THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS vs. ESTANISLAO R. counsel Atty. Gregorio B.
counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio before the Supreme Court on the above-
BAYOT
FACTS: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with
malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday
Tribune of June 13, 1943, which assured the prompt issuance of a marriage
license and a marriage arranged to the wishes of the parties through their
assistance. Respondent first denied having published the said advertisement
but subsequently admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted in violation of the Code of Ethics
which prohibits the solicitation of legal business (Also provided in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2)
HELD: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services
or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple
of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must
be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.) The
Court decided that the respondent should be reprimanded.
PEOPLE VS ROSQUETA
Failure to file apellant’s bried on time
Every now and then, although there seems to be more of such cases of late,
a member of the bar is proceeded against for failure to live up to the
responsibility owed to a client as well as to this Court. This is another such
instance. In our resolution of May 25, 1973, we required respondent Gregorio
B. Estacio, counsel de parte for appellants to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for failure to file the brief for
appellants within the period which expired on March 30, 1973. He failed to
show cause as thus required, and on September 7, 1973, we issued a
resolution suspending him from the practice of law except for the purpose of
filing the brief which should be done within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Then on October 22, 1973, he filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it
appeared that he did seek to explain his failure to file the brief on time, but
he left it to be mailed on June 9, 1973 with Antonio Rosqueta, Sr., father
of appellants Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and Eusebio Rosqueta, who,
however, was unable to do so as on the 10th of June, his house caught
fire. He would impress on this Court that he was not informed of such
occurrence until the preparation of his motion for reconsideration. At any
rate, he would stress that both Antonio Rosqueta, Sr. and Salvador
Labariento, father-in-law of the third appellant, Citong Bringas, informed
him they would withdraw the appeal as they could not raise the money
needed for pursuing it. He had a supplement to such motion for
reconsideration filed on October 25, 1973 wherein he stated that he could not
secure the affidavits of appellants themselves as two of them were in the
Penal Colony in Davao and the third in the Iwahig Penal Colony in Palawan.
On November 5, 1973, this Court required appellants to comment on a
motion for reconsideration of respondent concerning specifically their
alleged desire to withdraw appeal.
Then on December 27, 1973, there was a motion of respondent submitting
two affidavits, one from Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and the aforesaid Citong
Bringas and the other from Eusebio Rosqueta wherein they indicated their
consent and approval to respondent's motion to withdraw appeal. The joint
affidavit of the first two appellants reads as follows: "1. That we are the same
persons named above who have been charged in Criminal Case No. L-36138
entitled People v. Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., et al. pending on appeal before the
Supreme Court of the Philippines; 2. That we hereby consent and approve
the motion to withdraw the appeal filed by our counsel, Atty. Gregorio B.
Estacio before the Supreme Court of the Philippines on that Criminal Case
No. L-36138 their pending in said Court;
3. That we have given our consent and approval of our own will voluntarily,
without duress, force, threat or fraud or deceit; [In witness whereof], we have
hereunto set our signatures this 4th day of December 1973 in the
Municipality of Panabo, Davao."1 The affidavit of Eusebio Rosqueta
follows: "1. That I am one of the accused in that case entitled People v.
Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., et al. under G.R. No. L-36138 now pending before the
Supreme Court of the Philippines; 2. That I hereby give my consent and
approval to the Motion to Withdraw the Appeal which has been filed by our
stated case; 3. That I have reached this conclusion after I have conferred with
our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio and this statement hereby revokes and
nullifies the statement signed by me on December 5, 1973 at the Central Sub-
Colony, Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan before witnesses, namely, Mr.
Abencio B. Gabayan and Miss Merle J. Jopida; 4. That I have executed this
affidavit of my own free will, without intimidation, threat, fraud, deceit,
duress or force; [In witness whereof], I have hereunto set my hand this 13th
day of December, 1973 in the City of Puerto Princesa."2
Respondent's liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be absolved from the
irresponsible conduct of which he is guilty. Respondent should be aware that
even in those cases where counsel de parte is unable to secure from
appellants or from their near relatives the amount necessary to pursue the
appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection with the case. It has
been a commendable practice of some members of the bar under such
circumstances, to be designated as counsel de oficio. That way the interest of
justice is best served. Appellants will then continue to receive the benefits of
advocacy from one who is familiar with the facts of the case. What is more,
there is no undue delay in the administration of justice. Lawyers of such
category are entitled to commendation.<äre||anº•1àw> They manifest
fidelity to the concept that law is a profession and not a mere trade with
those engaged in it being motivated solely by the desire to make money.
Respondent's conduct yields a different impression. What has earned a
reproof however is his irresponsibility. He should be aware that in the
pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot
be too casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not
enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly
mailed. Such inattention as shown in this case is inexcusable. At any rate,
the suspension meted on him under the circumstances is more than justified.
It seems, however, that well-nigh five months had elapsed. That would
suffice to atone for his misdeed.
WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The
requirement to file the brief is dispensed with but Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio
is censured for negligence and inattention to duty. Likewise, as prayed for by
appellants themselves, their appeal is dismissed.
DE ROY VS CA
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of private
respondents, Luis Bernal, Sr., et al., resulting in injuries to their family and
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop but the former failed to do so.
Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. This decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. On
the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion
for extension of tie to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by
the appellate court. They again filed for a motion for reconsideration but was
subsequently denied.
Petitioner filed for a special civic action for certiorari to declare null and void
the previous decision and claimed that the appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion. They contended that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas
case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette. Also they
argued that the petitioners had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if
only they heeded the warning to vacate the shop.
Issues: Whether or not the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-
day period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended, could be applied to the case at bar.
Held: The ruling in the Habaluyas case should be made to apply to the case
at bar, notwithstanding the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in
the Official Gazette.
Ratio:
• There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and
as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the duty of the
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court, which are published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and in
pubications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and law journals.
• The ruling in the Habaluyas case was that the 15-day period for
appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. Such motion may be filed only in cases pending in the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which in its discretion
may grant or deny the extension requested. Such decision was
given prospective application to subsequent cases like
 Lacsamana vs Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court and Bacaya vs Intermediate Appellate Court.
• With regard to the contention on the “last clear chance” of private
respondents to avoid the accident, this should be disregarded,
since the doctrine of “last clear chance”, wich has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
PCGG VS SANDIGANBAYAN AND MENDOZA
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega
loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank
issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and
ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held
where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance
and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by
RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to
recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and
cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio
Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan,
et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza
as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court
assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service.”
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when
he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of
“matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the
matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as
SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by
respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
“matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot
disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK
is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG
does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention
on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable
meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an
act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The
evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government
lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting,
enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the
intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely
petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the
Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the
role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest
of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position
as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his
tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule
6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held
public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a
lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting
“engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the service.
DUCAT JR VS VILLALON
Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr., the registered owner of the subject property,
filed an ejectment case against respondent, their family counsel, who hired
workers to construct a piggery in the subject property of complainant.
Respondent, however, claimed that the subject property had been sold to
him orally. Subsequently, he alleged that subject property was given to him
by the father of complainant (Jose Ducat, Sr.), for past legal services.IaTCc
The IBP found Atty. Villalon guilty of Gross Misconduct and suspended
him from law practice for two (2) years.
Upholding the decision on appeal, the Court held that the acts of respondent
lawyer constitute gross misconduct, because: respondent is presumed to
know that transfer of any titled real property must be in writing; when the
transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991, respondent knew it
was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed said document of sale without any special
power of attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and as
regards the subsequent Deed of Sale dated December 5, 1991 covering the
same property, respondent admitted that there was in fact no consideration
for the conveyance.
The Supreme Court suspended Atty. Villalon, Jr. from the practice of
law for one year because the record did not show that he had any
direct participation in the notarization of the questionable deed of sale.
The Court enjoins lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness,
fair play and nobility in the course of their practice of law.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CANON 7 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY; DUTY OF LAWYERS TO UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. — The
ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice
of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus
rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at
all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The
trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the
lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this
end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.
CORDOVA VS CORDOVA - nangabit
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion
Delizo and with two children, left his
wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986,
Salvacion and Cordova had a reconciliation where Cordova
promised to leave his mistress. But apparently, Cordova still
continued to cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again lived
with another woman and worse, he took one of his children with him
and hid the child away from Salvacion. In 1988, Salvacion filed a
letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually,
multiple hearing dates were sent but no hearing took place because
neither party appeared. In 1989, Salvacion sent a telegraphic
message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating that she
and her husband has reconciled. The Commission, since Salvacion
failed to submit her evidence ex parte, merely recommended the
reprimand and admonishment of Cordova.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.
HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents
evidence that he has been morally
reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his
wife. Before a person can be
admitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good
moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On
the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes “a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage” such was the case in the case at bar.
"the continued possession . . . of a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . . and
its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground for disbarment
DELOS REYES VS AZNAR
Facts:
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University
(Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B.
Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for
several times... under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if
she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further
alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr.
Gil Ramas, had her undergo... forced abortion.
July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge
of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and
by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a... woman of loose
morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted
by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute
the allegations made against him.
As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge leveled
against him is in furtherance of complainant's... vow to wreck vengeance
against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation
of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the
school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is
likewise contended... that the defense did not bother to present respondent
in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has
been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge
of the complainant.
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence, both
testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficent and uncorroborated
the accusation of intentional... abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a
period of not less than three (3) years.
Issues:
is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore... be removed or
suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar
Ruling:
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason... of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice.
it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in
asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila
where he... had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would
flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
ARCIGA v MANIWANG
FACTS
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the
disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975)
on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his
promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on
September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
Got acquianted in 1970 sa Cebu City. Med stud and law stud . When
magdalena refused to go with him in a motel in 1971, he stopped seeing her.
Had sexual congress in 1971, magdalena said refused earlier sex because shes
married and has a son. She became pregnant and arranged their marriage.
December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino
who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be
told that their marriage could not take place because he had married
Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she
returned to Davao.
ISSUE
WON respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was so corrupt and
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment?
RULING
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This
case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where
lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H.
Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent
sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making
reference to their trysts in hotels.
One letter in 1951 contains expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing
and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm
conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and
the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with
impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of
her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for
disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not
so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montaña vs.
Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382;
Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA
667; Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case
No. 997, September 10, 1979, 93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
AMBROSIO SABAYLE, Complainant, v. HON. TEODULO C.
TANDAYAG, ATTY. CARMELITO B. GABOR and ATTY. PABLO
B. BADONG, Respondents.
Carmelito Gabor and Pablo B. Badong for and in behalf of themselves.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS’ DISBARMENT; SERIOUS
DISHONESTY AND PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT. — We agree with
the findings of the Solicitor General in respect of respondent Carmelito B.
Gabor. A lawyer who knowingly takes part in a false and simulated
transaction not only by notarizing a simulated Deed of Sale but also by
sharing in the profits flowing from defrauding of the victim through such
transaction by acquiring half of the property sought to be transferred by the
false transaction, is guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — The Court, resolved to disbar respondent
Carmelito B . Gabor and to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to
REQUIRE him to surrender his Attorney’s Certificate to the Clerk of this
Court forthwith.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint for suspension or disbarment dated 15 December 1968,
complainant Ambrosio Sabayle charged respondent Teodulo C . Tandayag,
then Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur,
respondent Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor and respondent Atty. Pablo B. Badong
with the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Judge Teodulo Tandayag — Misconduct in office, inefficiency and
incompetence;
Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor — Violation of his duties as Notary Public by
acknowledging a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported vendors and
for taking advantage of his position as Assistant Clerk of court by purchasing
one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that that
Deed of Sale was fictitious; and.
Atty. Pablo B. Badong — Negligence in the performance of his professional
duties by failing to file an Opposition to a Motion in Civil Case No. IL-43
handled by him for complainant, and failing to take an appeal from the
decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 30302-R dated 5 May
1967, to the Supreme Court after having received the sum of P4,500.00 as
court fees, transportation expenses and attorney’s fees.
By a Resolution dated 3 February 1969, the Court required the respondents
to file their Answers to the complaint, which all the respondents did in due
course.
After consideration of the Answers filed by the respective respondents, the
Court, by a Resolution dated 8 August 1969, resolved to dismiss the
complaint insofar as respondent Judge Teodulo C. Tandayag was concerned,
and referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation insofar as respondent Attorneys Gabor and Badong were
concerned.
Fourteen (14) years later, because of the difficulty of securing the appearance
in Manila of the parties who all resided in Iligan City, then Assistant Solicitor
General Eduardo Montenegro referred the case on 28 June 1983 to the City
Fiscal of Iligan City for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 23 January 1984, Dominador L.
Padilla, City Fiscal of Iligan City, found that respondent Pablo B. Badong
had died on 11 August 1983; that complainant Ambrosio Sabayle had
"miserably failed to prove the charges he [had] alleged in his complaint
before the Honorable Supreme Court with sufficient evidence" against both
respondents Carmelito B. Gabor and Pablo B. Badong; and therefore
recommended that complainant’s charges against both respondents Badong
(deceased) and Gabor be dismissed.
On 5 November 1987, the Solicitor General filed his Report and
Recommendation dated 27 October 1987. The background facts, as found by
the Solicitor General, may be summed up as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. In 1961, the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No.
IL-43 entitled "Lucas Sebua, Et. Al. v. Ambrosio Sabayle" for enforcement
of subsidiary civil liability and for damages, rendered judgment against
therein defendant Sabayle requiring him to pay P7,000.00 as indemnity for
death, moral damages and attorney’s fees.
2. To avoid execution pending appeal, Sabayle filed a Supersedeas Bond
which, together with the Record on Appeal and Appeal Bond, were approved
by the judge and forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Sabayle’s appeal was
there docketed as C.A. G.R. No. 30302-R.
3. While the case was pending before the Court of Appeals, one of the
bondsmen in the Supersedeas Bond, Mr. Pedro Lim, filed an Urgent Motion
to Release Movant from the Effects of his Supersedeas Bond. Plaintiff-
appellee’s counsel opposed Pedro Lim’s Motion; respondent Atty. Pablo
Badong, counsel of defendant-appellant (Sabayle) did not interpose any
objection to the Motion. Respondent Judge Tandayag of the trial court
approved Mr. Pedro Lim’s Motion in an order dated 21 December 1967
which also approved a Surety Bond filed by complainant Sabayle in lieu of
the real property of Pedro Lim.
4. Complainant Sabayle had shortly before obtained a Surety Bond from the
Manhattan Guarantee Company, Inc. (Manhattan, in brief) and submitted a
piece of land owned by him to Manhattan as collateral supporting what
Sabayle believed to be his indemnity agreement. Both the Surety Bond issued
by Manhattan and the document signed by complainant Sabayle which later
turned out to be an Absolute Deed of Sale, were notarized by respondent
Carmelito B. Gabor.
5. Six (6) months after his order releasing Mr. Pedro Lim as bondsman under
the Supersedeas Bond, Judge Tandayag set aside his order, upon Motion for
Reconsideration of the Sebuas, principally because of a circular issued by the
Secretary of Justice cancelling the authority of Manhattan to issue surety
bonds in court proceedings. Judge Tandayag reinstated the Supersedeas Bond
set up by Mr. Pedro Lim.
6. The complainant then discovered that the document he had signed was an
Absolute Deed of Sale purportedly transferring ownership of a parcel of land
owned by Sabayle in favor of Mr. Teopisto Salcedo, Manager of Manhattan.
It also appeared that respondent Carmelito B. Gabor had subsequently
purchased from Mr. Teopisto Salcedo one-half (1/2) of the piece of land
purportedly acquired by Mr. Salcedo from complainant Sabayle.
7. Complainant Sabayle thereupon commenced before the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte Civil Case No. II-102 (1403) against Mr.
Teopisto Salcedo, respondent Carmelito B. Gabor and the Iligan City
Register of Deeds for annulment of the Absolute Deed of Sale. During the
pendency of this Civil Case for annulment, complainant Sabayle and Mr.
Teopisto Salcedo entered into a Compromise Agreement dated 25 May 1973.
In this Agreement, Mr. Salcedo admitted "that the Absolute Deed of Sale
acknowledged before Notary Public Carmelito B. Gabor was absolutely
simulated or fictitious," the supposed purchase price never having been paid
by Mr. Salcedo to the complainant and the parties never having intended to
enter into such contract of sale, and that Mr. Salcedo had never taken
possession of the land referred to in the Deed of Sale. Mr. Salcedo admitted,
further, that complainant was "owner in fee simple and the actual possessor"
of the land described in the Absolute Deed of Sale. The Compromise
Agreement was approved by the court which then rendered, on 5 November
1975, a decision which declared: (1) the Absolute Deed of Sale dated 26
October 1967 allegedly executed by Sabayle in favor of Teopisto Salcedo
and notarized by Carmelito B. Gabor; and (2) the Deed of Sale allegedly
executed by Teopisto Salcedo in favor of Carmelito B. Gabor and notarized
by Melvin Salise, as null and void, and complainant Sabayle to be the owner
of the land involved. The court also ordered Carmelito B. Gabor to pay
Sabayle P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
8. Complainant Sabayle had also filed a complaint for falsification of public
document with the Office of the City Fiscal of Iligan City. This complaint
was dismissed on the ground that the evidence adduced was not clear and
convincing.
9. Complainant Sabayle also filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao
del Norte administrative charges against respondent Carmelito B. Gabor for
serious misconduct, dishonesty, and acts unbecoming an Assistant Clerk of
Court. The trial Judge recommended dropping of this administrative charge
apparently upon the ground that the involvement of Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor
in the transaction was not shown to have been "in his (official) capacity as
Assistant Clerk of Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
In his Report and Recommendation, the Solicitor General recommended
dismissal of the charges against respondent deceased Pablo B. Badong as
moot and academic. While these charges may well be regarded as moot and
academic, we believe that in the present case, these may and should be
disposed of on the merits. It was not the deceased’s fault that these
proceedings have taken such an inordinate amount of time to complete and
his family is entitled to know the outcome.
Complainant Sabayle charged deceased respondent Pablo B. Badong with
negligence in the performance of his professional duties as counsel of
Sabayle, consisting of failure to file an Opposition to the Motion of
bondsman Pedro Lim to be relieved from the effects of his supersedeas bond,
and to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No.
30302-R dated 5 May 1967. In his Answer, deceased respondent Badong
explained that it was complainant Sabayle himself who had been interested
in effecting the release of bondsman Pedro Lim, since Mr. Lim had merely
accommodated Sabayle and since Mr. Lim wished to sell his piece of land,
the title of which had been annotated with a lien by reason of the supersedeas
bond. 1 Mr. Badong, further, explained in his Answer that he had been
retained by complainant Sabayle after the Court of Appeals had already
rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court and that he was
unable to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to this Court because
Sabayle did not have complete records of his case, in particular, the
appellant’s Brief and the Record on Appeal filed before the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Badong had requested the Court of Appeals to allow him to
borrow or withdraw a copy of the Record on Appeal and the appellant’s Brief
on file with the Court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals denied his Motion
as well as his Motion for a rehearing or reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Finally, in his Answer, respondent Badong also urged as a
countercharge against complainant Sabayle that the latter be punished for
contempt of court for deliberate falsehood and perjury.
The record also shows that on 11 October 1973, complainant Sabayle and
deceased respondent Badong filed with the Office of the Solicitor General a
"Joint Motion to Dismiss charges as against Atty. Pablo B. Badong only, etc."
dated 5 October 1973. This Joint Motion stated, in relevant
part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That complainant impleaded respondent Atty. Pablo B. Badong due
entirely to some misapprehension of facts and premises; complainant thought
then that his said former counsel in Civil Case No. IL-43, C.A.-G.R. No.
30302-R did nothing to advance and protect his interest in said case; but now,
after careful examination of the record and deliberate consideration of the
premises, complainant is sufficiently convinced and abundantly persuaded
that the said respondent was not remiss in the discharge of his professional
duties to me and that he did in fact try his best as a lawyer, to protect my
interest;
2. That accordingly, I do not find any bases for further prosecuting my said
administrative charges against Atty. Pablo B. Badong; that I stand satisfied
with the services he had rendered; and I affirm my faith and confidence in
him as a lawyer and a member of the Bar, and as an officer of this Court; and
that he had not been remiss in the discharge of his trust as member of the
legal profession;
3. That in his Answer to the Complaint in the above entitled case, on the other
hand, the said respondent Atty. Pablo B. Badong pressed counter-charges
against the above-named complainant; with the spirit of mutual respect and
amity restored between him and the complainant, for the sake of community
peace and better understanding, the said respondent is no longer interested in
the further prosecution of the said counter-charges and asks that the same be,
also, dropped;
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The movants, accordingly, prayed that the administrative charges against
respondent Badong be dismissed or recommended for dismissal by this Court
and that Badong’s counter-charges against complainant Sabayle be similarly
dismissed.
The above Joint Motion was, however, dismissed by Solicitor Celso P.
Ylagan in an order dated 27 March 1974, upon the ground that "settlement
with a client on the basis satisfactory to him does not preclude inquiries into
the moral and professional quality of an attorney’s acts prior to or in
connection therewith (People v. Chamberline, 242 III, 260). The Court will
not permit matters affecting the character of its officers to be settled by
private agreement (In Re: 9 L.T. Reports N.S. 299)."cralaw virtua1aw library
We note that the order of Solicitor Ylagan did not purport to rule on the
factual or non-factual character of the statements made in the Joint Motion
to Dismiss Charges. Indeed, Solicitor Ylagan appears to have issued his order
of dismissal because the administrative case was then still under
investigation, certainly as against respondent Carmelito B. Gabor. Upon the
other hand, the Court notes that the City Fiscal of Iligan City had concluded
in his report to the Solicitor General dated 23 January 1984
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Examining, however, the answer filed by Atty. Badong together with his
several annexes therein we can conclude that Atty. Badong was not negligent
at all in the handling of complainant’s case before the Honorable Court of
Appeals. In fact, Atty. Badong has exhausted all the limits available under
the Rules of Court for the case of complainant. This is supported by all the
pleadings he has filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals in Civil Case
No. IL-43, entitled "Lucas Sebua v. Ambrosio Sabayle." (Emphasis supplied)
After careful examination of the records of this case, the Court agrees with
the above evaluation of Iligan City Fiscal Dominador Padilla. Complainant
Sabayle had in fact retracted his charges against deceased respondent Badong
and admitted that he (Sabayle) had been mistaken in his charges.
Turning to the charges against respondent Carmelito B. Gabor, the Solicitor
General found that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Respondent indeed was guilty of Misconduct in violation of his oath as a
member of the bar.
The Decision of the Trial Court in Civil Case No. II-102 for Annulment of a
Deed of Sale (Annex D) is a mute but highly credible evidence that the Deed
of Sale executed by complainant with Mr. Teopisto Salcedo is truly simulated
and fictitious, for lack of consent and consideration. The Decision shows that
respondent Gabor never attended any of the hearings of the case. Neither did
he present evidence. On top of these, he did not appeal the Decision,
indicating his agreement with the Court’s findings.
x x x
The Trial Court, in its Decision in Civil Case No. II-102, for Annulment of a
Deed of Sale, found:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘It having been established that the deed of sale allegedly executed by the
plaintiff in favor of the defendant Salcedo is truly simulated and fictitious for
lack of consent and consideration and, null and void, it necessarily follows
that the defendant Teopisto Salcedo never became the owner of the property
mentioned in the deed of sale. Neither did he acquire any right thereto from
the execution of this fictitious deed of sale. As a consequence, the defendant
Salcedo had nothing to transfer to the other defendant Carmelito Gabor when
he in turn executed the deed of sale in the latter’s favor. The defendant
Carmelito Gabor, therefore, on his part cannot claim any right arising from
this document allegedly executed in his favor by the defendant Salcedo. This
is more accentuated by the fact that he never came into the possession of this
property allegedly sold to him which is very clear in its significance. It further
proves that the deed of sale executed between him and Salcedo, like the first
deed of sale admitted by Salcedo to be simulated and fictitious, is also
simulated and fictitious.’ (p. VII, Decision, Nov. 5, 1975, Annex "D").
Respondent does not deny that he notarized the disputed Deed of Sale, but
claims that complainant and his wife were present when he ratified the
document.
The finding of the Trial Court, however, that the Deed of Sale is fictitious
gives credence to the charge that respondent ratified the document in the
absence of complainant and his wife, which, needless to say, constitutes
censurable conduct.
In the same vein, we do not agree with respondent’s defense that he did not
participate in the preparation of the fictitious Deed of Sale.
A lawyer, who through negligence fails to discover the falsity of a document
which he uses in connect on with the performance of his functions may be
dealt with administratively for failure to exercise care, notwithstanding lack
of intent on his part to deceive (Berenguer v. Carranza, G.R. Adm. Case No.
716, Jan., 1969, 26 SCRA 673).
Here, not only did respondent know of the fictitious sale between
complainant and Mr. Teopisto Salcedo, so that the latter did not have any
right to transfer to him a portion of the land, respondent also maliciously
participated in the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring to him one-half of
the property for sufficient consideration. Such conduct, constitutes willful
disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to act at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor." (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the findings of the Solicitor General in respect of respondent
Carmelito B. Gabor. A lawyer who knowingly takes part in a false and
simulated transaction not only by notarizing a simulated Deed of Sale but
also by sharing in the profits flowing from defrauding of the victim through
such transaction by acquiring half of the property sought to be transferred by
the false transaction, is guilty of serious dishonesty and professional
misconduct. There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers
who, as officers of the courts, participate in the dispensation of justice to
behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. It is important
that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled
to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become common reality. It
is equally important that lawyers not be allowed to profit from their own
dishonest acts. This injunction is of particular importance for Notaries Public
who are authorized by law to convert private writings into public instruments
and to warrant the genuineness and voluntariness of such instruments by
acknowledging them.
In In re Del Rosario, 2 Mr. Justice Malcolm stressed the standards required
from members of the legal profession:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one
who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise
of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied
by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity
is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as
a duly authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266;
People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association v. Thomas [1906], 36 Colo., 126;
10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People v. Macauley [1907], 230 III., 208; Ex
parte Wall [1882], 107 U.S., 265.)." 3 suspended for five (5) years from the practice of law. A
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the charges against
deceased respondent Pablo B. Badong as moot and academic and for lack of
merit. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the family of the deceased
respondent Pablo B. Badong.
The Court, further, resolved to DISBAR respondent Carmelito B . Gabor and
to STRIKE his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to REQUIRE him to
surrender his Attorney’s Certificate to the Clerk of this Court forthwith. This
Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
INVESTMENT AND MGT SERVICES CORP VS ROXAS
VITUG, J.:
The administrative proceedings against Atty. Leodegario V.
Roxas started way back in 1975 when a petition for
"disbarment or suspension" was filed, on 03 January of that
year, by the Investment and Management Services
Corporation. The petition averred that the complainant
managed three corporations in the Philippines, to wit:
Worldwide Paper Mills, Inc., Prime Trading Corporation and
Luzon Leather Industries, Inc. Respondent lawyer, while
he was still petitioner's Administrative and Legal
Officer, allegedly "misappropriated or appropriated
for his own use and benefit certain sums of money or
checks which he received in trust . . . from the Prime
Trading Corporation and Luzon Leather Industries,
Inc. amounting to P2,623.80, from the debtors of
Luzon Leather Industries, Inc. amounting to P3,444.00,
and from a number of employees of the Worldwide Paper
Mills, Inc. amounting to P1,749.50 or a (grand) total of
P7,817.30." 1 In addition, according to petitioner,
respondent issued bouncing checks to pay for personal
obligations.
In the Court's resolution of 13 January 1975, respondent
was required to file an answer to the petition within ten
(10) days from notice. The resolution was sent to his
address at 647 John Glenn Street, Moonwalk Subdivision,
Phase II, Parañaque, Rizal. There was no response. On 08
September 1977, or more than two and a half years later,
respondent filed a "Motion for Substitution of Xerox Copy of
the Petition" supposedly because the copy sent to him was
not legible in certain portions that thereby prevented him
from preparing an answer. He asked that the ten-day
period within which to file his answer be counted from his
receipt of a new copy of the petition. He listed his address
at 566-B Pedro Gil Street, Malate, Manila.
In a manifestation, dated 23 September 1977, petitioner
informed the court that respondent was furnished with a
legible copy of the petition per Registry Receipt No. 12212.
On 20 December 1977, petitioner filed a second
manifestation stating that the legible copy of the petition
sent to respondent at his Malate address was returned
"unclaimed.
The Court, on 16 January 1978, directed the Clerk of Court
to mail the copy of the petition to respondent at 89
Igualdad (Equalidad) Street, Lemery, Batangas, which was
respondent's permanent address shown in his petition to
take the Bar Examinations. Respondent was given another
ten (10) days within which to answer the petition. The
Court further resolved to refer the matter to the Office of
the Solicitor General ("OSG") for investigation, report and
recommendation after the expiration of the ten-day period,
with or without respondent's answer, in order to avoid a
further delay in the proceedings.
On 27 April 1990, the OSG, through Assistant Solicitor
General Edgardo L. Kilayko, transmitted to the Court its
report, with the recommendation that respondent be
separate complaint was filed by the OSG with the Court.
In its resolution, dated 04 June 1990, the Court required
respondent to file his answer to the administrative
complaint filed by the OSG within fifteen (15) days from
notice.
In his answer, filed on 20 July 1990, respondent denied the
charges claiming that they were merely intended to harass
or embarrass him. Respondent, this time, indicated his
address at 2310-D San Anton Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
The OSG filed its reply on 17 January 1991, averring that
respondent's general denial should be deemed an admission
of the material allegations of the complaint.
In the resolution of 04 February 1991, the matter was
referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ("IBP").
On 08 November 1995, IBP Director for Bar Discipline
Agustinus V. Gonzaga transmitted to the Court the records
of the case, as well as the notice and copy of the decision,
viz:
Please take notice that on February 18, 1995 a resolution
was passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines in the above-entitled case the original of
which is now on file in this office, quote:
RESOLUTION NO. X1-95-287
Adm. Case No. 1417
Investment and Management Services Corporation vs. Atty.
Leodegario V. Roxas
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A;" and finding the
recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable law and rules,
respondent is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) month from
the practice of law. 2
From the Commissioner's Report, dated 30 January 1995, it
would appear that the case had been set for hearing a
number of times but both complainant and respondent
failed to appear. While the notices sent to respondent at his
Sampaloc address were at first received by him, later
communication, however, remained "unclaimed." The report
noted that for lack of evidence, the complaint should be
dismissed; however, it added that respondent's
"actuations," supra, in the course of the proceedings
deserved disciplinary sanctions. IBP, adopting the
Commissioner's Report, ordered the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
month.
Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court governing
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys, if the IBP Board of
Governors, by a majority vote of its total membership,
determines that a lawyer should be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations. The
resolution, together with the whole record of the case, shall
then be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. 3
In its resolution of 25 February 1992, the Court also
directed; thus:
Re-Cases involving the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or fine upon lawyers. The Court En Banc
RESOLVED that effective today, all cases involving the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or fine upon lawyers
shall be decided either by Division or En Banc conformably
with the following rules:
(1) If the penalty of suspension is imposed for a period of
one (1) year or less, the resolution of a case shall be by the
Division concerned; if the penalty exceeds one (1) year,
resolution shall be by the Court En Banc;
(2) If the penalty imposed is a fine of P10,000 or less, the
resolution shall be by the Division concerned; if more than
P10,000 resolution will be by the Court En Banc;
(3) In case both suspension and a fine are involved,
resolution shall be by the Court En Banc if the suspension
exceeds one (1) year or the fine exceeds P10,000.
(4) In case of two or more suspensions of the lawyer,
service of the same will be successive, not simultaneous.
Accordingly, we shall take the IBP decision ordering the
one- month suspension of respondent to be merely
recommendatory.
After a thorough review of the case, we find nothing to
warrant a reversal of the findings of the IBP; indeed, the
Court believes, given the circumstances, that a more
severe penalty than that recommended needs to be
imposed.
Respondent clearly had no intention to squarely face the
charges against him. By repeatedly changing his address
without informing the investigating officials or the Court he
somehow managed to evade the administrative
investigation for, after years of delay, no longer could
complainant corporation be reached to substantiate its
charges. The Court cannot take the matter lightly.
A lawyer must constantly conduct himself with great
propriety. He is also an officer of the court, and he
owes to it, as well as to his peers, utmost respect and
fidelity. His relationship with others should no less be
characterized than by the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor. 4 When he took the oath
as a member of the legal profession, he made a
solemn promise to so stand by those pledges. In this
covenant, respondent lawyer has miserably failed.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas is ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon his receipt of this decision.
NARIDO v LINSANGAN
FACTS
Two administrative cases wherein respondents Jaime S. Linsangan and
Rufino B. Risma, who frepresented adverse parties in a workmen's
compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other.
The charge against respondent Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Naridois
that he violated the attorney's oath by submitting a perjured statement. When
required to answer, not only did he deny the complaint but he would also
hold respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client, the
complainant, Flora Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting
in what respondent Linsangan called "embarrassment, humiliation and
defamation" of a brother in a profession
ISSUE
RULING
Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo: 4 "It should be observed, in
this connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations,
between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and
will not receive any sympathy from this court."
The complaint against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is dismissed for lack
of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma is exculpated from the charge of
having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is, however,
admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our
law he could recover by way of attorney's contract entered into between
him and his client as to his being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award
granted her in a workmen's compensation suit is declared to be of no
force and effect, the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only
because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced
expenses for a poor client. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the
records of
both respondents.
PEOPLE v SESBRENO
FACTS
atty sesbreno has been filed with a case of libel
Based on alleged defamatory statement found in a pleading that he made.
allegedly libelous statements imputing that Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza is an
irresponsible person, cannot be trusted, like Judas, a liar and irresponsible
childish prankster.
Requested for squashal of information because accordimg to him it is
protected by doctrine of absolute privilge communication
ISSUE
Does atty sesbreno's wordings in the pleading employed language that is
unbecoming of a member of the Bar and therefore would result to a violation
the CPR?
RULING
However, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that, at times, zeal
in the defense of one's clientmay be carried to the point of undue skepticism
and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by
two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from
edifying (Narido v. Linsangan, 58 SCRA 85). Mutual bickerings and
recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the
dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy
from this Court (Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293).
Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be
allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each
other or toward suitors in the case. All personalities between counsel should
be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a case it is
indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal peculiarities and
idiosyncracies of counsel on the other side. Personal colloquies between
counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be
carefully avoided (Canon 17, Canons of Professional Ethics). Lawyers owe
respect not only to the courts and their clients, but also to other members of
the Bar.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language
should likewise be dignified (In re Climaco, 55 SCRA 107, 121). Choice of
language is a important requirement in the preparation of pleadings
Appropriately, in the assertion of their client's rights, lawyers - even those
gifted with superior intellect - are enjoined to rein up their tempers. Greater
care and circumspection must be exercised in the preparation of their
pleadings and to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language
(Yangson v. Saladanan, 68 SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a desirable
trait also of practising attorneys
Atty Sesbreno is reprimanded and admonished to refrain from employing
language unbecoming of a member of the Bar and to extend
courtesy and respect to his brothers in the profession with a warning that any
future infraction of a nature
similar to that found in this case shall be dealt with more severely
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners, vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning
Facts
The herein petitioner Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas ere
complainant in the case no. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, “PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al.” which the Court of Industrial Relation
rendered a decision in favor of the complainant,ordering reinstatement
and backwages. Cipriano Cid and Associates and Atty. Atanacio Pacis
filed a notice of attorney’s lien equivalent to 30% of the total
backwages. Complainants Entila and Tenazas filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney’s fees for 25% of
their bacwages, and on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a Petition for
the Award of Services Rendered equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Muning petition was opposed by the herein petitioner on the ground that the
former is not a lawyer.
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition
Issue:
Whether or not Quentin Muning, a non lawyer, can recover attorney’s fees
Held:
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-
23467, 27 March 1968, that an agreement providing for the
division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral
and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no
less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated; that acting as an attorney without authority constitutes
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an
unlawful act or an act done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be
allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion
as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a
chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures.
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be
awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that
appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should
be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and
cannot justify an exception.
HALILI VS CIR
The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than
five hundred bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation
initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for overtime with the
CIR. The disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties
reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the
employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of land
was eventually registered in the name of the Union.
The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with
the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to
sell and dispose of the property. Union President Amado Lopez, in a letter,
informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the
said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm based on
whatever amount would be awarded the Union.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897
workers' claim. When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases,
still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name B.C.
Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the principal
lawyer in these cases.
Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases
were pending resolution. He always held office in the firm's place at Puyat
Building, except in 1966 to 1967 when he transferred to the Lakas ng
Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint at the latter office, Atty.
Pineda continued handling the case with the arrangement that he would
report the developments to the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law firm
in 1968, he continued working on these cases and using the Puyat Building
office as his address in the pleadings.
When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to
his partners (he was made the most senior partner) that he had a retainer's
contract. He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did not divulge the
1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of the Union knew of the
contract.
The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears
anomalous and even illegal as well as unethical considering that-
1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of
the Union chosen by about 125 members only. It was not a contract with
the general membership.
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili
Transit and the 45% fee for those who were no longer working worked to
the prejudice of the latter group who should and were entitled to more
benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in
1967, the Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila. By
then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the workers would be out of work which
would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.
3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was
executed when Atty. Espinas was still handling the appeal of Halili Transit
in the main case before the Supreme Court.
4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien
with Arbiter Valenzuela on February 8, 1983, he did not attach the
retainer's contract.
5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized.
A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected in
view of PD 1529 which requires no less than an order from a court of
competent jurisdiction as authority to sell property in trust.
Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the
earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent
motion, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The sale was
finally consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow agreement.
When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for
the Union) learned of the sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past
Union president Amado Lopez, he requested Labor Arbiter Raymundo
Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records of the case. The latter,
however, told him that the records of the case were missing. Thereupon,
Atty. Espinas requested Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the
records.
Issue: TAN TEK BENG VS DAVID

a.Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in FACTS
contempt. In said agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his
professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also
b. Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred. bound himself not to deal directly with the clients

Held:
a. YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity
of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration
of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or
their witnesses during litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice.
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last.
There were mutual accusations of doublecross. No civil suit wad filed by
Tan.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of
himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro
Jacinto as president and financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of
office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should
also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan
Tek Beng refused.
1977 Tan Died

In the Slade Perkins case, "the exercise of the power to punish contempt has
a twofold aspect, namely (1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for
his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of
some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform.
Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them,
contempts are classified as civil or criminal.
A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a
court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein.
A criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and dignity
of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.
ISSUE
whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David
(admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer
(alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the
attorney's fees received by David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng.
RULING
Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.
We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty commsitted by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and
technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec.
21 of Act No. 190).

That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice
b. YES. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain
provides:
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be
unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42;
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National
grounds.—A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his Bank, 62 Phil. 569)
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corrupt or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part
showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the
attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or
showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence.

In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted

Atty. Pineda's motion for such authority to sell the property make the entire
transaction dubious and irregular.

Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to

sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the
authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait for valid
authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter
whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize.

The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who
were no longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who
were still working as provided for in the alleged retainer's contract are
also very exorbitant and unconscionable.

*Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is

sentenced to imprisonment and directed to show cause why he should not
be disbarred.