[G.R. No. L-32096. October 24, 1970.
] with the commensurate power of control over economic
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation
Commissioner, Petitioner, v. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA, in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br.
XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO, Respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor
General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres
for Petitioner.
Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.
Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES;
DETERMINATION OF VALIDITY IN CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS.
— There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars
the Supreme Court from passing upon the question of the
validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding
for certiorari before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; GENERALLY. — Police power is the
authority of the state to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. It is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. In negative terms, it
is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly
distinguishable with the totality of legislative power.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. — It is in the above sense the greatest
and most powerful attribute of government. Its scope, ever-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefit. The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROMOTION OF PUBLIC SAFETY, REFLECTOR
LAW. — It would be to overturn a host of decisions impressive
for their number and unanimity were this Court to sustain the
attack on the Reflector Law (Republic Act No. 5715) ostensibly
for disregarding the due process safeguard. It would be to
close one’s eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to
condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays
lack of concern for public safety. The statute assailed is not
infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or
caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to
a felt public need. It can stand the test of the most
unsympathetic appraisal.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE REJECTED. — The
Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-
faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the
responsibility of coping with social and economic problems
affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote
the general welfare through state action. No constitutional
objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property
rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to
be heeded, unless on the clearest and most satisfactory proof
of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a
showing, there maybe declaration of nullity, not because the Page | 1
laissez-faire principle was disregarded, but because the due
process, equal protection or non-impairment guarantees
would call for vindication.
6. ID.; ID.; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS; GENERALLY.
— It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments
may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot
be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute all its term and provision when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is
an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enactment. The legislative does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that
may be the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF LEGISLATIVE STANDARD AND
POLICY. — To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental
rules and regulations.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
IMPLEMENTING THE REFLECTOR LAW. — Administrative Order
No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, issued
pursuant to the authority granted him to promulgate rules and
regulations, giving life to and translating into actuality the
fundamental purpose of the Reflector Law to promote public
safety, is not invalid as an undue exercise of legislative power.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation
Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law 1 in this proceeding
for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the
Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, be annul and set aside his order for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed against
Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement
of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court
for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent
Teddy C. Galo assailing the validity of such enactment as well
as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer,
would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal
questions raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent
Teddy C. Galo, who was quite categorical in his assertion that
both the challenged legislation and the administrative order
transgress the constitutional requirements of due process and
nondelegation, is not averse either to such a definitive ruling.
Considering the great public interest involved and the reliance
by respondent Galo on the allegation that the repugnancy to
the fundamental law could be discerned on the face of the
statute as enacted and the executive order as promulgated,
this Court sees no obstacle to the determination in this
proceeding of the constitutional questions raised. For reasons
to be hereafter stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector
Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the
implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional
infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial.
As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo
on his behalf and that of other motorists filed on May 20, 1970
a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise
of the police power, for being violative of the due process
clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation
wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event
that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional,
Administrative Order No, 2 of the Land Transportation
Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation
be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There
was a healing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction held on May 27, 1970 where both
parties were duly represented, but no evidence was
presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent Judge
ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed
against the enforcement of such administrative order. There
was, the day after, a motion for its reconsideration filed by the
Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the meanwhile,
the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued on June 1, 1970
the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the
required bond. The answer before the lower court was filed by
petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970,
respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of
the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed with this Court on June 18, 1970.
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required
respondents to file an answer to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G.
Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he
restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and,
as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in seeking
that the legal questions raised, namely the constitutionality of
the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of Administrative
Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of the authority conferred
on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power, be definitely decided. It was
not until July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer
seeking the dismissal of this petition concentrating on what he
considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative Order
No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the Reflector
Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In the meanwhile,
on July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing with
Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and
respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear during the
course of such argumentation that the matter of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under
consideration by this Court. The case is thus ripe for decision.
We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2.
1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the
petition, the answers, and the oral argument, it would be
proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as
indicated, is in the affirmative. It is to be noted that the main
thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather
convincing fashion that the challenged legislation does not Page | 2
suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by
the respondent Galo. Since the special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition filed by him before respondent
Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment by
the attribution of the violation on the face thereof of the due
process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it
would follow that there is sufficient basis for us to determine
which view should prevail. Moreover, any further hearing by
respondent Judge would likewise be limited to a discussion of
the constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts having
been made. This is one case then where the question of
validity is ripe for determination. If we do so, further effort
need not be wasted and time is saved. Moreover, the officials
concerned as well as the public, both vitally concerned with a
final resolution of this question of validity, could know the
definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great
public interest, as was mentioned, to be served by the final
disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying that
respondent Galo be declared as having no cause of action with
respondent Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his
suit.
There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach.
We have done so before in a suit, Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2
involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was a
petition for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg. We there
announced that we "have decided to pass upon the question
of the validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing
that by doing so we would be putting an end to a dispute, a
delay in the disposition of which has caused considerable
damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco
planters themselves."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars
this Court from similarly passing upon the question of the
validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to
test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The same felt need for resolving once and for all the vexing
question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment
and thus serve public interest exists. What we have done in the
case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate
branches, the executive, we can very well do in the matter
before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act.
Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs
prayed for, the burden of showing the unconstitutionality of
the act having proved to be as will now be shown, too much
for respondent Galo.
2. The Reflector Law reads in full:" (g) Lights and reflector when
parked or disabled.—Appropriate parking lights or flares
visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner
of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or
in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner
as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor
vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or
other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or
attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at
night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not
provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this
subsection shall be registered." 3 It is thus obvious that the
challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police
power to promote public safety.
Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, 4 identified
police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the
state." Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso, 5 reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people." The concept was set forth in
negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth
decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society." 6 In that sense it could be hardly
distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc 7 with
the totality of legislative power.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew
"the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of
powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to
all the great public needs." 9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may
be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the time." 10 The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to unsure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.
It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for
their number and unanimity were this Court to sustain
respondent Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to do, especially
so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for
disregarding the due process safeguard is singularly
unpersuasive. It would be to close one’s eyes to the hazards of
traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character.
Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety. How
can it be plausibly alleged then that there was no observance
of due process equated as it has always been with what is
reachable? The statute assailed is not infected with
arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far
from oppressive. It is a legitimate response, to a felt public
need. It can stand the test of the most unsympathetic
appraisal.
Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to
resist the teaching of many American State Court decisions
referred to in the secondary source, American Jurisprudence,
principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been
cautioned against an indiscriminate acceptance of such
doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental
postulate in American public law, laissez-faire.
It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a
concept did influence American court decisions on
constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo
speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of
caution which would do well to heed. It was a categorical
imperative which statesmen as well as judges, must obey." 12
For a long time, legislation tending to reduce economic
inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process
clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on
such a basic assumption.
The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more Page | 3
responsive to the social and economic forces at work changed
matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater receptivity by the
American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential
of property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of
Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a contrary
drift. He did note the expending range of governmental activity
in the United States. 13 What is undeniable is that by 1943,
laissez-faire was no longer the dominant theory. In the
language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must transplant
these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-
interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and
social advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded and strengthened
governmental controls."cralaw virtua1aw library
While authoritative precedents from the United States federal
and state jurisdictions were deferred to when the Philippines
was still under American rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-
faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then. As
early as 1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already had occasion to affirm:
"The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of
the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are
of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief
in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity.
The Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail
after the other two branches of the Government in this
progressive march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision.
which held invalid under the due process clause a provision
providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and
thirty days after confinement could be cited to show that such
a principle did have its day. It is to be remembered though that
our Supreme Court had no other choice as the Philippines was
then under the United States, and only recently the year
before, the American Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-faire theory, did hold that a
statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally
infirm.
What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional
Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was
rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of
coping with social and economic problems with the
commensurate power of control over economic affairs.
Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the
general welfare through state action. No constitutional
objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property
rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to
be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most
satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a declaration of
nullity, but not because, the laissez-faire principle was
disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or
non-impairment guarantees would call for vindication.
To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased
whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy
is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of
the Constitutional Convention. Manuel A. Roxas, later the first
President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of
the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted
the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions"
and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of
industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing
business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the
then] current tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke
thus: "My answer is that this Constitution has a definite and
well defined philosophy, not only political but social and
economic. . . . If in this Constitution the gentleman will find
declarations of economic policy they are there because they
are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the
Filipino people because we believe that the days have come
when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution
those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the
freedom to develop national aspirations and national
interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries
which a constitutional provision automatically imposes. 19
It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice
Laurel, who likewise sat in the Constitutional Convention and
was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a concurring
opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of
Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
20 that the Constitution did away with the laissez-faire
doctrine. In the course of such concurring opinion and after
noting the changes that have taken place calling for a more
affirmative role by the government and its undeniable power
to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the
doctrine in People v. Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as
a living principle." 21
It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle
that during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity
was found to have attached to legislation covering such
subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23
minimum wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation
of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and
control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the
Republic this Court having given the seal of approval to more
favorable tenancy laws, 29 nationalization of the retail trade,
30 limitation of the hours of labor, 31 imposition of price
control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one month, 33
and social security scheme. 34
Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more
diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with
not unexpected regularity, during all the while our
Constitution has been in force, attesting to the demise of such
a shibboleth as laissez-faire. It was one of those fighting faiths
that time and circumstances had upset, to paraphrase Holmes.
Yet respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That,
it would appear, is a vain quest, a futile undertaking. The
Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly
hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the
constitutional test.
3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent
Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2
issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being
contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April
17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing
what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of
whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be
registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall
either be factory built-in-reflector, commercial glass reflectors,
reflectionized tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall
have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times
such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters
away at night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions,
placement and color. As to dimensions, the following is
provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in
diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape
— At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or
taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle
owner." 36 Provision is then made as to how such reflectors
are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." 37 There is the
further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there Page | 4
shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each
side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or
painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof.
38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in,
commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint
placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or
yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all
be red. 39
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed.
Thus: "Non-compliance with the requirements contained in
this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the
motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its
registration may be suspended in pursuance of the provisions
of Section 16 of RA-4136; [Provided], However, that in the case
of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) of
Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty
pesos shall be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of that under
Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an
amendment, Petitioner, as the Land Transportation
Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations
for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its
provisions. 41 It is likewise an express provision of the above
statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, a fine of not less
than P10 nor more than P50 could be imposed. 42
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments
may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot
be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is
an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when
it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what
is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may
indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority
or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.
The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the
legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and
practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative
powers . . ." 48
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together
with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of
which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and
emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in
statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical Page | 5

whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is
public safety. What is sought to be obtained as in Calalang v.
Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." 43
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice
Laurel in a decision announced not-too-long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of
non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of ‘subordinate
legislation’ not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments." 44 He continued:
"Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and
the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the
practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual
approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is
authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the
statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life
to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His
power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative
Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,
launched against it by respondent Galo.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
are granted, the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of
preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9,
1970 denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside.
Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C.
Galo, there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and
Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown
to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from Justice Villamor, J., took no part.
J. B. L. Reyes in People v. Exconde: 46 "It is well established in
this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non- Concepcion, C.J., did not take part.
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All
that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the
law prescribes . . ." 47

An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle

comes from the pen of the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed
upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true
that, under our system of government, said power may not be
delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is
to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and
another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the
execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under
the second category, if the law authorizing the delegation
furnishes a reasonable standard which ‘sufficiently marks the
field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be
known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the
legislative will.’ (Yakus v. United States, 88 L. ed. 848) . . . It
should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be
construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law
creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, ‘to
maintain monetary stability in the Philippines,’ and ‘to
promote a rising level of production, employment and real
income in the Philippines.’ (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265). These
standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the
delegated authority, the character of administrative details in
the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said
[G.R. No. L-24693. October 23, 1967.] The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be
deprived of their present business or a particular mode of
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of police power.
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and GO Persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the
CHIU, Petitioners-Appellees, v. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the
OF MANILA, Respondent-Appellant. VICTOR police power embark in those occupations subject to the
ALABANZA, Intervenor-Appellee. disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that Page | 6

power.
J. M. Aruego, A. Tenchavez and L. U. Go for Petitioners-
Appellees.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates for Respondent-Appellant.

DECISION

SYLLABUS
FERNANDO, J.:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ABSENCE OF INJURY TO RIGHTS BY

A Motion for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31,
OPERATION OF STATUTE OR ORDINANCE. — Unless a person
1967 was filed by petitioners, followed by a Motion for new
is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
trial. As the Motion for reconsideration is clearly without
operation of statute or ordinance he has no standing, except
merit, there is no occasion for this sought-for new trial.
perhaps as to the liberty to contract, which is part and parcel
Consequently, both motions are denied.
of their right to property.

(1) No merit in the Motion for reconsideration. —

2. ID.; FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, NOT A BAR TO POLICE POWER
MEASURES. — In this jurisdiction, the liberty to contract, has
In the decision of this Court of July 31, 1967, sought to be
never stood in the way of the enactment of police power
reconsidered, its basis was categorically set forth in the
measures when called for by circumstances. The same is true
following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
in the United States, where such concept has definitely fallen
from its previously high estate under the impact of the Nebbia
"As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A
(291 US 502), West Coast Hotel Co. (300 US 379), and Olsen
decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
(313 US 1305) decisions.
character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance.
3. ID.; DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY ALLOWED PROVIDED DUE
Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what
PROCESS IS OBSERVED. — One could, consistently with the
has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
fundamental law, be deprived of his property, as long as due
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
process is observed.

"Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the

4. ID.; CHALLENGED ORDINANCE DOES NOT DENY EQUAL
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity
PROTECTION CLAUSE. — Since the challenged ordinance
that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
applies to all the motels in Manila, an assertion that there is
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: ‘The presumption
denial of equal protection would be extremely far-fetched.
is all in favor of validity . . . . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
5. ID.; LAISSEZ FAIRE CONCEPT AS BAR TO ENACTMENT OF
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with
REGULATORY MEASURES, MAY NOT BE INVOKED. — The
the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
invocation of the laissez faire concept as bar against the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
enactment of regulatory measures, which undoubtedly would
necessitates action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
result in the diminution of income and the loss of business,
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
does not occasion any misgiving as to the conformity of the
essential to the well being of the people . . . . The Judiciary
decision arrived at by the Court with controlling constitutional
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not
law principles. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
of police regulations.’
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest. The state in order to promote the general welfare
"It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it
business and occupations. Persons and property may be
is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
face, which is not the case here. The principle has been
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of
O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
succinctly summed up the matter thus: ‘The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process
of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence
of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute.’ No such factual foundation being laid in the present
case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside."cralaw virtua1aw library
The O’Gorman principle 1 fails to meet the approval of counsel
of petitioners. They would restrain unduly and unjustifiably its
operation. In the language of the motion for reconsideration:
"The U.S. Supreme Court was not laying down as a general rule
in constitutional cases that there must be a factual foundation
of record to offset the presumption of constitutionality of any
and every law."cralaw virtua1aw library
To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, this interpretation is without
support in authority or reason and rests upon a misconception.
It is to betray an almost total lack of awareness of the import
and significance of the O’Gorman doctrine in American
constitutional law. Authorities on the subject of proven
competence and knowledge flatly reject such a view. Dodd, 2
Dowling, 3 Freund, Sutherland, De Wolfe Howe, and Brown, 4
and Kauper 5 in their standard casebooks quote the same
excerpt from O’Gorman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. appearing in
the opinion of this Court. Dodd entertained no doubt: "The
accepted view is that stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
O’Gorman case." 6 nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be
Frankfurter and Landis were equally explicit in their
appreciation of what the O’Gorman dictum means. "As
doctrine, there is nothing new in the avowal of a need for
concreteness in passing judgment upon the legislative
judgment. But perhaps last term marks a more sedulous
attention to its observance. Certainly the procedure followed
by the Court in O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., if
regularly observed, will affect not a little the fate of legislation.
If insisted upon, it will compel the bar to argue questions of
legislative validity in the perspective of the circumstances
which gave rise to a particular statute." 7
The late Professor Hamilton of the Yale Law School, one of the
most distinguished constitutionalist, would have been
appalled by the unorthodoxy of the view of counsel of
petitioners. For him, the O’Gorman opinion was a
manifestation of the jurist’s art at its
best:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If the jurists have the feelings of other men, Monday, the fifth
of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-one, must have been
a day of consequence in the life of Mr. Justice Brandeis. On
that day he handed down the judgment of the United States
Supreme Court in the O’Gorman case. The cause was a simple
suit in contract: the result depended upon the validity of a New
Jersey statute regulating the commissions to be paid by
insurance companies to their agents for securing business. The
more general question was the tolerance to be accorded to
legislative price-fixing under the Fourteenth Amendment. And,
as the fortunes of litigation broke, the issue came to be the Page | 7
intellectual procedure by which the constitutionality of the
acts which make up the public control of business are to be
determined. Upon that day the views of Brandeis became ‘the
opinion of the court,’ and a new chapter in judicial history
began to be written.
"x x x
"In form ‘the opinion of the court’ is a very simple and
unpretentous document. It begins with a statement of the
issue and a history of the case, continues with a brief summary
of the reasons for the statute and a statement that ‘the
business of insurance is so affected with a public interest that
the state may regulate the rates,’ and concludes with a
declaration of the test for validity. As ‘underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character,’ it follows that `the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute.’ It did not appear ‘upon
the face of the statute, or from any facts of which the court
must take judicial notice, that in New Jersey ‘evils did not
exist,’ for which the statute was ‘an appropriate remedy.’
Accordingly the court was compelled to declare the statute
valid; in fact it was left with no alternative.
"Yet the simple lines of a short opinion present a superb
example of the jurist’s art . . . ." 8
This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the
readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights,
especially those involving the freedom of the mind, present
and ominous. That in such an event there should not be a rigid
insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented
does not argue against the force of the above excerpts on the
weight to be accorded the O’Gorman doctrine in this case.
The prop here failing, is there anything else in the Motion for
reconsideration that calls for a modification of the decision of
this Court? The answer must be in the negative. It ought not to
have escaped petitioners that the opinion of the Court after
noting the lack of factual foundation to offset the presumption
of constitutionality went on to discuss the due process aspect
to make clear that on its face, the Ordinance cannot be
considered void.
"Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’ It would be,
to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to
be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put,
police power is `that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.’
"There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts
speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila, traceable in great part to
the existence of motels, which ‘provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit’ and thus
become the `ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’ The
challenged ordinance then ‘proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration
form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view
at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes
the registration of transients and guests.’ Moreover, the
increase in the license fees was intended to discourage
`establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal’ and at the same time, to increase `the income of
the city government.’ It would appear therefore that the
stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the
validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it."cralaw
virtua1aw library
There is nothing in the Motion for reconsideration that in any
wise affects adversely or impairs the force of the above
conclusion. The task of proving that the challenged Ordinance
is void on its face is one attended with difficulty. Nonetheless,
with the persistence worthy of a better cause, petitioners
would cite as fatal infirmity the alleged invasion of the rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, to liberty, and to
property.
As the unchallenged rule, to paraphrase Laurel, is that unless a
person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights
by the operation of statute or ordinance, 9 he has no standing,
the invocation of petitioners as motel operators of their
alleged right to being free from unreasonable search and
seizure need not be taken seriously. Nor does their claim of the
alleged infringement of their liberty deserve any further
thought, its implausibility being self- evident, except perhaps
as to the liberty to contract, which is part and parcel of their
right to property. Unfortunately for them, in this jurisdiction
the liberty to contract, except in the Pomar 10 case as noted in
the decision, has never stood in the way of the enactment of
police power measures when called for by circumstances such
as undoubtedly exist in this case. The same is true in the United
States, where such a concept has definitely fallen from its
previously high state under the impact of the Nebbia, 11 West
Coast Hotel Co. 12 and Olsen decisions. 13
That leaves only the alleged grievance that there was an
unconstitutional invasion of property rights. It goes without
saying that petitioners themselves cannot ignore that one
could, consistently with the fundamental law, be deprived of
his property as long as due process is observed. The decision Page | 8
makes clear that such indeed was the case as far as this
Ordinance was concerned. To that aspect, a considerable
portion of the opinion was devoted, citing a number of
applicable decisions of this Court, all tending to demonstrate
that there was no due process infraction. The Motion for
reconsideration is conspicuously barren of any attempt to
show that under our previous decisions referred to, the
challenged Ordinance could be successfully assailed. It would
follow then that this reiteration of an argument, previously
shown to be far from persuasive, is deserving of a similar fate.
That is all there is to the Motion for reconsideration. That and
what Justice Cardozo aptly referred to as reference to
"grotesque or fanciful situations," which if they would arise
could then be appropriately dealt with. As the famed jurist
aptly noted: "That they are conceivable though improbable
ought not to govern our construction." 14 That is not the way
then to impugn the validity of an ordinance. Neither could it
be rightfully looked upon as laying a foundation for setting
aside a decision. The Motion for reconsideration, to repeat, is
palpably lacking in merit.
1. No occasion for new trial. —
Subsequently, a supplemental Motion for new trial dated
September 25, 1967, was filed the same day. As earlier pointed
out, with the Motion for reconsideration having been shown
to be devoid of merit, the supplemental Motion for new trial
should likewise be denied. In the main, what was so
unsuccessfully put forth by counsel for petitioners was
adhered to. Additional counsel would bring in new points,
namely, the alleged denial of equal protection and the
repugnancy to "the laissez faire principle underlying our
economic system, as it would substantially reduce return on
the investment." Neither suffices to justify any modification of
the decision, much less its reconsideration. A new trial would
therefore be a exercise in futility.
The alleged denial of equal protection was predicated on the
greater advantages that the motels in the suburbs of Manila
would enjoy as against those within the city limits. On its face,
such argument is clearly unfounded. If the legislative power of
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila were not limited to
its boundaries, if it could apply to the suburban area, then
perhaps plausibility could be imparted to such a claim. Since,
as is undeniable, the challenged Ordinance applies to all the
motels in Manila, an assertion that there is denial of equal
protection would, to put it at its mildest, be extremely far-
fetched.
Nor does the invocation of the laissez faire concept as bar
against the enactment of regulatory measures, which
undoubtedly would result in the diminution of income and the
loss of business, occasion any misgiving as to the conformity of
the decision arrived at by this Court with controlling
constitutional law principles. Did not petitioners take note of
the view announced by Justice Laurel quoted in the decision to
the effect that the policy "of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest." The decision likewise cited this jurist, speaking for Page | 9

the Court in Calalang v. Williams: 15 "Public welfare, then, lies

at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state . . . . To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated." That was in 1940. Then in 1955,
came Co Kiam v. City of Manila, 16 where Justice Reyes, A., for
a unanimous Court categorically declared: "And surely, the
mere fact that some individuals in the community may be
deprived of their present business or a particular mode of
earning a living can not prevent the exercise of the police
power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result
from the legal exercise of that power. (City of New Orleans v.
Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Nor does the reference by new counsel to American state

court decisions call for a different conclusion. The United
States Supreme Court in the leading case of West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 17 decided in 1943, was
equally explicit, saying "the laissez-faire concept or principle of
non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs,
and social advancements are increasingly sought through
closer integration of society and through expanded and
strengthened governmental controls." Two names of great
repute, Freund and Learned Hand, were cited by petitioners.
Neither, if properly understood, could help their cause at all.
According to Freund: "In short, when freedom of the mind is
imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum
of respect, when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers’
judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not
precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil
liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of
values within the due process clause." 18 The illustrious
Learned Hand writing on Chief Justice Stone’s concept of the
judicial function had occasion to note the "discredited
attitude" of what he referred to "as the old apostles of the
institution of property . . . ." 19

What then is left? Clearly nothing to call for the

reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967. Nor is there
the least justification for a new trial and reception of evidence.

Wherefore, the Motion for reconsideration of petitioners of

September 16, 1967 and supplemental Motion for new trial of
September 25, 1967, are denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,

Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
[G.R. NO. 122846 : January 20, 2009]
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and
STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. CITY OF MANILA, represented
by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving
the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew
with the incessant clash between government power and
individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension
between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the
nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels
and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-
Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated
city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from
offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash
up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision
tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional
rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The
same parameters apply to the present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the
validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim)
signed into law the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced
in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared
policy of the City Government to protect the best interest,
health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in
general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance"
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City
of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and
rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are
hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses,
pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean
admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12)
hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than
twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by
owners or managers of said establishments but would mean
the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall
violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction
thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1)
year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
Page | 10
the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the
president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the
operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in
case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the
business license of the guilty party shall automatically be
cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City
ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or
any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately
upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session
today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development
Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order ( TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant,
herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by
Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis
as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only
three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation
(WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the
ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito
Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels
and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to
intervene.10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the
proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as
plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to
withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993,
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993
alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of
the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor
General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is
constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed
to submit the case for decision without trial as the case
involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the
RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774
of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of
the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate
economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the
illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate
purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos
was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on
the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a Petition for Review on Certiorariwith the
Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the
Court treated the petition as a Petition for Certiorariand
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities, among other local government units, the
power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power
of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised
Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for
the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances
which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months
imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single
offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and
void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
Page | 11
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.24 First, it held
that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short
time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power
is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through
a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is
justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally,
as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City
Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via Petition for Review
on Certiorari .25 In their petition and Memorandum,
petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before
the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners' standing.
Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering
"wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered
with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that
the equal protection rights of their clients are also being
interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not
these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for
protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate
to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or
action challenged to support that party's participation in the
case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the
principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does
unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch
of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of
government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the
judicial system derived directly from the Constitution.27 The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates
concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise
definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and
personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as
the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein,
the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on
the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements
of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several
exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits,
third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the
doctrine of transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party
standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme
Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to
bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three
important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered
an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a "sufficiently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the
litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there
must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect
his or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business
interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the
Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for
their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in
constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our
nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United
States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to
bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where
parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or
invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection
claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state
action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States
Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge
a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as
accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections
available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be
diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of
confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v.
Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a
licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal
protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory
scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of
21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High
Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as
advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their
market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship
with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the
latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In
overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in
effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally
applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the
overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly
restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.39 In this
case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a
sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We
can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the
Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert
the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to
mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 Page | 12
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations
Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40 Ermita-
Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill
up a prescribed form stating personal information such as
name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before
they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This
earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar
to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a
blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the
Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the
ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the
case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered
under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were
enacted with a view of regulating public morals including
particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments.
This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no
wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered
by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its
core, this is another case about the extent to which the State
can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room
more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be
rooted in the police power as conferred on local government
units by the Local Government Code through such implements
as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity
of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. 43 Police power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from
the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas
stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power
is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years
of presence in our nation's legal system, its use has rarely been
denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging
sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill
of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of
Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities
animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the
framework for analysis of due process or equal protection
questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due
deference to the co-equal branches of government as they
exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled
to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of
caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same
passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many
political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any
perception that the judiciary is merely the third political
branch of government. We derive our respect and good
standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and
neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to
that end than through the development of rigorous and
sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze
the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional
questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of
due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The
purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection
against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and
partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their
property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as
imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government,
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself
with government action adhering to the established process
when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples
range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of
a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects,
there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government
action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned
by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government
has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty,
or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most
other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal
thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental
freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is
Page | 13
now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before
it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due
process has not been predicated on the frequency with which
it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the
libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of
the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired
potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has
emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its
application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive
due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the
evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court
in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene
Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to
the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
"discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a
"fundamental right."52 Consequently, two standards of judicial
review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and
the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate
scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for
evaluating classifications based on gender 53 and
54
legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in
Reed v. Reed. 56 While the test may have first been articulated
in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since
been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly
in analysis of equal protection challenges.57 Using the rational
basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.58 Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and
the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded
the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such
as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel. 64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should
be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at
bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the
law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would
warrant the application of the most deferential standard - the
rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional
rights of their patrons - those persons who would be deprived
of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of
these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of
political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of
cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the
people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not
shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
fundamental freedoms - which the people reflexively exercise
any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence - that accurately reflect the degree
of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally
incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not
a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what
may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where
the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence
as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a
manner innately understood by them as inherent, without
doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental
rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights,
thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for
the common welfare."[65] In accordance with this case, the
rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed
embraced in the concept of liberty.[ 66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of
Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness
the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be
no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad
indeed. 67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the
ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have
gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery and
Page | 14
fornications' in Manila since they 'provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.'
"68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is
accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior
among willing married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was
in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains
significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As
the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so
very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to
unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed,
they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his
civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking,
that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to
others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe
that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense
free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified
by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to
the right to privacy independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the
Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate
uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than
twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time
in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their
homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest
between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays
in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in
need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours
with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient
alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power
is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it
away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to
donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a
blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no
distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in
illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus
it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are
rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the
Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging,
thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject
them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of
the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home,76 and it is skeptical
of those who wish to depict our capital city - the Pearl of the
Orient - as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third
World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the
grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all
evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact
of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem
confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world.
The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product.
Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new
businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of
individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact
already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing
the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active
police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would
have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners
and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in
fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected
only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding
into the lives of its citizens. However well' -intentioned the
Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their Page | 15
patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of
the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room
more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality
among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary
provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court
is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the promotion of public
morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.78 The
advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy
does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may
foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize.
It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared
morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the
pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an
adequate accommodation of different interests. 79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that
"you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a
matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is
more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to
legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with
public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for
one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as
there are widely accepted distinctions between right and
wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen
not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also
the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the
enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished
from non-free societies not with any more extensive
elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from
our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices
in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent
and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to
uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law,
by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they
take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the
people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an
indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is
hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to
the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid
the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less
drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page | 16
[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC., Petitioner, v. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of
the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, Respondents.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES; VESTURE
OF QUASI LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS. — The
vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable
and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing
complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. v.
Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative
bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society’s
ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned
to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more
expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. LABOR LAW; OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT; DOLE AND POEA
CIRCULARS; POWER TO RESTRICT AND REGULATE INVOLVES A
GRANT OF POLICE POWER. — It is noteworthy that the assailed
circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for
overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged
administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
"administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred" upon the respondents (People v.
Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate
conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of
police power (City of Naga v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898).
To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" and whereas the
power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the
interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility
and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INVALID FOR LACK OF PROPER PUBLICATION
AND FILING IN THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGISTER. — Nevertheless, the DOLE and POEA circulars are
legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper
publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4,
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Page | 17
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order
was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters
(PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing
DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA
Memorandum Circular Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong
Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the
POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of obtaining
overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers,
including domestic helpers.chanrobles law library
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the
abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong
Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE
itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying
such Hong Kong-bound workers.
"In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance
the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment
agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July
1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the
processing and deployment of household workers bound for
Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.
"In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the
Bureau of Local Employment’s regional offices are likewise
directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a
manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong
on a regional basis.
"For compliance." (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued
Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10,
1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing
and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and
the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending
to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
"Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government
Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong
Kong.
"Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in
order to operationalize the temporary government processing
and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong
resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by
private employment agencies for said skill and host market,
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued
Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the
processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for
Hong Kong.
"TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the
recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong. Page | 18

the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the

implementation of said policy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991
pertaining to the government processing and deployment of
"I. Creation of a Joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of
Placement Unit (HWPU). employment contracts which have been attested by the Hong
Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be
"An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing
HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry
segment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s
hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new
"The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination scheme which requires prior accreditation with the POEA.
with appropriate units and other entities
concerned:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for
accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine
"1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31
Recruitment Agencies August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves
accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA
"2. Manpower Pooling Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation
before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be
"3. Worker Training and Briefing allowed.

"4. Processing and Deployment "Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted
applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this
"5. Welfare Programs. list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list
will be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower
"II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for pool.
Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or
Principals.cralawnad "For strict compliance of all concerned." (Emphasis supplied, p.
36, Rollo.)
"Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino
DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition
Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache’s for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA
Office in Hong Kong. circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following
reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"x x x
1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
"X. Interim Arrangement and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars;
"All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall
continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under the 2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to
name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.
3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the
"Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Office of the National Administrative Register were not
Philippine Consulate General in Hong Kong a list of their complied with.
accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July.
The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the
the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After petition.
the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of
applicants will be the POEA manpower pool. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the
power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement
"For strict compliance of all concerned." (pp. 31-35, Rollo.) activities.chanrobles law library : red
"Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall
have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this
title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and
is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions of this title." (Italics ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the
POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May
1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the
overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment
Services, is broad and far-ranging for:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the
defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and
duty:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing
system to private sector participation in the recruitment and
placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . . .’ (Art. 15,
Labor Code, Italics supplied)." (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment
Development Board the power and
duty:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of
Filipino contract workers, on a government to government
arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate .
. . .’ (Art. 17, Labor Code.)" (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took
over:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or
representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen
for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms
of employment for contract seamen workers and secure
compliance therewith." (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable
and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing
complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. v.
Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative
bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society’s
ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned
to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more
expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the
petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment
of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A
careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances
discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and
policing powers expressly or by necessary implication
conferred" upon the respondents (People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA
450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article
36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of
Naga v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to
confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to
"regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first
and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its Page | 19
patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v.
Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly
observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order
No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner’s
business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and
deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the
establishment of the `mechanisms’ that will enhance the
protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In
fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino
domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy
other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other
countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other
countries.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to
end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive
collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees
and other charges committed by private employment agencies
recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They
are] reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare
clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and
deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with
public interest.
"x x x
"The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing
Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial
measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been
attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative
Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are
hereby ‘temporarily suspended effective July 1. 1991.’
"The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to
recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only.
"x x x
". . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and
deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the
restriction of the scope of petitioner’s business is confined
solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment
agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic
helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business
in the Philippines." (pp. 62-65. Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the
police power as delegated to the executive branch of
Government.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and
unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and
Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in
question may not be enforced and implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The
implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of
1991, and POEA Memorandum Circular Nos. 30 and 37, Series
of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED Page | 20

pending compliance with the statutory requirements of

"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
unless it is otherwise provided. . . . ." (Civil Code.)
SO ORDERED.
"Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and
other government agencies charged with the administration Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr ., Romero, Nocon and
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15)
days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of
general circulation." (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as
amended.)

Section 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the

University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons." (Underscoring supplied, Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

"Section 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making

requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book,
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed
by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must
be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency
rules known to persons who may be affected by them."
(Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987.)

Once more, we advert to our ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera, 146

SCRA 446 that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be

published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation," (p. 447.).chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in

nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties." (p. 448.)

"We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication

at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the laws." (p. 448.)
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE
BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO
JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, Respondents.
Don P. Porciuncula for Petitioner.
Ma. Bezen Ringpis Liban/Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; POLICE
POWER; NATURE AND SCOPE. — The latin maxim salus populi
est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum
of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the
people under the State’s police power. As an inherent
attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public
needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a
wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as
parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice
Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro (89 Phil. 660, 708, [1919]) wrote: "The police power
of the State," one court has said . . .’is a power coexistensive
with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed ‘the law of
overruling necessity.’ It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."
Carried onward by the current of legislature. the judiciary
rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative
discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond
the great principles that mean security for the public welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the
individual."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE THEREOF ENJOYS A PRESUMED
VALIDITY UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT IT DOES NOT ENHANCE
THE PUBLIC WELFARE OR WAS EXERCISED ARBITRARILY OR
UNREASONABLY. — Thus, police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the
common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a
presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon
petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly its
ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PROPER REGULATION OF A PROFESSION,
CALLING, BUSINESS OR TRADE IS A VALID EXERCISE THEREOF.
— Neivertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper
regulation of a profession, calling business or trade has always
been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the
police power by the state particularly when their conduct
affects either the execution of legitimate governmental
functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and
welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the
legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own property so as Page | 21
not to pose injury to himself or others.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE THE LIBERTY CURTAILED AFFECTS AT
MOST THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY, THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF
REGULATORY MEASURES IS MUCH WIDER. — In any case,
where the liberty curtailed aftects at most the rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is
certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or
accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is
to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police
power, or regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to
pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed
fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests
determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional
Regulation Commission has began to require previously
licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish
documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had
undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for
renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these
requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property
right under the due process clause. So long as professionals
and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no
such deprivation exists.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE POLICIES; THE STATE SHALL
AFFORD FULL PROTECTION TO LABOR; ELUCIDATED. —
Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of
employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full
employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government’s constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for
the protection of our work-force, local or overseas. As this
Court explained in Philippine Association of Servvice Exporters
(PASEI) v. Drilon, in reference to the recurring problems faced
by our overseas workers: what concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send
its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot
satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that
our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally
and economically, while away from home. A profession, trade
or calling is a property right within the meaning of our
constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right
to work and the right to make a living because these rights are
property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of
which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
6. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; NON-IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATIONS OF
CONTRACTS; MUST YIELD TO THE STATE’S POLICE POWER. —
It is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their
argument that the government cannot enact the assailed
regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to
contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, we held that" (t)he non-impairment clause of the
Constitution . . . must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by
the government." Equally important, into every contract is
read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the
police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject
impressed with the public welfare.
7. ID.; ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; MERELY REQUIRES
THAT ALL PERSONS BE TREATED ALIKE UNDER LIKE
CONDITIONS. — The equal protection clause is directed
principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege.
It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the
object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to
operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that
all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. We have held,
time and again, that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such
classification is based on real and substantial differences
having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the
law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to
present and future conditions, the classification does not
violate the equal protection guarantee.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This limits of government regulation under the State’s police
power are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy.
Assailed is the government’s power to control deployment of
female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record
Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of
any contract for overseas employment. By contending that the
right to overseas employment is a property right within the
meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that
deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous
requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and
constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.
The factual antecedents are undisputed.
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in
1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban
against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and
other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded
after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised
to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks
in the system of deployment. In its place, the government,
through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently
issued Department Order No. 28 creating the Entertainment
Industry Advisory Council (EIAC). which was tasked with issuing
guidelines on the training, testing certification and
deployment of performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC’s recommendations, 1 the Secretary of
Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3
establishing various procedures and requirements for Page | 22
screening performing artists under a new system of training,
testing, certification and deployment of the former.
Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and
certification requirement were to be issued an Artist’s Record
Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any
contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of the
industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled
for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC’s
recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and
implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders
were the following issuances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional
guidelines on the training, testing, certification and
deployment of performing artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record
Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after
the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and
has passed the required tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a
performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for
those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions
therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on
the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists
who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special
Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program)
although they must pass the academic test.
In Civil No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent
Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995
filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally
contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right
to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and
3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due
process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of
the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and
"in gross violation of the constitutional right . . . to life liberty
and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
aforestated orders.
On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc.
and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion
for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the
trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.
However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order
denying petitioners’ prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal from the trial court’s Order, respondent court, in CA
G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the same. Tracing the
circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB
requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent
court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise
by the state of the police power.
We agree.
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the
character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at
promoting the general welfare of the people under the State’s
police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which
virtually "extends to all public needs," 2 this "least limitable" 3
of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments
through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a
host of its regulatory powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice
Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro 4 wrote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The police power of the State," one court has said . . .’is a
power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly
termed ‘the law of overruling necessity.’ It may be said to be
that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it
to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society." Carried onward by the current of legislature, the
judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of
legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not
go beyond the great principles that mean security for the
public welfare or nod not arbitrarily interfere with the right of
the individual." 5 schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993,
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which
precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare or the common good. As the
assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it
follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate
that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not
enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably.
A through review of the facts and circumstances leading to the
issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the
Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned
Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police
power.
In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending
country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with
mammoth populations such as India and China. According to
the National Statistics Office, this diaspora was augmented
annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or
illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for
various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better
work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions.
Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country
for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed
slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47%
between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the
end of 1991, 6 the year former President Aquino instituted the
ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino Page | 23
entertainer Maricris Sioson.
It was during the same period that this Court took judicial
notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of
our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and
entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked
by physical and personal abuse." 7 Even then, we noted that"
[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by
testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent
government action." 8
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant
number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes
abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into
prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these
women, the government began instituting measures aimed at
deploying only those individuals who met set standards which
would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of
these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have
nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending
up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and
forced into jobs other than those indicated in their
employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been
forced into prostitution.
Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation
D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory
Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on
entertainment industry matters. 9 Acting on the
recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on
January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders
embodied EIAC’s Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines
on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas
Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted,
petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC, 10 which gave
the recommendations on which the ARB and other
requirements were based.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly
the women was paramount in the issuance of Department
Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the
deployment of performing artists to "high-risk" destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment further
underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes
the method of screening performing artists by requiring
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for
the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad.
It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room
for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is
usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit
are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently
subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The
ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting
to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining
minimum skills required from entertainers and performing
artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily
met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The
tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from
those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any
available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible
exploitation.
As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3
questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the
requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-
C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for
registration of returning performers. The requirement for a
venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and
nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of
foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from
prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with
unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices.
Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any
stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or
arbitrary. They address a felt need of according greater
protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW’s. They
respond to the industry’s demand for clearer and more
practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions
were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after
consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government
organizations. On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the
safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan
and other destinations, without stifling the industry’s concerns
for expansion and growth.
In any event, apart from the State’s police power, the
Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest
protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional
statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the
Constitution provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare.
More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the
1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of
employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full
employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government’s constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for
the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. At this
Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters
(PASEI) v. Drilon, 11 in reference to the recurring problems
faced by our overseas workers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such
an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is
bad enough that the country has to send its sons and
daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their Page | 24
employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling
expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home.
We now go to petitioners’ assertion that the police power
cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing
workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified
under the old process, because, having previously been
accredited, their accreditation became a "property right,"
protected by the due process clause. We find this contention
untenable.
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the
meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living
because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an
actionable wrong. 12
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation
of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police
power by the state particularly when their conduct affects
either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and
public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate
range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose
injury to himself or others. 13
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. 14 To pretend that licensing
or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause
is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police
power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to
pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed
fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests
determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional
Regulation Commission has began to require previously
licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish
documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had
undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for
renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these
requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property
right under the due process clause. So long as professionals
and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no
such deprivation exists.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their
argument that the government cannot enact the assailed
regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to
contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, we held that" [t]he non-impairment clause of the
Constitution . . . must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by
the government." 15 Equally important, into every contract is
read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the Page | 25

police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject

impressed with the public welfare.

A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of

entertainers and performing artists under the assailed
department orders constitutes class legislation which violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do not
agree.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against

undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it
is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does
not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be
treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed. 16 We have held, time and
again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not forbid classification for so long as such classification
is based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.
17 If classification is germane to the purpose of the law,
concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to
present and future conditions, the classification does not
violate the equal protection guarantee.

In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly

applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for
jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further
the Constitutional mandate requiring government to protect
our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse
and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of
government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must
somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of
these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the
assailed measures enable our government to assume a
measure of control.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought

to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETA
LAWAGON, CRISPIN ALCOMENDRAS, CORAZON SABINADA,
VIRGINIA CATA-AG, FLORENCIA SABANDON, AND LEDEVINA
ADLAWAN, Petitioners, v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS &
EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVAO FRUITS
CORPORATION, AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189305
CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION (PBGEA), DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal through the consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari assails the decision promulgated on January 9,
20091 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set
aside the judgment rendered on September 22, 2007 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, in Davao City upholding
the validity and constitutionality of Davao City Ordinance No.
0309-07, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED.
The assailed September 22, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), 11th Judicial Region, Branch 17, Davao City,
upholding the validity and constitutionality of Davao City
Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FURTHER, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 January
2008 enjoining the City Government of Davao, and any other
person or entity acting in its behalf, from enforcing and
implementing City Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Antecedents
After several committee hearings and consultations with
various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao
City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a
ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao
City, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07
Series of 2007
AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL SPRAYING AS AN
AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES BY
ALL AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY
Be it enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City in
session assembled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 1. TITLE. This Ordinance
shall be known as "An Ordinance Banning Aerial Spraying as an
Agricultural Practice in all Agricultural Activities by all
Agricultural Entities in Davao City";
SECTION 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. It shall be the policy of the City Page | 26
of Davao to eliminate the method of aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities
within Davao City;
SECTION 3. DEFINITION OF TERMS:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya. Aerial Spraying - refers to
application of substances through the use of aircraft of any
form which dispenses the substances in the air.
b. Agricultural Practices - refer to the practices conducted by
agricultural entities in relation to their agricultural activities;
c. Agricultural Activities - refer to activities that include, but
not limited to, land preparation, seeding, planting, cultivation,
harvesting and bagging;
d. Agricultural Entities - refer to persons, natural or juridical,
involved in agricultural activities
e. Buffer Zone - is an identified 30-meter zone within and
around the boundaries of agricultural farms/plantations that
need special monitoring to avoid or minimize harm to the
environment and inhabitants pursuant to policies and
guidelines set forth in this Ordinance and other government
regulations. It is an area of land that must lie within the
property which does not include public lands, public
thoroughfares or adjacent private properties. It must be
planted with diversified trees that grow taller than what are
usually planted and grown in the plantation to protect those
within the adjacent fields, neighboring farms, residential area,
schools and workplaces.
SECTION 4. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY - The provisions of this
Ordinance shall apply to all agricultural entities within the
territorial jurisdiction of Davao City;
SECTION 5. BAN OF AERIAL SPRAYING - A ban on aerial spraying
shall be strictly enforced in the territorial jurisdiction of Davao
City three (3) months after the effectivity of this Ordinance.
SECTION 6. BUFFER ZONE - Consistent with national legislation
and government regulations, all agricultural entities must
provide for a thirty (30) meter buffer zone within the
boundaries of their agricultural farms/plantations. This buffer
zone must be properly identified through Global Positioning
System (GPS) survey. A survey plan showing the metes and
bounds of each agricultural farm/plantation must be
submitted to the City Mayor's Office, with the buffer zone
clearly identified therein;
SECTION 7. PENAL PROVISION - Violation of any provision of
this Ordinance shall be punished as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya. First Offense: Fine of P5,000.00
and imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more
than three (3) months;
b. Second Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not
less than three (3) months but not more than six (6) months
and suspension of City-issued permits and licenses for one (1)
year;
c. Third Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not
less than six (6) months but not more than one (1) year and
perpetual cancellation of City issued permits and licenses;
Provided, that in case the violation has been committed by a
juridical person, the person in charge of the management
thereof shall be held liable;
SECTION 8. REPEALING CLAUSE - Any Ordinance that is
contrary to or inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Ordinance shall be deemed amended or repealed accordingly.
SECTION 9. EFFECTIVITY - This Ordinance shall take effect thirty
(30) days from its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Davao City;
ENACTED, January 23, 2007 by a majority vote of all the
Members of the Sangguniang
2
Panlungsod. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on
February 9, 2007.3 The ordinance took effect on March 23,
2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao
Pioneer.4 Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban
against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months
thereafter.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc.
(PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits
Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development
Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek
the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.5 They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal
protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property
without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant]
to Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code).
On May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to
banana plantations in Davao City led by Wilfredo
Mosqueda, 7 joined by other residents of Davao
City,8 (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction.9 The RTC granted their motion on June 4,
2007.10chanrobleslaw
On June 20, 2007, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction, and subsequently issued the
writ.11chanrobleslaw
Judgment of the RTC
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional,
decreeing thusly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the subject [O]rdinance No. 0309-07 Page | 27
valid and constitutional in all aspect of the grounds assailed by
the petitioner, said [C]ity [O]rdinance No. 0309-07, is sustained
of its validity and constitutionality.
Accordingly, the order of this court dated June 20, 2007,
granting the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by
petitioner is ordered cancelled and set aside as a result of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised
police power13 under the General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code;14 that the ordinance, being based on a valid
classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause;
that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of
pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a
higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift; 15 and that
the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality,
and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had
violated the Constitution. 16chanrobleslaw
However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-
month transition period under Section 5 of Ordinance No.
0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an extended
transition period.17chanrobleslaw
Decision of the CA
PBGEA, et al. appealed,18 and applied for injunctive relief from
the CA, 19 which granted the application20 and consequently
issued a TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity of the
ordinance.21chanrobleslaw
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision
reversing the judgment of the RTC. 22 It declared Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive; found the three-month
transition period impractical and oppressive in view of the
engineering and technical requirements of switching from
aerial spraying to truck-mounted boom spraying; and opined
that the ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection Clause
inasmuch as Section 3(a) of the ordinance - which defined the
term aerial spraying - did not make reasonable distinction
between the hazards, safety and beneficial effects of liquid
substances that were being applied aerially; the different
classes of pesticides or fungicides; and the levels of
concentration of these substances that could be beneficial and
could enhance agricultural production.
The CA did not see any established relation between the
purpose of protecting the public and the environment against
the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the
imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of
substances, on the other. It ruled that the maintenance of the
30-meter buffer zone within and around the agricultural
plantations under Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07
constituted taking of property without due process because
the landowners were thereby compelled to cede portions of
their property without just compensation; that the exercise of
police power to require the buffer zone was invalid because
there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was
obnoxious to the public welfare; and that, accordingly,
Ordinance No. 0309-07 was unconstitutional because of the
absence of a separability clause.
The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective
motions for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motions on
August 7, 2009.23chanrobleslaw
Hence, the separate, but now consolidated, appeals by
petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
In G.R. No. 189185, petitioners Mosqueda, et al. rely on the
following grounds, namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I fundamental rights as residents of Davao City, which were the
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS
AND CONCEPTS OF LAW WHICH, PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DAVAO
ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID
II
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
III
THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS MORE
THAN REASONABLY RELATED TO THE PURPOSE IT SEEKS TO
ACHIEVE
IV
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS VALID, BEING DEMONSTRABLY
REASONABLE AND FAIR
V
THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO THE 30-METER BUFFER
ZONE ARE [SIC] CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
BEING A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
Mosqueda, et al. state that the CA ignored well-established
precepts like the primacy of human rights over property rights
and the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance; that
the CA preferred the preservation of the profits of respondents
PBGEA, et al. to the residents' right to life, health and
ecology,24 thereby disregarding the benevolent purpose of the
ordinance; that the CA assumed the functions of the lawmaker
when it set aside the wisdom behind the enactment of the
ordinance; that the CA failed to apply the precautionary
principle, by which the State was allowed to take positive
actions to prevent harm to the environment and to human
health despite the lack of scientific certainty; that the CA erred
in applying the "strict scrutiny method" in holding that the Page | 28
ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it only
thereby applied in reviewing classifications that affected
fundamental rights; that there was nothing wrong with
prohibiting aerial spraying per se considering that even the
aerial spraying of water produced drift that could affect
unwilling neighbors whose, constitutional right to a clean and
healthy environment might be impinged; 25cralawred that as
far as the three-month period was concerned, the CA should
have considered that manual spraying could be conducted
while the PBGEA, et al. laid down the preparations for the
conduct of boom spraying;26 that "reasonableness" could be
more appropriately weighed by balancing the interests of the
parties against the protection of basic rights, like the right to
life, to health, and to a balanced and healthful ecology; 27 that
PBGEA, et al. did not substantiate their claim of potential
profit losses that would result from the shift; that business
profits should remain inferior and subordinate to their
rights that the assailed ordinance has sought to protect; 28 that
PBGEA, et al. did not explore other modes of pesticide
treatment either as a stop-gap or as a temporary measure
while shifting to truck mounted boom spraying; 29 that the
imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone was a valid exercise of
police power that necessarily flowed from the protection
afforded by the ordinance from the unwanted effects of
ground spraying; that the imposition of the buffer zone did not
constitute compensable taking under police power, pursuant
to the pronouncements in Seng Kee & Co. v. Earnshaw and
Piatt30Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals,31 and Social Justice
Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.;32 and that the 30-meter buffer zone
conformed with the ISO 14000 33 and the DENR Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) requirement. 34chanrobleslaw
In G.R. No. 189305, petitioner City of Davao submits the
following as the issues to be considered and resolved, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 5 OF ORDINANCE NO. 0309-
07, SERIES OF 2007 IS OPPRESSIVE AND AN UNREASONABLE
EXERCISE OF DELEGATED POLICE POWER
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07
CONSTITUTES TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT
COMPENSATION, THUS, VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
IV
WHETHER OR NOT AERIAL SPRAYING OF FUNGICIDES IS SAFE
TO THE PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact
the assailed ordinance because it would thereby protect the
environment and regulate property and business in the
interest of the general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of
the Local Government Code;35 that the ordinance was enacted
to carry out its mandate of promoting the public welfare under
the General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of the Local
Government Code); that the ordinance did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because the distinction lies in aerial
spray as a method of application being more deleterious than
other modes; that aerial spraying produces more drift that
causes discomfort, and an extremely offensive and obnoxious
experience the part of the residents; that spray drift cannot be
controlled even with use by the respondents of highly
advanced apparatus, such as the Differential Global
Positioning System, Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers,
Intellimap, Intelliflow Spray Valve System, Control and Display
Unit and the Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System; 36 that
because of the inherent toxicity of Mancozeb (the fungicide
aerially applied by the respondents), there is no need to
provide for a substantial distinction based on the level of
concentration;37 that as soon as fungicides are released in the
air, they become air pollutants pursuant to Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999),38 and
the activity thus falls under the authority of the local
government units to ban; and that the ordinance does not only
seek to protect and promote human health but also serves as
a measure against air pollution.
The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power
because it does not thereby oblige the shift from aerial to
truck-mounted boom spraying; that the respondents only
choose boom spraying to justify the alleged impracticability of
the transition period by erroneously adding the months
required for each of the stages without considering other steps
that may be simultaneously undertaken; 39 that the Court
should apply its ruling in Social Justice Society v. Atienza,
Jr.,40 by which the six-month period for the folding-up of
business operations was declared a legitimate exercise of
police power; that the respondents did not present any
documentary evidence on the feasibility of adopting other
methods;41 that only 1,800 hectares out of 5,200 hectares of
plantations owned and operated by PBGEA's members use
aerial spraying, hence, the perceived ominous consequence of
imposing a ban on aerial spray to the banana industry is
entirely misleading;42 that the urgency of prohibiting aerial
spray justifies the three-month transition period; that the
complaints of the community residents - ranging from skin
itchiness, contraction and/or tightening in the chest, nausea,
appetite loss and difficulty in breathing after exposure to spray
mist - only prove that aerial spraying brings discomfort and
harm to the residents; that considering that the testimony of
Dr. Lynn Crisanta R. Panganiban, a pharmacologist and
toxicologist, established that fungicides could cause
debilitating effects on the human body once inhaled or
digested, the CA erred in holding that there was no correlation Page | 29
between aerial application and the complaints of the
residents; that given that aerial spray produces more drift and
is uncontrollable compared to the other methods of applying
fungicides, the ordinance becomes reasonable; 43 and that the
medical-related complaints of the residents need not be
proven by medical records considering that these were based
on personal knowledge.44chanrobleslaw
The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-
meter buffer zone is a valid exercise of police power, rendering
the claim for just compensation untenable; that the
maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the
respondents to cede a portion of their landholdings; that the
planting of diversified trees within the buffer zone will serve to
insulate the residents from spray drift; that such buffer zone
does not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial
use of their property;45 and that the buffer zone is consistent
with the Constitution, which reminds property owners that the
use of property bears a social function.46chanrobleslaw
In their comment, the respondents posit that the petition of
the City; of Davao should be dismissed for failure to attach
material portions of the records, and for raising factual errors
that are not within the realm of this appeal by petition for
review on certiorari; 47 that the CA correctly declared the
ordinance as unreasonable due to the impossibility of
complying with the three-month transition period; that
shifting from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying will take
at least three years and entails careful planning, equipment
and machineries, civil works, and capital funding of at least
P400,000,000.00;48 that the Court could rely on its ruling
in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,49 where an ordinance directing
an existing establishment to wind up or to transfer its business
was declared as confiscatory in nature, and, therefore,
unconstitutional;50 that the total ban against aerial sprayig,
coupled with the inadequate time to shift to truck-mounted
boom spraying, effectively deprives the respondents with an
efficient means to control the spread of the Black Sigatoka
disease that threatens the banana plantations; that the
ordinance will only expose the plantations to the virulent
disease that is capable of infecting 60% of the plantations on a
single cycle51 missed;52 that compared with other modes of
application, aerial spraying is more cost-efficient, safe and
accurate; that truck-mounted boom spraying, for instance,
requires 80-200 liters of solution per hectare,53 while manual
spraying uses 200-300 liters of solution per hectare; that aerial
spraying oily requires 30 liters per hectare; that in terms of
safety and accuracy, manual spraying is the least safe and
accurate,54 and produces more drift than aerial
spraying;55 that due to the 300-liter solution required, the
workers will be more exposed to the solution during manual
application and such application will thus be more in conflict
with the purpose of the ordinance to prevent human
exposure;56 that the respondents also find the irrigation
sprinklers suggested by the City of Davao as wasteful, unsafe
and impractical because it cannot provide the needed
coverage for application of the solution to effectively control.
the Black Sigatoka disease; that in contrast, aerial application,
coupled with the latest state of the art technology and
equipment, ensures accuracy, effectiveness, efficiency and
safety compared to the other methods of application; that the
respondents vouch for the safety of the fungicides they use by
virtue of such fungicides having been registered with the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) and classified as
Category IV,57 and found to be mild; and that oral ingestion in
large doses is required before any adverse effects to humans
may result.58chanrobleslaw
The respondents lament that the ban was imposed without
any scientific basis; that the report59 prepared by a fact-finding
team (composed of the Vice Mayor, the City Health Officer,
The City Planning and Development Coordinator and the
Assistance City Planning and Development Coordinator)
organized by the City of Davao revealed that there was no
scientific evidence to support the clamor for the ban against
aerial spraying; that furthermore, national government
agencies like the Department of Agriculture (DA), Department
of Health (DOR) and the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) similarly concluded that there was no scientific evidence
to support the ban;60 that for four decades since the adoption
of aerial spraying, there has been no reported outbreak or any
predisposition to ailment connected with the pesticides
applied; that the testimonies of the residents during the trial
were mere "emotional anecdotal evidence" that did not
establish any scientific or medical bases of any causal
connection between the alleged health conditions complained
of and the fungicides applied during aerial spraying; 61 that the
allegations of health and environmental harm brought by the
pesticides used to treat the banana plantations were
unfounded; that the 2001 study of the International Agency for
Research on Cancer showed that, contrary to the claim of Dra.
Panganiban, the by-product of Mancozeb (Ethylenethiourea or
ETU) was "non-genotoxic" and not expected to produce
thyroid cancer;62 that Carlos Mendoza, a geo-hydrologist and
geophysicist, testified that underground water contamination
through aerial spraying would be impossible because of the
presence of latex, thick layers of clay and underlying rock
formations;63 that even the study conducted by the Philippine
Coconut Authority (PCA) showed that the rhinoceros beetle
infestation in coconut plantations adjacent to the banana
plantations was due to the farmer's failure to observe phyto-
sanitary measures, not to aerial spraying; 64 that furthermore,
aerial spraying is internationally accepted as a "Good
Agricultural Practice" (GAP) 65 under the International Code of
Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides by the
United Nations-Food and Agricultural Organization (UN-FAO);
that as such, they observe the standards laid down by the UN-
FAO, and utilize aerial spraying equipment that will ensure
accuracy, safety and efficiency in applying the substances, and
which more than complies with the requirement under the
Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides
(Rome 2001);66 that in addition, they strictly observe standard
operating procedures prior to take-off,67 in-flight68 and post-
flight;69 that they substantially invested in state-of-the-art
technology and equipment designed to ensure safety,
accuracy, and effectiveness of aerial spraying operations, to
avoid aerial drift;70 that their equipment include: wind meters
(to measure the wind velocity in a specific area), wind cones
(to determine the wind direction, and whether the wind is a
headwind, tailwind or a crosswind); central weather station (to
measure wind speed, the temperature and relative humidity),
Differential Global Positioning System Page | 30
(DGPS),71 Intellimap,72 Control and Display Unit,73 Micronair
Rotary Drift Control Atomizers (AU 5000 Low-Drift
model),74 Intelliflow Spray Valve System,75 and Target Flow
Spray Valve Switch System;76 and that they want to minimize,
if not, eliminate the occurrence of spray drift in order to
minimize wastage of resources and reduced efficiency of
spraying programs implemented to control the Black Sigatoka
disease.77chanrobleslaw
The respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 0309-07 will
regulate aerial spraying as a method of application, instead of
the substances being used therein; that the prohibition is
overbroad in light of other available reasonable measures that
may be resorted to by the local government; that the
ordinance is unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, and
tantamount to a restriction or prohibition of trade;78 that the
ordinance will effectively impose a prohibition against all
pesticides, including fungicides that fall under the mildest type
of substance; that as such, the petitioner has disregarded
existing valid and substantive classifications established and
recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO) that are
adopted by the FPA; that the FPA is the national agency armed
with the professional competence, technical expertise, and
legal mandate to deal with the issue of use and application of
pesticides in our country; that the fungicides they administer
are duly registered with the FPA, and with other more
developed countries that have observed a stricter
environmental and public health regulation such as the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
European Union (EU); that as such, the City of Davao has
disregarded valid, substantial and significant distinctions
between levels of concentration of the fungicides in the water
solution aerially sprayed; that it is the FPA that regulates the
level of concentration of agricultural chemicals prior to
commercial distribution and use in the country; that the
members of PBGEA only spray a water solution (water cocktail)
containing 0.1 liter to 1.5 liters of the active ingredient of
fungicide in a 30-liter water solution per hectare that has
undergone rigorous testing and .evaluation prior to
registration by the FPA; that the active ingredients of the
fungicide are so diluted that no harm may be posed to public
health or to the environment through aerial application;79 that
the ordinance was so broad that it prohibits aerial application
of any substance, including water; 80 and that aside from
fungicides, the respondents also aerially apply vitamins,
minerals and organic fertilizers.81chanrobleslaw
The respondents submit that the maintenance of the 30-meter
buffer zone under Section 5 of the ordinance constitutes an
improper exercise of police power; that the ordinance will
require all landholdings to maintain the buffer zone, thereby
diminishing to a mere 1,600 square meters of usable and
productive land for every hectare of the plantation bounding
residential areas, with the zone being reserved for planting
"diversified trees;" that this requirement amounts to taking
without just compensation or due process; and that the
imposition of the buffer zone unduly deprives all landowners
within the City of Davao the beneficial use of their
property;82 that the precautionary principle cannot be applied
blindly, because its application still requires some scientific
basis; that the principle is also based on a mere declaration
that has not even reached the level of customary international
law, not on a treaty binding on the
Government.83chanrobleslaw
The respondents argue that the illegality of the transition
period results in the invalidity of the ordinance as it does not
carry a separability clause; and that the absence of such clause
signifies the intention of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of City
of Davao to make the ordinance effective as a
whole.84chanrobleslaw
The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is
unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise
of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in
decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes
of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring
the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6
thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling of the Court
We deny the petitions for review for their lack of merit.
I 1960.96 Out of the 5,205 hectares of commercial plantations
Preliminary considerations:
The significant role of the banana industry
in ensuring economic stability and food security
There is no question that the implementation of Ordinance No.
0309-07, although the ordinance concerns the imposition of
the ban against aerial spraying in all agricultural lands within
Davao City, will inevitably have a considerable impact on the
country's banana industry, particularly on export trading.
Banana exportation plays a significant role in the maintenance
of the country's economic, stability and food security. Banana
is a consistent dollar earner and the fourth largest produced
commodity in the Philippines.85 In 2010, the Philippines
figured among the top three banana producing countries in
the world.86 In 2014, fresh bananas accounted for 17% of the
country's top agricultural export commodities, gaining a close
second to coconut oil with 18%.87 The Davao Region (Region
XI)88 was the top banana producing region in 2013, with a
production growth rate of 16.4%, and 33.76% share in the total
agricultural output of the Region.89chanrobleslaw
Despite these optimistic statistics, the banana industry players
struggle to keep up with the demands of the trade by
combatting the main threat to production posed by two major
fungal diseases: the Panama Disease Tropical Race 4 (Fusarium
oxysprum f.sp. cubense) and the Black Sigatoka leaf spot
disease (Mycosphaerella ffiensis morelet). Pesticides have
proven to be effective only against the Black Sigatoka disease.
There is yet no known cure for the Panama
disease.90chanrobleslaw
The menace of the Black Sigatoka disease cannot be taken
lightly. The disease causes destruction of the plant by Page | 31
significantly reducing the leaf area, leading to premature
ripening of the produce and resulting in yield losses of at least
50%.91 Due to its effects on banana export trading, the disease
has emerged as a global concern that has correspondingly
forced banana producers to increase the use of chemical
pesticides.92 Protectant fungicides such as Mancozeb,
chlorothalonil and Propiconazole are applied to combat the
disease.93 These agricultural chemicals are aerially applied by
the respondents in the banana plantations within the
jurisdiction of Davao City to arrest the proliferation of the
disease.
Considering that banana export plantations exist in vast
monocultures, effective treatment of the Black Sigatoka
disease is done by frequent aerial application of fungicides.
This is an expensive practice because it requires permanent
landing strips, facilities for the mixing and loading of
fungicides, and high recurring expense of spray
materials.94 The cost of aerial spraying accounts to 15-20% of
the final retail price of the crop, making the technology
essentially unavailable to small landholdings that are more
vulnerable to the disease. 95chanrobleslaw
Aerial spraying has become an agricultural practice in Davao
City since the establishment of the banana plantations in
devoted to Cavendish banana being operated by the
respondents in Davao City,97 around 1,800 hectares receive
treatment through aerial application. These plantations are
situated in Barangays Sirib, Manuel Guianga, Tamayong,
Subasta Dacudao, Lasang, Mandug, Waan, Tigatto and
Callawa,98 and are affected by the ban imposed by Ordinance
No. 0309-07. The DTI has issued a statement to the effect that
the ban against aerial spraying in banana plantations "is
expected to kill the banana industry," affects the socio-
economic development of the barangays hosting the affected
plantations, and has a disastrous impact on export trading. The
DTI has forecasted that the ban would discourage the entry of
new players in the locality, which would have a potential
drawback in employment generation. 99chanrobleslaw
II
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07
under its corporate powers
The petitioners assert that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid act
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City- pursuant to its
delegated authority to exercise police power in the
furtherance of public welfare and in ensuring a sound and
balanced environment for its constituents. The respondents
negate this assertion, describing the ordinance as
unreasonable, discriminatory and oppressive.
The petitioners' assertion of its authority to enact Ordinance
No. 0309-07 is upheld.
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an
ordinance must pass a two-pronged test: the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers
of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and
the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements
of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).100chanrobleslaw
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in
Section 53101 and Section 54102 of The Local Government Code.
These provisions require the ordinance to be passed by the
majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned, and to
be presented to the mayor for approval. With no issues
regarding quorum during its deliberation having been raised,
and with its approval of by City Mayor Duterte not being
disputed, we see no reason to strike down Ordinance No.
0309-07 for non-compliance with the formal requisites under
the Local Government Code.
We next ascertain whether the City of Davao acted within the
limits of its corporate powers in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-
07.
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the
basic authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
in order to promote the general welfare.103 Such legislative
powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress
through either the Local Government Code or a special law.
The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the Local
Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables
the local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and
maintain local autonomy.104 Section 16
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers,
namely: the general legislative power and the police power
proper. General legislative power refers to the power
delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or
the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the case of Dayao City,105 to
enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and make
regulations. This power is limited in that the enacted
ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and the power must
be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers and
duties legally conferred to the local legislative body. The police
power proper, on the other hand, authorizes the local Page | 32
government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for
the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the local government unit and its
constituents, and for the protection of their
property.106chanrobleslaw
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the
local government unit with the authority to enact legislation
.aimed at promoting the general
welfare, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. —
(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code. x x x
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the local government unit takes its cue
from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local
government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its
constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology
are well within the corporate powers vested in the local
government unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City is vested with the requisite authority to enact an
ordinance that seeks to protect the health and well-being of its
constituents.
The respondents pose a challenge against Ordinance No. 0309-
07 on the ground that the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
has disregarded the health of the plantation workers,
contending that by imposing the ban against aerial spraying
the ordinance would place the plantation workers at a higher
health risk because the alternatives of either manual or truck-
boom spraying method would be adopted; and that exposing
the workers to the same risk sought to be prevented by the
ordinance would defeat its purported purpose.
We disagree with the respondents.
With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and
safety of plantation workers are secured by existing state
policies, rules and regulations implemented by the FPA, among
others, which the respondents are lawfully bound to comply
with. The respondents even manifested their strict compliance
with these rules, including those in the UN-FAO Guidelines on
Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001).
We should note that the Rome 2001 guidelines require the
pesticide applicators to observe the standards provided
therein to ensure the health and safety of plantation workers.
As such, there cannot be any imbalance between the right to
health of the residents vis-a-vis the workers even if a ban will
be imposed against aerial spraying and the consequent
adoption of other modes of pesticide treatment.
Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and
maintaining environmental integrity are privileges that do not
only advance the interests of a group of individuals. The
benefits of protecting human health and the environment
transcend geographical locations and even generations. This is
the essence of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution.
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.107 we declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned
ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to
the alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift
justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the
ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces
of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically
the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be
construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to
enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A
thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact
legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
By distinguishing authority from method we face this question:
Is a prohibition against aerial spraying a lawfully permissible
method that the local government unit of Davao City may
adopt to prevent the purported effects of aerial drift? To
resolve this question, the Court must dig deeper into the
intricate issues arising from these petitions.
II
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the
corporate powers of the local government and passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law.108 In order to
declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also
comply with the following substantive requirements, namely:
(1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
it must not be unreasonable.109chanrobleslaw
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to fulfill the objectives of the Government. 110 A local
government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the
State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive.111 The first requirement refers to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.112chanrobleslaw
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must
have a sufficient justification for the Government's
action.113 This means that in exercising police power the local
government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or
despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary
purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a
legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are Page | 33
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly
oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must
survive a due process challenge.114chanrobleslaw
The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-
07 for being unreasonable and oppressive in that it sets the
effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the
ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate
time to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and
effectively deprives them of efficient means to combat the
Black Sigatoka disease.
The petitioners counter that the period is justified considering
the urgency of protecting the health of the residents.
We find for the respondents.
The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of
pesticide application within three months can readily be
appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and
the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even
the RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to
other modes of spraying within three months in view of the
costly financial and civil works required for the
conversion.115 In the assailed decision, the CA appropriately
observed:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There appears to be three (3) forms of ground spraying, as
distinguished from aerial spraying, which are: 1. "Truck-
mounted boom spraying;" 2. "manual or backpack spraying."
and 3. "sprinkler spraying." Petitioners-appellants claim that it
was physically impossible for them to shift to "truck-mounted
boom spraying" within three (3) months before the aerial
spraying ban is actually enforced. They cited the testimony of
Dr. Maria Emilia Rita G. Fabregar, Ph.D, PBGEA Chairperson, to
the effect that since banana plantations in Davao City were
configured for aerial spraying, the same lack the road network
to make "truck-mounted boom spraying" possible. According
to Dr. Fabregar, it was impossible to construct such road
networks in a span of three (3) months. Engr. Magno P.
Porticos, Jr., confirmed that the shift demands the
construction of three hundred sixty (360) linear kilometers of
road which cannot be completed in three (3) months.
In their separate testimonies, Dr. Fabregar and Engr. Porticos
explained that a shift to "truck-mounted boom spraying"
requires the following steps which may be completed in three
(3) years:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. six (6) months for planning the reconfiguration of banana
plantations to ensure effective truck-mounted boom spraying
for the adequate protections of the plantations from the Black
Sigatoka fungus and other diseases, while maximizing land use;
2. two (2) months to secure government permits for
infrastructure works to be undertaken thereon;
3. clearing banana plants and dismantling or reconstructing
fixed infrastructures, such as roads, drains, cable ways, and
irrigation facilities, which phase may be completed in eighteen
(18) months;
4. importation and purchase of trucks mounted with boom
spraying, nurse trucks and protective gears. The placing of
orders and delivery of these equipments, including the training
[of] the personnel who would man the same, would take six
(6) months; and cralawlawlibrary
5. securing the needed capitalization to finance these
undertakings would take six (6) months to a year.
Ms. Maria Victoria E. Sembrano, CPA, Chairperson of the
PBGEA Finance Committee, testified that her committee and
the Technical Committee and Engineering Group of PBGEA
conducted a feasibility study to determine the cost in
undertaking the shift to ground spraying. Their findings fixed
the estimated cost for the purpose at Php 400 Million.
x x x x
Both appellees failed to rebut the foregoing testimonies with
empirical findings to the contrary.
x x x x
Thus, in view of the infrastructural requirements as
methodically explained, We are convinced that it was
physically impossible for petitioners-appellants to carry out a
carefully planned configuration of vast hectares of banana
plantations and be able to actually adopt "truck-mounted
boom spraying" within three (3) months. To compel
petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial spraying in favor of
"manual or backpack spraying" or "sprinkler spraying" within 3
months puts petitioners-appellants in a vicious dilemma
between protecting its investments and the health of its
workers, on the one hand, and the threat of prosecution if they
refuse to comply with the imposition. We even find the 3-
months transition period insufficient, not only in acquiring and
gearing-up the plantation workers of safety appurtenances,
but more importantly in reviewing safety procedures for
"manual or backpack spraying" and in training such workers for
the purpose. Additionally, the engineering works for a
sprinkler system in vast hectares of banana plantations could
not possibly be completed within such period, considering that
safety and efficiency factors need to be considered in its
structural re-designing.
x x x x
Respondent-appellee argues that the Ordinance merely
banned an agricultural practice and did not actually prohibit
the operation of banana plantations; hence, it is not
oppressive. While We agree that the measure did not impose
a closure of a lawful enterprise, the proviso in Section 5,
however, compels petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial
spraying without affording them enough time to convert and
adopt other spraying practices. This would preclude
petitioners-appellants from being able to fertilize their
plantations with essential vitamins and minerals substances,
aside from applying thereon the needed fungicides or
pesticides to control, if not eliminate the threat of, plant
diseases. Such an apparent eventuality would prejudice the
operation of the plantations, and the economic repercussions Page | 34
thereof would just be akin to shutting down the venture.
This Court, therefore, finds Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-
07 an invalid provision because the compulsion thereunder to
abandon aerial spraying within an impracticable period of
"three (3) months after the effectivity of this Ordinance" is
"unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply
with."116chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted
boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and
financial resources given the topography and geographical
features of the plantations.117 As such, the conversion could
not be completed within the short timeframe of three months.
Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to
comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-
month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment
and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a
buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due
process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly
deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the
beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking without
just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,118 we have thoroughly explained
that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests
the owner of the beneficial use of its
property, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that
"private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." The provision is the most important
protection of property rights in the Constitution. This is a
restriction on the general power of the government to take
property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that
the government does not confiscate the property of some to
give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society,
then society should pay. The principal purpose of the
guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified.
A "possessory" taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory"
taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property.
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was
held that a taking also could be found if government regulation
near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance
requires the planting of diversified trees within the identified
buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and
deemed as confiscatory requiring payment of just
compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to
compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of
all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The Page | 35

of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely
a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be deprived of their landholdings because they can still cultivate
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as
the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, the buffer zones.
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
III
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-
degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
07 rests on its supposed collision with the Equal Protection
propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S.
Clause. The respondents submit that the ordinance
Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit:
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each
(1) by prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the
case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that
substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be
the economic loss caused by public action must be
applied; and (2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all
compensated by the government and thus borne by the public
agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the
as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated
landholding.
on those few persons subject to the public action.
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A
situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial
protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction
or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view,
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
property law that existed when the owner acquired the land
execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The
make the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property
concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial
governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between
uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
legitimate governmental objective.119chanrobleslaw

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws
productive use of land will require compensation under the
to all persons or things without distinction,120 nor intends to
takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land
prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed
that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a
or by the territory in which it is to operate.121 The guaranty of
taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a
equal protection envisions equality among equals determined
complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect
according to a valid classification.122 If the groupings are
on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
and the character of government action. These inquiries are
from another.123 In other word, a valid classification must be:
informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to
(1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the
prevent the government from forcing some people alone to
purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only;
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
and (4) equally applicable to all members of the
borne by the public as a whole.
class.124chanrobleslaw

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking"

if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the
distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner.
(bold Emphasis supplied)
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the
purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial spraying within and
Based on these parameters, we find for the respondents.
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the
justification given by the Government for its conduct is gauged
by using the means-end test.125 This test requires analysis of:
(1) the interests of the public that generally require its
exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular class; and
(2) the means employed that are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive based on the purpose of the ordinance cannot be easily
upon individuals.126 To determine the propriety of the discerned because the ordinance does not make any express
classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz: or implied reference to it. We have to search the voluminous
the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. records of this case to divine the animus behind the action of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial spraying as
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation an agricultural activity. The effort has led uS to the following
test or rational basis test) demands that the classification proposed resolution of the Sangguniang Page | 36

reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.127 The rational Panglungsod,134viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

basis test often applies in cases involving economics or social
welfare,128 or to any other case not involving a suspect RESOLUTION NO. ____
class.129chanrobleslaw Series of 2007

When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a A RESOLUTION TO ENACT AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL
disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or SPRAYING AS AN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL
heightened review. Classifications based on gender or AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY
illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny.130 To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an
WHEREAS, the City of Davao, with fertile lands and ideal
important governmental interest and be substantially related
climactic condition, hosts various large farms planted with
to that interest, but the justification for the classification must
different crops;
be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.131chanrobleslaw
WHEREAS, these farms, lay adjacent to other agricultural
businesses and that residential areas abuts these farm
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative
boundaries;
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
WHEREAS, aerial spraying as a mode of applying chemical
disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the
substances such as fungicides and pesticides is being used by
burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
investors/companies over large agricultural plantations in
a compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive
Davao City;
means to protect such interest.132chanrobleslaw

WHEREAS, the Davao City watersheds and ground water

The petitioners advocate the rational basis test. In particular,
sources, located within and adjacent to Mount Apo may be
the petitioning residents of Davao City argue that the CA
affected by the aerial spraying of chemical substances on the
erroneously applied the strict scrutiny approach when it
agricultural farms and plantations therein;
declared that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the ban included all substances including water
WHEREAS, the effects of aerial spraying are found to be
and vitamins. The respondents agree with the CA, however,
detrimental to the health of the residents of Davao City most
and add that the ordinance does not rest on a valid distinction
especially the inhabitants nearby agricultural plantations
because it has lacked scientific basis and has ignored the
practicing aerials spraying;
classifications of pesticides observed by the FPA.

WHEREAS, the unstable wind direction during the conduct of

We partly agree with both parties.
aerial spray application of these chemical substances pose
health hazards to people, animals, other crops and ground
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational
water sources;
basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the
rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable
WHEREAS, in order to achieve sustainable development,
relationship between the means and the purpose of the
politics must be based on the Precautionary Principle.
ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the
Environment measures must anticipate, prevent, and attack
prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or
the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are
reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all
threats of serious, irreversible damage, lack of scientific
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
of the law.133chanrobleslaw
measures to prevent environmental degradation;

Applying the test, the established classification under

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the City of Davao to ensure the
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be viewed in relation to the group
safety of its inhabitants from all forms of hazards, especially if
of individuals similarly situated with respect to the avowed
such hazards come from development activities that are
purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the
supposed to be beneficial to everybody;
classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative
classification); and (2) the classification based on purpose
WHEREAS, pesticides are by its nature poisonous, it is all the
(elimination of the mischief). The legislative classification
more dangerous when dispensed aerially through aircraft
found in Section 4 of the ordinance refers to "all agricultural
because of unstable wind conditions which in turn makes
entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile, the classification
aerial spray drifting to unintended targets a commonplace.

WHEREAS, aerial spraying of pesticides is undeniably a
nuisance.
WHEREAS, looking at the plight of the complainants and other
stakeholders opposed to aerial spraying, the issue of aerial
spraying of pesticides is in all fours a nuisance. Given the
potential to drift. However, the type of formulation,
surfactant, or other adjuvant may affect spray drift potential.
Secondary drift is associated with pesticide vapor. Pesticide
vapor drift is the movement of the gas that forms when an
active ingredient evaporates from plants, soil, or other
surfaces. And while vapor drift is an important issue, it only Page | 37

vastness of the reach of aerial spraying, the said form of pertains to certain volatile products. Vapor drift and other
dispensation falls into the category of a public nuisance. Public forms of secondary drift are product specific. Water-based
nuisance is defined by the New Civil Code as one which affects sprays will volatize more quickly than oil-based sprays.
a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of However, oil-based sprays can drift farther, especially above
persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or 95°F, because they are lighter.
damage upon individuals may be unequal.
Understandably, aerial drift occurs using any method of
WHEREAS, the General Welfare Clause of the Local application, be it through airplanes, ground sprayers, airblast
Government Code empowers Local Government Units to enact sprayers or irrigation systems.139 Several factors contribute to
ordinances that provide for the health and safety, promote the the occurrence of drift depending on the method of
comfort and convenience of the City and the inhabitants application, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
thereof.
AERIAL AIRBLAST GROUND CHEMIGATION
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, that for the health, safety and peace of mind of all
Crop Droplet Application
the inhabitants of Davao City, let an ordinance be enacted Droplet size
canopy size height
banning aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all
agricultural entities in Davao City.
Application Droplet Boom
Wind speed
xxxx height size height

The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides

as a nuisance because of the unstable wind direction during Wind Wind
Wind speed
the aerial application, which (1) could potentially contaminate speed speed
the Davao City watersheds and ground water sources; (2) was
detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most Swath
especially those living in the. nearby plantations; and (3) posed adjustment
a hazard to animals and other crops. Plainly, the mischief that
the prohibition sought to address was the fungicide drift
resulting from the aerial application; hence, the classification Canopy
based on the intent of the proposed ordinance covered all
agricultural entities conducting aerial spraying of fungicides Boom length
that caused drift.

The assailed ordinance thus becomes riddled with several Tank mix
distinction issues. physical
properties
A brief discussion on the occurrence of the drift that the
ordinance seeks to address is necessary. Source: F.M. Fishel and J.A. Ferrell, "Managing Pesticide Drift,"
available at http://edis.ifas.edu/pi232. citing Pesticide Notes,
Pesticide treatment is based on the use of different methods MSU Extension.
of application and equipment,135 the choice of which methods
depend largely on the objective of distributing the correct dose The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted
to a defined target with the minimum of wastage due to in Davao City are aerial, truck-mounted boom, truck-mounted
"drift."136 The term "drift" refers to the movement of airborne mechanical, and manual spraying.140 However, Ordinance No.
spray droplets, vapors, or dust particles away from the target 0309-07 imposes the prohibition only against aerial spraying.
area during pesticide application.137 Inevitably, any method of
application causes drift, which may either be primary or Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by
secondary. As fittingly described by scholars: 138 insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and
harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given
Primary drift is the off-site movement of spray droplets at, or this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement
very close to, the time of application. For example, a field that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?
application using a boom in a gusty wind situation could easily
lead to a primary drift. Primary spray drift is not product We answer in the negative.
specific, and the active ingredients do not differ in their

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial
spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide
application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom
spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the
community and to the environment. 141 A ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks
to achieve.142 In the process, the ordinance suffers from being
"underinclusive" because the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks
to eliminate.143 A classification that is drastically
underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as
an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly
serves the intended purpose of the law.144chanrobleslaw
The claim that aerial spraying produces more aerial drift
cannot likewise be sustained in view of the petitioners' failure
to substantiate the same. The respondents have refuted this
claim, and have maintained that on the contrary, manual
spraying produces more drift than aerial treatment145 As such,
the decision of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted with
arbitrariness.
Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance
also tends to be "overinclusive" because its .impending
implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation
will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of
individuals than those included in the intended class based on
the purpose of the law.146chanrobleslaw
It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad
because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to
be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity
to be conducted. The respondents admit that they aerially
treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also
vitamins and other substances. The imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and
regardless of the agricultural activity being performed
becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no
relation to the purported inconvenience, discomfort, health
risk and environmental danger which the ordinance, seeks to
address. The burden now will become more onerous to various
entities including the respondents and even others with no
connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of the
ordinance.
In this respect, the CA correctly
observed:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ordinance No. 0309-07 defines "aerial spraying" as the
"application of substances through the use of aircraft of any
form which dispenses the substances in the air." Inevitably, the
ban imposed therein encompasses aerial application of
practically all substances, not only pesticides or fungicides but
including water and all forms of chemicals, regardless of its
elements, composition, or degree of safety.
Going along with respondent-appellee's ratiocination that the
prohibition in the Ordinance refers to aerial spraying as a
method of spraying pesticides or fungicides, there appears to
be a need to single out pesticides or fungicides in imposing
such a ban because there is a striking distinction between such
chemicals and other substances (including water), particularly
with respect to its safety implications to the public welfare and
ecology.
Page | 38
x x x x
We are, therefore, convinced that the total ban on aerial
spraying runs afoul with the equal protection clause because it
does not classify which substances are prohibited from being
applied aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be
made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of
liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and the
environment.147chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We clarify that the CA did not thereby apply the strict scrutiny
approach but only evaluated the classification established by
the ordinance in relation to the purpose. This is the essence of
the rational basis approach.
The petitioners should be made aware that the rational basis
scrutiny is not based on a simple means-purpose correlation;
nor does the rational basis scrutiny automatically result in a
presumption of validity of the ordinance or deference to the
wisdom of the local legislature.148 To reiterate, aside from
ascertaining that the means and purpose of the ordinance are
reasonably related, the classification should be based on a
substantial distinction.
However, we do not subscribe to the respondents' position
that there must be a distinction based on the level of
concentration or the classification imposed by the FPA on
pesticides. This strenuous requirement cannot be expected
from a local government unit that should only be concerned
with general policies in local administration and should not be
restricted by technical concerns that are best left to agencies
vested with the appropriate special competencies. The
disregard of the pesticide classification is not an equal
protection issue but is more relevant in another aspect of
delegated police power that we consider to be more
appropriate in a later discussion.
The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be
traced to its Section 6 by virtue of its requirement for the
maintenance of the 30- meter buffer zone. This requirement
applies regardless of the area of the agricultural landholding,
geographical location, topography, crops grown and other
distinguishing characteristics that ideally should bear a
reasonable relation to the evil sought to be avoided. As earlier
discussed, only large banana plantations could rely on aerial
technology because of the financial capital required therefor.
The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will
become more burdensome to the small agricultural
landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-meter
belt surrounding their property; (2) that will have to be
identified through GPS; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer
zone will have to be plotted in a survey plan for submission to
the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the
crops that may be cultivated therein based on the mandate
that the zone shall be devoted to "diversified trees" taller than
what are being grown therein.149 The arbitrariness of Section 6
all the more becomes evident when the land is presently
devoted to the cultivation of root crops and vegetables, and
trees or plants slightly taller than the root crops and vegetables
are then to be planted. It is seriously to be doubted whether
such circumstance will prevent the occurrence of the drift to
the nearby residential areas.
Section 6 also subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone
requirement agricultural entities engaging in organic farming,
and' do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide drift. The
classification indisputably becomes arbitrary and whimsical.
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification
tends to undercut the governmental claim that the
classification serves legitimate political ends.150 Where
overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a
greater discriminatory or burdensome effect than
necessary.151 In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section
6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious
classification, and for thereby violating the Equal Protection
Clause.
The discriminatory nature of the ordinance can be seen from
its policy as stated in its Section 2, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. It shall be the policy of the City
of Davao to eliminate the method of aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities
within Davao City.
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large
farmholdings that are the only ideal venues for the investment
of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It
effectively denies the affected individuals the technology
aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation
not only of banana but of other crops as well. The prohibition
against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the operations of
the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to
arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other
menaces that threaten their production and harvest. As earlier
shown, the effect of the ban will not be limited to Davao City
in view of the significant contribution of banana export trading
to the country's economy.
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it
oppressive and unreasonable in light of the existence and
availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that
will not overburden the respondents and those dependent on
their operations as well as those who stand to be affected by
the ordinance. In the view of Regional Director Roger C. Chio
of DA Regional Field Unit XI, the alleged harm caused by aerial
spraying may be addressed by following the GAP that the DA
has been promoting among plantation operators. He explained
his view thusly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The allegation that aerial spraying is hazardous to animal and
human being remains an allegation and assumptions until
otherwise scientifically proven by concerned authorities and
agencies. This issue can be addressed by following Good
Agricultural Practices, which DA is promoting among fruit and
vegetable growers/plantations. Any method of agri-chemical
application whether aerial or non-aerial if not properly done in
accordance with established procedures and code of good
agricultural practices and if the chemical applicators and or
handlers lack of necessary competency, certainly it could be Page | 39
hazardous. For the assurance that commercial
applicators/aerial applicators possessed the competency and
responsibility of handling agri-chemical, such applicators are
required under Article III, Paragraph 2 of FPA Rules and
Regulation No. 1 to secure license from FPA.
Furthermore users and applicators of agri-chemicals are also
guided by Section 6 Paragraph 2 and 3 under column of
Pesticides and Other agricultural Chemicals of PD 11445 which
stated: "FPA shall establish and enforce tolerance levels and
good agricultural practices in raw agricultural commodities; to
restrict or ban the use of any chemical or the formulation of
certain pesticides in specific areas or during certain period
upon evidence that the pesticide is eminent [sic] hazards has
caused, or is causing widespread serious damage to crops, fish,
livestock or to public health and environment."
Besides the aforecited policy, rules and regulation enforced by
DA, there are other laws and regulations protecting and
preserving the environment. If the implementation and
monitoring of all these laws and regulation are closely
coordinated with concerned LGUs, Gas and NGAs and other
private sectors, perhaps we can maintain a sound and health
environment x x x.152chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, based on the Summary Report on the Assessment and
Factfinding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana
Plantations,153 submitted by the fact-finding team organized
by Davao City, only three out of the 13 barangays consulted by
the fact-finding team opposed the conduct of aerial spraying;
and of the three barangays, aerial spraying was conducted only
in Barangay Subasta. In fact, the fact-finding team found that
the residents in those barangays were generally in favor of the
operations of the banana plantations, and did not oppose the
conduct of aerial spraying.
IV
The Precautionary Principle still requires scientific basis
The petitioners finally plead that the Court should look at the
merits of the ordinance based on the precautionary principle.
They argue that under the precautionary principle, the City of
Davao is justified in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 in order
to prevent harm to the environment and human health despite
the lack of scientific certainty.
The petitioners' plea and argument cannot be sustained.
The principle of precaution originated as a social planning
principle in Germany. In the 1980s, the Federal Republic of
Germany used the Vorsogeprinzip ("foresight principle") to
justify the implementation of vigorous policies to tackle acid
rain, global warming and pollution of the North Sea.154 It has
since emerged from a need to protect humans and the
environment from increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and
unquantifiable but possibly catastrophic risks such as those
associated with Genetically Modified Organisms and climate
change,155 among others. The oft-cited Principle 15 of the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992 Rio
Agenda), first embodied this principle, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Principle 15
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-
6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is
lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect.156 In such
an event, the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting
either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and
protecting the environment.157chanrobleslaw
It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall
only be relevant if there is concurrence of three elements,
namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and
serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is
relatively certain, or that the causal link between an action and
environmental damage can be established, or the probability
of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not
precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the
precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a
threat of environmental harm; or if the threatened harm is
trivial or easily reversible.158chanrobleslaw
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with,
there has been no scientific study. Although the precautionary
principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a
connection between the serious or irreversible harm and the
human activity, its application is still premised on empirical
studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective
policy choices under the precautionary
159
principle. chanrobleslaw
Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after
scientific inquiry takes place. This scientific stage is often
considered synonympus with risk assessment.160 As such,
resort to the principle shall not be based on anxiety or
emotion, but from a rational decision rule, based in
ethics.161 As much as possible, a complete and objective
scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health
should be conducted and made available to decision-makers
for them to choose the most appropriate course of
action.162 Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an
activity is also important in the application of the principle. The
potential harm resulting from certain activities should always
be judged in view of the potential benefits they offer, while the
positive and negative effects of potential precautionary
measures should be considered.163chanrobleslaw
The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial
spraying appears to be the Summary Report on the Assessment
and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in
Banana Plantations.164 Yet, the fact-finding team that
generated the report was not a scientific study that could
justify the resort to the .precautionary principle. In fact, the Page | 40
Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the
fact-finding team that recommended only a regulation, not a
ban, against aerial spraying. The recommendation was in line
with the advocacy of judicious handling and application of
chemical pesticides by the DOH-Center for Health
Development in the Davao Region in view of the scarcity of
scientific studies to support the ban against aerial
spraying.165chanrobleslaw
We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining
the ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing is known of
the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring
to the health of the residents within and near the plantations
and to the integrity and balance of the environment. It is
dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial
spraying would be adverse even in the absence of evidence.
Accordingly, for lack of scientific data supporting a ban on
aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down
for being unreasonable.
V
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act
The Court further holds that in addition to its
unconstitutionality for carrying an unwarranted classification
that contravenes the Equal Protection Clause, Ordinance No.
0309-07 suffers from another legal infirmity.
The petitioners represent that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid
exercise of legislative and police powers by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Davao City pursuant to Section 458 in relation to
Section 16 both of the Local Government Code. The
respondents counter that Davao City thereby disregarded the
regulations implemented by the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA), including its identification and classification of
safe pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
We uphold the respondents.
An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity on the basis
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot
be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of
things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject, and necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well-being of
the people.166chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal
interpretation to its general welfare provisions. The policy of
liberal construction is consistent with the spirit of local
autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient
power and discretion to accelerate their economic
development and uplift the quality of life for their
constituents.
Verily, the Court has championed the cause of public welfare
on several occasions. In so doing, it has accorded liberality to
the general welfare provisions of the Local Government
Code by upholding the validity of local ordinances enacted for
the common good. For instance, in Social Justice Society (SJS)
v. Atienza, Jr.,167 the Court validated a zoning ordinance that
reclassified areas covered by a large oil depot from industrial
to commercial in order to ensure the life, health and property
of the inhabitants residing within the periphery of the oil
depot. Another instance is Gancayco v. City Government of
Quezon City,168 where the Court declared as valid a city
ordinance ordering the construction of arcades that would
ensure the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants,
improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience, as well as the promotion of their prosperity. Even
in its early years, the Court already extended liberality towards
the exercise by the local government units; of their legislative
powers in order to promote the general welfare of their
communities. This was exemplified in United States v.
Salaveria,169 wherein gambling was characterized as "an act
beyond the pale of good morals" that the local legislative
council could validly suppress to protect the well-being of its
constituents; and in United States v. Abendan,170 whereby the
right of the then Municipality of Cebu to enact an ordinance
relating to sanitation and public health was upheld.
The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not
meant to be an invincible authority. In
fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the reasonableness
and consistency of the exercise by the local government units
with the laws or policies of the State.171 More importantly,
because the police power of the local government units flows
from the express delegation of the power by Congress, its
exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the power
should be construed against the local legislative
units.172 Judicial scrutiny comes into play whenever the
exercise of police power affects life, liberty or property. 173 The
presumption of validity and the policy of liberality are not
restraints on the power of judicial review in the face of
questions about whether an ordinance conforms with the
Constitution, the laws or public policy, or if it is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a
common right. The ordinance must pass the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing
laws.174chanrobleslaw
Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal
corporations with sufficient power to govern themselves and
manage their affairs and activities, they definitely have no right
to enact ordinances dissonant with the State's laws and policy.
The Local Government Code has been fashioned to delineate
the specific parameters and limitations to guide each local
government unit in exercising its delegated powers with the
view of making the local government unit a fully functioning
subdivision of the State within the constitutional and statutory
restraints.175 The Local Government Code is not intended to
vest in the local government unit the blanket authority to
legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to legislate upon
in the guise of serving the common good. Page | 41
The function of pesticides control, regulation and
development is within the jurisdiction of the FPA under
Presidential Decree No. 1144.176 The FPA was established in
recognition of the need for a technically oriented government
entity177 that will protect the public from the risks inherent in
the use of pesticides.178 To perform its mandate, it was given
under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1144 the following
powers and functions with respect to pesticides and other
agricultural chemicals, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 6. Powers and functions. The FPA shall have
jurisdiction, on over all existing handlers of pesticides,
fertilizers and other agricultural chemical inputs. The FPA shall
have the following powers and functions:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
III. Pesticides and Other Agricultural Chemicals
1. To determine specific uses or manners of use for each
pesticide or pesticide formulation;
2. To establish and enforce levels and good agricultural
practices for use of pesticides in raw agricultural commodities;
3. To restrict or ban the use of any pesticide or the formulation
of certain pesticides in specific areas or during certain periods
upon evidence that the pesticide is an imminent hazard, has
caused, or is causing widespread serious damage to crops, fish
or livestock, or to public health and environment;
x x x x
5. To inspect the establishment and premises of pesticide
handlers to insure that industrial health and safety rules and
anti-pollution regulations are followed;
6. To enter and inspect farmers' fields to ensure that only the
recommended pesticides are used in specific crops in
accordance with good agricultural practice;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the
compatibility between the usage and the application of
pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for human
health and environmental safety. This responsibility includes
not only the identification of safe and unsafe pesticides, but
also the prescription of the safe modes of application in
keeping with the standard of good agricultural practices.
On the other hand, the enumerated devolved functions to the
local government units do not include the regulation and
control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.179 The
non-inclusion should preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City from enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07, for
otherwise it would be arrogating unto itself the authority to
prohibit the aerial application of pesticides in derogation of the
authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree
No. 1144.
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and
explicit authority to do so, the City of Davao performed
an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao
could act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act should
always conform to and reflect the will of its principal.180 As
clarified in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:181
[W]here the state legislature has made provision for the
regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the
subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a
municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the
same conduct. In Keller vs. State, it was held that: "Where
there is no express power in the charter of a municipality
authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters
which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal
ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which
is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature,
may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide
concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and
declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the
State." A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances
are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal
corporation.
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation
of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU
cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation
of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An
ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and
statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The
principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that
municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot
adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or
repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to
pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied
restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the
general law.182 (Emphasis ours)
For sure, every local government unit only derives its
legislative authority from Congress. In no instance can the local
government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its
ordinance cannot run against or contravene existing laws,
precisely because its authority is only by virtue of the valid
delegation from Congress. As emphasized in City of Manila v.
Laguio, Jr.:183
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing
law gives stress to the precept that local government units are
able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative
power, a delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
This relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.184chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Page | 42
Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an
activity already covered by the jurisdiction of the FPA, which
has issued its own regulations under its Memorandum Circular
No. 02, Series of 2009, entitled Good Agricultural Practices for
Aerial Spraying of Fungicide in Banana Plantations.185 While
Ordinance No. 0309-07 prohibits aerial spraying in banana
plantations within the City of Davao, Memorandum Circular
No. 02 seeks to regulate the conduct of aerial spraying in
banana plantations186 pursuant to Section 6, Presidential
Decree No. 1144, and in conformity with the standard of Good
Agricultural Practices (GAP). Memorandum Circular No. 02
covers safety procedures,187 handling188 and post-
189
application, including the qualifications of
190 191
applicators, storing of fungicides, safety and equipment
of plantation personnel,192 all of which are incompatible with
the prohibition against aerial spraying under Ordinance No.
0309-07.
Although Memorandum Circular No. 02 and Ordinance No.
0309-07 both require the maintenance of the buffer zone, they
differ as to their treatment and maintenance of the buffer
zone. Under Memorandum Circular No. 02, a 50-meter "no-
spray boundary" buffer zone should be observed by the spray
pilots,193 and the observance of the zone should be recorded
in the Aerial Spray Final Report (ASFR) as a post-application
safety measure.194 On the other hand, Ordinance No. 0309-07
requires the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone to be
planted with diversified trees.195chanrobleslaw
Devoid of the specific delegation to its local legislative body,
the City of Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact
Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must
be struck down also for being an ultra vires act on the part of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City.
We must emphasize that our ruling herein does not seek to
deprive the LGUs their right to regulate activities within their
jurisdiction. They are empowered under Section 16 of
the Local Government Code to promote the general welfare of
the people through regulatory, not prohibitive, ordinances
that conform with the policy directions of the National
Government. Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this test as
it contravenes the specific regulatory policy on aerial spraying
in banana plantations on a nationwide scale of the National
Government, through the FPA.
Finally, the unconstitutionality of the ban renders nugatory
Ordinance No. 0309-07 in its entirety. Consequently, any
discussion on the lack of the separability clause becomes
entirely irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-
07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY
ENJOINS respondent City of Davao, and all persons or entities
acting in its behalf or under its authority, from enforcing and
implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit. Page | 43

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del

Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza,
and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., No part. Former law partners are counsels.
Brion, J., On leave.
Leonen, J., See separate concurring opinion.
EN BANC
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing G.R. No. 133640
business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the
name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE'S
BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing
business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK;
JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and
style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN,
doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing
business under the name and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in
their individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS,
Petitioners,
- versus
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the
constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
otherwise known as the 'National Blood Services Act of 1994,
and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of
1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act
No. 7719.
G.R. No. 133640, [1] entitled 'Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing
business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood
Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health and G.R. No.
133661, [2] entitled 'Doctors Blood Bank Center vs.
Department of Health are petitions for certiorari and
mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the
following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2)
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both
petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibitory
injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from
implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a mandatory
injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health
to grant, issue or renew petitioners' license to operate free
standing blood banks (FSBB).
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the
Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998. [3]
G.R. No. 139147, [4] entitled 'Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing
business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood
Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health, on the other hand, is
a petition to show cause why respondent Secretary of Health
should not be held in contempt of court.
This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this
Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640 and
133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999. [5]
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered
non-stock and non-profit association composed of free
standing blood banks.
Page | 44
Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his
capacity as the public official directly involved and charged
with the enforcement and implementation of the law in
question.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of
1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to
provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country.
It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15,
1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette
on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said
law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the
Department of Health (DOH). [6]
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 [7] provides:
Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All
commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of
two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a
maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
' Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall
effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a
period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of
two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to
extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and
review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. [8]

Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country
have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood centers run
by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run
blood services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial
blood services.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act
of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial
blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled 'An Act
Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human
Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks
and Blood Processing Laboratories. The law, which was
enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and
operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood
processing laboratories. The Bureau of Research and
Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the
power to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic
Act No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created
within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the licensure
requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories.
Due to this development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series
of 1971, was issued. The new rules and regulations triggered a
stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was
characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension
and communication of such suspensions to hospitals, a more
systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with
blood banks through monthly information bulletins.
Unfortunately, by the 1980's , financial difficulties constrained
the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the
blood banks. [9]
Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety
of blood and blood products intensified when the dreaded
disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first
described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of Blood
Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood
Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of
transfusion-associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence,
the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy
outlining certain principles that should be taken into
consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated guidelines
requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood products for
transfusion. [10]
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was
made. The DOH issued Administrative Order No. 57, Series of
1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and
tertiary depending on the services they provided. The
standards were adjusted according to this classification. For
instance, floor area requirements varied according to
classification level. The new guidelines likewise required
Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed
by a pathologist or a hematologist. [11]
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A
institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program (NBSP).
The BRL was designated as the central office primarily
responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the
creation of a committee that will implement the policies of the
program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils.
Page | 45
In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled 'An Act
Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an
Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other
Purposes' was introduced in the Senate. [12]
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No.
384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated to address the
issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system.
Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the
appropriate committees and subsequently consolidated. [13]
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation,
with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the
Philippine blood banking system entitled 'Project to Evaluate
the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. It was
revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were
supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC,
13.7% by government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4%
by private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the
study was made, there were only twenty-four (24) registered
or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the
country. Hence, with these numbers in mind, the study
deduced that each commercial blood bank produces five times
more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than
the government-run blood banks. The study, therefore,
showed that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial
sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the
donors of commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of
private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid
donors are those who receive remuneration for donating their
blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run
hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary. [14]
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by
persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely
to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood
transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis,
Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
than those donated to PNRC. [15]
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates
around P50 to P150, and because of this arrangement, many
of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who
need cash immediately. Since they need the money, these
donors are not usually honest about their medical or social
history. Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary donors who give
their true medical and social history are about three times
much safer than blood from paid donors. [16]
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino
doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific indications for
blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack
of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust their
practices and use of blood and blood products. It also does not
matter to them where the blood comes from. [17]
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing
for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said
law was promulgated by DOH.
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH
pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23
of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said
Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased out
by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the
Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood
bank only until May 27, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses
granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the
aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The case was entitled 'Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing
business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood
Bank, docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status
quo ante order. [18]
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the
constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely,
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following
grounds: [19]
1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood
Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the equal
protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free
standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the
purpose of the law;
2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood
Services Act and its Implementing Rules represent undue
delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the
state; and,
3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood
Services Act and its Implementing Rules are unwarranted
deprivation of personal liberty.
Page | 46
On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar
petition for mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction before this Court entitled
'Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health, docketed as
G.R. No. 133661. [20] This was consolidated with G.R. No.
133640. [21]
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and
regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to
operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998.
Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the petition
submitted the following questions [22] for resolution:
1. Was it passed in the exercise of
police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power?
2. Does it not amount to deprivation of
property without due process?
3. Does it not unlawfully impair the
obligation of contracts?
4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with
no ready machinery to deliver the same supply and services,
does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing
respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment. In the same
Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from implementing
and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and its
implementing rules and regulations until further orders from
the Court. [23]
On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a
Consolidated Comment on the petitions for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition
to the issuance of a temporary restraining order. [24]
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health
submitted that blood from commercial blood banks is unsafe
and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can
close down commercial blood banks to protect the public. He
cited the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1101 which
later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship
speech of Senator Orlando Mercado.
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks
can be found in the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 1011,
excerpts of which are quoted below:
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to
phase out all commercial blood banks. So that in the end, the
new section would have a provision that states:
ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER
A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT.
BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS
ONLY AND THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY
BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE
NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING AND
PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE
UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE
DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH.
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called
'Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking
System. This has been taken note of. This is a study done with
the assistance of the USAID by doctors under the New Tropical
Medicine Foundation in Alabang.
Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular
study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and selling of blood
and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood.
This goes to the very heart of my amendment which seeks to
put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of
commerce of man.
The Presiding Officer [ Senator Aquino ] : What does the
sponsor say?
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to
find out how the Gentleman defines a commercial blood bank.
I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the
measure, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where
profit is considered.
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would
accept it, we can put a provision on Section 3, a definition of a
commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for
profit and engages in the buying and selling of blood or its
components.
Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by
Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of Page | 47
Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health.
In recommendation No. 4, he says:
The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a
two-year period will give the Department of Health enough
time to build up government's capability to provide an
adequate supply of blood for the needs of the nation...the use
of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of
commodity.
Taking into consideration the experience of the National
Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making the hospital
100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a
success story of a hospital that does not buy blood. All those
who are operated on and need blood have to convince their
relatives or have to get volunteers who would donate blood
If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those
commercial blood banks, they will cut corners because it will
protect their profit.
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the
people who are normally in the high-risk category. So we
should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we
can go into a national voluntary blood program.
It has been said here in this report, and I quote:
Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe
because a donor who expects payment for his blood will not
tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social
behavior such as sexual promiscuity which increases the risk of
having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs.
Laboratory tests are of limited value and will not detect early
infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four diseases
in the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible
diseases we do not yet screen for and there could be others
where there are no tests available yet.
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood
will also try his best to limit his expenses. Usually he tries to
increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits,
hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests altogether.
He may also try to sell blood even though these have infections
in them. Because there is no existing system of
counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get
away with many unethical practices.
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this
issue. The reason why contaminated blood was sold was that
there were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the
testing process. They were protecting their profits. [25]
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further
elucidated his stand on the issue:
Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of
poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos, who, unemployed,
without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will
walk into a commercial blood bank, extend their arms and
plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their age,
their medical history. They will lie about when they last sold
their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred
pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of
course, until the next bloodletting.
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and
urbane medical centers. This same blood will now be bought
by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was
sold. Between this buying and selling, obviously, someone has
made a very fast buck.
Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related
disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients come in for
minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with
hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy and he
leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in
for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS.
We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood
because of poverty. The humane dimension of blood
transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of
giving it
For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial
blood banks that lobby their interests among medical
technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even
physicians so that a proactive system for collection of blood
from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and
unrewarding.
The Department of Health has never institutionalized a
comprehensive national program for safe blood and for
voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health
concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial blood
bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to
tell the patient to buy blood.
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if
we are to close them down, there will be no blood supply. This
is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe
supply of blood. We cannot allow commercial interest groups
to dictate policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian
effort. This cannot and will never work because their interest
in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect
commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood
donation. Only the Government can do it, and the Government
must do it. [26]
Page | 48
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of
Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to order
respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from
announcing the closure of commercial blood banks,
compelling the public to source the needed blood from
voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts 'that will
ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners' blood
banks. [27]
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment
and/or Opposition to the above motion stating that he has not
ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of
the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998
by the Court. In compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise
ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and
flyers to the public which state that blood banks are closed or
will be closed. According to respondent Secretary, the same
were printed and circulated in anticipation of the closure of
the commercial blood banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719,
and were printed and circulated prior to the issuance of the
TRO. [28]
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition
to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not be Held in
Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public
respondent's willful disobedience of or resistance to the
restraining order issued by the Court in the said case.
Petitioners alleged that respondent's act constitutes
circumvention of the temporary restraining order and a
mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly
administration of justice. [29] Petitioners added that despite
the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No.
133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence
of commercial blood banks, disseminated misleading
information under the guise of health advisories, press
releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers stating, among others,
that 'this year [1998] all commercial blood banks will be closed
by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on
government blood banks. [30] Petitioners further claimed that
respondent Secretary of Health announced in a press
conference during the Blood Donor's Week that commercial
blood banks are illegal and dangerous' and that they 'are at the
moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that
their commercial interest is more important than the lives of
the people. These were all posted in bulletin boards and other
conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other
medical and health centers. [31]
In respondent Secretary's Comment to the Petition to Show
Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in
Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained
that nothing was issued by the department ordering the
closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health
advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to the
Court's issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21,
1998. [32]
Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of
Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon
the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 or
the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to
address the issues and/or questions raised by petitioners
Page | 49

the information campaign was 'to promote the importance concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No.
and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the 133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder:
public about the hazards of patronizing blood supplies from
commercial blood banks. [33] In doing so, he was merely
performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of
I
Health to protect the health and welfare of the public.
Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES
blood donation program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;
particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that, in order to
ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood
donation shall be promoted through public education,
II
promotion in schools, professional education, establishment
of blood services network, and walking blood donors. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
that he has the duty to promote the program of voluntary
blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to
donate blood voluntarily and educating the people on the risks
associated with blood coming from a paid donor promotes III
general health and welfare and which should be given more
importance than the commercial businesses of WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
petitioners. [34] IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-
IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;

On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest

in the case as taxpayers and citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention
was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid
down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661, namely,
IV
the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance of a writ
of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
relatives of individuals who had died allegedly because of IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE
shortage of blood supply at a critical time. [35] DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY;

The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719

constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. [36] V

In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
due course to the aforementioned petition, the Court granted POWER; and,
the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above
intervenors on August 9, 1999.
VI

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS

In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent
Secretary of Health stated that the sale of blood is contrary to
the spirit and letter of the Act that blood donation is a
humanitarian act and 'blood transfusion is a professional
medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and
[b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or
charging fees other than those allowed by law is even
penalized under Section 12. [37]
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE
PUBLIC WELFARE.
As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the
Act is being challenged, it is the contention of petitioners that
the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is
unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted
delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the
Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and
the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of
Health must conform in the performance of his functions.
Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period
that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing
out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act
constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue
delegation of legislative power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left
the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee
or delegate of the Legislature. [38] Except as to matters of
detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations
to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general
rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative board
may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. [39]
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of
1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the
Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the
health of the people and has mandated several measures to
attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of
commercial blood banks in the country. The law has
sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of
the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is,
the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation.
By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to
the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given legislation and effectuate its policies. [40] The Secretary
of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad
powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the
Act states:
'SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. ' The implementation of the
provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the rules and
regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty
(60) days from the approval hereof
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by
virtue of the administrative body's authority and expertise in
the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of
1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act
No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the
details of the law for its proper implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides
that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be
extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 'based on
the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the
existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary
may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be
delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the
power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is
illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall Page | 50
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can
be made. [41]
In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers
granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was
extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2
thereof:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy In order to promote public
health, it is hereby declared the policy of the state:
a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood
donation by the citizenry and to instill public consciousness of
the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision
of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of
commodity;
c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and
equitable distribution of blood supply and blood products;
d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary
blood donation to curb the hazards caused by the commercial
sale of blood;
e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary
blood donation in the existing health subjects of the formal
education system in all public and private schools as well as the
non-formal system;
f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to
participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-profit
collection of blood;
g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish
and organize a National Blood Transfusion Service Network in
order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and
safe supply of blood;
h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions
promoting voluntary blood donation and providing non-profit
blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for
costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations from
governmental and non-governmental entities;
i) to require all blood collection units and blood
banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis;
j) to establish scientific and professional standards
for the operation of blood collection units and blood
banks/centers in the Philippines;
k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities
related to the collection, storage and banking of blood; and,
l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to
include preventive services and education to control spread of
blood transfusion transmissible diseases.
Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules
and regulations violate the equal protection clause enshrined
in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against
commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is
not germane to the purpose of the law. [42]
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule
that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited
but classification on a reasonable basis and not made
arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification,
however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member
of the class. [43]
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of
1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health and
welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New
Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the
Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and
unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious
diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly
from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes
more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the
blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors
who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors
because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social
history during the blood screening. [44]
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719,
to instill public consciousness of the importance and benefits
of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper
blood collection from healthy donors. To do this, the
Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial
blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking system,
to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and Page | 51
so as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary blood
donation program of the government. In lieu of commercial
blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict
adherence to professional and scientific standards to be
established by the DOH, shall be set in place. [45]
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the
law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination
and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a
classification was made between nonprofit blood
banks/centers and commercial blood banks.
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the
following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former
operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical
service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the
former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter
treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe
blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating
blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather
than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of
commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate
as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply
from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared
to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored
study on the Philippine blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of
the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar
circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply
only to the existing conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks
without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether
or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of
police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of
the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services
Act was enacted in the exercise of the State's police power in
order to promote and preserve public health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. [46]
In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the
avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health by
ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country
through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective
requires the interference of the State given the disturbing
condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the
purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to
phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously
affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of
commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to
serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid
exercise of the State's police power. Therefore, the Legislature,
under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is
both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police
power is the State authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare. [47]
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds
and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of
personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-
impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional
and void because it infringes on the freedom of choice of an
individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood
which should be outside the domain of State intervention.
Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification,
petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the
human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the
liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be
made to apply to human blood because the latter can be
replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the
human organs would constitute invalid classification. [48]
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial
blood banks will be disadvantageous to them as it will affect
their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and
other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be
struck down because it violates the non-impairment clause
provided by the Constitution.
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be
subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general welfare of the State and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual
may be subordinated. [49]
Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, [50] settled is the rule that the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier
purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by
this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of
the State's power of regulation. While the Court understands
the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the
concern of the Government in this case, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the
ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result
of government regulation.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all
Page | 52
contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be
subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being
of the community may require, or as the circumstances may
change, or as experience may demonstrate the
necessity. [51] This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda.
de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations [52] where the Court
held that individual rights to contract and to property have to
give way to police power exercised for public welfare.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of
commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public
considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as
proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the
Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws
cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in
derogation of the principle of separation of powers. [53]
That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood
banks without distinction in order to achieve the objective of
the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but,
this would be arguing on what the law may be or should
be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far
cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this
Court to pass upon. [54]
Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No.
139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent
Secretary of Health's explanation satisfactory. The statements
in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or
threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the law.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a
flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the
court. [55] There is nothing contemptuous about the
statements and information contained in the health advisory
that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by
this Court ordering the former to cease and desist from
distributing the same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional
infirmity in the questioned provisions of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. [56] Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor.
Otherwise, the petition must fail.

Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the

constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
Page | 53

constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes

a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by
petitioners, is for Congress to determine. [57]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders

judgment as follows:

1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the

Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of
1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.
The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998,
is LIFTED.

2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition

seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of court
is DENIED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016
DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND
NORTHERN LUZON DRUG
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY AFFAIRS; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH;
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE;
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT;
AND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 with a Prayer
for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction which seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution3 dated
November 19, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 109903. The CA dismissed petitioners' Petition for
Prohibition4 and upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory
twenty percent (20%) discount on the purchase of medicine by
persons with disability (PWD).
The antecedents are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn March 24, 1992, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7277, entitled "An Act Providing for the
Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled
Persons and their Integration into the Mainstream of Society
and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the "Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons," was passed into law.5 The law
defines "disabled persons", "impairment" and "disability" as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act,
these terms are defined as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Disabled Persons are those
suffering from restriction of different abilities, as a result of a
mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity
in the manner or within the range considered normal for a
human being;
(b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration of
psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure of
function;
(c) Disability shall mean (1) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more psychological,
physiological or anatomical function of an individual or
activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an
impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 9442 was enacted7
amending R.A. No. 7277. The Title of R.A. No. 7277 was
amended to read as "Magna Carta for Persons with Disability"
and all references on the law to "disabled persons" were
amended to read as "persons with disability"
(PWD).8 Specifically, R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a twenty
(20) percent discount on the purchase of medicine, and a tax
deduction scheme was adopted wherein covered
establishments may deduct the discount granted from gross
income based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives. SEC. 32. Persons
with disability shall be entitled to the following:
Page | 54
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
(d) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the
purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with disability;
x x x x
The abovementioned privileges are available only to persons
with disability who are Filipino citizens upon submission of any
of the following as proof of his/her entitlement thereto:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(i) An identification card issued by the city or municipal
mayor or the barangay captain of the place where the
person with disability resides;
(ii) The passport of the person with disability concerned;
or
(ii) Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID)
issued by the National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
x x x x
The establishments may claim the discounts granted in sub-
sections (a), (b), (c), (f) and (g) as tax deductions based on the
net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided,
however, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as
deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that
the discount is granted: Provided, further, That the total
amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC),
as amended.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
944210 was jointly promulgated by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Education,
Department of Finance (DOF), Department of Tourism,
Department of Transportation and Communication,
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and
Department of Agriculture. Insofar as pertinent to this
petition, the salient portions of the IRR are hereunder NCWDP will provide the design and specification of the
quoted:11 identification card that will be issued by the Local Government
Units.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE III. DEFINITION OF TERMS
6.14. Availmenl of Tax Deductions by Establishment Granting
Section 5. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules and Twenty Percent. 20% Discount - The establishments may claim
Regulations, these terms are defined as follows: the discounts granted in sub-sections (6.1), (6.2), (6.4), (6.5)
Page | 55

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary5.1. Persons with Disability - are
those individuals defined under Section 4 of RA 7277 "An Act
Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-
Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended and their
integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other
Purposes". This is defined as a person suffering from restriction
or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory
impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the
range considered normal for human being. Disability shall
mean (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more psychological, physiological or anatomical
function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a
record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having
such an impairment.
x x x x
and (6.6) as tax deductions based on the net cost of the goods
sold or services rendered: Provided, however, that the cost of
the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income
for the same taxable year that the discount is granted:
Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax
deduction net of value-added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall
be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
On April 23, 2008, the National Council on Disability Affairs
(NCDA)14 issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of
2008,15 prescribing guidelines which should serve as a
mechanism for the issuance of a PWD Identification Card (IDC)
which shall be the basis for providing privileges and discounts
to bona fide PWDs in accordance with R.A.
9442:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

IV. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

RULE IV. PRIVILEGES AND INCENTIVES FOR THE PERSONS WITH
DISABILITY A. The Local Government Unit of the City or Municipal
Office shall implement these guidelines in the
Section 6. Other Privileges and Incentives. Persons with issuance of the PWD-IDC
disability shall be entitled to the following:
x x x x
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
D. Issuance of the appropriate document to confirm the
6.1.d. Purchase of Medicine - at least twenty percent (20%) medical condition of the applicant is as
discount on the purchase of medicine for the exclusive use and follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
enjoyment of persons with disability. All drugstores, hospital,
pharmacies, clinics and other similar establishments selling Disability Document Issuing Entity
medicines are required to provide at least twenty percent
(20%) discount subject to the guidelines issued by DOH and
Apparent Medical Licensed Private or
PHILHEALTH.12chanrobleslaw
Disability Certificate Government Physician
x x x x
Licensed Teacher duly
School
6.11 The abovementioned privileges are available only to signed by the School
Assessment
persons with disability who are Filipino citizens upon Principal
submission of any of the following as proof of his/her
entitlement thereto subject to the guidelines issued by the
Certificate of Head of the Business
NCWDP in coordination with DSWD, DOH and DILG.
Disability Establishment or Head of
6.11.1 An identification card issued by the city or municipal Non-Government
mayor or the barangay captain of the place where the person Organization
with disability resides;

Non-
6.11.2 The passport of the persons with disability concerned; Medical Licensed Private or
Apparent
or Certificate Government Physician
Disability

6.11.3 Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID)

issued by the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons (NCWDP). However, upon effectivity of this
Implementing Rules and Regulations, NCWDP will already
adopt the Identification Card issued by the Local Government
Unit for purposes of uniformity in the implementation.
E. PWD Registration Forms and ID Cards shall be issued and
signed by the City or Municipal Mayor, or Barangay Captain.
xxxx
V. IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The effectivity
of NCDA Administrative Order No. 1 is hereby SUSPENDED
Any bonafide person with permanent disability can apply for pending Respondent's compliance with the proof of filing of
the issuance of the PWD-IDC. His/her caregiver can assist in the NCDA Administrative Order No. 1 with the Office of the
application process. Procedures for the issuance of the ID National Administrative Register and its publication in a
Cards are as follows: newspaper of general circulation.
Page | 56

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA. Completion of the Respondent NCDA filed a motion for reconsideration before
Requirements. Complete and/or make available the following the CA to lift the suspension of the implementation of NCDA
requirements:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary A.O. No. 1 attaching thereto proof of its publication in
the Philippine Star and Daily Tribune on August 12, 2010, as
1. Two "1x1" recent ID pictures with the names, and well as a certification from the ONAR showing that the same
signatures or thumbmarks at the back of the picture was filed with the said office on October 22, 2009.22 Likewise,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
2. One (1) Valid ID
Decision.
3. Document to confirm the medical or disability
condition (See Section IV, D for the required In a Resolution dated November 19, 2010, the CA dismissed
document). petitioners' motion for reconsideration and lifted the
suspension of the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 considering
On December 9, 2008, the DOF issued Revenue Regulations the filing of the same with ONAR and its publication in a
No. 1-200916 prescribing rules and regulations to implement newspaper of general circulation.
R.A. 9442 relative to the tax privileges of PWDs and tax
incentives for establishments granting the discount. Section 4 Hence, the instant petition raising the following
of Revenue Regulations No. 001-09 states that drugstores can issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
only deduct the 20% discount from their gross income subject
to some conditions.17chanrobleslaw I. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT IS A
On May 20, 2009, the DOH issued A.O. No. 2009- VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS
001118 specifically stating that the grant of 20% discount shall AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
be provided in the purchase of branded medicines and BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION TO
unbranded generic medicines from all establishments PETITIONERS AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED DRUGSTORES;
dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the PWDs. 19 It
also detailed the guidelines for the provision of medical and II. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT SECTION 32
related discounts and special privileges to PWDs pursuant to OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED BY RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND THE
R.A. 9442.20chanrobleslaw OTHER IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE;
On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition
with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a III. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
Writ of Preliminary Injunction21 before the Court of Appeals to DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITIES UNDER SECTION 4(A), SECTION
annul and enjoin the implementation of the following 4(B) AND SECTION 4(C) OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED BY RA 9442,
laws:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary RULE 1 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
23
REGULATIONS OF RA 7277, SECTION 5.1 OF THE
1) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442; IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF RA 9442, NCDA
AO 1 AND DOH AO 2009-11 ARE NOT VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS
2) Section 6, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
Regulations of R.A. No. 9442;
IV. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
3) NCDA A.O. No. 1; MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
4) DOF Revenue Regulation No. 1-2009;
We deny the petition.
5) DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011.
The CA is correct when it applied by analogy the case of Carlos
On July 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision upholding the Superdrug Corporation et al. v. DSWD, et al.24 wherein We
constitutionality of R.A. 7277 as amended, as well as the pronouced that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9257 which grants 20%
assailed administrative issuances. However, the CA suspended discount on the purchase of medicine of senior citizens is a
the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 pending proof of respondent legitimate exercise of police
NCDA's compliance with filing of said administrative order with power:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) and
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
dispositive portion of the Decision to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
25
benefits. cralawred Accordingly, it has been described as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.26 It is [t]he
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of
the subjects of the same.27chanrobleslaw
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined
by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.28chanrobleslaw
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good
would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the
questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence
of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of
the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification
in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in
its favor.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Police power is the power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domain is
the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which
the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just compensation. In
the exercise of police power, property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state.30 A legislative act based on the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more
familiar words, (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the
interference of the state; and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.31chanrobleslaw
R.A. No. 7277 was enacted primarily to provide full support to
the improvement of the total well-being of PWDs and their
integration into the mainstream of society. The priority given
to PWDs finds its basis in the
Constitution:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ARTICLE XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xxxx
Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all
economic agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations,
cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have
the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so
demands.32chanrobleslaw
ARTICLE XIII
Page | 57
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
xxxx
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to
33
paupers. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, R.A. No. 7277 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. The grant of the rights and
privileges for disabled persons shall be guided by the following
principles:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a). Disabled persons are part of
the Philippine society, thus the Senate shall give full support to
the improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons
and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Toward this end, the State shall adopt policies ensuring the
rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance of disabled
persons.
It shall develop their skills and potentials to enable them to
compete favorably for available opportunities.
(b). Disabled persons have the same rights as other people to
take their proper place in society. They should be able to live
freely and as independently as possible. This must be the
concern of everyone - the family, community and all
government and non-government organizations.
Disabled person's rights must never be perceived as welfare
services by the Government.
x x x x
(d). The State also recognizes the role of the private sector in
promoting the welfare of disabled persons and shall
encourage partnership in programs that address their needs
and concerns.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To implement the above policies, R.A. No. 9442 which
amended R.A. No. 7277 grants incentives and benefits
including a twenty percent (20%) discount to PWDs in the
purchase of medicines; fares for domestic air, sea and land
travels including public railways and skyways; recreation and
amusement centers including theaters, food chains and
restaurants.35 This is specifically stated in Section 4 of the IRR
of R.A. No. 9442:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 4. Policies and Objectives - It is the objective of
Republic Act No. 9442 to provide persons with disability, the
opportunity to participate fully into the mainstream of
society by granting them at least twenty percent (20%)
discount in all basic services. It is a declared policy of RA 7277
that persons with disability are part of Philippine society, and
thus the State shall give full support to the improvement of
their total wellbeing and their integration into the
mainstream of society. They have the same rights as other
people to take their proper place in society. They should be
able to live freely and as independently as possible. This must
be the concern of everyone the family, community and all
government and non-government organizations. Rights of
persons with disability must never be perceived as welfare
services. Prohibitions on verbal, non-verbal ridicule and
vilification against persons with disability shall always be
observed at all times.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, the PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of
medicine is supported by a valid objective or purpose as
aforementioned. It has a valid subject considering that the
concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional
notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.
As in the case of senior citizens,37 the discount privilege to
which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by
the general public to which these citizens belong. The means
employed in invoking the active participation of the private
sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law,
is reasonably and directly related.38 Also, the means employed
to provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs are
reasonably related to its accomplishment, and are not
oppressive, considering that as a form of reimbursement, the
discount extended to PWDs in the purchase of medicine can
be claimed by the establishments as allowable tax deductions
pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in
Section 4 of DOF Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009. Otherwise
stated, the discount reduces taxable income upon which the
tax liability of the establishments is computed.
Further, petitioners aver that Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as
amended by R.A. No. 9442 is unconstitutional and void for
violating the due process clause of the Constitution since
entitlement to the 20% discount is allegedly merely based on
any of the three documents mentioned in the provision,
namely: (i) an identification card issued by the city or municipal
mayor or the barangay captain of the place where the PWD
resides; (ii) the passport of the PWD; or (iii) transportation
discount fare identification card issued by NCDA. Petitioners,
thus, maintain that none of the said documents has any
relation to a medical finding of disability, and the grant of the
discount is allegedly without any process for the
determination of a PWD in accordance with law.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277, as amended by R.A. No. 9442,
must be read with its IRR which stated that upon its effectivity,
NCWDP (which is the government agency tasked to ensure the
implementation of RA 7277), would adopt the IDC issued by
the local government units for purposes of uniformity in the
implementation.39 Thus, NCDA A.O. No. 1 provides the
reasonable guidelines in the issuance of IDCs to PWDs as proof
of their entitlement to the privileges and incentives under the
law40 and fills the details in the implementation of the law.
As stated in NCDA A.O. No. 1, before an IDC is issued by the
city or municipal mayor or the barangay captain,41 or the
Chairman of the NCDA,42 the applicant must first secure a
medical certificate issued by a licensed private or government Page | 58
physician that will confirm his medical or disability condition.
If an applicant is an employee with apparent disability, a
"certificate of disability" issued by the head of the business
establishment or the head of the non-governmental
organization is needed for him to be issued a PWD-IDC. For a
student with apparent disability, the "school assessment"
issued by the teacher and signed by the school principal should
be presented to avail of a PWD-ID.
Petitioners' insistence that Part IV (D) of NCDA Administrative
Order No. 1 is void because it allows allegedly non-competent
persons like teachers, head of establishments and heads of
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to confirm the
medical condition of the applicant is misplaced. It must be
stressed that only for apparent disabilities can the teacher or
head of a business establishment validly issue the mentioned
required document because, obviously, the disability is easily
seen or clearly visible. It is, therefore, not an unqualified grant
of authority for the said non-medical persons as it is simply
limited to apparent disabilities. For a non-apparent disability
or a disability condition that is not easily seen or clearly visible,
the disability can only be validated by a licensed private or
government physician, and a medical certificate has to be
presented in the procurement of an IDC. Relative to this issue,
the CA validly ruled, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG)
ratiocination that teachers, heads of business establishments
and heads of NGOs can validly confirm the medical condition
of their students/employees with apparent disability for
obvious reasons as compared to non-apparent disability which
can only be determined by licensed physicians. Under the
Labor Code, disabled persons are eligible as apprentices or
learners provided that their handicap are not as much as to
effectively impede the performance of their job. We find that
heads of business establishments can validly issue certificates
of disability of their employees because aside from the fact
that they can obviously validate the disability, they also
have medical records of the employees as a pre-requisite in
the hiring of employees. Hence, Part IV (D) of NCDA AO No. 1
is logical and valid.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, DOH A.O. No. 2009-11 prescribes additional
guidelines for the 20% discount in the purchase of all
medicines for the exclusive use of PWD.44 To avail of the
discount, the PWD must not only present his I.D. but also the
doctor's prescription stating, among others, the generic name
of the medicine, the physician's address, contact number and
professional license number, professional tax receipt number
and narcotic license number, if applicable. A purchase booklet
issued by the local social/health office is also required in the
purchase of over-the-counter medicines. Likewise, any single
dispensing of medicine must be in accordance with the
prescription issued by the physician and should not exceed a
one (1) month supply. Therefore, as correctly argued by the
respondents, Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A.
No. 9442 complies with the standards of substantive due
process.
We are likewise not persuaded by the argument of petitioners
that the definition of "disabilities" under the subject laws is
vague and ambiguous because it is allegedly so general and
broad that the person tasked with implementing the law will
undoubtedly arrive at different interpretations and
applications of the law. Aside from the definitions of a "person
with disability" or "disabled persons" under Section 4 of R.A.
No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442 and in the IRR of RA
9442, NCDA A.O. No. 1 also
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
4. Identification Cards shall be issued to
any bonafide PWD with permanent disabilities due to
any one or more of the following conditions:
psychosocial, chronic illness, learning, mental, visual,
orthopedic, speech and hearing conditions. This
includes persons suffering from disabling diseases
resulting to the person's limitations to do day to day
activities as normally as possible such as but not
limited to those undergoing dialysis, heart disorders,
severe cancer cases and such other similar cases
resulting to temporary or permanent disability.45
Similarly, DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011 defines the different
categories of disability as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule IV, Section 4, Paragraph B of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of this Act required the Department of
Health to address the health concerns of seven (7) different
categories of disability, which include the following: (1)
Psychological and behavioral disabilities (2) Chronic illness
with disabilities (3)Learning(cognitive or intellectual)
disabilities (4) Mental disabilities (5) Visual/seeing disabilities
(6) Orthopedic/moving, and (7) communication
deficits.46chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, when
the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application not
interpretation thereof is imperative. However, where the
language of a statute is vague and ambiguous, an
interpretation thereof is resorted to. A law is deemed
ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more
senses. The fact that a law admits of different interpretations
is the best evidence that it is vague and
ambiguous.47chanrobleslaw
In the instant case, We do not find the aforestated definition
of terms as vague and ambiguous. Settled is the rule that
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special and technical
training and knowledge of such agency.48 As a matter of policy,
We accord great respect to the decisions and/or actions of
administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledge,
ability, and expertise in the enforcement of laws and
regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale for
this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious
needs of a modern or modernizing society and the
establishment of diverse administrative agencies for
addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the
accumulation of experience and growth of specialized
capabilities by the administrative agency charged with
implementing a particular statute. 49chanrobleslaw Page | 59
Lastly, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 7227, as amended by
R.A. No. 9442, violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it fairly singles out drugstores to bear the
burden of the discount, and that it can hardly be said to
"rationally" meet a legitimate government objective which is
the purpose of the law. The law allegedly targets only retailers
such as petitioners, and that the other enterprises in the drug
industry are not imposed with similar burden. This same
argument had been raised in the case of Carlos Superdrug
Corp., et al. v. DSWD, et al.,50 and We reaffirm and apply the
ruling therein in the case at bar:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution protects
property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can
intervene in the operations of a business which may result in
an impairment of property rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While
Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the
protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts
and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of
the State for the promotion of public
51
good. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the privileges
conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons
or things differently situated should be treated differently.52 In
the case of ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. v. Hon. Purisima, et
al.,53 We held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is
equality under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When
things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they
may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union, this Court
declared:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
State. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according
to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
require that things which are different in fact be treated in statute.56 The burden of proof is on him who claims that a
law as though they were the same. The equal protection statute is unconstitutional. Petitioners failed to discharge such
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are burden of proof.
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
within which it is to operate. of Appeals dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution dated Page | 60

November 19, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. 109903 are AFFIRMED.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of concur.
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the

purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction,
the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion.
It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific
or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is
it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical
nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection
guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing
degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as
they may appear.

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification,

that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary.54 With respect to R.A. No.
9442, its expressed public policy is the rehabilitation, self-
development and self-reliance of PWDs. Persons with
disability form a class separate and distinct from the other
citizens of the country. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of
the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to
the PWDs fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. Thus,
Congress may pass a law providing for a different treatment to
persons with disability apart from the other citizens of the
country.

Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a

proper exercise of police power using the due process clause
and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular, a large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislature to determine, not only what interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection
of such interests.55 Thus, We are mindful of the fundamental
criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017
SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE WELFARE OF DISABLED
PERSONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, AND THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 2 dated
June 17, 2011, and Resolution3 dated November 25, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102486, which
dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon
Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), the National Council for
the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP) (now National
Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of
Finance (DOF) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the
implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257,
otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003"
and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20%
discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and
persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them
as tax deduction.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of drugstore operation in the Philippines while the
respondents are government agencies, office and bureau
tasked to monitor compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442,
promulgate implementing rules and regulations for their
effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke
licenses of erring establishments.
Factual Antecedents
On April 23, 1992, R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize
the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation-Building, Grant
Benefits and Special Privileges and For Other Purposes," was
enacted. Under the said law, a senior citizen, who must be at
least 60 years old and has an annual income of not more than
P60,000.00,4 may avail of the privileges provided in Section 4
thereof, one of which is 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines. The said provision states:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizen. – x x x:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to utilization of transportation
services, hotels and similar lodging establishment, restaurants
and recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in
the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim
the cost as tax credit[.]
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
To recoup the amount given as discount to qualified senior
citizens, covered establishments can claim an equal amount as
tax credit which can be applied against the income tax due
from them.
On February 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo signed R.A. No. 9257, amending some provisions of R.A.
No. 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on the
purchase of medicines but removed the annual income ceiling
Page | 61
thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges under the
law. Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the
discount granted to senior citizens, from tax credit to tax
deduction from gross income, computed based on the net cost
of goods sold or services rendered. The pertinent provision, as
amended by R.A. No. 9257, reads as follows:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens
shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels
and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for
the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
xxxx
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under
(a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of
the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost
of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross
income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall
be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and
shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. (Emphasis
ours)
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD issued the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9257. Article 8 of Rule VI of
the said IRR provides:
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. - The establishment
may claim the discounts granted under Rule V, Section 4 –
Discounts for Establishments; Section 9, Medical and Dental
Services in Private Facilities and Sections 10 and 11 – Air, Sea
and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net
cost of the goods sold or services rendered. Provided, That the
cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross
income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if applicable,
shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes
and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended;
Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction
shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the
Department of Finance (DOF). (Emphasis ours)
The change in the tax treatment of the discount given to senior
citizens did not sit well with some drug store owners and
corporations, claiming it affected the profitability of their
business. Thus, on January 13, 2005, Carlos Superdrug
Corporation (Carlos Superdrug), together with other
corporation and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary
Injunction before this Court, entitled Carlos Superdrug
Corporation v. DSWD,5 docketed as G.R. No. 166494, assailing
the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 primarily
on the ground that it amounts to taking of private property
without payment of just compensation. In a Decision dated
June 29, 2007, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
assailed provision, holding that the same is a legitimate
exercise of police power. The relevant portions of the decision
read, thus:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined
by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.
xxxx
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While
Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the
protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts
and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of
the State for the promotion of public good.
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests
largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other
private establishments concerned. This being the case, the
means employed in invoking the active participation of the
private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of
the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient
proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that
the continued implementation of the same would be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will
refrain from quashing a legislative act.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.6 (Citations omitted)
On August 1, 2007, Carlos Superdrug filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing decision. Subsequently, the
Court issued Resolution dated August 21, 2007, denying the
said motion with finality.7
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the
"Magna Carta for Disabled Persons" was enacted, codifying
the rights and privileges of PWDs. Thereafter, on April 30,
2007, R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A. No. 7277.
Page | 62
One of the salient amendments in the law is the insertion of
Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the other
privileges and incentives of PWDs, including the grant of 20%
discount on the purchase of medicines. Similar to R.A. No.
9257, covered establishments shall claim the discounts given
to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross income, based on
the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Section 32 of
R.A. No. 9442 reads:
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives
SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to the
following:
xxxx
(c) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the purchase of
medicines in all drugstores for the exclusive use or enjoyment
of persons with disability;
xxxx
The establishments may claim the discounts granted in sub-
sections (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g) as tax deductions based on
the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided,
however, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as
deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that
the discount is granted: Provided, further, That the total
amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC),
as amended. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the foregoing, the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 was
promulgated by the DSWD, Department of Education, DOF,
Department of Tourism and the Department of Transportation
and Communications.8 Sections 5.1 and 6.1.d thereof provide:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules and
Regulations, these terms are defined as follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined
under Section 4 of RA 7277, "An Act Providing for the
Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons
with Disability as amended and their integration into the
Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes." This is defined
as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a
result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform
an activity in a manner or within the range considered normal
for human being. Disability shall mean: (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an
individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of such
an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment.
xxxx
6.1.d Purchase of Medicine – At least twenty percent (20%)
discount on the purchase of medicine for the exclusive use and
enjoyment of persons with disability. All drug stores, hospital,
pharmacies, clinics and other similar establishments selling
medicines are required to provide at least twenty percent
(20%) discount subject to the guidelines issued by DOH and
PHILHEALTH.
On February 26, 2008, the petitioner filed a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction9 with the CA, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional (a) Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257, and (b)
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 and Section 5.1 of its IRR, insofar
as these provisions only allow tax deduction on the gross
income based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered as compensation to private establishments for the
20% discount that they are required to grant to senior citizens
and PWDs. Further, the petitioner prayed that the respondents
be permanently enjoined from implementing the assailed
provisions.
Ruling of the CA
On June 17, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition, reiterating
the ruling of the Court in Carlos Superdrug10 particularly that
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 was a valid exercise of police
power. Moreover, the CA held that considering that the same
question had been raised by parties similarly situated and was
resolved in Carlos Superdrug, the rule of stare decisis stood as
a hindrance to any further attempt to relitigate the same issue.
It further noted that jurisdictional considerations also compel
the dismissal of the action. It particularly emphasized that it
has no original or appellate jurisdiction to pass upon the
constitutionality of the assailed laws,11 the same pertaining to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Even assuming that it had
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC, the principle of hierarchy
of courts mandates that the case be commenced and heard by
the lower court.12 The CA further ruled that the petitioner
resorted to the wrong remedy as a petition for prohibition will
not lie to restrain the actions of the respondents for the simple
reason that they do not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial duties relative to the issuance or implementation
of the questioned provisions. Also, the petition was wanting of
the allegations of the specific acts committed by the
respondents that demonstrate the exercise of these powers
which may be properly challenged in a petition for
prohibition.13
The petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration 14 of the
Decision dated June 17, 2011 of the CA, but the same was
denied in a Resolution15 dated November 25, 2011.
Unyielding, the petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT A PETITION
FOR PROHIBITION FILED WITH THE CA IS AN IMPROPER
REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 20%
SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs;
II
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SUPREME
COURT'S RULING IN CARLOS
SUPERDRUG CONSTITUTES STARE DECISIS;
III
Page | 63
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE 20% SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR
CITIZENS AND PWDs IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.
ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE
JUST COMPENSATION TO THE PETITIONER AND OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED DRUGSTORES;
IV
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE 20% SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR
CITIZENS AND PWDs DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PETITIONER'S
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW; and
V
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITIES AND
PWDs ARE NOT VAGUE AND DO NOT VIOLATE THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 16
Ruling of the Court
Prohibition may be filed to question
the constitutionality of a law
In the assailed decision, the CA noted that the action, although
denominated as one for prohibition, seeks the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442. It held that in such a case, the
proper remedy is not a special civil action but a petition for
declaratory relief, which falls under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC, in the first instance, and of the Supreme
Court, on appeal. 17
The Court clarifies.
Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful
and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by
law.18 This is, however, not the lone office of an action for
prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et
al.,19 prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy to
prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to
usurpation of legislative authority.20 And, in a number of
jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to
assail the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its
implementation.
In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections,21 therein petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to
assail the constitutionality of Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006, or
the "Fair Elections Act," which prohibited the publication of
surveys within 15 days before an election for national
candidates, and seven days for local candidates. Included in
the petition is a prayer to prohibit the Commission on Elections
from enforcing the said provision. The Court granted the
petition and struck down the assailed provision for being
unconstitutional.22
In Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et
al.,23 therein petitioner assailed the constitutionality of
paragraphs (c), (d), (f) and (g) of Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002," on the ground that they constitute undue delegation
of legislative power for granting unbridled discretion to
schools and private employers in determining the manner of
drug testing of their employees, and that the law constitutes a
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It also sought to enjoin the Dangerous Drugs Board
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency from enforcing
the challenged provision.24 The Court partially granted the
petition by declaring Section 36(f) and (g) of R.A. No. 9165
unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined the concerned
agencies from implementing them.25
In another instance, consolidated petitions for
prohibitions26 questioning the constitutionality of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund were deliberated upon by this
Court which ultimately granted the same.
Clearly, prohibition has been found an appropriate remedy to
challenge the constitutionality of various laws, rules, and
regulations.
There is also no question regarding the jurisdiction of the CA
to hear and decide a petition for prohibition. By express
provision of the law, particularly Section 9(1) of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129,27 the CA was granted "original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
This authority the CA enjoys concurrently with RTCs and this
Court.
In the same manner, the supposed violation of the principle of
the hierarchy of courts does not pose any hindrance to the full
deliberation of the issues at hand. It is well to remember that
"the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It
generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations.
For this reason, litigants are required to [refer] to the trial
courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of
these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of
the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision
cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as
they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the
rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases
brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but
legal questions."28
Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside
for special and important reasons, such as when dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice.29 Thus, when
based on the good judgment of the court, the urgency and
significance of the issues presented calls for its intervention, it
should not hesitate to exercise its duty to resolve.
The instant petition presents an exception to the principle as
it basically raises a legal question on the constitutionality of
the mandatory discount and the breadth of its rightful
Page | 64
beneficiaries. More importantly, the resolution of the issues
will redound to the benefit of the public as it will put to rest
the questions on the propriety of the granting of discounts to
senior citizens and PWDs amid the fervent insistence of
affected establishments that the measure transgresses their
property rights. The Court, therefore, finds it to the best
interest of justice that the instant petition be resolved.
The instant case is not barred by
stare decisis
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that the
ruling in Carlos Superdrug constitutes as stare decisis or law of
the case which bars the relitigation of the issues that had been
resolved therein and had been raised anew in the instant
petition. It argues that there are substantial differences
between Carlos Superdrug and the circumstances in the
instant case which take it out from the operation of the
doctrine of stare decisis. It cites that in Carlos Superdrug, the
Court denied the petition because the petitioner therein failed
to prove the confiscatory effect of the tax deduction scheme
as no proof of actual loss was submitted. It believes that its
submission of financial statements for the years 2006 and 2007
to prove the confiscatory effect of the law is a material fact
that distinguishes the instant case from that of Carlos
Superdrug.30
The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not
constitute stare decisis to the instant case, not because of the
petitioner's submission of financial statements which were
wanting in the first case, but because it had the good sense of
including questions that had not been raised or deliberated in
the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20%
discount granted to PWDs, the supposed vagueness of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and violation of the equal
protection clause.
Nonetheless, the Court finds nothing in the instant case that
merits a reversal of the earlier ruling of the Court in Carlos
Superdrug. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, there is a very
slim difference between the issues in Carlos Superdrug and the
instant case with respect to the nature of the senior citizen
discount. A perfunctory reading of the circumstances of the
two cases easily discloses marked similarities in the issues and
the arguments raised by the petitioners in both cases that
semantics nor careful play of words can hardly obscure.
In both cases, it is apparent that what the petitioners are
ultimately questioning is not the grant of the senior citizen
discount per se, but the manner by which they were allowed
to recoup the said discount. In particular, they are protesting
the change in the tax treatment of the senior citizen discount
from tax credit to being merely a deduction from gross income
which they claimed to have significantly reduced their profits.
This question had been settled in Carlos Superdrug, where the
Court ruled that the change in the tax treatment of the
discount was a valid exercise of police power, thus:
Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction
reduces the net income of the private establishments
concerned. The discounts given would have entered the
coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private
establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257.
xxxx
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the
senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the
definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State,
in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden
of partly subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant
benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and
well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our
society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the
Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act
provides:
SEC. 2. [R.A.] No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives.— Pursuant to
Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the
family to take care of its elderly members while the State may
design programs of social security for them. In addition to this,
Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
provides: "The State shall provide social justice in all phases of
national development." Further, Article XIII, Section 11,
provides: "The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick,
elderly, disabled, women and children." Consonant with these
constitutional principles the following are the declared policies
of this Act:
xxxx
(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the
improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively
seek their partnership.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty
percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental
services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees
charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and
other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares
for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments
extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may
claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
Page | 65
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined
by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.31 (Citations omitted
and emphasis in the original)
Verily, it is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly
as they reach the point in their lives when the vigor of their
youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. Not
much because of choice, they become needing of support from
the society for whom they presumably spent their productive
days and for whose betterment they exhausted their energy,
know-how and experience to make our days better to live.
In the same way, providing aid for the disabled persons is an
equally important State responsibility. Thus, the State is
obliged to give full support to the improvement of the total
well-being of disabled persons and their integration into the
mainstream of society.32 This entails the creation of
opportunities for them and according them privileges if only to
balance the playing field which had been unduly tilted against
them because of their limitations.
The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only
upon the State, but also on the community and even private
entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role
as parens patriae which holds it under obligation to provide
protection and look after the welfare of its people especially
those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means
parent of his or her country, and refers to the State in its role
as "sovereign", or the State in its capacity as a provider of
protection to those unable to care for themselves.33 In fulfilling
this duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent
powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.
In Gerochi v. Department of Energy,34 the Court passed upon
one of the inherent powers of the state, the police power,
where it emphasized, thus:
[P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the
most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the
State. The justification is found in the Latin maxim salus populi
est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law)
and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property
as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent
attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public
needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments
through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a
host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the power to
"regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first
and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its
patrons.35 (Citations omitted)
It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress
enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws mandating a 20%
discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens
and PWDs. It is also in further exercise of this power that the
legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax
deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments.
The petitioner, however, claims that the change in the tax
treatment of the discount is illegal as it constitutes taking
without just compensation. It even submitted financial
statements for the years 2006 and 2007 to support its claim of
declining profits when the change in the policy was
implemented.
The Court is not swayed.
To begin with, the issue of just compensation finds no
relevance in the instant case as it had already been made clear
in Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by the
State in the imposition of senior citizen discount was its police
power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
just compensation is not required in wielding police power.
This is precisely because there is no taking involved, but only
an imposition of burden.
In Manila Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of the DSWD,
et al.,36 the Court ruled that by examining the nature and the
effects of R.A. No. 9257, it becomes apparent that the
challenged governmental act was an exercise of police power.
It was held, thus:
[W]e now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount
to determine if it constitutes an exercise of police power or
eminent domain.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior
citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully
employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and,
thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It
may not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to
honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive
years of their lives on contributing to the development and
progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of
honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law.
As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation
affecting the ability of private establishments to price their
products and services relative to a special class of individuals,
senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential
concern. In turn, this affects the amount of profits or
income/gross sales that a private establishment can derive
from senior citizens. In other words, the subject regulation
affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private
establishment. However, it does not purport to appropriate or
burden specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of Page | 66
the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit
of the public, or senior citizens for that matter, but merely
regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the
amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private
establishments may derive from, senior citizens.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with
substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on
investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as
police power measures. x x x.37 (Citations omitted)
In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State."38 Even then, the State's claim of police power cannot
be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding purpose
of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare,
public health and safety, among others. It is a measure, which
by sheer necessity, the State exercises, even to the point of
interfering with personal liberties or property rights in order to
advance common good. To warrant such interference, two
requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State; and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method.39
The subjects of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, i.e., senior citizens
and PWDs, are individuals whose well-being is a recognized
public duty. As a public duty, the responsibility for their care
devolves upon the concerted efforts of the State, the family
and the community. In Article XIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution, the State is mandated to give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good. The more apparent manifestation of these social
inequities is the unequal distribution or access to healthcare
services. To abet in alleviating this concern, the State is
committed to adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost, with priority for
the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children.40
In the same manner, the family and the community have
equally significant duties to perform in reducing social
inequality. The family as the basic social institution has the
foremost duty to care for its elderly members.41 On the other
hand, the community, which include the private sector, is
recognized as an active partner of the State in pursuing greater
causes. The private sector, being recipients of the privilege to
engage business in our land, utilize our goods as well as the
services of our people for proprietary purposes, it is only fitting
to expect their support in measures that contribute to
common good. Moreover, their right to own, establish and
operate economic enterprises is always subject to the duty of
the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene
when the common good so demands.42
The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the
method taken by the legislature to implement the declared
policies of the subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on the
medical services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs
and to treat the said discounts as tax deduction rather than tax
credit. The measure is fair and reasonable and no credible
proof was presented to prove the claim that it was
confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory, there must
be taking of property without just compensation.
Illuminating on this point is the discussion of the Court on the
concept of taking in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,43viz.:
There are two different types of taking that can be identified.
A "possessory" taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory"
taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property.
xxxx
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of
what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of
degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each
case. x x x.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is
that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner
that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view,
equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or
property law that existed when the owner acquired the land
make the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial
uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
xxxx
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a 'taking"
if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the
distinct investment-backed expectations of the
44
owner. (Citations omitted)
The petitioner herein attempts to prove its claim that the
pertinent provisions of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 amount to
taking by presenting financial statements purportedly showing
financial losses incurred by them due to the adoption of the
tax deduction scheme.
For the petitioner's clarification, the presentation of the
financial statement is not of compelling significance in
justifying its claim for just compensation. What is imperative is
for it to establish that there was taking in the constitutional
Page | 67
sense or that, in the imposition of the mandatory discount, the
power exercised by the state was eminent domain.
According to Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de
Castellvi,45 five circumstances must be present in order to
qualify "taking" as an exercise of eminent domain. First, the
expropriator must enter a private property. Second, the
entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should
be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.46
The first requirement speaks of entry into a private property
which clearly does not obtain in this case. There is no private
property that is invaded or appropriated by the State. As it is,
the petitioner precipitately deemed future profits as private
property and then proceeded to argue that the State took it
away without full compensation. This seemed preposterous
considering that the subject of what the petitioner supposed
as taking was not even earned profits but merely an
expectation of profits, which may not even occur. For obvious
reasons, there cannot be taking of a contingency or of a mere
possibility because it lacks physical existence that is necessary
before there could be any taking. Further, it is impossible to
quantify the compensation for the loss of supposed profits
before it is earned.
The supposed taking also lacked the characteristics of
permanence47 and consistency. The presence of these
characteristics is significant because they can establish that the
effect of the questioned provisions is the same on all
establishments and those losses are indeed its unavoidable
consequence. But apparently these indications are wanting in
this case. The reason is that the impact on the establishments
varies depending on their response to the changes brought
about by the subject provisions. To be clear, establishments
are not prevented from adjusting their prices to accommodate
the effects of the granting of the discount and retain their
profitability while being fully compliant to the laws. It follows
that losses are not inevitable because establishments are free
to take business measures to accommodate the contingency.
Lacking in permanence and consistency, there can be no taking
in the constitutional sense. There cannot be taking in one
establishment and none in another, such that the former can
claim compensation but the other may not. Simply told, there
is no taking to justify compensation; there is only poor
business decision to blame.
There is also no ousting of the owner or deprivation of
ownership. Establishments are neither divested of ownership
of any of their properties nor is anything forcibly taken from
them. They remain the owner of their goods and their profit or
Profit: P200.00
loss still depends on the performance of their sales.

Apart from the foregoing, covered establishments are also
provided with a mechanism to recoup the amount of discounts
they grant the senior citizens and PWDs. It is provided in
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442
After the passage of the law, the three establishments reacted
differently. Establishment 1 was passive and maintained the
price of Drug A at P8.00 which understandably resulted in
diminution of profits.
Page | 68

that establishments may claim the discounts as "tax deduction

Establishment 1
based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered."
Basically, whatever amount was given as discount, covered
establishments may claim an equal amount as an expense or Drug A
tax deduction. The trouble is that the petitioner, in protesting
the change in the tax treatment of the discounts, apparently
Acquisition cost P8.00
seeks tax incentive and not merely a return of the amount
given as discounts. It premised its interpretation of financial
losses in terms of the effect of the change in the tax treatment Selling price P10.00
of the discount on its tax liability; hence, the claim that the
measure was confiscatory. However, as mentioned earlier in
the discussion, loss of profits is not the inevitable result of the
change in tax treatment of the discounts; it is more
appropriately a consequence of poor business decision. Number of Patrons 100

It bears emphasizing that the law does not place a cap on the
amount of mark up that covered establishments may impose Senior Citizens/PWD 50
on their items. This rests on the discretion of the establishment
which, of course, is expected to put in the price of the
overhead costs, expectation of profits and other
considerations into the selling price of an item. In a simple
illustration, here is Drug A, with acquisition cost of P8.00, and Sale:
selling price of P10.00. Then comes a law that imposes 20% on
senior citizens and PWDs, which affected Establishments 1, 2 100 x P10.00 = P1,000.00
and 3. Let us suppose that the approximate number of patrons
who purchases Drug A is 100, half of which are senior citizens
and PWDs. Before the passage of the law, all of the
establishments are earning the same amount from profit from
the sale of Drug A, viz.: Deduction: P100.00

Before the passage of the law:

Drug A
Profit: P100.00
Acquisition cost P8.00
On the other hand, Establishment 2, mindful that the new law
will affect the profitability of the business, made a calculated
Selling price P10.00
decision by increasing the mark up of Drug A to P3.20, instead
of only P2.00. This brought a positive result to the earnings of
the company.

Number of Patrons 100

Sales:

100 x P10.00 = P1,000.00

Establishment 2 Establishment 3

Drug A Drug A

Acquisition cost P8.00 Acquisition cost P8.00

Page | 69

Selling price P11.20 Selling price P11.00

Number of Patrons 100 Number of Patrons 100

Senior Citizens/PWD 50 Senior Citizens/PWD 50

Sale: Sale:

100 x P11.20 = P1,120.00 100 x P11.00 = P1,100.00

Deduction: P112.00 Deduction: P110.00

Profit: P208.00 Profit: P190.00

For its part, Establishment 3 raised the mark up on Drug A to
only P3.00 just to even out the effect of the law. This measure
left a negligible effect on its profit, but Establishment 3 took it
as a social duty to share in the cause being promoted by the
government while still maintaining profitability.
The foregoing demonstrates that it is not the law per se which
occasioned the losses in the covered establishments but bad
business judgment. One of the main considerations in making
business decisions is the law because its effect is widespread
and inevitable. Literally, anything can be a subject of
legislation. It is therefore incumbent upon business managers
to cover this contingency and consider it in making business
strategies. As shown in the illustration, the better responses
were exemplified by Establishments 2 and 3 which promptly
put in the additional costs brought about by the law into the
price of Drug A. In doing so, they were able to maintain the
profitability of the business, even earning some more, while at
the same time being fully compliant with the law. This is not to
mention that the illustration is even too simplistic and not the
most ideal since it dealt only with a single drug being
purchased by both regular patrons and senior citizens and
PWDs. It did not consider the accumulated profits from the
other medical and non-medical products being sold by the
establishments which are expected to further curb the effect
of the granting of the discounts in the business.

It is therefore unthinkable how the petitioner could have

suffered losses due to the mandated discounts in R.A. Nos.
9257 and 9442, when a fractional increase in the prices of
items could bring the business standing at a balance even with
the introduction of the subject laws. A level adjustment in the
pricing of items is a reasonable business measure to take in
order to adapt to the contingency. This could even make
establishments earn more, as shown in the illustration, since
every fractional increase n the price of covered items
translates to a wider cushion to taper off the effect of the
granting of discounts and ultimately results to additional
profits gained from the purchases of the same items by regular
patrons who are not entitled to the discount. Clearly, the effect
of the subject laws in the financial standing of covered
companies depends largely on how they respond and forge a
balance between profitability and their sense of social
responsibility. The adaptation is entirely up to them and they
are not powerless to make adjustments to accommodate the
subject legislations.
Still, the petitioner argues that the law is confiscatory in the
sense that the State takes away a portion of its supposed
profits which could have gone into its coffers and utilizes it for
public purpose. The petitioner claims that the action of the
State amounts to taking for which it should be compensated.
To reiterate, the subject provisions only affect the petitioner's
right to profit, and not earned profits. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, the right to profit is not a vested right or an
entitlement that has accrued on the person or entity such that
its invasion or deprivation warrants compensation. Vested
rights are "fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable." 48 More
extensively, they are depicted as follows:
Rights which have so completely and definitely accrued to or
settled in a person that they are not subject to be defeated or
cancelled by the act of any other private person, and which it
is right and equitable that the government should recognize
and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and settled
according to the then current rules of law, and of which the
individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice,
or of which he could not justly be deprived otherwise than by
the established methods of procedure and for the public
welfare. x x x A right is not 'vested' unless it is more than a
mere expectation based on the anticipated continuance of
present laws; it must be an established interest in property,
not open to doubt. x x x To be vested in its accurate legal sense,
a right must be complete and consummated, and one of which
the person to whom it belongs cannot be divested without his
consent. x x x.49 (Emphasis ours)
Right to profits does not give the petitioner the cause of action
to ask for just compensation, it being only an inchoate right or
one that has not fully developed50 and therefore cannot be
claimed as one's own. An inchoate right is a mere expectation,
which may or may not come into existence. It is contingent as
it only comes "into existence on an event or condition which
may not happen or be performed until some other event may
prevent their vesting." 51 Certainly, the petitioner cannot claim
confiscation or taking of something that has yet to exist. It
cannot claim deprivation of profit before the consummation of
a sale and the purchase by a senior citizen or PWD.
Right to profit is not an accrued right; it is not fixed, absolute
nor indefeasible. It does not come into being until the
occurrence or realization of a condition precedent. It is a mere
"contingency that might never eventuate into a right. It stands
for a mere possibility of profit but nothing might ever be
payable under it."52
The inchoate nature of the right to profit precludes the
possibility of compensation because it lacks the quality or
characteristic which is necessary before any act of taking or
expropriation can be effected. Moreover, there is no yardstick
fitting to quantify a contingency or to determine
compensation for a mere possibility. Certainly, "taking"
presupposes the existence of a subject that has a quantifiable Page | 70
or determinable value, characteristics which a mere
contingency does not possess.
Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax
deduction, suffice it is to say that it is within the province of
Congress to do so in the exercise of its legislative power. It has
the authority to choose the subject of legislation, outline the
effective measures to achieve its declared policies and even
impose penalties in case of non-compliance. It has the sole
discretion to decide which policies to pursue and devise means
to achieve them, and courts often do not interfere in this
exercise for as long as it does not transcend constitutional
limitations. "In performing this duty, the legislature has no
guide but its judgment and discretion and the wisdom of
experience."53 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,54 legislative
discretion has been described as follows:
Legislative congressional discretion begins with the choice of
means, and ends with the adoption of methods and details to
carry the delegated powers into effect. x x x [W]hile the
powers are rigidly limited to the enumerations of the
Constitution, the means which may be employed to carry the
powers into effect are not restricted, save that they must be
appropriate, plainly adapted to the end, and not prohibited by,
but consistent with, the letter and spirit of the Constitution. x
x x.55 (Emphasis ours)
Corollary, whether to treat the discount as a tax deduction or
tax credit is a matter addressed to the wisdom of the
legislature. After all, it is within its prerogative to enact laws
which it deems sufficient to address a specific public concern.
And, in the process of legislation, a bill goes through rigorous
tests of validity, necessity and sufficiency in both houses of
Congress before enrolment. It undergoes close scrutiny of the
members of Congress and necessarily had to surpass the
arguments hurled against its passage. Thus, the presumption
of validity that goes with every law as a form of deference to
the process it had gone through and also to the legislature's
exercise of discretion. Thus, in Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez,
etc., and Sarmiento,56 the Court emphasized, thus:
It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the
legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police
power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy
of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of
necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any
law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the
measures adopted to implement the public policy or to
achieve public interest. x x x.57 (Emphasis ours)
The legislature may also grant rights and impose additional
burdens. It may also regulate industries, in the exercise of
police power, for the protection of the public. R.A. Nos. 9257
and 9442 are akin to regulatory laws, the issuance of which is
within the ambit of police power. The minimum wage law,
zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the
operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working
hours to eight, and the like fall under this category.58
Indeed, regulatory laws are within the category of police
power measures from which affected persons or entities
cannot claim exclusion or compensation. For instance, private
establishments cannot protest that the imposition of the
minimum wage is confiscatory since it eats up a considerable
chunk of its profits or that the mandated remuneration is not
commensurate for the work done. The compulsory nature of
the provision for minimum wages underlies the effort of the
State, as R.A. No. 672759 expresses it, to promote productivity-
improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent
standard of living for the workers and their families; to
guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production; to enhance employment generation in the
countryside through industry dispersal; and to allow business
and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion and
growth, and as the Constitution expresses it, to affirm labor as
a primary social economic force.60
Similarly, the imposition of price control on staple goods in R.A.
No. 758161 is likewise a valid exercise of police power and
affected establishments cannot argue that the law was
depriving them of supposed gains. The law seeks to ensure the
availability of basic necessities and prime commodities at
reasonable prices at all times without denying legitimate
business a fair return on investment. It likewise aims to provide
effective and sufficient protection to consumers against
hoarding, profiteering and cartels with respect to the supply,
distribution, marketing and pricing of said goods, especially
during periods of calamity, emergency, widespread illegal
price manipulation and other similar situations.62
More relevantly, in Manila Memorial Park, Inc.,63 it was ruled
that it is within the bounds of the police power of the state to
impose burden on private entities, even if it may affect their
profits, such as in the imposition of price control measures.
There is no compensable taking but only a recognition of the
fact that they are subject to the regulation of the State and
that all personal or private interests must bow down to the
more paramount interest of the State.
This notwithstanding, the regulatory power of the State does
not authorize the destruction of the business. While a business
may be regulated, such regulation must be within the bounds
of reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable,
and its provision cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the
guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by
the exercise of police power.64 After all, regulation only
signifies control or restraint, it does not mean suppression or
absolute prohibition. Thus, in Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz,65 the Court emphasized:
The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and
harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the
interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility
and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates
as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes
an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties
of due process and equal protection of the laws.66 (Citation
omitted)
Here, the petitioner failed to show that R.A. Nos. 9257 and
9442, under the guise of regulation, allow undue interference
in an otherwise legitimate business. On the contrary, it was
Page | 71
shown that the questioned laws do not meddle in the business
or take anything from it but only regulate its realization of
profits.
The subject laws do not violate the
equal protection clause
The petitioner argues that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are
violative of the equal protection clause in that it failed to
distinguish between those who have the capacity to pay and
those who do not, in granting the 20% discount. R.A. No. 9257,
in particular, removed the income qualification in R.A. No.
7432 of P60,000.00 per annum before a senior citizen may be
entitled to the 20% discount.
The contention lacks merit.
The petitioner's argument is dismissive of the reasonable
qualification on which the subject laws were based. In City of
Manila v. Hon. Laguio Jr.,67 the Court emphasized:
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in like circumstances.68 (Citations omitted)
"The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another."69 For a
classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial
distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law,
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it
must apply equally to all members of the same class.70
To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction
as to income, is a valid classification. The Constitution itself
considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a
priority to address their needs. When the Constitution
declared its intention to prioritize the predicament of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children,71 it did not make any reservation as to income, race,
religion or any other personal circumstances. It was a blanket
privilege afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in
view of the vulnerability of their class.
R.A. No. 9257 is an implementation of the avowed policy of the
Constitution to enact measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities.72 Specifically, it caters to
the welfare of all senior citizens. The classification is based on
age and therefore qualifies all who have attained the age of 60.
Senior citizens are a class of their own, who are in need and
should be entitled to government support, and the fact that
they may still be earning for their own sustenance should not
disqualify them from the privilege.
It is well to consider that our senior citizens have already
reached the age when work opportunities have dwindled
concurrently as their physical health. They are no longer
expected to work, but there are still those who continue to
work and contribute what they can to the country. Thus, to
single them out and take them out of the privileges of the law
for continuing to strive and earn income to fend for themselves
is inimical to a welfare state that the Constitution envisions. It
is tantamount to penalizing them for their persistence. It is
commending indolence rather than rewarding diligence. It
encourages them to become wards of the State rather than
productive partners.
Our senior citizens were the laborers, professionals and
overseas contract workers of the past. While some may be well
to do or may have the capacity to support their sustenance,
the discretion to avail of the privileges of the law is up to them.
But to instantly tag them as undeserving of the privilege would
be the height of ingratitude; it is an outright discrimination.
The same ratiocination may be said of the recognition of PWDs
as a class in R.A. No. 9442 and in granting them discounts. It
needs no further explanation that PWDs have special needs
which, for most, last their entire lifetime. They constitute a
class of their own, equally deserving of government support as
our elderlies. While some of them maybe willing to work and
earn income for themselves, their disability deters them from
living their full potential. Thus, the need for assistance from
the government to augment the reduced income or
productivity brought about by their physical or intellectual
limitations.
There is also no question that the grant of mandatory discount
is germane to the purpose of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, that is,
to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development and make essential goods and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost, with
special priority given to the elderlies and the disabled, among
others. The privileges granted by the laws ease their concerns
and allow them to live more comfortably.
The subject laws also address a continuing concern of the
government for the welfare of the senior citizens and PWDs. It
is not some random predicament but an actual, continuing and
pressing concern that requires preferential attention. Also, the
laws apply to all senior citizens and PWDs, respectively,
without further distinction or reservation. Without a doubt, all
the elements for a valid classification were met.
The definitions of "disabilities" and
"PWDs" are clear and unequivocal
Undeterred, the petitioner claims that R.A. No. 9442 is
ambiguous particularly in defining the terms "disability" and
"PWDs," such that it lack comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must guess at its meaning. It likewise
bewails the futility of the given safeguards to prevent abuse
since government officials who are neither experts nor
practitioners of medicine are given the authority to issue
identification cards that authorizes the granting of the
privileges under the law.
The Court disagrees.
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 9442,
defines "disabled persons" as follows: Page | 72
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or
different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory
impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the
range considered normal for a human being[.]
On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1
of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows;
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined
under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An Act Providing for the
Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons
with Disability as amended and their integration into the
Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes. This is defined
as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a
result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform
an activity in a manner or within the range considered normal
for human being. Disability shall mean (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an
individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of such
an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment.
The foregoing definitions have a striking conformity with the
definition of "PWDs" in Article 1 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which
reads:
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in
interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
(Emphasis and italics ours)
The seemingly broad definition of the terms was not without
good reasons. It recognizes that "disability is an evolving
concept"73 and appreciates the "diversity of PWDs."74 The
terms were given comprehensive definitions so as to
accommodate the various forms of disabilities, and not confine
it to a particular case as this would effectively exclude other
forms of physical, intellectual or psychological impairments.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,75 it was declared,
thus:
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment
of terms without defining them; much less do we have to
define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature
to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
Apparent Medical Licensed Private or
from the whole act x x x.76 (Citation omitted)
Disability Certificate Government Physician
At any rate, the Court gathers no ambiguity in the provisions
of R.A. No. 9442. As regards the petitioner's claim that the law School Licensed Teacher duly
lacked reasonable standards in determining the persons Assessment signed by the School
entitled to the discount, Section 32 thereof is on point as it Principal Page | 73

identifies who may avail of the privilege and the manner of its
availment. It states:
 Head of the
Sec. 32. x x x Business
Certificate of Establishment
The abovementioned privileges are available only to persons
Disability
with disability who are Filipino citizens upon submission of any  Head of Non-
of the following as proof of his/her entitlement thereto: Government
Organization
(I) An identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor
or the barangay captain of the place where the persons with
disability resides; Non- Medical Licensed Private or
Apparent Certificate Government Physician
(II) The passport of the persons with disability concerned; or Disability

(III) Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID) issued

by the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons To provide further safeguard, the Department of Health issued
(NCWDP). A.O. No. 2009-0011, providing guidelines for the availment of
the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by PWDs. In
It is, however, the petitioner's contention that the foregoing making a purchase, the individual must present the documents
authorizes government officials who had no medical enumerated in Section VI(4)(b), to wit:
background to exercise discretion in issuing identification
cards to those claiming to be PWDs. It argues that the provision i. PWD identification card x x x
lends to the indiscriminate availment of the privileges even by
ii. Doctor's prescription stating the name of the PWD,
those who are not qualified.
age, sex, address, date, generic name of the medicine,
The petitioner's apprehension demonstrates a superficial dosage form, dosage strength, quantity, signature
understanding of the law and its implementing rules. To be over printed name of physician, physician's address,
clear, the issuance of identification cards to PWDs does not contact number of physician or dentist, professional
depend on the authority of the city or municipal mayor, the license number, professional tax receipt number and
DSWD or officials of the NCDA (formerly NCWDP). It is well to narcotic license number, if applicable. To safeguard
remember that what entitles a person to the privileges of the the health of PWDs and to prevent abuse of [R.A. No.]
law is his disability, the fact of which he must prove to qualify. 9257, a doctor's prescription is required in the
Thus, in NCDA Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 001, series of purchase of over-the-counter medicines. x x x.
2008,77 it is required that the person claiming disability must
iii. Purchase booklet issued by the local social/health
submit the following requirements before he shall be issued a
office to PWDs for free containing the following basic
PWD Identification Card:
information:
1. Two "1x 1" recent ID pictures with the names, and
a) PWD ID number
signatures or thumb marks at the back of the picture.
b) Booklet control number
2. One (1) Valid ID c) Name of PWD
d) Sex
3. Document to confirm the medical or disability e) Address
condition78 f) Date of Birth
g) Picture
To confirm his disability, the person must obtain a medical h) Signature of PWD
certificate or assessment, as the case maybe, issued by a i) Information of medicine purchased:
licensed private or government physician, licensed teacher or
head of a business establishment attesting to his impairment. i.1 Name of medicine
The issuing entity depends on whether the disability is i.2 Quantity
apparent or non-apparent. NCDA A.O. No. 001 further i.3 Attending Physician
provides:79 i.4 License Number
i.5 Servicing drug store name
DISABILITY DOCUMENT ISSUING ENTITY i.6 Name of dispensing pharmacist

j) Authorization letter of the PWD x x x in case the medicine is

bought by the representative or caregiver of the PWD.
The PWD identification card also has a validity period of only
three years which facilitate in the monitoring of those who
may need continued support and who have been relieved of
their disability, and therefore may be taken out of the
coverage of the law.

At any rate, the law has penal provisions which give concerned
Page | 74

establishments the option to file a case against those abusing

the privilege. Section 46(b) of R.A. No. 9442 provides that
"[a]ny person who abuses the privileges granted herein shall
be punished with imprisonment of not less than six months or
a fine of not less than Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00), but not
more than Fifty Thousand pesos (P50,000.00), or both, at the
discretion of the court." Thus, concerned establishments,
together with the proper government agencies, must actively
participate in monitoring compliance with the law so that only
the intended beneficiaries of the law can avail of the privileges.

Indubitably, the law is clear and unequivocal, and the

petitioner's claim of vagueness to cast uncertainty in the
validity of the law does not stand.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a)

of Republic Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act No.
9442 are hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
(SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO
BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES,
AND CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, MINOR, FOR HERSELF AND
AS REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
JR., Petitioners, v. QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY
MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS
CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY
TIANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the
constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local
governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The
petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada,
and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local
governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from
implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending
resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of
Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic
Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act,"
as amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as
the right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody." 3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,4 dated August 26,
1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na
Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng
Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No.
80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00
P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew
Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of
Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes"
dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon
City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled
"An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon
City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing
Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for
Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society,
in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the
youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that
the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a)
result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus,
fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to Page | 75
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in
rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In
addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance
contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there
are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law
enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age
of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that the
law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical
assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law
enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator. 14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances
contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from the
operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working
students or students with evening class, they contend that the
lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out
at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due process; 16 and
(b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly
tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable
relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of
minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect
and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the
community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance,
particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of
RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision
imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand,
and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall
be imposed on minors for curfew violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a
compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available
to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street
lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit
televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law
enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and
preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the
government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e.,
mandatory parental counseling and education seminars
informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and
that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is
whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised
in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition,
questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners'
direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts
doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to
warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." 24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentalitv of the Government. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded
the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined
to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies
involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable."25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions
for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under
the Constitution." 27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the
Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28 Page | 76
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.
GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was
expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule
has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for
review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules -
allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions
invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]" 30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew
Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila,
and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative
powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the
Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right
to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their
children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by
imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as
amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on
minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is
grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias."31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners correctly
availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although
these governmental actions were not made pursuant to any
judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as
remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and
executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is
whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is
justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse
must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court
has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
[(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of
this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in
the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if
it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in
this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is
justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be anactual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the
existence of the first two (2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the
traditional or in the expanded setting — is the presence of an
actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy
is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."'36 According to recent
jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded
jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is
simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an
actual justiciable controversy in this case given the evident
clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the
Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents'
constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes
against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their
asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of
grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to
exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for
adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were
being implemented until the Court issued the TRO 39 enjoining
their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury
is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but
rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
determination of whether those assailing the governmental
act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the
court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining,
some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of
the challenged governmental act."40 "'[I]nterest' in the
question involved must be material — an interest that is in
issue and will be affected by the official act — as distinguished Page | 77
from being merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a
person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights
by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged
breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of
minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2)
the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related to
the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce
Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting
the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor
at the time the petition was filed before this Court,44 and,
hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as
alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after
school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by
virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand,
petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro
Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes
(Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal
age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus,
they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for
which they could base any direct injury as a consequence
thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of
whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to
rear their children as they have not shown that they stand
before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be
noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas,
Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for
himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr.
Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his
primary right as a parent as he only stands as the
representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel
was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and,
consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK
still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized
by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances,
i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required
personal interest in the controversy. More particularly,
Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation
of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation
of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the
standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are
concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court
has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal
standing, especially when paramount interest is
involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act
are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of
the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality
of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review.
Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these
issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and the
right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the
extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the
interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels
a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the
standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive
aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors
to travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court must
first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances
are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances
are void for not containing sufficient enforcement parameters,
which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled
discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack
of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the
questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though
they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew
offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus,
acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the
Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the
age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or
identification of the child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly
identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which,
because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning
Page | 78
and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so
that one may act accordingly.49The void for vagueness
doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which
are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined
that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional
uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty
cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases
where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to
give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as
well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a
definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the
due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no
constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are
"void-for-vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement
parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not
assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms
related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
however, matters of policy that are best left for the political
branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of
curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in
a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show
that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems
from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular
conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that
ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because
agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what
conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough
of Middletown,51 it was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and
subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and
arbitrary application based on individual impressions and
personal predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without
any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew
Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for
vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no
sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly
state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as
amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may
be determinedfrom the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence
of these documents, age may be based on information from
the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
(Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew
Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344)
repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory
law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630,54minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are
children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is
a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of
the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances
should be read and implemented in conjunction with related
statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel
and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the
curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application
of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent
proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the
absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement
authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect,
which - needless to state - should be done ethically and
judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers
disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate
action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have
the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances
as void for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this
right includes the right to determine whether minors will be
required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay
late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is
primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's
interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling. 57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the
State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of
their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children
(i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the
development of their moral character are characterized not
Page | 79
only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means
that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their
authority over their children; they are equally obliged to
exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this
provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to
ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free,
independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For
indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for
additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the
child for these [obligations] must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and
elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of
teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially
responsible citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a
substantial measure of authority over one's
60 61
children." In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court of
the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing
of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As
in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their
children is not only described as "natural," but also as
"primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents'
superior right over the State in the upbringing of their
children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to parental
control over their children was explained by the US Supreme
Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by
minors. But an additional and more important justification
for state deference to parental control over children is that
"the child is not [a] mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should
be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child,
the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or
mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or
welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing
of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but
rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v.
Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens
patriae in protecting minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in
an unfavorable position, vis-a vis other parties. Unable as
they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have
the political community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States
Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x
x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty
to aid parents in the moral development of their
children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to
fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that
"[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for
the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation
in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who have the primary
responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions
designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their
children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater
length, these ordinances further compelling State interests
(particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the
prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail
limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and
lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential
physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the
night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor
children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this
time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-
rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over
their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are
able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect
of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the
parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public
places without parental accompaniment during the curfew
hours.73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their
minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to
influence or control their minors' activities.74 As such, the
Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his
or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances
positively influence children to spend more time at home.
Consequently, this situation provides parents with better
opportunities to take a more active role in their children's
Page | 80
upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle
(Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city government
"was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A
curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their
children from the perils of the street but are unable to control
the nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also
aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend
time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates
that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable
to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which
justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared
unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their
children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim
that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny
test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling
State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the
protection of minors from crime, there are other less
restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.78 In
addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours.79
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any
inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern
Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of
the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases,"81viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily
apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations
not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute
cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad
if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is
that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the
litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on
a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give
way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts
to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern
with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute
on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent
effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n
restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the
Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme
Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment,83 and that claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will
an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation
that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression."'85
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it
was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the
basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to
violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are
raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm
of freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed
curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under
the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person -
includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to
be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work
where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of
life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access
and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education,
Page | 81
free expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The
inter-relation of the right to travel with other fundamental
rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v.
Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion,
speech, assembly, and association require one to move about,
such movement must necessarily be protected under the First
Amendment. Restricting movement in those circumstances to
the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised
without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those
rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment to freedom of travel and
movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to
their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall,
freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason,
people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of
a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply
limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with
freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases
supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public
interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental
rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not
absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right,
provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction
on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of
their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew
period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor
becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal
activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the
limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete
with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special
protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA
9775,99 RA 9262,100 RA 9851, 101 RA 9344,102 RA 10364,103 RA
9211,104 RA 8980,105 RA 9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD)
603,107 as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which
explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city
or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal
councils may prescribe such curfew hours for children as may
be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew
ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and
the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact
curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this
case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In
other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as
required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise
of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely
to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this
relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and
enjoy constitutional rights,108but the exercise of these rights
is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always
subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their
parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens
patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts
the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs
concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute
contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful
employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are
required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a
foreign country by themselves or with a person other than
their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State
has broader authority over the minors' activities than over
similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's
general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State
may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even
though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
117
In Bellotti, the US Supreme Court identified three (3)
justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are:first, the peculiar vulnerability
of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed and mature manner; and third, the
importance of the parental role in child rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children
generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees
against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is
entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's
vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...sympathy, and ...
paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on]
the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood
and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the
upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive
of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme
Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to
Page | 82
minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range
of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are
the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in
public places, and the possible harms arising from other
activities subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets].
It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately
designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power,
whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or
one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in
the primary use of highways. But even in such use streets
afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other
uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may
be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions
on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are
singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of
judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental
rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in
classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the
rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by
the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in
our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the
strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test. 127 At this juncture,
it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same
constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has
broader authority over minors than over adults does not
trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez
v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile
curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the
parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The
Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less "fundamental"
for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights
may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,]
indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children than of adults. x x x. Thus, minors' rights are not
coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a
greater range of interests that justify the infringement of
minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that,
when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x
x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level
of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the
context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework
enables courts to determine whether the state has a
compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on
minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in
regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe
that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review
burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the
ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a
consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens
patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling State interests justifying the assailed government
act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification
that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of
proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include
constitutionally declared policies.133This Court has ruled that
children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and
care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling
interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way. 135 As explained in Nunez,
the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling
interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on
adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also
highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and
care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the
ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of
public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their
exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the
Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal
curfews on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be
neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and
Page | 83
moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-
school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and
member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or
meander in public or private roads, streets or other public
places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies
reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or
wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities
involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national
laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to
regulate the movement of minor children during night time by
setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or
cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or
detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor
children, there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of
growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities
wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of
criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society
are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their
nefarious activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the
information gathered by the City Council to support its passage
of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a
guidepost to our own treatment of the present case.
Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer
community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make
dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left
unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that
its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest—that
of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted
on the basis of information from many sources, including
records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of
public opinion, news reports, data from the United States
Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police
reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence,
elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping
unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make
for a safer community. The same streets may have a more
volatile and less wholesome character at night than during
the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a series of
dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug
dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale.
Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in
violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal
influences at an early age may persist in their criminal
conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these
theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their
finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In
attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for
children to come into contact with criminal influences,the City
was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile
violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local
governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical
data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming
prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or
perpetrators, in their respective localities.139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary
to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power
under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus
finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but,
in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on
public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a
compelling State interest exists for the enactment and
enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied,
the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set
forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or
provide the least restrictive means to address the cited
compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict
scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from
the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of
their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the
restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to
achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling
interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to
be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly
drawn.141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing
standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity,
whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present
case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to
ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to
travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance
unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn,
resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely
exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone
Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic
Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local
Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from
Page | 84
attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various
churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles,
aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor
relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a
minor could not even attend the city council meetings if they
ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views
on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a
deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very
carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional muster.
It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment
rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a
direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association
activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective
provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the
coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by
their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b)
those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines,
using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes
and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue
of their employment, are required in the streets or outside
their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at
night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions,
to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night;
(c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling
towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running
errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or
persons of legal age having authority over them; (f) those
involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts
minors from the curfew during these specific occasions:
Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day,
the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All
Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black
Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not
narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the
rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at
night from school or work.148 However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent,
the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable
exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression,
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first
two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors'
constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this
ordinance;
Page | 85

among others.
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited,
and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of (b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation
constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-
it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail curricular activities of their school or organization
below: wherein their attendance are required or otherwise
indispensable, or when such minors are out and
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church unable to go home early due to circumstances
activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non- beyond their control as verified by the proper
school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and authorities concerned; and
from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an
legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or
emergency situation such as conflagration,
church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
intellectual development, yet, such participation is not
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the (d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized
curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively
employment activity, or going to or returning home
prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities
from the same place of employment activity without
(such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults,
any detour or stop;
similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate
activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise
their religion is therefore effectively curtailed. (e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel
accompanied by an adult in no violation of this
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues Ordinance;
for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council
meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to
peaceably assemble and to free expression. (f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence
engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court
attending an official school, religious, recreational,
finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these
educational, social, communitv or other similar
legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription
private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect
school, or other similar private civic/religious
minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as
organization/group (recognized by the community)
becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These
that supervises the activity or when the minor is
legitimate activities are merely hindered without any
going to or returning home from such activity,
reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas
without any detour or stop; and
Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila
Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly
drawn. (h) When the minor can present papers certifying that
he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working
completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are student.152 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of
above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions
exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly
may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such,
drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association,
they cannot subsist independently despite the presence150 of
free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of
any separability clause.151
free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of

exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of
association by enabling minors to attend both official and
extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church
but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered
by these items given that the minors' attendance in the
official activities of civic or religious organizations are
allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas
Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is
sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by
exempting attendance at religious masses even during
curfew hours. In relation to their right to travel, the
ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from
the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these
numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth,
only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute
to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within
the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly
authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage
in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding
curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is
implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item
(a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by
their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be
understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive
sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable
construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile
curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference
is not superior but only complementary to parental
supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the
parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but
primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in
passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the
welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of
giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully
understand the import and consequences of their actions. In
one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.
This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud
as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the
nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is
under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent
lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same against
the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and
prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew
imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably
justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence,
constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way
limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the
lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from
crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes
the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it Page | 86
proper - as it was raised- to further discuss the validity of its
penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the
parentis or guardian under Section 8 thereof,154 does not
impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas
Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s
or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community
service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of
the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to
the fine imposed therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance
imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and
frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth
violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as
follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the
sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth
offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian
or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under
Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition, and a warning about the legal
impostitions in case of a third and subsequent
violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10)
days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by
the Punong Barangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could
validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community
service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344,
as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors
for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an
offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be
considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed
by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances
enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status
offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations,
truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-
drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors
against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness,
public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall
be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed
on children for said violations, and they shall instead be
brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the
barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be
recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with
the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention
programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities
for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting
education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of
regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the
similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or
penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is
the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew
ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty" 157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a
wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or
fine";158 "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a
person who commits a deliberate or negligent
act."159 Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction - such
as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or
privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the
law."160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to
mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the
regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A
thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate
intervention programs, such as community-based
programs recognized under Section 54 162 of the same law.
161
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community
service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors. For one, the community service programs provide
minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote
accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and
social stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light, these
programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the
law and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the
opportunity to become productive members of society and
thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their
community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is
likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it
is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing
disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is
generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel
or warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law
Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued
warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary
defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke,
warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or
oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or
warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in Page | 87
administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or
admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based
programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they
are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on
the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their
objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and
for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so
as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to
reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City
of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a
severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary
defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not
restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law"; 168 while the
Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal
censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by
his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than
just a warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is
a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the
error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke
the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual
including the public against repeating or committing the same,
and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or
violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from
others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly
indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably
constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical,
and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be
imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status
offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand,
fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations,
portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and
irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other
hand, the impositions of community service programs and
admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not
constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances
have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is,
that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to
promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has
passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the
only issuance out of the three which provides for the least
restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the
Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that
enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights
during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or Page | 88

guardian", has also been construed to include parental

permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the
manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of
the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared

unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City
Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in
accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila

Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances
should always conform with the law, these provisions must be
struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court

hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local
government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa
Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas
City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while
Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local
government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,VALID in accordance
with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 130230 : April 15, 2005]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. DANTE O. GARIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act
No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and
suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement of
traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent
Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation
receipt (TVR) and his driver's license confiscated for parking
illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August
1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR:
You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic
Operations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date
of apprehension for disposition/appropriate action
thereon. Criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem
license after 30 days.
Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date
of apprehension.1
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the
respondent addressed a letter2 to then MMDA Chairman
Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license,
and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original
complaint3 with application for preliminary injunction in
Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, on
12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No.
7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring
motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The
respondent further contended that the provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and
impose unspecified - and therefore unlimited - fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and continues to
suffer great and irreparable damage because of the
deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing
rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the
confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers granted to it by
Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing,
collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic
violations, which powers are legislative and executive in
nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity
of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the
three powers of government in administrative agencies.4
The MMDA also refuted Garin's allegation that the Metro
Manila Council, the governing board and policy making body
of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing
rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the court's
Page | 89
attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001
dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned
the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as
he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the
absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining
order on 26 September 1995, extending the validity of the TVR
as a temporary driver's license for twenty more days. A
preliminary mandatory injunction was granted on 23 October
1995, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondent's
driver's license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed
decision5 in favor of the herein respondent and held that:
A. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular
Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March 23, 1995, hence
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing
confiscation of driver's licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is
void ab initio.
b. The summary confiscation of a driver's license without
first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard; depriving him
of a property right (driver's license) without DUE PROCESS; not
filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction,
cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby made permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to return to
plaintiff his driver's license; th(e) MMDA is likewise ordered to
desist from confiscating driver's license without first giving the
driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding.
In filing this petition,6 the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its
argument in the court below and contends that a license to
operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property
right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under
the police power in the interest of the public safety and
welfare. The petitioner further argues that revocation or
suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking
without due process as long as the licensee is given the right
to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the
taking and the judiciary retains the power to determine the
validity of the confiscation, suspension or revocation of the
license, the petitioner points out that under the terms of the
confiscation, the licensee has three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the
MMDA Adjudication Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutor's
Office.
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-
95-001 was validly passed in the presence of a quorum, and
that the lower court's finding that it had not was based on a
"misapprehension of facts," which the petitioner would have
us review. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the
basis for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary
confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself,
and that such power is self-executory and does not require the
issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its
Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum
Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the
use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under
the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be
paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no
longer confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in
cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs
were given seven days from the date of implementation of the
new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or
vehicle plates.7
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of
a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating
drivers' licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken
the Court's need to decide this case, which has been rendered
moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum
Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-
implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any
other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating
drivers' licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of
the petitioner's future programs, this Court deems it
appropriate to make the following observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the
state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a
motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by
the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in
the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public
safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process
requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v.
Provincial Board of Rizal 8 on the license to operate a
cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry9 and Oposa v. Factoran10 on
timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v.
Municipality of Surigao11 on a legislative franchise to operate
an electric plant.
Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point,
such as State ex. Rel. Sullivan,12 which states in part that, "the
legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and
thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is
extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to
conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor
vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration
and the licensing of their operators have been required almost
from their first appearance. The right to operate them in
public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a
privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police
power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The
power to license imports further power to withhold or to
revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed
conditions."
Page | 90
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Funk,13 to the effect that:
"Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use
of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and
property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an
automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but, when
operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an
engine of destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of the
police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must,
prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated
on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of
general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle
Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor
vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed to the
promotion of public safety and is well within the police
power."
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it
is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the
power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor
vehicles may be operated on the state highways.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc.,14 we categorically stated that Rep. Act No.
7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone
legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative
in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which
claimed that it had the authority to open a subdivision street
owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to public traffic
because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power
in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this
premise, the MMDA argued that there was no need for the City
of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the
public.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the
MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local
government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro
Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an
ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the
street was invalid.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies
to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers
as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local
Government Code of 1991.15 A local government is a "political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs."16 Local government
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
which exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several
local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924
in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
development and administrative region" and the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the
region placed under "a development authority" referred to as
the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power . Even the Metro Manila Council
has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants
of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
a "development authority." It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature and these are actually summed
up in the charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. - - -x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory
and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the
autonomy of the local government units concerning purely
local matters."
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The
power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro
Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's
functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances
and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
the metropolis .17 (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is
understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant
the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers' licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with
Page | 91
the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and
Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority." The
contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall
"install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose
and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in
nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 413618 and P.D. No.
160519 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this
purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and
regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation
center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic
enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security
guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to
whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted
by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative
powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case),
the petitioner is not precluded - and in fact is duty-bound - to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the
exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management,
as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs.20
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a
development authority created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector, which
may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory
construction that a statute is to be read in a manner that would
breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,21 and is supported by
the criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute.22
A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services
with metro-wide impact that transcend local political
boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by
the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and
traffic management,23 and we are aware of the valiant efforts
of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled
roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are
limited by the MMDA's enabling law, which we can but
interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in
this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or
regulation arising from a legitimate source.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and

TINGA, JJ.,concur.

Page | 92
G. R. No. 157036 - June 9, 2004
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ Petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, ET. AL., Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is
subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and
order1 and the protection of the people against violence are
constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is
to be construed in connection and in harmony with these
constitutional duties.
Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to
enjoin the implementation of the "Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside
of Residence"2 (Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by
respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
The facts are undisputed:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered
a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need
for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising
crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent
Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms
Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus:
"THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH PROFILE CRIMES
THAT TEND TO DISTURB THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS OF
THE COMMUNITY THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING OF FORMER
NPA LEADER ROLLY KINTANAR. I UNDERSTAND WE ALREADY
HAVE THE IDENTITY OF THE CULPRIT. LET US BRING THEM TO
THE BAR OF JUSTICE.
THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THEIR
PLOTS IF OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CAN RID
THEMSELVES OF RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE
ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN PUBLIC PLACES.
THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND
INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO CARRY FIREARMS
IN PUBLIC PLACES. THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE
LIMITED ONLY TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS
AND NOT TO CARRYING THEM IN PUBLIC PLACES. FROM NOW
ON, ONLY THE UNIFORMED MEN IN THE MILITARY AND
AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS CAN CARRY
FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND ONLY PURSUANT TO
EXISTING LAW. CIVILIAN OWNERS MAY NO LONGER BRING
THEIR FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES. THOSE WHO
WANT TO USE THEIR GUNS FOR TARGET PRACTICE WILL BE
GIVEN SPECIAL AND TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO
TIME ONLY FOR THAT PURPOSE. AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD
THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE IN THE PREMISES
OF THE FIRING RANGE.
WE CANNOT DISREGARD THE PARAMOUNT NEED FOR LAW
AND ORDER. JUST AS WE CANNOT BE HEEDLESS OF OUR
PEOPLES ASPIRATIONS FOR PEACE."
Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane
issued the assailed Guidelines quoted as follows:
"TO : All Concerned Page | 93
FROM : Chief, PNP
SUBJECT : Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the
Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence.
DATE : January 31, 2003
1. Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
2. General:
The possession and carrying of firearms outside of residence is
a privilege granted by the State to its citizens for their
individual protection against all threats of lawlessness and
security.
As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular
license, special permit, certificate of registration or MR) are
prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence.
However, the Chief, Philippine National Police may, in
meritorious cases as determined by him and under conditions
as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry
firearms outside of residence.
3. Purposes:
This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the
implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms outside
of residence as provided for in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations, Presidential Decree No. 1866, dated June 29,
1983 and as directed by PGMA. It also prescribes the
conditions, requirements and procedures under which
exemption from the ban may be granted.
4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:
a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of
licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for
a new PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter
prescribed.
b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby
prohibited from carrying their firearms outside their residence
except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty
detail orders issued by competent authority pursuant to
Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall
pertain only to organic and regular employees.
5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms
outside of residence.
a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been
approved, provided, that the persons and security of those so
authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature of their
position, occupation and profession are under imminent
danger.
b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter
Orders granted by their respective agencies so authorized
pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such
Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for the duration of the
official mission which in no case shall be more than ten (10)
days.
c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their
respective security agencies so authorized pursuant to Section
4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case
exceed 24-hour duration. d. Members of duly recognized Gun
Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes
of practice and competition, provided, that such firearms while
in transit must not be loaded with ammunition and secured in
an appropriate box or case detached from the person. e.
Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps. 6. Requirements
for issuance of new PTCFOR: a. Written request by the
applicant addressed to Chief, PNP stating his qualification to
possess firearm and the reasons why he needs to carry firearm
outside of residence. b. Xerox copy of current firearm license
duly authenticated by Records Branch, FED; c. Proof of actual
threat, the details of which should be issued by the Chief of
Police/Provincial or City Directors and duly validated by C, RIID;
d. Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly authenticated by the Drug
Testing Center, if photocopied; e. Copy of DI/ RIID clearance,
duly authenticated by ODI/RIID, if photocopied; f. Copy of
Neuro-Psychiatric Clearance duly authenticated by NP Testing
Center, if photocopied; g. Copy of Certificate of Attendance to
a Gun Safety Seminar, duly validated by Chief, Operations
Branch, FED; h. NBI Clearance; i. Two (2) ID pictures (2" x 2")
taken not earlier than one (1) year from date of filing of
application; and j. Proof of Payment
7. Procedures: a. Applications may be filed directly to the
Office of the PTCFOR Secretariat in Camp Crame. In the
provinces, the applications may also be submitted to the Police
Regional Offices (PROs) and Provincial/City Police Offices
(P/CPOs) for initial processing before they are forwarded to
the office of the PTCFOR Secretariat. The processors, after
ascertaining that the documentary requirements are in order,
shall issue the Order of Payment (OP) indicating the amount of
fees payable by the applicant, who in turn shall pay the fees to
the Land Bank. b. Applications, which are duly processed and
prepared in accordance with existing rules and regulations,
shall be forwarded to the OCPNP for approval. c. Upon
approval of the application, OCPNP will issue PTCFOR valid for
one (1) year from date of issue. d. Applications for renewal of
PTCFOR shall be processed in accordance with the provisions
of par. 6 above. e. Application for possession and carrying of
firearms by diplomats in the Philippines shall be processed in
accordance with NHQ PNP Memo dated September 25, 2000,
with Subj: Possession and Carrying of Firearms by Diplomats in
the Philippines. 8. Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms: a.
The firearm must not be displayed or exposed to public view,
except those authorized in uniform and in the performance of
their official duties. b. The firearm shall not be brought inside
public drinking and amusement places, and all other
commercial or public establishments."
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom
a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his
request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition
impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP;
Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias,
as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division. He
anchored his petition on the following grounds:
Page | 94
"I
THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY MUCH LESS
BY A MERE SPEECH TO ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND THE LAW
ON FIREARMS BY IMPOSING A GUN BAN AND CANCELING
EXISTING PERMITS FOR GUNS TO BE CARRIED OUTSIDE
RESIDENCES.
II
OFFICIALLY, THERE IS NO PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE ON THE
GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH NEVER INVOKED POLICE
POWER TO JUSTIFY THE GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTS VERBAL
DECLARATION ON GUN BAN VIOLATED THE PEOPLES RIGHT TO
PROTECT LIFE AND THEIR PROPERTY RIGHT TO CARRY
FIREARMS.
III
THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE
QUESTIONED GUIDELINES BECAUSE:
1) THERE IS NO LAW, STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH
GRANTS THE PNP CHIEF THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE
THE PNP GUIDELINES.
2) THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PD 1866
CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER SET OF
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.
3) THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR THE
PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTNG GUIDELINES ON THE GUN
BAN.
IV
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES
IMPLEMENT PD 1866, AND THE AMENDMENTS THERETO, THE
PNP CHIEF STILL HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE
SAME BECAUSE
1) PER SEC 6, RA 8294, WHICH AMENDS PD 1866, THE IRR
SHALL BE PROMULGATED JOINTLY BY THE DOJ AND THE DILG.
2) SEC. 8, PD 1866 STATES THAT THE IRR SHALL BE
PROMULGATED BY THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY.
V
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE:
1) THE RIGHT TO OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM IS NECESSARILY
INTERTWINED WITH THE PEOPLES INHERENT RIGHT TO LIFE
AND TO PROTECT LIFE. THUS, THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE
PETITIONER OF THIS RIGHT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
FOR:
A) THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS MOST
POTENT, IF NOT HIS ONLY, MEANS TO DEFEND HIMSELF.
B) THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES STRIPPED PETITIONER OF HIS
MEANS OF PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE STATE COULD NOT POSSIBLY PROTECT ITS CITIZENS
DUE TO THE INADEQUACY AND INEFFICIENCY OF THE POLICE
FORCE.
2) THE OWNESHIP AND CARRYING OF FIREARMS ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS WHICH
CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND WITHOUT JUST CAUSE.
VI
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES WERE
ISSUED IN THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER, THE SAME IS AN
INVALID EXERCISE THEREOF SINCE THE MEANS USED
THEREFOR ARE UNREASONABLE AND UNNCESSARY FOR THE
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS PURPOSE TO DETER AND PREVENT
CRIME THEREBY BECOMING UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO LAW-
ABIDING GUN-OWNERS.
VII
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND
CONFISCATORY SINCE IT REVOKED ALL EXISTING PERMITS TO
CARRY WITHOUT, HOWEVER, REFUNDING THE PAYMENT THE
PNP RECEIVED FROM THOSE WHO ALREADY PAID THEREFOR.
VIII
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED
AT AND OPPRESSIVE ONLY TO LAW-ABIDING GUN OWNERS
WHILE LEAVING OTHER GUN-OWNERS THE LAWBREAKERS
(KIDNAPPERS, ROBBERS, HOLD-UPPERS, MNLF, MILF, ABU
SAYYAF COLLECTIVELY, AND NPA) UNTOUCHED.
IX
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND UNFAIR
BECAUSE THEY WERE IMPLEMENTED LONG BEFORE THEY
WERE PUBLISHED.
X vested in Congress.5 Congress may not escape its duties and
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE EFFECTIVELY AN EX POST FACTO
LAW SINCE THEY APPLY RETROACTIVELY AND PUNISH ALL
THOSE WHO WERE ALREADY GRANTED PERMITS TO CARRY
OUTSIDE OF RESIDENCE LONG BEFORE THEIR
PROMULGATION."
Petitioners submissions may be synthesized into five (5) major
issues:
First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the
assailed Guidelines;
Second, whether the citizens right to bear arms is a
constitutional right?;
Third, whether the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant
to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to
property?;
Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a
valid exercise of police power?; and
Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post
facto law?
The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition
pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, Page | 95
in refutation of petitioners arguments, he contends that: (1)
the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2)
petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and
carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the
due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed
Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier.
On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts,
suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. In
several instances where this Court was confronted with cases
of national interest and of serious implications, it never
hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial
determination of the cases.3 The case at bar is of similar import
as it involves the citizens right to bear arms.
I
Authority of the PNP Chief
Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner
argues that only Congress can withhold his right to bear arms.
In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and
respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and
arrogated upon themselves a power they do not possess the
legislative power.
We are not persuaded.
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of
government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent departments: the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of
the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere.4
Pertinently, the power to make laws the legislative power is
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that "delegata
potestas non potest delegari" "delegated power may not be
delegated."6
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power,
however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice
permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to
certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards,
councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and
directors.7 Such licensing power includes the power to
promulgate necessary rules and regulations.8
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the
early days of our Republic, the legislatures tendency was
always towards the delegation of power. Act No.
1780,9 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the
President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove
applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or
to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other
lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any
time.10 Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which he
may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the
Act.11 With the enactment of Act No. 2711, the "Revised
Administrative Code of 1917," the laws on firearms were
integrated. 12 The Act retained the authority of the Governor
General provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing
complexity in the Office of the Governor-General resulted in
the delegation of his authority to the Chief of the
Constabulary. On January 21, 1919, Acting Governor-General
Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 8 13 authorizing
and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his behalf in
approving and disapproving applications for personal, special
and hunting licenses. This was followed by Executive Order No.
6114 designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the
government custodian of all firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. Executive Order No. 215,15 issued by President
Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief
of the Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or
disapprove applications for personal, special and hunting
license, but also the authority to revoke the same. With the
foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of
the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time.
In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree
No. 186616 perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the
Constabulary. Section 2 specifically provides that any person
or entity desiring to possess any firearm "shall first secure the
necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the
Constabulary." With regard to the issuance of PTCFOR, Section
3 imparts: "The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious
cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he
may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them
outside of residence." These provisions are issued pursuant to
the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him
to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of the decree.17 At this juncture, it bears
emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the chief law governing
possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was issued
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative power.18 In an attempt to evade the application of
the above-mentioned laws and regulations, petitioner argues
that the "Chief of the PNP" is not the same as the "Chief of the
Constabulary," the PC being a mere unit or component of the
newly established PNP. He contends further that Republic Act
No. 829419 amended P.D. No. 1866 such that the authority to
issue rules and regulations regarding firearms is now jointly
vested in the Department of Justice and the DILG, not the Chief
of the Constabulary.20
Petitioners submission is bereft of merit.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,21 the Philippine National
Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the
Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing
authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers,
the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and
explosives in accordance with law.22 This is in conjunction with
the PNP Chiefs "power to issue detailed implementing policies
and instructions" on such "matters as may be necessary to
effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties" of the
PNP.23
Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not
Page | 96
divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his
authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did
not repeal entirely P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the
reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus,
the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the
Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations
regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations dated September 15,
1997 jointly issued by the Department of Justice and the DILG
pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the
automatic review, by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of
convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give
effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No. 8294, thereby
ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts
into the community.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the
PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.
Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyos declaration
of a nationwide gun ban, arguing that "she has no authority to
alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere
speech."
First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyos speech was
just an expression of her policy and a directive to her
subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President
Arroyo enacted a law through a mere speech.
Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the
President. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies
his power as Chief Executive, thus: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." As Chief
Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that
controls the course of her government. She lays down policies
in the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever policy
she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In
short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate,
she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a
duty.24 Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent
Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just
directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act
is well within the prerogative of her office.
II
Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?
Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a
constitutionally-protected right. This, he mainly anchors on
various American authorities. We therefore find it imperative
to determine the nature of the right in light of American
jurisprudence.
The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English
and American society. It antedates not only the American
Constitution but also the discovery of firearms.25
A provision commonly invoked by the American people to
justify their possession of firearms is the Second Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States of America, which
reads:
"A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed."
An examination of the historical background of the foregoing
provision shows that it pertains to the citizens "collective right"
to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens
"individual right" to own and possess arms. The setting under
which the right was contemplated has a profound connection
with the keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed
citizenry. That this is how the right was construed is evident in
early American cases.
The first case involving the interpretation of the Second
Amendment that reached the United States Supreme Court
is United States vs. Miller.26 Here, the indictment charged the
defendants with transporting an unregistered "Stevens
shotgun" without the required stamped written order,
contrary to the National Firearms Act. The defendants filed a
demurrer challenging the facial validity of the indictment on
the ground that the National Firearms Act offends the
inhibition of the Second Amendment. The District Court
sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. On
appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms
under the Second Amendment as referring to the collective
right of those comprising the Militia a body of citizens enrolled
for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual right
of citizen to bear arm. Miller expresses its holding as follows:
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a shotgun having a barrel of less than
eighteen inches in length at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any
part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could
contribute to the common defense.
The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United
States.27 Here, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Federal Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does not
conflict with the Second Amendment. It ruled that:
"While [appellants] weapon may be capable of military use, or
while at least familiarity with it might be regarded as of value
in training a person to use a comparable weapon of military
type and caliber, still there is no evidence that the appellant
was or ever had been a member of any military organization
or that his use of the weapon under the circumstances
disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In fact, the
only inference possible is that the appellant at the time
charged in the indictment was in possession of, transporting,
and using the firearm and ammunition purely and simply on
a frolic of his own and without any thought or intention of
contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia
which the Second amendment was designed to foster as
necessary to the security of a free state."
Page | 97
With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume
that the US Constitution grants upon the American people the
right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the United
States vs. Cruikshank28 decreed: "The right of the people to
keep and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution.
Neither is it in any way dependent upon that instrument."
Likewise, in People vs. Persce,29 the Court of Appeals said:
"Neither is there any constitutional provision securing the right
to bear arms which prohibits legislation with reference to such
weapons as are specifically before us for consideration. The
provision in the Constitution of the United States that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed is not designed to control legislation by the state."
With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified
as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Our
Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second
Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case of United
States vs. Villareal:30
"The only contention of counsel which would appear to
necessitate comment is the claim that the statute penalizing
the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping
and the use of firearms without a license, is in violation of the
provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the
United States Constitution against the infringement of the
right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms
(U. S. Constitution, amendment 2), which is not included in
the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out
that in no event could this constitutional guaranty have any
bearing on the case at bar, not only because it has not been
expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but also
because it has been uniformly held that both this and similar
provisions in State constitutions apply only to arms used in
civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, note 18); x x
x."
Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the
Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear
arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It
is a mere statutory creation. What then are the laws that
grant such right to the Filipinos? The first real firearm law is
Act No. 1780 enacted by the Philippine Commission on
October 12, 1907. It was passed to regulate the importation,
acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms. Section 9
thereof provides:
"SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more
firearms for personal protection, or for use in hunting or
other lawful purposes only, and ammunition therefor, shall
make application for a license to possess such firearm or
firearms or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon
making such application, and before receiving the license, the
applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings bank
in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which
the license is to be issued, or in lieu thereof he may give a bond
in such form as the Governor-General may prescribe, payable
to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two
hundred pesos for each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
That persons who are actually members of gun clubs, duly
formed and organized at the time of the passage of this Act,
who at such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not
be required to make the deposit or give the bond prescribed
by this section, and the bond duly executed by such person in
accordance with existing law shall continue to be security for
the safekeeping of such arms."
The foregoing provision was restated in Section 887 31 of Act
No. 2711 that integrated the firearm laws. Thereafter,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified
the laws on illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives and
imposed stiffer penalties for their violation. R.A. No. 8294
amended some of the provisions of P.D. No. 1866 by reducing
the imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the
right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or
absolute right.
III
Vested Property Right
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." Petitioner invokes this provision, asserting
that the revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed
Guidelines deprived him of his "vested property right" without
due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of
law.
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted
Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost
consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest
exists.32 The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing
a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor
property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry,33 we ruled
that "a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right." In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held
in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.34 that:
"Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or
a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution."
Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally
protected property right, relied heavily on Bell vs.
Burson35 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "once a
license is issued, continued possession may become essential
in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interest of the
licensees."
Petitioners reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case involves a
drivers license, not a license to bear arms. The catena of
American jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is
perfectly in accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is neither a
Page | 98
property nor a property right. In Erdelyi vs. OBrien,36 the
plaintiff who was denied a license to carry a firearm brought
suit against the defendant who was the Chief of Police of the
City of Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the denial
violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws. The United States Court of Appeals
Ninth Circuit ruled that Erdelyi did not have a property interest
in obtaining a license to carry a firearm, ratiocinating as
follows:
"Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever a person has
only an abstract need or desire for, or unilateral expectation of
a benefit. x x x Rather, they arise from legitimate claims of
entitlement defined by existing rules or understanding that
stem from an independent source, such as state law. x x x
Concealed weapons are closely regulated by the State of
California. x x x Whether the statute creates a property interest
in concealed weapons licenses depends largely upon the
extent to which the statute contains mandatory language that
restricts the discretion of the [issuing authority] to deny
licenses to applicants who claim to meet the minimum
eligibility requirements. x x x Where state law gives the issuing
authority broad discretion to grant or deny license application
in a closely regulated field, initial applicants do not have a
property right in such licenses protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d at 180 (gaming
license under Nevada law);"
Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of
Philadelphia,37 Conway vs. King,38 Nichols vs. County of Sta.
Clara,39 and Gross vs. Norton.40 These cases enunciated that
the test whether the statute creates a property right or
interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to
the issuing authority.
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in
the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which
state that "the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases
as determined by him and under such conditions as he may
impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them
outside of residence." Following the American doctrine, it is
indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a
property right protected under our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other
regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer
an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised
under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be
reasonably imposed.41 A licensee takes his license subject to
such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one
of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is
not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the
defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the
meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.42 The US
Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,43 held: "The
correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a
necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by
the State is always revocable."
The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the
Philippines as early as 1908. Thus, in The Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra44 we ruled:
"x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he
does or not is entirely optional with himself, but if, for his own
convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess arms, he must
do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose,
for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by
law. The Government can impose upon him such terms as it
pleases. If he is not satisfied with the terms imposed, he should
decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing
possession of the arms he does agree to such conditions, he
must fulfill them."
IV
Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a
property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot
be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of
the States police power. All property in the state is held subject
to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and
general welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the
validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the
essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due
process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property
rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its
issuance was the need for peace and order in the society.
Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those
committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to
disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed
it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the
motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is
the interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means
employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly
oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not
entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe
is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence.
However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of
their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we
believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is
regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.
Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do
not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of
all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around
with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the Page | 99
PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns
have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the
police power.45 In State vs. Reams,46 it was held that the
legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner
conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public
peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the
means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power.
The ruling in United States vs. Villareal,47 is relevant, thus:
"We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness
of a statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the too
frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and
excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of
such a regulation would tend to increase the security of life
and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any
community wherein the practice of carrying concealed
weapons prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive
upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that
its enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate
exercise of the police power of the state."
V
Ex post facto law
In Mekin vs. Wolfe,48 an ex post facto law has been defined as
one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes
such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex
post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 49 The
assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto
law because it is prospective in its application. Contrary to
petitioners argument, it would not result in the punishment of
acts previously committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[G.R. Nos. 84132-33 : December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 257
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND NEW AGRIX, INC.,
Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, THE EX-OFFICIO
SHERIFF and GODOFREDO QUILING, in his capacity as Deputy
Sheriff of Calamba, Laguna, Respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
This case involves the constitutionality of a presidential decree
which, like all other issuances of President Marcos during his
regime, was at that time regarded as sacrosanct. It is only now,
in a freer atmosphere, that his acts are being tested by the
touchstone of the fundamental law that even then was
supposed to limit presidential action.: rd
The particular enactment in question is Pres. Decree No. 1717,
which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of
Companies to be administered mainly by the National
Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for
filing claims against the Agrix companies and created a Claims
Committee to process these claims. Especially relevant to this
case, and noted at the outset, is Sec. 4(1) thereof providing
that "all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any
of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby
extinguished."
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) had executed in favor
of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate
mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over three (3) parcels of land
situated in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the
mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. It was for the expressed
purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that
the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos.
Pursuant thereto, the private respondent filed a claim with the
AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In
the meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National
Development Company, petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1)
of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, for the cancellation of the mortgage lien in
favor of the private respondent. For its part, the private
respondent took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a second case with
the same court to stop the foreclosure. The two cases were
consolidated.
After the submission by the parties of their respective
pleadings, the trial court rendered the impugned decision.
Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero annulled not only the
challenged provision, viz., Sec. 4 (1), but the entire Pres.
Decree No. 1717 on the grounds that: (1) the presidential
exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of
separation of powers; (2) the law impaired the obligation of
contracts; and (3) the decree violated the equal protection
clause. The motion for reconsideration of this decision having
been denied, the present petition was filed.: rd
The petition was originally assigned to the Third Division of this
Court but because of the constitutional questions involved it
was transferred to the Court en banc. On August 30, 1988, the
Court granted the petitioner's prayer for a temporary
restraining order and instructed the respondents to cease and
Page | 100
desist from conducting a public auction sale of the lands in
question. After the Solicitor General and the private
respondent had filed their comments and the petitioners their
reply, the Court gave due course to the petition and ordered
the parties to file simultaneous memoranda. Upon compliance
by the parties, the case was deemed submitted.
The petitioners contend that the private respondent is now
estopped from contesting the validity of the decree. In support
of this contention, it cites the recent case of Mendoza v. Agrix
Marketing, Inc., 1 where the constitutionality of Pres. Decree
No. 1717 was also raised but not resolved. The Court, after
noting that the petitioners had already filed their claims with
the AGRIX Claims Committee created by the decree, had
simply dismissed the petition on the ground of estoppel.
The petitioners stress that in the case at bar the private
respondent also invoked the provisions of Pres. Decree No.
1717 by filing a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee. Failing
to get results, it sought to foreclose the real estate mortgage
executed by AGRIX in its favor, which had been extinguished
by the decree. It was only when the petitioners challenged the
foreclosure on the basis of Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, that the
private respondent attacked the validity of the provision. At
that stage, however, consistent with Mendoza, the private
respondent was already estopped from questioning the
constitutionality of the decree.
The Court does not agree that the principle of estoppel is
applicable.
It is not denied that the private respondent did file a claim with
the AGRIX Claims Committee pursuant to this decree. It must
be noted, however, that this was done in 1980, when President
Marcos was the absolute ruler of this country and his decrees
were the absolute law. Any judicial challenge to them would
have been futile, not to say foolhardy. The private respondent,
no less than the rest of the nation, was aware of that reality
and knew it had no choice under the circumstances but to
conform.: nad
It is true that there were a few venturesome souls who dared
to question the dictator's decisions before the courts of justice
then. The record will show, however, that not a single act or
issuance of President Marcos was ever declared
unconstitutional, not even by the highest court, as long as he
was in power. To rule now that the private respondent is
estopped for having abided with the decree instead of boldly
assailing it is to close our eyes to a cynical fact of life during
that repressive time.
This case must be distinguished from Mendoza, where the
petitioners, after filing their claims with the AGRIX Claims
Committee, received in settlement thereof shares of stock
valued at P40,000.00 without protest or reservation. The
herein private respondent has not been paid a single centavo
on its claim, which was kept pending for more than seven years
for alleged lack of supporting papers. Significantly, the validity
of that claim was not questioned by the petitioner when it
sought to restrain the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage by the private respondent. The petitioner limited
itself to the argument that the private respondent was
estopped from questioning the decree because of its earlier
compliance with its provisions.
Independently of these observations, there is the
consideration that an affront to the Constitution cannot be
allowed to continue existing simply because of procedural
inhibitions that exalt form over substance.
The Court is especially disturbed by Section 4(1) of the decree,
quoted above, extinguishing all mortgages and other liens
attaching to the assets of AGRIX. It also notes, with equal
concern, the restriction in Subsection (ii) thereof that all
"unsecured obligations shall not bear interest" and in
Subsection (iii) that "all accrued interests, penalties or charges
as of date hereof pertaining to the obligations, whether
secured or unsecured, shall not be recognized."
These provisions must be read with the Bill of Rights, where it
is clearly provided in Section 1 that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due course of law
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law"
and in Section 10 that "no law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed."
In defending the decree, the petitioners argue that property
rights, like all rights, are subject to regulation under the police
power for the promotion of the common welfare. The
contention is that this inherent power of the state may be
exercised at any time for this purpose so long as the taking of
the property right, even if based on contract, is done with due
process of law.
This argument is an over-simplification of the problem before
us. The police power is not a panacea for all constitutional
maladies. Neither does its mere invocation conjure an instant
and automatic justification for every act of the government
depriving a person of his life, liberty or property.
A legislative act based on the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more
familiar words, a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the
interference of the state; and b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 2
Applying these criteria to the case at bar, the Court finds first
of all that the interests of the public are not sufficiently
involved to warrant the interference of the government with
the private contracts of AGRIX. The decree speaks vaguely of
the "public, particularly the small investors," who would be
prejudiced if the corporation were not to be assisted.
However, the record does not state how many there are of
such investors, and who they are, and why they are being
preferred to the private respondent and other creditors of
AGRIX with vested property rights.:-cralaw
The public interest supposedly involved is not identified or
explained. It has not been shown that by the creation of the
New Agrix, Inc. and the extinction of the property rights of the
creditors of AGRIX, the interests of the public as a whole, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, would be
promoted or protected. The indispensable link to the welfare
of the greater number has not been established. On the Page | 101
contrary, it would appear that the decree was issued only to
favor a special group of investors who, for reasons not given,
have been preferred to the legitimate creditors of AGRIX.
Assuming there is a valid public interest involved, the Court still
finds that the means employed to rehabilitate AGRIX fall far
short of the requirement that they shall not be unduly
oppressive. The oppressiveness is patent on the face of the
decree. The right to property in all mortgages, liens, interests,
penalties and charges owing to the creditors of AGRIX is
arbitrarily destroyed. No consideration is paid for the
extinction of the mortgage rights. The accrued interests and
other charges are simply rejected by the decree. The right to
property is dissolved by legislative fiat without regard to the
private interest violated and, worse, in favor of another private
interest.
A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and
so comes under the protection of the Bill of Rights. So do
interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are
also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot
simply be taken by law from one person and given to another
without compensation and any known public purpose. This is
plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the Constitution.
And not only is there arbitrary taking, there is discrimination
as well. In extinguishing the mortgage and other liens, the
decree lumps the secured creditors with the unsecured
creditors and places them on the same level in the prosecution
of their respective claims. In this respect, all of them are
considered unsecured creditors. The only concession given to
the secured creditors is that their loans are allowed to earn
interest from the date of the decree, but that still does not
justify the cancellation of the interests earned before that
date. Such interests, whether due to the secured or the
unsecured creditors, are all extinguished by the decree. Even
assuming such cancellation to be valid, we still cannot see why
all kinds of creditors, regardless of security, are treated alike.
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the privileges
conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons
or things differently situated should be treated differently. In
the case at bar, persons differently situated are similarly
treated, in disregard of the principle that there should be
equality only among equals.- nad
One may also well wonder why AGRIX was singled out for
government help, among other corporations where the
stockholders or investors were also swindled. It is not clear
why other companies entitled to similar concern were not
similarly treated. And surely, the stockholders of the private
respondent, whose mortgage lien had been cancelled and
legitimate claims to accrued interests rejected, were no less
deserving of protection, which they did not get. The decree
operated, to use the words of a celebrated case, 3 "with an evil
eye and an uneven hand."
On top of all this, New Agrix, Inc. was created by special decree
notwithstanding the provision of Article XIV, Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution, then in force, that:
SEC. 4. The Batasang Pambansa shall not, except by general
the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation,
being neither owned nor controlled by the Government,
should have been created only by general and not special law.
And insofar as the decree also interferes with purely private
agreements without any demonstrated connection with the
public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the
obligation of the contract.
Page | 102

law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of With the above pronouncements, we feel there is no more
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or need to rule on the authority of President Marcos to
controlled by the Government or any subdivision or promulgate Pres. Decree No. 1717 under Amendment No. 6 of
instrumentality thereof. 4 the 1973 Constitution. Even if he had such authority, the
decree must fall just the same because of its violation of the
The new corporation is neither owned nor controlled by the
Bill of Rights.
government. The National Development Corporation was
merely required to extend a loan of not more than WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Pres. Decree No. 1717
P10,000,000.00 to New Agrix, Inc. Pending payment thereof, is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The temporary restraining
NDC would undertake the management of the corporation, order dated August 30, 1988, is LIFTED. Costs against the
but with the obligation of making periodic reports to the Agrix petitioners.- nad
board of directors. After payment of the loan, the said board
can then appoint its own management. The stocks of the new SO ORDERED.
corporation are to be issued to the old investors and
stockholders of AGRIX upon proof of their claims against the
abolished corporation. They shall then be the owners of the
new corporation. New Agrix, Inc. is entirely private and so
should have been organized under the Corporation Law in
accordance with the above-cited constitutional provision.

The Court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of
the contract between AGRIX and the private respondent
without justification. While it is true that the police power is
superior to the impairment clause, the principle will apply only
where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it
will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the
legislature in the interest of the greater number. 5 Most
present-day contracts are of that nature. But as already
observed, the contracts of loan and mortgage executed by
AGRIX are purely private transactions and have not been
shown to be affected with public interest. There was therefore
no warrant to amend their provisions and deprive the private
respondent of its vested property rights.

It is worth noting that only recently in the case of the

Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, 6 we sustained
the preference in payment of a mortgage creditor as against
the argument that the claims of laborers should take
precedence over all other claims, including those of the
government. In arriving at this ruling, the Court recognized the
mortgage lien as a property right protected by the due process
and contract clauses notwithstanding the argument that the
amendment in Section 110 of the Labor Code was a proper
exercise of the police power.: nad

The Court reaffirms and applies that ruling in the case at bar.

Our finding, in sum, is that Pres. Decree No. 1717 is an invalid

exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the
traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful
method. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of
the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate
creditors of AGRIX constitutes taking without due process of
law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured
creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of