Art.

88-104 – Absolute Community Property

Title Principles/Holding
Nobleza v. Nuega WoN the decision to declare the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property null and void proper. – It is
Married proper
Sept. 1, 1990
Rogelio Nuega----------------------------R Shirley Nuega
 1988, while still engaged, R Nuega working as Israel domestic - P Nobleza was not a buyer in good faith
helper  It is the party who claims to be an innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such assertion, and it is not
o Rogelio request; R Nuega sent money for purchase enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith.
of a residential lot for their home o To successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the presumption is the “buyer in good faith” must
o House purchased from Rodeanna Realty have shown prudence and due diligence in the exercise of his/her rights.
Corporation, (Sept. 13, 1989)  It presupposes that the buyer did everything that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of
 R Nuega arrived in PH; settled the equity over the property his/her rights and interests against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation.
and the monthly amortizations - In the case: P Nobleza merely relied in the TCT. Hence, she is not a buyer in good faith.
 TCT over the subject property issued by Registry of Deeds  A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other
solely named under Rogelio (Oct. 19, 1989) surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.
- After marriage, R Nuega returned to Israel for work
 She later learned that Rogelio brought home another woman - *** The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s financial contribution in the
- R Nuega filed 2 case v. Rogelio – (1) concubinage and purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is
(2) legal separation and liquidation of property community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.
 In between the filing of the cases, R Nuega learned that that  Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property
Rogelio had intention to sell subject property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
o R Nuega advised the interested buyers – one of o The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those
which was P Josefina Nobleza, of the existence of the excluded by the marriage settlement.
cases filed v. Rogelio and cautioned against buying  Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:
before the cases are closed and terminated o Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
o Under a Deed of Absolute Sale, Rogelio sold the  Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof,
subject property to P Nobleza without R Nuega’s if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community
consent (P380k) property;
- RTC granted the petition for legal separation and Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
ordered the dissolution and liquidation of regime of abs. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the
fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
community property
 Rogelio appealed to CA, but dismissed In the case: Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore
-
 forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to
Decision became final and executory and a writ of
execution was issued its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio’s name appears in the TCT as owner, the
- R Nuega instituted a Complaint for Rescission of Sale property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
and Recovery of Property v. P Nobleza and Rogelio to  From Art. 96 FC, Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the written consent of respondent or the authority of the
RTC court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void.
 Ruled in favor of R Nuega o There being no evidence on record that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, R Nuega
 CA affirmed RTC’s decision cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.

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Art. 105-133 – Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Title
Muñoz, Jr. v. Carlos
R Erlinda Ramirez---------------------------R
Married CC
Eliseo Carlos
 Residential lot in the subject property previously covered by
TCT in the name of R Ramirez
 Eliseo mortgaged the TCT with Erlinda’s consent to GSIS
(P136,500 housing loan) payable 20 yrs; built house on the lot
 Title transferred to P Francisco Muñoz through Deed of
Absolute Sale, executed by R Ramirez, for herself and as atty-
in-fact of R Carlos for P602k
- Rs filed complaint for nullification of DAS
 Claimed there was no sale but only a mortgage; the
documents transferring the title to P Muñoz were falsified
o Rs alleged that P Muñoz granted them P602k loan;
P Muñoz gave Erlinda P200k advance to cancel the
GSIS mortgage; P Muñoz promised to give the
P402k upon surrender of TCT & GSIS mortgage
cancelled & submit affidavit signed by R Carlos
waiving all rights to property
o R Ramirez paid GSIS to cancel the mortgage;
surrendered TCT to P Muñoz but R Carlos’ affidavit
was unsigned; P Muñoz refused to give the
remaining balance and to cancel the mortgage and
demanded R Ramirez to return the 200k but unable
as it was used as payment to GSIS loan; P Muñoz
kept the title; Rs later discovered that TCT now under
name of P Muñoz
 P Muñoz countered that there was valid contract of sale
o Alleged Rs sold property to him; sale was implied
promise to repurchase within 1yr, during which
period, Rs would lease it for P500 rental; Rs failed to
repurchase w/in 1yr, TCT transferred to his name
 In RTC, Rs presented that R Carlos sig in SPA are forgeries; P
Muñoz raised that property is paraphernal reg. to R Ramirez
o RTC upheld sale, even w/o R Carlos consent
(unnecessary) as it has genuine sig of R Ramirez
o CA reversed – property became conjugal prop when
used as collateral for housing loan; cannot be
mortgaged without Carlos’ consent
Principles/Holding
WoN the property is paraphernal or conjugal. – Paraphernal; consent of R Carlos immaterial
- As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
 In the case: Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.
o Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the
marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The lot,
therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.
- Wrong application by CA of Art. 158 CC and Calimlim-Canullas
 Under the second paragraph of Article 158 CC, a land that originally belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction
of improvements thereon at the expense of the partnership. Court applied this provision in Calimlim-Canullas, where it was held that
when the conjugal house is constructed on land belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the
husband is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
 In the case: As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the CC, its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains
(Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August
3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the
Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states:
 The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.”
o Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil
Code, except with respect to rights then already vested.
- Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at
the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses.
 Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at
the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
 In the case: Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. Eliseo paid about P60,755.76,44, not the
entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is reasonable
to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly
salary deductions.
o Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the
petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the
special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
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 Title
Ayala Investments v. CA
Obtained loan from
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM)-----P Ayala Investments
 As added security, R Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed
security arrangements, making himself jointly and
severally answerable w/ PBM’s debt to P Ayala
 PBM failed to pay the loan; P Ayala filed case for sum of
money v. PBM and R Alfredo
o Court ordered PBM and R Alfredo to jointly and
severally pay P Ayala P50.3M w/ interests
o Writ of execution pending appeal was executed;
notice of sheriff sale on 3 conjugal props of R Sps.
Ching was served
 R Sps. filed case for injunction v. Ps to enjoin auction sale
o Alleged Ps cannot enforce judgment v. conjugal
partnership on the ground that subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership; TRO issued v. writ of execution
 P Ayala filed petition to R CA. It issued TRO on order of RTC;
auction sale pushed through – P Ayala was the only bidder
o Certificate of Sale issued; upon expiration of
redemption period, final deed of sale was issued
and then registered
- R CA later decided on the issue of declaring the
execution null and void in that the loan procured from
P Ayala was for the benefit of PBM, and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of the R Sps. - P Ayala claims that there would be benefits, such as prolonged employment, shares of stock of family would
appreciate, prestige and career would be boosted
 Court said that these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting
Principles/Holding
WoN the obligation incurred by respondent husband did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of the private respondent.
- *** Conclusions drawn by Court from several related cases:
1. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his
own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term “x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
a. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services
to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed.
i. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
2. If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
a. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it
is “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
i. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
- In the case: Co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
 Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching’s acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Burden of proof lies with P Ayala.
o This is because PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of petitioners-appellees—this despite the fact
that the members of the said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
o In the case: Considering the odds involved in guaranteeing a large amount (P50M) of loan, the probable prolongation of
employment in PBM and increase in value of its stocks, would be too small to qualify the transaction as one “for the benefit”
of the surety’s family. Verily, no one could say, with a degree of certainty, that the said contract is even “productive of
some benefits” to the conjugal partnership.
HELD: Petition was denied.
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 Title Principles/Holding
Ching v. CA Obtained loan of WoN the contention of petitioner-wife is tenable. – YES, presumption of conjugal character not overturned
P9M from
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM)---R Allied Banking Corp
 PBM, through EVP, P Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory - CA ruled that the presumption in Article 160 of the New Civil Code shall not apply where, as in this case, the
note for said amount petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of the money used to acquire the shares of stock.
o As added security, P Alfredo, with Tañedo and Kiat  It held that the levied shares of stocks belonged to P Alfredo, as evidenced by the fact that the said shares were registered in the
Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the R ABC corporate books of Citycorp solely under his name.
binding themselves to jointly and severally - The Sps. aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor
guarantee the payment of all the PBM
when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 160, and that such presumption subsists
obligations owing the R ABC to the extent of
P38M. Renewed several times. even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching.
 R ABC extended another loan to PBM, amounting to P13M  According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or
o As in the previous loan, the PBM, through Alfredo business. And, contrary to the ruling of the CA, where conjugal assets are attached in a collection suit on an obligation contracted by
Ching, executed a promissory note the husband, the wife should exhaust her motion to quash in the main case and not file a separate suit.
- The PBM defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
 ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ - *** Court finds that Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage
of preliminary attachment against the PBM to collect the are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
P12,612,972 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank
husband, or to the wife.
charges.
 It is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership.
o Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were
 As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even
P Alfredo, Tañedo and Kiat Hua, in their capacity as
when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still
sureties of the PBM
be considered conjugal.
 Deputy sheriff levied on attachment the 100k common
shares of Citycorp. Stocks in P Alfredo’s name
 The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome the same.
o R Encarnacion Ching, assisted by husband R Alfredo
(married Jan. 8, 1960), filed a Motion to Set Aside the - In the case: The 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the
levy on attachment name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during
 Alleged that that the 100,000 shares of the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses.
stocks levied on by the sheriff were  The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to
acquired by her and her husband during adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
their marriage out of conjugal funds  The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp solely in the name of the petitioner-
 Also, the indebtedness covered by the husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
continuing guaranty or comprehensive
 He who claims that property acquired by the spouses during their marriage is not conjugal partnership property but belongs to one of
suretyship contract executed by
them as his personal property is burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase the same. Respondent failed to
petitioner P Alfredo for the account of PBM
do the same.
did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership
- RTC ordered the lifting of Writ of Preliminary - CA also erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
Attachment on the shares of stocks and the return to the respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing
R Sps. R ABC filed petition to CA a legitimate business under Art. 161(1) CC.
 signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business.
- CA nullified RTC’s order, citing that P Encarnacion was
 For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some
not a party in the trial court and it’s barred by laches advantages accrued to the spouses. – not shown in the case

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 Title Principles/Holding
Francisco v. Gonzales Can the Taal Property be sold to answer for the debts of Michel? NO
- Sps. Cleodia and Ceamantha Francisco was annulled
 In the Compromise Agreement, it was stated that “Title and - The RTC should not have ignored that TCT No. 167907 is in the name of “Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele
ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and U. Francisco.”
lot shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to P  On its face, the title shows that the registered owner of the property is not Matrai and Michele but Cleodualdo, married to Michele.
Cleodia and P Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach This describes the civil status of Cleodualdo at the time the property was acquired.
nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old, respectively” o Records show that Cleodualdo and Michele were married on June 12, 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on
located in 410 Taal St., Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa August 3, 1988. As such, their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership of gains.
City.
- Meanwhile, a case for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary - The CA acknowledged that ownership of the subject property is conjugal in nature;18 however, it ruled that since
Attachment was filed by R Sps. Jorge and Purification Michele’s obligation was not proven to be a personal debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to
Gonzales v. Matrai and Michele the benefit of the family, and hence, the property may be held answerable for it.
 Ordered to vacate the premises leased located in 264 Lanka  Court do not agree
Drive, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City.  A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows
- Notice of sale by execution was then issued covering the money for that purpose upon her husband’s failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is
real property in the name of Sps. Francisco transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.
 When Ps grandmother learned of the scheduled auction, she o Failure to establish any of these circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the
as guardian-in-fact, filed a motion to stop the sale; denied by wife’s personal obligation.
RTC; filed petition to CA o In the case: The foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from
 Pending resolution in CA, RTC issued order granting R Sps. a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai.
Gonzales’ petition for issuance of new certificate of title and - Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the Notice of Levy on Execution on November 28, 2001,21 there was
writ of possession already annotated on the title that:
 P’s petition was dismissed by CA  “declaring the Marriage Contract between Michelle Uriarte and Cleodualdo M. Francisco, Jr. is null & void ab initio, the title of
- Ps argue that: ownership of the conjugal property consisting of the above-described property shall be transferred by way of a Deed of Donation to
 they are the rightful owners of the property as the Partial Cleodia Michaela and Ceamantha Maica Francisco”
Decision issued by the RTC had already become final; o This annotation should have put the RTC and the sheriff on guard, and they should not have proceeded with the execution
 their parents already waived in their favor their rights over the of the judgment debt of Michele and Matrai.
property;
 the adjudged obligation of Michele in the ejectment case did
- It should also be noted that the judgment debt for which the subject property was being made to answer was
not redound to the benefit of the family;
incurred by Michele and her partner, Matrai. Respondents allege that the lease of the property in Lanka Drive
 Michele’s obligation is a joint obligation between her and
Matrai, not joint and solidary. redounded to the benefit of the family.
- The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC to  Such is not the case! Michele, who was then already living separately from Cleodualdo, rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and
Matrai’s own benefit. In fact, when they entered into the lease agreement, Michele and Matrai purported themselves to be husband
proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject
and wife.
property o Respondents’ bare allegation that petitioners lived with Michele on the leased property is not sufficient to support
 The power of the court in executing judgments extends only the conclusion that the judgment debt against Michele and Matrai in the ejectment suit redounded to the benefit of
to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment the family of Michele and Cleodualdo and petitioners.
debtor alone, in the present case to those belonging to
Michele and Matrai.
HELD: Petition is granted. CA decision set aside.
 One man’s goods shall not be sold for another man’s debts.

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 Title Principles/Holding
Buado v. Nicol Filed a complaint for Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of
damages against
P Sps. Buado----------------------------------Erlinda Nicol the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a “stranger?”
 Said case from Erlinda’s civil liability from criminal offense
of slander - In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property must be taken into
o RTC ordered Erlinda to pay damages account.
o Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties  In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, SC held that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case
insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on o On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals, SC stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the
execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership
Cavite. over his exclusive or paraphernal property.
 Notice of sheriff’s sale issued  Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit
- 2 days before public auction sale, an affidavit of third- of the conjugal partnership or not.
party claim from Arnulfo Fulo was received
 Auction sale still proceeded with P Sps. Buado as highest
- Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal
bidder; certificate of sale was issued
partnership. We do not agree.
- 1yr later, R Romulo Nicol, Erlinda’s husband, filed a
 There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment of
complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
and the deputy sheriff.
 Alleged that Ps connived and directly levied - *** Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime
upon and execute his real property without or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal
 RTC dismissed R Romulo’s complaint partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of
o CA reversed RTC’s decision the debtor-spouse.
 In the case: Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
 To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some
advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.

HELD: Case dismissed. The filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch
21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case
to Branch 21 for further proceedings.

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 Title
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite
- P Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, others, were accused of
murder
 RTC acquitted P Efren due to insufficient evidence; Melecia
and others were found guilty and sentenced to death
 RTC ordered those guilty to pay each of the heirs jointly and
severally damages
- SC affirmed the conviction; also affirmed the civil
indemnity and moral damages
 Decision became final and executory
- Upon motion for execution by heirs of the deceases, RTC
ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of
real properties registered in the names of P Efren and - From SC: Article 256 FC does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of
Melecia
 Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on
execution were issued.
 P Efren and Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia; RTC denied
o CA dismissed the petition
Principles/Holding
WoN the conjugal properties of spouses P Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case. YES, did not contend allegation of no separate prop
- To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the properties
of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses’ property relations.
 P claim: Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that they were
married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.
o R claim: Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it was the CC, not the FC, which governed the
marriage, they insist that it was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia.
 Reasoning that the fact of marriage before FC effectivity does not prevent the application of [A]rt. 94, last paragraph,
of the FC because their property regime is precisely governed by the law on absolute community. This finds support
in Art. 256 of the FC. – both RTC and CA wrong
property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with
prenuptial agreements.
 The FC itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage.
 Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married
prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
- When post-marriage modifications may take place:
a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;
b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime;
c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply
with his obligations to the family;
d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135;
e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.
- In the case: None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
- What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the CC was still the operative law on marriages.
 The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains.
o Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal
partnership of gains under the Civil Code. (Art. 105 FC)
- Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal properties
of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case.
 Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity
that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 Family Code FC have been covered.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|7
 Title Principles/Holding
BA Finance v. CA Issue raised by P BA Finance: While it is true that A & L Industries is a single proprietorship and the registered
P BA Finance-------------------------------R Augusto Yulo owner thereof is private respondent Lily Yulo, the said proprietorship was established during the marriage and
Gave loan to

 Loaned P591k as evidenced by promissory note R Augusto its assets were also acquired during the same. Therefore, it is presumed that this property forms part of the
signed in his own behalf and as representative of A&L conjugal partnership of the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo and thus, could be held liable for the obligations
Industries contracted by Augusto Yulo, as administrator of the partnership.
 PR Augusto presented an alleged SPA executed by wife, R
Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and under whose
name the said business is registered, purportedly - There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of R Augusto and R Lily Yulo and
authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure the loan and sign the therefore the same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the spouses
promissory note. does not destroy its conjugal nature.
 However, about 2mo prior to the loan, R Augusto had  However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit
already left Lily Yulo and their children and had of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code.
abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation o In the case: the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the R Lily
became due and demandable, R Augusto failed to pay the Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by R Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation
same. he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.
- P BA Finance prayed for issuance of writ of attachment,  Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure such loan
alleging the R Sps. Yulo were guilty of fraud in contracting from the petitioner.
the debt  To make A & L Industries liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the
Civil Code.
 Fraud consisted of R Sps. Yulo’s inducing P to enter into a
contract w/ them by executing a Deed of Assignment in favor
of P, assigning all their rights, titles and interests over a HELD: The petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal properties with
construction contract executed by and between the spouses respondent Lily Yulo.
and A. Soriano Corporation  Thus, it follows that the writ of attachment cannot issue against the said properties.
o the said spouses failed and refused to remit the
collections and instead, misappropriated the
proceeds for their own use and benefit, without the - CA decision set aside, P ordered to pay R Lily P600k as actual damages. Remaining properties released in favor of P.
knowledge or consent of the petitioner. (said attachment led to closing of business)
- RTC issued the writ of attachment enabling P BA
Finance to attach the properties of A&L Industries
- R Lily answered that though she is married to R Augusto,
the former abandoned her and their children 5mo before
the filing of the complaint;
 they were already separated then the promissory note was
executed; her signature in the SPA was forged as she never
authorized R Augusto to transact any business for A&L
Industries
- RTC dismissed P’s complaint; CA affirmed RTC’s decision

* document not signed in front of notary public

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|8

 Title Principles/Holding
Heirs of Ayuste v. CA Whether petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste without
Married the consent of Christina Ayuste.
Sept. 24, 1961
Christina Ayuste------------------------------Rafael Ayuste
 The couple purchased a parcel of land in Lucena - *** Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot alienate
o Deed of sale was executed, signed, and filed with the or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wife’s consent, subject only to certain
Register of Deeds exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her husband should dispose of their
o TCT was issued in the name of Rafael Ayuste,
conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that—
married to Christina Ayuste
 The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
- Later, a deed of absolute sale was executed by Rafael in contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which
favor of PR Viena Malabonga, sold for P40k tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
 On pg2, signature of Christina was present, below the phrase heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
“with my conformity”
 Deed of sale was registered with the register of deeds; TCT
- There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the
was issued in name of PR Malabonga
- It was only after Rafael’s death that Christina discovered, husband without the consent of his wife is voidable.
 The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife.
in the course of an inventory of their properties, that the
 Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation—there is room only for application.
title to the land in Lucena was missing and that it was sold
by Rafael to PR Malabonga - In the case: The deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on October 13, 1989. However,
- Christina filed a complaint to RTC for the annulment of it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with the lower court asking for the annulment
the sale, cancellation of the title issued in the name of of the sale.
private respondent and for the payment of moral,  Although the action was filed within ten years from the questioned transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage
exemplary and actual damages. which was dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989.
 alleges that her signature on the deed of sale was forged and  Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time.
that her husband Rafael Ayuste sold the property without her
knowledge and consent.
- *** As such, the fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not
- RTC declared the deed of absolute sale null and void
material.
 ordered PR Malabonga to return possession of property to
 The Court affirms public respondent CA’s ruling that registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the
Christina; cancel TCT
whole world.
 CA reversed RTC’s decision
o Since the deed of sale was registered on March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed to have constructive notice of the
o Christina Ayuste’s right to bring an action for the
sale from such date.
annulment of the sale is barred by laches because of
her failure to file it during the existence of the
marriage in accordance with article 173 of the Civil HELD: Decision of CA affirmed.
Code (during marriage, w/in 10 yrs).
o Also, it found private respondent to be entitled to
the protection of a buyer in good faith and for value.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|9

 Title Principles/Holding
Heirs of Reyes v. Mijares 1) What is the status of the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses? VOIDABLE
Vicente Reyes--------------------------------Ignacia
Married 1960
Reyes 2) Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share
 Bought a lot in Balintawak, QC and registered in their names of Ignacia? IN ITS ENTIRETY
o Lot and apartments built thereon were part of 3) Are respondent spouses purchasers in good faith? NO
conjugal properties having been purchased using
conjugal funds
- Under CC, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or
 They were separated de facto since 1974
 In 1984, Ignacia learned that on Mar. 1, 1983, Vicente sold implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable.
the lot to R Sps. Cipriano and Florentina Mijares; new TCT  This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from
was issued in the name of R Sps. Mijares Apr. 19, 1983 the questioned transaction, seek its annulment.
 Ignacia also found out that Vicente filed a petition for - In the case: There is no dispute that the lot is a conjugal property having been purchased using the conjugal funds
administration and appointment of guardian with MTC of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage.
o Vicente misrepresented that his wife died on Mar.  It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is
22, 1982 and that he and their 5 minor children were voidable.
her only heirs  Her action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year
o Court appointed Vicente as the guardian of their prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code.
minor children. Subsequently, the court authorized o Even if we reckon the period from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the respondent spouses entered
Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia. into a contract concerning the lot, Ignacia’s action would still be within the prescribed period.
- Ignacia filed a complaint for annulment of sale on June
4, 1996 - Re: the annulment of the sale in its entirety by RTC – such is correct
 R Sps. Mijares answered that they are purchasers in good faith  The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the
and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by wife’s consent, may be annulled by the wife.
the court.
 Vicente, meanwhile, contended that what he sold to the
spouses was only his share in the lot, excluding the share of
- Re: 3rd issue, R Sps. Mijares are not purchasers in good faith
his wife, and that he never represented that the latter was  A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
already dead. such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
o Also claimed that R Sps. Mijares took advantage of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the
his illiteracy by filing a petition for the issuance of owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his
letters of administration and appointment of guard and still claim he acted in good faith.
guardian without his knowledge.  In the case: there existed circumstances that should have placed respondent spouses on guard.
- RTC declared the sale of the lot void with respect to o The death certificate of Ignacia shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same death certificate, however, reveals that the
date it was issued by the Civil registrar, the date the alleged death was reported to the Civil Registrar, and the alleged date of
Ignacia’s share; later modified and declared the sale void
burial or cremation, all happened prior to the alleged date of death
in its entirety  These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted respondents to investigate further, especially so
- Both parties appealed to CA; pending appeal, Ignacia that respondent Florentina Mijares admitted on cross examination that she asked for the death certificate of Ignacia
died; replaced by compulsory heirs because she was suspicious that Ignacia was still alive.
 CA reversed and set aside RTC decision, citing that  Moreover, respondent spouses had all the opportunity to verify the claim of Vicente that he is a widower
notwithstanding the absence of Ignacia’s consent, the same  Neither can respondent spouses rely on the alleged court approval of the sale.
must be valid as they were innocent purchasers for value
HELD: order annulling the deed of absolute sale was reinstated

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|10

 Title
Pelayo v. Perez
P David Pelayo-------------------------------R Melki Perez
Conveyed to
 Deed of sale of two lots (agricultural) in Panabo
o P Lorenza Pelayo (wife) and another witnessed the
execution of the deed
 However, P Lorenza signed only on the 3rd
page in the space provided for witness
 Due to which, R Perez’ registration of the
deed was denied
o R Perez asked P Lorenza to sign on the 1st and 2nd
pages; refused
 Hence, he instituted a complaint for
specific performance against her and
husband P David
- RTC denied the petition
 CA reversed; ruled that by P Lorenza’s signing as witness to
the execution of the deed, she had knowledge of the
transaction.
o Deemed to have given consent to the same
o Declared valid and enforceable the questioned deed
of sale; ordered P Lorenzana to affix her signature
Principles/Holding
WoN there was implied marital consent of the wife of petitioner David Pelayo. YES
- The Court agree with the CA ruling that P Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space
provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
- *** Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A wife’s
consent to the husband’s disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in
any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed
given.
 In the case: Although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances
leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and
consented to the sale.
o P Sps. do not deny that P Lorenza was present during the execution of the deed of sale as her signature appears thereon.
Neither do they claim that P Lorenza had no knowledge whatsoever about the contents of the subject document. Thus, it is
quite certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal property between her husband and respondent.
o P Sps. did not even attempt to overcome the aforementioned presumption as no evidence was ever presented to show that
Lorenza was in any way lacking in her mental faculties and, hence, could not have fully understood the ramifications of signing
the deed of sale.
o Neither did P Sps. present any evidence that P Lorenza had been defrauded, forced, intimidated or threatened either by her
own husband or by respondent into affixing her signature on the subject document.
 If Lorenza had any objections over the conveyance of the disputed property, she could have totally refrained from
having any part in the execution of the deed of sale. Instead, P Lorenza even affixed her signature thereto.
- Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January
11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property
does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable.
 Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose
consent was not obtained.
 In the case: Despite R Perez’ repeated demands for P Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages of the deed of sale, showing
respondent’s insistence on enforcing said contract, P Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale.
o It was only when respondent filed a complaint for specific performance on August 8, 1991 when petitioners brought up P
Lorenza’s alleged lack of consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if the transaction was indeed entered into without P Lorenza’s
consent, the Court find it quite puzzling why for more than three and a half years, P Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek
the nullification of the assailed contract.
HELD: The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that P Lorenza knew of the full import of the transaction
between respondent and her husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she, in effect, signified her
consent to the disposition of their conjugal property.
 Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|11
 Title Principles/Holding
Aguete v. PNB WoN CA erred in declaring that the loan contracted by husband P Joe A. Ros with R Philippine National
P Joe Ros--------------------------------------R PNB Laoag
Obtained loan from Bank—Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family. IT WAS CORRECT; loan redounded to benefit of family
 P115k loan; as security P Ros executed a real estate mortgage
involving a parcel of land w/ the improvements - The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The subject property is thus considered part of
 Upon maturity, loan remained outstanding the conjugal partnership of gains.
o PNB institutes extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings  There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguete’s marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16
on the mortgaged property January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968.
o After the extrajudicial sale, Certificate of Sale was  There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115k on 23 October 1974.
issued in favor of PNB Laoag  PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB of the subject property.
 After 1yr without being redeemed, o On the other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies affixing her signature to the mortgage
property was consolidated registered in and loan documents.
the name of PNB Laoag
- Complaint was filed by P Estrella Aguete (wife) for
- *** The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of
annulment of the proceedings pertaining to the
the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows P Aguete to
mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property
question P Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
 Claimed that she had no knowledge of the loan obtained by
 However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared
her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted
only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
on the conjugal property
o In the case: We follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros’ encumbrance
 Said that her signatures affixed on the documents were
of the subject property.
forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
the family
- RTC ruled in favor of P Sps. - The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public documents.
 Declared that P Aguete did not sign the loan documents, did  Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
not appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.
execution of the loan documents, did not receive the loan  The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged
proceeds from PNB, was not aware of the loan until PNB signer.
notified her that she and her family should vacate the  In the case: PNB was correct when it stated that P Sps’ omission to present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of
mortgaged property because of the expiration of the forgery was fatal to petitioners’ cause.
redemption period. o P Sps. did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that P
 Under CC (effective law at time of transaction), P Ros could Aguete’s signatures were really forged.
not encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without P Aguete’s consent. - The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively “for additional working [capital] of buy & sell
 P Aguete may, during their marriage and within ten years
of garlic & virginia tobacco.”
from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
 In her testimony, P Aguete confirmed that P Ros engaged in such business but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. P Aguete
annulment of the contract her husband entered into without
was also aware of loans contracted by P Ros but did not know where he “wasted the money.”
her consent, especially in the present case where her consent
 Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support
is required.
of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts
o RTC, however, ruled that its decision is without
prejudice to the right of action of PNB to recover the
amount of the loan and its interests from P Ros. HELD: Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the
- CA reversed RTC’s decision; granted PNB’s appeal conjugal partnership. Petition denied.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|12

 Title
Heirs of Hernandez v. Mingoa Whether the title of the subject property in the name of respondent Melanie Mingoa may still be reconveyed
 Domingo Hernandez, Sr. and wife Sergia Hernandez were to the petitioners. - NO, failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment of the
awarded a piece of real property by Philippine Homesite and contract during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction necessarily barred her from
Housing Corporation by way of salary deduction questioning the sale of the subject property to third persons.
o Deed of Absolute Sale of the property was executed
by PHHC in their favor; TCT was issued
 It bears an annotation of the retention
period of the property (can’t sell to 3rd
persons for a period)
o Hernandez, Sr. died intestate, and it was only after
burial that his heirs found out that the TCT was
cancelled 1yr before, and a new TCT was issued to
respondents
 Cancellation was based on 3 documents:
irrevocable power of atty, irrevocable SPA,
and deed of absolute sale
- According to Rs, Hernandez Sr. was awarded by PHHC
the Right to Purchase the property, however failed to pay
all the installments due on said property
 Afraid he would forfeit his right to purchase the property
awarded to him, Hernandez Sr. sold to R Dolores Camasura
his rights through a deed of transfer of rights
 Simultaneous to this, Hernandez Sr. and Sergia executed an
irrevocable SPA appointing R Camasura as atty-in-fact with
express power to sign, execute and acknowledge any contract
of disposition, alienation and conveyance of her right over the
aforesaid parcel of land.
o The irrevocable power of attorney was necessary in
order to enable the buyer, R Camisura, to sell the lot
to another, R Plaridel Mingoa, without the need of
requiring Hernandez, to sign a deed of conveyance
 R Camisura later sold her right over said
property to R Mingoa; took possession and
paid the installments to PHHC;
 Leter sold the property to eldest child R
Melanie Mingoa; new TCT was issued
- RTC in favor of petitioners
 Proved during trial that signature of wife was falsified; it is as
if the wife never authorized the agent to sell her share of the
subject land, it being conjugal property
 CA reversed RTC’s decision
Principles/Holding
- The SPA in favor of R Camisura pertinently states that the latter is the lawful attorney-in-fact of Domingo B.
Hernandez, Sr., married to Sergia Hernandez
 The Deed of Transfer of Rights, also executed by Hernandez, Sr. in R Camisura’s favor, expressly states that the former transfers his
rights over the subject property to the latter. Notably, such deed was simultaneously executed with the SPA on February 14, 1963.
 The Court cannot but conclude that the SPA executed by Hernandez, Sr. in R Camisura’s favor was, in reality, an alienation involving
the subject property.
- Having ruled that the SPA in favor of Camisura was a contract of sale, the next question is whether or not such sale
was valid.
 The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus, the sale of his ½ share in the conjugal property was valid.
With regard to the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the sale involving their conjugal property, the trial court found that it was
lacking because said wife’s signature on the SPA was falsified.
o Forgery was so blatant. Having compared the questioned signature on the SPA with those of the documents bearing the
sample standard signature of Sergia Hernandez, we affirmed both lower courts’ findings regarding the forgery.
 However, Sergia’s lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid.
- Petitioners contend that such lack of consent on the part of Sergia Hernandez rendered the SPAs and the deed of
sale fictitious, hence null and void in accordance with Article 1409 of the Civil Code.
 Court finds that Articles 1409 and 1410 are not applicable to the matter now before us.
o Said property was awarded to Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in
the name of Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the property to R Melanie
Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978. Since all these events occurred before the Family Code
took effect in 1988, the provisions of the CC govern these transactions.
 Art. 173 provides that the wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent
 In the case: Here, the husband’s first act of disposition of the subject property occurred in 1963 when he executed
the SPA and the Deed of Transfer of Rights in favor of R Camisura. Thus, the right of action of the petitioners
accrued in 1963, as Art. 173 of the CC provides that the wife may file for annulment of a contract entered
into by the husband without her consent within ten (10) years from the transaction questioned during
marriage. Ps filed the action for reconveyance in 1995. Even if we were to consider that their right of action arose
when they learned of the cancellation of old TCT and the issuance of new TCT in R Melanie Mingoa’s name in 1993,
still, 12yrs have lapsed since such discovery, and they filed the petition beyond the period allowed by law.
Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together with her children, filed the action for reconveyance, the conjugal
partnership of property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of the latter’s death on
April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore, petitioners’ action has prescribed.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|13
 Title Principles/Holding
Ko v. Aramburo - RTC ruled in favor of Rs Virginia and Augusto’s heirs
 R Virginia is Corazon Aramburo Ko’s sister-in-law (brother of  It was established in trial that Simeon and R Virginia were in bad terms; they had lived separately; highly suspicious that Virginia
Simeon. Corazon and Simeon have another sibling, Augusto would sign a deed of sale, consenting to husband’s decision to sell their conjugal assets
(predeceased them)  R Virginia also disowned the signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale; NBI found the signature as forgery
 R Virginia’s co-heirs are the heirs of Augusto; Ps are heirs of  Without conformity of R Virginia, Simeon cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
Corazon
Simeon Aramburo------------------Virginia Aramburo (R)
Married CC
- CA affirmed RTC’s decision
 Together with Corazon and husband Felix, acquired 7  Corazon maintained the subject properties are not part of Sps. Simeon and Virginia’s conjugal properties; said to be not included in
parcels of land (subject properties) from Sps. Casaul through the case for dissolution of conjugal properties and in the separation of properties between Simeon and Virginia
a Deed of Cession  R Virginia meanwhile insisted that only 1/3 of the subject properties is owned by Simeon and that the same is conjugally-owned by
 Sps. Simeon and Virginia and Sps. Felix and Corazon her and Simeon since it was acquired during their marriage; sale void and fictitious
executed a Deed of Cession in favor of Augusto’s heirs,
subject of which is the 1/3 pro-indiviso portion of the subject
Did CA correctly sustain RTC’s decision, declaring the parties as co-owners of the subject properties? - YES
properties
In the affirmative, may the subject titles be nullified and transferred to the parties as to their respective
- Allegedly with the use of falsified documents, Corazon
portions? YES for the heirs, NO for Virginia due to prescription
was able to have the entire subject properties
transferred exclusively to her name
- The law that governs the case is CC, not FC, as the circumstances all occurred before FC effectivity on Aug. 3, 1988
 R Virginia and Augusto’s heirs were deprived of their pro-
 Court decision: Regarding the ownership, no reason to depart from RTC’s ruling as affirmed by CA
indiviso share and produce
- Corazon, on her part, claimed that although the
properties were previously registered under their aunt - Augusto’s heirs own 1/3 pro-indiviso share in the subject properties
 The Deed of Cession executed by Sps. Felix and Corazon, Simeon and Virginia in favor of Augusto’s children was in fact
and uncle, Sps. Casaul, they were, in truth, owned by their implemented as evidenced by Corazon’s testimony that she was merely administering the said properties for Augusto’s heirs as her
parents (Sps. Juan and Juliana) nephews and nieces were still minors at that time
 Sps. Casaul allegedly merely returned said properties to Sps.
Juan and Juliana by ceding the same to their children,
- Simeon’s heirs, which include R Virginia, also own 1/3 pro-indiviso share in the subject properties
Corazon and Simeon
 The Court finds that the subject properties is part of Simeon and Virginia’s conjugal properties
 Further averred that said properties were ceded only to her
 It is undisputed that the properties were originally registered in the name of Sps. Casaul, that in a Deed of Cession, these were ceded
and Simeon
to Sps. Felix and Corazon, Simeon and Virginia, and that it was ceded during Sps. Simeon and Virginia’s marriage; there was also
 Also alleged that she and Simeon thought of sharing 1/3 of
no proof shown that the properties actually belong to Simeon and Corazon’s parents
the properties with Augusto’s heirs, hence they executed a
 Art. 160 CC provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
Deed of Cession, but later on decided to recall and not
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” – this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with a strong,
implement the same
clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of
o As such, only she and Simeon shared ½ portion each
proof rests upon the party asserting it.
of the properties
o In the case: Ps failed to adduce ample evidence that would reflect exclusive character of the properties
o Also alleged that Simeon sold and conveyed his
entire ½ share to her, hence she became the sole
o Presumption of conjugal ownership remains strong, unless a strong, clear and convincing proof was presented to prove
otherwise. In fact, even registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature –
owner
what is material is the time when the property was acquired.
 Portion belong to Simeon’s exclusive
property, hence R Virginia’s conformity
o The fact that the subject properties were not included in the cases for separation of properties between Simeon and Virginia
also does not prove that the same are not part of the conjugal properties – such fact cannot be considered as a strong, clear
was not necessary
and convincing proof that the said properties exclusively belong to Simeon.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|14

- Simeon could not have validly sold 1/3 share of Augusto’s heirs, as well as the 1/3 portion of his and Virginia’s share
without the latter’s consent, to Corazon
 Re: portion of Augusto’s heirs – Simeon had no right to sell the same; the object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller.
One cannot give what one does not have.
 Re: Simeon’s sale of their commonly-owned properties – voidable, it was without Virginia’s conformity
o Art. 166 CC – requires consent of wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership except when there is a showing that the wife is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or in like situations
 In the case: R Virginia vehemently denies having conformed to the sale in favor of Corazon. NBI’s findings appearing
on the Deed of Absolute Sale is a forgery.

- As for Augusto’s heirs, the action to nullify the sale of their share, being void is imprescriptible; as for Virginia, the
action to nullify the sale of her share, being merely voidable, is susceptible to prescription
 Virginia questioned the sale after the 10yr allowed period
 Only recourse is to demand only the value of the property

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|15

 Title Principles/Holding
Guiang v. CA Married Is the contract void or voidable contract? – It was void
Judie Corpuz------------------------------Gilda Corpuz (R)
Dec. 24, 1968

 Apr. 22, 1988, Sps. Corpuz sold ½ portion of their lot to P Sps.
Guiang. They have since occupied that portion and built their
house thereon.
 R Gilda left for Manila in June 1989 seeking employment
abroad
 In Jan. 1990, daughter Harriet Corpuz learned her father
intended to sell the remaining ½ portion, including their
house,to P Sps. Guiang
o Wrote her mother such, and R Gilda replied that
she was objecting to the sale
o Harriet, however, did not inform her father about
this; instead gave the letter to Luzviminda Guiang
so that she would advise Harriet’s father
 Judie pushed through with the sale and sold to Luzviminda
Guiang thru a Deed of Transfer of Rights the remaining ½
portion of the lot and the house standing thereon
o Junie and Harriet signed the document as witnesses
- To cure whatever defect in Judie’s title over the lot,
Luzviminda executed another agreement over the lot
- P Sps. Guiang insist that the Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed in good faith and for valuable
consideration. The absence of R Gilda’s consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Art. 1390 CC
 The error in P Sps. Guiang is evident – Art. 1390, par. 2 refers to contracts visited by vices of consent
 In the case: R Gilda’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent
o As such, the contract property falls within the ambit of Art. 124 FC, which was correctly applied by the two courts
 …In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void…
 Any alienation or encumbrance made after Aug. 3, 1988 when the FC took effect by the husband of the conjugal
partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void
WoN the amicable settlement ratified the contract of sale. – NO
- Under Art. 1390 CC, the Deed of Transfer of Rights cannot be ratified even by an amicable settlement
 The participation by some barangay authorities in the amicable settlement cannot otherwise validate an invalid act
 It also cannot be denied that the amicable settlement entered into by R Gilda and the P Sps. Guiang is a contract
o It is a direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights
o By express provision of law, such a contract is also void
 Basically, a void contract cannot be ratified
o Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties

with Manuela Callejo

 Judie signed as witness of the sale HELD: Petition denied. Court affirms the challenged Decision and Resolution.
- Mar. 11, 1990, R Gilda later went home, gathered her
children, and stayed at their house; also informed that
Judie already had another wife
 For staying in the house sold by Judie, Sps. Guiang
complained for trespassing
 They had an amicable settlement
- RTC and CA found that any alienation or encumbrance
by the husband of the conjugal property without the
consent of his wife is null and void as provided under
Art. 124 FC
 Rejected P Sps. Guiang’s contention that the amicable
settlement ratified the sale, citing Art. 1409 which expressly
bars ratification of the contracts specified therein,
particularly those “prohibited or declared void by law”

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|16

 Title Principles/Holding
Manalo v. Camaisa - CA added that since Norma refused to sign, the sale was never perfected
 Downpayment was even returned by R Sps. Camaisa and was accepted by P Manalo
- P Thelma Manalo saw an ad in the news by R Sps.
(Norma and Edilberto) Camaisa for the sale of 2 properties
WoN RTC and CA erred in dismissing P Manalo’s complaint. - NO
(10-door apartments)
 P Manalo negotiated for the purchase through a real estate
WoN the contracts to sell between P Manalo and Edilberto were already perfected that the Sps. could no
broker authorized by R Sps. Camaisa longer back out of the agreement. - NO
 P Manalo made visual inspection, shown tax declarations, real
property tax payment receipts, location plans, vicinity maps - Court does not find error in the decisions of both RTC and CA
- P Manalo then made a definite offer to Ediberto buy the  The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the
properties with the knowledge and conformity of wife written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void
Norma  The properties subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband
 Later agreed upon P1.5M (Taytay) and P2.1M (Makati) to be and wife must concur
paid on installments (P100k and P200k respectively)  In the case: Norma did not give her written consent to the sale
 Agreement was handwritten by P Manalo and signed by o Even granting that Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied,
Ediberto her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity
 P Manalo pointed out the conjugal nature of the o *** Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however, being merely aware
properties; Ediberto assured her of Norma’s conformity of a transaction is not consent
and consent to the sale
 Typewritten Contracts to Sell later signed; checks delivered to - Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is
Edilberto being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is warranted by
o Contracts were then given to Edilberto for the
the circumstances
formal affixing of his wife’s signature
 However, that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is
- Norma then requested to meet with P Manalo for incapacitated
clarifications  In the case: P Manalo failed to allege and prove that Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts
 Handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell o In the absence of such showing of the wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought
- P Manalo was later surprised then R Sps. Camaisa later
informed her that they were backing out of the agreement HELD: Petition denied.
(need “spot cash”)
 P Manalo reminded R Sps. Camaisa that the contracts to sell
had already been duly perfected and Norma’s refusal to
sign would unduly prejudice her
 Norma refused to sign; P Manalo filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages v. R Sps. Camaisa to
compel Norma to sign the contracts to sell
- RTC dismissed the complaint, CA affirmed
 On the ground that under Art. 124 FC, court cannot
intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of
the consent of the wife since said wife who refused to
give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|17

 Title Principles/Holding
Homeowners Savings Bank v. Dailo WoN the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the property as co-owner thereof is valid as
Dailo (R) to his undivided share. - NO
Married
Marcelino Dailo---------------------------Miguela
Aug. 8, 1967
 During their marriage, the Sps. Dailo purchased a house and Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
lot Dailo, Jr. the same having redounded to the benefit of the family. - NO
 The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in
favor of the late Marcelino as vendee thereof to the
- In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
exclusion of Miguela
- Dec. 1, 1993, Marcelino executed an SPA in favor of one husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent
Lilibeth authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from P of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
Bank to be secured by the Sps. Dailo’s house and lot husband who contracted the sale.
 In the case: The same principle in Guiang squarely applies
 Lilibeth obrained a P300k loan from P Bank
 A Real Estate Mortgage was then constituted on the subject
property - Sps. Dailo were married on 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or
 All the above took place without knowledge and consent conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between the Sps. Dailo.
of R Miguela  With the effectivity of the FC, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the FC was made applicable to conjugal partnership of
- Loan matured; P Bank instituted extrajudicial gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property
 After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale was issued in - The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
favor of P Bank as the highest bidder
constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership.
 After lapse of 1yr without the property being redeemed, P
 By express provision of Article 124 FC, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition
Bank consolidated the ownership
or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
- Marcelino died; Miguela claimed that she had no  The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in
knowledge of the mortgage on the property, which was the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does.
conjugal  Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in
 Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent.
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and - P Bank imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino on the
Damages against P Bank
conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family.
 P Bank prayed for dismissal on the ground that the property
 The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party
was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
litigant claiming as such.
- RTC ruled in favor of R Miguela  Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a
- CA affirmed RTC’s decision doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
 Found that the property was conjugal in nature, in the o Other than P Bank’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the loan obtained by the late Marcelino redounded to the benefit of the family.
presumption that the subject property acquired during the o Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
marriage of Sps. Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.
 Declared as void the mortgage on the subject property HELD: Petition denied.
because it was constituted without the knowledge and
consent of R Miguela, in accordance with Article 124 FC.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|18

 Title Principles/Holding
Fuentes v. Roca - RTC dismissed the case - action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale,
- Sabina Tarroza owned a lot; sold it to her son Tarciano forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery.
under a Deed of Absolute Sale  In the case: R Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of sale was registered with the Registry
of Deeds and the new title was issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to the
 Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title
Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.
transferred to his name.
 Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario was
- In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to P Sps. Fuentes
not conclusive proof of forgery.
 They later signed an agreement to sell which agreement
- CA reversed RTC’s decision
expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months
 The agreement required the P Sps. Fuentes to pay Tarciano a  Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property relations were governed by the Civil Code
down payment of ₱60k for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. under which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the
 Within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10
and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged years of the January 11, 1989 sale.
wife, Rosario Roca, to the sale.
 Upon Tarciano’s compliance, the Sps. Fuentes were to take WoN Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to
possession of the lot and pay him an additional ₱140k or the Fuentes spouses was forged; - YES
₱160k, depending on WoN he succeeded in demolishing the WoN the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale already prescribed;
house standing on it.
o If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the P Sps. Fuentes would become - Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the law that applies to this case is the FC, not CC.
owners of the lot without any further formality  Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes
and payment. spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the FC took effect on August 3, 1988.
- Atty. Plagata who processed their documents went to  In contrast to Article 173 of the CC, Article 124 of the FC does not provide a period within which the wife
see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property.
an affidavit of consent. o It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the
 As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata
sale, the same would be void.
notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City.
 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale on Jan. 11, 1989 - But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have
in favor of the P Sps. Fuentes. They then paid him the been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.
additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement.  This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.
 A new title was issued in the name of the Sps. who  In the case: The Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property
immediately constructed a building on the lot. that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an
 On January 28, 1990 Tarciano died, followed by his wife action.
Rosario.
- 8yrs later, Tarciano and Rosario’s children, Tarciano’s WoN only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
sister and her son (R Rocas) filed an action for annulment  Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is forever lost? NO
of sale and reconveyance of the land against the P Sps.  Sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When
the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.
Fuentes
 claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since  As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it.
 Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. - Sps. Fuentes entitled to recover payment due to good faith. CA decision affirmed.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|19

 Title Principles/Holding
Alejo v. Cortez - RTC declared the Kasunduan as a perfected contract and P Dolores as the rightful owner of the property.
- Property belonged to the conjugal property/absolute  While the Kasunduan patently lacks the written consent of Jorge, the latter's acts reveal that he later on acquiesced and accepted
the same. In particular, the RTC observed that Jorge did not reasonably and expressly repudiate the Kasunduan but instead
community of property of the R Sps. Jorge and Jacinta demanded from Dolores compliance therewith and that he allowed Dolores to take possession of the property.
Leonardo (R Sps Leonardo) and upon which their - R Sps. Cortez and R Sps. Leonardo appealed; CA granted the appeal
residential house was built.  CA held that Jorge, by imposing a new period within which Dolores was to pay the remaining balance and by increasing the purchase
 In Mar. 1996, Jorge’s father, Ricardo, approached his sister P price, only qualifiedly accepted the Kasunduan. Being a qualified acceptance, the same partakes of a counter-offer and is a rejection
Dolores Alejo to negotiate the sale of the subject property of the original offer.
 Jacinta executed a Kasunduan with Dolores for the sale
of the property for P500k.
WoN the Kasunduan is a perfected and binding contract as it was accepted by Jorge through his overt acts. –
o Dolores was to pay P70k as down payment, while
P230k is to be paid on April 30, 1996 and the
NO
remaining balance of P200k was to be paid before
the end of the year 1996. - Any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the FC is governed by Article 124
 The Kasunduan was signed by Jacinta and Ricardo as  The law is therefore unequivocal when it states that the disposition of conjugal property of one spouse sans the written consent
witness. Jorge, however, did not sign the agreement. of the other is void.
- The down payment of P70k and the P230k were paid by  In the case: It is an established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta and signed by her alone. By plain terms of
P Dolores the law therefore, the Kasunduan is void.
 She was allowed to possess the property and introduce
improvements thereon. - The Court however agree with the RTC and the CA when it held that the void Kasunduan constitutes a continuing
- On Jul. 3, 1996, Jorge wrote a letter to P Dolores offer from Jacinta and Dolores and that Jorge had the option of either accepting or rejecting the offer before it was
denying knowledge and consent to the Kasunduan. withdrawn by either, or both, Jacinta and Dolores.
 Jorge further informed P Dolores that Jacinta was retracting  The point of contention is whether Jorge accepted such continuing offer. If so, then the Kasunduan is perfected as a binding contract;
her consent to the Kasunduan due to Dolores' failure to otherwise, the Kasunduan remains void.
comply with her obligations.  CA noted that in varying the terms of the Kasunduan, i.e., in the time of payment and the purchase price, Jorge is deemed to have
 Jorge sent another letter to P Dolores demanding that the only qualifiedly accepted the same
latter pay the balance of P200k on or before Oct. 5, 1996, o It is undisputed that after the execution of the Kasunduan, Jorge sent two letters: one, in forming her that he did not consent
otherwise the purchase price shall be increased to P700k to the sale; and the other, demanding that Dolores pay the balance of the purchase price on or before October 5, 1996 and
 Before· the Barangay, Dolores tendered the balance of P200k failing which, the purchase price shall be increased to P700k
but Jorge refused to accept the same. Instead, Jorge filed o Jorge's 1st letter was an outright and express repudiation of the Kasunduan. The 2nd letter, while ostensibly a demand for
cases for ejectment and annulment of sale, reconveyance compliance with Dolores' obligation under the Kasunduan, varied its terms on material points, i.e., the date of payment of
and recovery of possession against her. the balance and the purchase price.
 During the pendency of said cases, the subject property was  *** Consequently, such counter-offer cannot be construed as evidencing Jorge's consent to or acceptance of
sold by R Sps. Leonardo to R Sps. Cortez under a Deed of the Kasunduan for it is settled that where the other spouse's consent to the sale of the conjugal property
Absolute Sale for a purchase price of P700k. appears in a separate document which does not contain the same terms and conditions as in the first
o A new transfer certificate of title was issued in the document signed by the other spouse, a valid transaction could not have arisen.
latter's names.  Jorge's subsequent letters to Dolores cannot be treated as a ratification of the Kasunduan; a void contract is not
o At the time of said sale, Dolores was in possession susceptible to ratification. Nor can Jorge's alleged participation in the negotiation for the sale of the property or
of the subject property. his acquiescence to Dolores' transfer to and possession of the subject property be treated as converting such
continuing offer into a binding contract as the law distinctly requires nothing less than a written consent to the
sale for its validity.
 Suffice to say that participation in or awareness of the negotiations is not consent.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|20
 Title
Ferrer v. Ferrer
- P Josefa Ferrer alleged she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer
 - After a reading of the allegations contained in petitioner’s Complaint, we are convinced that the same failed to state
Alfredo is the half-brother of Rs Manuel and Ismael Ferrer
- Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a a cause of action.
piece of lot  In the case: P Josefa asserts a legal right in her favor by relying on the Decision of the RTC
 Alfredo applied for a loan with SSS to build improvements
thereon, including a residential house and a two-door
apartment building.
 It was during their marriage that payment of the loan was
made using the couple’s conjugal funds.
 From their conjugal funds, they constructed a warehouse on
the lot.
- R Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building,
as well as the warehouse
 However, in Sept. 1991, he stopped paying rentals
 Alleged that he had acquired ownership over the property
by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor
of Rs Manuel and Ismael and their spouses.
o New TST was issued, registered in the names of Rs
- P Josefa contend that on Oct. 2, 1989, when Alfredo was
already bedridden, Rs Manuel and Ismael made him - *** Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the
sign a document to be his last will and testament separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
 The document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering
spouses.
Alfredo’s lot and the improvements thereon.
 Alfredo filed a Complaint for Annulment in RTC; dismissed
o found that the terms and conditions of the Deed of
Sale are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
and public policy
o According to P Josefa, the ruling of the RTC shows
that, when Alfredo died, or at the time of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the
right to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements on Alfredo’s lot. Alleged that the
cost of the improvements amounted to P500k;
hence, ½ thereof should be reimbursed and paid
by respondents as they are now the registered
owners of Alfredo’s lot.
- CA reversed
Principles/Holding
Whether the CA erred in dismissing P Josefa’s Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. – YES
o It can be recalled that the aforesaid case is an action for Annulment filed by Alfredo and P Josefa against the respondents
to seek annulment of the Deed of Sale, executed by Alfredo in respondents’ favor and covering the herein subject premises.
o The Complaint was dismissed by the RTC, and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court
 According to petitioner, while the RTC recognized that the improvements constructed on Alfredo’s lots were deemed as Alfredo’s
exclusive and capital property, the court also held that P Josefa, as Alfredo’s spouse, has the right to claim reimbursement from
the estate of Alfredo.
o It is argued by petitioner that her husband had no other property, and his only property had been sold to the respondents;
hence, she has the legal right to claim for reimbursement from the respondents who are now the owners of the lot and
the improvements thereon.
o *** P Josefa was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to violate
her right. While we could concede that the case made a reference to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120
of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse
upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested.
 *** There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-
spouse.
 When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of
the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
 otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
 In the case: The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family
Code.
- The respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises,
are not petitioner’s spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse
petitioner for her costs rested.
 It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or
efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner’s right to be
reimbursed.
HELD: Petition denied.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|21
 Title Principles/Holding
Muller v. Muller Married WoN R Helmut is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo land.
Sept. 22, 1989
Elena Muller (P)--------------------------Helmut Muller (R)
 - P Elena contends that R Helmut, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines; that R
R Helmut later inherited the house in Germany from his
parents Helmut was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and that R Helmut’s purpose for
 Sold and used the proceeds to purchase land (Antipolo) for
filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo
P528k and the construction of a house amounting to P2.3M
land.
o Antipolo land was registered in the name of P
Elena - R Helmut claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo land but merely reimbursement;
- Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to P Elena; that the funds
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses were given to P Elena in trust; and that equity demands that R Helmut should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
eventually separated.
 R Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties - Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they
before RTC are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.
- RTC decided to terminate the regime of absolute  In the case: R Helmut was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court.
community of property o He declared that he had the Antipolo land titled in the name of P Elena because of the said prohibition.
 also decreed the separation of properties between them o His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by - Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can
gratuitous title during the marriage.
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.
 With regard to the Antipolo land, the court held that it was
 To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
acquired using paraphernal funds of the R Helmut.
o However, it ruled that R Helmut cannot recover his
funds because the property was purchased in - He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the  In the case: R Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought
Constitution. the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
o “save in cases of hereditary succession, no private  To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to HELD: Petition granted. The decision of CA ordering P Elena to reimburse R Helmut the amount of P528k for the
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2.3M for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, is reversed and
- CA modified RTC’s decision
set aside
 It held that R Helmut merely prayed for reimbursement for
the purchase of the Antipolo land, and not acquisition or
transfer of ownership to him.
 It also considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in
trust for the respondent.
 As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is
nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|22

Art. 130 – Nature of Disposition of Conjugal Assets after Death of one of the Spouses without Liquidation
Title
Go, Sr. v. Servacio Sold 2 parcels of
land to
Jesus Gaviola------------------------------>Protacio Go, Jr.
 Mar. 29, 1999 (23yrs later), Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation and Waiver
o he affirmed there that it was his father, Protacio
Go, Sr., not he, who had purchased the 2 parcels
of land
- Nov. 25, 1987, Marta Go (Protacio, Sr.’s wife and P Heirs’
mother) died
- Dec. 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and son R Rito (w/ wife Dina),
sold a portion of the property to R Ester Servacio for - It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the FC are governed by
~P5.7M the rules found in Chapter 4 of Title IV of the FC.
 Mar. 2, 2001, P Heirs demanded the return of the property,
but R Servacio refused
 After barangay proceedings failed, P Heirs sued R Servacio
and R Rito for the annulment of the sale of the property
- P Heirs averred: Following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation,
the property became conjugal property
 The sale of the property to R Servacio without the prior
liquidation of the community property between Protacio,
Sr. and Marta was null and void.
- R Servacio and R Rito countered: Protacio, Sr. had
exclusively owned the property because he had
purchased it with his own money.
- RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr.
 Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of
the property, holding that: “xxx As long as the portion sold,
alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the other
heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it plainly,
as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the
legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid.”
- The RTC’s denial of their motion for reconsideration
prompted the petitioners to appeal directly to the Court
on a pure question of law. HELD: Petition denied. RTC decision affirmed.
Principles/Holding
WoN Article 130 of the FC is the applicable law; and that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void
for being made without prior liquidation. - NO
- Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the FC, viz.:
“Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their
property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the CC or other laws, as provided in
Article 256.”
 Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
 *** Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the
FC.
o *** In the case: Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the CC,
and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her
share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
 Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either
by agreement or by judicial decree.
o Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share.
o Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
 Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(R Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.
- Article 105 of the FC expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership
is “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the CC or other laws.”
 This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void.
o Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of R Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and R
Rito in the property subject of the sale.
o In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that
might not be validly sold to her.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|23
 Title Principles/Holding
Domingo v. Molina - RTC dismissed the case because P Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio did not sell the property to
- June 15, 1951, Sps. Anastacio and Flora Domingo Sps. Molina.
 Also held that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property without Flora’s consent since the sale was necessary to answer for conjugal
bought a property, consisting of a ½ undivided
liabilities. CA affirmed RTC’s decision in toto
portion over a parcel of land
Borrowed money
from Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal. - YES
Anastacio Domingo-------------------------->Sps. Molina Whether fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Molina. - NO
- Sept. 10, 1978 (10yrs after Flora’s death), Anastacio sold
his interest over the land to the Sps. Molina to answer - Anastacio & Flora’s conj. partnership was dissolved upon Flora’s death due to Art 175(1) CC (now Art. 126[1] FC).
for his debts. In 1986, Anastacio died. - Article 130 of the FC requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits
 May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered
any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation
and transferred the entire ½ undivided portion of the land to
 While Article 130 of the FC provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership
the Sps. Molina.
shall be void, this rule does not apply in the case since the provisions of the FC shall be “without prejudice to vested rights already
- P Melecio (one of Sps. Domingo’s children) learned of acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
the transfer
 Filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of
- An implied co-ownership among Flora’s heirs governed the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition.
Ownership against Sps. Molina on May 17, 1999.
 In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, the Court held that the properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall
 P Melecio claims: Anastacio gave the subject property to
under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and
Sps. Molina to serve as collateral for the money that
partition.
Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold
o The surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not
the interest over the subject property without Flora’s consent,
consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership.
as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
 In the case: An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s
o Also added that the document transferring
share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns an undivided ½ of the
Anastacio and Flora’s ½ undivided interest over the
original conjugal partnership properties as his share
land must have been falsified
o Also asserts that he occupied the land from the time - Art. 493 of CC on co-ownership provides:
of Anastacio’s death to time he filed the Complaint. “Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
 Melecio presented the testimonies of the Records Officer of he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
the Register of Deeds of Tarlac, and his nephew, George But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
- The Sps. Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the
 In the case: Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without an actual
title to the subject property to answer for his debts and partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose
told the Sps. Molina that they already own half of the land. of his undivided interest in the subject property.
 Sps. Molina have been in possession of the subject property
before the title was registered under their names and have
- The Sps. Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest.
religiously paid the property’s real estate taxes.
 Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
 Sps. Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed
sale since he accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow  Consequently, Anastacio’s sale to the Sps. Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio’s
money. rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the
extent of Anastacio’s interest.
 Sps. Molina asserted that Melecio built his nipa hut on the
subject property only in 1999, without their knowledge and  The Sps. Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the coheirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the coheirs
consent. after liquidation and partition.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|24

- P Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, is an action for
partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., “it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in
cases where their consent was not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the
undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of
Court.”

- The sale of the subject property to the spouses Molina was not attended with fraud.
 P Melecio’s argument that no document was executed for the sale is negated by the CA finding that there was
a notarized deed of conveyance executed between Anastacio and the R Sps. Molina, as annotated on the
OCT of the disputed property.
 Furthermore, P Melecio’s belief that Anastacio could not have sold the property without his knowledge cannot
be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina’s registered title over the subject property.

HELD: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|25

 Title
Uy v. Estate of Fernandez
Vipa Fernandez-----------------------------Levi
married
Lahaylahay
Mar. 24, 1961
 Vipa Hernandez - registered owner of a parcel of land
 w/ 2 children = Grace Joy, Jill Frances
- 1990, contract of lease executed between Vipa and P
Rafael Uy
 over the property + improvements thereon
 P Uy bound himself to pay Vipa, as consideration for the
lease, P3k/mo with a provision for 10% increase every year
thereafter
- Mar. 5, 1994, Vipa died leaving no will or testament
 Grace Joy became de facto administrator of Estate of Vipa
(Fernandez); Levi left Aklan
- June 1998, P Uy stopped paying monthly rents
 Estate of Vipa, through Grace Joy, filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer v. P Uy on 2003
o Alleged that, as of June 1998, P Uy was already
bound to pay rent and that his last payment was
made in May 1998
o Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the
Complaint, P Uy’s unpaid rents amounted to
P271,150.00.10
o The Estate of Vipa claimed that despite repeated
demands, P Uy refused to pay the rents due.
 P Uy denied that he refused to pay the rent for the lease
of the subject property.
o claimed that sometime in June 1998, Patria
Fernandez-Cuenca (Vipa’s sister) demanded for the
payment of the rents, claiming that she is the
rightful heir of Vipa.
o Since he had no idea on who is entitled to receive
the rent for the subject property, he deposited the
amount of P10k with the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC Iloilo City on Nov. 20, 1998 and that
Grace Joy was informed of such consignation.
o claimed that a case for the settlement of the
Estate of Vipa was instituted by Patria with the RTC
o He averred that he is willing to pay the rent on the
leased property to the rightful heirs of Vipa and that
he made another consignation with the RTC in the
amount of P6k.
Principles/Holding
- MTCC ruled in favor of the Estate of Vipa; ordered P Uy to vacate the premises and pay the unpaid rentals
 found that after Vipa’s death in 1994 until 1998, Rafael was paying the rent for the lease of the subject property to Grace Joy.
 That the real reason why Patria claimed to be the heir of Vipa is because she owed Rafael money which she could not pay.
o Patria then charged the debt she owes to Rafael from the monthly rent of the subject property, an arrangement that
Rafael took advantage to avoid paying Grace Joy the monthly rents.
 The MTCC further opined that the consignations made by Rafael in the total amount of P16k are not valid since there was no prior
tender of payment.
- RTC reversed MTCC’s decision; the MTCC erred in including the entire property as part of the Estate of Vipa.
 Explained that the subject property was acquired by Vipa during the subsistence of her marriage with Levi and, as such, is part
of their conjugal properties.
 After Vipa’s death, the conjugal partnership was terminated, entitling Levi to ½ of the property.
 The RTC then pointed out that Levi sold his share in the subject property to Rafael, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale (Dec. 29, 2005)
 RTC ruled that Rafael, as co-owner of the subject property, having bought Levi’s ½ share, had the right to possess the same.
- CA reversed RTC’s decision; reinstated MTCC’s decision
 held that P Uy raised the issue of ownership of the subject property, i.e., Levi’s sale of his ½ share in the subject property to P Uy,
only for the first time in his appeal with the RTC.
 Accordingly, it was error on the part of the RTC to have resolved the issue of ownership of the subject property.
WoN P Uy is a co-owner of the property, and as such, has the right to possess the same. – YES
- Levi and Vipa were married on March 24, 1961, and in the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of conjugal
partnership of gains governs their property relations.
 It is presumed that the subject property is part of the conjugal properties of Vipa and Levi considering that the same was acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no proof to the contrary.
 When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was automatically terminated.
 Under Article 130 FC, the conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution due to the death of either spouse, should be
liquidated
o either in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased OR,
o in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within one year from the death of the deceased spouse.
Absent any liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property is void.
 Article 130 FC is applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established between the spouses prior to the effectivity of
the FC pursuant to Article 105 thereof
- Rafael bought Levi’s one-half share in the subject property in consideration of P500k as evidenced by the Deed of
Sale (Dec. 29, 2005).
 At that time, the conjugal partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated.
 However, such disposition, notwithstanding the absence of liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not necessarily
void.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|26
- It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife are co-owners
of all the property of the conjugal partnership.
 Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual
and vested ½ undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation
and partition of the conjugal partnership.
 With respect, however, to the deceased spouse’s share in the conjugal partnership properties, an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensues among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
o In the case: Thus, upon Vipa’s death, ½ of the subject property was automatically reserved in favor of the surviving
spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal partnership. The other half, which is Vipa’s share, was transmitted to Vipa’s heirs
— Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and her husband Levi, who is entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.
 The ensuing implied co-ownership is governed by Article 493 CC - … he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it…But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership
o Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being first done either
by agreement or by judicial decree.
 Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land
or thing.
o Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest.
 Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his right
as a co-owner thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer, P Uy, a co-owner of the subject property.

- However, P Uy became a co-owner of the subject property only on December 29, 2005 — the time when Levi
sold his one-half undivided share over the subject property to the former.
o Thus, from December 29, 2005 Rafael, as a co-owner, has the right to possess the subject property as an incident of
ownership.
o *** prior to his acquisition of Levi’s ½ undivided share, P Uy was a mere lessee of the subject property and is thus obliged
to pay the rent for his possession thereof.

HELD: Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the subject property since he is already a co-owner thereof.
 Nevertheless, Rafael is still bound to pay the unpaid rentals from June 1998 until April 2003 (check date) in the amount of
P271,150.00.
 Further, Rafael is likewise bound to pay reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the subject property from May 2003 until
December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3k per month with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|27

Art. 134 - 141 – Judicial Property During Marriage (grounds for sufficient cause)
Title Principles/Holding
Maquilan v. Maquilan Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration
Virgilio Maquilan (P)---------------------Dita
married
Maquilan (R) of nullity of marriage is valid.
 P Virgilio later discovered that R Dita was having illicit sexual
affair with her paramour - The P Virgilio contends that the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits
 Prompted P Virgilio to file a case of adultery the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property.
o R Dita and paramour were convicted  Since the R Dita was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under
- R Dita filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Articles 43(2) and 63 FC.
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal o Court held that the provisions are inapplicable – Art. 43 FC refers to Art. 42 where a subsequent marriage is terminated
Partnership of Gains and Damages with RTC because of the reappearance of an absent spouse;
 Imputing psychological incapacity to P Virgilio  While Art. 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation.
o In the case: it involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of
- During pre-trial, P Virgilio and R Dita entered into a
psychological capacity.
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in partial settlement of
the conjugal partnership of gains - The contention that the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the
 P Virgilio later filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the
repudiation of the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT on the
guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced.
grounds that his previous lawyer did not apprise him of its  *** Under Art. 143 FC, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval
consequential effects = Denied o In the case: The questioned COMPROMISE AGREEMENT which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of
property allowed under the law.
- P Virgilio later filed a Petition for Certiorari and
 This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
Prohibition with the CA o Note: However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors
 claiming RTC committed grave error and abuse of discretion of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Art. 136 FC.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction = Dismissed
o conviction of R Dita of adultery does not ipso facto
disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
- The argument of the P Virgilio that he was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of
property, considering she had only been sentenced the voluntary settlement is not convincing.
with prision correccional which does not carry the  Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the P Virgilio as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to
accessory penalty of civil interdiction which be evident.
deprives the person management her property and  General rule: Negligence of counsel binds the client.
disposal of such property inter vivos o Exception: where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application
o Sps. voluntarily separated their property through “results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality – none sufficiently shown in the present case
their COMPROMISE AGREEMENT with court
approval under Article 134 FC; HELD: The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject
o the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, which embodies
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is VALID without prejudice to the rights of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary
the voluntary separation of property, is valid and
binding in all respects because it had been interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.
voluntarily entered into by the parties;
o that the mistake or negligence of the lawyer
binds his client, unless it falls on the exceptions

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|28

 Title
Noveras v. Noveras (1 exam case) st
married
Dec. 3, 1988
David Noveras (P)----------------------Leticia Noveras (R)
 Lived in US, both later acquired US citizenship
 During marriage, acquired several properties in PH & US
- Sampaloc property used to be owned by P David’s
parents
 Mortgaged the property for loan; when about to be
foreclosed, paid P1.5M to redeem
- Due to business reverses, P David returned to PH
 Dec. 2002, R Leticia executed SPA to sell the Sampaloc
property for P2.2 M
- Sept. 2003, P David allegedly abandoned his family
Principles/Holding
- RTC decided that net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in PH are ordered to be awarded
to P David only, with the properties in the US remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia
 Recognized that under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed
by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes,
support and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
- CA modified, directing the equal division of the PH properties between the spouses.
WoN CA should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded the PH properties to him. - NO
- In the case: Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence.
 The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
 Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The RTC thus
erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

and lived with Estrellita Martinez

- R Leticia claimed that P David agreed to and executed a - *** General rule: Any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the marriage.
 Exception: If the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Arts 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 FC.
Joint Affidavit
 In the case: Leticia filed the instant petition for judicial separation of property on under pars. 4 and 6 of Art. 135 FC, to wit:
- Upon learning that P David had an extra-marital affair, (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for
Leticia filed a petition for divorce in California in Art. 101;
 Divorce granted; California court granted to R Leticia a) The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate
custody of children + all US properties
judicial separation of properties under par. 4 of Art. 135 FC.
- Aug. 8, 2005, R Leticia filed a petition for Judicial  In the case: R Leticia knows that the P David has returned to and stayed at his hometown as
Separation of Conjugal Property in RTC she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment.
 Relied on the Joint Affidavit and his failure to comply the
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
same
 Prayed for:
b) The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
o power to administer all conjugal properties in PH; more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable.
o P David and his partner to cease and desist from  Sps. living separately since 2003, P David cohabiting w/ another, filed for divorce and granted
selling the subject conjugal properties;  *** Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
o the declaration that all conjugal properties be
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
forfeited in favor of her children;
o P David to remit half of the purchase price as
share of R Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc - The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute
property; community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code.
 P David answered that the conjugal partnership properties, a) Under Art. 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime
which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and
that all expenses of liquidation be charged against the
conjugal partnership. HELD: We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes.
Petition denied.

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Art. 147 - 148 – Regimes of Unions w/o marriage or under a void marriage (Under Art. 147)
Title Principles/Holding
Valdes v. RTC Branch 102 of QC What governs the property relations of marriages declared void due to psychological incapacity? - Co-
married
Antonio Valdes (P)--------------------Consuelo Valdes (R) ownership
Jan. 5, 1971
 June 22, 1992, P Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of
the marriage pursuant to Art. 36 FC - RTC was correct. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during
 RTC declared the marriage null and void due to mutual the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148, such as the case may be, of FC.
psychological incapacity  For Art. 147, this peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each
 In its decision, the P and R are directed to start proceedings other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
on the liquidation of their common properties as defined  The term “capacitated” in the provision refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any “male or female of the
by Art. 147 FC, and to comply with the provisions of Articles age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Arts. 37 and 38
50, 51 and 52 within thirty (30) days from notice  Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
- R Consuelo sought a clarification of the order above equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
 asserted that FC contained no provisions on the procedure efforts.
for liquidation of common property in “unions w/o marriage.” a) A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
- RTC made the following clarification: jointly if said party’s “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.”
 Considering that Art. 147 FC explicitly provides that the b) Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s separate property are not included in the co-
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the ownership.
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have  Art. 147 also expressly provides that:
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of
will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
defendant will own their ‘family home’ and all their other b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
properties for that matter in equal shares. children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
 In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of
common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
co-ownership found in CC shall apply.
- P Antonio moved for reconsideration of the order, but - When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry OR when they do not live exclusively
denied with each other (as husband and wife), Art. 148 will govern.
 In the SC, P Antonio submits that Arts. 50, 51 and 52 FC should  Only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
be held controlling, arguing that: in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
a) Art. 147 FC does not apply to cases where parties are o Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal.
psychologically incapacitated  The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may
b) Arts. 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Arts. 102 and 129 be, if so existing under a valid marriage.
FC govern the disposition of the family dwelling in  If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, heretofore expressed.
including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
- In the case: RTC did not commit a reversible error in ruling that P and R own the “family home” and all their common
c) Assuming that Art. 147 applies to marriages property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under CC, not Arts. 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Arts. 102 and
be read consistently with Art. 129. 129, FC, should aptly prevail.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|30

  The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation
of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
 The first paragraph of Art. 50 FC, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code

HELD: Orders of RTC affirmed.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|31

 Title
Buenaventura v. CA (1 exam case) st
Married
Noel Buenaventura (P)---------------------Isabel Singh (R)
Jul. 4, 1979
 P Noel filed a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of wife R
Isabel
o later amended to say they were both psychologically
incapacitated; R Isabel denied she has the condition
- RTC declared the marriage null and void ab initio
 ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property, particularly P Noel’s
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East
Bank, by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent 50%
of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89
together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this
decision and ½ of his outstanding shares of stock with
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;
pay for moral and exemplary damages
 P Noel appealed; while case was pending, R Isabel filed a
motion to increase the P15k monthly support to son Javy; P
Noel opposed
- CA increased the support to P20k; also dismissed P
Noel’s appeal; affirmed in toto RTC’s decision
 Revealed that P Noel only married due to heavy parental
pressure
 His priority is career
 Unable to relate to son, Javy as a father
 No inclination for marriage to work
 No desire to keep R Isabel and their son as shown by the
reluctance to reconcile
Principles/Holding
- Award of moral damages based on Arts. 2217 and 21 CC while marriage declared null and void based on Art. 36
 It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of
an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful.
WoN the division of ½ for both the retirement benefits and shares of stock in the companies proper. - YES
- The declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property
 When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
- The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved
 In the case: P Noel, who worked as VP of FEBTC, received a separation/retirement package of ~P3.6M
 Nothing yet has been given to R Isabel by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be
given ½ share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership
properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with
Art. 117, par. 2 FC.
 For the same reason, she is entitled to ½ of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park
and the Provident Group of Companies.
- Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in
relation to Arts. 41, 42 and 43 FC, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains, as the case may be, do not apply.
 Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to
be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
 * discussion on Valdes v. RTC case reiterated here
- In the case: Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court were found, both by RTC and CA, to have
been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership.
 No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.
 The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo
should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
HELD: The order giving respondent ½ of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and
½ of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but
on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|32
 Title Principles/Holding
Abing v. Waeyan - MTC, finding that the money used in the construction came solely from P John, ruled that it was exclusively his,
John Abing (P)----------------------------Juliet
Cohabited
Waeyan (R) including the sari-sari store
 Cohabited as H&W without the benefit of marriage  Required R Juliet to surrender possession thereof to P John
 Couple bought a 2-storey residential house - RTC affirmed MTC decision; but CA reversed RTC
o Tax declaration in the name of R Juliet  CA held that as the parties have no benefit of marriage and that they acquired properties during that union, their property relations
- Dec. 2, 1991, R Juliet left to work in Korea cannot be governed by the provision of CC on conjugal partnership, but by rule on co-ownership
 Sent money to P John who deposited the same in joint bank o Parties’ share to properties they have accumulated during cohabitation shall be equal unless there is proof to the contrary
account  P John’s evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the construction, hence, the same pertained to both
o Being a co-owner, R Juliet cannot be evicted
- 1992, the 2-storey house underwent renovation
 A new structure was annexed to it, housing a sari-sari store
(subject property)
WoN the subject property of the suit pertains to the exclusive property of P John. – NO; it’s conjugal
- 1994, R Juliet returned and continued living with P John
 She managed the store, P John worked as mine employee - The Court affirms CA with modification
- 1995, relationship turned sour  Other than P John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money borrowed from relatives, spent for the construction
 Decided to partition their properties of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim
 They executed (Oct. 7, 1995) a Memorandum of Agreement  P John even failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives from whom
o Left unsigned by the parties, though signed by he made his borrowings and how much he borrowed from them
witnesses  All he offered to reinforce his claim was the affidavit executed by a certain Macaraeg that P John borrowed P30k from him; he failed
 Under the unsigned agreement, P John shall leave the to offer similar affidavits from relatives he borrowed from
dwelling, with R Juliet paying him P428,870 representing P o Even then, Macaraeg stated in the affidavit that P John borrowed in 1990, but P John himself admitted that subject property
John’s share in all their properties was constructed only in 1992
o On same day, R Juliet gave partial payment of  Doubtful of the amount allegedly borrowed was used in the construction
P232,397.66; remaining balance to be paid on 12  As to the tax declaration, the Court has ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of
monthly installments claims of ownership
o Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner
- R Juliet failed to pay the balance
 P John demanded her to vacate the annex structure
housing the sari-sari store; she refused - Using Art. 147 FC, it is clear that, as in the present case, in the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property
- P John filed an ejectment suit against her before MTC acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru
 He alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares
annex structure with his own funds and thru money he  Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership
borrowed from his relatives; added that the tax  Under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares”
declaration was under his name  In the case: Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, R Juliet, as correctly ruled by CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
 He claimed exclusive ownership of the subject structure – She is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as P John
gave him the right to eject R Juliet upon failure to pay the
balance - As to the Memorandum of Agreement, Court disagrees with CA that it being unsigned by the parties, it will no longer
 R Juliet countered – original house was renovated thru
have any effect between them
common funds and that the annexed structure was merely
 R Juliet’s failure to pay P John the balance of the latter’s share in their common properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum
an attachment or extension to the original house
of money against R Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement, not for ejectment

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|33

 Title Principles/Holding
Metrobank v. Pascual - RTC declared the REM invalid; in favor of R Nicolson
Married  Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said lot to be conjugal, the same having been acquired
Jan. 19, 1985 during the existence of the marriage of R Nicholson and Florencia. In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116, FC
Florencia Nevalga-------------------Nicholson Pascual (R) o P Metrobank has not overcome the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot
 During the union, Florencia bought from Sps. Sering a lot  Waiver was also defective – R Nicholson denied, Notarizing officer’s signature forged, also executed on Apr. 9, 1995 (3mo before RTC
with a 3-door apartment decision of marriage nullity)
 TCT 156283 was issued in the name of Florencia, “married  P Metrobank was also a mortgagee in bad faith in account of negligence
to Nicholson Pascual”
- CA affirmed RTC’s decision
- 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Art. 36, FC WoN CA erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by applying Art. 116 FC. – NO it did not err; it was
 RTC declared the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity of R Nicholson
conjugal
 RTC ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-Sps WoN CA erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage between the R Nicholson Pascual and
conjugal partnership of gains Florencia ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses. - NO it did not err; it was
 Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways not ipso facto dissolved
without liquidating their conjugal partnership
- Apr. 30, 1997, Florencia w/ Sps. Oliveros, obtained P58M
- The disputed property is conjugal
loan from P Metrobank  While P Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 CC, not Art. 116 FC, is the applicable legal provision since the property was
 To secure the obligation, Florencia and Sps. Oliveros acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed,
executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds.
properties, including one involving lot with TCT 156283 o Contrary to P Metrobank’s submission, the Court did not add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential
 Florencia submitted documents to procure the loan: requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise.
o Copy of TCT 156283, photocopy of marriage- o Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption
nullifying RTC decision, “waiver” that the property is conjugal.
o “waiver” was said to be executed by R Nicholson in  If proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the
favor of Florencia legal presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity.
 Covered the conjugal properties of the ex-
Sps. listed therein, but did not include the
lot in question - Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto end the nature of Conjugal Ownership
 P Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CA’s holding, Art. 129 (7) FC is inapplicable.
- Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay the loan
o Asserts that the waiver executed by R Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal property
 P Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings
regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acquired during the marriage.
 P Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder in the auction
 Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically result in a regime of
sale (Jan. 21, 2000)
complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.
- June 28, 2000, R Nicholson filed to RTC complaint to  Court agrees with R Nicholson
declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed o *** While the declared nullity of marriage of R Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the
property conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
 R Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
property, was mortgaged without his consent o This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 FC on liquidation of the conjugal partnership’s assets and liabilities which
 P Metrobank answered that the lot, registered in Florencia’s is generally prospective in application, or Arts. 179 - 185 CC on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
name, was paraphernal; also raised good faith  Both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.
 Pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied
ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|34

  In the case: Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership.
o What governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
 Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her ½ undivided interest in the disputed property
even without the consent of Nicholson.
 However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the ½ undivided portion that Florencia
owned.
 Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining ½ undivided portion of the lot is null and
void, R Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
o The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share in the conjugal partnership.
 But the deed of waiver allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and
the conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature, not to mention that of the
notarizing officer.

- P Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the
½ undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to
Nicholson.
 P Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights “shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the
bank in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”

HELD: CA decision affirmed with modification. The REM on the property NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided
½ portion of the disputed property owned by R Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other undivided ½ portion
belonging to Florencia.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|35

 Title Principles/Holding
Diño v. Diño Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
Alain Diño (P)-------------------------Ma. Caridad Diño (R) after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Art. 147 FC. - YES
 Childhood friends; started living together (1984), separated
(1994), lived together again (1998) - P Alain argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
 Jan. 14, 1998, they were married Voidable Marriages, the rule (issuance of decree of absolute nullity of married only after liquidation, partition, and
- May 30, 2001, P Alain filed an action for against R Ma. distribution) does not apply to Article 147 (and 148) FC. - Court agrees with P Alain
Caridad for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage due to
psychological incapacity - The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
 alleged that R Ma. Caridad failed in her marital obligation to
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on 148 of the Family Code.
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that  Art. 147 FC applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
depleted the family assets. whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
 further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at
times become violent and hurt him. - For Art. 147 FC to apply, the following elements must be present:
 R Ma. Caridad did not file an answer within the reglementary 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
period 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
- P Alain later learned that R. Ma. Caridad filed a petition 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with P Alain, In the case: All these elements are present and there is no question that Art. 147 FC applies to the property relations
granted by SC of California on 25 May 2001. between petitioner and respondent.
 Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, R Ma. Caridad
married a certain Manuel Alcantara.
- The ruling of RTC has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Arts. 147
- Dr. Tayag found that R. Ma. Caridad was suffering from and 148 FC. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Narcissistic Personality Disorder “Sec. 19. Decision.—(1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree
 RTC granted the petition on the ground that R Ma. Caridad of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
was psychologically incapacitated Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.”
 It rendered a decision dissolving the regime of absolute
community of property.
- *** It is clear from Art. 50 FC that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void
o A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
shall only be issued upon compliance with Arts. 50
ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 (2nd bigamous marriage contracted and 45 (voidable
and 51 FC marriage) FC.
- P Alain filed a motion for partial reconsideration  In short, Art. 50 FC does not apply to marriages which are declared void I under Art. 36 FC, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of
 For Arts. 40 and 45, since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership
property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall of gains (unless a different one is agreed upon), there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree
only be issued upon compliance with Arts. 50 and 51 FC of annulment could be issued.
 RTC modified: A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF o That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Art. 36 FC because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules
MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and on co-ownership.
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 o In the case: P Alain’s marriage to R Ma. Caridad was declared void under Art. 36 FC and not under Arts. 40 or 45. Thus, what
FC governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
 HENCE, the present petition

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|36

 Title Principles/Holding
Salas, Jr. v. Aguila - RTC ruled in favor of R Aguila
Married  The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules, even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the court can proceed
Sept. 7, 1985 with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated
Juan Salas (P)-------------------------------Eden Aguila (R) upon, as in this case.
 P Salas later left their conjugal dwelling; no longer  The RTC found that the Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed
communicated with R Aguila or their daughter  However, RTC held that P Salas failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties.
- Oct. 7, 2003, R Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration - Rubina intervened
of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity  claimed that the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; P Salas did not contribute money to purchase the
 The petition states that they “have no conjugal properties Discovered Properties; authorized her brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed with legal
whatsoever.” documentation, he registered the properties in the name of “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.”
- RTC rendered a Decision declaring the nullity of the - CA affirmed RTC’s decision
marriage of P Salas and R Aguila.
 The RTC Decision further provides for the “dissolution of WoN CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision ordering the partition of the parcels of land between
their conjugal partnership of gains, if any.”
petitioner and respondent. – NO, it did not err
- Sept. 10, 2007, R Aguila filed a Manifestation and
Motion, stating that she discovered: - The party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.
 2 200 sq.m. parcels of land with improvements and
 P Salas alleged that contrary to R Aguila’s petition stating that they had no conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived
 A 108 sq.m. parcel of land with improvement
Properties during their marriage.
The registered owner of the Discovered Properties is “Juan
o However, the RTC found, and CA affirmed, that P Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived
S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.”
Properties during their marriage (documents submitted are merely photocopies and not certified true copies)
- Sept. 21, 2007, during the hearing, R Aguila testified that  On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their marriage.
someone informed her of the existence of the Discovered o Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in P Salas’ name were acquired during his marriage
Properties with R Aguila.
 Thereafter, she verified the information and secured copies of
TCTs of the Discovered Properties. - On both Salas and Rubina’s contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the
 When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina Salas is P
contention unmeritorious.
Salas’ common-law wife.
 The TCTs state that “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas” is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties.
- Feb. 8, 2008, P Salas filed an Opposition, alleging that  A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that
there is no conjugal property to be partitioned based on it is valid and regularly issued.
R Aguila’s petition.  The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
 Salas claimed that R Aguila waived her right to the  Furthermore, P Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation.
Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated o It was only when Rubina intervened that P Salas supported Rubina’s statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
properties he allegedly waived in favor of R Aguila, to wit:  Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene
(1) parcels of land with improvements; (2) P200k; and (3) in this case.
motor vehicles.
 Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties were
- In Diño v. Diño, we held that Art. 147 FC applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
deemed partitioned.
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void under Art. 36 FC, as in this case.
 Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s
joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership.
o In the case: Salas did not rebut this presumption. PETITION DENIED, CA decision AFFIRMED

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|37

 Title
Ventura v. Abuda
Married
June 9, 1980
Socorro Torres-----------------------------Esteban Abletes
 Don’t have common children, but had children from prior
marriages
o Socorro’s son, who later had a son, Edilberto
Ventura, Jr. (P)
o Esteban’s daughter, Evangeline Abuda (R)
- Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting
marriage to Crispin Roxas (married Apr. 18, 1952) when
she married Esteban.
- Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was
dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in 1960.
- According to P Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban
purchased a portion of a lot (Vitas property)
 The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by R
Evangeline on her father’s behalf sometime in 1970.
o Title of Vitas property was issued to “Esteban
Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro
Torres.”
 P Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, R Evangeline and
Esteban operated small business establishments (Delpan
property)
Principles/Holding
- RTC dismissed the petition; ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning.
 The Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are governed by Arts. 144 and 485 CC
 The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition of the properties.
o Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
- CA sustained the decision of RTC
 The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Art. 148 FC, and not Arts. 144 and 485 CC.
o Art. 148 FC states that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other
o The CA found that P Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas and Delpan properties.
 P Edilberto was unable to provide any documentation evidencing Socorro’s alleged contribution.
WoN P Edilberto as an heir of Socorro can claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties. – NO
- Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties.
 It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it.
o Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
o This is a reiteration of Art. 148 FC, which CA applied in the assailed decision
- In the case: Applying the provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if:
1. these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and
2. there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.

- Sept. 6, 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan

properties to R Evangeline and her husband, R Paulino - Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-
- Sept. 11, 1997, Esteban died; Jul. 31, 1999, Socorro died owned by Esteban and Socorro because:
1. the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and
- 2000, Leonora Urquila, mother of P Edilberto, discovered
2. title to the land was issued to “Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres.”
the sale
 P Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for
COURT DO NOT AGREE. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase
Annulment of Deeds of Sale “married to Socorro Torres” is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned
o P Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties the property.
was fraudulent because Esteban’s signature on o The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to
the deeds of sale was forged. Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage.
 R Sps. Abuda argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage  Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.
to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and  As to the claim that R Evangeline shouldered the payment, the Court do not agree.
void. o The Delpan property was also acquired prior to marriage with Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of
o Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father.
right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents
HELD: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|38

 Title Principles/Holding
Beumer v. Amores - RTC ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, P Beumer could
Married not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them
Dutch Filipina
Willem Beumer (P)----------------------Avelina Amores (R) notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands.
Mar. 29, 1980

 Nov. 10, 2000, RTC declared the nullity of their marriage due
to P Beumer’s psychological incapacity
 Consequently, P Beumer filed a Petition for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership praying for the distribution of the
properties
 In defense, R Amores averred that, with the exception of
their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and
petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during
their marriage
o the truth being that she used her own personal
money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out
of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I
by way of inheritance.
o She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her
and P Beumer attesting to the fact that she
purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon
using her own money.
o Accordingly, R Avelina sought the dismissal of the
petition for dissolution
- During trial, P Beumer testified that while Lots 1, 2142,
5845 and 4 were registered in the name of R Avelina, - As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
these were acquired with the money he received from comes into equity must come with clean hands.
the Dutch government as his disability benefit  Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity; A litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
 since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for
their acquisition.
 also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before
the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Art.
89 FC, hence, invalid.
- RTC dissolved the parties’ conjugal partnership
 awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her
paraphernal properties – though onerous, P Beumer not
allowed to acquire private land, except by inheritance;
 the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive
properties;
 the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned
by the parties - acquired during their marital union and since
there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings
and residential units.
 Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise
denied for not having come to court with clean hands.
- P Beumer elevated the matter to CA, contesting only the RTC’s award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of R Amores
 the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of
his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership.
 he prayed for reimbursement of ½ of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half
in favor of his estranged ex-wife.
 CA affirmed in toto RTC’s decision, stressing the fact that P Beumer was “well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to
acquire lands in the Philippines.” Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement.
WoN P Beumer can assert or claim a right of half or whole of the purchase price used in the purchase of the
subject properties. – NO
- P Beumer admitted that he “is well aware of the constitutional prohibition (Art. XII, Sec. 7 1987 Constitution)” and
even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and R Amores registered the properties in the latter’s name.
 Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition.
 On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s
claim for reimbursement.
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
 In the case: P Beumers statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the
veracity of his claims:
o While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,
he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same.
o Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness; he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
- Even on grounds of equity, the Court cannot grant reimbursement to P Beumer given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase.
 a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all; one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
 Provision for unjust enrichment also does not apply; proscribed in the Constitution
HELD: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|39

 Title
Ocampo v. Ocampo
Married
Virginia Ocampo (P)---------------Deogracio Ocampo (R)
Jan. 16, 1978
 P Virginia filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of her Marriage with R Deogracio due to
psychological incapacity
 RTC declared marriage null and void; became final
- Mar. 31, 1999, RTC directed parties to submit a project
of partition of their inventoried properties
 If they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the
factual issues with regard to said properties.
 Having failed to agree on a project of partition
of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued
where the parties adduced evidence in support of
their respective stand
- Jan. 13, 1004, RTC rendered the assailed Order
 It stated that the properties declared by the
parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50
sharing.
- CA denied reconsideration, hence the present petition
Principles/Holding
Whether R Deogracio should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad
faith and psychological perversity. - NO
- While P Virginia and R Deogracio married Jan. 16, 1978, it is still FC provisions on conjugal partnerships which will
govern the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if they’re married before FC.
 Art. 105 FC explicitly mandates that FC shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before FC without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under CC or other laws.
o Thus, under FC, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal.
o The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.
 The applicable law insofar as liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liability is concerned, is Art. 129 FC in relation to
Art. 147 FC.
- The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Art. 36 FC, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Art. 147 or Art. 148 FC.
 Art. 147 FC applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.
o For Art. 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void as in the case.
- From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should, therefore, be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
 Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
 A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said
party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
o Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
 In the case: The trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia
failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts
o Petitioner’s claim that the seed money in that business was provided by her mother and that, without it, the properties subject
of controversy could not have been acquired.
o That may be true but the Court is not prone to believe so because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but
petitioner’s self-serving allegations.
o Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful husband were made, but the testimonies failed
to fully convince the Court that respondent should be punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because
of his indiscretion.
- All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered,
are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.
 not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses
only. PETITION DENIED.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|40
Art. 147 - 148 – Regimes of Unions w/o marriage or under a void marriage (Under Art. 148)
Title
Agapay v. Palang
Married
Jul. 16, 1949
Miguel Palang-----------------Carlina/Cornelia Palang (R)
 Miguel left for Hawaii on Oct. 1949 for work; R Herminia
- CA reversed RTC’s decision; declared Rs the owners of the properties and ordering P Erlinda to vacate
Palang was then born May 12, 1950
 Returned to PH in 1964; stayed in Zambales with brother
instead of with wife and child
 Returned to PH for good in 1972; still refused to live with wife
and child
Married
Jul. 15, 1973
Miguel Palang---------------------------Erlinda Agapay (P)
 Miguel was 63yo, P Erlinda was 19yo
 2mo earlier, May 17, 1973, Miguel and P Agapay, evidenced
by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased an agricultural/rice
land
o TCT under their names
 House and lot were likewise purchased on Sept. 23, 1975
allegedly by P Agapay as sole vendee
o TCT under P Agapay’s name
- Miguel and R Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as
a form of compromise agreement to settle a case filed by
latter
 Agreed to donate conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of
land to R Herminia
- Dec. 6, 1977, Miguel and P Agapay had a son, Kristopher
- Feb. 15, 1981, Miguel died.
- Jul. 11, 1981, Rs Cornelia and Herminia filed an action
for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages v. P Agapay
 Rs sought to get the rice land and H&L allegedly bought by
Miguel during cohabitation with P Agapay
 P Agapay contended that the rice land was registered in
her’s and Miguel’s names; she also had already given ½ of
the property to Kristopher
o Added that H&L is her sole property, bought with
own money
Principles/Holding
- RTC dismissed the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties
pertained to the conjugal property of R Cornelia and Miguel Palang.
 Confirmed the ownership of P Erlinda to the H&L and the ½ portion of the rice land; other ½ of the rice land inherited by Kristopher
WoN the ownership of the riceland and the H&L, the first in favor of Miguel Palang and P Erlinda Agapay and
the second, in favor of P Erlinda Agapay alone was valid. – NO, hence CA’s decision was proper
- The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and P Erlinda.
 The provision of law applicable here is Art. 148 FC providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage.
 While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel
and R Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.
- Under Art. 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
 It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Art. 147 which states that efforts in the care
and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has
no salary or income or work or industry.
o If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
o In the case: Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-
sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland.
 Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around 20yo and Miguel
Palang was already 64yo and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
 As such, no basis of co-ownership with Miguel. Riceland must revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and R Cornelia.
o As to the H&L, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20k on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22yo. The testimony
of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.
 testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed that P Erlinda’s name alone be
placed as the vendee
 The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent
by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation
HELD: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|41
 Title Principles/Holding
Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo - R Elvira contended that even if she and P Eustaquio actually cohabited, P Eustaquio could not validly claim a part of
the subject real and personal properties because Art. 144 CC, which provides that the rules on co-ownership shall
Eustaquio Mallilin (P)---------------------Elvira Castillo (R) govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under
Cohabited

 Both are married but separated from respective a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to contract marriage.
 In the case: R Elvira alleged that their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact
spouses
being raised by P Eustaquio, i.e., whether they lived together as H&W, was irrelevant as no co-ownership could exist between them.
 Set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage - P Eustaquio opposed R Elvira’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Corporation  Contended that Art. 144 CC had been repealed by the FC which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited co-ownership even though
o P Eustaquio as President and Chairman; R a man and a woman living together are not capacitated to marry each other.
Elvira as VP and Treasurer - RTC granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
 Business flourished; acquired real and personal  CA ordered case remanded to RTC for trial of merits; upheld P Eustaquio’s position that Art. 144 CC had been repealed by Art. 148 FC.
properties
o Registered solely in R Elvira’s name Can the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law, considering the present status of
- 1992, irreconcilable differences, couple separated the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as
 P Eustaquio demanded from R Elvira his share in husband and wife.
the properties
o R Elvira refused; claimed to be the - Art. 144 does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 FC now provides for a limited
exclusive owner of all real and personal co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other.
 It was error for the RTC to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they
properties as they were acquired entirely
were alleged to have been living together, they could not have owned properties in common.
out of her own money and registered  The FC, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without
solely in her name. the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them
o denied that she and P Eustaquio lived as through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions
H&W because the fact was that they were which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
o There is thus co-ownership even though the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
still legally married to their respective
o In the case: there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein.
spouses.  Consequently, whether P and R cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are part of the alleged
- R Elvira filed a Motion for Summary Judgement co-ownership are genuine and material.
 contended that summary judgment was proper,  All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been acquired after FC.
 With respect to the property acquired before FC took effect if it is shown that it was really acquired under
because the issues raised in the pleadings were
the regime of CC, then it should be excluded.
sham and not genuine
- Other than the real properties, P Eustaquio also seeks partition of a substantial amount of personal properties
consisting of motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry.
 By dismissing P Eustaquio’s complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly denied P
Eustaquio his right to prove ownership over the claimed real and personal properties.
 The dismissal of P Eustaquio’s complaint is unjustified since both ends may be amply served by simply excluding from the action for
partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.

HELD: Decision of CA reversed, case remanded to RTC.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|42
 Title
Saguid v. CA
Jacinto Saguid (P)------------------------------Gina Rey (R) - It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly
Cohabit 1987
 P Gina was 17yo, separated de facto from husband married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter.
 P Jacinto was the patron of their fishing vessel “Saguid  Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 FC, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
Brothers”; R Gina worked as a fish dealer, eventually an
entertainer in Japan
 1996, they separated
- Jan 9, 1997, R Gina filed a complaint for Partition of
Personal Property with Receivership v. P Jacinto
 Alleged that with her entertainer salary of $1.5k/mo, she was
able to contribute P70k in the completion of their
unfinished house
 From earnings of fish dealer and entertainer, she was able to
acquire furniture and household effects (P111,375)
 R Gina prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these
properties, and the P70k for house construction be
reimbursed to her
 She testified funds from their joint account was used for
the construction materials, appliances, other personal
properties
- P Jacinto answered that expenses for the house
construction was solely from his income as captain of
the fishing vessel
 Averred that R Gina’s meager income as fish dealer rendered
her unable to contribute in the house construction
o Selling fish was also a mere pastime
 Also contended that R Gina did not work continuously in
Japan (only 6mo/yr)
 When their house was repaired, R Gina did not share in the
expenses as it was spent on the daily needs and business of
her parents
 The joint account from the bank was used to spend for the
purchase of the disputed personal properties
- RTC ruled in favor of R Gina; CA affirmed
Principles/Holding
WoN R Gina should be the sole owner of the said properties. – NO
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances
of the same married man.
 Under this regime, “. . . only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions . . .” Proof of actual
contribution is required.
 In the case: Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity FC,
Art. 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
o Before Art. 148 FC was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage.
o Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before FC took effect, Art. 148 governs.
- As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature
of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
 In the case: The controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties.
o R Gina alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70k for the completion of their house.
o However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are
receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials for ~P11k.
o On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly
from their joint account with the bank.
 While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient
proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein.
 Pursuant to Art. 148 FC, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share
shall be presumed to be equal.
 Here, since the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375, their share therein is equivalent to
1/2, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
o As to the house, the extent of R Gina’s co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her
proven contribution in the construction thereof.
HELD: CA decision affirmed with modification.
 R Gina is declared co-owner of P Jacinto in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent
of P55,687.50.
 P Jacinto is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public
auction to satisfy R Jacinto’s claim.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|43
 Title
Atienza v. De Castro
Cohabit 1983
Lupo Atienza (P)--------------------Yolanda De Castro (R) - It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because P Lupo was validly
 P Lupo was the President and GM of Enrico Shipping married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with R Yolanda.
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation; R Yolanda
was hired as accountant of the two corporations
 Despite P Lupo being a married man, they cohabited; two
children were born
 They eventually separated
- P Lupo filed a complaint v. R Yolanda for judicial
partition between them of a parcel of land with
improvements
 P Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired during
his union with R Yolanda, hence the property is co-owned
 P Lupo averred that the property was acquired by R
Yolanda using his exclusive funds
o Title was transferred by seller in R Yolanda’s name
without his knowledge and consent
o He did not raise an objection as at that time, their
affair was still thriving; it was only after their
separation and news that R Yolanda allowed a new
live-in partner in the property when he demanded
share as co-owner
- R Yolanda denied P Lupo’s allegations
 She allegedly acquired the same property for P2.6M using her
exclusive funds from her savings and earnings as a
businesswoman
- RTC rendered judgment for P Lupo, declaring the
property as owned in common by him and R Yolanda
 Ordered its partition between the two in equal shares
- CA reversed the RTC’s decision; decided that the
property is exclusively owned by R Yolanda
 CA ruled that under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family
Code vis-à-vis the evidence on record and attending
circumstances, Yolanda’s claim of sole ownership is
meritorious, as it has been substantiated by competent
evidence.
 To CA, P Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his
allegation that the subject property was purchased by
Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.
Principles/Holding
WoN the subject property is co-owned by P & R. – NO, it was exclusively owned by R Yolanda
 Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Art. 148 FC, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple
alliances of the same married man.
 Under this regime, …only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual
contribution is required.
 The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other,
but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property
or industry.
o Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
 In the case: Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, Art. 148 thereof applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Art. 144 CC.
o Before Art. 148 FC was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery
or concubinage.
o Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the FC took effect, Art. 148 governs.
- The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts an affirmative issue.
 In the case: It is P Lupo’s posture that R Yolanda, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely
manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.
o Unfortunately for P Lupo, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts duly
written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption and the Deed of Transfer, all entered
into by and between the R Yolanda and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the P Lupo.
 P Lupo’s claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged
contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds
to the benefit of the respondent.
o In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case,
P Lupo failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
- In contrast to petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, herein R Yolanda was able to present preponderant
evidence of her sole ownership.
 There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, R Yolanda sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase
the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money
lending and jewelry retail.
 She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank
account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the
subject property. PETITION DENIED; CA decision AFFIRMED
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|44
 Title
Borromeo v. Descalar
Cohabit 1983
Wilhelm Jambrich-----------------Antonietta Descallar (R)
 R Antonietta was a separated mother of two boys
 They decided to live together and transferred to their own
house and lots (subject properties)
o In the Contracts to Sell covering the properties,
Jambrich and R Antonietta were referred to as the
buyer; Deed of Absolute Sale was later issued
o However, registration was refused in the Register of
Deed as Jambrich as an alien (Austrian) could not
acquire alienable lands of the public domain
 Jambrich’s name was erased from the
document
 TCTs over the properties were issued in
Antonietta’s name alone
- Their relationship only lasted until Apr. 1991
 R Antonietta found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began
to live with another woman
 Jambrich supported R Antonietta’s sons for only 2 months
after the break up
- Jambrich met P Camilo Borromeo in 1986
 P Borromeo was engaged in real estate business; also built
and repaired speedboats as a hobby
 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from P Camilo
o Jambrich became indebted for P150k
o To pay for his debt, Jambrich sold his rights and
interests in the subject properties to P
Borromeo for P250k as evidenced by Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment
 When P Borromeo sought to register the deed of
assignment, he discovered that the titles to the three lots
have been transferred to R Antonietta
o Subject property has also been mortgaged
- RTC filed a complaint v. R Antonietta for recovery of
real property
 Alleged that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the
properties using his exclusive funds; that he acquired
absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his favor
Principles/Holding
- At the trial, R Antonietta presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property
with money from a supposed copra business.
 P Borromeo, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich
received while still employed by his company
 Shown that before meeting Jambrich, R Antonietta was working only as a waitress and living in the squatter’s area; Jambrich took pity
on her and her children and offered her a better life. She was in financial distress.
o It is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties or could contribute any amount for their
acquisition which according to her is worth more than P700k when while she was working as a waitress
- RTC ruled in favor of P Borromeo and against R Antonietta
 CA reversed, saying that the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.
- The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses the
financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute.
 At the time of acquisition, Jambrich was gainfully employed. On the other hand, R Antonietta was working as a waitress, later on
during the acquisition, was unemployed
o Her allegations of a copra business was unsubstantiated.
 Further, the additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and
to construct the house thereon
o Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject properties to P
Borromeo by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed
- In the case: R Antonietta was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together.
 In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his
or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-
ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
- As to the registration, it is not a mode of acquiring ownership
 Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner.
 A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.
o However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not
acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration (in the present case)
- *** The transfer of land to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not
Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen.
 If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
HELD: CA decision reversed; RTC decision reinstated. P Borromeo validly obtained the land.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|45
 Title
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna (1 exam case) st
Married
Eugenia Luna (R)---------------------Atty. Juan Luces Luna - Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
Sept. 10, 1947
 They later agreed to live apart and agreed to separation of
property
o Entered into a written agreement “Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement”
 Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic
Married
Soledad Lavadia (P)------------------Atty. Juan Luces Luna
Jan. 12, 1976
- Atty. Luna organized a new law firm named LUPSICON
 LUPSICON purchased a condominium unit as law office
 LUPSICON was later dissolved; Atty. Luna had 25/100 share
over it
 After Atty. Luna’s death, his share in the condominium unit
including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment
(subject properties) were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna,
ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
o He then leased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit to Atty. De la Cruz who
established his own law firm
- P Soledad filed a complaint with the RTC
 alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the governed by the rules on co-ownership
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts
 since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of
the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the
extent of 3/4 pro indiviso share consisting of her 1/2
share in the said properties plus her 1/2 share in the net
estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the
latter’s last will and testament
 the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded
SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties.
 complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of
the 3/4 portion of the subject properties
- RTC ruled in favor of the R Heirs; CA affirmed
Principles/Holding
WoN P Soledad is entitled to a share in the property. – NO, failed to establish actual contribution
- The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval
 P Soledad insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia
had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. – Such insistence was unwarranted
o Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations.
 The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under
Art. 190 and Art. 191 CC
o The approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic is not sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia
 The approval took place only as an incident of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia
 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law.
 Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of
their marriage
- Atty. Luna’s marriage with P Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during their marriage were
 In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.
 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property.
 Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
o In the case: The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit
 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty.
Luna had even sent her a “thank you” note
 That she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and
 That Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his
law practice.
o P Soledad failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property.
 She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the
acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit.
HELD: Court upheld CA’s decision. No co-ownership was established.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|46
Art. 149 - 151 – The family is an institution
Title Principles/Holding
Romero v. Singson WoN the case should be dismissed by reason that the parties to the case are siblings and no attempt at
 Ps Consolacion and Rosario and R Engracia Singson are compromise was made by R Engracia prior to the filing of the case, then it should be dismissed for failure to
siblings comply with Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Art. 151 FC and Art. 222
- Their parents, Macario and Felicidad Domingo, owned a CC. – NO, such contention was waived
parcel of land
- Ps Consolacion and Rosario, and other siblings Rafael - The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be resolved in R Engracia’s favor.
and Ramon, are the actual occupants of the property  True, no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
 R Engracia, meanwhile, lived in Mandaluyong after getting earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made.
married o However, the failure of a party to comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect.
- Macario (Feb. 22, 1981), Felicidad (Sept. 14, 1997) died o If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.
 New TCT was issued under R Engracia’s name, by virtue of
a notarized Deed of Sale on June 7, 2006 - Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the property in said
o Said to be executed by Macario and Felicidad as
person’s name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property.
sellers, and R Engracia as buyer
 A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested.
o This despite the fact that both already died
 The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.
- R Engracia sent letters to siblings; vacate the property  Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility. A
 Ps and other siblings filed a Complaint v. R Engracia for  Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title
Annulment and Cancellation of the TCT and the deed of binding upon the whole world.
sale, reconveyance, and damages
o Claimed that the deed of sale is a forgery
o That heirs of the Sps. are entitled to a reconveyance - Since R Engracia acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the name of the original
of the same registered owners, Macario and Felicidad.
- R Engracia filed an unlawful detainer suit v. Ps and her  Being heirs of the owners, Ps and R Engracia thus became, and remain co-owners — by succession — of the subject property.
 As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including possession — whether de facto or de jure; R
brothers before MeTC
Engracia thus has no right to exclude them from this right through an action for ejectment.
 Sought to evict her siblings from the subject property,
claiming she is the owner of the same, and payment of
monthly rent; P prayed for dismissal HELD: Petition granted. CA decision reversed. RTC decision reinstated.
- MeTC ruled in favor of R Engracia as the owner; RTC
affirmed
 In MfR, RTC reversed itself
o The complaint should be dismissed outright for
failure to comply with a condition precedent under
Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the parties being siblings and there being no
allegations in the complaint as regards efforts at
compromise having been exerted, a matter that
was raised by Ps
- CA reversed RTC’s decision; reinstated MeTC decision

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|47

 Title Principles/Holding
O’laco v. Cocho - P O’laco contend that the present action should have been dismissed
 argued that the complaint fails to allege that earnest efforts toward a compromise were exerted considering that the suit is
between members of the same family, and no trust relation exists between them.
Emilia O’laco (P)------------------- Philippine Sugar Estate
Bought land from
 Even assuming ex argumenti that there is such a relation, petitioners further argue, R Sps. Cho Chit are already barred by laches.
 TCT under P O’laco’s name
- R Sps. Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia learned that WoN the case should be dismissed for failure of the complaint to allege earnest efforts for compromise were
P O’laco sold the land to Roman Catholic Archbishop of extended considering the suit is between family members. – NO
Manila for P230k
 R Sps. Cho Chit sued P Sps. O’laco and Hugo Luna to recover
the purchase price of the land
- The present action is between members of the same family since P Emilia O'Laco and R O Lay Kia are half-sisters.
o Asserted that P O’laco knew that they were the real  Consequently, there should be an averment in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, pursuant
vendees of the land sold by Philippine Sugar Estate, to Art. 222 of the NCC, or a motion to dismiss could have been filed under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court.
and that the legal title thereto was merely placed  It is well-settled that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit
in P O’laco’s name. between members of the same family.
o The subsequent sale breached their trust o Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of cause of
action.
 P Sps. O’laco denied the existence of any form of
 But, plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint to correct the defect if the amendment does not actually confer jurisdiction
trust relation on the court in which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of action was originally within that court's jurisdiction.
o Averred that P O'Laco actually bought the property o In such case, the amendment is only to cure the perceived defect in the complaint, thus may be allowed.
with her own money; that she left the Deed of  In the case: While R Sps. Cho Chit did not formally amend their complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to introduce evidence
Absolute Sale and the corresponding title with R purporting to show that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made.
Sps. Cho Chit merely for safekeeping; that when she o That is, R O Lay Kia importuned P O'Laco and pressed her for the transfer of the title of the land in the name of Sps. Cho
asked for the return of the documents evidencing Chit, just before Emilia's marriage to Hugo Luna.
her ownership, R Sps. Cho Chit told her that these  But, instead of transferring the title as requested, P Emilia sold the property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
were lost; and, that in view of the loss, she filed a Manila.
petition for issuance of a new title, and the then CFI  This testimony was not objected to by P Sps. O’laco.
of Manila granted her petition.  Hence, the complaint was deemed accordingly amended to conform to the evidence, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10
- RTC found no trust relation between the parties; of the Rules of Court.
dismissed the complaint with the counterclaim
- CA set aside the decision of the RTC, hence the petition - If the defendant permits evidence to be introduced without objection and which supplies the necessary
allegations of a defective complaint, then the evidence is deemed to have the effect of curing the defects of the
complaint.
 The insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is deemed ipso facto rectified.

HELD: Petition denied. CA decision which reversed RTC’s decision affirmed.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|48

 Title Principles/Holding
Guerrero v. RTC of Ilocos Norte (a) Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217, par.
P Gaudencio Guerrero filed a case as an accion publiciana against R (4), and Art. 222 CC, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts
Pedro Hernando towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained – NO, brothers by affinity
 R Judge Bello dismissed the case on the ground that the are not members of the family contemplated in the provisions; earnest efforts towards a compromise not
parties being brothers-in-law, the complaint should have
required
alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a
compromise.
 Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the - Art. 151 starts with the negative word “No,”
parties exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise  This means that the requirement is mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest
and that the same failed. efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that, “if it is shown that no such efforts were in
However, R Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect fact made, the case must be dismissed.”
since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the
complaint on this ground in his answer. - In the case: However, the provisions are not applicable to the present case.
 In Gay on v. Gayon, it was ruled that the enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same family does not
- It was only at the pre-trial conference, that the comprehend “sisters-in-law.”
relationship of P Guerrero and R Hernando was noted o In that case, it was emphasized that “sisters-in-law” (hence, also “brothers-in-law”) are not listed under Art. 217 of the
by R Judge Bello, they being married to half-sisters New Civil Code as members of the same family.
o Since Art. 150 FC repeats essentially the same enumeration of “members of the family,” we find no reason to alter existing
hence are brothers-in-law
jurisprudence on the matter.
 On the basis thereof R Judge gave an Order to P Guerrero
that he has 5 days “to file his motion and amended Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that P Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of R Hernando, was
complaint” to allege that the parties were very close required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the
complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest (b) Whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were
efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed.
exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. - NO
 Apparently, R Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional
defect.
- P Guerrero moved to reconsider the Order - We need only reiterate our ruling in O’Laco v. Co Cho Chit, citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, that the attempt to
 claimed that since brothers by affinity are not members of compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members
the same family, he was not required to exert efforts of the same family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the
towards a compromise.
proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
 P Guerrero likewise argued that R Hernando was precluded
 It is not therefore correct, as P Guerrero contends, that R Hernando may be deemed to have waived the aforesaid defect in failing
from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to
to move to dismiss or raise the same in the Answer.
dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in
 Court also cannot sustain the proposition of R Hernando that the case was, after all, also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the
his answer.
Rules of Court” for failure of petitioner to comply with the court’s order to amend his complaint.
 R Judge denied the motion; held that “failure to allege that
o A review of the assailed orders does not show any such directive which P Guerrero supposedly defied.
earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional
o The Order merely gave P Guerrero 5 days to file his motion and amended complaint with a reminder that the complaint failed
such that for failure to allege same the court would be
to allege that earnest efforts were exerted towards a compromise.
deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
 The Order dismissing the case without prejudice only made reference to an earlier order “admonishing” counsel for
case.”
Guerrero to amend the complaint, and an “admonition” is not synonymous with “order.”
o He warned that unless the complaint was amended
within 5 days, the case would be dismissed; period
expired, hence case was dismissed HELD: Petition granted. Appealed orders are set aside.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|49
 Title Principles/Holding
Hiyas Savings Bank v. Acuña, et al. WoN the lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between
- Alberto Moreno (R) filed a complaint v. Hiyas Savings husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit. – YES, lack of
Bank (P), his wife Remedios, and Sps. Owe for earnest efforts for compromise not a ground for dismissal
Cancellation of Mortgage
 Contends he did not secure any loan from P Hiyas, nor did he - In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the subject property.
sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor;  The Court held there that it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just
 That his wife, acting in conspiracy with P Hiyas and the Sps. happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to
Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves
it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he o Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a
could not have executed the said contract because he was condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper.
then working abroad.  Art. 151 FC applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members.
- P Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss
 On the ground that R Alberto failed to comply with Art. HELD: Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
151 FC wherein it is provided that no suit between members
of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
 P Hiyas contends that since the complaint does not contain
any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made prior to its institution, then
the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
- R Alberto argued in his comment
 He argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a
member of the same family as contemplated under Art. 150
FC, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts
toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before
filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss.
 Alberto asserts that since three of the party-defendants are
not members of his family the ground relied upon by Hiyas
in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable.
- RTC ruled in favor of R Alberto
 Court agrees that earnest efforts towards a compromise is
not required before the filing of the case considering that it
involves parties who are strangers to the family.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|50

Art. 152 - 162 – The family home
Title
Patricio v. Dario III
Perla Patricio (P)--------------------
married
Marcelino Dario (RIP)
Marcelino Marc Dario (R) Marcelino Dario III
Marcelino Dario IV
- Marcelino died intestate; among the properties he left
was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-
school building
- Aug. 10, 1987, P Perla, Marcelino Marc and R Marcelino
extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino
 P Perla and Marcelino Marc advised R Marcelino to partition
the subject property and terminate co-ownership
o R Marcelino refused to partition the property
- P Perla and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition before RTC
 RTC ordered the partition in the following manner: P Perla -
4/6, Marcelino Marc – 1/6, R Marcelino – 1/6
 RTC also ordered sale of the property by public auction where
all parties concerned may put up bids
- R Marcelino filed a motion for reconsideration; denied
- CA also denied, but upon motion for reconsideration, CA
partially reconsidered
 CA dismissed the complaint for partition by P Perla and
Marcelino Marc
 Held that the family home should continue despite the death
of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary
thereof.
o The heirs could not partition the property unless
the court found compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. The appellate court also held that the
minor son of private respondent was a minor
beneficiary of the family home.
Principles/Holding
Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition
on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
- R Marcelino claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by Sps. Marcelino and Perla
cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson
of the decedent.
 He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of
age.
o R Marcelino insists that even after the expiration of 10yrs from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even
after July 1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises.
- The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its
beneficiaries” must be actual.
 Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
“beneficiaries” enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted
jointly by the husband and wife.
 But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
- To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur:
(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home; and
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
- Article 159 FC expressed that:
 If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years,
there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
- In the case: Marcelino IV satisfied the 1st requisite. He has also been living in the family home since 1994, or within
10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the 2nd requisite. However, as to the 3rd requisite, Marcelino
IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him.
 The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default
is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
 As such, he cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Art. 154 because he did not fulfill the 3rd requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
HELD: Petition granted.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|51
 Title Principles/Holding
Mondequillo v. Breva Whether or not a final judgment of CA in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a
- Jan. 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by CA in the case family home constituted under the Family Code. – YES
“Salinas et al. v. Modequillo et al.” finding Modequillo et
al. liable to Salinas et al. (vehicular accident) - P Jose asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was duly
 The said judgment having become final and executory, a constituted as a family home under the FC.
writ of execution was issued by the RTC-Davao City to  Thus, P Jose argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Art. 155 FC
satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the o The decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on Mar. 16, 1976 and which
defendants Modequillo et al. became final in 1988 is also not one of those under Art. 155 FC when the family home may be levied upon and sold on
 Sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and a parcel execution.
of agricultural land, both in the name of P Jose
- A motion to quash and/or set aside levy was filed by - Under FC, a family home is deemed constituted on a H&L from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
P Jose  There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the CC.
 Alleged that the residential land is where the family home  If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
is built since 1969 and prior to commencement of the case  Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of
 Said that such is exempt from execution, forced sale, or the family who owns the home.
attachment under Art. 152 and 153 FC except for
liabilities mentioned in Art. 155 thereof - In the case: The residential house and lot of P Jose was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
o Said that judgment debt sought to be enforced
extrajudicially under CC.
against the family home of defendant is not one of
 It became a family home by operation of law only under Art. 153 FC.
those enumerated under Art. 155 FC
 It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of FC on Aug. 3, 1988
- RTC denied the motion and subsequent motion for  As such, the contention of P Jose that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family
reconsideration in 1969 is not well-taken.
o Under Art. 162 FC, it is provided that “the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable.”
 It does not mean that Arts. 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of FC and
are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the FC.
 Art. 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of FC, are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.
 Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

- Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? NO
 The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on Mar. 16, 1976 and the
money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on Jan. 29, 1988.
 Both preceded the effectivity of FC on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in
FC.

HELD: Petition dismissed.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|52

 Title Principles/Holding
Taneo, Jr. v. CA Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale pursuant to the writ of execution issued by
- As a result of a case for recovery of property in favor of the trial court in the case is prohibited under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 – It was proper
R Abdon Gilig, 2 properties of Ps Pablito Taneo, Jr., Jose Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution. - NO
Taneo, Nena Catubig and H, Cilia Moring and H, were
levied to satisfy judgment amount of P5k - The Court agree with R Gilig that the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale was not violative of the law.
 1st, a parcel of land, and 2nd, a family home  The judgment obligation of the petitioners against R Gilig arose on June 24, 1964.
 The 2 properties were sold at a public auction to R Gilig as  The properties were levied and sold at public auction with R Gilig as the highest bidder on February 12, 1966.
highest bidder  On Feb. 9, 1968, the final deed of conveyance ceding the property to R Gilig was issued after the Ps failed to redeem the property
 After failure to redeem, final deed of conveyance was  Pablo Taneo’s application for free patent was approved only on October 19, 1973.
executed
- Ps filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance - The sequence of the events leads the Court to the conclusion that even before the application for homestead had
void been approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the land.
 Alleged that they were children and heirs of Pablo and  The deed of conveyance issued on February 9, 1968 finally transferred the property to R Gilig.
Narcisa (RIP); left the subject property upon death o As of that date, Pablo Taneo did not actually have anymore rights over the land which he could have transferred to Ps.
 Considering that said property has been acquired through o The Ps are not the owners of the land and cannot claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141.
free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not
subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, - Ps aver that the house which their father constituted as family home is exempt from execution.
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141.  In a last-ditch effort to save their property, petitioners invoke the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code.
 Ps further alleged that they were in continuous, open and
peaceful possession of the land - A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family.
 Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor R Gilig  It is said, however, that the family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted
over the subject property including their family home over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which was extrajudicially constituted in accordance with which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
law.
o As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance,
R Gilig was able to obtain in his name a tax How to constitute family home:
Declaration over the land, thus casting a cloud of Civil Code Family Code
doubt over the title and ownership of Ps over said Judicially - filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
property. court it is occupied in the family residence
- R Gilig refuted the contentions, alleging that he lawfully Extrajudicially - recording of a public instrument in the proper
registry of property declaring the establishment of the family home
acquired the subject properties described
 sale has become final as no redemption was made within one
year from the registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale - Ps seek refuge to avert execution of the family home arguing that as early as 1964, Pablo Taneo had already
 since petitioners are still in possession of the subject property, constituted the house in question as their family home.
he has been deprived of acts of ownership and possession  While Art. 153 FC provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
and therefore, prayed for payment of rentals from Feb. 1968 residence, it does not mean it has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted
until possession has been restored to them. as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the
- RTC dismissed the complaint, declaring R Gilig as the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of FC
 The applicable law, then, in the case at bar is still CC where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite.
absolute and legal owner of the land; CA affirmed
HELD: Petition denied.

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 Title
Cabang v. Basay
- Felix Odong (RIP) - owner of Lot 7777 (Mar. 9, 1966)
 However, Felix and heirs never occupied/took possession
of lot
- June 16, 1987, Rs Basay bought said real property
from the Odong heirs; TCT was issued
 Rs Basay also did not occupy the property
- Ps Cabang, on the other hand, had been in continuous,
open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same
parcel of land since 1956 up to the present.
 They were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings of Lot
7778
 It was later discovered that Ps Cabang were actually
occupying Lot 7777
- Rs Basay filed a complaint for Recovery of Property v.
Ps Cabang
- RTC ruled in favor of Ps Cabang
 Held that rights of Rs Basay to recover the land have been
barred by laches
- CA reversed RTC’s decision
- Rs filed a petition to SC
 SC denied Ps Cabang petition for late filing
 SC resolution then became final and executory
- Case remanded to court a quo to determine value of
the improvements by Municipal Assessor
 Report showed that there were 3 residential buildings on the
property in litigation
Principles/Holding
WoN the property is a duly constituted family home which is not subject to execution. - NO
- Ps Cabang insist that the property subject of the controversy is a duly constituted family home which is not
subject to execution, thus, they argue that the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court.
- As aptly pointed out by the appellate court, from the inception of the case, it was already of judicial notice that
the improvements introduced by petitioners on the litigated property are residential houses not family homes.
 Belatedly interposing such an extraneous issue at such a late stage of the proceeding is tantamount to interfering with and varying the
terms of the final and executory judgment and a violation of Rs Basay’s right to due process.
 The refusal, therefore, of the trial court to enforce the execution on the ground that the improvements introduced on the litigated
property are family homes goes beyond the pale of what it had been expressly tasked to do, i.e. its ministerial duty of executing the
judgment in accordance with its essential particulars.
 Even squarely addressing the issue of whether or not the improvements introduced by petitioners on the subject land are family homes
will not extricate them from their predicament.
- The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300k in urban
areas and P200k in rural areas.
 A family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
o There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
- There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it was duly
constituted as such.
 It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property owned by the persons constituting it.
 The family home must be established on the properties of: (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the
exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with
third persons…
o Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of Ps Cabang. For all their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact
is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by Rs Basay and the question of ownership
had been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate court’s judgment in the case.
o Thus, petitioners’ continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.
HELD: CA decision declaring Rs Basay entitled to the writ of execution and ordering Ps Cabang to cavate the subject
property is affirmed.
Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|54
 Title Principles/Holding
Eulogio v. Bell - CA granted Rs petition
 Rs Bell siblings are the children of R Sps. Bell  Ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution sale of the subject family home after finding
that its present value exceeded the statutory limit.
- 1995, Rs Bell siblings lodged a Complaint for
The basis for the valuation of a family home under Art. 160, according to the appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court’s order was contrary to law.
title and damages v. Ps Enrico and Natividad Eulogio
 Complaint sought the annulment of contract of sale
Whether a hearing to determine the value of respondents’ family home for purposes of execution under Art.
executed by R Sps. Bell over their residential H&L and the
cancellation of the title obtained by Ps Eulogio
160 FC is barred under the principle of res judicata.
- RTC granted Rs’ Bell prayers, but declared R Sps. Bell
liable to Ps Eulogio for P1M + 12% interest/annum - Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents’ family home is barred by res judicata.
 Said that the sale of the subject H&L is only an equitable  In the case: Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same property. Moreover, the same contentions
mortgage and evidence advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over respondents’ family home have already been used to support
o However, mortgage cannot bind the property in their arguments in the main proceedings.
question for being violative of Chapter 2, Title 4
of FC, its encumbrance not having been Whether respondents’ family home may be sold on execution under Art. 160 FC. - NO
consented to in writing by a majority of the
beneficiaries who are the plaintiffs herein
- *** Rs Bell allege that the family home which has been constituted on the H&L in question is exempt from
- Both Ps and Rs appealed to CA, but it affirmed RTC’s
alienation and that its value does not exceed P300k.
decision in toto  R Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey house was built in 1947 and was made of wood and hollow blocks. He inherited it in 1976 from
- Rs Bell later brought the case to SC to question their his parents and has been living there with his family. In 1976, when an extra-judicial settlement was made of the estate of his parents,
P1M liability + interest; dismissed the fair market value of the house was P70k.
- June 9, 2004, RTC issued a Writ of Execution  City Assessor Pargas also testified that during the prior years the assessed values were lower (fair market value of P76k and the
 Rs’ Bell property was levied on execution residential house located thereon of P50k, for a total value of P126k)
 Upon motion by Rs Bell, RTC ordered the lifting of the writ o This shows that the limit of the value of P300k under Art. 157 FC has not been exceeded.
of execution on the ground that the property was a family  *** The Court therefore concludes that the said house is a family home under Chapter 2, Title 5 of the Family Code.
home o Its alienation by the said Sps. Bell without the written consent of the majority of the children/plaintiffs is null and void
for being contrary to law and public policy as enunciated in Art. 158 FC
- Ps filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of
the writ of execution
- Respondents’ family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
 Invoking Art. 160 FC, they posited that the current market
 Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code.
value of the property exceeded the statutory limit of
o Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article 153
P300k considering that it was located in a commercial area,
and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1M.
- RTC set the case for hearing to determine the present - *** From the drafters of the FC regarding improvements (re: deliberations on Art. 160):
 if the value of the family home exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements by the one establishing the
value of the family home of Rs
family home, the Article will apply;
 Also appointed a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on
 if it is through an involuntary improvement, like the conversion into a residential area or the establishment of roads and other
the prevailing market value of the H&L
facilities, the one establishing the family home should not be punished by making his home liable to creditors.
 Rs sought reconsideration of the directives; denied
 RTC directed the issuance of writ of execution after finding
- Justice Puno posed the question: What is “due to the subsequent improvement?” Is it the “excess” or is it the “increase,” or is it the “increase,”
that present value exceeded the limit
which constitutes the “excess?”

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|55

  In reply, Justice Reyes opined that it is the “increase” which constituted the “excess.”

- *** To
summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to P300k
in urban areas and P200k in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law.
 If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of
exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home.
 Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any
of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following
conditions obtain:
(a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and
(b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home
can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and
160.

- As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family home,
and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit.
 Moreover, Rs Bell have timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution.
 On the other hand, there is no question that the money judgment awarded to Ps Eulogio falls under the ambit of Article 160.

- *** To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish
these facts:
(4) there was an increase in its actual value;
(5) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its
owners or any of its beneficiaries; and
(6) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
- In the case: None of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by petitioners. The sole evidence presented
was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the
actual transaction was an equitable mortgage.
 Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the actual value of
the property in dispute.

- The Court thus agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution
of the property in dispute under Article 160.
 The trial court had already determined with finality that the property was a family home, and there was no proof that its value had
increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution sale of the property.

HELD: Decision of CA enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the sale of the family home of respondents, is
AFFIRMED.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|56

 Title Principles/Holding
De Mesa v. Acero, Jr. WoN the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under FC and, thus, could not
- Involves a parcel of land registered under P Araceli De have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution. – It was not
Mesa exempt; they were estopped
 P Sps. De Mesa jointly purchased the subject property on
Apr. 17, 1983 while cohabiting before marriage - The P Sps. De Mesa maintain that the subject property is a family home and, accordingly, the sale thereof on
 House later constructed on subject property, which they execution was a nullity.
occupied after they married in Jan. 1987
- *** In Ramos v. Pangilinan, this Court laid down the rules relative to exemption of family homes from execution:
- Sept. 1988, P Arcaeli obtained a loan from R Claudio  If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code, then it must have been constituted either judicially
Acero, Jr. for P100k or extra-judicially
 This was secured by a mortgage over the subject property o Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the
 P Aracaeli issued a check drawn against China Banking court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located.
Corporation payable to R Claudio o Extrajudicial constitution involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of
o Check was dishonored; account was closed Property.
o P Sps. De Mesa failed to heed demand for payment Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.
- R Claudio filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 v. P  For family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially,
Sps. De Mesa and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually
 RTC acquitted the P Sps. De Mesa but ordered them to pay resides therein.
P100k with interest o Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon
- Mar. 15 1993, Writ of Execution was issued and levied
the area where it is located.
upon the subject property o Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is
 Property sold in auction; R Claudio was highest bidder; made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.”
Certificate of Sale issued to him
- Feb. 1995, Claudio leased the property to P Sps. De - *** Summary of rules regarding constitution of family homes for purposes of exemption from execution:
Mesa and a certain Juanito for P5.5k monthly rent 1. First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family
 P Sps. De Mesa and Juanito defaulted in payment of rent home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
- Mar. 24, 1995, Final Deed of Sale over property was 2. Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family
issued to R Claudio; new TCT issued in his favor homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein;
- Due to the unpaid rentals, R Sps. Acero filed a
3. Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family
complaint for ejectment v. Ps and Juanito Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
 P Sps. De Mesa claimed R Sps. Acero have no accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
right over the subject property; denied they are
mere lessors - In the case: The subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing,
 Declared they are the lawful owners of property however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions
- MTC ruled in favor of Sps. Acero; RTC dismissed the of the Civil Code.
appeal; CA denied P Sps. De Mesa’s petition  Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and
was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family
home.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|57

- The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property
at public auction.
 Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, Court nevertheless rule
that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for nullification of the new TCT.
 Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter (before the sale at public auction).
o Failure to do so would estop the party from claiming the exemption

- The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor
himself before the sale of the property at public auction.
 In the case: Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof
at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same.
 Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.

HELD: Petition denied.

Persons 3rd Exam Digests by LAD Gador|58

 Title Principles/Holding
Salazar v. Felias - At the same time, the Heirs of Nivera filed a Motion for Execution and Demolition.
 Anchored on the fact that the Decision in the case for recovery of ownership, possession and damages had long attained finality
- Feb. 28, 1990, R Remedios Felias (representing Heirs of
 RTC granted the Motion for Execution and Demolition, denying the Motion to Desist
Nivera), filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, - Heirs of Lastimosa filed an appeal before CA, questioning the Writ of Execution and Demolition by RTC; dismissed
Possession and Damages against the Sps. Romualdo
Lastimosa and Felisa Lastimosa WoN CA erred in ordering the execution of the decision (declaring Heirs of Nivera as absolute heirs, ordering
 R Felias sought to recover 4 parcels of land
 During the trial, Romualdo died; Motion for Substitution
Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate). – NO, it was proper
was filed by decedent’s wife, Felisa, and their children (Heirs
of Lastimosa) - One of the claims raised by P Salazar was that the execution cannot continue as the Writ of Execution is being
- RTC declared Heirs of Nivera as the absolute owners enforced against property exempt from execution, being a family home
of the parcels of land  Art. 155 FC ordains that the family home shall be exempt from execution
 Ordered Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and surrender  Heirs of Nivera countered that P Salazar failed to present evidence to prove her claim.
possession thereof  On the contrary, P Salazar herself admitted in her pleadings that she does not reside in the subject property
- Meanwhile P Felicitas Salazar, daughter of Romualdo,  Moreover, the subject property belonged to the Heirs of Nivera in as early as the 1950s, thereby negating P Salazar’s claim that it is
her family home.
with two other Heirs of Lastimosa (Recto and Rizalina),
filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgement to CA
 Sought to nullify RTC’s decision and the corresponding Writs
- There is no dispute that this ruling of the RTC had become final and executory. Pursuant thereto, the lower court
of Execution and Demolition issued a Writ of Execution and Demolition.
 In her Petition for Annulment of Judgment, P Salazar  In the case: This notwithstanding, P Salazar seeks to prevent the execution of the same order, arguing that the writ was issued against
claimed that she was deprived of due process when she was the wrong party; and that the property sought to be executed is exempt from execution.
not impleaded in the case for Recovery of Ownership
- CA dismissed the Petition for Annulment of - The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the
Judgement dwelling place and the land on which it is situated.
 CA refused to give credence to the contention that the Heirs  It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
of Nivera are at fault for failing to implead P Salazar as a party  However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family home cannot forestall the
defendant in the action for recovery of ownership. execution of a final and executory ruling.
 Rather, the failure to include P Salazar in the proceedings was o It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such property is a family home.
due to the fault of the Heirs of Lastimosa, who neglected to o Whether the claim is premised under CC or FC, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
include her in their Motion to Substitute.
- Court affirmed CA’s decision in the Petition for - *** Rules relative to the levy on execution of the Family Home
Annulment of Judgment; Court’s ruling became final 1. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family.
2. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated.
- Meanwhile, the Heirs of Lastimosa filed with the RTC an
3. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties
Urgent Motion to Order the Sheriff to Desist from of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family.
Making Demolition 4. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300k in urban areas and P200k in
 premised on the fact that P Salazar had an aliquot share over rural areas.
the property, which had not yet been partitioned. 5. (addition) Residence in the family home must be actual.
- Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential tenets, it becomes all too apparent that P Salazar cannot conveniently
claim that the subject property is her family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation.
 It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed:

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 a. duly constituted as a family home
b. constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family
c. resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries)
d. forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either
spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and
e. has an actual value of Php 300k in urban areas, and Php 200k in rural areas.

- A perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare allegation, P Salazar adduced no proof to
substantiate her claim that the property sought to be executed is indeed her family home.
 Equally important, the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC in the case for recovery of ownership, that the subject
property has belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the l950s.
o This automatically negates P Salazar's claim that the property is her family home.

HELD: Petition denied for lack of merit. CA decision affirmed in toto.

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