Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1 (2018) 83–104 Interreligious Studies and Intercultural Theology (print) ISSN 2397-3471
https://doi.org/10.1558/isit.32682 Interreligious Studies and Intercultural Theology (online) ISSN 2397-348X
All is of God:
Joy, Suffering, and the Interplay of Contrasts
sydnorjo@emmanuel.edu
Abstract
This essay elaborates a constructive, comparative, nondual theodicy
for the Christian tradition based on the Hindu Vaiṣṇava tradition.
According to the Indologist Henrich Zimmer, in Vaiṣṇavism everything
is an emanation of Viṣṇu, therefore everything is of Viṣṇu. All apparent
opposites are inherently divine and implicitly complementary. Good
and bad, joy and suffering, pain and pleasure are not conflicting
dualities; they are interdependent qualities that increase one another’s
being. The Hindu myth of Samudra Manthan, or the Churning of the
Ocean, exemplifies Vaiṣṇava nondualism. In that story, gods and
demons—seeming opposites—cooperate in order to extract the nectar
of immortality from an ocean of milk. If “opposites” are interdependent,
hence complementary, then they are not “opposites” but mutually
amplifying contrasts. Given this phenomenology, and applying it to the
Christian tradition, a benevolent God who desires full vitality for her
creatures would have to create pain, suffering, darkness, and death in
order to intensify their correlates. Love would demand their creation,
because love would want abundant life for all. In this aesthetic theodicy,
the interplay of all contrasts results from the love of a life-giving God.
Keywords
theodicy, comparative theology, Vaiṣṇavism, mythology, suffering
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2018, Office 415, The Workstation, 15 Paternoster Row, Sheffield, S1 2BX
84 Jon Paul Sydnor
Introduction
We should not, cannot, yet must attempt theodicy. We should not
attempt theodicy because it does not help the suffering and may even
harm them. We cannot succeed at theodicy, because the answers never
suffice—the best theodicy is the least wrong theodicy. Yet we must offer
a theodicy, because human beings are the species that asks “Why?”
This bold questioning may be one of our greatest glories. We dare to
ask questions that we cannot answer. Incessantly asking “Why?” has
produced science, asking “Why do things happen?” It has produced
philosophy, asking “Why are we here?” It has produced psychology,
asking “Why do we act the way we do?” And it has produced theology,
asking “Why do we sense a God within and beyond our universe?”
Because human beings are the species that asks “Why?” we must ask
why this loving God, whom we sense, sustains such a trying universe,
which we feel. Embarking upon theodicy, we implicitly ask if our
universe is comprehensible, and we risk the possibility that it may not
be (Hick 1966, 371).
The resulting conversation is only for those who are not currently
suffering, at least not any more than usual. It is for those who want
to make sense of life and are willing to fail. By the grace of God, even
in this failure we may find some peace. Wrestling with theodicy now
will at least save us from beginning the process—distraught, frantic,
and desperate—when suffering strikes. In this way, theodicy may
be pastoral; that is, helpful to us in our existential situation, both as
individuals and as communities. It cannot answer the unanswerable
questions, but maybe it can inoculate us against the doubt that
accompanies tragedy. And, if we wrestle long enough, we may even
outgrow the questions.
What follows is an aesthetic theodicy, an explanation of suffering
with reference to the quality of human experience and the intensity
of divine benevolence. I write as a progressive, Protestant Christian,
comparative theologian, and pastor. As a progressive Protestant, I will
avoid theories that describe suffering as God’s punishment of human
beings for sin. When suffering becomes affliction, when it is distributed
unevenly, it can no longer be the proportionate punishment of a just
God. As a comparative theologian, I look beyond (as well as within) the
Christian tradition for theological stimulation. Comparison broadens
the conversation, presents new possibilities of religious being, and
questions what we consider obvious. It produces new and better
questions, which may even produce new and better answers. As a
pastor, I will always evaluate those answers based on their application
it. Pleased, Viṣṇu notes that the nectar has divided the asuras, and he
promises the devas that he will give it to them. He assumes his female
form as Mohinī, entrances the demons with her beauty, and secures
the nectar from them. Then, she distributes it to the gods, leaving none
for the demons. Realizing that they have been tricked, the demons
attack the gods but are defeated by their newly energized cousins and
enemies. Once the gods re-establish their sovereignty, Brahmā has
them negotiate for peace with their cousins and vanquished enemies,
the demons (Wilson 1895, 70–81).
suffocating both. They can only survive this milk-borne toxic event
with the help of another powerful God, Śiva, who suffers the poison
for them. Śiva cleanses the ocean of milk—the symbol of life—of its
toxicity. Now, it can offer its potency.
As the ocean yields her wealth the gods keep their promise to Viṣṇu.
They do not covet the riches, but wait patiently for the elixir. When
the elixir appears, and the demons try to steal it for themselves,
fighting over it with one another, the gods do not enter the fray.
Instead, they remain calm and trust Viṣṇu. Trust in God, expressed as
calm detachment and freedom from greed, is the only way to receive
the divinely promised vitality. Those who thirst for it (in this case, the
demons) may appear to receive the boon, but they will soon lose it, to
their great dismay.
Appearing in his female form as Mohinī, Viṣṇu civilizes the demons,
then tricks them into giving her the elixir and turns it over to the
gods. Revitalized, the gods can now battle the demons and win—until
advised to negotiate for peace by Brahmā. For who knows what life
would be like without their cousins and enemies? Indeed, who knows
when they might need their enemies again?
For example, in The Laws of Manu the Lord explicitly creates dualities:
“in order to differentiate conduct, [the Lord] differentiated right from
wrong, then he bound creatures to the contrasts: joy and suffering,
etc.” (Laws of Manu §1.26, 6 author’s translation, adapted from Olivelle
and Doniger). God rejects pure unity in favour of calculated diversity.
The One chooses to become the Many while remaining the One
(Taittiriya Upaniṣad 2.6.1). God, as the source of all phenomena, does
not create metaphysical opposition. Instead, he creates experiential
amplification. Like the colours on a canvas, ordained difference
cooperates to generate everyday abundance (O’Flaherty 1976, 49).
Likewise, in the myth of Samudra Manthan, all is of Viṣṇu. Energies
that contest with one another are synergies that amplify one another.
Creation and destruction, evolution and dissolution, cosmos and chaos
are of an essence. Opposites are united by their divine source and
justified by their divine function (Zimmer 1946, 46). Evil does not exist
in itself or for itself, but only to serve the greater good of vitality. For
this reason, the holy in Hinduism can manifest itself in both benign
and terrifying forms: the mother Goddess Devī can appear as fanged,
blood drinking Kālī. Śiva can appear as Bhairava (“Frightful”), his
demonic, destructive, yet protective form. And, most relevant to our
discussion, Viṣṇu can appear as Narasiṃha—his half-man, half-lion
form—who disembowels the demon Hiraṇyakaśipu on his lap.
Moreover, Hindu mythology generally asserts the interdependence
of moral polarities by asserting the consanguinity of devas (gods)
and asuras (demons). They are not separate species, tribes, or even
families—they are cousins. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (§1.3.1),
both gods and demons are sons of the creator Prajāpati. In Viṣṇu
Purāṇa §3.17, the gods are absolutely flummoxed when the demons
begin to observe Vedic precepts, fulfill their sacred duties, and
practice religious penance—in other words, when the demons begin
to do what the gods do. Gaining power through virtue, the demons
become invincible, forcing the gods to seek assistance from Viṣṇu.
Even then, Viṣṇu only defeats the demons by deluding them into
non-Vedic practices: he becomes the Buddha, who rejects the Vedas,
animal sacrifice, and the caste system. The demons follow willingly,
forsaking true religion, thereby allowing their destruction (§3.18). In
the Mahābhārata (§12.8.28) Arjuna asks, “Do the gods prosper without
killing their kinsmen, the demons?” (O’Flaherty 60). Elsewhere, the
Mahābhārata declares that enmity is innate to gods and demons
because they are brothers (§12.8.28, §5.98.180. See O’Flaherty 1976,
57–62).
Virtue is only possible when vice is an option. Viṣṇu creates gods and
demons so that free beings can cultivate moral excellence within the
balance of the universe. Paradoxically, evil is necessary and desirable,
yet must be overcome. Only thus does the self experience increase
within a universe of possibilities. Metaphysical tension is a gift from
God, who sustains the complementary polarities that sentient beings
negotiate and through which they become wise (O’Flaherty 1976, 378–
379).
In addition to sustaining mutually amplifying contrasts, Viṣṇu can
also appear as Viśvarūpa (“universal form”), the original source of all
such difference. In this manifestation Viṣṇu reveals his sovereignty
over all the forces in the universe. Gods and demons, good and evil,
creation and destruction, joy and suffering, life and death all serve
the one supreme Viṣṇu, because all are of the one supreme Viṣṇu.
The clashing forces of this-worldly life merge into their harmonious
source, the terrifying and beneficent personal God (Zimmer 1946,
124–125). Generally, those who see Viṣṇu in his universal form beg
him to take on a more manageable aspect. For instance, in chapter 11
of the Bhagavad Gītā the warrior Arjuna asks to see Viṣṇu’s true form,
which is his Universal Form. Viṣṇu (here, in his avatār as Kṛṣṇa) reveals
the cosmic sweep of his being—infinite arms, infinite heads, without
beginning or end, exceeding even the universe, face ablaze, blindingly
brilliant, worshipped by all, feared by all, granting life, yet consuming
creatures in his gaping maw—dreaming, destroying, and engaging
in intimate conversation with a devotee. Overwhelmed, Arjuna begs
Viṣṇu to return to his conventional appearance: “I rejoice that I have
seen what has never before been seen, but my mind is unhinged with
fear. O god, show me that other form again. Be merciful, lord of gods,
home of the world! I need to see you as you were before: crowned, with
a club, and holding a discus. O thousand-armed one, whose material
form is the universe, assume your four-armed shape” (Johnson 1994,
52).
Unlike Arjuna, when the accomplished sage Nārada sees Viṣṇu
as Viśvarūpa, he simply bows in gratitude. To see reality as it is
requires wisdom and preparation. The wise know that the contrasts
of existence emanate from a shared, divine source, even as that divine
source transcends them, and offers shelter from the maelstrom of
polarities that he himself has created. Only personal devotion to Viṣṇu
can redeem us within (not from) this fluent play of synergies. That
is, recognizing the divine origin of negation empowers us to accept
negation as a gracious aspect of experience. Then, we can live within
Figure 6: Jacob Wrestling with the Angel by Gustav Dore. Credit: Wikicommons.
For those with a sense for the divine, even tribulation can reveal
a love underlying the universe, to which the universe is imperfectly
transparent. This love discloses itself only in intimations. It will offer
no proof to the sceptical, but it will offer inspiration to the receptive
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2018
All is of God 97
agony and the ecstasy, but also to the unresolvable paradox of faith
embodied in the words Jesus cries from the cross: “my God, my
God, why have you forsaken me?” (Mark 15: 34). He simultaneously
acknowledges the presence of God and the absence of God. He
accuses God of abandonment, demands of God a defence, yet dies
before receiving one, perhaps because God has no adequate answer.
Crucifixion is an incomprehensibly “grotesque and gratuitous” act.
The Romans created it to terrorize subjugated peoples. This torturous
execution was public, prolonged, and political, reducing the victim to
a political symbol of the Empire’s power over (Crossan 1994, 124–127).
Theologically, the crucifixion of Jesus testifies to the unholy within
the universe, useless suffering that freedom produces but God abhors.
In a challenge to our thesis, something emerges in creation that is
alien to Godself. God did not intend the unholy, but God allows it out
of respect for our moral consequence. Crucially, God suffers from this
demonic fault in reality. God in Christ undergoes demonic alienation
from God through crucifixion (Fiddes 2013, 6–7). In other words,
freedom is of God, but the results of freedom may not be. Faced with
a choice between freedom and suffering, God has chosen to preserve
freedom. We may wish it otherwise, but God has prioritized vitality
over security (Hick 1966, 291).
Yet, God does not make these choices at a distance. In the
incarnation, we see that God has entered creation as unconditional
celebrant. On the cross, we see that God has entered creation as
absolute participant. No part of the divine person is protected from
the dangers of embodiment. God in Jesus is perfectly open to the
mutually amplifying contrasts of embodied life. And God is perfectly
subject to the grotesque and gratuitous suffering that God rejects but
freedom allows. God is completely here; God is fully human. For the
cosmic Artist in a position of creative responsibility, authentic love
necessarily results in vulnerable suffering. Incarnation necessitates
crucifixion. Grotesque and gratuitous suffering may not be from God,
but God has taken it into the Godhead. So now, it is of God (Moltmann
1993a, 270–274).
Resurrection as a declaration of divine decision
Crucifixion alone would repudiate the divine will and intent. For God
to suffer alongside us is insufficient. Doctrinally, theodicy presumes
eschatology; human suffering demands divine healing. Crucifixion
offends God, who responds to it with resurrection (Hodgson and King
1985, 217–219).
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