Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA,
LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN
T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES
ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents.

Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.

F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.

BENGZON, J.:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the
ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members
of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition
that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as
follows:

WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of
the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor
of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;

WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of
Cebu stated the following:.

xxx xxx xxx

The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at
premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as
long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation
would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .

WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one
visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to
contempt and disrepute; . . . .
 Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be
appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in
his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or
the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do
so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special
committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the
adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.

In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that
if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall
not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the
Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to
answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its
implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the
special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to
defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before
closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.

Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda,
San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress
having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole
respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.

There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House,
made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59
and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to
substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and
for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended
from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.

Resolution No. 175 states in part:

WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59,
adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious,
reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege
speech of June 23, 1960; and

WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the
dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it

RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be,
as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20
that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3)
supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so
because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes
the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its
members.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt
from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any
other place" than Congress.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of
Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the
floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were
censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case,
a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked
his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be

censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this
decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a
foreign country.

And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one
year.

Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he
argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other
business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House,
that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.

Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may
not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.

The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any
rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular
measure."6

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:

The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is
within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of
procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty
action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411;
City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany,
23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977,
124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So.
888; McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co.
145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of
Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]

It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted
the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the
resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.
(2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced.
We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in
black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it
would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously
observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it
has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the
courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature since each department is equally independent within the
power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in
what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power
 to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or
unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In
1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a
bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no
hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme
Court of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has
been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the
power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state
has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to
enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;'
'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the
sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no
provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house
of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department
and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An
attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the
exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is
expressly forbidden to do.

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the
principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to
other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the
courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.

Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of
impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to
disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in
the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles
and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute
unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered.9

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent.
In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months
because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered
in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the
validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate
had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and
the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove
an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each
house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."

The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent
of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best
represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy."
But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then
the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the
Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-
General, who had appointed him.

It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were
granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and
preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the
Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the
power it then exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not
impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in
1949.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations
are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)

In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction
had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved
the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as
such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or
academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all
members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable
cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15

At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court
thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and
decisive.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:

I concur with the majority that the petition filed by Congressman Osmeña, Jr. does not make out a
case either for declaratory judgment or certiorari, since this Court has no original jurisdiction over
declaratory judgment proceedings, and certiorari is available only against bodies exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial powers. The respondent committee, being merely fact finding, was not properly
subject to certiorari.

I submit, however, that Congressman Osmeña was entitled to invoke the Court's jurisdiction on his
petition for a writ of prohibition against the committee, in so far as House Resolution No. 59 (and its
sequel, Resolution No. 175) constituted an unlawful attempt to divest him of an immunity from
censure or punishment, an immunity vested under the very Rules of the House of Representatives.

House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V, provides as follows:

If it is requested that a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the Member
making such request shall indicate the words excepted to, and they shall be taken down in
writing by the Secretary and read aloud to the House; but the Member who uttered them
shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the censure of the House therefor, if further
debate or other business has intervened.

Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmeña had delivered his speech and before the
House adopted, fifteen days later, the resolution (No. 59) creating the respondent Committee and
empowering it to investigate and recommend proper action in the case, the House had acted on
other matters and debated them. That being the case, the Congressman, even before the resolution
was adopted, had ceased to be answerable for the words uttered by him in his privilege speech. By
the express wording of the Rules, he was no longer subject to censure or disciplinary action by the
House. Hence, the resolution, in so far as it attempts to divest him of the immunity so acquired and
subject him to discipline and punishment, when he was previously not so subject, violates the
constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation, and Resolution Nos. 59 and 175 are legally
obnoxious and invalid on that score. The rule is well established that a law which deprives an
accused person of any substantial right or immunity possessed by him before its passage is ex post
facto as to prior offenses (Cor. Jur. vol. 16-A, section 144, p. 153; People vs. Mc Donnell, 11 Fed.
Supp. 1015; People vs. Talklington, 47 Pac. 2d 368; U. S. vs. Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp. 849).

The foregoing also answer the contention that since the immunity was but an effect of section 7 of
House Rule XVII, the House could, at any time, remove it by amending those Rules, and
Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 effected such an amendment by implication. the right of the House to
amend its Rules does not carry with it the right to retroactive divest the petitioner of an immunity he
had already acquired. The Bill of Rights is against it.

It is contended that as the liability for his speech attached when the Congressman delivered it, the
subsequent action of the House only affected the procedure for dealing with that liability. But
whatever liability Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. then incurred was extinguished when the House
thereafter considered other business; and this extinction is a substantive right that can not be
subsequently torn away to his disadvantage. On an analogous issue, this Court, in People vs. Parel,
44 Phil., 437 has ruled:

In regards to the point that the subject of prescription of penalties and of penal actions
pertains to remedial and not substantive law, it is to be observed that in the Spanish legal
system, provisions for limitation or prescription of actions are invariably classified as
substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the provisions for the prescription of
criminal actions in the Penal Code and not in the 'Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal.' This is in
reality a more logical law. In criminal cases prescription is not, strictly speaking, a matter of
procedure; it bars or cuts off the right to punish the crime and consequently, goes directly to
the substance of the action. . . . (Emphasis supplied.).

I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws, that the objectionable measures happen to be House Resolutions and not statutes. In so
far as the position of petitioner Osmeña is concerned, the essential point is that he is being
subjected to a punishment to which he was formerly not amenable. And while he was only meted out
a suspension of privileges that suspension is as much a penalty as imprisonment or a fine, which the
House could have inflicted upon him had it been so minded. Such punitive action is violative of the
spirit, if not of the letter, of the constitutional provision against ex post facto legislation. Nor is it
material that the punishment was inflicted in the exercise of disciplinary power. "The ex post
facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme Court has ruled, "can not be evaded by giving civil form
to that which is essentially criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U. S.] 1104, 1106;
Cummings vs. MIssouri, 18 L. Ed. 276).

The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House rules is to protect the freedom of action of
its members and to relieve them from the fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a
result of political convenience, vindictiveness, or pressures. it is unrealistic to overlook that, without
the immunity so provided, no member of Congress can remain free from the haunting fear that his
most innocuous expressions may at any time afterwards place him in jeopardy of punishment
whenever a majority, however transient, should feel that the shifting sands of political expediency so
demand. A rule designed to assure that members of the House of the House may freely act as their
conscience and sense of duty should dictate complements the parliamentary immunity from outside
pressure enshrined in our Constitution, and is certainly deserving of liberal interpretation and
application.

The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as instances of disciplinary taken
notwithstanding intervening business, are not truly applicable. Of the five instances cited by
Deschkler (in his edition of Jefferson's Manual), the case of Congressman Watson of Georgia
involved also printed disparaging remarks by the respondent (III Hinds' Precedents, sec. 2637), so
that the debate immunity rule afforded no defense; that of Congressmen Weaver and Sparks was
one of censure for actual disorderly conduct (II Hinds, sec. 1657); while the cases of Congressmen
Stanbery of Ohio, Alex Long of Ohio, and of Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky (II Hinds, sec. 1248, 1252
and 1655) were decided under Rule 62 of the U. s. House of Representatives as it stood before the
1880 amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the Rousseau case, the ruling of Speaker
Colfax was to the following effect (II Hinds' Precedents, page 1131):

This sixty-second rule is divided in the middle a semicolon, and the Chair asks the attention
of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Wilson) top the language of that rule, as it settles the whole
question:

62. If a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the person calling him to be
order shall repeat the words excerpted to —

That is, the "calling to order" is "excepting" to words spoken in debate "and they shall be
taken done in writing at the Clerk's table; and no Member shall be held to answer, or be
subject to the censure of the House, for words spoken, or other business has intervened,
after the words spoken, and before exception to them shall have been taken.

The first part of this rule declares that "calling to order" is "excepting to words spoken in
debate." the second part of the rule declares that a Member shall not be held subject to
censure for words spoken in debate if other business has intervened after the words have
been spoken and before "exception" to them has been taken. Exception to the words of the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Grinnell) was taken by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Harding),
the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Banks), the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr.
Rosseau), and also by the Speaker of the House, as the records of the Congressional Globe
will show. The distinction is obvious between the two parts of the rule. In the first part it
speaks of a Member excepting to language of another and having the words taken down. In
the last part of the rule it says he shall not be censured thereafter unless exception to his
words were taken; but it omits to add as an condition that words must also have been taken
down. The substantial point, indeed the only point, required in the latter part of the rule is,
that exception to the objectionable words must have taken.
The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases and the Rules of our House of
Representatives is easily apparent. As Rule 62 of the United States House of Representatives stood
before 1880, all that was required to preserve the disciplinary power of the Hose was that exception
should have been taken to the remarks on the floor before further debate or other business
intervened. Under the rules of the Philippines House of Representatives, however, the immunity
becomes absolute if other debate or business has taken place before the motion for censure is
made, whether or not exceptions or point of order have been made to the remarks complained of at
the time they were uttered.

While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in Article VI, section 15 of our
Constitution does not bar the members being questioned and disciplined by Congress itself fro
remarks made on the floor, that disciplinary power does not, as I have noted, include the right to
retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a member of an immunity already gained. And if Courts
can shield an ordinary citizen from the effects of ex post facto legislation, I see no reason why a
member of Congress should be deprived of the same protection. Surely membership in the
Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the liberties enjoyed by the individual citizen.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. If may not by
its rules ignore constitutional restraint or violate fundamental rights and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and
the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitation all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate or even more just. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph
& Co., 36 Law Ed., 324-325.)

Court will not interfere with the action of the state senate in reconsideration its vote on a
resolution submitting an amendment to the Constitution, where its action was in compliance
with its own rules, and there was no constitutional provision to the contrary.
(Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963) (Emphasis supplied.).

Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel the Legislature to act in any specified
manner, should not deter it from recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and nullify of the
questioned resolutions and of all action that has been disbanded after the case was filed, the basic
issues remain so important as to require adjudication by this Court.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:

I fully concur in the above dissent Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, Reyes, and I venture to add:

Within a constitutional government and in a regime which purports to be one of law, where law is
supreme, even the Congress in the exercise of the power conferred upon it to discipline its
members, must follow the rules and regulation that it had itself promulgated for its guidance and for
that of its members. The rules in force at the time Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech
declared by the House to constitutes a disorderly conduct provides:

. . . but the Member who uttered them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the
censure of the House therefor, if further debate or other business has intervened. (Rule XVII,
Sec. 7, Rules, House of Representatives.)

Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech in question on June 23, 1960. It was only on July 8, or
15 days after June 23, 1060 when the House created the committee that would investigated him. For
fully 15 days the House took up other matters. All that was done, while the speech was being
delivered, was to have certains portions thereof deleted. I hold that pursuant to its own Rules the
House may no longer punish Congressman Osmeña for the delivered fifteen days before.

The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish Congressman Osmeña immediately after its
delivery, except to have some part of the speech deleted, show that the members of the House did
not consider Osmeña's speech a disorderly conduct. The idea to punish Congressman Osmeña,
which came 15 days after, was, therefore, an afterthought. It is, therefore, clear that Congressman
Osmeña is being made to answer for an act, after the time during which he could be punished
therefor had lapsed.

The majority opinion holds that the House can amend its rules any time. We do not dispute this
principle, but we hold that the House may not do so in utter disregard of the fundamental principle of
law that an amendment takes place only after its approval, or, as in this case, to the extent of
punishing an offense after the time to punishing an had elapsed. Since the rule, that a member can
be punished only before other proceedings have intervened, was in force at the time Congressman
Osmeña delivered his speech, the House may not ignore said rule. It is said in the majority opinion
that the rule limiting the period for imposition of a penalty for a speech to the day it was made, is
merely one of procedure. With due respect to the majority, we do not think that it is merely a rule of
procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of the time in which the House may take punitive
action against an offending member; it is alienation (in reference to time) on the liability to
punishment. As Mr. Justice J.B.L., Reyes points out, the rule is substantive, not merely a procedural
principle, and may not be ignored when invoked.

If this Government of laws and not of men, then the House should observe its own rule and not
violate it by punishing a member after the period for indictment and punishment had already passed.
Not because the subject of the Philippic is no less than the Chief Magistrate of the nation should the
rule of the House be ignored by itself. It is true that our Government is based on the principle of
separation of powers between the three branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary proposition
that this Court should not interfere with the legislature in the manner it performs its functions; but I
also hold that the Court cannot abandon its duty to pronounce what the law is when any of its (the
House) members, or any humble citizen, invokes the law.

Congressman Osmeña had invoked the protection of a rule of the House. I believe it is our bounden
duty to state what the rule being invoked by him is, to point out the fact that the rule is being violated
in meting out punishment for his speech; we should not shirk our responsibility to declare his rights
under the rule simply on the board excuse of separation of powers. Even the legislature may not
ignore the rule it has promulgated for the government of the conduct of its members, and the fact
that a coordinate branches of the Government is involved, should not deter us from performing our
duty. We may not possess the power to enforce our opinion if the House chooses to disregard the
same. In such case the members thereof stand before the bar of public opinion to answer for their
act in ignoring what they themselves have approved as their norm of conduct.

Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this dissent personally believe that vitreous attacks
against the Chief Executive, or any official or citizen for that matter, should be condemned. But
where the Rules, promulgated by the House itself, fix the period during which punishment may be
meted out, said Rules should be enforced regardless of who may be prejudicated thereby. Only in
that way may the supermacy of the law be maintained.

Footnotes

1 These, except Congressman Abeleda, share the views of petitioner.

2 Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367.

3 Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 189; Hiss. vs. Barlett & Gray. 468, 63 Am. Dec. 768, 770.

4Rules of the House not the force of law, but they are merely in the nature of by-laws
prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of their own proceedings. (67 Corpus Juris
Secundum, p. 870)

5 Corpus Juris Secumdum, p. 870.

6 South Georgia Power vs. Bauman, 169 Ga. 649; 151 s. w. 515.

7 146 Cal. 604; 69 L. R. A. 556.

8Canno's Precedents (1936) par. 2497) William Willet, Jr. of New York); par. 2498 (Louis v.
Mc Fadden of Pensylvania).

9Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and the House of Representative by Louis Deschler (1955)
p. 382.

10the Jones Law placed "in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of
their domestic affairs as can be given them, without in the meantime impairing the rights of
sovereignty by the people of the United States." (Preamble)

11Apart from the view that power to remove includes the power to suspend asan incident.
(Burnap vs. U. s. 252, U. S. 512, 64 L. Ed. 693, 695.) This view is distinguishable from
Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil., 175.(See Gregory vs. Mayor, 21 N. E. 120) But we need not
explain this now. Enough to rely on congressional inherent power.

12 See appendix par. VII, Cushing.

13This, apart from doubts on (a) our jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for declaratory
judgments, and (b) availability of certiorari or prohibition against respondents who are not
exercising judicial or ministerial functions (Rule 67, sec. 1 and 2).

14 See supra.

15 Phil., 83.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949

JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.

Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Tañada for
respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and
Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to
deny the petition.

Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to
explain the principal grounds for the denial.

The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:

In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare quested that his
right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator
Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.

Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at
the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed
his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he
did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the
resolution submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read
slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator
Francisco and Tirona.

Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the
United States, all the Senator were present.

Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with,
but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner
and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his
privilege speech. The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes,
but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy.

Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then
presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada
instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of
any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while,
tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator
Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.

At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement.
At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was
recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.

Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote.
Another commotion ensued.

Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote.

Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the
rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore,
urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze
the functions of the Senate.

Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over
the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.

Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner
when the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and
submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously
approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.

The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.

By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.

The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the
crucial points:

a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

c. Should the petition be granted?

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We
refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended
senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at
liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might
change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not
allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should
characterized judicial deliberations.

The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not
where two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as
such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate
only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves
into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his
place in the same one Philippines Senate.

It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent
makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in
matters of similar nature.

The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of
February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr.
Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do,
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those
four on those sub-questions.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only
by ten or less.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum,
"the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a
majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after
this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with
Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any
time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to
avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of
all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without
costs.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, C.J., concurring:

I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the case.1 The present crisis in the Senate is one that
imperatively calls for the intervention of the Court.

Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of non-interference by the courts with the Senate
because the legal capacity of his group of twelve senators to acts as a senate is being challenged by
petitioner on the groundof lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers et al., Atl. 726;
23 L. R. A., 352). If this group is found sufficient to constitute a quorum under the Constitution, then
its proceedings should be free from interference. But if it is not possessed of a valid quorum, then its
proceedings should be voided.

The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate cannot be considered a
political question the determination of which devolves exclusively upon the Senate. That issue
involves a constitutional question which cannot be validly decided either by the Cuenco group or by
the Avelino group separately, for, if the Cuenco group has no quorum, the Avelino has decidedly
less. And for obvious reasons, the two groups cannot act together inasmuch as the members of the
Avelino group, possibly to avoid trouble, do not attend the sessions presided by the respondent
believing as they do that the latter was illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco group
believing itself as possessing the constitutional quorum and not desiring to make any semblance of
admission to the contrary, does not find it convenient to compel the attendance of any senator of the
Avelino group. Then the question arises--who will decide the conflict between the two groups? This
anomalous situation will continue while the conflict remains unsettled, and the conflict will remain
unsettled while this Court refuses to intervene. In the meantime the validity of all the laws,
resolutions and other measures which may be passed by the Cuenco group will be open to doubt
because of an alleged lack of quorum in the body which authored them. This doubt may extend, in
diverse forms, to the House of Representative and to the other agencies of the government such as
the Auditor General's Office. Thus, a general situation of uncertainty, pregnant with grave dangers, is
developing into confusion and chaos with severe harm to the nation. This situation may, to a large
extent, be stopped and constitutional processes may be restored in the Senate if only this Court, as
the guardian of the Constitutional, were to pronounce the final word on the constitutional mandate
governing the existing conflict between the two groups. And, in my opinion, under the present
circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to meet challenge of the situation which
demands the utmost of judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As hereinbefore stated, the
present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of this Court.

As to the legality of respondent's election as acting President of the Senate,2I firmly believe that
although petitioner's adjournment of the session of February 21, 1949, was illegality cannot be
countered with another illegality. The session wherein respondent was elected as acting President of
the Senate was illegal because when Senator Mabanag raised the question of a quorum and the roll
was called, only twelve senators were present. In the Philippines there are twenty-four senators, and
therefore, the quorum must be thirteen. The authorities on the matter are clear.

The constitution of our state ordains that a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum.
the house of representative consist of 125 members; 63 is a majority and quorum. When a
majority or quorum are present, the house can do business; not otherwise.
A quorum possessed all the powers of the whole body, a majority of which quorum must, of
course, govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan., 155; 32 P., 470, 476; 19 L.R.A., 519.)

Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house
shall constitute a quorum to do business, is, for the purpose of the Assembly, not less than
the majority of the whole number of which the house may be composed. Vacancies from
death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion
of Justice, 12 Fla. 653.)

The general rule is that a quorum is a majority of all the members and a majority of this
majority may legislate and do the work of the whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23
S. E. 250-252, 30 L.R.A., 532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)

. . . a majority of each House is necessary to transact business, and a minority cannot

transact business, this view being in keeping with the provision of the Constitution permitting
a smaller number than a quorum to adjourn from day to day merely. (Earp vs. Riley, 40
OKL., 340; p. 164; Ralls vs. Wyand, 40 OKL., 323; 138 P. 158.)

The Constitution provides that "a majority of each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, when a majority are present the House is in a position to do
business. Its capacity to transact business is then established, created by the mere presence
of a majority, and depend upon the disposition or assent or action of any single member or
faction of the majority present. All that the Constitution required is the presence of a majority,
and when that majority are present, the power of the House arises. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph
& Co., 36 Law ed. 321, 325.)
 If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all the agents are assembled, or if all
have been duly notified, and the minority refuse, or neglect to meet with the other, a majority
of those present may act, provided those present constitute a majority of the whole number.
In other words, in such case, a major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum,
and a majority of the quorum may act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum,
the power of the minority to act is, in general, considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 4th
ed., sec. 283.)3

Therefore, without prejudice to writing a more extensive opinion, if necessary, I believe that
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco has not been legally elected as acting President of the Senate. It is
true that respondent Cuenco, in fact, must be the Senate President because he represent the
majority of the members now present in Manila, and, at any new session with a quorum, upon the
present senatorial alignment, he will be elected to said office. But precisely he is now the master of
the situation, he must win his victory in accordance with the Constitution. It is absolutely essential in
the adolescent life of our Republic to insist, strictly and uncompromisingly, on thedemocratic
principles consecrated in our Constitution. By such efforts alone can we insure the future of our
political life as a republican form of government under the sovereignty of a Constitution from being a
mockery.

The situation now in this Court is this — there are four members who believe that there was
no quorum in respondent's election as against four other member who believe that there was
such quorum. Two members declined to render their opinion on the matter because of their refusal
to assume jurisdiction. And, one member is absent from the Philippines. Thus, the question of
whether or not respondent has been legally elected is, to say the least, doubtful in this Court under
the present conditions. This doubt, which taint the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other
measures that the Cuenco group has passed and may pass in the future, can easily be dispelled by
them by convening a session wherein thirteen senators are present and by reiterating therein all that
has been previously done by them. This is a suggestion coming from a humble citizen who is
watching with a happy heart the movement of this gallant group of prominent leaders campaigning
for a clean and honest government in this dear country of ours.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to who among the parties is entitled to hold the
position of President of the Senate is in issue.

There is no question that up to Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time the controversial incidents
took place, petitioner Jose Avelino was rightful occupant of the position. the litigation has arisen
because of the opposing contentions as to petitioner's outer and as to respondent's election as
acting President of the Senate, on February 21, 1949.

Petitioner contends that the proceedings in which a resolution was passed declaring the position of
President of the Senate vacant and electing respondent Mariano J. Cuenco as acting President of
the Senate were illegal because, at the time, the session for said day has been properly adjourned,
and the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall had no right to convene in a rump
session, and said rump session lacked quorum, while respondent contents that the session which
was opened by petitioner had not been legally adjournment, the Senators who remained in the
session hall had only continued the same session, and there was quorum when the position of the
President of the Senate was declared vacant and when respondent was elected as acting President
of Senate, to fill the vacate position.
Petitioner's version of the facts, as alleged in his petition, is to the effect that on Monday, February
21, 1949, at the time petitioner opened the session in the Senate session hall, there were twenty two
Senators present who answered the roll call; Vicente J. Francisco. Fernando Lopez, Emiliano
TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos
Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Tañada,
Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera,
Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag, and the petitioner Jose Avelino. While the minutes of the preceding
session was being read the crowd of more than 1,000 people who entered the Senate hall to witness
the session, became unruly, the repeated efforts of petitioner as well as the sergeant-at-arms and
other peace officers to maintain peace and order notwithstanding. Fights and commotions ensued
and several shots were fired among the audience. The Senator who spoke could not be heard
because the spectators would either shout to drown their voices or would demeans that some other
Senator should take the floor and be recognized by petitioner. Pandemonium reigned and it was
impossible for the Senate to proceed with its deliberations free from undue pressure and without
grave danger to its integrity as a body and to the personal safety of the members thereof. Senator
Pablo Angeles David moved for adjournment until Thursday, February 24, 1949. There being no
objection, petitioner adjourned the session until February 24, 1949. Thereupon petitioner and nine
other Senator namely, Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles
David, Sulipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enriquez Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin left
the session hall. Senator Melencio Arranz, President Pro-Tempore of Senate, went up the rostrum
and, assuming the presidency of the chamber, convinced the remaining twelve Senators into a rump
session, in which a resolution was passed declaring vacant the position of the President of the
Senate and electing respondent as President of the Senate. Thereupon respondent pretended to
assume the office of president of the Senate and continues to pretend to assume said office.

Petitioner alleged five grounds to claim that respondent is usurping or illegally exercising the office of
the President of the Senate: 1. Petitioner had adjourned the session of the senate, the adjournment
having been properly moved and, without objection, favorably acted upon; 2. Petitioner had full
power to adjourn the session even without motion under chapter II, Section 8, paragraph (e) of the
Rules of the Senate; 3 The ordinary daily session having been adjourned, no other session could be
called in the Senate on the same day; 4 The President Pr-tempore had no authority to assume the
presidency except in the cases specified in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rule of the Senate, and none
of the conditions therein mentioned obtained at the time in question; and 5. The twelve Senators that
convened in the rump session did not constitute a quorum to do business under the Constitution and
the rule of the Senate, being less than one-half plus one of the twenty four members of the Senate.

Respondent's version of the events as follows:

(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada announced and reserved in
open session of the Senate that on Monday, February 21, 1949, he would make use of his one-hour
privilege, it was known that formal charges would be filed against the then Senate President,
petitioner in this case, on said date. Hours before the opening of the session on Monday, February
21, 1949, Senators Lorenzo M. Tañada and Prospero Sanidad registered in the Office of the
secretary of the Senates a resolution in which serious charges were preferred against the herein
petitioner. A certified copy of said resolution, marked as Exhibit "1" is hereto attacked and made an
integral part hereof:

(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall
at and before 10:00 A.M., schedule time for the session to begin, and in spite of the fact that the
petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner deliberately delayed his appearance at the session
hall until about 11:35 A.M.;

(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but
instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senator Tañada and
Sanidad and in the presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and carefully said resolution,
after which he called and conferred with his followers, Senators Francisco and Tirona;
(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requested of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that
the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order;

(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long established in the Senate, moved that the roll call be
dispensed with as it was evident that with the presence of all the 22 senator who could discharges
their functions, there could be no question of a quorum, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion,
evidently in pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of petitioner and his followers to make
use of all sorts of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech on
the charges filed against petitioner. The roll call affirmatively showed the presence of the following
22 Senators; Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David,
Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz,
M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo M. Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,
Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag and Jose
Avelino;

(f) Senator Sanidad next moved, as in the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minute,
but this motion was likewise opposed by senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy;

(g) Before and after the roll call before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada
repeatedly took the floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the
charges against petitioner, but the latter, then presiding, continually ignored him; and when after the
reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the antics
of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously and vociferously shouting at Senator Sanidad
"Out of order! Out of order! Out of order! . . .," everything the latter would ask the petitioner to
recognized the right of Senator Tañada to speak.

(h) At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by
prearrangement, but the police officers present were able to maintain order. No shots were fired
among the audience, as alleged in the petition. It was at about this same time that Senator Pablo
Angeles David, one of petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for
adjournment of the session, evidently again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to
prevent Senator Tañada from speaking;

(i) Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition
was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a
vote;

(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote;

(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked out of the session hall.

(l) Without the session being adjournment, Senators David, Tirona, Francisco,Torres, Magalona, and
Clarin followed the petitioner out of the session hall, while the rest of the senators, as afore-named in
sub-paragraph (e) hereof, remained to continue the session abandoned by petitioner, whereupon
Senator Melencio Arranz, as Senate Pro-tempore, took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a speech, whereby he asked that it be made of record
— as it was in so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon SenatePresident Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate;
(n) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session, which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the
Chair.

(o) Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was carried unanimously, Gregorio Abad was appointed
Acting Secretary, as the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session;

(p) Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech, Which took more than hours, on the charges against the petitioner contained in the
Resolution, attacked hereto as Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration and approval
ofsaid Resolution. Senator Sanidad reiterated this motion, after having firstread aloud the complete
text of said Resolution, and thereafter the same was unanimously approved;

(q) With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yield edit to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate," a copy of which is herewith attacked and made an integral
part hereof as Exhibit "2". Put a vote, the said Resolutionwas unanimously approved, respondent
having abstained from voting;

(r) The respondent having been duly elected as Acting President of the Senate, immediately took his
oath of Office in open session, before Senate President Pro-Tempore Melencio Arranz, and since
then, has been discharging the duties and exercising the rights and prerogatives appertaining to said
office;

(s) From the allegation of the petition, it clearly appears that the petitioner had only nine senators in
his favor and twelve, decidedly against him, which fact negates the petitioner's assertion that there
was no opposition to the motion for adjournment submitted by Senator David;

(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21, 1949, to the allegedadjournment, it was
evidently and manifestly the purpose of the petitioner to deprive Senator Tañada of his right to take
the floor and to speak on the charges filed against said petitioner; that said petitioner resorted to all
means to deprive the Senate of its right and prerogative to deliberate on Senate Resolution No. 68,
Exhibit "1", and that when the petitioner realized that a majority of the Senator who were present in
the said session was ready to approved said resolution, the petitioner abandoned the session;

(u) The minute of the session held on February 21, Exhibit 1949, a copy of which is hereto attacked
and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "3", show that the petitioner illegally abandoned the
Chair while the Senate was in session and that the respondent has been duly elected Acting Senate
President in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Respondent alleges further that Senator David's motion for adjournment was objected to and not
submitted to a vote and, therefore, could not have been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had
the power to adjourn the session even without motion; that the session presided over, first by
petitioner and then by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having been threatened or intimidated by
anybody, and after petitioner abandoned the session continued peacefully until its adjournment at
4:40 P.M.; that there was only one session held on said date; that petitioner's abandonment of the
Chair in the face of an impending ouster therefrom constituted a temporaryincapacity entitling the
Senate President Pro-tempore to assume the Chair; that there was quorum as, with the absence of
Senator Tomas Confessor, whowas in the U. S. and of Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill
and confined in the Lourdes Hospital, the presence of at least twelve senators constitutes a quorum;
that, despite petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session to February 24, 1949, convinced that he
did not count with the majority of the Senators and not wanting to be investigated by the
specialinvestigation committee regarding the grave charges preferred against him, the petitioner
deliberately did not appear at the session hall on said date.
Three special defenses are advanced by respondent: (a) Lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
(b) No cause of action as there are only nine Senators who had recognized petitioner's claim against
twelve Senators or who have madepatent their loss of confidence in him by voting in favor of his out
ouster; and (c) The object of the action is to make the supreme Court a mere tool of a minority group
of ten Senators to impose petitioner's will over and above that of the twelve other members of the
Senate, to entrench petitionerin power.

In impugning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respondent contends that the present case is not
justiciable, because it involves a purely political question, the determination of which by the Senate
is binding and conclusiveupon the court (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 43 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil., 192) respondent has been recognized as acting President of the Senate by the President of
the Philippines and said recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts (Barcelon vs. Baker, 5
Phil., 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366); the Senate is the only body that can
determine from time to time who shall be its President and petitioner's only recourse lies in said
body; and this Court's action in entertaining the petition would constitute an invasion and an
encroachment upon the powers, rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to
Congress, of which the Senate is a branch.

Upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to the real events, this Court authorized the reception of
evidence. Before passing to consider and to weigh said evidence so as to determine the true events,
it is only logical that we should first pass upon the question of jurisdiction raised by respondent.

In attacking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court respondent alleges, as first ground, that the
present controversy is not justiciable in nature, involving, as it does, a purely political question, the
determination of which by the political agency concerned, the Senate, is binding and conclusive on
the courts.

The contention is untenable. In the first place, it begs question. It assumes as premises that the
question has been determined by the Senate, when the two opposing parties claim that each one of
them represents the will of the Senate, and if the controversy should be allowed to remainunsettled,
it would be impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong, and who really represent the
Senate.

The question raised in the petition, although political in nature, are justiciable because they involve
the enforcement of legal precepts, such as the provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of the
Senate. Thepower and authority to decided such questions of law form part of the jurisdiction, not
only expressly conferred on the Supreme Court, but of which, by express prohibition of the
Constitution, it cannot be divested.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various court, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error,
as the law or the rules of the court may provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts
in —

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or
regulations is in question.

(2) All case involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.

(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.

(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
 (5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.

Because the legal questions raised in this case cannot be decided without decided also what is the
truth on the controversial facts, by the very natureof things, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
reached the settlement of the conflict claims as to the real events.

Respondent alleges that he has been recognized by the President of the Philippines as acting
President of the Senate and that executive recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts. The
contention is erroneous. The actions of the President of the Philippines cannot deprive the Supreme
Court of the jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution. If the Congress of the Philippines, in which
the Legislature power is vested, cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to decide
questions of law, much less canthe president of the Philippines, on whom is vested the Executive
power, which in the philosophical and political hierarchy is of subordinate category to the of the
Legislative power, do so. The power to enact laws is higher than the power to execute them.

The third argument of argument of respondent, although based on truth, has nothing to do with the
legal questions raised in this case. It is true that the Senate is the only body that can determine from
time who is and shall be its President, but when the legal questions are raised in a litigation likein the
present case, the proper court has the function, the province and the responsibility to decide them.
To shirk that responsibility is to commit a dereliction of official duty.

Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the petition, is invade and encroach upon the
powers, rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to the Legislative Department, of
which the Senate is a branch. The contention is erroneous. The controversy as to thelegality of the
adjournment declared by petitioner, of petitioner's ousters, as a result of the resolution declaring
vacant the position of President of the Senate, or respondent's election as acting President of the
Senate, and as to whether or not the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall could
continue holding session and if they constitute quorum, are all legal question upon which courts of
justice have jurisdiction and the SupremeCourt is the final arbiter.

From the evidence, it appears that in the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, at the time the
resolution of confidence in favor of petitioner, introduced by the Senator Lopez, was being put to
vote, Senator Tañada voted,Senator Tañada voted in the negative, alleging as ground damaging
facts, supported by several checks, highly detrimental to the personal and officialhonesty of
petitioner. At the same time, Senator Tañada announced his intention of filing in the next session, to
be held on Monday, February 21, 1949, formal charges against petitioner and of delivering during
the so-called privilege hour a speech in support of said charges.

On said Monday morning, hour before the opening of the ordinary daily session, Senator Tañada
and Sanidad registered with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution for the appointment of a
Committee of three, composed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David, and Mabanag, with instructed to
proceed immediately to investigate the serious charges against petitioner embodiedin the document.

Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of the respondent's answer, is as follow:

RESOLUTION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE

SENATE PRESIDENT, JOSE AVELINO.

WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a caucus of high government officials of the
Philippines Government and leaders of the Liberal Partyheld at Malacañang palace on
January 15, 1949, delivered a speech,wherein he advocated the protection, or, at least,
tolerance, of graft and corruption in the government, and placed the interest of grafters and
corrupt officials as supreme and above the welfare of the people, doctrine under which it is
impossible for an honest and clean governmentto exist;
WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose Avelino was given wide publicity by the
press, especially the Chronicle Publication in their issues of January 16 and 18, 1949, as
follows:

The senate President defenses the abuses perpetrated by Liberal Party men. He called the
investigations of the surplus property commission irregularities and the immigration quota
scadal as acts of injustice he describe the probe as "criminal" and "odious." He flayed the
National Bureau of Investigation agents for persecuting Liberal party leaders.

"We are not angels", he said. "When we die we all go to hell. It is better to be in hell because
in that place are no investigations, no secretary of justice, no secretary of interior to go after
us."

Avelino, who is the present President of the Liberal party, ensured the President for his
actuations which, he claimed, were mainly responsible for the division of the party into two
hostile camps.

Avelino asked the President to "tolerate" if he could not "permit", the abuse of the party in
power, because why should we be saints when in reality we are not?

He stressed that the present investigation being conducted by President Quirino on the
surplus property scandal and the immigration quota rackety has lowered the prestige of the
Liberal Party in the eyes of the people, and is a desecration to the memory of the late
President Manuel Roxas. "It is a crime against the Liberal Party", Avelino said.

Defining his attitude regarding rights and privileges of those who are in power in the
government, Avelino maintained that the Liberal Party men are entitled to more
considerations and should be given allowance to use the power and privilege. If they abuse
their power as all humans are prone to do, they will be given a certain measure of tolerance,
Avelino said, adding, "What are we in power for?"

Avelino cited the surplus property investigations as an attempt to besmear the memory of
Presidential Roxas. As a result of these investigations, the members of Congress are
subjected to unjust and embarrassing questioning by NBI, Avelino said. And what is worse is
the fact that these senators and representatives are being pilloried in public without formal
charges filed against them. (Manila Chronicle issue of Jan. 16, 1949).

At last Saturday night's caucus Senate President Avelino for two hours lectured to
President Quirino on Liberal Party discipline. At the same time he demanded
"tolerance" on the part of the Chief Executive by the party in power.

The investigations were conducted on vague charges, Avelino claimed. Nothing

specific has teen filed against atop Liberal Party man. And yet National Bureau of
Investigation agents have persecuted top leader of the LiberalParty. That is not
justice. That is injustice. . . . It isodious. . . . It is criminal.

Why did you have to order an investigation Honorable Mr. President? If you cannot
permit abuses, you must at leasttolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not
hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when in realitywe are not? We are
not angels. And besides when we die we all go to hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go
to hell wherethere are no investigations, no Secretary of Justice, no Secretary of
Interior to go after us.

When Jesus died on the Cross. He made a distinction between a good crook and the
bad crooks. We can prepare to be good crooks.
 Avelino related the story of St. Francis of Assisi. Athief sought sanctuary in St.
Francis' convent. When thesoldiers came to the convent and ordered St. Francis to
produce the wanted thief, St. Francis told the soldiers that thehunted man had gone
the other way.

Avelino then pointed out that even a saint had condoned the sins of a thief.

xxx xxx xxx

The investigation ordered by President Quirino, Avelino said, was a desecration of

the memory of the late President Roxas. The probe has lowered, instead of
enhanced, the prestige of the Liberal Party and its leader in the eyes of the public.

If the present administration fails, it is Roxas and not Quirino that suffers by it,
because Quirino's administration is only a continuation of Roxas, Avelino said.

Avelino compared all political parties to business corporations, of which all members
are stockholders. Every year the Liberal Party makes an accounting of its loss profit.
The Liberal Party, he said, has practically no dividends at all. It has lost even its
original capital. Then he mentionedthe appointments to the government of
Nacionalistas like: Lino Castillejo,as governor of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, Nicanor Carag, consulto Madrid; and Vicente Formoso, General
Manager of the National Tabacco Corporation."(Manila Chronicle issue of January
18, 1949.).

WHEREAS, after the first publication of the said speech in the Manila Chronicle issue of
January 16, 1949, the Senate President, in a letter to the said news report was a "maliciously
distorted presentation of my remarks at that caucus, under a tendentious headlines", and
threatened that "unless the proper redness is given to me, therefore, I shall feel compelled to
take the necessary steps to protect my reputation and good name";

WHEREAS, the Chronicle Publication not only refuse to retract or make the rectification
demanded by the Senate President, but on the contrary, in their issue of January 18, 1949,
challenged him to take his threatened action, stating that "in order to est abolished the truth,
we are inviting the Senate President to file a libel suit against the Chronicle" and further
repeated the publication of their reports on the Senate President speech in the same issue of
January 18, 1949 as quoted above;

WHEREAS, notwithstanding in the considerable length of time that has elapsed, the Senate
President has not carried out his threat of filing action against the Chronicle Publication,
thereby confirming, in effect, his doctrine of tolerance of graft and corruption;

WHEREAS, in open and public session of the Senate on February 18, 1949, there were
exhibited photostatic copies of four checks totalling P566,405.60, which appears to have
come into the possession and control of the Senate President, after he had assumed his
office;

WHEREAS, the first of the aforesaid check, which is Manager's Check No. M5375 of the
National City Bank of the National City Bank of New York, drawn on September 24, 1946, in
favor of the Senate President in the amount of P312,500.00, was indorsed by him to his wife,
Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the Philippine
National Bank on October 26, 1946;

WHEREAS, the second of the aforesaid checks, which is Manager's Check No. 49706 of the
Nederlands Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 21, 1946, in favor of the Senate
President in the amount of P196,905.60, was indorsedby him to his son, Mr. Jose Avelino,
Jr., who cashed it October 22, 1946;

WHEREAS, the third of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37262 of the Nederlandsch
Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 23,1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a
Chinese concern, in favor of "cash", in the amount of P10,000.00, was indorsed by the
Senate President to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her Saving
Account No. 63436 with the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;

WHEREAS, the fourth of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37268 of the
Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank, drawn by the aforementioned Chinese concern,
Chiung Liu Ching Long and Co., Ltd., in the amount of P47,500.00 in favor of the Senate
President, was indorsed by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her
current account with the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;

WHEREAS, of the four checks aforementioned, the one for P196,905.60 was cashed by the
Senate President's son, Jose Avelino, Jr., on October 22, 1946; while of the three other
checks totalling P370,000.00 which was deposited by the Senate President's wife, Mrs.
Enriqueta C. Avelino, in her saving and current accounts with the Philippines National Bank
on October 26, 1946, P325,000.00 were withdraw by her on same day;

WHEREAS, in the course of the speech delivered by the Senate President on the floor of the
Senate on February 18, 1946, in an attempt to explain the foregoing checks, he refused to
be interpolated on the same, and his explanation lacked such details and definiteness that it
left many doubts unsettled;

WHEREAS, in the case of the check for P312,500.00 the Senate President explanation that
the same represented proceeds from the sale of surplus beer to cover party obligation is
directly contradicted by the source of the same, Ching Ban Yek, who declared under oath
before the Horilleno Investigating Committee that the said sum of P312,500.00 had been
loaned byhim to the Senate President, who repaid the same within ten days;

WHEREAS, it appears that during the period from December 29, 1945 to April 30, 1948,
deposits totalling P803,865.45 were made in the current account of the Senate President's
wife Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in the Philippine National Bank, of which amount P6,204.86
were deposited before his election to office and the sum of P797,660.59 was deposited after
his election;

WHEREAS, the tax returns of the Senate President do not bear explanation madein his
speech of February 18, 1949 to the effect that he and his wife had made substantial amounts
in commercial transaction in shoes and liquor;

WHEREAS, in his said speech of February 18, 1949, the Senate President said that "en
politica todo vale", and that inasmuch as the Nacionalistas were prone to commit frauds, it
was right for the Liberals to commit frauds in the electionsto even up with frauds committed
by the opposition;

WHEREAS, the said speech of February 18, 1949 delivered by the SEnate President
justified the commission of electoral frauds, which justification is a direct attack on the
sovereignty of the people and may be a cause of unrest or resolution;

WHEREAS, the senate President, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on

Appointments which passes upon all Presidential appointment, including thoseto the
judiciary, has abused the prerogatives of his office by seeking in several instances to
 interfere with and influence some judge in decidingcase pending before, thereby imperilling
the independence of the judiciaryand jeopardizing the impartial administration of justice;

WHEREAS, the honor, dignity and prestige of the people and of the membersof the Senate
demand a through, impartial and immediate investigation of allforegoing; Now, therefore,

1 Be it resolved, To appoint, as they are hereby appointed

2 Committee of three (3) members of this Senate, to be com
3 posed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David and Mabanag, who
4 shall immediately proceed to investigate the charges mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the attendance of witnesses
6 and the production of books of account, documents, and other
7 evidence, and to utilized the facilities and the services of such
8 personnel of this Senate as it may deem necessary, with in
9 structions to render its report and recommendations to the
10 Senate on or before Friday, February 25, 1949.

Adopted, February 21, 1949.

Although a sufficient number of Senators to constitute quorum were already present in said morning
at and before 10:00 o'clock, the schedule time for the daily session to begin, the session was not
then opened, because petitioner failed to appear in the hall until about 11:35, the time petitioner
ascended the rostrum where, instead of calling the meeting to order, he asked for a copy of the
resolution introduced by the Senators Tañada and Sanidad and, after reading it slowly, he called to
his side Senators Angeles David and Tirona and conferred with them.

Only after the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that thesession be opened, that
petitioner called the meeting to order shortly before 12:00 o'clock noon.

Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with. Senator Tirona opposed the motion and
the roll call showed the presence of the following twenty two Senators: Vicente J. Francisco,
Fernando Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres,
Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Prospero
Sanidad, Lorenzo Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia,
Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Manag and Jose Avelino.

Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the minutes be dispersed with, but the motion was
again opposed by Senator Tirona whose opposition was joined by Senator Angeles David, and the
reading of the minutes proceeded.

Senator Tañada repeated took the floor to floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege
speech in support of the charges against petitioner,pursuant to the announcement he made in the
session of February 18, 1949; he did it before and after the roll call and the reading of the minutes.
he wasignored by the Chair and petitioner announced that he would order the arrestof any Senator
who speak without having been previously recognized by him.Senator Sanidad requested the Chair
to recognized the right of Senator Tañada to speak, and every time he would make the request,
Senator Tirona would oppose him upon the ground that the requests were out of order.

Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the Senate gallery. Shout were heard from
individuals of the audience, where two fist fight took place. The detonation of a gun shot was heard
from outside. Senator Angeles David, after being recognized by the Chair, moved for adjournment of
the session. The motion was objected by Senator Cuenco who, at the same time, moved thatthe
motion be submitted to vote. Petitioner, instead of submitting to vote the motion to adjourn, banged
the gavel and declared the session adjourned until next Thursday, February 24, 1949, and,
thereupon, left the session hall followed by the nine Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique
Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin), supporting him. Twelve SEnator, respondent and his
eleven supporters, remained in the session hall. Senator Arranz, President Pro-tempore of the
SEnate, ascended the rostrum,and called those Senators present to order. Senator Mabanag raised
the question of quorum and the question of quorum and the President Pro-tempore ordered a roll
call, to which all the twelve Senators remaining in the sessionhall answered.

The President Pro-tempore declared the presence of quorum and those presentproceeded to
continue transacting business. Senator Cabili took an made it of record that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate President Pro-tempore
and those remainingmembers of the Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and
paralyze the functions of the Senate. Senator Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to
preside over the session and the suggestion was carried unanimously and respondent took the
Chair.

Senator Tañada delivered his privilege speech, which took two hours on the charge against
petitioner contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration
and approval of said resolution, thecomplete text of which was read. The motion was seconded by
Senator Sanidad, and the resolution was unanimously approved. Respondent yielded the Chair to
the President Pro-tempore and Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.67, Exhibit "2", which
read as follows:

RESOLUTION DECLARING VACANT THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

AND DESIGNATING THE HONORABLE MARIANO JESUS CUENCO ACTING PRESIDENT
OFTHE SENATE.

Resolved by the Senate in session assembled, That a quorum exists; that the Honorable
Jose Avelino, President of the Senate having abandoned the chair, his position is hereby
declared vacant; and that, the Honorable Mariano JesusCuenco of Cebu, designated Acting
President of the SEnate, until further orders from this Body.

Adopted, February 21, 1949.

The resolutions unanimously approved, with respondent abstaining from voting. Pursuant to said
resolution, respondent took his oath of office inopen session before President Pro-Tempore Arranz
and has started, since then,to discharge the duties, rights and privileges of acting President of
theSenate.

The above recital of facts is based on our findings on the evidence on record. From the said facts we
believe the following conclusions are unavoidable.

1. The adjournment declared by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.

2. After petitioner and the 9 Senators supporting him had walked out from the session hall, the
Senate could not continue holding session and transact business for lack of quorum.

In the following discussion we will express the reasons in support of the above conclusions.

ILLEGAL ADJOURNMENT

A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when a question is under debate and, with certain
restriction, it has the highest privilege under all other conditions. Under parliamentary practice, even
questions of privilege and the motion to reconsider yield to it. The motion to adjourn may be made
after the "yeas'' and "nays" are ordered and before the roll call has begun, before reading of the
journal. The motion is not debatable and, after the motion is made, neither another motion nor an
appeal may intervene before the taking of the vote.

The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. It is too
tremendous a power to be wieldedby a single individual. The functions of the Senate and its
opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without
jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a
democratic social order. Single-handedindividual discretion on the matter may not mean anything
other than placing the legislative chamber under a unipersonal tyranny.

There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an
adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to
decree motu proprio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in
thiscountry and in the United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize
the existence of such a provision.

Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of Senator Angeles David to
said effect was properly made and met with no objection. If this version of the facts is true, then it
was right for petitioner to declare the adjournment, because the absence of anyobjection, provided
the motion was properly made and the other Senators after having been properly apprised of the
motion, did not object to it, was an evidence of an implied consent of all the members. The evidence,
however, fails to support petitioner's claim.

We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be more in consonance with truth. We are of
opinion that the motion to adjourn was actually objected to. Senator Tañada was bent on delivering a
speech he had ready onthe charges embodied in a resolution fathered by himself and by Senator
Sanidad, which both filed early in the morning, long before the session was opened. The formulation
of said charges had been announced days before,since the session of Friday, February 18, 1949,
when he showed photostatic copies of some checks as basis of a part of the charges to be filed. In
said Friday session respondent's group suffered defeat on the approval of the resolution of
confidence fathered by Senator Lopez. And it is understandable that respondent's group of
Senators, believing themselves to constitute the majority, did not want to waste any time to give a
showing of said majority and must have decided to depose petitioner as soon as possible to
wrestfrom him the Senate leadership that upon democratic principles rightly belongs to them.

As a showing of eagerness to hurry up the unfolding events that would give them the control of the
Senate, Senator Sanidad moved to dispense with the roll call and the reading of the minutes, and
had been requesting that Senator Tañada be recognized to take the floor. Senator Tañada himself
made attempts to deliver his speech.

Evidently, petitioner and his supported decided to adopt a blocking strategyto obstruct the process
that would give due course to the investigationof the serious charges made in resolution No. 68,
Exhibit 1, and wouldeffect petitioner's ouster as President of the Senate.

This strategy is evidence by the belated appearance of petitioner and his supporters at the session
hall and petitioner's procrastination in opening the session, by taking all his time in reading first the
Tañada and Sanidad resolution, formulating charges against him, and conferring with Senators
Angeles David and Tirona and in not calling to order the members of the Senate before Senator's
Cuenco and Sanidad began urging that the session beopened.

Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he could adjourn the session
under the rules of the Senate, is not well taken. There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving
petitioner such authority. Theprovisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate President to
take measures to stop disorder, but that power does not include the one to adjourn.
The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of the
petitioner and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least,
delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against petitioner and of his
impedingouster, by the decisive votes of respondent's group of Senators.

The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.

QUORUM

There is no controversy that at the session in question there were present in the session hall only
twelve Senators, those composing respondent's group, and this fact had been ascertained by the roll
call ordered by President Pro-tempore Arranz, after Senator Mabanag had raised the question
of quorum.

The Constitution provides:

A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Sub-sec. 2 Article
VI.)

The majority mentioned in the above provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual
members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership
of each chamber of Congress.

The Senate was and actually is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less
than thirteen. Twelve is only half of twenty-four. Nowhere and at no time has one-half even been the
majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.

We have heard with interest the arguments advanced by respondent's counsel, premised on the fact
that the above constitutional provision does not use the words "of the members" and the theory of
the amicus curiae that themajority mentioned in the Constitution refers only to the majority of the
members who can be reached by coercive processes. There is, however, nothing in said arguments
that can validly change the natural interpretation of theunmistakable wordings of the Constitution.
"Majority of each House" can mean only majority of the members of each House, and the number of
said members cannot be reduced upon any artificial or imaginary basis not authorized by the context
of the Constitution itself or by the sound processes of reason.

For all the foregoing, we conclude that:

1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case, notwithstanding their
political nature and implications, are justiciable and within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the
Supreme Court, which cannot be divested from it by express prohibition of the Constitution. Should
there be analogous controversy between two claimants to the position of the President of the
Philippines, according to the Solicitor General, one of the attorneys for respondent, the Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction to decide the controversy, because it would raise a constitutional
question. Whether there was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators in whichrespondent
was elected acting President of the Senate, is a question that call for the interpretation, application
and enforcement of an express and specific provision of the Constitution. Should the two absent
Senators comeand attend the session and side with the petitioner's group, it is agreed that the
Senate will be kept at a stand still, because of the deadlock resulting from twelve Senators, each
group supporting petitioner's and respondent's opposing claims to the position of President of the
Senate. Admitting that pressure of public opinion may not break the impasse, it hasbeen suggested
from respondent's side that it may invite revolution. Between the two alternatives, jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and revolution, there is only one choice possible, and that is the one in consonance
with the Constitution, which is complete enough to offer orderly remedies for any wrong committed
within the framework of democracy it established in this country. Should this Supreme Court refuse
to exercise jurisdiction in this case,such refusal can only be branded as judicial abdication, and such
shirking of official responsibility cannot expect acquittal in the judgment of history. The gravity of the
issues involved in this case, affecting not only the upper branch of Congress, but also the
presidential succession as provided by Republic Act No. 181, is a challenge to our sense of duty
which we should not fail to meet.

2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the Monday session, without the authority of the
Senate, was illegal and, therefore, null and void.

3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his supporters, after petitioner
and his nine supporters had walked out from the session hall, had no constitutional quorum to
transact business.

4. The resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and choosing
respondent as acting President of the Senate, has been adopted in contravention of the Constitution
for lack of quorum. The fact that respondent has been designated only as acting President of the
Senate, a position not contemplated by the Constitution or by Republic Act No. 181 on presidential
succession, so much so that his position in acting capacity, according to his own counsel, would not
entitle respondent to Succeedto the position of the President of the Philippines, emphasizes the
invalidity of respondent's election.

Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the legal issues involved are very simple, and it would
not be hard to reach a prompt conclusion if we could view the controversies with the attitude of a
mathematician tacklingan algebraic equation. Many considerations which, from the point of view of
laymen, of the press, of public opinion in general and the people at large, may appear of great
importance, such as who will wield the power to control the Senate and whether or not petitioner is
guilty of the serious charges filed against him, are completely alien to the questions that this Court
must answer. The motives and motivations of petitioner and respondent of their respective
supporters in the Senate in taking the moves upon which this case has arisen are their exclusive
business and should not be minded for the purposes of our decision.

The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and to elect another Senator as
president of the Senate, and their freedom to make such change is subject only to the dictates of
their own conscience and to anyverdict that the people, through the electorate, may render at the
polls, and to the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making such changes of leadership, the
Senate and the Senators are bound to follow the orderlyprocesses set and outlined by the
Constitution and by the rules adopted by the Senate as authorized by the fundamental law. Any step
beyond said legal bounds may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the proper courts of
justice, the latter cannot simply wash their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of lack of
jurisdiction, adopting the indifferent attitude of a passerby who does not care whether the lashing of
the wind may causea live wire to ignite a neighboring house.

When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the Supreme Court, complaining that the
President of the Senate has adjourned or is adjourning the daily session of the Senate over and
above objections voiced from thefloor and without obtaining first the approval or consent of the
majority, we cannot close our eyes to the complaint or bury our heads in the sand in ostrich fashion:
Otherwise, we would be disregarding ours sworn duty and,with our abstention or inaction, we would
be printing the stamp of our approval to the existence and continuation of a unipersonal tyranny
imposed upon the upper chamber of Congress, a tyranny that may obstruct and defeat the
functioning and actuations of the Senate and, consequently, of the whole Congress, thus depriving
the country of the benefits of legislation.

When a member of the Senate comes to us complaining that he is being deprived of the powers and
prerogative of the position of President of the Senate, to which he has been duly elected because
twelve Senators, without constituting a quorum, have illegally convened and voted to depose him
and to elect another Senator in his place, he raises a constitutional question of momentous
importance which we should not fail to answer without betraying the official trust reposed on us.
Such complaint constitutes, in effect, an accusation of usurpation of authority by the twelve
Senators, in utter violation of the fundamental law. The situation would demand ready and noother
agency of government can offer that remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom the complaint
has been filed.

The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable condition for effective collective
action. Because a society or collective body is composed of separate and independent individual
units, it cannot exist without the moral annectent of proper of organization and can onlyact in
organized form. Every time it has to act, it has to an organic whole, and quorum here is the
organizing element without which the personality of the body cannot exist or be recognized. The
importance of such organizing element has been recognize by the members of our Constitutional
Convention, and that is the reason why they inserted in the Constitution the provision requiring the
existence of quorum for the former National Assembly to transact official business and that
requirement was also imposed by the National Assembly when, amending the Constitution, it voted
itself out ofexistence, to be replaced by a bicameral Congress. The requirement, both in the original
text of the Constitution and in the amendment, had been ratified by the sovereign will of the people.

When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute a quorum we did it for mighty
reasons, such as that democracy is based on the rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less
than the majority of the members, one-half of them for example, as in the present controversy, is to
allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where the Constitution
provides for only one. If the twelve Senators of respondent's group constitute quorum to transact
official business, what willpreclude the twelve remaining Senators from constituting themselves into
a quorum to transact official business? This is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to attend
the session, even if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad and sides with
petitioner's group. Then there will be, in effect, two Senate and, according to respondent's theory the
Supreme Court will have no jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and noone decide it except public
opinion or, in its failure, revolution. Such absurd situation and catastrophic result should be avoided:

Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may take shelter when afraid to
displease the powerful.

Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case, everybody must congratulate
himself because petitioner, instead of resorting to any high-handed mean to enforce his right to
continue holding the positionof the President of the Senate, has come to us for proper redress by the
orderly by the orderly processes of judicial settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that three year ago,
he impugned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and won his case on that ground — the injustice
then committedagainst the suspended Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero now being more
generally recognized — petitioner came to this Court to submit his case to our jurisdiction.

The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint with this Supreme Court is premised on this
sharing the conviction that said Tribunal is the last bulwark of the rights and liberties of the people,
the final arbiter on all constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the majesty of the law. That
conviction and faith should not be betrayed, but rather strengthened, and more imperatively
nowadays when the majesty of the law, the basic tenets of the Constitution, the principles of
humanity springing fromthe golden rule, which is the law of laws, are being the subject of bold
onslaughts from many elements of society, bent on taking justice in their own hands or on imposing
their will through fraud or violence. The malady is widespread enough to imperatively and urgently
demand a more complete respect and faith in the effectiveness of our system of administration of
justice.

For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in this case is to disappoint the believers in a
philosophy and social order based on constitutional processes and on legal juridical settlement of all
conflicts that may beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of this case that for this Court
to refuse cognizance of it may not have other alternative,if the pressure of public opinion may fail —
and by experience we know that it had suffered many failures — than revolution. This immeasurable
responsibilityof this Supreme Court if it should falter in the performance of its plain duty and should
dispose of this case with the indifference with which a beach vacationist would dismiss a gust of
wind.

The principle of separation of powers, so often invoked, to bind the hands of justice into futility,
should not be understood as absolute. It is an apt rule of the tri-partite division of government as
enunciated by Aristotle and further developed by Montequieu, as the best scheme to put in practice
the system of check and balance considered necessary for a workable democracy. To make
absolute that principle is to open the doors irretrievable absurdity and to create three separate
governments within a government and three independent states within a state. Indeed, it is to avoid
such a teratologiccreature that the Constitutional Convention had not inserted among the principles
embodied in the fundamental law.

Judicial determination of all constitutional or legal controversies is the inherent function of courts.
The Constitution of the United States of America, unlike our own Constitution, is silent a to the power
of courts of justice to nullify an unconstitutional act of Congress. Notwithstanding the silence, when
the proper case arose, the United States Supreme Court, under the wise leadership of Chief Justice
Marshall, had not hesitated in declaring null and void a law enacted in contravention of constitutional
provisions. The Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines should not fail to match such and
outstanding evidence of evidence of judicial statesmanship.

To bolster the stand against our assumption of jurisdiction in this case the theory has been
advanced that, the President of the Philippines having recognized respondent as a duly elected
acting President of the Senate, that recognition is final and should bind this Court. The theory
sprouts from the same ideology under which a former king of England tried to order Lord Coke how
the latter should dispose of a pending litigation. Our answer is to paraphrase the great English judge
by saying that nothing should guide us except what in conscience we believe is becoming of our
official functions, disregarding completely what the President of the Philippines may say or feel about
it.

As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the office. As in the present case, Congress may
split into two groups after a presidential election and each group may proclaim a different candidate
as the duly elected Presidentof the Philippines. Because of a mistaken ideas to the scope of the
principle of separation of powers, if the case is brought to us for decision, shall we, as Pontious
Pilate, wash our hands and let the people bleed and be crucifiedin the Calvary of revolution?

There is absolutely no merit in invoking the unfortunate decision in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, (77
Phil., 1.92). No one now would regret more that such a decision had been rendered than petitioner
himself, the very one whowon it upon the pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of jurisdiction. The
more said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one of the blemishes without which the
escutcheon of the post-liberation Supreme Court would be spotless.

We vote to render judgment granting the petition and ordering respondent to relinquish the powers,
prerogative and privileges of the position of the President of the Senate in favor of petitioner who, on
the other side, should be restrained from putting any obstacle or obstruction by illegal adjournments
or otherwise, in the holding of the, regular daily session of the Senate. Said body should be allowed
to continue transacting official business unhampered by any procedure intended to impede the free
expressionof the will of the majority.
BRIONES, M., dissente:

Sin perjuicio de redactar una opinion mas extensa sobre mi voto en ese asunto, me permito
adelantar las siguientes observaciones:

(1) Esta Corte Suprema tiene jurisdiccion sobre el asunto. — Reafirmo la posicion tomada por mi en
los asuntos de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192) y Mabanag contra Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1). La
cuestion constitutional y legal aqui debatida no es de caracter puramente politico en el sentido de
que esta Corte deba inhibirse de enjuiciarla, sino que es perfectamente justiciable. Se plantea la
cuestion de si el grupo de senadores que eligio al recurrido como presidente interino del Senado
tenia facultad para hacerlo. Se alega y se sostiene que no existia dicha facultad, puesto que cuando
dicho grupo se reunio no habia un quorum presente de conformidad con los terminos de la
Constitucion y de los reglamentos del Senado. Esta cuestion es justiciable y puede y debe ser
enjuiciada, determinada y resuelta por esta Corte, ya que la parte agraviada ha venido a nosotros
en demanda de remedio. Esta Corte no puede lavarse las manos en un ademan de inhibicion
pilatista; no puede continuar con la politica de esconde-cabeza-en la arena-del-desierto estilo
aveztruz. El issue constitucional y legal discutido es importante, muy importante. Tiene
repercusiones directas y vitalisimas en la vida, libertad y hacienda de los ciudadanos. Es el negocio
supremo de legislar lo que esta en debate. Es, por tanto, una de las esencias de la misma republica
el tema de la controversia. La escaramuza politica es lo de menos; el meollo juridico-constitucional
es lo esencial e importante.

Es tanto mas urgente que esta Corte asuma jurisdiccion sobre el caso cuanto que el conflicto
surgido en el Senado entre los dos grupos politicos en guerra ha cobrado las proporciones de una
tremenda crisis nacional, preñada de graves peligros para la estabilidad de nuestras instituciones
politicas, para el orden publico y para la integridad de la existencia de la nacion.

Tenemos un precedente tipico en la jurisprudencia del Estado de New Jersey, Estados Unidos de
America. Es el caso de Werts vs. Rogers, del año 1894, Atlantic Reporter, Vol. 28, p. 728, N. J. La
analogia es completa. Tambien se disputaban la presidencia del Senado dos Senadores, cada cual
pretendiendo ser al legitimo. Tambien hubo dos facciones, cada cual reclamando ostentar la
genuina representacion popular. Un grupo se llamo "Adrian Senate" y el otro grupo "Rogers
Senate", por los nombres de los presidentes en disputa. Se arguyo igualmente que la Corte
Suprema de New Jersey no podia asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso por tratarse de una cuestion
eminentemente politica, por tanto no justiciable. La Corte, sin embargo, conocio del caso y, por boca
de su Presidente el eminente jurisconsulto Mr. Beasley, hizo el siguiente categorico
pronunciamiento:

. . . . That this court has the legal right to entertain jurisdiction in this case, displayed by this
record, we have no doubt; and we are further of opinion that it is scarcely possible to
conceive of any crisis in public affairs that would more imperatively than the present one call
for the intervention of such judicial authority. (supra, p. 758.)

Ademas de la justiciabilidad de la materia en controversia, una de las principales razones invocadas

por la Corte Suprema de New Jersey para asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso fue la extrema
necesidad de resolver un dead lock que paralizaba la maquinaria legislativa, afectaba a la
estabilidad del gobierno y ponia en grave peligro los intereses publicos. Pregunto: no existe la
misma razon de extrema necesidad en el presunto caso? que duda cabe de que el conflicto entre
las dos facciones en nuestro Senado esta afectando seriamente a los intereses publicos? que duda
cabe de que la normalidad constitucional esta rota, con grave preocupacion de todo el mundo y con
grave daño de la tranquilidad publica?

(2) El levantamiento de la sesion ordenado por el presidente Avelino fue ilegal y arbitrario. — Estimo
que el presidente Avelino obro ilegal y arbitrariamente al ordenar el levantamiento de la sesion
frente a la oposicion firme, energica y tenaz de algunos senadores adversos a el. En vista de esta
oposicion, el deber de la Mesa era someter a votacion la mocion de levantamiento de la sesion
presentada por el Senador Angeles David. Avelino no tenia el derecho, por si y ante si, de declarar
levantada la sesion. Solamente cuando no se formula ninguna objection es cuando rutinariamente el
presiding officer puede dar por aprobada una mocion de levantamiento de la sesion. Si la facultad
de levantar la sesion no estuviera sujeta a la expresa voluntad de la mayoria, seria un arma
sumamente peligrosa en manos de un presidente despotico y arbitrario.

La pretension de que el Senador Avelino ordeno el levantamiento de la sesion en uso de sus

facultades inherentes, en vista de que el mismo creia que habia un peligro inminente de desorden y
tumulto en la sala de sesiones, es completamente insostenible. Las circunstancias del caso no
justifican semejante pretension, a tenor de las pruebas obrantes en autos. Lo que debia haber
hecho el Senador Avelino era tratar de apaciguar al publico y prevenir todo conato de desorden.
Tenia medios para hacerlo. No lo hizo. En cambio, dejo la silla presidencial juntamente con los
senadores de su grupo. Esto equivalia a una desercion y los senadores del otro grupo tenian
perfecto derecho a proceder como procedieron, quedandose en el salo para continuar celebrando la
sesion. Esta sesion venia a ser una tacita reconduccion — una simple prolongacion de la sesion
que habia sido declarada abierta por el presidente Avelino con un quorum presente de 22
miembros.

(3) Sin embargo, la sesion prolongada se convirtio en ilegal por falta de quorum. — Es cosa
establecida y admitida por ambas partes que al reanudarse la sesion estaban presentes los 12
miembros del grupo llamado "Senado de Cuenco" mas tres senadores del grupo llamado "Senado
de Avelino". En esta coyuntura el Senador Mabanag, del grupo de Cuenco, suscito la cuestion
del quorum, de cuyas resultas se ordeno por el Senador Arranz, que entonces presidia la sesion, la
lectura de la lista. Tambien es cosa establecida en autos y admitida por ambas partes que al
comenzar el roll call o lectura de la lista, lot tres senadores del grupo de Avelino salieron del salon y
solamente respondieron al roll call los 12 senadores del grupo de Cuenco.

Resulta evidente de estos hechos que no habia quorum, por cuanto que componiendose el Senado
de 24 miembros debidamente elegidos y cualificados, el quorum para celebrar sesion valida debe
ser de 13 miembros. Tanto la jurisprudencia federal como la de los estados de la Union americana
esta repleta de decisiones en las que se ha sentado firmemente la doctrina de que la base para
determinar el quorum legislativo es el numero total de miembros elegidos y debidamente
cualificados de cada camara.1 En el presente caso, como se ha dicho, ese numero total es 24. Por
tanto, el grupo Cuenco no podia seguir celebrando validamente sesion, en vista de la falta
de quorum. De acuerdo con la Constitucion y los reglamentos, el grupo Cuenco tenia ante si dos
caminos para actuar: (a) suspender la sesion de dia en dia hasta obtener el necesario quorum; (b) o
compeler la asistencia de suficientes senadores del otro grupo para constituir dicho quorum,
pudiendo a dicho efecto ordenar inclusive el arresto de los huelguistas. (Constitucion de Filipinas,
art. VI, sec. 10, ap. 2;2 Reglamento del Senado, Cap. VI, arts. 23 y 24.3) Asi que todos los
procedimientos efectuados por el grupo Cuenco en dicha sesion eran nulos e ilegales.

Se ha insinuado que el cambio de fraseologia en el precepto constitucional sobre quorum es

significativo. Efectivamente en el texto original de 1935 se decia lo siguiente: "A majority of all the
Members shall constitute a quorum to do business" . . . , mientras que en el texto enmendado de
1940 se dice: "A majority of each House shall constitute a qurrum to do business" . . . . De esto se
quiere deducir la consecuencia de que esta reforma habra sido por algo, y este algo acaso sea la
posibilidad de una base menor de la totalidad de miembros para determinar la existencia de
un quorum. El argumento, a mi juicio, es insostenible, por no llamarlo futil. Los autores de la
enmienda no han hecho mas que copiar literalmente la fraseologia de la Constitucion federal
americana; y ya hemos visto que esta se ha interpretado en el sentido de que señala, como base
para determinar el quorum, la totalidad de los miembros electos y cualificados de cada camara. Por
tanto, el cambio fraseologico, en vez de denotar cambio en el significado, refuerza el sentido
tradicional de que la base para la determinacion del quorum la totalidad de los miembros electos y
cualificados de cada camara. Aparte de que es elemental en hermeneutica legal que una misma
cosa puede expresarse en terminos diferentes.
Tambien se ha insinuado, con bastante ingenio, que en el caso que nos ocupa, la base mas
racional para el quorum es 23, excluyendo al Senador Confesor que se halla en America, pero
incluyendo al Senador Sotto, que si bien no pudo estar presente en la sesion de autos por estar
gravemente enfermo, hallabase, sin embargo, en Manila susceptible en cualquier momento de ser
llamado por el Senado. El fundamento de esta opinion es que para la determinacion del quorum no
debe ser contado un miembro que esta fuera de la accion coercitiva de la camara. La proposicion es
igualmente inaceptable. No solo no tiene ningun precedente en la jurisprudencia, sino que es
convencional, arbitraria, sometiendo el quorum, que debe ser algo permanente, a ciertas
eventualidades y contingencias. Hay que tener en cuenta que el precepto constitucional y la regla
pertinente no establecen ninguna salvedad. Donde la ley no distingue, no debemos distinguir.

(4) Cual es el remedio. — No cabe duda de que una mayoria de Senadores tiene derecho a
reorganizar el Senado en la forma que les plazca, siempre que ello se sujete a las normas
prescritas por la Constitucion, las leyes y los reglamentos. En el presente caso el grupo Cuenco que
al parecer forma la mayoria, por lo menos hasta la fecha, tiene en sus manos los instrumentos
constitucionales y legales para efectuar una reorganizacion. Puede convocar una sesion y compeler
la asistencia de un numero suficiente de Senadores para formar quorum, ordenando el arresto si
fuese necesario de dichos senadores. Esto en el supuesto de que el Senador Avelino y su grupo
sigan boicoteando las sesiones del Senado para impedir la existencia de un quorum. Pero si el
grupo Avelino acude voluntariamente al Senado, entonces los dos grupos pueden buenamente
restaurar la normalidad constitucional, procediendo a efectuar la reorganizacion que desee y dicte la
mayoria.

Hasta que esto se haga, el Senador Avelino es tecnicamente presidente del Senado. Es verdad que
Avelino cometio una grave arbitrariedad ordenando el levantamiento de la sesion sin derecho y
facultad para ello; pero una arbitrariedad no justifica otra arbitrariedad; la de destituirle por medios
anticonstitucionales, ilegales y antireglamentarios. Los motivos de la accion de Avelino y de la de
sus adversarios no nos interesan para nada ni caen dentro de nuestra provincia; lo unico que nos
concierne son sus repercusiones juridicas.

Es de suma importancia, sobre todo en estos momentos incipientes de la republica, el que

mantengamos rigida e implacablemente la integridad de la Constitucion y de los procedimientos que
prescribe. Solo de esta manera podremos evitar el ciego desbordamiento de las pasiones politicas y
personales, con todas sus funestas consecuencias. A toda costa hay que impedir la formacion de
un clima politico, social o moral que facilite las cuarteladas, los pronunciamientos, los golpes de
mano y de estado (coup d'main, coup d'etat) — eso que caracteriza la historia azarosa de las
llamadas "banana republicas". Un 19 Brumario solamente se puede prevenir imponiendo con todo
rigor, sin blandas transigencias, la observancia de la Constitucion y de las leyes y reglamentos que
la implementan.

Voto, por tanto, en favor de la concesion del recurso interpuesto.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that the twelve senators who elected Senator
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate did not constitute a quorum and, consequently, that his
election was illegal.

It appears tome that the basis for computing a quorum of the Senate is thenumber of senators who
have been elected and duly qualified and who have not ceased to be senators by death or legal
disqualification. If this were not so, what is the standard of computation? No satisfactory, reasonable
alternative has been or can be offered.
Absence abroad cannot be a disqualification unless by such absence, under the Constitution, a
member of the Senate loses his office, emoluments, and other prerogatives, temporarily or
permanently. There is no claim that this happens when a senators' presence at the session be the
criterion, then serious illness or being in a remote island with which Manila has no regular means of
communication should operate to eliminate the sick or absent members from the counting for the
purpose of determining the presence of a majority.

The distinction made between absentees form legislative sessions who are in the Philippines and
absentees who are in a foreign country is, to my arbitrary and unreasonable. From both the
theoretical and the practical by members of Congress are sometimes found necessary to fulfill their
missions. If we test the interpretation by its consequences, its unsoundness and dangers become
more apparent. The interpretation would allow any number of legislators, no matter how small, to
transact business so long as it is a majority of the legislators present in the country. Nothing in my
opinion could have been farther from the minds of the authors of the Constitution than to permit,
under circumstances, less than a majority of the chosen and qualified representatives of the people
to approve measures that might vitally affect their lives, their liberty, happiness and property. The
necessity of arresting absent members to complete a quorum is too insignificant, compared with the
necessity of the attendance of an absolute majority, to make unamenability to arrest a factor for
ruling out absentees who are beyond the legislature's process. The Congress is eminently a law-
making body and is little concerned with jurisdiction over its members. The power to order arrest is
an emergency measure and is rarely resorted to. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful if the authority to
arrest could always afford a satisfactory remedy even in the cases of members who were inside the
Philippines territory. This is especially true in the United States of America, after whose form of
government ours is patterned and whose territorial possession extend to the other side of the globe.

This case is easily distinguishable from Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1).

In those cases the petitions were directed against an action of a recognized Senate exercising
authority within it own domain. Here the process sought is to be issued against an appointee of a
senate that, it is alleged was not validly constituted to do business because, among other reasons
alleged, there was not quorum. The Court is not asked to interfere with an action of a coordinate
branch of the government so much as to test the legality of the appointment of the respondent.

Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court provides:

An action for usurpation of office of franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercise a public office, or a
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by authority of law;

xxx xxx xxx

This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not exclude officers appointed by
the legislative branch of the government. Although this Court has no control over either branch of the
Congress, it does have the power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends to be its officer is
holding his office according to law or the Constitution. Political questions as a bar to jurisdiction can
only be raised by the supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one of its creatures.
(Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How. 1, 12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two lesser officers of the
Senate appointed by different faction thereof and contesting each other's right to the office, it would
not be the Senate by the Court which would be called upon to decide the controversy. There is more
reason for the Court to intervene when the office of the President of the Senate is at stake. The
interest of the public are being greatly imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a speedy
determination of the same is imperatively demanded, in the interest of good government and public
order.
Fundamentally this case is analogous to Attorney General, ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers, 23 Lawyers'
Reports, annotated, 354, to which I am indebted for much of the reasoning adduced in this dissent
on the question of this Court's jurisdiction.

March 14, 1949

RESOLUTION

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R. L-2821, Jose
Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice towriting later an extended opinion, has
resolved, by a majority of seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent
events whichjustify its intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this
Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Mr. JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice
Briones in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate President.

The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of the quorum upon the ground
that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,the constitutional requirement in that regard has
become a mere formalism,it appearing from the evidence that any new session with
a quorum wouldresult in the respondent's election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the latter's
persistent effortsto block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, he believethat the
group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitutionand that the majority's ruling is
in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.

The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J. Cuencohas been legally elected
as Senate President and the petition is petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on the question of jurisdiction
but concurs on the question of quorum.

Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on that on that of quorum.

Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and reserves his vote on the
question of quorum.

Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.

FERIA, J., concurring:

In the case of Vera et al. vs. Avelino et al., (77 Phil., 192), the principal question raised was whether
this Supreme Court had jurisdiction to set aside the Pendatun resolution ordering that petitioners
Vera, Diokno and Romero shall not be sworn to nor seated as members of the Senate, and compel
the respondents had no power to pass said resolution, because it was contraryto the provisions of
Sec. 11, Article VI, of the Constitution, which createdthe Electoral Tribunal for the Senate as well as
for the House of Representative, and provided that said Tribunal shall be judge of all contestsrelating
to the election returns and qualifications of their respective members. Respondent Avelino et al.,
who were represented by Senator Vicente Francisco and the Solicitor General, impugned the
jurisdiction of this Court to take this Court to take cognizance of said case on the ground that the
question therein involved was a political question, and petitioners Veraet al., who were represented
by Attorney Jose W. Diokno, who is now oneof the attorneys for respondents, who now contends
that this Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the present case, then maintained that this Court
had jurisdiction.

And in the case of Mabanag et al. vs. Jose Lopez Vito et al., 78 Phil., 1, the question involved was
whether it was within the jurisdiction of this Court to take cognizance of the case and prohibit the
respondents from enforcing the "Congressional Resolution of both Houses proposing an amendment
to the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance there", grantingcertain rights to the citizens of the
United states of American in the Philippines, on the ground that it was null and void because it was
not passedby the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives,
voting separately, as required by Sec. 1, Art. XV, of the Constitution, since if the Members of
Congress who were not allowed to take part had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. Petitioners Mabanag et al. contended that the Court had jurisdiction and the respondents
maintained the contrary on the ground that the question involved was apolitical one and within the
exclusive province of the Legislature.

The theory of Separation of Powers as evolved by the Courts of last resortfrom the State
Constitution of the United States of American, after which our owns is patterned, has given rise to
the distinction between justiceable question which fall within the province of the judiciary, and
politicalquestions which are not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and are to be decided, under
the Constitution, by the People in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government, except to the
extent that the power to deal with such question has been conferred upon the court byexpress or
statutory provision. Although it is difficult to define a politicalquestion as contradistinguished from a
justiceable one, it has been generally held that the first involves political rights which consist in the
power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or managementof the government of
the government, while justiceable questions are those which affect civil, personal or property rights
accorded to every member of the community or nation.

Under such theory of Separation of Power, the judicial Supremacy is the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate case and controversies that present justiceable issues, which fall within the
jurisdiction or power allocated to the judiciary; but when the issue is a political one which
comeswithin the exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive department of the Government to
decide, the judicial department or Supreme Court has no powerto determine whether or not the act
of the Legislative or Chief Executiveis against the Constitution. What determines the jurisdiction of
thecourts is the issue involved, and not the law or constitutional provisionwhich may be applied.
Divorced from the remedy sought, the declaration of this Court on the matter of constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of alegislative or executive act, would be a mere advisory opinion, without a
coercive force.

Relying on the ruling laid down in Severino vs. Governor General, 16 Phil.,336; Abueno vs. Wood,
45 Phil., 612; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of
said respondent in both casesthat the question involved was a political question and therefore this
Court had no jurisdiction. I was one of the three Justice who held that this Courthad jurisdiction, and
dissented from the decision of the majority.

When the present case was first submitted to us, I concurred with the majority, in view of the ruling
of the Court in said two cases, which constitutes a precedent which is applicable a fortiori to the
present case and must, therefore, be followed by the virtue of the doctrine or maxim of stare decisis,
and in order to escape the criticism voiced by Lord Bryce inAmerican Commonwealth when he said
that "The Supreme Court has changed its color i.e., its temper and tendencies, from time to time
according to the political proclivities of the men who composed it. . . . Their action flowed naturally
from the habits of though they had formed before their accession to the bench and from the
sympathy they could not but feel for the doctrineon whose behalf they had contended." (The
ANNALS of the American Academyof Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50).
Now that the petitioner, who obtained a ruling favorable to his contention in the Vera-Avelino
case, supra, insist in his motion for reconsideration that this Court assume jurisdiction and decide
whether or not there was quorum in session of the Senate of February 21, 1949, and is willing to
abide by the decision of this Court (notwithstanding the aforementioned precedent),and several of
the Justices, who have held before that this Supreme Courthad no jurisdiction, now uphold the
jurisdiction of this Court, I gladly change my vote and concur with the majority in that this Court has
jurisdiction over cases like the present in accordance with my stand inthe above mentioned cases,
so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in
justiceable but political questions as well.

But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution sought to be reconsidered,that there was
a quorum in the session of the Senate of Senate of February 21,1949, for the following reasons:

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the
National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was
amended in the Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to basethe majority,
not on the number fixed or provided for the Constitution,but on actual members or incumbents, and
this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason
of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or forother causes which make
attendance of the member concerned impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each house
is empowered to issue to compel itsmembers to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.
That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight,or for
considering the use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that
Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required "concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the National Assembly to expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the
present Constitutional, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each
House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of
the Senate, the actual members of the SEnate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-
three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

This conclusion is in consonance with the legislative and judicial precedent. In the Resolution of both
Houses proposing an amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended to the
Constitution, granting parity rightto American citizen in the Philippines out of which the case
of Mabanag vs. Lopez, supra arose, both Houses of Congress in computing the three-fourths of all
the members of the Senate and the House of Representative votingseparately, required by Sec. 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the three-fourths of all the members was based, not on the number
fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on the actual members who have qualifiedor were not
disqualified. And in the case of People vs. Fuentes, 46 Phil., 22the provision of Sec. 1, subsection 2,
of Act No. 3104, which requiredunanimity of vote of the Supreme Court in imposing death excepted
from the court those members of the Court who were legally disqualified from the case, this Court
held that the absence of the Chief Justice Avanceña, authorized by resolution of the Court, was a
legal disqualification, and his vote was not necessary in the determination of the unanimity of the
decision imposing death penalty.

PABLO, J., concurrente:

Aungue los Sres. Magistrados Paras, Feria, Bengzon y yo, sosteniamos que este Tribunal no tenia
jurisdiccion sobre el asunto porque era de naturaleza eminentemente politico, emitimos, sin
embargo, nuestra opinion de que los doce senadores constituian quorum legal para tomar
resoluciones. Desde luego, la opinion no surtio el efecto deseado. La huelga en el Senado continua.
Los recientes acontecimientos pueden trascender a peores, con sus inevitables repercusiones
dentro y fuera del pais. Cuando las pasiones politicas no van por el cauce de la prudencia pueden
desbordase y causar fatales consecuencias. Es un sano estadismo judicial evirtarlo y, si es
necesario, impedirlo.

El recurrente pide que se reconsideresa nuestra dividida opinion. alegando que las divisiones civiles
en varias naciones han producido sangrientes luchas fratricidas. Si no tuviera en cuenta mas que la
solitud original y los hechos probados, la mocion de reconsideracion debe ser denegada en cuanto
a mi voto sobre la falta de jurisdiccion. La jurisdiccion no se confiere por la simple solicitud de una
parte, ni por la anuencia de amas, sino por la ley o por la Constitucion.

La apelacion del recurrente de que este Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para evitar derramamiento de
sangre llega al corazon. Como magistrado, no deben importante las consecuencias; pero como
ciudadano, me duele ver una lucha enconada entre dos grupos en el Senado sin fin practico. Al
pueblo interesa que la Legislatura reanude su funcionamiento normal. Fuerza es transigir, pues,
para que haya seis votos que sostengan que este Tribunal tiene jurisdiccion. Si insisto en mi opinion
anterior, fracasara todo esfuerzo de reajustre de nuestras opiniones para dar fin a la crisis en el
Senado.

El Sr. Presidente del Tribunal y los Sres. Magistrados Perfecto y briones opinian hoy que
hubo quorum en la continuacion de la sesion despues de la marcha del Senador Avelino y
compañeros. Con ellos, ya hay siete votos que sostienen que las resoluciones votadas por los doce
senadores son legales y validas. pero para dar fuerza legal a esta conclusion, es indispensable que
el tribunal la declare con jurisdiccion. Contribuyo mi grando de arena a la feliz conclusion de un
conflicto que esta minando el interes publico: voto hoy por que el Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para
dar fuerza a mi opinion anterior de que los doce senadores formaban quorum.

De be denegarse la mocion de reconsideracion.

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

The problem of democracy must be faced not in the abstract but as practical question, as part of the
infinitely motley aspects of human life. They cannot be considered as scientific propositions or
hypothesis independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable flights of the spirit which
seen to elude the known laws of the external world. Experience appears to be the only reliable guide
in judging human conduct. Birth and death rates and incidence of illness are complied in statistics for
the study and determination of human behavior, and statistics are one of the means by which the
teaching may render their quota of contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual well-
being and collective happiness.

The way this case has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the evidence coming from
many quarters and sectors, is provenly far from being conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We
intended to settle the controversy between petitioner and respondent, but actually we left hanging in
the air the important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed before us in quest of enlightenment
and reasonable and just in a quandary.

We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary
functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-attendance to sessions of about one-half
of the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and remained unexecuted like
mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent
persons with well-known addresses and residences and have been in daily contact with news
reporters and photographers. Farce and mockery have been interspersed with actions and
movements provoking conflicts which invite bloodshed.
It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that, notwithstanding the overflow of
political passions and the irreconcilable attitude of warring factions, enough self-restraint has been
shown to avoid any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as abstaining in the
upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of the Representatives.
It has already involved in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved the President of
the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution
cannot be expected from any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter other
than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.

The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators almost one-half of the entire body, are unanimous
in belief that this Court should take jurisdiction of the matter and decide the merits of the case one
way or another, and they are committed to abide by the decision regardless of whether they believe
it to be right or mistaken. Among the members of the so-called Cuenco group, there are several
Senators who in not remote past (see Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192 and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil., 1) have shown their conviction that in cases analogous to the present the Supreme Court
has and should exercise jurisdiction. If we include the former attitude of the senator who is at present
abroad, we will find out that they are in all eighteen (18) senators who at one time or another
recognized the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the settlement of such momentous
controversies as the one now challenging our judicial statesmanship, our patriotism, our faith in
democracy, the role of this Court as the last bulwark of the Constitution.

In the House of Representatives unmistakable statements have been made supporting the stand of
the eighteen (18) senators, or of three-fourths (3/4) of the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the contention that we should decide this case on the
merits.

Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex. Consequently like its
parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an
upshot of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy
appraisal of reality in its true form.

It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in
the Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a
colonial Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the masters. That explains its glaring
inconsistencies.

Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1), both patterned after the colonial philosophy pervading the decision in
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (46 Phil., 83.) Judicial emancipation must not lag behind the political
emancipation of our Republic. The judiciary ought to ripen into maturityif it has to be true to its role
as spokesman of the collective conscience, of the conscience of humanity.

For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is toviolate the Constitution.
Refusal to exercise the judicial power vested in it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case
raises vital constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to
decide them. It would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our
Constitutional Convention to have drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the
organization of Philippine democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme Court the authority to
decide such constitutional questions.

Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as unjustifiable as the refusal of senators on strike
to attend the sessions of the Senate and toperform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the
legislative powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even more harmful
than a laborers' strike or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally while laborers
temporarily stop to work. Society may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But
society is menaced with dissolution in the absence of an effective administration of justice. Anarchy
and chaos are its alternatives.

There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the highest organs and officers of
government. If they should fail to perform their functions and duties, what is the use for minor
officials and employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional question of quorum should not be
leftunanswered.

Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators constitute the majority requiredfor the
Senate quorum is absolutely unacceptable. The verbal changes made in the constitutional
amendment, upon the creation of Congress to replace the National Assembly, have not affected the
substance of the constitutional concept of quorum in both the original and amended contexts. The
words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the National
Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the house of Congress, because
they were a mere surplusage. The writer of this opinion, as Member of the Second National
Assembly and in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who
proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean only the
majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members.

The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exactmathematical
meaning. A majority means more than one-half (½). It can neverbe identified with one-half (½) or
less than one-half (½). It involved acomparative idea in which the antithesis between more and less
is etched in the background of reality as a metaphysical absolute as much as the antithesis of all
opposites, and in the same way that the affirmative cannot be confused with the negative, the
creation with nothingness, existence withnon-existence, truth with falsehood.

The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less
than thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not constitute the majority in a group composed of twelve four (24)
units. This is so evident that is not necessary to have the mathematical genius of Pythagoras, Euclid,
Newton and Pascal to see it. Any elementary school student may immediately perceive it.

No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of the two
equal number constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The five (5) fingers of one
hand cannot be the majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two hands. Majority is
incompatiblewith equality. It implies the idea of superiority.

Majority is a derivative of major which, in its turn, is a derivative of the Latin "magnus," meaning
great. Majority means the greater of two numbers that are regarded as part of a total: the number
greater than half. It implies a whole of which constitute the greater part or portion. It presupposes the
existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of twelve four (24) senators
composing the Senate.

The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing respondent merely as Acting of the Senate, asan emergency measure to fill the vacuum
created by petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding officer by his walked in the session of
February 21, 1949, the presence of the twelve (12) senators was enough quorum.

The Constitution provides:

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Article VI.)

The "smaller number" referred to in the above provision has to act collectively and cannot act as
collective body to perform the function specially vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by
one among theirnumber. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take
measure to "compel the attendance of absent member in such manner and underpenalties as such
House may provide," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber.
Said "smaller number" maybe twelve or even less than twelve senators to constitute a quorum for
the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored.

As events have developed after the decision in this case has been rendered on March 4, 1949, the
picture of the petitioner's attitude has acquired clearerand more definite form, and that picture brings
us to the conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.

At the hearing of this case for the reception of evidence before Mr. Justice Bengzon, Senator
Mariano J. Cuenco, the respondent, on cross-examination bySenator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel
for petitioner, manifested that he waslooking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting
President of the Senate, and that if Senator Jose Avelino, the petitioner, should attend the sessions.
He would only make of record his protest, and never resort to force or violence to stop petitioner
from presiding over said sessions.

The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside over the sessions was made by respondent
under oath twice, and petitioner, although he refused to attend the hearing of this case, so much so
that, instead of testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under the rules of procedure, is
inadmissible as incompetent and is as valueless as an empty gesture, could not fail to learn about
respondent's testimony, because it was given publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and
petitioner's counsel, Senator Francisco, would certainly not have failed to inform him about it.

Notwithstanding respondent's testimony, petitioner failed to take advantage of it and continues to

refuse to attend the sessions of the Senate since he and his group of senators have walked out from
the historic Monday session of February 21, 1949.

If petitioner is sincere in his desire of presiding over the sessions of the Senate, for which reason he
has sought the help of the Supreme Court, why has he failed to take advantage of the commitment
made under oath by respondent since February 26, 1949? Why has he, since then, been not only
failing but refusing to attend the sessions and preside over them? Why is it that petitioner and his
group of Senators have given occasion, in fact, compelled the senators of the Cuenco group to issue
warrants of arrest to remedy the lack of quorum that has been hampering the sessions of the
Senate? Why is it that the Senate sergeant-at-arms, his subordinates and the peace officers helping
him, have to be hunting for the senators of the Avelino group in a, so far, fruitless if not farcical
endeavor to compel them to attend the sessions?

The events that have been unfolding before our eyes, played up everyday in screaming headlines in
all newspapers and of which, by their very nature, we cannot fail to take judicial notice, considered,
weighed and analyzed in relation with the happenings in the Friday and Monday sessions, February
18 and 21, 1949, have driven into our mind the conviction that, powers and prestige which command
the position of President of the Senate, he actually has no earnest desire to preside over the
sessions of the Senate, the most characteristic and important function of President of the Senate.

His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding respondent's commitment to allow him to preside
over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of
office. (Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De Guzman, 49 Phil., 371; 46 Corpus Juris p.
980-981; Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So. 999; 43 American Jurisprudence p. 27).

What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the Senate sessions? What are his group's
reason? They say that they want a square decision on the merits of this case, for which reason the
motion for reconsideration has been filed. Although we believe that the Supreme majority vote, to
exercise jurisdiction in this case, and the inconsistency in the position taken by some Members of
the majority has only increased public bewilderment, stronger reasons for petitioner and his group to
sabotage the sessions of the Senate.
If this Court had decided this case as the four dissenters would have it, there cannot be any doubt
that the Senate impasse would have been settled many days ago and, with it, the present national
crisis hampering and armstringing the legislative machinery. .

The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The showings of open defiance to warrants of arrest
are highly demoralizing. People are asking and wondering if senators are placed above the law that
they can simply ignore warrants of arrest and despite the authority of the officers entrusted with the
execution. Threats of violence pervade the air. Congress is neglecting the public interests that
demand remedial legislation. The present state of confusion, of alarm, of bewilderment, of strife
would have ended if, for the reasons we have stated in our dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court
would have ordered petitioner's reposition.

Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be the President of the Senate, he would
certainly have attended the Senate sessions to preside over them. Then the sessions with senators
of the Avelino group attending, would have been held with the constitutional quorum. The twelve
senators of the Cuenco group would have the opportunity of voting solidly to ratify or to reenact all
the disputed actuations of the rump session of February 21, 1949, and there is no doubt that they
would have succeeded in ousting petitioner and electing respondent to the position of President of
the Senate.

Everything then would have followed the normal course. With the presence of a clear and
unquestionable quorum, petitioner and his followers would have no ground for any complaint, and
respondent could have assumed the Senate's presidency without any hitch.

Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group might have resorted again to the same strategy,
by quorum the rump session of February 21, 1949, but it is not probable that they would have taken
the same course of action after this Court, almost unanimously declared that petitioner's action in
adjourning the session of February 21, 1949, was arbitrary and illegal. At any rate, the Senators of
the Cuenco group would have been by then well prepared to have orders of arrest ready for
immediate execution before the striking senators could leave the building housing the session hall.

The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped at once. Legislation must go on. The serious
charges filed or may be filed against petitioner, respondent and other senators demand imperatively
investigation and action to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty ones. Public interest cannot
demand less.

Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title to claim the position in controversy. This result
will not legally or practically close any door for him to again seek the position by attending the
sessions of the Senate and by securing a majority that would support him in his bid.

The motion for reconsideration should be denied.

Footnotes

1 On this matter, the vote is 6 to 4 in favor of lack of jurisdiction.

2 On this matter, the vote is 4 to 4.

3 Quoted with approval in U.S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law ed., 321, 325.

BRIONES, M., disidente:

1 ". . . . Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution of the United States provides:

"Each House shall be the judge of the elections. . . . and a majority of each shall
constitute a quorum to do business."

"Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court of that country held in U.S. vs. Ballin,
Joseph & Co., 36 L. Ed. 321, 325:

"The Constitution provides that 'a majority of each (house) shall constitute
a quorum to do business.' In other words, when a majority are present, the House is
in a position to do business. Its capacity to transact business is then established,
created by the mere presence of a majority, and does not depend upon the
disposition or assent or action of any single member or fraction of the majority
present. All that the Constitution requires is the presence of a majority, and when that
majority are present, the power of the House arises."

"The same decision quoted with approval from Dillon, Mun. Corp., the following rule:

". . . If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all tha agents are
assembled, or if all have been duly notified, and the minority refuse or neglect to
meet with the others, a majority of those present may act, provided those present
constitute a majority of the whole number. In other words, in such case, a major part
of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum, and a majority of the quorum may
act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum, the power of the minority to
act is, in general, considered to cease."

"Quorum as used in U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, Sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house
shall constitute a quorum to do business, is, of the purposes of the Assembly, not less than
the majority of the whole number of which the house may be composed.

Vacancies from death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted in ascertaining

the quorum." (Opinion of Justices, 12 Fla. 653)

2A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may provide.

3CHAPTER VI — The house — Sec. 23. A majority of the Senators shall constitute
a quorum to do business.

"SEC. 24. Whenever the question of quorum is raised by any Senator in any session,
the Chair shall immediately order a roll call and announce forthwith the result.

"This shall be done without debate. If after the roll call it appears that there is
no quorum, a majority of the Senators present may other the Sergeant-at-arms to
summon the attendance of absent Senators, and, if necessary, to compel their
attendance, in which case the order that that effect shall not be subject to debate.

"SEC. 25. Only for a just cause may a Senator be excused from atttending the
session."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,

vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G.
CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.

Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.

Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:p

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to
thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed.
60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches
of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered
by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their
prerogatives.

In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all
too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-
like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the
matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole
determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond
judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the
President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or
executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed
out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse
thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not
usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the
two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President
and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of
inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable
controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such
action, as in this case. It is —

a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to
administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to
hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of
which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.
Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Pampanga:

Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes

Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes

Difference...................................... 3,300 votes

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest
(HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is
composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining
six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member

Associate Justice

Supreme Court
 FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member

Congressman

1st District

Benguet LDP

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member

Congressman

1st District Palawan

LDP

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member

Congressman

2nd District Nueva Ecija

LDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member

Congressman

1st District Davao del Sur

LDP

JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member

Congressman

4th District Batangas

LDP

ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member

Congressman

2nd District Zamboanga del Sur

(formerly GAD, now NP)

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda,
Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of
twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation
and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the
finalization of the decision in the case.

The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over
Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief,"
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc
case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to
honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the
result of the appreciation of the contested ballot1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a
hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-
Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30
P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6,
1991.

On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco
informed Congressman Camasura by letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur
Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and
Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao
del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical
and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a
meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the
two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to
take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M.
Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP,
the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral
Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:

13 March 1991

Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City

Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination
and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of
which are hereto attached.

Thank you.
 For the Secretary-General

(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)

Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because —

By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the
electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for
14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990).
Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached
on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for
reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.

The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23
votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-
appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4
months.

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A.
Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H.
Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino,
David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.

Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience
vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of
the leader of his party.

Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely
difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8
integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us
that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We
believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional
function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it.

In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional
representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should
be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935
Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of
the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party having the second
largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the
Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative
component in the Tribunal.

In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the
sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be
lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election
contests.
 We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of
affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as
they sit in Tribunal deliberations.

There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have
been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is
scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No.
45), after the Holy Week recess.

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of
the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.

Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship
and membership in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx xxx

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution
No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:

In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its
Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is
because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five
members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be
validly promulgated.

The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the
opinion that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the
orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even
date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign
as a member of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and
Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)

On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz
and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed
that:

... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge'
of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal
considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the
Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in
the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial
judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the
Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with
the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
 ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz,
and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to
EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in
character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that
the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is
co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only
for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the
issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.

Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep.
Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc,
otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"

2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be

designated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging
functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and

discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and

4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to
comment5 on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and
allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is
designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said
Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by
this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)

Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.

Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress'
being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the
political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and
in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any
of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political
party;6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,7 for if a
member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely
nullified;8 and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair"
of the LDP9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question
beyond the reach of judicial review.10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no
cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in
the HRET.11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an
indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HRET.12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the
HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the
Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights.
What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET.13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed
had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that
decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's)
prejudice.14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party
to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal
would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to
whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is
valid."15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol
was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives
had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several
newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and
elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.16

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with
the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of
"reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.

Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three
members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The
1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:

Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
 nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the
second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any
political party to control the voting in the tribunal.

The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February
5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier
said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
House of Representatives:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative
office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members.

The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them,
without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil.
818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a
majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within
the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
 constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as
the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, attest:

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral
tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are
constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not
constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?

MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?

MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?

MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the
electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be
valid?

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments
are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.

MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like
to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be
applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these
electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these
electoral tribunals.

MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate
branch of government.

MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable
rule is to leave unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the
election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this Committee on
Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.

Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule
because apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?

MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman
will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
 have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although
they are independent.

MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both
bodies?

MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.

MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies
are independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?

MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee
on the Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner
Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering
that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case
of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in
accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an political considerations.
That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when
there are six politicians sitting there.

MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the
opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this
Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent.
(pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives,
or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the
judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista
Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP)
which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop.
A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political
party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge"
of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary
enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not
for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral
Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court
Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It
should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no
political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No
coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to
go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert
design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish
him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in
the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in
the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be
cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That
stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against
the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to
his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal.
He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge
its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must
perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or
the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59
SCRA 183, 207).

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his
favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole
judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the
resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal.
The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and
void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is
ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the
decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside.
Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice
of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in
the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon
service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against
respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of Representatives, assuming that
said act were politically motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its authority?

The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so on the strength of the second
paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House of Representatives in
withdrawing and rescinding its nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman Juanito
J. Camasura, Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the
majority's posture which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine of separation of
powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for this reason that I register my dissent.

A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed
among three (3) great departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these departments is
separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly
from the fundamental law.1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not
only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each is
unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without the other, they are nevertheless in many
senses independent of each other. That is to say, one department may not control or even interfere
with another in the exercise of its particular functions.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to the
point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in
the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other
department.3 In other words, one department must not encroach upon nor interfere with acts done
within the constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been
delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the
others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from any encroachment or interference of
whomsoever.4

This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the judiciary through the exercise of
its power of judicial review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases involving political
questions.5

In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the House of Representatives withdrew
and rended the nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated by a letter of Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr.
informing the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the expulsion of Congressman Juanito J.
Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP members to join the said political
party. As a result of this letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House Electoral Tribunal was
withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal
was informed of such action of the House.

Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of Representatives as it is, he alleges, but
a employ to thwart the promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him (petitioner
Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and
which decision would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that not only does the action
of the House of Representatives violate the independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it
also violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said electoral tribunal.

Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that the House of Representatives
has the sole authority to nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in the House
Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole
power to remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever the ratio in the representation of
the political parties in the House is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion of a House member from a political party. A Tribunal member's term of office in said
electoral tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his legislative term. Were
that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating representation in the electoral tribunal based on
political affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a member of the Tribunal changes
party affiliation.

As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of the House Electoral Tribunal.
Three (3) of the members of the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six (6) members come from the members of the
House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the partylist system.6 The House of Representatives has the power to
nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal (representing the House) provided, of
course, that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.

Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination extended to a member of the electoral
tribunal (representing the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the House has
expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint or designate a member of the
House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, to my mind,
necessarily include the power to remove said member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a member
of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of the political
parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and respected, no matter how politically
motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not with policy, wisdom
or expediency.7 The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does
the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the House of
Representatives should have done what it has done.

Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act done within the constitutional
authority to the legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the House cannot
question the act of the Chief Justice, should he deem it proper to change the Justices who sit as
members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be designated or nominated as
members of the electoral tribunal, how they should vote — surely are matters that not merely
concern political action as far as members of the House are concerned, but are the very essence of
political action, if political life has any connotation at all. To open courts of justice to such political
controversies would have courts sit in judgment over the manifold disputes engendered by political
manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the political arena which in the long run
could undermine and destroy their independence.

The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the
Constitution.8 It is not within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative
acts as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such acts, like the
one at bar, are exclusively of legislative concern.9 To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the
principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand so aptly observed, "one cannot find
among the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the validity of the decisions of
another 'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be understood
that the three (3), Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as it were, a Leibnizian
monad, looking up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without any mutual dependence. What could
be better evidence of complete dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one
'Department' as to its authority on a given occasion to review and reversal by another? Such a
doctrine makes supreme the Department that has the last word. "10 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the division of power tacitly accepted by
society runs counter to its own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This may be
because the society is still unsure of what the best division of power would be and so temporarily
accepts the existing one, or because the society has vacated its decisionmaking function and special
interest groups have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court can neither validate a
clearly unconstitutional distribution, and thereby subject its role as guardian to claims of fraud, nor
invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be ignored. To do either would be to
sacrifice the popular prestige which is the Court's primarily source of power."11

Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the
nomination of Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is politically
motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the
electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of the
House of Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what
other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically motivated? After all, that branch of
government is a political branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its acts are and will always be
politically motivated.

The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered opinion, bring it within the Court's
power to strike down the legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not this court —
who should ultimately judge the act when they cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto
itself the power to institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in the last analysis on which
all else depend, the vitality of a political system would be greatly weakened by reliance on the
judiciary for any and all political reforms and, in time, a complacent body politic will result. It is the
responsibility of the people and none other, to remain ever vigilant about their government to the end
that they can continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. To leave this task to
the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive of democratic government itself

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

SARMIENTO, J., disssenting:

Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am unable to agree with the majority. I
believe that the questions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of Congress,
revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in which the Court
can not intervene.

It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle
principle of separation of powers.

Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers
within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last
persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of Representatives, assuming that
said act were politically motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its authority?

The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so on the strength of the second
paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House of Representatives in
withdrawing and rescinding its nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman Juanito
J. Camasura, Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the
majority's posture which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine of separation of
powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for this reason that I register my dissent.

A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed
among three (3) great departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these departments is
separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly
from the fundamental law.1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not
only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each is
unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without the other, they are nevertheless in many
senses independent of each other. That is to say, one department may not control or even interfere
with another in the exercise of its particular functions.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to the
point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in
the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other
department.3 In other words, one department must not encroach upon nor interfere with acts done
within the constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been
delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the
others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from any encroachment or interference of
whomsoever.4

This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the judiciary through the exercise of
its power of judicial review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases involving political
questions.5

In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the House of Representatives withdrew
and rended the nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated by a letter of Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr.
informing the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the expulsion of Congressman Juanito J.
Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP members to join the said political
party. As a result of this letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House Electoral Tribunal was
withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal
was informed of such action of the House.

Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of Representatives as it is, he alleges, but
a employ to thwart the promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him (petitioner
Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and
which decision would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that not only does the action
of the House of Representatives violate the independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it
also violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said electoral tribunal.

Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that the House of Representatives
has the sole authority to nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in the House
Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole
power to remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever the ratio in the representation of
the political parties in the House is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion of a House member from a political party. A Tribunal member's term of office in said
electoral tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his legislative term. Were
that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating representation in the electoral tribunal based on
political affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a member of the Tribunal changes
party affiliation.

As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of the House Electoral Tribunal.
Three (3) of the members of the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six (6) members come from the members of the
House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the partylist system.6 The House of Representatives has the power to
nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal (representing the House) provided, of
course, that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.

Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination extended to a member of the electoral
tribunal (representing the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the House has
expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint or designate a member of the
House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, to my mind,
necessarily include the power to remove said member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a member
of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of the political
parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and respected, no matter how politically
motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not with policy, wisdom
or expediency.7 The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does
the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the House of
Representatives should have done what it has done.

Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act done within the constitutional
authority to the legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the House cannot
question the act of the Chief Justice, should he deem it proper to change the Justices who sit as
members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be designated or nominated as
members of the electoral tribunal, how they should vote — surely are matters that not merely
concern political action as far as members of the House are concerned, but are the very essence of
political action, if political life has any connotation at all. To open courts of justice to such political
controversies would have courts sit in judgment over the manifold disputes engendered by political
manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the political arena which in the long run
could undermine and destroy their independence.

The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the
Constitution.8 It is not within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative
acts as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such acts, like the
one at bar, are exclusively of legislative concern.9 To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the
principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand so aptly observed, "one cannot find
among the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the validity of the decisions of
another 'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be understood
that the three (3), Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as it were, a Leibnizian
monad, looking up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without any mutual dependence. What could
be better evidence of complete dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one
'Department' as to its authority on a given occasion to review and reversal by another? Such a
doctrine makes supreme the Department that has the last word. "10 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the division of power tacitly accepted by
society runs counter to its own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This may be
because the society is still unsure of what the best division of power would be and so temporarily
accepts the existing one, or because the society has vacated its decisionmaking function and special
interest groups have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court can neither validate a
clearly unconstitutional distribution, and thereby subject its role as guardian to claims of fraud, nor
invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be ignored. To do either would be to
sacrifice the popular prestige which is the Court's primarily source of power."11

Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the
nomination of Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is politically
motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the
electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of the
House of Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what
other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically motivated? After all, that branch of
government is a political branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its acts are and will always be
politically motivated.

The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered opinion, bring it within the Court's
power to strike down the legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not this court —
who should ultimately judge the act when they cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto
itself the power to institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in the last analysis on which
all else depend, the vitality of a political system would be greatly weakened by reliance on the
judiciary for any and all political reforms and, in time, a complacent body politic will result. It is the
responsibility of the people and none other, to remain ever vigilant about their government to the end
that they can continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. To leave this task to
the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive of democratic government itself

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

SARMIENTO, J., disssenting:

Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am unable to agree with the majority. I
believe that the questions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of Congress,
revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in which the Court
can not intervene.

It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle
principle of separation of powers.

Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers
within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last
persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.

Footnotes

1 Annex B, p. 29, Rollo.

2 Annex D, p. 34, Rollo.

3 Resolution No. 03-91 p. 35, Rollo.

4 Annex D-2 p. 36, Rollo.

5 The comments of the respondents were later treated as their answer ers to the petition to
which the Court gave due course.

6 p. 53, Rollo.

7 p. 93, Rollo.

8 p. 94, Rollo.

9 p. 111, Rollo.

10 p. 99, Rollo.

11 p. 127, Rollo.

12 p. 130, Rollo.

13 p. 142, Rollo.

14 p. 150, Rollo.
15 5 p. 152, Rollo.

16 p. 157, Rollo.

Padilla, J.:

1 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56.

2 Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. 338, 349.

3 Kilbourn vs. Thomson, 103 US 168, 25 L. ed. 177; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612.

4 Mr. Justice Concepcion in Tanada, et al. vs. Mariano Jesus Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-
10520, 28 February 1957.

5 Neptali Gonzales, Philippine Political Law, 1966 ed., p. 102.

6 Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

7 Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 182.

8 Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192.

9 People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535.

10 delivered on occasion of the Oliver Wendell Homes Lecture of 1958 and published in
LEARNED HAND, The Bill of Rights 4 (1958).

11 Philippines Strum, "The Supreme Court and Political Questions" a study in judicial
evasion, 1974 ed., p. 103.