CASE DIGEST

Mendoza v. Arrieta
Obligations and Contracts

Court Supreme Court

Date June 29, 1979
Petitioner Edgardo E. Mendoza
Respondents Hon. Abundio Z. Arrieta, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, CFI of Manila, Felino Timbol,
and Rodolfo Salazar
Ponente Melencio-Herrera, J.
Relevant topic Sources of Obligations – Institution of Civil and Criminal Actions

FACTS:
 Oct. 22, 1969, at about 4 PM: a 3-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao,
Bulacan. It involved a Mercedez Benz owned and driven by Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by
Salazar, and a gravel and sand truck owned by Timbol and driven by one Freddie Montoya
 2 separate informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Salazar and
Montoya with the CFI of Bulacan. The information against Montoya was for causing damage to the jeep of
Salazar, causing said jeep to hit and bump the car of Mendoza.
 Mendoza testified that Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left at the intersection
going to Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. This version of events was also adopted by
Montoya
 Salazar testified that he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards Marilao but was stopped at
the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic and while he was at a stop position, his jeep was
bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montoya, causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then
swerved to the left and hit Mendoza’s car
 July 31, 1970: Montoya was found guilty by the CFI. Salazar was acquitted from the offense charged in the
criminal case in view of its finding that the collision between Salazar’s jeep and Mendoza’s car was due to the
former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. No damages were awarded to
Mendoza since he was only a complainant against Salazar and not against Montoya
 August 22, 1970: Mendoza filed a civil case with the CFI of Manila against Salazar and Timbol for
indemnification of damages sustained by his car
 Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Mendoza is barred by the prior judgment in the criminal
case wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by Mendoza and for failing to state a cause
of action.
 September 12, 1970: The CFI dismissed the complaint against Timbol.
 Jan. 30, 1971: The CFI also dismissed the complaint against Salazar, reasoning that while an independent
civil action for liability under Art. 2177 of the CC can be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the
offense from which it arose, the new ROC (effective Jan. 1, 1964) requires an express reservation of the civil
action to be made in the criminal action. Otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 111

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUES HELD
WON the civil case against Timbol is barred by Mendoza’s failure to reserve, in NO
the criminal action, his right to institute an independent civil action

WON the civil case against Salazar was properly dismissed YES

RATIO:
As to Timbol
 For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur:
1. It must be a final judgment;
2. It must be rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties;
3. It must be a judgment on merits; and
4. There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
cause of action
- The first 3 requisites are present. However, Mendoza is correct that there is no identity of cause of action.
In the criminal case, Montoya was prosecuted for damages caused, not to Mendoza’s car, but to Salazar’s
jeep. Timbol was also not a party therein. Furthermore, in the criminal case, the cause of action was the
enforcement of civil liability arising from criminal negligence, whereas the civil case is based on quasi-
delict (as evident based on the complaint) under Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the CC

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CASE DIGEST
Mendoza v. Arrieta
Obligations and Contracts

- As held in Barredo v. Garcia, there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
and responsibility for fault or negligence under quasi-delict. The same negligent act may produce either a
civil liability arising from a crime under the RPC or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under
the CC.
- Note elements of cause of action: 1) plaintiff’s primary right (e.g. being the owner of the car), and 2)
defendant’s delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff’s primary right
 The CFI erroneously dismissed the civil suit since it may proceed independently of the criminal case and
regardless of the result of the latter.
- Art. 31 (NCC) provides: “When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.”
 Timbol argues that Mendoza failed to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an
independent civil action, invoking Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which states:
- “In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.”
 The Court, in Garcia v. Florida, interpreted this provision of the Rules of Court
- It was reiterated that the same negligent act causing damage or injury may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for quasi-delict
- The latter being distinct and independent of the former, the proviso in Section 2, Rule 111 is contrary to
the letter and spirit of the mentioned articles which were intended to constitute as exceptions to the
general rule stated in Section 1, Rule 111
- The proviso, which is procedural, may be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law
since the articles themselves do not provide for the reservation required
- Further, if Section 2 is substantive, it is not within the power of the SC to promulgate through the ROC; if
not substantive but adjective, it still cannot stand due to its inconsistency with Article 2177
 Hence, the civil case against Timbol is not barred by Mendoza’s failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action of his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict

As to Salazar
 Civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases
- The offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal (Art. 100 of the RPC) and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana (Art. 2177,
NCC)
- Civil action is deemed instituted with criminal action (Section 1, Rule 111) unless expressly waived or
reserved for separate application by the offended party
 In the case at bar, Mendoza based his cause of action against Salazar on culpa criminal, evidenced by his
active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against Salazar
- No need to make reservation since the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal case
 The basis of acquittal, as pronounced by the CFI, was that Salazar cannot be held liable for damages
sustained by Mendoza’s car since “the facts from which the civil liability might arise do not exist”
- Civil action is held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 (ROC)
“Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ...”
- Article 29 (NCC) also provides:
“When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or
not the acquittal is due to that ground.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent
Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the
merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No.
80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

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