[Adm. Case No. 2736. May 27, 1991.

LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION represented by Mr. SOLOMON U. LORENZANA, JR., as its President and
General Manager, and/or Mrs. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, as its Vice-President, Petitioners, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO L.
DARIA, Respondent.

Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr. for petitioners.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — In an effort to extricate himself from this charge,
the respondent submits that since he was able to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on
appeal to set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings, then the charge
of negligence should be considered moot and academic already. We find this submission not meritorious. Instead, we
agree with the position of the Solicitor General: Respondent’s plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse
Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects of respondent’s negligence. Indeed, had respondent
attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have been no
delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was
prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to
other cases of complainant. In fact he had to prepare complainant’s position paper which respondent should have
done earlier. From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE, Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

2. ID.; ID.; A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. — The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted
Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the counter-affidavit, submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of
estafa filed against San Juan by LFC. As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-
affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of estafa
while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC. Again, we concur
with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General: . . . Respondent, however, tried to extricate
himself from his predicament by testifying that the counteraffidavit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R.
Enriquez, who had his (respondent’s) name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will
delete his name and signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to bring the counteraffidavit to Atty. Enriquez so
that he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him; and that San Juan filed the counteraffidavit
with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name and signature still on it. It is submitted that, apart from being a
mere afterthought, respondent’s explanation is incredible. His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment on
the complaint . . . We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former
client. . .. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in
another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent
of the former case.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

The respondent lawyer, Atty. Francisco L. Daria, is administratively charged 1 on two counts, to wit: chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

1. Negligence and

2. Betrayal of his former client’s confidences.

A verified complaint dated February 22, 1985 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC, hereinafter), and
received by the Court on February 25, 1985. 2
The Court, on June 10, 1985, resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report,
and recommendation.

After proper proceedings, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation," dated
February 21, 1990 and received by the Court on February 26, 1990.

From the findings made by the Solicitor General, the pertinent facts may be summarized as follows:
Respondent Francisco L. Daria is charged with negligence and betrayal of his former client’s confidences. The
following facts are in connection with the charge of negligence.

Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) on January 8, 1981 as its legal counsel
and was designated as its personnel manager six months later (tsn. pp. 6-7, Dec. 9, 1985). On May 23, 1983, LFC
employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for Illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against complainant
before the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment (MOLE). On May 30, 1983, summons was served on
the parties with the requirement that position papers be submitted (Exh. G).

During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973 * (sic) Hanopol and respondent tried to explore the possibility of an amicable
settlement. Since no agreement was reached the hearing was reset to June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol
was supposed to go to his office on that date respondent failed to appear for the second setting (tsn. pp. 14-15, Dec.
9, 1985). So, the Labor Arbiter was constrained to further reset the hearing to June 23, 1983. Respondent received
on June 23, 1983 the Order for the resetting to June 1983 (Exh. J).

In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor case, setting the hearing therein
also on June 28, 1983 (Exh. H-6). Faced with a conflicting schedule, respondent decided to move to postpone the
hearing in the Hanopol case. However, instead of filing a written motion for postponement, he opted to call, through
his secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to move for postponement (Exh. H-5; tsn. p. 16, Dec. 9, 1985).
Respondent’s telephone message apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing on June 28,
1983, he considered the case submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol’s complaint and affidavit (Exh. G-1).
Respondent had not submitted a position paper.

After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to pay Hanopol the total sum of
P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis of Hanopol’s evidence alone.

Respondent Daria appealed the Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on August 23, 1983
(Exh. 4), The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. The case was set for hearing on June
25, 1984 and July 12, 1984 wherein attempts for an amicable settlement still proved futile. The Labor Arbiter set two
more dates for hearing: July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984 (tsn. pp. 21-22, Dec. 9, 1985).

In the meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his intention to resign. In the light of
this development, management hired Atty. Rogelio Udarbe to take his place on July 16, 1984, the effective date of his
resignation (Exh. 2). Respondent endorsed the cases of complainant to Atty. Udarbe (tsn. pp. 23-25, Dec. 9, 1985).

During the hearings in the Hanopol case on July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984, no one appeared for complainant. So,
on August 15, 1984, Hanopol filed a "Manifestation and Motion" praying that the earlier Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated July 29, 1983 be revived. (Exh. 5)

On September 1, 1984, Atty. Jose Loy, Jr. was hired by complainant LFC vice Atty. Udarbe and he immediately came
across the above-mentioned "Manifestation and Motion." On September 5, 1984, he filed an Opposition (Exh. 6)
thereto, and on September 19, 1984, he followed this up with a position paper for LFC (Exh. 7). However, the Labor
Arbiter had already revived his earlier Decision dated July 29, 1983 in another Decision dated September 4, 1984,
thereby prompting Atty. Loy to appeal the latter Decision (Exh. 3). In a resolution dated May 9, 1985, the NLRC
ordered anew the remand of the case for further proceedings (Exh. 8).

In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client’s confidences, the following facts
appear on record.

While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian Cortes, issued a
memorandum dated February 28, 1984 (Exh. C) to its employee, Roberto San Juan, requiring him to submit a written
explanation for his alleged double liquidation and unliquidated cash advances. Another memorandum dated March
15, 1984 (Exh. D) was issued this time by complainant’s internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to
complainant’s president, summing up San Juan’s unliquidated advances amounting to P9,351.15. Respondent was
furnished a copy of this memorandum (Exh. D-3). The executive committee, to which respondent belongs, investigated
San Juan on his unliquidated advances. On account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan under
preventive suspension, per his letter to him dated April 25, 1984 (Exh. E).

On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent a demand letter to San Juan
requiring him to restitute the amount of P9,351.15 (Exh. N-2). Since he failed to pay the amount demanded, a
complaint for estafa was lodged against him before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. San Juan thereafter resigned
and sought the assistance of respondent in the preparation of his counteraffidavit in January 1985 (tsn. p. 35, Nov. 5,
1985). Respondent prepared San Juan’s counteraffidavit and signed it (Exh. F). San Juan then submitted his
counteraffidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (tsn. p. 42, Nov. 5, 1985). 3
x x x
For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol case which resulted
in complainant LFC’s default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted for negligence.
The respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen him in his office to work out a compromise agreement, on the
scheduled day of the second hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not. 4

It is the finding of the Solicitor General that this excuse by the respondent is not borne by the Constancia 5 setting the
case for hearing. The Constancia clearly states: "By agreement of the parties, case reset to June 17, 1983 at 2:00
p.m. as previously scheduled." 6 Since it was signed by both Hanopol and the respondent, the Solicitor General
argues that the respondent’s explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory.

With regard to his second non-appearance for the hearing on June 2, 1983, the respondent justified his absence by
claiming that he had another hearing on the same date and that he told his secretary to call up the Office of the Labor
Arbiter to have the hearing of the Hanopol case postponed. 7 The Solicitor General avers.

. . . It is submitted that respondent’s actuation was not warranted by the circumstances. As it turned out, the telephone
request apparently did not reach the Labor Arbiter, thereby constraining him to declare complainant in default and
render judgment against it. 8

In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he was able to persuade the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand
the case for further proceedings, then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and academic already. 9
We find this submission not meritorious. Instead, we agree with the position of the Solicitor General.

Respondent’s plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the
effects of respondent’s negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the
required position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps,
would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived
successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he had to
prepare complainant’s position paper which respondent should have done earlier (Exh. 7). 10

From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: 11

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

The other accusation against the respondent by the Solicitor General was that he had betrayed complainant LFC’s
confidences in violation of the then Canon 37 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, to

It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer’s employment, and extends
as well to his employee’s and neither of them should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure
or use of these confidences, either for the private advantages of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and
even though there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment when
he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
x x x
Superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the appropriate Canon now is.
CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the counter-
affidavit, 12 submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC. As a matter
of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a
fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and
San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC.

Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General.

. . . Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the counteraffidavit was
prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his (respondent’s) name typed on it; that after reading
it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to
bring the counteraffidavit to Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey
him; and that San Juan filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name and signature
still on it (tsn. pp. 47-51, Dec. 9, 1985).

It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent’s explanation is incredible. His foregoing
testimony is not reflected in his comment on the complaint . . . 13

We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former client.

. . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation
of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case
other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former
case. 14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is found guilty of both the charge of negligence, a transgression
of Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and the charge of betrayal of his former client’s confidences, in violation of Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Let this Decision be entered in the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts and
IBP chapters.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur

[ A.C. No. 555, November 25, 1968 ]

ERNESTO M. NOMBRADO, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JUANITO T. HERNANDEZ, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an administrative case for disbarment instituted by Ernesto M. Nombrado against Juanito T. Hernandez, a
member of the Philippine Bar, charging to latter with malpractice on two counts, namely: (1) for having appeared as
counsel for Crispin Nazareno in a civil case for forcible entry against Arsenio Pansaon, his former client, being the
offended party and complainant, in a criminal case for serious physical injuries wherein Eufemio Velasco (Nazareno),
a son of Crispin, was the accused; and (2) for having appeared as counsel for the accused and also for the complaining
witness in Criminal Case No. 329 of the Justice of the Peace Court (now municipal Court)
of Baganga, Davao (now Davao Oriental).
In our resolution of January 14, 1963, we referred this case for investigation to the Solicitor General, who in turn
endorsed it to the Provincial Fiscal of Davao for the same purpose, both complainant and respondent being residents
of Baganga, Davao Oriental. When the case was set for hearing by the First Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of Davao respondent manifested and requested that since the charges were the same as- those filed by the same
complainant against him in Disbarment Case No. 37 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, wherein a decision had
already been rendered, the records of said proceeding, together with the evidence adduced by the parties, be
forwarded to this Court, through the Solicitor General, for final disposition. Complainant in turn submitted his evidence
in support of the charges against respondent.

With respect to the first count, it is undisputed that sometime in 1952 respondent was engaged by Arsenio Pansaon as
his counsel in the prosecution of a criminal case for serious physical injuries entitled "People vs. Eufemio Nazareno"
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Baganga, Davao. In that case the accused was charged with having
mauled Arsenio Pansaon when the latter was seen within the perimeter of the land then being disputed between
said Arsenio Pansaon and Eufemio's father, Crispin Nazareno. However, the case was dismissed when the
complaining witness failed to appear on the day of the trial. Several years thereafter Crispin Nazareno, through
respondent, filed a complaint for forcible entry against Arsenio Pansaon and two other persons, involving the same
parcel of land which was the root cause of the mauling incident. The defendants moved to disqualify respondent from
appearing as counsel for the plaintiff on the ground that he had previously acted as counsel for Arsenio Pansaon in
the criminal case for physical injuries, but the motion was subsequently withdrawn. In the Justice of the Peace Court
the plaintiff lost, but won in the Court of First Instance of Davao on appeal.
When Disbarment Case No. 37 against respondent was heard in the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Arsenio Pansaon testified for petitioner and said that perhaps he lost the forcible entry case because
respondent had become privy to valuable information about his claim of ownership of the parcel of land in question in
the course of their attorney-and-client relationship and must have used such information against him, including a
document obtained by respondent from notary public Abellanosa. Respondent denied the truth of the foregoing
testimony and in turn declared that the only information he obtained from complainant Pansaon was about the mauling
incident itself - how it happened and why he sustained the injuries; that he did not ask Pansaon for any papers or
documents in connection with that criminal case, except a medical certificate issued to him by the attending physician;
that in handling the forcible entry case for Crispin Nazareno against his former client, he did not use against the latter
any fact or information he acquired in the course of their attorney-and-client relationship; and that if there was any
document he presented in the forcible entry case it came from Crispin Nazareno and not from notary
public Abellanosa.
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that even if respondent did not
use against his client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become
privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case,
for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical
injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts: In the complexity of what is said in the course of
dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of
the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given to him in a
professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as
counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the same case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further
said:
"Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for
testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practicioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. x x x It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case, the
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of Justice."
This Court went even further in San Jose vs. Cruz, 57 Phil. 792, wherein the respondent was charged with malpractice
for having represented a new client whose interests were opposed to those of his former client in another case:

"x x x . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another
case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the
former case."[1]

Under the first count, respondent has shown a departure from the strict norms of professional conduct laid down for
members of the bar.
Under the second count, it appears that respondent was counsel for the
defendants Sotero Pontawe and Teofilo Aumada in Criminal Case No. 329 for theft of large cattle before the Justice
of the Peace Court of Baganga. Before the scheduled hearing on September 18, 1959, upon request of complaining
witness Ramon Morales, respondent prepared a motion to dismiss on the ground that the "real accused in this case
are not the above-named persons." Notwithstanding the motion to dismiss, the complaining witness was cited to
appear on September 25, 1959 "to find out why Mr. Ramon Morales, the complainant of Criminal Case No. 329, did
not appear on September 18, 1959, the date designated for preliminary investigation proper of this case, and to find
out whether the manifestation of counsel of the defense that there is such amicable settlement in this case, Criminal
Case No. 329, is true." During the hearing on September 25, 1959, a heated exchange of argument arose between
respondent and the private prosecutor, Atty. Danao, because of the latter's insistence on calling Morales to the
Witness stand despite his expressed desistance to prosecute the criminal case. Respondent manifested his intention
to "intervene in behalf of the complaining party in connection with the action of Atty. Danao in this particular case."
We concur with the Solicitor General's view that under the foregoing circumstances, respondent's act of preparing the
motion to dismiss and stating in the course of the hearing thereof that he was intervening "in behalf of the complaining
party", did not constitute simultaneous appearance in behalf of the contending parties since there was no longer any
conflict to speak of, the complainant having desisted from prosecuting the case against the accused. Consequently,
there was nothing improper in respondent's conduct.
Upon the facts established in connection with the first count the Solicitor General has recommended that the penalty
of reprimand and warning be administered, citing the decision of this Court in a comparable case, Caoibes vs. de la
Rosa, 27 Phil. 265. We believe the recommendation is justified.
WHEREFORE, respondent Juanito T. Hernandez is hereby reprimanded and warned that a repetition of
unprofessional conduct on his part will be dealt with more severely. Let this decision be noted in respondent's
record as a member of the Bar.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19695 November 17, 1922
JUAN S. RUSTIA, Petitioner, vs. THE JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Thirteenth Judicial District,
Honorable FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ, ROSA H. DE PORCUNA and her husband JUSTO M. PORCUNA and
EULALIA MAGSOMBOL, Respondents.
The petitioner in his own behalf.
The respondents Porcunas in their own behalf.
Jose Mayo Librea for the other respondents.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner alleging that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance
exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing a pending action at the instance of the parties but without the intervention of
the attorney for the plaintiff in the case, the herein petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears from the record that on July 31, 1921, the respondent Justo Porcuna, for himself and on behalf of his wife,
the respondent Rosa H. de Porcuna, by means of a written contract, retained the petitioner to represent them as their
lawyer in case No. 1435 then pending in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and in which Rosa H. de Porcuna
was the plaintiff and one Eulalia Magsombol was the defendant. The contract fixed the petitioner's fee at P200 in
advance with an additional contigent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should not
compromise the claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer, the herein
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After trial, the petitioner then being plaintiffs' attorney of record, the Court of First Instance, under date of December
24, 1921, rendered judgment in favor of Justo Porcuna and Rosa H. de Porcuna ordering the defendant Eulalia
Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of cloth or in default thereof to pay to them the sum of P3,250. On January
14, 1922, Eulalia Magsombol filed her exception to the judgment and on the following day presented a motion for a
new trial, which was denied on the 21st of the same month. She thereupon gave notice of appeal and presented a bill
of exceptions which was approved on February 20, 1922. On March 2, 1922, and before the transmission of the bill
of exceptions to this court, the plaintiffs presented the following motion in the Court of First Instance.
The plaintiffs, without any further intervention of their attorney, now appear before this Honorable Court and
respectfully aver:chanrobles virtual law library
That, through Mr. Miguel Olgado, they already settled this case with the herein
defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That the basis of the compromise is that we, the plaintiffs, finally agree that we should be paid the amount of eight
hundred pesos (P800) in two installments; P300 to be paid on this same date, and the remaining five hundred pesos
(P500) at the end of March, 1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That we, the plaintiffs, recognize not to have any further rights in this case than to the aforesaid amount of eight
hundred pesos (P800) and that this is the total amount the defendant Eulalia Magsombol should pay us, and we have
no right whatever to any other amount than the aforementioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
That we have not sold to any other person our rights as plaintiffs in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Wherefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request the dismissal of this case without any pronouncement as to costs, and
that the appeal interposed by the defendant be further dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Batangas, Batangas, P.I., March 2, 1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(Sgd.) ROSA H. PORCUNA
Plaintiff chanrobles virtual law library

JUSTO M. PORCUNA
Plaintiff .
The defendant, through here attorney, Jose Mayo Librea, having signified her assent to the motion, the Court of First
Instance on the same day, March 2, dismissed the action without notice to counsel for the
plaintiffs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner alleges that he did not discover the dismissal of the action until April 4, 1922. After an unsuccessful
effort to obtain a reconsideration of the order of dismissal from the trial court, he filed the present petition for a writ
of certiorari. By resolution dated October 24, 1922, this court denied the petition and upon motion of the petitioner we
shall now briefly state our reason for such denial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The burden of the petitioner's contention is (1) that he, as attorney of record, was entitled to notice of his client's
motion to dismiss the case, and (2) that after the approval of the bill of exceptions the lower court had lost jurisdiction
of the case and had no power to dismiss it. A moment's reflection should make it clear that neither of these propositions
is tenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure a client may dismiss his lawyer at any
time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to
conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to compromise
a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.
Though there is a valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a large proportion of the sum recovered in case
of success, this does not give the attorney such an interest in the cause of action that it prevents plaintiff from
compromising the suit. (4 Cyc., 990, and authorities cited in Note 6; see also Louque vs. Dejan, 129 La., 519;
Price vs. Western Loan and Savings Co., 19 Ann. Cas., 589 and Note.)
In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to do. By appearing personally and
presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. The petitioner's contingent interest in the judgment rendered
did not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest nor as an attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the
motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the case after the bill of exceptions had been
approved, it is very true upon such approval the lower court loses its jurisdiction over all contentious matters connected
with the issues in the case. But there is nothing to prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of
exceptions with the consent of said court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of the court. That was all that was
done in this case. A valid agreement between the parties to a case is the law of the case in everything covered by the
agreement. (Civil Code, art. 1091; Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Obed, 13 Phil., 391.) The petitioner might have
protected his interests by entering an attorney's lien under section 37 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition for a writ of certiorari was therefore properly denied. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
CRISPINO FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. G. JESUS B. RUIZ, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cagayan, PROVINCIAL WARDEN of
Cagayan and LEONARDO MANDAC, represented by his Heirs, thru the Widow DOLORES VDA. DE
MANDAC, respondents.
Eliseo M. Cruz for petitioner.

Laggui & Laggui for private respondents.

DE CASTRO, J:
This is a Petition for certiorari and/or Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Crispin Flores on October 24, 1972 after he
has been allegedly arrested and detained illegally by Order of the respondent Judge, dated June 20, 1972, finding
him guilty of indirect contempt. (Annex A, Petition, p.11, Rollo).

From the records of this case, it appears that petitioner was actually arrested on August 28, 1972 and has since been
detained in the Provincial Jail of Cagayan until his release by virtue of a bond of P500.00 which he was allowed to file
by this Court in its Resolution dated October 31, 1972 (p. 33, Rollo), which he must have filed as he had precisely
asked to be bailed, pending his appeal from the Order of the respondent judge dated August 10, 1972. (Annex E to
Petition, p. 24, Rollo). The reason for the delayed arrest is that petitioner was given a period up to August 1, 1972 "to
inform the court whether or not he relinquishes his possession over the land in question."
The land in question was levied upon and sold on execution on November 28, 1978 to satisfy the award of damages
in favor of Leonardo Mandac, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1616 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against petitioner
and his father, Doroteo Flores, as defendants and the losing parties in said case. They failed to redeem the property
sold to the heirs of Leonardo Mandac in the auction sale. Hence, the respondent court ordered petitioner to place in
possession the heirs of Leonardo Mandac who had in the meantime died. For his refusal to vacate the land in favor
of the heirs of Mandac, contempt proceedings were instituted against petitioner on motion of Atty. Antonio N. Laggui
as counsel of the aforementioned heirs. As previously stated, these contempt proceedings led to his arrest and
detention.
Petitioner, however, questions the legality of the proceedings for not having been assisted by counsel during the
hearing of the motion for contempt, and for not having been duly informed of the contempt charge by being furnished
a copy of the motion, or properly "arraigned" before trial. Thus, petitioner claims to have been deprived due process
of law which voided the proceedings against him as for lack of jurisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty imposed
on him, citing Santiago vs. Alikpala, L-25133, September 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 356.

Further, petitioner contends that his act of not surrendering possession of his levied property does not constitute
contempt, citing the case of Faustino Lagrimas vs- JP of Camiling, et al., L-14345, July 20, 1961, 2 SCRA 793,
and Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, et al., L-8565, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 851.
1. On the issue of whether petitioner was denied due process as he claims, both respondent judge and private
respondents deny the claim of petitioner, of having been so denied, private respondents even quoting from the
transcript of the stenographic notes the following:

COURT: Is the defendant Crispin Flores in Court?

(Interpreter calls out the name of Crispin Flores, and answered that he is present).
( The Court addresses Crispin Flores).
Q. Who is going to represent you in this case?
A. I have a lawyer but he was not able to come.
Q. Did you notify him?
A. Yes, sir, but he was not able to come today.

Q. Are you willing to go into trial in this case even in the absence of your lawyer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you need the assistance of any lawyer?
A. No more, anyway I can answer.

(pp. 1 and 2, tsn Barias June 19, 1972).

The veracity of the alleged proceedings as indicated above is denied by petitioner, alleging that no such proceedings
took place, and that, in any event, the transcript was not signed by the stenographer. What happened according to
him, is that I when respondent judge had learned that he was without counsel, he told him (petitioner) to deliver
possession of the premises to the private respondents, and for this purpose gave him ten (10) days to carry out that
mandate. In spite of the plan of petitioner that the hearing on that date be postponed so that his counsel of record
could appear for him or that a new counsel would be hired to appear in his behalf, the respondent judge, however,
demurred, and with the assistance of a certain Atty. Joshua Pastores, petitioner was made to sign an understanding
to deliver up the premises within the period indicated by the judge on pain of being imprisoned." (Petitioner's
Memorandum, pp. 79-80, Rollo).
The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has never been considered subject to waiver. The practice
has always been for the trial court to provide the accused with a counsel de officio, if he has no counsel of his own
choice, or cannot afford one. This is because —
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence and this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that his
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented
that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney,
it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
(People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752; See also Aguador vs. Enerio 37 SCRA 140).
On the basis of the aforequoted ruling, it cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to
satisfy the constitutional right of an accused to counsel. Petitioner, as the respondent in the contempt charge, a
proceedings that partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution, was thus denied due process. This is more so as
petitioner does not appear to have been duly notified of the contempt charge, nor was properly "arraigned," since he
was not assisted by counsel during the hearing (Santiago vs. Alikpala, supra). Admittedly with a counsel of record,
petitioner could not have willingly submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. It is certainly much easier
to believe, that, as petitioner alleges, he asked for postponement, because of the absence of his counsel, but that the
respondent judge denied the plea, a fact not expressly traversed in the respondent judge's comment (p. 56, Rollo).
Neither has he denied the allegation in the petition that there was a denial of petitioner's right to due process for not
having been duly informed of the contempt charge, nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof, as he is entitled to
one as a matter of right and as a matter-of duty of the court. All that respondent judge said in his comment is that
"defendant Flores has been granted his day in court to defend himself from the charges presented by reason of his
contumacious acts." (p. 56, Rollo).
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the proceedings on the contempt charge has been vitiated by lack of due
process, entitling petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus he seeks.
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defects
results in the absence or loss of 'jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less
effective may be availed of by the defendant. In Harden vs. The Director of Prisons (81:741/1948/), Justice Tuason,
speaking for the Court, explicitly announced that "deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights" justify a
proceeding for habeas corpus, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Abriol vs. Homeres (84 Phil. 525) is even more
categorical. In that case, the action of a lower court, denying the accused the opportunity to present proof for his
defense, his motion for dismissal failing, was held by this Court as a deprivation of his right to due process. As was
made clear by the opinion of Justice Ozaeta: 'No court of justice under our system of government has the power to
deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary invokes the right, and
the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused
without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be conaterany attacked in a
habeas corpus proceeding. (Santiago vs. Alikpala, supra.)

2. We also find as not clearly established by the pleadings and annexes, the legal basis for the pronouncement of
guilt for contempt against petitioner. What would constitute contempt is the re-entry of the defeated party into the
premises after possession thereof has been delivered to the prevailing party by the sheriff in enforcement of the writ
of execution (Rom vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 758, 763; Chinese Commercial Property Co. vs.
Martinez, et. al., L-18565, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 848; Faustino Lagrimas vs. JP of Camiling, et. al., L-14345,
July 20,1961, 2 SCRA 793). Thus, in the order of the respondent judge, dated September 28, 1972, (Annex G to
Petition, pp. 30-31, Rollo), it was stated that:
By virtue of the writ of execution of the decision in this case the plaintiffs were placed in possession over the parcel
described in paragraph 3 of the complaint. Sometime in March, 1969, defendants invaded the land and since then,
they refused to vacate same. Plaintiffs, on July 2, 1969, filed the first motion for contempt against the defendants.
The other properties of defendants were levied, foreclosed and sold to defendants on November 28, 1968 in a public
auction to satisfy the damages awarded in the same judgment. The defendants failed to redeem the bidded properties
within the one year from the registration of the certificate of sale of the land, and yet defendants refused to vacate
same land for which plaintiffs filed the second motion for contempt on December 17, 1971.
The Court did not pass upon the first motion for contempt but gave due course to the second motion for contempt.
It is altogether clear that with respect to the parcel described in paragraph 3 of the complaint, the Mandacs were
placed in possession thereof but subsequently, the petitioner herein invaded the land and had since refused to leave
it. With respect, however, to the land in question, petitioner never vacated the same; there was, therefore, no re-entry
to speak of. According to petitioner, the sheriff who tried to enforce the writ of possession never succeeded in locating
the specific land to be delivered to the Mandacs to be able to claim having placed the latter in possession of the land.
(pp. 77- 78, Rollo). Where the defeated party asked to vacate the premises by the judgment of the court, refuses to
vacate the same on being ordered by the sheriff enforcing a writ of execution or possession, no contempt is committed,
as held in Goyena de Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., G. R. No. L-2851, January 31, 1950, cited in Chinese
Commercial Property Co. vs. Martinez, et al., supra. In the case of Rom vs. Cobadora, L-24764, July 17, 1969, 28
SCRA 758, Justice Teehankee, speaking for the court said:

The order of execution issued by the lower court is address solely and exclusively to the sheriff, who under the above-
cited rules is called upon to oust the defeated party from the property and make the delivery or restitution by placing
the prevailing party in possession of the property, and mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of the defeated party
to relinquish the property, would not constitute contempt.

3. There is, likewise, an allegation in the petition that the Motion for Contempt was filed by the counsel of Leonardo
Mandac after the latter's death, and therefore, the motion was unauthorized and without legal standing. From what
has been said above that petitioner is not guilty of contempt, the challenge against the legality of the motion for
contempt need not be inquired into. In fairness, however, to private respondent from his allegation in his Answer that
—
7. Atty. Pedro N. Laggui had authority to file the motion for contempt against the Petitioner on June 30, 1969; at that
time, Leonardo Mandac was still alive. Atty. Antonio N. Laggui likewise had authority to file the motion for contempt
against the Petitioner on December 17, 1971 no longer as counsel for the deceased Leonardo Mandac — for at that
time he was already dead — but as counsel for his wife and children in whose favor the corresponding deed of sale
of the parcels of land sold at auction on November 28, 1968, was executed by the Sheriff on February 12, 1970,
pursuant to the Order dated January 21, 1970. (Answer, p. 69, Rollo).
We have no hesitation to say that the Motion for Contempt has been filed with proper authority.
For all the foregoing, the present petition should be, as it is, hereby granted, thereby setting aside the order of the
respondent judge finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.