The School Of Names.

Ming chia is a concept that can be easily mistranslated as Logicians, Sophists or even
dialecticians. It’s not quite all wrong with this, the correct, or at least, the less ambiguous
should be The School of Names. One if its fundamental problem is the relation between
ming (the name) and shih (actuality) or, as it might be seen in the western philosophy, the
relation between subject and predicate. Example:
Socrates is a man: therefore “Socrates is” as shih and a man as the name.
This is a chair: therefore “This” as shih and chair as the ming or name.
Members of the school of names where called Pien Che (debaters) From the book Chuang
Tzu, in the chapter titled “The Autumn flood” it’s represented Kung-sun Lung as the master
whom “proved the impossible as possible and affirmed what others deny”. This might lead
to the conclusion that this man was the Rethor Maximus of its time and, maybe, the
cleverest debater of the school. The members were known for the way to stablish paradox
in conversations and debates with others, usually denying what other affirmed and
affirming what others denied. Their most important leaders were Kung-sun Lung, Teng Hsi,
Hui Shih and Huan Tuan. About the last one there is almost none information. The
foundational leaders: Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung.
There will be two tendencies in the School of names: One about emphasizing the relativity
of actual things (Shih) and the other one about the absoluteness of names (Lung)

Hui Shih’s Relativism

Hui Shih was native of the state of Sung (Honan today) he was a great lecturer but all of his
writings are lost. The most we know, from him, is a series of “ten points” in the chapter
“The World” in the Chuang-tzu.
“The greatest has nothing beyond itself and is called The Great One. The smallest has
nothing beyond itself and is called The Small One. ” (Fung, 1948. 84p.)
This first point is taken as Analytical propositions, or those propositions in which the
meaning of the proposition it’s completed by the fact of the understanding of the concepts
implied in them. If we know what does it means “great” or “small” we are going to,
automatically understand the sense and the veritative character of a proposition like the
mentioned before. But they don’t say anything about the world in the terms that this
proposition never says what, in fact, is the actual smallest thing or the greatest thing.
Then, saying that there is something that is the greatest thing or the smallest thing, means
that based on the series of experiences, there is nothing great and nothing small. When
followed by a name, the before mentioned propositions, will convert in Synthetic
propositions, or proposition bases purely in the experience, their veritative character will be
contingent but not necessary.
By this analysis he led to the conclusion that the qualities and differences of actual concrete
things (concrete objects) are all liable and relative to change. There is no possibility for the
establishment of rigid meanings for actual things. There will be relativity in the meaning of
the proposition.
The fundamental statement of this author was to make visible the variety of references and
the ambiguity of our language. Where something might be great in one sense, but small in
the other, being the same actual, thing. The actuality it’s the one who’s going to give the
proper meaning to the names of the qualities. There is always more than just one way to
make a statement about reality.

Kung-sun Lung´s Theory of Universals

“My horse is white, and a white horse is not a horse”
Here is the other spectrum of the analysis of language by this School, the names we use to
understand the facts and objects of reality are absolute and permanent.
Discourse of the White horse:
When referring to a White Horse the author said that the word Horse refers to a shape, the
word White to a color. In terms of the individuality of meanings of each name, what refers
to color should not refer to shape and the same in the other way. Or, the one refers to a
kind of animal, the second one to a kind of color…. The sentence White horse might refer
to a kind of animal plus a kind of color. We have that the intension of each statement it’s
different and has its own meaning; therefore, a White horse is not a Horse. Then he starts
doing a list of 8 propositions where he tried to make visible the absoluteness and
universality of the names or concepts filled with a reference in the objects of the actuality
and the experience.
Specified white it’s not white. The universal whiteness refers to all the things that have that
are white, but when the name White it’s follow by another name like, horse, the reference
then its white-horse but not horse and not white. If there is such a thing called White horse,
then it can´t be called a horse or white. The universal whiteness, does not specify what it’s
white, but the proposition White-horse specifies what is that to be called white, even though
it’s not white, because it’s White plus and specification. The word used for specified is
Ting.
Such is the thing with universals, the got no really sense when applied “alone” because is
unspecified… you need a reference in the actual world in order to specify the universal.
The universal, by itself got no sense. The sense of the universal will depend on the
specification of the particulars.
-Discourse on whiteness and hardness.
What we can prove it’s what we catch with our first handed sensorial experience of an
object:
There is a white hard stone. At first sight what we can catch it’s the whiteness of the stone,
that’s with our eyes. Then the hardness will then don’t exist in these terms. If we catch our
experience by touching the stone, then there will be nothing of whiteness in this experience.
Even though if we know what a stone is, then we must suppose that it’s hard. So that only
gives us two: white stone, the hardness it’s content in the concept of rock. “While we are
sensing the whiteness of the rock, then we cannot sense the hardness”
The other argument it’s a metaphysical one, being Whiteness and Hardness universals its
existence will be independent of the objects existing in the physical world. The hardness
will be hardness even though there is not such a thing hard in the world. Just to prove that
universals are separated from each other and that their existence it’s independent of the
actuality.
-Discourse of Chin and Wu
Wu: Concrete particular things. Chin: Abstract universals (or to indicate)
Being the Chinese language the way it is, there is not specification between common terms
and abstract terms. That’s why Chin may refer to a class of particular things (and their
attributes) or the attribute and the universals. In this language a Universal is what a name
points out, what the name denotes. For example: Horse it’s the universal concept for all the
class of animals that share the characteristics of a horse but “a Horse” it’s no longer an
universal term because it’s referring to and object in concrete. The application of the
universal to a “concrete particular thing” or Wu.
The content of Chin might be equivalent to the “concept” or objective idea.
Bibliography:
Fung Yu-Lan, 1948, A short history of Chinese Philosophy, Macmillan Company (Spanish
Translation: Feng Youlan, 1989, Breve historia de la filosofía china, Beijing: Ediciones en
Lenguas Extranjeras)