Legal Ethics Cases

A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,


vs.

IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July
5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee
of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half
after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his
legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising
and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our
views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public
is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the
ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition
should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or
not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.
10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
– A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering
the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and
after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy &
Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed,
in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If
it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and
to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers,
the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof,
in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which
is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found

GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.


Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

____________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA, petitioners,


vs.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL
TEOXON, ENGR. LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO,
SR., respondents.
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty


knows how extremely expensive it is to be poor.

–– James Baldwin

The Constitution affords litigants—moneyed or poor—equal access to the courts;

moreover, it specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having
access to the courts.1 Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and
implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision. As such,
filing fees, though one of the essential elements in court procedures, should not be an
obstacle to poor litigants' opportunity to seek redress for their grievances before the
courts.

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the annulment of the September 11, 2001
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 27, in Civil Case No.
99-4403 entitled Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura v. The Local
Government Unit of the City of Naga, et al., dismissing the case for failure of petitioners
Algura spouses to pay the required filing fees.2 Since the instant petition involves only a
question of law based on facts established from the pleadings and documents
submitted by the parties,3 the Court gives due course to the instant petition sanctioned
under Section 2(c) of Rule 41 on Appeal from the RTCs, and governed by Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Facts

On September 1, 1999, spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a
Verified Complaint dated August 30, 19994 for damages against the Naga City
Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence
and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their
boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.

Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants,5 to

which petitioner Antonio Algura's Pay Slip No. 2457360 (Annex "A" of motion) was
appended, showing a gross monthly income of Ten Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Four Pesos (PhP 10,474.00) and a net pay of Three Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen
Pesos and Ninety Nine Centavos (PhP 3,616.99) for [the month of] July 1999.6 Also
attached as Annex "B" to the motion was a July 14, 1999 Certification7 issued by the
Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property
declared in their name for taxation purposes.

Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, Executive
Judge Jose T. Atienza of the Naga City RTC, in the September 1, 1999 Order,8 granted
petitioners' plea for exemption from filing fees.

Meanwhile, as a result of respondent Naga City Government's demolition of a portion of

petitioners' house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from
their boarders' rentals. With the loss of the rentals, the meager income from Lorencita
Algura's sari-sari store and Antonio Algura's small take home pay became insufficient for
the expenses of the Algura spouses and their six (6) children for their basic needs
including food, bills, clothes, and schooling, among others.

On October 13, 1999, respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim dated October 10,
1999,9 arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of
action, the spouses' boarding house blocked the road right of way, and said structure
was a nuisance per se.

Praying that the counterclaim of defendants (respondents) be dismissed, petitioners

then filed their Reply with Ex-Parte Request for a Pre-Trial Setting10 before the Naga
City RTC on October 19, 1999. On February 3, 2000, a pre-trial was held wherein
respondents asked for five (5) days within which to file a Motion to Disqualify Petitioners
as Indigent Litigants.

On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-
Payment of Filing Fees dated March 10, 2000.11 They asserted that in addition to the
more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of
the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a
computer shop on the ground floor of their residence along Bayawas St., Sta. Cruz,
Naga City. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners' second floor was used as their
residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a
month. In addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their
computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to
them. Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.

On March 28, 2000, petitioners subsequently interposed their Opposition to the

Motion12 to respondents' motion to disqualify them for non-payment of filing fees.
On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as
indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption
from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section
18 of the Revised Rules of Court—directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.13

On April 28, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000
Order. On May 8, 2000, respondents then filed their Comment/Objections to petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.

On May 5, 2000, the trial court issued an Order14 giving petitioners the opportunity to
comply with the requisites laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them to qualify as
indigent litigants.

On May 13, 2000, petitioners submitted their Compliance15 attaching the affidavits of
petitioner Lorencita Algura16 and Erlinda Bangate,17 to comply with the requirements of
then Rule 141, Section 18 of the Rules of Court and in support of their claim to be
declared as indigent litigants.

In her May 13, 2000 Affidavit, petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the demolition of
their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00. She,
her husband, and their six (6) minor children had to rely mainly on her husband's salary
as a policeman which provided them a monthly amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less.
Also, they did not own any real property as certified by the assessor's office of Naga
City. More so, according to her, the meager net income from her small sari-sari store
and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband, were not enough to
pay the family's basic necessities.

To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also submitted the
affidavit of Erlinda Bangate, who attested under oath, that she personally knew spouses
Antonio Algura and Lorencita Algura, who were her neighbors; that they derived
substantial income from their boarders; that they lost said income from their boarders'
rentals when the Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, through its officers,
demolished part of their house because from that time, only a few boarders could be
accommodated; that the income from the small store, the boarders, and the meager
salary of Antonio Algura were insufficient for their basic necessities like food and
clothing, considering that the Algura spouses had six (6) children; and that she knew
that petitioners did not own any real property.

Thereafter, Naga City RTC Acting Presiding Judge Andres B. Barsaga, Jr. issued his
July 17, 200018 Order denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Judge Barsaga ratiocinated that the pay slip of Antonio F. Algura showed that the
"GROSS INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS of plaintiff Algura [was] ₧10,474.00 which
amount [was] over and above the amount mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 141,
Section 18 for pauper litigants residing outside Metro Manila."19 Said rule provides that
the gross income of the litigant should not exceed PhP 3,000.00 a month and shall not
own real estate with an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00. The trial court found that, in
Lorencita S.J. Algura's May 13, 2000 Affidavit, nowhere was it stated that she and her
immediate family did not earn a gross income of PhP 3,000.00.

The Issue

Unconvinced of the said ruling, the Alguras instituted the instant petition raising a
solitary issue for the consideration of the Court: whether petitioners should be
considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying filing fees.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

A review of the history of the Rules of Court on suits in forma pauperis (pauper litigant)
is necessary before the Court rules on the issue of the Algura spouses' claim to
exemption from paying filing fees.

When the Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the rule on pauper litigants
was found in Rule 3, Section 22 which provided that:

Section 22. Pauper litigant.—Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action
or defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by
affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or
otherwise. Such authority[,] once given[,] shall include an exemption from payment of
legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and printed brief. The legal fees
shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case [favorable] to the pauper, unless
the court otherwise provides.

From the same Rules of Court, Rule 141 on Legal Fees, on the other hand, did not
contain any provision on pauper litigants.

On July 19, 1984, the Court, in Administrative Matter No. 83-6-389-0 (formerly G.R. No.
64274), approved the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of Rates and
Charges of Court Fees, through its Chairman, then Justice Felix V. Makasiar, to revise
the fees in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to generate funds to effectively cover
administrative costs for services rendered by the courts.20 A provision on pauper
litigants was inserted which reads:

Section 16. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of court fees.—Pauper-litigants

include wage earners whose gross income do not exceed P2,000.00 a month or
P24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila, and P1,500.00 a month or
P18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila, or those who do not own
real property with an assessed value of not more than P24,000.00, or not more than
P18,000.00 as the case may be.

Such exemption shall include exemption from payment of fees for filing appeal bond,
printed record and printed brief.

The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor of
the pauper-litigant.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the pauper-litigant shall execute an

affidavit that he does not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor own any real
property with the assessed value afore-mentioned [sic], supported by a certification to
that effect by the provincial, city or town assessor or treasurer.

When the Rules of Court on Civil Procedure were amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (inclusive of Rules 1 to 71) in Supreme Court Resolution in Bar Matter No.
803 dated April 8, 1997, which became effective on July 1, 1997, Rule 3, Section 22 of
the Revised Rules of Court was superseded by Rule 3, Section 21 of said 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as follows:

Section 21. Indigent party.—A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied
that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees,
and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him.
The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent,
unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment
is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the
payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

At the time the Rules on Civil Procedure were amended by the Court in Bar Matter No.
803, however, there was no amendment made on Rule 141, Section 16 on pauper
litigants.

On March 1, 2000, Rule 141 on Legal Fees was amended by the Court in A.M. No.
00-2-01-SC, whereby certain fees were increased or adjusted. In this Resolution, the
Court amended Section 16 of Rule 141, making it Section 18, which now reads:

Section 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.—Pauper litigants (a)
whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand
(P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property
with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt
from the payment of legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the
pauper litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do
they own any real property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may
have been incurred.

It can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141 without
revoking or amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of pauper
litigants from payment of filing fees. Thus, on March 1, 2000, there were two
existing rules on pauper litigants; namely, Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 18.

On August 16, 2004, Section 18 of Rule 141 was further amended in Administrative
Matter No. 04-2-04-SC, which became effective on the same date. It then became
Section 19 of Rule 141, to wit:
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.– INDIGENT LITIGANTS
(A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT
EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN
EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET
VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT
OF LEGAL FEES.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they
do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The
current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. (Emphasis supplied.)

Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were
made to implement RA 9227 which brought about new increases in filing fees.
Specifically, in the August 16, 2004 amendment, the ceiling for the gross income of
litigants applying for exemption and that of their immediate family was increased from
PhP 4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and PhP 3,000.00 a month outside Metro
Manila, to double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the maximum value
of the property owned by the applicant was increased from an assessed value of PhP
50,000.00 to a maximum market value of PhP 300,000.00, to be able to accommodate
more indigent litigants and promote easier access to justice by the poor and the
marginalized in the wake of these new increases in filing fees.

Even if there was an amendment to Rule 141 on August 16, 2004, there was still no
amendment or recall of Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigants.

With this historical backdrop, let us now move on to the sole issue—whether petitioners
are exempt from the payment of filing fees.

It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case No. 99-4403) was filed on September 1,
1999. However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000
Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable
rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party which took effect on July 1,
1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants which became effective on July 19,
1984 up to February 28, 2000.

The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as
a pauper litigant by submitting an affidavit that they do not have a gross income of PhP
2,000.00 a month or PhP 24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila and PhP
1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila or
those who do not own real property with an assessed value of not more than PhP
24,000.00 or not more than PhP 18,000.00 as the case may be. Thus, there are two
requirements: a) income requirement—the applicants should not have a gross monthly
income of more than PhP 1,500.00, and b) property requirement––they should not own
property with an assessed value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.

In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita
Algura and neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura
showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00,21 and a Certification of the Naga
City assessor stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their names for
taxation.22 Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property as shown by the
Certification of the Naga City assessor and so the property requirement is met. However
with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP
10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita
Algura when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold
prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not
satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as
indigent litigants although the court should have applied Rule 141, Section 16 which
was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on September 1, 1999. Even if
Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were
applied, still the application could not have been granted as the combined PhP
13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP 3,000.00 monthly income
threshold.

Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April
14, 2000 Order disqualifying them as indigent litigants23 that the rules have been
relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which
authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if the court is satisfied that the party
is "one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family." The trial court did not give credence to this view
of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent
Party.
The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to
litigate as indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to
apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should
the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having
been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.

The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as
Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141,
Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now the present rule) are still valid and
enforceable rules on indigent litigants.

For one, the history of the two seemingly conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not
the intent of the Court to consider the old Section 22 of Rule 3, which took effect on
January 1, 1994 to have been amended and superseded by Rule 141, Section 16,
which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M. No. 83-6-389-0. If that is the case, then
the Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision on
Rules, could have already deleted Section 22 from Rule 3 when it amended Rules 1 to
71 and approved the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997.
The fact that Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigant was
retained in the rules of procedure, even elaborating on the meaning of an indigent party,
and was also strengthened by the addition of a third paragraph on the right to contest
the grant of authority to litigate only goes to show that there was no intent at all to
consider said rule as expunged from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000
and the second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite these two amendments, there was
no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces the desire of the
Court to maintain the two (2) rules on indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as
an indigent litigant.

It may be argued that Rule 3, Section 21 has been impliedly repealed by the recent
2000 and 2004 amendments to Rule 141 on legal fees. This position is bereft of merit.
Implied repeals are frowned upon unless the intent of the framers of the rules is
unequivocal. It has been consistently ruled that:

(r)epeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest
that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation
and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute[,] it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any
former law relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language
used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the
reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every effort must be
used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction they can
be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.24 (Emphasis
supplied).

Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly
amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two
rules can and should be harmonized.

The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a
settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be
made to harmonize them. Hence, "every statute [or rule] must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence."25

In Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enunciated that in the
interpretation of seemingly conflicting laws, efforts must be made to first harmonize
them. This Court thus ruled:

Consequently, every statute should be construed in such a way that will harmonize it
with existing laws. This principle is expressed in the legal maxim 'interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi,' that is, to interpret and to do it in
such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best method of interpretation.26

In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand
together and are compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an
indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting
documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the
income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141—that
is, the applicant's gross income and that of the applicant's immediate family do not
exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the
applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant
meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant
is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it
would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has "no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and
his family." In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to
disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on
the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3
also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at
any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly
discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court
determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed
and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the
court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3,
Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing
that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound
discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that the
applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must
also guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to
prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee
requirement.

Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the
Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not
satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property
under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court
should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners
to adduce evidence to show that they didn't have property and money sufficient and
available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family.27 In that
hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to refute the
allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as
indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to
the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants
using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21.

Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption
meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the
grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not
satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright;
instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use
its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III, Section 11 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) itself, initiated
by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed prime importance on 'easy access
to justice by the poor' as one of its six major components. Likewise, the judicial
philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban makes it
imperative that the courts shall not only safeguard but also enhance the rights of
individuals—which are considered sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt,
one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered
access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 14, 2000 Order granting the
disqualification of petitioners, the July 17, 2000 Order denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, and the September 11, 2001 Order dismissing the case in Civil Case
No. RTC-99-4403 before the Naga City RTC, Branch 27 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Furthermore, the Naga City RTC is ordered to set the "Ex-Parte Motion to
Litigate as Indigent Litigants" for hearing and apply Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure to determine whether petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

____________________________________________________________

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,


vs.

HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a

motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1 One of the
grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to
the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to
delay this case."2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that
petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be
plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could
ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There
is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be
taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is
not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to
comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on
the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very
much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation
a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition
is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then
and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of
the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3,
1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as
well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of
November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved
futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to
withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime
was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in
the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his
order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution
to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the
accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two
witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the
motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as
Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial
would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status
of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused.
The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963,
October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8,
1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to another
order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging
indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9,
1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has
been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to
come all the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that there
was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court
and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections
and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to
continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case."6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his
obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For
those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of
eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed
a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable
then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7 "There is need anew in this
disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in
the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a
profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To
avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer
may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered
without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention.
After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of
relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his
paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be
fulfilled."8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent
was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court
should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of
their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties
necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez
in People v. Estebia11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a
court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a
duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the
case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of
the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-
defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For,
indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger
dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to
fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel
could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief
Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his

own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even
more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of
an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for
the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility
as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now.
There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his
time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that
petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a
member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those
enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them,
when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

____________________________________________________________

A.C. No. 4497 September 26, 2001

MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants,


vs.

ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROÑO,1 respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For our resolution is the administrative complaint2 for disbarment of respondent, Atty.
Florante E. Madroño filed by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino. Complainants
allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against
them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.

Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police

stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school
teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-
Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.

Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate

administrative cases against respondent.

In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave

threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary against respondent.
Respondent was therein found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant,
who was unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent was accordingly
dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in government but without
forfeiture of retirement benefits.

Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases of Sealana-

Abbu v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge
Madroño, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486.4 In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal
case without prior notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido
charged that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were
deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods but did not issue the corresponding
memorandum receipts. Some of the goods were lost while others were substituted with
damaged goods. Respondent was found guilty of both charges and his retirement
benefits were forfeited.

In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing
them by filing numerous complaints against them, namely:

1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against
Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to
an acquaintance who thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while
posing as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.

2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his co-
respondents in the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of
Venustiano's firearm.

3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the
Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent
alleged that Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into
custody a prisoner by final Judgment who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33,8 filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as
chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being
related to a candidate for barangay councilor.

At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano
Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still
pending.

Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since
they had earlier filed administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from
the judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against them, they
suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial damage. They claim that their
children had to stop going to school since the family funds were used up in attending to
their cases.

For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the administrative
cases in which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not constitute moral
turpitude. Hence, he could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the
complaints he filed against complainants was manufactured. He adds that he "was so
unlucky that Saburnido was not convicted."9 He claims that the complaint for serious
irregularity against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter was
able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating that his service firearm was lost.
He also points out that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his
watch. As for his complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends that by
mentioning this case in the present complaint, Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right
to call the attention of the proper authorities to a violation of the Election Code.

In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against them were
meant only to harass them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in
the BEI in 1995 only because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She stated
that she told the other BEI members and the pollwatchers that she was related to one
candidate and that she would desist from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody
objected, she proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added that her
relative lost in that election while respondent's son won.

In a resolution dated May 22, 1996,10 we referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent
and his counsel failed to appear and present evidence in the hearing of the case set for
January 26, 2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have waived his
right to present evidence in his behalf during said hearing. Neither did respondent
submit his memorandum as directed by the IBP.

After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants submitted
convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct
that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP.

A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.11 Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:

RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants

reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces
vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual,
as complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from the judiciary. We see
in respondent's tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the
persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is
trying to exact revenge.

Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal
profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do.x x x
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from
the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
12 While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.13 In this case, we find
suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is
not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the
legal profession.14

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found GUILTY of gross

misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a WARNING
that a repetition the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent's
suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of this decision. Let notice of this
decision be spread in respondent's record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur

____________________________________________________________

.R. No. 1203 May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.

Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.


W. A. Kincaid for defendant.

PER CURIAM:

Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he
had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the
law then in force in said city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and
after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the
purpose of evading the law.

The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made
answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After
reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs.
H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits
in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that
the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made
an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and
directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of
suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.

We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they
were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge
and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes"
Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of
an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his
office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or
the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.

In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United
States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been
convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of
opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D.
Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the
7th day of February, 1903.

It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of
law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
_________________________________________________________

G.R. No. L-23467 March 27, 1968

AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for

himself and as General President,

ATTY. JOSEUR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ATTY. LEONARDO C.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Jose Ur. Carbonell for and in his own behalf as petitioner.


Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-
ULP-Cebu.

The background facts are as follows:

On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union,
Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said
union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor
practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Made
respondents were their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc.
(Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo Guillen, its
chief engineer and general factory superintendent; and Fraternal Labor Organization
and/or Roberto Poli, its president.

Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated June
30, 1956 and July 6, 1956), 2 respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9,
1957, answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also
filed their answer dated July 12, 1957.

With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial
commissioner.

At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared and
testified. Two of these ten were permanent (regular) employees of respondent
company; the remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular employees were
Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan
Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente,
Felimon Villaluna and Brigido Casas.

On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, rendered
judgment, which provides, inter alia, that the two regular employees (Reyes and
Magtubo) be reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of seniority and other
benefits which should have accrued to them had they not been illegally dismissed, with
full back wages from the time of their said dismissals up to the time of their actual
reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in the meantime" and that the
eight seasonal workers "be readmitted to their positions as seasonal workers of
respondent company (Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time
they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling season on October 1, 1955
up to the time they are actually reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the
period of their lay-off."

Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this Court. 3 On

March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners
therein did not seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962. The
judgment became final.

Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to determine the
actual money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its
Examining Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the back wages due
the ten complainants.

On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back wages
due the ten complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for
reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on September 24, 1963.

In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15,
1963 in the same case — CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu — a "Notice of Attorney's Lien."
He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case
No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the
Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he "had actually rendered
legal services to the laborers who are subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-
ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily
agreed to give [him], representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts
equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25%
attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into consideration the
length of services he rendered and the nature of the work actually performed by him."
 On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's
Lien," which in part reads:

3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on February 3, 1956,
had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel herein, representing his
Attorney's fees on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent
(30%) of whatever money claims that may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy
of said Agreement, in the local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the
English language are hereto attached as annexes "A" "A-1" hereof;

4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above-entitled Case was already decided in
their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are also Complainants in this
Case begged from the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to
Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also
Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%) although the
latter's actual services rendered was so insignificant thereof;

5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the President of said
Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and consented that his attorney's
fees be reduced to only Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%)
as originally agreed upon in 1956.

On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a
document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and dismissal —
thru a union board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof) — of Atty. Leonardo
C. Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu,
effective February 28, 1963.

On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds for his
discharge specified in the board resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and
ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated
contract for attorneys' fees.

On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and
complainants' motions for resonsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and
also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien. Judge Martinez' order
reads in part:

(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount representing

25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as attorney's fees;
xxx xxx xxx

(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the respondent

company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez, and he may
collect the same from the Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this order, subject to
existing auditing procedures; ....

Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4

On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order
with respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no
jurisdiction to determine the matter in question, and that the award of 25% as attorneys'
fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was denied on April
28, 1964 by CIR en banc.

On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution was
filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.

On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the motion of
June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the
Cashier of the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81 representing
attorneys' fees and deducting therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit.

Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the

ten employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.

1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority to
adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising
from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases
ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere
incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the
special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.

These arguments are devoid of merit.

The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end

feature of the main case, CIR No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's
jurisdiction. And, it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has
acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction
until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related
thereto." 5 Expressive of the rule on this point is this —
 4. It is well settled that:

A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential
to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court has power to do all things
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction,
and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even though the court may
thus be called upon to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as
original causes of action.

While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to

effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation,
implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In re
Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions,
every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the
enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So demands, matters, or questions
ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the Court may
thus be, called on to consider and decide matters, which as original causes of action,
would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S.
pp. 136-138.)

Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958,
and Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the court having
jurisdiction over the main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto, even if
they would otherwise, be outside its competence. 6

To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners

advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules.
Thus it is, that usually the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court
which renders the judgment. 8 And, it has been observed that "[a]n approved procedure,
where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or where money has been paid into
court, is for the attorney to file an intervening petition and have the amount and extent of
his lien judicially determined." 9 Appropriately to be recalled at this point, is the recent
ruling in Martinez vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967,
where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was made by
this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court of Industrial Relations
obviously had jurisdiction over the main cases, ... it likewise had full jurisdiction to
consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorney's
fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 10
 2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten (10) successful
complainants in C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the
amount adjudicated by the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).

They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.

Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30%
attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and
one of the 10 successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25% since "they
have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five
Per Cent (5%)." Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3,
1956 — before the 48 employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated
fee is 30% of whatever amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract
was signed only by 8 of the 10 winning claimants. What happened to the others? Why
did not the union intervene in the signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said
contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract
only after the receipt of the decision.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered into by
the union and its officers thru its President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell
and Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall be divided equally ("share
and share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the
union president.

After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys'
fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution
of the above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the
Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It noted,
too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of Attorney's Lien.

3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should
share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in
terms clear and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except
with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." The union
president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such
president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys'
fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.

4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is

to receive in a suit "should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." 11

Lately, we said: 12

The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is
found under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable, is now
deeply rooted in this jurisdiction....

xxx xxx xxx

Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis
whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable,
because a lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court
in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be
subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy demands
that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source
of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe, et al. v.
Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action is
between the debtor and the creditor, and not between attorney and client. As courts
have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must necessarily have the
right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract, is
valid. Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138.

In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and
unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a monthly salary of
P175, the other successful complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of
P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the long period of time that they were illegally and
arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money
judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice
therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this judicial antidote.

The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to
assume that they have not reached an educational attainment comparable to that of
petitioner Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers.
Because of the inequality of the situation between laborers and lawyers, courts should
go slow in awarding huge sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely on
contracts. 14 For, as in the present case, the real objective of the CIR judgment in CIR
Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the complaint laborers who were unjustifiedly
dismissed from the service. While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to
develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them, still lawyers should not
be permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What
is to be paid to the laborers is not windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow.
Contracts for legal services between laborer and attorney should then be zealously
scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.

5. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of
twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably compensates the whole of the
legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by
petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all, they are the
counsel of record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this
fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the proceedings reveal the
existence of an association between said attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the
name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common effort of the two. It cannot be
denied though that most of those pleadings up to judgment were signed for Fernandez
& Carbonell by respondent Fernandez.

We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez

and Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962,
complained to CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor
to inform him about the incidents of this case." He there requested that he be furnished
"separately copies of the decision of the court and other pleadings and subsequent
orders as well as motions in connection with the case."

Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift in
their professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize
Official Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of
Execution" was also registered in the same court. Although filed under the name of
"Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty.
Carbonell.

On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for

Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he
filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding
the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On September 24, 1963, he also
filed a "Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other pleadings
that were filed later were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in the name of
"Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of
the court battle was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its
eyes to the legal services also rendered by Atty. Carbonell. For, important and
numerous, too, were his services. And, they are not negligible. The conclusion is
inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-five per cent
(25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein. As to how much, this is a function pertaining to
CIR.

6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to
Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount
recovered. In the event payment actually was made, he should be required to return
whatever is in excess of the amount to which he is entitled in line with the opinion
expressed herein. 15

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five per cent (25%)
attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March
19, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25,
1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective
shares of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the
amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys' fees or both. No costs. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles
and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.