Republic v Pagadian City Timber | Sept 16, 2008 | G.R. No. 159308 | Nachura, J. and relevant sectors.
levant sectors. DENR Sec. Cerilles thus issued an Order canceling IFMA, which was affirmed by the
Doctrine
- License agreements is a privilege granted by the State to a person, and are not contracts within
the purview of the due process and non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the
Constitution
- Filipinos have the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, with the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment
- The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, to explain one’s side, or to
seek a reconsideration of the ruling complained of.
Summary
The Republic of the Philippines and Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. executed Industrial Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-040, authorizing PCT to utilize, develop, and manage 1,999.4
hectares of land in Zamboanga del Sur according to the Comprehensive Development and Management
Plan (CDMP) approved by the DENR. Some years passed, and in response to several complaints filed by
members of the Subanen tribe, the DENR decided to conduct an evaluation and assessment of the area.
The assessment revealed that PCT failed to comply with the CDMP and thus it was recommended that
the IFMA should be cancelled. This was done by the DENR, and affirmed by the Office of the President,
but the CA ruled that the IFMA was a contract that could not be unilaterally cancelled. However, the
Court held that license agreements are not contracts, and PCT was not denied due process.
FACTS
Oct. 14, 1994: Petitioner and respondent execute IFMA
Aug. 17, 1995: CDMP is approved by DENR
Oct. 8, 1998: DENR Region IX creates team to evaluate and assess IFMA in response to several
complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe regarding PCT’s failure to implement the CDMP,
disrespecting the IP’s rights, and constant threat and harassment by armed men.
Oct. 22, 1998: DENR sends letter giving notice of the evaluation to be conducted
Oct. 23, 1998: DENR Evaluation Team go to IFMA site and conduct assessment, revealing the ff:
- only 98 out of 2,008 seedling hills survived
- some areas planted on belong to the Certificates of Stewardship Contracts (CSC)
- only 1 look-out tower, 1 bunkhouse, 1 stockroom, 1 dilapidated billboard poster, 1 multi-
purpose shed, 2 concrete monuments
- facilities generally below par
- only 28% of the target goal area planted
Oct. 29, 1998: DENR Evaluation Team holds exit conference, explaining findings, and asking Santiago
(the Operations Manager of PCT) if he had any questions. He had none, but only requested a copy of the
assessment.
The Evaluation Team recommended that PCT explain why they failed to develop IFMA according to the
CDMP, as well as hiring a full-time forester, and amending the boundary to exclude the areas covered by
the CSC. However, RED Mendoza submitted a memorandum to DENR Secretary Cerilles recommending
that IFMA be cancelled for PCT’s failure to implement the CDMP and adopt agreements w/ communities
OP. Respondent went to the CA, which ruled in its favor, thus this petition.
ISSUES
1. W/N the CA erred in ruling that the IFMA is a contract and not a mere privilege granted by the
State
2. W/N the CA erred in ordaining that PCT can invoke prior resort to arbitration or the option to
mend its violations under IFMA
RATIO
1. YES. IFMA is a license agreement under PD 705, which defines a license as “a privilege granted
by the State to a person” and such is evident in the IFMA itself. Jurisprudence also supports such
a view (the various cases mentioned in Alvarez v PICOP Resources, Inc.). But even assuming the
IFMA could be a contract, the alleged property rights are not absolute. Moreover, all Filipino
citizens have the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which has the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. The DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated
to actualize the policy, and private rights must yield when they conflict with public policy and
common interest.
2. YES. Sec. 35 of the IFMA uses the word “may” which is interpreted to mean that petitioner has
the discretion whether or not to give notice and allow the option to remedy the breach. PCT is
not entitled to arbitration (under Sec. 36 of IFMA) as the cancellation was based on Sec. 26 of
DAO No. 97-04 (failure to implement CDMP and agreements w/ communities and relevant
sectors). Respondents were given the opportunity to contest the findings when the filed the
appeal and MR before the Office of the President. A party cannot feign denial of due process
where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.
HELD
The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
and the DENR Order as well as the Resolutions of the Office of the President are REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED
 Merida v People of the Philippines
Facts: Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court)
with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and
remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod
Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.6
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a
narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong
barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco.
When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree
but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner,
bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner
showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife.8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When
Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo
that he cut the tree with Calix's permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree
trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into
lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property
and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of
the lumber,9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to
petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently
conducted an investigation on the matter.10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial
Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the
preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut the
narra tree with Calix's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor11 found probable cause to indict petitioner
and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez
who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner
testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in the tree-
cutting.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
RULING:
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207. The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint
filed by specified individuals,18 non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying
such cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity20 and not
to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit
an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this
Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned
in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the
evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest
officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to
conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80 refers to
"reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest
officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or
officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence."22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot
be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support
the complaint or report."23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD
705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.24
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
 as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber
or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority;26 and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged of having "cut,
gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private land28 without x x x the
necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing],
collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence
showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act
of "cutting" a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x
xtimber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit.29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit,
petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the
authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's
permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the
lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.30 Petitioner does not explain
why Royo and Hernandez, public officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie
on the stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that the acts of these
public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's
authorization to Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property.
Petitioner has no use of Calix's authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in
the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes "timber"
under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only "forest product" (which
circuitously includes "timber.")31 Does the narra tree in question constitute "timber" under Section 68?
The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that
"timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by
compliance with specified dimensions33 or certain "stand age" or "rotation age."34 In Mustang Lumber,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68
of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In
ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common usage
meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used
for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in
a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should
we.36 x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its
common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or
joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams,
tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.38
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into "several pieces
of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet
x x x." These measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner
on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in evidence.39 Further, Hernandez testified that
the larger portion of the felled log left in the Mayod Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at
the big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8
meters."40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for
building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
 thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not presented in evidence. Accordingly, we
imposed on the accused the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.

3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if
the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50
pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5
pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the
provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the
value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.

The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring 111 board feet
were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the
amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandez's
testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are his "estimates"
based on "prevailing local price."41

This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty
imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more than a
mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact.42 In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix
the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.43 In People v.
Dator44 where, as here, the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for
possession of lumber without permit, the prosecution's evidence for the lumber's value consisted of an
estimate made by the apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was compounded
 Momongan v. Judge Omipon PROVIDENT TREE FARMS V. BATARIO
231 SCRA 463
Syllabus:
The confiscation proceedings under AO No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the
Facts: Petitioner PTFI is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees
Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the order
in its plantations which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In
of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to
consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation,
include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before the
Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among
lower court or by enforcing AO No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states that “[t]he confiscation of
which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products.
the conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any criminal action which shall be
On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported 4 containers
filed against the owner thereof or any person who used the conveyance in the commission of the
of matches from Indonesia and 2 or more containers of matches from Singapore. On 25 April 1989, upon
offense.”
request of PTFI, Secretary Factoran of the DENR issued a certification that "there are enough available
softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price." In light of this, PTFI filed
Facts: Dionisio Golpe was apprehended by police officers while he was driving his truck loaded with
with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a TRO against
illegally cut lumber. It was later found that a certain Basilio Cabig owned the logs, thus, a complaint was
respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-
filed against him. Judge Rafael Omipon, the respondent in this case, “found that a prima facie case exists
derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations.
against Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Golpe, was not
The case was raffled to respondent Judge Demetrio M. Batario. Lower court ruled in favor of
charged in the complaint.” Augustus Momongan, the Regional Director of the DENR, filed the present
respondents, stating that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations."
complaint against Judge Omipon alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of
PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction,
illegally cut forest products violated Section 68 and 68-A of PD No. 705 and AO No. 59, Series of 1990.
"restraining the entry of safety matches into the country for the purpose of securing compliance with
Momongan further claims that Judge Omipon is devoid of authority to release the truck despite the non-
Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code" and for damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly
inclusion of Golpe in the complaint.
violated by the importation of safety matches, is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and
incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code. PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the
Issue: Whether Judge Omipon had authority to release the assailed truck and thus be free from any
procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of Tax Appeals because the
disciplinary sanction.
instant action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that
since it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is
Ruling: Yes. Judge Omipon had the authority to order the release of the truck. Although the DENR
warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala.
Secretary or his duly authorized representatives have the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or
gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense, based on Section
68-A of PD No. 705 and AO No. 59, this power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the
Issue: Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code
DENR. The act of Judge Omipon of releasing the truck did not violate PD No. 705 and AO No. 59 because
and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation, and
his act did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. “The confiscation
other incidental matters relating to such.
proceedings under Administrative Order No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the Revised
Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction.” Momongan assails that
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner anchors his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36,
Judge Omipon should have turned over the truck to the Community Environment and Natural Resources
par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of
Office (CENRO). Judge Omipon however had no mandatory duty to do so, and should therefore not be
wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs
visited with disciplinary action.
since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture cases and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over
prohibited importations.
The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is
within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional
Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. An
order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and
declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
Also, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would
preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to
GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES, respondents. alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.

Doctrine:
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined
in the law.
***The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected
or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber of other forest products cut, gathered,
collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or
permit granted by the state.
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on
the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the
offense defined in the law.
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal.
The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the
owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in
private woodlands. While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect
or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited
case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil
law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705.
Facts: This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the CFI of Quezon dismissing the information Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material, it was
filed therein. sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and Dispositive Portion:
punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines, in an information which read: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the
information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1591 is reinstated.
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2)
grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information
does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. The Trial court dismissed the information on the
grounds invoked and the reconsideration sought was denied.

Hence this petition.

Issue: WoN the information charged an offense.

Held: YES. The Court agree with the petitioner that the information substantially alleged all the
elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was
admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was
"without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused
"illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and
without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different
species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization
of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the
 Daylinda A. Lagua, et al. v. Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, et al.
Syllabus:
Presidential Decree No. 705, upon which the respondent court based its order, does not vest any
power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether the closure of a logging road is legal
or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be
maintained.
Facts: This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was instituted by the
petitioners against the private respondents for closing a logging road without authority.
The private respondents contended that the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of
the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc. of its rights as a timber
licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads. Therefore, the resolution of this question is
properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have
jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding that the
Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before
an action for damages can be instituted.
Issue: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over an action for damages arising from the closure of a
logging road.
Ruling: Yes. The trial court has jurisdiction. “Presidential Decree No. 705 upon which the respondent
court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development must first determine
that the closure of a logging road is illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an
action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly
for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether such closure was illegal is
a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private
respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power
and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way,
much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a
forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.”
ERNESTO AQUINO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers' Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers'
Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the
repairs of Teachers' Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest
ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City,
conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit
allowing the cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an
appropriate place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the
same is required to plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which
shall be properly maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and
development of the planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and
regulations shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of
penalties in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or
as soon as the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepeña, Daniel Salamo, Pablo
Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being
cut at Teachers' Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto
Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. They
also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site, together with
Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the
trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The
volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without
permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and
the forest charges were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705) was filed
against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
 That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market
price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price — P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total
forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City,
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the
aforecited law.
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a
copy of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who
claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps
about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees,
petitioner and Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioner's supervision. He stated that petitioner was
in possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two
were stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely
followed petitioner's instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the
permit was issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers' Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and
Masing cutting down the trees in petitioner's presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers' Camp. He
allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit.
However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the
inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees because
he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three other men.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises
questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For
questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products
Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the
case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under existing forest laws and regulations.
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the
implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine
trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees
because the lumber was used by Teachers' Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted
of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against
them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from
cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could
have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.
 Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not
an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection,
or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24
September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto Aquino
is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.
MUSTANG LUMBER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development. The
Special Actions and Investigation Division of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID organized a team
of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.
The team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the
petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of
narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa. On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard
and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical
possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or
his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. On 10 April 1990,
counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to the Chief of SAID Robles requesting an extension of fifteen
days to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly
the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the petition.
Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR Factoran issued an order confiscating the woods seized in the truck of
the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard.
Issue: Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and that petitioner should not be
held for illegal logging.
Held: The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the
contrary, the SC rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in
the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads: Processing plant
is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wall bond, block board, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright
edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in AMADO TAOPA vs. People of the Philippines
the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the
FACTS: The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction
loaded with illegally-cut 113 pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species
between raw or processed timber.
without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
prejudicial to the public interest, and thereby arrested its, driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was
covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner
Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber, Taopa, Ogalesco and
Cuison were charged for violating Sec. 68 of PD No. 705 as amended, in the RTC Virac, Catanduanes.
They pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After trial, RTC found them guilty as charged beyond
reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison appealed to CA, Cuison was acquitted but Taopa’s conviction
was affirmed. However, a petition was filed by Taopa seeking his acquittal from the charges against him
alleging that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the owner of the seized lumber as he was not
in the truck when the lumber was seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Sec. 68 of PD No. 705.

HELD: The RTC and CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa’s house and that
Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck drive by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber
were seized. These facts proved Taopa’s exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the
truck. Thus, the court was convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber, Sec.
68 PD No. 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC for the penalties imposed on
violators. Violation of Sec. 68, PD No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting, and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an
offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. The actual market value of the 113
pcs of lumber was P67, 630.00. Following Article 310 in relation to 309, the imposable penalty should be
reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months
and one day to 20 years plus as additional period of four years for the excess of P47, 630.00. The
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower to
that prescribed in the RPC.
 Dagudag v Judge Paderanga
FACTS: Illegal forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. were seized by the DENR.
The items were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were consequently abandoned by
the unknown owner.
Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated products.
Respondent Judge issued the writ despite the fact that an administrative case was already pending
before the DENR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct
unbecoming a judge.
HELD: Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First,
under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail
of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence.
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.
Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin
constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a
prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take
reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of
judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance
with laws. The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this
rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any
administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright.
Paat vs. CA GR # 111107
FACTS: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman, while on its way to
Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the DENR personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed
in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the CENRO in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order
of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof 15 days within which to submit an explanation
why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation.
On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner
Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents filed a
letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July
12, 1989. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to
private respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary."
Pending resolution of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against
petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,
ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending that private respondents had no
cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration having been
likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of
Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal
question.
Hence, this present petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
ISSUE: Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for
replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding?
HELD: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still
be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial
power can be sought.
The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons,
for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and to dispose of the case.
However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case.
Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved
is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5)
when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9)when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when
the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy
which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed
by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency's prerogative.
Wherefore, petition is GRANTED, decision of CA reversed and set aside. The Restraining Order is hereby made
permanent; and the Secret of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
ALVAREZ VS PICOP
November 29, 2006
FACTS: PICOP was granted Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 covering an area of 75,545 hectares
in Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental, to "terminate on April 25,
2002." On 23 December 1999, DENR promulgated DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53
mandating the conversion of the TLA into IFMA that is primarily aimed at sustaining the raw materials
for the continuous operation of the integrated wood processing plant of the company. Pursuant to this,
PICOP signified its intention to convert its TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA).
A Performance Evaluation Team was created to conduct performance evaluation indicating
violations by PICOP of such as the non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year
reforestation plan as required by the DENR rules and regulations. Also there are alleged unpaid and
overdue forest charges of PICOP. It was the position of the DENR members that PICOP’s application for
the IFMA conversion should undergo the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP representative
Atty. Caingat, however, claimed that "the conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA has already been
completed" and indicated that they had "no choice except to decline participation in the ongoing
meeting and bring our issues to the proper public and legal forum."
Accordingly, the Secretary of DENR claims that further processing of PICOP’s application for the
conversion of TLA No. 43 cannot proceed until PICOP complies with the requirements. Insisting that the
conversion of its TLA No. 43 had been completed, PICOP filed a Petition for Mandamus against then
DENR Secretary Alvarez before the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOP’s
Petition for Mandamus. On appeal, CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition by the
DENR assailing that the mandamus filed by PICOP should be out rightly dismissed on the ground that
RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since the acts questioned herein are related
to the licensing regulation and management of forest resources. Furthermore, RTC is prohibited to issue
TRO, writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction as provided by PD605 and
RA8975.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE BECAUSE THE
SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF PERTAINS TO THE EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN OF THE DENR
SECRETARY
HELD: YES. The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with damages. Specifically, it sought to
compel the DENR Secretary to: (1) sign, execute and deliver the IFMA documents to PICOP; (2) issue the
corresponding IFMA number assignment; and (3) approve the harvesting of timber by PICOP from the
area of TLA No. 43. In its petition for mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that "DENR Secretary Alvarez acted
with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction in refusing to perform his ministerial duty
to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue the corresponding IFMA number to it." What
is at stake is not the scope of the DENR jurisdiction but the manner by which it exercises or refuses to
exercise that jurisdiction.
The courts have the duty and power to strike down any official act or omission tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The 1987 Constitution is explicit in providing that judicial power includes not
only the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. Since PICOP alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR Secretary, it
behooves the court to determine the same. An outright dismissal of the case would have prevented
such determination.
it is argued that PICOP’s immediate resort to the trial court was precipitate based on the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This holds no water. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is disregarded when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention, which are averred to be extant in this case, citing PICOP’s employment of a sizable number
of workers and its payment of millions in taxes to the government. Moreover, contrary to [the DENR
Secretary’s] claim, the approval of an application for IFMA conversion is not purely discretionary on the
part of the DENR Secretary since the approval of an IFMA conversion depends upon compliance with the
requirements provided under DAO No. 99-53. Even assuming, arguendo, that the approval of an IFMA
conversion involves the exercise of discretion by the DENR Secretary, the writ of mandamus may be
issued to compel the proper exercise of that discretion where it is shown that there was grave abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
DENR Sec is wrong in invoking the provisions of PD605 and RA8975. These statutes merely
proscribe the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction. They cannot, under pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the
courts of authority to take cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action, as long as such action
and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction.
Hence, the outright dismissal of the mandamus prayed for by DENR herein is hereby denied.
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES
December 3, 2009
Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.
Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No.
43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR
Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP
even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No.
43, as amended, into an IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for
Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed
by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA)
with PICOP.
Issue: Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which
the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA).
Held: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No
lawimpairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked. The Presidential Warranty
cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete
abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise
the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.