
a more severe sentence than fifteen years’ incarceration.”). So, too, has the
Supreme Court. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 349-50 (2012)
within the ordinary meaning of “all terms of sentence.” See, e.g., § 775.083(1),
Fla. Stat. (2019) (“A person who has been convicted of an offense other than a
Lastly, although fees and costs can reasonably be said to differ in many
respects from restitution and fines, various court pronouncements and statutory
provisions similarly support including them within the scope of Amendment 4’s
phrase “all terms of sentence.” See, e.g., Osterhoudt v. State, 214 So. 3d 550, 551
(Fla. 2017) (“[T]rial courts must individually pronounce discretionary fees, costs,
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and fines during a sentencing hearing to comply with due process requirements.”);
Rollman v. State, 887 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 2004) (“[T]he same sentencing judge
pronounced Rollman’s sentence, which imposed ten years in prison, ten years of
probation, and the payment of restitution and court costs.”); Bassett v. State, 23 So.
3d 236, 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“Bassett was sentenced to five years’ prison to
pay certain costs and fees.”); § 27.52(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2019) (authorizing the
court to “[a]ssess the application fee [for the appointment of a public defender] as
part of the sentence”); § 435.07(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (referring to “any fee, fine,
ordered by the court “as part of the judgment and sentence”); § 633.107(1), Fla.
This Court’s decision in Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008), is
error” for purposes of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). After noting
orders of community control, [and] cost and restitution orders” from “the sentence
itself,” 983 So. 2d at 572 (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800 court cmt.), Jackson
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imposed, whether involving incarceration, conditions of probation, or costs,” id. at
572-73; see also Kirby, 863 So. 2d at 244 (referring to “the trial court’s statutory
Amendment 4’s use of the broad phrase “all terms of sentence” can only
imposed,” including “costs.” Jackson, 983 So. 2d at 573. Or in the words of the
CONCLUSION
that the phrase “all terms of sentence,” as used in article VI, section 4, has an
ordinary meaning that the voters would have understood to refer not only to
It is so ordered.
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LABARGA, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s ultimate decision that the phrase “all terms of
sentence,” as used in article VI, section 4 (Amendment 4), encompasses all “legal
however, with the majority’s conclusion that the phrase “all terms of sentence,” as
used in Amendment 4, “has an ordinary meaning that the voters would have
understood” to include LFOs. Nor do I concur with the majority’s strict adherence
the exclusion of available extrinsic evidence that would assist the Court in
“The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey in
this context, is what the text means.” Majority op. at 14 (quoting Antonin Scalia &
Context is the operative word of this theory. As explained by Justice Scalia in his
dissent in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015), “[S]ound interpretation
requires paying attention to the whole law, not homing in on isolated words or
even isolated sections. Context always matters.” As noted by the majority, the
“textualism,” dates back to as early as the 1800s when Justice Joseph Story, who
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served on the United States Supreme Court from 1812 to 1845, emphasized that in
interpreting the Constitution, every word must be afforded its “plain, obvious, and
common sense” meaning, “unless the text furnishes some ground to control,
qualify, or enlarge it.” Majority op. at 14. Since that time, textualism has been
advocated by justices such as Hugo Black and, in recent history, Antonin Scalia, an
definitions because “in general, a dictionary may provide the popular and
(quoting In re Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen., 132 So. 3d 786, 800 (Fla. 2014)). As
provision when the text is unclear or ambiguous. One such avenue is to seek to
ascertain the intent of the framers and voters, an approach which, as discussed
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This Court has long observed that “[t]he fundamental object to be sought in
construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of the framers and the
the people, never to defeat it. Such a provision must never be construed in such
manner as to make it possible for the will of the people to be frustrated or denied.”
Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960); see also In re Senate Joint
will of the people in passing the amendment.”); Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277,
consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters.” (quoting Carib. Conserv.
Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conserv. Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492, 501 (Fla. 2003)));
Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1978) (“[I]n construing the
Constitution, we first seek to ascertain the intent of the framers and voters, and to
interpret the provision before us in the way that will best fulfill that intent.”).
In taking issue with this consistently applied approach, the majority contends
misunderstood to shift the focus of interpretation from the text and its context to
the judicial imposition of meaning that the text cannot bear, either through
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expansion or contraction of the meaning carried by the text.” Majority op. at 14.
evidence of the true intent of the framers and voters, such as the evidence available
throughout the theory’s history. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, for instance, was
quite explicit on the question of intent: “[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but
what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using
them in the circumstances in which they were used . . . . We do not inquire what
the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.” Oliver Wendell
I agree with the majority that the lodestar of constitutional and statutory
interpretation should be, in the first instance, the application of the words of the
governing text read in context. However, the analysis should provide some
allowance for consideration of the intent of the framers and voters in instances
whether the phrase “all terms of sentence” encompasses all LFOs imposed by the
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sentencing judge. Nevertheless, in strict adherence to the “supremacy-of-text
principle,” the majority has chosen to disregard this revealing and helpful extrinsic
evidence and rely strictly on its interpretation of the meaning of “all terms of
sentence.”
August 9, 2019, requesting this advisory opinion. The letter, includes, inter alia,
the responses by counsel for the sponsor of Amendment 4, Floridians for a Fair
argument in 2017. Arguably, these exchanges provide the most helpful revelations
payment of any fines,” and counsel for the sponsor responded: “Yes, sir . . . all
terms mean all terms within the four corners.” Majority op. at 2. Justice Lawson
similarly asked, “You said that terms of sentence includes fines and costs . . .
that’s the way it’s generally pronounced in criminal court, would it also include
The majority opinion also includes revelations made in the sponsor’s brief,
which clearly express the sponsor’s intention that payment of all LFOs would be
required. The sponsor’s brief asserted: “Specifically, the drafters intend that
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individuals with felony convictions, excluding those convicted of murder or a
felony sexual offense, will automatically regain their right to vote upon fulfillment
of all obligations imposed under their criminal sentence.” Majority op. at 10. The
majority summed up the sponsor’s position with the following statement: “In other
words, the Sponsor intended that ‘all terms’ refer to obligations, not durational
at 11 (emphasis added).
anything that a judge puts into a sentence.” Majority op. at 11. The majority
added:
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convictions who fully complete their entire sentence – including any probation,
parole, and restitution – before earning back the eligibility to vote.” Majority op.
at 11.
Finally, the majority included in its opinion the American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Florida’s 2018 voter guide which informed voters that
op. at 12.
with the following revealing statement: “The Sponsor’s expressed intent and
campaign statements simply are consistent with that ordinary meaning that would
This evidence clearly resolves any question regarding the meaning of the
phrase “all terms of sentence” and should not be excluded from consideration.
Surely, if the text in this case had said, “all terms of sentence, including payment in
sources, including dictionaries, would not have been necessary. Unfortunately, for
Moreover, textualism, for all its usefulness, is less reliable when the text in
question, such as the four-word text in this case, is not sufficiently developed to
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allow its full meaning to be discernable. In such instances, consideration of
question. Unfortunately, given the majority’s decision today setting forth the so-
afforded its due consideration. While I agree that the initial step in resolving
examine the words of the governing text in context, I disagree with the summary
determining the meaning of the text—including the intent of the framers and voters
concerning the intention of the sponsor and others involved in the process of
proposing Amendment 4, based on this record, I could not concur with the majority
based solely on the theory that “the only objective evidence for the intent of a text
Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s ultimate decision that the phrase
do so only because the extrinsic evidence presented concerning the sponsor’s intent
assisted me. I dissent to the majority’s position that the phrase “all terms of
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sentence” is unambiguous and that the voters would “most likely understand” it to
available extrinsic evidence that would assist the Court in construing constitutional
Theodore Leopold, Diana L. Martin, and Poorad Razavi of Cohen Milstein Sellers
& Toll, PLLC, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida; and Cecilia Aguilera and Jon
Sherman, Fair Elections Center, Washington, District of Columbia,
for Interested Parties, Orange County Florida Branch of the NAACP, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Florida, the American Civil Liberties Union, The
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School, the Florida
Conference of the NAACP, and League of Women Voters of Florida
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for Interested Party, Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(FACDL)
Daniel Bell, General Counsel, J. Michael Maida, Deputy General Counsel, and W.
Jordan Jones, Staff Attorney, House Judiciary Committee, Tallahassee, Florida;
and Jonathan L. Williams of Lash & Goldberg LLP, Miami, Florida,
Interested party
Jeremiah Hawkes, General Counsel, and Ashley Istler, Deputy General Counsel,
The Florida Senate, Tallahassee, Florida
for Interested Parties, The Florida Senate and Bill Galvano, in his official
capacity as President of The Florida Senate
Interested parties
Chad W. Dunn of Brazil & Dunn, L.L.P., Miami, Florida; and Danielle Lang,
Molly E. Danahy, and Mark P. Gaber of Campaign Legal Center, Washington,
District of Columbia
for Interested Parties, Bonnie Raysor, Diane Sherrill, and Lee Hoffman
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